NOT PREC E DENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________ No. 1 3

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____________ GUY WILLIAMS, Appellant

v. TRENTON POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY OF TRENTON; OFFICER KENNETH LUGO, in dividually and in his official capacity as a police officer for the City of Trenton ; JOHN DOES, 1

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On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D. C. No. 3

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- cv
- 06352) District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp

Submit ted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on June 6 , 2014
Before: HARDIMAN , S CIRICA and ROTH , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : January 23, 2015 )

O P I N I O N *

ROTH , Circuit Judge : * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5. 7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

Guy Williams appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to
d efendants City of Trenton, Trenton Police Department, and Detectives Kenneth Lugo
and Sheehan Miles and subsequent denial of a motion for reco nsideration

. For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. I. Background Williams filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , seeking damages for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment by Trenton police detectives, who arre sted and detained Williams on the anonymous tip of a Confidential Informan t (CI). On May 2,
2009 , Detective Miles received a tip from a CI that a suspect matching a certain description was walking with a gun at a specific location. After Miles relayed th is
information to Detective Lugo , as well as an update based on a second call from the CI , Lugo and Detective Franicevich spotted Williams entering a nearby restaurant and noted that he matched the description exactly. The detectives led Williams out of t he restaurant and frisked him, at which point he volunteered that a gun was in his pocket. After the
detectives found a .22 caliber pistol , Williams was charged with Unlawful Possession of Weapons (handgun) in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:39

- 5B and Ce rtain Persons Not To Have Weapons (Felon) in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39

- 7B. In his deposition for this case, Williams stated that on the night of the arrest, he immediately knew the identity of the CI and told the police that same night that th ey would never secure a conviction because the CI was not reliable enough to establish probable cause. At the time of his criminal trial , Williams filed a motion to suppress on this basis

. The trial judge held a suppression hearing on April 11, 2011, gra nting3

Williams’s motion. Lacking other evidence, the prosecutors dropped the charges shortly
thereafter. On October 28, 2011, Williams filed this action, raising various civil rights claims under Section 1983 and the New Jersey state constitution. Defen dant moved for summary judgment, arguing , inter alia , that the suit is time

- barred

. The District Court granted summary judgment to d efendants solely on statute of limitations grounds

. B ecause that issue was dispositive, the court did not reach d efendants ’ other arguments. Williams now appeals that ruling.
II. Discussion

“ Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are governed by the personal injury
statute of limitations of the state in which the cause of action accrued. ” O ’ Connor v. City of Newark , 440 F. 3d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 2006) . In New Jersey, Section 1983 actions must be brought “within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.” Id. at 12 6

- 2 7. The same is true of New Jersey state constitutional actions. Cf. Montells v. Haynes , 133 N.J. 282, 295 (1993) ; see also Hawkins v. Feder , A

- 4004

- 10T2, 2012 WL 5512460 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2012)

. The limitations period in a Section 1983 action “ begins to run from the time when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which i s the basis of the section
1983 action .” Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp. , 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991)

. In cases of wrongful arrest, where that arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, the statute

“ begins to run at the time the claimant becomes de tained pursuant to legal process .”
Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007)

. For Williams, this means that the statute on4

his wrongful arrest claim began to run on May 2, 2009, the night he was arrested and jailed. As he filed this action on October 28 , 2011, it is time

- barred.
Williams makes two related arguments on appeal. First, while acknowledging that the statute began to run on May 2, 2009, he argues that the statute was equitably tolled by the ongoing criminal proceedings. Relying on Gibson v. Superintendent of N

. J

. Dep artment of Law & Public Safety Div ision of State Police , 411 F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 2005) , Williams argues that under Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994), he could not have filed the action until the criminal proceedings were termina ted in his favor, and thus
the statute of limitations was equitably tolled. T his argument is foreclosed by Wallace , which held that the Heck rule does not apply to false arrest claims. 549 U.S. at 39 4

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. As we acknowledged in Dique v. New Jersey State Police , 603 F.3d 181, 18 8 (3d Cir. 2010) , Wallace supplanted our decision in Gibson , and it controls here. Williams’s second argument relies on Dique

. In Dique , we held that though
Wallace supplanted Gibson , the discovery rule can still postpone accrual. 603 F.3d at
188

. Accordingly, Williams argues that he could not have discovered the
unconstitutional nature of the search until the April 11, 2011 suppression hearing. Under the discovery rule, however, t he action accrue d when Williams “ discovered, or b y exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that he might have a basis for an
actionable claim .” Id. In Dique , we held that the plaintiff’s selective enforcement claim did not accrue until 11 years after his arrest because he was initially stopped for speeding, and it was not until his attorney discover ed documents outlining the selective enforcement practices that he could have known his stop was part of such a scheme.5

Williams , o n the other hand, knew of the potentia l for illegality of t he arrest the same night

. Williams stated that very night that he knew the identity of the CI, taunting the police officers that they would never get a conviction. T he discovery rule therefore does not apply to these facts, as there was nothing new to di scover. III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.