J-S52001-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER W. JACKSON,

Appellant No. 429 WDA 2011

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 19, 2011

In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-30-CR-0000135-2009

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and WECHT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2015

Appellant, Christopher W. Jackson, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on January 19, 2011, in the Greene County Court of 

Common Pleas. Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition seeking to withdraw 

his representation and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), 

which govern a withdrawal from representation on direct appeal. Appellant 

has filed a response to counsel’s petition to withdraw. After careful review, 

we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence.

On July 22, 2009, the trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea to one 

count of aggravated assaulted in connection with Appellant striking an 

employee at SCI Greene while Appellant was incarcerated at that institution 
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on separate charges. On that same day, July 22, 2009, the trial court 

imposed a sentence of two and one-half to ten years of imprisonment plus 

fines, costs, fees, and restitution. On January 19, 2011, the trial court 

entered an amended order, which was identical to the July 22, 2009 

sentencing order, but it eliminated the requirement that Appellant was to 

pay fines and restitution. This timely appeal followed. 

Before we address the question raised on appeal, we first must resolve 

appellate counsel’s request to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 

A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). There are procedural and briefing 

requirements imposed upon an attorney who seeks to withdraw on appeal. 

The procedural mandates are that counsel must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that 

he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise 

additional arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the 

court’s attention.

Id. at 1032 (citation omitted).

In this case, counsel has satisfied those directives. Within his petition 

to withdraw, counsel averred that he conducted an examination of the 

record. Following that review, counsel concluded that the present appeal is 

wholly frivolous. Counsel sent Appellant a copy of the Anders brief and 

petition to withdraw, as well as a letter, a copy of which is attached to the 
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petition to withdraw. In the letter, counsel advised Appellant that he could 

represent himself or that he could retain private counsel to represent him.

We now examine whether the brief satisfies the Supreme Court’s 

dictates in Santiago, which provide that

in the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s 

petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of 

the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) 

refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the 

appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for 

concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate 

the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes 

on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous.

Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1032 (quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361).

Counsel’s brief is compliant with Santiago. It sets forth the history of 

this case and outlines pertinent case authority. We thus conclude that the 

procedural and briefing requirements for withdrawal have been met.

The sole issue on appeal involves the trial court’s amendment of 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 9. In his pro se letter 

responding to counsel’s petition to withdraw, Appellant assails the legality of 

the amended sentencing order and alleges fraud. Letter, 7/31/15. 

However, as pointed out by counsel, Appellant fails to recognize that the 

amended sentencing order is in his favor and clarifies that Appellant is not 

required to comply with an errant entry in his initial judgment of sentence 

that directed the payment of costs, fines, fees, and restitution.
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Ordinarily, a court may not modify an order after the passage of thirty 

days. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (“Except as otherwise provided or prescribed 

by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order 

within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any 

term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.”). 

Notwithstanding section 5505, a court retains its inherent power to correct 

patent mistakes in its orders even after the passage of thirty days. 

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 64-65 (Pa. 2007) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Cole, 263 A.2d 339 (Pa. 1970)). 

Here, there was no indication in the record that any fines or restitution 

were to be imposed. Yet, the written sentencing order, entered following the 

trial court’s acceptance of Appellant’s guilty plea and imposition of a 

sentence of thirty to 120 months of incarceration, included the following 

language: “It is further ORDERED that all your costs, fines, fees, and 

restitution must be paid within fifteen (15) days of today’s date.” 

Sentencing Order, 7/22/09. Almost eighteen months later, the trial court, 

on its own motion, removed the fines, fees, and costs requirement from 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Amended Sentencing Order, 1/19/11. 

Thus, we agree with counsel’s summation that the trial court did not impose 

fines or restitution despite the language in the initial order, the trial court 

corrected this error in the January 19, 2011 order, the amended order favors 
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Appellant, and it clearly eliminates any fine or restitution. Anders Brief at 

15.

After review, we conclude that Appellant’s challenge to the amended 

sentencing order is wholly frivolous. The trial court had the authority to 

correct the mistaken imposition of fines and restitution, and the resulting 

amended order was in Appellant’s favor. Additionally, we have 

independently reviewed the record in order to determine whether there are 

any non-frivolous issues present in this case. Commonwealth v. Harden, 

103 A.3d 107, 111 (Pa. Super. 2014). Having concluded that there are no 

meritorious issues, we grant Appellant’s counsel permission to withdraw, and 

we affirm the judgment of sentence.1

Petition of counsel to withdraw is granted. Judgment of sentence 

affirmed. 

____________________________________________

1 Counsel surmises that Appellant’s actual grievance is with withdrawals 

from his prison account by the Department of Corrections. Petition to 

Withdraw/Letter to Appellant, 6/16/15, at 2. To the extent that there may 

be an issue with deductions from Appellant’s prison account, that is, as 

counsel notes, an administrative matter and one not properly challenged in 

an appeal from the judgment of sentence. We offer no opinion on 

deductions from Appellant’s account, and our decision today is entered 

without prejudice to Appellant’s ability to pursue an administrative remedy in 

a proper proceeding.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/16/2015