# Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis

Emergency Planning for

Extremely Hazardous Substances

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Federal Emergency Management Agency 

# U.S. Department of Transportation 

# December 1987

# Preface

This guide was developed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Transportation (DOT) .

In November 1985, as part of its National Strategy for Toxic Air Pollutants, EPA published the Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program(CEPP) Interim Guidance and invited public review and comment. The Interim Guidance contained information on how to organize planningcommittees, write a plan, and conduct a hazards analysis on a site-specific basis. In April 1986, EPA began collaborating with FEMA and other Federal agency members of the National Response Team (NRT) in the revision of FEMA’s widely-distributed Planning Guide and Checklist for Hazardous Materials Contingency Plans (popularly known as “FEMA-10”). In October 1986, during the time that a revised FEMA-10 was being prepared, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) was enacted. Title Ill of SARA is also known asthe Emergency Planning and Community Rightto-Know Act. Section 303 of SARA required theNRT to publish guidance to assist local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) with the development and implementation of comprehensive hazardous materials emergency response plans. The Federal agencies revising FEMA-10 prepared a document that included guidance for meeting the SARA Title Ill planning requirements. The NRT published this document as the Hazard

ous Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1) on March 17, 1987.

This current guide supplements NRT-1 by providing technical assistance to LEPCs to assess the lethal hazards related to potential airborne releases of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) as designated under Section 302 of Title Ill of SARA. Future revisions of this guidance (scheduled for publication in 1988) will consider flammables, corrosives, explosives, and other hazards. Anyone using this guide also needs to acquire and use NRT-1.

12/87 i There are many definitions of “hazards analysis. ” In an effort to develop and maintain consistency among Federal guidance documents, this guide adopts the approach to community level hazards analysis adopted by 14 Federal agencies in NRT-1. NRT-1 defines “hazardsanalysis” as a three step process: hazards identification, vulnerability analysis, and risk analysis, and provides general descriptions and specific procedures for each. This guide provides a technical discussion of, and specific proceduresfor, a method that can be employed in conducting a hazards analysis that will allow planners toconsider the potential risks in their local communities.
Although the use of this guide is not mandatory, it does have many advantages, some of which are the following:

� It enables local planners to conduct a hazards analysis, which is an essential step inthe planning process, and thereby assists local planners in meeting planning requirements of SARA Title Ill;

� It will facilitate community awareness of the potential risks of chemical releases while helping the community to plan for, respond to, and reduce those risks.

� It is consistent with NRT-1 mandated under SARA and approved by 14 Federal agencies:

� It is consistent with training programs (e.g.contingency planning) that are being conducted by the Emergency Management Institute in Emmitsburg, Maryland:

� It can be used by software developers who want their products to be consistent with the planning requirements of Title Ill of SARA: and

It will promote consistency among local emergency plans. Techniques presented in this guide and NRT-1 will also be helpful to LEPCs during the annual review and updating of their plans, as required by SARA Title Ill.

# Table of Contents

PAGE

PREFACE

............................................................ i

1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

...................................... 1-1

1 .1 Purpose of this Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
1.2 Emergency Planning: the National Response Team Planning Guide . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.3 Beginning to Plan

............................................ 1-3
1.4 Hazards Analysis

................................................. 1-3

A. Hazards identification . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

B. Vulnerability analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

C. Risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

1.5 Background

...................................................... 1l- 5

1.5.1 EPA’s Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program

................. 1-5

1.5.2 Other Public and Private Sector Programs

......................... 1l-5
1.5.3 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (Title Ill of SARA)

............................................. 1l-6
A. Identifying the Extremely Hazardous Substances that Trigger the Planning Process

........................................... 1- 6

B. Planning Structure and Process

.................................. 1-6

C. Other Title Ill Information for Planners

............................. 1-8

.............................................. 1.6 Contents of this Guide 1-8

2. HAZARDS ANALYSIS: AN OVERVIEW

.................................. 2-1

...... ........................................ 2.1 Hazards Identification 2-1

............................ 2.1

. 1 Identification of Hazardous Chemicals 2-2

2.1.2 Procedures for Hazards Identification

............................. 2-2

... 2.1.3 Summary of Useful Information Resulting from Hazards Identification 2-6

# Table of Contents (Continued)

PAGE

2.2 Vulnerability Analysis for Airborne Extremely Hazardous Substances



### . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.2.1 General Description of Estimation of Vulnerable Zones

.............. 2-7

2.2.2 Variables in Estimating Size of Vulnerable Zones

................... 2-9

A. Quantity and Rate of Release to Air

............................... 2-9 B. Meteorological Conditions

....................................... 2-9 C. Surrounding Topography

........................................ 2-13 D. Levels of Concern

............................................. 2-13

2.2.3 The Relationship of Estimated Vulnerable Zones to Actual Releases

. . . 2-13

2.2.4 Application of Estimated Vulnerable Zones to Hazards Analysis for Extremely Hazardous Substances

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17

2.2.5 Evacuation Considerations for Airborne Releases of Extremely Hazardous Substances

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18

2.3 Risk Analysis

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21

2.3.1 Overall Approach to Risk Analysis: Ranking of Hazards

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21

2.3.2 Types of Information Required for Risk Analysis

. . . . . . . . . . . 2-22

2.3.3 Limiting the Collection of Information

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25

2.3.4 Assembly of the Information Obtained from the Hazards Analysis

. . . . . 2-25

2.3.5 Relative Ranking of Risk

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-28

3. STEP-BY-STEP PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING A HAZARDS ANALYSIS OF EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.1 Initial Screening to Set Priorities Among Sites

. . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.1.1 Hazards Identification

.......................................... 3-1

3.1.2 Estimate Vulnerable Zones for Screening Purposes

................. 3-2

A. Gases

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

B. Liquids

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

C. Solids

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
Worked Examples for Initial Screening

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

3.1.3 Risk Analysis for Initial Screening of Reporting Facilities

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

# Table of Contents (Continued)

PAGE

3.2 Reevaluation: Planning for Facilities by Priority

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

3.2.1 Hazards Identification

.......................................... 3-7

3.2.2 Reevaluation of the Vulnerable Zones

............................ 3-7

A. Gases

........................................................ 3-8

B. Liquids

........................................................ 3-8

C. Solids

........................................................ 3-8

3.2.3 Risk Analysis

................................................. 3-10

4. USING THE RESULTS OF A HAZARDS ANALYSIS

........................ 4-l

4.1 What the Plan Must Contain

........................................ 4-l

4.2 Planning Information Provided by the Hazards Analysis

.................. 4-2

4.3 Case Studies from Hazards Analysis

................................. 4-3

4.4 Plan Reviews in the Context of Local Resource Needs

.................. 4-7

4.5 Use of Computerized Systems in Planning

........................ 4-8

APPENDICES

APPENDIX B: THE CRITERIA USED TO IDENTIFY EXTREMELY

APPENDIX G: EQUATIONS USED FOR THE ESTIMATION OF VULNERABLE APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

ACRONYMS
...............................,...................... A-1

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

. . . . ........... ......................... A-4

HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

APPENDIX C: THE LIST OF EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

. . . . . . . . . . C-1

APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON LEVELS OF CONCERN

. . . . . . . . . . D-1

APPENDIX E: SAMPLE PROFILE

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1

APPENDIX F: FIRE AND REACTIVITY HAZARDS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1

ZONES

....................................................... ........................ G-1

# List of Exhibits

PAGE

EXHIBITS

1-1 Overview of Planning Process

..................................... 1-2

1-2 Title Ill Information from Facilities Provided in Support of Plan Development

............................................ 1-7

1-3 Title Ill Planning Steps

............................................ 1-9

2-1 Types of Facilities Where Certain Extremely Hazardous Substances Might Be Found in Quantities Greater than Their TPQs

................. 2-5

2-2 Information from Hazards Identification

............................. 2-8

2-3 The Movement Downwind of a Plume of Airborne Extremely Hazardous Substances Following an Accidental Release

......................... 2-10

2-4 Vulnerability Zones for a Hypothetical Community Resulting from Airborne Releases of Chemicals A and B

.......................... 2-11

2-5 Vulnerable Zones along a Transportation Route When Airborne Releases of Chemicals A and B Occur

...................................... 2-12

2-6 The Effect of Different Assumptions on the Calculation of the Size of the Estimated Vulnerable Zone

.................................. 2-14

2-7 Vulnerable Zones for Five Facilities in a Hypothetical Community

........ 2-15

2-8 Plume Development and Movement During a Hypothetical Accidental Release

....................................................... 2-16

2-9 Factors Affecting Vulnerable Zone Estimations

....................... 2-19

2-10 Summaries of Some Accidents that Occurred in 1980-81

.............. 2-24

2-11 Steps in Hazards Analysis

........................................ 2-26

2-12 Example Hazards Analysis Matrix for a Hypothetical Community

......... 2-29

2-13 Example Qualitative Definitions of Probability of Occurrence

............ 2-31
Example Definitions of Severity of Consequences to People

............ 2-31

2-14 Risk Analysis Matrix

.............................................. 2-32

3-1 Vulnerable Zone Distances for Quantity of Release and Level of Concern. Rural, F Air Stability, Low Wind Speed. For Quantities of Release Up to 500 Pounds/Minute

.............................................. 3-11

# List of Exhibits

PAGE

3-2 Vulnerable Zone Distances for Quantities of Release and Level of Concern. Urban, F Air Stability, Low Wind Speed. For Quantities of Release Up to 500 Pounds/Minute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13

3-3 Vulnerable Zone Distances for Quantity of Release and Level of Concern. Rural, D Air Stability, 12 Miles Per Hour Wind Speed. For Quantities of Release Up to 500 Pound/Minute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15

3-4 Vulnerable Zone Distances for Quantity of Release and Level of Concern. Urban, D Air Stability, 12 Miles Per Hour Wind Speed. For Quantities of Release Up to 500 Pounds/Minute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17

4-1 Example Hazards Matrix for Planning Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

B-1 Criteria to Identify Extremely Hazardous Substances that May Present Severe Health Hazards to Humans Exposed During a Chemical Accident or Other Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

B-2 Criteria to Identify Other Hazardous Substances Produced in Large Quantities that May Present Severe Health Hazards to Humans Exposed During a Chemical Accident or Other Emergency . . . . . B-5

B-3 Other Extremely Hazardous Substances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-6

C-1 List of Extremely Hazardous Substances and Data for Hazards Analysis (Alphabetical Order) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2

C-2 List of Extremely Hazardous Substances and Data for Hazards Analysis (CAS # Order) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-11

D-1 Emergency Response Planning Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-7

D-2 (Alphabetical) Published Toxicity Guidelines for Extremely Hazardous Substances that could be used for the Level of Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-9

D-3 (CAS #) Published Toxicity Guidelines for Extremely Hazardous Substances that could be used for the Level of Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-18

G-1 Formulas Recommended by Briggs (1973)

.......................... G-6

J-1 Sample Event Tree Analysis

...................................... J-5

J-2 Example Fault Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J-7

# 1. Introduction and Overview

1.1 Purpose of This Guide

The purpose of this guide is to help local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) conductsite-specific hazards analyses for airborne releases of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) as required by Title Ill of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), also known as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) . Although these substances may also threatenproperty and the environment, this guide is primarily concerned with lethal effects of airborne substances on humans. An expanded version of this document which will also address hazards such as flammability, explosivity, corrosivity, and reactivity, is planned. The hazards analysis guidance in this present document will help to identify potential problems and serve as the foundation for planning and prevention efforts with emphasis on EHSs. (See Section 1.3 for a definition and brief description of “hazards analysis. ” See Section 1.5.3 for a description of “extremely hazardous substance. “) This document represents a joint effort by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Department of Transportation (DOT) to provide coordinated and coherent technical guidance. Although this guide can be useful to all community and industry planners, itis intended especially for LEPCs established under the provisions of SARA. The three steps ofhazards analysis--hazards identification, vulnerability analysis, and risk analysis--provide a decision-making process for the LEPCs to followas they undertake the development of comprehensive emergency plans mandated by SARA Title Ill. This chapter includes a description of: the relationship of this guide to general planning guidance, a general description of hazardsanalysis, the legislative and programmatic background for this technical guidance, and an overview of the remaining chapters.



# 1.2 Emergency Planning; the National Response Team Planning Guide

Title Ill of SARA requires each LEPC to prepare a Hazardous Materials Emergency comprehensive emergency plan by October 17, Planning Guide 1988. For general assistance in preparing a WH-562A comprehensive emergency plan, planners 401 M Street, S.W. should consult the Hazardous Materials Emer

- Washington, DC 20460 g encv Planning Guide (NRT-1) prepared by the LEPCs should obtain, read, and understand National Response Team (NRT). NRT-1 is a NRT-1 before using this technical guide.statutory requirement under SARA and was published on March 17, 1987. It is available free of Exhibit l-l illustrates the various activities that charge from: are part of the emergency planning process.



### 1-1

## Exhibit l-l 

# Overview of Planning Process*

12/87 1-2NRT-1 offers general guidance on how to accomplish all of these planning activities. Thispresent document offers specific technical guidante for conducting a hazards analysis for the airborne release of EHSs, as well as a general consideration of other hazardous substances. The shaded box in Exhibit l-l indicates where the material in this technical guide fits into the overall planning process described in NRT-1,



# 1.3 Beginning to Plan

Before actually developing a plan, the LEPCshould: review existing plans, review existing response capabilities, and conduct a hazards analysis.
Information from existing plans will prove helpful in the development of an emergency plan under Title Ill. Existing plans may have been prepared by individual facilities, by communities, by the State, or by the Regional Response Team (RRT) of the Federal government. The plans can bereevaluated and information in them can be tailored to present needs.
NRT-1 and Appendix I of this guide include lists of questions that LEPCs can use to identify what prevention and response capabilities are present at facilities, among transporters, and within local communities.
LEPCs should conduct a hazards analysis of allfacilities reporting that they have EHSs in quantities greater than the threshold planning quantity(TPQ). This hazards analysis should help planners identify what additional response capabilities are needed. This analysis serves as the basis for development or revision of the emergency response plans that are mandatory under Title Ill of SARA.



# 1.4 Hazards Analysis

Hazards Identification Chemical Identity

Location Quantity

Nature of the Hazard Vulnerability Analysis

Vulnerable Zone
Human Populations

Critical Facilities

Environment Risk Analysis
Likelihood of a Release Occurring

Severity of the Consequences

A hazards analysis’ is a necessary step in com- community. This guide follows the definition of prehensive emergency planning for a commu- “hazards analysis” used in NRT-1 and focuses nity. Comprehensive planning depends upon a principally on hazards analysis for airborne reclear understanding of what hazards exist and leases of EHSs. what risk they pose for various members of the

Hazards analysis as presented in this guidance is intended for use in emergency response planning for EHSs. Its purpose and the meaning of its terminology are different from the purpose and terms used in “risk assessment” as defined by NAS. Because local communities will be conducting hazards analyses (as described in this guide) and risk assessments under different sections of SARA, a discussion of risk assessment can be found in NAS Press, 1983, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process. Washington D.C. 191 pp.

12/87 1-3 1The hazards analysis described in this guide is a 3-step decision-making process to identify thepotential hazards facing a community with respect to accidental releases of EHSs. All three steps should be followed even though the level of detail will vary from site to site. The hazards analysis is designed to consider all potential acute health hazards within the planning district and to identify which hazards are of high priorityand should be addressed in the emergency response planning process. The Title Ill emergency response plan must address all EHSs that are reported to the State Emergency ResponseCommission (SERC), but other substances including EHSs below their TPQs may also be included. Depending upon the size and nature of a planning district, the hazards analysis may becomplex or relatively easy. LEPCs that have access to the necessary experts might want to conduct a detailed quantitative hazards analysis. Such a complete analysis of all hazards may not always be feasible or practical, however, givenresource and time constraints in individual planning districts.
General information and an approach to understanding the three components of hazardsanalysis as it is applied to the EHSs are discussed in Chapter 2. A brief overview is presented below.

A. Hazards identification typically provides specific information on situations that have the potential for causing injury to life or damage toproperty and the environment due to a hazardous materials spill or release. A hazards identification includes information about: Chemical identities:The location of facilities that use, produce, process, or store hazardous materials:The type and design of chemical container or vessel: The quantity of material that could be involved in an airborne release: andThe nature of the hazard (e.g., airborne toxic vapors or mists which are the primary focus of this guide; also other hazards such as fire, explosion, large quantities stored or processed,handling conditions) most likely to accompany hazardous materials spills or releases.
B. Vulnerability analysis identifies areas in thecommunity that may be affected or exposed, individuals in the community who may be subjectto injury or death from certain specific hazardous materials, and what facilities, property, or environment may be susceptible to damage should a hazardous materials release occur. Acomprehensive vulnerability analysis provides information on: The extent of the vulnerable zones (i.e., an estimation of the area that may be affected in a significant way as a result of a spill or release of a known quantity of a specific chemical under defined conditions) ; The population, in terms of numbers, density, and types of individuals (e.g.,facility employees: neighborhood residents: people in hospitals, schools,nursing homes, prisons, day care centers) that could be within a vulnerable

zone: The private and public property (e.g.,critical facilities, homes, schools, hospitals, businesses, offices) that maybe damaged, including essential support systems (e.g., water, food, power, communication, medical) and transportation facilities and corridors; and The environment that may be affected,and the impact of a release on sensitive natural areas and endangered species. Chapter 2 discusses vulnerability analysis with a special emphasis on human populations.

C. Risk analysis is an assessment by the community of the likelihood (probability) of an accidental release of a hazardous material and the actual consequences that might occur, based on the estimated vulnerable zones. The riskanalysis is a judgement of probability and severity of consequences based on the history of previous incidents, local experience, and the best

12187 1-4available current technological information. It provides an estimation of:The likelihood (probability) of an accidental release based on the history of current conditions and controls at the facility, consideration of any unusual environmental conditions (e.g., areasin flood plains), or the possibility of simultaneous emergency incidents (e.g., flooding or fire hazards resulting in the release of hazardous materials);Severity of consequences of human injury that may occur (acute, delayed, and/or chronic health effects), the number of possible injuries and deaths, and the associated high-risk groups:

This section briefly describes EPA’s original Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP), other recent public and private sector programs, and EPCRA.

1.5.1 EPA’s Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program For the past several years, EPA has pursued anactive voluntary program to enhance preparedness and response capabilities for incidents involving the airborne release of EHSs. In June1985, EPA announced a two-part National Strategy for Toxic Air Pollutants. The first part, established under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act,deals with routine releases of hazardous air pollutants. The second part was the developmentof the CEPP, designed to address, on a voluntary basis, accidental airborne releases of acutely toxic chemicals. Since its inception,CEPP has had two goals: to increase community awareness of chemical hazards and to enhance State and local emergency planning for dealing with chemical accidents. These goalsand initial activities influenced the legislative action that led to the enactment of Title Ill of SARA, where many CEPP objectives are addressed (see Section 1.5.3). Severity of consequences on critical facilities (e.g., hospitals, fire stations, police departments, communication centers); Severity of consequences of damage to property (temporary, repairable, permanent); and Severity of consequences of damageto the environment (recoverable, permanent) .To have an accurate view of the potential problems in a district, the LEPC would need to address all of the steps in hazards analysis outlinedabove. Each of the three steps should be followed even if extensive information is not available for each site. The process anticipates that local judgement will be necessary.

1.5.2 Other Public and Private Sector Programs Awareness of the 1984 Bhopal, India tragedy and less catastrophic incidents in the UnitedStates has led many State and local governments to improve their preparedness and response capabilities for chemical emergencies. They developed emergency plans for chemical accidents, enacted right-to-know legislation to provide citizens access to information about chemicals in their community, and organizedhazardous materials planning councils and response teams.
In the private sector, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) has developed and implemented the Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) program. TheCAER program encourages chemical plant managers to contact community leaders and assist them in preparing for possible incidents involving hazardous materials, including those involving airborne toxics. CAER industry participants canprovide information about chemicals and chemical processes that exist within the community(an important source for the "hazards identification” phase of a hazards analysis); professional 

# 1.5 Background

12/87 l-5expertise to help communities develop emergency plans; equipment and personnel to assist local officials during emergency notification and response operations: and specific assistance in training responders and exercising emergency plans.

1.5.3 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (Title Ill of SARA) On October 17, 1986, SARA became law. Title Ill of SARA contains numerous requirements for Federal, State, and local governments as well asprivate industry in the areas of emergency planning, community right-to-know, hazardousemissions reporting, and emergency notification. These requirements build upon the original CEPP (elements of which are now mandatory), numerous existing State and local programsaimed at community right-to-know and preparedness, and the CMA CAER program.

The objectives of Title Ill are to improve localchemical emergency response capabilities (primarily through improved emergency planningand notification) and to provide citizens and local governments access to information about chemicals in their localities.
Title Ill addresses planning by: (1) identifying the EHSs that trigger the planning process: (2) requiring facilities to identify themselves if they have quantities of EHSs exceeding the TPQs; (3) requiring the establishment of a State and localplanning structure and process (including specifics on committee membership); (4) requiring facilities to make information available to localplanners: and (5) specifying the minimum contents of local emergency plans. This guidance includes information about all of these topics. (See NRT-1 for an additional discussion of plan contents and guidance for planning). Exhibit 1-2 summarizes the types of information that will be available as a result of compliance with Title Ill,and indicates how local planners can use the information. Planners should not only be aware ofFederal, but also of State and local requirements that apply to emergency planning. A. Identifying the Extremely Hazardous Substances that Trigger the Planning Process. Title Ill required EPA to publish a list of EHSs and TPQs for each of those substances. EPA fulfilled this requirement in a rule published on April 22, 1987 (Federal Register, Vol. 52, No. 77, pp. 13378-13410). The list of EHSs included the402 chemicals found in the CEPP Interim Guidance List of Acutely Toxic Chemicals 2 and four additional chemicals added as a result of new information. Four chemicals have been removed from the list and 36 others are proposedfor delisting as they do not meet the acute lethality criteria. (See Appendix C for the list of EHSs and Appendix B for an explanation of the criteria used in identifying these chemicals.)

B. Planning Structure and Process. Sections 301-303 of Title Ill include the following required steps:
State Governors appointed SERCs by April 17, 1987. SERCs identified local emergency planning districts (LEPDs)by July 17, 1987 and appointed members of the LEPC by August 17, 1987. SERCs are to coordinate and supervise the work of the LEPCs, and review all emergency plans to ensure that all thelocal plans for any one State are coordinated. Facilities had to notify SERCs by May 17, 1987 if they have any listed EHS(s) that exceed the designated TPQ. The TPQ is a specific quantity assigned toeach of the EHSs. If a facility has present at any time an EHS in an amount greater than the TPQ, the facility must identify itself to the SERC. The SERC notifies the LEPC to include the facility, if appropriate, in its comprehensive emergency plan. SERCs can specify other facilities to be included in the emergency plan.

2 Title II1 of SARA replaces the term “acutely toxic chemical” with “extremely hazardous substance”.

12/87 1-6

## -Exhibit 1-2 

# TITLE III INFORMATION FROM FACILITIES PROVIDED IN SUPPORT OF PLAN DEVELOPMENT Information Generated by How LEPC Can Use Title Ill Compliance Title Ill Authority the Information

Facilities subject to Title Ill planning requirements (including those designated by the Governor or SERC)
Additional facilities near subject facilities (such as hospitals, natural gas facilities, etc.)
Transportation routes

Major chemical hazards (chemical name, properties, location, and quantity)

Facility and community response methods, procedures, and personnel
Facility and community emergency coordinators

Release detection and notification procedures

Methods for determining release occurence and population affected
Facility equipment and emergency facilities; persons responsible for such equipment and facilities
Evacuation plans
Training programs

Exercise methods and schedules Section 302; Notice from Governor/SERC
Sections 302 (b) (2) ; 303 (c) (1)

Sections 303(c) (1) ; 303(d) (3)

Section 303 (d) (3) for extremely hazardous substances used, produced, stored

Section 311 MSDSs for chemicals manufactured or imported

Section 312 inventories for chemicals manufactured or imported
Sections 303(c) (2); 303(d) (3)

Sections 303 (c) (3) ; 303 (d) (1)

Sections 303(c) (4) ; 303 (d) (3)

Sections 303 (c) (5) ; 303 (d) (3)

Sections 303 (c) (6) ; 303 (d) (3)

Sections 303(c) (7) ; 303(d) (3)
Sections 303 (c) (8) ; 303(d) (3)
Sections 303(c) (9); 303(d) (3) Hazards analysis -- Hazards identification
Hazards analysis -- Vulnerability analysis
Hazards analysis -- Hazards identification
Hazards analysis -- Hazards identification

Response functions (see pp. 49ff of NRT Planning Guide)
Assistance in preparing and implementing the plan (see p. 11 of NRT Planning Guide)
Initial notification; Warning systems (see pp. 50, 53 respectively of NRT Planning Guide)
Hazards analysis -- Vulnerability analysis and risk analysis
Resource management

Evacuation planning
Resource management
Testing and updatingiii. Facilities must provide the following information to the LEPC: the name of a facility representative (by September17, 1987) to serve as facility emergency coordinator and assist the LEPCin the planning process; information requested by the LEPC that is necessary for developing and implementing the emergency plan (see Section 303(d) (3) of Title Ill of SARA); and any changes at the facility that could affectemergency planning. (Facility compliance with this SARA requirement will make available much information thatshould prove helpful for hazards analysis and annual plan revisions.)
iv. LEPCs must prepare comprehensiveemergency plans for all facilities subject to the regulations by October 17, 1988.

V. Transporters of EHSs do not have tonotify SERCs under Section 302. Section 327 of Title Ill of SARA states that Title Ill does not apply to any substanceor chemical being transported, includThe components of a hazards analysis are discussed in more detail in the next chapter of thisguide. The discussion in Chapter 2 is as simplified and direct as possible, given the complexity of hazards analysis. Additional technical materialis in the appendices. Chapter 3 provides a detailed step-by-step procedure for hazards analysis of the EHSs at the local level. Guidance for incorporating results of a hazards analysis into the overall planning process is found in Chapter 4.
Several appendices have been included in this guide. Appendix A contains a list of abbreviations and acronyms and a glossary of technicalterms. (Users of this guide should regularly consult Appendix A for help in understanding theterms used). Appendix B describes EPA’s criteria for identifying EHSs. Appendix C contains the list of EHSs designated by Title Ill of SARA both alphabetically and by Chemical Abstract Service ing transportation by pipeline, except as provided in Section 304. Section 304 requires notification of releases ofEHSs and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation andLiability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) hazardous substances from facilities, pipelines, motor vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft. Barges and other vessels are exempted from Section 304 reporting.The Title III planning structure for receiving information and formulating plans is displayed in Exhibit 1-3.

C. Other Title III Information for Planners.

This guide does not include a detailed description of Sections 304, 311, 312, and 313 of Title Ill. Details of these sections may be found inAppendix A of NRT-1. What is important for users of this guide to know is that facilities complying with these sections of Title Ill will provide information to LEPCs that may prove useful forhazards analysis and emergency plan development and revision.

(CAS) number. This appendix also provides information on important physical properties of each substance and the levels of concern (LOC) which are required to estimate vulnerable zones.Appendix D provides information and calculations concerning exposure levels of EHSs and the basis for the LOC. Appendix E is a sample chemical profile of one of the EHSs (acrolein).Appendix F contains descriptions of fire and reactivity hazards. Appendix G contains more technical information for estimating and reevaluating vulnerable zones. As a warning to planners to avoid automatically establishingevacuation distances from the estimated vulnerable zones, Appendix H includes a discussion ofissues to be considered for evacuation. Appendix I supplements Chapters 3 and 4 with a procedure for gathering important information to evaluate sites for contingency planning. Appendix J details other methods for evaluating hazards and supplements Chapters 2 and 3. 

# 1.6 Contents of this Guide

12/87 l-8

## Exhibit l-3 

# Title III Planning Steps

l-9Appendix K provides an evaluation guide for the use of computerized systems that could be of assistance in emergency response planning.Appendix L is an annotated bibliography of pertinent references. Appendix M lists the EPA Regional preparedness contacts and coordinators as well as FEMA Regional contacts.

12/87 I-10

# 2. Hazards Analysis: An Overview

This chapter provides an overview of hazards analysis as it relates to emergency planning for extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) under Title III of the Superfund Amendments andReauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). The approch to hazards analysis presented here is not mandatory but it will assist localities in meeting the planning requirements of SARA Title Ill. As in Chapter 1 this chapter follows the same general format and supports the principles presented inNRT-1. It represents a relatively simple yet effective means of evaluating potential hazards resulting from the accidental release of an EHS. The three basic components in the hazards analysis discussed here are (1) hazards identification, (2) vulnerability analysis, and (3) risk analysis.
The step-by-step process planners should follow in conducting a hazards analysis is outlinedin Exhibit 2-1 1 (pp. 2-26 and 2-27) and described in detail in Chapter 3. The overview inthis chapter should be carefully read and understood before attempting an actual hazardsanalysis as outlined in Chapter 3. The information in Appendices I and J should also be reviewed.



# 2.1 Hazards Identification

Risk Analysis

Likelihood of a Release Occurring

Severity of the Consequences

Hazards identification, the first step in hazards This information can be used by emergency analysis, is the process of collecting information planners, as well as by fire/rescue services, poon: lice departments, and environmental protection

� The types and quantities of hazardous departments as they prepare for, respond to, materials in a community; and recover from emergencies involving hazardous materials. Section 2.1 .1 discusses the � The location of facilities that use, pro- types of hazards that chemicals may pose to the duce, process, or store hazardous mate- community. Section 2.1.2 discusses sources of rials; data for hazards identification and procedures

� Conditions of manufacture, storage, proc- that planners may use in gathering data. Infor­ essing, and use: mation derived from hazards identification will

� Transportation routes used for transport- subsequently be used in vulnerability analysis ing hazardous materials: and (described in Section 2.2) and risk analysis (de­

� Potential hazards associated with spills or scribed in Section 2.3).
releases.

2-l2.1.1 Identification of Hazardous Chemicals Hazards are situations that have the potential for causing injury to life and/or damage to propertyand the environment. Chemicals may be potentially hazardous because of their toxicity orphysical/chemical properties such as flammability and reactivity. Comprehensive planning forhazardous materials emergencies should encompass all hazards capable of causing loss of life, injury or damage to health, or damage to property or the environment. The guidance in this document focuses on the single hazard ofacute toxicity, specifically acute lethality to individuals as a result of airborne releases of EHSs.
Extremely Hazardous SubstancesChemicals with high acute lethality have the potential for causing death in unprotected populations after relatively short exposure periods atlow doses. On the basis of toxicity criteria (discussed in Appendix B), EPA identified a list ofchemicals with high acute toxicity (listed in Appendix C) from the more than 60,000 chemicals in commerce. This is the list of EHSs required by Title Ill of SARA. Because airborne releases of acutely lethal substances, while infrequent,can be catastrophic, Title Ill requires consideration of these EHSs in emergency plans.
Although all of the listed substances are extremely toxic, the hazards presented by a spill will also vary depending on the physical and chemical properties of the substance spilled andthe conditions under which the substance is handled (e.g., elevated temperatures and pressures) . Some substances are highly volatile and thus likely to become airborne, while others arenon-powdered solids that are unlikely to become airborne. The potential to become airborne was considered in the determination of the threshold planning quantity (TPQ) for ‘EHSs.
A summary of publicly available information on the listed substances is presented in the EPA Chemical Profiles issued in December 1985 as part of the Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP) Interim Guidance. The profile for each chemical includes synonyms as well as information on recommended exposure limits,physical/chemical characteristics, fire and explosion hazards and fire fighting procedures, reactivity, health hazards, use, and precautions. Profiles for each EHS are available. The profiles are currently being updated and supplemented with additional information, including emergency medical treatment guidance and information about personal protective equipment which should be used by emergency response teams. The revised profiles should be available byspring 1988. See Appendix E for a revised sample chemical profile.

Other Hazards In addition to acute lethality, substances maycause other types of toxic effects in people exposed to them (e.g., long-term or short-term illness, damage to skin or eyes). Criteria for the identification of chemicals (other than those thatare acutely lethal) that cause serious health effects from short-term exposures are being developed on a priority basis. When such criteria are established, they will be used in expanding the list of EHSs. At that time, guidance will be provided to address planning for chemicals that cause these other toxic effects. It should be noted that even substances that are relativelyless toxic may pose a hazard if they become airborne in large quantities.
Hazards other than toxicity (e.g., fire, explosion, and reactivity) that may be associated with bothEHSs and other substances should be considered in emergency preparedness and response planning and are discussed briefly in Appendix F. In many cases, emergency response agenciessuch as fire departments may have already addressed these types of hazards. Hazards other than toxicity will be considered in future revisions to the list of EHSs.

2.1.2 Procedures for Hazards IdentificationHazards identification begins with the identification of the facilities that have EHSs in the community. Mandatory reporting by facilities, underTitle Ill, will now identify those facilities that possess one or more of the EHSs in excess of its TPQ . In addition, because considerable information on the properties, amounts, and conditions of use of EHSs is needed to prepare reliable emergency plans, Title Ill specifically states: “the owner or operator of the facilityshall promptly provide information to such committees necessary for developing and implementing the emergency plan” (Section 303 (d) (3) ). Supplemental information on the quantity and location of hazardous chemicals will

2-2 12/87become available in March of 1988, fulfilling requirements under Sections 311 and 312, Title Illof SARA. Facility inspections will remain important information-gathering activities for local planners, as well as for safety and emergency response personnel who must establish accident prevention programs and pre-emergency plans.Other information available from the site may include facility hazard assessments, facility safetyaudits, spill prevention and control countermeasures (SPCC), and probability-based risk assessments (PRAs) . Although hazards identification should also include identification of transportation routes through the community for EHSs, this information will not be reported under Title Ill of SARA.

This section will discuss how to obtain information on EHSs and the types of facilities that are engaged in manufacturing , processing, storing, handling, selling, and transporting EHSs. Thissection also briefly discusses sources of information on other hazardous substances.
Extremely Hazardous Substances EHSs present in quantities above their TPQ will be identified for the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) by the reporting facilities. However, EHSs in quantities below the TPQ could also present a hazard to the community under certain circumstances and the LEPCs may wish to include them in their hazards analysis.As noted in Section 1.5.3, Title Ill of SARA includes the following provisions concerning EHSs:
If a facility has one or more chemicals from the current list of EHSs in quantities exceeding its TPQ, it must report this factto the State emergency response commission (SERC). The committee can obtain from the facilityinformation on what chemicals are present and in what amounts. The facility emergency coordinator will be the primary source of information. The specificchemical identity of an EHS may sometimes be withheld as a trade secret. Evenwhen the chemical identity is held confidential, however, certain information onthe specific chemical is important for subsequent steps in hazards analysis and will be provided by the facility. The following points should be discussed with facility representatives to obtain information for hazards identification:

Chemical identity, including chemical name and Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) number for substances not claimed as trade secret;Quantities of EHSs normally present, including: 

## (1) Total quantity of each EHS at the facility. The quantity of chemical can vary from day to day depending onoperations. Planners should determine the amount that is typically onhand on any given day. This information is necessary to assess the potential impact should an accident involving this quantity occur. (2) Maximum quantity that could be present in each storage or processing location. Facilities may use the same chemical in many different locations and have the capacity to store morethan what is typically on hand. Planners need to determine the maximum quantity, even though the facility mayrarely have this much on-site. Hazards associated with the maximum quantity may be much different thanthe hazards associated with the typical quantity. These differences need to be addressed by planners. (3) Configuration of storage, including the maximum potential quantity in a single storage or processing vessel. Some facilities handle. quantities of chemicals in isolated storage vessels while others may have two or more interconnected vessels to allow greater flexibility in the use of storagecapacity. It is possible that an accident involving one vessel will involvethe inventory in another if they are interconnected. The maximum potential quantity in a single vessel or group of interconnected vessels must be known to estimate the impact ofan accidental release (see “vulnerability analysis” in Section 2.2).

2-3• If the chemical identity is held confidential, information about certain properties of the substance will be provided by the facilityto allow a hazards analysis to proceed, including: (1) Physical state. At ambient conditions (room temperature and atmosphericpressure) is the chemical a gas, liquid, or solid? If solid, is it powdered (with less than 100 micron particle size), in solution, or molten? (2) Approximate vapor pressure (in millimeters of mercury or atmospheres), if the substance is a liquid or is a solid handled in molten form. For the liquid, the vapor pressure at handling temperature should be obtained,while the vapor pressure at the melting point should be obtained for the molten solid. (3) Approximate level of concern (LOC) (the concentration of EHS in airabove which there may be serious irreversible health effects or death as a result of a single exposure for a relatively short period of time). The approximate concentration in air that equals the LOC in grams per cubic meter is needed in the vulnerable zone analysis (see Appendices C and D) . The approximate values provided shouldbe sufficiently close so as not to significantly alter the size of the estimated zones (see Section 2.2). Conditions under which the chemicals are

processed, handled, or stored, including: (1) Temperature. Facilities may keep certain substances at temperatures other than ambient depending on their use. (2) Pressure. Some substances must bestored under pressure (e.g., liquefied gases). (3) Other unique features of the handling systems employed to manufacture,process, store, use or otherwise handle the substance at the facility. This information is useful for the riskanalysis portion of the hazards analysis. See Appendix J for more information. Note that some of this information might be held as trade secret by the facility. Planners should work closely with facility representatives to obtain information necessary for emergency plan development. Exhibit 2-1 presents several chemicals from the list of EHSs and some types of facilities other than chemical plants where these chemicals might be present in quantities exceeding the TPQ. Some of the EHSs in the exhibit might befound in other types of facilities in smaller quantities (e.g., chemicals in laboratories).
Hazardous materials, including EHSs, are also transported through, by, or over communities byhighway vehicles, rail cars, watercraft, and aircraft virtually 24 hours a day. Shipments may range from less than a pound to thousands of pounds of material. Because transporters are not required to report under SARA Sections 302and 303, identification of routes through a community over which EHSs are transported will bemore difficult than the identification of fixed facilities. Nevertheless, transportation routes and transported chemicals should be identified if possible.
The experience gained through Department of Transportation (DOT) pilot planning projects demonstrates that identification of transportation hazards for emergency planning can be done by gathering information directly at the community level (see Hazardous Materials Transoortation: A Svnthesis of Lessons Learned from the DOT Demonstration Project) . Usefull information maybe collected with assistance from representatives of trucking. rail, air freight, and shipping industries. Facility representatives may be able to provide data on the shipping and transfer of EHSs, although this approach will identify onlythose transported materials destined for local facilities. The following points could be discussed with facility representatives:

� Frequency of shipments (daily, weekly, irregular schedule) ;

� Form of shipment (tank truck, tank car, drums, boxes, carboys in trucks or vans, pipelines, barges) ;

12/87 2-4

## Exhibit 2-l Types of Faclities where Certian Extremely Hazardous Substances Might be 

# Found in Quantities Greater than their TPQs

Etremely Hazardous Substance (TPQs in parentheses)

Ammonia Chlorine Sulfuric Acid Phosgene Aldicarb Type of Facility (100 Ibs) (100 Ibs) (500 Ibs) (10 Ibs) (100 lbs/ 10,000 Ibs)

Blueprinting Facilities X X

Frozen Food Processing

Processing Plants/

Plumbing, Heating, and Air Bulk Storage Facilities X X

Farms X 

### X

Facilities X

Pesticide Distributors 

### X

Formulators X X X 

### X

Conditioning Companies X Pulp and Paper Plants X X

Retail Stores X Swimming Pools X

Warehouses X X 

### X

Water Treatment Facilities X X

*TPQ for Aldicarb is 100 pounds for fine powders or solutions, 10.000 pounds otherwise.

12187 2-5Quantity of shipments (tons; gallons;number of drums, tanks, vats or carboys); andTransportation routes through the community (highways, railroads, pipelines).
The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) establishes DOT as the responsibleagency for guidance on routing controls. Proposed Changes in routes should be made in accordance with the Guidelines for Applving Crite

ria to Designate Routes for Transporting Harzard

ous Materials, DOT FHWA 1980.

Other Hazardous Materials Planners can apply the toxicity criteria used byEPA for the list of EHSs (see Appendix B) to determine whether other chemicals at facilities in the area qualify as EHSs even though they are not listed as such under the Federal regulations. Planners may also want to obtain information on transportation of other hazardous materials, as described above for EHSs. The discussion points listed in the previous section on EHSs could alsobe raised with facility representatives and transportation industry representatives with reference to other hazardous substances.
Hazardous materials can be found throughout most communities in several types of sites and facilities. Besides obvious sites and facilities (e.g., flammable liquid storage tanks, gasolinestations, chemical supply companies), hazardous materials are likely to be found at other places, see Exhibit 2-1 (e.g., dry cleaners, auto body shops, hospitals, and construction sites).
Information on hazards other than toxicity associated with the chemicals on the list of EHSsmay be obtained from the EPA Chemical Profiles. Flammability and reactivity data on many other chemicals are available in the Fire Proteq

tion Guide on Hazardous Materials developed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) . The Hazardous Materials Table (49 CFR 172),developed by DOT, classifies hazardous materials in transportation by the type of hazards they present. (See also the DOT Hazardous Materials Table in the Proposed Rule of November 6, 1987, Federal Register, Vol. 52, No. 215, pp. 42787-42931.) Planners might Want to use those chemicals listed by the NFPA with the highest flammability and reactivity ratings, and those listed by DOT in certain hazard classes, as a starting point for identification of these types of hazards in the community. The United Nations publication, Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, is also a useful source of information. Another source of information on many chemicals is the Coast Guard’s Chemical Hazards Response Information System (CHRIS) hazardous chemical data base.

2.1.3 Summary of Useful Information Resulting from Hazards Identification
At the conclusion of the hazards identification step of hazards analysis, planners should have the following information:
A list of EHSs present at facilities in the district in quantities exceeding the TPQ; the properties of these EHSs: and where,in what quantity, and under what conditions they are used, produced, processed, or stored. Mixtures of chemicals will be reported if the portion of EHSs in the mixture is equal to or greater than one percent and more than the TPQ. Information on chemicals claimed as tradesecret, including physical state, approximate vapor pressure of liquids and molten solids, and approximate LOC as defined in this guidance. Routes used for transportation of EHSs through the planning district. In addition, although it is not presently requiredto meet the statutory requirements for emergency plan development under Title Ill of SARA, planners may obtain the following informationduring hazards identification if necessary for developing and implementing an emergency plan:

� A list of EHSs present in quantities less than the TPQ and where, in what quantity, and under what conditions they are used, produced, processed, or stored.

� Hazards besides airborne toxicity posed by the EHSs in the community.

� Chemicals other than those listed that meet the acute lethality criteria.

12/87 2-6� A list of other hazardous chemicals and where, in what quantity, and under whatconditions they are used, produced, processed, or stored; and the type of hazard they pose. � Routes used for transportation of otherhazardous materials through the community. Exhibit 2-2 summarizes the types and sourcesof information obtained during hazards identification.



# 2.2 Vulnerability Analysis for Airborne Hazardous Substances

Vulnerability analysis is the second part of thethree-part hazards analysis. This section outlines a process that can be used in performing a vulnerability analysis for facilities that have chemicals on the Section 302 list of extremelyhazardous substances (EHSs) and transportation routes used for transporting these substances to and from the fixed facilities or through the communities. (The facilities andtransportation routes should be identified as described in Section 2.1).
The vulnerability analysis will provide informationthat will be helpful in fulfilling planning requirements under Title Ill of SARA. This information includes:

An estimation of the vulnerable zone for each EHS reported and the conditions and assumptions that were used to estimate each vulnerable zone:

� The population, in terms of numbers and types (e.g., neighborhood residents: high density transient populations such as workers and spectators in auditoriums orstadiums; sensitive populations in hospitals, schools, nursing homes, and day care centers) that could be expected to be within the vulnerable zones: and � Essential service facilities such as hospitals, police and fire stations, emergencyresponse centers, and communication facilities, Although this guide is primarily concerned with the impact of EHSs on the surrounding humanpopulation, planners may also choose to consider as part of their vulnerability analysis the private and public property (e.g., homes, schools,hospitals, businesses, offices) that may be affected, including essential support systems (e.g. water, food, power, medical), as well as sensitive environments (e.g., drinking watersupplies, food crops, or animal habitats). Consideration of property and sensitive environments may be particularly important for chemical releases that pose hazards other than thoseassociated with acute toxicity. Planners can refer to community emergency services (e.g., fire departments, police departments, hospitals) for assistance in obtaining information about thepopulation and essential services within the vulnerable zone.

2.2.1 General Description of Estimation of Vulnerable Zones For purposes of this guidance, a vulnerable zone is an estimated geographical area that may be subject to concentrations of an airborne EHS at

12/87 2-7

### Exhibit 2-2


# INFORMATION FROM HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

Essential Information

Facilities in community with EHSs in quantities exceeding the TPQ

identity of EHSs in community

Quantity of EHSs present

Transportation routes for EHSs

Other Useful information

identity and location of other acutely toxic chemicals

� Information on hazards other than toxicity of EHSs

� Information on other hazardous substances, including: Identity Location Quantity Hazards Transportation routes Source of Information

Facilities must report to SERC information will be made available to LEPC’s

Facility emergency coordinator

Facility emergency coordinator

Facility emergency coordinator, representative of transportation industries

Information to be provided now under Section 303 (d) (3) and in the future under Sections 311, 312, and 313 of SARA: facility emergency coordinators

EPA Chemical Profiles; facility emergency coordinators

Information to be provided now under Section 303 (d) (3) and in the future under Sections 311, 312, and 313 of SARA: community sources

Representatives of transportationindustries and facilities receiving shipments of chemicals

12/87 2-8levels that could cause irreversible acute health effects or death to human populations within the area following an accidental release. Vulnerable zones are based on estimates of the quantity of an EHS released to air, the rate of release to air,airborne dispersion, and the airborne concentration that could cause irreversible health effects or death. Release and dispersion methodologies are not precise and provide only estimates of the actual distances and areas that may beaffected by an accidental release. Many methods are available to evaluate both releases andairborne dispersion. They vary in their assumptions and therefore the results obtained may differ. The dispersion models selected for this guidance are described in Appendix G.

At the time of an accidental release, with the wind generally moving in one direction, the area affected by a release is the area downwind only.Because the wind direction at the time of an actual accidental release cannot be predicted,planners must consider all possible wind directions and subsequent plume paths. (A plume isthe cloud formation of airborne chemical that results from a release (Exhibit 2-3).) Consequently, the estimated vulnerable zones are circles with the potential release site located at the center (Exhibit 2-4). Because it is not possible to predict the exact location of a transportationaccident, the estimated vulnerable zone for potential releases associated with transportation of an EHS is a “moving circle” or corridor (Exhibit 2-5).

The size of an estimated vulnerable zone depends upon the distance the airborne chemical travels before it disperses and is diluted in the air to a concentration below a “level of concern”(see subsection D below) for acute health effects or death. This distance depends on several variable factors.

2.2.2 Variables in Estimating Size of Vulnerable Zones Many of the variables are very complex and it is beyond the scope of this document to discuss them all in detail. In addition many do not havea significant impact on the size of estimated vulnerable zones given the imprecise nature of these assumptions. The major factors affecting the size of a vulnerable zone for emergency planning are described below. A. Quantity and Rate of Release to Air Not all of a released chemical will necessarilybecome airborne. The quantity that actually becomes airborne and the rate at which it becomes airborne depend upon:

� Total quantity released or spilled:

� Physical state (solid, liquid, gas); and

� Conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure)under which the chemical is stored or handled. Gases typically become airborne more readily than liquids. Liquids or molten solids generally become airborne by evaporation. The rate atwhich they become airborne (rate of volatilization) depends on their vapor pressure, molecular weight, handling temperature, the surface area of the spill (pool size), and the wind speed at the time of the spill. A spilled liquid with a higher vapor pressure will become airborne (through evaporation) more rapidly than a spilled liquid with a low vapor pressure at the same temperature. Also, a liquid will evaporate faster if the surface area or pool size of the spillis increased, if the liquid has a higher than ambient temperature, and if it is exposed to greater wind speeds. Molten solids will volatilize muchfaster than those in solid state. Solids as powders are likely to become airborne only if propelled into the air by force (e.g., by an explosionor the loss of air filtration in a pneumatic conveying system). Solids that are not powdered are less likely to become airborne.
The size of an estimated vulnerable zone is proportional to the quantity and rate of release.Smaller release volumes based on similar assumptions will yield lower release rates which will reduce the size of the estimated vulnerable

zone.
The application of these variables in the vulnerable zone estimate will be discussed later in thischapter and also in Chapter 3. For more information on the calculations and derivations related to these variables, see Appendix G.

B. Meteorological Conditions Among the many meteorological factors, windspeed and atmospheric stability have the greatest effect on the size of estimated vulnerable

zones.. Increased wind speed and the

12/87 2-9

## Exhibit 2-3 

# The Movement Downwind of a Plume of an Airborne Extremely Hazardous Substance Following an Accidental Release.

12/87 2-10

## Exhibit 2-4 

# Vulnerable Zones for Community Planning Resulting from Airborne Releases of Chemicals A and B

12/87 2-11

## Exhibit 2-5 

# Vulnerable Zones along a Transportation Route When Airborne Releases of Chemicals C and D Occur

12/87 2-12accompanying decreased atmospheric stabilitywill result in greater airborne dispersion (and dilution) of a chemical, and a resultant decrease in the size of the estimated vulnerable zone. Additional information on these meteorological variables is presented in Appendix G.

C. Surrounding TopographyThe topography of the area surrounding a potential release site will affect the size of the estimated vulnerable zones.
The principal topographical factors are natural obstructions such as hills and mountains, andman-made structures such as high-rise buildings. Natural formations and surface conditions are always site-specific and therefore beyond the scope of this guidance. If significant natural barriers exist within estimated vulnerable zones, appropriate technical support should be solicitedfrom local, State, or EPA Regional meteorologists or experts in the private sector includingthe facility. On the other hand, general methodologies do exist for describing the dispersion of chemical substances in urban areas containinghigh buildings and in flat, rural areas. The methodology for estimating vulnerable zones in urban and rural areas is discussed later in this chapter and is presented in Chapter 3.

D. Levels of Concern A level of concern (LOC), for purposes of this document, is defined as the concentration of anEHS in air above which there may be serious irreversible health effects or death as a result of a single exposure for a relatively short period of time.
There is at present no precise measure of an LOC for the chemicals listed as EHSs. Various organizations over the past several years have been developing acute exposure guidelines for a limited number of hazardous chemicals; themethodology, however, is still under development. The preliminary guidelines and the progress to date are described in detail in Appendix D. Until more precise measures are developed, surrogate or estimated measures of the LOC have been identified for the listed EHSs. Local officials may choose values for the LOC differentfrom those estimated in this guidance, depending upon their requirements, the specific characteristics of the planning district or site, and the level of protection deemed appropriate. Extreme caution and prudence should be exercised when choosing an LOC.
For the purposes of this guidance, an LOC hasbeen estimated by using one-tenth of the "Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health” (IDLH)level published by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) or one-tenthof an approximation of the IDLH from animal toxicity data. Other exposure guidelines that may be used to estimate LOC include the “Threshold Limit Value” (TLV) published by the AmericanConference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), guidelines developed by the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) underdevelopment by a consortium of chemical companies. These values are discussed and listed in Appendix D. The use of LOC in the vulnerable zone estimate is discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter 3.

2.2.3 The Relationship of Estimated Vulnerable Zones to Actual Releases
The estimated vulnerable zones are shown as circles with different radii in Exhibits 2-6 and 2-7to illustrate how changing conditions or assumptions can influence the vulnerable zone estimate. At the time of an accidental release, only some portion of the estimated vulnerable zonewill actually be involved. The specific area covered by the plume will be determined principally by wind direction and the degree of dispersion of the plume. The area through which the plumemoves is generally referred to as a plume “footprint.” Exhibit 2-8 shows the plume footprint for the release of a sample chemical substance.Note that the actual concentration of the airborne chemical tends to decrease as it moves further downwind from the release site because of continual mixing and dilution (dispersion) of the chemical with air. Note also that the plume movement is affected by the speed of the wind.
Although a footprint represents the area enveloped by a plume, it is not possible to predictwith any high degree of accuracy the wind direction and wind speed. Therefore the direction and shape which the plume may take at the time of an accidental release is not known in advance.

2-13 12/87

## Exhibit 2-6 

# The Effect of Different Assumptions on the Calculation of the Radius of Estimated Vulnerable Zones

12/87 2-14

## Exhibit 2-7

12/87 2-15

## Exhibit 2-8 

# Plume Development and Movement during a Hypothetical Accidental ReleaseFurther, both wind speed and direction maychange during the course of the release. Because of this, it is suggested that planners use acircle for fixed sites or a corridor for transportation routes when estimating vulnerable zones.

2.2.4 Application of Estimated VulnerableZones to Hazards Analysis for Extremely Hazardous SubstancesThis section provides an overview of how vulnerable zones can be estimated as part of a hazards analysis. To estimate the zone, specific values must be assigned to each of the variables discussed in the previous sections. Values may be obtained from the reporting facilities, from techniques contained in this document, or other sources recommended in this guide. In several instances, this guide provides liquid factors which replace a series of calculations. Thesefactors are intended to make the process of estimating the vulnerable zones much easier for local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) .

The step-by-step hazards analysis described in Chapter 3 of this guidance is divided into two major phases. The first phase involves a screening of all reporting facilities to set priorities among facilities so that more detailed hazards analysis can be conducted for those facilities that pose the greatest risk should a release occur. The first phase employs assumptions for a credible worst case scenario. The second phase involves the reevaluation of the facilities by priority. During this phase the LEPCs have the opportunity to reevaluate the assumptions used in the screening phase on a case by casebasis using data that may be unique to a particular site.
Estimating Vulnerable Zones for Initial Screening Because of time and resource limitations, localplanners may not be able to evaluate all reporting facilities at the same time or to the sameextent. Thus planners should set an order of priority among potential hazards for all facilities that have reported the presence of one or more EHSs in excess of the TPQ. One way to do this is to estimate a vulnerable zone radius using assumptions for a credible worst case scenario.Values that reflect these assumptions are assigned to all the variables discussed in Section 2.2.2. In this way, all facilities and substances are similarly evaluated to establish a relative

measure of potential hazard for purposes of prioritization.
The initial estimated screening zones are basedon the following credible worst case assumptions.
Quantity released: maximum quantity that could be released from largest vessel or interconnected vessels. Rate of release to air: total quantity of gas, solid as a powder, or solid in solution is assumed to be released in 10 minutes; for liquids and molten solids, the rate is based on the rate of evaporation (rate of voltization). As explained in Appendix G this guidance simplifies the calculation of the rate of evaporation with a liquid factorwhich approximates. a series of calculations. This number is called liquid factor ambient (LFA), liquid factor boiling (LFB), or liquid factor molten (LFM) depending on the handling conditions of the EHS. Temperature: not applicable to gases orsolids as powders or in solution; for liquids, dependent on whether they are usedat ambient temperature or near their boiling points: for molten solids, at their melting point. Meteorological conditions: wind speed of 1.5 meters per second (3.4 miles per hour) ; F atmospheric stability.Topographic conditions: flat, level, unobstructed terrain: use of the dispersion model for rural areas. LOC: one-tenth of the (NIOSH) published(IDLH) value or one-tenth of its approximation. * (See Appendix D for a discussion of LOC.)

* Provided it is not exceeded by the ACGIH TLV. In this case, the TLV is used.

2-17 12/87As a result, the only information necessary to utmost care and prudence. Although some estimate the vulnerable zone for initial screening changes in estimated or assumed values may is: increase the size of the estimated vulnerable
Chemical identity: Maximum potential quantity in a singlevessel or interconnected vessels (obtained from the facility); Location of vessel and facility (obtained from the facility); LOC (found in Appendix C); and In instances of confidentiality claims, theapproximate LOC as defined in this guidance, physical state, and approximate vapor pressure of a liquid or molten solid (obtained from the facility). Planners can use the estimated zone, togetherwith an initial consideration of population and essential service facilities within this zone and any readily available information on the likelihood of a release to establish an order of priority among the facilities. The considerations of population and critical services are discussed in Section 2.3 of this chapter.

Reevaluation of the Estimated Zones Once the prioritization of facilities is completed,the LEPCs should begin a systematic reevaluation of those facilities which initially appear to represent the greatest potential hazards. This will require careful review of the considerations presented in Chapters 2 and 3 and AppendicesG and I in this document, consultation with facility officials, and perhaps the aid of experts in theappropriate technical areas. After careful evaluation of new data, planners may wish to alter certain values and assumptions such as:
Quantity likely to be released (use information from facility);Likely rate of release to air (obtain information from facility or other sources);Meteorological conditions (obtain information from facility, local, State, or regional experts, or other sources); Topographical considerations (e.g., urban versus rural landscape); and Values used for the LOC. zone, in many instances the zone will be reduced by such changes. Exhibit 2-9 provides asummary table of how the principal variables affect the estimated zone. For example, discussions with a facility representative may indicate that in one particular operation, vessels arerarely filled to maximum capacity or that equipment is engineered or designed to minimize or contain accidental releases. Chemicals may be subjected to higher temperatures or pressures than was originally assumed. Meteorological data may show that the worst-case conditions prevail for only a small percentage of the time or that they prevail for a large percentage of the time. The use of one-tenth of the IDLH or an approximation of this value as the LOC may ormay not be considered overly protective for local circumstances. Local planners may favor the use of another value as an appropriate guideline for an LOC.

Decisions to alter the values or assumptions that affect the size of the estimated vulnerable zone involve a consideration of acceptable risk and are a matter of judgement at the local level. There is no guidance available that can providevalues that would ensure no risk or that can provide an acceptable balance between risk and the appropriate level of planning for each district. This decision rests with local officials.
It is possible that reevaluation of the screeningzones may lead to the estimation of several vulnerable zones as shown in Exhibit 2-7. Planners must then carefully consider the populations and essential services at risk, both within and outside these zones and reach conclusions on the level and type of planning they believe is necessary. Section 2.3 provides information on analyzing the risk associated with releases of EHSs to populations and essential services facilities within the planning district.

2.2.5 Evacuation Considerations for AirborneReleases of Extremely Hazardous Substances
Decisions about whether or not to evacuate as well as about evacuation distances are incident- Reevaluation of the screening zones based on specific and must be made at the time of an ac­ “credible worst case” assumptions used for screening purposes should be performed with

12/87 2-18

### EXHIBIT 2-9 

## FACTORS AFFECTING VULNERABLE ZONE ESTIMATIONS

IF IT WILL CAUSE RESULTING IN
the quantity on site that might be involved in an accident is reduced

the time period of release of a given quantity increases
the release source point is above ground level

the terrain considered is rough (uneven and mountainous) instead of flat
the area is urban, containing high buildings and other man-made structures a higher value for LOC is chosen

a lower value for LOC is chosen a reduction in the smaller estimated zones total airborne quantity and the quantity released per minute

a reduction in the smaller estimated zones airborne quantity released per minute
an increase in dispersion smaller estimated zones (mixing and diluting of the (possibly) chemical in air)
an increase in dispersion smaller estimated zones (mixing and diluting of the chemical in the air)

an increase in dispersion smaller estimated zones (mixing and diluting of the chemical in the air)

a reduction in the geographical smaller estimated zones area with airborne concentrations above the LOC
an increase in the geographical larger estimated zones area with airborne concentrations above the LOC

2-19tual release. An estimated vulnerable zone should not automaticallv be used as the basis for evacuation during an incident response, For example, the following variable factors are always part of an evacuation decision: wind speed and direction, temperature, humidity, air dispersionconditions, and time of day. In addition, the vulnerable zone is described as a circle or a corridor surrounding the possible incident site andprovides no information on the breadth of a potential plume. An evacuation zone is typically a pathway through which a plume might move from the point of release. The vulnerable zone is helpful because it identifies an area about which evacuation decisions might need to bemade, but the evacuation zone will always depend on other factors.

Evacuation during incidents involving the airborne release of acutely toxic chemicals is sometimes , but by no means always , necessary. Release of airborne toxics can occur and move downwind so rapidly that there wouldbe no time to evacuate residents. For shortterm releases, the most prudent course of action for the protection of the nearby residents would often be to remain indoors with the doorsand windows closed and the heating and air conditioning systems shut off. An airborne cloud willfrequently move quickly past. Vulnerable populations, such as the elderly and sick, may suffer more injury by being evacuated than by staying inside and putting simple countermeasures into effect. If the releases occur over an hour or more, or if there is a fire that cannot be readily controlled within a short time, then evacuation may be a sensible alternative. The disadvantages of evacuation in incidents involving airborne releases of EHSs are numerous. Two have already been alluded to, namely that events occur so rapidly that there may be no time to evacuate and that vulnerable populationswould sustain fewer adverse effects by remaining inside until the toxic cloud has passed. Slight changes in wind velocity and directioncould be very important if evacuation were begun during a release of airborne toxic chemicals: differences in temperature between air layers could also cause the toxic cloud to disperse in ways that would be hard to predict. It would be difficult to estimate how long a community would be exposed to a toxic cloud.
The estimated vulnerable zone for a potential airborne release of a specific quantity of EHSrepresents the area surrounding the potential release site within which vulnerable populationsand facilities might be affected. It does not reflect the time frame of the impact of an accident. It also does not mean that just beyond the zone boundary residents are safe. The many assumptions made in the calculations for the vulnerable zones and the fact that no safe levels for any of the chemicals on the list of EHSs have been established for the general population, make it inappropriate to base evacuation solely on these estimates. If the estimated vulnerable zone is greater than planners can cope with, the community should work closely with the facility to discuss the possibility of reducing the risk of exposure. This could be achieved by reducing inventories, establishing controls or alarms to make sure no release occurs, and by installingearly warning systems. A more detailed discussion of evacuation is given in Appendix H.

12/87 2-20

# 2.3 Risk Analysis

Risk analysis is the third part of the hazards analysis process. Risk analysis can provide a relative measure of the likelihood and severity of various possible hazardous events and enablethe emergency plan to focus on the greatest potential risks. Risk analysis requires certain information collected during the first two steps of thehazards analysis (hazards identification and vulnerability analysis), as well as other informationspecific to the facility or the local area. The appropriate level of detail and scope of the risk analysis must be determined based on the local situation and the resources available. This guide is meant primarily to assist local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) in carrying out a relatively quick and inexpensive risk analysis. LEPCs with access to the necessary resources may wish to conduct a detailed quantitative risk analysis. However, a risk analysis of this type is beyond the scope of the guidance presented here and it is recommended that committeesseek other guidance and expert advice for conducting quantitative risk assessments. A quantitative risk assessment is not deemed essential to performing a hazards analysis suitable for emergency response planning in most cases. The real value of risk analysis derives from the fact that it gives planners an ability to put each potential situation into perspective (in terms of the probability that it will occur and the resulting effects it will have) and results in emergency plans that will address the most likely and most severe potential hazards. 2.3.1 Overall Approach to Risk Analysis: Ranking of HazardsBecause available safeguards such as containment, controlled flow, and proper venting may greatly reduce the opportunity for, or extent of, exposure, the mere presence of a hazardous chemical is insufficient to identify the level of risk involved. Whenever a hazard exists, however, there is always some risk, however small it might be.
Risk analysis includes an estimate of the probability or likelihood that an event will occur. Risk can be characterized in qualitative terms as high, medium, or low, or in quantitative termsusing numerical estimates and statistical calculations. For practical purposes, a risk analysis may be based on a subjective, common-sense evaluation. Few people live in daily fear of being struck by a meteorite. They know that, althoughthe risk exists, it is very small because the probability is low. A busy street corner, known to be the site of frequent auto accidents, could be considered to present a high risk of accidents. Citizens know that the likelihood of being struck by an automobile is much greater and requires safeguards (e.g., looking both ways before crossing a street). In both of these situations,the evaluation of the probability of a future incident is based on knowledge of the frequency with which that incident has occurred in the past. Historical records of past events can,therefore, be put into practical use in risk analysis.

12/87 2-21Both probability and consequences are extremely important in evaluating risk. A high risk situation can be the result of a high probability with severe consequences (e.g., irreversible health effects or death due to an airborne toxicchemical, a fire or explosion with injuries or fatalities) , whereas moderate risk situations can be a result of either high probability with mildconsequences or low probability with more severe consequences. Diminishing the likelihood of an accident or minimizing the consequences will reduce risk overall.
A relative ranking of hazards for the purposes ofcommunity emergency planning does not require extensive mathematical evaluations, application of statistics, or extensive support fromexperts. Application of readily available information and common sense, when combined withsite-specific evaluations such as the vulnerability analysis, will complete much of the risk analysis process. Because it is based on the knowledge, experience, local considerations, and the priorities of the people in the planning district or community involved, there is no universal right answer in risk analysis.

2.3.2 Types of Information Required for Risk Analysis Much of the information concerning sources ofhazard, populations, and essential services subject to damage should have been assembledduring the screening portion of the hazards identification and vulnerability analysis. Risk analysiswill also require information on facility and community plans and safeguards, existing local response capabilities in place, and an historical record of past incidents and their outcomes.
Planners who have used the screening methodology to estimate vulnerable zones as described in Section 2.2 of this chapter and in Chapter 3will then need additional information about priority facilities for which they will develop plans first.The process described in this section is iterative: (1) Planners gather additional information about high priority facilities first; (2) Planners then reevaluate and rank the risks associated with highest priority sites (and make emergency plans accordingly); (3) Planners then return to the original list of facilities that were assigned a lower priority during the screening and repeat the process until all reporting facilities have been reevaluated. Following the reevaluation of all facilities, appropriate emergency plans should be developed.
Facility Information Facilities are an important source of information about risk. They are required under Title Ill ofSARA to provide both chemical inventory and release information to LEPCs. Information required under Section 304 about spills or releases that have occurred will be useful for this phase ofhazards analysis. Certain State and local governments have additional community-right-toknow regulations and spill reporting requirements with which facilities must also comply. Thus industries can and should be approachedwith questions regarding the hazards and safeguards present at their facilities. Interaction withfacilities should be based on cooperation, respect for trade secrets and other confidentialbusiness information, and recognition of the industry as a member of the community. Facilities should be aware of the importance of certain information (e.g., the results of a facility risk assessment) and should cooperate in providingas much pertinent information as possible. Specific types of information concerning extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) that LEPCs may want to request from facilities include:
Anticipated adverse health effects of a substance and their degree of severity: Safeguards in place on-site: Recommendations made by facilities for community safeguards: Prevention approaches used for past events in which adverse health effects were prevented, and details of the events: Lessons learned from past events in whichadverse health effects occurred, and details of the events:Hazards evaluations conducted by the facility (e.g., HAZOP; see Appendix J).

In addition to the information and recommendations which they will provide, facilities may bewilling to contribute resources to assist in emergency response management including:

� Assistance in planning and response by facility technical experts:

12/87 2-22Copies of facility emergency response plans and spill prevention control andcountermeasures (SPCC) plans (see Appendix I); Assistance in cleanup and recycling of spilled materials: and Training and safe handling instructions.
Community Plan and Safeguard Information Many communities will already have in place one or more emergency response plans developed to address a variety of hazards. Such plans mayrequire revision to include recent new regulations and perhaps may be incomplete in addressing acutely toxic airborne releases, but will provide a valuable starting point for additionalplanning. Specific types of plans which may already exist include: Local multi-hazard emergency operations plans (EOPs) (developed under Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidance);Emergency plans for transportation-related hazards (developed under Department of Transportation (DOT) guidance); Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) plans (developed by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) ); and The SPCC plans of individual facilities.

Historical Accident Records
There are two benefits to the review of historical records of hazardous materials incidents in riskanalysis. First, an analysis of the sites and materials involved in prior accidents will indicatehazards that may represent significant risks. Although no two accidents will be identical, certain situations, if unaltered, can precipitate other more severe incidents. A second benefit is thedevelopment of an ability to recognize and assess potential risks which would not be apparent to an untrained evaluator. The development of an appreciation for what could happen can beachieved through a review of what has happened in the past. To assist in increasing the overall awareness of the nature and complexity of hazardous incidents, Exhibit 2-10 includesbrief summaries of some accidents that occurred during 1980 and 1981 throughout the world. The Acute Hazardous Events Data Base prepared for the EPA Office of Toxic Substances(December 1985) has information on the chemicals involved in accidents that posed high risks to human health. The historical record of local hazardous incidents may be more valuable inidentifying possible hazards in each district. Facility compliance with Section 304 of Title Ill of SARA will provide this type of information in the future.

An historical record of local hazardous materialsincidents should include information from the following organizations:

� Fire department and rescue squad:

� Police department:

� Public health department:

� Local hospitals and physicians:

� Local chemical cleanup and spill response companies;

� Universities (chemistry, chemical engineering, and science laboratory safety personnel);

� Local industry: and News media (print and broadcast). When accumulating records of past incidents, information concerning the responsible parties will not be essential to the risk analysis process. Many of the information sources listed above may be more willing to provide the needed data (e.g., date, time, location, material, extent of incident, injuries sustained, remedial actionstaken, safeguards implemented) if they are assured that blame will not be assigned in the process.
Changing Factors Affecting Future Incidents
The historical record of incidents will containvaluable information. However, to properly apply such data to the risk analysis process requires that any changes which have occurred be taken into account. For example, the assembled historical record may contain several accidents involving the release of hazardous materials at a particular site. If the engineering controls, containment facilities or processes used are altered over time, the results of the risk analysis may be substantially different from whatthe historical record might predict. Any evaluation of past accidents must take into account any changes in the following:

12/87 2-23

## Exhibit 2-10 

## SUMMARIES OF SOME ACCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED IN 1980-81Surrounding populations and critical facilities; Transportation routes: and Engineering control methods.

2.3.3 Limiting the Collection of Information The preceding section contains some generalguidance concerning the types of information required for a risk analysis and where to obtain such data. Appendix I contains suggestions for more detailed questions and concerns which may be raised during discussions to collect the needed information. These are all tools for use in determining what information to collect: none of them, however, will be wholly adequate foremergency planning needs. Community-specific checklists will have to be developed for use in collecting information since each locality and community has different needs, requirements, and points of emphasis.
The suggested approach for using the tools in this guide to aid in the development of such a community-specific checklist is to: 

## 1) Review Appendix I for the types of information that appear to be needed. 2) Highlight and amend the suggestions in Appendix I to reflect the specific needs of your local.community or planning district. 3) Develop a detailed checklist of information needed based on the amended (tailored)version of Appendix I and the types of information outlined in the prior section of this guidance. 4) Set a priority for each item of information based on perceived need, effort involved, and available resources. 5) Request the needed information and assemble it. (This process will be described in the next section.) It is very important to recognize when enoughinformation has been collected. A cursory review of Appendix I, which is by no means a complete set of discussion points, will demonstrate the volume of information that can be collected for the risk analysis. Collection of data on allpossible interactions of elements would be extremely time consuming. The complexity of the analysis and the effort required to perform it will depend directly on the volume of data collected. The focus of the information collection should beon developing a relative measure of the likelihood and severity of possible hazardous events.This goal does not demand an exhaustive collection of data. Reviewing data as they are collected will greatly assist in identifying informationthat is essential as opposed to that which is peripheral to the risk analysis process. If in doubt, base decisions on whether the information:

� Has the potential for altering the relative ranking of the hazard to the community: and

� Directly involves identification of a hazard, determination of likelihood of an incident, assessment of outcome of an accident, or identification of the safeguards needed or available to reduce the magnitude of the damage.
Anything outside these categories can be considered of secondary importance and should becollected only if resources allow. Such limitations, when properly applied to the entire information collection process (i.e., prioritization ofthe checklist before data is collected) can benefit the risk analysis by eliminating unnecessary types of information (e.g., details concerningdamage from the least likely events) before effort is expended on its collection and analysis.

2.3.4 Assembly of the Information Obtained from the Hazards Analysis Data that are systematically assembled as they become available during the three major steps of the hazards analysis can be easily evaluated as the risk analysis progresses and can be used to identify missing data as well as information that is complete. As has been discussed earlierin this chapter, a hazards analysis is first performed during the screening of reporting facilities using “credible worst case assumptions” forestablishing priorities among facilities. The hazards analysis of each facility is then reevaluatedaccording to priority based on a careful reassessment of the assumptions used in the screening process. A list of these steps is shown in Exhibit 2-11.
Information obtained during both the screening process and the reevaluation process can be stored in a hazards analysis matrix. The hazards

12/87 2-25

### EXHIBIT 2-11



# STEPS IN HAZARDS ANALYSIS

INITIAL SCREENING

1. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

A. List facilities that have reported EHSs in the community in excess of the threshold planning quantity TPQ

B. Contact each facility on the list for information on the EHSs present

i. Chemical identities

ii. Quantities and location of chemicals present

iii. Properties of the chemicals if identity is trade secret

iv. Conditions under which chemicals are used, produced, processed, or stored

C. Obtain information on transportation routes of EHSs, if possible

D. Obtain information on hazardous materials, facilities, and transportation routes (other than for those with EHSs above the TPQ) listed by SERCs (optional)

2. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

A. Estimate vulnerable zone for screening using credible worst case assumptions

i. Determine rate of release to air using information from the facility concerning quantity likely to be released from a vessel or interconnected vessels and fixed assumptions about time of release

ii. Use LOC from Appendix C

iii. Determine zone using Exhibit 3-l and fixed conditions

B. Identify characteristics of human population (e.g., number, concentration, general health) within estimated vulnerable zone

C. Identify critical facilities within estimated vulnerable zone

3. RISK ANALYSIS

A. Collect information obtained in hazards identification and vulnerability analysis

B. Make rough estimate of risks posed by each based on readily available information on the likelihood of a release and severity of consequences

C. Identify those facilities with higher priority due to the estimated risks they pose

12/87 2-26

## PLANNING FOR FACILITIES BY PRIORITY

4. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

A. Contact each facility on the list and other expert sources for additional information on the EHSs present and what conditions might be present during a release

i. Reevaluate estimate of quantity likely to be present

ii. Reevaluate estimate of rate of release

iii. Consider typical weather and wind conditions

B. Obtain additional information on typical transportation conditions, if possible



### 5. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

A. Reestimate vulnerable zone using reevaluated assumptions gathered from conversations with the facility and other expert sources

B. Identify characteristics of human population within estimated vulnerable zone

C. Identify critical facilities within estimated vulnerable zone



### 6. RISK ANALYSIS

A. Collect all information obtained in hazards identification and vulnerability analysis into a table

B. Obtain additional information on community and facility safeguards, response capabilities, and accident records

C. Make judgment of probability of release and severity of consequences

D. Organize all information (from A, B, and C) in a matrix format

E. Rank risks

F. Develop, or revise emergency plans for higher priority facilities



## INTEGRATING HAZARDS ANALYSIS INTO THE PLAN. See Exhibit 4-1 Emergency Planning Information Section.

12/87 2-27

## Exhibit 2-13


## EXAMPLE QUALITATIVE DEFINITIONS OF PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCEzoning

Providing a basic for requesting additionalIn general, the events with likelihood-consequence rankings of high-high, high-medium, medium-high, and medium-medium will require some additional attention and possible mitigating

measures. However, other less likely scenarios may also have serious consequences and be of high concern to a particular community and would warrant the focus of emergency planning.This initial approach to ranking hazards can enable the best use of the available planning resources.
The planning and decision-making situations inwhich risk analysis information may prove valuable include: summarizes routing requirements at the Federal, State, and local levels consistentwith the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) of 1975);

emergency response resources (e.g . , firedepartment vehicles equipped for hazardous materials incidents); and

� Developing new training materials or selecting available materials. The application of the results of a risk analysis tothe emergency planning process will be described in detail in Chapter 4.
Development of a comprehensive local emergency plan; Updating of facility emergency response plans: Planning major transportation routes forhazardous chemicals (it should be emphasized that the Federal Highway Administration publication FHWA-IP-80-15,Guidelines for Applying Criteria to Designate Routes for Transporting Hazardous Materials, should be used. This document The summary description of the components of hazards analysis presented in this chapter and Appendices I and J will provide a sound basis for understanding the next chapter of this guidance. Chapter 3 leads planners step by step through a hazards analysis, beginning with the initialscreening of reporting facilities to establish priorities, and followed by a subsequent reevaluation of the estimated vulnerable zones and hazards analysis by priority of potential hazard.

12/87 2-33

# 3. Step-by-Step Procedures for Conducting a Hazards Analysis of Extremely Hazardous Substances

Introduction Chapter 2 provided an overview of the underlying concepts and application of the three major steps in conducting a hazards analysis of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) . These steps are hazards identification, vulnerability analysis, and risk assessment.
This chapter provides procedures that can be used in a stepwise fashion to actually conduct a hazards analysis for a specific EHS as reported by a facility under Title Ill of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). This chapter contains only minimal information on the background and concepts of the hazards analysis. Effective use of these procedures requires that all information presented in Chapter 2 and Appendices I and J be reviewed and understood.

General Overview Because of time and resource limitations, planners will likely not be able to analyze

3.1.1 Hazards Identification The hazards identification for initial screening is based primarily on those facilities in the planning district that have reported EHSs in excess of the TPQs under Section 302, Title Ill of SARA. Identification of hazards from EHSs present in amounts lower than the TPQ and from other hazardous substances may be undertaken but is not mandatory under this Act. Step 1. Prepare a list of all facilities in the planning district that have reported EHSs under Section 302 of Title Ill. Include any additional facilities specified by the State emergency response commission (SERC). Step 2. Prepare a list of all EHSs at each facility that exceed the TPQs. Chemical identity hazards and plan in detail for all facilities immediately. Resources should be concentrated first on those situations that present the greatest potential risk should an accident occur. To accomplish this, the hazards analysis is separated into two phases. The first phase is the initial screening of all facilities reporting EHSs on their premises in excess of their threshold planning quantities (TPQs). The initial screening is performed to establish priorities among reporting facilities using credible worst case assumptions. The second phase represents a reassessment by order of priority of the potential hazards posed by the reporting facilities. This is accomplished through the reevaluation of the assumptions used for the initial screening. Both the initial screening and the reevaluation phases utilize the three basic steps of a hazards analysis: hazards identification, vulnerability analysis, and risk analysis.

should include chemical name and Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) registry number. Although it is not required under Title Ill of SARA, a list of EHSs below the TPQ could also be considered for hazards analysis. This information can be obtained from the facility representative. Step 3. Using chemical name or CAS number, find ambient physical state of substance in Appendix C. Step 4. Obtain from the facility representative information concerning the total quantity present, the average daily quantity, and maximum quantity in a single vessel or group of interconnected vessels for each EHS that exceeds the TPQ. 

# 3.1 Initial Screening to Set Priorities Among Sites

3-1(If the EHS is a solid, these two steps (3 and 4) guidance and close approximations of the should establish the quantity of solid in each of following properties for each EHS: the following forms: powdered (less than 100 i. Physical state at ambient conditions microns particle diameter), molten (liquid), or in ii. For liquids: the vapor pressure at solution .) ambient conditions and boiling point Step 5. Obtain from the facility representative temperature additional information on liquids, solids, and iii. For molten solids: the melting point mixtures or solutions: temperature and vapor pressure at the i. For liquids: temperature of liquid in melting point temperature
each vessel and whether or not the Approximation should be sufficiently close so vessel is located in a diked area. as not to significantly affect the size of the Information provided on temperature estimated zones. may be specific or may be stated Step 7. If the local emergency planning generally as ambient or above/below committee (LEPC) deems it necessary, ambient. For purposes of this guidance, obtain information in steps 1 through 6 for liquids at ambient or below ambient other EHSs that are present in quantities that temperature are evaluated at ambient, do not exceed the TPQ. and those at temperatures greater than ambient are evaluated at their boiling (NOTE: This step is not mandatory under Title Ill temperature. of SARA, but EHSs could pose a hazard to the community in quantities less than the TPQ.) ii. For molten solids: whether or not each vessel is in a diked area. Solid materials Step 8. Organize and record essential other than those in powdered or molten information and data. A discussion on the form, or in solution, may be considered assembly of information is provided in as low priority for hazards analysis. Section 2.3.4.
iii. For mixtures, solutions, or solids as powders: concentration of each EHS in a 3.1.2 Estimate Vulnerable Zones for mixture or solution, or fraction of a solid Screening Purposes with particle size less than 100 microns, For screening purposes, the vulnerable zone is on a weight percent basis. The hazards an estimate of the area potentially affected by analysis will be conducted using only the quantity of EHS present in the mixture or the release of an EHS using a set of fixed solution, or the quantity of solid with assumptions about the release and airborne particle size less than 100 microns. (For dispersion of the substance. example, 10,000 pounds of a solution of Step 1. For each EHS, use the maximum acrylamide in water at a concentration of quantity of material in a vessel or group of 30 percent by weight represents 3,000 interconnected vessels. pounds of acrylamide for hazards analysis.) For an EHS that is not in a mixture, solution, or partially powdered solid, this quantity is (NOTE: for the purposes of this guidance, the the maximum quantity that could be state (solid, liquid, gas) of the EHS is assumed released (QS). Use this value and proceed to be that for which it is listed at ambient to Step 3. To determine QS for an EHS in a conditions in Appendix C. The specific handling mixture or solution, or as a powder, proceed condition may place the EHS in a different state to Step 2. than listed, e.g., liquid handled as a gas. If the Step 2. For each EHS in a mixture, solution, or EHS is handled at other than ambient conditions, that is partially powdered or molten, the calculations should reflect the ambient state, determine the QS of EHS by multiplying the as explained in this guide.) maximum quantity of mixture, solution, or solid in a single vessel or interconnected Step 6. If facilities make confidentiality claims vessels by the concentration and/or portion for chemical identity, obtain from the facility that is molten or powdered as follows: representative close approximations of the 

### QS (Ibs) level of concern (LOC) as defined in this

3-2= Total Quantity of Mixture, Solution, or Solid (Ibs) x Concentration and/or portion molten or powdered (wt%) /100 Example: A facility has 1000 pounds of a 50 percent by weight solution of ammonia in water. The quantity of ammonia that could be released is: QS = 1000 pounds x 50/100 = 500 pounds Step 3. Determine the rate (in pounds per minute) of release of the EHS to air. Note that the calculation of the rate at which a substance becomes airborne is dependent upon its physical state and the temperature of the liquid or molten solid at the time of release. If the physical state at ambient temperature is a gas, continue as described below in Section A. If the physical state is liquid, proceed to Section B. For soiids, refer to Section C. Once the rate of release (QR) is determined for each substance, proceed to step 4 to determine the vulnerable zone for each facility.

A. Gases

A-1. Determine the rate of release to air (QR) by dividing the maximum quantity of EHS that could be released from a vessel or group of interconnected vessels (QS) by 10: QR (Ibs/min) = QS (Ibs)/lO minutes Example: 2000 pounds (QS) of chlorine is stored in a single 1 ton container. The rate of release to air (QR) is: QR = 2000 Ibs/lO minutes QR = 200 Ibs per minute.

B. Liquids B-1. If the liquid is handled only at or below ambient conditions, use the Liquid Factor Ambient (LFA) from the list of EHSs in Appendix C (see Exhibit C-1 and C-2). If the liquid is handled at temperatures greater than ambient, use the Liquid Factor Boiling (LFB) from the list in Appendix C. If the chemical identity is claimed confidential and the facility representative has provided a close approximation of the vapor pressure and boiling point at the handling temperature for the confidential liquid, use Appendix G to calculate an LFA or LFB.

3-3 B-2. If the area surrounding the vessel(s) is not diked, go directly to B-6. If the area is diked, determine the area bounded by the dike in square feet (ft 2 ). B-3. To determine if using the diked area is appropriate, estimate the area of the pool that might be formed by the spilled liquid if the area were not diked as follows: Area of Pool (ft 2 ) = QS (Ibs) x 0.49 B-4. Compare this area to the diked area. If the estimated area of the pool is smaller than the diked area, go to B-6 and do not use the diked area. If the diked area is smaller, continue to B-5. Example: 10,000 pounds of acrolein is stored in a tank in a diked area of 1600 square feet. The pool area is derived as follows: Area of Pool = 10,000 x 0.49 = 4900 ft 2
Since the diked area (1600 ft 2 ) is less than the calculated area of the pool (4900 ft 2 ), use the diked area for further calculations.

B-5. Determine the Rate of Release to air (QR) for a liquid spilled in a diked area using the following formula: QR (Ibs/min) = LFA or LFB x Diked Area (ft 2 ) x 2.8 (NOTE: the factors 2.8 and 1.4 in B-5 and B-6, respectively, take into account the low wind speed of 1.5 m/set (3.4 miles/hour); see Appendix G.) Example: 50,000 pounds of pure, hot acrolein is spilled in a diked area of 1600 square feet. Using the liquid factor boiling (LFB) of 0.02, the rate of release to air (QR) is:
QR = 0.02 x 1600 ft 2 x 2.8 QR = 90 Ibs/min
B-6. Determine the Rate of Release to air (QR) for a liquid spilled in an undiked area using this formula: QR (Ibs/min) = QS (Ibs) x LFA or LFB x 1.4 Example: 50,000 pounds of pure, hot acrolein is spilled in an undiked area.Using the liquid factor boiling (LFB) of 0.02, the rate of release to air (QR) is:
QR = 50,000 Ibs x 0.02 x 1.4
QR = 1400 Ibs/min

C. Solids C-1. If the solid is powdered (particles less than 100 microns in diameter) or in solution, go to C-2. If the solid is molten, go to C-3. If the solid is not powdered, not in solution, nor molten, defer hazards analysis of this chemical and begin with another chemical at this facility, or proceed to another facility. Solids other than in powdered, molten, or dissolved form are less likely to become airborne.

C-2. It is assumed that the maximum quantity of a solid that might be released (QS) is the quantity finely powdered or in solution. The QR of a powder or solution of a solid is QS divided by 10 or: QR (Ibs/min) = QS (Ibs)/lO minutes

C-3. For molten solids, find the Liquid Factor Molten (LFM) from the list of EHSs in Appendix C (see Exhibit C-1 or C-2). If no LFM is available on the list, consult with facility personnel to obtain the necessary data to calculate the LFM as described in Appendix G. For molten solids claimed confidential, obtain a close approximation of the vapor pressure and melting point temperature from the facility representative and calculate an LFM using the formulae in Appendix G.

C-4. If the area around the vessel(s) holding the molten solid is not diked, proceed to C-6. If the area around the vessel(s) is diked, determine if it is appropriate to use the diked area by comparing it to the liquid pool area as described in steps B-3 to B-5.

C-5. Determine the QR for a molten material in a diked area as follows: QR (Ib/min) = LFM x Diked Area (ft 2 ) x 2.8 C-6. Determine the QR for a molten material in an undiked area as follows: QR (Ib/min) = quantity actually molten (Ibs) x LFM x 1.4 Step 4. Select the LOC for the chemical from the list of EHSs in Appendix C (see Exhibit C-1 or C-2). In instances of confidentiality claims, obtain this value or close approximation from the reporting facility. Step 5. Estimate the distance (radius) of the screening zone using Exhibit 3-1 as follows: i. Locate across the top of the table the LOC value that most closely approximates the LOC for the EHS in question. If the LOC value falls halfway between two values on the table, use the value on the table that is smaller (to the left). ii. Locate the value in the left hand column that most closely approximates the calculated QR (Ibs/min) . If the calculated OR is halfway between two values on the table, use the value which is larger (lower on the table).

iii Read across and down to the distance given in tenths of a mile. This value is the calculated radius of a circle encompassing the potential release site and represents the size (in tenths of a mile) of the estimated vulnerable zone for the initial screening of reporting facilities. Example: The LOC for nitrobenzene is 0.10 grams per cubic meter and the estimated rate of release to air (QR) is 15 pounds per minute. The radius of the estimated vulnerable zone is 0.4 miles. Step 6. Using a local map of appropriate scale, draw a circle to scale around the potential release site with the potential release site as the center and the estimated vulnerable zone distance as the radius. This represents the estimated vulnerable zone for initial screening of reporting facilities. Step 7. Identify populations and essential service facilities that are located within the estimated vulnerable zone. Step 8. Record essential data. A discussion of the assembly of information and an example format are provided in Section 2.3.4.

3-4I

I 

# Worked Examples for Initial Screening

Example 1. Gas Release (Chlorine) An 800 pound tank of chlorine, which is normally a gas, is stored at a water treatment plant. No other tanks are nearby and it is not interconnected to any other storage vessels containing chlorine. For screening purposes, it is assumed that the total quantity in the tank can be released, and the release will take place over a ten minute period. Therefore,

OR = QS/lO QR = 800 pounds/l0 minutes = 80 pounds per minute. The LOC for chlorine is 0.0073 grams per cubic meter (g/m 3 ) (from Exhibit C-1 or C-2 in Appendix C) . Locate the LOC listed along the top row of Exhibit 3-1. The LOC of chlorine falls between two values on the table: the lower value is used (i.e., LOC = 0.005 g/m 3). Locate the OR (80 pounds per minute) in the left hand column. Read across from QR = 80 and down front LOC = 0.005 to the distance. The estimated vulnerable zone has a radius of greater than 10 miles from the chlorine storage tank.

Example 2. Gas Release (Ammonia) A tank truck contains 3.000 pounds of ammonia. For screening purposes it is assumed that the entire 3,000 pounds is released during a ten-minute period following an accident: the airborne quantity released per minute (QR) is calculated as follows: QR = 3,000 pounds110 minutes = 300 pounds per minute The LOC for ammonia (from Exhibit C-1 or C-2 in Appendix C) is 0.035 g/m 3

. Locate the LOC in the top row of Exhibit 3-l. Locate the QR, 300 pounds per minute, in the left-hand column. Using Exhibit 3-1 and reading across from 300 pounds per minute and down from 0.035 g/m3 to the intersection of the row and column, the radius of the vulnerable zone or the distance over which the concentration of ammonia may reach the LOC is estimated to be 7.6 miles.

Example 3. Pure Liquid at Elevated Temperature, Undiked Area Pure methyl isocyanate is handled in an undiked 1000 pound reactor in a pesticide plant. The chemical is handled at warm temperatures (39°C). The LFB from Exhibit C-1 is 0.02. The quantity released to air per minute is calculated as follows: QR = QS (Ibs) x LFB x 1.4 QR = 1000 pounds x 0.02 x 1.4 = 28 pounds per minute The LOC for methyl isocyanate is 0.0047 g/m 3 (see Exhibit C-1 or C-2 in Appendix C). Using Exhibit 3-l the radius of the vulnerable zone is estimated. Locate the LOC in the top

row. The LOC of methyl isocyanate falls between two values. Use the lower value, 0.0035 g/m 3

. Locate the QR, 28 pounds per minute, in the left hand column. The QR falls between two values. Use the higher value, 30 pounds per minute. Read across from the rate of release of 30 pounds per minute and down from the LOC of 0.0035 g/m 3 to find the distance. The vulnerable zone distance is estimated to be 7.6 miles.

3-5(Note that for methyl isocyanate, there is a large fraction of the chemical would become a possibility that a runaway polymerization solid and stay in the reactor while the remainder reaction could produce very high temperatures would be quickly released to the atmosphere as and pressures in the reactor. In this case, a a gas.)

Example 4. Liquid at Ambient Temperature in Acrolein in a 50 percent solution by weight, at ambient temperature, is stored in an undiked 50,000 pound tank. The LFA from Exhibit C-l is 0.007. The airborne quantity released per unit time to air is calculated as follows:
OS = 50,000 pounds x 50/100 QS = 25,000 pounds


### QR = 25,000 pounds x 0.007 x 1.4 QR = 245 pounds per minute The LOC for acrolein is 0.0011 g/m 3 (see Exhibit C-1 or C-2 in Appendix C) . The distance Mixture or Solution in an Undiked Area
over which the concentration of acrolein in air may reach the LOC is estimated from Exhibit 3-1. Read across from 250 pounds per minute, and down from the LOC of 0.0007 to the distance. The vulnerable zone radius is estimated to be greater than 10 miles. (10 miles is the maximum radius that can be estimated by this method.) Locate the LOC in the top row. The closest value lower than 0.0011 is 0.001. Locate the QR in the left hand column. The closest value higher than 245 pounds per minute is 250.

Example 5. Liquid in Diked Area About 50,000 pounds of pure, hot acrolein is stored in a reactor. Since the liquid is hot, the LFB from Exhibit C-1, 0.02, is used in the calculation of the quantity released. The area around the reactor is diked and it is 40 feet square (1,600 ft 2 ). Check this against the area of the pool generated by the reactor contents: Area of pool = QS x 0.49 = 50,000 x 0.49 = 24,500 ft 2

Since the diked area is smaller the OR is: QR (Ibslmin) = LFB x diked area (ft 2 ) x 2.8 QR = 0.02 x 1600 x 2.8 = 90 pounds per minute Using Exhibit 3-1 locate the LOC of 0.0011 g/m 3 for acrolein in the top row. The closest value lower than 0.0011 is 0.001. Locate the release rate of 90 pounds per minute in the left hand column. Read across from 90 pounds per minute and down from 0.001 g/m 3 to find the distance. The distance over which the airborne concentration of acrolein could exceed the LOC (i.e., the radius of the estimated vulnerable zone) is estimated to be greater than 10 miles.

Example 6. Finely Powdered Solid A site has 10,000 pounds of acrylamide stored The rate of release to air is: in a large bin. About 20 percent of it has a particle size less than 100 microns. The 

### QR = OS/l0 minutes = 2,000/10 maximum quantity that could be released (QS) = 200 Ibs per minute
is: The LOC for acrylamide is 0.11 g/m 3 (see OS = 10,000 Ibs x 20/100 = 2,000 Exhibit C-1 or C-2 in Appendix C). Exhibit 3-1 is used to determine the distance over which the Ibs.

3-6concentration of acrylamide in air may reach the across from the OR of 200 pounds per minute LOC . Locate the LOC in the top row. The and down from the LQC of 0.1 g/m 3, the closest value lower than 0.11 is 0.1 g/m 3

. distance is estimated to be 2.1 miles. Locate the QR in the left hand column. Reading

3.1.3 Risk Analysis 

### for Initial Screening of Reporting Facilities For purposes of initial screening, the risk analysis is limited to a very rough estimate of the likelihood or probability of an incident and the severity of consequences to humans. 

### Step 1. Evaluate populations at risk in the estimated vulnerable zone. This should include estimated number of individuals, types of populations such as elderly, children, infirm, incarcerated, residents, and transients such as daily workers, audiences, and spectators. 

### Step 2. Evaluate critical facilities at risk in the estimated vulnerable zone. This should include hospitals or other health care facilities, fire and police stations, other emergency response facilities, and communications facilities. 

### Step 3. Establish a relative ranking system for the potential consequences posed by hazards from reporting facilities. This may be qualitative such as high, medium, or low, or may be a simple numerical system. For further information, see Section 2.3.1. 

### Step 4. If available, use known historical information about incidents in the area, estimate the likelihood of a release. (NOTE: for most hazards, the probability of occurrence will be assumed to be the same.) 

### Step 5. Record the judgements made in steps 3 and 4.



# 3.2 Reevaluation; Planning for Facilities by Priority

The reevaluation process provides the opportunity to analyze further the potential hazards of reporting facilities by order of priority. This effort is characterized by the stepwise reevaluation of certain of the credible worst case assumptions used to estimate vulnerable zones during the initial screening process. It is important to emphasize that changes in assumptions resulting in a reduction in size of the zone should be considered with extreme care and prudence. Less conservative assumptions will decrease the estimated zone. In the event of 

### a release under less favorable conditions, a greater area and perhaps a greater population 

### may be affected.



### 3.2.1 Hazards ldentification Step 1. Review the priority list of reporting facilities developed during the initial screening process and, starting with the highest priority facilities, begin reevaluation of assumptions that were used to estimate the credible worst case vulnerable zones. Step 2. List potential hazards other than those associated with acute lethality. (This step is not mandatory.)



### 3.2.2 Reevaluation of the Vulnerable Zones step 1. Reevaluate the assumptions used to estimate the quantity of EHS likely to be released from 

### a vessel or vessels. Planners should seek advice from appropriate experts including representatives of the facility. Estimates by the facility or other sources of the total quantity of EHS that could be released from a vessel and supporting rationale should be reviewed carefully. These may include revised estimates of the quantity of a liquid likely to be spilled based on actual quantities present or processed and the capabilities to mitigate a release. 

### step 2. Reevaluate the assumptions used to estimate the rate at which the EHS becomes

3-7have calculations or data on the actual amount of substance that could be released when solids are molten, in solution, in powdered form, or vaporized. If there is no way for powders or solutions to become airborne due to explosions or problems with pneumatic systems, release of the substance beyond the boundaries of the facility is not likely. This information should be included in the risk analysis (below). Similarly, molten solids may “freeze” upon contact with air at ambient temperatures and may not evaporate, or conditions may differ from those used to calculate the LFM. Obtain appropriate input from facility representatives and calculate a new LFM or use other data from the facility or other sources to estimate the rate at which the solid becomes airborne. As for liquids, the rate at which a molten solid evaporates from the pool depends upon the wind speed at the time of release. Consult Appendix G to calculate a factor to account for wind in the calculation of the rate of release to air of a molten solid. Once more realistic site-specific information has been collected and reevaluated regarding the release rate to air of gases, liquids, and solids, be sure to record the new data and the justification for changes. Then proceed to the next step (Step 3) in the reevaluation of the vulnerable zones. Step 3 . Determine if the area around the facility is predominately rural or urban, as follows: If more than 50% of the land within a mile (1.6 km) radius is used as:
1. Heavy industrial (large chemical, other manufacturing facilities, 3-5 story buildings, flat roofs, grass and trees extremely rare), or
2. Light to moderate industrial (rail yards, truck depots, warehouses, industrial parks, minor fabrication, l-3 story buildings, flat roofs, limited grass and trees), or
3. Commercial (office and apartments, hotels, 10 story heights, flat roofs, limited grass and trees), or
4. Compact residential (single and some multiple family dwellings closely spaced, 2 story or less, alleys, pitched or flat roofs, limited lawns and few old established shade trees, no driveways), then the area should be classified as urban. Otherwise use rural conditions. Select appropriate tables for use under Step 4. Guidance may be sought from appropriate experts. Step 4. Consider the principal meteorological conditions of wind speed and atmospheric stability. Consult local, State, or regional
sources for information on frequency distributions of wind speed, direction, and atmospheric stability. This guidance provides tables for four different conditions (NOTE: Exhibits for Chapter 3 are at the end of the Chapter):

a. The worst case conditions of rural topography, moderately stable atmospheric conditions (F stability) and low wind speed of 1.5 meters per second (3.4 mph) (Exhibit 3-1); b. Urban area, low wind speed of 1.5 meters per second (3.4 mph), and moderately stable atmospheric conditions (F stability) predominate (Exhibit 3-2) ;

c . Rural area, moderate wind speed of 5.2 meters per second (about 12 mph), and less stable atmospheric conditions (D stability) (Exhibit 3-3); and d. Urban area, moderate wind speed of 5.2 meters per second (about 12 mph), and less stable atmospheric conditions (D stability) (Exhibit 3-4). Step 5. Evaluate the effect of varying wind speed and atmospheric stability on the estimated vulnerable zone by using Exhibits 3-3 and 3-4 (wind speed of 5.2 meters per second (12 mph) and D stability). For evaluation of other wind speeds and stabilities, refer to instructions in Appendix G. Decide to retain or change values for wind speed and stability and record final decision. If values for the assumptions used are not found in this guidance, consult experts including representatives of the facility. Step 6. Consider the value of the LOC used to estimate the vulnerable zone during the initial screening process. The one-tenth of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) value or its approximation represents a credible worst case exposure level. Other exposure guidelines may be obtained from Appendix

3-9D, from the facility in question, or from appropriate experts. step 7. Evaluate the effect of changing the value of the LOC on the estimated zone and its impact on the risk analysis. After careful consideration of the impact on the risk analysis, retain or change the value of the LOC and record it. Step 8. Using all revised data and assumptions, estimate new vulnerable zones and decide whether to utilize the reevaluated zones in the risk analysis process. This may be an iterative process.

3.2.3 Risk Analysis
The risk analysis performed during the reevaluation process includes an assessment of the likelihood as well as the severity of an accidental release. This relative risk analysis is qualitative in nature, although LEPCs have the option to develop a relative ranking on a numerical basis. step 1. Based on information obtained from Chapter 2 and Appendices I and J of this guide, the facility representative, historical records, and appropriate experts, carefully evaluate the likelihood (probability) that an accidental release of a particular EHS will occur and not be contained or mitigated. Step 2. Assign a high, medium, or low ranking for the probability in Step 1 and record the decision as discussed in Section 2.3. Step 3. Using the reevaluated vulnerable zones, again evaluate populations at risk. This should include an estimated number of individuals, as well as types of populations such as elderly, children, infirm, and incarcerated. The evaluation should also consider transient populations (e.g., daily workers, audiences, and spectators), Step 4. Evaluate critical facilities at risk within the reevaluated zone. This should include hospitals or other health care facilities, fire and police stations, other emergency response facilities, and communications facilities. Step 5. Based on Steps 3 and 4, establish a relative ranking system, for the severity of consequences to humans associated with potential hazards posed by reporting facilities. This may be simply qualitative (high, medium, low) as discussed in Section 2.3, or it may be a simple numerical system. Step 6. Using Steps 2 and 5, establish an overall relative risk for each facility, and record the relative rankings of facilities (see Section 2.3.1). This completes the hazards analysis as presented in this guidance document, This information can also be used for the development of site-specific release scenarios for training exercises and for refining response plans.

3-10

# 4. Using the Results of a Hazards Analysis

As noted in Chapter 1, hazards analysis is a necessary first step in developing a comprehensiveemergency plan; it is a decision-making process that helps planners screen and decide which facilities to plan for. After local planners have completed a hazards identification, vulnerability analysis, and risk analysis, they should develop appropriate response procedures and organize all this material into an emergency response plan. This information can also be used for the development of site-specific release scenarios for training exercises and for refining response plans. This chapter summarizes the plan contents required by Title Ill of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), lists the information provided by by a hazards analysis, briefly discusses three case studies forplanning purposes, and describes how computers can be helpful to the planning process. Planners should use the National Response Team’s Hazardous Materials Energency Plannin g Guide (NRT-1) guidance document and the information generated by using this guidance to develop emergency plans for their district.



# 4.1 What the Plan Must Contain

Title Ill of SARA requires each emergency plan to include at least each of the following:

(1) Identification of facilities within the local emergency planning district (LEPD) subject to the Title Ill requirements: identification ofroutes likely to be used for the transportation of substances on the list of extremelyhazardous substances (EHSs) ; and identification of additional facilities contributing or subjected to additional risk due to their proximity to facilities subject to Title Ill ofSARA, such as hospitals or natural gas facilities.

(2) Methods and procedures to be followed by facility owners and operators and localemergency and medical personnel to respond to any releases of EHSs.

(3) Designation of a community emergencycoordinator and facility emergency coordinators, who shall make determinations necessary to implement the plan.

(4) Procedures providing reliable, effective, and timely notification by the emergencycoordinators and the community emergency coordinator to persons designated in the emergency plan, and to the public, that a release has occurred. 

## (5) Methods for determining the occurrence of a release, and the area or population likely to be affected by such release.
(6) A description of facilities in the communitysubject to Title Ill requirements and emergency equipment at each facility in the community.
(7) Evacuation plans, including provisions for a precautionary evacuation and alternative traffic routes.
(8) Training programs, including schedules for training of local emergency response and medical personnel.
(9) Methods and schedules for exercising the emergency plan. The information gathered in the hazards analysiswill be useful in fulfilling several of these requirements, in particular (l), (4), (5) and (6). NRT-1 (page 38, Planning Element G) discussesthe integration of the hazards analysis into emergency planning, and should be used as a complement to this guide. NRT-1 discusses approaches to the planning process, whether a community chooses to develop a multi-hazard

12/87 4-lemergency operations plan (EOP) or incorporate hazardous materials plan. Sample formats for hazardous materials planning into an existing emergency plans are outlined and planning eleEOP, or to develop or revise a single-hazard ments are discussed in detail.



# 4.2 Planning Information Provided by the Hazards Analysis

As a result of the hazards analysis, the following types of information concerning EHSs should be available during the initial stages of the planning process :

� Location (1) What facilities have EHSs
(2) What transportation routes have EHSs

(1) The maximum quantity likely to be released at a facility
(2) The maximum quantity likely to be transported at one time per transportation vehicle

� Potential risks (1) Likelihood of release
(2) Consequences of release

� Other hazards to consider
(1) Whether the material is flammable
(2) Whether water can be used on it
(3) Reactivity with other materials present to form other hazardous substances and/or to release heat (4) Likelihood of damage to property
(5) Likelihood of damage to the environment

� Emergency response information (1) Size of the vulnerable zone in case of a release
(2) How many people are likely to be within the vulnerable zones
(3) Sensitive populations within the vulnerable

zones (4) Essential service facilities within the vulnerable zones
(5) What emergency medical procedures should be followed
(6) What specialized equipment emergencymedical response personnel or local hospitals need to treat victims of exposure and whether they have such equipment
(7) Type of protective gear (clothing andequipment) needed by emergency response personnel

- Is it available at the facility?

- Is it available to emergency responders?
(8) What sampling and monitoring devices can be used to determine concentration levels

- Are such devices available? 

## (9) Containment/cleanup procedures 

## (10) What materials are needed for containment, neutralization, and cleanup

- Are these materials available?

12/87 4-2

# 4.3 Case Studies from Hazards Analysis

To illustrate the planning process, and the use ofhazards analysis in this process, the same hypothetical releases of chlorine, ammonia, and methyl isocyanate as described in Chapter 2(Exhibit 2-12) and Chapter 3 are used as examples. Exhibit 4-1 presents relevant data on the three example chemicals and considerations that the planning committee needs to address. This information can be used in the planningprocess to ensure that all needs can be accommodated should an emergency arise.

In each of the case studies, a release of a hazardous substance is possible and both the responsible party and local government must beprepared to handle the resulting hazards and associated problems. In order to respond in aneffective and safe manner, local emergency responders (and private sector managers in thecases of fixed facilities such as the water treatment plant and the pesticide manufacturing plant portrayed in these case studies) must work together to create a comprehensive hazardousmaterials emergency plan. In order to be effective, the plan must be tested and updated atleast annually and more often as needed if conditions change after establishment of the plan.

In each of the case studies, planners must firstconsider the safety of people within the estimated vulnerable zones. Not only must planners address evacuation but also in-place sheltering, as vapor clouds may move into populated areas too quickly to allow for a safe evacuation. Adequate warning systems must be in place to notify the public of a release. Personswho will require protection from hazardous releases include: a) people located in ‘the immediate area of the release (plant employees in the case studies involving chlorine and methylisocyanate, and motorists in the case of an anhydrous ammonia tank truck accident), b) people in areas threatened by hazards resulting from the released materials, and c) emergency responders. (Appendix H presents a detaileddiscussion on evacuation and in-place sheltering, including decision-making, planning, conducting an evacuation, sheltering of evacuees, and re-entry.)A second planning consideration is hazard control and containment operations. Procedures for controlling and containing a hazardous release must be established and identified within the plan and exercised regularly. In each of thecase studies, the hazardous material has multiple hazards associated with it. (Chlorine is poisonous, corrosive, and can act as an oxidizer;anhydrous ammonia is corrosive and can be fatal if inhaled: and methyl isocyanate is poisonous and extremely flammable.) Multiple hazardsrequire special expertise in control and containment procedures. Regarding incidents where local government and private industry are both involved in remedial actions (such as the cases of the water treatment plant and the pesticideplant), planners must set forth provisions for cooperation between the two groups to ensure thatresponse actions are coordinated and that direction and control are centralized. Another key planning consideration is that of emergency medical care. Provisions must be made for on-scene emergency medical care(establishment of a triage area may be necessary) t transport of victims to hospitals, and emergency room treatment. In order for this emergency care system to function properly, the hazardous materials plan should establishprocedures coordinating the activities of the local emergency medical services (e.g., fire/rescue department, rescue squad, ambulanceservice) and local hospital(s) to ensure that victims are treated quickly and effectively. Specialized medical supplies to treat exposures to certain chemicals should be identified duringthe planning process so that adequate and current supplies will be available.

Planners must address several other areas ofcommunity response as well. These include incident command; communications: search and rescue: detection, monitoring, sampling andanalysis: damage assessment: cleanup: decontamination: and cost recovery. The hazardous

12/87 4-3materials plan must address each of these areas of community response by delegating specificresponsibilities to appropriate agencies of the local government. The plan also should include assistance available from regional, State, and Federal agencies as well as private industry and volunteer organizations.
In addition to addressing emergency procedures, the hazardous materials plan must also address what equipment is needed to contain and control hazardous materials spills and fires.The plan must identify the equipment, its location, how to get it to the incident scene, and howto use it safely and effectively. The most important specialized equipment that will be needed is protective gear for the emergency responders.This includes fully encapsulated chemical protective suits, thermal protection, and positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus. Interms of equipment needed to stop a leak, specialized plugging and/or patching devices are likely to be needed, unless the opening in the

Title Ill requires each planning committee “to evaluate the resources necessary to develop, implement and exercise the emergency plan” and to “make recommendations with respect to additional resources that may be required andthe means for providing such additional resources.”

The NRT believes that it would be very useful tohave these resource evaluations and recommendations available for the Regional Response Teams (RRTs) at the time of the plan reviews. Many of the suggested plan changes may be rather modest and are not likely to require theexpenditure of significant local emergency planning committee (LEPC) resources. Other changes may be more difficult to accomplish and may require substantially more resources than are available to the LEPC. RRT comments may be more useful if the RRTs can formulate them in a way that takes into consideration theLEPC’s resource base. RRTs may wish to identify those suggestions for improvement that could be made with available resources and those that might require additional resources. 

# 4.4 Plan Reviews in the Context of Local Resource Needs damaged tank is too large to seal off. In orderto keep track of hazardous material concentration levels, specialized monitoring devices will be needed. Monitoring is extremely important in the case of methyl isocyanate due to its vapors being odorless (but still highly dangerous) in low concentrations. Specialized cleanup and neutralizing materials (e.g., soda ash, caustic soda, activated carbon, diatomaceous earth) likely will be needed as well. Containment equipment also must be available at the accident scene. Materials (e.g., soil, sand) and heavy equipment (e.g., bulldozers, back hoes, dump trucks) likely will be used to construct dikes to contain spilled material or contaminated runofffrom vapor knockdown and fire suppression operations. The heavy equipment also will beneeded following the incident to remove contaminated soils and pavement. Lack of information concerning these specialized resources could make response efforts for a hazardous materials release unnecessarily difficult.

LEPCs may include their resource requirementsin a separate section of their plans, provide information in a separate report or present requirements in a formal request for additional resources submitted to the cognizant State emergency response commission (SERC) . Regardless of the method used, RRTs would be interested in information on:

the personnel resources required by theLEPC in the preparation of the plan, including man-months of effort, and technicalexpertise provided and the additional resources that the LEPC would like to have available to revise and strengthen this plan: the financial resources required to develop the plan and the financial resources that the LEPC would like to have available in the future: the personnel and financial resources that would be required to exercise the plan, asproposed by the LEPC in the section on exercises: and

12/87 4-7the means by which the LEPC generated lieves that the necessary additional rethe resources necessary to develop the sources could be secured.plan and the means by which the LEPC be

# 4.5 Use of Computerized Systems in Planning

Computerized systems have many applicationsthat would be useful to the LEPC as it incorporates hazards analysis information into a comprehensive emergency plan. They could be used for:

• Listing the facilities and the major transportation routes that handle or carry hazardous substances through the planning district and for storing and reporting chemical and hazards analysis information. Thiscould facilitate data management associated with hazards identification.

• Modelling the release of chemicals and estimating vulnerable zones (vulnerability analysis). The system’s capabilities couldbe restricted to the simplified methods outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 or could include a more sophisticated analysis. A furtherlevel of sophistication which considers meteorological, topographical, and other sitespecific release scenario variables could also be developed according to the level ofdetail the local planning committee considers appropriate.

� Identifying the regulatory requirements ofTitle Ill as they relate to chemical emergency preparedness.
In addition, computerized systems could be used to provide emergency management and response information. Appendix K provides an evaluation guide in the form of a checklist forhazardous chemical inventory, planning, and response computerized systems. This checklistwas developed to assist local emergency planning groups in evaluating and selecting computer systems and software that will have capabilities relevant to their environmental management and planning needs.

12/87 4-8AAR/BOE

ACGIH

AlChE

AIHA

ATSDR

BLEVE

CAER

CAS

CEPP

CERCLA

CHLOREP

CHRIS

CMA

DOD

DOT

EEC

EEG

EEGL

EHS

EOP

EPA

ERPG

FDA

FEMA

FIFRA

FMEA

FMECA

FTA

HAZOP 

### APPENDIX A 

## ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS ACRONYMS

Association of American Railroads/Bureau of Explosives American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists American Institute of Chemical Engineers
American Industrial Hygiene Association Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion Community Awareness and Emergency Response (a CMA program)

Chemical Abstract Service
Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program (EPA) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“Superfund”) Chlorine Emergency Plan (developed by the Chlorine Institute)
Chemical Hazard Response Information System

Chemical Manufacturers Association
Department of Defense
Department of Transportation
European Economic Community Emergency Exposure Guideline (developed by Dow Chemical)
Emergency Exposure Guidance Level (developed by the NRC) Extremely Hazardous Substance Emergency Operation Plan

Environmental Protection Agency Emergency Response Planning Guideline
Food and Drug Administration
Federal Emergency Management Agency Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis Hazard and Operability Study



### A-lHMTA Hazardous Materials Transportation Act

IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health

LC50 Median Lethal Concentration

LCLO Lethal Concentration Low

LD50 Median Lethal Dose

LDLO Lethal Dose Low

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee

LEPD Local Emergency Planning District

LFA Liquid Factor Ambient

LFB Liquid Factor Boiling

LFM Liquid Factor Molten

LOC Level of Concern

MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet

NAS National Academy of Sciences

NCP National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NRC National Response Center or National Research Council

NRT National Response Team

NRT-1 Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide, prepared by the National Response Team

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OPP Office of Pesticide Programs (EPA)

OSC On-Scene Coordinator

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OSWER Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response 

### (EPA)

PEL Permissible Exposure Limit

PMN Premanufacture Notice

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment

QR Rate of Release of EHS to Air

QS Maximum Quantity of Chemical that Could Be Released

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

REL Recommended Exposure Limits

RQ Reportable Quantity

RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration 

### (DOT)

A-2RRT Regional Response Team

RTECS Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances

SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986

SERC State Emergency Response Commission

SPCC Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures (Plan)

SPEGL Short-term Public Exposure Guidance Level (developed by the NRC)

Title III Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (Part of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986)

TLVs* Threshold Limit Value

TWA Time Weighted Average

TPQ Threshold Planning Quantity

TSCA Toxic Substances Control Act

USCG United States Coast Guard

USGS United States Geological Survey

VP Vapor Pressure

VSD Virtually Safe Dose

Vz Vulnerable Zone

WB World Bank

*TLVs is a registered trademark



### A-3

## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Accident Site The location of an unexpected occurrence, failure, or loss, either at a facility or along a transportation route, resulting in a release of hazardous materials: an incident site.

Acute Severe but of short duration. Acute health effects are those that occur immediately after exposure to hazardous chemicals. Acutely Toxic Chemicals Chemicals that can cause severe short- and long-term health effects after a single, brief exposure (short duration). These chemicals (when ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through the skin) can cause damage to living tissue, impairment of the central nervous system, severe illness, or, in extreme cases, death.

Airborne Release Release of any chemical into the air.

Ambient Surrounding. Ambient temperatures are temperatures of the surrounding area (e.g., air or water).
By-Product Material, other than the principal product, that is produced or generated as a consequence of an industrial process.

Chemical Process A particular method of manufacturing or making a chemical, usually involving a number of steps or operations.

Chronic Of long duration or having frequent recurrence. Chronic health effects are those that become apparent or continue for some time after exposure to hazardous chemicals.

Combustion Product Material produced or generated during the burning or oxidation of a material,

Command Post Facility located at a safe distance upwind from an accident site, where the on-scene coordinator, responders, and technical representatives can make response decisions, deploy manpower and equipment, maintain liaison with media, and handle communications. Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) Program Program developed by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), to assist chemical plant managers in taking the initiative in cooperating with local communities to develop integrated (community/industry) plans for responding to releases of hazardous materials. Contingency Plan A document to identify and catalog the elements required to respond to an emergency, to define responsibilities and specific tasks, and to serve as a response guide.

Critical Facilities Facilities essential to emergency response, such as fire stations, police stations, hospitals, and communication centers. Decomposition Product Material produced or generated as a result of the physical or chemical degradation of a parent material.

A-4Dike A barrier such as a low wall or embankment designed to prevent a spill from spreading or flooding.
Disposal The removal of waste material to a site or facility that is specifically designed and permitted to receive such wastes.
Emergency A situation created by an accidental release or spill of hazardous chemicals which poses a threat to the safety of workers, residents, the environment, or property.

Evacuation Removal of residents and other persons from an area of danger.

Exercise A simulated accident or release set up to test emergency response methods and for use as a training tool.
Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHSs) A list of chemicals identified by EPA on the basis of toxicity, and listed under Title Ill of SARA. These chemicals are listed in Appendix C. The list is subject to revision.
Facility Defined for Section 302 of Title Ill of SARA as all buildings, equipment, structures, and other stationary items which are located on a single site or on contiguous or adjacent sites and which are owned or operated by the same person (or by any person which controls, is controlled by, or under common control with, such person). For purposes of emergency release notification, the term includes motor vehicles, rolling stock, and aircraft.
Facility Emergency Coordinator Facility representative for each facility with an extremely hazardous substance (EHS) in a quantity exceeding its threshold planning quantity (TPQ), who participates in the emergency planning process.

Fenceline Outermost perimeter of a facility property.

Hazard Any situation that has the potential for causing damage to life, property, and/or the environment.

Hazardous Chemical Any chemical which is a physical hazard or a health hazard as defined under OSHA 29 CFR 1910.1201.

Hazardous Material Any substance or material in a quantity or form which may be harmful to humans, animals, crops, water systems, or other elements of the environment if accidentally released. Hazardous materials include: explosives, gases (compressed, liquefied, or dissolved), flammable and combustible liquids, flammable solids or substances, oxidizing substances, poisonous and infectious substances, radioactive materials, and corrosives.
Hazardous Substances (Superfund) Substances designated as hazardous under CERCLA (also known as Superfund); CERCLA incorporates substances listed under the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, RCRA, and TSCA Section 7.

A-5Hazards Analysis The procedure for identifying potential sources of a hazardous materials release, determining the vulnerability of an area to a hazardous materials release, and comparing hazards to determine risks to a community.
Hazards Identification Provides information on which facilities have extremely hazardous substances (EHSs), what those chemicals are, and how much there is at each facility. Also provides information on how the chemicals are stored and whether they are used at high temperatures, Mandatory facility reporting under Title Ill will provide most of the information needed for a hazards identification, Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) The maximum level to which a healthy worker can be exposed for 30 minutes and escape without suffering irreversible health effects or escape-impairing symptoms,

Lethal Causing or capable of causing death. Lethal Concentration Low (LCLO) The lowest concentration of a chemical at which some test animals died following inhalation exposure. Lethal Dose Low (LDLO) The lowest dose of chemical at which some test animals died following exposure. Level of Concern (LOC) The concentration of an extremely hazardous substance (EHS) in the air above which there may be serious irreversible health effects or death as a result of a single exposure for a relatively short period of time. Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) A committee appointed by the State emergency response commission (SERC), as required by Title Ill of SARA, to formulate a comprehensive emergency plan for its district. Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) A compilation of information required under the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard on the identity of hazardous chemicals, health and physical hazards, exposure limits, and precautions. Section 311 of Title Ill of SARA requires facilities to submit MSDSs under certain conditions. Median Lethal Concentration (LC50) Concentration level at which 50 percent of the test animals died when exposed by inhalation I for a specified time period. Median Lethal Dose (LDSO) Dose at which 50 percent of test animals died following exposure. Dose is usually given in milligrams per kilogram of body weight of the test animal. Morbidity Ability to cause illness or disease. National Response Center A communications center for activities related to response actions: it is located at Coast Gaurd headquarters in Washington, DC. The National Response Center receives and relays notices of discharges or releases to the appropriate On-Scene Coordinator, disseminates On-Scene Coordinator and Regional Response Team (RRT) reports to the National Response Team (NRT) when appropriate, and provides facilities for the NRT to use in coordinating a national response action when required. The toll-free number (800-424-8802, or 202-426-2675 or 202-267-2675 in the Washington, DC area) can be reached 24 hours a day for reporting actual or potential pollution incidents.

A-6On-Scene Coordinator The pre-designated local, State, or Federal official responsible for the coordination of a hazardous materials response action, as outlined in the pertinent Emergency Response Plan.

Plume Effluent cloud resulting from a continuous source release.

Radius of the Vulnerable Zone The maximum distance from the point of release of a hazardous substance at which the airborne concentration could reach the level of concern (LOC) under specified weather conditions. Reportable Quantity (RQ) The quantity of a hazardous substance that triggers reporting under CERCLA; if a substance is released in a quantity that exceeds its RQ, the release must be reported to the National Response Center (NRC), as well as to the State emergency response commission (SERC) and the community emergency coordinator for areas likely to be affected by the release.
Response The efforts to minimize the risks created in an emergency by protecting the people, the environment, and property, and the efforts to return the scene to normal pre-emergency conditions.

Risk A measure of the probability that damage to life, property, and/or the environment will occur if a hazard manifests itself: this measure includes the severity of anticipated consequences to people. Risk Analysis Assessment of the probable damage that may be caused to the community by a hazardous substance release. Special Populations Groups of people that may be more susceptible than the general population (due to preexisting health conditions (e.g., asthmatics) or age (e.g., infants and the elderly)) to the toxic effects of an accidental release. Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures (SPCC) Plan Plan covering the release of hazardous substances as defined under authority of the Clean Water Act. Stability Classes, Atmospheric Pasquill stability classes (ranging from “A” to “F”) are meteorological categories of atmospheric conditions. Pasquill stability class A represents unstable conditions under which there are strong sunlight, clear skies, and high levels of turbulence in the atmosphere, conditions that promote rapid mixing and dispersal of airborne contaminants. At the other extreme, class F represents light, steady winds, fairly clear nighttime skies, and low levels of turbulence. Airborne contaminants mix and disperse far more slowly with air under these conditions, and may travel further downwind at hazardous concentrations than in other cases. Stability class D, midway between A and F, is used for neutral conditions, applicable to heavy overcast, daytime or nighttime. State Emergency Response Commission (SERC) Commission appointed by each State governor according to the requirements of Title Ill of SARA: duties of the commission include designating emergency planning districts, appointing local emergency planning committees (LEPCs), supervising and coordinating the activities of planning committees, reviewing emergency plans, receiving chemical release notifications, and establishing procedures for receiving and processing requests from the public for information.

A-7Storage Methods of keeping raw materials, finished goods, or products while awaiting use, shipment, or consumption. Threshold Planning Quantity (TPQ) A quantity designated for each chemical on the list of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) that triggers notification by facilities of the State emergency response commission (SERC) that such facilities are subject to emergency planning under Title Ill of SARA.

Toxic Chemical Release Form Information form required to be submitted by facilities that manufacture, process, or use (in quantities above a specified amount) chemicals listed in Section 313 of Title Ill of SARA.

Toxic Cloud Airborne mass of gases, vapors, fumes, or aerosols of toxic materials. Toxicity The ability of a substance to cause damage to living tissue, impairment of the central nervous system, severe illness, or death when ingested, inhaled, or absorbed by the skin.
Toxicology The study of the adverse effects of chemical agents on biological systems.

Transfer Loading and unloading of chemicals between transport vehicles and storage vessels, and sending chemicals via pipes between storage vessels and process reactors.
Transport Mode Method of transportation: highway: rail (trains); water (ships/barges); pipelines: air (planes).
Vapor Dispersion The movement of vapor clouds or plumes in air due to wind, gravity spreading, and mixing.
Vulnerability Analysis Assessment of elements in the community that are subject to damage should a hazardous materials release occur; includes gathering information on the extent of the vulnerable zone, conditions that influence the zone, size and type of the population within the zone, private and public property that might be damaged, and the environment that might be affected.

Vulnerable Zone An area over which the airborne concentration of a chemical involved in an accidental release could reach the level of concern (LOC).

A-8

### APPENDIX B 

## THE CRITERIA USED TO IDENTIFY EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

B.1 BASIS FOR THE CRITERIA

Introduction. In an effort to direct communityplanning efforts to those chemicals that, because of their inherent toxicity, are most likely to cause severe toxic effects in humans who are exposed to them due to an accidental release, EPA has specified toxicity criteria that can be used to screen chemical information sources and to identify acutely toxic chemicals. These criteria were used to identify the chemicals on the list of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) required by Title Ill. While the criteriafocus on animal lethality data, EPA is also concerned about a wide array of human toxic or clinical effects other than death (e.g., lung edema, liver or kidney damage, reproductiveand developmental toxicity, neurological disorders, cardiac effects, dermal irritation and corrosion, and ocular damage). Such effects may be considered if suitable data are available when the list of EHSs is revised.

Use of Animal Data. In defining criteria, EPA had to identify the health effects of concern and the data to be used. EPA elected to use animalacute toxicity data derived from controlled experiments to infer potential for acute toxic effects in humans. EPA has assumed that humans and animals (mammals) are similar, on the average, in intrinsic susceptibility to toxic chemicals and that animal data can be used as surrogates for human data. This assumption is one of the basic premises of modern toxicology and is an important component in the regulationof toxic chemicals. An additional benefit of using animal data is that there exists a large database that is accessible to the public and government agencies such as EPA. Because human populations are diverse (e.g., individuals differin age, health, and genetic background) and individuals are expected to vary considerably intheir sensitivity to chemical substances, EPA assumed that humans are at least as sensitive to each toxic chemical as the most sensitive animal species tested. Type of Toxicity Data Used. Complete toxicological information on all potential concerns about the consequences of an acute chemical exposure is not available on all chemicals. EPA initially focused on lethality, not only becauseEPA wishes to avoid accidents resulting in human death, but also because lethality data arethe most available and commonly reported information provided from animal toxicity testing.EPA determined that the most appropriate animal test data to use as surrogates for human acute toxicity are those data from animal acute toxicity tests expressed as the median lethal concentration (LC50) when the substance has been administered by inhalation (via the lungs),or the median lethal dose (LD50) when the substance has been administered orally (via the mouth) or dermally (via the skin). These data represent dose levels or concentrations of a chemical that are expected to result in the death of 50 percent of the test animals. Exposure to EHSs released during an accident is expected primarily to involve chemicals that are airborne. Thus, the inhalation route of human exposure isof primary concern during or following an accident. However, it should be borne in mind that humans could be exposed to an EHS by any or all of these routes after its accidental release. In using data on oral and dermal acute lethality, EPA was not specifically concerned with these routes of exposure in humans, but rather withidentifying compounds with inherent high potential for acute toxicity.

Use of LDLO and LCLO Data. Even with theamount of animal data that is available, there exist chemicals for which there are no standard acute toxicity test data. In those cases where toxicity testing has not determined an LD50 orLC50 value, EPA selected an alternative measure of acute toxicity: the lowest dose or concentration at which some animals died following exposure (LDLO or LCLO). EPA used LDLO or LCLO values in those instances where there areno median toxicity values available for a chemical. Data from these tests may be more Variable than those provided from median lethality tests, but for the purposes of screening largenumbers of chemicals it was deemed necessaryto provide a second level screening tool in preference to missing potentially toxic chemicals not adequately tested. However, it is expected that there are chemicals that may be acutely toxic,but for which there are no toxicity test data available in the public literature. It is expected that planners may obtain data that are not available in the open literature from firms manufacturing chemicals. By knowing whether chemical firms and other facilities have any chemicals that areon the list of EHSs or that meet the criteria, planners should be able to identify all potentially acute toxicants used in their community,

B.2 THE CRITERIA

Criteria Values Adopted. EPA adopted the criteria shown in Exhibit B-l to identify EHSs that may present severe health hazards to humans exposed to them during an accident or other emergency. The specific values chosen areconsistent with toxicity values judged by the scientific community as indicative of potential for acute toxicity. The values shown in Exhibit B-l are lower than those for highly toxic chemicals in the health hazard definitions mandated by OSHA in its Hazard Communication Standard (FR Vol. 48, No. 248, p. 53346).

A chemical was identified as an EHS if animal test data with a value less than or equal to that stated for the LD50 or LC50 criteria for any oneof three exposure routes were found. A chemical without LD50 or LC50 test data was evaluated using the alternate LDLO or LCLO criteria. EPA has prepared a list of chemicals that meet these criteria: these chemicals are included on the list of EHSs under Title Ill of SARA.

EPA Criteria Compared with European Economic Community/World Bank Criteria. Thescreening criteria selected by EPA were consistent with internationally accepted criteria used by both the European Economic Community (EEC) and the World Bank (WB). EPA’s criteriarecognized precedents set by these two organizations; however, in a conservative effort to avoid missing or excluding any potentially toxicchemicals, EPA modified the basic toxic substances criteria used by these organizations in three ways:

1. Lethality data are not limited to data onrats, but include data on the most sensitive mammalian species tested:

2. Data from tests with inhalation exposure time up to 8 hours is accepted instead of data from 4-hour exposure tests only: and

3. LDLO and LCLO data are used when LD50 or LC50 data are not available.The criteria were designed to take maximum advantage of the kinds of animal data available forscreening and to limit the potential for overlooking chemicals that may be potentially acutely toxic. The criteria should maximize the potential for planners to identify toxic chemicals.

8.3 APPLICATION OF THE CRITERIA

RTECS Data Base. The screening criteria can be applied to any experimental data or data base on chemical substances that includesacute animal toxicity data. EPA applied the criteria to a specific toxicity data repository, Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances (RTECS), maintained by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). TheRTECS data base was used as the source of toxicity data for identifying acutely toxic chemicals because it has the largest computerized set ofacute toxicity information available, with information on more than 79,000 chemicals. RTECS is designed to be a single-source document for basic toxicity information and other data. It is widely accepted and used as a toxicity datasource, as indicated by the fact that some organizations (e.g., health agencies and chemicalcompanies) include RTECS numbers as a toxicity reference on the lists of chemicals in their files. While RTECS is not formally peer reviewed, the data presented are from scientific literature that has been edited by the scientific community before publication. In addition, the RTECS Editorial Review Board is responsible forreviewing a limited number of citations to remove ambiguities or errors. Them are limitations associated with the use of the RTECS data base, but for the purposes of screening acute

12/87 B-2

## Exhibit B-I


## Criteria to Identify Extremely Hazardous Substances that May Present Severe Health Hazards to Humans Exposed During a Chemical Accident or Other Emergency

Route of
a 

## Exposure Acute Toxicity Measure b 

## Value

Inhalation Median Lethal Concentration Less than or equal to 0.5 milli­ in Air (LC50) grams per liter of air for exposure time of 8 hours or less

Dermal Median Lethal Dose (LD50) Less than or equal to 50 milligrams per kilogram of body weight

Oral Median Lethal Dose (LD50) Less than or equal to 25 milligrams per kilogram of body weight

a The route by which the test animals absorbed the chemical, i.e., by

breathing it in air (inhalation), by absorbing it through the skin (dermal), or by ingestion (oral).

b LC50: The concentration of the chemical in air at which 50 percent of

the test animals died. LD50: The dose that killed 50 percent of the test animals. In the absence of LC50 or LD50 data, LCLO or LDLO data should be used. LCLO: Lethal Concentration Low, the lowest concentration in air at which any test animals died. LDLO: Lethal Dose Low, the lowest dose at which any test animals died.

12/87 B-3toxicity data, RTECS provides a large and easilysearchable data file. It is important to emphasize that the purpose of the criteria was to provide a screening tool for the initial identificationof chemicals that may be acutely toxic to humans. Additional information on the toxicity ofspecific chemicals may be available from the facility emergency coordinator.
TSCA Inventory, Active Pesticide Ingredients, and PMN Chemicals. EPA selected only those chemical substances in current production by referring to the 1977 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) Inventory and the current EPA list ofactive pesticide ingredients. The TSCA Inventory is a list of chemical substances in production at the time the Inventory was compiled. Chemical substances entering commerce since 1977 through the Premanufacturing Notice (PMN) review process under Section 5 of TSCAwere screened for acute toxicity data and compared to the criteria for possible inclusion on the list.

Radioactive materials, chemical substances in research and development stages, and thosemanufactured, processed, or distributed in commerce for use as food, food additives, drugs, or cosmetics are not listed in the TSCA Inventory and, hence, were not considered. If research chemicals that meet the criteria are produced for commercial use under TSCA or for pesticide use under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), EPA will identify such chemicals through its PMN review program and pesticide registration program and list them under future rulemakings.

8.4 OTHER EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

Chemicals that do not meet the criteria for acute toxicity discussed in the previous section are notnecessarily safe. In fact, some are toxic to humans and may pose threats to the community if accidents occur. EPA identified and included on the list of EHSs some of these chemicals usingcriteria based on the following factors: large volume production, acute lethality values, and known risk, as indicated by the fact that some of the chemicals have caused death and injury in accidents.

Candidates for listing were identified from the high-production capacity chemicals listed in the SRI International publication, 1985 Directory of Chemical Producers, United States of America, pp. 388-389, or from the World Bank List Group B: Other Toxic Substances. The toxicity criteria shown in Exhibit B-2 were used to aid in decidingwhich chemicals to list. In addition to high-production chemicals meeting these criteria, several other slightly less toxic chemicals werelisted because of their known hazards: for example, several of them have caused death or injury in accidents. Exhibit B-3 lists these other chemicals included on the list of EHSs.

12/87 B-4

## Exhibit B-2


## Criteria to Identify Other Hazardous Substances Produced in Large Quantities that May Present Severe Health Hazards to Humans Exposed During a Chemical Accident or Other Emergency

Route of Exposure a 

## Acute Toxicity Measure b 

## Value

Inhalation Median Lethal Concentration Less than or equal to 2 milli­ in Air (LC50) grams per liter of air for exposure time of 8 hours or less

Dermal Median Lethal Dose (LD50) Less than or equal to 400 milligrams per kilogram of body weight

Oral Median Lethal Dose (LD50) Less than or equal to 200 milligrams per kilogram of body weight

a The route by which the test animals absorbed the chemical, i.e., by

breathing it in air (inhalation), by absorbing it through the skin (dermal), or by ingestion (oral).

b LC50: The concentration of the chemical in air at which 50 percent of

the test animals died. LD50: The dose that killed 50 percent of the test animals. In the absence of LEO or LD50 data, LCLO or LDLO data should be used. LCLO: Lethal Concentration Low, the lowest concentration in air at which any test animals died. LDLO: Lethal Dose Low, the lowest dose at which any test animals died.

12/81 B-5

## Exhibit B-3


## Other Extremely Hazardous Substances

Chemicals on the following list were judged to be extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) on the basis of high production capacity and the criteria summarized in Exhibit B-2 or known hazards (see Section 8.4).



## Name CAS Number Acrylamide 79-06-1 Acrylonitrile 107-13-1 Adiponitrile 111-69-3 Ammonia 7664-41-7 Aniline 62-53-3 Bromine 7726-95-6 Carbon disulfide 75-15-0 Chloroform 67-66-3 Cyclohexylamine 108-91-8 Epichlorohydrin 106-89-8 Ethylene oxide 75-21-8 Formaldehyde 50-00-0 Hydrogen chloride (gas only) 7647-01-0 * Hydrogen peroxide 7722-84-1

Hydrogen sulfide 7783-06-4 Hydroquinone 123-31-9 Methyl bromide 74-83-9 Nitrobenzene 98-95-3 Phosgene 75-44-5 Propylene oxide 75-56-9 Sulfur dioxide 7446-09-5 Tetramethyl lead 75-74-1 Vinyl acetate monomer 108-05-4

* Concentration greater than 52 percent.

12/87 B-6

### APPENDIX C 

## THE LIST OF EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

EPA identified chemicals that meet the criteria ent physical state, molecular weight, boilfor extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) dis- ing point, vapor pressure, level of concern cussed in Section B.2. In addition, other chemi- (LOC), and liquid factors, cals were identified as EHSs as described in Section B.4. The chemicals are listed by their � Exhibit C-2: Same list as that in Exhibit common names and also by their Chemical Ab- C-1, in CAS number order. stract Service (CAS) numbers. While a chemical may be known by several different names, the Note that the value for the LOC given in these CAS number provides a unique and unambigu- Exhibits is one tenth the Immediately Dangerous ous identification. The list of EHSs is presented to Life and Health (IDLH) level or an estimation in the following forms: of that level for chemicals which do not have aspecific IDLH assigned to them. Refer to AppenExhibit C-1 : List of common names, in al- dix D for a more detailed discussion of the LOC phabetical order, with CAS number, ambi- and other values that planners may wish to use.

C-l

### APPENDIX D 

## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON LEVELS OF CONCERN

D. 1 INTRODUCTION

Levels of concern (LOCs), for purposes of this document, are defined as the concentrations of an extremely hazardous substance (EHS) in air above which there may be serious irreversible health effects or death as a result of a single exposure for a relatively short period of time.
There is at present no precise measure of LOCsfor the chemicals listed as EHSs. Various organizations have been developing for the past several years acute exposure guidelines for a limited number of hazardous chemicals: themethodology, however, is still in the developmental stages. Certain of the guidelines underdevelopment and the progress to date are described in detail below. Until more precisemeasures are developed, surrogate or estimated measures of LOCs have been identified for the listed EHSs. Local officials may choose values for LOCs different from those estimatedin this guidance, depending upon their requirements and the specific characteristics of theplanning district or site and the level of protection deemed appropriate.
For the purposes of this guidance, the LOC hasbeen estimated by using one-tenth of the “Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health” (IDLH)level published by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) or an approximation of the IDLH from animal toxicity data (See Appendix B). Other exposure guidelines that may be used to estimate LOC include the “Threshold Limit Values” (TLVs 1 ), published bythe American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), guidelines developed by the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences, (NAS), and Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) under development by a consortium ofchemical companies. Descriptions of the development and uses of these exposure guidelines will be given in the following sections.

TLVs is a registered trademark. LOCs may be given in units of parts per million (ppm), milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m3), milligrams per liter (mg/L), or grams per liter (g/L).The equations for determining LOC in this guidance use the units grams per cubic meter, (g/m3), so any other units, such as ppm, must be converted to g/m3. Levels given in parts permillion can be converted to grams per cubic meter (g/m3) as follows:

where MW is the substance’s molecular weight. For example, chlorine has an LOC (0.1 IDLH) of 2.5 ppm and a molecular weight of about 71 g/ mole. Thus, the LOC in grams per cubic meter is:

LOC given in milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m3) can be converted to g/m3 as follows:
LOC (in g/m3) = LOC (in mg/m3)/1000LOC given in grams per liter (g/L) can be converted to g/m3 as follows:
LOC (in g/m3) = LOC (in g/L) x 1000 LOC given in milligrams per liter (mg/L) is equivalent to LOC in g/m3:
LOC (in g/m3) = LOC (In mg/L)

D.2 LEVEL OF CONCERN BASED ON ONE-TENTH IDLH OR ONE-TENTH THE ESTIMATED IDLH

About ten years ago, NIOSH developed IDLH levels for approximately 390 chemicals from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Z-1 and Z-2 lists. These are lists of toxic and hazardous substances to which

12/87 D-l 1employee exposure must be limited as required by the Code of Federal Regulations 29, Chapter 17, Part 1910. IDLHs were developed exclusively for respirator selection in the workplace. The definition of IDLH provided in 30 CFR 11.3 (the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, PL 91-596) is: "Immediately dangerous to life or health means conditions that pose an immediate threat to life or health or conditions that pose animmediate threat of severe exposure to contaminants, such as radioactive materials, whichare likely to have an adverse cumulative or delayed effect on health.” The IDLH concentrationrepresents the maximum concentration of a substance in air from which healthy male workers can escape without loss of life or irreversible health effects under conditions of a maximum 30-minute exposure time. Practically, IDLH’s are concentrations above which a highly reliable breathing apparatus is required with provisions for escape.
The methodology in developing IDLHs takes into account immediate reactions that could preventescape without injury, such as severe eye irritation or lung edema. The procedure used to derive IDLH’s from data from mammalian toxicity studies is outlined below:

1. Where acute exposure data are available(30 minute to 4 hour exposures), the lowest exposure concentration causing death or irreversible health effects in any species is used as the IDLH concentration. Thesedata are often reported as lethal concentration, low (LCLO).
2. Chronic exposure data are generally not considered in developing IDLH levels for the following reason: “Chronic exposure data may have no relevance to the acute effects and should be used in determiningthe IDLH concentration only upon competent toxicological judgment.” (NIOSH 1978 2 ),

See Section D.7 for all references in Appendix D. 3. Where there are no toxicity data to derivean IDLH concentration, 500 times the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) shall be used as the IDLH level. EPA recognizes that the IDLH was not designed as a measure of the exposure level required to protect general populations. First, the IDLH is based upon the response of a healthy, maleworker population and does not take into account exposure of more sensitive individualssuch as the elderly, children, or people with various health problems. Second, the IDLH is based upon a maximum 30-minute exposure period,which may not be realistic for accidental airborne releases. IDLH values have been developed for about one-fourth of the EHSs on thelist. The IDLH may not indicate the concentration that could result in serious but reversible injury. Based on these conditions, one-tenth theIDLH level or an estimation of this value for substances that do not have a published IDLH, has been selected as one approximation of an LOCavailable for planning purposes. These IDLH values have been developed with human acute toxicity as the principal consideration and representexposure concentrations that are one to two orders of magnitude below the median lethal concentration (LC50) or the median lethal dose (LD50) levels reported for mammalian speciesunder experimental conditions. IDLHs were estimated from acute animal toxicity test data for substances without IDLH values. In these instances, the concentration used is determinedfrom LC50, LCLO, LD50, or LDLO data. Inhalation data were used, if available, in preference to other data, and median lethality data werepreferred to other types. The following equations show how these data are converted to air concentrations comparable to the IDLH level:

(1) estimated IDLH = LC50 x 0.1; (2) estimated IDLH = LCLO (3) estimated IDLH = LD50 x 0.01 (4) estimated IDLH = LDLO x 0.1

12/87 D-2 2D.3 LEVELS OF CONCERN BASED ON THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUES (TLVs 3 )
ACGIH publishes an annual list of three types of workplace exposure limits for several hundred compounds. ACGIH has published three TLVsas guidelines since 1941: Threshold limit valueTime-weighted average (TLV-TWA), TLV-Shortterm exposure limit (TLV-STEL), and TLV-Ceiling (TLV-C).

1. The TLV-TWA is defined as the time weighted average concentration limit for a normal eight hour workday and 40 hours per week, to which nearly all workers may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect.

2. The TLV-STEL is a 15-minute timeweighted average concentration for a normal eight-hour workday and forty-hour workweek. All workers should be able to withstand up to four exposures per day of concentrations as high as the TLV-STEL with no ill effects if the TLV-TWA is not alsoexceeded. TLV-STELs are applied to supplement the TLV-TWA when there are recognized acute effects from a substance whose toxic effects are primarily of a chronic nature.

3. The TLV-C is the airborne concentration that should not be exceeded in theworkplace under any circumstances. Ceiling limits may supplement other limits or stand alone. In many cases, ACGIH couldnot find sufficient toxicological data to derive TLV-STELs or TLV-Cs for chemicalswhich had already been assigned a TLVTWA. In these instances, the ACGIH recommends that five times the TLV-TWA beused in place of the TLV-C and that shortterm exposures not exceed 3 times- theTLV-TWA for more than a total of 30 minutes during the day.
TLVs are based primarily on acute toxicity data (LC5Os and LD50s) and irritation data (irritation of the cornea and respiratory tract). Irritation effects that are considered range from barely

TLVs is a registered trademark. detectable to irreversible, in laboratory animalsand human subjects documented in industrial exposures. Only some TLVs consider neurotoxicand mutagenic effects. Although TLVs are derived for the protection of healthy male workers, they occasionally consider special impacts on workers with chronic respiratory problems,TLVs do not consider reproductive effects (ACGIH 1966). ACGIH advises against using or applying the TLV levels outside the workplace.

D.4 LEVELS OF CONCERN BASED ON NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES SHORT-TERM EXPOSURE LEVELS

For the last forty years, the NRC’s Committee on Toxicology has submitted emergency exposureguidelines for chemicals of concern to the Department of Defense (DOD) (NRC 1986), Theseguidelines are used in planning for sudden contamination of air during military and space operations; specifically, they are used to choose protective equipment and response plans after non-routine but predictable occurrences such as line breaks, spills, and fires. These guidelines are for peak levels of exposure considered acceptable for rare situations, but are not to be applied in instances of repeated exposure.
An Emergency Exposure Guidance Level (EEGL) is defined as a concentration of a substance in air (gas, vapor, or aerosol) judged by DOD to be acceptable for the performance of specific tasksby military personnel during emergency conditions lasting 1-24 hours. Exposure to an EEGL is not considered safe, but acceptable during tasks which are necessary to prevent greater risks, such as fire or explosion. Exposures atthe EEGLs may produce transient central nervous system effects and eye or respiratory irritation, but nothing serious enough to prevent proper responses to emergency conditions.
Since the 1940’s, the NRC has developed EEGLsfor 41 chemicals, 15 of which are listed in Section 302 of Title Ill of SARA as EHSs. Although acute toxicity is the primary basis for selectingEEGLs, long term effects from a single acute exposure are also evaluated for developmental, reproductive (in both sexes), carcinogenic, neurotoxic, respiratory and other organ-related

12/87 D-3 3effects. The effect determined to be the most seriously debilitating, work-limiting, or sensitive is selected as the basis for deriving the EEGL. This concentration is intended to be sufficiently low to protect against other toxic effects that may occur at higher concentrations. Factors such as age of the exposed population, length of exposure, and susceptibility or sensitivity of theexposed population are also considered in determining EEGLs.
Safety factors are used in developing EEGLs to reflect the nature and quality of the data. Safety factors for single exposures may differ from those used in chronic studies. In the absence ofbetter information, a safety factor of 10 is suggested for EEGLs (i.e., the reported toxicity value should be divided by 10) if only animaldata are available and extrapolation from animals to humans is necessary for acute, shortterm effects (NRC 1986). The safety factor of 10 takes into account the possibility that someindividuals might be more sensitive than the animal species tested. A factor of 10 is also suggested if the likely route of human exposure differs from the route reported experimentally (NRC 1986) (e.g., if oral data are reported and inhalation is the most likely exposure route for humans).
As noted by NRC (1986, p. 7), development ofan EEGL for different durations of exposure usually begins with the shortest exposure anticipated - i.e., 10-15 minutes - and works up tothe longest, such as 24 hours. Under the simplest framework, Haber’s law is assumed to operate, with the product of concentration (C) andtime (t) as a constant (k) for all the short periods used (Ct=k) (Casarett and Doull 1986). If Ct is 30 and t is 10, then C is 3; if Ct is 30 and t is30, then C is 1. If detoxification or recovery occurs and data are available on 24-hour exposures, this is taken into account in modifying Ct.In some instances, the Ct concept will be inappropriate, as for materials such as ammonia that can be more toxic with high concentrations over short periods. Each material is considered in relation to the applicability of Haber’s law.
Generally, EEGLs have been developed for exposure to single substances, although emergency exposures often involve complex mixtures of substances and, thus, present the possibility of toxic effects resulting from several substances. In the absence of other information,guidance levels for complex mixtures can be developed from EEGLs by assuming as a first approximation that the toxic effects are additive.When the chemical under evaluation for development of an EEGL is an animal or human carcinogen, a separate qualitative risk assessment is undertaken in recognition of the fact that evenlimited exposure to such an agent can theoretically increase the risk of cancer. The risk assessment is performed with the aim of providing an estimate of the acute exposure that would not lead to an excess risk of cancer greater than 1 in10,000 exposed persons. The following mathematical approach, taken directly from NRC(1986, pp. 26-27), is applicable for EEGL cornputations for carcinogens:

1. If there has been computed an exposure level d (usually in ppm in air), which after alifetime of exposure is estimated to produce some "acceptable” level of excess risk of cancer -- say, 1x10 -6 -- this has been called a “virtually safe dose” (VSD). Computation of the dose d, if not alreadydone by a regulatory agency, will be computed by the Committee on Toxicology inaccordance with generally accepted procedures used by the major regulatory agencies, i.e., using the multistage nothreshold model for carcinogenesis and the appropriate body weight/surface area adjustments when extrapolating from an animal species to humans.

2. If carcinogenic effect is assumed to be a linear function of the total (cumulative)dose, then for a single 1-day human exposure an acceptable dose (to yield the same total lifetime exposure) would be d times 25,600 (there being approximately25,600 days in an average lifetime); the allowable 1-day (24-h) dose rate would be

d x 25,600

3. Because of uncertainties about which of several stages in the carcinogenic process a material may operate in, and because of the likely low age of military persons, it can be shown from data of Crump and Howe (1984) that the maximal additional risk that

12/87 D-4these considerations contribute is a factor of 2.8. As a conservative approach, the acceptable dose is divided by 2.8, i.e.,
d x 25,600 2.8
If a lifetime excess risk, R, is established by DOD (for example, at 1x10 -4 , as hasbeen suggested by the International Council on Radiation Protection for nuclear power plant workers), then the appropriate extent of risk at the EEGL would be

(In the example given here, the level of risk at d was no more than 1x10 -6 .) If R is 1 x10 -4 , then R/risk at d = 10 -4 /10 -6 = 100 (NRC 1986).

4. If a further element of conservatism is required (for example, where animal data need to be extrapolated to estimate human risk), an additional safety factor can be used as a divisor.
The NRC’s Committee on Toxicology has also developed special public exposure guidelines upon request from Department of Defense. The Short-term Public Exposure Guidance Level(SPEGL) is defined as an acceptable ceiling concentration for a single, unpredicted short-term exposure to the public. The exposure period is usually calculated to be one hour or less andnever more than 24 hours. SPEGLs are generally set at 0.1 to 0.5 times the EEGL. A safetyfactor of 2 is often used to take into account effects on sensitive subpopulations, such as children, the aged, and people with debilitating diseases. A safety factor of 10 may be used to take into account the effects of an exposure onfetuses and newborns. Effects on the reproductive capacity of both men and women are also considered. Five SPEGLs (for hydrazine, dimethylhydrazine, monomethyl hydrazine, nitrogen dioxide, and hydrogen chloride) have been developed by the NRC: all five chemicals are on the list of EHSs. D.5 LEVELS OF CONCERN BASED ON EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING GUIDELINES

A consortium of twenty-five chemical firms hasdeveloped a uniform protocol for community exposure guidelines based upon the NRC/NAS guidelines, EEGLs, and SPEGLs. The AmericanIndustrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) is providing technical review. These guidelines are notintended for repeated exposures and their adoption and use by individual companies is intended to be voluntary.

The consortium members have identified 100 chemicals of concern: for fifteen chemicals, draft Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) have been developed. None of theseas yet is available for review. Briefly, the recommended procedure for developing ERPGs is as follows:

1) Companies should use a multi-disciplinaryteam, including members from the toxicological, medical, and industrial hygiene fields, to collect and review data and draftERPG documentation. The protocol recommends identifying producers and users of the material and requesting unpublished data on human health effects. Literature searches of computer databases are also recommended.

2) Acute toxicity data, as well as possiblelong-term effects from a single acute exposure, including carcinogenicity,neurotoxicity, and reproductive and developmental effects are considered. Adjustments may be made, based upon informed judgment, for the increased susceptibility of sensitive subgroups in the population. ERPGs for carcinogens may be derived using the carcinogenicity riskassessment methodology for acute exposures employed by the NRC (1986).
3) The protocol specifies that three concentration levels are needed for each chemi12/87 D-5cal. The ERPG-1 is defined as the “maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals couldbe exposed for up to one hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.” The ERPG-2is the concentration below which it is believed that “nearly all individuals” wouldcome to no permanent harm after a onehour exposure period. The ERPG-3 is the “maximum concentration belowwhich...nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without.. life threatening health effects.” (See Exhibit D-1)
4) After the ERPG Task Force reviews and edits the documentation, the guidelines andtheir rationales are reviewed by a Toxicology Committee within the AIHA. The committee is comprised of experts from government, industry, and academia.
5) When they are approved, the guidelines and their documentation are filed at the AIHA headquarters in Akron and will be available to the public upon request.

D.6 OSHA PERMISSIBLE EXPOSURE LIMITS AND NIOSH RECOMMENDED EXPOSURE LIMITS

OSHA Permissable Exposure Limits (PELs) are workplace exposure standards listed in 29 CFR 1910, Subpart Z, General Industry Standards for Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals.

Most of the PELs listed in 29 CFR 1910 were based on ACGIH TLVs, about 450 of which OSHAadopted in 1971 as interim standards under section 6(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Between 1972 and 1984, OSHA promulgated 9 permanent major health standards regulating worker exposure to 21 toxic chemicals or mixtures. These standards, besides establishingPELs for these chemicals or mixtures, also provided guidance on exposure monitoring, regulated areas, methods of compliance, respiratoryprotection, protective clothing, and hazard communication. Chemicals and substances listed in Subpart Z were divided into 3 tables. PELs for chemicalson the first table are usually 8-hour timeweighted average (TWA) concentrations, not tobe exceeded in an 8-hour workday. For chemicals on the second table, ceiling concentrations and maximum peak concentrations were given in addition to 8-hour TWA concentrations. The maximum peak concentrations have associated with them exposure durations (e.g. five minutemaximum peak concentration in any 2 hour period). These concentrations should never exceed the maximum peak, and should fall between the ceiling and the maximum peak concentration for the duration indicated. The third table provided 8-hour TWA concentrations for mineral dusts.
The majority of OSHA PELs were adopted fromthe ACGIH TLVs available in 1971. PELs are enforceable by law, whereas the ACGIH TLVs are recommendations. It should be noted that there have been no revisions of the PELs since their adoption, although the corresponding ACGIH TLVs may have been revised.
For chemicals which NIOSH has published recommendations, the NIOSH recommended exposure limits (RELs) are found in the Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards . RELs are 8- or 10- hourTWA concentrations and/or ceiling concentrations.

D.7 GUIDELINES AVAILABLE FOR EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

As local planning committees may consider the use of one tenth of the IDLH inappropriate for their specific situation, Exhibits D-2 and D-3 list the guidelines that have been discussed in this appendix that are available for each chemical on the List of Extremely Hazardous Substances. Planners may wish to use these values, butshould do so only after discussion of the potential implications with qualified technical personnel.

12/87 D-6D. 8 REFERENCES Crump, KS. and R.S. Howe. 1984. The multistage model with a time-dependent dose patAmerican Conference of Governmental Indus- tern: applications to carcinogenic risk assesstrial Hygienists. 1986. Threshold Limit Values ment. Risk Analysis 4: 163-176. and Biological Exposure Indices for 1986-87. Cincinnati, Ohio.
Casarett and Doull. 1986. Toxicology. Edited by C.D. Klassen, M.O. Amdur, and J. Doull. New York, Macmillan Publishing.

12/87 D-7

## Exhibit D-l 

## Emergency Response Planning Guidelines

Adapted from Organization Resources Counselors, 1987.

12/87 D-8NIOSH. 1978. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. The Standards Completion Program Draft Technical Standards Analysis and Decision Logics. NIOSH Library, Cincinnati, Ohio. Copy courtesy of Dr. Howard Ludwig, NIOSH.

NIOSH. 1985. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, DHEW (NIOSH) Publication No. 78-210.

NRC. 1979. The National Research Council.Criteria for Short-term Exposures to Air Pollutants. November 1979.

NRC. 1986, National Research Council, Committee on Toxicology. Criteria and Methods for Preparing Emergency Exposure Guidance Level(EEGL), Short-Term Public Emergency Guidance Level (SPEGL), and Continuous ExposureGuidance Level (CEGL) Documents. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. Organization Resources Counselors. 1987. Memorandum to ORC Occupational Safety and Health Group from Darrell K. Mattheis andRebecca L. Daiss, update on Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) Task Force.. July 20, 1987.
Swank, M.G., Branson, D.R., Rampy, L.W.1986. The Dow Program to Develop Emergency Exposure Guideline Concentrations (EEGs), February 12, 1986.

12/87 D-9

### APPENDIX E 

## SAMPLE PROFILE AND EMERGENCY FIRST AID TREATMENT

EPA has prepared chemical profiles of the ex- and, in some cases, an emergency first aid tremely hazardous substances (EHSs) listed in treatment guide, are available in hard copy or on Exhibits C-1 and C-2. Emergency first aid treat- IBM compatible floppy disks. This appendix proment guides are also available for a number of vides, as an example, the profile and emerEHSs. A chemical profile for each substance gency first aid treatment guide for acrolein.

12/87 E-lEPA Chemical Profile

CHEMICAL IDENTITY -- ACROLEIN 

### CAS Registry Number: 107-02-8 Page 1 of 4

Date: October 31, 1985 Revision: November 30, 1987

CAS Registry Number: 107-02-8

Synonyms: Acraldehyde; Acrylaldehyde; Acrylic Aldehyde; Ally1 Aldehyde; Aqualin; Aqualine; Ethylene Aldehyde; Magnacide H; NSC 8819; Propenal; 2-Propenal; Prop-2-en-l-al; 2-Propen-l-one

Chemical Formula: C3H40

Molecular Weight: 56.06

SECTION I -- REGULATORY INFORMATION

CERCLA (SARA) 1986:

Toxicity Value Used for Listing Under Section 302: LC50 inhalation (mouse) 0.15 mg/liter/6 hours (*NIOSH/RTECS 1985)

TPQ: 500 (pounds)

RQ: 1 (pounds)

Section 313 Listed (Yes or No): Yes

SECTION II -- PHYSICAL/CHEMICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Physical State: Liquid

Boiling Point: 126F, 52.5C (*Merck 1983)

Specific Gravity (H20-1): 0.8389 at 20C; 0.8621 at 0C (*Merck 1983)

Vapor Pressure (mmHg): 210 at 68F, 20C; 135.71 at 50F, 10C (*Weed Science Society of America 1974)

Melting Point: -126F, -88C (*Merck 1983)

Vapor Density (AIR-l): 1.94 (*Encyc Occupat Health and Safety 1983)

Evaporation Rate (Butyl acetate-l): Not Found

12/87 E-2

### CAS Registry Number: 107-02-8 Page 2 of 4

ACROLEIN

SECTION II -- PHYSICAL/CHEMICAL CHARACTERISTICS (continued)

Solubility in Water: Soluble in 2-3 parts water (*Merck 1983)

Appearance and Odor: Colorless or yellowish liquid with extremely sharp, disagreeable, acrid, irritating odor (*Sax 1979, *CHRIS 1980)

SECTION III -- HEALTH HAZARD DATA

OSHA PEL: TWA 0.1 ppm ( 0.25 mg/m3) (NIOSH 1987, p. 44)

ACGIH TLV: TWA 0.1 ppm (0.25 mg/m3); STEL 0.3 ppm (0.8 mg/m3) (ACGIH 1986-87, p. 9)

IDLH: 5 ppm (NIOSH 1987, p. 44)

Other Limits Recommended: EEGL 0.05 ppm (60 minutes) (NRC 1984a, pp. 27-34)

Routes of Entry: Inhalation: Yes (*NIOSH/RTECS 1985) Skin: Yes (*NIOSH/RTECS 1985) Ingestion: Yes (*Gosselin 1984)

Health Hazards (Acute, Delayed, and Chronic): Extremely toxic; probable oral human lethal dose is S-50 mg/kg, between 7 drops and one teaspoon for a 70 kg (150 lb.) person (*Gosselin 1984). Inhalation of air containing 10 ppm of acrolein may be fatal in a few minutes (*NRC 1981). Death from cardiac failure accompanied by hyperemia and hemorrhage of the lungs and degeneration of the bronchial epithelium is possible. Acrolein causes acute respiratory and eye irritation; severe gastrointestinal distress with slowly developing pulmonary edema (lungs fill up with fluid); and skin irritation (Gosselin 1984, p. 11-186).

Medical Conditions Generally Aggravated by Exposure: Not Found

SECTION IV -- FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD DATA

Flash Point (Method Used): -15F, -26C (CC); less than OF, -18C (OC) (*NFPA 1978) Flammable Limits: LEL: 2.8% (*NFPA 1978) UEL: 31% (*NFPA 1978)

Extinguishing Methods: Dry chemical, alcohol foam, or carbon dioxide. Water may be ineffective, but can be used to keep containers cool (*NFPA 1978).

12/87 E-3

### CAS Registry Number: 107-02-8 Page 3 of 4

ACROLEIN

SECTION IV -- FIRE AND -EXPLOSION HAZARD DATA (continued)

Special Fire Fighting Procedures: In advanced or massive fires, fire fighting should be done from safe distance or from protected location. Use dry chemical, alcohol foam, or carbon dioxide. Water may be ineffective, but should be used to keep fire-exposed containers cool. If a leak or spill has not ignited, use water spray to disperse vapors. If it is necessary to stop a leak, use water spray to protect men attempting to do

so. Water spray may be used to flush spills away from exposures and to dilute spills to nonflammable mixtures (*NFPA 1978). Withdraw immediately in case of rising sound from venting safety device or any discoloration of tank due to fire. Isolate for l/2 mile in all directions if tank car or truck is involved in fire (DOT 1987, Guide 30).

Unusual Fire and Explosion Hazards: Under fire conditions, polymerization
may occur. If inside a container, violent rupture of the container may take place (*NFPA 1978).

NFPA Flammability Rating: 3

SECTION V -- REACTIVITY DATA

Stability: Unstable: Yes (*Merck 1983) Stable:

Conditions to Avoid: Exposure to alkalis or strong acids (*Encyc Occupat Safety and Health 1983) or to oxygen (*NFPA 1978).

Incompatibility (Materials to Avoid): Alkalis or strong acids act as catalysts, causing a condensation reaction and liberating energy. Reaction may be very rapid and violent (*Encyc Occupat Health and Safety 1983). Readily converted by oxygen to hazardous peroxides and acids (*NFPA 1978).

Hazardous Decomposition or Byproducts: When heated to decomposition, it emits highly toxic fumes (*Sax 1975).

Hazardous Polymerization: May Occur: Yes (*NFPA 1978) May Not Occur:

Conditions to Avoid: Elevated temperatures, such as fire conditions. (Polymerization inside container could cause violent rupture of container under fire conditions.) (*NFPA 1978)

12/87 E-4

### CAS Registry Number: 107-02-8 Page 4 of 4

ACROLEIN

SECTION VI -- USE INFORMATION
Acrolein is used in manufacture of colloidal forms of metals; making plastics, perfumes: as a warning agent in methyl chloride refrigerant; and has been used in military poison gas mixtures (*Merck 1983). It is also used as an intermediate in the production of glycerine, methionine, acrylic acid, and esters (*SRI). Acrolein is also an intermediate for glycerol, polyurethane, polyester resins, and pharmaceuticals (*Hawley 1981). Additionally, acrolein is used as an aquatic herbicide, biocide, slimicide (*Farm Chemicals Handbook 1984) and molluscicide (*Kearney and Kaufman 1975).

SECTION VII -- PRECAUTIONS FOR SAFE HANDLING AND USE (Steps to be Taken in Case Material is Released or Spilled)

When handling acrolein, no skin surface should be exposed (*NFPA 1978). Remove all ignition sources. Ventilate area of spill or leak. For large quantities, cover with sodium bisulfite, add small amount of water and mix. Then, after 1 hour, flush with large amounts of water and wash site with soap solution. Liquid should not be allowed to enter confined space, such
as sewer, because of possibility of explosion. Take up spill for disposal by absorbing it in vermiculite, dry sand, or earth and disposing in a secured landfill or combustion chamber (*NIOSH 1981).

SECTION VIII -- PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR EMERGENGY SITUATIONS

For emergency situations, wear a positive pressure, pressure-demand, full facepiece self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or pressure-demand supplied air respirator with escape SCBA and a fully-encapsulating, chemical resistant suit. See the introduction and comment section at the beginning of the profiles for additional information.

Suit Material Performance (based on EPA/USCG "Guidelines", 1987) (Chemical Resistance/Amount of Data):

Butyl: Good/Limited Butyl/Neoprene: Poor/Many CPE: Poor/Many Nitrile: Poor/Many Viton: Poor/Many Viton/Chlorobutyl: Good/Limited

SECTION IX -- EMERGENGY TREATMENT INFORMATION

See Emergency First Aid Treatment Guide

E-5

### Emergency First Aid Treatment Guide for ACROLEIN

(107-02-8)

This guide should not be construed to authorize emergency personnel to perform the procedures or activities indicated or implied. Care of persons exposed to toxic chemicals must be directed by a physician or other competent authority.

Substances Characteristics:

Pure Form - Colorless or slightly yellow liquid.

Odor - Extremely sharp.

Commercial Forms - 92 to 99% pure liquid.

Uses - Chemical intermediate, manufacture of plastics, perfumes, paper, colloidal forms of metals; component of military poison gas mixture, liquid fuel, antimicrobial agent, aquatic pesticide; warning agent in methyl chloride refrigerant.

Materials to Avoid - Strong acid, alkali, caustic soda, oxidizers, oxygen (except for use in emergency life support).

Other Names - Acquinite, acraldehyde, acrylaldehyde, acrylic aldehyde, ally1 aldehyde, ethylene aldehyde, Magnacide H, 2-Propenal.

Personal Protective Equipment: See Chemical Profile Section VIII.

Emergency Life-Support Equipment and Supplies That May Be Required: Compressed oxygen, forced-oxygen mask, soap, water, milk, activated charcoal, saline cathartic or sorbitol.

Signs and Symptoms of Acute Acrolein Exposure:

Warning: Acrolein is highly irritating to skin and mucous membranes. Caution is advised.

Signs and symptoms of acute exposure to acrolein may be severe and include shortness of breath, tightness of chest, pulmonary edema, and coma. Lacrimation (tearing), nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea may occur. Acrolein will irritate or burn the skin and mucous membranes. Eye contact may cause irritation, swelling, discharge and/or cornea1 injury.

12/87 E-6

### ACROLEIN

Emergency Life-Support Procedures:

Acute exposure to acrolein may require decontamination and life support for the victims. Emergency personnel should wear protective clothing appropriate to the type and degree of contamination. Air-purifying or supplied-air respiratory equipment should also be worn, as necessary. Rescue vehicles should carry supplies such as plastic sheeting and disposable plastic bags to assist in preventing spread of contamination.

Inhalation Exposure:

1. Move victims to fresh air. Emergency personnel should avoid self-exposure to acrolein.

2. Evaluate vital signs including pulse and respiratory rate and note any trauma. If no pulse is detected, provide CPR. If not breathing, provide artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other respiratory support.

3. Obtain authorization and/or further instructions from the local hospital for administration of an antidote or performance of other invasive procedures.

4. RUSH to a health care facility.

Dermal/Eye Exposure:

1. Remove victims from exposure. Emergency personnel should avoid selfexposure to acrolein.

2 . 

### Evaluate vital signs including pulse and respiratory rate and note any trauma. If no pulse is detected, provide CPR. If not breathing, provide artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other respiratory support.

3 . 

### Remove contaminated clothing as soon as possible (and place in plastic bag).

4. 

### If eye exposure has occurred, eyes must be flushed with lukewarm water for at least 15 minutes.

5 . 

### Wash exposed skin areas THOROUGHLY with soap and water.

6 . 

### Obtain authorization and/or further instructions from the local hospital for administration of an antidote or performance of other invasive procedures.

7. 

### RUSH to a health care facility.

12/87 E-7

### ACROLEIN

Ingestion Exposure:

1. Evaluate vital signs including pulse and respiratory rate and note any trauma. If no pulse is detected, provide CPR. If not breathing, provide artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other respiratory support.

2 . 

### Obtain authorization and/or further instructions from the local hospital for administration of an antidote or performance of other invasive procedures.

3 . 

### Give the victims water or milk: children up to 1 year old, 125 mL (4 oz or l/2 cup); children 1 to 12 years old, 200 mL (6 oz or 3/4 cup); adults, 250 mL (8 oz or 1 cup). Water or milk should not be given if victims are not conscious and alert.

4. 

### Activated charcoal may be administered if victims are conscious and alert. Use 15 to 30 gm (l/2 to 1 oz) for children, 50 to 100 gm (l-3/4 to 3-l/2 oz) for adults, with 125 to 250 mL (l/2 to 1 cup) of water.

5. 

### Promote excretion by administering a saline cathartic or sorbitol to conscious and alert victims. Children require 15 to 30 gm (l/2 to 1 oz) of cathartic; 50 to 100 gm (l-3/4 to 3-l/2 oz) is recommended for adults.

6 . 

### RUSH to a health care facility.

E-8

### APPENDIX F 

## FIRE AND REACTIVITY HAZARDS
Congress mandated in Title Ill of SARA that local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) focusinitially on acute toxicity hazards related to extremely hazardous substances (EHSs). Otherhazards may warrant consideration in emergency preparedness and response planning.This appendix is a brief discussion of fire and reactivity hazards.

Fire Hazards. Flammable materials, particularlythose that will ignite at a relatively low temperature (i.e., that have low flash points), clearly may be a hazard to communities. There areseveral major types of fires that may be associated with hazardous material discharges, with the type of fire being a function not only of thecharacteristics and properties of the spilled substance but the circumstances surrounding the accident. The types are:

• Flame Jets. Tanks, cylinders, and pipelines which contain gases under pressure (i.e., compressed gases or liquefied gases) may discharge gases at a high speed if they are somehowpunctured or broken during an accident. If the gas is flammable and encounters an ignition source, a flame jetof considerable length (possibly hundreds of feet) may form from a hole less than a foot in diameter.

• BLEVEs. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions (BLEVEs) are among the most feared events when tanks of hazardous materials are exposed to fire or physical damage or other events that cause excessive pressures within the tank. A BLEVE could occur when flames impinge upon the vapor space (unwetted internal surface) of the tank where there is no liquid to absorb heat. As the vapor space is heated, the pressure inside the tank (even after the relief valve opens) becomes so great that it eventually vents itself through the weakest area of the tank. As the pressure inside is increasing, the flames weaken the structural integrity of the tank, thus creating the conditions for venting. This sudden venting of pressure and vaporization of product involves the violent rupture of the container, with rocketing fragments. If the container stored a flammable liquid or gas, a large rising fireball will form, the size of which will vary with the amount of hazardous material present.Vapor or Dust Cloud Fires and Explosions. Vapors evolved from a pool of volatile liquid or gases venting from apunctured or otherwise damaged container, if not ignited immediately, will form a plume or cloud of gas or vapor that moves in the downwind direction.If this cloud or plume contacts an ignition source, a wall of flame may flash back towards the source of the gas or vapor, sometimes with explosive force.Similarly, fires may flash through airborne clouds of combustible dusts.Dusts may explode under some conditions (e.g., grain elevator explosions). Liquid Pool Fires. A liquid pool fire is a fire involving a quantity of liquid fuel such as gasoline spilled on the surfaceof the land or water. An added complication is that the liquid fuel, depending on terrain, may flow downslope from the accident site and into sewers, drains, surface waters, and other catchments. Flammable Solid Fires. A “flammable solid” may cause fires through friction or retained heat from manufacturing or processing. It can be ignited readily and when ignited burns vigorously and persistently. Included in this class are spontaneously combustible(pyrophoric) and water-reactive materials. Fires involving these materialspresent a difficult challenge to firefighters, particularly when water cannot be used.

12/87 F-1Reactivity Hazards. Some of the more common and/or dangerous types of reactions, and howthey may alter the outcome of an accidental release, are outlined below:

• Reactions with Water or Moist Air. Some substances generate heat when mixed with water. Some strong acids may evolve large amounts of fumes when in contact with water or moisture in the air. These fumes, which may consist of a mixture of fine droplets of acid in air and acid vapors, are usually highly irritating, corrosive, and heavier than air. Other materials may ignite, evolve flammable gases, or otherwise react violently when in contact with water. Knowledge of the reactivity of any substance with water is especially important when water is present in the spill area. Uninformed firefighters can worsen a situation by applying water to the water-reactive chemicals.

• Reactions with Combustible Organic Materials. Strong oxidizing or reducingagents have the common characteristic of being able to decompose organicmaterials and react with a variety of inorganic materials while generating heat, flammable gases, and possibly toxic gases. If the heat generated issufficient to ignite a combustible material or a flammable gas (when confined), either a fire or explosion may

occur.

• Polymerization Reactions. Many plastics are manufactured by means of apolymerization reaction in which molecules are linked together into longchains. Some of the chemicals capable of polymerizing have a strong tendency to do so even under normal ambient conditions and are especially prone to polymerize if heated above acertain temperature or if contaminated. Once polymerization starts, achain reaction may occur that develops high pressures and temperatureswithin containers and can lead to possible rupture of the container and discharge of flammable and/or toxic gases if safety and control systems malfunction or are lacking.

• Decomposition Reactions. Some chemical molecules are unstable and can break apart in a runaway reaction once the process is initiated. Variouscontaminants or heat may start a reaction. Containers may rupture or vent various flammable and/or toxic gases.Decomposition and polymerization reactions are hazardous only if they become uncontrolled and start a chain reaction that cannot be stopped with available equipment, materials, or safety systems.

• Corrosivity. The process by which achemical gradually eats away or dissolves another material is referred to as corrosion. It represents yet another type of chemical reactivity that mustbe considered in assessing the hazards of any given material. The word “corrosive” is also used descriptively to indicate that a substance may cause chemical burns of the skin, eyes, or other bodily tissues.

• Other Reactivity Hazards. In addition to the types of reactions discussedabove, hazards can result from the following situations:
The combination of various chemicals may produce new chemicals with hazards quite different and possibly more severe than thoseassociated with the original materials. Some combinations may result in

spontaneous fires: spontaneous explosions: formation of substances which will ignite or explode if shocked, heated or subjected to friction: generation of toxic gases, liquids, or solids; or generation of flammable gases, liquids, or solids.

12/87 F-2

### APPENDIX G 

## EQUATIONS USED FOR THE ESTIMATION OF VULNERABLE ZONES

G. 1 INTRODUCTION Chapter 3 presents a tabular method for estimation of the radius of the vulnerable zone (VZ) for releases of gases, liquids, and solids. This appendix contains the equations used to derive the tables found in Chapter 3. Section G.2 discusses the derivation of the release rate term of the vulnerablezone calculation. For liquids, a liquid factor including many of the variables that affect rate of evaporation is used for the estimate: this factor is also described in Section G.2.
Section G.3 discusses the derivation of the relationship between downwind distance, as a function of rate of release, and level of concern (LOC) as presented in Exhibits 3-1 to 3-4 in Chapter 3.

The calculations are based on applications of the dispersion model described in the Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates, Public Health Service Publication No. 999-AP-26, 1970 (popularly known as Turner’s Workbook). Estimates of dispersion distribution parameters are those of Briggs,based on McElroy and Pooler’s experiments, given in the Handbook of Atmospheric Diffusion, Department of Energy Publication No. DOE/TIC-11223, 1982.

The following assumptions are made concerning the circumstances of the credible worst case release (these assumptions are designed to be conservative and represent adverse conditions for screening purposes) :
Rural flat terrain with no obstacles (e.g., hills) that would interfere with the downwind movement of the plumes (obstacles would increase the dispersion capability of the plume); Ground level release (releases from elevated sources tend to disperse more readily than ground level releases); F Stability and 1.5 meters per second (3.4 miles per hour) wind speed, representing stableair and low wind speed (the VZ calculated under these conditions is larger than that calculated under conditions usually considered typical); and Continuous release (consistent with a catastrophic loss) rather than a brief “puff.”

The following assumptions are made concerning the substance released:
There is no phase change and the plume is at ambient temperature (phase changes and temperature changes would cause variations in dispersion and evaporation (volatilization) rates). The substance released is neutrally buoyant in air. Dense gases are treated the same way as neutrally buoyant gases in this analysis. (The behavior of a dense gas is different, but for the calculations presented in this appendix, the concentrations along the centerline of the plumeare considered. These concentrations are comparable for dense gases and neutrally buoyant gases); A Gaussian distribution of the plume’s spread, in both horizontal and vertical planes, was assumed in the dispersion estimates: Gases are released over a ten minute period: Liquids are instantaneously spilled from containment onto a flat, level surface forming a 0.033 ft (1 cm) deep pool and are allowed to evaporate at ambient or boiling conditions: Solids in powder form (<100 microns particle size) behave like gases and are also released in ten minutes:

12/87 G-1Solids in solution are assumed to behave as a finely dispersed aerosol and are released in ten minutes: Solids in molten form are assumed to behave as liquids. The quantity molten is assumed to lose containment instantaneously, forming a 0.033 ft (1 cm) deep pool on a flat, level surface and volatilizing at its melting point temperature: and Solids in “brick” form (i.e., not powdered, in solution, vaporized, or molten) are not likely to be released.

G.2 ESTIMATION OF AIRBORNE QUANTITY RELEASED FOR LIQUIDS The rate of release of a chemical is needed for calculation of the radius of the VZ. It is dependent on the quantity of chemical released, the nature of the release scenario (i.e., pool of liquid, release ofpressure relief valve, etc.), and the properties of the chemical released. For spilled pools of chemicals, the rate of release is usually taken to be the evaporation rate (rate of volatilization). Using the assumptions presented above, the following equation is used to calculate the rate of release to air for liquids (in Ibs/min) :

(1) QR = (60 sec/min x MW x K x A x VP x (929cm 2 /ft 2

, (Clement 1981) R x (T1+273) x (760 mm Hg/atm) x 454 g/lb

where: QR = Rate of release to air (Ibs/min); MW = Molecular weight (g/g mole);
K = Gas phase mass transfer coefficient (cm/sec); A = Surface area of spilled material (ft 2 ); VP = Vapor pressure of material at temperature T1 (mm Hg);
R = 82.05 atm cm 3 /g mole K; and
T1 = Temperature at which the chemical is stored ( 0 C).

The equation for the evaporation rate (rate of volatilization) can be rewritten as follows:

(2) QR= 0.162 x MW x K x A x VP R (T1+273)

K can be estimated based on a known value for a reference compound as follows:

(3) K = K ref x (MW ref /MW) 1/3 (Clement 1981)

Using water as the reference compound:

(4) K K water =0.25 x (u) 0.78 (Mackay and Matsugo 1973) ref

where: u = Windspeed (m/sec)

12/87 G-2Combining Equations 3 and 4:

(5) K = 0.25 (u) 078 x (18/MW) 1/3

Combining equations for QR and K yields the following equations:

0.162 x 0.25 x (u) 0.78 x (18) 1/3 x MW 2/3 x Ax VP (6) 

### QR = R x (T1 + 273)

0.106 x (u) 0,78 x MW 2/3 x Ax VP (7) 

### QR = R x (T1 + 273)

Calculation of the surface area (A) of the spilled material is carried out as described in the following sections.

G.2.1 CALCULATION OF SURFACE AREAS OF POOLS OF SPILLED LIQUIDS For diked areas, the surface area is assumed to be the area inside the dike (unless the surface area of the spill is smaller than the diked area). If the area is not diked, the following assumptions are used to calculate the surface area of the spill:
Density = 62.4 Ib/ft 3 (i.e., all liquids are assumed to have the same density as water) Depth of pool is 0.033 ft (I cm) The surface area of the spilled liquid (ft 2 ) is:



### QS (Ibs) (8) A = 62.4 lb/f 3 x 0.033ft = 0.49 x QS

where: QS = Quantity spilled (Ibs); and A = Surface area (ft 2 ).

Substituting for A in Equation 7, the quantity released to air per minute (QR) can be estimated as follows:

0.106 x (u) 0.78 x MW 2/3 x 0.49 x QS x V P (9) 

### QR = 82.05 x (T1 + 273)

12/87 G-3G. 2.2 LIQUID FACTORS Equation (9) may be simplified by separating all the chemical specific parameters, such as vaporpressure and molecular weight, and the temperature into a “liquid factor.” The “liquid factor” therefore includes all the terms of Equation (9), except the quantity spilled (QS) and the wind speed term. For ambient temperatures, VP is the vapor pressure measured at T1 (ambient temperature). The liquid factor at ambient conditions (LFA) is calculated as:

0.106 x MW 2/3 x 0.49 x VP (10) LFA = 82.05 x (T1 + 273)

For a liquid at its boiling temperature, VP is assumed to be 760 mm Hg at T1, the normal boiling point of the liquid. The liquid factor at the boiling point (LFB) is calculated as:

0.106 x MW 2/3 x 0.49 x 760 (11) LFB = 82.05 x (Boiling point + 273)

For a solid at its melting point, VP is the vapor pressure measured at T1 (melting point). The liquid factor at the melting point (LFM) is calculated as:

0.106 x MW 2/3 x 0.49 x VP melting (12) LFM = 82.05 x (melting point + 273)

The liquid factor multiplied by the quantity spilled and the wind speed term (u 0.78 ) gives the airborne quantity release rate:

(13) QR = QS x u 0.78 x (LFA, LFB, or LFM)

For diked areas:

(LFA, LFB, or LFM) x Diked Area (ft 2 ) x u 0.78 (14) QR = 0.49

Liquid factors for listed substances that are liquid at ambient conditions, or solid with potential for handling at molten state, are listed in Appendix C.

G.3 ESTIMATION OF A VULNERABLE ZONE The following equation, based on Turner’s Workbook, was used to derive the vulnerable zone radius. The concentration downwind of a release is given by:

(Turner 1970, Equation 3.4)

12/87 G-4for a ground level release with no effective plume rise where:

C = Airborne concentration, gm/m3 QR = Rate of release to air, gm/sec
= 3.141 = dispersion deviation, horizontal (y), and vertical (z) u = windspeed, m/sec

This equation represents the steady state concentration at some distance downwind and is applicable for release ranging from 10 minutes to one hour.



### QR (g/sec)
3.141 x u x c

0.318 x QR (g/sec)

u x c

QR (Ib/min) = QR (g/sec) x (60 sec/min x 1 lb/454 g)

QR (Ib/min) = 0.132 x (QR g/sec)

QR (g/sec) = (QR g/sec) / 0.132

0.318 x QR (Ibs/mi n)
0.312 x u x C

2.41 x QR (Ib/min ) (17) u x c
As downwind distance increases, the product increases. For practical use to be made of the diffusion formula, numerical values of the diffusion coefficients must be determined. To deal with the resulting wide variations in turbulent properties, meteorologists have introduced stability classes into which atmospheric conditions are classified. Briggs (1973) used McElroy and Pooler’s

G-1. To use these equations to determine distances, it will be necessary to use trial and error methods or a computer. For the development of this guidance, both rural (open country) and urban conditions for F atmospheric stability (the most stable class used for this guidance) and D atmospheric stability (neutral class assumed for overcast conditions during day or night, regardless of wind speed) were used.

12/87 G-5

### EXHIBIT G-1 

## FORMULAS RECOMMENDED BY BRIGGS (1973)

Pasquill Stability
Type

Open-Country Conditions

0.22d(1+0.0001d) -1/2 0.20d 0.16d(1+0.0001d)- 1/2 0.12d 0.11d(1+0.0001d) -1/2 0.08d(1+0.0002d)- 1/2 0.08d(1+0.0001d)- 1/2 0.06d(1+0.0015d)- 1/2 0.06d(1+0.0001d)- 1/2 0.03d(1+0.0003d)- 1 0.04d(1+0.0001d)- 1/2 0.016d(1+0.0003d)- 1

Urban Conditions

A-B 0.32d(1+0.0004d)- 1/2 0.24d(l+0.001d) 1/2
C 0.22d(l+0.0004d)- 1/2 0.20d D 0.16d(l+0.0004d)- 1/2 0.14d(1+0.0003d)- 1/2
E-F 0.11d(1+0.0004d)- 1/2 0.08d(l+0.00015d)- 1/2

NOTE: d = downwind distance.

12/87 G-6G.4 REFERENCESBriggs, G.A. 1973. Diffusion Estimation for Small Emissions. ATDL Contribution File No. 79. Atmospheric Turbulence and Diffusion Laboratory.
Clement Associates Inc. 1981. Mathematical Models for Estimating Workplace Concentration Levels: A Literature Review, EPA Contract 88-01-6065. Prepared for ETD/EPA.
Hanna, F.R., Briggs, G.A. and Hosker, R.P. 1982. Handbook of Atmospheric Diffusion, Department of Energy Publication No. DOE/TIC-11223.
Mackay, Douglas and Matsugo, Ronald S., “Evaporation Rates of Liquid Hydrocarbon Spills on Land and Water.” The Canadian Journal of Chemical Engineering, Vol. 51, August, 1973.

McElroy, J.L. and Pooler, F. 1968. St. Louis Dispersion Study Report AP-53. U.S. Public Health Service, National Air Pollution Control Administration.
Turner, B. 1970. Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates. Public Health Service Publication No. 999-AP-26.

12/87 G-7This document will not give you evacuation distances nor provide definitive guidance on estimating evacuation zone.Decision about whether or not to evacuate

at the time of an actual release. The estimated vulerable zones should be used for planning purposes only and should not be used as an evecuation zone 

### APPENDIX H 

## GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EVACUATION OR IN-PLACE SHELTERING

An accidental release of hazardous materials sometimes necessitates evacuation of people from certain areas to prevent injury or death. These areas can include those directly affected by toxic fumes and gases or fire and those areas that may be potentially affected during the course of the incident (e.g., through wind shift, a change in site conditions). Evacuation is a complex undertaking. Rather than attempting to provide specific step-by-step guidance for eachpossible scenario, we will discuss in this appendix general considerations that should be addressed in advance by the local emergency planning committee (LEPC). Specifically, thisappendix will discuss: deciding whether evacuation is appropriate and necessary (SectionH.1); steps in conducting an evacuation (Section H.2); and in-place sheltering as an alternative to evacuation (Section H.3).

H.1 MAKING A DECISION ON EVACUATION
The first evacuation consideration, determining whether an evacuation is necessary, involves a comprehensive effort to identify and considerboth the nature of and circumstances surrounding the released hazardous material and its effect on people. No safe exposure levels have been established for the extremely hazardoussubstances (EHSs) and therefore it is not possible to calculate evacuation distances using the methods outlined in this guidance. Section H. 1.1discusses how hazardous conditions and inherent properties of the released materials affect evacuation decisions. Section H. 1.2 discusses how life safety factors affect the decision on whether or not to order an evacuation.

The Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) Emergency Response Guidebook provides initialisolation and evacuation distances for transportation incidents. The evacuation distances given in the guidebook are preceded by the following advice: “The [initial isolation/evacuation] table is useful only for the first twenty to thirty minutes of an incident.. . . There are several good reasons for suggesting that the use of the table belimited specifically to the initial phase of a nofire spill incident during transport. The best calculations for these tables are not reliable for long vapor travel times or distances. At their best they are estimates for a cool, overcast night with gentle and shifting winds moving a non-reactive, neutrally-buoyant vapor.” The DOT Emergency Response Guidebook is intended to help first responders to make informed judgments during the initial phases of a hazardous materials transportation incident. LEPCs are cautioned not to use it as a substitute for a specific plan for responses to hazardous materials incidents.

H. 1.1 Hazardous Conditions Affecting Evacuation Decisions

Numerous factors affect the spread of hazardous substances into the area surrounding a leaking/burning container or containment vessel.Evacuation decision-makers must carefully consider each of these factors in order to determine the conditions created by the release, the areas that have been or will be affected, and the health effects on people. The factors that affectevacuation include amount of released material(s), physical and chemical properties of the released material(s), health 

### hazards, dispersionpattern, atmospheric conditions, dispersion medium, rate of release, and potential duration ofrelease. Each of these factors is explained below.To begin with, it is necessary to know the material’s physical and chemical properties, including :
Physical State - solid, liquid, or gas: Odor, color, visibility;
Flammability: flashpoint, ignition temperature, flammable limits;
Specific Gravity: whether material sinks or floats on water:
Vapor Density: whether vapors rise or remain near ground level; Solubility: whether material readily mixes with water;
Reactivity: whether material reacts with air, water, or other materials:
Crucial Temperatures: boiling point, freezing point.
It is also necessary to know the health effects resulting from a short-term exposure:

� Acute or chronic hazards:

� Respiratory hazards:

� Skin and eye hazards: and
Ingestion hazards.
Another consideration is the dispersion patternof the released hazardous material, for example:

• Does the release follow the contours of the ground?

� Is it a plume (vapor cloud from a point source) ?

• Does the release have a circular dispersion pattern (dispersing in all directions)?
Atmospheric conditions must also be addressedwhen determining the appropriate evacuation response to a hazardous material release. Atmospheric conditions that may affect the movement of material and evacuation procedures include:

� Wind (speed and direction);

� Temperature:

� Moisture (precipitation, humidity); • Air dispersion conditions (inversion or normal); and

• Time of day (daylight or darkness). Other considerations important in making evacuation decisions include:
Whether the hazardous material is being released into air, land, and/or water and its concentration in air or water: Size and potential duration of the release: and
Rate of release of the material, as well as the projected rate (the rate of release may change during the incident).

H.1.2 LIFE SAFETY FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN PLANNING AN EVACUATION
Life safety factors to consider when planning an evacuation include the number and types ofpeople that require evacuation and the resources needed to conduct a safe and effectiveevacuation. Whether the people are actually located in an area that contains hazards or arelocated in an area that is only threatened by hazards is a critical component of evacuation planning .

Populations in a Hazardous Area
When considering people who are actually located within a hazardous area, the LEPC must address whether responsible authorities shouldorder people to remain indoors, rescue individuals from the area, or order a general evacuation. The “remain indoors” option should be considered when the hazards are too great to risk exposure of evacuees. (See Section H.3 for further discussion of in-place sheltering.) It may be necessary to rescue people from the hazardous area, but this would involve supplying protective equipment for evacuees to ensure their safety. The third option is to order a general evacuation. In this case people must evacuateby means of private transportation or by transportation provided by local or State government, a private sector company, or volunteer groups.

Populations in a Threatened Area
For an area that is only threatened by a hazardous release, it should be determined whether

12/87 H-2potential evacuees can be evacuated before hazards reach the area. To safely evacuate the area, a significant amount of lead time may be required. Depending on the hazards and their movement (as described above), evacuation assistance personnel may not have much lead time.

Identifying People to be Evacuated

Numerous factors must be considered to ensure that an evacuation is conducted in a safe and effective manner, including how many people will be involved, where they are located, their degree of mobility, and whether there are any communication barriers to address. Potentialevacuees may be found in many different locations:

Residences

Educational institutions

Medical institutions

Health care facilities

Child care facilties

Correctional facilities

Offices

Commercial establishments
Manufacturing/industrial/research facilities

Government facilities
Places of public assembly

Parks and other recreational areas
Sporting arenas/stadiums
Roadways
In addition to the above considerations, the LEPC must determine what persons will require special assistance in evacuating the area andwhether there exist any barriers to communication between evacuees and evacuation assistance personnel. Special consideration should be given to:

� Persons lacking private transportation

� The elderly

� Children Handicapped persons
The infirm

Prisoners Non-English speaking persons

Resources Needed To accomplish a safe and effective evacuation,the LEPC must provide for appropriate and sufficient resources, including personnel, vehicles,and equipment appropriate for emergency situations.Among the agencies that would likely supply personnel during an evacuation operation are the Red Cross, police department, fire department, and emergency medical service agencies.In addition to personnel, specially equipped vehicles may have to be put in service, including: Lift-equipped buses and taxi cabs for handicapped persons: Ambulances for infirm and handicapped persons: and Vehicles for transporting persons lacking private transportation.Making prior arrangements to ensure the availability of these vehicles in times of emergencywill result in a more timely and effective evacuation. The type of equipment that will be necessary during an evacuation includes: Protective gear for evacuation assistance personnel (e.g., masks to protect the lungs, protective covering for the skin and eyes); Protective gear for evacuees who may have to be taken through an area of heavy chemical concentration: Communication equipment (e.g. portable and mobile radios, mobile public address systems, bull horns); and Evacuation tags (a tag or marker attached to a door to indicate that the occupants have been notified) for buildings that have been evacuated.

H.2 CONDUCTING AN EVACUATION

Should it be decided that an area is to be evacuated, the evacuation must be conducted in a

12/87 H-3well-coordinated, thorough, and safe manner. Evacuation involves a number of steps, which include assigning tasks to evacuation assistancepersonnel, informing potential evacuees, providing transportation as necessary, providing emergency medical care as necessary, providing security for evacuated areas, and sheltering evacuees as necessary.

H.2.1 Evacuation Tasks
The first step is to assign tasks to evacuationassistance personnel. These tasks include information concerning:
The specific area to evacuate
Protective gear to be worn Instructions to be given to evacueesTransportation of evacuees who are without private transportation
Assistance to special populations

Shelter locations Security for evacuated areas
Traffic and pedestrian control Communication procedures The progress of the evacuation efforts must be monitored by those in charge who should alsoprovide continuous direction to evacuation assistance personnel.

H.2.2 Evacuation Warning and Instruction
The second step in an evacuation is to inform people that they must evacuate and to provide them with accurate instructions. This procedure can be accomplished in several ways:

� Door-to-Door

. Requires significant manpower; is a slow process but is very thorough.

• Public Address System (from a mobile unitor within a building). Requires less manpower than a door-to-door evacuation andis quicker to accomplish but is not as thorough.

� Combination of Door-to-Door and Public Address System. For some sections of an area door-to-door notification may be

12/87 H-4 more expeditious, whereas in other areas evacuation instructions given via a public address system may be adequate and less time consuming. The potential evacuees might also be alerted to the emergency by means of an alerting and warning system that prompts them to tune in to their radios for instructions from the EmergencyBroadcast System or a similar broadcast system.

H.2.3 Movement of Evacuees The third step in an evacuation is to provide movement assistance to evacuees. Movement assistance includes: Arranging transportation for evacuees who are without private transportation: Arranging for movement of the infirm and handicapped:

Traffic control: Encouraging evacuees to move along in an expeditious manner.Buses and/or vans will be needed for transportation of large groups of evacuees. Evacuatingthe infirm and handicapped will involve liftequipped buses, vans, and/or ambulances.Traffic control involves restricting access of vehicles into the evacuated area and facilitatingspeedy vehicular movement out of the evacuation area.

H.2.4 Emergency Medical Care for Evacuees Should evacuees become exposed to hazards during an evacuation, emergency medical care must be provided. If a hazardous vapor cloud were to move suddenly upon a large group of people being evacuated, numerous casualtieswould be possible. For this reason, it is advantageous to have emergency medical service (basic and advanced life support) units standing by in case they are needed.

H.2.5 Security in Evacuated Areas
Once an area is evacuated, law enforcementpersonnel must guard the area to prevent looting and other unauthorized actions. Security forces operating in or around an evacuated areamust be dressed in appropriate chemical protective gear.H.2.6 Sheltering of Evacuees
The final step in the evacuation process is toprovide shelter to the evacuees. Merely advising people to evacuate an area is inadequate. Providing shelter for them in a safe and comfortable building is of great importance, particularly at night or during inclement weather. In order toeffectively serve the needs of evacuees, a shelter should have the following facilities, services, and characteristics:
One qualified person to serve as Shelter Manager -- usually a Red Cross or local government representative Sufficient space to avoid overcrowding

Restroom facilities

Shower facilities
Specialized facilities for the handicapped
Chairs, tables, and other furniture
Adequate lighting, temperature control, ventilation, and uncontaminated water Telephone system and/or two-way radio

Food and refreshments
Adequate safety features to meet fire, building, and health requirements

Medical surveillance and careCare for the young, elderly, and handicapped

Information available for evacuees concerning the emergency Sufficient parking near the shelter
Shelters should be identified and managementand operational procedures should be established as part of a preparedness plan. When selecting shelters, locations must be chosen that are in areas beyond current and projected areas of hazard contamination. To ensure thatevacuees are continuously sheltered in safe areas, the following actions are necessary:

• Collect and evaluate data on the spread of hazards toward shelters.

� Establish and maintain communications with shelters. • Make provisions for the monitoring of hazards in and around each shelter and evaluate the resulting data.

• Advise shelter managers when shelters willhave to be evacuated because of approaching hazards. Should shelters have to be evacuated, alternatelocations must be identified and shelter coordinators notified. To ensure the health and safety of evacuees at shelters, provisions should be made for evacuee medical surveillance and care. This is especiallyimportant for evacuees who may have been exposed to hazardous materials vapors. Ideally, each shelter should have medical professionals assigned to care for evacuees. They must bealert to symptoms caused by hazardous materials and be responsible for treating victims or calling for emergency medical assistance.Evacuees showing symptoms should be separated from those unaffected. The medical professional can also assist evacuees who need prescription medicines.

H.2.7 Re-entry into Evacuated AreasBefore making the decision to authorize reentry, data collected by the monitoring crewsmust be verified and the advice of health officials considered. Once the decision to authorize re-entry hasbeen made, re-entry operations must be coordinated. These operations may be looked upon as an evacuation in reverse, as many of thesame steps must be undertaken. Re-entry operations involve: Notifying people that they can return to evacuated areas.Providing evacuees with special information or instructions. Coordinating transportation for evacuees who require it.Providing traffic control and security in areas being re-entered. Advising people to report lingering vapors or other hazards to emergency services. Advising people to seek medical treatmentfor unusual symptoms that may be attributable to the hazardous materials release.

12/87 H-5H.3 IN-PLACE SHELTERING
Evacuation decisions are of necessity very incident-specific and the use of judgment will be necessary. If the release occurs over an extended period of time, or if there is a fire that cannot be controlled within a short time, thenevacuation may be the sensible option. Evacuation during incidents involving the airborne release of EHSs is sometimes, but by no means always, necessary. Airborne toxicants can be released and move downwind so rapidly that there would be no time to evacuate residents. For short-term releases, often the most prudent course of action for the protection of the nearby residents would be to remain inside with the doors and windows closed and the heating and air conditioning systems shut off. An airbornecloud will frequently move past quickly. Vulnerable populations, such as the elderly and sick, may sustain more injury during evacuation, than they would by staying inside and putting simple countermeasures into effect.
There are other disadvantages associated with evacuation during incidents involving airborne releases of EHSs. Changes in wind velocity and direction are difficult to predict and could be very important if evacuation were undertaken during a release. Differences in temperature between air layers could also cause the toxic cloud to disperse in ways that would be hard topredict. These factors and others make it difficult to estimate how long the community wouldbe exposed to a toxic cloud. Also, no safe exposure or concentration levels have been established for the general population with regard to releases of chemicals included on the list of EHSs.
In-place sheltering, therefore, may be a sensible course of action, when the risks associatedwith an evacuation are outweighed by the benefits of in-place sheltering. In order for this protection measure to be effective, the affectedpopulation must be advised to follow the guidelines listed below: Close all doors to the outside and closeand lock all windows. (Windows seal better when locked). Seal gaps under doorways and windows with wet towels and those around doorways and windows with duct tape or similar thick tape.
Building superintendents should set all ventilation systems to 100 percent recirculation so that no outside air is drawn into thestructure. Where this is not possible, ventilation systems should be turned off.
Turn off all heating systems and air conditioners.
Seal any gaps around window type air-conditioners, bathroom exhaust fan grilles, range vents, dryer vents, etc. with tapeand plastic sheeting, wax paper, or aluminum wrap.

Turn off and cover all exhaust fans in kitchens, bathrooms, and other spaces.
Close all fireplace dampers.
Close as many internal doors as possible in homes or other buildings.
If an outdoor explosion is possible, close drapes, curtains, and shades over windows. Stay away from windows to prevent potential injury from flying glass.
If you suspect that the gas or vapor has entered the structure you are in, hold a wet cloth over your nose and mouth.
Tune in to the Emergency Broadcast System channel on the radio or television forinformation concerning the hazardous materials incident and in-place sheltering.
It should be understood that following the aboveguidelines will increase the effectiveness of inplace sheltering as a protective action. Following these guidelines does not ensure that this type of protective action will indeed be effective.

12/87 H-6

### APPENDIX I 

# INFORMATION COLLECTION TO EVALUATE SITES FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING

1.1 OVERVIEW

This appendix presents a process for collecting information that will be needed to assess the hazards posed by particular sites and to developcommunity emergency plans. The National Response Team’s Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guid e (NRT-1) should be consulted when preparing such plans. The process focuses on an examination of the sites that use, produce, process, or store extremely hazardous substances (EHSs). The types of information tobe collected include descriptions of the chemicals present, ongoing measures for the control of potential releases, and the available response resources and capabilities at the site and within the community, including existing emergency plans. Initial requests for information should bemade in a way that promotes continued cooperation between the personnel at the sites and the community planners. The informationshould be sought in a way that encourages facilities to participate actively in the planning process along with local government and other community groups. Title Ill of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986(SARA) requires facilities to assist local planning committees by supplying information and designating an emergency planning coordinator (see Chapter 1). The Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) has published A Manager’s Guide to Title Il l that suggests ways for participants in the Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) program to cooperate with local planning committees.

Many sites will already have safety and contingency plans in response to regulatory requirements or as part of normal operating procedures. The community should learn what the facility is doing to identify and deal with the possible release of acutely toxic chemicals. The plantsite may have identified community impacts resulting from accidental chemical releases andhave taken measures to reduce risks. The planners can then identify what additional steps and
resources, such as personnel, training, and

12/87 I-1 equipment, might be needed at the facility or in the community.
The information collection process is outlined here as a series of discussion points, which arepresented as examples of the types of information that a community may want to use to assesspotential hazards. A community planning committee may use some, all, or none of these discussion points. Depending on the community’sinitial perception of potential risks, the discussion points can be tailored by the committee to meet specific local needs. Some of these points will be rather simple and direct, such as those used to determine what EHSs are located at a site, and their quantity. Other points should generate additional discussion, for example, whether any EHSs are handled or stored near other chemicals that are flammable, explosive,or reactive. If such a situation does exist, subsequent discussions should be designed to: (1) identify these chemicals, (2) determine how the facility isolates the chemical of concern (e.g., the chemical of concern is stored in fire-proofcontainers, or the adjacent flammable, explosive, or reactive chemical is stored under conditions to prevent leakage or explosion), and (3) what additional precautions are taken to ensure that a release will not affect the surrounding community.
Planners should always be aware that:
The specific identity of an EHS may sometimes be withheld as a trade secret. In theabsence of specific chemical identity, however, important information such as the physical state and the levels of concern (LOCs), as defined in this document, should be provided. The information-gathering effort should not be adversarial but rather an attempt by all concerned to cooperate in describing andsolving a potential problem facing the entire community: Facilities may be sensitive concerning whatthey consider proprietary business information:Asking a particular question does not imply that there is a definite problem, but rathershows a desire to identify and address potential problems: and
Title Ill of SARA requires facilities to provide information to planners that will enable hazards analysis.

1.2 ORGANIZATION

The suggested discussion points for gatheringand analyzing information for a hazard assessment are presented in four sections:
Site activities and management programs:

� Site location information;
Site measures for managing and controlling chemical releases; and Site interface with community response and preparedness programs.

Information obtained from these discussion points and the information sources discussed in Chapter 2 will assist the planners in assessing site-specific hazards and should be consideredalong with the factors used for assessing chemical releases outlined in Chapter 2 and detailed in Appendix H. Even if the sites have safety andcontingency plans in place, the community planners should not neglect the procedures suggested in Chapters 2 and 3, as they will enablethe community to assess hazards posed by different sites and to develop contingency plans in order of priority.

The discussion points outlined here are far ranging. Not all of them will be necessary to elicitinformation required for site-specific assessment. However, most will need to be discussedfor the final phase of this program, the formulation of emergency plans. For this reason they are included here. Planners may select those points that best suit their needs for each phase of the process.

The first section outlines the points of information that the community planners will want to obtain about the type and quantity of chemicals used, produced, processed, or stored and to evaluate the appropriateness and timeliness of any planning that may already have been done at the site. If little emergency preparedness work has been done, the planners need to knowthe site’s chemical handling and processing activities, related management programs, and capability for responding to chemical release emergencies.
Next, the planners will want to find out about those physical, topographic, meteorological, and demographic factors that, although external to the facility itself, have an important bearing onhow to prepare for an emergency involving a release from the facility. The facility may already have assembled this kind of information as part of its internal planning process.
Most companies, for reasons of plant and employee safety, community concern, regulatoryrequirements, or as a matter of corporate policy, have analyzed the potential on-site and offsite impact of a chemical release. Plans for promoting on-site safety, emergency plans, andliquid spill and hazardous waste release prevention plans may already have been developed asa result of standard industrial practice or regulatory requirements. If such plans are available, they can be a valuable starting point for thelarger task facing the planners, that is, developing an up-to-date comprehensive community emergency plan, in addition to the initial task of ranking the site-specific hazards.
The final step for the community planners is that of developing, or updating, the community emergency plan. NRT-1 should be consulted for this step. Based on emergency planning efforts that may already have been undertaken at the site, as well as on the planners’ assessment of the site’s activities and management programs, the planners can assess the adequacy of thesite’s emergency plans and those of the community. A solid foundation will now exist upon which future cooperative planning and updating

can occur.

1.3 SITE ACTIVITIES AND MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
This section contains example discussion pointsthat will assist planners in collecting basic information about the site’s processes and related management programs. With this information and using the procedures outlined in Chapter 2 and 3, the planners can assess a site’s potentialhazards as well as evaluate its emergency response resources and capabilities. This information will also be useful in developing a community emergency plan. The planners first need information about the hazardous materials thatexist at the site and then about how these materials are handled and managed.

1 . Chemicals of Concern That Could Be Released:

Chemicals used, produced, processed,or stored that meet the criteria (see Appendix B) or are on EPA’s EHS list (seeAppendix C), whether or not they exceed the threshold planning quantities (TPQs). (The specific chemical identity of an EHS may sometimes be withheld as a trade secret. In the absence of thespecific identity, however, important information such as the physical state and the LOC, as defined in this document, should be obtained.)
Chemicals that could result from reaction, combustion, or decomposition of chemicals at the site.High temperature, high pressure processing and storage of chemicals.

2 . Shipping and Transfer of EHSs:

� Frequency of shipments (daily, weekly, irregular schedule).

� Quantity of shipments (tons, gallons, number of drums, tanks, and vats).

� Form of shipment (e.g., tank truck, rail car, drums, boxes, carboys, pipelines, barges).

� Transportation routes through the community (roads, railroads, pipelines).

� Unloading systems:o pumping versus gravity feed systems, and o underground versus aboveground pipelines.

� Unloading procedures: o monitoring by plant personnel, and o remote monitoring by tank level gauges, alarms, automatic cut-off valves, and similar means.

3. Storage Conditions:
Quantities normally stored in aboveground tanks and underground tanks.Drum storage areas (indoors and outdoors). Storage of gas cylinders.Use and operation of secondary spillcontainment systems. Techniques used for the separation of incompatible chemicals. Special systems used for the storage of reactive, flammable, and explosive chemicals.

4. Handling Procedures for EHSs:
Special safety systems used in connection with high temperature or high pressure operations.Secondary equipment containment systems for reactor and other processes. Pumping versus gravity-feed systems. Materials handling by automatic systems versus manual systems. Use of alarm systems for tank level gauging, temperature and pressure sensing. Redundancy for critical process (i.e., availability of back-up equipment in case of failure, or automatic system shut-down after a system failure). Frequency of inspection and testing ofcritical process equipment, alarm systems and similar equipment.

5. Site Management Characteristics:

� Hours of operation and production rates during different shifts (planning needs may differ between day and night shifts),

� Degree of around-the-clock coverageby trained, responsible, and fully authorized technical and management staff.

12/87 I-3Plant security (e.g., fencing, guards on duty, remote sensing by TV monitors, alarm connections to local police and fire departments).

Plant wastewater and stormwater drainage: direct discharges to local surfacewater versus discharge to on-site or offsite treatment plants.Site emissions to the air covered by Federal and State environmental regulations.

Hazardous and non-hazardous solid wastes generated, treated, stored, or disposed on-site. Wastes transported off-site.

6. Site Process Design and General Operations:

Listing and description of relevant site processes for synthesis, manufacture, formulation, repackaging, distribution, and handling of EHSs. Design and construction specificationscovering such aspects as handling temperature and pressure, and materials’ compatibility.Process design to consider safety devices, alarms, and back-up systems to ensure the integrity of the process and to protect the facility during normal and unusual conditions of operation. Programs for managing changes in thedesign or operation of process equipment and changes in chemical component amounts, concentrations, or types. Preventive maintenance programs for facilities and equipment critical to safe process operation.Maintenance training and implementation that addresses the potential for preventing or controlling the release of EHSG.Description of “best engineering practice” and “state-of-the-art” process design, construction, operation, and

12/87 I-4 maintenance for similar facilities within the industry.

1.4 SITE LOCATION INFORMATION

These example discussion points allow the community planners to describe the vulnerable zone in greater detail and to assess the adequacy ofboth site and community preparedness programs.

1. Significant Physical, Topographic, and Meteorological Features:

Distance to site fenceline or boundariesfrom Chemical storage and process areas. Transportation access/egress including surface, air, and water routes. Terrain characteristics of importancesuch as mountains, hills, canyons, valleys, and plains.Meteorological features, including profiles of wind speed and direction, precipitation, and temperature. Distance to nearest surface-water body, including drainage ditches and other conduits, and flood plains.

2. Site Demographic Characteristics:
Distance to nearby populations such as communities, subdivisions, commercial or industrial sites, and transportation corridors. Distance to public facilities such as schools, hospitals, parks, playgrounds and stadiums. Numbers of people within vulnerable zone distances and a characterization of how those numbers can fluctuate hourly, daily, and seasonally. Value of property and commercial goods located within potential vulnerable zone.

1.5 SITE MEASURES FOR MANAGING AND CONTROLLING CHEMICAL RELEASES

This section contains example discussion points to help the community understand those actionsalready taken by a facility to identify hazardous situations and to describe the potential effects on people, property, and the environment. The planners should identify the control measuressite management has put in place to control releases of EHSs, their by-products and decomposition products, or other chemicals that meet the criteria. Facilities are defined under Section 302 of Title Ill of SARA (see glossary).

1 . Site, Community, and Environmental Impacts of Potential Emergencies:

Site analyses or models to predict location, intensity, and duration of hazards related to chemical releases. Community, State, or Federal activities or studies that the site has integrated with their own release modeling efforts. Past experiences or incidents at the site. Past experiences with similar chemicals and processes. Past facility and transportation incidents in the community involving hazardous materials. Relationship of past response efforts to possible future needs. Note that transporters are not required to keep historical records. Activities or studies by trade groups, professional societies, or academia that could be of value.

2. Control and Response Plans in Operation, under Development, or on File:

� Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures (SPCC) Plan covering the release of hazardous substances as defined under authority of the Clean Water Act.

� General site safety plan covering routine and non-routine operations, maintenance, emergencies, training, and inspections.

� Site emergency response and preparedness plans.

� Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) Part B Emergency Response Plan covering site and community response procedures and contingencies for release to the environment of hazardous wastes as required by the regulations under RCRA in 1976 and as amended in 1980 and 1984.

� Site and corporate policies for developing, implementing, and updating all such plans.

3. Equipment Available On-Site for Emergency Response:
Basis for having such equipment onsite. Description of “good practice” and “state-of-the-art” equipment for similar facilities within and chemicals handled by the industry. Fire-fighting systems (fire hydrants, sprinklers, extinguishers, chemical fire retardants, protective clothing).Fogging or misting systems for vapor release control.
Neutralization materials for acids or caustics. Dedicated dump tanks, absorbers,scrubbers, or flares for liquid/vapor release control. Absorbants, foams, and specializedChemical agents for containing and controlling releases. Emergency power systems in case of power outage. Containment booms for surface-water spills.

4. Leak and Spill Detection Systems:

� Basis for installation of these systems.

� Description of “good practice” and “state-of-the-art” systems for similar chemicals handled by the industry.

� Gas detection monitors or explosimeters for determining sources and severity of leaks.

� Oil spill detection devices for nearbysewers or drains to surface-water bodies.

12/87 I-5Wind direction indicators for determiningthe direction of released chemical aerosols or vapors.Chemical spill detection systems for corrosives, organics, and other volatilizable liquid spills.Degree to which such systems are remotely monitored and can initiate an automatic response. Activation sensors for rupture disks and relief valves. Sensors to detect overfilling of tanks and initiate automatic response.

Site Emergency Response Procedures:

Chain of command for leak or spill notification within the plant (24-hour notification system). Employee evacuation plan. Response procedures for operations and staff personnel.

6. Community Notification Procedures:

Criteria for notifying the community of a release. Procedures for notification, such assounding alarms and contacting community officials, local police and fire departments, nearby populations, and the media.Ongoing education of citizens and workers to inform them of the exact meaning of notification alarms.

7. Outside Emergency Response Resources:

Contracts with local cleanup contractors. Arrangements with local hospitals or other medical facilities.Mutual aid agreement with other local industries.

8. Training and Preparedness: Frequency of employee training in emergency response procedures. Extent of emergency response training(training sessions, emergency drills, involvement of local police and fire departments in emergency training and drills, which employees receive training). Frequency of updating of contingency plans (regular basis or only after changes in plant operating procedures).

Inspection of emergency equipment (frequency and extent). Description of “good practice” and “state-of-the-art” practices for similar facilities within the industry.

I.6 SITE INTERACTIONS WITH COMMUNITY RESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS

These discussion points help the community evaluate its emergency response resources and capabilities and those of the facilities. They aredesigned to identify planning activities, resources used, and response capabilities established within the community. Information will berequired from a Variety of local emergency response agencies and government agencies.These discussion points may need to be addressed only once for the entire community. This information will be used directly to develop the community emergency plan and will assistthe planners in evaluating what emergency response resources may be needed in addition to those already in place or planned by the facility or community.

1. Planning Documents and Activities:

Existing community hazardous chemical emergency plans.
Current status of community emergency plan or planning process for EHSs or other hazardous chemical emergencies. Status of technical reference library or other information systems for response procedures for chemicals.
Structure and authority of existing community planning and coordination body (e.g.,

12/87 I-6task force, advisory board, interagencycommittee) to plan for and deal with emergencies.
Status of previous surveys or assessmentsof potential risks to the community from facility or transportation accidents involving hazardous chemicals.
Status of any existing assessments of prevention and response capabilities within thecommunity’s own local emergency response network.

Frequency of training seminars, exercises,or mock accidents performed by the community in conjunction with local industry or other organizations.

Integration of any existing hazardous chemical plans into any existing community contingency plans for other emergencies.

2. Planning Review and Update:

Community personnel and programs for periodic analysis, review, and update of the community contingency plan.
Corporate and on-site facility officials designated to maintain and update the site contingency plan and to interact with the local emergency planning group.
Corporate and facility policies in this regard.

3 Training and Preparedness:

Capacity and level of expertise of the community’s emergency medical facilities, equipment, and personnel.
Arrangements for assistance from or mutual aid agreements with other jurisdictions or organizations (e.g., other communities,counties, or States; industry; military installations; Federal facilities; response organizations ).
Availability of any specific chemical or toxicological expertise in the community -­either in industry, colleges and universities, or on a consultant basis. Availability of equipment and materials on the local level to respond to emergencies. Accessibility of equipment, materials, and manpower in emergency situations.
Completeness of a list of important resources and their availability for speedy response activities: wreck clearing, transfer, transport, cleanup, disposal, analytical sampling laboratories, and detoxifying agents.
Training and equipment available to the local emergency services (fire, police, medical).
Proximity of specialized industry response teams (e.g.) CHLOREP, AAR/BOE), State/Federal response teams, or contractor response teams available to the community. Average time for them to arrive on the

scene.Definition of community emergency transportation network.
Designation of specific evacuation routes; public awareness of evacuation routes.
Designation of specific access routes designated for emergency response and services personnel to reach facilities or accident sites.
Other procedures for protecting citizens during emergencies (e.g., remain indoors, wear gas masks).

4. Community, State, and Federal Agencies and Other Organizations that Can Contribute to or Should Have a Role in the Contingency Planning Process :

Fire Department.
Police/Sheriff/Highway Patrol.
Emergency Medical/Paramedic Servicesassociated with local hospitals or fire or police departments.
Emergency Management Agency/Civil Defense.
Public Health Agency.
Environmental Agency..

12/87 I-7Red Cross.

Other local community resources such as transportation department, public housing, communications.

5. Communications:

A list of specific community points of contact and a description of what their duties and responsibilities are in an emergency.

Agencies involved, areas of responsibility

(e.g., emergency response, evacuation, emergency shelter, medical/health care,food distribution, control of access to accident site, public/media liaison, liaison with Federal and State responders, locating and manning the command center), the name of the contact, position, 24-hour telephone number, and the chain of command. Status of the emergency communicationsnetwork in the community to alert the public, keep the public informed with up-todate information, and provide communications between the command center, the accident site, and off-scene support.Components available for the communications network (e.g., special radio frequency, network channel, siren, dedicated phone lines, computer hook-up). Status of community source list with the name, position, and phone number of a contact person for technical informationassistance. This can be Federal, State, industry associations, and local professional groups.

I-8

### APPENDiX J 

## METHODS FOR EVALUATING HAZARDS USED BY FACILITIES

J.1 INTRODUCTION

Many facilities will have undertaken detailed analyses of their plant operations. This appendix describes three procedures which they mayhave used to evaluate hazards in everyday operating procedures. They are Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Event Tree Analysis, and Fault Tree Analysis. Some community planners may wish to use these methods or at least befamiliar with them. It may be possible for planners to use such studies if they are available forthe facilities of concern. The prodcures discussed below, as well as others, are described in detail in Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Pro

cedures prepared by Battelle Columbus Division for the Center for Chemical Plant Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE). These methods for risk analysis arehighly complex and the methodologies employed are under continual development by experts in the field. It is therefore suggested that planners intending to use these methodologies seek appropriate technical support.

J.2 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY

A HAZOP is a technique commonly used by chemical process facilities to identify hazards and difficulties that prevent efficient operation. There are two versions of the technique, one which deals with “deviations” and the other with "disturbances.” “Deviations” are caused bymalfunction or maloperation of a specific production system. ‘Disturbances” include problems caused by influences outside the specifiedsystem, including other activities and the environment.

The first version of HAZOP to be developed and the most widely known was aimed at deviationsand is called a “Guide Word” HAZOP. Each element of the process is evaluated separately. The purpose of the element is specified andnotational deviations are generated by associating this purpose of the element with distinctive words or phrases called “guide words.” These guide words are “no” or “not," “more,” “less,” “as well as," " part of,” "reverse,” and “otherthan” which, broadly speaking, cover all possible types of deviation.

For each notational deviation, a determinationmust be made whether this is a possible situation (e.g., no flow or reverse flow in a transfer line that should have forward flow). If this is possible, the conditions in which that situationmight occur and the possible hazardous consequences must be identified. The guide wordsare applied to all materials and all operating parameters (e.g., flow, temperature, pressure). The guide words are applied not only to theequipment, but also to the operating procedures. All phases of operation (e.g., startup, normal operation, shutdown, backwash) must also be included. As would be expected, this approach can be time-consuming and the time taken can vary from several days for a small production unit, to several months for a complex facility.

The second version of HAZOP studies is called a “creative checklist” HAZOP. This version has been developed as a complement to the guide word HAZOP to cover “disturbances." It is of particular value in two situations. These are to enable a HAZOP study to be carried out veryearly in the design process, even before the detailed design necessary for a “guide word” HAZOP is available; and to cover hazards which may be caused by interactions between units which could be perfectly safe if built in isolation, but may be capable of adverse interactions. This second method uses a checklist of known major hazards and nuisances. The checklistwould contain words such as “fire,” “explosion," “toxicity,” “corrosion,” ”dust,” and “smell.” The checklist is initially applied toevery material likely to be present; raw materials, intermediates, finished products, byproducts and effluents. This establishes qualitatively whether hazards and nuisances exist andalso provides a quantitative data base of the numerical intensities of different hazards. Thus“fire” would result in not only a note that a material is flammable but numerical measurements such as a “flash point” and “flammable limits.”Any missing data are pinpointed and timely 3. Track what the actors will do under the cursteps taken to collect such data. rent conditions: and

The Second method continues with the association of the same checklist with each item of equipment. The materials present in such equipment, together with the inventories, are known as the “materials hazards.” As the analysis proceeds, the potential for all major hazards including interactions between units or the unit and its environment are identified. The flow of hazards can be in both directions. For example, the environment may pose hazards to the unit (e.g., flooding and earthquakes), whichwould have to be considered in the siting, design, and layout of the unit. Although less well known than the guide word HAZOP, the creative checklist HAZOP has been found to be a quick and valuable complementary approach.

While local emergency planners will not possess the resources or need to perform a HAZOP on all facilities in the community, the concept of analyzing deviations from normal performancecould be the best way to analyze the most hazardous elements found in the community. For example, if a shipping error caused a volume of a hazardous chemical to be delivered to a localfacility that exceeded the capacity of the chemical material loading area, where would the excess material be placed? If part of a train storedon the local rail siding caught fire, is there sufficient space available to segregate the chlorine tank cars that are often kept there?

J.3 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

Event tree analysis is a systematic approach thatfocuses primarily on a chain of events or occurrences. While the possible outcome of some events may be intuitive, complex situations must be broken down into a series of sequential events.

The steps in event tree analysis are:

1. Identify the actors in an emergency (e.g., hazardous materials, response personnel);

2. Identify the conditions present;

12/87 J-2 4. Visualize the effect of the activities on the outcome of the event.

The following example analysis from Analysis ofHazardous Materials emergencies for Emergency Program Managers: Student Manual FEMA SM-110 (see Appendix L) visualizes the potential outcome of a leaking vessel (in this case a drum) of flammable liquid engulfed in afire. In this situation, the actors and their activities include:

• Burning fuel is heating the drum:

� Drum is absorbing heat from the burning fuel and heating the contents; and

• Contents of drum are absorbing heat from the drum.
The complex activities of the emergency are divided into sequential events in which the burning fuel generates heat, causing the drum contents to change physical state (liquid to gas). This expansion of the contents will raise the pressure in the drum and stress the drum components.

The possible activities of the drum can then be evaluated. Possibilities include:

• The flat drum head will begin to round out as the internal pressure continues to rise:

• The weld between the drum head and the drum wall will begin to yield: and

• The drum head will separate from the drum wall.
When the drum head breaks away from the side wall, activities of the contents could include:

� As the pressure is relieved through the breach in the drum, the heated contents will expand and flow through the breach.

� Drum contents will escape to the atmosphere, creating a new actor -- vaporized flammable contents.

� Escaping contents will produce a propulsive effect on the drum, propelling it like a rocket.If the drum is still surrounded by the burning fuel, the vaporized contents will ignite,forming a fireball and escalating the problem.
When the drum is open, possible activities of the drum and contents include:

The drum, propelled by the escaping contents, may fly along a trajectory that is dependent upon where the drum was heated. Obstructions may change the direction or distance of travel.

• The released contents may fall along the flight path of the drum, leaving a trail of burning material along the ground.

The third step in event tree analysis visualizes the sequential interrelationship of the actors. Each event is broken down and placed in logicalsequence to make the possible points of intervention readily apparent. In this way, the application of event tree analysis provides a detailed understanding of the mechanical, chemical, and thermal interactions that affect the behavior of actors in an emergency.

Four general factors that affect the behavior of hazardous materials in an emergency are:

• Inherent properties and quantity of the hazardous material:

• Built-in characteristics of the container;

• Natural laws of physics and chemistry; and

� Environment, including the physical surroundings (terrain) and the conditions (weather).
These factors and their interrelationships can provide a basis for visualizing what will happen in an emergency involving hazardous materials.

For most events involving hazardous materials, the scenario begins with a container (e.g., tank, pipe, drum, cylinder, bag) that under normal conditions holds a hazardous material. The event begins when the container is disturbed or stressed in some way. When the stress exceeds the capacity of the container, a breach of the container’s integrity occurs and some type of release will occur. The escaping matter and/ or energy will follow the patterns governed by the natural laws of physics and chemistry to disperse into the surrounding environment. As thematerial comes in contact with vulnerable elements in the environment, the duration and intensity of the exposure influences the type ofevent that results. These basic elements of hazardous events are combined to form a model for the behavior of hazardous materials.

Stress Stage of the Behavior Model
Stress is an applied force or system of forces that tends to strain or deform a container and may trigger a change in the condition of the contents. There are three basic forms of stress: thermal, mechanical, and chemical. Thermalstress results from the effects of extreme temperature changes which may be caused by fire, sparks, friction, electricity, radiative transfer, or extremes of cold or heat.
Mechanical stress is caused by an object which physically contacts the container. The object may puncture, gouge, bend, break, tear or split the container. A chemical stress is caused by a chemical action such as acids corroding thecontainer, pressure generated by decomposition, polymerization, or runaway reactions.

Breach Stage of the Behavior Model
If the container is stressed beyond its structurallimits, it will open or breach. Different containers breach in different ways:
Disintegration, which is the total loss of integrity (e.g., a glass jar shattering).Attachments open up (e.g., a pressure relief device malfunctions).

Punctures from external sources. A split, tear or crack of a container (e.g., torn bags or boxes, or split or cracked drums).

Release Stage of the Behavior Model

Once the container is breached, the material can escape to the environment. There are four types of release:

• Violent rupture causes runaway cracking ofclosed containers and Boiling Liquid Ex12/87 J-3panding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE), and occurs in less than one second.
Rapid release through pressure relief devices, damaged valves, punctures, or broken piping will take several seconds to several minutes.
A spill or leak, which is a non-violent flow through opening in fittings, splits or tears, and punctures may take minutes to days.
Detonation is an explosive chemical reaction which occurs in less than 1 /100th of a second. Examples are military munitions, dynamite, and organic peroxides.
Dispersal Stage of the Behavior Model

Once the hazardous material is released into the surrounding environment, the event is likely toescalate in intensity. The properties and characteristics of the material, in combination withthe laws of physics and chemistry, will determine the pattern of the distribution of matter and energy. The forms that the matter or energy may take include: fragments, powder, dust, schrapnel, liquid, vapor, vaporizing liquid, gases, infared rays, and shock waves. Factorsthat will affect the movement of materials include temperature differentials, density with respect to water and air, wind speed and direction, and gravity. The dispersion path that is followed may be linear, radial, random, or couldfollow the contour, upward or outward. The dispersion pattern may be in the form of a cloud, cone, plume, stream, or irregular deposits.

Dispersion patterns will also depend on the physical form of the material (i.e., gas, liquid, or solid). Gases escaping under pressure (e.g., leaks from a cylinder) form a cloud or plume. If enclosed, the cloud will fill the available space: if not enclosed, it may be carried by the wind as a plume. If the vapor’s density is greater than air, the material may settle into depressions or travel along the ground as a plume.

Liquids may flow along the ground as a stream while simultaneously vaporizing and acting as a gas (stream with plume) or may be absorbed into the ground or onto clothing worn at the scene (irregular deposits). Solids may scatter (irregular deposits), form dust clouds that are carried by the wind (plume), or stick to surfaces (irregular deposits).

Exposure Stage of the Behavior Model
As the hazardous material moves away from the point of release, exposure to the surrounding environment may occur through a variety of pathways including: ingestion, physical contact, and inhalation. Duration of the exposure andConcentration of the material are particularly important aspects of the exposure event.

Damage Stage of the Behavior Model
Damage due to the exposure to the hazardous material includes aspects of the susceptibility ofthe environment or population. Such susceptibility will differ markedly depending on the timeof day, season of the year, age of the population, and ability of the population to escape or otherwise mitigate the event.
The types of damage which may occur include:thermal (heat and cold), radioactive, asphyxiation, toxic or poison, corrosive or chemical,disease (viral or bacterial), and physical or mechanical.
Damage can be expressed in terms of: fatalities, injuries, property destruction, critical system disruption, and environmental disruption.
As shown in Exhibit J-1, event tree analysistraces each event, as it occurs or does not occur, and each safety or control equipment or procedure to identify the possible outcome. Note that several paths through the event treecan have similar or identical outcomes. It is important to trace all possible events through all paths that can affect the outcome. In addition toidentifying the possible outcomes and their relative severity, an event tree can visually represent the potential importance of possible equipment or procedures in mitigating the severity of damage. In the example in Exhibit J-1, if both hazardous events occur and procedure A fails, the control procedure B is completely ineffective in altering the outcome or severity of damage.

5.4 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an analytical technique used to determine the means by which an

12/87 J-4

## Exhibit J-l 

# Sample Event Tree Analysis

12/87 J-5unwanted event, such as a release of toxic materials, could possibly occur. The technique, which in structure is similar to the event analysis technique, involves the development of fault tree diagrams which illustrate the “chain of events” required for a particular event to occur.

Fault tree analysis reverses the normal sequence of events and places the undesirable event under study (i.e., head event) at the top of the diagram. The incident is assumed to have occurred and sub-events which represent themeans by which this event could occur are inserted below. Sub-events which are interrelated (i.e., dependent incidents), in that they must both occur before the subsequent eventcan occur, are related by a logical “and.” Subevents which are unrelated in that the occurrence of any one sub-event would cause the subsequent event, are connected with a logical "or.” For example, in the analysis of the overflow of a storage tank that is being filled withgasoline, in which the storage tank has a highlevel alarm, the associated fault tree might be constructed as in Exhibit J-2. The head event is that the tank overflows.

The fault tree technique only considers those actions which must occur for the head event to occur, and therefore isolates the events of importance from the many possible events. In the example, in order for the tank to overfill, theremust be an increase in the tank level of the flammable liquid (gasoline) (sub-event 1) and nocorrective action taken before overfilling (subevent 2).

Since both sub-event 1 and sub-event 2 must occur before the head event occurs, the two events are connected to the head event by an “and” (i.e., sub-event 1 and sub-event 2 must occur to have the head event occur).

The fault tree analysis continues down the tree and breaks each of the sub-events into theircomponents in a similar manner (i.e., if no corrective action occurs, there must be a high level alarm failure or an operator failure).

Sub-event 2 would then be divided into:

Sub-event 2.1. High Level Alarm Fails

Sub-event 2.2. Operator Fails

12/87 J-6 The analysis continues until the sub-events cannot be practically subdivided further. The determination of this point is left to the judgement of the analyst. Exhibit J-2 illustrates an example of the beginning of a simple fault tree: however, this event might need to be subdivided further to reach the practical limits of the analysis.

As the number of sub-events increases due to system complexity, the fault tree can become very complex. The analyst can limit the effort involved by carefully selecting the scope of the head event and by limiting the level of detail considered in the analysis.

Fault tree analysis is useful for describing the interrelationship of events or components of asystem which must “fail” for an accident to occur. Since only the negative actions (i.e., failures), and only those actions related to the actual head event are considered, the technique is often an efficient means of analyzing complex scenarios or systems.

J.5 FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS

As described in the AlChE document, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedure, Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)identify and tabulate equipment and system failure modes and the potential effects on the system or plant for each failure mode. The failure mode is a description of how equipment fails(e.g., open, closed, on, off, or leaks). The effect is the accident or system response resulting from the failure. The FMECA also includes a criticality ranking for each failure mode. Single failure modes that result in or contribute to a major accident are identified; however, FMECA is not efficient for identifying combinations of equipment failures that lead to accidents.FMECA may be used to supplement more detailed hazard assessments such as HAZOP or Fault Tree Analysis. Results of this type of analysis include worst-case estimates of the consequences of single failures and a relativeranking of equipment failures based on estimates of failure probability and/or hazard severity.

## Exhibit J-2 

# Example Fault Tree

12/87 J-7

### APPENDIX K 

# EVALUATION GUIDE FOR AVAILABLE COMPUTER APPLICATIONS ADDRESSING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING

PURPOSE OF THIS CHECKLIST

This appendix contains a checklist of criteria developed to help local emergency planning committees (LEPCs), or other groups considering purchasing software, to identify computerized applications to assist in emergency responseplanning as outlined in the chapters of this document. The checklist identifies many of the ways that software applications can be of assistance. The priorities and needs of the local planningdistrict will dictate which criteria are to be considered and may require development of additional criteria.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION USED TO DEVELOP THE CHECKLIST

The checklist criteria were developed from information in the National Response Team’s Hazard

ous Materials Emergency Planning Guid e (NRT-1) and this technical guidance document. NRT-1 was designed to help local communitiesrespond to potential incidents involving hazardous materials. This guidance document supplements NRT-1 by identifying the facility and transportation route information necessary for hazards analysis and emergency planning, providing guidelines for determining vulnerable zones, and outlining the process for analyzing risks.
Understanding the planning processes describedin these documents and how the information being assembled will be used is a prerequisite for determining which computer application will best address the specific set of needs involved.

STRUCTURE OF THE CHECKLIST Section 1. Provides a checklist for evaluatingthe computer hardware (equipment) and additional software (programs) required to operate the system. The flexibility and ease of use of the system and the availability of training and other types of vendor support are also addressed.

The next sections of the checklist are based on the structure of this Guidance Document, and include: Section 2. Hazards Identification (assembling facility, transportation route, and chemical data); Section 3. Vulnerability Analysis (modeling of releases); Section 4. Risk Analysis (ranking of hazards); andSection 5. Emergency Response Planning (assembling hazards identification, vulnerability analysis, and risk analysis information).Section 6. Regulatory Requirements. This section describes a few of the ways that a software application can explain the requirements under Title Ill and assist in compliancewith requirements, such as tracking deadlines and responding to requests for information.

NOTE: This checklist highlights some important user costs to be considered, however the total system cost is difficult to represent. Some software applications may require the purchase of specialized hardware or additional softwarefrom other manufacturers. Vendors may include fees for tailoring of the software application to meet a user’s needs in the original price. Training, manuals, technical support services,additional data entry, software updates, and additional copies of the software may be included or may need to be purchased separately.

1 National Response Team. Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guid e. NRT-1 (March 1987).

12/87 K-lIn addition to the initial purchase costs of the application, the long-term investment required to install, maintain, and operate the full workingsystem must be considered. Such costs will include: assembling the required data: validating and entering the data: training new personnel; purchasing updated software: and correcting and amending the data as changes occur.These costs will apply to some extent to any application purchased. Assistance in estimating some of these costs may be available from dataprocessing professionals within the State government or from computer-oriented firms located within the district.

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR EVALUATINGEMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS

The suggested procedure for LEPCs to use the checklist is as follows:

1. Identify the local district’s need to manage emergency response planning information under NRT-1 and this Guidance Document. Understanding how the information is to beused in the planning process is an essential first step to focusing the evaluation on the needs.

2. Select the criteria on the checklist which most closely represent the local district’sneeds and priorities for emergency response planning. It is not expected that all criteria listed will apply.

3. Develop any additional criteria required to address local needs and priorities (e.g., consistency with the type of computer equipment that is already available). 4. Rank the criteria according to levels of importance (e.g., must be met, would be valuable, can be delayed).

5. Identify vendors and their emergency response software from the available literature, advertising, and other sources. Aninitial list of commercial software applications will be made available through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) emergency preparedness coordinator in each EPA regional office.

6. Request information from the vendors(e.g., sales literature, demonstration software, cost information, and current users of the application who can be contacted as references).

7. Review the information and complete a checklist for each software application.

6. Contact vendors to request any additionalinformation and to clarify data on the applications which seem best suited to the need.

CAUTIONS: An evaluation include the specific priorities and needs of the individual jurisdiction.
Any comparison of the cost of computer applications requires the assessment of many factors in addition to the purchase price identified by the vendor. (See NOTE on previous page for a detailed discussion of costs.)
Computer systems are continually being modified and refined. The results of the evaluation will become out-of-date and should be repeated if the purchase of a system is delayed.

12/87 K-2

## CRITERIA FOR THE REVIEW OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING

Computer System Requirements (Hardware, Software, Support, Etc.) Objective: Provide a basis to evaluate the functional capabilities, design limitations, and operational requirements of the system, and to evaluate the vendor’s ability and willingness to support the system.



## Criteria Explanation/Examples

1. Demonstrations of the software application are available?

2. Documentation of the software is available for review?

3. Software application is available for a trial evaluation?

4. Vendor is willing to modify the application?

5. Software is compatible with hardware that is already available or hardware that can be easily obtained?

6. Computer system hardware memory can be expanded to meet the anticipated needs?

7. Requires additional software to be purchased from other companies to function?

8. Sold as modular components which are priced separately?

9. Total system cost is consistent with budget capabilities of user? Either a professional sales demo or current user demo may be available.

User’s manuals and other explanatory material from the vendor.

30-day free trial may be available from the vendor.

The application may require changes by the vendor to allow specific community needs to be addressed.

Microcomputer; monitor: graphics board: modem: phone line: math co-processor: data storage space: digitizer: printer or plotter.

Hardware can accept additional memory required to load the software and modify the largest data file needed.

Operating system: printer interface: graphics package.

Modules may be selected and assembled to meet specific requirements (NOTE: the software may require purchasing several modules to function properly.)

Costs of hardware, software, training, and data input may be hidden.

K-3 12/87

## Computer System Requirements (Continued)
Criteria Explanation/Examples

10. Limits hardware and data access by unauthorized users?

11. User friendly and requires a minimal amount of user training?

12. Vendor provides additional training which may be required?

13. Allows data that was entered by the system vendor to be updated by the user?

14. Allows new types of data to be entered by the user which were not included in the vendor’s application?

15. Limits copying or distribution by copyright or copy protection?

16. Validates data as it is entered or stored in the application?

17. In addition to using established keywords, allows searches to be performed with criteria chosen by the user?

18. Quality data sources were used and updates will be available as source information changes?

19. Allows reports or graphs to be designed by the user? Access may be limited through passwords and/or encryption of stored data.

Menu driven: provides help screens: clearly presented instructions: uses a mouse or touch screen.

Training classes and materials may be required when the system is installed and as employees are hired: cost of training should be considered.

Allows modification of procedures for handling a spill or release according to facility or community practices.

A new field of data can be added to the database (e.g., new type of chemical information: facility response procedures).

Some vendors limit the ability to make copies of the software and require copies to be purchased for each user.

Tests data against valid ranges (e.g., pH <14) or lists of acceptable data (e.g., chemical names).

Data can be identified by other than preset criteria such as through a menu (e.g., user defined searches).

Chemical data content is current and generally accepted by science and health agencies such as EPA, OSHA, NIH, NOAA, U.S.Coast Guard, DOT, and others: cost and timeliness of updates should be considered.

User can specify data to be included, physical layout, and headings for columns of data.

12/87 K-4

## Computer System Requirements (Continued)
Criteria Explanatiorn/Examples

20. Allows data to be transferred System can communicate with other systems (input and output) with other (e.g., Lotus, dBASE, ASCII and DIF data types of software packages and formats: Macintosh and IBM equipment). hardware systems?

21 Is in use by others who are Vendors may provide names of current willing to provide information users of the system who would be on their experience? willing to discuss their experience.

22 Will the system software and New capabilities that are compatible data be updated by the vendor? with the current system may be added.

23 Vendor provides continued service If this type of service is available, a and support if the user experiences maintenance and support fee will probably any type of difficulties in operating be charged. the system?



## HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION Objective: Provide information on the identity, quantity, location, physical properties, and toxicity

of chemicals at sites within the planning district.



## Criteria Explanation/Examples

Facilities

1. Accepts data on one or more manufacturing and storage facilities?

2. Accepts chemical inventory and storage data?

3. Accepts information concerning facility accident potential or history?

4. Records or describes engineering controls and safeguards at specific facilities? Locations: activities: and inspection records.

Chemical names; quantities: site location(s); storage methods, temperature, and pressure.

Events that could result in damage; anticipated damage and consequences: and historical accident records.

Detection, fire suppression, and security systems: containment and drainage systems: and utility shutoffs.

12/87 K-5

## HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION (Continued)
Criteria Explanation/Examples

Transportation Routes

1. Records shipping routes taken to Identifies route taken and materials deliver materials to facilities transported. (e.g., highway, rail, and air)?

2. Accepts information on the Routes may create problems because of: major safety characteristics width: access: traffic patterns: and of routes? jurisdictions.

3. Logs transportation data, Tracks planned cargo shipments for schedules, and exceptions? location and time expected.

Chemical Information

1. Database contains information As required by the Title Ill regulations concerning the extremely (i.e., threshold planning quantities). hazardous substances?

2. Contains information about the Flammability; reactivity; corrosivity; chemical and physical properties? vapor pressures: physical states: boiling and melting points.

3. Contains the health hazards and Exposure routes and limits: signs and risks, toxicological data, and symptoms: target organs: and medical first aid procedures? conditions aggravated by exposure.

4. Contains methods for the safe Identifies the equipment, clothing handling and use of the chemical, and procedures required. and emergency response?

5. Indicates if notification Identifies notification requirements requirements apply to the for release of reportable quantities chemical released? of chemicals (e.g., CERCLA, SARA).

12/87 K-4

## VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS Objective: Identify geographic zone of the community that may be affected by an airborne release

and populations that may be subject to harm.



## Criteria Explanation/Examples

1. Accepts information on critical areas around facilities and routes? Drinking water supplies: cropland; livestock: sensitive natural areas.

2. Accepts information on the characteristics of populations located in areas that could be in the vulnerable zone? Location of special populations (e.g., elderly: handicapped: hospitals: prisons; schools) and population density.

3. Calculates the vulnerability zone based on the maximum quantity present for screening? Calculations are based on credible worst case assumptions identified in this technical guidance document.

4. Allows site-specific inputs to the calculation of vulnerability zones and provides release scenarios? Calculations are based on site-specific planning factors such as wind speed, stability class, and chemical toxicity.

Modeling the Release of Chemicals (predicting the path, the effect, and the area of impact of the

chemical release using mathematical analysis)

Inputs (information that drives the model)

1. Accommodates physical characteristics of the chemical?

2. Addresses different types of releases?

3. Supports multiple point sources?

4. Address releases from any source or only pre-selected sources? Liquids at boiling point or ambient temperature;. powdered solids: solids in solution: molten solids: gas density.

Instantaneous and continuous releases including spills, leaks, fires, explosions, and BLEVEs.

Several release sources operating concurrently.

Modeling ability may be limited to a specific set of pre-established sites or may be capable of representing releases from any possible location (e. g., transportation accident).

12/87 K-7

## VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (Continued)

Criteria Explanation/Examples

5. Accepts data on meteorological conditions? Wind velocity and direction: temperature: stability class: precipitation.

a. Allows observed data to be manually input? Data are typed into the system using the keyboard.

b. Allows a modem link for direct data entry? Accepts data directly from laboratories or weather stations.

c. Requires a meteorological tower for data input? Facility or community meteorologic tower is required for data collection.

6. Accepts data input for the level of concern? Uses the data entered to calculate the vulnerable zones.

Algorithms (equation(s) and assumptions used to calculate the results such as the concentration

of the plume of released chemicals)

1. Employs dispersion models that are consistent with those used in this technical guidance document?

2. Identifies the types of assumptions used?

3. Calculates chemical dispersion rates and routes?

4. Supports terrain modeling and considers complex terrain? Gaussian dispersion models based on Turner’s Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates, PHS Pub. No. 999-AP-26. Different air stabilities and wind speeds are used.

Some models are not documented to provide information on the assumptions used to perform calculations and their effect on the model’s results, or the limits of the model’s ability.

Provides information on the plume size, motion, and concentration over time: and predicts toxic corridors.

The ability to accommodate site-specific effects of terrain can be significant under some circumstances.

Outputs (the results of the calculations performed)

1. Presents pictorial representation Presents model output as dispersion of dispersion plumes? plume overlaid on a map of the area.

12/87 K-82. Produces line, bar, or pie graphs? Presents model output in graphical format (e.g., concentrations experienced at a location over time).

3. Retains the results of calculations Systems differ in their ability to re-enact a in final form for future review or stores series of calculations or to reproduce a the input parameters to allow the specific output. results to be reproduced?



## RISK ANALYSIS Objective: Provide a basis to judge the relative likelihood (probability) and severity of various possible events. Risks can be expressed in qualitative terms (high, medium, low) based on subjective, common-sense evaluations, or in quantitative terms (numerical and statistical calculations).



## Criteria Explanation/Examples

1. Allows judgement to be made concerning facilities and routes, for probable hazard and severity of consequences? Judgement may be based on the accident history, type of facility, storage conditions, control technologies in place, and other factors.

2. Assembles quantitative facility information concerning possible release scenarios? Recognized systematic approaches include: hazard operability study (HAZOP): event tree analysis: fault tree analysis.

3. Allows priorities to be recorded according to community concerns and opinions? Judgement and concerns of the community can be entered into the ranking and prioritization for community hazards.

12/87 K-9

# EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING
Ob jective: Assemble detailed information concerning hazards, vulnerability, and risk; provide

action outlines for responders and criteria for plan review; present maps of the local area; and provide simulation capabilities for training.



## Criteria Explanation/Examples

1. Provides detailed methods for promptly identifying the affected area and population based on release information?

a. Maps facility locations and transportation routes?

b. Plans routes for hazardous chemical shipments?

2. Accepts emergency information and plans provided by chemical facilities?

a. Records facility emergency contacts?

b. Generates floor plans of facility storage sites?

c. Indicates location of engineering controls/safeguards?

3. Provides an action outline for emergency responders?

4. Identifies the needed emergency response equipment for various types of emergencies?

5. Stores the inventory of local response equipment and provides location and availability information? Mapping: modeling; demographical statistics: worst case release.

Provides details of relative locations of hazards and vulnerable zones.

Based on characteristics of routes available, selects the least dangerous route.

Plans; procedures: site diagrams: emergency checklists.

Provides names, titles, and 24-hr. phone numbers for emergency purposes.
Shows building layout and chemical locations graphically.
Identifies safeguards such as emergency shut-offs graphically, or by detailed description of the location.

Provides a chain of events or considerations that is based on the site-specific conditions involved.

Provides a decision aid for choosing proper equipment and required medical supplies based on the chemicals involved.

Assists in the identification of equipment available from chemical facilities, local emergency responders, hospitals, other communities, and private contractors.

12/87 K-1O

# EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING (Continued)

Criteria Explanation/Examples

6. Stores information on community emergency procedures and plans?

7. Provides criteria for evaluating existing emergency response functions?

8. Prompts for information to update emergency response plans?

9. Identifies hazardous material training program requirements and stores training information and schedules?

10. Provides simulation capabilities for training? Direction and control; communications: evacuation and sheltering: medical treatment facilities: resource management: cleanup and disposal: decontamination: and documentation.

Identifies the essential elements that should be present in the plans based on regulatory requirements and local community priorities.

Flags information that changes frequently (e.g., emergency contacts, telephone numbers, and addresses).

Provides criteria for evaluation of training programs and stores information on training completed per regulatory requirements.

Provides example test emergencies to exercise the plan and train response personnel.

12/87 K-11

# IDENTIFICATION OF REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
O biective: Track regulatory deadlines and assist in the assessment of compliance with reporting

requirements, as well as record the status of required information and log requests for information.

NOTE: These criteria concentrate on planning and response requirements of Title Ill of SARA. The

following is only a partial list of the possible capabilities that computer applications may possess with regard to the identification of regulatory requirements.



## Criteria Explanation/Examples

1. Tracks deadlines for reporting Deadlines for reporting as required requirements under Title Ill of under Title 111 of SARA Sections 302, 304, SARA? 311-312, and 313.

2. Provides a means to respond to Report capabilities may include information reporting requirements production of the submission forms or of Title III of SARA? letters or partial assembly of the needed information.

3. Has the capability to store and Data manipulation including cross manage MSDS and chemical indexing lists to identify all facilities inventory form data? using a particular chemical.

4. Addresses public requests for Record type and number of requests information under Title Ill of SARA? and provide information to answer them.

5. Tracks the status of planning Identify when a plan was developed in the local districts? and when it was last updated.

12/87 K-12

### APPENDIX L 

# SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

This appendix lists some other documents that may prove helpful to anyone organizing a community awareness and preparedness program for responding to releases of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs).

1. Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1). Washington, D.C.: National Response Team: prepared by ICF Incorporated, 1987.
NRT-1 was prepared to comply with the requirement in Section 303(f) of SARA. It contains general guidance on selecting and organizing the planning team, and describes how to carry out fundamental planning tasks (e.g., review existing plans, assess response capabilities, conduct a hazards analysis). The guide describes in detail what should be included in a hazardous materials emergency plan and suggests how this material could be organized.
NRT-1 can be obtained free of charge from:.

Hazmat Planning Guide WH-562A 401 M Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20460

2. Community Teamwork: Working Together to Promote Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Research and Special Programs Administration; prepared by Cambridge Systematics, Inc. 1983.
This publication provides State and local (i.e., fire, police, emergency service/civil defense, transportation, public safety, and environmental protection) officials with guidance on the most efficient use of their resources to develop effective hazardous materials programs. The bulk of the guide describes how one can, with a limited budget (1) perform a risk analysis: (2) obtain and mobilize emergency response services: (3) perform hazardous materials inspections: and (4) obtain hazardous materials training.

Deliberate and detailed attention to minimizing costs is a- consistent aspect of DOT’s Community Teamwork. Because most communities must take into consideration strict budget limitations when devising preparedness plans, Community Teamwork should be of interest for this reason alone. Community Teamwork will also prove helpful to those planning to provide personnel safety equipment and clothing. Copies of Community Teamwork can be obtained by calling (202) 426-2301 or writing to:

Office of Hazardous Materials Transportation, Attn.: DHM-50 Research and Special Programs Administration Department of Transportation 400 7th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

3. Hazardous Materials Management System: A Guide for Local Emergency Managers. Portland: Multnomah County Office of Emergency Management, 1983.
This handbook is a detailed guidance document prepared at the local level and published by the Multnomah County Office of Emergency Management in Portland, Oregon. This handbook guides thelocal emergency manager in the development and implementation of a comprehensive system approach for dealing with hazardous materials incidents within a specific geographic area. It is written from the perspective that such a system is multi-disciplinary and requires a team effort under the leadership of a local “emergency manager.”

12/87 L-14.

Information on availability of the Multnomah County guide can be obtained by calling (503) 255-3600 or writing to:

Multnomah County Emergency Management 12240 N.E. Glizan Portland, Oregon 97230

4. Community Awareness and Emergency Response Program Handbook. Washington, D.C.: Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), 1985.
This private sector planning document is similar to those prepared by government agencies. However, the CMA document addresses two areas of chemical plant management:

Community awareness: developing a community outreach program and providing the public with information on chemicals manufactured or used at local chemical plants: and

Emergency response planning: combining chemical plant emergency plans with other local planning.

This CMA document presumes that the key organizing person might have no experience in contingency planning; hence, the information is provided in elementary detail to help just such an organizer. Pages 1-40 will prove helpful to any community preparing to develop an emergency plan to respond to EHS incidents. Appendix 1 lists typical components of a chemical plant emergency response plan: Appendix 2 provides highlights of interrelated plant, community, and State plans.
Copies of the CMA guide are available for $10.00 and can be obtained by calling (202) 887-1100 or writing to:

Chemical Manufacturers Association 2501 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037

5. An Unconstrained Overview of the Critical Elements in a Model Stare System for Emergency Responses to Radiological Transportation Incidents. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C.: Commission and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; prepared by Rockwell International, 1981.

6. Atmospheric Emergencies: Existing Capabilities and Future Needs. Washington, D.C.: Transportation Research Board, 1983.

7. Chemical Hazards Response Information System (CHRIS), Manual II: Hazardous Chemical Data. Washington, D.C.: United States Coast Guard, Department of Transportation, 1984.

8. Criteria and Methods for Preparing Emergency Exposure Guidance Level (EEGL) Documents. Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, May 1985.

9. Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants. Washington, D. C. : U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980. (NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1).

10. Emergency Planning, Student Manual. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, August 1983.

11. Disaster Operations: A Handbook for Local Governments. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1981.

12/87 L-212. 1987 Emergency Response Guidebook. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1987. This guidebook is available at:

Office of Hazardous Materials Transportation, Attn. : DHM-50 Research and Special Programs Administration Department of Transportation 400 7th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590

13. Guidance for Developing State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness for Transportation Accidents. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1983. (FEMA-REP-5)

14. Guide and Checklist for the Development and Evaluation of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Fixed Nuclear Facilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of International and State Programs, 1974.

15. Guide for Development of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans, CPG 1-8. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, October 1985.

16. Multi-Media Compliance Inspection: Union Carbide Corporation, Institute, WV. Philadelphia: Environmental Protection Agency, Region Ill, 1985.

17. The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. Washington, D.C.: U.S.Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Part 300. (Usually referred to as the National Contingency Plan).

18. Objectives for Local Emergency Management, CPG 1-5. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, July 1984.

19. Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Users Manual for Small Communities and Rural Areas. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration; Prepared by Department of Civil Engineering, Kansas State University, 1981.

20. Emergency Handling of Hazardous Materials in Surface Transportation, Student, Patrick J. (ed). Washington, D.C.: Association of American Railroads, Bureau of Explosives, 1981,

21. Overview of Environmental Pollution in the Kanawha Valley, Vincent, James R,. Denver: EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, 1984.

22. Highly Hazardous Materials Spills and Emergency Planning, Zajic, J.E., and Himmelman, N.A. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1978.

23. Hazardous Materials Transportation: A Synthesis of Lessons Learned from the DOT Demonstration Projects. Washington, D.C.: ICF Incorporated. This report summarizes seven DOT-sponsoreddemonstration projects on prevention and preparedness planning. Appendix F contains a discussion of the lessons learned so that other communities can benefit from the experience.

24. Hazardous Materials Response Guide, Kelty, J. Emergency Response Unit, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. This guide is designed to provide rapid access to information on hazardous properties of chemicals involved in emergency incidents.

25. Safeguards Report. University of Charleston, Charleston, West Virginia: National Institute for Chemical Studies, November 1986. A Community Hazard Assessment for the Kanawha Valley of West Virginia.

12/87 L-326. Criteria and Methods for Preparing Emergency Exposure Guidance Level (EEGL), Short-Term Public Emergency Guidance Level (SPEGL), and Continuous Exposure Guidance Level (CEGL) Documents. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986. This document was developed by the Board on Toxicology and Environmental Health Hazards of the National Research Council. It is designed exclusively for the use of the Department of Defense (D O D) for the chemicals of interest to it.

27. The Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates, Turner, B., Public Health Service Publication No. 999-AP-26, 1970.

28. Analysis of Hazardous Materials Emergencies for Emergency Program Managers: Student Manual. FEMA SM-110.

29. DOT Hazardous Materials Table. 49 CFR 172.101.

30. Fire Protection Guide on Hazardous Materials. Quincy, MA.: National Fire Protection Association, 1986.

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### APPENDIX M 

## EPA AND FEMA REGIONAL CONTACTS

A. EPA Regional Preparedness Contacts

Region I (Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut) 60 Westview Street Lexington, MA 02173

Region II (New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands) 26 Federal Plaza Room 900 New York, NY 10278

Region Ill (Pennsylvania, Maryland, D.C., Delaware, Virginia, West Virginia) 841 Chestnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19107

Region IV (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky) 345 Courtland Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30365

Region V (Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota) 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, IL 60604

Region VI (New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arkansas) 1445 Ross Avenue Allied Bank Tower at Fountain Place Dallas, TX 75202

Region VII (Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Missouri) 726 Minnesota Avenue Kansas City, KS 66101 Environmental Services Division (617) 861-6700, ext. 221

Response and Prevention Branch New Jersey: (201) 321-6657 New York: (212) 264-2525

Office of Emergency Response (215) 597-8907

Emergency Response and Control Section (404) 347-3931

Emergency Response Section (312) 886-1964

Regional Information Center (214) 655-2270

Preparedness Coordinator (9 13) 236-2806

12/87 M-1Region VIII (Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota) One Denver Place 999 18th Street Suite 500 Denver, CO 80202

Region IX (California, Nevada, Arizona, Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam) 215 Fremont Street San Francisco, CA 94105

Region X (Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Alaska) 1200 Sixth Avenue Seattle, WA 98101

Title III/CEPP Information HOTLINE NUMBER Emergency Response Branch (303) 293-1723

Toxics Division (415) 974-7460

Hazardous Waste Division Emergency Response Team (206) 442-1263

1-800-535-0202 (in Washington, D.C.: (202) 479-2449)

12/87 M-2B. FEMA Regional Offices (Note: Direct all requests to the “Hazmat Program Staff” of the appropriate FEMA Regional office.)

Region I (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusettes, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont) 442 J. W. McCormack POCH Boston, MA 02109 (617) 223-9540

Region II (New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands) Room 1337 26 Federal Plaza New York, NY 10278 (212) 238-8208 Region Ill (Delaware, Washington DC, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia) Liberty Square Building 105 S. 7th Street Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215) 597-9416 Region IV (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee) Suite 700 1371 Peachtree Street, N.E. Atlanta, GA 30309 (404) 347-2400 Region V (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin) 4th Floor 175 W. Jackson Blvd. Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 431-5501 Region VI (Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas) Federal Regional Center, Room 206 800 N. Loop 288 Denton, TX 76201-3698 (817) 898-9399 Region VII (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska) 911 Walnut Street, Room 300 Kansas City, MO 64106 (816) 283-7060

Region VIII (Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming) Denver Federal Center, Building 710 Box 25267 Denver, CO 80225-0267 (303) 235-4811 Region IX (Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, American Samoa, Guam) Building 105 Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129 (415) 923-7100

Region X (Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington) Federal Regional Center 130 228th St., S.W. Bothell, WA 98021-9796 (206) 481-8800

US GOVERNMENT PRlNTlNG OFFlCE 1991- 5 17- 003/ 4 7004

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