[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-10088

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-21483-WMH

SCOTT JENSEN, 

LAURA JENSEN, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

MIAMI-DADE COUNTY CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION DEPARTMENT, 

 Defendant - Appellee,

COUNTY MAYOR CARLOS ALVAREZ,

 Defendant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(April 14, 2015)

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Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Scott Jensen appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 

Miami-Dade County (the “County”) on his deliberate indifference claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.

1

 His central allegation is that correctional officers employed by the 

County savagely beat him while he was in their custody. Because the record is 

devoid of evidence that the County’s policymakers were on notice of any pattern of 

use of excessive force in the County’s detention facilities, we affirm.2

A county may not be held liable under § 1983 unless officials with “final 

policymaking authority” promulgate or permit the practice that caused a

constitutional violation. Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th 

Cir. 2003). When a plaintiff’s theory of liability is that a county failed to train its 

personnel sufficiently to avoid violation of a constitutional right, “a plaintiff must 

present some evidence that the municipality knew of a need to train and/or 

 1 Although the appellant’s brief refers to Laura Jensen as a party to this appeal, she is not

a party. She voluntarily dismissed her only claim, a state law claim for loss of consortium, 

before the district court issued its final summary judgment order on the sole remaining count in 

the action.

Further, we note that after the deadline to file his reply brief had passed, Mr. Jensen 

moved this Court to accept the brief out of time and attached the brief to his motion. We grant 

his motion.

2 We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 

legal standards as the district court. See Bailey v. TitleMax of Georgia, Inc., 776 F.3d 797, 800 

(11th Cir. 2015).

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supervise in a particular area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to 

take any action.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998).

Mr. Jensen failed to meet this burden.3

 He acknowledges that discovery was 

fruitless in this regard: the County’s former Mayor and the former director of the 

County’s corrections department—the only witnesses deposed who could speak to 

this issue—denied knowledge of any excessive force problems in the County’s 

detention facilities. The former Mayor insisted under oath that he “would not have 

. . . tolerated” a systematic excessive force problem had he known of one. Doc. 

172-1 at 3. The former director of corrections testified in his deposition to a 

subjective belief during his tenure that there was no “significant issue of concern 

regarding the use of force . . . .”4

 Doc. 184-1 at 30. Regardless of whether these 

witnesses’ perceptions were accurate or reasonable, absent evidence to the 

contrary, their testimony is conclusive of the issue of knowledge. Although Mr. 

Jensen expresses incredulity about their testimony, no record evidence 

substantiates his contention that the Mayor or another County official with 

 3 Mr. Jensen relies almost exclusively on a Department of Justice investigation and report 

identifying a pattern of excessive force in County detention facilities. But, the investigation and 

report cannot create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the County’s awareness of such a 

pattern because the constitutional violation Mr. Jensen alleges took place months before the 

investigation began. Accordingly, the Department of Justice’s involvement could not have put 

the County’s policymakers on notice.

4 Thus, as the district court emphasized, the former director of corrections never found 

cause to alert the Mayor to any excessive force problem. And, even if we assume arguendo that 

the former director had final policymaking authority, his testimony is the only evidence 

probative of his knowledge.

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policymaking authority knew or must have known about a pattern of excessive 

force. The district court correctly found that no genuine issue of material fact 

remained for trial.

5

 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

AFFIRMED.

 5 Because we find no evidence that a County policymaker was on notice of any pattern of 

excessive force, we need not review the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Jensen failed to 

present a triable issue of fact regarding the immediate cause of his injuries.

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