NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0596-13T1

LISA LLEWELYN, f/k/a LISA SHEWCHUK,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAMES SHEWCHUK,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________________________

Argued October 15, 2014 – Decided

Before Lihotz, Espinosa and Rothstadt.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden 

County, Docket No. FM-04-271-02.

Michael P. Albano argued the cause for 

appellant Adrianna Shewchuk (Albano & Viola, 

L.L.C., attorneys; Mr. Albano, on the 

briefs).

Maury K. Cutler argued the cause for 

respondent James Shewchuk.

Respondent Lisa Llewelyn has not filed a 

brief.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

ROTHSTADT, J.A.D.

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

April 13, 2015

APPELLATE DIVISION

April 13, 2015
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Appellant, Adrianna Shewchuk, the parties' adult daughter, 

appeals from the Family Part's August 23, 2013 order granting 

defendant's motion to terminate child support because she was

emancipated, which the court entered with plaintiff's consent. 

Appellant appeared as an "[i]nterested [p]arty" and participated 

in the motion.1 On appeal, she argues she is not emancipated as 

she "has not moved beyond [her parents'] sphere of influence or 

responsibility . . . and has not obtained an independent status 

of her own[.]" Defendant James Shewchuk argues in opposition 

his daughter's voluntary actions resulted in her being 

emancipated, justifying the court's entry of the subject order.

We have carefully reviewed the record and considered the 

arguments presented in light of the applicable legal principles. 

We affirm.

We discern the facts from the motion record. Appellant was 

born in 1992 to plaintiff and her biological father. The 

parties were married in August 1994, and defendant adopted 

appellant that same year. Approximately a year later, a child 

was born to the parties. The parties divorced in 2002 and 

shared joint custody of the two children. Plaintiff was 

designated as the parent of primary residence and defendant was 

 

1 The court did not enter an order permitting her intervention. 

See R. 4:33.
3 A-0596-13T1

to pay child support and contribute to the children's college 

costs.

In April 2013, defendant filed a motion seeking various 

relief, including having appellant declared emancipated. 

According to defendant's supporting certification, he learned 

appellant left plaintiff's home and moved into the home of her 

biological father as of January 1, 2013, she was not attending 

school (she graduated from high school in 2011), and was 

working. In her responsive certification, plaintiff confirmed 

appellant moved in with her biological father on January 1, but 

plaintiff thought the move was only temporary. However, as 

appellant never returned to her residence, plaintiff "join[ed] 

in on [d]efendant's [m]otion to emancipate [appellant]

immediately" and consented to terminating the child support 

order and crediting defendant with any overpayment.

Appellant filed two certifications in opposition to 

defendant's motion. In her first certification, she confirmed 

she left her mother's home in December 2012 to live with her 

biological father, although she never identified a reason for 

the move. She further stated she was a "full-time student at" a 

community college as she "started taking classes in the summer 

of 2011 . . . [and she was] continuing [her] education" at a 

different community college "pursuing an associate's degree and 
4 A-0596-13T1

then . . . plan[ning] on continuing [her] education in the 

medical field." In support of her statement, she provided a 

copy of her college transcript from the first school she 

attended. Appellant also confirmed she was working part-time at 

a doughnut shop, earning $7.75 per hour. Based on these facts, 

appellant argued she was "not emancipated," "[could not] 

support" herself "or live independently." According to 

appellant, her "biological father and his wife [were] supporting 

[her]."

The "unofficial" community college transcript appellant

provided revealed she took one course in the summer of 2011, for 

which she did not receive college credits. In the ensuing year 

she took thirty credits, an additional three credits in the 

summer of 2012 and thirteen more credits in the fall term. She 

did not provide transcripts from the second school, but instead 

supplied "Registration Statement and Bill" documents issued by 

the school. Those statements, for the period after she left her 

mother's home, show appellant registered for eight credits for 

spring 2013 and twelve credits for the fall 2013 semester. A 

course schedule form for the spring 2014 semester indicated 

appellant intended to take twelve credits.

Appellant also filed a supplemental certification in 

further opposition to her father's motion. In that 
5 A-0596-13T1

certification, appellant confirmed she was registered for the 

fall 2013 semester at the second school, she was taking four 

classes and her "natural father's wife paid [the] bill." She 

also explained in the spring 2013 semester she originally 

registered for four classes for eleven credits, dropped a class 

and completed the remaining eight credits. Appellant stated 

that her "natural father's wife paid $705.25" of the $1024 

tuition bill and $441.10 for her books.

Appellant also stated she had "been seeing [her] doctors 

for depression and anxiety[,]" and attached a copy of a 

"Clinical Visit Summary" for an examination conducted on July 

22, 2013, by an internist and a July 22, 2013 letter from a 

psychologist. The summary listed the symptoms that the 

physician addressed during the examination, recorded her vitals 

and listed her medications, which included anti-anxiety and 

anti-depressive medications. It did not indicate a diagnosis. 

The psychologist's letter, addressed "to whom it may concern," 

stated "appellant has been a patient of mine since March 2013, 

and is diagnosed with an anxiety disorder with mixed anxiety and 

depression related to her family situation." 

The court considered oral argument on August 23, 2013. 

Counsel for appellant and both parties appeared. At the 

conclusion of counsel's arguments, the court relied upon our 
6 A-0596-13T1

decision in Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301 (App. Div. 

1997), found appellant left her mother's home and was being 

supported by "other people," and concluded "by her own choosing, 

she . . . moved beyond the sphere of influence and 

responsibility exercised by her parents, and she is now 

independent of her parents." The court entered an order 

memorializing its decision and this appeal followed.

Clear standards guide our limited review. We "do not 

disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial 

judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and 

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of 

justice . . . . " Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. 

of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Also, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special 

jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts 

should accord deference to family court factfinding." Cesare v. 

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). Accordingly, when a reviewing 

court concludes there is satisfactory evidentiary support for 

the trial court's findings, "its task is complete and it should 

not disturb the result, even though it has the feeling it might 

have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal." 
7 A-0596-13T1

Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

However, we confer no deference to a trial court's 

interpretation of the law, which we review de novo to determine 

whether the judge correctly adhered to applicable legal 

standards. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of 

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Reversal is reserved only 

for those circumstances when we determine the factual findings 

and legal conclusions of the trial judge went "so wide of the 

mark that a mistake must have been made." N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). It is when we are convinced 

the trial court's determinations "are so manifestly unsupported 

. . . as to offend the interests of justice," that we intervene. 

Rova Farms, supra, 65 N.J. at 484 (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted) accord N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008).

We begin our review by recognizing a child's right to 

pursue support from his or her parents. Children of divorced 

parents have the right "to be supported at least according to 

the standard of living to which they had grown accustomed prior 

to the separation of their parents." Pascale v. Pascale, 140 

N.J. 583, 592 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks
8 A-0596-13T1

omitted). "[O]ne of the fundamental concepts in American 

society is that parents are expected to support their children 

until they are emancipated, regardless of whether the children 

live with one, both, or neither parent." Colca v. Anson, 413 

N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2010) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). "The obligation to provide child 

support is [i]ngrained into our common law, statutory, and rulebased jurisprudence." Ibid. (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). "Accordingly, a parent is obliged to contribute 

to the basic support needs of an unemancipated child to the 

extent of the parent's financial ability[.]" Ibid. (alteration 

in original)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

"[I]t is also firmly established that child support is for 

the benefit of the children; therefore, the right to receive 

support belongs to the children, not the custodial parent." 

Ibid. (citations omitted). A child's right to support is, 

therefore, enforceable not only at the insistence of a custodial 

parent against a non-custodial parent, but at the child's 

insistence as well. See Uniform Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-

45(a) and (b); and -53 (c)(permitting an adult child to bring an 

action for paternity and support up to the age of twenty-three); 

and Sakovits v. Sakovits, 178 N.J. Super. 623, 631 (Ch. Div. 

1981) (holding that a previously emancipated child should not 
9 A-0596-13T1

"forever . . . be estopped from seeking . . . contribution from 

his parents" towards beginning or resuming his education).

Enforcement by the child is not necessarily defeated by the 

fact that she has reached the age of majority. "In certain 

situations, parents still have an economic duty to support 

children after their eighteenth birthday, . . . ." N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Services v. W.F., 434 N.J. Super. 288, 296 (App. 

Div.) (quoting Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543 (1982)), 

certif. denied, 218 N.J. 275 (2014)). "[I]n appropriate 

circumstances, the privilege of parenthood carries with it the 

duty to assure [for example] a necessary education for 

children." Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543; see also Gac v. 

Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 542 (2006) ("The Legislature and our courts 

have long recognized a child's need for higher education and 

that this need is a proper consideration in determining a 

parent's child support obligation.").

A determination of emancipation is a legal concept, imposed 

when the fundamental dependent relationship between parent and 

child ends. See Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 17 (App. 

Div. 2006) (stating emancipation is "the conclusion of the 

fundamental dependent relationship between parent and child"). 

It is not automatic and "need not occur at any particular age 

. . . ." Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543. When the 
10 A-0596-13T1

circumstances surrounding the parent-child relationship support 

a finding the child is emancipated, "the parent relinquishes the 

right to custody and is relieved of the burden of support, and 

the child is no longer entitled to support." Filippone, supra, 

304 N.J. Super. at 308. However, a child's right to support is 

also not "defeated merely because both parents are united in 

their determination to declare the child emancipated." Johnson 

v. Bradbury, 233 N.J. Super. 129, 136 (App. Div. 1989).

The law also provides that once a child reaches the age of 

majority, now eighteen, N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3, a parent has 

established "prima facie, but not conclusive, proof of 

emancipation." Ibid. (citations omitted). Once the presumption 

is established, the burden of proof to rebut the statutory 

presumption of emancipation shifts to the party or child seeking 

to continue the support obligation. See Filippone, supra, 304 

N.J. Super. at 308. The presumption of emancipation may be 

overcome by evidence that a dependent relationship with the 

parents continues because of the needs of the child. Dolce,

supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 18. 

Deciding whether a child is emancipated requires a factsensitive analysis. Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543. "[T]he 

essential inquiry is whether the child has moved beyond the 

sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and 
11 A-0596-13T1

obtains an independent status of his or her own." Filippone, 

supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 308 (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). A court's emancipation "determination involves 

a critical evaluation of the prevailing circumstances including 

the child's need, interests, and independent resources, the 

family's reasonable expectations, and the parties' financial 

ability, among other things." Dolce, supra, 383 N.J. Super. at 

18 (citing Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 545).

The critical evaluation required for emancipation 

determinations typically necessitates a plenary hearing, 

especially "when the submissions show there is a genuine and 

substantial factual dispute[,]" which the trial court must 

resolve. Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 

2007); see also Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J. Super. 15, 20 (App. 

Div. 2006) (reversing motion on emancipation because the court 

"failed to recognize there were material facts in dispute and 

evidence beyond the motion papers necessary for resolution of 

the matter" required a plenary hearing); Conforti v. Guliadis, 

128 N.J. 318, 322 (1992) (holding plenary hearings are required 

when there are "contested issues of material fact on the basis 

of conflicting affidavits"). However, "[a]s is particularly the 

case in matters that arise in the Family Part, a plenary hearing 
12 A-0596-13T1

is only required if there is a genuine, material and legitimate 

factual dispute." Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 264-65 (2012).

Following our review, we conclude appellant's opposition to 

defendant's motion did not trigger the obligation for a plenary 

hearing, Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. 

Div.), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 455 (1995), because the 

certifications filed did not present a material factual dispute. 

"All of the relevant material was supplied to the motion judge 

. . . at the time of the original application . . . ." Fineberg 

v. Fineberg, 309 N.J. Super. 205, 218 (App. Div. 1998). "A

plenary hearing would adduce no further facts or information,"

ibid., as it was undisputed appellant voluntarily moved out of 

her mother's home to live with her biological father, attended 

community college part-time, had her expenses paid for by his 

wife, worked and was under a doctor's care for anxiety and 

depression. No other facts were raised.

Appellant argues although she is a legal adult and chose to 

relocate to her biological father's home, she remains a student 

and needs financial assistance, now provided by a third party 

who has no legal obligation to do so. Appellant has presented 

no legal authority directly on point to support her claim she is 

not emancipated under these circumstances.
13 A-0596-13T1

In cases involving minors or adult children with special 

needs, we determined "residence by a minor apart from his 

parents does not by itself result in emancipation." Filippone, 

supra, 304 N.J. Super. at 311 (citation omitted). We also

observed: "Other states have, even more to the point, expressly 

held that a troubled minor's removal from his parents' home to a 

public or private institutional alternative or even to the home 

of friends or relatives does not relieve the parents of their 

support obligation during minority provided the child is not 

entirely self-supporting." Ibid. (citations omitted). In L.D. 

v. K.D., 315 N.J. Super. 71 (Ch. Div. 1998), the Family Part 

refused to emancipate a nineteen year-old high school student 

who, with the aid and consent of her mother, the custodial 

parent, lived in an apartment with roommates so she could finish 

her studies in the same school district. Id. at 76-77. The 

court relied on the fact that the child, who had handicaps and 

disabilities, "was pursuing her senior year of high school [and] 

was completely financially dependent upon her mother who also 

utilized the child support paid by her father to finance [the 

child's] living arrangement." Id. at 77.

We find appellant's situation to be extremely different. 

Although she provided information about her treatment for 

depression and anxiety, there was no evidence her issues 
14 A-0596-13T1

interfered with her ability to be independent. Also, unlike the 

cases we previously considered, there was no evidence of her 

parents continuing to provide her with support once she left her 

mother's home. Rather, to the extent appellant required any 

support, she voluntarily relied upon support provided by others 

who were not under any legal obligation to provide her with 

anything.

We conclude the Family Part judge correctly determined 

appellant failed to rebut the presumption of her emancipation. 

It was undisputed she voluntary left her mother's home at the 

age of twenty to live with her biological father. She simply 

withdrew from her parents' supervision and control, obtained 

part-time employment, sporadically attended school and arranged 

for her support in reliance upon the financial relationship she 

entered into with her biological father and his wife. The 

Family Part correctly found under these circumstances appellant

emancipated herself and the motion judge properly applied the 

law to these facts. 

Affirmed.