FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SKYE ASTIANA; TAMAR DAVIS

LARSEN, on behalf of themselves

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP, INC., a

Delaware corporation; JASON

NATURAL PRODUCTS, INC., a

California corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-17596

D.C. No.

4:11-cv-06342-

PJH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 10, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed April 10, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and A. Wallace

Tashima and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown
2 ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP

SUMMARY*

Preemption / Primary Jurisdiction / 

Food and Drug Administration

The panel reversed the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) dismissal of a quasi-contract cause of action, and

dismissal of California state law claims under the primary

jurisdiction doctrine in a putative nationwide class action

claiming that the class members were deceived into

purchasing “natural” cosmetics.

Primary jurisdiction is a prudential doctrine that permits

courts to determine whether a claim implicates technical and

policy questions that should first be addressed by an agency

with regulatory authority over the relevant industry.

The panel held that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did

not expressly preempt California’s state law causes of action

that create consumer remedies for false or misleading

cosmetics labels. The panel also held that although the

district court properly invoked the primary jurisdiction

doctrine, it erred by dismissing the case rather than issuing a

stay pending potential agency action by the Food and Drug

Administration. The panel indicated that on remand, the

district court may consider whether events during the

pendency of the appeal had changed the calculus on whether

further FDA proceedings were necessary. Finally, the panel

concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP 3

quasi-contract cause of action as duplicative of, or

superfluous to, the putative class’s other claims.

COUNSEL

Joseph N. Kravec, Jr. (argued) and Wyatt A. Lison, Feinstein

Doyle Payne & Kravec, LLC, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;

Michael D. Braun, Braun Law Group, P.C., Los Angeles,

California; Janet Lindner Spielberg, Law Offices of Janet

Lindner Spielberg, Los Angeles, California, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

James M. Schurz (argued) and Lisa A. Wongchenko,

Morrison & Foerster LLP, San Francisco, California, for

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

A product labeled “all natural” or “pure natural” likely

evokes images of ground herbs and earth extracts rather than

chemicals such as “Polysorbate 20” or “Hydroxycitronellal.” 

This class action alleges that false or misleading product

labels duped consumers seeking natural cosmetics into

purchasing products that were chock-full of artificial and

synthetic ingredients. Although the underlying question of

what constitutes a “natural” cosmetic poses a fascinating

question, it is not the one we answer. Instead, this appeal

requires us to decide whether federal preemption or the

primary jurisdiction doctrine prevents the district court from
4 ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP

deciding when a “natural” label on cosmetic products is false

or misleading.

We conclude that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,

21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (“FDCA”), does not expressly

preempt California’s state law causes of action that create

consumer remedies for false or misleading cosmetics labels. 

Although the district court properly invoked the primary

jurisdiction doctrine, it erred by dismissing the case rather

than issuing a stay pending potential agency action by the

Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). On remand, the

district court may consider whether events during the

pendency of this appeal have changed the calculus on

whether further FDA proceedings are necessary.

Background

The Hain Celestial Group and JÂSÖN Natural Products

(collectively “Hain”) make moisturizing lotion, deodorant,

shampoo, conditioner and other cosmetics products. Hain

labels these products “All Natural,” “Pure Natural,” or “Pure,

Natural & Organic.”

Skye Astiana, Tamar Davis Larsen, and Mary Littlehale

(collectively “Astiana”) filed a putative nationwide class

action claiming that they were deceived into purchasing

Hain’s cosmetics, which contain allegedly synthetic and

artificial ingredients ranging from benzyl alcohol to airplane

anti-freeze. Astiana claims she likely would not have

purchased—and certainlywould not have paid the going price

for—Hain’s cosmetics had she been aware of their synthetic

and artificial contents. Astiana sought injunctive relief and

damages under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP 5

California’s unfair competition and false advertising laws,

and common law theories of fraud and quasi-contract.

Hain filed two motions to dismiss the complaint. First, it

moved to partially dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As relevant here, the district court

dismissed the quasi-contract cause of action, noting that

“while restitution is available as a remedy for plaintiffs’ other

causes of action, it is not a standalone cause of action in

California and is nonsensical as pled in any event.”1

In its second motion to dismiss, Hain asserted that

Astiana’s state law claims are preempted by the FDCA. In

the alternative, Hain urged that the suit should be stayed or

dismissed under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The

district court found the latter argument persuasive and

dismissed Astiana’s claims so the parties could seek expert

guidance from the FDA.

Analysis

I. PREEMPTION

Hain argues that the FDCA expressly preempts Astiana’s

state law claims. Although the district court did not address

this argument, Hain asks us to do so, citing our authority to

“affirm on any grounds supported by the record.” Franklin

v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1100 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). We accept

this invitation because this purely legal question remains a

threshold issue for resolution.

1 The district court also dismissed plaintiff Littlehale from the suit. 

Littlehale initially appealed this ruling, but voluntarily dismissed her

appeal before oral argument.
6 ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP

In analyzing express preemption, we “start with the

assumption that the historic police powers of the States were

not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the

clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe

Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The FDCA

proscribes any cosmetics labeling that is “false or misleading

in any particular.” 21 U.S.C. § 362(a). The more specific

preemption language prohibits any state or local government

from “establish[ing] or continu[ing]in effect any requirement

for labeling or packaging of a cosmetic that is different from

or in addition to, or that is otherwise not identical with”

federal rules. 21 U.S.C. § 379s(a). Hain’s argument that this

language expressly preempts any state law claim that a

cosmetic label is false or misleading does not square with

Supreme Court precedent.

The preemption language of § 379s is virtually identical

to the statutory text at issue in two Supreme Court cases:

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), and Bates v.

Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005). Like the

statutes at issue in those cases, the FDCA bars states from

imposing new or additional labeling “requirements,” but is

silent with regards to states’ ability to provide remedies for

violations of federal law. In light of this similarity, we have

little difficulty concluding that the FDCA does not preempt

state laws that allow consumers to sue cosmetics

manufacturers that label or package their products in

violation of federal standards.

In Medtronic, the Supreme Court considered whether the

FDCA’s prohibition on state medical device safety

“requirements” that are “different from, or in addition to”

federal requirements preempted state law product liability

claims. 518 U.S. at 481 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)). 
ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP 7

Looking to the text, the Court concluded that nothing in the

statutory language “denies [a state] the right to provide a

traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law

duties when those duties parallel federal requirements.” Id.

at 495. Simply put, the availability of state law damages for

violations of federal law “does not amount to [an] additional

or different ‘requirement.’” Id.

The Court reached a similar conclusion in Bates. There,

chemical manufacturers argued thatthe labeling requirements

of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act

(“FIFRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq., preempted state law

claims that their products failed to include adequate warnings. 

That statute mandates certain chemical labeling requirements

and prohibits states from “impos[ing] or continu[ing]in effect

any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or

different from” federal requirements. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). 

The Court determined that this language is not an absolute bar

to state law failure to warn claims, reasoning that FIFRA

“does not . . . pre-empt any state rules that are fully consistent

with federal requirements.” Bates, 544 U.S. at 452. To the

extent state law might be construed more broadly than federal

law, the solution is not to prohibit state law suits altogether,

but to “instruct the jury on the relevant [federal]standards, as

well as any regulations that add content to those standards.” 

Id. at 454.

Hain attempts to escape the dictates of the Supreme Court

by arguing that Astiana’s suit would create a “novel state

labeling requirement” under California’s Sherman Act,

Health & Safety Code § 111730. This approach does not

save the preemption argument. Astiana is not asking Hain to

modify or enhance any aspect of its cosmetics labels that are

required by federal law. Rather, she claims deception as a
8 ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP

result of advertising statements that contradicted the true

ingredients listed on the FDA-mandated label. See Williams

v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We

do not think that the FDA requires an ingredient list so that

manufacturers can mislead consumers and then rely on the

ingredient list to correct those misinterpretations and provide

a shield for liability for the deception.”). FDA regulations do

not require Hain to label its products as “All Natural” or

“Pure Natural.” If Astiana’s suit ultimately requires Hain to

remove these allegedly misleading advertising statements

from its product labels, such a result does not run afoul of the

FDCA, which prohibits “requirement[s]” that are “different

from,” “in addition to,” or “not identical with” federal rules.

Hain also argues that the complaint’s reference to the

FDA’s informal food labeling policy represents an attempt to

create a state regulatory regime where no corresponding

federal rules exist. This characterization does not ring true. 

Astiana referenced these regulations to demonstrate that Hain

knew or should have known its products contained

ingredients that would likely be considered synthetic and

artificial. Notably, the complaint referenced Hain’s

correspondence with a non-profit organization for the same

purpose.

Hain finally points out that the FDA has never issued

regulations regarding the use of “natural” on cosmetics labels. 

That is true, but Hain then argues that the FDA’s failure to

issue specific regulations on the subject is tantamount to a

conscious decision by the agency to permit any use of this

term a manufacturer sees fit. This argument proves too much. 

By this logic, a manufacturer could make any claim—wild,

untruthful, or otherwise—about a product whose contents are

not addressed by a specific regulation. The statute, however,
ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP 9

proscribes statements that are “false or misleading in any

particular,” not statements that are “prohibited by specific

FDA regulations.” Indeed, in a “Small Business Fact Sheet”

published on its website, the FDA itself stated that while the

agency “has not defined” the word natural, all cosmetics

labels must still be “truthful and not misleading.”2 This

statement is, of course, consistent with § 362(a)’s prohibition

on “false or misleading” labeling and reinforces our

conclusion that the FDA did not intend to permit

indiscriminate use of the word “natural” on cosmetics labels.3

The FDCA does not expressly preempt state causes of

action predicated on federal cosmetics labeling laws.

Astiana’s state law claims that Hain’s products were labeled

in a way that was “false or misleading in any particular” may

proceed.

II. PRIMARY JURISDICTION

We next address whether the district court properly

dismissed Astiana’s claims under the primary jurisdiction

doctrine. Before we reach the merits of the district court’s

decision, we consider two procedural points raised by

Astiana.

2

Small Business & Homemade Cosmetics: Fact Sheet, U.S. FDA,

http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/ResourcesForYou/Industry/ucm388736.

htm (last updated Oct. 20, 2014).

3 To the extent Hain claims that no consumer would be deceived by a

cosmetics label that contains the phrase “All Natural” because every

cosmetic necessarily contains artificial, synthetic, or manufactured

materials, this argument goes to the merits of Astiana’s assertion that she

was deceived by the allegedly false or misleading label, not the question

of federal preemption.
10 ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP

Astiana first urges that Hain waived its right to seek

dismissal on primary jurisdiction grounds because this

defense was asserted in a pleading titled: “Motion to dismiss

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).” Strictly speaking, this title

was inaccurate because “[p]rimary jurisdiction is not a

doctrine that implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the

federal courts.” Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip

Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 2002). In Astiana’s

view, the erroneous caption on Hain’s motion constitutes

waiver of the primary jurisdiction defense.

Astiana’s position reads too much into the caption. Just

as one can’t judge a book by its cover, a pleading caption is

hardly dispositive of the nature of the pleading. Astiana also

overlooks the reality of what occurred in the briefing of the

motion. Both Hain and Astiana addressed the merits of the

primary jurisdiction argument without reference to the

caption. Far from waiver, Hain’s motion put Astiana on

notice of the defense, and Astiana responded to this

argument.

Astiana also urges us to acknowledge that its

correspondence with the FDA during the pendency of this

appeal demonstrates that the agency declined to take primary

jurisdiction over this case. In a motion for judicial notice,

Astiana asserts that her counsel sent a letter to the FDA in

December 2013, four weeks after the district court dismissed

her claims. The letter, which was not sent to opposing

counsel or the court at that time, asserted inaccurately that

there had been a “Referral for 21 C.F.R. [§] 10.25(c)

Administrative Determination” in the case. Although

§ 10.25(c) permits federal courts to refer matters to the FDA

for administrative proceedings, the district court did not do so
ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP 11

in this case. Rather, the court had already dismissed the case

when Astiana requested that “the FDA render an

administrative determination on the meaning of ‘natural’ as

applied to personal care products regulated under the FDCA,

or advise that the agency declines to make such a

determination.” Astiana’s letter did not comply with the

FDA’s requirements for initiating a citizen petition. 21

C.F.R. § 10.30. The inquiry was never assigned a docket

number, and the FDA’s response was neither posted to its

website nor published in any other capacity. Cf. 21 C.F.R.

§ 10.65(a) (noting that “correspondence” with FDA

employees does not constitute final agency action “subject to

judicial review”).

Hain’s counsel learned of this missive nearly two months

later and immediately wrote a letter to the FDA urging it not

to respond to Astiana’s request for administrative guidance. 

In March 2013, Dr. Linda M. Katz, the Director of the FDA’s

Office of Cosmetics and Colors, responded to Astiana’s

initial request and outlined the procedures for establishing the

meaning of the term “natural,” absent a pre-existing

definition. The letter noted that “making the requested

determination without adequate public participation would

not be in keeping with FDA’s commitment to the principles

of openness and transparency.” Dr. Katz further observed

that “priority cosmetic public health and safety matters are

currently fully occupying the resources that FDA has

available for proceedings on cosmetics matters” and

“proceedings to define ‘natural’ do not fit within [the

agency’s] current health and safety priorities.”

The question is what do we do with this private

correspondence on appeal? Our answer: nothing. Because

any consideration as to the weight or the substantive
12 ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP

implications of the letter should be left to the district court on

remand, we deny Astiana’s motion for judicial notice.

We now consider the meat of Astiana’s claim: whether

the district court’s decision to dismiss the case under the

primary jurisdiction doctrine was error. Although the district

court properly invoked primary jurisdiction, it erred by

dismissing the case without prejudice rather than staying

proceedings while the parties (or the district court) sought

guidance from the FDA.

Primary jurisdiction is a prudential doctrine that permits

courts to determine “that an otherwise cognizable claim

implicates technical and policy questions that should be

addressed in the first instance by the agency with regulatory

authority over the relevant industry rather than by the judicial

branch.” Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114

(9th Cir. 2008). In evaluating primary jurisdiction, we

consider “(1) the need to resolve an issue that (2) has been

placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an

administrative body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant

to a statute that subjects an industry or activity to a

comprehensive regulatoryauthoritythat (4) requires expertise

or uniformity in administration.” Syntek, 307 F.3d at 781.

Not every case that implicates the expertise of federal

agencies warrants invocation of primary jurisdiction. Rather,

the doctrine is reserved for a “limited set of circumstances”

that “requires resolution of an issue of first impression, or of

a particularly complicated issue that Congress has committed

to a regulatory agency.” Clark, 523 F.3d at 1114 (quoting

Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., 277 F.3d 1166,

1172 (9th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Without doubt, defining what is “natural” for cosmetics
ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP 13

labeling is both an area within the FDA’s expertise and a

question not yet addressed by the agency.

Nonetheless, courts must also consider whether invoking

primary jurisdiction would needlessly delay the resolution of

claims. Reid v. Johnson &Johnson, No. 12-56726, 2015 WL

1089583, at *12 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Philip

Morris USA Inc., 686 F.3d 832, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The

primary jurisdiction doctrine is rooted in part in judicial

efficiency.”). Under our precedent, “efficiency” is the

“deciding factor” in whether to invoke primary jurisdiction.

Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir.

2007).4

Common sense tells us that even when agency expertise

would be helpful, a court should not invoke primary

jurisdiction when the agency is aware of but has expressed no

interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Similarly,

primary jurisdiction is not required when a referral to the

agency would significantly postpone a ruling that a court is

otherwise competent to make. See Amalgamated Meat

Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am., 381 U.S. at 686

(“[Primary jurisdiction] does not require resort to an

expensive and merely delaying administrative proceeding

4 Although the Supreme Court has never expressly held that courts

should weigh efficiency concerns against other factors relevant to primary

jurisdiction, see Ellis v. Tribune Television Co., 443 F.3d 71, 90 (2d Cir.

2006), the Court has discussed judicial economy in several of its primary

jurisdiction opinions. See, e.g., Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 270

(1993) (expressing concern that invoking primary jurisdiction “could

produce substantial delay”); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat

Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,

686 (1965) (“[T]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not a doctrine of

futility.”).
14 ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP

when the case must eventually be decided on a controlling

legal issue wholly unrelated to determinations for the

ascertainment of which the proceeding was sent to the

agency.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

On the record before it, the district court did not err in

invoking primary jurisdiction. Determining what chemical

compounds may be advertised as natural on cosmetic product

labels is “a particularly complicated issue that Congress has

committed to” the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 700.3 et seq.

Obtaining expert advice from that agency would help ensure

uniformity in administration of the comprehensive regulatory

regime established by the FDCA.

While the FDA had shown some reticence to define

“natural,” Judge Hamilton was not alone in thinking that new

guidance would be forthcoming. In response to a flurry of

litigation over food labeling, three other district courts

invoked the agency’s primary jurisdiction to see if the FDA

intended to offer further regulations regarding the use of the

term “natural.”5 Following these referrals, which occurred

around the same time Hain sought to invoke primary

jurisdiction in this case, the FDA outlined the complexities of

the issue and responded to the courts that “priority food

public health and safety matters are largely occupying the

limited resources that FDA has to address food matters.” 

Letter from Department of Health & Human Services, In Re

Gen. Mills, No. CIV-A-12-249, at ECF No. 94. More

 

5

 These cases are: In re Gen. Mills, Inc. Kix Cereal Litig., No. CIV-A12-249 KM, 2013 WL 5943972 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2013), Barnes v.

Campbell Soup Co., No. C12-05185 JSW, 2013 WL 5530017 (N.D. Cal.

July 25, 2013), Cox v. Gruma Corp., No. 12-CV-6502 YGR, 2013 WL

3828800 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2013).
ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP 15

specifically, the agency “decline[d] to make a determination”

at that time with respect to labeling genetically engineered

ingredients as “natural.” Id.

Once a district court determines that primary jurisdiction

is appropriate, it may either stay proceedings or dismiss the

case without prejudice. When the purpose of primary

jurisdiction is for “parties [to] pursue their administrative

remedies,” a district court will “[n]ormally” dismiss the case

without prejudice. Syntek, 307 F.3d at 782. However, when

a court invokes primary jurisdiction “but further judicial

proceedings are contemplated, then jurisdiction should be

retained by a stay of proceedings, not relinquished by a

dismissal.” N. Cal. Dist. Council of Hod Carriers v. Opinski,

673 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1982).6In either circumstance,

the district court must be attuned to the potential prejudice

arising from the dismissal of claims. Because the Ninth

Circuit “has not clearly adopted the doctrine of equitable

tolling in primary jurisdiction cases,” prudence dictates that

a court should stay proceedings rather than dismissing them

when there is a “possibility” that the running of the statute of

limitations during administrative proceedings could affect the

parties’ rights. United States v. Dan Caputo Co., 152 F.3d

1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

6

Indeed, this case demonstrates the mischief that can arise when a

district court dismisses claims rather than staying them while awaiting

agency action. Rather than seeking guidance from the FDA, Hain

attempted to leverage the district court’s dismissal on primary jurisdiction

into an outright dismissal of some of Astiana’s claims by arguing that she

had forfeited her right to request a stay in proceedings. Enabling such

“gotcha” litigation tactics is not the purpose of the primary jurisdiction

doctrine.
16 ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP

In dismissing the case rather than staying it, the court did

not consider whether the parties would be “unfairly

disadvantaged.” Reiter, 507 U.S. at 268. The purpose of

referral to the FDA was not for the agency to adjudicate

Astiana’s claims, but to provide expert advice that would be

useful to the court in considering this lawsuit. Plus,

dismissing the case had the potential to prejudice members of

the putative consumer class because of the running of the

statute of limitations. In light of these considerations, we

reverse the dismissal on primary jurisdiction grounds. On

remand, the district court may consider whether events during

the pendency of this appeal—including Astiana’s informal

letter, the FDA’s website publication of a Small Business

Fact Sheet regarding cosmetics labeling, and the FDA’s

response to the other courts—affect the need for further

proceedings at the FDA or demonstrate that another referral

to the agency would be futile.

III. QUASI-CONTRACT

The district court dismissed Astiana’s quasi-contract

cause of action, concluding that restitution “is not a

standalone cause of action in California and is nonsensical as

pled in any event.” We part ways with the district court. 

Astiana’s pleadings, though inartful, are better read as raising

a valid quasi-contract claim seeking the remedy of restitution.

As the district court correctly noted, in California, there

is not a standalone cause of action for “unjust enrichment,”

which is synonymous with “restitution.” Durell v. Sharp

Healthcare, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 682, 699 (Ct. App. 2010);

Jogani v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503, 511 (Ct. App.

2008). However, unjust enrichment and restitution are not

irrelevant in California law. Rather, they describe the theory
ASTIANA V. HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP 17

underlying a claim that a defendant has been unjustly

conferred a benefit “through mistake, fraud, coercion, or

request.” 55 Cal. Jur. 3d Restitution § 2. The return of that

benefit is the remedy “typically sought in a quasi-contract

cause of action.” Id.; see Munoz v. MacMillan, 124 Cal. Rptr.

3d 664, 675 (Ct. App. 2011) (“Common law principles of

restitution require a party to return a benefit when the

retention of such benefit would unjustly enrich the recipient;

a typical cause of action involving such remedy is

‘quasi-contract.’”). When a plaintiff alleges unjust

enrichment, a court may “construe the cause of action as a

quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.” Rutherford

Holdings, LLC v. Plaza Del Rey, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 872

(Ct. App. 2014).

Astiana alleged in her First Amended Complaint that she

was entitled to relief under a “quasi-contract” cause of action

because Hain had “entic[ed]” plaintiffs to purchase their

products through “false and misleading” labeling, and that

Hain was “unjustly enriched” as a result. This

straightforward statement is sufficient to state a quasicontract cause of action. To the extent the district court

concluded that the cause of action was nonsensical because

it was duplicative of or superfluous to Astiana’s other claims,

this is not grounds for dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) (“A

party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense

alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or

defense or in separate ones.”).

REVERSED and REMANDED.