J-A16009-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.G.A., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 231 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002974-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.G.A., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 232 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000295-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.R.A., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 234 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000721-2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.R.A., A 

MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.P., MOTHER

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: No. 235 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000486-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.J.A., JR., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 236 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered December 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002973-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.J.A., JR., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 237 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000294-2019

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 6, 2022

S.P. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders changing the permanency goals 

for her three minor children to adoption and the decrees involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to the children. Mother argues she was 

substantially compliant with the dependency court’s directives and that 

changing the permanency goals to adoption and terminating her parental 

rights was not in the children’s best interests. We affirm the decrees 

terminating Mother’s parental rights and dismiss as moot the appeals from 

the goal change orders.

Mother has three children with J.J.A., Sr. (“Father”): J.J.A., Jr. (“J.A.”) 

(born 2015), A.G.A. (“A.A.”) (born 2017), and S.R.A. (“S.A.”) (born 2020). 

The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) became involved with the family 

in August 2017, prior to S.A.’s birth, after learning that J.A. and A.A. were 

living in a home infested with cockroaches and that A.A. required intensive 

medical care, including a gastronomy tube. DHS was informed that Mother 

and Father were “intellectually delayed” and unable to properly care for the 

children. Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/17/22, at 4. 

DHS engaged Family Empowerment Services to assist the family.

However, DHS subsequently received several General Protective Services 

(“GPS”) reports about the family. The reports stated that Mother and Father

were failing to provide adequate medical care for the children and refusing an 

in-home nurse for A.A. The home and children were also reported to be dirty 

and unkempt, and Mother and Father had “unidentified disabilities or delays.” 
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Id. at 4-5. DHS investigated further and found the parents unable “to grasp 

the severity of [A.A.]’s condition” and observed that J.A. was developmentally 

delayed. Dependency Petition, 11/15/17, ¶ 5, at l., m. DHS reported,

[A.A.] was hospitalized due to complications from a G-tube and 

ear infection. [A.A.] has a genetic disease called 22Q11 and 

cardiac issues. She has a g-tube that is not kept clean and the 

parents are not feeding correctly causing the child to lose weight. 

There was a nurse coming to the home but [M]other “fired” her 

and refuses services. . . . DHS visited the home and found it to be 

inappropriate for a medical[ly] needy infant. The home is 

overcrowded, numerous animals in the home and feces from the 

animals throughout the home. There [are] only two beds and one 

is covered with dirty laundry. It was also learned that [J.A.], age 

2 is autistic. He was receiving services through Child Link but 

[M]other also stopped allowing Child Link to continue working with 

[J.A.].

Order for Protective Custody, 11/18/17, at 3 (unpaginated). At one point, 

A.A.’s heart medication ran out and the parents did not refill the prescription 

because they thought A.A. no longer needed it. Trial Ct. Op. at 7.

DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody for J.A. and A.A. in 

November 2017. Following a shelter care hearing, DHS placed J.A. in kinship 

care with his maternal great-aunt (“Maternal Aunt”). A.A. was transferred 

from the hospital to a medical facility and later to a pediatric specialty group 

home. 

The court held an adjudicatory hearing and adjudicated the children 

dependent. The court referred the parents to the Behavioral Health System 

(“BHS”) for a psychological evaluation and IQ testing and to the Achieving 

Reunification Center (“ARC”). The court ordered DHS to create a Single Case 
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Plan (“SCP”) and to refer the parents for parenting capacity evaluations

(“PCEs”) and Family School. DHS was also to refer J.A. for early intervention 

services. The court ordered the parents to have supervised visits with the 

children. See Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 11/17/17.

In March 2018, an initial Single Case Plan (“SCP”) was created. Mother’s 

objectives included:

• obtain appropriate housing;

• attend ARC and adhere to all recommended services; 

• participate in the PCE; 

• complete an individual therapy program at Joseph J. Peters 

Institute; 

• attend all medical appointments for the children;

• attend scheduled visits with Children; and 

• sign all necessary releases. 

See Trial Ct. Op. at 11.

The SCP was later revised to add: compliance with Intellectual Disability 

Services (“IDS”), treatment at Community Organization for Mental Health and 

Retardation (“COMHAR”), and demonstrate household skills, including 

budgeting. Id. at 12-14. The court held periodic permanency review hearings 

to monitor the parties’ progress. 

In June 2020, Mother gave birth to S.A. prematurely. Upon S.A.’s 

discharge from the NICU, DHS obtained an order of protective custody and 

placed S.A. with Maternal Aunt. The court adjudicated S.A. dependent in 
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September 2020 and ordered that the parents have liberal visits with the 

children while supervised by Maternal Aunt. Mother appealed the adjudication 

of dependency, arguing that she had been compliant with her DHS service 

directives. This Court affirmed, finding the evidence at the adjudicatory 

hearing substantiated the court’s finding that Mother still lacked the capacity 

to parent S.A. See Int. of S.A., 253 A.3d 278 (Pa.Super. 2021).

The court revised the SCP in March 2021, adding that Mother and Father 

were to participate in a domestic violence assessment. Trial Ct. Op. at 19-20. 

DHS placed A.A., whose leg had been surgically amputated and was 

wheelchair-bound, with Maternal Aunt that July. N.T., 12/15/21, at 65.

The following month, DHS filed petitions to change the permanency 

goals for the children to adoption and for involuntary termination of Mother’s 

and Father’s parental rights to the children under Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), 

(5), and (8).1 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. 

At a hearing on the termination and goal-change petitions, in December 

2021, the court heard expert testimony from Dr. William Russell, a licensed 

psychologist at Forensic Mental Health Services. He had completed the PCE

for Mother in July 2018. Dr. Russell opined that both parents had 

developmental delays, and that due to Mother’s difficulty with functioning 

independently, and in light of J.A.’s developmental delays and A.A.’s medical 

____________________________________________

1 DHS had filed an initial set of petitions for J.A. and A.A. in April 2019 which 

the court had held in abeyance. See Permanency Review Order, J.A., 1/21/20, 

at 2; Continuance Order, J.A., 6/11/19, at 1.
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needs, Mother “does not present with the capacity to provide safety and/or 

permanency to her Children.” Trial Ct. Op. at 23. 

Dr. Russell said he had been troubled by Mother’s inability to recognize 

any problems with her children or describe their significant needs. Mother told 

Dr. Russell that she did not see anything wrong with her children and that she 

did not understand what was happening. Id. at 24. Dr. Russell testified he 

had additional concerns with whether Mother has since found stable housing, 

whether Mother has learned to budget, and whether there is domestic violence 

in the household. Id. at 25. He further noted that “if Mother is not consistent 

with attending visits with her children, then it raises the question of how she 

is going to meet the children’s needs on a 7-day a week, 24-hour-a-day basis.” 

Id. at 25-26.

Dr. Russell testified that although he had assessed Mother in 2018, any 

unaddressed concerns with Mother’s parenting ability would persist. Id. at 26. 

Dr. Russell testified that Mother may never acquire the capacity to safely 

parent, even if she completes all the recommendations. He explained that

attending therapy and parenting classes “does not mean that what was 

presented will be internalized and transferred to other surroundings.” Id. at 

25. 

The court also heard the testimony of Tiyonna Pelzer, the case manager 

with the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) from September 2020 through 

August 2021. Pelzer testified that when she was on the case, Mother had

enrolled in mental health treatment and completed a PCE, IDS services, 
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parenting classes, and Family School. Id. at 27. However, Pelzer testified that 

A.A. has significant medical issues and J.A. is autistic, and “there were ongoing 

concerns” with Mother’s ability to meet their needs. Id. at 26-27. Pelzer 

testified that Mother does not understand why the children are in DHS care 

and the issues involved, despite various conferences on the subject. Id. at 

27.2 When Mother would receive paperwork that she did not understand, she 

would bring it to Pelzer to explain it to her. N.T. at 61. Pelzer further testified 

that Mother never complied with the objective of making a household budget.

Trial Ct. Op. at 27. Mother also failed to show Pelzer any documentation 

regarding her right to live in the property where she resides with Father and 

his mother. Id. at 28. 

Furthermore, Mother reported multiple times that Father was abusing

her, but Mother refused to attend any domestic violence counselling. Id. at 

26-27, 28. According to Pelzer, “She said they’re -- they’re just not doing it.” 

N.T. at 59. Pelzer also testified, “[Mother] has demonstrated that when it’s 

____________________________________________

2 When asked whether Pelzer believed Mother understood her role and why 

the children were in care, Pelzer responded,

When I first got the case and my initial visit at Mom and Dad’s 

home, they were blaming everyone else that their – why their 

children got taken away from them. And still, now – when – before 

I left, Mom didn’t understand. She was blaming grandmom, at the 

time that I left, why her children wasn’t allowed to come home. 

And I had to explain to Mom that it wasn’t Grandmom’s fault why 

the children couldn’t come home.

N.T. at 53.
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occurring that she’s afraid of [Father]. I don’t think she would be able to 

protect her children.” Id.

Regarding Mother’s relationship with the Children, Pelzer testified that 

Mother had trouble obtaining transportation passes to visit the children once 

Maternal Aunt moved to New Jersey, and Mother would not go on visits without 

Father. Trial Ct. Op. at 28. She said that Mother has no parental bond with 

A.A. or S.A., and when Mother would visit S.A., the child would “just scream 

and cry.” Id. at 28-29. Pelzer stated that J.A. does recognize her as his 

mother. Id. However, J.A. looks to Maternal Aunt to meet his needs. N.T. at 

63. When Mother did not visit, J.A. would not ask about her, and sometimes 

he would ask for his maternal uncle. Id. at 64. According to Pelzer, “[a]ll three 

[c]hildren are bonded to the Maternal Aunt and look to her for love, protection, 

and support.” Trial Ct. Op. at 29. Pelzer believes the children would not suffer 

irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated and that it would 

be in the children’s best interests to be adopted by maternal Aunt. Id.

DHS also presented the testimony of Danielle Enguero, the CUA case 

manager as of October 2021. Enguero testified that Mother did not sign new 

releases that would allow her to confirm Mother’s continuing mental health 

treatment, and Mother has not provided Enguero with any documentation 

showing she is entitled to live at her residence. Id. at 29. Enguero testified 

she has not been able to refer Mother to counseling for domestic violence, 

because Mother has not signed the necessary authorizations. Id. Enguero 
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further testified that Mother failed to attend a medical visit for A.A. in 

November of 2021, when A.A. was sick and hospitalized. Id.; N.T. at 98.

Enguero stated that Mother has not been consistent with visiting the 

children and does not confirm her visits 48 hours in advance to allow Enguero 

to purchase the train fare. Trial Ct. Op. at 29. Enguero testified that all three 

children now live with Maternal Aunt and that they “are very well adjusted in 

the Maternal Aunt’s home and are thriving.” Id. at 30. J.A., who is autistic,

attends first grade, and A.A., who has an in-home nurse five days a week, has 

enrolled at the same school. Id.; N.T. at 102. S.A. has no special medical or 

developmental needs. Trial Ct. Op. at 30.

The court-appointed child advocate for the two older children also 

addressed the court. She stated that J.A. is 6 years old and A.A. is 4 years 

old, and they both have special needs. Id. After visiting the children twice, 

the child advocate “could tell they were loved and well taken care of and they 

both wanted to stay with Maternal Aunt.” Id. at 30.

Mother testified that she is unemployed and receives Supplemental 

Security Income payments. Id. at 30. She attends mental health therapy at 

COHMAR, seeing a doctor monthly and a therapist every two weeks. Id.

Mother completed training in financial planning, parenting, and Family School, 

and was trained at CHOP to maintain A.A.’s G-Tube and perform CPR. Id. at 

30-31. She pays her phone bill and navigates public transportation to attend 

her appointments. N.T. at 125-26. Mother testified she is not notified 

regarding her children’s medical appointments, and that she has had to pay 
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out-of-pocket for visits to her children. Trial Ct. Op. at 31. She also stated she 

refuses to go to domestic violence counseling because she does not need it; 

but, convinced by her attorney that it was mandatory, she tried to call the 

CUA worker and supervisor, and neither have answered the phone or 

responded to her voicemails. Id.

The court granted the petitions, having found DHS provided clear and 

convincing evidence of the statutory requirements for termination pursuant to 

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) and that adoption is in the best 

interest of the children.

Mother appealed,3 and raises the following:

A. Whether the trial court erred in law and/or abused [its] 

discretion when it changed the goal from reunification to 

adoption when Mother was substantially compliant with her 

SCP objectives.

B. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), and (8)?

C. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights without giving 

primary consideration to the effect that the termination would 

have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs of 

the child as required by the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(b)?

Mother’s Br. at 5 (unnecessarily capitalization and answers below omitted).

____________________________________________

3 Father also appealed from the decrees involuntarily terminating his parental 

rights to the children. His appeals are docketed at Nos. 238, 239, and 240 

EDA 2022.
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Mother characterizes this appeal as being “about whether disabled 

parents have a right to raise their children and/or remain in their children’s 

lives.” Id. at 9. Mother first contends that the court erred in changing the goal 

to adoption, because the testimony established she had completed all her SCP 

objectives with the exception of domestic violence counseling. Mother argues 

she completed IDS services, was enrolled in mental health treatment, moved 

into a stable home with Father, was attending A.A.’s medical visits, and

completed parenting classes. She argues the objective of domestic violence 

counseling was not added until June 2021, and she did not complete this final 

objective because “[t]he CUA never stated that she signed mother up for 

domestic violence counseling and stated that you have to ask the new 

worker.” Id. at 10. Mother also complains she was “not give[n] an opportunity 

to demonstrate her ability other than in Family School.” Id. She also maintains 

that the court never had Mother re-evaluated to determine whether she 

needed additional services or training “to demonstrate that she could provide 

safety and stability for her children.” Id. at 10-11. 

Mother further argues the court erred in finding grounds for termination 

of Mother’s parental rights under § 2511(a). Mother claims that she had 

substantially completed her SCP, and, although she was given an additional 

objective of domestic violence counseling “right before” the termination 

petitions were filed, she was willing to work towards that objective, and the 

reason she had not yet done so is that the new CUA worker had failed to issue 

a referral. Id. at 12. Mother also argues grounds for termination were not met 
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under Section 2511(a) because she did not have a settled purpose of 

relinquishing her parental claim to her children.

Finally, Mother argues the court erred in terminating her parental rights

under Section 2511(b) because it is not in the best interests of the children.

She argues that she consistently visited the children until their caretakers 

moved to New Jersey,4 which created an obstacle for Mother because she did 

not drive and had to pay her own way on public transportation, and that the 

CUA was inconsistent with providing Mother with transportation funds.

We will first address Mother’s issues regarding termination of her 

parental rights. We review the termination of parental rights for an error of 

law or abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 

(Pa.Super. 2018). So long as the record supports them, we will accept the 

factual findings and credibility determinations of the trial court. Id.

The party seeking involuntary termination of parental rights must 

establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is warranted 

under Sections 2511(a) and (b). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a), (b); In re 

Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 728 (Pa.Super. 2008). The statutory grounds for 

termination listed under Section 2511(a) focus on the conduct of the parent. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a); In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 508 

(Pa.Super. 2006). 

____________________________________________

4 Mother also argues there “was no legitimate reason given why the caregivers 

were allowed to move to New Jersey vers[us] remaining in Philadelphia.”

Mother’s Br. at 13. Mother did not raise this issue before the trial court, and 

it is therefore waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
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Under subsection 2511(a)(8), termination is warranted when:

The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the 

court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months 

or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

Under this subsection, a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the 

conditions that initially caused the placement, and the efficacy of reunification 

services, do not factor into the analysis. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 

502, 511 (Pa.Super. 2006); In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 

(Pa.Super. 2003). This is because, after 12 months of placement, “[a] child’s 

life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. (quoting In Re: J.T. 

and R.T., 817 A.2d 505, 509 (Pa.Super. 2003)). Even if the parental 

incapacity is inherent and faultless, “the law is clear that parents who are 

incapable of performing parental duties are no less unfit than parents who 

refuse to perform them.” See In re: N.C., 763 A.2d 913, 918 (Pa.Super. 

2000).

If the court determines that grounds for termination have been 

established under Section 2511(a), the court must then determine whether 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest under Section 

2511(b). That provision states, “The court in terminating the rights of a parent 

shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional 
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needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). A major component 

of this analysis “concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing any such bond.” In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 

(Pa.Super. 2007).

The court credited the testimony of Dr. Russell, who had evaluated 

Mother’s capacity for parenting in 2018, as well as that of Pelzer and Enguero, 

the two caseworkers providing reunification services to Mother. See Trial Ct. 

Op. at 23, 26; N.T. at 143-44. The court also relied on its “own history with 

this case, having adjudicated and presided over many review hearings.” N.T. 

at 144-45.

The court observed that the older children have been in placement for 

over four years and Mother still lacked the capacity to safely parent them. 

Regarding the progress made by the parents, the court opined,

[W]hat I heard today was that the parents have not changed their 

status regarding their ability to parent these children. They may 

have attended some classes. They may have . . . completed some 

classes and gotten attendance, but -- and it’s a phrase that the 

doctor used: compliance is not competence. . . . And it’s important 

because the same status exists now. While the parents have 

partially complied with the requirements, they complied with the 

requirements when they feel like it. 

* * *

The other issues involved are the parents’ inability to understand 

the needs of these children, understand the ability to—they do not 

have the ability to understand communications which may attend 

all of the treatment and care for the children. . . . They would need 

someone to read those documents and interpret them for them in 
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order for them to understand the needs of the children. And the 

needs of these children are not simple needs.

* * *

[T]he parents have not progressed one bit in their understanding 

of the case, of their understanding of the needs of the children, 

[and] have not progressed in their ability to parent, [which] is the 

key issue here. 

When you have children with needs like this, the children’s needs 

are escalated, and the parents have to have the ability to meet 

that escalation. The parents haven’t changed their ability to meet 

the needs of these children since the children were taken into care. 

They’ve not demonstrated any additional ability to parent these 

children. 

Id. at 139, 140, 144-45.

The court also considered the children’s needs and welfare, and Mother’s 

bonds with the children. It credited the testimony that A.A. does not want to 

reunite with Mother, that S.A. has never been in Mother’s care, and that 

neither have a parental relationship with Mother. Id. at 141, 144. The court 

found that while J.A. recognizes his Mother, the testimony established that 

Mother and J.A. do not share a parental bond. Id. at 144. The court also relied 

on the testimony that the children are receiving care and security from 

Maternal Aunt, and there would be no irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were 

terminated. Id. The court concluded,

[M]y test is not whether you’re going to be sad because I’m going 

to terminate your parental rights. It’s whether terminating the 

parental rights is in the best interest of the children and are we 

going to be able to provide a better future for these children when 

they’re in someone else’s care? And the answer for me is a 

resounding yes for all three children, supported by evidence which 

is clear, convincing, and essentially uncontradicted.
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Id. at 145.

The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that DHS presented clear 

and convincing evidence supporting involuntary termination of Mother’s 

parental rights under Subsections (a)(8) and (b). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(8), (b). It is uncontradicted that all three children have been removed 

from Mother’s care for a period exceeding 12 months.

In addition, the conditions leading to the removal of the children persist: 

Mother lacks the capacity to provide adequate medical care for her children, 

consistently attend medical appointments and visits, and make satisfactory 

choices regarding her children’s safety, such as providing a home free of 

domestic violence. The court credited the testimony that, two years after Dr. 

Russell had expressed the same concern, Pelzer, who left the case in 2020, 

found that Mother could not grasp the issues at hand, fully understand 

important communications without assistance, or understand why the children 

were in placement in the first place. Although the objective of domestic 

violence counseling was added to Mother’s SCP approximately six months 

before the termination hearing, Mother made no progress toward this goal, 

and the trial court credited the testimony that this was due to Mother’s refusal 

to pursue the goal or sign the necessary authorizations.

Finally, the evidence supports that termination best suits the needs and 

welfare of the children—relevant here under both subsection 2511(a)(8) and 

(b). The children have no parental bond with Mother, and are thriving with 

Maternal Aunt, who is willing to adopt them. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to the children. As we affirm termination under Subsection 

(a)(8), we need not determine whether grounds for termination were 

established under the other subsections. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating this Court need only affirm the court’s 

decision as to one subsection under Section 2511(a)).

Mother’s challenge to the permanency goal change is moot given our 

decision to affirm the involuntarily termination of Mother parental rights. See 

Int. of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1272-73 (Pa.Super. 2021) (finding issues 

regarding goal change moot in light of termination of parental rights); see 

also In re D.K.W., 415 A.2d 69, 73 (Pa. 1980) (stating once parental rights 

are terminated, issues of custody and dependency under Juvenile Act are 

moot). We therefore dismiss the appeals from the orders granting the 

petitions for goal change.5

Decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights affirmed. Appeals from 

goal change orders dismissed as moot.

____________________________________________

5

If the appeals from the goal change orders were not moot, we would affirm 

the orders. A court is required to consider the factors listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6351(f), and ultimately decide a child’s placement under a best interest 

standard. Int. of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917-18 (Pa.Super. 2020). As 

discussed above, the record supports the trial court’s determination that 

adoption is in the children’s best interests.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/6/2022