File Na me: 08a0095n.06 Filed: F ebrua

ry 5, 2008 NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON

No. 05-3875 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT N D U E M E C A J, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,
v. MI CHAEL

MUKASEY, Respondent-Appe llee. ON AP PE A L F ROM THE B OARD OF IM M IG RA T IO N A P P E A LS

/ Be fore : KENNED Y, MARTI N, and CL AY, Circuit J udg es. BO YCE F. MARTI

N, J R., Circuit J udg e. Ndue Mecaj appeals the decision of the Boa rd of I mmigration Appeals deny ing his motion to reope n his case f ollowing a

deportation order issued in ab se nti a . Be cause the Boa rd did not a llow Meca

j the opportunity

to rebut the pre sumption of rece ipt of notice of

a re schedule d hear ing, w e REVERSE and REMAND f or a he aringon the merits of Meca j’s claim that he did not re ceive notice. I On Fe bruar

y 10, 2003, a border patrol ag ent stopped Meca j a nd place d him under ar

rest for

a la c k o f im mi g r a ti o nd o c u me n ts
. D u r in g anin te r v ie w w it h th e a g e n t, M e c a

j s tate d th a t h e w as living and w orking in the United States and ha d rec ently moved t o 3 0 1 5 0 W es t 9 Mile Road, # 20 81 3, F arm ing ton

Hi lls , M ic hig an 4 83 36 . T he same da y , I NS ( now I mm igrat ion

and Cus tom sNo. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 2 Enforc emen t ) issued Mec aj a Notice to Appear to stating that he was to appe ar be fore an immigration judge at a date a nd time to be deter

mined. The Notice to Appea r listed his Far

mington Hills address as his cur

rent re sidence

. Meca j was re lease d on Fe bruar

y 18, 2003. A Noti ce to the Executive Off ice f or I mmigration Review wa s prepa

red by Deportation Assistant Donald Wi lliams which listed Mecaj’s a ddress a s 26 58 Cov e B ay

Dr. , Wate rf

or d, MI 48 23 9. Me c a

j w a s a dv ise d o f h is r e sp on sib ili ty to u pd a te his

a d dr e s s i n c a s e o f a

c h an g e an d

w a s p r o v i d e d

a f o r m o nw h i c h t o d o s o . On Aug ust 14, 20 0 3 , the g overnme nt sent n o t i ce of a he aringset for N ovember 20, 2003 to the Waterfor d addre ss. Meca j appar ently re ce i v ed t h is notice since he attended the hear ing a s require d. The notice stated that Meca j must correc t any

err ors in his contact infor mation. At the he ari ng , th e jud g e re c us e d h e rs e lf be c a us e of pr ior rel ati ons w ithMe c a j’ s c ouns e l. Notice of a re hear ing se t for June 22, 2004 was serve d in person to Mec aj , an d again listed the Waterfor d addre ss. Due to a scheduling conflict with a judge ’s training day , the cour t y et ag ain re schedule d the he ari ng , th is t ime mov ingit f ro m June 22 to Jun e 15 , 2 00 4. No tic e of thi s c ha ng e wa s se nt b y

ma il to the Waterfor d addre ss. Meca j asserts that he ne ver r ece ived this notice. On J une 8, 2004, Mecaj’s attorney , filed a motion for continuance beca use of a scheduling conflict on June 22. The motion was denied w ithout mention that the date had alr eady been c hang ed. On J une 15, 2004, Meca

j did not appea

r at the hearing , and so t he immigr ation judge order ed Mec aj
re m o v ed

. On J u n e 2 2 , M ec aj an d h i s at t o rn ey

ap p ea re d fo r t h e h ea ri n g an d

we re t o l d t h at t h e j u d ge
was a way for tra ining a

nd that an orde r for

deportation had been issued in a bs e nti a .No. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 3 Meca

j then filed a moti on to reope n his proce eding s claiming that he had not r ece ived notice of the he ari ng . Th e imm ig ratio n judg e de nie d the mot ion be c a us e Me c a j wa s awa re of the ne e d to up date his a dd

re ss a nd no tic e wa s se nt t o th e Wat e rf or d a dd re ss a nd no t r e tur ne d a s und e liv e ra

ble raising the pre sumption of rece ipt. Me ca j ap p ea l ed to the B oard of I mmigration Appeals which adopted the immig ration judg e’s de cision. II Th is C ourt

re vie ws the B oa

rd of I mmi g ra tio n App e a ls’ de nia l of a moti on to re op e n for a bu se of dis cr etion. I.N.S. v. Abudu , 4 85 U. S. 9 4, 96 (1 98 8) ; Da ne sh v ar v . A sh c ro ft , 355 F.3d 615, 625 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) . T he B oa

rd a bu se s it s dis c re tio n wh e n it a c ts a rb itr ari ly , ir

ra tio na lly , o r c on tr a ry

to law. Babai v. I.N.S. , 985 F.2d 252, 255 ( 6th Cir. 1993). Meca j was ordered de ported in a bs e nti a beca use he w as not prese nt at his hearingand notice of hea ring was sent to his las t k n o wn ad dress, a ccor ding to statute. 8 U .S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (A). Normally proof that a

n alien did not rec eive notice would allow the alien to r equest that his case be reope ned following a depor tation order issued in a bs e nti a . 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (C). The immigr ation judge ignor ed any evidenc e that Mec aj did not actua lly rec eive notice, and instead pre sumed rec eipt of notice ba sed on the fa ct that notice wa s sent to Meca j’s last known

a d dr e s s an d

w a s n o tr e tu r

n e d a s u n d e l i v e r a

b l e . T h i s w a s i n e r r o r . M a i l i n g n o t i c e r a i s e s o n l y a rebuttable presumption of re ceipt. Salta v. I.N.S. , 314 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002)

. Since notice in this case wa s sent b y re gu l ar m ai l rather than ce rtified mail, that pre sumption i s weaker. Id

. Fur thermore , the B oard must consid er al l releva nt evidence , including c ircumstantial evidenc e, offe red to re but the presumption of re ceipt. Lopes v. Gonzales, 468 F. 3 d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2006).No. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 4 Meca j’s aff idavit stating that he did not rece ive notice, the f act that Me caj atten d ed his init ial hear ing, the fac t that Me caj prese nted himself in court on June 22 for the re schedule d hear ing, a nd the fa ct that Mec aj did rec eive other co rr es p o n d ence sent to the Waterf ord addr ess, must be
c on sid e re d, alo ng wi th a

ny oth e r e vid e nc e Me c a

j pr e se nts , in

de te rm ini ngif

Me c a j c an o ve rc ome the pre sumption. The g overnme nt a

rg ues that no notice is r equire d in this case . Notice is not requir ed whe n the alien f

a il s to p r o v id e a

c u r r e n t a d dr e s s a s r e qu ir e d

b y s tatute
. 8 U
. S. C. § 1 2 2 9 a ( b ) ( 5 ) (B ). Ho we ve r, be c a

us e Me c a j di d p ro vid e an a dd

re ss, the g ov e rnme nt re ma ine d un de r a n o bli g a tio n to send notice to tha t a dd

re ss. Whil e it i s tr

ue that Me c a

j c ann ot n owbe he ard

to c omp la in that he did not rec eive notice beca

use he ha d moved, he may prese nt evidence that he norma lly would rec eive
corr espondenc e at that location, y et did not rec eive notice. To this e nd he may point to the fact that he did re ceive other c orre spondence at the Waterf ord addr ess even though he now ave rs that he lives at a diff ere nt addre ss. The g overnme nt also argues that under Maghradze v . Gonzales , 462 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2006), re ceipt of notice should be imputed to Mecaj throug h t h e d o ctrine of constructive r ece ipt beca use Me ca j fa i l ed to corre ct his addre ss. We do not agr ee. We have not applied c onstructive
re ce i p t i n t h i s co n t ex t , b u tas s u m i n g arguendo that it do e s a pp ly , c on str

uc tiv e re c e ipt

is a pp ro pr ia te
w h e r e t h e c i r c u m s t an c e s i n d i c a t e t h e a l i e n i s a t t e mp t i n g t o g a i na d v an t a g e b y thwarti ng service of notice. In Maghradze, the B oard of I mmigration Appeals appa rently considere d the re ceipt require ment met if notice we re pr operly provided (i.e ., notice was mailed to the last addre ss provided by the alien) , but the alien thwar ted deliver

y . Id ; see also, Sabir v. Gonzales , 4 21 F .3 d 4 56 , 4 59 (7 thNo. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 5

The dissent points to the immi g ration judg e’s last sente nce as a fa ctual finding that Meca j 1 thwarte d delivery . The immigration judg e stated, “ I f re spondent did not rece ive the notice of hear ing be c a us e he mov e d wi tho ut a dv isi ng thi s Court of his c ha ng e of a dd re ss, it w a s d

ue to h is e xcu sa

ble [si c] inaction.” We do n o t b el i ev e t h is is a fac tual finding that Meca j thwarted de livery : the statement addr esses a

hy pothetical that does not c orre spond to Mecaj’ s claim. Fur thermore , even if it wer e a fa c tua l f ind ing , it fi nd s o nly

“ e xcu sa ble [sic ] ina c tio n, ” no t th wa rt ing . Ine xcu sa

ble inaction without more does not necessar ily rise to the leve l of thwartingwhich we would require g iven the dra conian pe nalty of depor tation. Cir. 2005) (sug g esting that an “alien should not be able to make himself unrea chable , and then late r ask to have his case reope ned beca use he did not rec eive notice”)

. We note that we do not ac cept the expansive definition of this conce pt, p ro m u l gated in Ma gh ra dz e , th a t on ly

if the a lie n f

a ils to
rec eive notice due to “c ircumstan ce s b ey o n d h i s control” c an he pe tition t o reope n his case. Id. Depor tation is extraordinarily

harsh, see e.g., Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 996 F.2d 804, 811 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (noting “the ha

rsh re sults that deportation wrec ks on aliens and their families”) , and we would not
re a d the statut e to i mpo se su c h c on se qu e nc e s b a se d o n me re e rr or or c are le ssn e ss w ith ou t e xplic it statutory instruction. Cf. Stapl es v. U nited States , 5 11 U. S. 60 0, 61 6 (1 99 4) (f ind ing that th e “ ha

rs h penalty ” of up to 10 y ear s imprisonment confirmed a re ad i n g of the statute that r equire d a hig her level of f ault wher e the statute w as silent). I n this case, we find no evidenc e that Mec aj has in any way attempted to thwar

t service of notice. I n fac t, he appe are d at the first sche duled hear ing, and at the orig inally appointed time for 1 the se c on d h e ari ng . T hu s Me c a j c ann ot be he ld to have c on str uc tiv e ly re c e ive d n oti c e sin c e he did not attempt to thwart rec eipt. IIINo. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 6 Be cause M ec aj provided an addre ss as requir ed by statute, and be cause he did not thwart
rec eipt, we find that the Boa rd err ed in pr esuming or imputing rec eipt of notice, a nd there fore that it a bu se d it s d isc re tio n. We t he re fo re REV ERS E a

nd REM AN D fo r c on sid e ra tio n th a t Me c a

j di d not actually

rec eive notice at the Waterf ord addr ess he pr ovided.No. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 7 Ke nnedy, Circuit Jud ge, dissenting. Be cause the re cord suppor ts the findings of

the I J and does not c ompel the conc lusion that Mr. M eca j did not attempt to thwart delivery of not ice, I respe ctfully dissent. We can only disag ree wi th a n I J’s f ind ing s o f fa c t re g ard ing a mot ion to re op e n whe n thos e fi nd ing s amou nt t o a n a bu se of discre tion. INS v. Abudu , 485 U.S. 94, 96 (1988). The I J made two alternative finding s, both of wh ic h a llo we d th e I J to de ny Mr
. Me c a

j’ s mot ion to re op e n. F ir st, the I J f ound that Mr
. Me c a

j di d
no t r e qu ir e no tic e un de r t he statut e . Se c on d, the I J found that M r. Mecaj sh ou ld b e c ha rg e d w ith constructive r ece ipt under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)( 5)(C)( ii) beca use he had thwarte d the g overnme nt’s g ood faith attempt to provide him with notice of his removal hea ring

. See M

aghradze v. Gonzale

s , 462 F.3d 50, 154 (2d Cir. 2006). Specif ically , the I J held: “I f [Mr. Meca j] did not rece ive the notice of [the re sc he du le d] he ari ng ,[ it w a s] be c a us e [Mr . M e c a

j] mo ve d w ith ou t a dv isi ngthi s Co ur t of thi s chang e of a ddress, [so his lack of notice] was due to his [ in] excusable inac tion.” J .A. at 30 (O rder of I mmi g ratio n Jud g e ). B ot h fi nd ing s are su pp or te d b y the re c or d, and

the re fo re are no t an a

bu se of discre tion. I . No Notice Was Require d The majority

err oneousl y co n cludes that Mr. Me caj wa s entitled to notice. 8 U.S.C. § 12 29 a (b )( 5) (B ), ho we ve r, pr ov ide s th a t no wr itt e n n oti c e of a re mov a l he ari ngsh a ll b e re qu ir e d if the “the a lien has fa il ed t o p ro vide the addr ess re quired unde r sec tion 1229(a)( 1)(F ).” 8 U .S.C. § 12 29 (a )( 1) (F ) e x pl icitl y

mand a te s th a t th e a lie n mu st p ro vid e his a dd re ss i n tw o c ir c ums tanc e s. First, the a lien must “immediately provide” an addr ess when the Notice to Appe ar is c ompleted. § 1229(a )(1)(F) (i). Second, a nd what is at issue her e, the a lien must “provide the Attorne y Gene ralNo. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 8

He did not update it despite, as the majority admits, Maj. Op. at 2, beinginformed by the 1 imm ig ratio n c ourt

tha t he ha d pr ov ide d the Wat e rf or d a dd re ss a nd that th e imm ig ra

tio n c ourt wo uld c on tin ue to u se it unti l Mr . M e c a j in fo rm e d it

of a dif fe re nt a dd re ss. immediately

with a written re cord of

any ch an ge of the a lien’s addr ess or tele phone number .” § 1229(a) (1)( F) (ii). A f t e r “ i m m e d i a t e l y p r o v i d [ i n g ] ” ana d dr e s s i nF ar m i n g t o nH i l l s w h e nt a k e ni n t o c u s t o dy, J.A. a t 59 (N oti c e to A

pp e ar d a te d Fe br

ua ry 10 , 2 00 3) , M r. Me c a

j th e n c ha ng e d h is a dd

re ss o n f ile to Waterford upon r eleas e from I NS custody , J .A. at 49 (N otice to the Executive Off ice of I mmigration Review (EOI R): Alien Addre ss form date d Fe b ruar y 18, 2003) (“ Upon re lease from I NS c us tod

y , the re sp on de nt[, Mr . M e c a j,] r e po rt e d h is[] a dd

re ss a nd te le ph on e numbe r w ill be : [in Waterfor d].”). Mr. Mec aj, howeve r, now c laims that he was not living in Waterfor d, but was living in Far mington Hills. J .A. at 42 (Aff idavit of Ndue Me caj) (“I

reside at . . . Far

mington Hills . . . .”);

see Petitioner’s Br ief at 9 (ref err ing to the Water ford a ddress at the time of Mr. Meca j’s rele ase f

rom
c us tod y a s Mr . M e c a

j’ s “ old a dd re ss” ). Mr . M e c a

j, a ft e r h a vin g pr ov ide d a n inco rrect a dd

re ss i n Wat e rf or d, ne ve r u

pd a te d h is a dd

re ss t o r e fl e c t th e fa c t th a t, a s h e no w c la im s, he was liv ingin F arm ing ton

Hi lls

. Suc h f

a ilure to d isc ha

rg e his statut or

y duty to u pd a te and corr ect

his a dd re ss 1 means that the I J can de cide that he must fac e the consequenc es under the statute, which is an or der of removal without notice beingrequire d. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (5)( B) . Be cause , based on the fa c ts a d m i t t e d b y M r . M e c a j , n o t i c e w a s n o l o n g e r r e qu i r e d , t h e I J d i d n o t a b u s e h i s d i s c r e t i o n in denying Mr . Meca

j’s motion to reopen on the g rounds of fa ilure to rec eive notice

. The majority protests this re sult ba sed on a theory that the petitioner did not adva nce a nd for which not a shre d o f ev i dence exis ts in the recor d. They say that Mr. Mec aj “did provide anNo. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 9 addre ss,” namely the one in Waterfor d, and that he ther efor e discha rg ed his statutory

duty to provide
a cor rec t addre ss beca

use he c an cla im that he expected to, and y et did not, rec eive notice at

“ that addre ss” in Water ford. Maj. Op. at 4. First, while Mr. Meca j c erta inly could mak e s u ch an
argume nt a

nd of fe r s up po rt inge vid e nc e , if he ha d an y , th e ma jor ity ig no re s b oth

the fa c t th a t he did
no t so ar g ue and the fa c t th a t he did no t pr e se nt a

sin g le bit of e vid e nc e in t

hat r e g ard . M r. Me c a

j, instead, asser

ted that he “re side[s] at
. . . Fa rming ton Hills,” and nowher e cla imed that he expected to r ece ive notice at the Waterfor d addre ss. See J .A. at 42 (Aff idavit of Nude Meca

j). I ndeed, Mr

. Meca j’s only argument, in fac t, is that the gove rnment s en t notice to the wr ong addre ss. See Petitioner’s Br ief at 10 (re fer ring to the Waterfor d addre ss as “incor rec t”). The only

evidenc e the majority cites for its own argument is the fac t that some how Mr. Meca j r ece ived the first n otice, which wa s mailed only

to Waterford. The m ajority pref ers to draw the conc lusion that thi s rec eived delivery indicates tha t Mr. Mec aj expected to re ceive notice in Waterfor d. This conclusion, howeve r, direc tly

cont ra d i ct s Mr. Meca

j’s asser tion in his brief that the Waterfor d addre ss was

“ inc or re c t.” I nd e e d, the re are nume ro us e xplana tio ns fo r M r. Me c a

j’ s r e c e ipt

of the no tic e se nt t o Waterfor d that would be consistent with Mr. Mec aj’s own a ssertions. The majority ’s assuming of fac ts not arg ued, and contra ry to those asser

ted, by the petitioner is made mor e unwa rra nted by the fac t that Mr. Meca

j ca rr i es t he burde n of proof when moving to reope n. See 8 U.S.C. § 12 29 a (b )( 5) (C )( ii)

. Mr
. Me c a j c ou ld h a ve , a

nd y e t di d n ot, a sse rt

the ma jor ity ’s a ssume d f

a c ts i n h is aff idavit, nor did he eve n argue in his brief that the maj o ri t y ’s assum ed fa cts are true. I do not

u n d e r s t an d

h o w t h e m a

j o r i t y c anc o n c l u d e t h a tt h e I J abused his discretion , a d e c i s i o nw h i c h t h e B IANo. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 10 aff irmed, base d on an ar g ument which the pe titioner did not asser t and for which there is no evidenc e in the rec ord to ca

rry the petitioner’s bur den of pr oof. I I . Mr. Mec aj Should be Charg ed with Constructive Rece ipt The I J also found, in the alter native, that Mr. Me caj s hould be cha rg ed with construc tive
re c e ip t of notic e be c a

us e he thw art e d th e g ov e rnme nt’ s atte mpt to p ro vid e him

wi th n oti c e of

his
resc heduled r emoval hea

ring

. The majority err oneously cites two rea sons f or disreg ardingthe I J ’s al t ern at i v e h o l d i n g. First, the major ity

asser ts that the I J did not find that Mr

. Meca j thwarted the g overnme nt’s attempt to provide him noti ce o f his resche duled re moval hear ing. T hey believe that the I J was

“ a dd re ss[i ng ] a h y

po the tic a l th a t do e s n ot c or re sp on d to Mec a

j’ s c la im. ” Ma

j. O p. a t 6 n .1 . T his fu nd a me nta lly

mis int e rp re ts the I J’s h old ing . T he I J fi rst he ld t hat Mr . M e c a

j w a s n ot e nti tle d to notice at a

n addre ss differ ent from the one he had supplied. The I J then held in the alter native that if in f a c t Mr . M e c a

j w a s e nti tle d to no tic e y e t di d n ot r e c e ive it, his la c k o f n oti c e “ wa s due to his [in]e xcu sa

ble ina c tio n. ” J.A. a t 30 . I do no t un de rs tand

ho w the maj or ity

c an c ha ra c te ri ze t

his alternative holding a s a ra ndom aside by

the I J “that does not c orre spond to Mecaj’ s claim.” Second, the major it y as s er ts that even if the I J in fac t found Mr. Mec aj thwar ted the g overnme nt’s attempt at notice, the I J abused his dis cr et i o n beca use there was “ no evidenc e that Meca j has in any

way attempt ed to t hwar

t service of notice.” Maj. Op. at 5. This conc lusion, howeve r, ig nores the r ecor d in this case. The I J ’s alternative holding, that Mr. Meca j w as at fault for thwarting t h e go v er n m ent’s attempt at notice, wa s in f

act well-supporte d by the rec ord. The majority emphasizes that Mr. Mec ajNo. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 11

The majority

notes its disag ree ment with an “expansive definition of” thwar ting de livery 2 of notice, w hich it believes other Circuits have adopted. Maj. Op. at 5. They seem to believe that the se de fi nit ion s are in corr ect be c a us e an a lie n mu st h a ve so me so rt of inv idi ou s in te nt t o avo id notice bef ore be ing c harg ed with construc tive rec eipt. Other Circ uits’ definitions, h oweve r, we re formulated in a

manner consistent with the s tatute. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (5)( C) discusses the g rounds an a li e nc anp r o v e w h e nmo v in g to r e o p e nr e mo v a l p r o c e e d in g s w h e nth e a li e nh a s b e e no rder ed remove d in a bs e nti a . Mr. Meca j w as attempting to car

ry his burden under

(C)(ii). That subsection re qu ir e s Mr . M e c a

j to “ de mon str a te [] that [he ] d id no t re c e ive no tic e . . . [] a nd [de mon str a te that] the fa ilure to a

pp e ar w a s th r o ug

h n o fa u lt o

f th e alien .” 8 U. S.C. § 1 22 9a (b )( 5) (C )( ii) (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e ma

jor ity wa nts to re a d o ut t

he re qu ir e me nt t

hat Mr . M e c a

j pr ov e tha

t it wa s n ot h is f

a ult that no tic e did no t re a c h him , and ins te a d re qu ir e that he me re ly pr ov e he ha d no inv idi ou s in te nt t o a vo id n oti c e . Wh ile the ma jor ity do e s thi s be c a

us e of the ha

rs h c on se qu e nc e s of de po rt a tio n, it i s Con g re ss’ s ju dg me nt t

hat su c h c on se qu e nc e s a

re re qu ir e d, and

the statut e e ns ur e s that the a lie n is repe atedly

notified about the ha

rsh conse q u ences of fa iling to appe ar a nd failing to keep the g overnme nt curre nt on his address. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (F )(iii), (a )(1) (G)( ii). a t on e tim e g a ve the gove rnm ent a n a dd re ss i n F arm ing ton

Hi lls , w hic h h e no w c la ims wa s h is
c or re c t a dd re ss. Ma j. O p. a t 5. Th is c omp le te ly ig no re s th e fa c t, w hic h th e I J found and the ma jor ity admits, that Mr. Meca

j then amende d his address to one in Water ford. J.A. at 29 (Orde r of I mmi g ratio n Jud g e ); Ma j. O p. a t 4 ( no tin g that th e la st add res s Mr. M e c a j pr ov ide d w a s in Wat e rf o r d )

. T h e o n l y r e a s o n t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s n o t i c e d i d n o t r e a c h M r . M e c a j a s h e c la ims , there fore , is beca

use Mr. Mec aj provided an addre ss to be used by the immigra

tion court that he now claims was incorre ct. I do not understand how this does not “ma ke himself unre acha

ble.” See Sa bir v. Gonzales , 421 F.3d 456, 459 ( 7th Cir. 2005). 2 I f g ivi ngthe imm ig ratio n c ourt the wr on g a dd

re ss w e re no t e no ug h, the re we re mor e fa c ts supporting the I J ’s conc lusion that Mr. Mecaj thwa rted the gove rnment’s g ood faith attempt at notice. Mr. Me caj a

ppear ed at the November 20, 2003 hear ing w ith his attorney . J .A. at 56. The only notice of that hear ing, how ever , was sent to the addr ess that Mr. Mec aj had pr ovided for c ontact by the immigration court , whi ch wa s Mr. Meca j’s Waterfor d addre ss. J .A. at 57 (Aug . 14, 2003No. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 12 Notice of Hea

ring set for Nov. 20, 2003). I f we believe Mr . Meca j’s asser tions that he was not living in Waterford at that time, the notice must have be en for war ded to him by the postal service , g iven to him by other oc cupants, or se nt to him in some other unusual fashion. All possible manner s of delivery would drawone’s attention to the fact that this c orre spondence had not be en sent to one’s
c ur re nt ad dr e ss. Th e fo rm no t only inf or me d him of the date and tim e of the re mov a l he ari ng , it

a lso g a ve him the se ins tr

uc tio ns re g ard inghis a dd re ss: IF Y O U R A D D R E S S IS N O T LIS T E D O N T H E N O T IC E T O A P P E A R , O R IF IT I S NOT CO RRE CT, WI TH I N F I VE DA YS O F TH I S NO TI CE Y OUMU ST PROV I DE T O THE I MMI GRATI ON COURT DETROI T, MITHE ATTA CHED FORM EOI R-33 WITH YOUR ADD RESS AND/OR TEL EPHONE NUMB ER WI THI N 5 DAYS OF THE C HANGE ON THE A TTACHED F ORM EOI R-33. AD DI TI ON AL

F ORMS E OI R- 33 CAN B E O B TA I NE D F RO M T HE CO UR T WHE RE Y OU ARE SCH ED UL ED TO APP EA R. I N T HE EV EN T Y OUAR E UN AB L E T O O B TA I

N A FO RM EO I R- 33 , YO U M AY PRO VI DE TH E CO UR T I N WR I TI NG WI TH YOUR NEW ADDRESS AND/OR TEL EPHONE NUMB ER BU T YOU MUST C L EARL Y MARK THE EN VEL OPE “CHANGE OF ADDRESS.” J .A. at 57 (N otice of H ear ing in Remova l Procee dings) . An alien thwa rts the g overnme nt’s attempt to provide notice w hen that alien, throug h extraordinary means of de livery , has his attention draw n to the fac t the g overnme nt has an incorre ct addr ess on file, a nd y et the alien f

ails to corre ct that

a dd re ss, de sp ite be ingins tr

uc te d to do so in ca

pit a l le tte rs . Ind e e d, Mr . M e c a j f a ile d to c or

re c t hi sNo. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 13
a dd re ss e ve n th ou g h a

c ha ng e of a dd re ss f or m, F or m E OI R- 33 , w a s p ro vid e d to him wi th t he fi rs t
no tic e , ev e n thou g h he c ou ld have se nt in a c ha ng e of a dd re ss o n r e g ula

r p a pe r i f h e los t th a t f

or m, and eve n though he in fac t attended the he aringon November 2 0 t h and could have told the I J or
so me oth e r c ourt

pe rs on ne l in

pe rs on that hi s a dd

re ss o n f ile wa s in c or

re c t. Unlike the majority , Ido not believe that these fa cts provide “ no evidenc e” that Mr. Meca j thwarte d the g overnme nt’s g ood faith attempt t o p ro v i d e him notice of his re schedule d remova l hear ing. I

ndeed, the opposit e i s t ru e; t h es e fa cts are enoug h to find that Mr. Meca j thwarted the g overnme nt’s attempt at providing him notice. The g overnme nt cannot kno w i t has the wr ong
a dd re ss o n f ile , a nd the a lie n sh ou ld be he ld a c c ounta ble , w he n th e g ov e rnme nt i s u sin g an a dd re ss: (1) that wa s the last one provided by the alien to the immigration c ourt; (2) that had appar ently been
succe ssful in previously notify ing the alien of a removal hear ing beca use t he alien had appe are d for a hea ring whose date was se nt only to that a ddress; and (3) that the alien never indicated wa s wrong or had chang ed, despite the fa ct that the g overnme nt had re peate dly informed that a lien that it was using that addre ss. I f i t is true that Mr. Me caj ne ver r ece ived this notice, then it is surely true that he thwar ted the g overnme nt’s attempt to contact him bec ause he g ave the g overnme nt the Waterfor d addre ss to be used by

the immigration court to contact him, he ha d previously responde d to notices
se nt t o Wate rf

or d, he wa s r e pe a te dly

ma de awa

re tha t th e g ov e rnment bel ieved him to l ive in Waterfor d and would be c ontacting him at the Waterfor d add re s s , an d y et he did not update or
c o r r e c tt h a ta d dr e s s a s t h e g o v e r n m e n tr e qu e s t e d

an d a s m an d a t e d

b y s t a tu t e . E v e n i f t h e m a j o r i t y, in i ts o wn ind e pe nd e nt j ud g me nt, be lie ve s Mr. Me c a j ma de a “ me re e rr or

or [wa s] c are le ss[], ” Ma

j. Op . at 5, Ido no t th ink

that th is b e lie f is so bo rne ou t by the re c or d to fi nd

that th e I J abu se d h isNo. 05-3875

Mec aj v. Muk

asey Pag e 14 dis c re tio n in

ru lin g to the c on tr ary . Whil e the I J c ou ld have c ho se n to g ra nt Mr
. Me c a

j’ s mot ion

to reope n despite the a

bove fa cts, it wa s not a

n abuse of discretion for the I J to hold that Mr. Meca j was not entitled to actual notice nor was it an a

buse of discr etion to hold in the alternative that Mr. Mec aj sh ou ld b e c ha

rg e d wi th c on str

uc tiv e re c e ipt fo r thw art ing the g ov e rnme nt’ s a bil ity to pr ov ide him
no tic e . I the re fo re re sp e c tf

ull y dis se nt.