Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 09A04-1410-CR-470 | April 7, 2015 Page 1 of 16

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark Leeman

Logansport, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jodi Kathryn Stein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Glenn Sciaraffa,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 7, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

09A04-1410-CR-470

Appeal from the Cass Superior Court.

The Honorable Richard A. 

Maughmer, Judge.

Cause No. 09D02-1405-FB-24

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Glenn Sciaraffa (Sciaraffa), appeals his conviction for 

dealing in methamphetamine, a Class B felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1)

(2013); maintaining a common nuisance, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-

13(b)(1) (2013); possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-

48-4-8.3 (2013); and his adjudication as an habitual substance offender, I.C. § 

35-50-2-10.

1

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Sciaraffa raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as follows: 

(1) Whether the trial court committed a fundamental error by admitting 

the presumptive positive test for methamphetamine; 

(2) Whether fundamental error occurred during the State’s closing 

argument; and

(3) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable 

doubt to sustain Sciaraffa’s conviction. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 

1 This statute was repealed by P.L.158-2013, § 664, eff. July 1, 2014.
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[4] During the evening of May 1, 2014, and into the early morning hours of May 2, 

2014, Sciaraffa manufactured methamphetamine in his residence near 

Galveston in Cass County, Indiana. He resided in the residence with his 

girlfriend Brandi Bragg (Bragg) and Bragg’s fifteen-year-old son. Sciaraffa 

manufactured the methamphetamine using the one-pot or “shake and bake” 

method in a closet in his house, which he had outfitted with a trap door and a 

fan to release the chemical fumes as he “burped” the gas from the mixture. 

(Transcript pp. 131, 126). At one point during the evening, Sciaraffa and Bragg

tested the methamphetamine by smoking a small portion Sciaraffa had 

extracted from the chemical solution. Bragg went to bed around 1 a.m. on the 

morning of May 2, 2014, while Sciaraffa continued the manufacturing process.

[5] Bragg awoke around 11 a.m. that same morning and followed Sciaraffa out to 

the garage. She “wanted to catch a buzz” and smoke some of the 

methamphetamine Sciaraffa had manufactured during the night. (Tr. p. 118). 

They both smoked the methamphetamine from a pipe in the garage and 

Sciaraffa handed Bragg a small amount in a bag to consume later. Sciaraffa 

then instructed Bragg “to clean house because he felt [] probation was going to 

be there today.” (Tr. p. 118). 

[6] Around 4:30 p.m. that afternoon, as Bragg was knocking on the garage door, 

several law enforcement officers arrived at the residence. Bragg informed the 

officers that Sciaraffa was in the garage and would not come out. When 

Howard County Probation Officer Dustin DeLong (Officer DeLong) 

approached the garage, Sciaraffa opened the door. Officer DeLong 
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immediately “noticed a very strong odor emitting from the garage,” which took 

his breath away. (Tr. p. 25). Asked what he was doing, Sciaraffa “held up a 

paint can,” “pointed to a guitar,” and informed the officer that he had been 

painting the instrument. (Tr. p. 25). Because the odor was not a paint smell but 

rather a “chemical type smell” that the officer could not really describe, Officer 

DeLong did not believe Sciaraffa’s explanation. (Tr. p. 26). 

[7] Officer DeLong informed Sciaraffa of the home visit; Sciaraffa agreed to a drug 

screen, and consented to a search of the residence. When giving his urine 

sample, Sciaraffa admitted that he had used methamphetamine within “the last 

three days.” (Tr. p. 28). He did not appear to be under the influence at that 

time and was “very cooperative.” (Tr. p. 36). During the search of the 

cluttered residence, the officers located a pipe in the master bedroom; a pen 

tube with a burned end and white residue on the kitchen counter; a blue 

surgical glove containing lithium battery casings on a kitchen ceiling beam; a 

bottle of acetone in the freezer; a glass pipe on a table on the back porch; a glass 

bottle with a milky, oily substance in the middle room off the back porch; a red 

Igloo container with liquid; an empty Coleman fuel can and a white container 

annotated with “Fridge and Air Coil Cleaner” hidden behind a table in the back 

closet; and a Gatorade bottle with liquid on top of a cabinet. (State’s Exh. 16). 

In the garage, the officers located clear air hose tubing used in the gassing 

process and digital scales. All of these items are associated with the 

manufacture of methamphetamine.
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[8] Samples were taken from the liquid inside the Gatorade bottle and from the 

oily, milky residue in the glass bottle and analyzed by Indiana State Police 

forensic scientist Kim Burrow (Scientist Burrow). During her analysis, Scientist 

Burrow did not find any presence of a controlled substance in the Gatorade 

bottle, but concluded that the glass bottle presumptively “indicated the presence 

of [m]ethamphetamine.” (State’s Exh. 28). She had an insufficient sample 

detail to run a confirmatory test, and noted on her certificate of analysis that 

“the concentration was insufficient for complete identification.” (State’s Exh. 

28). 

[9] On May 7, 2014, the State filed an Information, charging Sciaraffa with Count 

I, dealing in methamphetamine, a Class B felony; Count II, possession of 

methamphetamine, a Class D felony; Count III, possession of chemical agents 

or precursors with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance, a Class D 

felony; Count IV, maintaining a common nuisance, a Class D felony; and 

Count V, possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. In addition, the 

State filed an Information alleging Sciaraffa to be an habitual substance 

offender. On May 12, 2014, the State dismissed Count IV and Sciaraffa 

proceeded to trial on the remaining charges.

[10] On August 13 through August 14, 2014, the trial court conducted a bifurcated 

jury trial. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all 

four Counts. Thereafter, the jury also determined that Sciaraffa was an habitual 

substance offender. On September 8, 2014, the trial court sentenced Sciaraffa to 

twenty years for Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine, a concurrent 
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three years for Class D felony possession of methamphetamine, a concurrent 

three years for Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance, and a 

consecutive one year for Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. 

The trial court enhanced the sentence for Sciaraffa’s Class B felony with eight 

years for the habitual substance offender adjudication. In sum, Sciaraffa 

received an aggregate twenty-nine-year sentence.

[11] Sciaraffa now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Admission of Evidence

[12] First, Sciaraffa contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

admitted into evidence the presumptively positive test results for 

methamphetamine found in the glass bottle. Our standard of review for rulings 

on the admissibility of evidence is well-settled. Admission or exclusion of 

evidence rests within the trial court’s sound discretion and its decision is 

reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. Southward v. State, 957 N.E.2d 975, 

977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The trial court’s decision must be clearly erroneous 

and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it 

constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. 

[13] Sciaraffa admits that he failed to object to the admission of the evidence at 

issue, thereby failing to preserve his claim for appellate review. See id. To 

avoid the review of his argument being waived, he invokes the fundamental 
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error doctrine which permits appellate review of otherwise procedurally 

defaulted claims. Id. As our supreme court has noted, this narrow doctrine 

may lead to reversal where there has been a “blatant violation of basic 

principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error 

denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Matthews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 

578, 587 (Ind. 2006). 

[14] Focusing on the foundational requirements for the admission of evidence, 

Sciaraffa contends that Scientist Burrow’s failure to explain the scientific 

principles and standards of a presumptively positive test should have excluded 

its presentation from the jury. Because of the State’s “heavy” reliance on the 

erroneously admitted test in its prosecution of Sciaraffa, the jury was “highly 

likely” influenced to return a guilty verdict. (Appellant’s Br. p. 14). 

[15] Pursuant to Indiana Rule of Evidence 702, expert scientific testimony is 

admissible only if reliability is demonstrated to the trial court. The Rule 

provides 

(a) A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 

opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

(b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied 

that the expert testimony rests upon reliable scientific principles.

The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of establishing the 

foundation and reliability of the scientific principles. Doolin v. State, 970 N.E.2d 

785, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). There is no specific test that must be considered 
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in order to satisfy Rule 702(b). Id. Rather, reliability may be established by 

judicial notice or, in its absence, by sufficient foundation to convince the trial 

court that the relevant scientific principles are reliable. Id. In concluding that 

scientific evidence is reliable, the trial court must determine whether the 

evidence appears sufficiently valid, or, in other words, trustworthy, to assist the 

trier of fact. Id. 

[16] In support of his argument, Sciaraffa references Doolin and Burkett v. State, 691 

N.E.2d 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied, for the proposition that the 

testimony must include an explanation of the nature of the presumptive test and 

its reliability. In Burkett, police stopped a speeding car, driven by Burkett. 

Burkett failed the field sobriety test and a portable breath test. Burkett, 691, 

N.E.2d at 1243. Before he was transported to jail, the officer conducted a 

patdown search for his safety. Id. During this search, the officer discovered a 

green, leafy substance in Burkett’s pocket, which, after conducting a field test, 

yielded a positive result for marijuana. Id. On appeal, we upheld the trial 

court’s decision that the officer was a qualified expert because he testified that: 

(1) he was trained to administer the test; (2) he followed the proper procedures; 

(3) the test consisted of three ampoules of acid that change color to show the 

presence of marijuana; and (4) the sheriff’s department routinely used the test. 

Id. at 1245.

[17] Although Doolin presented similar circumstances as Burkett, we reached the 

opposite result. While the officer in Doolin provided a general overview of the 

steps he intended to follow when conducting the field test, he did not testify as 
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to any specific name or otherwise identify the test, indicate its reliability, the 

scientific principles on which it was based, or recognize any standards regarding 

its use and operation. Doolin, 970 N.E.2d at 789. In fact, we noted that the 

officer’s explanation at trial was nothing more than to “break an ampoule of 

something over the challenged plant material and shake it up. If whatever is in 

the ampoule causes the material to turn blue, it’s marijuana.” Id. Due to the 

lack of any foundational evidence, the Doolin court concluded that the State 

failed to establish the test’s reliability under Evid. R. 702(b). Id. 

[18] We find Sciaraffa’s equation of Scientist Burrow’s chemical tests with the quick, 

on-the-scene field tests performed by an officer unpersuasive. Scientist Burrow 

is a professional forensic scientist with the Indiana State Police Laboratory and 

has an extensive education and experience in drug analysis. She testified to the 

specific test performed on the glass bottle, which presumptively “indicated the 

presence of [m]ethamphetamine.” (State’s Exh. 28). She elaborated that she 

performed a “Thimlar chromatography test and a gas chromatography/mass 

spectrometry test” on the specimen. (Tr. p. 202). These are the “specialized 

tests” that are part of the normal testing procedure and which require “expert 

training to administer.” (Tr. p. 203). Both of these tests are “generally accepted 

in the relevant scientific community.” Markley v. State, 603 N.E.2d 891, 893 n.5 

(Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied.

[19] In order to identify a controlled substance in a specimen, Scientist Burrow is 

required to perform at least two tests: “one being a presumptive test and one 

being a confirmatory test.” (Tr. p. 206). The presumptive test on the glass 
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bottle indicated the presence of methamphetamine; however, “there wasn’t 

enough sample” to confirm the presumptive testing’s result. (Tr. p. 206). As 

such, Scientist Burrow was not “scientifically certain that it was 

methamphetamine.” (Tr. p. 206). The mere fact that she could not perform a 

confirmatory test does not invalidate the test or inhibit its admissibility but 

rather reflects on the weight of her testimony. See McKnight v. State, 1 N.E.3d 

193, 203-04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that any inaccuracy in the scales used 

to weigh the cocaine went to the weight of the evidence and not its 

admissibility). 

[20] Based on Scientist Burrow’s testimony, we conclude that the State properly 

established the foundation and reliability underlying the scientific principles of 

the test performed on the glass bottle in accordance with Evid. R. 702(b). 

Therefore, there was no error, let alone a fundamental error, in the trial court’s 

admission of the evidence.

II. State’s Closing Argument

[21] Next, Sciaraffa contends that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct 

when it indicated during closing argument that the State had located actual 

methamphetamine during the search of the residence.

[22] In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct properly raised in court, we 

determine whether (1) misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) whether the 

misconduct, under all the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of 

grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected to otherwise. 
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Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014), reh’g denied. A prosecutor has the 

duty to present a persuasive final argument and thus placing a defendant in 

grave peril, by itself, is not misconduct. Id. “Whether a prosecutor’s argument 

constitutes misconduct is measured by reference to case law and the Rules of 

Professional Conduct. The gravity of peril is measured by the probable 

persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s decision rather than the degree 

of impropriety of the conduct.” Id. (quoting Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 

835 (Ind. 2006)). To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the 

defendant must—at the time the alleged misconduct occurs—request an 

admonishment to the jury, and if further relief is desired, move for a mistrial. 

Id. 

[23] Sciaraffa did not raise any objection to nor seek relief from the prosecutor’s 

remarks during trial; rather, the record reflects that he acknowledged to the jury 

that he intentionally failed to object to the contested statements. In order to 

avoid procedural default, he now asserts that the State’s remarks constituted 

fundamental error. In evaluating Sciaraffa’s claim, we look, in addition to the 

customary requirements of the doctrine, at the alleged misconduct in the 

context of all that happened and all relevant information given to the jury—

including evidence admitted at trial, closing argument, and jury instructions—

to determine whether the misconduct has such an undeniable and substantial 

effect on the jury’s decision that a fair trial was impossible. Id. 

[24] We stress that “[a] finding of fundamental error essentially means that the trial 

[court] erred . . . by not acting when he or she should have.” Id. (quoting 
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Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. 2012)). Fundamental error is meant to 

permit appellate courts a means to correct the most egregious and blatant trial 

errors that otherwise would have been procedurally barred, not to provide a 

second bite at the apple for defense counsel who ignorantly, carelessly, or—like 

here—strategically failed to preserve an error. Id. 

[25] In closing argument, the State argued:

What do I have to prove? That a person, [Sciaraffa], knowingly or 

intentionally manufactured methamphetamine pure or adulterated. So 

I have to prove that it was the defendant, [Sciaraffa]. [Bragg] said it 

was him. She knows him. She lived with him for three years. She 

said she saw him do it. How do we know it was knowingly or 

intentionally? She saw him take the steps, she handed him a fuel can, 

she saw him burping the vessel, those are things that he was doing 

intentionally. He knew what he was doing. How do we know it was 

manufactured? We have the remnants. We have [Bragg’s] testimony 

and most importantly we have the final product. [Bragg] told you the 

night that he was making it they each had some. That it was the same 

methamphetamine she has had every time. It gave her the same effect 

that she knew it was methamphetamine. They used it again the next 

morning. We know just like making cookies if you take some of the

steps out, if you are not manufacturing them, if you are not baking 

them you don’t have the right finished product. We know he 

manufactured because he had the finished product. [Bragg] saw him 

do it, we have the remnants to prove he did it and we have the finished 

product to show that he did it. . . . I anticipate [defense counsel] is 

going to get up here and say well you didn’t find everything. . . . I 

don’t have to give you every ingredient. Why is that? Because just 

like when you bake cookies the ingredients go in and the sugar 

dissolves, the eggs get mixed in, you no longer have those individual 

ingredients. But again we know that the manufacturing, the baking, 

takes place because you have the finished product. . . . We know that 

they were all there, that they all went in because we have the finished 

product.
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(Tr. pp. 221-23). Pointing to the lack of “actual methamphetamine in 

evidence,” Sciaraffa maintains that the prosecutor’s statements of “he had the 

finished product” and “we have the final product” suggest to the jury that the 

State “had actual evidence of methamphetamine in its possession that had been 

excluded from presentation at trial.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 10). We disagree.

[26] Placed within the context of the closing argument, the State’s remark that “he 

had the finished product” clearly referred to a permissible inference made from 

analysis of the evidence presented at trial. Poling v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1212, 

1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). The State argued that Bragg’s testimony established 

the manufacturing process, up to the consumption of the actual 

methamphetamine—in other words, the final product. Bragg testified to the 

jury that she aided Sciaraffa, she saw him burp the vessel, and shared some of 

the drug. 

[27] Furthermore, Sciaraffa’s argument that the State’s use of the term “we” alludes 

to the cover-up of evidence is equally without merit. At trial, Sergeant Patrick 

Zeider (Sergeant Zeider) explained to the jury that “all the liquids [he] located, 

[he] tested” with water and pH paper on the scene. (Tr. p. 176). He also 

specified that he only took samples from two containers: the Gatorade bottle 

and the glass bottle with the milky, oily content. Sergeant Zeider clarified that 

he placed the samples in evidence bags, properly labeled them, and delivered 

them to the State Police Laboratory for further analysis by Scientist Burrow. 
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[28] Overall, the jury received preliminary and final instructions with correct 

statements of the law. The court’s preliminary instruction No. 20 cautioned the 

jury that “[w]hen the evidence is completed, the attorneys will make final 

arguments. These final statements are not evidence. The attorneys are 

permitted to characterize the evidence, discuss the law and attempt to persuade 

you to a particular verdict. You may accept or reject those arguments as you 

see fit.” (Tr. Vol. 6 Jury Instructions). Viewed in the totality and context of the 

evidence, we conclude that the State’s comments during closing argument fell 

within the bounds of prosecutorial advocacy and no misconduct, let alone 

fundamental error, occurred. 

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

[29] Lastly, Sciaraffa contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence

beyond a reasonable doubt to support his conviction for dealing in 

methamphetamine, a Class B felony. Generally, in addressing a claim of 

insufficient evidence, an appellate court must consider only the probative 

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, without weighing 

evidence or assessing witness credibility, and determine therefrom whether a 

reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Glenn v. State, 884 N.E.2d 347, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), 

trans. denied. 

[30] To convict Sciaraffa of dealing in methamphetamine, the State was required to 

establish that Sciaraffa knowingly or intentionally manufactured 
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methamphetamine, pure or unadulterated. See I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2013). 

Focusing on Bragg’s testimony, Sciaraffa claims that “Bragg testified that she 

smoked methamphetamine twice with Sciaraffa but there was no evidence 

showing beyond a reasonable doubt that Sciaraffa actually made the 

methamphetamine that she claims they smoked together.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 

15). Insofar as Sciaraffa disputes Bragg’s testimony and requests this court to 

reweigh her credibility, we decline his invitation as this is the “jury’s exclusive 

province.” McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126-27 (Ind. 2005). Considering 

the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the State carried its burden of 

proof.

[31] Bragg testified that she saw Sciaraffa manufacture methamphetamine using the 

“shake and bake” method during the evening of May 1 and into the early 

morning hours of May 2, 2014. (Tr. p. 131). She noticed Sciaraffa “burp” the 

vessel several times to release the gasses which had build up inside. (Tr. p. 

126). She admitted that when the process reached its conclusion, she and 

Sciaraffa sampled the product by smoking a small portion. Around 11 a.m. that 

morning, Bragg wanted to catch another buzz, and she informed the jury that 

both she and Sciaraffa smoked methamphetamine from a pipe in the garage, 

after which Sciaraffa handed her a small amount in a little bag to consume 

later. Bragg’s testimony is underscored by her self-professed four-year addiction 

to methamphetamine; she knew what it looked like and was well-versed in the 

manufacturing process. 
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[32] During a search of the residence later that same day, law enforcement officers 

noticed a chemical-type smell emitting from the garage. Throughout Sciaraffa’s 

residence, the officers also located items associated with the manufacture of 

methamphetamine, including stripped lithium battery casings and a glass bottle,

which presumptively tested positive for methamphetamine. Mindful of the 

testimony and evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the State 

sufficiently supported Sciaraffa’s conviction for Class B felony dealing in 

methamphetamine.

CONCLUSION

[33] Based on the foregoing, we hold that no fundamental error occurred during the 

admission of the presumptive positive test for methamphetamine or the State’s 

closing arguments. We also conclude that the State presented sufficient 

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Sciaraffa’s conviction for dealing 

in methamphetamine. 

[34] Affirmed. 

[35] Vaidik, C. J. and Baker, J. concur