J-S24017-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

LOUIS VIOLA, JR. AND LOUIS VIOLA, 

SR.,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE 

CORPORATION, GENERAL ACCIDENT 

INSURANCE AND CAMDEN FIRE 

INSURANCE ASSOCIATION,

Appellees No. 2446 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered July 2, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Civil Division, at No(s): 03865 September Term 1997

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2015

Father and son, Louis Viola, Sr., and Louis Viola, Jr., (collectively 

“Appellants”), appeal from the trial court’s order denying Appellants’ motion 

for sanctions against General Accident Insurance Corporation, General 

Accident Insurance, and Camden Fire Insurance Association, (collectively 

“General Accident”), and interest on the settlement proceeds that Appellants 

were due to receive from General Accident. We affirm.

In resolving the first of two prior appeals which Appellants have 

presented to our Court, we summarized the “pertinent facts and procedural 

history” of this action as follows: 

In April and September 1993, Appellant Louis Viola, Jr. 

was involved in two separate motor vehicle accidents. The 
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vehicles he operated during each accident were owned by his 

father, Appellant Louis Viola, Sr., who was also a passenger in 

the September 1993 accident. Appellant Louis Viola, Sr. was 

insured by State Farm, and Louis Viola[,] Jr. was insured by 

General Accident. 

Appellants commenced this action by filing a petition to 

appoint third/neutral arbitrator and complaint on September 29, 

1997, against [General Accident], alleging damages resulting 

from both motor vehicle accidents. By order dated November 

23, 2001, Appellants were directed to support their claims 

against [General Accident] with evidence, including supporting 

documentation of any wage loss incurred, by January 31, 2002. 

Five years elapsed without Appellants providing this 

documentation. [General Accident] filed motions for summary 

judgment. Appellants filed a reply to each motion. The trial 

court granted both motions, thereby dismissing Appellants’ 

claims with prejudice.

Viola v. Krouse, et al., 954 A.2d 49 (Pa. Super. 2008) (unpublished 

memorandum) at 1-2, petition for allowance of appeal denied 964 A.2d 2 

(Pa. 2009) (“Viola I”). 

In Viola I, Appellants queried “[w]hether the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment with respect to the wage loss claims of 

[Appellants] where [Appellants] did not possess documentary evidence 

relating to such claims but where [they] did propose to offer oral testimony 

to support their wage loss claim?” Id. at 2. We noted that “[w]ithin the 

argument portion of their brief, Appellants also argue that the trial court 

erred in dismissing Appellant Louis Viola, Jr.’s claim for unpaid medical 

expenses. As this claim was not identified in their statement of the issues, 

we will not consider it further. See generally, Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).” Viola I,

at 4 n.3. 
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After reviewing the record, including the trial court’s assertion that 

Appellants “have failed over five years to comply with the [trial] Court’s 

discovery order and provide evidence to support their claims,” we 

“concluded that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment” in 

favor of General Accident. Id. at 5-6. 

In resolving Appellants’ second appeal to our Court, we provided the 

following additional background regarding this action:

[Following our Supreme Court’s denial of Appellants’ 

petition for allowance of appeal referenced above,] [o]n October 

1, 2009, the arbitration panel, tasked with resolving the 

outstanding uninsured/underinsured motorist claims, dismissed 

[Appellants’] [reasserted] wage-loss claims for failure to provide 

documentation. On December 9, 2009, Arbitrator James 

McEldrew, Esquire, scheduled an arbitration hearing to resolve 

the single remaining uninsured/underinsured motorist claim. 

However, due to a scheduling error the other two arbitrators 

were not present. As the hearing could not proceed, the parties 

entered settlement negotiations facilitated by Arbitrator 

McEldrew, and the parties allegedly agreed on the sum of 

$10,000 to Louis Viola, Sr. and $15,000 to Louis Viola, Jr. [FN4: 

There appears to be agreement on the award, as the record 

indicates that [Appellants] repeatedly requested that General 

Accident pay this sum.] General Accident also contends that 

[Appellants] agreed to release General Accident and its 

successor-in-interest from all claims related to the 1993 

accidents. Arbitrator McEldrew affirmed the terms of the 

settlement as described by General Accident in an affidavit.

General Accident immediately presented [Appellants] with 

release letters for signature accepting the terms of the 

settlement, and requested tax information needed to process the 

payments. [Appellants] initially failed to respond to General 

Accident’s communications. They then objected to the “release 

of all claims” provision and refused to release OneBeacon 

America Insurance Company, the successor-in-interest to the 

now defunct parties [Appellants] originally sued. After several 

months of continued negotiation over the release language, on 
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or about May 11, 2010, General Accident filed a Motion to 

Enforce Settlement, first with the arbitration panel, and when 

[Appellants] objected to that forum, with the trial court. The 

trial court issued the order now on appeal, which enforced the 

settlement as described by General Accident and Arbitrator 

McEldrew. 

[Appellants] contend that the trial court erred in enforcing 

the settlement without first holding a full evidentiary hearing to 

determine if a settlement had actually been reached at the 

December 2009 meeting, and if so, what the terms of that 

settlement are. [FN5: [Appellants] claim that only a “tentative 

settlement” was reached, that was conditioned on General 

Accident paying the $25,000 as a “condition precedent” to any 

final resolution of the outstanding claims. Appellants’ 

Memorandum in Support of Answer to [General Accident’s] 

Motion, 1/3/2012. We note that all claims except the 

uninsured/underinsured motorist claim have been dismissed, 

either by the trial court or by the arbitration panel.]

Viola v. Krause, et al., 68 A.3d 369 (Pa. 2013) (unpublished 

memorandum) at 3-4 (“Viola II”). Citing prior precedent from our Court 

requiring trial courts to “hold evidentiary hearings to determine questions of 

fact relating to a contested settlement[,]” we vacated the trial court’s order 

and remanded the case “for a hearing to determine if the parties reached a 

settlement on December 9, 2009 and if so, what the terms of that 

settlement are, and if it should be enforced.” Id. at 5-6. 

Instantly, the trial court set forth the following additional details 

germane to the present appeal:

On May 9, 2014, this Court was assigned the instant 

Motion to Enforce Settlement. Said Motion was originally filed

December 15, 2011 and, as noted above, was the subject of an 

appeal. The Motion asserted that prior to arbitration on 

December 9, 2009, the parties had settled on the remaining 

Uninsured Motorist (“UIM") claims for the sum of $10,000 to 
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Louis Viola, Sr. and $15,000 to Louis Viola, Jr., in exchange for 

full releases. See Appellee's Motion to Enforce Settlement, ¶ 11. 

[General Accident] had forwarded Appellants signed release 

forms on December 14, 2009; on January 28, 2010, Appellants 

responded that the releases were unacceptable. See [General 

Accident’s] Motion to Enforce Settlement, ¶ 17. Despite 

[General Accident’s] efforts to obtain specific objections to the 

releases or otherwise effectuate a release, such attempts were 

unsuccessful. See [General Accident’s] Motion to Enforce 

Settlement, ¶ 21-30. Thus, alleging they had been prejudiced 

due to their reliance upon the settlement, [General Accident] 

filed the Motion to Enforce. See [General Accident’s] Motion to 

Enforce Settlement, ¶ 32-33. 

On May 19, 2014, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause 

why the requested relief should not be granted.

On June 12, 2014, this Court heard argument and 

evidence in this matter. A settlement was reached between the 

parties in 2009. Notes of Testimony, hereinafter N.T., 6/12/14 

at 7-8, 11. There was no dispute that a settlement had been 

reached, only a dispute regarding the terms. N.T. 6/12/14 at 

11. Appellants had sued three entities collectively known as 

General Accident: General Accident Insurance Corporation, 

General Accident Insurance, and Camden Fire Insurance 

Association. N.T. 6/12/14 at 9. However, prior to the 

settlement of the case, General Accident went out of business 

and sold its interests to OneBeacon America Insurance. N.T. 

6/12/14 at 9. [General Accident] presented Appellant with a 

corrected release naming the three parties sued as well as 

OneBeacon America Insurance as successor in interest. N.T. 

6/12/14 at 10. Appellants then refused to sign the release. N.T. 

6/12/14 at 10. Appellants also sought the [ex]clusion of medical 

and wage loss claims [from] the release as well as interest from 

December of 2009. N.T. 6/12/14 at 17-18. However, the 

medical and wage loss claims had been dismissed by the neutral 

arbitrator prior to the hearing on December 9, 2009. N.T. 

6/12/14 at 19-20.

James McEldrew (“McEldrew"), the neutral arbitrator, 

testified that prior to the hearing on December 9, 2009, he had 

dismissed the wage claim because sixteen (16) years after the

accident underlying this case, Appellants had still provided no 

documentation of lost wages. N.T. 6/12/14 at 21-22. [FN2: 

McEldrew, the court-appointed arbitrator, had in error forgotten 
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to notify the other two arbitrators of the arbitration date. N.T. 

6/12/14 at 20, 22. McEldrew offered to reschedule the 

arbitration and stated that the matter could be rescheduled; that 

the parties could proceed to arbitration before him alone; or that 

the time could be used for a settlement conference. N.T. 

6/12/14 at 20. All parties agreed to proceed with a settlement 

conference. N.T. 6/12/14 at 20.] He sat down with counsel for 

both Appellants and [General Accident] to explain the 

settlement, and all parties were in agreement with the terms, 

including the dismissal of the wage loss claim. N.T. 6/12/14 at 

22-23. All parties were colloquied prior to settlement. N.T. 

6/12/14 at 22-23. McEldrew had never been presented with 

medical bills as part of the claim or packages, so medicals were 

not part of the issue. N.T. 6/12/14 at 23. 

Additionally, at the outset of the hearing, Allen Feingold 

("Feingold"), a disbarred attorney who had represented 

[Appellants] at the outset of the case, was present. N.T. 

6/12/14. Feingold attempted to enter his appearance at the bar 

of the court; however, he was not permitted to do so. N.T. 

6/12/14 at 6. Following the hearing, Feingold presented an 

entry of appearance for review by the Prothonotary. See

[General Accident’s] Motion to Object to the Entry of Allen 

Feingold, ¶ 1.

On June 16, 2014, [General Accident] filed a motion 

objecting to Feingold's entry of appearance. See [id.] [General 

Accident] noted Feingold had been disbarred by Order of the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on August 22, 2008. See [id. at] 

¶ 2. Additionally, on September 2, 2009, the President Judge of 

this Court entered an Order enjoining Feingold from entering any 

courtroom, tribunal, arbitration hearing, deposition, and/or to 

function in any capacity in a legal proceeding other than as a 

witness, party or spectator. See [id. at] ¶ 3. Additionally, the 

Philadelphia Prothonotary's Office may not accept any filing, by 

electronic means or otherwise, from Feingold without prior 

approval of the President Judge. See [id.]

On June 25, 2014, this Court concluded its hearing in the 

matter. At that time, [General Accident] stated that it had 

received Appellants’ release forms drafted and signed by 

Appellants. N.T. 6/25/14 at 6. However, the forms sought only 

to release "an entity known as GA ... GA does not exist and 

never has existed." N.T. 6/25/14 at 7. Thus, less than two 

weeks after receiving the releases, [General Accident] returned 
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them to Appellant with "GA" stricken out and the parties properly 

identified, as well as an additional digit needed to correct the 

policy number. N.T. 6/25/14 at 7-8. No substantive changes 

were made. N.T. 6/25/14 at 9, 11. 

When questioned regarding the differences in language 

between the release Appellants’ counsel had generated and sent 

to [General Accident], and the release [General Accident] had 

returned to Appellants, Appellants w[ere] unable to point to any 

differences between the language. N.T. 6/25/14 at 14-15. 

Indeed, [General Accident] agreed that the amounts of money in 

the settlements were correct. N.T. 6/25/14 at 18. Instead, 

Appellants argued they were entitled to interest on the amount 

of the settlement because [General Accident] had “not paid” the 

money. N.T. 6/25/14 at 15. On the second day of argument, 

Feingold was again present and came to the bar of the court 

several times during the proceedings to consult with counsel for 

Appellants, handing counsel for Appellants handwritten notes, as 

well as making gestures and loudly whispering in the back of the 

courtroom. N.T. 6/25/14 at 16. This Court again requested that 

Feingold cease disrupting court proceedings. N.T. 6/25/14 at 

16.

Following argument, this Court found that there was a 

settlement and that it should be enforced, and instructed the 

parties to submit proposed orders with two or three pages of 

argument on the interest. N.T. 6/25/14 at 21-22. This Court 

held the matter under advisement for no more than five (5) days 

so that Appellants and [General Accident] could prepare the 

requested materials. N.T. 6/25/14 at 22.

On June 30, 2014, [General Accident] filed a proposed 

Order and Memorandum of Law in support of their position. 

On July 1, 2014, this Court granted [General Accident’s] 

Motion to Enforce Settlement, and ordered Appellants to sign 

and execute releases in a form substantially identical to that 

attached as exhibit “S” to the original Motion. 

On July 8, 2014, over one (1) week after the due date of 

the proposed orders and memorandums of law and over one (1) 

week after the Order was signed, Appellants untimely filed a 

“True History of This Case and Memorandum.” 

On August 1, 2014, Appellants filed a timely Notice of 

Appeal to the Superior Court. 
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On August 4, 2014, this Court issued its Order pursuant to 

Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b), directing Appellants to file their Concise 

Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal within twentyone (21) days.

That same day, [General Accident] filed a Motion for 

Sanctions, as Appellants had not yet returned the signed 

releases. 

On August 6, 2014, this Court ordered that the entry of 

Allen Feingold be stricken, and [for] the Prothonotary [to] refuse 

to accept an additional entry of appearance from Mr. Feingold 

without prior approval from the President Judge of the Court of 

Common Pleas, per the Order of the Honorable Pamela Dembe of 

September 2, 2009. 

On August 13, 2014, Appellant filed his Concise Statement 

of Matters Complained of on Appeal[.] [] 

On September 5, 2014, this Court dismissed [General 

Accident’s] Motion for Sanctions without prejudice, as it lacked 

jurisdiction to rule upon it due to the pendency of the instant 

appeal. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/22/14, at 1-6. 

On appeal, Appellants present the following issue:

1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant [A]ppellants 

sanctions and interest on the settlement proceeds which 

[General Accident] has repeatedly wrongfully refused to pay?

Appellants’ Brief at 3. 

Our review of Appellants’ issue requires an examination of the trial 

court’s application of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229.1, which 

governs the imposition of sanctions following a settling defendant’s failure to 

deliver settlement proceeds in a timely manner following the receipt of an 

executed release from a plaintiff. 
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We conduct our review mindful that:

“As questions regarding the interpretation of the Rules of Civil

Procedure are questions of law, our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Marlette v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 618 Pa. 617, 57 A.3d 1224, 1228 (2012). 

“Within the ambit of the discretionary authority allocated by the 

rules to the trial courts, we review for abuse of discretion.” 

Cooper v. Schoffstall, 588 Pa. 505, 905 A.2d 482, 488 (2006).

Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hosp. of Sisters of Christian Charity, 91 A.3d 

680, 686 (Pa. 2014). 

Rule 229.1 provides in pertinent part:

Rule 229.1. Settlement Funds. Failure to Deliver. 

Sanctions[.]

(c) If a plaintiff and a defendant have entered into an agreement 

of settlement, the defendant shall deliver the settlement funds to 

the attorney for the plaintiff, or to the plaintiff if unrepresented, 

within twenty calendar days from receipt of an executed release.

***

Upon receipt of the settlement funds, the plaintiff shall file a 

discontinuance or deliver a discontinuance to the defendant. 

(d) If settlement funds are not delivered to the plaintiff within 

the time required by subdivision (c), the plaintiff may seek to

(1) invalidate the agreement of settlement as permitted by law, 

or

(2) impose sanctions on the defendant as provided in subdivision 

(e) of this rule.

(e) A plaintiff seeking to impose sanctions on the defendant shall 

file an affidavit with the court attesting to non-payment. The 

affidavit shall be executed by the plaintiff’s attorney and be 

accompanied by

(1) a copy of any document evidencing the terms of the 

settlement agreement,
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(2) a copy of the executed release,

(3) a copy of a receipt reflecting delivery of the executed release 

more than twenty days prior to the date of filing of the affidavit,

(4) a certification by the attorney of the applicable interest rate,

(5) the form of order prescribed by subdivision (h), and

(6) a certification by the attorney that the affidavit and 

accompanying documents have been served on the attorneys for 

all interested parties.

(f) Upon receipt of the affidavit and supporting documentation 

required by subdivision (e), the defendant shall have twenty 

days to file a response.

(g) If the court finds that the defendant violated subdivision (c) 

of this rule and that there is no material dispute as to the terms 

of the settlement or the terms of the release, the court shall 

impose sanctions in the form of interest calculated at the rate 

equal to the prime rate as listed in the first edition of the Wall 

Street Journal published for each calendar year for which the 

interest is awarded, plus one percent, not compounded, running 

from the twenty-first day to the date of delivery of the 

settlement funds, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees 

incurred in the preparation of the affidavit.

Pa.R.C.P. 229.1(c) – (g).

In rebutting Appellants’ claim of error, the trial court explained:

Appellants argue they are entitled to interest per Pa.R.C.P. 

229.1(c), “if a plaintiff and a defendant have entered into an 

agreement of settlement, the defendant shall deliver the 

settlement funds to the attorney for the plaintiff ... within twenty 

(20) calendar days from receipt of an executed release.” 

Pa.R.C.P. 229.1(c). Although in such cases a plaintiff may seek 

sanctions including interest, such action would not be proper 

in a case such as this, where the delay was due to 

[Appellants’] actions. Indeed, Appellants refused to sign the 

corrected release signed and returned to them by [General 

Accident]. N.T. 6/12/14 at 10. 

Thus, this Court properly denied Appellants’ claim for 

interest.
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Trial Court Opinion, 10/22/14, at 8 (emphasis supplied). Based on our 

review of the record, we discern no trial court error.

To invoke Rule 229.1, the parties are required to “have entered into an 

agreement of settlement,” see Pa.R.C.P. 229.1(c), the occurrence of which

Appellants specifically denied and appealed to our Court, and which was the 

very issue we remanded for determination by the trial court during the June 

2014 hearings. While the trial court ultimately determined, following the 

June 2014 hearings, that the parties had settled this matter in 2009, 

Appellants are not entitled to any interest that accrued while they disputed 

the existence and terms of the agreement. 

Further, Rule 229.1 requires “the defendant [to] deliver the settlement 

funds ... within twenty calendar days from receipt of an executed release.” 

Pa.R.C.P. 229.1(c). As noted by the trial court, and as noted by General 

Accident in their motion for sanctions, at of the time of Appellants’ filing of 

their notice of the instant appeal, Appellants still had not executed the 

revised release in this matter, which correctly identifies the settling payors 

and the policy number. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/22/14, at 6. While 

Appellants emphasize their execution of a prior version of the release, 

Appellants disregard their longstanding dispute regarding the effect of that 

executed release and the claims and terms covered therein. 

Appellants further disregard that the trial court can only impose 

sanctions and interest “[i]f the court finds that the defendant violated 

subdivision (c) of this rule and that there is no material dispute as to the 
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terms of the settlement or the terms of the release[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 229.1(g) 

(emphasis supplied). Here, the trial court did not find that General Accident 

violated 229.1(c). Moreover, because Appellants raised “material disputes 

as to the terms of the settlement” and the “terms of the release” following 

the 2009 agreement, the trial court properly declined to “impose sanctions in 

the form of interest” against General Accident. See Pa.R.C.P. 229.1(g). 

In sum, the trial court did not err in denying Appellants’ motion for 

sanctions and interest against General Accident. We thus affirm the trial 

court’s order. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/13/2015