IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30085

Summary Calendar

GAYL PAYTON,

Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

NEWELL NORMAND, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Sheriff, 

Jefferson Parish; MARK IANNAZZO, Individually in his Capacity as 

Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Deputy; DANNY JULIAN, Individually in His 

Capacity as Jefferson Parish Sherriff’s Deputy,

Defendants–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:13-CV-310

Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Gayl Payton filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against defendants for 

false arrest and use of excessive force, arising from an incident in which she 

was arrested and suffered physical injuries while allegedly interfering in a 

dispute between her daughter and her daughter’s boyfriend. Payton

* Pursuant to Fifth Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Fifth 

Cir. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 8, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-30085

subsequently entered an Alford plea in connection with her arrest. 

Consequently, Payton’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey unless the 

“factual basis for the [Alford plea] is temporally and conceptually distinct from 

the excessive force claim.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Because Payton has not articulated facts that could support her excessive force 

claims without running afoul of Heck, summary judgment for the defendants 

was proper. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

I.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 

Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is 

appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(a). All facts and inferences are construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Dillon, 596 F.3d at 266. 

II.

Payton filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Jefferson Parish Sheriff 

Newell Normand and Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Deputies Danny Julian and 

Mark Iannazzo alleging that she was injured by their use of excessive force 

during an incident outside her daughter’s house. In February 2012, there was 

an altercation between Payton’s daughter and Payton’s daughter’s boyfriend 

in which both Payton and the defendant officers became involved. Stemming 

from this incident, Payton was arrested and charged with resisting a police 

officer and interfering with the police. She entered an Alford plea to the 

misdemeanor of interfering with law enforcement officers. 

Payton then brought this lawsuit alleging that she sustained injuries to 

her face, knee, neck, and wrists due to the defendants’ excessive force during 

the arrest. According to Payton, she was injured when officer Iannazzo 

grabbed her from behind and threw her to the ground while she was standing, 

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uninvolved in the altercation. According to the defendants, Payton refused 

orders to remove herself from the incident and was physically interfering when 

she was injured. 

Heck v. Humphrey bars a claim for “allegedly unconstitutional conviction 

or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 

would render a conviction or sentence invalid” unless “that . . . conviction or 

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or 

called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 

512 U.S. at 486–87. This rule applies equally to Alford pleas. Ballard v. 

Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 396–97 (5th Cir. 2006). However, “a claim that excessive 

force occurred after the arrestee has ceased his or her [interference] would not 

necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction for the earlier [interference].” 

Bush, 513 F.3d at 498. The inquiry as to whether an excessive force claim is 

barred under Heck is “analytical and fact-intensive” and depends upon 

whether “the factual basis for the conviction is temporally and conceptually 

distinct from the excessive force claim.” Id.

Appellant, in both her Complaint and her brief on appeal, relies on a 

version of the facts that is inconsistent with her arrest and Alford plea for 

interfering with the officers. For the reasons explained by the district court, 

we hold that her § 1983 claim is barred by Heck. Because her underlying claim 

against Iannazzo and Julian is barred, her claims against Sheriff Normand are 

likewise barred. See Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 

2006) (holding that there can be no supervisory liability where there is no 

underlying constitutional violation). The judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED. 

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