### FILED 

### MAR07, 2013 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt WA State CourtofAppeals, Division III INTHE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 30030-7-111 ) Respondent, ) ) 

### v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION RICHARD ARTHURGUISASOLA, ) ) Appellant. ) KORSMO, C.J.

- Richard Guisasola appeals his conviction for unlawful possession ofa firearm in the second degree, l arguingthat the officer lacked articulable suspicionto stop him for hunting from theroad. We affirm. FACTS OnOctober 25,2009, Washington State Fish and Wildlife OfficerTroy McCormick stopped a truck driven byMr. Guisasola on suspicion ofroad huntinghunting from inside a motorvehicle. Itwas the last day ofdeerhunting season andthe officerwas patrolling for hunters along U.S. Forest Service Road 30 near Crawfish Lake.

1RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i).No.30030-7-III State v. Guisasola The officer observed a truck approaching at a slow rate ofspeed (between 0-7 m.p.h.), almost stopping at times, despite the 35 m.p.h. speed limit. In OfficerMcCormick's experience, this activity in thatpart ofthe forest during hunting season often indicated road hunting. He then stopped the truck to ensure that the driver, Mr. Guisasola, and his passengerwere not road hunting and to check theirhunting licenses. Mr. Guisasola and his passenger confirmed thatthey were rifle hunting for deer, and were not engaged in illegal road hunting. Becausethey had valid hunting licenses the officer sent them on their way. OfficerMcCormick then reported the stop to dispatch, whichreported backthatboth men hadprior felony convictions and could not legally own orpossess a firearm. The officer caught back up with the truck and arrested both men without incident. Following the arrest, Mr. Guisasola was charged with one count ofunlawful possession ofa firearm in the second degree. He moved to suppress the evidence ofhis possession ofa firearm, arguing thatthe initial stop ofthe vehicle was illegal. The trial court denied the motion and the parties proceeded to a stipulated facts bench trial. The trial court found Mr. Guisasola guilty, and he timely appealed. ANALYSIS The only issue on appeal is whether OfficerMcCormickhad "articulable facts" to support the initial stop ofMr. Guisasola's truck. UnderRCW 77.15.080(1), Fish and Wildlife officers with "articulable facts" that a person is engaged in hunting activities can 2No.30030-7-III State v. Guisasola temporarily stop the person and check for compliance with hunting laws. The statute does not define "articulable facts," but case law has defined it as analogous to the "articulable suspicion" standard used underthe state and federal constitutions. 

### Schlegel



### v. Dep 't o/Licensing, 137 Wn. App. 364, 369, 153 P.3d 244 (2007). "Articulable suspicion" means a "substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred or is about to occur." 

### State v. 

### Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1,6, 726 P.2d445 (1986). In the context of RCW 77.15.080, "articulable facts" means a substantial possibility that the person is engaged in hunting activities. 

### Schlegel, 137 Wn. App. at. 369. Mr. Guisasola argues thatthe facts ofthe present case are not similar enough to 

### Schlegelto support the court's determination that "articulable facts" existedtojustifythe stop. His argument erroneously assumes that 

### Schlegel's unique facts are the end-all standard for establishing "articulable facts." In

### Schlegel, this courtheld that a Fish and Wildlife officerhad "articulable facts" under RCW 77.15.080(1) because the defendant

was driving a hunting styIe vehicle in a hunting area during hunting seasonwhile wearing hunting type clothes. 

### Schlegel, 137 Wn. App. at 370. But, 

### Schlegel did not hold that all stops hadto be supported by these same facts; it only held thatthe facts must give rise to

a substantial possibility that the person stopped is engaged in hunting activities. 

### Id. Here, OfficerMcCormick saw a truck travelling along a two-lane gravel road on the last day ofhunting season in a forested area often used for hunting. Mr. Guisasola suggests that he couldhavejust as likely been a hiker, camper, orbird watcher because 3No.30030-7-III State v. Guisasola that area was often used for those activities as well. However, he was not travelling along the road like aperson looking to pull offand hike or camp. He was trolling along a 35 m.p.h. road, slowing, speeding up, and then slowing again while never getting above a slow crawl. In the officer's experience, this driving behavior in this location was indicative ofroad hunting. These "articulable facts" ofhunting activities supported a temporary stop under RCW 77.15.080(1). While the officer might have had reasonable doubts about Mr. Guisasola's intentions, RCW 77.15.080 does notrequire the officer to dismiss all reasonable doubts before stopping possible hunters. All that the statute requires is a substantialpossibilitythat the person is engaged in hunting activities. These facts satisfied that standard. The trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress. Affirmed. A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuantto RCW 2.06.040. Korsmo, C.J. WE CONCUR:

Sldd ,1.



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