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Filed 4/8/15 In re J.G. CA1/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

In re J.G. et al., Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

JESSICA G., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A143009 

 (Marin County 

 Super. Ct. Nos. JV25895A, JV25896A, 

 & JV25897A) 

 Jessica G. (Mother) appeals an order removing her two daughters from her care. 

She asserts the evidence was insufficient to support the removal findings and orders. 

Because the issues are moot, we dismiss the appeal. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In February 2014, Marin County Health and Human Services (the Department) 

filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition, asserting Mother’s 13 and 11-

year-old daughters were at substantial risk of suffering harm due to instances of domestic 

violence and Mother’s substance abuse, as well as due to the abuse of a sibling, 7-month 

old J.G. The Agency detained all three children. 

 At the jurisdictional hearing in April 2014, Mother submitted on the Department’s 

amended petition, which the juvenile court sustained under section 300, subdivisions (b) 

and (j). In August 2014, following the contested dispositional hearings in July 2014, the 
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juvenile court found the two daughters to be dependents and ordered their removal from 

Mother’s care. In September 2014, Mother appealed from that order. 

 On December 19, 2014, the daughters were returned to Mother’s care. Thereafter, 

on March 9, 2015, following Mother’s completion of various treatment programs, 

continued attendance in counseling and therapy, along with her continuous sobriety for 

more than one year, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and dismissed the case. 

II. DISCUSSION 

The Agency moves to dismiss the appeal as moot. An appeal from an order in a 

juvenile dependency matter may be rendered moot by the dismissal of dependency 

jurisdiction during the pendency of the appeal if the dismissal of jurisdiction deprives the 

appellate court of the power to grant the relief sought in the appeal. (In re Michelle M.

(1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 330.) 

The purpose of the dependency proceedings is to reunify children with a parent. 

(In re Tania R. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 447, 451.) Here, the court placed the daughters 

with Mother in December 2014 and terminated jurisdiction in March 2015.1

 As a result, 

the Department maintains that the issues on appeal are moot. 

 In Mother’s opposition to the motion dismiss, she argues that the appeal is not 

moot because it still presents justiciable issues, particularly in light of the fact that she has 

appealed from the juvenile court’s March 2015 order.2 According to Mother, dismissing 

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 J.G., who was also a dependent child, had been returned to Mother’s care 

prior to the disposition hearing; the juvenile court also dismissed the case pertaining to 

J.G. We grant the Agency’s request and take judicial notice of the court’s minute orders 

terminating jurisdiction. (Evid.Code, §§ 452, 459.) We recognize the Supreme Court has 

stated postjudgment evidence may not, except in extraordinary circumstances, be used as 

a basis to reverse a termination of parental rights on appeal. (See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 396, 413.) However, because this appeal is not from an order terminating 

parental rights and we are not reversing, taking judicial notice here is not prohibited by 

In re Zeth S.

2

 The notice of appeal was filed on March 19, 2015, and the appeal is still 

pending. 
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the appeal would have the effect of an affirmance, insulating the jurisdictional rulings 

from review. 

 “[W]here a judgment dismissing the dependency action is challenged on appeal 

the case ‘is not moot if the purported error is of such magnitude as to infect the outcome 

of [subsequent proceedings] or where the alleged defect undermines the juvenile court’s 

initial jurisdictional finding. Consequently the question of mootness must be decided on 

a case-by-case basis.’ [Citation.]” (In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1547, 

original italics (Joshua C.).) 

 For example, in Joshua C., supra, the children’s father argued on appeal that there 

was insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings as to the children and that 

the juvenile court erred by refusing to grant certain discovery orders thereby denying him 

due process. (Joshua C., supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1546.) Respondent agency 

contended that the issues could not be reached as dismissal of the dependency action at 

the dispositional hearing rendered the case moot. (Ibid.) The dispositional orders had 

awarded sole physical and legal custody of the children to their mother and restricted 

visitation for the father. (Id. at p. 1547.) The appellate court held that the fact that the 

dependency action had been dismissed should not preclude review of a significant basis 

for the assertion of jurisdiction where exercise of that jurisdiction resulted in custody and 

visitation orders that continued to adversely affect the father. (Id. at p. 1548.) 

Joshua C. is distinguishable from the instant case. The appellant in Joshua C. was 

challenging visitation and custody orders that continued to affect him adversely after

termination of the proceeding; in such a case, an appellant should be permitted to 

challenge the jurisdictional findings in his attack on the orders. Here, by contrast, there is 

no ongoing order that continues to adversely affect Mother. 

 Mother next argues that the appeal should not be dismissed as moot because the 

jurisdictional finding might have an adverse effect in some future proceedings. She does 

not, however, point to any actual proceeding in which the findings would be used. 

Moreover, the juvenile court’s order terminating the dependencies declared that there is 

no basis for juvenile court jurisdiction, and thus went a long way to removing any stigma 
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of the jurisdictional findings. The court recognized that Mother had completed “several 

drug/alcohol treatment programs, and she continues to attend counseling and therapy, . . . 

and skills development programs.” 

 While the court’s order falls short of saying that the conditions never supported a 

finding under subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300—which is what Mother urges 

here—the distinction does not warrant a departure from the well-established mootness 

doctrine under the circumstances before us. The final word of the juvenile court is that 

the conditions do not exist and that there is no need for the Department to protect the 

children. 

 She also argues that dismissal will likely result in further adverse collateral 

consequences by requiring her to pay for the costs of support and legal services for her 

children while they were in the system. Whereas, if she is successful in challenging the 

jurisdictional findings, she would not be subject to such reimbursement. (See, e.g., 

§ 903.1, subd. (b) [specified persons not liable for costs of support and legal services if 

§ 300 petition dismissed at or before the jurisdictional hearing].) We decline to set aside 

the mootness doctrine based on speculation as to what might happen in the future. 

 Finally, Mother argues we should decide the appeal, notwithstanding the mootness 

doctrine because it raises a matter of continuing public interest in resolving the issue of 

“the right of capable parents in treatment programs to delegate care of their child or 

children to a capable caregiver” while they are completing a residential treatment 

program. 

 We have discretion to resolve an appeal, even if technically moot, when it raises a 

matter of continuing public interest that is likely to recur. (In re Jody R. (1990) 218 

Cal.App.3d 1615, 1622.) Here, however, Mother does not ask us so much to clarify a 

legal standard that will likely recur in litigation among other parties, but rather to 

determine whether the evidence was sufficient in this particular case that she had 

reasonable means to protect her children by delegating a capable caretaker. We decline 

to exercise our discretion to decide the matter on this basis. 
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III. DISPOSITION 

 The appeal is dismissed. 
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 _________________________ 

 RUVOLO, P. J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

REARDON, J. 

_________________________ 

STREETER. J.