J-S15044-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

BLAINE MATTHEW WARFIELD

Appellee No. 1075 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-18-CR-0000129-2014

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED APRIL 07, 2015

The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s order granting Blaine 

Warfield’s motion to suppress. We conclude that there were valid grounds to 

stop Warfield for an investigative detention to determine whether Warfield 

furnished liquor to minors. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum. 

Warfield was charged with furnishing liquor to minors1 based on a 

series of events in and around Lock Haven, Pennsylvania on October 5, 

2013.2 Warfield filed a pretrial motion to suppress alleging that liquor code 

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6310.1.

2 Warfield also was charged with unlawful acts relating to liquor beverages 

(“unlawful acts”) under 47 P.S. § 4-493. Following a preliminary hearing, a 

magisterial district justice dismissed the unlawful acts charge. The case 

proceeded to the trial court on the furnishing liquor charge alone.
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enforcement officers stopped him and his companions in violation of his 

constitutional rights. The trial court held a suppression hearing in which 

three liquor code enforcement officers testified for the Commonwealth. 

There were no defense witnesses. On June 24, 2014, the trial court entered 

an order and opinion granting Warfield’s motion to suppress. The 

Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal3and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement of matters complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion incorporating its June 24, 2014 opinion by 

reference.

The Commonwealth raises two issues in this appeal:

1. Did the trial court err in finding that the interaction 

between the officer and the defendant was an 

investigative detention?

2. Did the trial court err in finding that any investigative 

detention was not supported by reasonable 

suspicion?

Brief For Appellant, p. 4.

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, our scope 

of review consists of the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together 

with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the 

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3 The Commonwealth may appeal an interlocutory order suppressing 

evidence when it certifies in its notice of appeal that the order terminates or 

substantially handicaps the prosecution. Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); Commonwealth 

v. Whitlock, 69 A.3d 635, 636 n. 2 (Pa.Super.2013). The Commonwealth 

provided the required certification in its notice of appeal.
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record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Whitlock, supra, 69 A.3d at 

637. We defer to the suppression court’s findings of fact that are supported 

by the record because, as the finder of fact, the suppression court has the 

prerogative to decide the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their 

testimony. Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa.2014). We are 

not bound by the suppression court’s conclusions of law, and we must 

determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. 

Whitlock, supra, 69 A.3d at 637.

The relevant facts of this case, derived from the certified record in 

accordance with the above scope and standards of review, are as follows. 

On October 5, 2013, Officer Harbach and other liquor code enforcement 

officers followed Warfield’s car to four establishments in or near Lock Haven. 

N.T., 6/18/14, pp. 11-14 (suppression hearing). Warfield was driving, and 

two young males accompanied Warfield. Id. Officer Harbach followed 

Warfield in one vehicle, and two other officers followed in a second vehicle. 

Id. at 11. At the first stop, a state liquor store, Warfield walked into the 

store alone and purchased items that he carried back to the car in plastic 

bags. Id. at 31-33. At the second stop, Puff’s Six Pack, an establishment 

that sells alcoholic beverages, Warfield walked inside alone and purchased 

one 6-pack of bottles. Id. at 15. He returned to his car and dropped off the 

6-pack, and then he walked back into the store alone and purchased one 12-

pack of cans. Id. The fact that Warfield made two separate purchases 
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indicated that he purchased alcoholic beverages, because Pennsylvania law 

prohibits restaurant licensees such as Puff’s from selling more than two 6-

packs in one sale. Id. at 16. 

At the third stop, one of the two young males purchased what 

appeared to be soda. N.T., 6/18/14, pp. 33-34. At the final stop, Eagle 

Distributors, Warfield walked inside alone and purchased one 30-pack of 

Busch Beer. Id. at 34-35. 

Based on Warfield’s string of purchases, Officer Harbach suspected 

that the two males with Warfield were minors. N.T., 6/18/14, p. 15. She 

testified that “[it] is a red flag ... when somebody is making all the purchases 

[alone and] there [are other] occupants, [because] if [the other occupants] 

were 21 [they] could have made it all in one single sale ... they all could 

have carried [alcoholic beverages] out.” Id. 

Following the final purchase at Eagle Distributors, the officers followed 

Warfield’s car to his residence on North Fairview Street. N.T., 6/18/14, pp.

14, 43. Officer Harbach parked her car two car lengths behind Warfield’s 

car. Id. at 14-15. When Warfield and the two males exited Warfield’s car, 

Officer Harbach observed that “all occupants were in possession of alcoholic 

beverages, and they were walking up towards me because I was actually 

standing directly in front of their residence.” Id. at 14. Upon viewing all 

three males in possession of alcoholic beverages, Officer Harbach identified 

herself as a liquor code enforcement officer and instructed the males to 
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“drop the alcohol.”4 Id. at 17. Officer Harbach also directed the males to 

produce identification and sit down on the ground. Id. at 17, 26. Warfield’s 

identification showed that he was 21 years old; the other two individuals 

were under age 21. Id. at 18.

The Commonwealth argued in the trial court that the events in front of 

Warfield’s residence were a “mere encounter” which did not require the 

liquor code enforcement officers to harbor any suspicion of criminal 

wrongdoing. Warfield countered that the events constituted an investigative 

detention for which the officers needed (but lacked) reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity. The trial court concluded that the incident was an 

investigative detention, and that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity. 

In this Court, the Commonwealth raises two arguments: (1) the 

incident with Warfield was a “mere encounter,” and (2) even if it was an 

investigative detention, Officer Harbach had reasonable suspicion to conduct 

an investigative stop. We conclude that the incident was a valid 

investigative detention supported by reasonable suspicion that Warfield 

illegally furnished liquor to minors.

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4 The other two officers arrived at the scene after Officer Harbach 

intercepted the males and initiated their detention. The trial court correctly 

focused on Officer Harbach as the crucial state actor in this case.
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Miller, 56 A.3d 

424, 429 (Pa.Super.2012). A seizure is a restraint on personal liberty under 

circumstances in which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. 

Lyles, 97 A.3d at 303. Factors which determine whether police have 

effectuated a seizure include, but are not limited to: (1) the presence or 

absence of police excesses; (2) whether there was physical contact; (3) 

whether police directed the citizen’s movements; (4) police demeanor and 

manner of expression; (5) the location of the interdiction; (6) the content of 

the questions and statements; (7) the existence and character of the initial 

investigative detention, including its degree of coerciveness; (8) the degree 

of seamlessness between the original encounter and subsequent 

developments; (9) whether the officer has told the citizen that he is free to 

depart; and (10) whether the officer has told the citizen that he is not 

required to consent to the search. Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 

884, 888-89 (Pa.2000).

There are three categories of interactions between citizens and police. 

In evaluating the level of interaction, courts conduct an objective 

examination of the totality of surrounding circumstances. Lyles, 97 A.3d at 

302. The first interaction, a “mere encounter”, does not carry any official 

compulsion to stop or respond and therefore does not require the police 
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officer to have any level of suspicion. Id. A mere encounter is not a 

seizure, because a reasonable person would feel free to leave or terminate 

the encounter. Id. at 302-03. The second interaction, an “investigative 

detention”, is a seizure which subjects an individual to a stop and temporary 

detention but is not so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of 

an arrest. Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889. An investigative detention is 

permissible if the police officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion 

that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity, and the detention may 

continue only so long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion. 

Id. 

The third interaction, an arrest or custodial detention, the most 

restrictive encounter, is a seizure that must be supported by probable cause. 

Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889. Probable cause exists 

when the facts and circumstances which are within 

the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, 

and of which he has reasonably trustworthy 

information, are sufficient to warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has 

committed or is committing a crime. The question 

we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was correct 

or more likely true than false. Rather, we require 

only a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of 

criminal activity. In determining whether probable 

cause exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances 

test.

Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 721 (Pa.2014) (italics in 

original). 
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The incident in this case exceeds the bounds of a mere encounter, 

because Officer Harbach exerted “official compulsion to stop or respond” by 

directing Warfield and the two minors to “drop the alcohol”, sit on the 

ground and produce identification. Lyles, 97 A.3d at 302. A reasonable 

person would not have felt free to leave or to terminate this encounter. 

Compare Lyles at 304-06 (interaction did not escalate beyond mere 

encounter when officers approached defendant and another man in front of 

abandoned building in area where numerous burglaries had recently 

occurred, asked what they were doing there, and requested identification; 

officer’s jotting down of identification information, as opposed to attempting 

to memorize it, did not restrain defendant’s freedom of movement; officer’s 

request was not accompanied by physical restraint, manifestation of 

authority, or mandate to comply; and officer did not tell defendant that he 

was not free to leave, or brandish a weapon).

This incident falls within the scope of an investigative detention, which 

Officer Harbach had the right to make if she had reasonable suspicion that 

criminal activity was afoot. Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889. In the course of an 

investigatory stop, an officer may frisk the individual’s outer garments if he 

has reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. 

Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 381 (Pa.Super.2013). The 

officer also can take other reasonable measures designed to protect himself 

during an investigatory detention. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Revere, 
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888 A.2d 694, 707 (Pa.2005) (“there are certain exigencies—and 

particularly, the need for safety or security in conducting and completing an 

investigatory detention — the existence of which would make it reasonable 

under the authority of Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] ... to place a 

suspect in a vehicle and transport him a short distance during an 

investigatory detention”); see also United States v. Ramires, 307 F.3d 

713, 716 (8th Cir.2002) (based on reasonable suspicion of drug 

manufacturing, officers authorized to order defendants out of crawl space at 

gunpoint and handcuff them, because drug trafficking is often accompanied 

by dangerous weapons). On the other hand, “if the protective search goes 

beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no 

longer valid under Terry ... ” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 

(1993). 

Officer Harbach reasonably suspected that Warfield was furnishing 

liquor to minors based on several factors: (1) the youthful appearance of the 

two passengers in Warfield’s car, (2) Warfield’s solo purchases of alcohol (or 

what Officer Harbach reasonably believed was alcohol) at three 

establishments while the two young males waited in Warfield’s car, and (3) 

Officer Harbach’s observation, from a lawful vantage point, of Warfield and

the two young males carrying alcohol in plain view outside of Warfield’s 

residence. Therefore, Officer Harbach had the authority to stop Warfield and 

the other two males for an investigative detention. See Commonwealth v. 
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Hayes, 898 A.2d 1089, 1093-94 (Pa.Super.2006) (officer had articulable 

and adequate suspicion that defendant was furnishing alcohol to minors so 

as to support investigative detention in which officer stopped vehicle as it 

backed out of parking space; officer saw vehicle in front of liquor store and 

saw driver pass something to defendant which he thought was money, 

officer formed suspicion that driver was probably underage based on 

experience as 10-year veteran of police department’s division for 

investigating furnishing alcohol to minors, defendant began walking towards 

liquor store, but turned back before she went inside and yelled to others in 

vehicle, “apple, apple,” and then “oh watermelon,” and defendant purchased 

two bottles of what officer believed was alcohol based on appearance and 

place of purchase).5 

Officer Harbach’s command to “drop the alcohol” was a reasonable 

measure to protect herself during the investigative detention. Revere, 

supra. At the time of the stop, Warfield or his companions conceivably 

could have attacked Officer Harbach with the bottles of alcohol in their 

hands. The command to drop the alcohol was a reasonable measure to 

prevent Warfield or his friends from using the bottles as weapons. 

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5 Notably, Hayes also comments: “It is per se reasonable for one to assume 

that when a person goes into a liquor store in Pennsylvania and emerges 

with bottles, that person has purchased alcohol.” Id. at 1094.
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Officer Harbach had the authority to examine Warfield’s license and 

the other males’ licenses during the investigatory detention. 

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 827 A.2d 469, 478 (Pa.Super.2003) (deputy 

was authorized to stop defendant and request identification based on 

reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaging in underage drinking).

Upon determining from the licenses that Warfield was 21 and the two other 

males were underage, Officer Harbach had probable cause to believe that 

Warfield was furnishing liquor to minors in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6310.1.

For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting 

Warfield’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as part of the 

investigatory detention outside of Warfield’s residence.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/7/2015