IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-11181

JACK BELL,

Plaintiff–Appellant

v.

DALLAS COUNTY,

Defendant–Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(08-CV-1834)

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff–Appellant Jack Bell sued Dallas County for retaliation and

interfering with his rights pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006). On March 25, 2010, the district court

denied Bell’s motion for summary judgment and granted the County’s motion for

summary judgment, concluding that the County had not interfered with Bell’s

rights pursuant to the FMLA and had not retaliated against him.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 15, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 Case: 11-11181 Document: 00512054024 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/15/2012
This civil action has previously been before this court. Bell v. Dallas Co.,

432 F. App’x 330 (5th Cir. 2011). On the first appeal, we affirmed the district

court’s rejection of Bell’s retaliation claim but remanded for further

consideration of his FMLA interference claim. On remand, the district court

revisited Bell’s interference claim. It filed its memorandum opinion and order

on August 30, 2011, concluding that: (1) Bell had not pleaded an FMLA

interference claim, and (2) even if Bell had pleaded such a claim, it failed as a

matter of law because there was no evidence that the County had denied him

benefits to which he was entitled pursuant to the FMLA. Again, Bell appealed,

restating his argument for his FMLA interference claim and also claiming that

the district court erred in denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint

after it issued its August 30, 2011 memorandum opinion and order.

We have reviewed the record on appeal and have considered the law and

facts as reflected therein and in the briefs of the parties. We are satisfied with

the district court’s reasoning in its August 30, 2011 memorandum opinion and

order, and therefore affirm.

We briefly address Bell’s claim that the district court erred in denying his

motion for leave to amend his complaint, which he asserted as part of his Rule

59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. “The court should freely give leave

[to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Nevertheless, this

generous standard is “tempered by the necessary power of a district court to

manage a case.” Schiller v. Alpert Grp., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted). We review the district court’s denial of Bell’s Rule 59(e)

motion for abuse of discretion, in light of the limited discretion of Rule 15(a). Id.

(citation omitted).

In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, the district court may

consider a variety of factors in exercising its discretion, including undue delay,

bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failures to cure

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

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party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of the amendment. 

Id.

Here, the prominent factors are undue delay and the futility of any

amendment. The County first raised the issue of the deficiency in Bell’s

complaint on June 1, 2009—nine months after Bell had filed his original

complaint. Bell simply disagreed, and did not amend his complaint. On October

8, 2009, the County filed its reply in support of its motion for summary

judgment, and raised the deficiency issue again. Over two years passed between

the time the County first highlighted the complaint’s deficiency and the point at

which Bell requested leave to amend, with two decisions issued by the district

court and one issued by this court in between. “[A]t some point, a court must

decide that a plaintiff has had fair opportunity to make his case; if, after that

time, a cause of action has not been established, the court should finally dismiss

the suit.” Schiller, 342 F.3d at 567 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Furthermore, even if the district court had granted Bell’s motionto amend,

the amendment would have been futile for the reasons elaborated in the district

court’s August 30, 2011 memorandum opinion and order. Therefore, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bell’s post-judgment motion for

leave to amend.

AFFIRMED.

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