Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ontiveros, 2015 IL App (2d) 140145

Appellate Court 

Caption

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

GERONIMO ONTIVEROS and CATALINA ONTIVEROS, 

Defendants-Appellants (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 

Inc., as Nominee for Fremont Investment and Loan, The City of 

Aurora, Nonrecord Claimants, and Unknown Owners, Defendants). 

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-14-0145

Filed February 23, 2015

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

The denial of defendants’ petition for relief from a default judgment of 

foreclosure and the order confirming the ensuing foreclosure sale 

pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure was 

affirmed, notwithstanding defendants’ contention that plaintiff was 

not licensed under the Collection Agency Act, since the decision of 

the appellate court in Dina holding that a mortgage made by an 

unlicensed lender was void as a matter of public policy applied to the 

contract, not to a judgment of the trial court, and being based on 

principles of contract law, it did not speak to jurisdictional matters.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, No. 12-CH-408; the 

Hon. Leonard J. Wojtecki, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Jack Kozar, of Kozar Law Office LLC, of Elmhurst, for appellants.

Edward J. Lesniak and Susan M. Horner, both of Burke, Warren, 

MacKay & Serritella, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Hudson and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendants, Geronimo and Catalina Ontiveros, appeal after what they assert is the denial of 

their motion to vacate a default judgment of foreclosure and the order confirming the ensuing 

sale. However, as we will discuss, the only matter of which we have jurisdiction on appeal is 

the denial of defendants’ petition for relief from judgment, brought under section 2-1401 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)). On the merits, defendants 

assert that, because plaintiff was not a licensed collection agency under the Collection Agency 

Act (Act) (225 ILCS 425/1 et seq. (West 2012)), the foreclosure and confirmation orders were 

void. We hold that lack of such licensure could not have made the judgments void. We 

therefore conclude that defendants did not state a basis for section 2-1401 relief, and so we 

affirm the petition’s denial.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Plaintiff, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., filed a foreclosure complaint against defendants; 

possible lienors Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee for 

Fremont Investment & Loan, and the City of Aurora; and nonrecord claimants and unknown 

owners. The complaint stated that the original mortgagee was MERS, as nominee for 

Nationstar Mortgage LLC; a mortgage document consistent with that allegation was attached 

to the complaint. Also included was an “Allonge to Note” dated November 11, 2008, in which 

Nationstar Mortgage LLC assigned the note to plaintiff. 

¶ 4 On February 29, 2012, Geronimo Ontiveros filed a pro se appearance but not an answer. 

Plaintiff moved for a default judgment against all defendants, which the court granted, and on 

August 24, 2012, the court entered a judgment of foreclosure. The judgment did not include a 

finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010) of immediate 

appealability or enforceability. 

¶ 5 Defendants entered an appearance through counsel on September 24, 2012, and, on the 

same day, filed a motion to vacate the default under section 2-1301(e) of the Code (735 ILCS 

5/2-1301(e) (West 2012)). They claimed several defenses not relevant here. The court denied 

the motion on November 7, 2012. 

¶ 6 Plaintiff filed a motion for confirmation of the sale on February 4, 2013. The court 

approved it the same day. 
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¶ 7 On March 6, 2013, defendants filed a motion to vacate the confirmation. They filed an 

amended motion to vacate on April 11, 2013. 

¶ 8 On July 5, 2013, with the motion to vacate pending, defendants filed a petition under 

section 2-1401, seeking to vacate the judgments as void as a result of plaintiff’s lacking the 

licensure required by the Act. The court “struck” the petition on July 16, 2013, on the basis that 

defendants had not appeared. On July 24, 2013, the court denied the motion to vacate, but gave 

defendants leave to renotice their petition. 

¶ 9 Plaintiff responded to the petition, asserting, among other things, that, because it was a 

bank, the requirement to be licensed as a collection agency did not apply to it. 

¶ 10 Defendants replied. They asserted, among other things, that the exception for banks did not 

apply to banks that own or operate collection agencies. They claimed that, because plaintiff 

owned and operated a collection agency licensed in the State of Washington, namely J.P. 

Morgan Services India Private Limited (with offices in Mumbai),1 the bank exception did not 

apply. 

¶ 11 The court held a hearing on the petition on December 18, 2013. Defendants argued that 

plaintiff’s lack of a license deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the 

foreclosure judgment. Argument centered on interpretation of the Act and the factual question 

of whether defendants were in default when plaintiff acquired the obligation. 

¶ 12 On January 29, 2014, the court entered an order (a formal written decision) in which it 

ruled that the Act is inapplicable to a bank unless it is operating as a collection agency. It 

therefore denied relief to defendants. 

¶ 13 Defendants filed a notice of appeal less than 30 days thereafter, seeking review of the 

January 29, 2014, order, the July 24, 2013, denial of their motion to vacate the confirmation, 

and the November 7, 2012, denial of their motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment. 

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 15 Initially, we must consider the extent of our jurisdiction in this appeal. We conclude that 

we have jurisdiction, but only over the court’s denial of defendants’ section 2-1401 petition. 

Defendants argue that we should treat their petition as a second postjudgment motion. They 

argue that, so treated, it acted to toll the time they had to appeal from the final judgment in the 

foreclosure case. We do not agree. 

¶ 16 It has long been the case in Illinois courts that a successive postjudgment motion is 

improper and does not toll the time for a party to file a notice of appeal. See Deckard v. Joiner, 

44 Ill. 2d 412, 418-19 (1970) (stating those rules); see also, e.g., McCorry v. Gooneratne, 332 

Ill. App. 3d 935, 940 (2002) (only the first of a party’s motions directed against a final 

judgment tolls the time in which that party can file a timely notice of appeal). Therefore, only 

defendants’ motion to vacate–filed March 6, 2013, and denied July 24, 2013–tolled the time 

for defendants to appeal the final order in the underlying case. An untimely notice of appeal 

does not vest jurisdiction in this court. E.g., McCorry, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 939. Defendants’ 

 

1This claim was supported by a paralegal’s affidavit explaining a search result from the State of 

Washington’s Business Licensing Service web page. According to that page, J.P. Morgan Services 

India Private Limited is currently registered in Washington, but does not currently have a 

collection-agency license. 
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notice of appeal, filed on February 10, 2014, was obviously untimely as an appeal of the 

confirmation judgment, even as that time was tolled by the consideration of the original 

postjudgment motion. 

¶ 17 We do have jurisdiction of this appeal as from the denial of a properly timed section 2-1401 

petition.2 Section 2-1401 provides, “Relief from final orders and judgments, after 30 days 

from the entry thereof, may be had upon petition as provided in this Section.”3

 735 ILCS 

5/2-1401(a) (West 2012). When, as here, the court made no Rule 304(a) finding as to the 

foreclosure judgment, a “judgment ordering the foreclosure of a mortgage is not final and 

appealable until the court enters orders approving the sale and directing the distribution.” 

In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542, 555 (1989). That the court’s last reviewable 

decision in a matter may be a ruling on a postjudgment motion does not make that ruling the 

final judgment, nor does the ruling on the motion make the final judgment interlocutory. Sears 

v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253, 258-59 (1981). Consistent with this, the pendency of a postjudgment 

motion does not toll the running of section 2-1401’s two-year limitations period. People v. 

Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d 198, 206 (2001). From this, we can conclude that, in a foreclosure case, a 

section 2-1401 petition is proper when it is filed more than 30 days after the entry of the 

confirmation order, regardless of the pendency of a postjudgment motion. Defendants filed 

their petition more than 30 days after the court confirmed the sale. We thus have jurisdiction to 

review the ruling denying relief under the petition. However, as we stated above, as an attempt 

to appeal from the underlying judgment, this appeal was too late. 

¶ 18 On the merits of the matter before us, defendants assert that, because plaintiff was an 

unlicensed debt collector, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter judgment, thus 

rendering the foreclosure and ensuing sale void. In support of this, they cite First Mortgage 

Co. v. Dina, 2014 IL App (2d) 130567, in which we held that a mortgage made when the 

original mortgage lender lacked a license would be unenforceable. Defendants’ argument is 

based on a misunderstanding of the relevant jurisdictional principles and a misreading of Dina.

¶ 19 Defendants’ argument relies entirely on their claim that the judgments were void. When a 

section 2-1401 petition is based on a claim that a judgment is void and no facts are in dispute, 

our review of the court’s disposition of the petition is de novo. People v. Hubbard, 2012 IL 

App (2d) 101158, ¶ 14. Similarly, the issue of whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is 

also an issue of law, subject to de novo review. Brandon v. Bonell, 368 Ill. App. 3d 492, 503 

(2006). 

¶ 20 At the outset, we note that a judgment is void only when the court that entered it lacked 

jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1998). Further, since the adoption 

of the 1964 amendments to the judiciary article of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 (Ill. Const. 

 

2

It appears to us that, in EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Kemp, 2012 IL 113419, ¶ 12, the supreme court 

held that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3) (eff. Feb 26, 2010) (which generally makes appealable 

any ruling granting or denying the relief sought in a section 2-1401 petition) is inapplicable to a 

prematurely filed section 2-1401 petition as a matter of common sense. On the other hand, it also 

appears that, in S.C. Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexander, 181 Ill. 2d 489, 495-97 (1998), 

after extended discussion, the court held that a petition’s prematurity is irrelevant to a reviewing court’s 

jurisdiction. Because we hold that the petition here was not premature, we need not further address this 

apparent conflict. 

3The section also creates a two-year limitations period for filing many petitions. However, there is 

no possibility here that the petition was too late. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 2012). 
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1870, art. VI (amended 1964), § 9), there have been only two jurisdictional requirements for a 

court to enter judgment: personal jurisdiction of the relevant parties and subject-matter 

jurisdiction. See Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 529-32 (2001) (holding that the 

1964 amendments eliminated the jurisdictional requirement that a court have inherent 

authority to adjudicate the controversy). 

¶ 21 Very little is necessary to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a circuit court: a complaint 

need only state a “justiciable matter,” which is a low bar indeed. Section 9 of the judiciary 

article of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (which incorporates the 1964 amendments to the 

previous constitution) is the source of our circuit courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. With 

minor exceptions not relevant here, the section gives the circuit courts subject-matter 

jurisdiction of “all justiciable matters.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9; see also Belleville Toyota, 

Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002) (so interpreting the 

section). A “justiciable matter” is “a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it 

is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations 

of parties having adverse legal interests.” Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335. Because of this 

grant of jurisdiction, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction does not depend upon the legal sufficiency 

of the pleadings.” Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 340. Therefore, “even a defectively stated 

claim is sufficient to invoke the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” and the “only [essential 

jurisdictional] consideration is whether the alleged claim falls within the general class of cases 

that the court has the inherent power to hear and determine.” (Emphasis in original.) In re Luis 

R., 239 Ill. 2d 295, 301 (2010). 

¶ 22 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s lack of proper licensing made its claim noncognizable and 

that this deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. They further suggest that the 

jurisdictional flaw was plaintiff’s lack of standing. However, a claim for foreclosure is a 

justiciable matter regardless of whether the plaintiff bringing the action is a proper party. 

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Canale, 2014 IL App (2d) 130676, ¶¶ 12-18. In particular, the 

plaintiff’s standing to bring the foreclosure action is not an element of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. Canale, 2014 IL App (2d) 130676, ¶¶ 9-15. 

¶ 23 Our decision in Dina does not support defendants’ position. In that decision, we held that a 

mortgage made by an unlicensed lender was void as contrary to public policy. Dina, 2014 IL 

App (2d) 130567, ¶ 18. We must emphasize that our holding of voidness applied to the 

contract, and not to a judgment of the trial court. As the decision was based on principles of 

contract law, it speaks not at all to jurisdictional matters. 

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm the denial of defendants’ section 2-1401 petition. 

¶ 26 Affirmed.