alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Annual Report of Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. (the Registrant) on Form 10-K for the period ending April 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Annual Report), we, R. Don Morris, President and Philip Manning, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) The Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.  Date:July 14, 2010By:/s/R. Don MorrisR. Don MorrisPresident and DirectorDate:July 14, 2010By:/s/Philip ManningPhilip ManningChief Financial Officer
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

ROYAL OILFIELD L.L.C.,

APPELLANT,

V.

LEWIS D. MARCELLUS,

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-14-00304-CV

Appeal from the

County Court at Law

of Reeves County, Texas

APPELLEE.

§

(TC# 4187C)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal is before the Court to determine whether it should be dismissed for want of 

prosecution. Finding that the Appellant’s brief has not been filed, we dismiss the appeal for want

of prosecution.

Appellant’s brief was due to be filed on March 12, 2015 but none was filed. On 

March 16, 2015, the Clerk notified Appellant that its brief was past due and no motion for 

extension of time had been filed. The letter advised Appellant that the Court intended to dismiss 

the appeal for want of prosecution unless Appellant responded within ten days and showed 

grounds for continuing the appeal. See TEX.R.APP.P. 38.8(a)(1). Neither the brief nor a motion 

for extension of time in which to file the brief has been filed. Accordingly, we dismiss the 
- 2 -

appeal for want of prosecution.

April 15, 2015

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.
**Exhibit 31.1****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     I, Sundaresan Raja, Chief Executive Officer of Airbee Wireless, Inc., certify that:     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Airbee Wireless, Inc.;     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, resultsof operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  c. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter(the registrant’s first fiscal quarter) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors andthe audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunction): a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.   /s/ Sundaresan Raja   Sundaresan Raja  Chief Executive Officer  November 14, 2005
SHERRY RADACK

 CHIEF JUSTICE

TERRY JENNINGS

EVELYN KEYES

LAURA CARTER HIGLEY

JANE BLAND

MICHAEL MASSENGALE

HARVEY BROWN

REBECA HUDDLE

RUSSELL LLOYD

 JUSTICES

Court of Appeals

First District

301 Fannin Street

Houston, Texas 77002-2066

 CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

 CLERK OF THE COURT

JANET WILLIAMS

 CHIEF STAFF ATTORNEY

PHONE: 713-274-2700

FAX: 713-755-8131

 www.txcourts.gov/1stcoa.aspx

April 13, 2015

Arturo Melo Medina

Darrington Unit

59 Darrington Road

Rosharon, TX 77583

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 01-96-00259-CR, 01-96-00260-CR, 01-96-00261-CR

Trial Court Case Number: 9427214, 9427213, 9427947

Style: Medina, Arturo Melo v. The State of Texas

This is to acknowledge your communication received April 8, 2015, with reference to your direct

appeal. Please be advised that the current status of your appeal is:

1. Enclosed is a copy of the Opinion in your appeal.

2. Enclosed is a copy of the Mandates in your appeal

3. Our records indicate that the mandate issued on June 8, 1998.

Very truly yours,

Christopher A. Prine

Clerk of the Court

FILE COPY
[No. 37648.

Department Two.

September 23, 1965.]

#### Theodore R. Krause *et al., Respondents,*v. E. Frank Mariotto *et al.,*Appellants.*

*Livesey, Kingsbury & Livesey,*by *George Livesey, Jr.,*for appellants.

*Abbott, Lant & Fleeson,*by *Richard Fleeson,*for respondents.

*

Reported in 406 P.2d 16.

Per Curiam.

Defendants appeal from a judgment rescinding a written contract of conditional sale and returning to plaintiffs, the purchasers, their down payment.

February 14, 1963, defendants sold the Bell-Ice Company to plaintiffs on conditional sale contract for $34,500. An $8,000 down payment was made. The sale included equipment, machinery, good will of the business and the S & S ice vending machine franchise for the territory.

Plaintiffs operated the business from March 1, 1963 until April 24, 1963 at which time the business was returned to defendants. In the meantime, two events occurred: plaintiffs sold for $4,850 one of the ice machines purchased, and retained the funds; and, it was discovered that defendants no longer had a franchise for the sale of the S & S ice vend*920ing machines. Plaintiffs gave written notice of recission; defendants gave notice of intention to forfeit the contract.

All of defendants’ assignments of error orbit around finding of fact No. 4:

> That a significant, material and valuable portion of the consideration to be transferred by Defendants to Plaintiffs in exchange for the purchase price was a S & S Vending Machine franchise for Whatcom, Skagit, Snohomish, Island and San Juan Counties in the State of Washington, which franchise was not in effect and was not available to Defendants to transfer to Plaintiffs at the time said agreement was entered into.

 This finding is amply sustained by the evidence. We will not substitute our opinion for that of the trial court. *West Coast Airlines, Inc. v. Miner’s Aircraft & Engine Serv., Inc., ante*p. 513, 403 P.2d 833 (1965). The purported franchise was a significant, material and valuable portion of the consideration to be transferred by defendants, and since there was no franchise in existence, it was not error to restore the parties to status quo. *Ross v. Harding,*64 Wn.2d 231, 391 P.2d 526 (1964). Failure of consideration is ground for recission of a contract. *Barber v. Rochester,*52 Wn.2d 691, 328 P.2d 711 (1958).

The judgment is affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-6429

AHMAD KAIS ABDUL-SATTAR,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

WILLIE WELDON, Warden of Lieber Correctional

Institution; SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge.

(CA-99-79-6-19AK)

Submitted: July 8, 1999 Decided: July 15, 1999

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ahmad Kais Abdul-Sattar, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Ahmad Kais Abdul-Sattar, a South Carolina inmate, appeals from

the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the

magistrate judge and dismissing without prejudice Abdul-Sattar’s 28

U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) petition. The district court dismissed AbdulSattar’s petition without prejudice because it raised claims properly brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1999). Because

a dismissal without prejudice is not generally appealable, we deny

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. See Domino

Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67

(4th Cir. 1993). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Downstream Operations

KATT – Other Controlled Sites

Does not contain CBI

In support of Ascend’s PMN filing, Further information for downstream

uses will be provided by third parties. This document is meant to convey

general information about these designated end uses.
General Description of Downstream Use

Approved Chemical

Distributor

KATT Production, Cantonment, FL

Formulation into

Product 1

Downstream Use 3

as an Industrial

Solvent

Formulation into

Product 2

Downstream Use 1,

USA

Downstream Use 2,

USA

Recycling or permitted 

Disposal of solvent

waste
Downstream Use 1

On Site

Storage

Mixing

Truck Offloading

Primary

Secondary

Ingredient

Transport, High %

Low % Low %

Step Ingredient

Final

End Use

Testing

Blue = Contains PMN Compound
Downstream Use 2

On Site

Storage

Mixing

Truck Offloading

Other Pesticide

ingredients

Low % High %

Step

Final

End Use

Transport,

Testing

Blue = Contains PMN Compound
Downstream Use 3

On Site

Storage

Tank

Truck OffloadingOther

ingredients

Solvent Tank

Permitted

Waste

Disposal

Recovery

Blue = Contains PMN Compound
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 May 27, 2014

d0519

Order 

Clerk

May 27, 2014

148580

MELANIE SOKOLOWSKI, Guardian of

SKYLAR SOKOLOWSKI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 148580

COA: 311661

Macomb CC: 2011-000632-NI

COUNTY OF MACOMB,

Defendant-Appellee. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 17, 2013 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

VIVIANO, J., did not participate because he presided over this case in the circuit 

court.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Anderson, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Felig, J.), rendered May 5, 1988, convicting him of burglary in the second degree (two counts), petit larceny, and criminal mischief in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

There is no merit to the defendant’s assertion that the trial court improperly delivered an alibi charge over the defense counsel’s objection. The defendant’s own testimony unequivocally raised an alibi defense *(see,*CPL 300.10 [2]; *People v Holt,*67 NY2d 819; *cf., People v DeGina,*72 NY2d 768; *People v Martin,*66 AD2d 995). In addition, the court clearly and emphatically charged the jury that the alibi defense placed no burden upon the defendant, and that the People were required to disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Howard,*153 AD2d 903, 905-906; *People v Spruill,*103 AD2d 785; *cf., People v Victor,*62 NY2d 374).

The defendant’s claim that he was physically incapable of participating in the jury selection proceedings due to the effects of his detoxification program is unsupported by the record *(see, People v Bornholdt,*33 NY2d 75, 89, *cert denied sub nom. Victory v New York,*416 US 905; *People v Picozzi,*106 AD2d 413). Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Eiber and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 15 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENNETH JORDAN, Defendant-Appellant. No. 97-1329 (D.C. No. 96-CR-498-N) (District of Colorado)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO , KELLY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Following a guilty plea to charges of armed robbery and use and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, appellant was sentenced to a term of life under 181 Appellant’s counsel has filed an Anders brief. Anders v. California , 386 U.S.

738 (1967). - 2 - U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A). To arrive at this sentence, the district court applied two prior convictions of armed robbery. Appellant contends the enhancement was improper because the first of those prior offenses was committed more than fifteen years before sentencing in this case. 1 The government correctly points out this makes no difference under the guidelines because appellant had been in custody on that offense within the fifteen-year limitation of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e). The record indeed shows although appellant was convicted on the first offense on March 9, 1979, he was paroled from that sentence on September 9, 1983. Moreover, having violated that parole and having been reincarcerated, he was paroled again on October 6, 1993. The offense of conviction in this case was committed December 6, 1996, within fifteen years after appellant’s 1983 and 1993 release dates. Thus, the initial conviction was appropriately applied by the district court to enhance the present sentence. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1) (enhancement applies when defendant has been “incarcerated during any part of such fifteen-year period.”). **See** United States v. Novey , 922 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1991). Appellant also contends the sentence was a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The contention is meritless. A sentence- 3 -

within the prescribed statutory limits generally cannot be found to violate the Eighth Amendment. United States v. Youngpeter, 986 F.2d 349 353 (10th Cir. 1993). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED . The motion to withdraw is GRANTED

. ENTERED FOR THE COURT

John C. Porfilio Circuit Judge
Exhibit 10.2

AMENDMENT NO. 6

TO

ADMINISTRATIVE AND INVESTMENT SERVICES AGREEMENT

Between

State Street Bank and Trust Company

and the

ABA Retirement Funds

WHEREAS,State Street Bank and Trust Company, a Massachusetts trust company (State Street), and the ABA Retirement Funds (formerly called the American Bar Retirement Association), an
Illinois not-for-profit corporation (ARF), have heretofore entered into an Administrative and Investment Services Agreement (As Amended and Restated), dated November 18, 2002 (the AISA Agreement);

WHEREAS,Section 16.07 of the AISA Agreement provides that it can be amended by written agreement between State Street and ARF; and

WHEREAS,State Street and ARF desire to amend the AISA Agreement in order to (i) permit State Street to terminate the AISA
Agreement on nine (9) months notice to ARF rather than upon twelve (12) months notice.

NOW, THEREFORE, in
consideration of the mutual promises set forth below and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, effective September 29, 2008 unless otherwise stated, State Street and ARF hereby agree as follows:



| | 1. | The final sentence of Section 15.01 is deleted and the following is inserted in lieu thereof:
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

State Street may terminate this Agreement effective at the end of any quarter after the close of business on or after December 31, 2006, by
delivering Notice of Termination to ARF at least nine (9) months prior to the Date of Termination specified therein.



| | 2. | All other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in effect as written.
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------



1



---

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,the parties have caused this instrument to be executed by their duly
authorized officers this 29th day of September, 2008.



STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANYBy:

/s/ Nancy GradyName:

Nancy GradyTitle:

Senior Vice PresidentABA RETIREMENT FUNDSBy:

/s/ Bradley K. BlewettTitle:

Acting Executive Director




2
N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential.


# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________
WILLIAM D. SLONE, (also known as William D. Sloan)
, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant

- Appellee.

______________________

2013

- 5128

______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 13

- CV

- 0424, Judge Charles F. Lettow.

______________________

JUDGMENT

______________________

W ILLIAM D. S LONE , of West Liberty, Kentucky, pro se.

J ENNIFER E. L A G RANGE , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Depar tment of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant

appellee. With her on the brief were S TUART F. D ELERY
, Assistant Attorney General, J EANNE E. D AVIDSON , Dire ctor, and P ATRICIA M. M C C ARTHY , Assistant Director.

______________________T HIS C AUSE having been heard and considered, it is

O RDERED and A DJUDGED :

P ER C URIAM (O’M ALLEY
, W ALLACH
, and T ARANTO
, Circuit Judges ).

AFFIRMED

. See Fed. Cir. R. 36.

E NTERED BY O RDER OF THE C OURT

January 9, 2014 /s/ Daniel E. O’Toole Date Daniel E. O’Toole Clerk of Court
Appeal Reinstated; Order filed April 14, 2015. 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-14-00572-CV

____________

RICHARD ALAN HAASE, Appellant

V.

ABRAHAM, WATKINS, NICHOLS, SORRELS AND FRIEND, LLP AND 

RANDY SORRELLS, Appellees

On Appeal from the 80th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2011-17970

ORDER

On July 28, 2014, appellant requested preparation of reporter’s records from 

hearings held March 28, 2014, and June 20, 2014. The reporter’s records were due 

October 20, 2014, but they were not filed. In response to this court’s order, on 

December 18, 2014, Michelle Tucker, the official court reporter, filed a record 

from the hearing held June 20, 2014. Appellant renewed his request for a reporter’s 

record from the hearing held March 28, 2014. On February 10, 2015, this court 
ordered Michelle Tucker to provide a written response regarding the status of the 

missing record by February 20, 2015. No response was filed. On March 31, 2015, 

the court abated the appeal and directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to 

determine the status of the record. In response to this court’s orders, on April 8, 

2015, Michelle Tucker, filed an “Information Sheet,” in which she states, “There is 

not a reporter’s record indicated for the March 28, 2014 hearing.” 

Based upon the court reporter’s representation that there is no reporter’s 

record from the March 28, 2014, hearing, we order the appeal REINSTATED. 

Because the court reporter filed a response to this court’s order, it is not necessary 

for the trial court to conduct the hearing requested in the March 31, 2015, order. 

Appellant’s brief shall be due on or before April 24, 2015.

PER CURIAM
In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District

APRIL 14, 2015

THE FOLLOWING CASES WERE AFFIRMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 

84.16(b) OR RULE 30.25(b).

1. ED100855 LATOYA CARTER, APP V STATE OF MISSOURI, RES

2. ED101356 CHRISTOPHER COLLETTA, APP V STATE OF MISSOURI, 

RES

3. ED101637 MANUEL CAZARES, APP V STATE OF MISSOURI, RES

4. ED101779 JOSEPH AFSHARI, APP V STL COUNTY, ET AL, RES

5. ED101818 IN THE INTEREST OF: B.H.

6. ED101958 ANTOINE ADEM, APP V JEFF. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, RES
_^CL 2Z/&C—

RECEIVED IN

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

APR 06 2015

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I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1205 

To amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to prohibit an adjournment 

for a period of more than 12 hours in the event of a lapse in appropriations. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 13, 2019 

Mrs. MURPHY (for herself and Mr. FITZPATRICK) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Rules, and in addition to 

the Committee on the Budget, for a period to be subsequently determined 

by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 

within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To amend the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 to prohibit 

an adjournment for a period of more than 12 hours 

in the event of a lapse in appropriations. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Keep Congress Work5 ing Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HR 1205 IH

1 SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON ADJOURNMENT. 

2 Section 309 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 

3 is amended by inserting ‘‘(a) JULY RECESS.—’’ and by 

4 adding at the end the following new subsection: 

5 ‘‘(b) MOTION TO ADJOURN DURING LAPSES IN AP6 PROPRIATIONS.—It shall not be in order in the House of 

7 Representatives or the Senate to adjourn for a period of 

8 more than 12 hours during any lapse in appropriations 

9 for all or part of the Government.’’. 

10 SEC. 3. WAIVERS AND APPEALS. 

11 Subsections (c)(1) and (d)(2) of section 904 of the 

12 Congressional Budget Act of 1974 are amended by insert13 ing ‘‘309(b),’’ after ‘‘306,’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS