J-S14010-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

JAMES ROBINSON, :

:

Appellant : No. 3612 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 6, 2013,

Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0001552-2007

BEFORE: DONOHUE, OLSON and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED APRIL 14, 2015

Appellant, James Robinson (“Robinson”), appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on December 6, 2013 by the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, following his convictions for thirddegree murder, persons not to possess a firearm, and carrying a firearm on 

public streets or public property in Philadelphia.1 For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm.

We summarize the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On the afternoon of June 11, 2004, Robinson, Michael Brooks 

(“Brooks”), Jarrett Stiff (“Stiff”), Hassan East (“East”), and Heath Caudle 

(“Caudle”) were playing a game of craps on Caudle’s porch. During the 

course of the afternoon, Robinson won a significant amount of money from 

 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 6105(a)(1), 6108.
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the other participants. As the game continued, Brooks began arguing with 

and berating Robinson, referring to him as an “ass bettor”2and accusing him 

of failing to pay back a prior gambling debt. Eyewitness testimony indicated 

that in the midst of this argument, Robinson left Caudle’s porch and walked 

to his pickup truck. A couple of minutes later, as he was walking back 

towards Caudle’s porch, Robinson pulled out a nine-millimeter handgun and 

fired approximately three to five shots in the direction of the porch. One of 

the shots struck Brooks in the neck, severing his spinal cord, several veins 

and arteries, and killing him within minutes.

Robinson’s first jury trial took place in February and March of 2012 

before the Honorable Lillian H. Ransom. Robinson’s first trial ended in a 

mistrial on March 8, 2012, after the jury indicated that it was unable to 

reach a verdict. Robinson’s second jury trial took place in September 2013 

before the Honorable Jeffrey Minehart. At this trial, the Commonwealth 

presented the eyewitness testimony of Stiff, East, and Caudle, each of whom 

identified Robinson as the individual who shot Brooks. While Stiff and 

Caudle testified at Robinson’s second trial that they did not observe the 

shooting, the Commonwealth presented as substantive evidence their signed

statements to police and testimony from Robinson’s first trial that they saw 

Robinson shoot Brooks. The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of 

 

2

 In gambling parlance, an “ass bettor” is someone who bets money that he 

or she does not have. See N.T., 9/19/13, at 26. 
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Tallena Chesney (“Chesney”), Robinson’s girlfriend at the time of the 

shooting, who testified that Robinson admitted to her that he shot Brooks.

On September 24, 2013, the jury found Robinson guilty of thirddegree murder and carrying a firearm on public streets or public property in 

Philadelphia. A nonjury proceeding immediately followed during which the 

Commonwealth presented evidence that Robinson had a prior conviction of 

burglary. Therefore, the trial court found Robinson guilty of persons not to 

possess a firearm, the prohibition against convicted felons carrying firearms. 

On December 6, 2013, the trial court sentenced Robinson to eighteen to 

thirty-six years of incarceration. On December 16, 2013, Robinson filed a 

timely notice of appeal. 

On appeal, Robinson raises the following issues for our review and 

determination:

1. Did not the trial court err in allowing the 

prosecutor to elicit testimony from [Stiff] that he and 

[Robinson] were codefendants in an unrelated 

federal case, even though the motion in limine court 

ruled that such testimony was inadmissible?

2. Did not the trial court err in preventing defense 

counsel from fully exploring the benefits [East] could 

receive from testifying for the government, 

specifically by preventing defense counsel from 

exploring the drug possession charges against [East] 

that were withdrawn as well as the further 

reductions in sentence that he may receive?

3. Did not the trial court deny [Robinson] his right to 

present a defense, by restricting defense counsel 

from presenting relevant admissible evidence, 
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specifically evidence concerning the statements of 

Robert Larry and Barbara Dantzler to police, that 

cast [Robinson]’s guilt into doubt?

4. Did not the trial court err in refusing to grant a 

mistrial due to the prosecutor’s misconduct in closing 

arguments?

Robinson’s Brief at 3-4.

The first three issues that Robinson raises on appeal each relate to 

evidentiary decisions made by the trial court. Our standard of review 

regarding evidentiary issues is as follows:

“The admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of 

the trial court and only a showing of an abuse of that 

discretion, and resulting prejudice, constitutes 

reversible error.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 

A.3d 24, 48 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). “An 

abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment, but is rather the overriding or 

misapplication of the law, or the exercise of 

judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as 

shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth 

v. Hanford, 937 A.2d 1094, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, [] 956 A.2d 432 

(Pa. 2008). Furthermore, “if in reaching a conclusion 

the trial court overrides or misapplies the law, 

discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the 

appellate court to correct the error.” 

Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1188 

(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 

[] 986 A.2d 150 (Pa. 2009).

Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 724-25 (Pa. Super. 2012).

For his first issue on appeal, Robinson argues that the trial court 

violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule. Robinson’s Brief at 22-26. The 
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record reflects that at a pretrial motion in limine hearing held prior to 

Robinson’s first trial, Judge Ransom ruled that while Stiff could testify 

against Robinson, he could not testify that he was Robinson’s codefendant in 

an unrelated federal case. N.T., 2/21/12, at 25-33. Robinson asserts that 

the trial court erred by allowing Stiff to testify at Robinson’s second trial that 

he was Robinson’s codefendant in the unrelated case. Robinson’s Brief at 

22-26. 

Our Court has stated the following in regards to the coordinate 

jurisdiction rule:

The coordinate jurisdiction rule, put simply, states 

that “judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not 

overrule each other’s decisions.” Zane v. Friends 

Hosp., [] 836 A.2d 25, 29 ([Pa.] 2003). The rule, 

applicable in both civil and criminal cases, “falls 

within the ambit of the ‘law of the case doctrine.’” 

Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co., [] 683 A.2d 

1226, 1230 ([Pa. Super.] 1996) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Starr, [] 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 

([Pa.] 1995)). Our Supreme Court explained in 

Starr that the law of the case doctrine “refers to a 

family of rules which embody the concept that a 

court involved in the later phases of a litigated 

matter should not reopen questions decided by 

another judge of that same court or by a higher 

court in the earlier phases of the matter.” Id. at 

1331. “Among the related but distinct rules which 

make up the law of the case doctrine” is the rule that 

“upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of 

coordinate jurisdiction, the transferee trial court may 

not alter the resolution of a legal question previously 

decided by the transferor trial court.” Id.

Commonwealth v. King, 999 A.2d 598, 600 (Pa. Super. 2010). 
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We conclude that this issue is meritless because the coordinate 

jurisdiction rule is inapplicable to this issue. Our Supreme Court has long 

held:

When a court grants a new trial, the necessary effect 

thereof is to set aside the prior judgment and leave 

the case as though no trial had been held. ... By the 

operation of an order granting a new trial, the cause, 

in contemplation of law, is precisely in the same 

condition as if no previous trial had been held.

Commonwealth v. Hart, 387 A.2d 845, 847 (Pa. 1978) (quoting 

Commonwealth ex rel. Wallace v. Burke, 45 A.2d 871 (Pa. Super. 

1951)). 

This case is procedurally similar to Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 

A.2d 294 (Pa. 2002). In that case, at defense counsel’s request pretrial, the 

trial court excluded statements made by a homicide victim regarding threats 

made to her prior to her death as being inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 301-

02. The jury ultimately was unable to reach a verdict in the case, resulting 

in a mistrial. Id. at 302. At retrial, counsel did not seek to exclude these 

statements, and the Commonwealth presented this testimony. Id. 

Following his conviction of first-degree murder, the defendant 

appealed, asserting that counsel was ineffective, inter alia, for failing to 

exclude the victim’s statements, as the trial court’s exclusion of those 

statements in the first trial precluded their admission in the second trial 

pursuant to the law of the case doctrine. Id. at 309. Our Supreme Court 
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disagreed, concluding: “Because the grant of a new trial ‘wipes the slate 

clean,’ so that a previous court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence 

generally does not bind a new court upon retrial, it is not evident that the 

[law of the case] doctrine applies in the present procedural context.” Id. at 

311 (internal citations omitted).

The case at bar, like Paddy, was a retrial following a mistrial that 

resulted from a hung jury. As the coordinate jurisdiction rule is inapplicable 

upon retrial, this issue is meritless and does not entitle Robinson to any 

relief.

For his second issue on appeal, Robinson argues that the trial court 

improperly prevented defense counsel from fully questioning East about the 

benefits he was receiving for testifying on behalf of the Commonwealth. 

Robinson’s Brief at 27-31. Specifically, Robinson complains that the trial 

court erred by preventing defense counsel from questioning East about drug 

possession charges against him that the federal government withdrew and 

the possible sentencing reductions that he could receive in an unrelated 

criminal matter for testifying. Id. at 27-29.

We conclude that this argument is meritless. The record reflects that 

the trial court did sustain defense counsel’s objection to the question: “So 

what happened actually is the marijuana case was withdrawn?” N.T., 

9/18/13, at 140-41. However, the trial court also permitted the following 

two questions: “Were you arrested for having drugs in prison?” and “While 
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you are a witness against [Robinson], you have committed crimes in jail that 

were withdrawn, is that correct, where the charges were withdrawn against 

you?” Id. 

Furthermore, during Robinson’s second trial, the jury heard extensive 

testimony relating to past and potential future benefits East either received 

or hoped to receive in exchange for his cooperation with the federal 

government. Both East and an FBI agent testified that by cooperating with 

the federal government, East had been able to avoid a life sentence on his 

federal robbery charges, and instead received a lesser sentence of thirty 

years of incarceration. N.T., 9/18/13, at 94-97, 115-20; N.T., 9/19/13, at 

135-44. Additionally, both East and the FBI agent testified that East could 

receive additional sentencing reductions based on his testimony in this case. 

N.T., 9/18/13, at 116-20, 125; N.T., 9/19/13, at 144-45, 154-55. Thus, the 

jury heard a significant amount of evidence that East’s testimony was 

potentially motivated by benefits promised to him by the federal government 

in his own criminal matters. Accordingly, Robinson’s second issue is 

meritless.

For his third issue on appeal, Robinson argues that the trial court erred 

by preventing him from presenting to the jury statements made to police by 

Robert Larry (“Larry”) and Barbara Dantzler (“Dantzler”). Robinson’s Brief 

at 31-38. Robinson asserts that he should have been able to present this 
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evidence to the jury because it implicates other persons in Brooks’ murder. 

Id. at 31-32, 35-38. 

The record reflects that Larry informed the police in his statement that 

Timothy Alfonzo (“Alfonzo”) told him that Alfonzo heard that a “young boy” 

had shot and killed Brooks while they were gambling on Caudle’s porch. 

Larry’s Statement, 6/12/04, at 1-2. Dantzler told police in her statement 

that she originally told her employer that her grandson, Henry Brown, may 

have been responsible for shooting Brooks. Dantzler’s Statement, 6/17/04, 

at 1. In that same statement, however, Dantzler also told police that she 

had lied about her grandson being involved in the shooting to avoid getting 

into trouble for missing work. Id. at 3. Dantzler informed police that she 

had heard about the murder from people she was with the night she missed 

work. Id. Because these statements represent multiple layers of 

inadmissible hearsay, we agree with the trial court’s decision to exclude this 

evidence.3

Hearsay is an out of court statement made by the declarant that a 

party offers into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 

statement. Pa.R.E. 801(c). In general, hearsay is not admissible, except as 

provided by the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, by other rules prescribed by 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute. Pa.R.E. 802. “The rationale 

 

3

 We note that “[w]e can affirm the [trial] court’s decision if there is any 

basis to support it, even if we rely on different grounds to affirm.” 

Commonwealth v. Lewis, 39 A.3d 341, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012).
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for the hearsay rule is that hearsay is too untrustworthy to be considered by 

the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 559 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (quotations and citation omitted). 

Additionally, “[a]n out-of-court declaration containing another out-ofcourt declaration is double hearsay.” Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 

1057, 1060 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted). “In order for double hearsay to be 

admissible, the reliability and trustworthiness of each declarant must be 

independently established. This requirement is satisfied when each 

statement comes within an exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. (quotations 

and citations omitted). Thus, “[d]ouble hearsay is admissible if each part 

conforms to a hearsay exception.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 

766, 777 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing Pa.R.E. 805).

After reviewing Larry’s and Dantzler’s statements, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding both statements. 

Larry’s and Dantzler’s statements include multiple levels of hearsay. Neither 

Larry nor Dantzler testified at trial. In the statements they gave to police, 

Larry and Dantzler provided police with information about Brooks’ murder 

that they received from other sources. See Larry’s Statement, 6/12/04, at 

1; Dantzler’s Statement, 6/17/04, at 3. In turn, those sources are either 

completely unidentified or did not witness Brooks’ murder first-hand. See 

id. Larry’s statement conveyed information about Brooks’ murder that he 

learned from Alfonzo, who did not witness the shooting first-hand. See
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Larry’s Statement, 6/12/04, at 1-2. Dantzler’s statement conveyed 

information about Brooks’ murder that she learned from unidentified people 

she was with the night of Brooks’ death. Dantzler’s Statement, 6/17/04, at 

3. Additionally, Robinson sought to introduce both statements at Robinson’s 

trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statements, that 

someone else was responsible for Brooks’ murder. See id. at 31-32, 35-38. 

Furthermore, each of the multiple levels of hearsay present in both 

statements do not conform to any hearsay exception. Thus, we have no 

basis on which to conclude that Larry’s and Dantzler’s statements were not 

prohibited by the rule against hearsay. Accordingly, the trial court properly 

excluded both statements.

For his final issue on appeal, Robinson argues that the trial court erred 

in refusing to grant a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct that 

occurred during closing arguments. Robinson’s Brief at 38-44. Robinson 

claims that the prosecutor improperly referenced his decision not to testify, 

which served no other purpose than to distract the jury from its proper 

focus. Id. Therefore, Robinson contends that the trial court erred in 

denying his request for a mistrial. Id. at 44.

Our standard of review for claims of prosecutorial misconduct is as 

follows:

Our standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct is limited to whether the trial court 

abused its discretion. In considering this claim, our 
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attention is focused on whether the defendant was 

deprived of a fair trial, not a perfect one. Not every 

inappropriate remark by a prosecutor constitutes

reversible error. A prosecutor’s statements to a jury 

do not occur in a vacuum, and we must view them in 

context. Even if the prosecutor’s arguments are 

improper, they generally will not form the basis for a 

new trial unless the comments unavoidably 

prejudiced the jury and prevented a true verdict.

Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d 29, 37 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 80 A.3d 777 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lewis, 

39 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa. Super. 2012)). Therefore, “we focus not on the

culpability of the prosecutor but rather on whether his actions deprived [the 

appellant] of a fair trial by prejudicially rendering the jury incapable of fairly 

weighing the evidence and entering an objective verdict.” Commonwealth 

v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 27 (Pa. Super. 2014). Additionally, this Court has 

stated that a “remark by a prosecutor, otherwise improper, may be 

appropriate if it is in [fair] response to the argument and comment of 

defense counsel.” Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1253 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (brackets in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 

889 A.2d 501, 543-44 (Pa. 2005)), appeal denied, 80 A.3d 774 (Pa. 2013).

Robinson takes issue with the following portion of the prosecutor’s 

closing argument:

[PROSECUTOR]: Folks, the evidence here is 

overwhelming and the fact of the matter is -- and 

the judge is going to [instruct] about the burden of 

proof and reasonable doubt. The defense counsel 

stood up here and told you that [Robinson] said he’s 
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not guilt[y], and the truth of the matter is ... that 

when [Robinson] gets arraigned on the charges, 

that’s not testimony --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, no, he said it’s not testimony. 

Go ahead.

[PROSECUTOR]: Now, [Robinson] has no burden to 

testify --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

[PROSECUTOR]: He’s not required to testify.

THE COURT: Overruled. We’re going to charge 

them.

[PROSECUTOR]: You can’t hold it against him if he 

doesn’t testify. You can’t infer anything from that, 

but he doesn’t get anything special for that 

arraignment. That arraignment is not testimonial. 

It’s not subject to cross-examination. And the fact 

of the matter is that -- it doesn’t -- it’s a nonentity 

as far as the evidence in this case is concerned.

The reality is [] if you think about it -- let’s say 

[Robinson] when we’re talking about Hassan East 

and Tallena Chesney, I mean, do you think that 

[defense counsel] as much outrage as he shows 

about witnesses cooperating, do you think that if he 

thought that his client had information that was 

[worthwhile] that he wouldn’t recommend to him 

you should tell what you know --

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.

THE COURT: Objection sustained. The jury is to 

disregard it. Let’s move on.

N.T., 9/23/13, at 178-80.
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

Robinson’s request for a mistrial. First, the prosecutor made the abovereferenced remarks relating to Robinson pleading not guilty at his 

arraignment in fair response to arguments made by defense counsel in his 

closing argument. During his closing, defense counsel referred to the fact 

that Robinson, at his arraignment, swore under oath that he was not guilty. 

Id. at 112. Thus, it was a fair response for the prosecutor to argue that the 

fact that Robinson pled not guilty at his arraignment does not constitute 

evidence of his innocence. See id. at 178-79. 

Second, the prosecutor’s remaining remarks, stating that if 

defendant’s counsel thought Robinson had information that was worthwhile, 

that he would recommend to him that he should tell what he knows, did not 

prejudice Robinson. Defense counsel’s objection prevented the prosecutor 

from completing his statement and the trial court sustained the objection, 

instructing the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s remarks. Id. at 180. “A 

jury is presumed to follow a trial court’s instructions[.]” Commonwealth v. 

Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 501 (Pa. 2014). Following closing arguments, the trial 

court further instructed the jury as follows:

First of all, ladies and gentlemen, and I will 

emphasize this again, [Robinson] is presumed to be 

innocent and has certain rights and one of those 

rights is not to testify. It’s a Constitutional right and 

there can be no inference of guilt or any other 

inference adverse to [Robinson] from the fact that he 
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didn’t testify, nor can any argument -- and the 

lawyer’s arguments are just that, arguments.

Any arguments about what [Robinson] knew or 

would have said, you must disregard and I sustained 

that objection. I want you to put that out of your 

mind, because the one thing you have to keep in 

mind is [Robinson] is presumed innocent and has an 

absolute right to remain silent.

N.T., 9/23/13, at 183-84. Our Supreme Court has held that “[a] mistrial is 

not necessary where cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome 

prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 422 (Pa. 

2011). Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

determination that the challenged remarks did not require the remedy of a 

mistrial.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/14/2015