United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA, 

GREENLEE COUNTY, ARIZONA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-5060

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:12-cv-00645-MMS, Judge Margaret M. 

Sweeney. 

______________________ 

Decided: April 6, 2015

______________________ 

ALAN IRVING SALTMAN, Smith, Currie & Hancock LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also 

represented by EVANGELIN LEE NICHOLS; CHARLES W.

SURASKY, Atlanta, GA.

SHARON ANN SNYDER, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also 

represented by STUART F. DELERY, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN,

JR., BRYANT G. SNEE, SCOTT MACGRIFF. 

______________________ 
2 PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US

Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Prairie County, Montana, and Greenlee County, Arizona (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) appeal from the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims (the 

“Claims Court”) dismissing their claim against the United 

States (the “government”) seeking additional payments

under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act (“PILT”), 31 

U.S.C. §§ 6901–6907 (2006), for fiscal years 2006 and 

2007. See Prairie Cnty. v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 194 

(2013). Because we conclude, as we did in Greenlee County v. United States, 487 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh’g & 

reh’g en banc denied, No. 06-5053 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 

2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1142 (2008), that the applicable version of 31 U.S.C. § 6906 limits the government’s 

liability under PILT to the amount appropriated by 

Congress, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

I 

In 1976, Congress enacted PILT to “compensate[ ] local governments for the loss of tax revenues resulting 

from the tax-immune status of federal lands located in 

their jurisdictions, and for the cost of providing services 

related to these lands.” Lawrence Cnty. v. LeadDeadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 258 (1985). 

PILT directs the Department of the Interior (“Interior”) to 

“make a payment for each fiscal year to each unit of 

general local government in which entitlement land is 

located.” 31 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1). It also provides that the 

“local government may use the payment for any governmental purpose.” Id.

PILT provides two alternative formulas for calculating the amount of payment with respect to each eligible 

local government based on the size of entitlement land 
PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US 3

within the jurisdiction of the local government, the population within that jurisdiction, and any funds that the 

local government received during the prior fiscal year 

from certain federal revenue-sharing programs. Id.

§ 6903. Section 6903(b)(1) provides that “[a] payment 

under section 6902 of this title is equal to the greater of” 

the two amounts derived from the alternative formulas. 

The applicable version of § 6906 (2006) further provides 

that “[n]ecessary amounts may be appropriated to the 

Secretary of the Interior to carry out this chapter. 

Amounts are available only as provided in appropriation 

laws.” The principal question in this appeal is whether 

the government’s liability under PILT is limited by the 

amount appropriated by Congress for fiscal years 2006 

and 2007. 

II

In a prior suit, Greenlee County unsuccessfully sought

full payments according to PILT statutory formulas. For 

fiscal years 1998 through 2004, Congress did not appropriate sufficient funds to provide for full payments to all 

eligible local governments according to PILT formulas. 

Interior followed the relevant regulation1 and proportionally reduced PILT payments to each local government. 

Greenlee County thus received PILT payments for each of 

those fiscal years, but did not receive the full amount

according to the statutory formulas.

In 2004, Greenlee County sued the United States in 

the Claims Court seeking to recover the difference between the amounts calculated based on PILT statutory 

1 43 C.F.R. § 44.51(b) (2006) provides that “[i]f 

Congress appropriates insufficient monies to provide full 

payment to each local government during any fiscal year, 

the Department will reduce proportionally all payments 

in that fiscal year.”

 
4 PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US

formulas and the amounts it actually received for fiscal 

years 1998 through 2004. The Claims Court, however,

concluded that under § 6906 the government’s obligation 

was “expressly conditioned on the availability of appropriations,” Greenlee Cnty. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 

482, 486 (2005), and thus dismissed Greenlee County’s

suit “for failure to state a claim,” id. at 483.

On appeal, we affirmed the Claims Court. Greenlee 

Cnty., 487 F.3d at 873. We concluded that “the language 

of § 6906 limits the government’s liability under PILT to 

the amount appropriated by Congress.” Id. at 878. 

Greenlee County recognized that, under the then-existing 

case law, the language of “subject to the availability of 

appropriations” in other statutes, such as the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act (“ISDA”),

was generally interpreted as restricting the government’s 

liability to the amount appropriated by Congress. Id. 

Greenlee County nevertheless sought to distinguish the 

“subject to the availability of appropriations” language 

from the language of § 6906. Id. We rejected that argument and found “little functional difference between 

saying that amounts are ‘subject to the availability of 

appropriations’ and saying that amounts are ‘available 

only as provided in appropriations laws’” for limiting the 

government’s liability. Id. Additionally, we reasoned that 

“[t]he conclusion that PILT limits the government’s 

liability to the amount appropriated is particularly appropriate because PILT, like the statute in Star-Glo, 

involves a benefits program not a contract, and ‘there is 

greater room’ in benefits programs to find the government’s liability limited to the amount appropriated.” Id.

at 879 (citing Star-Glo Assocs., LP v. United States, 414 

F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

Greenlee County filed a petition for writ of certiorari

in the Supreme Court, which the Court denied. Greenlee 

Cnty. v. United States, 552 U.S. 1142 (2008).
PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US 5

III

For fiscal years 2006 and 2007, Congress again did 

not appropriate sufficient funds to provide for full payments according to PILT formulas. In 2012, the Plaintiffs 

sued the United States in the Claims Court, seeking to 

recover the difference between the amounts calculated 

based on PILT formulas and the PILT payments that they

actually received for those two fiscal years. Prairie Cnty., 

113 Fed. Cl. at 198. The Plaintiffs asserted that the

Supreme Court’s decision in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo 

Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012), changed the law such 

that our decision in Greenlee County is no longer controlling. In Ramah, the Court held that the government is

obligated to pay the full amount of contract support costs

under ISDA contracts, when the amount appropriated by 

Congress is sufficient to pay the costs of any individual 

contracting tribe, but insufficient to pay the total costs of 

all contracting tribes. 132 S. Ct. at 2186.

The government moved to dismiss for failure to state 

a claim, and the Claims Court granted the motion. The 

court concluded that Greenlee County remains controlling 

precedent because Ramah involves government contracts 

and the PILT program does not. Prairie Cnty., 113 Fed. 

Cl. at 200. The court noted that the Supreme Court in 

Ramah emphasized that its decision was based on 

longstanding principles of government contract law, 

whereas we have stated in Greenlee County that PILT 

involves a benefits program, not a contract. Id. at 201. 

The court also found that the Plaintiffs failed to allege 

any implied-in-fact contract with the United States in 

their complaint. Id. at 202. Moreover, the court held that 

Greenlee County was collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issue. Id. at 203.

The Claims Court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and dismissed their suit. The Plaintiffs 
6 PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US

appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the Claims Court’s grant of a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. United States, 704 F.3d 949, 954 (Fed. Cir. 

2013). “A complaint must be dismissed under Rule 

12(b)(6) when the facts asserted do not give rise to a legal 

remedy.” Id. Issues of statutory interpretation are also 

reviewed de novo. Qantas Airways Ltd. v. United States, 

62 F.3d 385, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

The Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court held in 

Ramah and Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, 543 

U.S. 631 (2005), that when multiple obligations are to be 

paid out of a single lump sum appropriation, the statutory 

language of “subject to the availability of appropriations” 

does not limit the government’s total liability to the 

amount appropriated by Congress. The Plaintiffs assert 

that this court in Greenlee County misinterpreted similar 

language in § 6906 as limiting the government’s liability. 

According to the Plaintiffs, the government is obligated to 

pay them the full amounts according to PILT formulas 

upon Congress’s appropriation of funds that are sufficient 

to cover their individual amount, even if insufficient to 

pay all eligible local governments according to the formulas. The Plaintiffs also argue that PILT is not a benefits 

program and, regardless, that there is no basis to treat 

contractual obligations and statutory benefits differently. 

Additionally, the Plaintiffs contend that Greenlee County 

is not collaterally estopped from bringing this suit because Ramah changed the applicable law.

The government responds that Ramah does not 

change the precedential value of Greenlee County, which 

controls in this case because the same statutory language 

of § 6906 that applied in Greenlee County also applies 

here. The government emphasizes that Ramah addresses 
PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US 7

issues of government contract law in the context of ISDA 

and does not apply in this case because the government 

does not owe any contractual obligation to the Plaintiffs. 

The government maintains that PILT payments are 

subsidies made at the discretion of Congress and that, as 

we have decided in Greenlee County, § 6906 limits the 

government’s liability. Moreover, the government responds that Greenlee County is collaterally estopped from 

relitigating the same issue because Ramah has not 

changed the law with respect to PILT payments. 

We agree with the Claims Court and the government 

that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramah, decided 

after Greenlee County, does not compel a different interpretation of PILT. And we conclude, as we did in Greenlee 

County, that the plain language of the applicable version 

of § 6906 limits the government’s liability under PILT to 

the amount appropriated by Congress. 

In Greenlee County, we considered prior cases that

addressed the issue whether the government’s liability is 

limited by Congressional appropriations in the context of 

statutes other than PILT. 487 F.3d at 877–80 (citing

Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. 631 (ISDA); United States v. 

Langston, 118 U.S. 389 (1886) (a statute that provides for 

a specific amount of salary to the representative of the 

United States in Haiti); Star-Glo, 414 F.3d 1349 (a statute 

that provides for payments to citrus growers for trees 

destroyed by a citrus disease); N.Y. Airways, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.2d 743 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (a statute that 

provides for payments to carriers for transporting mail)). 

We recognized that “‘[i]t has long been established that 

the mere failure of Congress to appropriate funds, without 

further words modifying or repealing, expressly or by 

clear implication, the substantive law, does not in and of 

itself defeat a Government obligation created by statute.’” 

Greenlee Cnty., 487 F.3d at 877 (quoting N.Y. Airways, 

369 F.2d at 748). We noted, however, that “in some 

instances the statute creating the right to compensation . 
8 PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US

. . may restrict the government’s liability . . . to the 

amount appropriated by Congress.” Id. at 878. After 

analyzing PILT, we concluded that it is so limited because 

the plain language of § 6906 limits the government’s 

liability to the amount appropriated by Congress. Id. at 

878, 880. We reasoned that our conclusion is “particularly appropriate” because PILT “involves a benefits program 

not a contract, and there is greater room in benefits 

programs to find the government’s liability limited to the 

amount appropriated.” Id. at 879 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Ramah involves ISDA, a different statute, and decides

whether the government’s obligation to pay contract 

support costs under self-determination contracts is limited by the amount appropriated by Congress. Ramah, 

132 S. Ct. at 2186. As the Supreme Court explained in 

Ramah, ISDA “directs the Secretary of the Interior, ‘upon 

the request of any Indian tribe . . . to enter into a selfdetermination contract . . . to plan, conduct, and administer’ health, education, economic, and social programs that 

the Secretary otherwise would have administered.” Id.

(citing 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)). The statute requires the 

government “to contract to pay the ‘full amount’ of ‘contract support costs.’” Id. (citing § 450j-1(a)(2), (g)). Moreover, “Congress included a model contract in ISDA and 

directed that each tribal self-determination contract ‘shall 

. . . contain, or incorporate [it] by reference.’” Id. at 2187 

(quoting § 450l).

ISDA also provides that, “‘[n]otwithstanding any other provision in [ISDA], the provision of funds under 

[ISDA] is subject to the availability of appropriations.’” 

Id. at 2186–87 (quoting § 450j-1(b)). The model contract

specifies that, “‘[s]ubject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary shall make available to the Contractor the total amount specified in the annual funding 

agreement’ between the Secretary and the tribe,” which 

includes contract support costs. Id. at 2187 (quoting 
PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US 9

§ 450l(c)). For each fiscal year at issue in Ramah, Congress appropriated a total amount “for the operation of 

Indian programs,” of which “not to exceed [a particular

amount]” was allocated for paying contract support costs. 

Id. (quoting Department of the Interior and Related 

Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000, 113 Stat. 1501A-148). 

The appropriated amounts, however, were insufficient to 

pay the aggregate contract support costs of all tribal 

contractors, and the government paid the tribes’ contract 

support costs on a uniform, pro rata basis. Id.

The Court held that, notwithstanding the “subject to 

the availability of appropriations” language in both ISDA 

and the self-determination contracts incorporating the 

model contract, the tribes could recover the full amount of 

contract support costs because “the Government cannot 

back out of its contractual promise to pay each Tribe’s full 

contract support costs.” Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2191. In 

reaching that conclusion, the Court relied on “wellestablished principles of Government contracting law,” id.

at 2189 (citing Ferris v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 542, 546 

(1892)), as well as its earlier decision in Cherokee Nation, 

in which the Court “stressed that the Government’s 

obligation to pay contract support costs should be treated 

as an ordinary contract promise, noting that ISDA uses 

the word ‘contract’ 426 times to describe the nature of the 

Government’s promise,” id. at 2188 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The Court explained that its ruling

“safeguards . . . the expectations of Government contractors,” id. at 2189, and “furthers the Government’s own 

long-run interest as a reliable contracting partner in the 

myriad workaday transaction of its agencies,” id. at 2190 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Here in this case, as we have stated in Greenlee County, PILT does not involve a contract. It is different from 

Ramah and Cherokee Nation, as not all grants of benefits 

are contracts. And the Plaintiffs do not appeal from the 

Claims Court’s determination that they failed to allege 
10 PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US

any implied-in-fact contract. PILT provides payments to 

eligible local governments to compensate them “for the 

loss of tax revenues resulting from the tax-immune status 

of federal lands located in their jurisdictions, and for the 

cost of providing services related to these lands.” Lawrence Cnty., 469 U.S. at 258. Congress does not require

the local governments to provide particular services in 

return for receiving PILT payments. The statute provides 

that a “local government may use the payment for any

governmental purpose.” 31 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1) (emphasis 

added); see also Lawrence Cnty., 469 U.S. at 269 (“[T]he 

counties should not be denied the discretion to spend 

§ 6902 funds for any governmental purpose, including

expenditures that are linked to federal lands within their 

borders.” (emphases added)). Accordingly, this case does 

not involve the same question as that addressed by the 

Supreme Court in Ramah and Cherokee Nation. 

Absent a contractual obligation, the question here is 

whether the statute reflects congressional intent to limit 

the government’s liability for PILT payments, or whether 

PILT imposes a statutory obligation to pay the full 

amounts according to the statutory formulas regardless of

appropriations by Congress. As we have concluded in 

Greenlee County, the plain language of § 6906 indicates 

that Congress intended to limit the government’s obligation to the amount appropriated. The applicable version 

of § 6906 provides that “[n]ecessary amounts may be 

appropriated to the Secretary of the Interior to carry out 

this chapter. Amounts are available only as provided in 

appropriation laws.” 31 U.S.C. § 6906 (2006) (emphasis 

added). The inclusion of the word “only” limits the availability of PILT payments to appropriations.

Moreover, the original version of what became § 6906 

reads as follows: “There are authorized to be appropriated 

for carrying out the provisions of this chapter such sums 

as may be necessary: Provided, That, notwithstanding 

any other provision of this chapter no funds may be made 
PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US 11

available except to the extent provided in advance in 

appropriation Acts.” 31 U.S.C. § 1607 (1976) (second 

emphasis added); see also Pub. L. No. 94-565, § 7, 90 Stat. 

2662, 2665–66 (1976). The language of the original version clearly authorizes payments to local governments 

only to the extent appropriated by Congress. See, e.g.,

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) 

(“As in any case of statutory construction, our analysis 

begins with the language of the statute. And where the 

statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there 

as well.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). In 1982, Congress recodified Title 31 of the 

United States Code, including PILT, and altered the 

language of § 6906 to the version that we apply in this 

case. See 31 U.S.C. § 6906 (1982); Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 1, 

96 Stat. 877, 1035 (1982). However, Congress explained 

that it did not intend to change the meaning of the provision: “Sections 1–3 of this Act restate, without substantive 

change, laws enacted before April 16, 1982, that were 

replaced by those sections. Those sections may not be 

construed as making a substantive change in the laws 

replaced.” Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 4(a), 96 Stat. at 1067

(1982). 

We also note that if Congress had intended to obligate 

the government to make full PILT payments, it could 

have used different statutory language. Indeed, Congress 

amended § 6906 in 2008 to achieve a different result for 

later years when it enacted the Emergency Economic 

Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, Div. C, Title VI, 

§ 601(c)(1), 122 Stat. 3765, 3911 (Oct. 3, 2008). Section 

6906, as amended, provides that: “For each of fiscal years 

2008 through 2012—(1) each county or other eligible unit 

of local government shall be entitled to payment under 

this chapter; and (2) sums shall be made available to the 

Secretary of the Interior for obligation or expenditure in 
12 PRAIRIE COUNTY, MONTANA v. US

accordance with this chapter.”2 31 U.S.C. § 6906 (2008). 

Notably, when amending § 6906, Congress chose not to 

retroactively apply the amended provision to fiscal years 

2006 and 2007, the fiscal years at issue in this appeal.3

We have considered the Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments but find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the applicable version of § 6906 limits the 

government’s liability under PILT to the amount appropriated by Congress. The Claims Court thus correctly 

held that, on undisputed facts, the Plaintiffs may not 

recover the difference between the amounts calculated 

based on PILT formulas and the PILT payments that they 

actually received for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. In light 

of our resolution of this appeal on statutory grounds, we 

need not address the collateral estoppel ground of the 

Claims Court’s decision. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the applicable version of § 6906 limits the government’s liability 

under PILT to the amount appropriated by Congress for 

fiscal years 2006 and 2007. Because the Claims Court 

correctly dismissed the Plaintiffs’ suit for failure to state a 

claim, we affirm its decision.

AFFIRMED

2 Congress subsequently extended the effective 

time period from fiscal year 2012 to 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-

141, Div. F, Title I, § 100111, 126 Stat. 405, 906 (2012), 

and then from fiscal year 2013 to 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-

79, Title XII, § 12312, 128 Stat. 649, 992 (2014).

3 Because the newer version of § 6906 does not apply to this case, we need not decide here whether the 

amendment would entitle all eligible local governments to 

receive full PILT payments according to the statutory 

formulas.