J-S10039-15

2015 PA Super 73

_____________________________

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

GREEN ACRES REHABILITATION AND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

NURSING CENTER : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

HENRY SULLIVAN AND HENRIETTA :

SULLIVAN :

:

APPEAL OF: HENRIETTA SULLIVAN : No. 2084 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): 070301125

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., AND PLATT, J.*

OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2015

Appellant, Henrietta Sullivan, appeals from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied her petition to 

strike a default judgment entered in favor of Appellee, Green Acres 

Rehabilitation and Nursing Center (“Green Acres”), in this breach of contract 

case. We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

Appellant’s father, Henry Sullivan, became a resident at Green Acres on 

January 21, 2005.1 Mr. Sullivan executed a power of attorney (“POA”) 

agreement, designating Appellant as his agent, on April 28, 2005. On March 

 

1 Although Appellant stated in her petition to strike the judgment that Mr. 

Sullivan died on December 22, 2007, the record, as it existed at the time the 

default judgment was entered, contains no evidence of Mr. Sullivan’s date of 

death. 
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13, 2007, Green Acres filed a complaint against Mr. Sullivan and Appellant, 

seeking $114,497.13 in damages based on allegations that Mr. Sullivan had 

failed to pay for nursing home services provided by Green Acres. The 

complaint included counts of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and 

quantum meruit against Mr. Sullivan and Appellant, and one count of breach 

of fiduciary duty against Appellant. In the following months, the complaint 

was reinstated several times to allow for service. With respect to Appellant, 

Green Acres served the complaint on September 22, 2007, at Appellant’s 

residence on an adult relative who refused to give her name to the process 

server. Appellant did not file an answer. 

On December 12, 2007, Green Acres sent to Appellant’s address via 

certified mail a ten-day notice of intent to file a praecipe for entry of default 

judgment. The notice stated in relevant part:

To: Henrietta Sullivan

Date: October 24, 2007

IMPORTANT NOTICE

YOU ARE IN DEFAULT BECAUSE YOU HAVE FAILED TO 

ENTER A WRITTEN APPEARANCE PERSONALLY OR BY 

ATTORNEY AND FILE IN WRITING WITH THE COURT YOUR 

DEFENSES OR OBJECTIONS TO THE CLAIMS SET FORTH 

AGAINST YOU. UNLESS YOU ACT WITHIN TEN DAYS 

FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, A JUDGMENT MAY BE 

ENTERED AGAINST YOU WITHOUT A HEARING AND YOU 

MAY LOSE YOUR PROPERTY OR OTHER IMPORTANT 

RIGHTS. YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS NOTICE TO A LAWYER 

AT ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER OR CANNOT 

AFFORD ONE, GO TO OR TELEPHONE THE FOLLOWING 

OFFICE TO FIND OUT WHERE YOU CAN GET LEGAL HELP:
J-S10039-15

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Philadelphia Bar Association

Lawyer Referral and Information Service

1101 Market Street, 11th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19107

(215) 238-6300

(See Petition to Strike Judgment, Exhibit F; R.R. at 78a). Fourteen days 

later, on December 26, 2007, Green Acres filed a praecipe for entry of 

default judgment against Appellant. Green Acres attached to the praecipe to 

enter default judgment a copy of the notice of intent to file the praecipe and 

a certification Green Acres had sent the notice to Appellant. The certification 

stated in relevant part: “Pursuant to R 4:43-1, the Motion for Final Judgment 

by Default has been sent by first class U.S. Postal Mail and Certified Mail, 

return receipt requested to [Appellant], Henrietta Sullivan....” (See Petition 

to Strike Judgment, Exhibit G; R.R. at 81a). Judgment by default was 

entered against Appellant in the amount of $114,497.13.2 

Appellant took no further action in this case until April 10, 2014, when 

she filed a petition to strike the default judgment on, inter alia, the following 

grounds: (1) the trial division of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case; (2) the judgment was 

improperly entered against Appellant in her individual, rather than 

representative, capacity; and (3) Green Acres attached to the praecipe to 

enter default judgment a fatally defective certification that it had sent 

 

2 Mr. Sullivan was personally served with the complaint on May 1, 2007, and 

served on July 23, 2007, with notice of intent to take a default judgment. 

Judgment by default against Mr. Sullivan was previously entered on 

December 12, 2007, in the same amount. 
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Appellant notice of its intent to file the praecipe to enter default judgment.3 

The trial court denied the petition on June 13, 2014. Appellant filed a 

motion for reconsideration and a timely notice of appeal on July 8, 2014. On 

July 9, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which Appellant 

timely filed on July 22, 2014. The court denied Appellant’s motion for 

reconsideration on July 30, 2014. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF 

LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO STRIKE (EITHER UPON 

[APPELLANT’S PETITION] TO STRIKE OR ITS OWN 

[MOTION]) THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST 

[APPELLANT], REGARDLESS OF THE PASSAGE OF TIME, AS 

VOID DUE TO LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 

IN THE TRIAL DIVISION WHEN ALL ALLEGATIONS OF 

WRONGDOING AND PRAYERS FOR RELIEF AVERRED IN 

THE COMPLAINT AGAINST [APPELLANT] ARE AGAINST HER 

IN HER REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AS AGENT FOR HER 

FATHER, HENRY SULLIVAN, UNDER A FINANCIAL POWER 

OF ATTORNEY?

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF 

LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO STRIKE (EITHER UPON 

[APPELLANT’S PETITION] TO STRIKE OR ITS OWN 

[MOTION]) THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST 

[APPELLANT] IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, REGARDLESS 

OF THE PASSAGE OF TIME, AS VOID FOR FAILURE TO SUE 

[APPELLANT] IN THE CORRECT CAPACITY, WHEN THE 

FACE OF THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO CONTAIN ANY 

ALLEGATIONS OF WRONGDOING OR ANY CLAIM AGAINST 

[APPELLANT] IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, BOTH OF 

WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO SUPPORT A DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT AGAINST HER IN THAT CAPACITY?

 

3 The record fails to show that Appellant properly served the petition to 

strike on Green Acres. 
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WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF 

LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO STRIKE (EITHER UPON 

[APPELLANT’S PETITION] TO STRIKE OR ITS OWN 

[MOTION]) THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST 

[APPELLANT], REGARDLESS OF THE PASSAGE OF TIME, AS 

VOID DUE TO A DEFECTIVE PROOF OF SERVICE OF THE 

NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

WHICH (A) FAILS TO CERTIFY THAT A WRITTEN NOTICE 

OF PRAECIPE TO ENTER JUDGMENT WAS MAILED OR 

DELIVERED AS REQUIRED BY [PA.R.C.P.] 237.1(A)(2), 

BUT RATHER CITES TO A NEW JERSEY RULE OF CIVIL 

PROCEDURE, WHICH IS OF NO EFFECT IN THE 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA AND (B) 

REFERENCES THE SERVICE OF A “MOTION FOR FINAL 

JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT” AND NOT A NOTICE OF PRAECIPE 

TO ENTER DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY THE 

RULE; BOTH OF WHICH REMOVED THE PROTHONOTARY’S 

AUTHORITY TO ENTER SUCH A DEFAULT JUDGMENT?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).4 

In her first issue, Appellant argues all allegations against her in Green 

Acres’ complaint concern Appellant’s alleged wrongdoing in her capacity as 

Mr. Sullivan’s POA. Appellant asserts all prayers for relief in the complaint 

 

4

In a footnote in the statement of the case in her brief, Appellant also 

complains Green Acres’ service of the complaint was improper because the 

return of service did not indicate how the process server identified the 

person served as a relative of Appellant or a person in charge of Appellant’s 

residence. Nevertheless, this argument appears nowhere in the argument 

section of Appellant’s brief. Appellant also fails to include this issue in her 

statement of the questions involved. Moreover, the footnote contains no 

citations to relevant authority. For these reasons, Appellant’s short footnote 

commentary regarding improper service is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) 

(stating argument shall be divided into as many sections as there are 

questions presented, followed by discussion with citation to relevant legal 

authority); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 604 Pa. 176, 985 A.3d 915 

(2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 906, 131 S.Ct. 250, 178 L.Ed.2d 165 (2010) 

(explaining appellant waives issue on appeal where she fails to present claim 

with citations to relevant authority or to develop issue in meaningful fashion 

capable of review). 
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likewise refer to her as “Power of Attorney, Henrietta Sullivan.” Appellant 

contends the trial division lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims 

against her because the Orphans’ Court Division has “mandatory” 

jurisdiction over matters pertaining to an agent’s actions under a POA. 

Appellant concludes the default judgment is void on its face, and the court 

erred when it denied Appellant’s petition to strike the default judgment on 

this basis. We disagree. 

An appeal regarding a petition to strike a default judgment implicates 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Oswald v. WB Public Square 

Associates, LLC, 80 A.3d 790, 793 (Pa.Super. 2013). Issues regarding the 

operation of procedural rules of court present us with questions of law. Id. 

Therefore, “our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Id. 

“A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which 

operates as a demurrer to the record. A petition to strike a judgment may 

be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the 

record.” Midwest Financial Acceptance Corp. v. Lopez, 78 A.3d 614, 

622-23 (Pa.Super. 2013). “[A] petition to strike is not a chance to review 

the merits of the allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is 

aimed at defects that affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the 

petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief.” Oswald, supra at 794. A fatal 

defect on the face of the record denies the prothonotary the authority to 
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enter judgment. Erie Ins. Co. v. Bullard, 839 A.2d 383, 388 (Pa.Super. 

2003). When a prothonotary enters judgment without authority, that 

judgment is void ab initio. Id. “When deciding if there are fatal defects on 

the face of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a [default] 

judgment, a court may only look at what was in the record when the 

judgment was entered.” Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Services, Inc.,

549 Pa. 84, 90, 700 A.2d 915, 917 (1997). 

A judgment is void on its face if one or more of three 

jurisdictional elements is found absent: jurisdiction of the 

parties; subject matter jurisdiction; or the power or 

authority to render the particular judgment. The term 

“jurisdiction” relates to the competency of the individual 

court, administrative body, or other tribunal to determine 

controversies of the general class to which a particular 

case belongs. Moreover, it is never too late to attack a 

judgment or decree for want of jurisdiction, as any such 

judgment or decree rendered by a court which lacks 

jurisdiction of the subject matter or the person is null and 

void, and can be attacked by the parties at any time. A 

petition to strike a judgment founded on a jurisdictional 

deficiency is therefore not subject to the same “timeliness” 

considerations as a petition to open the judgment.

Flynn v. Casa Di Bertacchi Corp., 674 A.2d 1099, 1105 (Pa.Super. 1996). 

Article V, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states as follows:

§ 5. Courts of common pleas

There shall be one court of common pleas for each judicial 

district (a) having such divisions and consisting of such 

number of judges as shall be provided by law, one of 

whom shall be the president judge; and

(b) having unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except 

as may otherwise be provided by law.
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Pa. Const. art. 5, § 5. See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 931(a) (stating: “Except 

where exclusive original jurisdiction of an action or proceeding is by statute 

or by general rule...vested in another court of this Commonwealth, the courts 

of common pleas shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and 

proceedings....”); Posner v. Sheridan, 451 Pa. 51, 299 A.2d 309 (1973) 

(explaining 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution abolished former system of 

separate trial courts and combined them into unified common pleas system). 

The Judicial Code establishes three separate divisions within the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas:

§ 951. Court divisions

(a) Philadelphia County.—The Court of Common Pleas 

of Philadelphia County shall have the following divisions:

(1) Trial division.

(2) Orphans’ court division.

(3) Family court division.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 951(a). Section 711 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries 

Code provides in relevant part as follows:

§ 711. Mandatory exercise of jurisdiction through 

orphans’ court division in general

Except as provided in section 712 (relating to 

nonmandatory exercise of jurisdiction through the orphans’ 

court division) and section 713 (relating to special 

provisions for Philadelphia County),[5]the jurisdiction of 

the court of common pleas over the following shall be 

exercised through its orphans’ court division:

 

5 Section 713 addresses matters relating to adoptions and birth records. 
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* * *

(22) Agents.—All matters pertaining to the exercise of 

powers by agents acting under powers of attorney as 

provided in...Chapter 56 (relating to powers of attorney).

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711(22). Section 952 of the Judicial Code, however, states 

the following:

§ 952. Status of court divisions

The divisions of a court of common pleas are 

administrative units composed of those judges of the court 

responsible for the transaction of specified classes of the 

business of the court. In a court of common pleas having 

two or more divisions each division of the court is 

vested with the full jurisdiction of the whole court, 

but the business of the court may be allocated among the 

divisions of the court by or pursuant to general rules.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 952 (emphasis added). With respect to matters filed in the 

wrong division, Section 5103(c) directs:

§ 5103. Transfer of erroneously filed matters

* * *

(c) Interdivisional transfers.—If an appeal or other 

matter is taken to, brought in, or transferred to a division 

of a court to which such matter is not allocated by law, the 

court shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter, 

but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper division 

of the court, where the appeal or other matter shall be 

treated as if originally filed in the transferee division on the 

date first filed in a court or magisterial district.

Id. § 5103(c). With reference to these constitutional and statutory 

provisions, our Supreme Court explained:

[J]urisdictional restraints upon the former common pleas 
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court under the old system no longer exist. The court of 

common pleas, as reconstituted, possesses the 

jurisdictions of the former courts of common pleas, courts 

of quarter sessions, courts of oyer and terminer, orphans’ 

courts, and juvenile courts. One of the purposes of the 

unified court is, of course, to simplify procedure and 

remove archaisms from the judicial system. A case may 

not be dismissed because brought in the wrong court; if 

the matter is justiciable, there is jurisdiction in the court of 

common pleas to hear it, and in a multi-division court the 

remedy for bringing the case in the wrong division is not a 

dismissal, but a transfer of the matter to the correct 

division.

Gorden v. Cutler, 471 A.2d 449, 453 (Pa.Super. 1983) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Waszinski, 485 Pa. 247, 254-55, 401 A.2d 1129, 1132 

(1978)). 

Instantly, Green Acres filed its complaint for breach of contract in the 

trial division of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. As 

Appellant concedes, the court of common pleas had subject matter 

jurisdiction over this case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 931(a). Thus, as a division of 

the court of common pleas, the trial division was vested with the full 

jurisdiction of the whole court to hear the case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 952; 

Gorden, supra. The question of whether the trial division was the 

appropriate administrative unit to hear the case is immaterial to the issue of 

subject matter jurisdiction. 

Moreover, the complaint sought damages based on Mr. Sullivan’s 

alleged failure to pay for nursing home services in accordance with his 

contract with Green Acres. All allegations in the complaint stemmed from 
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Mr. Sullivan’s alleged debt to Green Acres. The allegations against 

Appellant, which concerned her failure to exercise her POA to pay this debt 

with Mr. Sullivan’s funds, were wholly derivative of the claims for breach of 

contract and unjust enrichment against Mr. Sullivan. Green Acres included 

the allegations against Appellant as an alternative means to recover the 

money damages it sought from her father. The gravamen of the complaint 

is that Mr. Sullivan breached his contract with Green Acres. Although 

irrelevant to the question of whether the trial division had subject matter 

jurisdiction, this case fell outside the scope of 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 711(22), in any 

event. Even if Green Acres had filed its complaint in the wrong division as 

an administrative matter, the proper action would be to transfer the case to 

the correct division, not to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(c). Therefore, the trial division had 

subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See Gorden, supra. 

In her second issue, Appellant argues the caption of the complaint 

indicates Appellant was sued in her individual capacity even though all of the 

allegations against Appellant concerned her actions as Mr. Sullivan’s agent 

under a POA. Appellant asserts an allegation against her in her individual 

capacity was “an absolute prerequisite to the entry of a default judgment 

against her in that capacity.” (Appellant’s Brief at 20). Appellant contends 

the statute of limitations has now run on Green Acres’ claims, and the 

default judgment cannot be amended to name Appellant in her 
J-S10039-15

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representative capacity. Appellant concludes this alleged defect is clear on 

the face of the complaint and renders the default judgment void. We 

disagree. 

“A petition to open a default judgment and a petition to strike a default 

judgment seek distinct remedies and are generally not interchangeable.” 

Stauffer v. Hevener, 881 A.2d 868, 870 (Pa.Super. 2005) (opening, not 

striking, default judgment based on meritorious statute of limitations 

defense raised in appellant’s petition to strike and/or open default 

judgment). 

A petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the 

equitable powers of the court. The decision to grant or 

deny a petition to open a default judgment is within the 

sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn 

that decision absent a manifest abuse of discretion or error 

of law.

Graziani v. Randolph, 856 A.2d 1212, 1223 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal 

denied, 583 Pa. 663, 875 A.2d 1075 (2005). “Conversely, a petition to 

strike a default judgment should be granted where a fatal defect or 

irregularity appears on face of record.” Erie Ins. Co., supra at 386. 

Ordinarily, if a petition to open a judgment is to be 

successful, it must meet the following test: (1) the petition 

to open must be promptly filed; (2) the failure to appear or

file a timely answer must be excused; and (3) the party 

seeking to open the judgment must show a meritorious 

defense.... In making this determination, a court can 

consider facts not before it at the time the judgment was 

entered.

Mother’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Krystkiewicz, 861 A.2d 327, 336 
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(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Cintas Corp., supra at 93-94, 700 

A.2d at 918-19). 

Here, Appellant averred in her petition to strike the default judgment 

that Mr. Sullivan died on December 22, 2007, four days before the default 

judgment was entered. Mr. Sullivan’s death would have terminated the 

POA, as there is no evidence the POA was coupled with an interest that 

made it irrevocable. See Appeal of Yerkes, 99 Pa. 401, 401 (1882) 

(stating: “A power of attorney ceases to be operative upon the death of the 

party giving it, unless it is coupled with such an interest as renders it 

irrevocable”). See generally In re Estate of Eastman, 760 A.2d 16 

(Pa.Super. 2000) (stating death of principal operates as instantaneous and 

absolute revocation of agent’s authority to act for principal unless agency is 

coupled with irrevocable interest). Thus, at the time the default judgment 

was entered against Appellant, she might no longer have been Mr. Sullivan’s 

agent. Under those circumstances, a default judgment could not have been 

entered against Appellant in her “representative capacity” because that 

capacity no longer existed. Here, the default judgment was entered against 

Appellant in her individual capacity, not as Mr. Sullivan’s POA. 

Additionally, Appellant is incorrect to suggest as a general matter that 

an agent acting under a POA cannot be held personally liable for her acts or 

omissions under a POA. See Metcalf v. Pesock, 885 A.2d 539 (Pa.Super. 

2005) (holding decedent’s former agent under POA was liable for invalid gift 
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he made to himself during decedent’s lifetime while POA was still effective). 

To the extent Appellant argues she cannot be held personally liable based on 

the specific allegations in Green Acres’ complaint, this claim is an 

inappropriate ground to strike a default judgment because it goes to the 

merits or allegations in the complaint and does not involve a fatal defect or 

irregularity on the face of the record. See Erie Ins. Co., supra. Appellant 

should have raised this defense, if at all, in a petition to open the judgment, 

which is a distinct remedy Appellant failed to seek. See Graziani, supra; 

Mother’s Restaurant, Inc. Therefore, the trial court properly declined to 

strike the default judgment on this ground. 

In her third issue, Appellant argues the certification Green Acres 

attached to its praecipe to enter default judgment failed to comply with 

Pa.R.C.P. 237.1. Specifically, Appellant contends the certification attached 

to the praecipe to enter default judgment (1) improperly referred to a 

“motion for final judgment by default” and (2) cited an inapplicable New 

Jersey Rule of Civil Procedure. Appellant concludes Green Acres’ certification 

was fatally defective and provides an alternative ground to strike the default 

judgment. We disagree. 

Rule 237.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure deals with 

notice of intent to take a default judgment and provides in relevant part as 

follows:

Rule 237.1 Notice of Praecipe for Entry of Judgment 

of Non Pros for Failure to File Complaint or by 
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Default for Failure to Plead

(a)(1) As used in this rule,

* * *

“judgment by default” means a judgment entered by 

praecipe pursuant to Rules 1037(b), 1511(a), 3031(a) and 

3146(a).

(2) No judgment...by default for failure to plead shall 

be entered by the prothonotary unless the praecipe for 

entry includes a certification that a written notice of 

intention to file the praecipe was mailed or delivered

* * *

(ii) in the case of a judgment by default, after the 

failure to plead to a complaint and at least ten days 

prior to the date of the filing of the praecipe to the 

party against whom judgment is to be entered and to 

the party’s attorney of record, if any. 

The ten-day notice period in subdivision [(a)(2)(ii)] shall 

be calculated forward from the date of the mailing or 

delivery, in accordance with Rule 106. 

(3) A copy of the notice shall be attached to the 

praecipe. 

Pa.R.C.P. 237.1(a)(1), (2)(ii), (3). The intent of Rule 237.1 is to allow the 

defaulting party a full ten-day period to cure the default. Acre v. Navy 

Brand Mfg. Co., 571 A.2d 466, 469 (Pa.Super. 1990). This rule operates in 

tandem with Rule 237.5, which provides:

Rule 237.5 Form of Notice of Praecipe to Enter 

Judgment by Default

The notice required by Rule 237.1(a)(2) shall be 

substantially in the following form:
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(CAPTION)

To: ___________________________

(Defendant)

Date of Notice: ________________

IMPORTANT NOTICE

YOU ARE IN DEFAULT BECAUSE YOU HAVE FAILED TO 

ENTER A WRITTEN APPEARANCE PERSONALLY OR BY 

ATTORNEY AND FILE IN WRITING WITH THE COURT YOUR 

DEFENSES OR OBJECTIONS TO THE CLAIMS SET FORTH 

AGAINST YOU. UNLESS YOU ACT WITHIN TEN DAYS 

FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE, A JUDGMENT MAY BE 

ENTERED AGAINST YOU WITHOUT A HEARING AND YOU 

MAY LOSE YOUR PROPERTY OR OTHER IMPORTANT 

RIGHTS.

YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS PAPER TO YOUR LAWYER AT 

ONCE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE A LAWYER, GO TO OR 

TELEPHONE THE OFFICE SET FORTH BELOW. THIS OFFICE 

CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION ABOUT HIRING A 

LAWYER.

IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO HIRE A LAWYER, THIS OFFICE 

MAY BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH INFORMATION 

ABOUT AGENCIES THAT MAY OFFER LEGAL SERVICES TO 

ELIGIBLE PERSONS AT A REDUCED FEE OR NO FEE.

___________________________

(Name of Office)

___________________________

(Address of Office)

___________________________

(Telephone Number)

____________________________

(Signature of Plaintiff or Attorney)

____________________________

(Address)
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Pa.R.C.P. 237.5. 

Under the doctrine of substantial compliance, the trial court may 

“overlook any procedural defect that does not prejudice a party’s rights.” 

Womer v. Hilliker, 589 Pa. 256, 267, 908 A.2d 269, 276 (2006) (emphasis 

in original). “[P]rocedural rules are not ends in themselves, and...rigid 

application of [the Rules] does not always serve the interest of fairness and 

justice.” Id. Rule 126 incorporates the doctrine of substantial compliance 

into the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure as follows: 

Rule 126. Liberal Construction and Application of 

Rules

The rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 

speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or 

proceeding to which they are applicable. The court at 

every stage of any such action or proceeding may 

disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not 

affect the substantial rights of the parties.

Pa.R.C.P. 126. Rule 126 allows an equitable exception for parties “who 

commit a misstep when attempting to do what any particular rule requires.” 

Womer, supra at 268-69, 908 A.2d at 276. Rule 126 does not excuse a 

party’s complete noncompliance with the rules, but Rule 126 “is available to 

a party who makes a substantial attempt to conform.” Id. at 271, 908 A.2d 

at 278 (holding there was no compliance, where party failed to take any 

steps to conform with Rule 1042.3 for filing certificate of merit); Pomerantz 

v. Goldstein, 479 Pa. 175, 178, 387 A.2d 1280, 1281 (1978) (holding 

appellant substantially complied with Rule 1038(d) for filing exceptions, 
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although pleading was erroneously titled motion for new trial, and appellee 

suffered no prejudice when trial court considered appellant’s pleading). 

Compare Oswald, supra at 796 (holding ten-day notice was defective 

because it contained generic language from outdated rule and failed to 

conform to amended language required under current Rule 237.5). 

Instantly, Green Acres filed a praecipe for entry of default judgment 

against Appellant on December 26, 2007. The praecipe included a 

certification that Green Acres had sent Appellant, via certified mail, a tenday notice of its intent to seek a default judgment. Mail receipts in the 

certified record indicate the ten-day notice was delivered to Appellant’s 

address on December 12, 2007. Green Acres also attached to the praecipe a 

copy of the ten-day notice, which complied with Pa.R.C.P. 237.5. Although 

the certification attached to Green Acres’ praecipe mistakenly referred to a 

“Motion for Final Judgment by Default” and an analogous New Jersey rule of 

court regarding entry of default judgment, the language of the actual tenday notice sent to Appellant was virtually identical to the language set forth 

in current Rule 237.5. 

Additionally, Green Acres sent the ten-day notice to Appellant more 

than ten days before it filed the praecipe for entry of default judgment. 

Thus, Green Acres fulfilled the purpose of Rule 237.1, which is to allow the 

defaulting party a full ten-day period to cure the default. See Acre, supra. 

Appellant fails to explain how Green Acres’ alleged misstep in its certification 
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attached to the praecipe prejudiced Appellant in any way. A review of the 

record as a whole reveals Green Acres had substantially complied with the 

applicable ten-day notice requirements before it sought entry of a default 

judgment against Appellant. See Pa.R.C.P. 237.1; Pa.R.C.P. 237.5; 

Womer, supra; Oswald, supra. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant failed to demonstrate a 

fatal defect on the face of the record as it existed when judgment was 

entered. See Midwest Financial, supra. Therefore, the court properly 

denied Appellant’s petition to strike the default judgment. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/13/2015