J-A05042-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MELANY RAMOS, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

MICHAEL AND DONNA JONES,

Appellees No. 2124 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered June 18, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Civil Division at No(s): C-0048-CV-2012-2141

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and ALLEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2015

Appellant, Melany Ramos, appeals from the June 18, 2014 order that 

granted partial summary judgment in favor of Michael Jones and Donna 

Jones (collectively “Appellees”), which was made final and appealable by an 

order entered on July 11, 2014. We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural background 

of this case as follows:

On March 2, 2012, [Appellant] filed a Praecipe for Writ of 

Summons. On March 27, 2012, [Appellees] filed a Praecipe for 

Rule to File Complaint.

On April 9, 2012, [Appellant] filed her Complaint, in which 

she avers that on March 21, 2010, a motor vehicle accident 

occurred between [Appellee] Michael Jones and [Appellant] at 

the intersection of Union Boulevard and Airport Road. [Appellee] 

Michael Jones was allegedly negligently driving a vehicle with the 

permission of [Appellee] [Donna] Jones. [Appellant] avers in her 

Complaint that she suffered “severe, serious and disabling” 

injuries, directly and proximately caused by the [Appellees’] 
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negligence. Specifically, she complains of sprains and strains of 

her neck and back, as well as injuries to her discs, shoulders, 

head and right knee. She also asserts that she suffers mental 

damages that were directly and proximately caused by this 

motor vehicle accident: PTSD, depression, fear, anxiety, and/or 

other mental and psychic injuries. [Appellant] also complains of 

economic injuries, including lost wages, the incurrence of large 

bills due to treatment, and out-of-pocket expenses. Finally, 

[Appellant] complains that, as a result of the accident, she is 

unable to pursue her usual occupation. 

On April 25, 2012, [Appellees] filed an Answer and New 

Matter. In their Answer, [Appellees] aver that [Appellee] Michael 

Jones had [Appellee] Donna Jones’s permission to use the 

vehicle, but he did not use the vehicle to run an errand for her or 

under her direction. In their New Matter, [Appellees] chiefly 

contend that [Appellant’s] claim for any non-economic losses is 

barred pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act 

(the “MVRL”), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701, et seq., because [Appellant] 

selected the limited tort option when applying for the insurance 

policy in effect at the time of the accident. See Answer with New 

Matter at ¶¶ 25-27. Additionally, [Appellees] contest causation. 

Id. at ¶28. Other affirmative and equitable defenses are also 

raised in the New Matter.

On May 9, 2012, [Appellant] filed her Response, asserting 

that the averments in [Appellees’] New Matter amounted to 

conclusions of law. Id. at ¶¶ 29-33. The parties engaged in 

discovery, which included obtaining medical records and 

conducting depositions. 

[Appellees] filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

on February 21, 2014, arguing that they are entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law because [Appellant] selected the 

limited tort option in her insurance policy and did not sustain an 

injury which constitutes a serious impairment of a body function. 

As such, they argue, she is not entitled to damages for noneconomic damages. [Appellees] filed a Memorandum of Law 

supporting their Motion on the same date. 

On March 24, 2014, [Appellant] filed an Answer and Brief 

in Opposition, in which she argued that this determination is one 

for the jury because reasonable minds could differ. On April 29, 

2014, [Appellees] filed a Reply to [Appellant’s] Brief in 

Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On May 1, 
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2014, [Appellant] filed [a] Reply to [Appellees’] Submission at 

Oral Argument.

This matter was placed on the April 25, 2014, Argument 

List and argument was heard.

Order and Statement of Reasons, 6/18/14, at 1-3.

The trial court concluded that Appellant’s injuries were de minimus, 

and it granted Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment. Order and 

Statement of Reasons, 6/18/14, at 1. The June 18, 2014 order precluded 

Appellant from seeking or recovering non-economic damages due to her 

selection of the limited tort option. Id. The order dismissed all claims for 

non-economic damages with prejudice. Id.

Ordinarily, an order granting partial summary judgment is 

interlocutory. However, on July 3, 2014, Appellant filed a motion to make 

the June 18, 2014 order final and appealable pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c). 

In an order filed on July 11, 2014, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion. 

Accordingly, the July 11, 2014 order, which granted partial summary 

judgment, made the June 18, 2014 order final and appealable. This timely 

appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellant raises one issue for this Court’s consideration:

1. Did the trial court usurp the jury’s function and commit an 

error of law / abuse of discretion in granting partial summary 

judgment and dismissing [Appellant’s] claim for noneconomic 

damages, given the existence of genuine issues of material 

fact as to whether [Appellant] suffered a “serious injury” or 

serious impairment of some bodily function, especially 

considering that [Appellant] submitted expert and lay 

testimony that [Appellant’s] ongoing injuries permanently 

disabled her from performing her pre-injury job as a CNA?
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Appellant’s Brief at 3.

The standard of review we apply is as follows:

Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting or 

denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of 

review is clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where 

it is established that the court committed an error of law or 

abused its discretion. Summary judgment is appropriate only 

when the record clearly shows that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. The reviewing court must view the record in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all 

doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 

against the moving party. Only when the facts are so clear that 

reasonable minds could not differ can a trial court properly enter 

summary judgment. 

Hovis v. Sunoco, Inc., 64 A.3d 1078, 1081 (Pa. Super. 2013).

In Pennsylvania, when selecting automobile insurance, drivers have 

the option of choosing limited-tort coverage or full-tort coverage. 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1705. An individual who has purchased full-tort coverage and who is 

injured by a negligent driver can recover all medical and out-of-pocket 

expenses, as well as financial compensation for pain and suffering and other 

noneconomic damages. Varner-Mort v. Kapfhammer, ___ A.3d ___, ___, 

2015 PA Super 14, at *4, 2015 WL 252444 (Pa. Super. 2015) (filed January 

21, 2015) (citing 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(a)(1)(B)). “A limited-tort plaintiff also 

can recover all medical and out-of-pocket expenses; however, such a 

plaintiff cannot recover for pain and suffering or other noneconomic 

damages unless the plaintiff’s injuries fall within the definition of ‘serious 

injury.’” Id. (citing 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(a)(1)(A)). The term “serious injury” 
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is defined as follows: “A personal injury resulting in death, serious 

impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.” 75 

Pa.C.S. § 1702. 

Our Supreme Court has held that in determining whether a 

motorist has suffered a serious injury, “the threshold 

determination was not to be made routinely by a trial court 

judge ... but rather was to be left to a jury unless reasonable 

minds could not differ on the issue of whether a serious injury 

had been sustained.” Washington v. Baxter, 553 Pa. 434, 719 

A.2d 733, 740 (1998). In conducting this inquiry, “several 

factors must be considered to determine if the claimed injury is 

‘serious’: ‘[1.] the extent of the impairment, [2.] the length of 

time the impairment lasted, [3.] the treatment required to 

correct the impairment, and [4.] any other relevant factors.’” 

Graham v. Campo, 990 A.2d 9, 16 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal 

denied, 609 Pa. 703, 16 A.3d 504 (2011). Our Supreme Court 

has cautioned that “the focus of these inquiries is not on the 

injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affected a particular 

body function.” Washington, supra. We remain cognizant of 

the principle that “[a]n impairment need not be permanent to be 

serious” under section 1705(d). Robinson v. Upole, 750 A.2d 

339, 342 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).

Cadena v. Latch, 78 A.3d 636, 640 (Pa. Super. 2013) (emphasis added).

Following our review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs, and 

relevant legal authority, we conclude that the Order and Statement of 

Reasons, which is incorporated by reference in the trial court’s August 21, 

2014 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) statement, comprehensively and correctly disposes 

of Appellant’s claim of error. See Order and Statement of Reasons, 

6/18/14, at 5-13 (reciting the facts of record, applying the four factors noted 

above, and concluding that reasonable minds could not differ on the 

conclusion that Appellant did not suffer a serious injury). Appellant elected 
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limited-tort coverage, and we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that 

Appellant failed to establish that she suffered a “serious injury” as that term 

is defined. We discern no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

conclusion.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court order granting Appellees’ motion 

for partial summary judgment, and we do so on the basis of the trial court’s 

Order and Statement of Reasons dated June 18, 2014. The parties are 

directed to attach a copy of the trial court’s June 18, 2014 Order and 

Statement of Reasons to this memorandum in the event of further 

proceedings.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/10/2015
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negligently driving a vehicle with the permission of Defendant Barbara Jones. The Plaintiff 

the intersection of Union Boulevard and Airport Road. Defendant Michael Jones was allegedly 

20 I 0, a motor vehicle accident occurred between Defendant Michael Jones and the Plaintiff at 

On April 9, 2012, the Pfointiff filed her Complaint, in which she avers that on March 21, 

to File Complaint. 

On March 27, 20 J 2, the Defendants, Michael Jones and Barbara Jones, filed a Praccipe for Rule 

On March 2. 2012, the Plaintiff, Melanie Ramos. filed 2 Praecipe for Writ of Summons. 

Facts and Procedural History 

STATEME!\T OF REASO~'S 

DISMISSED with prejudice. 

It is further ORDERED that any and all claims for non-economic damages are 

her selection of the Limited Tort Option. 

Plaintiff is precluded from asserting and recovering any and all non-economic damages due to 

Rarnos's, response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is GR.\NTED. and the 

Jones and Barbara Jones's. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. and the Plaintiff. Melanie 

AND NOW, this I ~r.dny of June, 2014, upon consideration of the Defendants, Michael 

ORDER OF COURT 

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en 

i\IELANIE R.Al\IOS, ) NO: C--18-CV-2012·2141 

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Plaintiff, ) 

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i\HCHAEL JONES, DONNA JONES, ) 

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Defendants. ) 

IN .THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY, PEl'fNSYLVA.NU 

CIVIL DIVISION 

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limited tort option in her insurance policy and did not sustain an injury which constitutes a 

arguing that they are entitled to judgment as a-matter of Jaw because the Plaintiff selected the· 

The Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on February 21, 2014, 

in discovery, which induded obtaining medical records and conducting depositions. 

Defendants' New Matter amounted to conclusions of law. Id. at f-129-33. The parties engaged 

On May 9, 2012, the Plaintiff filed her Response, asserting that the averments in the 

defenses are also raised in the New Matter. 

27. Additionally, the Defendants contest causation. Id. at l 28. Other affirmative and equitable 

the insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident. See Answer with New Matter at 1125- 

Pa.C.S.A. § 1701, et seq., because the Plaintiff selected the limited tort option when applying for 

losses is barred pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act (the "MYRL"), 75 

New Matter, the Defendants chiefly contend that the Plaintiff's claim for any non-economic 

the vehicle, but he did not use the vehicle to run an errand for her or under her direction. In their 

Defendants aver that Defendant Michael Jones had Defendant Donna Jones's permission to use 

On April 25, 2012, the Defendants filed an Answer and New Matter. In their Answer, the 

as a result of the accident, she is unable to pursue her usual occupation. 

of large bills due to treatment, and out-of-pocket expenses. Finally, the Plaintiff complains that, 

injuries. The Plaintiff also complains of economic injuries, including lost wages, the incurrence 

motor vehicle accident: PTSD, depression, fear, anxiety, and/or other mental and psychic 

also asserts that she suffers mental damages that were directly and proximately caused by this 

strains of her neck and back, as well as injuries to her discs, shoulders, head and right knee. She 

. proximately caused by the Defendants' negligence. Specifically, she complains of sprains and 

avers in her Complaint that she suffered "severe, serious and disabling" injuries, directly and 

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service of the motion. In other words, the nonmoving party has a clear and affirmative duty to u 

allegations or denials of the pleadings but rnusrfile a response within thirty (30) days after 

..... ~ 

Further/under Pa.R.C.P. J 035.3(a), the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere 

Pa.R.C.P. l 035.2 . 

(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including 

the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden 

of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the 

cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to 

be submitted to the jury. 

(I) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a 

necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be 

established by additional discovery or expert report, or 

After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to 

unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in 

whole or in part as a matter of law 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 states: 

Legal Standard () 

This matter was placed on the April 25, 2014, Argument List and argument was heard. 

Submission at Oral Argument. 

Partial Summary Judgment. On May 1, 2014, the Plaintiff filed Reply lo Defendants' 

April 29, 2014, the Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Motion for 

argued that this determination is one for the jury because reasonable minds could differ. On 

On March 24, 2014, the Plaintiff filed an Answer and Brief in Opposition, in which she 

on the same date. 

non-economic damages. The Defendants filed a Memorandum of Law supporting their Motion 

serious impairment of a body function. As such, they argue, she is not entitled to damages for 

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respond to a motion for summary judgment. Harber Phi la. Ctr. Citv Office Ltd. v. LPCI Ltd. 

P'ship, 764 A.2d 1100, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2000). Also, Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(d) specifically provides 

that "[s]ummary judgment may be entered against a party who does not respond." lg_, 

Summary judgment may be granted only in the clearest of cases where the record shows 

that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. P.J.S. v. Pa. State Ethics Comm'n, 723 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1999) (citing 

Marks v. Tasman, 589 A.2d 205 (Pa. 1991)). Summary judgment is only appropriate in the 

clearest of cases, because an order favorable to the moving party will prematurely end an action. 

Scopel v. Done!2al Mut. Ins. Co., 698 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citations omitted). 

The moving party has the burden of proving the non-existence of any genuine issue of material 

fact. O'Rourkc v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 730 A.2d 103.9, 1041 (Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 1999) (citing Kee 

v. Tumoike Comrn'n, 722 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998)). "Failure ofa non-moving party 

to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of 

proof ... establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law." 

Mu;:phv v. Duguesne Univ. of the Holv Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (Pa. 2001) (quoting Youn2 v. 

PennDOT, 744 A.2d 1276, 1277 (Pa. 2000)) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all 

doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving 

party. Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 674 A.2d I 038, I 04 t (Pa. 1996) ( citation omitted). 

Under the Nanlv·Gto Rule, summary judgment may not be granted where the moving 

party relies exclusively on oral testimony, either through testimonial affidavits or deposition 

testimony to establish the absence of a genuint! issue of material fact. Nantv-Glo Borou!Zh v. 

American Suretv Co., J 63 A. 523, 524 (Pa. 1932); see also Penn Center House. Inc. v. Hoffman, 

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court judge in (these] matters ... but rather [is] to be left to a jury unless reasonable minds could 

[is] to be followed and ... the threshold determination [is] not to be made routinely by a trial" 

law and the legislative history of the lvfVFRL, that: "the traditional summary judgment standard 

"limited tort option" under the MVFRL. Our Supreme Court determined, after a review of case 

by which the plaintiff is permitted Lo recover non-economic damages despite her selection of the 

standard by which trial courts are lo determine whether a plaintiff has suffered a "serious injury" 

Initially, we note that in Washirnzton v. Bnxter, supra, our Supreme Court established the 

a body function or permanent serious disfigurement." 75 Pa.C.S .A. § 1702. 

MVFRL defines "serious injury" as "[a] personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of 

precluded from an action for any non-economic loss .... " 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(d). Further, the 

sustained is a serious injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort option shall be 

alternative remains eligible to pursue a cause of action for economic loss, "[uJnless the injury 

forth in the policy." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § I 705(a). While the insured who elects the limited tort 

monetary damages unless the injuries suffered fall within the definition of 'serious injury' as set 

medical and other out-of-pocket expenses, but not for pain and suffering or for other nonlimited tort option, an insured driver who is injured by another driver may "seek recovery for all 

Pa.C.S.A. § 1705; ~ also Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 737-38 (Pa. 1998). Under this 

insured motorist may elect a "limited tort" option in exchange for lower insurance rates. 75 

Under Section 1705 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law ("MVFRL''), an 

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f, 

Discussion 

at 1041 (citing Kaplan v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 688 A.2d 736 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997)). 

Super. 1995); Garcia v. Savaize, 586 A.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Pa. Super. 1991); O'Rourke, 730 A.2d 

553 A.2d 900, 903 (Pa. 1989); White v, Owens Comin!! Fibere:las. Coro., 668 A.2d 136, 142 (Pa. 

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contends resulted solely from the motor vehicle accident. See Complaint f I 0. 

accident of .tvfarcb 21, 20 I 0. Here, the Plaintiff complains of neck and shoulder pain, which she 

We look to first at what body function, if any, was injured as a result of the motor vehicle 

original); see also McGee, 750 A.2d at 914. 

serious injury such that a body function has been seriously impaired." Id. at 741 (emphasis in 

suffered any injury; rather, the question is whether appellant has shown that he suffered a 

answered is not whether appellant has adduced sufficient evidence to show that appellant 

(omission in original). Further, our Supreme Court emphasized that "[t]he question to be 

Washim!ton, 719 A.2d at 740 (quoting Difranco v. Pickard, 398 N.W.2d 896, 901 (Mich. 1986)) 

Was the impairment of the body function serious? The focus of these 

inquiries is not on the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affected a 

particular body function. Generally medical testimony will be needed to 

establish the existence, extent, and permanency of the impairment . . . . In 

determining whether the impairment was serious, several factors should be 

considered: the extent of the impairment, the length of time the impairment 

lasted, the treatment required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant 

factors. An impairment need not be permanent to be serious. 

What body function, if any, was impaired because of injuries sustained in a 

motor vehicle accident? 

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The 'serious impairment of a bodily function' threshold contains two inquiries: 

bodily function" as stated by the Michigan Supreme Court: 

The Washineton Court adopted the following definition of't'serious impairment of a 

Muldownev, 750 A.2d Q 12, 914 (Pa Super. 2000). 

ultimate determination should be made by the jury in all but the clearest of cases." McGee v. 

740. Moreover, all inferences must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Thus, "the 

not differ on the issue of whether a serious injury has been sustained." Washington, 719 A.2d at 

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and or a general surgeon as this is not'part of the cervical injury related to her .MVA." 

pain, but found no rpdiation of symptoms. Further, he found: "Regarding the cervical 

adenopathy, she's been instructed many times to get this checked by her family physician 

months after the accident. Dr. Grassi noted some continuing upper, mid and lower back 

(4) On June 29, 2010, the Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Grassi for a follow-up appointment, three 

lower back sprain/strain. 

neck, right knee contusion, and myofasciitis (inflammation of a muscle and its fascia), 

included ongoing cervicalgia (neck pain) whiplash-type syndrome in the upper back and 

of Orthopedic Associates of the Greater Lehigh Valley, P.A. His clinical impressions 

(3) On April 13, 2010, and May 4, 2010, the Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Joseph Grassi, M.D., 

normal limits. A CT scan of the brain revealed no abnormalities. 

her cervical spine was performed and the cervical spine was found to be wi thin the CJ 

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,_) (emphasis added) Dr. Grassi advised the Plaintiff to use a rolling backpack to take 

later, and was diagnosed with right knee pain and a musculoskeletal strain. An x-ray of 

(2) The Plaintiff was examined at Airport Road EmergiCenter on March 30, 2010, nine days 

department the symptoms are unchanged." 

documentation states: "[a]t their worst the symptoms were mild, in the emergency 

neck was noted. With regard to the severity of the symptoms, the physician 

and painful tenderness in the right knee. No abnormalities or tenderness in the back or 

the motor vehicle accident of March 21, 20 I 0, and discharged with soft tissue injuries 

(I) The Plaintiff was examined in the emergency room of Sacred Heart Hospital following 

reveals the following with regard to the impairment: 

Second, we consider whether the impairment of the body function is serious. The record 

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adenopathy, no contusions, no ecchymosis, Tenderness entire spine from Cl to Tl. No 

revealed: "Trachea rnidline, no meningeal signs, no jugular venous 'distention, no cervical 

on June 1'3, 2011, complaining of neck and shoulder pain. An examination of the neck 

(9) The Plaintiff sought emergency medical attention at Pinnacle Health Community Campus 

describes tenderness and cervicalgia (neck pain). Pain medicine was prescribed. 

(SJ The Plaintiff went to Pennsylvania Pain Specialists, P.C., on March 4, 2011. The report 

right and left neck. No restrictions were imposed as to the Plaintiff's activities. 

complaining of severe neck pain. A neck exam revealed mild soft tissue tenderness in the 

(7) The Plaintiff went to Lehigh Valley Hospital -Muhlenberg on January 10, 2011, 

as needing a long-term formal physical therapy program." 

to physical therapy. If this is necessary, we can reorder it but at this time I do not see her 

stated: "She is working on trying to get her insurance re-established so she can get back 

and neck pain. He again noted some soft tissue tightness and discomfort. Dr. Grassi 

(6) On September 28, 2010, Dr. Grassi saw the Plaintiff again due to some recurring back 

her work. She continues with her college activities." 

her back in three weeks' time, hopefully moving her along so that we can release her for 

(inflammation) of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine. Dr. Grassi stated: "I will see 

included a continuation, but improvement, of whiplash-type syndrome, and myofasciitis 

about today." He also found some tightness in her muscles. His clinical impressions 

Dr. Grassi noted a reduction in pain levels and that the Plaintiff was "active, moving 

(5) On June I 7, 2010, the Plaintiff went to Dr. Grassi for another follow-up appointment. 

academics, and noted that she was not currently working. 

weight off of her shoulders and back. He stated that she could continue with her 

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during her deposition that she did not seek to secure employment until she moved to Harrisburg -. 

While there has been a gap in the Plaintiff's employment history, however, she testified 

motor vehicle collision, due to her neck and back pain. See id. 

new/current employment do ~ot match those required of a CNA, the job she had prior to the 

Melany Ramos ("N.T."), 23-25. The Plaintiff asserts that her tasks and duties for her 

offer light duty for a Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) position. See Deposition Testimony of 

her position could only be held open for a certain amount of time, and that her employer did not 

(Apri I 6, 20 I 0). The Plaintiff did not return to her job, citing her degree of physical pain, that 

- letter from Dottie Kurpat, Director of Brookmont/Blough Healthcare Centers, to the Plaintiff 

from her accident until April 23, 20 I 0. See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit "Q" 

and received a note from her employer which granted her a leave of absence in which to recover 

We next look at the length of the injury. Following the accident, the Plaintiff requested 

syndrome; cervical radiculitis; lumbar radiculitis; and chronic post-traumatic cervical and 

traumatic cervical and lurnbosacral strain and sprain; post-traumatic cervical facet joint 

Independent Medical Evaluation. Dr. Weiss diagnosed the patient with chronic post- 

( 12) On September 17, 2013, the Plaintiff went to Dr. David Weiss, D. 0., for an orthopedic 

lumbar rnyofascial pain syndrome. () 

December 31, 2012. There was no mention of neck or back pain in the medical reports. 

( l l) The Plaintiff sprained her ankle while at work, for which she received treatment on 

health issues. There is no mention of neck or back pain in the medical report. 

(] 0) The Plaintiff sought medical attention at Pinnacle Health on August 29, 2011, for other 

trapezius." The diagnosis was ''IvfVC chronic neck pain." 

step offl.] no discrete rnidline tenderness[,] pain is greater in the left trapezius and right 

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The Plaintiff alleges that she has difficulty sleeping and requires her children's help to do 

Plaintiff did not-result from the motor vehicle accident. See id. 

gave these instructions. however, after noting that the cervical adenopathy experienced by the 

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times and uses a rolling backpack, according to Dr. Grassi 's instructions, See id. Dr. Grassi 

Plaitniff is able to continue with her education and with work, but she has difficulty sitting at 

on the Plainti ff s performance of her job functions and engagement in personal activities. The 

Finally, we examine any other relevant considerations regarding the impact of the injury 

family doctor or a general surgeon. See Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit "K." 

not caused by the motor vehicle accident, but rather from her failure to seek treatment from a 

found on July 29, 2010, that her cervical adenopathy, which contributed to her pain levels, was 

medical attention as necessary. See Deposition N.T. at 25. As noted above, however, Dr. Grassi 

continue with certain treatments due to her financial circumstances, but sought emergency C) 

to a few physical therapy treatments. See id. at Exhibit "M." Apparently, the Plaintiff could not 

Summary Judgment, Exhibit "E." The Plaintiff went to an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Grassi, and 

after the accident, in which her injuries were described as minor. See Motion for Partial 

With regard to treatment, the Plaintiff sought emergency medical attention immediately 

was able to continue with her education by taking a class on campus and a class online. See id. 

for disability. See id. at 29. During the time period in which the Plaintiff was out of work, she 

at 24. Likewise, she did not contact her former employer to request light duty, nor did she file 

not obtain documentation from a medical provider to excuse her from work until a later date. ~ 

obtaining a job because it took her awhile to obtain another vehicle. See id. at 26:9-10. She did 

after she was evicted from her residence. Id. The Plaintiff also notes that she had difficulty 

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laundry. See Deposition N.T. at 67:20-25, 10:6-10. She indicates that this injury has had a u 

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the arthritis in his right foot "seem[edJ to have had little or no impact on [the plaintiff's] 

his feet. Id. The court found that the treatment for his injuries was not extensive. I.Q... Further, 

f,/ 

diagnosed by the emergency room physician with mild injuries and was discharged after a few 

hours. Id. He missed a fe~v shifts al his jobs, where he was required to do most of his work on 

~" 

sustained a serious injury. Washin(!ton, 719 A.2d at 74l In that case, the plaintiff had been 

In \.Vashington, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the plaintiff had not 

Care Administration, expecting her degree in 20 l 4. See id. at I 0: 15-24, 11 :3-13, 11: 15-22. 

Administration in 2013, and attending classes at Eastern University in Harrisburg for Health 

Northampton Community College, a bachelor's degree from Central Penn for Health Care 

participated in furthering her education, obtaining a degree in business administration for 

patients with whom the Plaintiff enjoys working. Id. at 15:12-14. Further, the Plaintiff has fully 

programs or activities for residents with varied stages of dementia and Alzheimer's," a group of 

dressed." Id. at I 5:3-6. She also had helped to "develop and implement cognitive support 

take care of the residents, participating i~ activities with them, and assisting residents in getting 

per week. See Deposition N.T. at 14:20-24; 16:22. Her job responsibilities include helping to 

a connections club associate at Country Meadows, where she works approximately thirty hours 

In terms of her employment, the Plaintiff is currently hired as a personal care assistant and 

restrictions are self-imposed, as her physicians did not impose any limitations on her activities. 

suffered from prior to the accident after she had her daughter, See id. at 67; 1-16. All of these 

that this accident has impacted her mental state by worsening her depression. which she already 

and spend meaningful time with them. See id. at 68:22-25, 69: 1-21. The Plaintiff also alleges 

activities that they once enjoyed together, but admits that she can still watch them play sports 

negative impact on her relationships with her children, as they cannot participate in physical 

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12 

to participate in sports with her children. Again, we note that Plaintiff's complaints of 

p 

that the pain doesnot inte;fere with her life, other than the claim that the pain makes it difficult 

•:' 

accident, there is no support in the medical records for her claim. Further, the record establishes 

While the Plaintiff chooses to attribute her neck and back pain to the motor vehicle 

extensive or consistent, but sporadic. 

before the accident. In addition. the treatment for the Plaintiff's pain and symptoms has not been 

Summary Judgment, Exhibit "K.'' It is apparent that complaints about neck pain existed long 

this is not part of the cervical injury related to her 1\ifVA." See id.; see also Motion for Partial 

instructed many times to get this checked by her family physician and/or a general surgeon as 

motor vehicle accident. Dr. Grassi noted that: "Regarding the cervical adenopathy, she's been 

treating physician, Dr. Grassi, determined that the cervical adenopathy did not result from the 

C) experienced during this time period resulted from the motor vehicle accident. In fact, her 

Further, she has failed lo present objective medical evidence that any pain that she has 

after the accident, she was discharged from the hospital on the same day with mild injuries. 

impact on [her) life for an extended period of time." McGee, 750 A.2d at 915. We note that 

with any bodily function as to permit a conclusion that the injuries have resulted in a serious 

(_) occasional stiffness and pain does not prevent her from working, attending school, viewing her 

neck. Plaintiff has failed to show that "these injuries resulted in such substantial interference 

of June 29, 2010, we would describe to be in the nature of soft tissue injuries to her back and 

based upon the medical records generated between the date of the accident and Dr. Grassi's note 

Similarly, the Plaintiff in the instant case has shown that she has suffered injury, which 

Washin!!ton court found the impairment resulting from the injury to be de minimis. ~ 

performance of his job functions and engagement in personal activities." Id. As a result, the 

0 

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(_) 

C) 

C) 

13 

ff?::~ 

STEPHEN G. BAR<\ TTA, P.J. 

BY THE COURT: 

Therefore, we grant the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 

here as to the absence of a serious impairment of a body function. 

impairment from that injury is clearly de minimis in this case. Reasonable minds could not differ 

the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, shows soft tissue injuries from the accident, but the 

children's athletic events, or engaging in her everyday routine. The evidence, when viewed in 

Circulated 03/30/2015 01:36 PM