Filed 4/6/ 16 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

FLORDELIZA HAWKINS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.
SUNTRUST BANK,
Defendant and Respondent. 2d Civil No. B26454 1 (Super. Ct. No. 56

- 2014

- 00453733

- CU

NP

- VTA) (Ventura County)

Rather than giving full faith and credit to a South Carolina foreclosure judgment, appellant contends that we should give it no faith and no credit. Thi s would require riding roughshod ove r Article IV, §1 of t he United States Constitution, s ection
1913 , subdivision (a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure
, and time honored principles of res j udicata and collateral estoppel

. 1 There is no principled reason to do so.

Flordeliza Hawkin s appeals from a judgment on the pleadings entered in favor SunTrust Bank (SunTrust), a Georgia state chartered bank, on her complaint for

1 United States Constitution, Article IV §1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in e ach State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Code of Civil Procedure, §1913, subd. (a) provides: "Subject to subdivision (b), the effect of a judicial record of a sister state is the same in this state as in the state where it was made, except that it can only be enforced in this state by an action or special proceeding."2

wrongful for eclosure. The trial court ruled that the action was barred by a South Carolina judicial foreclosure judg ment. We affirm

.

T he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue decided in the South Carolina action, i.e., that appellant was personally served with a summons and complaint before a default judgment was entered. The doctrine of res j udicata, of which collateral estoppel is a part, encompasses both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. ( Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896

- 897, fn. 7.) "The best way of remembering these doctrines clearly is to view collateral est oppel as a miniature of res judicata; the former applies to issues, the latte r to entire claims or lawsuits. " ( Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2d. ed. 1995) p. 169.) Facts and Procedural History In 2006, appellant and her now deceased husband , James C. Hawkins (Hawkins), arranged for a $154,000 revolving line of credit with SunTrust. The loan was secured by a mortgage on appellant's South Carolina home , at 2130 Cheddar Road, Belton, South Carolina . In December 2010, appellant and Hawkins def aulted on the loan, owing $157,631.82. SunTrust sued for judicial foreclosure in a South Carolina state court. On January 11, 2011, SunTrust filed affidavits of service declaring that the summons and complaint were personally served on Hawkins and appell ant on December 9, 2011 at 2130 Cheddar Road, Belton, South Carolina

. A default was entered again st appellant and Hawkins, and the judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered on April 19, 2012.
T he 2130 Cheddar Road property w as sold at a foreclosure sale and a $119,994.62 deficiency judgment was entered against appellant and Hawkins. They were evicted in January 2013.

A year later, appellant appeal ed on the theory that she had no knowledge of the judgment because she and Hawkins "were not serve[d] properly." ( SunTrust v.
Hawkins et al , South Carolina Court of Ap peals, Case No. 2014

- 001363.) On August 25, 2014, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for failure to cure
deficien cies in the notice of appeal. The South Carolina for eclosure judgment is final.3 B efore the South Carolina appeal was dismissed, appellant filed suit in
Ventura Coun ty for wrongful foreclosure. The complaint alleges that the foreclosure was improper because SunTrust foreclosed on the property "without noti ce

-- specifically without service of process." It states that appellant was evicted from her home without
notice. The complaint prays for, among other things, $70,000 damages, $600 a month lost rent, an d emotional distress damages.

SunTrust answered the complaint, alleging that the South C arolina judgment controlled and that res jud icata and collateral estoppel were dispositive
affirmative defenses . T he trial court took judicial notice of the South Carolina judgment
and ruled that appellant was barre d from relitigating the issue of whether she was served with a summons and complaint in the South Carolina action.
Ju dgment on the Pleadings Based O n South Carolina Law Because a judgment on the pleadings is akin to a demurrer and tests the sufficiency o f the complaint, our review is de novo. ( Wise v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 725, 738.) The validity of the South Carolina judgment is determined by the law of the state where the judgment was rendered. ( Gagnon Co. v.
Nevada Desert Inn, Inc. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 448
, 454.)

Pursuant to South Carolina law, the doctrine of res judicata encompasses issue preclusion and bars a subsequent action by the same parties when the claims arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of a prior suit. ( Plum Creek Development Co, Inc . v. City of Conway (S.C. 1999) 512 S.Ed.2d 106, 109.) Absent fraud or collusion, the default judgment is res judicata if the trial court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. (See e.g., Toney v. LaSalle Bank
N.A.
, (D.S.C. 2012) 896 F.Supp.2d 455, 468 [homeowner's action to set aside a judicial foreclosure barred because matter was previously adjudicated in state court]; Bank of
America v. Jennett (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 104, 120 [default judgment in Hawaii foreclosure action resulting in deficiency judgment given full faith and credit].)4 To establish res judicata, SunTrust Bank was required to prove the following three elements: (1) identity of the parties; (2) identity of the subject matter; and (3) adjudication of the issue in the prior action. ( Riedman Corp. v. Greenville Steel Structures, Inc. (S

. C

. 1992) 419 S.E.2d 217, 219

. ) Appellant does not dispute the first two elements (identity of the parties and identity of subjec t matter), but argues that the third element was not established because personal jurisdiction (i.e., proper service of the summons and complaint) was not adjudicated in the South Carolina action. "Whenever a foreign judgment is raised as a defense, the c ourt in the subsequent case can consider whether the court that rendered the judgment had the jurisdiction to do so. " ( Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1386.)

Appellant claims that she was not personally served with the summons an d complaint and that substituted service was attempted but not effectuated

. These factual
claims are dehors of the record, i.e., they are not reflected in the South Carolina judgment
or court record s . The affidavit of service states that appellant and Ha wkins were personally served with the summons and complaint . The affidavit includes description s of the two people served. Appellant could have brought a motion to set aside the judgment but, instead, appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals and t hen abandoned the appeal. Appellant certainly had notice of the action when she was evicted.
She fails to explain why a motion to vacate the judgment was not filed in South Carolina before moving to California and filing suit here.

Appellant asser ts tha t the South Carolina appeal was only a "special appearance" and has no collateral estoppel effect. We need not decide that issue. The
South Carolina trial court judgment include s the finding that appellant and Hawkins were
served with the s ummons and com plaint. Appellant cites no authority that the judgment

may be collaterally attacked in California by filing a new action for wrongful foreclosure.
The doctrines of r es judicata and collateral estoppel preclude piecemeal litigation by splitting a single c ause of action or relitigating the same primary right. ( Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co, supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 897.)5 Judicial Notice of Sister State Judgment Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the factual findings i n the South Carolina judgment. A lthough a court cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations in a court record, it can take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judg ments. ( Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.) "To determine whether to preclude relitigation on collateral estoppel grounds, judicial notice may be taken of a prior judgment and other court records. [Citations.]" ( Rodgers v. Sargent Controls &
A erospace (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 82, 90.)

As a general rule factual findings in a judgment are not the proper s ubject of judicial notice. T hat does not end our inquiry. "'Whether a factual finding is t rue is a different question than whether the truth of that factual finding may or may not be subsequently litigated a second time. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel will, when they apply, serve to bar relitigation of a factual dispute even in those instances where the factual dispute was erroneously decided in favor of a party who did not testify truthfully.' [Citation.] In other words, even though a factual finding in a prior judicial decision may not establish the truth of that fact for purposes of judicial notice, the finding
itse lf may be a proper subject of judicial notice if it has a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent action." ( Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 148.)

The trial court did not err in taking judicial notice of the South Carolina judgment and the service of process finding . The doctrine of res judicata/collateral estoppel bars relitigation of a factual dispute even when the factual dispute was erroneously decided in favor of a party who did not testify. (See Nakash v. Superior
Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 59, 67 [ res judicata ] ; McClain v. Rush (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 18, 2 8

- 29 [collateral estoppel] .) " 'Collateral estoppel' is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversar y system of justice. It

means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and6

final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." (

Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 3 97 U.S. 436, 443 [25 L .Ed.2d 469 , 475].) Courts often speak of applying full faith and credit to a sister state's judgment in order to implement res judicata principles. ( Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1271 .) "With respect to judgments
, 'the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.' [Citation.]

. . . A State may not disregard the judgment of a sister State because it disagrees with the reasoning underlying the judgment or deems it to be wrong on the merits." ( V.L. v. E.L. (March 8 , 2016 , No. 15

- 648) __U.S.__, __ [2016 D. A

. R

. 2273, 2273].)
Conclusion The purpose of the full faith and credit provisions, res ju dicata, and collateral estoppel rules is to prevent repetitive and vexatious litigation

. It also prevent s the waste of scar ce judicial resources. (See 7 Wi tkin, Cal . Procedure ( 5t h e d. 2008 ) Judgment
, § 334, p. 938 .) A llowing appe llant to proceed in this action would frustrate all
of the articulated reasons for the se rules.

The judgment is affirmed. SunTrust Bank is awarde d costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

YEGAN, J. We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.Kent Kellegrew, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Malcolm Tator , for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Zareh A. Jaltorossian, Maureen M. Home, Abraham J. Coleman, Michael Gerst, Hana R. Herscovitz; Reed Smith. David J. de Jesus; Reed Smith, for Defendant
and Respondent

.