alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CCC COMMODITY INVENTORY

As of February 29, 2020

(Million Units Except as Noted) OUTSTANDING UNDER LOAN CCC-OWNED

CY 2018 CY 2019 INVENTORY 2/

(Actual Units)

BUTTER (LB) - - 0.0

CHEESE (LB) - - 0.0

NONFAT DRY MILK (LB) - - 0.0

BARLEY (BU) 0.0 4.3 0.0

CORN (BU) 2.1 615.2 0.0

OATS (BU) 0.0 0.8 0.0

SORGHUM (BU) 0.2 2.1 0.0

SOYBEANS (BU) 0.3 117.8 0.0

WHEAT (BU) 0.3 43.2 0.0

RICE (CWT) 0.0 26.5 0.0

REFINED SUGAR (Mil. Lbs.) 133.0 584.5 0.0

 IN-PROCESS BEET 0.0 970.5 0.0

RAW CANE SUGAR (Mil. Lbs.) 0.0 1,299.9 0.0

 IN-PROCESS CANE 0.0 0.0 0.0

HONEY (Mil. Lbs.) 0.0 8.5 0.0

PEANUTS (tons) 0.0 1,842,900.0 0.00

CANOLA SEED (CWT) 1/ 0.0 1,260.0 0.0

CRAMBE (CWT) 1/ 0.0 0.0 0.0

FLAXSEED (CWT) 1/ 0.0 33.0 0.0

MUSTARD SEED (CWT) 1/ 0.0 0.0 0.0

RAPESEED (CWT) 1/ 0.0 0.0 0.0

SAFFLOWER SEED (CWT) 1/ 4.0 4.0 0.0

SESAME SEED (CWT) 1/ 0.0 0.0 0.0

SUNFLOWER SEED (OIL) (CWT) 1/ 0.0 390.0 0.0

SUNFLOWER SEED (Other) (CWT) 1/ 0.0 13.0 0.0

DRY PEAS (CWT) 1/ 0.0 1,161.0 0.0

LENTILS (CWT) 1/ 96.0 164.0 0.0

CHICKPEAS (CWT) 1/ 204.0 336.0 0.0

UPLAND COTTON (BALE) 7,200 6,354,500 4,002

ELS COTTON (BALE) 0 321,200 0

1/ Minor Oilseeds & Pulses are in thousand units.

2/ CCC acquired 2018 Crop Year upland cotton as follows: 

15 bales from May 2019, 81 bales from June 2019, 2,996 bales from July 2019, 17,630 bales from August 2019,

24,633 bales from September, 7,325 bales from October, 12,066 bales from November, 

2,234 bales from December, and 58 bales from January maturing loans.

Following were multiple invitations that sold 8,264 bales in September; 39,325 bales in November, 

7,899 bales in December, 9,697 bales sold in January, and 1,513 bales in February. 

In total, there were 4,002 bales of upland cotton in inventory on February 29, 2020. 

CCC also acquired 2018 Crop Year peanuts as follows: 4,559.12 tons from July 2019, 37,417.73 tons from 

August 2019, 37,845.19 tons from September 2019, 4,735.16 tons from October, 4,054.36 tons from 

November, and December 2,025.31 tons maturing loans.

Total CCC peanut forfeitures for Crop Year 2018 were 84,719.20 tons. CCC sold 340.51 tons from Invitation 

No. 8, 28,563.44 tons from Invitation No. 9, 13,052.09 tons from Invitation No. 10, 34,005.36 tons from

Invitation No. 11, 3,846.40 tons from Invitation No.12, 4,268.73 tons from Invitation No. 13, 0 tons from 

Invitation 14, 2,780.41 from Invitation 15, 1,249.44 tons from Invitation 16, 667.18 tons from Invitation 17, 

2025.31 tons from Invitation 19. 

This brought the total CCC peanut inventory to 0.00 tons as of February 29, 2020. 

Report Completed: March 30, 2020
Opinion issued April 7, 2015.

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-15-00259-CV

———————————

IN RE JOSEPH DEGIOANNI AND EMTEL, INC., Relators

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relators, Joseph Degioanni and Emtel, Inc., have filed a petition for a writ of 

mandamus, challenging an order granting real parties in interest Robert L. 

Pendergraft and William P. Haddock’s motion to stay the matter until the dispute is 

resolved by arbitration.

1

 

1

The underlying case is Joseph Degioanni and Emtel, Inc. v. Robert L. Pendergraft 

and William P. Haddock, cause number 2014-63317, pending in the 151st District 

Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Mike Engelhart presiding.
2

We deny the petition.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.
#### Leonard Charles PURCELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ben M. TOMASI, a hearing examiner for the State of Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division; George L. Theobald, Hearing Division Director, Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue of the State of Colorado, and Alan Charnes, Director of the Department of Revenue, State of Colorado, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 79CA0611.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

Jan. 4, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 1980.

Certiorari Denied April 7, 1980.

G. William Beardslee, Fort Collins, for plaintiff-appellant.

J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendants-appellees.

PIERCE, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals a judgment of the district court sustaining an order of the Department of Revenue suspending plaintiff’s driver’s license for a period of one year and denying plaintiff’s request for a restricted license. We affirm.

*845At a hearing conducted by the Department pursuant to § 42-2-123, C.R.S.1973, it was determined that plaintiff had accumulated 12 points within 12 months and 19 points within 2 years, and that his license should therefore be suspended. Plaintiff contends that the Department acted improperly in considering a citation from the City of Fort Collins issued on May 30, 1977. Citing *Stortz v. Colorado Department of Revenue,*195 Colo. 325, 578 P.2d 229 (1978), and *Dunn v. Tice,*Colo.App., 598 P.2d 530 (1979), plaintiff contends that the May 30 ticket does not bear on its face a notation of the points assessed for the offense and therefore may not be considered a conviction by the hearing officer.

Plaintiff’s reliance on *Stortz*and *Dunn,*which dealt with penalty assessments under the provisions of § 42-4-1501(4)(a), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum.Supp.), is misplaced. Section 42-2-121(3), C.R.S.1973, requires that for a penalty assessment to be considered a conviction for the purposes of suspension or revocation of a license, the summons must state clearly the points to be assessed for the offense. However, the conviction which plaintiff challenges was not the result of a penalty assessment, but rather resulted from a court appearance. Because the statutory provision which requires that a summons reflect the number of points to be assessed for the offense charged relates only to penalty assessments, plaintiff’s contention is without merit.

Judgment affirmed.

RULAND and STERNBERG, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Bienvenido Banch, Appellant.

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Barn-brick, J.), rendered August 17, 1988, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, attempted murder in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, reckless endangerment in the second degree, and menacing, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, we discern no violation of the *Rosario*principle in the People’s nondisclosure of a "Homicide Bureau Report” authored by an Assistant District Attorney who testified for the People at trial. The record reveals that the report constituted a type of internal worksheet containing, *inter alia,*the name of the trial assistant who had taken the defendant’s statements, the detective assigned to appear in the event of Grand Jury action and the names and addresses of witnesses. According to the trial assistant who had compiled it, the report was created so as to ensure that the Assistant District Attorney charged with *686subsequently presenting the case to the Grand Jury "could keep track of all the evidence in the case”. Under these circumstances, and since the report contained neither the statements of witnesses nor interview summaries drawn from statements of witnesses, the report constituted work product that was not subject to disclosure as *Rosario*material *(see,*CPL 240.10 [2]; *cf., People v Adger,*75 NY2d 723, 726; *People v Consolazio,*40 NY2d 446, 452-453, *cert denied*433 US 194; *People v Rayford,*158 AD2d 482; *People v Bell,*140 AD2d 937). Although the disclosure of statements made by two other prosecution witnesses was delayed, the record establishes that the defendant sustained no discernible prejudice as a result *(cf., People v Wallace,*76 NY2d 953).

We have reviewed the defendant’s remaining contentions and find them to be unpreserved for appellate review or lacking in merit. Kunzeman, J. P., Kooper, Lawrence and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of John J. Ambrosano, Respondent, v Canajoharie Central School District, Appellant.

—Mahoney, P. J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Best, J.), entered March 19, 1990 in Montgomery County, which granted petitioner’s application pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

On March 26, 1989 petitioner, while on leave from his duties at West Point Military Academy, was injured while playing basketball on a court on the grounds of Canajoharie Elementary School, premises under the control of respondent. Richard Rose, School Superintendent for respondent, was a participant in the game that resulted in petitioner’s injury.

On August 25, 1989, petitioner brought an order to show cause in Supreme Court, Orange County for leave to serve a late notice of claim. On September 19, 1989 that application was dismissed without prejudice on the ground that Orange County was an improper venue. A second order to show cause for the same relief was brought on October 24, 1989 in Montgomery County. Supreme Court thereafter granted petitioner’s application for leave to file a late notice of claim. This appeal ensued.

*915Both Education Law § 3813 (2-a) and General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) permit the court, in its discretion, to extend the time to serve a late notice of claim. Here, respondent contends that it was deprived of actual knowledge of the claim because its Superintendent, who saw petitioner sustain the alleged injuries, was not acting in his official capacity at the time of the accident. We reject this argument. Respondent’s chief officer was present at the time of the mishap, a fact that he admits in his affidavit. Thus, it is clear that respondent acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts of petitioner’s claim *(see, Matter of Frazzetta v Rondout Val. Cent. School Dist.,*166 AD2d 843). Further, we agree with Supreme Court that "[t]he relatively short delay * * * has certainly not prejudiced [respondent]” *(see, Matter of Nichols v Board of Educ.,*166 AD2d 846; *Matter of Edwards v Town of Delaware,*115 AD2d 205).

Weiss, Levine, Mercure and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
JUDGMENT

Court of Appeals 

 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-14-00052-CR

DONTA TREMAINE BROWNING, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 240th District Court of Fort Bend County. 

(Tr. Ct. No. 11-DCR-058541).

This case is an appeal from the final judgment signed by the trial court on December 

11, 2013. After submitting the case on the appellate record and the arguments properly 

raised by the parties, the Court holds that the trial court’s judgment contains no reversible 

error. Accordingly, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below for observance.

Judgment rendered February 26, 2015.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Brown and Lloyd. Opinion delivered 

by Justice Brown.
EXHIBIT 10.36.3



AMENDMENT



Amendment dated as of February 24, 2004 (the Amendment) to Amended and Restated Engagement Letter between Michael Warren Associates, Inc. (the
Firm or Warren) and BNS Co. (the Client or the Company) dated January 24, 2003 as amended to date (the Agreement).



WHEREAS, the parties wish to amend the Agreement to allow for the extension of services subject to the Agreement.



NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of these premises and the
mutual promises set forth below, and for good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby given, the parties hereby agree as follows:



|1. | The Assignment Length set forth in Addendum I to the Agreement is hereby amended to delete the phrase One year from January 24, 2003, unless earlier
terminated and replace the same with From January 24, 2003 to and including December 31, 2004, unless earlier terminated.
|-- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Except as modified above, the Agreement as amended shall remain in full force and effect.
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties has caused this Amendment to be duly executed and delivered as of the day first
above written.



Michael Warren Associates, Inc.By:

/s/    MICHAEL WARRENMichael WarrenBNS Co.By:

/s/    KENNETH N. KERMESKenneth N. Kermes Chairman, Board of
Directors
CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Harpreet Singh Sangha, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Douglas Lake Minerals Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

|Date:  November 5, 2006 | /s/ Harpreet S. Sangha
Harpreet Singh Sangha
Chief Executive Officer
|----------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------
CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Antonia Bold-de-Haughton, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Douglas Lake Minerals Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

|Date:  November 3, 2006 | /s/ Antonia Bold-de-Haughton
Antonia Bold-de-Haughton
Chief Financial Officer
|----------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
M A N D A T E

TO THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 8 of HIDALGO COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas, on the 12th day of

February, 2015, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

Agua Special Utility District, Appellant,

v.

Ruben Ochoa and Maria Belen G.

Ochoa

Appellees.

CAUSE NO. 13-14-00596-CV (Tr.Ct.No. CCD-0087-H)

was determined; and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion. Costs of the appeal are adjudged against

appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

      

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals

for the Thirteenth District of Texas, in this behalf, and in all things have it duly

recognized, obeyed and executed.

WITNESS, the Hon. Rogelio Valdez, Chief Justice of our Court of Appeals, with the seal

thereof affixed, at the City of Edinburg, Texas this 9th day of April, 2015.

Dorian E. Ramirez, CLERK

FILE COPY
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15D0323. ANTHONY B. MOORE v. JANEENE H. MOORE-MCKINNEY.

Anthony Moore filed this application for discretionary appeal from the trial

court’s order awarding him custody of his minor son and setting his ex-wife’s child

support obligations. Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11), direct appeals are permitted

from “[a]ll judgments or orders in child custody cases awarding, refusing to change,

or modifying child custody or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of

such child custody judgments or orders.” The order to be appealed is a final

judgment in a child custody case modifying child custody. Thus, Moore had a right

of direct appeal. The fact that he wishes to challenge only the child support portion

of the trial court’s order does not alter this conclusion. See Collins v. Davis, 318 Ga.

App. 265, 266-269 (1) (733 SE2d 798) (2012) (if trial court’s order falls within scope

of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (11), then a direct appeal is authorized regardless of the issue

raised on appeal).

We will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is

subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is

hereby GRANTED. Moore shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a

notice of appeal with the trial court. If, however, he has already filed a notice of

appeal, he need not file a second notice. The clerk of the trial court is DIRECTED

to include a copy of this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

April 08, 2015
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

04/08/2015
Regulatory Evaluation

Docket No. FAA-2015-6537 Directorate Identifier: 2014-NM-154-AD

If you make changes to the values in the table below, you must ensure the totals update accordingly. If 

they do not, click (or Tab) into and then out of the changed cell.

Estimated Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Do not include oncondition costs here

Costs per Product (e.g., aircraft, engine, 

propeller, appliance)

Work-hours

(include 

access, testing, 

and close-up)

Labor 

cost 

(@$85/h

our)

Parts Cost Total Costs 

(labor + 

parts)

Number of 

U.S. 

Registered 

Products

Total Cost 

for U.S. Fleet

Inspection 4.0 $ 340.00 $0 $ 340.00 69 $23,460.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

The known number of products in compliance: 0

Total Costs of compliance for U.S. fleet: $23,460

Costs covered under warranty (if known) $0

On-Condition Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Work-hours 

(include access, 

testing, and closeup)

Labor cost 

(@$85/hour)

Parts Cost Cost per Product

Corrective Action 98.0 $8,330.00 $0 $8,330.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

Special considerations for Economic Analysis (Use this field to explain anything in the Estimated Costs table 

that was assumed or might not be obvious. This field can also be used to explain warranty costs):
Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant? 

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Explain for 

either a Yes or No answer.

YES NO 

Explanation: 

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific requirements for 

aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode of transportation?

YES* NO 

*Explanation: