J-A10038-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MICHAEL VEON

Appellant No. 1128 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order June 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004656-2008

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2015

Appellant, Michael Veon, appeals from the order entered in the 

Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, denying his first petition brought 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

While serving as a member of the Pennsylvania legislature, Appellant used 

public resources to further his own political campaigns. Appellant diverted 

taxpayer monies to pay “bonuses” to campaign and legislative staffers for 

campaign work. Additionally, Appellant’s staffers performed the campaign 

work during the legislative working day, further consuming public resources. 

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of multiple counts of 

restricted activities―conflict of interest, theft of services, theft by deception, 

and criminal conspiracy. On June 18, 2010, the court sentenced Appellant 

to an aggregate term of five (5) years nine (9) months to fourteen (14) 

years’ imprisonment. Appellant filed post-sentence motions on Friday, July 

2, 2010, which the court denied on October 26, 2010. 

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on November 24, 2010. On April 26, 

2011, this Court issued a rule to show cause, directing Appellant to explain 

why this Court should not quash his appeal as untimely filed. Appellant filed 

a response on May 12, 2011. On May 18, 2011, this Court discharged the 

show cause order without taking further action. This Court also referred the 

timeliness issue to the merits panel assigned to Appellant’s case. This Court 

noted, “The merits panel may revisit the timeliness issue. Therefore, 

Appellant should be prepared to address the issue....” (Order, filed 5/18/11, 

at 1). On December 13, 2012, a panel of this Court (with one dissent) 

quashed the appeal as untimely filed. See Commonwealth v. Veon, 64 

A.3d 19 (Pa.Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum). 

Appellant filed a counseled PCRA petition on April 26, 2013, arguing 

prior counsel were ineffective for failing “to file timely post-[sentence] 

motions and a timely notice of appeal after being specifically requested by 

[Appellant] to appeal his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.” 

(PCRA Petition, filed 4/26/13, at 4). On August 26, 2013, Appellant filed an 
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amended PCRA petition, in which he continued to assert his claim of prior 

counsels’ ineffectiveness. The amended petition also included a list of 

witnesses who would testify on Appellant’s behalf, as well as summaries of 

the proposed witnesses’ testimony. 

On October 2, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss 

Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely filed. Also on October 2, 2013, the 

Commonwealth filed a response to Appellant’s amended PCRA petition, 

asserting: 

[Appellant] was sentenced on June 18, 2010. His 

conviction became final on July 18, 2010, when the 30-day 

deadline for a timely appeal to the Superior Court passed. 

He therefore had until July 18, 2011...to file for relief under 

the PCRA. He, however, did not file his initial petition until 

April 2[6], 2013. 

(Response to Amended PCRA Petition, filed 10/2/13, at 4). The court 

conducted argument on December 4, 2013. On June 10, 2014, the court 

granted the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss and denied PCRA relief. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 9, 2014. On July 16, 

2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely 

filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on August 6, 2014. 

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Appellant timely 

filed his current PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196 

(Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 603 Pa. 684, 982 A.2d 1227 (2009). 

Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely 
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PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837 A.2d 1157 

(2003). The most recent amendments to the PCRA, effective January 16, 

1996, provide that a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent 

petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment 

becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Bretz, 830 

A.2d 1273 (Pa.Super. 2003). A judgment is deemed final “at the conclusion 

of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the 

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of 

time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). “[I]n 

circumstances in which no timely direct appeal is filed relative to a judgment 

of sentence, and direct review is therefore unavailable, the one-year period 

allowed for the filing of a post-conviction petition commences upon the 

actual expiration of the time period allowed for seeking direct review, as 

specified in the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 596 Pa. 354, 361, 943 

A.2d 264, 268 (2008). 

The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA 

allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition 

will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, the 

petition must allege and the petitioner must prove: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result 

of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or 

laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of 

the United States; 
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). “As such, when a PCRA petition is not 

filed within one year of the expiration of direct review, or not eligible for one 

of the three limited exceptions, or entitled to one of the exceptions, but not 

filed within 60 days of the date that the claim could have been first brought, 

the trial court has no power to address the substantive merits of a 

petitioner’s PCRA claims.” Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 

70, 77, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (2000). 

Instantly, the court sentenced Appellant on June 18, 2010. Because 

Appellant’s post-sentence motions were due on or before Monday, June 28, 

2010, but untimely filed on Friday, July 2, 2010, his judgment of sentence 

became final on Monday, July 19, 2010, upon expiration of the 30-day 

period to file a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant filed the current PCRA petition on April 

26, 2013, almost three years after his judgment of sentence became final. 

Thus, Appellant’s current prayer for relief is patently untimely. See Brown, 

supra (explaining one-year period for filing PCRA petition commenced upon 

expiration of time allowed for filing direct appeal, rather than upon 
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disposition of untimely filed notice of appeal). See also Commonwealth v. 

Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50 (Pa.Super. 2000) (stating one-year period for filing

PCRA petition commenced after expiration of time allowed for seeking 

further review by Pennsylvania Supreme Court on direct appeal, even 

though defendant later filed untimely petition for allowance of appeal, which 

Supreme Court denied). Moreover, Appellant failed to plead or prove one or 

more of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA timeliness requirements.2 

Therefore, Appellant’s petition remains time-barred. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

Judge Jenkins did not participate in the consideration or decision of 

this case.

____________________________________________

2

In his brief, Appellant attempts to invoke an exception to the time 

restrictions of the PCRA, arguing the facts upon which his claim is based 

were unknown to him and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Appellant also argues 

that application of the PCRA time restrictions is unconstitutional as applied to 

a petitioner alleging the denial of his constitutional right to a direct appeal 

due to the abandonment of counsel. Nevertheless, Appellant failed to raise 

these arguments before the PCRA court. See Commonwealth v. Ousley, 

21 A.3d 1238 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 698, 30 A.3d 487 

(2011) (reiterating issues not raised in PCRA petition cannot be considered 

on appeal); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 533 A.2d 1051 (Pa.Super. 1987) 

(explaining constitutional issues are waived if not raised and preserved at all 

levels of adjudication). Moreover, Appellant failed to advance these specific 

arguments in his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v. 

Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005) (stating general rule that any 

issue not included in Rule 1925(b) statement is waived for purposes of 

appellate review). Therefore, Appellant failed to preserve these arguments 

advanced in his brief. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/10/2015