alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-10522

Summary Calendar 

T. H. HILL, 

Plaintiff–Appellant, 

versus 

DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE; DALLAS COUNTY; 

CITY OF DALLAS; BRENDA H. THOMPSON; CARL E. ROBERTS, L.L.C.; 

CARL R. KING; DALLAS COUNTY CLERKS OFFICE, 

Defendants–Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas 

USDC No. 3:15-CV-1311

Before JONES, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

T. H. Hill moves for authorization to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) 

to pursue the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. By doing so, he is 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fif h Circuit

FILED

February 10, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-10522 Document: 00513871792 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/10/2017
No. 15-10522

2 

challenging the district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good 

faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Because the 

notice of appeal was filed after the magistrate judge had issued his report and 

recommendation (“R&R”) but before the district court had ruled, Hill sought to 

appeal the R&R. 

A premature notice of appeal is valid only where the order appealed from 

announces a decision that would be appealable if it were immediately followed 

by the entry of judgment. FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 

498 U.S. 269, 276–77 (1991); see also United States v. Cooper, 135 F.3d 960, 

963 (5th Cir. 1998). Even if it were immediately followed by the entry of judgment, the R&R was not appealable, see Cooper, 135 F.3d at 962–63, so the 

notice of appeal is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court, see id. Because Hill sought to appeal a non-appealable order, his appeal has no arguable 

basis in law or fact and therefore is frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 

215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). 

 Accordingly, the motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal is DENIED, 

and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 

5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 15-10522 Document: 00513871792 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/10/2017
PARK AT SYCAMORE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ROZALIND WILSON 

and ALL OCCUPANTS, 

Defendant. 

NO. 2015-001375-1 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

JUDGMENT 

IN THE COUNTY COURT 

ATLAWNO. l 

TARRANTCOUNTY,TEXAS 

On April 2, 2015, the above-styled and numbered cause came on for trial. This cause 

was an eviction appeal from a judgment rendered against Defendant in the Justice of the Peace 

Court Precinct 6, Tarrant County, Texas. Plaintiff Park at Sycamore appeared by and through its 

attorneys of record, The Suster Law Group, PLLC. Defendant Rozalind Wilson did __ 

appear. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over the case and parties. The Court further finds 

that Defendant breached the lease contract with Plaintiff. The Court further finds that Plaintiff is 

entitled to possession of the premises located at 7516 Cape Cod Drive, Apartment #733, Fort 

Worth, Texas 76133. The Court further finds that Plaintiff has sustained actual damages as a 

result of Defendant's breach of lease. The Court further finds that Plaintiff should be awarded 

reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees. The Court further finds that Plaintiff should be 

awarded court costs. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff take judgment against Defendant Rozalind 

Wilson in the amount of$ ~ DO 0 JL._ , for actual damages and that Plaintiff be awarded 

post-judgment interest at the contractual rate of eighteen percent ( 18%) per annum. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Rozalind Wilson and all occupants vacate 

the premises located at 7516 Cape Cod Drive, Apartment #733, Fort Worth, Texas 76133, and 

JUDGMENT PAGE 1 

 RECEIVED IN 2nd COURT OF APPEALS FORT WORTH, TEXAS 04/10/2015 2:11:42 PM DEBRA SPISAK Clerk
that Plaintiff be granted judgment for possession of such premises. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff take judgment against Defendant Rozalind 

Wilson in the amount of $1,002.09 for reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees through trial. IT 

IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff take judgment against Defendant in the amount of an 

additional $7,500.00, for necessary and reasonable attorneys' fees should Plaintiff prevail on 

appeal to the Court of Appeals. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff take judgment 

against Defendant in the amount of an additional $4,500.00, for necessary and reasonable 

attorneys' fees should Plaintiff prevail on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff be awarded court costs in the amount of 

$116.00. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all funds placed in the registry of the Court by 

Defendant or on Defendant's behalf be immediately released to Plaintiff and mailed to The 

Suster Law Group, PLLC, 1316 Village Drive, Suite 500, Plano, Texas 75093. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all writs necessary to enforce this judgment be issued 

in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas and any related statutory waiting periods. All 

relief not herein granted is denied. This judgment shall represent a full and final disposition of 

all claims brought by all parties in this lawsuit. 

SIGNED this b. day of April, 2015. 

JUDGMENT PAGE2
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-22-00086-CV

Jonathan Jones, Appellant

v.

Laury Carson, Appellee

FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. D-1-FM-17-004533, THE HONORABLE MADELEINE CONNOR, JUDGE PRESIDING

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

Appellant’s brief on appeal was originally due June 15, 2022. On appellant’s 

motion, the time for filing was extended to August 4, 2022. Appellant has now filed a second 

motion, requesting that the Court extend the time for filing appellant’s brief. We grant the 

motion for extension of time and order appellant to file a brief no later than September 19, 2022.

No further extension of time will be granted and failure to comply with this order may result in 

dismissal of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a).

It is ordered on August 25, 2022.

Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Kelly
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Tom Brown, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A for the year ending December 31, 2002 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Daniel G. Blanchard, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



/s/DANIEL G. BLANCHARD Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and TreasurerAugust 5, 2003

---
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 20

- 050 8 V

UNPUBLISHED

JERRY TAYLOR

,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent. Chief Special Master Corcoran

Filed: September 7, 2021

Special Processing Unit (SPU) ;
Rul ing on Entitlement; Concession;
Table Injury; Hepatitis B (Hep B)

Vaccine; Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (SIRVA)

Bridget Candace McCullough, Muller Brazil, LLP, Dresher, PA , for P etitioner.

Jennifer Leigh Reynaud , U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for R espondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

On April 27, 2020

, Jerry Taylor filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa

- 10, et seq. 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that he suffered left shoulder injur ies related to vaccine

administration as a result of a He patitis B vaccine received on October 23, 2018 . Petition

at 1 . The case was assigned to the S pecial Processing Unit of the Office of Special

Masters.

On September 3, 2021

, R espondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he co ncedes

that P etitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at

1. Specifically, R espondent agrees that “ petitioner has no history of pain, inflammation, or dysfunction in his left shoulder; his pain and reduced range of motion were limited to

1 Because this unpublished R uling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E

- Government Act

of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the R uling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information,

the disclosure of which would co nstitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99

- 660, 100 Stat. 3755

. Hereinafter, for ease
of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subpara graph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012 ).2

the shoulder in which the vaccine was administered; and no other condition or abnormality

w as identified to explain his symptoms

. ” Id. at 4 . Respondent further agrees that the statutory six month sequela requirement has been satisfied and that Pet itioner has

satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the Act

. Id.

In view of R espondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that

P etitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran
Chief Special Master
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-6572

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus EON DAVID, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CR-95-206, CA-98-917-1) Submitted: June 17, 1999 Decided: June 23, 1999 Before MURNAGHAN and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Eon David, Appellant Pro Se. Lawrence Patrick Auld, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the order from which David appeals was filed on March 17, 1999, it was entered on the district court’s docket sheet on March, 18, 1999. March 18, 1999, is therefore the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 and 79(a); see also Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM: Eon David seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West Supp. 1999). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. David , Nos. CR-95-206; CA-98-917-1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 1999). * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
391 A.2d 673

#### Commonwealth v. Barnett, Appellant.

Submitted March 13,1978.

James M. Schall, Public Defender, for appellant; Gary Deane Wilt, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Order affirmed.

HOFFMAN, J., dissented.
Exhibit 32.2



Certification required by Rule 13a-14(b)
or

Rule 15d-14(b) and Section 1350 of Chapter
63 of Title 18 of the United States Code



In connection with the Quarterly Report
of NGP Capital Resources Company (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2014, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, L. Scott Biar, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer,
Secretary and Chief Compliance Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|Date:    August 7, 2014 | /s/ L. SCOTT BIAR                                                         
|----------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                        | L. Scott Biar                                                             
|                        | Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, Secretary and Chief Compliance Officer
# Mfrnmo f
•••x.€ rOPERATION S
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. A.O:2 3 

# Florid aHous e o f

Representative s Set h McKee l Representative , Distric t

6 3

425 0 Sout h Florid aAvenue , Suit e 4 Lakeland , F L 33813-172 5 (863)647-489 6 (863)647-489 8 Fa x email : solli.nickoel'ffnivfloridahuuse.gov 319X11 6 Capito l 40 2 S

. Monro e Stree t Tallahassee , F L 32399-130 0 (850 ) 488-989 0 Augus t 23 , 201 0
Th e Honorabl e Ra

y LaHoo d Secretary , U

. S

. Departmen t o f Transportatio n 40 0 7ti i Street , S W Roo m1020 0 Washington , D C 2059 0 Secretary LaHood , I write tiii s lette r

t o expres s m

y support fo r Lakelan dLinde r

Regional Airport' s gran t applicatio n fo

r th e Departmen t

o f Transportation' s Smal l Communit y Ai r Ser\'ic e Developmen t

Program

. I'v e lon g believe dtha

t amor e intens e focu s on attractin g lo w far e commercia l ai r

traffi c i s th e righ t

answe r for Lakelan dan di s th e directio n th e ne w Airport administratio n shoul dpursue . Tlii s gran t woul d allo w ou r airport th e opportunit y t o foster

tha t economi c growth

. A t th e local an dstat e level , Lakelan dha s garnere dtremendou s suppor t fo r th e airport

a s a n integra l par t o f amor e divers e transportatio n portfolio

. Th e Cit y i s investin g ove r

$i.4 M o n infrastructur e project s t o prepar e fo

r commercia l service

. Additionally , th e Cit y provide s polic e an dfir

e ser\'ice s a t n o cos t to th e airport , savin g ove r $450,00 0 annuall y fro

mth e rat e bas e whic h carrier s woul d otherwis e hav e t o pay . FDO T i n Augus t 201 0 grante dth e airpor

t $2.0 M t o fun

dth e improvement s necessary to accommodat e schedule dfligh t operations ; thes e includ e ticketin g areas , baggag e claim , baggag e make-u p areas , steril e areas , th e security checkpoint , acces s controls , CCTV , additional ' facilit y squar e footage , an doffice s fo r T.S.A

. Lakeland' s uniqu e locatio n alon g th e 1- 4 corrido r further necessitate s th e nee dfor lo w fare ai r service

. Proximity t o th e futur e hig h spee drai l syste mwil l enabl e eas y acces s t o an dfromth e Airpor t wit h groun dtransportatio n alternative s availabl e t o mov e passenger s t o thei r final destinatio n withi n Pol k

County , o r

it s neighborin g Hillsboroug h an dOrang e County

. Again , I believ e thi s projec t goe s alon g way towar ddevelopin g asafe , efficient an dreliabl e regional transportatio n structur e for Polk County an dI sincerel y appreciat e you r consideration , ca n b e o f furthe r assistance , pleas e d o no t hesitat e t o contac t

m e directly

. Sincerely , I f I

Set h McKee l
IA 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. J. RES. 47 

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to repeal 

the sixteenth article of amendment. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 22, 2019 

Mr. KING of Iowa submitted the following joint resolution; which was referred 

to the Committee on the Judiciary 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United 

States to repeal the sixteenth article of amendment. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two3 thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all 

6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when 

7 ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several 

8 States within seven years after the date of its submission 

9 for ratification: 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
2 

•HJ 47 IH 

1 ‘‘ARTICLE— 

2 ‘‘The sixteenth article of amendment to the Constitu3 tion of the United States is hereby repealed.’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42 with BILLS
#### Doris Socoloff, as Administratrix of the Estate of Norman Socoloff, Deceased, Respondent, v New York Eye and Ear Infirmary, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

—In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice and wrongful death, the defendant New York Eye and Ear Infirmary appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bellard, J.), dated November 22, 1989, which denied its motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the facts, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the defendant New York Eye and Ear Infirmary.

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint insofar as asserted against it. At the time the appellant served its first 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216 on October 11, 1988, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to comply or seek an extension of the 90-day period. The plaintiff did not respond to this demand nor to a second demand served on May 25, 1989. Having failed to fulfill her obligations, the plaintiff was obligated to establish a justifiable excuse and a meritorious cause of action to avoid the sanction of dismissal. The affirmation by the plaintiff’s counsel was insufficient to *728establish a meritorious cause of action and, as no acceptable excuse was offered for the failure to proceed and timely file the note of issue, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant *(see, Midolo v Horner,*131 AD2d 825; *Meth v Maimonides Med. Center,*99 AD2d 799). Bracken, J. P., Kooper, Lawrence, Balletta and O’Brien, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6323

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

SHONTONIO L. WITHERSPOON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior

District Judge. (2:08-cr-00844-PMD-1)

Submitted: September 29, 2016 Decided: October 4, 2016 

Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Shontonio L. Witherspoon, Appellant Pro Se. Sean Kittrell, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Shontonio L. Witherspoon seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) 

motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or 

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Witherspoon has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-4236

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

TONY LEE JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Richard L. Williams, Senior

District Judge. (CR-03-238)

Submitted: September 29, 2004 Decided: October 7, 2004

Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jennifer M. Newman, LAW OFFICES OF JENNIFER M. NEWMAN, P.C.,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States

Attorney, Brian Whisler, Michael C. Wallace, Sr., Assistant United

States Attorneys, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Tony Lee Jones appeals his convictions for three counts

of distribution of cocaine base with a resulting ninety-eight month

sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.

Jones’s sole contention on appeal is that insufficient

evidence supported his convictions. To determine if there was

sufficient evidence to support a conviction, this court considers

whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Government, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v.

Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 495 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.

2906 (2004). Substantial evidence is defined as “that evidence

which ‘a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 333

(4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-

63 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). The court reviews both direct and

circumstantial evidence and permits “the [G]overnment the benefit

of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought

to be established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021

(4th Cir. 1982). Witness credibility is within the sole province

of the jury, and the court will not reassess the credibility of

testimony. United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir.

1989).
- 3 -

We have fully reviewed the materials submitted by the

parties and find that sufficient evidence existed to support the

convictions. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED