2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-1-2011

USA v. Tyrone Williams

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-1400

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Tyrone Williams" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1717.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-1400

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

TYRONE D. WILLIAMS,

a/k/a Willie Gulley

Tyrone D. Williams,

 Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(Crim. No. 3-07-cr-00005-001)

District Judge: Hon. Kim R. Gibson

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

Monday, January 24, 2011

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, Circuit Judges,

and STEARNS, District Judge

(Opinion Filed: March 1, 2011 )

OPINION

McKEE, Chief Judge.

 

Honorable Richard G. Stearns, District Court Judge, United States District Court for the 

District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
2

Tyrone Williams appeals the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. For 

the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

Since we write primarily for the parties, we need not set forth the factual history of 

this case in detail.1

Williams filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the multiple 

searches of the house that resulted in him entering a conditional guilty plea to violating 

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The plea was entered after the district court partially 

denied his motion to suppress physical evidence. 

Williams argues that: (1) the district court erred in finding that the first search 

warrant was supported by probable cause; and (2) the Leon “good faith” exception to the 

exclusionary rule does not apply. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925 (1984) 

(holding that courts can “reject suppression motions posing no important Fourth 

Amendment questions by turning immediately to a consideration of the officers’ good 

faith.”). However, since the application of Leon is determinative, we need not decide if 

the warrants were supported by probable cause. See United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 

73 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that even if an affidavit lacked probable cause, the good faith 

exception would require reversal of a district court’s suppression order).

“Suppression . . . is inappropriate when an officer executes a search in objectively 

reasonable reliance on a warrant’s authority.” Id. at 74; accord Leon, 468 U.S. at 920. 

 

1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review for clear error a district 

court’s factual findings,” while conducting “plenary review of legal rulings and mixed 

questions of law and fact.” United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 395-96 (3d Cir. 

2006). 
3

This Court has determined that the exception to the exclusionary rule is appropriate 

because “[i]n the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s 

probable cause determination.” Williams, 3 F.3d at 74 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 921).

Nevertheless, the exception does not always apply, even when a search is 

supported by a search warrant. For example, it does not apply where an affidavit in 

support of the warrant contains knowingly or recklessly false information. See Leon, 468 

U.S. at 923 (“Suppression remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in 

issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was 

false . . . .”). Similarly, “in cases where the magistrate wholly abandon[s] his judicial 

role,” or when an affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 

belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” the good faith exception does not apply. Id. 

Williams argues that the affidavit was misleading because it included the 

statement from Paul’s daughter that suggested a gun was in the house. However, the 

daughter’s statement was not false. To the contrary, the officers’ search did reveal a gun 

in the master bedroom, which is exactly where the daughter suggested looking. 

Williams also argues that the good faith exception should not apply because the 

affidavit was “bare bones.” As we have just explained, the good faith exception does not 

apply when an affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official 

belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Here, however, the 

affidavit recounted the officers’ response to the domestic violence call, and explained 

why the officers believed that evidence of domestic violence would be found inside 
4

Williams’ home. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that the Leon 

exception negated application of the exclusionary rule. 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court’s order denying 

Williams’ request to suppress evidence pursuant to the search warrants.