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IN THE INTEREST OF: ) 

M.B.N., a child under seventeen years of ) 

age. ) 

 ) 

GREENE COUNTY JUVENILE OFFICE, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner-Respondent, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) No. SD33397 

) 

 ) Filed: April 13, 2015 

E.R.N., ) 

 ) 

 Respondent-Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY 

Honorable David C. Jones, Circuit Judge 

AFFIRMED

E.R.N. (“Mother”), the mother of M.B.N. (“Child”), brings this appeal from the 

judgment terminating her parental rights to Child. In her first three points, she challenges 

the statutory bases for the termination and in her fourth point she challenges that it is in 

the best interest of Child to have Mother’s parental rights terminated. We affirm the 

judgment. 
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 Child, who was born in 2002, came into the care of the Children’s Division in 

2010, as a result of his own severe behavioral problems. At the same time, Child’s older 

sibling, who was at C-Star for substance abuse issues, was taken into protective custody. 

A hotline was received that Child had such a severe meltdown at school that the 

classroom was evacuated. The principal stated that Child behaved when he was on his 

medication but, over the few weeks prior to the meltdown, Child’s behaviors had gotten 

worse and more aggressive. Mother had told the school principal that she was running 

low on Child’s medication, which was a patch. The Children’s Division worker felt that 

Mother was unreceptive to input from the Children’s Division, but Mother was told that 

she needed to address Child’s medication issue immediately. Mother told the principal 

that she did not have money for medication and was giving Child half the dosage of his 

medication. 

Mother had received services from the Children’s Division during several periods 

of time prior to this hotline referral. Mother took Child to the emergency room due to an 

“accidental” overdose; she said she gave him more medication because his behavior had 

been worsening. Custody was taken in June 2010, after a juvenile conference with a 

determination that Mother was acting “very erratic.” Mother was told she needed to 

address her own mental health needs. The court found removal was necessary due to 

Mother’s improper supervision of Child, inappropriate parenting, and abuse by 

intentionally giving an overdose of medication. After custody had been taken, Mother 

was put on a 96-hour hold because of her comments concerning going to sleep and not 

waking up. 
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While Child was in foster care, his behavior continued to regress. He was first in 

a traditional foster home but was moved because the foster parent was afraid for the life 

of her biological child. Child was hospitalized and then moved to a career foster home, 

with all placements indicating he had the same behavior issues that he had before he 

came into custody. He was placed in at least three different facilities. At the time of trial 

he was in a very structured group facility, Butterfield, and continued to have negative 

behavior issues, causing him to be in seclusion. He is on at least six different 

medications at Butterfield. An aunt had a home study requesting custody, but was not 

approved. No other family members stepped forward as a possible placement and there 

was no future placement available, other than the group home, at the time of trial. The 

Children’s Division “hoped that there might be someone out there” as an available 

placement if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. 

 At this same time, the Children’s Division reported that Mother did not have 

stable housing or employment and had problems with visitation because Child had a 

history of running away, and also because the Children’s Division felt Mother did not 

have a “nurturing ability.” It was recommended that Mother take parenting classes and 

family therapy. Mother sought therapy from Ms. Courtney-Miller, who indicated that the 

number one issue to address was Mother’s unresolved grief and loss bereavement arising 

from the murder of her oldest son and the loss of Child to protective custody. Many of 

Mother’s symptoms of depression, anxiety, stress, sleep disturbances, outbursts of anger, 

difficulty maintaining focus and concentration, and disruptions in appetite were due to 

recollections of her son’s death. The symptoms were a “walking diagnosis for posttraumatic stress disorder.” The therapist stated that Mother’s depression adversely 
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impacted her ability to parent Child at the time or to even care for herself but suggested 

that there was a reasonable likelihood that the mental health issues would be rectified 

within an ascertainable period of time; however, the impending murder trial was forcing 

Mother into continual trauma. 

 In addition to her personal issues of depression, Mother was involved in a 

relationship where there was domestic violence. After Child went into care, Mother had 

substance-abuse issues, including positive drug tests for methamphetamine and a failure 

to appear for drug testing. She also failed to appear for visitation and family visits and 

stopped attending grief counseling over the death of her older child. At the time of trial, 

the Children’s Division was unaware of whether Mother had a stable residence and 

appropriate home or stable employment. Child was placed three hours from Mother’s 

home. Though Mother could have had some assistance with transportation, she rarely 

availed herself of it. 

 “This Court reviews whether clear, cogent, and convincing 

evidence was presented to support a statutory ground for terminating 

parental rights under Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). 

Therefore, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed unless there is no 

substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, 

or it erroneously declares or applies the law. The judgment will be 

reversed only if we are left with a firm belief that the order is wrong. 

Conflicting evidence will be reviewed in the light most favorable 

to the trial court’s judgment. Appellate courts will defer to the trial court’s 

credibility assessments. When the evidence poses two reasonable but 

different inferences, this Court is obligated to defer to the trial court’s 

assessment of the evidence. 

 . . . . 

After this Court determines that one or more statutory ground has 

been proven by clear, convincing, and cogent evidence, this Court must 

ask whether termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the 

child. At the trial level, the standard of proof for this best interest inquiry 
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is a preponderance of the evidence; on appeal, the standard of review is 

abuse of discretion.” 

J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of 

C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 815-16 (Mo. banc 2011)). “The circuit court’s judgment will 

be affirmed if the record supports at least one ground and supports that termination is in 

the best interest of [Child].” Id. at 630. 

With that standard of review in mind, we will thus address the claimed error in 

Mother’s third point: that Mother had failed to rectify the conditions that led to Child’s 

placement in care and that conditions of a potentially harmful nature still existed such 

that Child could not be returned to Mother in the near future. 

 Mother admits that she had “missteps in addressing her own therapy issues” but 

states that these missteps were primarily a result of the post-traumatic stress caused by 

the murder and subsequent trial for the murder of her older son. Mother points to the 

evidence of her therapist that Mother could address the issues of lack of visitation, 

unstable housing and unemployment, and her inability to deal with Child’s severe 

behavioral issues within the next six months. The trial court entered Interim Findings 

and Recommendations but scheduled a third day of trial for ninety days after the hearing 

in order to give Mother an opportunity to remedy some of the issues which arose during 

the trial. Mother did not appear in person for that third day of trial. During that time, 

Mother did not submit to drug testing, attending only one counseling session, and visited 

Child only once. There was testimony that Child was doing “better” on the last day of 

the trial than he had been previously. 

 It is clear from the above, including the admissions of Mother, that substantial 

evidence supports the trial court’s judgment. Mother was not able to care for Child 
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during the entire time that he was in the care of the Children’s Division. Although she 

had been dealt a harsh hand with the death of one son and the behavioral issues of the 

second son, the reality facing the trial court was that Mother was given an opportunity to 

deal with her issues and Child’s issues and was not able to do so at the time of trial. 

Mother had failed to rectify the conditions that caused Child to come into care, including 

her depression, her substance abuse, her living conditions (including involvement in a 

violent relationship), and her inability to put Child’s needs first. She simply was not 

capable, and would not be capable, in the foreseeable future to parent Child. The abovecited evidence supports the judgment that Mother failed to rectify the conditions that 

brought Child into care. Mother’s third point is denied. 

 In addition to finding that one of the statutory conditions had been met, the trial 

court had to determine whether the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best 

interest of Child. We review that finding of the trial court for an abuse of discretion. In 

re F.C., 211 S.W.3d 680, 684 (Mo.App. S.D. 2007). Although it is troubling that Child’s 

behavior was the trigger that brought him into care and away from his family and that 

behavior regressed while in the care of experts in childcare, we cannot find an abuse of 

discretion in the findings that the termination was in Child’s best interest. This is so 

because of the evidence indicating a limited emotional tie between Mother and Child, the 

limited visitation and contact between Mother and Child, and the testimony indicating 

that additional services would not bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling the 

return of Child to Mother within an ascertainable time. The case was pending for four 

years and, though there were events that would challenge the strongest of parents, Mother 

simply could not parent Child at the time of trial. Although Mother points to the 
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evidence that it will be difficult to find an adoptive home for Child due to the past 

frequent placements of Child, the court did not abuse its discretion in believing the 

testimony that it would be possible to find a permanent home for Child and that one of 

the difficulties in finding that permanent home was that Mother’s parental rights had not 

been terminated. We are mindful of Mother’s concern that Child will be parentless with 

little hope for adoption and a permanent home, but we cannot find that the trial court 

abused its discretion in finding that it was in Child’s best interest that Mother’s parental 

rights be terminated. 

The judgment is affirmed. 

Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer, J. - Opinion Author 

Mary W. Sheffield, P.J. - Concurs 

Don E. Burrell, J. - Concurs