Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1412-CR-551 | April 14, 2015 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jeffrey Elftman 

Deputy Public Defender 

Kokomo, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General of Indiana 

Brian Reitz 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Stephen A. Jones 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

April 14, 2015 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

34A05-1412-CR-551 

Appeal from the Howard County 

Superior Court 1 

Honorable William C. Menges, 

Judge 

Cause No. 34D01-1008-FB-698 

Friedlander, Judge. 

[1] Stephen A. Jones presents a single issue on appeal, whether the trial court erred 

in its determination of credit time. 

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions. 
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[3] On August 19, 2010 Jones was charged in Howard County with three counts of 

dealing in a schedule I controlled substance as a class B felony, possession of a 

controlled substance as a class D felony, neglect of a dependent as class D 

felony, and two counts of dealing in marijuana as a class A misdemeanor. On 

January 19, 2011, Jones pleaded guilty to two counts of dealing in a schedule I 

controlled substance as a class B felony and one count of possession of 

marijuana as a class A misdemeanor. Jones was sentenced to an aggregate 

term of ten years in the Department of Correction (DOC), with four years 

suspended to supervised probation. At the time of sentencing Jones was given 

one hundred credit days. 

[4] On October 25, 2011, Jones filed a petition to modify his sentence to supervised 

probation or home detention. The petition was granted on December 21, 2011, 

and Jones was ordered to complete the Howard County Community Transition 

Program (CTP) before serving 499 executed days on home detention. While 

participating in the CTP and on home detention, Jones was on GPS 

monitoring. He received 2 sanctions resulting in incarceration for 6 actual days 

and a total of 12 credit days. On July 2, 2014 the State filed a petition to 

revoke Jones’s suspended sentence because he was terminated from the CTP. 

Jones admitted the alleged violations on October 9, 2014, and the court 

imposed the remaining 2866 days of his suspended sentence, to be served in the 

DOC. Jones received credit time for 282 days spent awaiting the disposition of 

the termination and probation revocation and for the 12 days of jail sanctions. 

The trial court determined, “he’s not entitled to credit time on CTP, and 
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number two, to the extent that he was on a bracelet as a condition of probation, 

he’s not entitled to credit time for that either.” Transcript at 12, 3. As a result, 

the trial court did not award him any credit time for time spent on home 

detention and GPS monitoring. On October 29, 2014, Jones filed a motion to 

correct errors, which the trial court denied. Jones now appeals. 

[5] Jones argues that the trial court erred in not awarding him credit time for the 

time he spent on home detention and GPS monitoring. We agree. We review 

the trial court’s factual determinations for an abuse of discretion, and its legal 

conclusions de novo. Strowmatt v. State, 779 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 

On appeal, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the trial court erred 

in calculating the credit time. Gardner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1997). 

[6] With respect to credit for time spent in a community corrections program—

here, in-home detention—a person who is serving a criminal sentence and 

placed in such a program is entitled to earn one day of credit time for each day 

the person is on home detention, plus any earned credit time. See I.C. § 35–38-

2.6-6(b); Pharr v. State, 2 N.E.3d 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). That person, 

however, may be deprived of earned credit time as provided by rules adopted by 

the DOC. See I.C. § 35–38–2.6–6(d). Only the DOC may deprive a community 

corrections participant of earned credit time. Pharr v. State, 2 N.E.3d 10, 12 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that “the statutes do not authorize trial courts to 

deprive offenders of credit time while in a community corrections program” 
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and instead the trial court is “authorized only to determine the credit time 

earned” by a defendant in such a program). 

[7] The State and Jones agree that Jones is entitled to credit time for his time on 

home detention and under GPS monitoring. Jones and the State disagree, 

however, as to the number of credit-time days to which he is entitled and 

whether he is eligible for good-time credit. Jones argues he is eligible for 1028 

actual days and 1028 good-time credit days spent on electronic monitoring for 

an aggregate of 2056 credit days. The State argues he spent only 875 actual 

days on electronic monitoring and home detention and that we must remand 

for a determination by the DOC as to whether he is entitled to good-time credit, 

and, if so, how many days should be awarded. 

[8] Two critical pieces of information are ambiguous in the record. First, it is 

unclear whether the DOC made a determination as to whether Jones was 

entitled to good-time credit. Second, it is unclear from the record whether the 

Howard County Superior Court supervises Community Corrections in Howard 

County and thus is entitled to make a determination of good-time credit. If that 

were the case, then the trial court would, in theory, be authorized to determine 

whether Jones is entitled to good-time credit. Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783 

(Ind. 2004). We note that Jones admitted to a violation of his in-home 

detention and, as such, is subject to a loss of good-time credit. But it is unclear 

whether the entity that made the determination to deny Jones credit time in this 

case was authorized to do so. Therefore, we remand with instructions to 
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identify the entity statutorily authorized to make a credit-time determination 

with respect to Jones’s sentence and that said entity make that determination. 

[9] We conclude that Jones is entitled to credit for actual time served on in-home 

detention and electronic monitoring. We remand with instructions to 

determine how much time he actually served and to include any good-time 

credit that the appropriate entity determines Jones should receive. 

[10] Judgment reversed and remanded. 

Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.