Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 73A01-1411-PC-499 | April 13, 2015 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Sheba Sorrells

Pendleton, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Sheba Sorrells,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 13, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

73A01-1411-PC-499

Appeal from the Shelby Superior 

Court, No. 1

The Honorable Jack A. Tandy, 

Judge

Case No. 73D01-0812-FB-016

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In 2009 Sheba Sorrells was convicted of Class B felony sexual misconduct with 

a minor, Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and Class A 
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misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a minor; at a bifurcated 

proceeding, Sorrells was also found to be a repeat sexual offender. Sorrells filed 

a notice of appeal but did not thereafter pursue the direct appeal. In June 2011 

Sorrells filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court committed 

fundamental error in denying his motion to continue. Following a hearing at 

which Sorrells presented witness testimony of several family members, the postconviction court issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law denying 

relief. Sorrells, pro se, now appeals.

Facts and Procedural History1

[2] In 2009, following a three-day jury trial, Sheba Sorrells was convicted of Class 

B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, Class C felony sexual misconduct 

with a minor, and Class A misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a 

minor. These convictions came about because of acts committed against a 

teenage victim, R.M.H. At a bifurcated proceeding, Sorrells was also found to 

be a repeat sexual offender. Following sentencing the trial court advised 

Sorrells of his appellate rights and then instructed Sorrells’ attorney, G. Allen 

Lidy (“Attorney Lidy”), to preserve his appellate rights. Attorney Lidy filed a 

 

1

Sorrells’ trial counsel filed a Notice of Appeal, requesting the Clerk to assemble the trial court’s record, the 

entire transcript of the jury trial, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing. See Appellant’s App. p. 147. 

However, Sorrells failed to pursue a direct appeal, and it appears that a transcript was never created. In any 

event, we do not have before us a factual record of the proceedings below. 
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Notice of Appeal but Sorrells did not follow through on perfecting a direct 

appeal from judgment. 

[3] In 2011 Sorrells filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he 

received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court committed 

fundamental error when it denied his motion to continue based on an allegedly 

late discovery by the State of a medical report. An evidentiary hearing was held 

in 2014. At the hearing, Sorrells called four witnesses to testify—his mother, 

father, grandfather, and daughter, C.H.—in support of his argument that his 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call these witnesses at his trial. The 

testimony of these witnesses at the post-conviction hearing revealed that 

Sorrells’ mother, brother, and grandfather had not observed and had no firsthand knowledge of the crimes of which Sorrells was convicted. C.H. testified 

that Attorney Lidy interviewed her before the trial and then decided not to have 

her testify. On cross-examination at the post-conviction hearing, C.H. admitted 

that in her statement to the police she had lied about Sorrells taking her and her 

friend, the teenage victim R.M.H., to a liquor store to buy alcohol because she 

“was afraid [her] dad was going to get in trouble.” P-C Tr. p. 33. C.H. also 

testified that her father told her and R.M.H., “What happens here stays here.” 

Id. at 43. 

[4] Sorrells also submitted into evidence a check for $545.72—which was admitted 

as Petitioner’s Exhibit A—from his trial counsel’s law firm, which was 

deposited into his trust account at Pendleton Correctional Facility after he filed 

the petition for post-conviction relief. At the time he offered the check into 
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evidence, Sorrells stated, “I don’t know about anyone else here, but when 

someone is given a refund of money for the job that they’ve done, I believe it’s 

because, you know, they didn’t do an adequate job.” Id. at 44. 

[5] Sorrells presented no evidence at the hearing on the trial court’s failure to grant 

his motion to continue, resulting in—as he argued in his petition for postconviction relief—“fundamental error and denial of due process of law and fair 

trial.” Appellant’s App. p. 163. During closing argument, when the State 

referenced this claim from Sorrells’ petition, Sorrells interjected, “I forgot about 

that.” Tr. p. 49. 

[6] Following the hearing, the post-conviction court issued findings of fact and 

conclusions of law denying Sorrells’ petition for post-conviction relief. The 

court wrote in pertinent part:

5) The Petition alleges fundamental error and denial of due process of 

law and fair trial because the State purposely withheld evidence from 

him and the trial court denied a requested continuance of his jury trial 

date. The Petitioner presented no evidence of withheld evidence by 

the State of Indiana or any evidence or argument related to denial of 

requested continuance of his trial.

6) The Petitioner also alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel 

by failing to investigate the facts of the case, interview witnesses, 

introduce documentary evidence, and present medical expert 

testimony regarding DNA evidence. Petitioner presented four 

witnesses at the hearing. Each witness, all family members of 

Petitioner, testified they were present at the scene of the criminal 

allegations and had information related to the demeanor and 

appearance of the victim. They each testified they discussed with 

[Attorney] Lidy their anticipated testimony. None of the four 

witnesses were called to testify. Each testified [Attorney] Lidy told 
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them that their testimony was not necessary or that it would not be in 

petitioner’s best interests for them to testify.

7) Trial counsel Lidy vigorously represented Petitioner during the 

three day jury trial.

Appellant’s App. p. 193-94. 

[7] Sorrells now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] On appeal, Sorrells argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he 

was not denied effective assistance of trial counsel, and he continues to 

maintain that the trial court committed fundamental error in denying his 

motion to continue his trial. In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner 

bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. PostConviction Rule 1(5); Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. 2008). When 

appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the 

position of one appealing from a negative judgment, and the standard of review 

is rigorous. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004); see also Trujillo v. 

State, 962 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ind. 2011). “To prevail on appeal from the denial 

of post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole 

leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the 

post-conviction court.” Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1144 (Ind. 2010), 

reh’g denied. Here, the post-conviction court made findings of fact and 

conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). “A 

post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a 
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showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 

2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The post-conviction court is the 

sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.” Woods 

v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind. 1998). Accordingly, we accept the postconviction court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we do 

not defer to the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law. Wilson v. State, 799 

N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 

[9] First Sorrells alleges that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

because Attorney Lidy failed to “investigate[] the scene of the crime” and didn’t 

call four “key witnesses.” Appellant’s Br. p. 5. A defendant claiming a 

violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel must establish the two 

components set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001). First, the defendant must 

show that counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 687). This requires a showing that counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness, and that the errors were so serious that 

they resulted in a denial of the right to counsel guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment. Id. (internal citation omitted). Second, the defendant must 

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. To establish 

prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
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been different. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

[10] Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and 

we will accord those decisions deference. Id. A strong presumption arises that 

counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the 

exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. The Strickland Court 

recognized that even the finest, most experienced criminal defense attorneys 

may not agree on the ideal strategy or the most effective way to represent a 

client. Id. Isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad 

judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective. Id. (citing 

Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 199 (Ind. 1997); Davis v. State, 598 N.E.2d 

1041, 1051 (Ind. 1992); Ingram v. State, 508 N.E.2d 805, 808 (Ind. 1987)). The 

two prongs of the Strickland test are separate and independent inquiries. Id. 

Thus, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Williams v. 

State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 154 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

[11] At the post-conviction hearing, Sorrells called four witnesses to testify—his 

mother, father, grandfather, and daughter, C.H.—in support of his argument 

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call these witnesses at his trial. 

Sorrells’ mother testified that she spoke with the victim, R.M.H., on the 

telephone “[d]uring the week in question” and R.M.H. “never said a word and 

she never acted like anything was happening.” P-C Tr. p. 8. Sorrells’ mother 

also testified that she asked Attorney Lidy if he wanted her to testify and he said 
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he didn’t need her to. Sorrells’ brother testified that he asked Attorney Lidy if 

he could testify, and Attorney Lidy had asked for an interview, but Sorrells’ 

brother thought perhaps he (the brother) had not “followed through” before the 

trial. Id. at 11. Sorrells’ brother went on to testify that he had conversed with 

R.M.H. around the time of the events for which Sorrells was convicted and 

R.M.H. “showed no signs of [having been molested].” Id. at 15. On crossexamination, the State confirmed that Sorrells’ brother’s opinion that “it likely 

didn’t happen” was “the entire evidence [he] had in this.” Id. at 19. On crossexamination, Sorrells’ grandfather admitted that he had no personal knowledge 

of any of the events that led to Sorrells’ convictions. 

[12] And finally, Sorrells’ daughter, C.H., testified that Attorney Lidy had

interviewed her before the trial and then decided not to have her testify. On 

cross-examination at the post-conviction hearing, C.H. admitted that in her 

statement to the police she had lied about Sorrells taking her and her friend, the 

teenage victim R.M.H., to a liquor store to buy alcohol because she “was afraid 

[her] dad was going to get in trouble.” P-C Tr. p. 33. C.H. also testified that 

her father told her and R.M.H., “What happens here stays here.” Id. at 43. In 

light of this testimony, it is understandable that Attorney Lidy did not believe 

that C.H. would be particularly helpful to Sorrells’ case. 

[13] Given the testimony elicited from all four witnesses at the post-conviction 

hearing, we cannot say that Sorrells has met his burden of showing a reasonable 

probability that, but for Attorney Lidy’s decision not to have these witnesses 

testify—insofar as that can be considered counsel’s “unprofessional errors”—
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the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 694; Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 603. Sorrells has failed to show that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness such that 

Sorrells was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. 

[14] Next Sorrells maintains that the trial court committed fundamental error in 

denying his motion to continue after the State produced a medical report 

shortly before the trial. However, the post-conviction procedures do not 

provide a petitioner with an opportunity to consider freestanding claims that the 

original trial court committed error. Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind. 

2001), reh’g denied. Such claims are available only on direct appeal. Id. (citing 

Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Ind. 2000)). Moreover, at the postconviction hearing, Sorrells presented no evidence whatsoever in support of this 

contention, and the post-conviction court noted as much in its findings of fact. 

[15] We cannot say that Sorrells has shown that the evidence as a whole leads 

unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the postconviction court. See Kubsch, 934 N.E.2d at 1144.

Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Bradford, J., concur.