alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
REVISED 10/11/2000 AGENDA

PUBL U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY C WORKSHOP ON A RULEMAKING TO CONSIDER ENERGY EFFICIENCY STANDA RD S FOR DISTRI BUTION TRANSFORMERS PLACE OF WORKSHOP:

DATE AND TIME:

PURPOSE OF THE WORKSHOP FORRESTAL BUILDING 1000 INDEPENDENCE AVENUE, SW ROOM 1E-245 WASHINGTON, DC 20585 TELEPHONE: 202-586-9127 TELEFAX: 202-256-4617 WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2000 9:00 A.M. - 5:00 P.M.

The purpose of this public workshop is to hear the views of interested persons on the issues and process involved in a rulemaking to consider energy efficiency standards for distribution transformers
. The Department will consider the views presented and comments submitted in formulating its approach in the rulemaking. 1. OPENING REMARKS AND INTRODUCTIONS If. AGENDA REVIEW Ill. DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMERS - TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION (Estimated Time for Presentation and Discussion) A. Introduction (:30) B. Market and Technology Assessment (1:30) 1. Product Class 2. Characterization of Baseline Distribution Transformers C. Screening Analysis (:30)Engineering Analysis (1:30) 1. Engineering Analysis Approaches 2. Retail Prices and Markups 3. Transformer Design Loads and Operational Loading E. Life-Cycle Cost Analysis (:15) F. Consumer Sub-group Analysis (:15) G. National Energy Saving and Net Present Value Analysis (:15) H. Manufacturer Impact Analysis (1:00) 1. Utility Impact Analysis (:15) J. Environmental Analysis (:15) Net National Employment Impact (:15)

IV. ADJOURNMENT
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 14

- 00324

- CV

In the Interest of J.F., A Child §

§

§

§ From the 233rd District Court

of Tarrant County (233

- 472828

- 10)

October 29, 2015

Opinion by Justice Gabriel



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

It is further o rdered that appellant D.F. shall bear the costs of this appeal,

for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Lee Gabriel

Justice Lee Gabriel
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

The undersigned, Mark Lana, the President, Chief Executive Officer and a Director of HS3 Technologies, Inc., hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)           the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of HS3 Technologies, Inc. for the nine months ended March 31, 2006 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)           the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of HS3 Technologies, Inc.

Dated May 12, 2006.

/s/ Mark Lana                                    

Mark Lana 

President, Chief Executive Officer and Director

(Principal Executive Officer)
#### In re the MARRIAGE of Jack KOKTAVY, Appellant, and Louise Susanna Koktavy, Appellee.

No. 79CA0392.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

May 22, 1980.

*1162Hochstadt, Straw & Davis, P. C., George M. Straw, Denver, for appellant.

Larry D. Tannenbaum, Denver, for appel-lee.

SMITH, Judge.

In this marriage dissolution proceeding, husband appeals from an order dividing the marital property and requiring him to carry life insurance naming his former wife as beneficiary. We affirm.

I.

Our examination of the record leads to the conclusion that there is no merit to husband’s assertion that the trial court erred in its division of marital property. The division of marital property is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and where, as here, there has been no abuse of discretion in making the division, it will not be set aside. *Moss v. Moss,*190 Colo. 491, 549 P.2d 404 (1973).

II.

Husband further asserts that the trial court erred in ordering him to continue to carry life insurance naming his former wife as beneficiary. We disagree.

Under prior law, an order requiring husband to carry life insurance as a means of continuing alimony after his death was not permitted. *Ferguson v. Olmsted,*168 Colo. 374, 451 P.2d 746 (1969). However, § 14-10-122(2), C.R.S.1973, provides: “Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon death of either party . . . .” The Supreme Court in *Icke v. Icke,*189 Colo. 319, 540 P.2d 1076 (1975), held that § 14-10-122(3), C.R.S.1973, permits a court to order a party to carry life insurance naming the parties’ minor children as beneficiaries. In that case, the court noted that the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act, § 14-10-101, et seq., C.R.S.1973, had changed prior law.

A similar situation is presented here. We conclude that § 14-10-122(2), C.R.S.1973, has also changed the prior law. Now, the statute as written contemplates the power of the court to provide that maintenance shall continue beyond the death of the party obligated to pay maintenance. As explained in 9A *Uniform Laws Annot., Marriage & Divorce Act*(Commissioners’ note), this section of the statute:

> “authorizes the parties to agree in writing or the court to provide in the decree that maintenance will continue beyond the death of the obligor or the remarriage of the obligee. In the absence of such an agreement or provision in the decree, this section sets the termination date for the obligation to pay future maintenance.”

Here, the use of life insurance as a maintenance device is particularly compelling. Husband was in very poor health, suffering from diabetes and high blood pressure. He had heart damage and had previously suffered a stroke. Furthermore, because of his poor health, husband was under doctor’s orders to work in a low pressure occupation.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in ordering husband to carry life insurance in favor of his former wife.

The order is affirmed.

COYTE and KELLY, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-6435

ANDROID VICSON TAYLOR, Petitioner - Appellant, versus RONALD J. ANGELONE, Director of Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District Judge. (CA-02-926-A) Submitted: July 10, 2003 Decided: July 16, 2003 Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Android Vicson Taylor, Appellant Pro Se. Robert H. Anderson, III, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Android Vicson Taylor, a state prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). When, as here, a district court dismisses a § 2254 petition solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both “(1) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right’ and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir.) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), cert. denied , 534 U.S. 941 (2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Taylor has not made the requisite showing. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Accordingly, we deny Taylor’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002







In connection with the Quarterly Report of Furio Resources Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending November 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Paul Fong, Chief Executive Officer of the Company and Patrick McGrath, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, respectively, do each hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





By /s/ Paul Fong

Paul Fong

Chief Executive Officer

January 7, 2005





By /s/ Patrick McGrath

Patrick McGrath

Chief Financial Officer

January 7, 2005
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*2133-06434-20-44
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-7040

ELIZABETH KNEWASSER,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

GEORGE E. HONTS, III, Judge,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, Chief District

Judge. (CA-98-427-R)

Submitted: September 30, 1998 Decided: October 21, 1998

Before ERVIN, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Elizabeth Knewasser, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying

relief on her petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 &

Supp. 1998). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s

opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning

of the district court. Knewasser v. Honts, No. CA-98-427-R (W.D.

Va. July 8, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Antonia Bold-de-Haughton, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB (Amendment No. 2) of Douglas Lake Minerals Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

|Date:  November 2, 2006 | /s/ Antonia Bold-de-Haughton
Antonia Bold-de-Haughton
Chief Financial Officer
|----------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
**Exhibit 35.2**

**Servicer Compliance Statement of Deere Credit Services, Inc.**

​

I, Steven N. Owenson, Senior Vice President and Finance Director of Deere Credit Services, Inc., state:

​

A review of Deere Credit Services, Inc.’s activities for the period from March 19, 2024 (the date of issuance of the John Deere Owner Trust 2024 transaction subject to the requirements of Regulation AB) through October 27, 2024 (the “Reporting Period”) and of Deere Credit Services, Inc.’s performance under the Sale and Servicing Agreement dated as of March 19, 2024 among John Deere Capital Corporation, John Deere Receivables LLC and John Deere Owner Trust 2024 has been made under my supervision, and to the best of my knowledge based on such review, Deere Credit Services, Inc. has fulfilled all its obligations under all relevant agreements in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period. 

​

​

​

| ​                | ​                     | ​                                    |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| Date: January 10, 2025 | Deere Credit Services, Inc. |
| ​                | ​                     | ​                                    |
| ​                | By:                         | */s/ Steven N. Owenson*                    |
| ​                | ​                     | Steven N. Owenson                          |
| ​                | ​                     | Senior Vice President and Finance Director |
| ​                | ​                     | ​                                    |
| ​                | ​                     | ​                                    |

​

----
EXHIBIT 99.2
                                                                    ------------



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of American Bar
Association/State Street Collective Trust (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the
period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Beth M. Halberstadt, as Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to and for purposes of 18
U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to my knowledge:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applicable to it; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


                                        /s/ Beth M. Halberstadt
                                        ---------------------------------------
                                        Beth M. Halberstadt
                                        Chief Financial Officer
                                        November 14, 2002
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 78 (Monday, April 23, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 24201]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-9796]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting Notice

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, April 25, 2012, 9:30 a.m. Eastern Time.

PLACE: Commission Meeting Room on the First Floor of the EEOC Office 
Building, 131 ``M'' Street NE., Washington, DC 20507.

STATUS: Part of the meeting will be open to the public and part of the 
meeting will be closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: 
    OPEN SESSION:
    1. Announcement of Notation Votes,
    2. Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and 
Conviction Records in Employment Decisions under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and
    3. Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue 
Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended.
    CLOSED SESSION:
    Agency Adjudication and Determination on Federal Agency 
Discrimination Complaint Appeals.

    Note:  In accordance with the Sunshine Act, the open session of 
the meeting will be open to public observation of the Commission's 
deliberations and voting. The remainder of the meeting will be 
closed. Any matter not discussed or concluded may be carried over to 
a later meeting.

    For the open session, seating is limited and it is suggested that 
visitors arrive 30 minutes before the meeting in order to be processed 
through security and escorted to the meeting room. (In addition to 
publishing notices on EEOC Commission meetings in the Federal Register, 
the Commission also provides information about Commission meetings on 
its Web site, eeoc.gov., and provides a recorded announcement a week in 
advance on future Commission sessions.)
    Please telephone (202) 663-7100 (voice) and (202) 663-4074 (TTY) at 
any time for information on these meetings. The EEOC provides sign 
language interpretation and Communication Access Realtime Translation 
(CART) services at Commission meetings for the hearing impaired. 
Requests for other reasonable accommodations may be made by using the 
voice and TTY numbers listed above.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Bernadette B. Wilson, Acting 
Executive Officer on (202) 663-4077.

     Dated: April 18, 2012.
 Bernadette B. Wilson,
 Acting Executive Officer, Executive Secretariat.
[FR Doc. 2012-9796 Filed 4-19-12; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6570-01-P
```
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed April 

14, 2015.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-15-00294-CR

IN RE LEXTER KENNON KOSSIE, Relator 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 

WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

208th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 0546166 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

On April 2, 2015, relator Lexter Kennon Kossie filed a petition for writ of 

mandamus in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221 (West 2004); see also 

Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator asks this court to compel the Honorable 

Denise Collins, presiding judge of the 208th District Court of Harris County, to

rule on his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
2 

Relator states in his petition that he filed an original petition for writ of 

habeas corpus on February 2, 2015, but the trial court has not ruled on the petition. 

To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must show that he has no adequate 

remedy at law to redress his alleged harm, and what he seeks is a ministerial act, 

not involving a discretionary or judicial decision. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth 

Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007).

A trial court has a ministerial duty to consider and rule on motions properly 

filed and pending before it, and mandamus may issue to compel the trial court to 

act. In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. 

proceeding); Ex parte Bates, 65 S.W.3d 133, 134 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, 

orig. proceeding). To be entitled to mandamus relief compelling a trial court to 

rule on a properly filed motion, relator must establish that the trial court (1) had a 

legal duty to rule on the motion; (2) was asked to rule on the motion; and (3) failed 

or refused to rule on the motion within a reasonable time. In re Layton, 257 

S.W.3d 794, 795 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, orig. proceeding); In re Molina, 94 

S.W.3d 885, 886 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding). However, a 

court is not required to consider a motion not called to its attention. Layton, 257 

S.W.3d at 795. 

It is relator’s burden to provide a sufficient record to establish that he is 

entitled to relief. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. 

proceeding). Relator has not done so. Relator has not attached any documents to 

his petition in support of his claim for relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(a)(1) 

(requiring relator to provide a certified or sworn copy of any document that is
3 

material to relator’s claim for relief and that was filed in any underlying 

proceeding). 

Relator has not established that he is entitled to mandamus relief. 

Accordingly, we deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus. 

 PER CURIAM 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Busby.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).