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SJC-11725

COMMONWEALTH vs. JOHNNY COLONDRES.

Hampden. December 2, 2014. - April 13, 2015.

Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 

& Hines, JJ.

Controlled Substances. Search and Seizure, Warrant, Affidavit, 

Probable cause, Search incident to lawful arrest. 

Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, Probable cause. 

Probable Cause. Practice, Criminal, Warrant, Affidavit, 

Motion to suppress.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 

Department on March 7, 2012.

A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by 

C. Jeffrey Kinder, J., and the cases were heard by Tina S. 

Page, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 

direct appellate review. 

Merritt Schnipper for the defendant.

Bethany C. Lynch, Assistant District Attorney, for the 

Commonwealth.
2

GANTS, C.J. Before trial, the defendant, Johnny Colondres,

moved to suppress evidence obtained from his apartment by 

Springfield police during the execution of an "anticipatory 

search warrant." The defendant claimed that police had executed

the search before the "triggering events" stated in the 

affidavit had occurred, and that therefore the search should be 

treated as warrantless and the evidence suppressed. The motion 

judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress and, after a 

jury-waived trial before a different judge, the defendant was 

convicted of trafficking in heroin and cocaine, and of unlawful 

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.1 The 

defendant appealed, and we granted his application for direct 

appellate review. We conclude that where, as here, the 

Commonwealth applies for an anticipatory search warrant and the 

judicial authorization to execute the search is conditioned on 

the occurrence of a specific future event, the search is 

authorized by the warrant where there is equivalent compliance 

with that condition precedent. Because we conclude that, in 

this case, there was both equivalent compliance with the 

warrant's condition precedent and probable cause to search the 

 

1 The defendant was sentenced to from eleven to thirteen 

years in State prison on the trafficking convictions, and one 

year in the house of correction on the possession with intent to 

distribute conviction, all to be served concurrently. He was 

found not guilty on an indictment charging possession of 

"Ecstasy" pills with intent to distribute.
3

defendant's residence once equivalent compliance was achieved, 

we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting 

convictions.

Background. The facts are not in dispute. The search of 

the defendant's apartment at 250 Oakgrove Avenue in Springfield 

arose out of an investigation by the Springfield police 

department of the defendant's nephew, Carlos Colondres.

2 As 

detailed in the affidavit by Officer John Wadlegger in support

of the application for the warrant to search the defendant's 

apartment, the police were investigating the sale of cocaine and 

heroin by a man known as "Loso." The investigation was assisted 

by an anonymous "cooperating source" (CS), who informed Officer 

Wadlegger that the CS had purchased cocaine from Loso "numerous 

times over the past month." The CS provided Officer Wadlegger

with Loso's cellular telephone number and the license plate 

numbers of the two vehicles Loso operated, one of which the CS 

identified as belonging to Loso's girl friend. The CS informed 

Officer Wadlegger that Loso lived with his girl friend "on a 

side street off of St. James Ave. in Springfield." The CS also 

informed Officer Wadlegger that the CS had seen Loso in 

possession of heroin for sale, and that Loso had offered to sell 

heroin to the CS.

 

2 Because Carlos Colondres has the same last name as the 

defendant, we refer to him as Carlos to avoid confusion.
4

After conducting a registry of motor vehicles inquiry,

Officer Wadlegger determined that one of the vehicles identified 

by the CS was registered to Carlos, and the second vehicle was 

registered to a woman named Mychael Barnett who lived at 14 

Berkeley Street in Springfield.3 When Officer Wadlegger showed 

the CS the registry of motor vehicles photograph of Carlos, the 

CS positively identified Carlos as Loso. Officer Wadlegger 

conducted a surveillance of 14 Berkeley Street and observed both 

vehicles parked in front of the address. He also observed 

Carlos leave that address, travel to 250 Oakgrove Avenue, and 

enter the building at that address. Carlos reemerged a short 

time later and returned to 14 Berkeley Street.

Officer Wadlegger arranged for the CS to conduct two

"controlled buys" of narcotics from Carlos. The first was 

initiated "[d]uring the week of December 25, 2011," when the CS 

telephoned Carlos and asked to purchase heroin from him; the 

second was initiated "[d]uring the week of January 8, 2012,"

when the CS telephoned Carlos and asked to purchase cocaine.

During both initiating telephone calls, Carlos told the CS to 

meet him at a prearranged location; during the conversation 

initiating the second controlled purchase, Carlos explained that 

 

3 The Commonwealth claimed in its opposition to the 

defendant's motion to suppress that 14 Berkeley Street is only 

0.2 miles from St. James Avenue in Springfield, but this 

information was not included in Officer John Wadlegger's 

affidavit in support of his application for a search warrant.
5

he "had to go and pick up the cocaine for the sale." Following 

the telephone conversations, police conducted a surveillance of

Carlos's movements, observing the same sequence of events on 

both occasions. Carlos traveled to 250 Oakgrove Avenue in 

Springfield, where he parked his vehicle and entered the

building. Carlos took the elevator to the third floor and 

entered apartment 304 with a set of keys.

4 A short time later, 

Carlos left the building and traveled to the arranged meeting 

location, where he met with the CS. After the meetings, Carlos 

returned to 14 Berkeley Street, and the CS met with Officer 

Wadlegger to turn over the drugs that the CS had purchased from 

Carlos using "buy money" the CS had been provided by the police.

5

On January 19, 2012, Officer Wadlegger applied for a search 

warrant for the defendant's apartment. In his affidavit, 

Officer Wadlegger said that, based on his training and 

experience and on the information obtained through his 

investigation, the defendant's apartment was being used as a 

 

4 After the first controlled purchase, Officer Wadlegger 

entered the entryway of the building at 250 Oakgrove Avenue and 

saw the defendant's name on the mailbox for apartment 304.

5 Before both controlled purchases, police searched the 

confidential source (CS) for "currency and/or contraband" and 

found none. The drugs that the CS turned over were "field 

tested" by police, with the drugs from the first controlled 

purchase testing positive for heroin, and the drugs from the 

second controlled purchase testing positive for cocaine.
6

"stash house" to store narcotics and cash.6 He stated in the 

affidavit that he was "requesting an anticipatory search warrant 

for 250 Oakgrove Ave., Apt. #304." He also attested that, 

between 6 P.M. and 8 P.M. that day, he received information from 

the CS that Carlos "would be making a delivery of cocaine to the 

South End section of the city," and "would be leaving 14 

Berkeley St. and then going to 250 Oakgrove Ave., Apt 304 to 

retrieve the cocaine," which Carlos would then deliver to the 

customer. Officer Wadlegger declared in his affidavit, "If this 

occurs, this will trigger probable cause to believe that cocaine 

is being kept inside 250 Oakgrove Ave., Apt #304."

Based on the affidavit, a warrant was issued by an 

assistant clerk-magistrate of the Springfield Division of the 

District Court Department to search the defendant's apartment

for cocaine, as well as for drug paraphernalia, monies, and 

personal papers. Later that day, the police observed Carlos 

travel from 14 Berkeley Street to the defendant's apartment, 

leave a short time later, and reenter his vehicle. At that 

time, not waiting for Carlos to make the anticipated delivery of 

cocaine, the police approached Carlos, removed him from the 

 

6 Officer Wadlegger explained in his affidavit that it is 

"quite common for upper level narcotics dealers" to have a 

"stash house" to protect their cash and narcotics from "'Rip 

Off' crews" and other rival drug dealers, and to reduce the 

likelihood that a cooperating source could inform police where 

the dealers store their cash and narcotics.
7

vehicle, and placed him under arrest. During the search 

incident to arrest, two bags of cocaine, one weighing 

approximately 57 grams and the other 4.5 grams, were seized from 

Carlos's person. The police then executed the search warrant 

for the defendant's apartment, seizing approximately 1,700 grams 

of cocaine, 878 tablets of "Ecstasy," 101 grams of heroin, one 

pound of marijuana, and drug packaging paraphernalia.7

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from 

the search, claiming that the search was not authorized by the 

warrant because it was conducted without the occurrence of the 

warrant's triggering event, i.e., the delivery of cocaine by 

Carlos to someone in the South End of Springfield. In denying 

the defendant's motion to suppress, the motion judge concluded

that the warrant to search the defendant's apartment was not an 

anticipatory search warrant. He recognized that "the affiant

. . . viewed probable cause as anticipatory," but found "no such 

limitation in the warrant itself," which commanded a search of 

the apartment within a reasonable time within seven days and

"was not predicated on the occurrence of any triggering event." 

The judge also found that the search warrant affidavit 

 

7 The defendant was at home when the police knocked and 

announced themselves but he did not answer the door. When the 

police forced open the door and entered the apartment, they saw 

the defendant running from a couch in the living room before he 

was secured. 
8

"established probable cause that evidence of criminal activity 

would be found" at the apartment, "whether or not the triggering 

events occurred." Having found that the search warrant was not 

anticipatory and that there was probable cause to support the 

warrant regardless of whether the triggering events occurred, 

the judge denied the motion to suppress.

Discussion. We address first the judge's conclusion that 

the search warrant was not anticipatory because the warrant 

itself did not declare that a triggering event was a condition 

precedent to the execution of the search. An anticipatory 

search warrant is "not require[d] . . . to contain on its face 

explicit directions about the triggering event, as long as the 

conditions precedent to the warrant's execution are contained in 

the affidavit supporting the application for the warrant." 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 Mass. 71, 73 (2000). See United 

States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97-99 (2006); Commonwealth v. 

Gauthier, 425 Mass. 37, 41-45 (1997). Because the affidavit 

here set forth the triggering events that were the conditions 

precedent to execution of the warrant, the failure of the 

warrant to recite those events on its face did not prevent the 

warrant from being an anticipatory search warrant.

"An anticipatory search warrant is a warrant that takes 

effect at a specified future time and not on its issuance." 

Commonwealth v. Staines, 441 Mass. 521, 525 (2004). See 
9

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 430 Mass. 838, 844 n.3 (2000), quoting 

United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.), cert. 

denied sub nom. Grant v. United States, 493 U.S. 943 (1989) ("An 

anticipatory warrant, by definition, is a warrant that has been 

issued before the necessary events have occurred which will 

allow a constitutional search of the premises; if those events 

do not transpire, the warrant is void"). See also Grubbs, 547 

U.S. at 94, quoting 2 W.R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), 

at 398 (4th ed. 2004) ("An anticipatory warrant is 'a warrant 

based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some 

future time [but not presently] certain evidence of crime will 

be located at a specific place'"). Implicit in this definition 

is that the occurrence of the "so-called 'triggering condition'"

specified in the affidavit is necessary to establish probable 

cause and therefore is a condition precedent to the execution of 

the warrant. See Grubbs, supra ("by definition, the triggering 

condition which establishes probable cause has not yet been 

satisfied when the warrant is issued"). Cf. Cruz, supra at 843-

844 ("Because probable cause existed at the time the warrant was 

issued, it was not an anticipatory warrant"). The judge or 

clerk-magistrate who authorizes an anticipatory warrant must 

find probable cause to believe that the evidence particularized 

in the warrant "will be found when the search is conducted"

(emphasis in original), Grubbs, supra at 95, not when the search 
10

is authorized. See Staines, supra. The authorization of the 

search, therefore, is conditioned on the occurrence of the 

triggering condition, because only then will the judge's or 

clerk-magistrate's "probable cause determination at the time of 

issuance [have] reached fruition." United States v. Rowland, 

145 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998).

Because judicial authorization for the search depends on 

the occurrence of the condition precedent, the triggering 

condition must be "clearly and narrowly defined," Gauthier, 425 

Mass. at 43, both "to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by 

government agents," id. at 44, quoting United States v. 

Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1993), and to permit a 

court to determine whether the triggering condition has 

occurred. See Gauthier, supra. Here, the triggering conditions 

were clearly defined: Carlos would leave his residence at 14 

Berkeley Street, travel to the defendant's apartment at 250 

Oakgrove Avenue, and then make a delivery to the customer. The 

first two conditions occurred; the third did not because Carlos 

was arrested after he left the defendant's apartment. 

If strict compliance with the triggering conditions is 

required, the conditions were not met and the search of the 

defendant's apartment was not authorized by the warrant. 

However, if equivalent compliance is required, the triggering 

conditions were met because Carlos's delivery of the cocaine was 
11

instrumental in establishing probable cause only because it 

would have demonstrated that Carlos had obtained cocaine from 

the apartment, and that was demonstrated without a delivery once 

two bags of cocaine were found on his person during the search 

incident to arrest. In effect, the police substituted the 

discovery of the bags of cocaine on Carlos's person for the 

delivery of at least some of that cocaine to a third person.

We conclude that the execution of a search is authorized by 

an anticipatory search warrant once there is equivalent

compliance, albeit not strict compliance, with the triggering 

conditions in the affidavit. An anticipatory search warrant, by 

definition, "takes effect at a specified future time," Staines, 

441 Mass. at 525, which means that the affidavit supporting it 

must make a prediction about the future events that will trigger 

the warrant. Because the future rarely goes exactly according 

to plan, the benefits of an anticipatory warrant would too often 

be lost if we required that the triggering conditions be 

satisfied to the letter before the warrant takes effect.8

 

8 "[O]ne of the major practical difficulties that confronts 

law enforcement officials is the time required to obtain a 

warrant. In many instances, the speed with which government 

agents are required to act . . . demands that they proceed 

without a warrant or risk losing both criminal and 

contraband. . . . The question . . . is whether the objective 

of the [F]ourth [A]mendment [to the United States Constitution] 

is better served by allowing an agent to obtain a warrant in 

advance of the delivery, or whether it is better served by 

forcing him to go to the scene without a warrant, and, if 
12

In determining whether there has been equivalent 

compliance, we look to the inference that would have been drawn 

had the triggering conditions stated in the affidavit occurred -

- here, that the cocaine in Carlos's possession was obtained 

from a stash in the defendant's apartment -- and determine 

whether the weight of that inference is as strong or stronger

under the actual conditions. The Commonwealth bears the burden 

of proving that the conditions that actually gave rise to the

search were as or more likely to establish probable cause as the 

triggering conditions stated in the affidavit. Cf. United 

States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 394-397 (6th Cir.), cert. 

denied sub. nom. Moore v. United States, 537 U.S. 1097 (2002), 

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1130, and cert. denied sub. nom. 

McDaniels v. United States, 538 U.S. 971 (2003) (reading 

affidavit in "commonsense fashion" and concluding that 

triggering condition, which required delivery and acceptance of 

parcel containing cocaine by someone inside residence, was met 

where someone who had been previously inside residence greeted 

delivery person outside, accepted parcel, and immediately left 

with it in vehicle, because these events "sufficiently 

 

necessary, proceed under the constraints of the 'exigent 

circumstances' exception, subject always to the risk of 'being 

second-guessed' by judicial authorities at a later date as to 

whether the known facts legally justified the search." United 

States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. 

nom. Grant v. United States, 493 U.S. 943 (1989), quoting 1 W.R.

LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), at 700-701 (1978).
13

establishe[d] a connection between the parcel and someone who 

ha[d] access to the residence to which the parcel [was]

addressed"); People v. Martini, 265 Ill. App. 3d 698, 708-710

(1994) ("the standard to be adhered to in the context of police 

execution of 'anticipatory' search warrants is the substantial 

compliance standard," and was satisfied where "strict 

compliance" was "not necessary"). Although here, by arresting 

Carlos, the police actively interrupted the sequence of events 

that the affidavit had said would trigger the warrant, that 

should not prevent the warrant from taking effect where the 

police otherwise established facts that provided equal support

for the same inference on which the probable cause determination 

approved by the clerk-magistrate had been based.

9

The requirement of equivalent compliance comports with our 

opinion in Commonwealth v. Gauthier, 425 Mass. 37 (1997). Under 

the anticipatory warrant authorized in that case, there were 

three triggering conditions for the execution of the search 

warrant of the defendant's residence: (1) the confidential 

informant was to place an order to purchase marijuana from the 

 

9 The record before the motion judge is silent as to why 

police chose to arrest Carlos and search him for cocaine rather 

than wait and see if he made the anticipated delivery. But we 

recognize that there will sometimes be good reason for police to

make such a choice in response to a developing situation, for 

instance, out of concern that crucial evidence will be lost or 

destroyed or that the identity of a confidential informant will 

be revealed.
14

dealer identified in the affidavit, (2) the dealer was to enter 

the defendant's residence (where marijuana was allegedly 

stored), and (3) marijuana was to be found on the dealer after 

he was searched upon leaving the residence. Id. at 39. The 

first two conditions were met, but we concluded that the third 

was not, because the police officer did not search the dealer as 

he was leaving the residence but instead waited until the

officer saw him enter the vehicle that he had driven to the 

defendant's residence and place something on the floor behind 

the driver's seat.

10 Id. at 40-41. We declared, "The triggering 

event language in warrants such as this one should be read 

sensibly and in context, and, when that is done, we must 

conclude that the triggering event failed to materialize here." 

Id. at 41. We reached that conclusion not simply because the 

delay in searching the dealer departed from the letter of the 

third condition, but because the actual evidence of probable 

cause was significantly weaker where the marijuana was found in 

the dealer's vehicle rather than on his person as he was leaving 

the defendant's residence. We noted that the police officer did 

not testify that he saw the dealer carry the package as he left 

 

10 The dealer drove off before the police could reach him to 

conduct a search. He was finally stopped by the police one and 

one-half miles from the defendant's residence, "following an 

attempted escape." The police searched the vehicle and found a 

bag containing marijuana behind the driver's seat. Commonwealth

v. Gauthier, 425 Mass. 37, 39-40 (1997).
15

the defendant's residence, and we further noted that where the 

driver of the vehicle "was himself an active dealer in 

narcotics," it was "possible that he had that particular bag of 

narcotics in the car all along." Id. at 40-41.

Our conclusion that equivalent compliance with the 

triggering conditions is sufficient to authorize the execution 

of the search warrant does not give "unfettered discretion" to 

the police. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d. at 12 ("magistrates who 

are asked to issue such warrants must be particularly vigilant 

in ensuring that the opportunities for exercising unfettered 

discretion are eliminated"). Although the police are not bound 

to the strict letter of the triggering conditions, they are very 

much fettered: where probable cause depends on compliance with 

the triggering conditions and the police do not strictly comply 

with those conditions, the Commonwealth must demonstrate at the 

motion to suppress hearing that the inference supporting 

probable cause was at least as strong from the conditions that 

actually gave rise to the search as it would have been from the 

triggering conditions stated in the affidavit. Failing that, 

the motion judge will rule that the execution of the search was 

not authorized by the warrant, and any fruits will be suppressed 
16

unless the Commonwealth proves that the search was lawful as a 

warrantless search.11

 

11 Because we conclude that there was equivalent compliance 

with the triggering conditions in this case, we need not 

consider whether a search is authorized by an anticipatory 

warrant where there is not equivalent compliance with the 

triggering conditions but where the information in the affidavit 

provided probable cause at the time the search warrant was

approved regardless of whether there was compliance with the 

triggering conditions. See Gauthier, 425 Mass. at 38 n.1. See 

also United States v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, 80 (1st Cir. 1999), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1172 (2000) ("whether the condition was 

satisfied . . . is beside the point" where "leaving the package 

at the door did nothing to establish probable cause to search 

the premises" and "probable cause existed to search the premises 

without delivery of the package [emphasis in original]").

Where an affiant believes that there might be probable 

cause to conduct a search without any triggering conditions but 

that probable cause would be stronger with triggering conditions 

(e.g., where an affiant believes that the evidence described in 

the affidavit might be regarded as stale), the affiant may 

request in the affidavit both an anticipatory and a traditional 

warrant to search the premises. A judge or clerk-magistrate 

will determine whether to issue an anticipatory search warrant 

based on whether there will be probable cause for the search 

once the triggering condition is satisfied, and whether there is 

probable cause to believe that the triggering condition will 

occur. See United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 96-97 (2006), 

quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("[F]or a 

conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth 

Amendment's requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of 

probability must be satisfied. It must be true not only that if

the triggering condition occurs 'there is a fair probability 

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 

particular place,' . . . but also that there is probable cause 

to believe the triggering condition will occur" [emphasis in 

original]). The judge or clerk-magistrate will determine 

whether to issue a traditional search warrant based on whether 

there is probable cause for the search at the time of the 

warrant request. If the warrant is allowed as both an 

anticipatory and a traditional warrant (and the judge or clerkmagistrate should so specify), a judge deciding a motion to 

suppress the search should treat the warrant as an anticipatory 
17

Having found equivalent compliance with the triggering 

conditions, we conclude that compliance with those conditions 

provided probable cause to believe that evidence of Carlos's 

drug trafficking would be located at the defendant's residence, 

which Carlos appeared to use as a "stash house."12 Where, as 

here, "the place to be searched is a residence," a showing of 

probable cause requires that the affidavit establish "a 

sufficient nexus" connecting the residence with evidence of 

criminal activity, by "provid[ing] a substantial basis for 

concluding that [such] evidence" will be found at the residence. 

Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 Mass. 721, 725-726 (2012), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438, 441 (2009), and 

Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 712 (2000). This nexus 

"need not be based on direct observation," Donahue, supra,

quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213, cert. 

denied, 464 U.S. 860 (1983), but "may be found in ' . . . normal 

inferences as to where a criminal would be likely to hide' the 

drugs he sells." Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 302 

(2003), quoting Cinelli, supra. Although "[n]o bright-line rule 

can establish whether there is a nexus between suspected drug 

 

warrant if there is equivalent compliance with the triggering 

condition and as a traditional warrant if there is not.

12 The defendant does not contend that there was not 

probable cause to believe that Carlos was engaged in drug 

trafficking at the time of his arrest.
18

dealing and a defendant's home . . . [,] [o]bservations by 

police of a suspect on multiple occasions leaving his residence 

and proceeding directly to a prearranged location to sell drugs 

can support a reasonable inference that the suspect is a drug 

dealer who stores drugs or packages drugs for resale in his 

residence." Commonwealth v. Escalera, 462 Mass. 636, 643 (2012)

(citing cases).

Officer Wadlegger's affidavit specified that during two 

controlled purchases, one during "the week of December 25, 

2011," and the second during "the week of January 8, 2012," the 

police observed that, shortly after the CS had telephoned Carlos 

to initiate the purchase of heroin or cocaine, Carlos left his 

residence and stopped briefly at the defendant's apartment 

before delivering the heroin or cocaine to the CS.

13 If there 

was any risk that the information regarding the earlier 

controlled purchases was stale or that it was insufficient to 

establish a pattern connecting the defendant's residence with 

Carlos's drug trafficking, that risk was eliminated when, in 

equivalent compliance with the triggering conditions for 

execution of the search, the same pattern was repeated by Carlos 

before he was found with two bags of cocaine on his person 

outside the defendant's apartment. Considered together with 

 

13 Carlos told the CS prior to one of these controlled 

purchases that Carlos "had to go and pick up the cocaine."
19

Officer Wadlegger's statement that, based on his experience, 

narcotics dealers commonly store drugs at "stash houses" located 

somewhere other than their primary residences, this evidence 

provided probable cause to believe that Carlos used the 

defendant's residence as a "stash house" from which he retrieved 

drugs when he needed them for a sale.

14

Conclusion. We therefore conclude, for reasons other than 

those found by the motion judge, that the defendant's motion to 

suppress was properly denied. The defendant's convictions are 

affirmed. 

So ordered.

 

14 For an anticipatory warrant to comply with the Fourth 

Amendment, there must not only be probable cause for the search 

once the triggering condition is satisfied; there must also be

probable cause to believe that the triggering condition will 

occur. See Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 95-97. The defendant does not 

specifically challenge on appeal whether there was probable 

cause to believe that the triggering conditions set forth in the 

affidavit would occur. Even if he had, such a challenge would 

fail, because the belief that the triggering conditions would 

occur was based on information from the CS, and in denying the 

motion to suppress, the motion judge implicitly found that the 

CS's basis of knowledge and veracity had been established in the 

affidavit (as required to show probable cause) from the 

corroboration obtained through independent police investigation 

of the information provided by the CS and through the two 

controlled purchases. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tapia, 463 

Mass. 721, 728-730 (2012).