IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR KENT COUNTY

FREDERICK BOWDEN, :

: C.A. No: K15C-02-019 RBY 

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

PINNACLE REHABILITATION AND :

HEALTH CENTER, AND KENT :

GENERAL HOSPITAL, BAYHEALTH :

MEDICAL AND BROOKSIDE :

CLINICAL LABORATORY, INC., :

:

Defendant. :

Submitted: April 7, 2015

Decided: April 8, 2015 

Upon Consideration of Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss 

GRANTED 

ORDER

Frederick Bowden, Pro se.

Maria R. Granaudo Gesty, Esquire, Burns White, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware for

Defendant Pinnacle Rehabilitation and Health Center.

James E. Drnec, Esquire, and Melony R. Anderson, Esquire, Balick & Balick, LLC,

Wilmington, Delaware for DefendantsKentGeneralHospital and Bayhealth Medical.

Jeffrey M. Austin, Esquire, Elzufon Austin Tarlov & Mondell, P.A., Wilmington,

Delaware for Defendant Brookside Clinical Laboratory, Inc. 

Young, J.
Bowden v. Pinnacle Rehabilitation and Health Center, et. al. 

C.A. No.: K15C-02-019 RBY 

April 8, 2015 

1

 Defendants Kent General and Bayhealth filed a motion to dismiss on February 27, 2015.

Defendant Pinnacle filed a motion to dismiss on March 13, 2015. Kent General and Bayhealth

joined Pinnacle’s motion on March 20, 2015. By motion dated March 20, 2015, Brookside also

joined Pinnacle’s motion to dismiss. 

2

 Loveman v. Nusmile, Inc., 2009 WL 847655, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2009).

2

SUMMARY

This suit presents the Court with the infrequent occurrence where Plaintiff’s

Complaint fails to state a claim so utterly that the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s case.

By his Complaint, Frederick Bowden (“Plaintiff”) alerts this Court and his named

adversaries (Pinnacle Rehabilitation and Health Center (“Pinnacle”), Kent General

Hospital (“Kent General”), Bayhealth Medical (“Bayhealth”), and Brookside Clinical

Laboratory, Inc. (“Brookside” and, together with the preceding parties,

“Defendants”)) that negligence resulted in the passing of his wife. No further factual

specifications are indicated. Although Delaware maintains a benevolent pleading

standard for claimants, Plaintiff’s statement fails to meet even this low threshold.

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURES

On February 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint against Defendants.

Plaintiff’s claim appears to arise out of the death of his wife. By two separate motions

Defendants’ move to dismiss Plaintiff’s case.1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s standard of review on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Superior

Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) is well-settled. The Court accepts all well-pled allegations

as true.2 Well-pled means that the complaint puts a party on notice of the claim being
Bowden v. Pinnacle Rehabilitation and Health Center, et. al. 

C.A. No.: K15C-02-019 RBY 

April 8, 2015 

3

 Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 2001 WL 541484, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2001).

4

 Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978).

5

 Id.

6

 Id.

7 Thompson v. Medimmune, Inc., 2009 WL 1482237, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. May 19,

2009). 

8

See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009). 

9 Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings, LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537

(Del. 2011) (“until this Court decides otherwise or a change is duly effected through the Civil

Rules process, the governing pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion to dismiss is

reasonable conceivability”)(internal quotations omitted). 

10 VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 611 (Del. 2003). 

3

brought.3 If the complaint and facts alleged are sufficient to support a claim on which

relief may be granted, the motion is not proper and should be denied.4 The test for

sufficiency is a broad one.5 If any reasonable conception can be formulated to allow

Plaintiff’s recovery, the motion to dismiss must be denied.

6

 Dismissal is warranted

only when “under no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged could the

complaint state a claim for which relief might be granted.”7

DISCUSSION

Delaware, differing from Federal jurisprudence,8maintainsitstraditionally low

threshold for sufficient pleadings.9 Only where a plaintiff could not “recover under

any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof,” is a court to

dismiss a claim.10 The pleading need only put “the opposing party on notice of the
Bowden v. Pinnacle Rehabilitation and Health Center, et. al. 

C.A. No.: K15C-02-019 RBY 

April 8, 2015 

11 Id. (emphasis added). 

12 Although Defendants Kent General and Bayhealth, and Defendant Pinnacle each filed

separate motions to dismiss, Defendants Kent General and Bayhealth, by motion dated March 20,

2015, joined Pinnacle’s motion. The Court, therefore, considers only the arguments contained in

Pinnacle’s brief. For all intents and purposes, however, Kent General’s and Bayhealth’s brief,

essentially, made the same contentions.

13 Complaint, dated February 23, 2015. 

14 See Draper v. Med. Ctr. Of Delaware, 767 A.2d 796, 799 (Del. 2001) (“There is no

different set of rules for pro se plaintiffs, and the trial court should not sacrifice the orderly and

efficient administration of justice to accommodate the unrepresented plaintiff”). 

4

claim being brought against it.”11 Plaintiff’s Complaint, which names three separate

Defendants, is that rare pleading where even Delaware’s liberal standard is not met.

Defendants are put on notice of nothing calling for a response. 

The Court, therefore, GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.12

As Defendants point out, Plaintiff’s Complaint contains a single, undeveloped

allegation: “[n]egligence resulted in the untimely death of the decedent Mestinea Ann

Melendez Bowden my wife...”13 The remainder of Plaintiff’s Complaint speaks solely

to its timely filing within the applicable statute of limitations. Defendants, therefore,

move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Superior Court Rule 12(b)(6), for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Despite this Court’s

sensitivity to the fact that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complete absence of any

specifications of negligence in Plaintiff’s Complaint cannot be overlooked.14

As Plaintiff is alleging negligence, Superior Court Rule 9(b) requires that his
Bowden v. Pinnacle Rehabilitation and Health Center, et. al. 

C.A. No.: K15C-02-019 RBY 

April 8, 2015 

15 VLIW Tech., 840 A.2d at 611, n.9 (recognizing limited exceptions to the notice

pleading standard, such as “Rule 9(b)...requir[ing] greater particularity...”). 

16 Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., 1999 WL 1442014, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1999). 

17 Doe 30's Mother v. Bradley, 58 A.3d 429, 462 (Del. Super. Ct. 2012). 

18 VLIW Tech., 840 A.2d at 611.

5

claim be plead with “particularity.”15 Chiefly, a complaint sounding in negligence

must “specify a duty, a breach of duty, who breached the duty, what act or failure to

act caused the breach, and the party who acted.”16 At best, Plaintiff has managed to

address the parties against which demands are made, and nothing more. Starkly

absent is the fundamental element of how the various Defendants are considered to

have acted bringing about the death of Plaintiff’s wife. Lacking facts to support the

remaining prongs, Plaintiff has made only conclusory allegations.“[C]laims of

negligence...may not be conclusory and must be accompanied by some factual

allegations to support them.”17 As Defendants’ accurately remark, they cannot even

be said to be on notice of the nature of Plaintiff’s claims against them. Notice is the

key demand of Delaware’s pleading standard.18 Faced with such deficient pleading,

the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s action for failure to state a claim sufficiently. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Robert B. Young 

 J.

RBY/lmc
Bowden v. Pinnacle Rehabilitation and Health Center, et. al. 

C.A. No.: K15C-02-019 RBY 

April 8, 2015 

6

oc: Prothonotary

cc: Counsel 

Mr. Frederick Bowden (via U.S. mail) 

Opinion Distribution