IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

)

STATE OF DELAWARE )

) I.D. No. 1012000026

v. )

)

NIGEL C. SYKES )

)

Defendant )

Submitted: September 15, 2014

Decided: November 5, 2014

On Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief.

SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

ORDER

Daniel B. McBride, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 

Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State

Nigel C. Sykes, Wilmington, Delaware, pro se

COOCH, R.J.

This 5th day of November, 2014, upon consideration of Defendant’s pro 

se First Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court that:

1. Defendant Nigel C. Sykes pled guilty in July 2011 to one count of 

Robbery First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm during 

the Commission of a Felony, one count of Attempted Robbery First 

Degree, and one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Person 

Prohibited. 

2. Prior to sentencing, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty 

Plea. The motion was denied by this Court and the denial was 
2

subsequently affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court.

1 In denying 

Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, this Court found, and 

the Supreme Court agreed, that Defendant’s plea was knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily entered, and that he was “not 

operating under any misapprehension or mistake as to his legal 

rights.”2

3. Defendant was then sentenced to sixty four years at Level V, 

suspended after fifteen years for six months at Level IV, with the 

balance of the sentenced to be served at Level III probation. 

4. Defendant filed the instant motion on June 17, 2014, asserting the 

following grounds for relief: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) 

lack of allegedly necessary medication on the the plea was entered 

renders the plea invalid, 3) A hearing was held without Defendant’s 

knowledge or presence; 4) Defendant was coerced into accepting 

the plea agreement.3

5. Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is controlled by the 

recently amended Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 as the motions

was filed after the new rule took effect on June 4, 2014.

4

 Under 

Superior Court Criminal 61(i), a Motion for Postconviction Relief 

can be potentially procedurally barred for time limitations, 

successive motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications.5

6. Rule 61(i)(1) provides that a motion exceeds time limitations if it is 

filed more than one year after the conviction is finalized, or if the 

motion asserts a newly recognized, retroactively applied right more 

than one year after it is first recognized.6

7. Rule 61(i)(2) provides that a motion is successive if it is the second 

or subsequent motion made under this Rule, and such successive 

 1 See State v. Sykes, 2012 WL 1413958 (Del. Super. Feb. 17, 2012); Sykes v. State, 55 A.3d 

839, 2012 WL 5503846 (Del. Nov. 13, 2012) (TABLE).

2 Sykes v. State, 55 A.3d 839, 2012 WL 5503846, at *3 (Del. Nov. 13, 2012) (TABLE).

3 Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 1-17. 

4 The most recent set of amendments to Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 took effect on June 4, 2014. 

5 Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(i)(1)-(4).

6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
3

motions are prohibited unless the pleading requirements of 

61(d)(2)(i) or (ii) are met.7

8. Rule 61(i)(3) bars consideration any ground for relief “not asserted 

in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction,” unless 

the movant can show “cause for relief from the procedural default” 

and “prejudice from violation of the movant’s rights.”8

 

9. Rule 61(i)(4) bars consideration of any ground for relief formerly 

adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the 

judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction 

proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing.”9

 

10. Before addressing the merits of this Motion for Postconviction 

Relief, the Court must address any procedural requirements of 

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).10 If a procedural bar exists, then 

the Court will not consider the merits of the postconviction claim

unless the Defendant can show that the exception found in Rule

61(i)(5) applies.

11 

11. Rule 61(i)(5), as recently amended, provides that consideration of 

otherwise procedurally barred claims is limited to claims that the 

Court lacked jurisdiction, or claims that satisfy the new pleading 

standards set forth in 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii).12 The new pleading 

standards require that the Motion either:

(i) Pleads with particularity that new evidence exists 

that creates a strong inference that the movant is 

actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the 

charges of which he was convicted; or

(ii) Pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule 

of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 

collateral review by the United States Supreme 

Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to 

 7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). For further discussion of the pleading standards articulated in 

the newly amended Rule, see infra. 8 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).

9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).

10 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).

11 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).

12 Id. 
4

the movant’s case and renders the conviction . . . 

invalid.13

12. This Court finds that all of Defendant’s claims are time-barred 

pursuant to Rule 61(i)(1) as Defendant’s motion was filed more than 

one year after Defendant’s conviction was finalized on direct 

appeal.

14 Moreover, all of Defendant’s claims are additionally barred 

for procedural default or former adjudication. Defendant’s arguments 

concerning the circumstances surrounding his guilty plea have been 

adjudicated several times over, and this Court declines to revisit 

them.15 Further, to the extent that Defendant’s claim regarding his 

alleged absence or lack of knowledge of a pre-trial hearing is novel, 

it is barred on grounds of procedural default.

13. Finally, even assuming arguendo that Defendant’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims are not time-barred, Defendant does not 

set forth sufficient evidence to survive either prong of Strickland. To 

successfully articulate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a 

claimant must demonstrate: 1) that counsel’s performance was 

deficient, and 2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial.”16 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a 

Defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness.17 Moreover, a defendant must 

 13 Super Ct. Crim R. 61(d)(2)(i). 14 See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (barring postconviction motion filed more than one year 

after judgment of conviction is final); Super. Cr. Crim. R. 61(m)(2) (“A judgment of 

conviction is final for the purpose of this rule . . . when the Supreme Court issues a mandate 

or order finally determining the case on direct review.”). See also Felton v. State, 945 A.2d 

594 (Del. 2008) (measuring start of filing period from date direct Supreme Court mandate was 

issued and direct appeal process concluded). The Supreme Court mandate affirming the 

judgment of this Court was issued in Defendant’s case on November 13, 2012. Defendant 

filed his Motion for Postconviction Relief on June 17, 2014, well past the one year deadline.

15 Specifically, both this Court and the Delaware Supreme Court found no evidence of 

coercion, nor any evidence that the lack of any alleged necessary medication rendered the 

entrance of his plea invalid or involuntary. See State v. Sykes, 2012 WL 1413958 (Del. Super. 

Feb. 17, 2012); Sykes v. State, 55 A.3d 839, 2012 WL 5503846 (Del. Nov. 13, 2012) 

(TABLE).

16 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)) 

(applying second prong of Strickland analysis in the context of a guilty plea); See also

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

17 Albury, 551 A.2d at 60.
5

make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them 

or risk summary dismissal.18 “[A] court must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.”19 

14. Defendant has neither shown any deficiency on the party of counsel, 

nor has he shown that but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would have 

insisted on going to trial. Rather, Defendant sets forth a laundry list 

of assertions that are at best, conclusory. This Court finds that, even 

assuming Defendant’s ineffective assistance claims were not time 

barred, they are without merit. 

15. Having determined that all of Defendant’s claims are procedurally 

barred in more than one way, this Court further finds that 

Defendant fails to demonstrate, pursuant to 61(i)(5), that any of his 

nine claims are exempt from the procedural bars of 61(i).20

Specifically, none of Defendant’s arguments articulate any factual 

basis to survive the pleading standards of 61(d)(2) as required by 

the Rule.21 As a result of Defendant’s failure to meet the pleading 

standards referenced in 61(i)(5), Defendant’s Motion for 

Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY 

DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________

Richard R. Cooch, R.J.

cc: Prothonotary

Investigative Services 

 18 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).

19 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

20 Super. Ct. Crim R. 61(i)(5) (requiring satisfaction of the pleading requirements in 

61(d)(2)(i)-(ii) for review of an otherwise barred claim);

21 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (referring to 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii) for requisite pleading 

standards).