October 29, 2014

OSWER Docket EPA Docket Center, Mail Code 2822–1T Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20460
Attention Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328

Re: Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7); Proposed Rule

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328

Dear Sir or Madam:

The Compressed Gas Association (CGA), founded in 1913, is dedicated to the development and promotion of safety standards and safe practices in the industrial, medical, and food gases industry. CGA represents over 125 member companies in all facets of the industry – manufacturers, distributors, suppliers, and transporters of gas es, cryogenic liquids, and related products and services. Through a committee system, CGA develops technical specificati ons, safety standards, and training and educational materials, and works with government agencies to formulate responsible regulations and standards and to promote compliance with these regulations and standards.

CGA member companies hold the safety of their empl oyees and the communities in which they operate in the very highest regard. Industry experience shows long-term and continuing improvements in personnel safety performance. With the onset of Risk Management Program (RMP) standard, our member companies have strived to meet or exceed its requirem ents, and our industry's safe ty record reflects that

effort.

CGA appreciates the opportunity to submit our comments rega rding possible revisions to EPA’s RMP regulations. CGA supports EPA's review of the RMP regulat ions and is also in favo r of enforcement of the existing regulations. New regulations should not be driven by incidents caused by lack of compliance with the existing regulation. Rather, any new requirements should be justifi ed through a demonstrated, costeffective reduction in risk and improvement in worker safety.

CGA represents many com panies that operate a multitude of facilit ies throughout the United States. As such, any information provided below does not repres ent the activities or actions undertaken by any specific company or at any specific location. Th ese answers represent a broad industry response. CGA cannot respond to those q uestions posed in the RFI seeking specific company or facility-level information.

Many industrial gas facilit ies are presently covered by the RMP stan dard due to the types or quantities of

materials handled and stored. These facilities range in scope from very large production plants to much smaller locations merely storing quantities of cove red chemicals barely above the threshold quantities. Containers of covered chemicals range from large pr essurized bulk containers (tanks) holding several thousand pounds of a covered chemical to multiple sm all containers (cylinders) each containing less than one pound of a covered chemical.OSHA RFI on PSM
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1. Update the List of Regulated Substances

CGA believes it is appropriate for EPA to periodically review the list of RMP regulated substances; however, EPA should only consider add ing new chemicals after clearly i dentifying the haza rds associated with these chemicals and the basis for establishing specific threshold quantit ies using a scientifically sound and risk-based approach. New chemicals s hould be added based on hazard and risk. Likewise, existing chemicals should be removed from the list of regulated substances if their risks and hazards are shown to be minimal. Government agencies should cons ider adopting similar lists of regulated chemicals, their thresholds, and approaches to addressing mixtur e concentrations. Such similar lists could reduce the burden of compliance for covered facilities.

CGA members are guided by NFPA 400 for reactive hazards and support the adoption by EPA of NFPA 400 for reactive hazards. In addition, rather than deve loping new regulations to address reactive hazards, CGA suggests EPA incorporate by re ference existing standar ds, such as NFPA 704, which is already referenced in NFPA 400. Such an approach is in accordance with OMB Circular A-119, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Vo luntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, from the Office of M anagement and Budget (OMB). National consensus codes integrate a broad cross section of opinions from a variety of stakeholder groups.

3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices

CGA recommends that EPA consider adopting the recently updated CCPS definition of RAGAGEP that

reads:

“Recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice, a term originally used by OSHA, stems from the selection and application of appr opriate engineering, operating, and maintenance knowledge when designing, operating and maintaining chemical facilities with the purpose of ensuring safety and preventing process safety incidents.

It involves the application of engineering, operatin g or maintenance activities derived from engineering knowledge and industry experience based upon the evaluation and analyses of appropriate internal and external standards, applic able codes, technical reports, guidance, or recommended practices or documents of a similar nature. RAGAGEP can be derived from singular or multiple sources and will vary based upon individual facility processes, materials, service, and other engineering considerations."

RAGAGEP is specific to a process and is best i dentified as part of the initial design and through mechanical integrity program development. Defining s pecific RAGAGEP requirements in regulation would likely result in inapplicable standards and codes being required and more applicable codes possibly being overlooked. RAGAGEP can include appropriate and appr oved internal standards as well as external consensus standards. RAGAGEP must recognize that there may be multiple approaches to designing and operating processes safely.

CGA member companies utilize a number of source s for RAGAGEP, including standards developed by CGA, NFPA, ASME, and ASTM, among others. The standa rds selected for RAGAGEP also are specific to a process and should be identified and defined as part of the initial design and through mechanical integrity program development. Rather than defining an arbitrary time frame, updates to identified RAGAGEP should be considered when the process is modified under management of change and as part of the periodic PHA review required by RMP. Evaluating updates to RAGAGEP outside of these defined and tested approaches would impose an additi onal burden with no demonstrated improvement in worker safety. Such an approach would likely prov e impractical considering the frequency with which codes and standards change.OSHA RFI on PSM
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Through a committee system, CGA develops technical sp ecifications, safety standards, and training and educational materials, and works with government a gencies to formulate responsible regulations and standards and to promote compliance with these regulations and standards. CGA member companies use the specification standards and other materials established by the CGA as a basis for their own internal standards, knowing that it meets the ne cessary criteria. Companies may impose additional requirements specific to their own unique operations.

4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirement s To Cover Any Safety-Critical Equipment

CGA believes the mechanical integrity requirements currently in regulation adequately address safetycritical systems. Although EPA has i dentified other equipment which, in its opinion, should be included in a mechanical integrity program, it provides no evidence that including such e quipment will increase safety. The identification of safety-critical equipment should be site-specific and risk-based. The Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is the vehicle used to i dentify process hazards, the equipment, systems, and procedures necessary to address the identified ha zards and the maintenance and mechanical integrity programs needed to maintain these systems. Expandi ng mechanical integrity requirements would result in equipment and systems greatly removed from a co vered process being included in the RMP standard without justification.

As EPA notes in the RFI, the Program 2 maintenan ce requirements, whic h were intended as a streamlined version of the mechanical integrity prog ram, includes process equi pment not mandated in the more rigorous Program 3 requireme nts. EPA should modify the Program 2 requirements to align with those in Program 3.

5. Require Owners and Operators To Manage Organizational Changes

CGA believes that requiring management of organiza tional changes is an important and evolving concept that is worthy of further consid eration. However, CGA also believes that approaches to management of organizational change are still under development and it would be premature at this time to require a particular approach. As an industry, we believe that management of organizational change could be addressed as a performance-based requirement rather than as a prescriptive requirement, allowing companies to adopt methodologies that are best suited to their specific circumstances.

6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits

Compliance audits do yield improved results by identifying deficiencies unseen by local operators. Requiring third-party compliance audits, however, will not necessarily yield improved results. Such an expansion will likely result in inadequately prepared a uditors reviewing processes with which they are unfamiliar, imposing significant burdens on companies to provide training to the auditor and supervision during the audit. Companies should be allowed to dete rmine and utilize the combination of internal and third-party audits that best fits their organizational structure, size, and need.

CGA believes that compliance auditors, whether inter nal or third-party, should possess certain minimum qualifications. CGA believes companies should be requ ired to document these required qualifications in their management system and the actual qualificat ions as part of their compliance reports.

Finally, CGA believes that specific timeframes in which to address identified deficiencies found in compliance audits should not be defined by regulation. Some deficiencies require a simple resolution that can be accomplished in a short timeframe. Others may require significant work and capital expenditure. Rather than establishing predetermined timeframes for response, EPA should consider adopting the approach already set forth in regulation for addressin g PHA findings. Resolution of identified deficiencies should be accomplished within a time period commensurate with the risk.OSHA RFI on PSM
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D. Additional Items for Which EPA Requests Information

1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis

Considering alternative approaches to hazardous processes is not an issue; CGA agrees that consideration of alternate technologies and chemicals should be included in initial process design considerations. CGA does not, however, agree that specif ic alternate technologies or their consideration should be required by regulation. As EPA itself not es in the RFI, “...ISTs are relative and can only be described as inherently safer when compared to a di fferent technology, including a description of the hazard or set of hazards being considered, their loca tion, and the potentially affected population. Because an option may be inherently safer with regard to some hazards and inherently less safe with regard to others, the decision pr ocess must consider the entir e life cycle, the full spectrum of hazards and risks, and the potential for transfer of risk from one impacted population to another."

The impression given is that there are fewer hazards associated with t he “safer technology” whereas it might just be a tradeoff of hazards. A “safer technolog y” might utilize a different chemical with perceived lower chemical hazards but requires the process to operate at higher pressures or temperatures or requires significantly higher quantities to be delivered and used.

Rather than EPA and OSHA developing and publis hing guidance for alte rnate technologies and chemicals, they should consider referencing one or more of the consensus publicat ions already available. Organizations such as CCPS provide guidance on considering alternate technologies and chemicals during process design. Many of thes e readily available publications prov ide checklists and other tools for considering alternate technologies and chemicals. EPA should not include a re quirement to consider alternate technologies specifically listed in the RM P, Lessons Learned Information System database, as there are a myriad of other factors to be considered when assessing the use of alternate technologies

and chemicals.

2. Emergency Drills To Test a Source’s Emergency Response Program or Plan

CGA concurs with EPA that there is great value in co nducting emergency respon se exercises with local emergency responde rs. Many CGA members’ facilities re ly on volunteer emergency response organizations for response services. In some cases the volunteer emergency response organizations cannot commit to participating in training or the dr ills/exercises. CGA believes that regulations should encourage such exercises but not require them. Requiring facilities to conduct these exercises without a concomitant requirement for local emergency respond ers to also participate will unreasonably penalize

these facilities.

Emergency response exercises help ensure that all response personnel, whether they are company employees or local emergency responders, understand their roles and are useful in identifying gaps in training or procedures which need to be addressed to improve plan performance. The best way to learn

from these exercises is to document the exercise results and post exer cise reviews. Such documentation provides a record of lessons learned and action s taken to address identified gaps. These exercise records should be shared with local emergency responders.

CGA does not agree that these records should be ma de available to the general public. CGA also does not agree that such records shoul d be provided to EPA with the facilities’ RMP. This imposes an

additional administrative burden on both the fac ility and EPA and serves little useful purpose. Such

records should be available for EPA to inspect during any facility RMP audit.

Emergency response during an actual release is a true test of the effectiv eness of any plan. Like exercises, the results from the response to an ac tual release should also be documented and lessons learned developed.OSHA RFI on PSM
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3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated Substances

CGA does not believe that automated detection and monitoring for releas es provides sufficient reliability to warrant including it in regulation. Monitoring is not a guarantee that a release will be detected. Even a well-designed system might not detect a release due the material's properties and to other influences such as wind speed or direction, humidity, te mperature, and other environ mental factors. Although detectors for some families of chemicals may be avail able, some are specific to an individual chemical. When a facility has multiple regulated chemicals, multiple detection systems would be needed. Further, many covered chemicals do not have de tectors capable of being automated.

Using such systems to provide automatic notificatio n to emergency responders and the general public poses significant risks. Currently, alarm points on detector systems are set low enough to provide the facility with time to address the leak before it wors ens to a point where emergency responders need to be involved or the public notified. Historically, such syst ems have been prone to false positives due to their sensitivity. CGA believes requiring automatic notification could impose a significant burden on local emergency responders by initiating un necessary responses. This is especia lly true for locations that rely on volunteer local emergen cy responders that ma y not have the capability to receive automatic

notifications. The use and effectivene ss of such systems should be cons idered as the facility develops its PHA and emergency response plan and not be required by regulation.

4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements

EPA's RMP regulations deal with off-site consequen ces and should not inclu de on-site co nsequences that are addressed in OSHA's PSM standard.

As noted in the RFI, several publications provide guidance for the location of occupied building and

trailers in facilities. In addition to the ones noted in the RFI, CGA recently published a globally harmonized publication on location of occupied buildings spec ifically to address air separation and hydrogen/carbon monoxide plants (CGA P-64, Guideline for the Location of Occupied Buildings in Industrial Gas Plants ). There is little need for EPA to develop its own requir ements. RMP already has requirement to review occupancy of surrounding buildings, but no guidance/ requirement to use this information; EPA should advocate that companies use their informat ion for PHA and emergency response plans.

NFPA and ICC codes presently address setback distance s for a variety of chemicals and processes. Rather than developing new guida nce, EPA should consider the guidance already provided.

EPA RMP regulations were specifica lly promulgated to address episodic releases of covered chemicals. Their use to address long-term, chronic exposure is well beyond the scope and intent of the regulations. EPA should not comingle the requirements of OSHA’s right to know regulations and its own EPCRA regulations with those dealing with emergency respon se. Such an effort could result in duplicative, or worse yet conflicting requirements.

5. Compliance With Emergency Response Program Requirements in Coordination With Local Responders

As EPA states in the RFI, current r egulations presently cover the issue. By regulation, facilities have the option to have employees respond to emergencies or depend on local emergency response authorities. The response choice made must be apparent in the facilities emer gency response plan and that choice will drive the elements of the plan. If, during inspecti ons facilities are found to be non-compliant with the regulations EPA should cite the facility and requir e any gaps be addressed in a timely manner. The answer to non-compliance is not more regulation, ju st enforcement of the existing regulations such as

those outlined in EPCRA.OSHA RFI on PSM
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6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements

CGA agrees with EPA that incident investigation and ac cident history reporting is an important element in determining how to prevent future incidents and accid ents. CGA further agrees that incidents usually occur as a result of a series of other problems. R oot cause analysis is an important part of any incident investigation. By determining the root cause, the fa cility can identify changes needed to prevent future occurrences. Thorough investigations do hel p facilities identify and address root causes.

EPA regulations require incident and a ccident history be reviewed as part of the initial development of PHAs and also be considered during PHA revalidation. While incidents leading to the release of a covered chemical are simple to define, defining a “nea r miss” or “process upset” is extremely difficult and will likely vary by industry, process, locations and t he like. CGA supports modifying current regulation to include a requirement that root cause analyses be co nducted for incidents. CGA believes, however, that a requirement to investigate “near misses” or “process upsets” is inappropriate. A better approach might be

to have facilities themselves define “near misses” and “process upsets” that should be considered in PHA revalidations. In this manner, any unique characteristics of a facility's processes and locations can be

addressed.

7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Requirements for Processes Involving Numerous Small Vessels Stored Together

CGA believes the worst case release scenario is an unrealistic approach to determining incident endpoints and provides little value in determining hazards mitigation strategies and emergency response plans. Including multiple, small vessels as a source when determining a worst case release does nothing to change this conclusion.

The incidents cited by EPA as the basis for includi ng multiple small vessels in worst case release quantities were not examples of worst case scenari os. For flammable chemicals a worst case scenario release, by definition, assumes the instantaneous rele ase of the contents of a single vessel followed by a vapor cloud explosion. While this type release might oc cur if the vessel fails catastrophically, a highly unlikely event, it is extremely improbable that multip le vessels would fail at the exact same moment. As noted in the examples, rather than instantaneous rele ases these incidents escalated over time. Following the initial release and ignition, the subsequent releas es occur from direct flame impingement or radiant heating. And since there is an igniti on source the likelihood of a vapor cloud explosion has been removed.

CGA suggests modifying the regulations to require facilities consider the knock on effect of having multiple small containers stored in proximity with no mitigation provided to reduce the knock on effect when developing alternate case releases. This is a mo re realistic solution to the concern raised by the incident examples cited by EPA in the RFI.

In response to these incidents, CGA pr oactively modified its publication CGA P-1, Safe Handling of Compressed Gases in Containers, to limit the quantity of flammable gases stored in one area and to identify adequate separation distance s between storage areas to minimize the possibility of knock on.

Although there is merit to considering the quantity of flammable chemicals contained in multiple small vessels stored in close proximity for developing an al ternate case scenario, CGA believes there is little merit in taking such an approach for non-flammable chemicals. Even with the instantaneous release of, for instance, a toxic gas from a cylinder there is li ttle likelihood of any knock on effect to surrounding cylinders. Without such knock on effect there is no compelling reason to consider anything more than a single vessel.OSHA RFI on PSM
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8. Public Disclosure of Information To Promot e Regulatory Compliance and Improve Community Understanding of Chemical Risks

CGA does not believe that providing RMP information to the general public will increase public safety or drive better regulatory compliance. CGA does believe that facility information should be provided to organizations such as emergency re sponse authorities, LEPCs, and SEPC s so they can fulfill their public safety roles. Providing RMP information to the general public raises facility security concerns. When the RMP regulations were first promulgated, they c ontained elements that required sharing certain information with the general public. Following the even ts on September 11, 2001, this requirement was rescinded due to well-founded security concerns. Provid ing information such as chemical stored on site, quantities, and hazard mitigation elements merely prov ides a roadmap for those who wish to do harm. In addition, providing such information may be prohi bited by DHS regulations, such as CFATS.

The real answer to better compliance is better enfor cement of existing requirements. Requiring facilities to publically post their RMP information will only result in additional work for those who currently comply and further ignoring of the regulations by those wh o do not comply. Depending on the public to identify facilities that do not comply with the RMP regulations will merely add administrative burdens to both the facilities and to EPA. Every such inquiry will have to be researched and answered.

9. Threshold Quantities and Off-Site Consequence Analysis Endpoints for Regulated Substances Based on Acute Exposure Guideline Level Toxicity Values

As noted above, CGA supports the periodic review of listed chemicals and t heir associated threshold quantities (TQs). Any changes to ei ther the listed chemicals or thei r associated TQs should be based on a scientifically sound and risk-based approach and be done in a clear and transparent manner. Although there may be merit to the approaches suggested by EPA, these changes will likely re sult in a significant increase in the regulated community and should onl y be undertaken after clear and thorough benefits and costs analyses.

Further, any change in approach to establishing TQ needs significant time for adoption. Facilities have changed operations to limit quantities below TQ; lower TQs will bring them under coverage.

10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data

CGA believes a facility's program level should solely be determined by the chemicals on-site, their TQs, and off-site consequences. Including a facility unde r Program 3 based exclusively on its NAICS code further complicates whether the facility is covered and adds little to no value. CGA also recommends that EPA periodically review RMP accident history data as part of their sound sc ientific approach when reviewing the list of covered chemicals and their TQs.

11. The ‘‘Safety Case’’ Regulatory Model

CGA opposes EPA and OSHA adopting a safety case approach to replace the RMP regulation and PSM standard. CGA believes that such a change will shift the responsibility to approve safety decisions from employers, who have the knowledge and expertise specific to a proc ess and its hazards, to government inspectors with lesser knowledge and expertise. EPA provides no evidenc e to support its contention that such a drastic change will improve worker safety.

In its RFI, EPA cites the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as an ex ample of the effective utilization of a safety case approach. EPA notes the NRC oversees 100 commercia l nuclear facilities and 3,000 nuclear material facilities with a staff of nearly 4,000. CGA understands there are nearly 14,000 RMP sites using hundreds of different process appro aches to produce and store covered chemicals. From a size and breadth of different technologi es encountered, there is no comparison between the scope of NRC and that of the RMP pr ogram. According to a 2009 report from the EPA Office of InspectorOSHA RFI on PSM
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General, 50 percent of high-risk RMP sites have never received an on-site inspection and over 65 percent of all RMP sites have never received an on-site insp ection since the RMP began in 1999. It would take an enormous increase in personnel, possessing a wide array of detailed technical knowledge and experience, to provide coverage approxi mating that provided by the NRC staff.

A main component of a safety case approach is for th e duty holder to produce a “safety case report” that identifies a process’s hazards and risks and describe how they will be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). CCPS defines ALARP as “a risk reduction goal, where the risk reduction efforts are

continued until the incremental effort to further reduce risk becomes grossly disproportionate to the level of risk reduction.” A regulator then “accepts” or “r ejects” the safety case report before the owner can begin operation. The safety case approach provides no criteria for acceptance or rejection of the safety case report other than the regulator ’s judgment that ALARP has been ac hieved. A regulator could require adopting different technologies or approaches based on his or her judgment alone. In addition to the significant time that this would require, such regulatory uncertainty would stifle innovation.

12. Streamlining RMP Requirements

CGA suggests EPA consider allowing mo re than one person to be identifi ed as a certified preparer to submit RMP information through EPA's website. Li miting authorizing submittals to a single person imposes an undue burden on companies, especially those with multiple facilities.

In conclusion, CGA appreciates the opportunity to submit our comments. We support EPA's review of the RMP regulations; however, we believe that new regulat ions should not be driven by incidents caused by lack of compliance with the existing regulations bu t rather justified through a demonstrated additional

reduction in risk. The some of the incidents cited in this RFI as a rationale for more regulation occurred because companies disregarded significant require ments of the current regulations. As has been demonstrated by the millions of safe operating hou rs accumulated by companies, compliance with the current regulations significantly reduces the risk of process safety incidents. A focus on awareness and enforcement of existing regulation would better serve EPA, the regulated community, their employees and the communities in which they operate.

Sincerely,

COMPRESSED GAS ASSOCIATION

Richard Craig

Technical Director 14501 George Carter Way, Suite 103 Chantilly, VA 20151 Telephone: 1-703-788-2730

Email: rcraig@cganet.com