NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

CHRISTIAN GREGORY JACKMAN, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

TERESA MARIE MCCANN, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 16-0263 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2014-096241

The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART

COUNSEL

Berkshire Law Office PLLC, Phoenix

By Keith Berkshire, Maxwell Mahoney 

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Teresa Marie McCann, Gilbert

Respondent/Appellant

FILED 9-14-2017
JACKMAN v. MCCANN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Acting Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, 

in which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

S W A N N, Judge:

¶1 This is an appeal from a dissolution decree’s orders regarding 

legal decision-making, parenting time, property allocation, and attorney’s 

fees. We hold that the legal decision-making and parenting-time orders 

have been rendered moot by the juvenile court’s determination that the 

children are dependent as to the appellant. We therefore dismiss that 

portion of the appeal. We affirm as to the property-allocation and 

attorney’s fee orders because we find no abuse of discretion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Teresa Marie Jackman (“Mother”) and Christian Gregory 

Jackman (“Father”) married in 2000. In October 2014, Father left the marital 

home with the parties’ three minor children. He obtained an order of 

protection, which included the children, based on allegations that Mother 

abused the children. The parties later agreed that Mother would have 

supervised parenting time three times a week, and the court appointed a 

best-interests attorney for the children.

¶3 Between December 2014 and February 2015, Mother had nine 

supervised visits. In May 2015, the court ordered Father to make the 

children available for telephonic contact once a week. Mother thereafter 

had some telephonic visits with the children, but the interactions ceased 

around August 2016 because Father claimed that the children did not want 

to participate.

¶4 Under a stipulated order entered in mid-2015, Mother was to 

submit to alcohol testing for ninety days, and Father was to undergo two 

drug tests, ninety days apart. Father tested positive for codeine in May 

2015, and he tested positive for codeine and hydrocodone in a second, 

untimely test in December 2015. Mother provided several diluted urine 

samples but by October 2015 eventually satisfied her alcohol-testing 

regimen.
JACKMAN v. MCCANN

Decision of the Court

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¶5 After a trial, the superior court found that Mother had 

physically and emotionally abused the children, and that she was in denial 

regarding her alcohol abuse. The court concluded that Father should have 

sole legal decision-making authority. The court further concluded that 

awarding substantial parenting time to Mother would endanger the 

children’s physical or emotional health. The court therefore ordered a 

parenting-time plan that gradually increased Mother’s time with the 

children and was conditioned on the family participating in an intensive 

therapeutic reunification program, individual counseling for the parents, 

and Mother testing negative on a full-spectrum drug test for eighteen 

months.

¶6 The court divided the marital property, including the marital 

residence, between Mother and Father. The court awarded Mother $6,000 

in attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 25-324(A). The court denied Mother’s 

motion to amend the judgment or grant a new trial.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Mother challenges the dissolution decree’s orders regarding 

legal decision-making, parenting time, property allocation, and attorney’s 

fees. We address each issue in turn.

I. MOTHER’S APPEAL IS MOOT AS TO THE LEGAL DECISIONMAKING AND PARENTING-TIME ORDERS.

¶8 After the close of briefing in this appeal, Mother notified this 

court of In the Matter of M.J., J.J., N.J., Maricopa County Superior Court Case

No. JD530683, a pending dependency action against her and Father as to 

the children. We take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s March 14, 2017 

orders finding the children dependent as to Mother, placing the children in 

the physical custody of the Department of Child Safety, and prohibiting 

Mother from visiting the children until therapeutically recommended. 

Those orders supersede the legal decision-making and parenting-time 

orders. See A.R.S. § 8-202(F); Michael M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 

230, 234, ¶ 15 (App. 2007). Our review of the legal decision-making and 

parenting-time orders therefore could provide no practical relief to Mother.

¶9 We will dismiss an appeal as moot when our action will have 

no effect on the parties, unless the issue on appeal is one of great public 

importance or is capable of repetition, yet evades review. Cardoso v. Soldo, 

230 Ariz. 614, 617, ¶ 5 (App. 2012). The legal decision-making and 

parenting-time orders in this case, while significant to the parties, does not 
JACKMAN v. MCCANN

Decision of the Court

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have broad public impact and is based on the specific facts. We therefore 

conclude that Mother’s appeal from those orders is moot.

II. THE SUPERIOR COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WITH 

RESPECT TO PROPERTY ALLOCATION.

¶10 Mother contends that the superior court erred by failing to 

order reimbursement for half of approximately $9,000 she spent to maintain 

the marital residence after service of the petition for dissolution. Those 

expenses were not mortgage payments affecting the equity in the house; 

rather, Mother paid ordinary upkeep, HOA fees, and taxes. Father 

maintained the insurance on the marital residence and paid Mother 

temporary spousal maintenance during the litigation. Father also incurred 

expenses to maintain his own residence.

¶11 The court ordered the marital residence sold, all outstanding 

encumbrances paid,1 and any remaining proceeds equally shared. The 

court has broad discretion in apportioning community assets in a 

dissolution, and we will not disturb that allocation absent an abuse of 

discretion. Boncoskey v. Boncoskey, 216 Ariz. 448, 451, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). In 

view of the foregoing facts, we discern no abuse of discretion here.

III. THE SUPERIOR COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WITH 

RESPECT TO THE ATTORNEY’S FEES AWARD.

¶12 The superior court, finding under A.R.S. § 25-324(A) that 

there was a substantial disparity of financial resources favoring Father but 

that neither party acted unreasonably in the litigation, awarded Mother 

approximately 10% of the attorney’s fees and costs she requested. Mother 

contends that she was entitled to a greater award because the evidence does 

not support the court’s finding that Father acted reasonably. Mother also 

contends that she was entitled to her attorney’s fees under A.R.S. 

§ 25-408(J), which provides that “[t]he court shall assess attorney fees and 

costs against either parent if the court finds that the parent has 

unreasonably denied, restricted, or interfered with court-ordered parenting 

time.”

 

1 Mother contends that the superior court failed to consider a debt 

owed to her father related to the marital residence. But Father 

acknowledges that the decree ordered all outstanding encumbrances paid 

before the equity is divided. Accordingly, the debt owed to Mother’s father 

is a non-issue.
JACKMAN v. MCCANN

Decision of the Court

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¶13 Mother contends that Father acted unreasonably by, among 

other things, refusing to encourage the children to participate in the courtordered supervised parenting time and telephonic access, failing to timely 

comply with the drug-testing order, failing to fully comply with the 

counseling orders, and failing to comply with orders to compel financial 

discovery. Where there are disputed facts or inferences to be drawn from 

those facts, and credibility determinations to be made, we will not reweigh 

the evidence or substitute our opinions for the superior court’s findings. See 

Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 348, ¶ 13 (App. 1998). The superior 

court found that many of Father’s behaviors were not in the children’s best 

interests. But the court did not specifically find that Father’s conduct was 

unreasonable. In fact, the court found that “Father has acted as a gatekeeper 

to protect the children [from] emotional and physical abuse,” and that the 

role was “partially validated by the facts of this case.” The court also found 

that the delays in counseling were caused, in part, by circumstances beyond 

Father’s control. The record supports the superior court’s findings. We 

discern no abuse of discretion in the attorney’s fees award.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We dismiss the appeal from the legal decision-making and 

parenting-time orders as moot. In all other respects, we affirm the decree.

¶15 We deny Father’s request for an award of attorney’s fees and 

costs on appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324. Though we conclude that Mother’s 

appeal lacks merit, we do not find it frivolous or abusive.