PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

MARTIN MENDOZA LEIBA, 

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney

General,  No. 11-1845

Respondent.

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL,

Amicus Supporting Petitioner. 

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Argued: September 20, 2012

Decided: November 9, 2012

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, DAVIS, Circuit Judge, and

Max O. COGBURN, Jr., United States District Judge

for the Western District of North Carolina,

sitting by designation.

Petition granted by published opinion. Chief Judge Traxler

wrote the opinion, in which Judge Davis and Judge Cogburn

joined.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Xavier F. Racine, CALDERON, RACINE &

DERWIN, PLC, Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Benjamin

Winograd, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Supporting Petitioner. Sheri Robyn

Glaser, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Tony West,

Assistant Attorney General, Anthony P. Nicastro, Senior Litigation Counsel, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Mary Kenney,

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, Washington,

D.C., for Amicus Supporting Petitioner. 

OPINION

TRAXLER, Chief Judge:

Martin Mendoza Leiba ("Mendoza") petitions for review of

a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("the Board")

affirming a decision of an immigration judge ("IJ") granting

a motion by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS")

to pretermit Mendoza’s applications for adjustment of immigration status and for a waiver pursuant to Immigration and

Nationality Act ("INA") § 212(h). We grant Mendoza’s petition.

I.

Mendoza is a native and citizen of El Salvador who entered

the United States illegally. He married in 1994, and he and his

wife now have five children. Mendoza adjusted his status to

that of lawful permanent resident ("LPR") in 1995 through an

employment-based immigration petition, and his wife became

a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2001. 

2 LEIBA v. HOLDER
In 2008, Mendoza was convicted in the Circuit Court of

Loudoun County, Virginia, of receiving stolen property, see

Va. Code § 18.2-108, and he received a 36-month suspended

sentence. DHS subsequently commenced removal proceedings against Mendoza in 2010 by filing a Notice to Appear

("NTA") with the Executive Office of Immigration Review.

The NTA charged Mendoza with removability under INA §

237(a)(2)(A)(iii), see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an

alien who, "any time after admission," was convicted of an

aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G),

i.e., which includes theft offenses for which the term of

imprisonment was at least one year. Through counsel, Mendoza admitted the NTA’s factual allegations but denied

removability as charged and indicated he would apply for

adjustment of status and a waiver under INA § 212(h). See 8

U.S.C. § 1182(h). DHS subsequently moved to pretermit

Mendoza’s application, arguing that his conviction rendered

him ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver.

The IJ granted DHS’s motion, ruling that an alien convicted

of an aggravated felony after obtaining LPR status is ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver. The IJ therefore ordered that Mendoza be removed to El Salvador. Mendoza appealed to the

Board, which affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal.

Mendoza now petitions for review of the Board’s decision.

II.

Mendoza argues that the Board erred in finding him barred

under § 212(h) from obtaining a waiver of inadmissibility. We

agree.

We review de novo the Board’s legal conclusions, including those regarding statutory construction. See Li Fang Lin v.

Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). We also grant

appropriate deference to the Board’s interpretation of the INA

under the two-step framework set out in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). Under that

LEIBA v. HOLDER 3
framework, we first consider "whether Congress has directly

spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. at 842. If a statute

is unambiguous concerning the question presented, then "that

is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,

must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress." Id. at 842-43; see Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d

243, 251 (4th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, if we conclude

that "Congress has not directly addressed the precise question

at issue, . . . the question for the court is whether the agency’s

answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."

Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 843.

The statutory provision at the center of this case, § 212(h)

of the INA, grants the Attorney General the discretion to

excuse the commission of certain crimes or other misconduct

that would otherwise preclude noncitizens from entering or

remaining in the United States. As it applies to Mendoza,

§ 212(h) allows the Attorney General to waive an alien’s

inadmissibility that is based on the alien’s conviction for an

aggravated felony if the "denial of admission would result in

extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien." 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(h)(1)(B).1

Before 1996, the only aliens categorically barred from

receiving § 212(h) waivers were those who had been convicted of committing, or attempting to or conspiring to commit, "murder or criminal acts involving torture." Immigration

Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(d)(4), 104 Stat.

4978, 5076-77. However, with the enactment of the Illegal

Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of

1996 ("IIRIRA"), Congress created a new category of aliens

ineligible for the waiver. New language in § 212(h) provided,

in pertinent part, that 

1Such waivers are available not only to those seeking to enter the United

States from abroad, but also to those aliens already in the United States

who are facing removal and who are eligible to avoid removal. See Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380, 385 n.3 (4th Cir. 2012). 

4 LEIBA v. HOLDER
No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in

the case of an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted

for permanent residence if either since the date of

such admission the alien has been convicted of an

aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully

resided continuously in the United States for a period

of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the

date of initiation of proceedings to remove the alien

from the United States.

Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 348, 110 Stat. 3009 (emphasis

added), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).2 The IIRIRA also pro2Section 212(h), in its entirety, provides: 

The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I), (B), (D), and (E) of subsection

(a)(2) of this section and subparagraph (A)(i)(II) of such subsection insofar as it relates to a single offense of simple possession

of 30 grams or less of marijuana if— 

(1)(A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that— 

(i) the alien is inadmissible only under subparagraph (D)(i) or

(D)(ii) of such subsection or the activities for which the alien is

inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the

alien’s application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,

(ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not

be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the

United States, and 

(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or 

(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son,

or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully

admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien’s denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen

or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such

alien; or 

(C) the alien is a VAWA self-petitioner; and 

LEIBA v. HOLDER 5
vided statutory definitions for "admission" and "admitted,"

which are defined as "with respect to an alien, the lawful

entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and

authorization by an immigration officer." Pub. L. No. 104-

208, Div. C, § 301(a), 110 Stat. 3009 (emphasis added), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). On the other hand, the INA

defines the term "lawfully admitted for permanent residence"

as "the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege

of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).

In Aremu v. Department of Homeland Security, 450 F.3d

578 (4th Cir. 2006), we construed the definition of "admission" and "admitted" in a context slightly different than that

before us here. In that case, the alien, Shanu, had been admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant visa for pleasure

on a six-month visa in 1989. See id. at 579. He remained in

the country illegally when his visa expired and was able to

(2) the Attorney General, in his discretion, and pursuant to

such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations

prescribe, has consented to the alien’s applying or reapplying for

a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status.

No waiver shall be provided under this subsection in the case of

an alien who has been convicted of (or who has admitted committing acts that constitute) murder or criminal acts involving torture, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder or a criminal

act involving torture. No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been admitted

to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent

residence if either since the date of such admission the alien has

been convicted of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States for a period of not

less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of

proceedings to remove the alien from the United States. No court

shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this subsection. 

8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 

6 LEIBA v. HOLDER
adjust to LPR status in 1996. See id. In 1998, however, he was

convicted of various fraud offenses. See id. On the basis of

these convictions, he was charged with removability under 8

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), which provides that 

Any alien who —

(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years (or 10 years in the

case of an alien provided lawful permanent resident

status under section 1255(j) of this title) after the

date of admission, and 

(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence

of one year or longer may be imposed, 

is deportable.

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added); Aremu, 450

F.3d at 579-80. The IJ concluded that "the date of admission"

in this context included not only the date that Shanu was originally admitted to this country but also the date of his adjustment to LPR status, and therefore ordered Shanu removed.

See Aremu, 450 F.3d at 580. The Board affirmed on appeal,

and Shanu filed a petition for review in our court. See id.

We granted Shanu’s petition under the first prong of Chevron review, concluding that in Shanu’s case, "the date of

admission" unambiguously referred to the date he entered the

country, not the date that he adjusted his status. See id. at 582-

83. We reasoned that an "[a]djustment of status is a method

of acquiring status as a permanent resident that is only available to those already within the United States." Id. at 581.

Because "admission," as Congress defined the term was a

type of entry into this country, we concluded that an adjustment of status was not included. See id. In so doing, however,

we "express[ed] no opinion" whether, in a case in which strict

adherence to the definition of "admission" would leave an

LEIBA v. HOLDER 7
alien without any "date of admission," we would use the date

of a status adjustment as a proxy for the date of admission in

order to avoid producing an absurd result. See id. at 583. 

In Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2012), a

decision issued after the Board issued its decision in the present case, we had occasion to interpret the very same § 212(h)

language at issue here. As such, that case bears close examination. Bracamontes was a native of Mexico whose mother

brought him to the United States illegally when he was less

than two years old. See id. at 382. He and his mother were

granted temporary resident status in 1987, which was adjusted

to LPR status in 1990. See id. After 1976, Bracamontes lived

continuously in the United States except for one week in 1988

when he visited Mexico. See id. In 1999, Bracamontes pled

guilty in Virginia state court to an aggravated felony. See id.

at 383. The issue in Bracamontes was whether that aggravated

felony rendered Bracamontes ineligible under § 212(h) for a

waiver of inadmissibility. An IJ found that it did and the

Board agreed and dismissed his appeal. See id. Bracamontes

then petitioned for review of the Board’s decision, and we

granted his petition. See id. at 383, 389.

Applying the first prong of Chevron analysis, we concluded

that the § 212(h) waiver bar unambiguously did not apply to

Bracamontes. We reasoned that the defined terms "admitted"

and "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" both separately appeared in § 212(h) and that they should be given the

meaning that Congress specifically designated for them. See

id. at 385. Replacing the terms in the statute with their respective definitions, we concluded that the language at issue

meant:

No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in

the case of an alien who has previously [lawfully

entered into the United States after inspection and

authorization by an immigration officer] as an alien

[with the status of having been lawfully accorded the

8 LEIBA v. HOLDER
privilege of residing permanently in the United

States as an immigrant] if . . . since the date of such

admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony.

See id. at 385-86. Because Bracamontes had never lawfully

entered the United States after inspection with LPR status —

as he achieved that status only after his last (and only) entry

into this country with inspection — we reasoned that the

§ 212(h) bar plainly did not apply to him. See id. at 385.

Although the government urged us to treat Bracamontes as

having been "admitted" by virtue of his obtaining of his 1990

status adjustment for purposes of § 212(h), we concluded that

doing so would require us to ignore the plain meaning of Congress’s definition of "admitted," which "[c]learly" does not

"include[ ] an adjustment of status." Id. We noted further that

the government’s interpretation would make surplusage out of

the words "who has previously been admitted to the United

States." Id. at 386. Recognizing that we were obliged to give

the statute its plain meaning, we rejected the Board’s interpretation. See id. at 386-87.

We noted that the government argued that our reading of

§ 212(h) would produce an absurd result, namely that aliens

who adjust to LPR status after entering the country would

receive more favorable treatment than those who entered with

LPR status. See id. at 388; see also Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel,

226 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 2000) ("If a literal reading of a

statute produces an outcome . . . that can truly be characterized as absurd, i.e., that is so gross as to shock the general

moral or common sense, then we can look beyond an unambiguous statute and consult legislative history to divine its

meaning." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)),

aff’d sub nom. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438

(2002). We squarely rejected that argument, however, concluding that Congress in fact "may have had rational reasons

for making such a distinction." Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 388.

In particular, we noted that Congress may well have been

LEIBA v. HOLDER 9
simply taking an incremental approach regarding the achievement of the goal of quickly removing aliens who have committed serious crimes, or it may rationally have concluded that

aliens who adjust post-entry are more deserving of being eligible for a waiver because many of them entered this country

as minors, grew up here, developed strong ties here, and may

well have more citizen relatives who would be hurt by their

removal. See id. at 389. 

We emphasized that our interpretation of § 212(h) was in

line with similar rulings from other circuits. See id. at 387.

We also noted that our interpretation did not conflict with the

Board’s decision in Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I. & N. Dec. 219

(BIA 2010) — which the Board relied on in the present case

for its conclusion that Mendoza was "admitted to the United

States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence."3

8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). We determined that Koljenovic was distinguishable since, in contrast to Bracamontes, who had once

been admitted to this country when he returned from a weeklong trip to Mexico, Koljenovic "effectively had no admission

at all unless his adjustment of status was used as the relevant

date of admission." Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 388. Based on

3

In Matter of Koljenovic, the Board noted that it had consistently construed status adjustments as "admissions." See 25 I. & N. Dec. 219, 221

(BIA 2010). The Board reasoned that under a contrary determination,

"aliens who entered without inspection and later adjusted their status

would never have been ‘admitted’ for permanent residence and would

therefore be ineligible for relief from removal that includes an ‘admission’

requirement." Id. The Board further found that the contrary interpretation

would also be at odds with INA § 245(b), which requires the Attorney

General to "record the alien’s lawful admission for permanent residence

as of the date" of the grant of the status adjustment. See id. The Board also

reasoned that Congress would not have intended "for an alien who entered

the United States illegally and was afforded the privilege of adjustment of

status to be able to avoid the restrictions contained in section 212(h) of the

Act, when those very restrictions would apply if the alien had gone

through consular processing to be admitted as a lawful permanent resident." Id. at 222-23. And, the Board concluded that legislative history supported its result. See id. at 222. 

10 LEIBA v. HOLDER
this difference, we noted that although the Board in

Koljenovic "arguably needed to fill in a ‘gap’ in the language

of section 212(h) because it was entirely silent concerning

how to treat an alien with no lawful entry at all," no such gap

existed in Bracamontes’s case. Id. (emphasis in original).

The government contends that this language in Bracamontes shows that Congress left a gap to fill in § 212(h), and thus

that under Chevron’s second step, we should defer to the

Board’s reasonable decision as to how to fill the gap. The

government maintains that "in section 212(h), Congress did

not address the situation of an alien with no lawful entry

whatsoever, as the language in section 212(h) refers only to

an alien with a previous admission, i.e., an alien who has lawfully entered the United States pursuant to INA

§ 101(a)(13)(A)." Supp. brief of Respondent at 5-6. 

In support of its position, the government argues that this

court "acknowledged" the existence of this gap in Bracamontes. Supp. brief of Respondent at 5, 6. We disagree. Our discussion of Koljenovic in Bracamontes explained only that the

factual circumstance on which the result in Koljenovic was

based was not present in Bracamontes. We commented that

the Board’s decision in Koljenovic was "arguably" correct,

but we certainly did not definitively resolve the proper application of the law to a factual scenario not before us. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 388. As such, the language represents

mere non-binding dicta, and does not answer the question of

whether Congress left a gap to fill in § 212(h) as to aliens who

have never entered the country legally. 

Regarding that question, we conclude that although we did

not directly decide whether Congress left such a gap, our

analysis in Bracamontes shows that no such gap exists. In

Bracamontes, we reasoned that the term "admitted" in

§ 212(h) "[c]learly [does not] include[ ] an adjustment of status." Id. at 385. Thus, we held:

LEIBA v. HOLDER 11
As such, an alien with [LPR] status who has entered

the United States legally, following inspection by an

immigration officer, and is subsequently convicted

of an aggravated felony, [has not "been admitted to

the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for

permanent residence" and thus] is statutorily ineligible for a section 212(h) waiver. With respect to other

aliens, however, the Attorney General retains the

discretion to grant a waiver . . . .

Id. at 386 (emphasis added). With Congress having spoken

directly to the issue before us, we must enforce § 212(h)’s

plain meaning.4 We note that since Bracamontes issued, the

Board has reached the same conclusion that we do today

4Prior to our issuance of Bracamontes, the government argued in this

appeal that under Mendoza’s interpretation, "Congress’ employment of the

phrase ‘alien lawfully admitted for permanent residen[ce]’ is, by in large,

a misnomer" if aliens can achieve that status without being "admitted."

Brief for Respondent at 19. Bracamontes forecloses our consideration of

that argument, but we note nonetheless that the Supreme Court rejected a

similar argument in Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124 (2008) (holding in the context of the Controlled Substances Act that although "felony"

was a defined term, another defined term, "felony drug offense," included

some offenses that did not satisfy the statutory definition of a "felony").

The government further maintains that Mendoza’s interpretation would

not make sense within § 212(h) itself because under § 212(h), the Attorney

General may waive inadmissibility "in the case of an immigrant who is the

spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an

alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the

satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien’s denial of admission

would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully

resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien." 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(h)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The government argues that if an

adjustment of status is not an admission, then an alien like Mendoza could

not obtain a waiver under § 212(h) because "any prospective hardship

befalling their family members would no longer be attributable to a denial

or refusal of ‘admission.’" Matter of Alyazji, 25 I. & N. Dec. 397, 403

(BIA 2011). This argument is also foreclosed by Bracamontes, which, like

the present case, also concerned an alien seeking a § 212(h) waiver based

on family hardship. 

12 LEIBA v. HOLDER
regarding the consequences of that decision, indicating that in

the Fourth Circuit, after Bracamontes, the § 212(h) aggravated felony bar unambiguously does not apply to an alien

who never entered the United States legally. See Matter of

Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 784, 788 (BIA 2012). 

The government argues that accepting Mendoza’s interpretation would produce an absurd result in that there is no rational basis for favoring aliens like him, who entered the country

illegally and only later obtained their LPR status through

adjustment, over those aliens who entered the country legally.

As we have explained, however, that is an argument we specifically rejected in deciding Bracamontes. See id. at 388-89.

We are without authority to revisit it here.5

The government further contends that adhering to Congress’s strict definition of "admitted" in the context of

§ 212(h) with regard to an alien like Mendoza, who has never

legally entered this country but who has adjusted to LPR status, would lead to other absurd results. First, the government

contends that such an alien would never be eligible to apply

for naturalization despite possessing LPR status because INA

§ 318 provides, as is relevant here, that "no person shall be

naturalized unless he has been lawfully admitted to the United

States for permanent residence in accordance with all applicable provisions of this chapter." 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (emphasis

5The government also argues that its construction "provides the most

reasonable reading of section 212(h)" since it would prevent § 212(h) from

possibly violating the Equal Protection Clause by arbitrarily treating aliens

who obtained LPR status after illegally entering the country differently

from those who entered the country with LPR status. Brief for Respondent

at 32 (citing Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337 (11th Cir. 1996)). However, our

conclusion in Bracamontes that "Congress may have had rational reasons

for making such a distinction" certainly saps this argument of any significant persuasive force. Bracamontes, 675 F.3d at 388; see also id. at 388

n.5 (noting that "courts have consistently overruled" "equal protection

challenges to the distinction drawn under section 212(h) between illegal

immigrants and those admitted as lawful permanent residents"). 

LEIBA v. HOLDER 13
added). We do not see why our decision today would affect

§ 318. As we explained in Bracamontes, the terms "lawfully

admitted to the United States for permanent residence" and

"admitted" have separate definitions. Our decision today,

which turns primarily on the meaning of "admitted," should

have no bearing on the meaning of "lawfully admitted to the

United States for permanent residence" in § 318.

The government next contends that literally applying Congress’s definition of "admitted" in cases of aliens who have

never lawfully entered this country would produce the absurd

result that such aliens would be ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal under INA § 240A. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.

That section provides that the Attorney General may cancel

removal of an inadmissible alien if, as is relevant here, he:

(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years,

(2) has resided in the United States continuously

for 7 years after having been admitted in any status,

and 

(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (emphasis added). The premise of the

government’s argument that it would be absurd for an alien

such as Mendoza to be eligible for a possible § 212(h) waiver

but to be ineligible for cancellation of removal is the government’s view that Congress intended to create congruity

between § 212(h) and § 240A. The distinctions between the

language used in § 240A and that used in § 212(h) clearly

show, however, that Congress did not intend such congruity.

First, § 240A(a)’s requirement that the alien have had LPR

status for at least five years is nowhere to be found in

§ 212(h). Second, unlike in § 212(h), Congress in § 240A

decided not to use the term "admitted" along with "lawfully

14 LEIBA v. HOLDER
admitted for permanent residence." "[W]here Congress

includes particular language in one section of a statute but

omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the

disparate inclusion or exclusion." Russello v. United States,

464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (alteration in original and internal

quotation marks omitted). We certainly see no absurdity in

this disparity. 

The government next maintains that applying Bracamontes

to an alien like Mendoza, who never entered this country

legally but who has adjusted to LPR status, would produce the

absurd result that he would be left in the position of never

being removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien

who was convicted of an aggravated felony "any time after

admission." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). However, assuming arguendo that such a result would be absurd, our decision

today does not produce that result and we offer no opinion

concerning whether Mendoza could be removed under that

subsection. We recognize that for aliens such as Mendoza it

is arguable that the date of their status adjustment should be

used as a proxy for their date of admission to avoid an absurd

result in interpreting § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). That recognition,

however, does not require us to refrain from enforcing the

plain meaning of § 212(h) when the result produced by our

application of § 212(h) is not absurd. See Aremu, 450 F.3d at

583 (adhering to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)’s definition of

"admitted" when interpreting a different statute while

acknowledging the possibility that adhering to the definition

when interpreting other statutes could produce absurd results);

Stone v. Instrumentation Lab. Co., 591 F.3d 239, 249 n.10

(4th Cir. 2009) (similar); see also Lockhart v. United States,

546 U.S. 142, 146 (2005) ("The fact that Congress may not

have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment

is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain

meaning." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

LEIBA v. HOLDER 15
Congress has not used the terms "admitted" and "lawfully

admitted to the United States for permanent residence"

together often in the INA and, indeed, the phrase "admitted to

the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent

residence" which appears in § 212(h), appears nowhere else in

the Code. The fact that Congress decided to use both terms

together is a very strong indication that it intended that each

term would serve a distinct purpose. Whether we would

refrain from enforcing the plain meaning of "admitted" or

"admission" in a different statutory context wherein Congress

used different language and where adhering to the strict definition of "admitted" or "admission" would produce absurd

results is a question we simply are not presented with in this

appeal.6

The government also maintains that applying Mendoza’s

interpretation produces the absurd result that even if the

Attorney General exercised his discretion to grant Mendoza a

§ 212(h) waiver, Mendoza would be susceptible to removal

under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) as "[a]n alien present in the

United States without being admitted or paroled."7 8 U.S.C.

6The Board’s decision in Matter of Espinosa Guillot, 25 I. & N. Dec.

653 (BIA 2011), supports the conclusion that the government’s claimed

absurd result would not necessarily follow from our adoption of Mendoza’s interpretation. Like Mendoza, the alien in that case was an LPR who

had never been "admitted" as that term is defined in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(1)(A). After the alien was convicted of narcotics trafficking, the

government commenced removal proceedings on the basis that the alien

had been convicted of an aggravated felony and controlled substance violation "after admission." See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Following an Eleventh Circuit decision very similar to the decision we issue

today, Lanier v. Attorney General, 631 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011), an IJ

determined that the alien’s status adjustment did not constitute an "admission" to the United States. See 25 I. & N. Dec. at 653-54. The Board

reversed, however. In so doing, it read Lanier narrowly, noting that Lanier

relied, as we do here, "on the particular language of section 212(h)" and

stating that the "holding should not be read to extend to other provisions

of the [INA]." Id. at 655. 

7The government also contends that we should reject Mendoza’s proposed interpretation in the case of an alien who has never lawfully entered

this country because 

16 LEIBA v. HOLDER
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). However, whether Mendoza is removable

under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) is a question not before us. As we

have explained, we can determine at the appropriate time how

§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) should be interpreted. 

Despite the existence of some obvious awkwardness in

applying Congress’s definition of "admitted" and "admission"

in other contexts, no absurdity is produced in doing so on the

facts before us and Congress’s intention regarding the meaning of the language we interpret today is plain. It is thus not

surprising that each circuit to construe § 212(h) in the context

we address today has concluded that obtaining LPR status

unambiguously does not constitute being "admitted" in the

context of § 212(h). See Hanif v. Attorney Gen., No. 11-2643,

2012 WL 4044727, at *4-*7 (3d Cir. Sept. 14, 2012); Lanier

v. Attorney Gen., 631 F.3d 1363, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 2011);

Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1095-1101 (9th Cir.

2010); Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 544 (5th Cir.

2008). Indeed, in Hanif and Lanier, the Third and Seventh

Circuits adhered to Congress’s strict definition of "admitted"

on facts indistinguishable from those before us, as those

cases, like Mendoza’s, involved aliens who had never entered

the country legally. How "admitted" and "admission" should

be interpreted in other contexts is a question for another day.

it is unclear how [a § 212(h) waiver] would benefit this alien if

he does not achieve an admission upon adjustment of status. If

this alien does not achieve an admission upon adjustment, then

this alien remains deportable for an act committed prior to the

adjustment. 

Supp. brief for Respondent at 9. We do not understand the government’s

argument. To the extent that it maintains that Mendoza himself would continue to be removable for his offense even if the Attorney General granted

a § 212(h) waiver, that is simply incorrect. To the extent that it maintains

that some other alien might suffer this fate, we do not understand how that

would be the case. 

LEIBA v. HOLDER 17
III.

In sum, for all the reasons we have discussed, we hold that

the § 212(h) waiver bar unambiguously does not apply to

Mendoza, and we grant his petition for review.

PETITION GRANTED

18 LEIBA v. HOLDER