IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

MORGAN AMANDA LEPPERT,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D16-2238

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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Opinion filed March 27, 2017

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Putnam County,

Patti A. Christensen, Judge.

Valarie Linnen, Atlantic Beach, for 

Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Koller, 

Assistant Attorney General, Daytona 

Beach, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Morgan Amanda Leppert appeals her judgment and sentence for first-degree 

murder, burglary with assault or battery, and robbery with a deadly weapon. Leppert 

raises four issues: 1) her lengthy sentence violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition 

against cruel and unusual punishment laid out in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); 

2) the trial court erred in not having a jury determine whether she killed, intended to kill, 
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or attempted to kill the victim; 3) the trial court erred in finding that she killed, intended to 

kill, or attempted to kill the victim; and 4) Leppert’s fifty-year sentences for the burglary 

and robbery charges violate the Eighth Amendment because they are de facto life 

sentences that fail to provide her with a meaningful opportunity for release and 

rehabilitation. We affirm on these issues. 

As to the second issue, the trial court made the requisite finding required by section 

775.082, Florida Statutes (2016), that Leppert killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill 

the victim. Leppert contends that the jury was required to make this finding under the 

statute. In a strikingly similar case, this court recently determined that the trial court did 

not err in making such a finding. Williams v. State, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D363 (Fla. 5th DCA 

Feb. 10, 2017) (“Our supreme court has expressly authorized a trial court to make the 

factual determination as to whether a defendant actually killed, attempted to kill, or 

intended to kill a victim.” (citing Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954, 963 (Fla. 2015))).

Lastly, we note that the trial court provided in Leppert’s sentence that she was 

eligible for a judicial review hearing after twenty-five years for all three charges. Pursuant 

to section 921.1402(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2016), Leppert was entitled to a review of her 

robbery and burglary convictions after twenty years. § 921.1402(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2016). 

We accordingly reverse that part of the sentencing order and remand this case for entry 

of an amended sentencing order consistent with this opinion.

As we did in Williams, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme 

Court as one of great public importance:

DOES ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, 133 S. CT. 2151 

(2013), REQUIRE THE JURY AND NOT THE TRIAL COURT 

TO MAKE THE FACTUAL FINDING UNDER SECTION 

775.082(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2016), AS TO 
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WHETHER A JUVENILE OFFENDER ACTUALLY KILLED, 

INTENDED TO KILL, OR ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE 

VICTIM?

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.

SAWAYA, BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.