alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-40401

VERNON KING, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

INDRIA N. RICE, Officer; KYLE D. HERRINGTON, Officer; UP TAYLOR, 

Officer,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:12-CV-612

Before PRADO, OWEN, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Vernon King, Jr., Texas prisoner # 590316, moves this court for 

authorization to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) following the district court’s 

dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a 

prisoner may not proceed IFP in a civil action or in an appeal of a judgment in 

a civil action if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed as frivolous or 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 14, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 14-40401 Document: 00513005112 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/14/2015
No. 14-40401

for failure to state a claim, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury. Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 1998). 

King has failed to show that he should be allowed to proceed IFP on appeal 

under § 1915(g) or that his appeal of the district court’s judgment presents a 

nonfrivolous issue. See Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982). 

King’s motion for leave to proceed IFP is denied.

The facts surrounding the IFP decision are inextricably intertwined with 

the merits of the appeal. See, e.g., Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 

1997). The appeal of the judgment of the district court presents no nonfrivolous 

issues, and the appeal is dismissed as frivolous. 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

2

 Case: 14-40401 Document: 00513005112 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/14/2015
United States Agricultural 1400 Independence Ave., SW.

Department of Marketing Stop 0231, South Building

Agriculture Service Washington, DC 20250-0231

Action Plan on Proposed Amendments

to the Appalachian, Southeast and Florida

Milk Marketing Orders

November 28, 2022

USDA received a formal proposal on October 28, 2022, to amend inter-market transportation 

credits in the Appalachian and Southeast orders and adopt new provisions to establish

distributing plant delivery credits in the Appalachian, Southeast and Florida orders. The 

proposal was submitted on behalf of the Dairy Cooperative Marketing Agency (DCMA), which 

represents nine cooperatives in the region. The proponents contend the three southeastern 

FMMO areas have a chronic milk deficit, creating challenging marketing conditions to ensure 

the fluid milk needs of the orders are met. The proponents contend that inter-market 

transportation credits in the Appalachian and Southeast orders and distributing plant delivery 

credits in the Appalachian, Southeast and Florida orders will incentivize more orderly movement 

of milk in the southeast region.

Based on the information submitted, USDA is considering initiation of a rulemaking proceeding 

that would include a public hearing to collect evidence regarding proposed changes to the intermarket transportation credits in the Appalachian and Southeast orders and adoption of 

distributing plant delivery credits in the Appalachian, Southeast, and Florida orders.

The following table outlines the timeframe of the rulemaking, should the Secretary of 

Agriculture choose to proceed, to ensure that the proceeding concludes within 120 days of the 

publication of this Action Plan:

Pre-Hearing Steps Anticipated Timeframe

Additional Proposals

Requested

• Request for additional proposals mailed November 28, 2022.

• Additional proposals must be received by December 19, 2022.

Pre – Hearing Workshop Will likely not be held.

Data Request Must be received no later than 10 days before start of hearing.

Tentative Hearing Date Late February 2023

If issued, a Notice of Hearing detailing the date, time and location of the hearing and the 

proposals under consideration, would be published in the Federal Register. The Notice of 

Hearing also would detail the deadline for all data requests of the Dairy Program to ensure the 

requested data is available at the start of the hearing. 

A copy of the submitted proposal can be found on the Dairy Programs website: 

https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/moa/dairy/petitions

Contact Person: Erin Taylor, (202) 720-7311, Erin.Taylor@usda.gov
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2076

KAREN MOORE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

GOOGLE, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Richard M. Gergel, District

Judge. (2:13-cv-03034-RMG)

Submitted: March 19, 2015 Decided: April 8, 2015

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Karen Moore, Appellant Pro Se. David Spence Cox, BARNWELL 

WHALEY PATTERSON & HELMS, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina; 

Joseph Charles Gratz, DURIE TANGRI LLP, San Francisco, 

California, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Karen Moore appeals the district court’s order accepting 

the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing her 

civil complaint.∗ We have reviewed the record and find no 

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated 

by the district court. Moore v. Google, Inc., No. 2:13–cv03034–RMG, 2014 WL 4955264 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2014). We deny the 

pending motion for stay pending appeal and for appointment of 

counsel as moot. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this Court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 ∗ We note that Moore’s notice of appeal designated not only 

the district court’s final order but also two pretrial orders of 

the magistrate judge. Because Moore sought review of the orders 

in the district court, and the district court addressed the 

issues Moore raises on appeal in its final order, we conclude 

that we have jurisdiction to review those issues in this appeal. 

Hoven v. Walgreen Co., 751 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 2014).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                           5,387
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  125,675
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (2,947)
<INVENTORY>                                     94,398
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 9,586
<PP&E>                                         141,884
<DEPRECIATION>                                  87,796
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 311,121
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          155,946
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         8,763
<OTHER-SE>                                      81,379
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   311,121
<SALES>                                        249,904
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               249,904
<CGS>                                          171,452
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  171,452
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                67,755
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,584
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,113
<INCOME-TAX>                                       452
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,661
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,661
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .41
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .41


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of
Wise Metals Group, LLC (the Company) for the fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, David DAddario, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, certify to my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: November 19, 2004



By:

/S/    DAVID
DADDARIODavid DAddarioChairman and Chief Executive Officer




A signed original of this
written statement, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Paul Kenneth TATE, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. 4550.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Feb. 21, 1980.

Richard G. Lindsley, Asst. Public Defender, Juneau, Brian Shortell, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.

James L. Hanley, Asst. Dist. Atty., Larry R. Weeks, Dist. Atty., Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

OPINION

Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CON-NOR, BOOCHEVER, BURKE and MATTHEWS, Justices.

PER CURIAM.

Paul Kenneth Tate pleaded nolo conten-dere to the crime of rape. He was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He appeals that sentence as excessive, contending that the sentencing court failed to give adequate weight to Tate’s rehabilitation potential, that Tate is not a “worst possible offender,” *Waters v. State,*483 P.2d 199, 201 (Alaska 1971), and that the court did not adequately consider the psychiatric report and other information about Tate’s past behavior.

Tate’s arguments are refuted by the record. Since 1968 Tate has been engaged in a constant course of antisocial conduct. His adult criminal convictions in Ohio include grand larceny, escape, a probation violation, and possession of marijuana. As a juvenile, he was adjudicated delinquent in Ohio on several occasions. While in military service he was convicted of several offenses by court martial, and was finally given an undesirable discharge. Moreover, at the time the present offense was committed Tate was out on bail pending extradition to the State of Washington for trial on eleven counts of forgery. Tate is also wanted by the State of Ohio for “absconding from probation.”

The rape for which he was sentenced here was committed in a calculated and cruel manner. It appears that Tate’s initial purpose in entering the victim’s apartment was to steal a large amount of rent receipts which he thought would be found there. Once in the apartment, however, he held the victim at knifepoint and, in addition to the rape, robbed her of what was in her pocketbook.

Tate has stated that, “unless I’m motivated into a drastic change I see no other means of self-support, but to a life of crime.” The psychiatric report prepared in *2connection with the sentencing proceeding in this case shows Tate as having an antisocial personality, and there is little prospect that his pattern of behavior can be readily altered.

We have repeatedly denounced rape as a most serious offense warranting a significant punishment. *Post*v. *State,*580 P.2d 304, 309 (Alaska 1978); *State v. Chaney,*477 P.2d 441, 446 (Alaska 1970). It is our conclusion that in imposing this sentence the superior court was not clearly mistaken.1
      *McClain v. State,*519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).

AFFIRMED.

. We note in this regard that under AS 11.15.130(c) Tate could have been sentenced to 20 years in the state penitentiary.
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ADAM K. VETTER,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-7090

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 12-3070, Chief Judge Bruce E. 

Kasold.

______________________ 

Decided: April 14, 2015

______________________ 

JEFFREY DANIEL SMYTH, Finnegan, Henderson, 

Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Palo Alto, CA, argued 

for claimant-appellant. Also represented by JENNIFER 

SWAN; RONALD LEE SMITH, Washington, DC. 

LOREN MISHA PREHEIM, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. 

Also represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., CLAUDIA BURKE; Y. KEN LEE, AMANDA 
2 VETTER v. MCDONALD

BLACKMON, Office of General Counsel, United States 

Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Before CHEN, BRYSON, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Adam K. Vetter appeals from the finding of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans 

Court) that the record does not reasonably raise a claim 

for 1) a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b), and 2) a 

disability rating based on the loss of use of his dominant 

hand under 38 C.F.R. § 4.63, which would further entitle 

Mr. Vetter to additional special monthly compensation 

under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(k). 

Although Mr. Vetter attempts to frame the issue on 

appeal as whether the Veterans Court correctly interpreted the law and applied the correct legal standards, in 

effect Mr. Vetter merely disagrees with the Veterans 

Court’s application of 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 and 38 C.F.R. 

§ 4.63 to find the record does not reasonably raise a claim 

under those provisions. We do not have jurisdiction to 

review the Veterans Court’s application of the law to the 

facts of Mr. Vetter’s case unless it presents a constitutional issue—which has not been alleged here. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2); Jackson v. Shinseki, 587 F.3d 1106, 1109 

(Fed. Cir. 2009); cf. Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 

225 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he mere recitation of a basis for 

jurisdiction by party or a court[] is not controlling; we 

must look to the true nature of the action.”).

Accordingly, we dismiss Mr. Vetter’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction.

DISMISSED

COSTS

No costs.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 48 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 48

    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
 providing that the rights extended by the Constitution are the rights 
                        of natural persons only.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 22, 2019

 Ms. Jayapal (for herself, Ms. McCollum, Ms. Norton, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. 
   Khanna, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Blumenauer, Mr. Takano, Ms. Schakowsky, Ms. 
 Bonamici, and Ms. Gabbard) submitted the following joint resolution; 
          which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
    Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
 providing that the rights extended by the Constitution are the rights 
                        of natural persons only.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled   (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States 
within seven years after the date of its submission for ratification:

                              ``Article--

    ``Section 1. The rights protected by the Constitution of the United 
States are the rights of natural persons only. Artificial entities, 
such as corporations, limited liability companies, and other entities, 
established by the laws of any State, the United States, or any foreign 
state shall have no rights under this Constitution and are subject to 
regulation by the People, through Federal, State, or local law. The 
privileges of artificial entities shall be determined by the People, 
through Federal, State, or local law, and shall not be construed to be 
inherent or inalienable.
    ``Section 2. Federal, State and local government shall regulate, 
limit, or prohibit contributions and expenditures, including a 
candidate's own contributions and expenditures, to ensure that all 
citizens, regardless of their economic status, have access to the 
political process, and that no person gains, as a result of that 
person's money, substantially more access or ability to influence in 
any way the election of any candidate for public office or any ballot 
measure. Federal, State, and local governments shall require that any 
permissible contributions and expenditures be publicly disclosed. The 
judiciary shall not construe the spending of money to influence 
elections to be speech under the First Amendment.
    ``Section 3. Nothing contained in this amendment shall be construed 
to abridge the freedom of the press.''.
                                 <all>
```
**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




**Exhibit
      32.1**




Pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63
      of
      Title 18 of the United States Code), the undersigned officer of Finlay
      Enterprises, Inc., (the “Company”) does hereby certify with respect to the
      Quarterly Report of the Company on Form 10-Q for the period ended August 2,
      2008
      (the “Report”) that:





1.
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and


2.
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.


Date:
                  September 11, 2008/s/
                  Arthur E. ReinerArthur
                  E. ReinerChairman,
                  President and Chief
                Executive
                  Officer




The
      foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United
      States Code) and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate
      disclosure document.
Exhibit32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of CelaneseHoldings LLC (the "Company") on Form10-Q for the period ending March  31, 2005 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the"Report"), I, David N. Weidman,President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|          |                                                                                                                     |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1.  | The Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and |

|          |                                                                                                                                                    |
|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2.  | The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company. |

Date: May 16, 2005

/s/ David N. WeidmanDavid N.WeidmanPresident and Chief ExecutiveOfficer

----
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                              U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In   connection   with  the  Annual  Report  of  Boston  Gas  Company  (the
"Corporation") on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Nickolas Stavropoulos, President and Chief Operating Officer of the Corporation,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, amended; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Corporation.

                                                /s/ Nickolas Stavropoulos
                                                -------------------------
                                                Name:  Nickolas Stavropoulos
                                                Title: President and Chief
                                                       Operating Officer
                                                Date:  March 28, 2003


Note: A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906 has
been  provided  to Boston Gas Company and will be retained by Boston Gas Company
and  furnished  to the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  or its staff upon
request.