IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard Wilson, : 

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 123 C.D. 2015

: Submitted: September 4, 2015

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections Bureau of Operations :

and Maintenance Construction and :

Capital Programs Chief, Dept. of Corr, :

Architectural Supervisor, Dept. of :

Corr, Facility Maintenance Manager, :

John Doe Manufactures and Installers :

of Corrections Cell Security Doors, :

John Doe (2) Corrections Officer At :

SCI, Greene, John Doe (3) SCI, Greene, :

Dept. Of Corr, Personnel Training, :

Coordinator :

BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE COLINS FILED: September 29, 2015

Richard Wilson (Plaintiff), pro se, appeals the December 11, 2014 

order of the Greene County Court of Common Pleas (Trial Court) granting the 

Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Department of Corrections on behalf 

of the above-captioned Commonwealth appellees (collectively DOC) and denying 

Plaintiff’s request for production of documents and things. We affirm.
2

Before this Court, Plaintiff raises two issues for review.1 First, 

Plaintiff contends that he has properly pled a claim for negligence under the real 

estate exception to sovereign immunity. Second, Plaintiff argues that the Trial 

Court abused its discretion and denied him due process of law by failing to grant 

his discovery request.

The Sovereign Immunity Act2(Act), as a general rule, grants the

Commonwealth immunity from negligence claims.

3

 42 Pa. C.S. § 8521(a). The 

Act provides specific exceptions to this general rule where immunity is waived by 

the Commonwealth “for damages arising out of a negligent act where the damages 

would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action 

if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign 

immunity.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(a). One of the exceptions delineated in the Act is 

commonly referred to as the real estate exception, which provides that a 

Commonwealth agency is liable when a plaintiff’s injuries are caused by a 

 

1

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, our scope of review is plenary and our standard 

of review requires that we affirm the trial court’s order only where the record, when viewed in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, clearly shows that there are no genuine issues 

of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. P.J.S. v. 

Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission, 894 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1999); Weckel v. Carbondale 

Housing Authority, 20 A.3d 1245, 1248 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011); Kuniskas v. Commonwealth, 

977 A.2d 602, 604 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).

2

42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8521-8528. Although colloquially referred to as the “Sovereign Immunity Act,” 

the provisions are found in the Judicial Code. 

3

The Act provides:

(a) General rule.—Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no provision 

of this title shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity for the purpose of 1 

Pa.C.S. § 2310 (relating to sovereign immunity reaffirmed; specific waiver) or 

otherwise.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8521(a).
3

dangerous condition or defect of Commonwealth agency real estate.

4

 Raker v. 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 844 A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) 

(“For an injury to be caused by a ‘dangerous condition of the real estate’ and fall 

within the real estate exception, the actual defect or flaw in the real estate itself 

must cause the injury, not some substance on the real property such as ice, snow, 

grease, or debris, unless such substances are there because of a design or 

construction defect”).

For a claim to proceed under the real estate exception to sovereign 

immunity, a plaintiff must allege that an artificial condition or defect of the land 

itself caused the injury; it is not sufficient to allege that the real property facilitated

an injury caused by the acts of Commonwealth employees or third persons. Jones 

v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 772 A.2d 435, 443-444 

(Pa. 2001) (having neither derived nor originated from train platform, salt on the 

ground was not a dangerous condition of real estate that caused plaintiff’s injuries);

Warnecki v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 689 A.2d 1023, 

1025 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (poor safety maintenance in subway station facilitated 

injury but injuries were caused by the criminal acts of third persons); Gallagher v. 

Commonwealth, Bureau of Corrections, 545 A.2d 981, 984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) 

 

4

Specifically, the exception provides:

(4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks.—A dangerous condition 

of Commonwealth agency real estate and sidewalks, including Commonwealthowned real property, leaseholds in the possession of a Commonwealth agency and 

Commonwealth real property leased by a Commonwealth agency to private 

persons, and highways under the jurisdiction of a Commonwealth agency, except 

conditions described in paragraph (5) [which refers to potholes and other 

dangerous conditions].

42 Pa. C.S. § 8522(b)(4).
4

(severing of inmate’s finger was not caused by a defect in the door, but by a

cellmate closing the door). 

Likewise, the real estate exception does not apply to claims alleging 

that a plaintiff’s injuries could have been avoided or minimized had the 

Commonwealth taken certain actions, as opposed to claims based on injury from a 

defect or dangerous condition of the real property. Dean v. Department of 

Transportation, 751 A.2d 1130, 1135 (Pa. 2000) (failure to install a guardrail is not 

a dangerous condition); Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307, 313 (Pa. 1989) (an unlit 

right-of-way along the shoulder of a road, which concealed a nearby strip-mine, is 

not an artificial condition or a defect of the land itself); Weckel v. Carbondale 

Housing Authority, 20 A.3d 1245, 1248, 1250 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (allegation that 

death may have been prevented by the door to the roof being equipped with a lock 

is irrelevant); compare Thornton v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 4 A.3d 1143, 

1149-1153 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (holding that a claim fell within the real estate 

exception to sovereign immunity where the plaintiff alleged that a defective 

fire/smoke detection system was a dangerous condition that caused fatal injuries).

In the instant matter, Plaintiff alleges that:

8. On October 18, 2013 [Plaintiff] was being escorted to an 

administrative hearing at the Greene County, Corrections facility 

accompanied by John Doe’s [sic] (2) and (3) corrections officers.

9. The escort required [Plaintiff] to stick both his arms through slot 

built into the cell security door to be handcuffed.

10. While John Doe (2) corrections officer attached handcuffs to 

[Plaintiff] and attached a teether [sic] line, John Does (2) and (3) were 

engaged in joking with each other in conversation.
5

11. While [Plaintiff’s] arms were protruding from the security door 

slot John Doe (2) shouted to John Doe (3) “Go!”

12. John Doe (3) proceeded to snatch the door open while the arms of 

[Plaintiff] were still protruding through the door slot.

13. The cell security door opened to its full extension slamming 

[Plaintiff’s] arms against the built-in door slot and against the 

doorway frame.

(Complaint, ¶¶8-13.) Plaintiff’s allegations defeat his negligence claim. By his 

own words, Plaintiff was injured as a result of the unnamed Corrections Officers’

inattention rather than from a defect in the door itself. Plaintiff argues that a 

doorstop of unknown design would have prevented his injury but this argument 

rests on conjecture and is irrelevant to whether a defect of the property was the 

cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Therefore, the Trial Court did not err in granting 

DOC’s motion for summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to state a claim as a 

matter of law.

We also conclude that the Trial Court did not err in denying Plaintiff’s 

discovery motion. The production of documents and things would not have 

changed the outcome in this matter. Plaintiff failed to state a claim for which he is 

entitled to relief under the law; had Plaintiff been able to produce sufficient 

evidence to prove every factual averment in his complaint, Plaintiff’s complaint 

would still necessitate dismissal.5

 

5

Plaintiff argues in his brief that the Trial Court failed to address his products liability claim

against a John Doe Manufacturer. This claim was not before the Trial Court; whether or not 

Plaintiff is able to state a claim against an unknown manufacturer has no bearing on the issue of 

whether Plaintiff’s claims against DOC are barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff also argues 

that by denying his discovery request, the Trial Court has hampered his ability to successfully 

advance his claim against the John Doe Manufacturer. However, a discovery motion to a party 

against whom you have no claim is not the proper vehicle by which to investigate a party against 

whom you believe you do have a claim. As DOC is a Commonwealth agency, Plaintiff is free to 
6

Accordingly, we affirm.

__________ ___________________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

 

request the information he seeks under the Right to Know Law, Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 

65 P.S. §§ 67.101–67.3104.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard Wilson, : 

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 123 C.D. 2015

: 

Pennsylvania Department of :

Corrections Bureau of Operations :

and Maintenance Construction and :

Capital Programs Chief, Dept. of Corr, :

Architectural Supervisor, Dept. of :

Corr, Facility Maintenance Manager, :

John Doe Manufactures and Installers :

of Corrections Cell Security Doors, :

John Doe (2) Corrections Officer At :

SCI, Greene, John Doe (3) SCI, Greene, :

Dept. Of Corr, Personnel Training, :

Coordinator :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 29th day of September, 2015, the order of the Greene 

County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion for summary judgment filed 

by the Appellees in the above captioned-matter is AFFIRMED. 

__________ ___________________________

JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge