I 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1231 

To prevent a nuclear arms race resulting from weakened international restrictions on the proliferation of intermediate- and short-range missiles, and 

for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 14, 2019 

Ms. FRANKEL (for herself, Mr. TED LIEU of California, Mr. KHANNA, and 

Mr. POCAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 

each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To prevent a nuclear arms race resulting from weakened 

international restrictions on the proliferation of 

intermediate- and short-range missiles, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Prevention of Arms 

5 Race Act of 2019’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) On February 1, 2019, Secretary of State 

4 Mike Pompeo announced the United States would 

5 immediately suspend its obligations and would with6 draw, in six months, from the Treaty between the 

7 United States of America and the Union of Soviet 

8 Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their In9 termediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, to10 gether with the Memorandum of Understanding and 

11 Two Protocols (commonly known as the ‘‘INF Trea12 ty’’), signed at Washington, December 8, 1987, and 

13 entered into force June 1, 1988. 

14 (2) The United States Senate provided its ad15 vice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty 

16 on May 27, 1988, by a vote of 93 to 5. 

17 (3) The INF Treaty permanently bans the 

18 United States and twelve former Soviet republics, in19 cluding Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, 

20 from testing or possessing ground-launched cruise or 

21 ballistic missiles of intermediate range (500 to 5,500 

22 kilometers, or roughly 300 to 3,400 miles). 

23 (4) The INF Treaty, signed by President Ron24 ald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail 

25 Gorbachev, led to the elimination of entire classes of 

26 United States and Russian nuclear and conventional 


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1 ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles—2,692 

2 in total—supported by on-site inspections that al3 lowed both sides to ‘‘trust but verify’’ compliance 

4 with the Treaty. 

5 (5) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

6 (NATO) allies were deeply involved in the pursuit of 

7 negotiation on the INF Treaty and have significant 

8 national security interests in the Treaty’s preserva9 tion. The communique from the July 11, 2018, 

10 NATO Summit in Brussels stated that the INF 

11 Treaty ‘‘has been crucial to Euro-Atlantic security’’. 

12 (6) Less than one month prior to the announce13 ment of the United States intent to withdraw from 

14 the INF Treaty, then-Secretary of Defense Jim 

15 Mattis met with his NATO counterparts to discuss 

16 the full-range of diplomatic, economic, and INF17 compliant military options to pressure the Russian 

18 Federation to return to compliance with the Treaty 

19 as outlined in the ‘‘Trump Administration INF 

20 Treaty Integrated Strategy’’ published December 8, 

21 2017. 

22 (7) Since the United States publicly declared in 

23 July 2014 that the Russian Federation was in viola24 tion of the INF Treaty’s prohibition on possessing, 

25 producing, or flight-testing a ground-launched cruise 


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1 missile (GLCM), which is the equivalent of the Rus2 sian SSC–8 missile system, the United States has 

3 worked with its NATO allies to identify a unified ap4 proach on the best way forward. 

5 (8) The United States did not exhaust diplo6 matic, economic, and military means to bring the 

7 Russian Federation back into compliance with the 

8 Treaty, and in 2018 alone, the United States can9 celled at least two strategic stability dialogues 

10 planned to be conducted with the Russian Federa11 tion. 

12 (9) On January 16, 2019, Under Secretary of 

13 State for Arms Control and International Security 

14 Andrea Thompson confirmed that the Russian Fed15 eration offered to exhibit the SSC–8 missile system 

16 for the United States, which, while insufficient in 

17 itself to resolve its Treaty violation, represented the 

18 first such offer since the first United States finding 

19 of non-compliance in 2014. 

20 (10) The United States withdrawal from the 

21 INF Treaty will allow the Russian Federation to es22 cape international criticism for its violation of the 

23 Treaty and sow division among NATO allies at a 

24 time when Alliance unity is critical to respond to a 


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1 range of destabilizing actions by the Russian Fed2 eration. 

3 (11) The United States withdrawal from the 

4 INF Treaty will free the Russian Federation to ex5 pand deployment of the SSC–8 missile system in 

6 ways that threaten NATO and Indo-Pacific allies 

7 without bearing any international legal cost in doing 

8 so. 

9 (12) The Department of Defense has also not 

10 yet identified the full estimated research, develop11 ment, testing, and evaluation, procurement, or per12 sonnel costs of producing, testing, and deploying a 

13 new short- or intermediate-range ground-launched 

14 cruise or ballistic missile currently prohibited by the 

15 INF Treaty. 

16 (13) No European or Asian ally has publicly de17 clared its willingness or readiness to host a future 

18 United States short- or intermediate-range ground19 launched cruise or ballistic missile currently prohib20 ited by the INF Treaty should the United States 

21 seek to deploy that capability. 

22 (14) The Secretary General of NATO, Jens 

23 Stoltenberg, stated on October 24, 2018, that ‘‘we 

24 don’t want a new Cold War, we don’t want a new 

25 arms race and therefore I don’t foresee that Allies 


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1 will deploy more nuclear weapons in Europe as a re2 sponse to the new Russian missile,’’ which precedes 

3 United States National Security Advisor John 

4 Bolton’s statement of November 9, 2018, that 

5 ‘‘there are no American plans to seek to deploy INF 

6 non-compliant missiles in Europe for the foreseeable 

7 future’’. 

8 (15) Any effort by the United States Govern9 ment to proceed beyond research and development of 

10 an intermediate-range cruise or ballistic missile that 

11 is nuclear armed will be portrayed in as deeply in12 consistent with the United States obligation under 

13 Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 

14 Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, July 1, 

15 1968 (commonly known as the ‘‘NPT’’), to ‘‘pursue 

16 negotiations in good faith on effective measures re17 lating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race’’. 

18 (16) Achieving the objective of expanding the 

19 INF Treaty’s membership to the People’s Republic 

20 of China, which has deployed intermediate-range 

21 missile systems in great number, is greatly dimin22 ished if parties to the existing Treaty cease imple23 mentation. 

24 (17) The Congressional Budget Office in Octo25 ber 2017 estimated that the costs of United States 


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1 nuclear weapons spending over the next three dec2 ades will amount to $1,200,000,000,000, or 

3 $1,700,000,000,000 when adjusted for inflation, 

4 which does not include new systems proposed in the 

5 2018 United States Nuclear Posture Review such as 

6 a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile 

7 (SLBM), a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), and 

8 a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). 

9 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

10 It is the sense of Congress that— 

11 (1) Secretary of State Pompeo’s announcement 

12 of the decision of the United States to withdraw 

13 from the INF Treaty, without proper consultation 

14 with Congress, is a serious breach of Congress’s 

15 proper constitutional role as a co-equal branch of 

16 government; 

17 (2) United States withdrawal from the INF 

18 Treaty will free the Russian Federation to deploy 

19 greater quantities of the SSC–8 missile to the det20 riment of United States national security and that 

21 of our allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific; 

22 (3) withdrawal from the INF Treaty will fail to 

23 limit or eliminate China’s short- and intermediate24 range missiles; 


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1 (4) the NATO alliance makes critical contribu2 tions to United States national security, and the 

3 failure to weigh the concerns of NATO allies risks 

4 weakening the joint resolve necessary to counter 

5 Russia’s aggressive behavior; and 

6 (5) as opposed to withdrawing from the INF 

7 Treaty, the United States should continue to ad8 vance other diplomatic, economic, and military meas9 ures outlined in the ‘‘Trump Administration INF 

10 Treaty Integrated Strategy’’ to resolve the concerns 

11 related to the Russian Federation’s violation of the 

12 Treaty and to reach agreement on measures to en13 sure the Treaty’s future viability. 

14 SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PROCURE15 MENT, FLIGHT TESTING, OR DEPLOYMENT OF 

16 SHORT- OR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE GROUND17 LAUNCHED BALLISTIC OR CRUISE MISSILE 

18 SYSTEM. 

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—No funds may be appropriated or 

20 otherwise made available for the procurement, flight test21 ing, or deployment of a United States short- or inter22 mediate-range ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile 

23 system with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers 

24 until the Secretary of Defense, in concurrence with the 

25 Secretary of State and the Director of National IntelVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:22 Mar 11, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1231.IH H1231

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1 ligence, submits a report and offers a briefing to the ap2 propriate committees of Congress that— 

3 (1) includes a Memorandum of Understanding 

4 (MOU) from a NATO or Indo-Pacific ally that com5 mits such ally to host deployment of any such mis6 sile on its own territory, and in the case of deploy7 ment on the European continent, has the concur8 rence of the North Atlantic Council; 

9 (2) confirms that the United States has not re10 jected any diplomatic offer to exhibit the SSC–8 

11 missile system, negotiations on a verifiable mutual 

12 agreement prohibiting the placement of INF-range 

13 missiles on NATO territory or within range of a 

14 NATO Member State, or any other transparency 

15 measure which may successfully move Russia closer 

16 to returning to compliance with the Treaty or pre17 vent a proliferation of INF-range systems on the 

18 continent; 

19 (3) assesses the implications, in terms of the 

20 military threat to the United States and its allies in 

21 Europe and the Indo-Pacific, of a Russian Federa22 tion deployment of intermediate-range cruise and 

23 ballistic missiles without restriction; 

24 (4) identifies what types of technologies and 

25 programs the United States would need to pursue to 


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1 offset the additional Russian capabilities, and at 

2 what cost; 

3 (5) identifies what mission requirements with 

4 respect to the Russian Federation and the People’s 

5 Republic of China will be met by INF-type systems; 

6 (6) identifies the degree to which INF-compli7 ant capabilities, such as sea and air-launched cruise 

8 missiles, can meet those same mission requirements; 

9 and 

10 (7) identifies the ramifications of a collapse of 

11 the INF Treaty on the ability to generate consensus 

12 among States Parties to the NPT Treaty ahead of 

13 the 2020 NPT Review Conference, and assesses the 

14 degree to which the Russian Federation will use the 

15 United States unilateral withdrawal to sow discord 

16 within the NATO alliance. 

17 (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 

18 subsection (a) shall be unclassified with a classified annex. 

19 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE20 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit21 tees of Congress’’ means— 

22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 

23 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and 


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1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

2 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep3 resentatives. 

Æ 


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