DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

HARRY HAHAMOVITCH, HHH DEVELOPMENT GROUP, INC., HHH 

FINANCIAL CORPORATION, INC., SOUTH SQUARE DEVELOPMENT, 

INC. and PLAZA LA MER, INC.,

Appellants,

v.

DELRAY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS, INC., SOSQ PROPERTY 

INVESTMENTS, INC., HATIM HASHWANI and ROBERT GEISERMAN,

Appellees.

No. 4D13-3510

[April 15, 2015]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm 

Beach County; David F. Crow, Judge; L.T. Case No. 501995006336AO.

Robert J. Hauser of Beasley Hauser Kramer & Galardi, P.A., West Palm 

Beach, and Robert A. Sweetapple and Alexander D. Varkas, Jr. of 

Sweetapple Broeker & Varkas, P.L., Boca Raton, for appellants.

Stephen A. Mendelsohn of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Boca Raton, and 

Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Samole, and Rachel A. Canfield of 

Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, for appellees Delray Property Investments, 

Inc., SOSQ Property Investments, Inc. and Hatim Hashwanti.

WARNER, J.

In this marathon litigation over agreements between appellants and 

appellees concerning the ownership in two commercial shopping centers, 

appellants challenge the final judgment awarding damages against them 

based upon fraud. They also contest the court’s declaration of their rights 

under the profit participation agreements between the parties. First, 

appellants claim that the fraud claim should have been barred by a merger 

clause in the profit participation agreements. Second, they contend that 

the trial court erred in finding that the contract did not require the 

appellees to furnish financial information to the appellants for the purpose 

of exercising their contractual right to purchase the properties and that 

appellants could not exercise their right to purchase retroactively. As to 

the first claim, the merger clause would not bar a cause of action for fraud, 
2

and in this case the fraud involved the closing of the property and not the 

subsequent participation interests to which the merger clause applied. As 

to the second claim, we agree with the trial court that appellants are not 

entitled to the requested relief of retroactively allowing them to exercise 

their rights to purchase. We affirm.

Facts

This case has a complex twenty-year history arising out of the sale of 

two commercial properties, Plaza La Mer in Juno Beach and South Square 

in Brooksville, Florida.1 Harry Hahamovitch and his associates entered 

into contracts to purchase the two properties through two affiliated 

corporations, Plaza La Mer, Inc. (“PLM”) and South Square Development, 

Inc. (“SDI”). To complete the purchase, however, Hahamovitch and his 

associates needed additional investors. They approached Hatim Hashwani 

to secure additional investors to provide financing. The investor whom 

Hashwani found did not want to enter into a partnership directly with 

Hahamovitch and his partners. Instead, the investor created Delray 

Property Investments, Inc. (“Delray”) and SOSQ Property Investments, Inc. 

(“SOSQ”) to be the assignees of the properties’ purchase contracts and 

then to take title.

The parties signed Preliminary Participation Agreements on each of the 

shopping plazas to establish their rights and responsibilities for the 

completion of the purchase. Pursuant to these agreements, Hahamovitch 

agreed to assign his contracts to purchase the two properties to Delray 

and to complete specified “confirmations” prior to closing. One of the 

provisions dealt with the payment of brokerage commissions. Horizon 

Equities Group, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm, was entitled to a 

$144,000 commission on the closing of the sale of Plaza La Mer, but 

Hashwani’s investor wanted to confirm that Hahamovitch would not 

receive any part of this commission. In the Preliminary Participation 

Agreements, the parties included a provision conditioning the closing on a 

confirmation that Hahamovitch would not receive a commission:

Written confirmation from Horizon Equities Group, Inc., that 

the commission due it (the “Horizon Commission”) from the 

Purchaser under the Agreement is $144,000. By executing 

this instrument on behalf of Assignor, Harry H. Hahamovich 

represents and warrants unto Assignee [Delray] that neither 

he nor any other entity in which he has an equity interest 

1 We are told this is the oldest active case in Palm Beach County.
3

(including without limitation, Assignor [Plaza La Mer]) is 

receiving any portion of the Horizon Commission.

The preliminary agreement also obligated the parties to enter into a profit 

participation agreement.

The evidence in the record shows that the purchase price for Plaza La 

Mer was $3.6 million, and Delray executed a $2.5 million mortgage. It also 

paid considerable costs to close. The purchase price of South Square was 

less, but also included cash plus a $2 million mortgage. After the closing 

on the two properties, the parties entered into nearly identical Profit 

Participation Agreements (“PPAs”) for each shopping plaza. Delray was 

designated as the owner of Plaza La Mer, and SOSQ was designated as the 

owner of South Square. PLM and SDI, the corporations owned by the 

Hahamovitch associates, along with Hashwani, were designated as 

“participants.” The agreements recognized that the participants were 

instrumental in securing the property for the owners, and the owners 

intended to provide for the participants to benefit from the shopping

centers. Rather than give the participants equity grants, the agreement 

provided that each participant would receive a portion of net cash flow and 

net proceeds after reimbursement of the owner’s outstanding capital 

including a compounded return on investment. The specific terms of the 

PPAs are most relevant to the second issue on appeal and will be discussed 

later in this opinion.

In addition, HHH Management, a corporation owned by Hahamovitch, 

became the manager of both shopping centers, responsible for the day-today operations. The Management Agreements for the properties required 

HHH Management to account to the owners for the income, expenses, and 

distributions on each property. The manager kept all the books and 

records of the shopping centers and was required to make quarterly 

reports to the owners of income, expenses, and distributions.

A year and a half later, the owners discovered that Hahamovitch had 

received a commission on the sale in violation of the provisions of the 

preliminary agreement. They terminated HHH Management as manager 

of the properties and filed suit in 1995 against Hahamovitch, PLM, and 

others connected with the Plaza La Mer purchase, because of the receipt 

of a commission by Hahamovitch. They alleged fraud and sought damages 

together with rescission of both Profit Sharing Agreements because of the 

misrepresentations of Hahamovitch.

The defendants responded, and PLM and SDI filed a counterclaim 

against Delray and SOSQ, respectively, claiming the right to an accounting 
4

to determine what distributions of profits were owed to those companies. 

In 1998 they filed an amended counterclaim for declaratory judgment in 

which they alleged a need for the court to construe the PPAs. They 

contended that they were entitled to information on net cash flow, net 

proceeds, or rent rolls so that they could determine whether to exercise 

option rights under the PPAs to extend a purchase offer to the owners for 

the properties. They alleged that Delray refused to provide the information 

which in good faith it should be required to give to them. They requested 

the court to declare the validity of the PPA and the rights of the parties to 

the contract. As well, they requested “incidental damages,” costs, and 

attorney’s fees.

Delray’s claims of fraud and breach of contract went to trial in 2003. 

An employee of Horizon Equities, the purported broker, testified that 

neither he nor Horizon was involved in the real estate transaction but were 

given $44,000 of the $144,000 commission to offset monies that 

Hahamovitch owned him for other services. He explained that none of the 

money he received had anything to do with the Plaza La Mer sales 

commission. He testified that he was directed (by Hahamovitch or his 

associate) to write a check for $100,000 to a company called Rodan 

Development to repay monies Hahamovitch had borrowed from Rodan in 

the initial stages of contracting to purchase Plaza La Mer. Hahamovitch 

gave contrary testimony that Horizon earned the commission and that he 

was merely a “clearinghouse” for the funds but didn’t receive a 

commission.

The jury rejected Hahamovitch’s testimony and returned a verdict in 

favor of Delray and SOSQ finding that the appellants each had conspired 

to defraud Delray and SOSQ. They awarded $144,000 in damages to 

Delray. They awarded nothing to SOSQ, because the commissions weren’t 

paid for the South Square property. Entry of judgment was deferred 

pending hearing on the plaintiffs’ (appellees) requests for rescission of the 

PPAs and the counterclaimants’ (appellants) request for an accounting.

The trial court then ruled that Delray and SOSQ could not rescind the 

PPAs and at the same time retain the properties. It ruled that all three of 

the agreements—the Preliminary Participation Agreements, the Profit 

Participation Agreements (PPAs), and the Management Agreements—had 

to be construed as one transaction, and Delray and SOSQ could not 

rescind only the PPAs. The court ruled that, despite the fraud regarding 

the commissions on the sale, the PPAs were enforceable. The court also 

ruled that the agreements entitled the defendants/counterplaintiffs to an 

accounting to determine the net cash flow and whether distributions were 

owing to PLM or SDI from the respective shopping centers. However, after 
5

a trial in 2004 where both sides presented substantially dissimilar 

accountings, the court rejected the accountings offered by both sides and 

appointed a neutral CPA.

The final hearing on the accounting did not take place until 2010. The 

CPA issued a report only as to Plaza La Mer. The report calculated the net 

cash flow from 1993 to 2010, as well as the outstanding capital, returns, 

and distributions to owner. As of the time of trial on the accounting, 

Delray’s outstanding capital plus accrued return amounted to 

$23,348,924. Those calculations showed that PLM was not owed any 

distributions, based upon the PPA. The court adopted the report. In its 

order the court noted that, although no accounting had been performed 

regarding South Square, the parties had stipulated that there was no net 

cash flow due to SDI. The parties had no agreement as to the amount of 

outstanding capital and return regarding South Square.

After the accounting was complete, PLM and SDI then asked the court 

to hear and rule on the remainder of their declaratory judgment count. At 

a further trial in 2013, they claimed that the PPAs provided PLM and SDI 

the option to purchase the properties, but they needed to know the net 

cash flow in order to construct an offer. They claimed that because Delray 

had refused to provide them with any accountings or information in 1995, 

Delray breached its good faith under the contract. Although it now had 

the accounting information, in order to remedy Delray’s failure to provide 

the information in 1995 and repudiation of the contract, they argued, PLM 

and SDI should be entitled to exercise what they claimed was their option 

to purchase the properties in accordance with the agreements’ terms as of 

1995. Hahamovitch testified that he would have needed information to 

make an offer and would have bought the property in 1996 after he was 

excluded from the operations. On the other hand, he also testified that he 

would have made an offer based upon the replacement building cost per 

square foot, not on the income approach to valuation. He did not make 

any offers at the time, because he was awaiting the court’s determination 

of the validity of the contract.

Delray objected that this claim had not been made in the pleadings. It 

further maintained that there was no right to an accounting under the 

contract for the purposes that PLM and SDI now espoused, i.e. so that 

they could create an advantageous offer.

The court entered a final judgment in favor of Delray and SOSQ. It 

found that PLM and SDI were requesting relief that they had not pled in 

their counterclaims. There, they had requested that the court declare the 

PPAs valid; that it determine the rights of the parties as expressed in the 
6

agreements; and that the court reserve jurisdiction to provide equitable 

relief. Whereas at trial, PLM and SDI were requesting a determination that 

the PPA required accountings for the purpose of determining the purchase 

price for claimed options and that this included a “right to purchase the 

properties at some unspecified date in the future retroactive to valuations 

in the 1995/1996 time period.” The court concluded that this claim had 

not been pled. Instead, PLM and its associates had spent years seeking 

an accounting for the purpose of determining their share of the profits and 

turned to the option to purchase claim only after the accounting showed 

that no funds were due. The court concluded that the claims “attempt to 

deprive the Plaintiffs [appellees] of their shopping centers at artificial and 

stale 18 year old valuations.” The court found that to permit an 

amendment to the pleadings to assert such claims would be unfair and 

severely prejudicial to Delray and SOSQ.

Moreover, the court found that the PPAs did not grant the options that 

PLM and SDI claimed. The agreements provided for only a conditional 

option to PLM or an affiliate, and neither PLM nor SDI, nor an affiliate, 

complied with the terms of the option by making an offer. The court found 

that the evidence did not support an ability to perform, other than pure 

speculation.

Finally, the court ruled the PPAs did not impose a duty on the 

plaintiffs/appellees to provide accountings for the purpose of making an 

offer on the property. It found, “This Court’s previous Order granting an 

equitable right to accounting for a determination of whether there are 

distributions of net cash flow due under the Profit Participation 

Agreements is substantially different than an accounting for the purpose 

the Counter-Plaintiffs now contend.” It reasoned that PLM or SDI could 

have made an offer subject to due diligence on income and expense 

information, or could have made an offer based upon fair market value. 

The court determined that “[a]ny purported retroactive exercise of such 

alleged option is purely speculative, and not supported by the evidence nor 

from the unambiguous language of the Agreements.”

In the decretal portion of the order, it entered judgment against all of 

the appellants on the $144,000 jury verdict on the fraud claim. It declared 

that the PPAs were valid and enforceable but that they did not grant an 

exclusive option to purchase the subject properties for the time period of 

1995/1996 or any other time in the past to be exercised at some time in 

the future. It concluded that Delray and SOSQ were not required to 

provide an accounting of net proceeds until a refinancing or sale occurred, 

nor were they obligated to continually update an accounting of net cash 

flow. Instead, should PLM or SDI desire such accountings, Delray and 
7

SOSQ must make their financial records available to PLM or SDI who may, 

at their cost, update the accountings.

In their appeal from the final judgment, the appellants – Hahamovitch, 

PLM, SDI, and associated entities – raise only two issues. First, they 

contend that the breach of contract and fraud claims regarding the 

brokerage commission should have been barred due to a merger clause in 

the PPAs. Second, they argue that the court erred in: (1) failing to find 

that Delray and SOSQ had a duty to provide an accounting to PLM or SDI 

for the purpose of exercising their purchase rights under the PPAs; (2) 

refusing to require Delray and SOSQ to provide net cash flow accountings 

in the future; and (3) failing to grant PLM and SDI relief by allowing them 

to exercise their purchase rights under the PPAs by using the rents, net 

cash flow, and outstanding capital figures from 1995/1996 when the PPAs 

were first repudiated by the appellees.

Fraud Judgment and Merger Clause

The appellants contend that Delray’s and SOSQ’s complaint for breach 

of contract and fraud failed to state a cause of action, because the 

representation or warranty with regard to the brokerage commissions 

contained in the Preliminary Participation Agreement was not repeated in 

the PPA, which contained a merger clause. We disagree that the merger 

clause extinguished a claim based upon the representation in the 

Preliminary Participation Agreement. In any event, the existence of a 

merger clause does not prevent a cause of action for fraud.

The Preliminary Participation Agreement had two purposes. First, it 

served to assign the rights to the contract for sale of the properties from 

HHH Development to Delray and SOSQ. The agreement contained 

provisions for “Confirmations” which must be received prior to closing on 

the properties, including the confirmation with respect to the brokerage 

commission. Second, it provided that the Assignees and Participants 

would enter into a PPA and a Management Agreement, copies of which 

were attached to the Preliminary Agreement.

The PPAs each contained a merger clause which provided:

This Agreement embodies and constitutes the entire 

understanding among the parties with respect to the 

Participation Interest, and all prior or contemporaneous 

agreements, understandings, representations, and 

statements, oral or written, relating to the Participation Interest

are merged into this Agreement.
8

(Emphasis supplied). Because the merger clause was limited to those 

representations relating to the participation interests, it did not cover 

representations with respect to commissions paid at the closing of the 

sales. The payment of the commission was a matter affecting the closing 

of the property and not the subsequent participation agreements.

In addition, the Preliminary Participation Agreements stated, “[T]his 

agreement and the Assignment Agreement shall be the controlling 

instruments . . . until . . . closing[.]” The closing occurred on August 9, 

1993, and in reliance on the representation of no commission being paid 

to Hahamovitch, Delray paid the $144,000 commission to Horizon. Once 

the closing took place, there was no reason to include the representation 

of “no commission” in the PPAs. The fraud had already occurred.

Finally, even if the fraud claim had not occurred prior to the signing of 

the PPAs, the argument is still without merit because the existence of a 

merger clause does not prevent a cause of action for fraud. See Noack v. 

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 742 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1999), citing Wilson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 622 So. 2d 25, 27 

(Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (it is a well-established rule that “alleged fraudulent 

misrepresentations may be introduced into evidence to prove fraud 

notwithstanding a merger clause in a related contract”). For all of these 

reasons, we affirm the judgment of fraud entered by the court.

Declaratory Judgment

PLM and SDI sought a declaration of their rights under the PPAs. 

Because both PPAs contain essentially similar provisions, we will utilize 

the terms of the Plaza La Mer PPA in analyzing the issues presented.

The purpose of the PPAs was to recognize and reward the Participants, 

PLM and Hashwani, as instrumental in arranging the acquisition of the 

properties by Delray. It allowed for the Participants to share in the profits, 

if any, of the shopping center, and it also provided for HHH Management 

to be the manager of the property. HHH Management was an affiliate of 

PLM.

The PPAs defined terms which are central to the rights of the parties 

under the agreement. We paraphrase portions of those terms.

Outstanding Capital is “an amount equal, as of the date of 

computation, to the Invested Sum less the portion of the Invested Sum 

which has been previously returned to the Owner.” The Invested Sum
9

constituted the initial amount invested by Delray of $1,570,000 plus any 

accrued returns. Return was defined as “a sum which equals the 

Outstanding Capital multiplied by thirty percent (30%), compounded 

annually.”

Net Cash Flow was to be computed on a quarterly basis and according 

to generally accepted accounting principles. It amounted to the income 

generated from the property less expenses. The actual definition is much 

more detailed, but as there is no issue on appeal as to its calculation, it is 

sufficient to generalize this term. Net Proceeds of a sale of the property 

constituted the sale price less an amount to satisfy any mortgages on the 

property and the standard costs of sale, such as recording costs, taxes, 

etc.

The Participation Interest amounted to distributions which would be 

paid to Participants pursuant to the terms of the agreement, specifically 

those relating to the payment of any net cash flow and net proceeds upon 

a sale or refinancing. Delray granted to PLM an 81.75% share of the 

Participation Interest in the Net Cash Flow and Net Proceeds, after the 

owner’s outstanding capital and return were paid, and the Owner agreed 

that it would be responsible to see that the Participation Interest would be 

timely paid to the Participants. Net Cash Flow was to be distributed no 

later than 45 days after the end of each Calendar Quarter.

The distribution of funds differed depending upon whether they came 

from Net Cash Flow or Net Proceeds of a sale of the property. Net Cash 

Flow would be distributed in the following order:

(1) To Owner to the limit of the accrued and unpaid Return; 

if any excess remained, then

(2) To the Owner to the limit of the Outstanding Capital; if 

any excess remained, then

(3) To Participants in an amount equal to the Return 

distributed to the Owner; if any excess remained then

(4)50% to the Owner and 50% to the Participants (of which 

PLM would receive 81.75%).

In the case of a sale, the distribution order was different with respect to 

the Owner. The Net Proceeds would first be paid to the owner to the limit 

of Outstanding Capital and then to the Owner to pay any accrued and 

unpaid Return. Thereafter, the distribution to the participants followed 

the same priority as with Net Cash Flow.
10

Section 3B and 3C of the PPA established the criteria for the sale of the 

properties. In 3B, PLM could force a sale at a minimum price, but it could 

require the Owner to sell to a PLM affiliate only if it also offered to the 

Owner the right to purchase its participation interest:

B. Provided Owner receives Net Proceeds upon Sale of an 

amount not less than the Outstanding Capital plus the 

Return, PLM can require Owner to sell the Property at any 

time. . . . Further, PLM can only require Owner to sell the 

Property to an entity in which PLM and/or Harry H. 

Hahamovitch has an equity interest (an “Affiliate”) if: (i) PLM 

provides Owner with a copy of the contract for the proposed 

sale to the Affiliate . . . ; (ii) PLM offers Owner the right to 

acquire PLM’s share of the Participation Interest at a purchase 

price equal to the amount which it would receive in the event 

of and upon closing under the Affiliate Contract Offer; and (iii) 

Owner fails to accept the offer to purchase PLM’s share of the 

Participation Interest within 30 days after the offer, or fails to 

close the purchase of PLM’s share of the Participation Interest 

within 60 days after the offer. PLM shall have no further 

rights or interests hereunder in the event of, and following 

Owner’s purchase of PLM’s share of the Participation Interest 

pursuant to this paragraph.

In Section 3C the agreement provided that the Owner could not sell the 

properties without PLM’s consent and required the Owner to give notice of 

its intent to accept any sale offer. PLM then had the right to purchase 

under the terms of the offer with a very detailed list of additional 

requirements.

The PPA did not provide for any reports to be distributed regarding Net 

Cash Flow. Instead, the Management Agreement required the Manager, a 

PLM affiliate, to provide operational reports to Delray, which included 

income, expense, and distributions. Thus, while everyone was working 

together, all parties would have received full information regarding the 

rents and expenses of the property. When Delray terminated HHH 

Management as Manager in 1995, the flow of information to PLM ceased.

PLM’s 1998 counterclaim for declaratory judgment demanded that 

information, including Net Cash Flow and rent rolls, to determine 

“whether it wants to exercise its right to demand the sale of [the property] 

to [PLM] or one of its affiliated companies” pursuant to Section 3B. It 

alleged that Delray had repudiated the PPA by filing its complaint to seek 

the PPA’s rescission. Because of Delray’s failure to supply the information, 
11

PLM alleged that in the event that PLM exercises its right to purchase, 

Delray should not be entitled to any Return until it complied with its 

contractual obligation to provide the information. It thus alleged that there 

was a need for a declaration of the validity of the PPA with the contractual 

obligations set forth in the declaration, i.e. the requirement to provide 

accounting information. It demanded as relief a determination of the 

validity of the contract and PLM’s rights in it. It did not sue for breach of 

contract based upon Delray’s repudiation of the PPA.

After the jury verdict on Delray’s fraud counts, PLM pursued its claims 

for accounting and declaratory judgment. It consistently claimed that 

these were equitable claims that PLM had a right to profits. Although its 

rights to purchase were mentioned in argument, PLM sought the 

accounting because it maintained that it was entitled to profits. Its 

accounting expert determined that PLM was entitled to distributions from 

$5 million in net cash flow, but these calculations were rejected by the 

trial court. Further, the court rejected the contention in the complaint for 

declaratory judgment that Delray should not be entitled to any return 

because of its failure to provide financial information to PLM. The court 

said, “The court also finds there is no basis for Defendant’s assumption 

[in its expert’s accounting] that the net return as set forth in the agreement 

between the parties should somehow be reduced to 7.5% or 0% as of 

August 1995.”

Thus, after the court accepted the neutral CPA’s report that no 

distributions were due to PLM and that the agreement would not be 

construed to eliminate the stated Return in the agreement, PLM proffered 

a new argument to the court in pursuing its declaratory judgment count. 

It claimed that, because Delray did not produce the Net Cash Flow and 

financial information in the 1995/1996 time period when a PLM affiliate 

would have made an affiliate contract offer, the court should allow PLM or 

an affiliate to make an offer to purchase the properties at 1995/1996 

valuations.

The trial court’s final declaratory judgment found that PLM or SDI did 

not have a right to purchase the properties under the PPA, as they claimed, 

nor did the PPAs require an accounting for the purposes of allowing the 

Participants to exercise their purchase rights under the contract. Finally, 

the court concluded that the relief requested, allowing it to exercise its 

option to purchase the properties at 1995/96 values, had never been pled 

or tried by implied consent, and it would be inequitable for such relief to 

be granted.
12

The trial court interpreted Section 3B of the PPAs as providing a 

conditional option to an affiliate of PLM to purchase the property. We 

agree. PLM could require the Owner to sell the property if it received an 

offer from anyone which would result in minimum net proceeds sufficient 

to repay the Owner its outstanding capital plus accrued return.2 But if an 

affiliate of PLM made an offer on the property at some price above the 

minimum specified in the contract, PLM was required to offer Delray the 

option to purchase its Participation Interest at the amount PLM would 

have received had Delray accepted the offer from PLM’s affiliate, closed on 

the property, and net proceeds were generated. Thus, Section 3B of the 

PPA did not create an option for PLM to purchase the property. It created 

an option on the part of Delray either to sell the property to the affiliate or 

to buy out PLM. A PLM affiliate could purchase the property only if Delray 

chose not to exercise its option of buying out PLM.

With respect to the accounting, PLM makes two arguments. First, it 

was entitled to an accounting of the Net Cash Flow in order to determine 

its right to any distributions. The court agreed with this when it ordered 

the accounting in 2004, which was completed in 2010. Second, it 

contended that it needed the information to determine whether it wanted 

to engage an affiliate to make an offer on the property. As to the latter, 

PLM claims that Delray’s failure to provide financial information 

constituted a violation of the implied covenant of good faith, because 

without that information it could not determine whether to make an offer 

on the property.

Florida contract law recognizes an implied covenant of good faith and 

fair dealing in every contract. QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condo. 

Apartment Ass’n, 94 So. 3d 541, 548 (Fla. 2012). “This covenant is 

intended to protect ‘the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties 

in light of their express agreement.’” Id. (quoting Barnes v. Burger King 

Corp., 932 F. Supp. 1420, 1438 (S.D. Fla. 1996)). There are, however, two 

limitations on such claims: “(1) where application of the covenant would 

contravene the express terms of the agreement; and (2) where there is no 

accompanying action for breach of an express term of the agreement.” Id. 

“A duty of good faith must ‘relate to the performance of an express term of 

the contract and is not an abstract and independent term of a contract 

which may be asserted as a source of breach when all other terms have 

been performed pursuant to the contract requirements.’” Id. (quoting Ins. 

2 Of course, PLM would have little reason to demand a sale at the minimum price, 

because that would yield no proceeds to PLM under the provisions of the 

agreement.
13

Concepts & Design, Inc. v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 785 So. 2d 1232, 1234 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2001)).

We agree with the trial court that providing information for Net Cash 

Flow or rent rolls for the purpose of determining an offer to purchase was 

not required by the contract. In this case, the parties were dealing at arm’s 

length, and Hahamovitch and his associates were exceptionally 

sophisticated in commercial lease properties. Hahamovitch was the 

manager of seventeen other shopping centers as well as Plaza La Mer and 

South Square. His company also managed Plaza La Mer and South Square 

until the termination of Management Agreement. As manager, the 

company negotiated all the leases and had intimate knowledge of the 

expenses, as well as the amounts for which comparable properties were 

renting. PLM, through its affiliate, had all of that information for the 

properties until HHH Management’s ouster in 1995 and thereafter it could 

still rely on the sophisticated analysis of Hahamovitch and his companies. 

Moreover, there are multiple methods for determining the value of 

property—comparable sales, income capitalization, or replacement cost, to 

name the most common. A contract for purchase could have been made 

without the information Hahamovitch and his companies sought from 

appellees. Indeed, at the trial in 2013, Hahamovitch testified that he 

would have made an offer based upon the replacement cost of the property 

on a per square foot basis, not an income approach.

Although Section 3B provided a minimum price at which PLM could 

force the owner to sell or buy it out, in reality PLM would never itself offer 

the minimum price or force a sale, because it would not obtain any portion 

of the net proceeds under the distribution scheme in the PPA. All of the 

net proceeds would be paid to Delray for its outstanding capital and 

return. Thus, in order to maximize its own profit on the sale or buy-out, 

it must offer an amount significantly higher than the minimum.

What PLM did need to know was the value of Delray’s Outstanding 

Capital, which included the original investment plus the return of 30% 

compounded annually. While its affiliate, HHH Management, was the 

manager, it had all of the information to calculate that amount. But even 

if it did not, it could easily calculate the maximum amount which it could 

be, i.e. the initial invested sum plus a 30% rate of return compounded 

annually.3 For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did 

not err in concluding that there was no obligation on the part of Delray to 

3 Any amount less than that would inure to PLM’s benefit in a sale, because it 

would mean that much less of the net proceeds would be required to satisfy 

Delray’s outstanding capital, leaving more to distribute to the Participants.
14

furnish the financial information to PLM for the purpose of determining 

whether PLM would make an offer on the property. Thus, its failure to do 

so would not compel the relief requested by PLM.

PLM relies on PL Lake Worth Corp. v. 99Cent Stuff-Palm Springs, LLC, 

949 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), but we conclude that it is 

distinguishable. There, we held an implied duty of good faith applied to 

require a landlord to supply information necessary to a tenant to 

determine whether to exercise its option to renew a lease, where the 

amount of the lease payments were not specified in the contract. The 

tenant signed a very favorable lease with an option to renew in five years 

at a specified base rate plus an unspecified charge for common element 

maintenance and taxes. The lease required the tenant to exercise the

option approximately six months prior to the expiration of the initial term. 

Before the option renewal date, the tenant asked for information regarding 

the estimated expenses, but the landlord failed to provide the information. 

After the option date had passed without the tenant exercising it, the 

landlord filed an action seeking a declaration that the option had expired

and the tenant was required to vacate the premises at the end of the initial 

term. In response, the tenant filed its own action for declaratory judgment

and injunctive relief to obtain the information needed to exercise the 

option. The trial court must have ordered the production of that 

information during the pendency of the claim, as our court said, “Within 

hours after the owner disclosed the maintenance and tax information 

pursuant to court order,” the tenant exercised its option. 949 So. 2d at 

1201. Our court held that the landlord had an implied duty of good faith 

to provide the information that the tenant needed in order to make an 

informed decision whether to exercise the option. Because the landlord 

breached the contract by failing to provide the information, it could not 

terminate the lease when the tenant belatedly exercised its option to 

renew.

99Cent is distinguishable, because the contract in that case set how to 

calculate the lease payment amount on renewal but failed to provide the 

actual amounts so that the total payment would be known to the tenant. 

Therefore, without knowing the estimated amount of common 

maintenance expenses and taxes the tenant would not know what its 

obligation would be if it renewed. In contrast, the PPA set a minimum, not 

a maximum, amount for an affiliate contract offer. PLM would not have 

exercised its right at the minimum price. Therefore, it was entirely up to 

it as to what it would offer to effect the forced sale/buyout provision. In 

making an affiliate offer, it was acting at arms-length and for its own 

interests.
15

Moreover, in 99Cent the tenant intended to renew its lease and even 

sought an injunction to require the landlord to supply the information, 

exercising its option to renew just hours after receiving it. Here, not only 

did PLM not allege in its suit that it would make an affiliate offer, later in 

the proceedings when it did receive the rent rolls and then again when the 

net cash flow accountings were complete, it did not make an offer.

We thus agree with the trial court that Delray had no obligation, 

express or implied, to furnish accountings for the purpose of PLM 

determining an offering price for the property. To the extent that Delray 

had a duty to account for net cash flow for the purpose of distributions to 

the Participants, together with the resulting determination of outstanding 

capital, the trial court found that Delray did have an obligation to provide 

an accounting to determine whether distributions were owed to the 

Participants. That has now been accomplished, and the accounting 

showed that PLM was not entitled to any distributions, nor, given the size 

of the outstanding capital of owner, would they be entitled to any into the 

future. Because of that fact, the trial court exercised its discretion and 

determined that Delray was not responsible for a further full accounting 

at Delray’s expense. Instead, Delray and SOSQ must furnish the financial 

records on the properties to PLM and SDI at their request to complete an 

updated accounting, should they so desire. The court, however, did 

require that an accounting of net proceeds must be made upon a 

refinancing or sale of the property. We think the trial court’s resolution 

regarding the obligation of future accounting was within its discretion.

Even if an accounting was required for the purposes of a PLM affiliate 

making an offer to purchase the property, the trial court determined that 

the specific relief requested by PLM was never pled nor tried by implied 

consent, and it would not be equitable to grant such relief. We agree. At 

the trial in 2013, PLM sought to be permitted to make an offer of purchase 

based upon the conditions as they existed in 1995/1996, i.e. the 

outstanding capital then allowed. This relief was never requested. Indeed, 

while PLM claims that it would have purchased the shopping center in 

1995, in its declaratory judgment action filed in 1998 it alleged that it 

needed the information in order to determine whether to make an offer, 

not that it intended to make an offer. Significantly, it also did not bring 

an action for breach of contract on the grounds that Delray and SOSQ had 

wrongfully terminated the agreement and refused to entertain any offer of 

purchase. That Hahamovitch testified in 2013 that he would have made 

an offer of $8.8 million in 1995/96 and had the ability to do so, was 

appropriately deemed by the trial court to be based on pure speculation, 

or, we might add, 20/20 hindsight. If he would have, and could have, 

made such an offer in 1995, he did not do so then or even when the court 
16

determined in 2004 that Delray and SOSQ could not rescind the contract. 

It was not until after the accounting showed that PLM would not have been 

entitled to any profit distribution that Hahamovitch claimed that he would 

have made an offer in 1995/96.

The complaint for declaratory judgment did allege that the Owners 

should be deprived of their contractual Rate of Return until the 

information demanded was furnished. However, the court already rejected 

such relief as contrary to the agreement. Since the complaint alleged that 

PLM could not determine whether to make an offer until it received such 

information, and the prayer for relief simply requested that the court 

determine the validity of the agreement together with PLM’s rights 

thereunder, we do not think that it provided sufficient notice to Delray and 

SDI that PLM would seek a buy-out based on 1995 prices.

We acknowledge those cases, such as Circle Finance Co. v. Peacock, 399 

So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), relied on by PLM, which hold that in 

equitable actions the court is not limited by the prayer for relief but can 

shape the relief necessitated by the issues and the proofs. But, in equity, 

the trial court can grant or deny such relief. In this case, the court denied 

the relief, not only because the specific relief requested was not expressly 

pled but also because given the passage of time, as well as the speculation 

which would have to be undertaken to grant such relief, it would be 

inequitable. The court did not abuse its discretion.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the final judgment of the trial 

court.

STEVENSON, J., and LINDSEY, NORMA S., Associate Judge, concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.