### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Fe brua ry 1, 200 5 S es sio n STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KOR IE BA TES

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty Nos. 00-12357, 02-07906 Jam es C. Beasley, Jr ., Judge

No. W2004-00686-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled May 20, 2005

T h e d e f e n d a n t ap p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n s f o r a t t e m p t e d s e c o n d

- d e g r e e m u r d e r a n d a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. Specifica lly , he ave rs that, (1) the evidenc e was insufficient to support the ver dicts; (2) the State’s failure to disclose the stat em en t o f an unindicted c o-conspirator constitutes a B rady violation and entitles him to a new trial; (3) the sentenc e was issued in error , in light of B lakely v. Washington; and (4) the cumulative eff ect of all err ors m erits a new trial. Following our re view, we aff irm the convictions and the se ntence s imposed. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., and J OE H. W AL KE R , S P

. J ., joined.
C. A nn e Ti pto n, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e (o n a pp e a l) , a ndRob e rt

Wils on Jone s, Dist ri c t Pu bli c Def ender , and Phy llis Aluko and Kindle Nanc e, Assistant Public Defe nders ( at trial), f or the
app e lla nt, Ko ri e B a te s.
Paul G . Su mme rs , Attor ne y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Ra c he l E . Wil lis , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L

. Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Paul Goodma n and Paul Hag erma n, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION

Fa cts and Proce dural History
O n O c to b e r

1 7 , 2 0 0 0 , th e d e f

e n d a n t, K o r ie B a te s , w a s in d ic te d o n o n e c o u n t o f c r im in al attempt first deg ree murder (a C lass A fe lony ). On Oc tober 8, 2002, a second indictment wa s re turne d, wh ic h c ha

rg e d th e de fe nd a nt w ith on e c ou nt of e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

(a Cla ss A f e l o n y)

. A j u r y c o n v i c t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t o f c r i m i n a l a t t e m p ts e c o n d d e g r e e m u r d e r ( a C l a s s B f e l o n y) and ag g ravated robbe ry

(a Cl as s B f

elony ), both lesser inc luded offe nses of those c harg ed in the ind ic tme nts

. F oll ow ing a he ari ng , th e de fe nd a nt w a s se nte nc e d, a s a Ra ng e I , s ta nd ardof

fe nd e r, toT h e r ec or d r ef l ec t s t h at Y ou n g an d W r i g h t l ed i n W r i g h t ’ s c ar , w h i l e t h e def en dan t , B r own , a n d W as h i n g t on 1 fo l l o wed i n Y o ung’ s t ruck.

T he r ecor d re f

l ect s t hat K er r and t he t hr ee men we r e a cquai nt ed wi t h one an ot her , as K er r ha d re cen t l y mo ved 2 f ro m B l yt he vil l e to M em p his.

T h e t r an s cr i pt r ev ea l s t h at Al l en r ec og n i ze d W as h i n g t on “ f r om ar ou n d t own ” an d f r om h i s a t t en di n g s ch ool 3

w i t h A l l en ’ s b ro t he rs i n B l yt he vil l e, A rka nsa s. -2- nin e a nde le ve n y e ars on the c ha rg e s, re sp e c tiv e ly . T he se nte nc e s w e re or de re d to ru n c on se c uti ve ly for a total effe ctive sente nce of twenty y ear s. The defe ndant now appea ls to this Court contending that: (1) the evidenc e was insufficient to support the verdic ts; (2) the State’s failure to disclose the
s t at ement of an unindicted co- conspirator constitutes a B rady

violation and entitles him to a new trial; (3) the se ntence was issued in error, in light of Blakely v. Washington; and (4) the cumulative
e ff e c t of a ll e rr or s me ri ts a

ne w t ri a l.
Take n in a light most favor able to the State, the re cord r efle cts that Earnest Young (“Y oung ”)
re c ru ite d th e de fe nd a nt a ndthr e e oth e r c omr a de s to tr a ve l f ro m B lythe vil le , A rk a ns a s, to M e mph is, Tenne ssee, to collect a drug -re lated debt owed by J ohn Ker r (“ Ker r”) to Young . Specifica lly , Young ins truc te d t he de fe nd a nt, Ty ro ne B ro wn (“ B ro wn ” ), a ndB yro n Wa sh ing ton (“ Was hin g ton ” ) t o fo llo w h im a ndJohn ny

Wri g ht ( “ Wri g ht” ) a s th e y tr a ve le d to Me mph is. 1

After arriving in Memp h is, W rig ht and Young pulled off of the roa d, and B rown g uided Washington to the stree t where Ker r’s a partment c omplex was located. Washington pa rked Y oung ’s truck at a nea

rby marke t, and the trio walked to K err ’s apartment. Upon arriving, they found Ke rr outside drinking a

beer and beg an a conver sation with him. At some point, the subject turne d to the 2 money owed by Ker

r t o Young and their intention of c ollecting the debt. Ke rr then invited the me n inside to “talk ab o u t it.” After Ker r denie d having the money , the def endant a nd Br own dre w wea pons and beg an to sea

rch the apartment, without objection from Ker r.
One of the three men wal k ed i n t o the master be droom of the a partment whe re K err ’s gi rl fr i en d , An d re a A l l en (“ Al l en ”) , wa s s l ee p i n g. S h e a wa k en ed t o fi n d t h e m a n g o i n g t h ro u gh dr a we rs a ndre pe a te dly

a sk ing , “ Whe re is it?” Th e ind ivi du a l the n for c e d he r t o g e t ou t of be d w hil e he “snatched the mattress” a nd sear ched unde r it. Allen described the first person who entere d the be dr oo m a s w e ari ng a

c a mou fl a g e d f

ish ing hat, a

t- sh irt w ith “ a nim atio n o n th e fr on t,” a ndje a ns
. Severa l minutes later, a se cond man, late r identi fi ed b y Al len as Washing ton, enter ed the 3 bedroom. The second man picked up a box and asked Allen w hat it was, to which she r eplied that it w a s “ a too l box.” Th e se c on d man le ft a ndre -e nte re d th e ro om, thi s ti me pic kin g up a brie fc a se and inquiring as to its contents. Af t er Al len re sponded that the brie fca se held Ke rr’ s mili tary dis c ha rg e pa pe rs a ndso me pic tur e s, the ma n c arrie d th e brie fc a se ou t of the be dr oo m. M ome nts later, A llen hear d Ker

r’s voice , and the f

irst man left the be droom. Shortly there afte r, Allen he ard
a g un sh ot. A thi rd ma n the n c a me to the do or of the be dr oo m a ndfi re d th re e sh ots a t A lle n, a nda ll three men left the a

partment.
After ly ing on the floor for

a fe w minutes, Allen g ot up and instructed the ba by sitters, who
wer e slee ping in the s econd be droom with her c hildren, to ca ll the police. Howe ver, w hen theyIt ap p e a rs tha t t h e d e fen d a n t wa s c o n v ic te d b a se d o n a the o ry o f cr im ina l re sp o n sib ili ty. 4
-3- attempted to place the ca ll, they discovere d that the phone r ec eiver s had bee n remove d from the apartment. They

then ra n to a neig hboring apartment to contact authorities.

I n the meantime, the de fendant, Brow n, and Washing ton returned to the truck a nd heade d back to B ly theville. Washington t estified at trial that the defendant took t he phone r ece ivers fr om Ker r’s a partment and threw the m out of the truck a fter the y left the complex. He further stated that the def endant disposed of both wea pons by throwing them into the Missi ssippi R iver a s they crosse d over the bridg e fr om Memphis into Ar k an s as
. Washington testified that Wrig ht and Young eventua lly

caug ht up to the t ruck on the i nterstate, and t he five car avanne d back to Bly theville and met at Washington’s a

partment. Although Wright left shortly afte r they arrived, the other s remaine d at the apa rtment to discuss what had oc curr ed in Memphis.

As a result of the events of that evening , J ohn Ker r wa s fatally

injured and A llen was tre ated for g unshot wounds to the left elbow, lef t leg , and lower

left bac k. She was late r release d. The defe ndant was indicte d for attemp t ed fi rst deg ree murder a s to Allen and espe cially ag g ravated robbery as to Ker

r. F oll owing a jury

trial, the def

endant wa s convicted of the lesser

included offe nses of attempted second deg ree murder and ag g ravated robbery
. He wa s sentence d to nine and 4
e l e v e n ye ar s o n t h e c h ar g e s , r e s p e c t i v e l y.
An a ly sis

I . Sufficienc y
I nitially , the def

endant a lleg es that the c orrobor ati n g evidenc e provide d by Washington, an indicte d co-de fendant, was insufficie nt to identify him as being connec ted with the char g ed off

ense. In Tenne ssee, a

conviction may

not be based solely

upon the uncor

roborated testimonyof an a ccomplice . State v. Bane, 57 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn. 2001) ; State v. Allen, 976 S.W .2d 661, 666 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . Furthermore , acc omplices ca nn o t co rrobor ate e ach other. Stat e v
. B o xle y , 7 6 S. W. 3 d 3 8 1 , 3 8 6 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 2 0 0 1 )

. I n o r d e r to q u a li f y as corr oborative e vidence : [t ]here must be some fa ct testified to, entire ly indep en d en t of the a ccomplice ’s testimony , w h ic h , ta

k e n b y it s e lf

, le a d s to th e in f

e r e n c e , n o t o n ly th a t a c r ime has been c ommitt ed, but also that the defe ndant is implicate d in it; and this independe nt corr oborative te stimonymust also include some fac t establishing the de fendant’s i d e n t i t y. State v. Big bee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994) (citations omitted).
The c orrobor ative evide nce may be dire ct or c ircumstantial and is not requir ed to be
s u f f i c i e n t , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , t o s u p p o r t a c o n v i c t i o n
. I d

. T h e c o rr o b o r a t i v e e v i d e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t if it fairly and leg itimately

tends to connec t the defe ndant with the commission of the crime char g ed.-4-

State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001). I n addition, corrobor ati o n i s s u ff i cient eve n though the evidenc e is slight and entitled, when standing alone, to but little consideration. State v. He fl in, 15 S.W. 3d51 9, 52 4 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 99). Th e c or ro bo ratio n n e e d n ot e xten d to a ll portions of the ac complice’ s ev i d en ce
. Bigbe e, 885 S.W.2d at 803. The sufficie ncy of the
corr oboration is a dete rmination for the jury . Shaw, 37 S.W.3d at 903. Second deg ree m u rd er i s defined, in pe rtinent part, a s “[a] knowing killing of another.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-210(a )(1) (2004). Moreove r, the inchoate offe nse of attempt is codified
a t T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 12 -1 01 a ndstate s: (a ) A p e rs on c omm its c ri min a l a tte mpt wh o, a c tin g wi th the kin d o f c ulp abil ity otherwise r equire d for the of fense : (1 ) I nte nti on a lly e ng a g e s in a c tio n or c a us e s a re su lt that w ou ld c on sti tut e an off ense if the circ umstances surrounding the conduct we re a s the person believes the m to be; (2) Ac ts with int ent to cause a re sult that is an ele ment of the off ense, and believes the conduct will cause the re sult without further co n duct on the person’ s part; or (3) Ac ts with int ent to co m p l et e a course of action or c ause a

result that
w o u ld c o n s ti tu te th e o f

f e n s e , u n d e r th e c ir c u ms tan c e s s u rr o u n d in g the
c on du c t as th e pe rs on be lie ve s th e m to be , a ndthe c on du c t c on sti tut e s a substantial step toward the c ommissi on of the off ense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 12-101(a ) (2004). There fore , attempted sec ond deg ree murder r equire s proof of: (1) a knowing , (2) attempt, ( 3) to kill another

. State v. Rush, 50 S.W .3d 424, 430 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted).

Further, a g g ravated robbe ry is define d as a robbery

“ac complished with a dea dly wea pon or by dis play of a ny art ic le us e d or fa sh ion e d to le a d the vic tim to re a so na bly be lie ve it to be a

de a dly
wea pon” or “ wher e the victim suffe rs serious bodily injury .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 (2004)

. I n the pre sent ca se, Washington testified that he went to Memphis in J une of 1999, to c ollect a debt f rom J ohn Ker

r on beha lf of Ea

rnest Young

. Upon arriving in Memphis, Washington stated that he , B ro wn , a ndthe de fe nd a nt park e d at a ne arb y fi sh mark e t a ndwa lke d to Ke rr ’s apa rt me nt. Washington further testified that Br own and the de fendant searc hed the a partment a nd that Br own opened K err’s brief

case with a knife and spoon. He stated that when B rown shook the briefc ase, Ker r “lung ed at” Br own and the de fendant, and it appea red that both men fi red shots at Ke rr. As Was hin g tonfl e d th e apa

rt me nt, he he ardtw o to thr e e mor e sh ots bu t wa s u na ble to d e te rm ine the ir
source
. Washington testified that, a fter r eturning to the truck, the thre e beg an to trave l in the direction of B ly theville and that the def endant thre w from the tr

uck window two phone rec eiver s he had taken-5-

from the a

partment. Washing ton also stated that the defe ndant disposed of the wea pons, throwing them into the Missi ssippi R iver a s they trave led over

the bridg e fr om Memphis into Arkansas. At trial, Washington re fre shed hi s rec ollection with a st atement given to police shortly afte r the incident. Af

ter reviewing the s tatement, he testified t hat, on the ni g ht of t he subj ect incide nt, the defe ndant wore “[a] black t-shirt, a pair of bl ue jeans and a camouf lag e fishing hat or hunting hat.” He f urther de scribed the hat as “ a fishing hat but the visor comes a ll the way around the head, ma

kes a complete circ le ar ound with a dra wstring . You ca n tie it up if y ou want to.”

Was hin g ton ’s te sti mon y

wa s c or ro bo rate d b y

Al le n, wh o s ta te d th a t th e fi rs t pe rs on to c ome into the bedroom “[had] on a fisherman’s hat and it was like a wide brim but it was ca mouflag e[d] and it was pulled down to rig ht up in here. A nd a t-shirt of some sort with something, a nimation on the fr on t, andso me je a ns or so me thi ng .” She fu rthe r te sti fi e d that wh e n s he tol d th e ba by sit te rs to call the police , they

informed he r that the phone rec eiver s wer e missing. L atrice Golden, one of the baby sitters that night, c orrobor ated the testimony that the phone rece ivers had be en re moved from the apa rt me nt.
We c onclude that the corr oboration evidenc e was sufficie nt to fairly and leg itimately connec t the def endant to the c onviction offense s. Both Washing ton and Allen testified as to the unique hat worn by defe ndant that nig ht. Furthe r, al t h o u gh Al l en was unable to positively identify the defe ndant following the i ncident, she indicated at trial that the defe ndant’s phy sical cha rac teristics matched those of the fir st intruder. Moreove r, Washington, Allen, and Golden testified to the f act tha t th e p h o n e r e c e i v e r s w e r e r e m o v e d f r o mt h e h o u s e
. F i n a l l y , W a s h i n g t o n i n d i c a t e d t h a tthe se rec eiver s weretaken from the apartment and dis posed of by the def endant. The ref

ore, w e conc lude that th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d w a s su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the c on vic tio ns
. I I . Br ady Violation

Ne xt, th e de fe nd a nt a lle g e s that the Sta te vio la te d B ra dy v. Ma ryla nd , 3 73 U. S. 8 3, 83 S. Ct

. 1194 (1963), whe n it failed to disclose the stateme nt give n to police by Wright, an unindicte d coconspirator

. I n Br ady , the Supreme Court he ld that “ suppression by the prosec ution of ev i d en ce fa vo ra ble to an ac c us e d upo n r e qu e st v iol a te s d ue pr oc e ss w he re the e vid e nc e is m a te ri a l e ith e r t o g uil t or to p un ish me nt, ir

re sp e c tiv e of

g oo d f a ith or ba d f a ith of the pr os e c uti on .” B ra dy , 3 73 U. S.
a t 87 , 8 3 S. Ct. a t 11 96 -9 7; s e e a lso Sa mpl e v. State , 82 S. W.3 d 2 67 , 2 70 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T he du ty to d isc los e e xten ds to a ll “ fa vo ra ble inf orma tio n, ” re g ard le ss of wh e the r the e vid e nc e is a dmi ssi ble at trial. Johns on v. State, 38 S.W .3d 52, 56 (Tenn. 2001). I n United States v. Ba g ley , 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S. Ct . 3375, 3380 (1985), the Supreme Court held that both exculpatory and impeac hment evidenc e fa ll under the B rady rule.

Howeve r, the State is not require d to disclose information the def endant a lrea dy

possesses or is able to obta in. State v. Marsha ll, 845 S.W .2d 228, 233 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Nor is the State require d to disclose i nformation that is not possessed by or under the control of the prosec ution or other g overnme ntal ag ency . I d.-6-

Be fore an ac cused is entitled to rel i ef u nder this theory , he must establish sever al prer equisites: (a) the prosec ution must have suppr essed the evidenc e; (b) the evidenc e suppre ssed
m u s t h a v e b e e n f

a v o r ab l e t o t h e a c c u s e d ; a n d ( c ) t h e e v i d e n c e m u s t h a v e b e e n m a t e r i a l

. S e e B a g l e y, 473 U.S. at 674-75 , 1 0 5 S . Ct. at 3379-80; Bra dy , 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct . at 1196-97; State v. Ed g in, 90 2 S. W.2 d 387 , 38 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) . E vid e nc e is c on sid e re d mate ri a l on ly if the re is a
rea sonable proba

bilitythat, had the e vidence been disc losed to the defe nse, the re s u lts of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent. Ky les v. Whit ley , 514 U.S. 419, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L . Ed. 2d 490 (1995); Edg in, 902 S.W .2d at 389.

I n o rd e r to pr ov e a B ra dy vio la tio n, a de fe nd a nt mus t sh ow that “ the fa vo ra ble e vid e nc e c ou ld
rea sonably

be take n to put the whole case i n such a diff ere nt light as to undermine confide nce in the verdic t.” Ky les, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S. Ct. at 1566; see a lso St rickler v. Gre ene, 527 U .S. 263, 119 S. Ct . 1936, 1952, 144 L . Ed. 2d 286 (1999). The Court in Ky les urg ed that the cumulative eff ect of the su pp re sse d e vid e nc e be c on sid e re d to de te rm ine ma te ri a lit y . Ky le s, 51 4 U .S. a t 43 6, 11 5 S. Ct. at 1567. Up on re vie w o f the state me nt in qu e sti on , we c on c lud e that its no nd isc los ur e do e s n ot v iol a te Br ady beca use it is ne ither favor able to the defe ndant nor mate rial. Taking the issues in order , we first note that our supreme court has held that “the B rady obligation comprehe nds evidenc e which provides some sig nif

ic an t ai d to the defe ndant’s ca se, whe ther it furnishes c orrobor ation of the defe ndant’s story , calls into q u es t i o n a material , althoug h not indispensable, eleme nt of the prosec ution’s version of the e vents, or cha lleng es the c redibility of a ke y prosec ution w i t n ess.” J ohnson v. State, 38 S.W .3d 52, 56-57 (Te nn. 2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ellison, 379 N.E.2d 56 0, 57 1 ( Ma ss. 19 78 )) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . A t th e mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l, the tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t: [T] here ’s not hing in [t he st atement] that’s i nconsistent with anything that I have se en or hea rd in the trial.
And, so, this Court would find that it does not contain anything e x culpatory as to [the defe ndant], a nd that there ’s not any thing, in this court’s opinion, that would ha ve – had Mr. Wrig ht been br oug ht in to testify based on this stateme nt, that would have exculpated [the defendant’s] role in t his case. In fac t, if I ’m not mistaken, I believe I rea d in he re wher e it was the – that [W rig ht] even indicated that [W ashing ton] was not suppose d to ha ve g one inside, that [the defe ndant] and the other g uy was the one s that wer e supposed to have g one inside and r oug hed up [Kerr ]. We ag ree with the finding s of the trial court. Contrary to the defe ndant’s arg ument that the statement pr ov ide s a

“ sig nif ic a ntl y dif fe re nt v e rs ionof

the fa c ts” than t hat given by Was hin g tona t tria l, i t appea rs that the two a g ree on all pertinent points. The stateme nt confirms that Young rec ruited Wright to drive him to Mem p h i s , ac companied by Washington, B rown, a nd the def endant. The state me nt f

urthe r c or ro bo rate s Wa sh ing ton ’s te sti mon y that, on c e in M e mph is, Wri g ht w a ite d in his vehicle w ith Y o u n g a n d h a d n o k n o w le d g e o f w h a t tr a n s p ir e d in K e rr ’ s ap ar tm e n t. F in a ll y , the-7-

statement indicate s that, after seeing Washington, B rown, a nd the defendant traveling in the truck approximately

thirty minutes later, Wrig ht and Young followed them ba ck to B ly theville.
We initi ally

note that Wright’s state ment provides no inform at i o n t o support the assertion that the def

endant did not e nter Ker

r’s a partment on the nig ht in question. Rather, it corrobor ates the S t at e’ s p ro o f that, af

ter sepa rating from B rown, Washing ton, and the def endant, Wrig ht and Young did not see the other s ag ain unt il they left Kerr’s apartment on their way back to B ly theville. Moreove r, the stateme nt indicates that the de fendant’s prese nce and his role in the incident we re intended and pla nned by Young . Specifica lly , the statem ent reveals that Young intended for Washington to rema in in the truck while B rown a nd the def endant “ [got] what [ Ker

r] had left and beat him up.” Washington corroborated t his statement at trial when he acknow ledg ed that he wa s supposed to drive to Ke rr’ s apartment and stay in the t ru ck wh i l e Brown and the de fendant went inside.

F ina lly , th e state me nt wo uld no t be a sig nif ic a nt ai d to impe a c h Wash ing ton . As p re vio us ly mentio n e d , th es ta

te me n t c o r

r o b o r ate s th ep e r

ti n e nt points of W ashing ton’s trial testimony ; theref ore, any discrepancies would be minor and would aid the de fendant only marg inally , if at all. We see no po ssi ble way in wh ic h thi s state me nt c ou ld r e nd e r s ig nif ic a nt aid t o th e de fe nd a nt, e ith e r t o e xcu lpate his role in the offe nse or to impeac h Washington.
We f urthe r c on c lud e that th e ma te ri a lity requ ir e me nt h a s n ot b e e n f ulf ill e d. Ev ide nc e is materia l when “the re is a r easona ble probabilit y that, had the e vidence been disc losed to the defe nse, the re sult of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent.” State v. Edg in, 902 S.W .2d 387, 390 (Tenn. 1995). Althoug h the State’s ca ses re fer ence the term “ probability ,” the true determination to be made is whe ther “ the def

endant ha s shown that ‘the fa vorable evidenc e could rea sonably be take n to put the whole ca se in such a dif fer ent light a s to undermine the c onfidenc e of the verdic t.’” J ohnson, 38 S.W .3d at 58 (quoting Irick v. State, 973 S.W.2d 643, 657 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p. 1998) (interna l citations omit ted)).
As we ha ve pre viouslynoted, the statemen t gi v en by Wright mere ly

confirme d and
corr oborate d the State’s proof of t he pertinent fac ts. There fore , if disclosed, it would not have prese nted any

previously

unknown or nove l fac t that would have c hang ed the c o m p l ex i on of the
case . As such, we conc l u d e t h at i ts disclosure ce rtainly would not have a ltered the case in such a way as to undermine the verdic t a s it stands. There fore , the requisite element of materiality has not been pr oven.
I I I . Sentencing
The de fendant also challeng es t he sentences impos ed in l ight of the Supreme Court’s r ece nt holding in B lakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Howeve r, in a re cent opinion, our supreme c ourt held that B lakely does not apply

to o u r s en t encing a ct. See State v. Edwin Gomez and Jonathan S. L ondono, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD, 2005 Tenn. L EXI S 350 (T e nn ., a t K no xvill e , A pril 1 5, 20 05 ). Th e re fo re , th is a rg ume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.-8-

Th e de fe nd a nt a lso c ha lle ng e s th e imp os ition of c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s. Ge ne ra lly , it is within the discretion of the tria l court to impose consec utive sentenc es if it finds by a pre pondera nce of the e vid e nc e that a t le a st o ne of the fo llo wi ng statut ory

c ri te ri a app lie s:
(1) [t ]he defendant is a profe ssional criminal who has knowing ly devoted suc h de fe nd a nt’ s li fe to c ri min a l a c ts a s a ma jor so ur c e of liv e lih oo d; (2) [t ]he defendant is an offe nder whose record of criminal ac tivityis ex tensive; ( 3 ) [ t ] h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a

d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y ab n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a
c omp e te nt psy c hiatr ist wh o co nc lud e s as a re su lt of a n inve sti g a tio n pri or to sentenc ing that t h e defe ndant’s criminal conduct has be en cha rac terized by
a patte rnof

re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be ha vio r w ith he e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s; (4) [t ]he defendant is a dang erous offende r whose behavior indicates littl e or no reg ard f or human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in whic h the ri sk to h uman li fe is h ig h; (5) [t ]he defendant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory

offe nses involving sexual abuse of a

minor with c onsideration of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the r elationship betwee n the def endant and victim or vi ctims, the time span of def

endant’ s undetec ted s exual activity , the nature and scope of the se xua l a c ts a nd the e xten t of the re sid ua l, ph y sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim

or vic tim s; (6) [t] he def

endant is sentenc ed for

an off ense c ommitt ed while on pr obation; or (7) [t] he def

endant is sentenc ed for

criminal conte mpt.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b)

.
I f the c ourt conc ludes the def endant is a dang er o u s o ff ender under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b)(4) , it must make two f urther de terminations in addition to apply ing g ener al sentenc ing principles. State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W .3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002) . First, it must find an extended sente nce is ne cessa ry to protect the publ i c fr om further criminal conduc t by

the de fe nd a nt, a nd , se c on d, it mus t fi nd c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing to b e re a so na bly re la te d to the se ve ri ty of the of fe ns e s. State v. W il kerson, 90 5 S. W.2 d 9 33 , 9 39 (T e nn . 1 99 5) . H ow e ve r, su c h s pe c if ic fac tual finding s are unnece ssary for the othe r categ ories o f T e n n e s s e eCo d eA n n otated sec tion 40-35- 115(b). State v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

. I n the pre sent ca se, the de fendant contends that imposing a consec utive sentenc e base d upon
su bs e c tio n ( b) (4 ) v iol a te s th e ho ldi ng of B lake ly

. We fi rs t note that bo th o ur su pr e me c ou rt

a ndthi s Court ha ve previously addre ssed the applicability of Blakely and Appre ndi to c o n s ec u t ive sentenc ing. In so doing, our courts have held, in harmony with other jurisdictions, that these ca ses-9-

do not af f e c t th e tria l c o u r t’ s ab il ity to o r d e r c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n c in g
. Se e St a te v
. Ro b in s o n, 146 S.W .3d 469, 499 n. 14 (Tenn. 2004) (citations omitted) (noting that “seve ral courts” have reje cted the contention that B lakely and Appr endi apply

to the decision to i mpose consec utive sentenc ing) ; S t a t e v
. H o w ar d W a l t e r T h o m a s , N o
. E 2 0 0 3

- 0 2 0 9 0

- C C A

- R 3

- C D , 2 0 0 5 T e n n
. C r i m
. A p p
. LE X IS 300, at *98-99 (T enn. Crim. App., at Knoxvill e, Mar . 30, 2 0 0 5 ) (rejecting Blakely contention as applied to conse cutive sente ncing based on subse ction (b)( 4)). Theref ore, w e re peat the holding s of the pre vious decisions and re ject this contention.

Ne xt, w e a dd re ss w he the r the tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y fo un d th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s a n a pp ro pria te candidate for c onsecutive se ntenc es u n d er subse ction (b)( 4). I n determining the pr opriety of
c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s, the tr ia l c ou rt op ine d:
The C o u rt has re viewed the statute with reg ard to those pa rticular f actor s, and the Cou rt a g a in i n r e vie wi ng no t on ly the statut e bu t th e c a se la w. Ca se s te ll u s th a t:

“ Th e de fe nd a nt m a y

no t to [sic ] be re qu ir e d to s erve mu lti ple sentenc es conse cutively

on the g round he is a dang er ous offe nder unless the rec ord establishes that the de fendant’s behavior indicated littl e or n o r e g ar d f

o r h u man li f

e a n d th a t h e d idn o t h e s it ate about committing a c rime in which the risk to human life was hig h.
“The circ umstances surrounding the commission of the offe nse we re a g g ra vated . T he c on fi ne me nt f or a n e xten de d p e ri odof

tim e is
nece ssary to protect socie ty

and that th e aggreg ate leng th of the
se nte nc e in c onsecut ive se nte nc ing is o rd e re d, re a so na bly re la te s to the offe nses for w hich the def endant stands c onvicted.”

I n this case, a g ain, as I

would state, I h av e o n e man who is dea d, one woman w ho
wa s mo rt a lly

wound ed, all to r e c ov e r dru g s a nddr ug mon e y . T hat’ s th e wh ole pu rp os e of

thi s. Th e y

fe lt that Mr . K e rr

ha d s tol e n th eir dru gs an d s tol e n th e ir
mon e y , a ndthe y sent th e m ov e r h e re a lit tle bit of se lf -h e lp r e po sse ssi on I

g ue ss i s wh a t y ou ’d c a ll it, a nd in the c ou rs e of that, the y too k a ma n’ s life an d m ort ally wounded his wife

. This Court find that those actions meet the c riteria se t out in the case la w and mee t the criteria set out in the statute for consec utive sentenc ing. I do find th at [ the defe ndant] is a d an gerous offende r whose be havior indicates littl e or no r eg ard f or hu ma n li fe a ndthat ha d no he sit a tio n abo ut c omm itt ing thi s c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk to human life wa s high, and I ’ll order that the sentenc es be se rved c onsecutively

. Upon re view i n g t he trial c ourt’s finding s at the sentenc ing he aring , we c onclude that the c ourt pr op e rl y fo un d tha t the de fe nd a nt me t the re qu ir e me nts of (b )( 4) a ndwa s a n a

pp ro pria te c a nd idate fo r c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing . T he reco rd reflec ts that th e tr ia l c ou rt re c ite d th e re qu isi te fa c tor s,-10-

e xpou nd e d o n the de ta ils of the of fe ns e , an d fou nd that the de fe nd a nt me t the ne c e ssa ry c ri te ri a to b e s e n t e n c e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y.
I V. Cumulative Error

F ina lly , th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e c umu la tiv e e ff e c t of a ll e rr or s me ri ts a

ne w t ri a l. I nitially , we note that the defe ndant has wa ived this arg ument for f ailure to raise it in his m otion for
ne w tr ia l. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (e ). F urthe r, a s w e ha ve fo un d n o in div idu a l e rr or a s to the c on vic tio ns , this arg ument is without m erit.
Conclusion
The de fendant’s convictions and sente nces a re a ffirme d.

____________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE