NUMBER 13-14-00622-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

 

IN THE INTEREST OF L.K.S., C.C.S. II, AND G.E.O.S., CHILDREN

 

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 

of Calhoun County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria 

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez

Appellants M.H.S. and C.C.S. appeal the trial court's order terminating their 

parental rights with respect to their three children, L.K.S., C.C.S. II, and G.E.O.S.1 We

affirm.

 

1 We will refer to the mother as M.H.S., the father as C.C.S., and their children as L.K.S., C.C.S. 

II, and G.E.O.S, in accordance with rule of appellate procedure 9.8. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b) (providing 

that in a parental-rights termination case, “the court must, in its opinion, use an alias to refer to a minor, and 

if necessary to protect the minor's identity, to the minor's parent or other family member”); see also TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“On the motion of the parties or on 

the court's own motion, the appellate court in its opinion may identify the parties by fictitious names or by 

their initials only.”). 
2

I. COMPLIANCE WITH ANDERS

APPELLANT M.H.S.

M.H.S.’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief in which she states

“there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal” and has requested that this Court permit 

her to withdraw as counsel. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 774–45 (1967); 

Porter v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (“[W]hen appointed counsel represents an indigent client in 

a parental termination appeal and concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for 

appeal, counsel may file an Anders-type brief.”). In her brief, counsel addresses: (1) 

whether the evidence presented at trial supported the termination of the parent-child 

relationship between M.H.S. and the children because (a) M.H.S. engaged in conduct or 

knowingly placed her children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the 

physical or emotional well-being of the children, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 

161.001(1)(D), (E) (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.), or (b) M.H.S. failed to comply 

with the provisions of the court order that set out what actions were necessary for her to 

obtain the return of her children, see id. § 161.001(1)(O); (2) whether the evidence was 

sufficient to support the best interest finding, see id. § 161.001(2); and (3) whether the 

trial court erred in terminating M.H.S.’s parental rights and not considering an alternate 

placement with their maternal grandmother. After reviewing the record, counsel 

concludes that the first two issues are “frivolous and [do] not support reversal by this Court 

 

The fourth and oldest child of M.H.S., J.P.A. III, who was sixteen years old at the time of trial, and 

his father, J.P.A. II, are not parties to this appeal. The trial court did not terminate parental rights to J.P.A. 

III. Instead, the court placed J.P.A. III with his maternal grandmother and named the grandmother and the 

child’s father joint permanent managing conservators. The court appointed M.H.S. as possessory 

conservator of J.P.A. III.
3

of the trial court’s judgment.” As to the third issue, counsel recognizes that “the [trial] 

court was not required to consider alternatives to termination” and advises M.H.S. that 

“because there is no legal duty on the part of the State to show alternate placement would

be a viable option for the children, [she] doubt[s] if the Court will reverse on this basis.” 

Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation 

showing why there are no non-frivolous grounds for advancing an appeal. See In re 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, 

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds 

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set 

out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), M.H.S.'s 

counsel has discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no reversible errors in 

the trial court's judgment. Counsel has demonstrated that she has complied with the 

requirements of Anders by examining the record and finding no arguable grounds to 

advance on appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3; 

see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. Counsel has demonstrated that she 

has complied with the requirements of Anders by (1) examining the record and finding no 

arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) serving a copy of the brief and her request 

to withdraw on M.H.S., (3) informing M.H.S. of her rights to file a pro se response, review 

the record preparatory to filing that response, and seek review if the court of appeals 
4

concludes that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) providing M.H.S. with a form motion for pro 

se access to the appellate record, with instructions to file the motion within ten days.2 

See Anders, 386 U.S. at 774; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–19; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 

n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. An adequate time has passed, 

and M.H.S. has not filed either a timely motion seeking pro se access to the appellate 

record or a motion for extension of time to do so. And she has not filed a pro se 

response.

II. COMPLIANCE WITH ANDERS

APPELLANT C.C.S.

C.C.S.’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief in which she 

“concludes there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal” and has requested that this Court 

permit her to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 774–45; Porter, 105 S.W.3d 

at 56. In her brief, counsel addresses: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial 

supported the termination of the parent-child relationship between C.C.S. and the children 

because (a) C.C.S. engaged in conduct or knowingly placed his children with persons 

who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of children, 

see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), or (b) C.C.S. failed to comply with the 

provisions of the court order that set out what actions were necessary for him to obtain 

the return of her children, see id. § 161.001(1)(O); and (2) whether the evidence was 

sufficient to support the best interest finding. See id. § 161.001(2). After reviewing the 

 

2

In the criminal context, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response 

[to a ‘frivolous appeal’ brief] need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. 

Rather, any response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the 

court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 

S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).
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record, counsel determined that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to 

support termination of parental rights because there was: (1) evidence of domestic 

violence between M.H.S. and C.C.S., a pattern of criminal activity, and a history of drug 

abuse which constitutes clear and convincing evidence of endangerment of the children’s 

physical or emotional well-being under sub-sections (D) and (E) of section 161.001(1) of 

the Texas Family Code; (2) evidence of multiple documented instances of C.C.S.’s failure 

to comply with the service plan developed by the Department of Family and Protective 

Services and to complete the items on his service plan which constitutes clear and 

convincing evidence that C.C.S. “failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that 

specifically established the actions necessary for the father to obtain the return of the 

child[ren] . . . .” under section 161.001(1)(O) of the family code; and (3) “clear and 

convincing evidence . . . to support the trial court’s finding that the termination of the 

parental rights of C.C.S. was in the best interest of the children, L.K.S., C.C.S.II, and 

G.E.O.S.”

Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional 

evaluation showing why there are no non-frivolous grounds for advancing an appeal. 

See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 407 n.9 (citing Hawkins, 112 S.W.3d at 343–44); 

Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3. In compliance with High, 573 S.W.2d at 813, and Kelly, 

436 S.W.3d at 318–19, C.C.S.'s counsel has discussed why, under controlling authority, 

there are no reversible errors in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has demonstrated 

that she has complied with the requirements of Anders by examining the record and 

finding no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; 

Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. 
6

Counsel has informed the Court that she has (1) examined the record, (2) found no 

arguable grounds to advance on appeal, and (3) served a copy of the brief and her 

request to withdraw on C.C.S. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 774; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–

19; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.

In March 2015, this Court informed C.C.S. that his counsel has examined the 

record, has found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal, and has requested to 

withdraw as C.C.S.’s counsel. We informed C.C.S. that he has the right to file a pro se 

response, review the record preparatory to filing that response, and seek review if we 

conclude that the appeal is frivolous. This Court also provided C.C.S. with a copy of the 

brief and the appellate record. An adequate time has passed, and C.C.S. has not filed 

a pro se response.

III. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, this Court must conduct a full examination of all 

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 

U.S. 75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, *1 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have reviewed the entire 

record and the briefs filed in this case, including the brief filed by the Texas Department 

of Family and Protective Services in response to the Anders briefs, and we have found 

nothing that would arguably support an appeal for either M.H.S. or C.C.S. See Bledsoe 

v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders

briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and 

reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the 

requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. 
7

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of M.H.S. and 

C.C.S. to L.K.S., C.C.S. II, and G.E.O.S.

IV. MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, counsel for M.H.S. and counsel for C.C.S. ask this 

Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In 

re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) ("If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must 

withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the 

appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the 

appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.") (citations omitted)). We grant each motion 

to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, we order each counsel 

to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to her client and to advise her client of his or 

her right to pursue a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court.

3

 See In re K.D., 

127 S.W.3d 66, 68 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

Justice

Delivered and filed the 14th

day of April, 2015.

 

3 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should M.H.S. or C.C.S. wish to seek further review of 

this case by the Texas Supreme Court, she or he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for review 

or file a pro se petition for review. Any petition for review must be filed with the Texas Supreme Court clerk 

within forty-five days after the date of either this opinion or the last ruling by this Court on all timely filed 

motions for rehearing or en banc reconsideration. See TEX. R. APP. P. 53.7(a). Any petition for review 

must comply with the requirements of rule 53.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. at R. 

53.2.