NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CATRINA K., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, E.K., C.K., J.R., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0218

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD27175

The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Amber E. Pershon

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 12-5-2017
CATRINA K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Catrina K. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s 

order severing her parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother is the biological mother of E.K., born March 2006;

C.K., born June 2008; and J.R.,

1 born August 2013.

¶3 In October 2013, neighbors called police to investigate 

possible abuse of E.K. by the children’s father.

2 Mother was not living with 

the family at the time, and her whereabouts were unknown. The 

Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of E.K. and C.K. and 

alleged they were dependent as to Mother due to abandonment and 

neglect. About three months later, after J.R.’s birth, Mother left J.R. with a 

woman who did not have the appropriate paperwork to care for him, and 

DCS filed a supplemental petition alleging J.R. was dependent as to Mother 

due to neglect.

3 E.K. and C.K. were found dependent as to Mother in 

January 2014, and J.R. was found dependent as to Mother in June 2014.

 

1 At the time DCS initiated dependency proceedings regarding J.R., it 

believed J.R. had a different father than E.K. and C.K. However, it was later 

determined that all three children had the same father.

2 Father later pled guilty to child abuse and was ultimately sentenced 

to prison. He is not a party to this appeal.

3 DCS later amended the petition to additionally allege J.R. was 

dependent due to substance abuse and Mother’s failure to engage in the 

dependency proceedings regarding other children. The superior court 

found J.R. dependent as to Mother on all alleged grounds.
CATRINA K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 DCS moved for severance of Mother’s parental rights to all 

three children in January 2015. It alleged Mother was unable to discharge 

her parental responsibilities because of a history of chronic abuse of 

dangerous drugs, controlled substances, and/or alcohol pursuant to 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(3); J.R. had been in an 

out-of-home placement for a cumulative period of six months or longer 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b); all three children had been in an out-ofhome placement for a cumulative period of nine months or longer pursuant 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a); and E.J. and C.K. had been in an out-of-home 

placement for fifteen months or longer pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

¶5 Approximately a year-and-a-half after DCS moved for 

severance, in June 2016, Mother was incarcerated for a drug-related offense. 

One month before the severance hearing’s scheduled date, in March 2017, 

Mother moved to continue the hearing, explaining in part that she would 

be released from jail shortly after the severance trial,4 was scheduled for an 

outpatient drug abuse assessment after her release, and wanted to engage 

in services. The superior court denied the motion. Mother moved again for 

a continuance during the hearing itself, but the court also denied that 

motion.

¶6 At the two-day severance hearing, the DCS case manager 

testified DCS offered Mother random substance testing through TASC, 

substance abuse assessment and treatment through TERROS, case aide 

visitation, parent aide visitation, psychological evaluation, and case 

management services. She acknowledged Mother had completed a 

substance abuse assessment and participated in some programs while she 

was in jail, but she said DCS still believed Mother was unable to parent the 

children because Mother had been unable to demonstrate stability or 

sobriety outside an institutional setting over the past three years, failed to 

complete any of the services offered to her, and had no in-person contact 

with the children since 2014. Similarly, she testified DCS did not believe 

Mother had made the necessary behavioral changes for reunification with 

the children because she had not demonstrated lasting sobriety or stability, 

had only recently been released from incarceration and would need to 

“start her life over,” and would need nine to twelve months to demonstrate 

the behavioral changes necessary to successfully reunite with the children.

¶7 After the hearing, the superior court severed Mother’s rights 

to the children on all alleged grounds. It found DCS had proven the 

 

4 Mother was released approximately two weeks before the severance 

hearing.
CATRINA K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

grounds for severance pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) by clear and 

convincing evidence due to Mother’s chronic substance abuse issues. It 

noted Mother’s history of substance abuse dated back to when she was 

thirteen years old; Mother had not been able to discharge her parental 

responsibilities since before the initiation of the dependency action; and it 

was reasonable to believe Mother’s chronic drug abuse would continue 

because, in part, she participated inconsistently in services, tested positive 

for illegal substances, was found in possession of illegal substances during 

the dependency, and was jailed for a drug-related offense until shortly 

before the severance hearing.

¶8 The superior court also found DCS had proven the grounds 

for severance pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), (b), and (c) because the 

children had been in an out-of-home placement for well over three years; 

DCS had made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services 

to Mother; and Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances that 

caused the children to come into care. The court noted, “Mother still [had] 

a substance abuse issue that remain[ed] unsolved,” and that “[w]hile 

Mother did not use illegal substances during her recent incarceration for 

drug related offenses,” DCS had shown that “more than a few months of 

sobriety in a controlled setting [was] necessary to remedy the circumstances 

that lead to the children coming into care.” It concluded Mother’s history 

of non-participation in reunification services supported a finding that her

substance abuse issues would continue for a prolonged and indeterminate

period.

¶9 Finally, the superior court found severance was in the 

children’s best interests. It found that although the children were not in an 

adoptive placement at the time of the hearing, DCS had found a new 

placement that was related to them and “there [was] no question 

maintaining a relationship with Mother would be detrimental to the 

children.” It also found Mother had no real relationship with the children 

and continued to have unresolved substance abuse issues, and it stated the 

children deserved a home free from substance abuse.

¶10 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Mother argues the superior court abused its discretion by 

severing her parental rights when: (1) insufficient evidence showed 

severance was in the children’s best interests; (2) the court denied Mother’s 
CATRINA K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

request for a continuance; and (3) insufficient evidence supported the 

grounds for severance.

I. Standard of Review

¶12 As the trier of fact in a severance proceeding, the superior

court is in the best position to weigh evidence, observe the parties, judge 

the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts. Jordan C. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009). We therefore view the 

evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 

favorable to affirming the court’s order, id., and we will not reverse unless 

no reasonable evidence supports its factual findings, Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. 

v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010). If reasonable evidence 

supports any one ground for severance, we need not address an appellant’s 

arguments pertaining to any other ground. Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

241 Ariz. 576, 577, ¶ 5 (App. 2017). Finally, “[m]otions to continue are 

addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its decision will not 

be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Yavapai Cty. Juv. Action No. 

J-9365, 157 Ariz. 497, 499 (App. 1988).

II. Best Interests

¶13 Mother argues insufficient evidence supports the superior 

court’s best interests finding. She asserts, in part, that she made substantial 

strides towards reunification, demonstrated a clear plan for remaining 

sober outside of jail, and had a bond with the children. She also asserts 

severance was not in the children’s best interests because at the time of the 

severance hearing, the children were placed separately and DCS had 

provided no confirmed adoptive placement.

¶14 Before severing parental rights, the superior court must find

by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the children’s best 

interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 

(2005). In doing so, the court “must include a finding as to how the 

child[ren] would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation 

of the relationship.” Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 

(1990). DCS need not show it has a specific adoption plan for the children; 

it must only show the children are adoptable or “would benefit 

psychologically from the stability an adoption would provide.” Maricopa 

Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994). The court may 

consider the existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a 

biological parent and her children, but this factor is not dispositive in 
CATRINA K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

addressing best interests. Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 

98, ¶ 12 (App. 2016).

¶15 Although we recognize and commend Mother’s progress 

towards sobriety, sufficient evidence supports the superior court’s best 

interests finding. The DCS case manager testified severance was in the 

children’s best interests because the children had been in an out-of-home 

placement for a significant period, deserved permanency, and were 

adoptable. The case manager acknowledged the children were not placed 

together in an adoptable placement at the time of the hearing, but she said

DCS had found a potential placement that the children knew and that

would allow the children to be adopted together. She further stated that 

even if the potential placement were unable to adopt, the children were 

adoptable and DCS could find another adoptive placement. Because this 

evidence is sufficient to support the superior court’s best interests finding, 

we affirm it.

III. Request for Continuance

¶16 Mother next argues the superior court abused its discretion 

by denying her request for a continuance, asserting there was no valid 

reason for the denial. She emphasizes that at the time of the denial, DCS 

had not found adoptive placements for the children and the only potential 

adoptive placement would entail a several-month wait. We will not disturb 

the court’s ruling on a motion to continue absent a clear abuse of discretion. 

No. J-9365, 157 Ariz. at 499.

¶17 “When an action has been set for trial, hearing or conference 

on a specified date by order of the court, no continuance of the trial, hearing 

or conference shall be granted except upon written motion setting forth 

sufficient grounds and good cause, or as otherwise ordered by the court.” 

Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 77(C)(1). The superior court addresses motions to 

continue in its sound discretion. See Henderson v. Henderson, 241 Ariz. 580, 

589, ¶ 29 (App. 2017).

¶18 We find no abuse of discretion. In asking for a continuance, 

Mother told the superior court that she was soon to be released from jail, 

committed to regaining custody of her children, had registered for an 

outpatient drug abuse assessment through her probation department, and

had arranged an apartment and job. She also noted there was no permanent 

placement secured for the children at the time. Section 8-533(B)(8)(a), 

however, does not require the court to wait until the children can be placed 

with an adoptable placement or the resolution of the parent’s criminal case 
CATRINA K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

before proceeding with a severance hearing, and such an interpretation 

would “indefinitely delay determinations regarding children whose best 

interests are at risk and require expedient consideration.” See Pima Cty. Juv. 

Severance Action No. S-2462, 162 Ariz. 536, 538 (App. 1989). DCS offered 

Mother services for over three years before the severance hearing, but 

Mother failed to participate during that time. Additionally, the court had 

granted Mother two previous continuances. Under these circumstances, 

the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion 

to continue.

IV. Grounds for Severance

¶19 Mother argues insufficient evidence supports the grounds for 

severance because she had been sober for ten months, left jail, and entered 

in-patient treatment at the time of the severance hearing.

¶20 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a),5 the superior court may 

sever parental rights if “[t]he child has been in an out-of-home placement 

for a cumulative total period of nine months or longer pursuant to court 

order . . . and the parent has substantially neglected or wilfully refused to 

remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home

placement.”6 Severance on this ground is not appropriate when a parent 

has made “appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial 

programs outlined by [DCS],” but it may be appropriate in cases where the 

parent “disappears for months at a time and makes only sporadic, aborted 

 

5 Because we conclude sufficient evidence supported severance under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a) for all three children, we do not address Mother’s 

claims pertaining to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(b), or (8)(c). See Crystal E., 241 

Ariz. at 577, ¶ 5 (clarifying that if clear and convincing evidence supports 

any one ground for severance, appellate court need not address claims 

pertaining to other grounds).

6 Mother does not challenge the superior court’s findings that DCS 

made diligent efforts to provide her with appropriate reunification services 

or that the children were in an out-of-home placement for over three years. 

She therefore concedes the accuracy of those findings, see Michael J. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 13 (2000), and we address only 

whether sufficient evidence supports the court’s finding that Mother “ha[d]

substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that 

cause[d] the child[ren] to be in an out-of-home placement[,]” see A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(a).
CATRINA K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

attempts to remedy” the circumstances. See Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. 

JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576 (App. 1994).

7 At a minimum, A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(a) requires the parent demonstrate “something more than trivial 

or de minimus efforts at remediation.” Id. at n.1.

¶21 Although, as Mother notes, the children’s guardian ad litem 

testified it was “possible, very possible, more likely than not” that Mother 

would be in a position in the near future to parent the children, ample 

evidence supports the superior court’s finding that Mother “ha[d]

substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that 

cause[d] the child[ren] to be in an out-of-home placement” pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a). The DCS case manager testified DCS did not believe 

Mother had made the necessary behavioral changes for reunification with 

the children because she had not demonstrated lasting sobriety or stability, 

had only recently been released from incarceration and would need to 

“start her life over,” and would need nine to twelve months to be able to 

demonstrate the behavioral changes necessary to successfully reunite with 

the children. Similarly, she testified DCS still believed Mother was unable 

to parent the children because she had been unable to demonstrate stability 

or sobriety outside an institutional setting over the past three years, failed 

to complete any of the services offered to her, and had no in-person contact 

with the children since 2014. She acknowledged Mother had completed a 

substance abuse assessment through TERROS, but she said that before her 

incarceration, Mother tested sporadically at TASC, was eventually closed 

out of TASC and TERROS due to lack of engagement, and tested positive 

for methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana during the severance 

proceedings. She noted Mother was unable to test from October 2016 to the 

date of the hearing because Mother was incarcerated for a drug-related 

offense, Mother’s parent aide was closed out unsuccessfully after three 

months due to no contact from Mother, and Mother did not attend her 

psychological evaluation. DCS, TERROS, and TASC records support this 

testimony. This evidence supports the superior court’s finding that Mother 

“ha[d] substantially neglected or wilfully refused to remedy the 

circumstances that cause[d] the child[ren] to be in an out-of-home 

placement” pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a); therefore, we affirm the 

court’s findings regarding the grounds for severance.

 

7 These cases were transferred from the Arizona Department of 

Economic Security to DCS in May 2014. See 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, 

§ 157(D) (2nd Spec. Sess.).
CATRINA K. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm the superior court’s order severing Mother’s 

parental rights.