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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

April 14, 2015 

v No. 319212 

Ingham Circuit Court 

LUIS ERNESTO GUZMAN-CORTEZ, LC No. 12-001136-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: O’CONNELL, P.J., and FORT HOOD and GADOLA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant, Luis Ernesto Guzman-Cortez, appeals as of right his convictions, following a 

jury trial, of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than 

murder, MCL 750.84, and killing a dog, MCL 750.50b. The trial court sentenced defendant to 

serve 180 to 600 months’ imprisonment for armed robbery, 60 to 120 months’ imprisonment for 

assault, and 24 to 48 months’ imprisonment for killing a dog. We affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 The trial court arraigned defendant on November 4, 2012. On June 18, 2013—three 

weeks before the date set for trial—appointed defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw from 

representing defendant. At the hearing on the motion, counsel indicated that defendant wanted 

counsel to withdraw and explained that “[e]very time I go to the jail and in defending this motion 

he won’t give me his version of the facts, so there has been a complete breakdown.” In response 

to questioning by the trial court, defendant admitted that he refused to speak to counsel, and he 

alleged that counsel was not working hard enough on his case. 

 The trial court denied defense counsel’s motion to withdraw from representing defendant. 

The trial court found that counsel had diligently prepared for trial and was an “outstanding 

attorney” with many years of experience before the court. The trial court also found that 

granting defendant’s motion would “certainly disrupt the judicial process,” which would also 

affect the trial of co-defendant Ramon Trejo-Chavarria.1

 

 

1

 Trejo-Chevarria’s appeal is also pending before this Court. 
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 At trial, Weslie Bonds testified that defendant and Trejo-Chavarria robbed him on 

October 30, 2012. According to Bonds, he knew both men from selling them marijuana on 

multiple occasions. Defendant and Trejo-Chavarria showed up unannounced at Bonds’s home at 

about 4:00 p.m. Bonds glimpsed defendant in his peripheral vision and saw that defendant was 

carrying a bat. 

 The next thing that Bonds remembered was that he was on the floor. Trejo-Chavarria 

was standing over him with a bloody baseball bat and defendant was taking things from his 

bedroom. His also realized that his head was bleeding and his dog had been stabbed to death. 

Bonds lost consciousness. When he woke, defendant and Trejo-Chavarria were gone. 

 Bonds went to the hospital and reported the assault. Bonds testified that electronics and 

jewelry were missing from his home. Lansing Police Department Detective Mark Lewandowski 

testified that officers arrested defendant and Trejo-Chavarria on November 5, 2012. According 

to Detective Lewandowski, they were riding together in a car that contained some of Bonds’s 

missing items, bloody jackets, a bloody knife with white hairs on it, and a broken and bloody 

baseball bat. A jury found defendant guilty of robbing Bonds, assaulting him, and killing his 

dog. 

II. SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 

 Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request to substitute 

counsel. We disagree. 

 This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision regarding 

substitution of counsel. People v Traylor, 245 Mich App 460, 462; 628 NW2d 120 (2001). The 

trial court abuses its discretion when its outcome falls outside the principled range of outcomes. 

People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). 

 An indigent defendant has the right to counsel, but not the right to counsel of his or her 

choosing. People v Mack, 190 Mich App 7, 14; 475 NW2d 830 (1991). A defendant is entitled 

to substitute counsel only if the defendant shows good cause and that the substitution will not 

unreasonably disrupt the judicial process. Id. “A defendant may not purposely break down the 

attorney-client relationship by refusing to cooperate with his assigned attorney and then argue 

that there is good cause for a substitution of counsel.” People v Meyers (On Remand), 124 Mich 

App 148, 166-167; 335 NW2d 189 (1983). 

 In this case, defendant waited to request substitution of counsel until three weeks before 

the date set for his joint trial with co-defendant Trejo-Chavarria. Defendant alleged that “every 

time when I have a court hearing he is not present” and that defendant “saw [counsel] only once 

at the jail . . . .” The trial court’s register of actions reflects that counsel had attended all but one 

hearing and had obtained a private investigator to assist in the defense. Counsel’s statement to 

the court indicated that he had visited with defendant in jail more than once. The trial court was 

in the best position to determine defendant’s credibility. See MCR 2.613(C). Defendant also 

admitted that he refused to cooperate with his attorney. 

 Given these circumstances, the trial court’s determinations that defendant did not have 

good cause to substitute counsel and that his request would unreasonably delay the joint trial did 
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not fall outside the range of principled outcomes. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion when it denied defendant’s request to substitute counsel. 

III. OFFENSE VARIABLE (OV) 13 

 Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously assessed 10 points under OV 13 at his 

sentencing hearing because his case did not involve three or more crimes against a person. A 

waiver is “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right[.]” People v Loper, 

299 Mich App 451, 472; 830 NW2d 836 (2013). When defense counsel expressly agrees with 

the trial court’s decision, counsel’s action constitutes a waiver that extinguishes any error. 

People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503; 803 NW2d 200 (2011). In this case, at defendant’s 

sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that “[w]e agree that there was a combination of three 

or more crimes against a person.” We conclude that defendant has waived this issue by 

expressly agreeing with the trial court’s assessment. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola