COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Coleman and 

 Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

DANIEL BIZZOCO 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0604-97-4 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF 

 JUNE 16, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

William G. Plummer, Judge Designate 

 John M. Tran (David S. Bracken; Greenberg, 

Bracken & Tran, P.C., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General 

(Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Daniel Bizzoco appeals his conviction for burglary and grand 

larceny. He contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he 

entered the burglarized townhouse.1 We disagree and affirm. 

 

 1In his brief, appellant also contends the evidence was 

insufficient to prove he entered in the nighttime. Appellant was 

indicted for violating Code § 18.2-89, common law burglary, an 

element of which is that the entry occur in the nighttime. 

 In the final order of conviction, the trial court pronounced 

that appellant was "convicted of two felonies, to-wit: Count 

One: Statutory Burglary and Count Two: Grand Larceny." The 

Sentencing Guidelines prepared by the probation officer listed 

the "Primary Offense" as "Stat. Burglary" and referenced Code 

§ 18.2-91, the statutory burglary code section. 

 Common law burglary is a Class 3 felony punishable by a term 

of imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 

twenty years. See Code §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-89. Statutory burglary 

is punishable by a term of imprisonment "for not less than one or 

more than twenty years or, in the discretion of the jury or 

[judge sitting] without a jury, be confined in jail for a period 

not exceeding twelve months." Code § 18.2-91. The trial judge 

imposed a three-year sentence for the burglary conviction, 

suspending imposition of all three years. 

 At oral argument, appellant's counsel conceded that 
 -2- 

 I. 

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

 So viewed, the evidence proved that Claudia Zarikow and 

Maria Gillespie shared a townhouse apartment at 1426 Woodbine 

Street in the City of Alexandria. Zarikow and Gillespie went 

upstairs to bed around 11:00 p.m. on June 10, 1996. At that 

time, the doors were locked; however, they left a downstairs 

window ajar about six to eight inches. Zarikow testified that, 

when she arrived downstairs the next morning, June 11, she 

noticed the window open all the way and that the screen had been 

removed and was leaning against the inside wall. Zarikow's 

laptop computer and school bag were missing. 

 While identifying a photograph of the exterior of her 

townhouse apartment, Zarikow was asked, "[W]hat, if anything, 

unusual did you notice about the area around the window?" 

Zarikow replied, "Well, I had planted plants here. In the 

morning, these were trampled because somebody had been trying to 

enter. In this [photograph], you can see [the plants] are 

crooked there." 

 Maria Gillespie corroborated much of Zarikow's testimony. 

 

appellant was convicted and punished for statutory burglary and 

that the nighttime element was no longer an issue on appeal. 

Therefore, we do not address that issue. 
 -3- 

Gillespie's "bag" containing personal property was also missing. 

 Darrell Linville, a fingerprint expert, examined latent 

fingerprints found outside of the window. Linville testified 

that the prints were those of appellant. The police examined the 

interior of the residence and recovered no fingerprints belonging 

to appellant. 

 Detective Robert Hickman interviewed appellant as part of 

his investigation of the burglary. Hickman telephoned appellant, 

and appellant agreed to meet with Hickman. Hickman met with 

appellant outside appellant's apartment building. Hickman 

identified himself and "asked [appellant] to speak with [him] 

concerning the burglary [he] was investigating on Woodbine 

Street." Hickman provided the following testimony: 

 [Appellant] said he didn't know where that 

was. And I explained to him where it was by 

pointing out the area. North Quaker Lane 

[appellant's apartment building location] was 

fairly, you know, where we were at, the 1200 

block, was very close to Woodbine. I told 

him it was behind Lindsay Cadillac and where 

the 7-Eleven is there, the 1600 block of 

North Quaker Lane. 

 And [appellant] acknowledged that he 

understood where I meant. And I asked him 

had he been back there, and he said, no, he 

doesn't go back there. I asked him if there 

was any reason why anyone would say they saw 

him or that his finger prints would be on 

Woodbine Street, and he said, no. 

 Hickman then "handed" appellant a supplementary police 

report containing Linville's confirmation that appellant's 

"latents [fingerprints] were lifted from exterior P.O.E. window." 

 After reading the report, appellant stated, "there is a mistake, 
 -4- 

that's not me." Appellant also stated that "he had been home 

that night." Hickman denied telling appellant that the burglary 

occurred at night, and he testified as follows: 

 I asked [appellant], what night was that? 

Knowing that I hadn't asked him or advised 

him of the date of the offense. I do that 

purposely, so later if the interrogation is 

claimed to have been, you know, fed by me, I 

can say, he gave me the date or a close date 

to the offense, and I hadn't given it to him. 

 So I knew at that point when he said, 

that night, that I hadn't given him the date. 

 And he said, the night that you are talking 

about. 

 Although dated, the supplementary report contained no 

offense date for the burglary. None of the stolen goods were 

recovered. 

 II. 

 "[W]hile defendant's fingerprint found at the 

scene of the crime may be sufficient under 

the circumstances to show defendant was there 

at some time, nevertheless in order to show 

defendant was the criminal agent, such 

evidence must be coupled with evidence of 

other circumstances tending to reasonably 

exclude the hypothesis that the print was 

impressed at a time other than that of the 

crime. Such 'other circumstances,' . . . 

'need not be circumstances completely 

independent of the fingerprint, and may 
 -5- 

properly include circumstances such as the 

location of the print, the character of the 

place or premises where it was found and the 

accessibility of the general public to the 

object on which the print was impressed.' 

Those attendant circumstances may demonstrate 

the accused was at the scene of the crime 

when it was committed. And if such 

circumstances do so demonstrate, a rational 

inference arises that the accused was the 

criminal agent." 

Tyler v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 162, 166, 487 S.E.2d 221, 223 

(1997) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 141, 146-47, 235 

S.E.2d 357, 360 (1977) (citations omitted)). 

 The Commonwealth always bears the burden of 

proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

When the Commonwealth relies solely upon 

fingerprint evidence to identify a criminal 

agent, it bears the burden of excluding every 

reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that is, 

those "which flow from the evidence itself, 

and not from the imagination of defendant's 

counsel." 

Id. (quoting Turner, 218 Va. at 148, 235 S.E.2d at 361). 

 Here, the fingerprint evidence confirming appellant's 

presence at the scene of the crime was "coupled with evidence of 

other circumstances tending to reasonably exclude" appellant's 

hypothesis that his presence at the crime scene was unrelated to 

the commission of that crime. As the record showed, appellant 
 -6- 

denied knowledge of the townhouse location. After Detective 

Hickman described in detail the location, appellant "acknowledged 

that he understood where [Hickman] meant." Appellant denied he 

had ever been to the townhouse and was unable to explain why his 

fingerprints would be found there. As in Tyler, "that 

circumstance reinforces the inference raised by the fingerprint 

evidence." See id. at 167, 487 S.E.2d at 224. Moreover, when 

confronted with the police report unequivocally indicating the 

presence of appellant's fingerprints, appellant said it was a 

mistake, and he again failed to provide any explanation for their 

presence. Finally, in denying any involvement with the crime, 

appellant disclosed his knowledge that the crime had been 

committed at night, a fact which, to that point in the police 

interview of appellant, had not been revealed. 

 Another such circumstance is detailed in the testimony of 

Zarikow, who testified that she had planted flowers below the 

window, but when she awoke on the morning of June 11, 1996, the 

plants "were trampled." 

 We hold that the fingerprint evidence and the other evidence 

of the attendant circumstances were sufficient to support the 

trial judge's finding that appellant was the criminal agent. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.