FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2021-1110

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JARQUEZ JEROME WHITLEY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.

Christopher N. Patterson, Judge.

December 13, 2023

PER CURIAM.

This appeal involves costs, fees, and fines the trial court 

imposed in two lump sums as part of Appellant’s sentences on two 

felonies. Appellant argues that that the trial court erred by 

imposing some of the costs twice. He also argues that the trial 

court erred when it imposed discretionary fines in a lump sum, 

depriving him of the ability to discern whether he wanted to 

contest the amounts being imposed. We agree in part.

The State contends that Appellant’s arguments have not been 

preserved for appeal because he did not object to the imposed costs, 

fees, and fines when the trial court imposed them. While that is 

the case, the trial court imposed lump sum costs, fees, and fines. 

Thus, Appellant did not have the ability to assess whether the trial 
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court was imposing unauthorized, excessive, or discretionary costs, 

fees, and fines until the trial court rendered the orders. Since he 

was not able to meaningfully assess the costs, fees, and fines being 

imposed prior to the orders being rendered and he timely filed a 

motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), the issues on appeal are properly 

before this Court. Hogle v. State, 250 So. 3d 178, 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2018). 

Having found the issues are preserved, we first turn to the 

costs Appellant claims were improperly imposed twice. In 2017, 

the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether certain court costs 

could be imposed on a per count basis or had to be imposed on a 

per case basis. McNeil v. State, 215 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 2017). In 

determining the answer to this question, the Florida Supreme 

Court examined the plain language of the statutes. Id. at 57−60. 

The Florida Supreme Court stated that when the statute states “a 

violation” or “any offense” without additional language that would 

limit the costs to a per case basis, the costs could be assessed on a 

per count basis. Id. at 58−60. When the statute used the limiting 

language of “per case,” then the cost could only be assessed once 

per case. Id. It even provided some examples of statutes that 

limited the costs to a per case basis. Id. at 58. Two of those 

examples are from sections 938.03 and 938.27, Florida Statutes 

(2016). McNeil, 251 So. 3d at 58.

Appellant complains about being charged twice for the costs 

associated with sections 938.03 and 938.27, Florida Statutes 

(2018). The language concerning the costs contained in those 

sections had not changed from the time the Florida Supreme Court 

analyzed them. As a result, the trial court erred by imposing these 

costs twice. On remand, the trial court must strike the duplicate 

costs.

Likewise, Appellant complains about being charged twice for 

the costs associated with section 938.05(1)(a), Florida Statutes 

(2018). This Court has determined, while using the same version 

of this statute, that the maximum amount that could be imposed 

was $225.00. Thomas v. State, 76 So. 3d 360, 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2011). Appellant was charged this maximum amount twice. As a 
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result, the trial court erred, and it must strike the duplicate cost

on remand. 

The trial court also imposed the costs associated with section 

938.01, Florida Statutes (2018), twice. Section 938.01 states, in 

relevant part, “(1) All courts created by Art. V of the State 

Constitution shall, in addition to any fine or other penalty, require 

every person convicted for violation of a . . . . criminal statute or 

convicted for violation of a municipal or county ordinance to pay 

$3 as a court cost.” This language does not suggest that the costs

are limited to a per case basis. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

err. 

Appellant was also charged twice for the costs associated with 

section 938.15, Florida Statutes (2018). Section 938.15 states, in 

relevant part, “In addition to the costs provided for in s. 938.01, 

municipalities and counties may assess an additional $2 for 

expenditures for criminal justice education degree programs and 

training courses, . . .” Since there is nothing limiting the cost to a 

per case basis, the trial court was free to impose the cost on each 

count. Thus, the trial court did not err. 

The next cost the trial court imposed twice was for the costs 

associated with section 318.18(11)(b), Florida Statutes (2018). 

Section 318.18(11)(b) allows for the imposition of fine of $3.00 for 

a fleeing and eluding conviction, and other nonrelevant traffic 

violations, in Bay County. The plain language of section 318.18 

allows for the imposition of the fine on a per count basis providing 

the count is for one of the enumerated traffic violations. Since 

Appellant was only convicted of one relevant traffic violation, this 

fine could only be imposed once. Therefore, the trial court erred 

when it imposed this cost twice. It must strike the duplicate cost

on remand.

Appellant also complains that the trial court improperly 

charged him twice for the costs associated with section 939.185, 

Florida Statutes (2018). Section 939.185 states in relevant part, 

“(1)(a) The board of county commissioners may adopt by ordinance 

an additional court cost, not to exceed $65, to be imposed by the 

court when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found 

guilty of, or adjudicated delinquent for, any felony . . . .” The plain 
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language of the statute does not limit the costs to a per case basis. 

Sanchez v. State, 332 So. 3d 1, 3−4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020). However, 

the inquiry does not stop there. We must consult the language of 

the ordinance to ensure that the county commission did not limit 

the costs to a per case basis. 

The relevant Bay County ordinance is worded similarly to 

section 939.185. Thus, the imposition of the costs is not limited to 

a per case basis. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by imposing 

this cost twice. 

Next, Appellant complains that the trial court erred by 

imposing the costs associated with section 775.083(2), Florida 

Statutes (2018), twice. Section 775.083(2) states in relevant part,

In addition to the fines set forth in subsection (1), court 

costs shall be assessed and collected in each instance a 

defendant . . . . is convicted of, . . . . , a felony, a 

misdemeanor, or a criminal traffic offense under state 

law, or a violation of any municipal or county ordinance 

if the violation constitutes a misdemeanor under state 

law. The court costs imposed by this sanction shall be $50 

for a felony . . . . 

By stating that the trial court shall assess costs for “each instance,”

those costs are to be imposed on a per count basis. Thus, the trial 

court did not err by imposing these costs twice. 

Now, we turn to the discretionary fines and costs. Appellant 

argues that because the trial court imposed discretionary fines 

without pronouncing them, they should be struck. We agree. When 

a trial court imposes discretionary fines, it is required to pronounce 

them so that a defendant has an opportunity to contest them. 

Bryant v. State, 302 So. 3d 995, 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). As a 

result, the following fines and surcharges associated with sections 

775.083(1), 938.04, 938.15, and 939.185 must be struck. However, 

the trial court may reimpose them if it gives Appellant notice and 

follows the proper resentencing procedures. Bryant, 302 So. 3d at 

1000. 
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The trial court also imposed more than the minimum amount 

for the assistance Appellant received from a public defender’s 

office. Because Appellant was entitled to be heard on any amount 

over the minimum, the amount over the minimum must be struck. 

Id. at 999−1000. If the trial court chooses, it may reimpose the 

higher amount if it gives Appellant notice and follows the proper 

resentencing procedures. Id. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

OSTERHAUS, C.J., and ROBERTS and LONG, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Kathryn Lane, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.