This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1028

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey Alan Truelson,

Appellant.

Filed April 13, 2015

Affirmed

Chutich, Judge

Meeker County District Court

File Nos. 47-CR-13-727

47-CR-13-747

47-CR-14-109

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony D. Spector, Meeker County Attorney, Brandi L. Schiefelbein, Assistant County 

Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Presiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and 

Chutich, Judge. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

CHUTICH, Judge

Appellant Jeffrey Truelson pleaded guilty to violating predatory offender

registration requirements, violating a no-contact order, and interfering with a 911 call. 

He now challenges the district court’s imposition of a ten-year conditional-release term

and imposition of costs for each of the three cases to which he pleaded guilty. Because 

the district court properly imposed the conditional-release term and costs, we affirm. 

FACTS

The facts of this case are undisputed. Truelson committed several crimes during 

the spring and summer of 2013: (1) As a predatory offender, he drove a car without 

properly registering it with law enforcement; (2) he contacted someone in violation of a 

no-contact order; and (3) he assaulted another person and stopped her from calling 911.

As a result of this conduct, the state filed three separate complaints against 

Truelson. On August 29, 2013, the state charged Truelson with felony violation of a nocontact order. On September 9, 2013, the state charged Truelson with two counts of 

felony domestic assault and gross misdemeanor interference with a 911 call. On 

February 13, 2014, the state charged Truelson with failure to register his car. 

Truelson pleaded guilty to violating a no-contact order, interfering with a 911 call, 

and failing to register a car. The plea agreement called for sentences under the 

presumptive guidelines to run concurrently, but did not mention conditional release or 

court costs. The state agreed to dismiss two assault charges as part of the plea agreement. 

At the plea hearing, Truelson admitted the underlying conduct for each offense. He also
3

admitted to being a predatory offender but never admitted that he was a designated risklevel-III offender. The district court told Truelson at the plea hearing that he would be 

“subject to whatever the recommendations of [the pre-sentence investigative report]”

were and that he would be sentenced according to the presumptive guidelines in 

conjunction with that report. Truelson agreed to the plea knowing that the terms of his 

sentence were not fixed. 

The district court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report from the Minnesota 

Department of Corrections. The department of correction’s report included information 

that Truelson was a risk-level-III offender. The district court sentenced Truelson to 39 

months in prison for failing to register his car, plus a statutorily required ten-year 

conditional-release term based on his sex-offender status. The district court imposed a 

concurrent 30-month sentence on the felony no-contact order violation and a concurrent 

one-year sentence on the gross misdemeanor interference with a 911 call. Truelson did 

not object to the sentence. Finally, the district court imposed a $75 surcharge, a $15 

library fee, and a $75 public defender co-payment for each of the three complaints to 

which Truelson pleaded guilty. Truelson appeals.

D E C I S I O N

I.

Truelson pleaded guilty for failing to comply with registration requirements as a 

predatory offender. A pre-sentence investigation report showed that Truelson was a risklevel-III offender; accordingly, the district court imposed a ten-year conditional-release 

term. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a (2014). Truelson did not object to the sentence 
4

at the hearing. On appeal, he now claims that the conditional-release term violated his 

Sixth Amendment rights because he did not admit to being a risk-level-III offender and a 

jury did not make a finding that he was a risk-level-III offender. This court reviews 

questions of constitutional law de novo. State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 139 (Minn.

2009). 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant “a jury determination that [he] is 

guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 (2000) 

(alteration in original) (quotation omitted). “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any 

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must 

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 

2362–63. 

In Minnesota, “the presumptive sentence prescribed by the Minnesota Sentencing 

Guidelines is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts 

reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 

131, 141 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Court has expanded 

the prior-conviction exception from Apprendi to include a defendant’s custody status, 

such as probation status; accordingly, the jury does not have to make a finding of fact on 

custody status before the district court may impose a sentence. State v. Allen, 706 

N.W.2d 40, 47–48 (Minn. 2005).

The issue presented here has been previously addressed by this court. In State v. 

Ge Her, 843 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. App. 2014), review granted (Minn. Apr. 29, 2014), this 
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court addressed the identical issue of imposing a conditional-release term for registration 

violations without a jury finding on the offender’s risk level. Section 243.166 sets a 

mandatory punishment when a person is convicted of failing to register and is a risklevel-III offender: “Notwithstanding the statutory maximum sentence otherwise 

applicable to the offense or any provision of the sentencing guidelines . . . the court shall 

provide that after the person has been released from prison, the commissioner shall place 

the person on conditional release for ten years.” Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a. Based 

on this statute, the district court in Ge Her sentenced the defendant to a statutorily 

mandated ten-year conditional-release term because of his status as a risk-level-III 

offender at the time of the registration violation. Ge Her, 843 N.W.2d at 592. 

The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence violated his Sixth Amendment 

right to a jury trial. See id. We held that a conditional-release term imposed under 

section 243.166, subdivision 5a, is part of the statutory-maximum sentence for risk-levelIII offenders convicted of violating registration requirements. Id. at 594. We further held 

that because determination of the risk level of a sexual offender is analogous to 

determinations of a prior conviction or probation status, which the district court alone 

may do, an offender’s risk level is not a fact that is constitutionally required to be found 

by a jury. Id. at 595–96.

Here, the district court determined that Truelson was a risk-level-III offender 

through a pre-sentence investigation report and records of the department of corrections. 

The ten-year conditional-release term is part of Truelson’s statutory-maximum penalty as 

a risk-level-III offender who violated registration requirements. Id. at 596. The risk-
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level-III status is analogous to the fact of a prior conviction or probation status, and the 

constitution does not require it to be determined by a jury. Id. Truelson’s Sixth 

Amendment rights were therefore not violated when the district court imposed a ten-year 

conditional-release term without a jury finding on his risk level. 

Truelson contends that we should disregard this precedent because the supreme 

court is currently reviewing Ge Her. He cites In re Stilinovich, 479 N.W.2d 731, 736 

(Minn. App. 1992), where this court, relying on Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 

136.02, said that a court of appeals decision is not final until the petition for review is 

denied. But rule 136.02 only refers to a stay of the entry of judgment when the supreme 

court grants review; it does not address the precedential value of the rule of law 

announced in a published opinion. Even though an opinion may not be “final,” this court 

typically follows the rule of law announced in a published opinion, even one subject to 

further review, until the Minnesota Supreme Court announces a different rule of law. See 

State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that we are “bound by 

supreme court precedent and the published opinions of the court of appeals”), review 

denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).

II.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court ordered Truelson to pay a $75 

surcharge, a $15 library fee, and a $75 public defender co-payment for each of the three 

complaints to which he pleaded guilty. Truelson argues that the district court’s order 

violates the governing statutes, contending that those statutes only allow the district court 

to order him to pay one set of costs. The state counters that the plea agreement concerned 
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three separate cases, and the district court could accordingly, in its discretion, impose 

costs three times. 

Both parties argue that the plain language of the statutes supports their arguments. 

This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Gaiovnik, 794 

N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2011). Three statutes are at issue here. The first statute requires

a surcharge: 

[T]he court shall impose and the court administrator shall 

collect a $75 surcharge on every person convicted of any 

felony, gross misdemeanor, misdemeanor, or petty 

misdemeanor offense . . . . When a defendant is convicted of 

more than one offense in a case, the surcharge shall be 

imposed only once in that case.

Minn. Stat. § 357.021, subd. 6(a) (2014). The next statute permits the district court to 

impose a library fee on a defendant, but states “[w]hen a defendant is convicted of more 

than one offense in a case, the county law library fee shall be imposed only once in that 

case.” Minn. Stat. § 134A.10, subd. 3 (2014). The final statute states that “an individual 

who has received public defender services shall pay to the court a $75 co-payment for 

representation provided by a public defender,” unless the co-payment is reduced or 

waived by the court. Minn. Stat. § 611.17(c) (2014).

“When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and 

free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of 

pursuing the spirit.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2014). Words are construed “according to 

their common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2014). A dictionary may 
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help ascertain a word’s common and approved usage. See State v. Schmid, 859 N.W.2d 

816, 820-21, 824 (Minn. 2015) (using the American Heritage Dictionary to define terms).

Black’s Law Dictionary defines a case as “[a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, 

suit, or controversy at law or in equity.” Black’s Law Dictionary 243 (9th ed. 2009). A 

criminal proceeding begins each time the state files a complaint against a defendant. See 

Minn. R. Crim. P. 1.06, subd. 1 (stating that a “charging document” is a complaint, 

indictment, citation, or tab charge). A new case begins each time the state files a criminal 

complaint. Here, the state filed three separate complaints against Truelson in August 

2013, September 2013, and February 2014. Each complaint began a new criminal case 

concerning separate and distinct conduct. 

Truelson argues that the three cases merged into one because of the manner in 

which they were resolved: Truelson dealt with all three cases as part of one plea 

negotiation; he filed one plea petition; he pleaded guilty to each of the three charges at

the same hearing; and the district court imposed concurrent sentences for the three 

charges at one sentencing proceeding. Truelson does not cite any relevant legal authority 

for this position, however.

1

 The district court dealt with the three cases at one hearing, 

likely for purposes of judicial economy or at the request of the attorneys, but that 

 

1

Truelson cites State v. Montermini, 819 N.W.2d 447, 454–55 (Minn. App. 2012), 

review denied (Minn. Nov. 20, 2012), for the proposition that a “plea agreement 

involving a package deal resolving multiple charges and uncharged conduct is treated as 

one case.” Montermini dealt with a prosecutor vacating an entire plea agreement after the 

defendant successfully appealed one of the convictions. Id. at 452. The prosecutor was 

then able to bring certain charges that it had agreed not to pursue as part of the original 

plea agreement. Id. Thus, Montermini does not address the issue of costs; nor is it 

factually analogous so as to be useful.
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treatment does not show that the cases were somehow merged into one. Rather, they 

remained three distinct cases, and the district court properly imposed costs in each 

criminal case in accordance with the governing statutes. 

Affirmed.