UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JOSE F. VALENCIA, 

 Plaintiff – Appellant, 

v. 

CITY OF SANTA FE; SANTA FE 

POLICE DEPARTMENT; GERALD 

SOLANO; ERIC B. JOHNSON; ARIC 

WHEELER; GERALD RIVERA; 

STEPHEN RYAN; JOHN DOES, both in 

their official capacities and as individuals, 

 Defendants – Appellees. 

No. 14-2136 

(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-00137-JCH-LAM) 

(D. N.M.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, McKAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellant Jose F. Valencia brought multiple claims in the district court related 

to the termination of his employment with the Santa Fe Police Department, suing 

 *

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

April 14, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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several members of the police department as well as the department itself and the city 

of Santa Fe. His complaint included claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging 

Appellees had violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 

U.S.C. §1985 alleging a civil conspiracy to violate his federal constitutional rights. 

Also included were claims under state law alleging wrongful termination, abuse of 

process, defamation, and violations of the New Mexico Whistleblower Protection Act 

and the New Mexico Abuse of Privacy Act. The district court dismissed several of 

Appellant’s claims in March 2013. The court subsequently granted Appellees 

summary judgment on each of the remaining claims in a final judgment issued in 

February 2014. 

In July 2014, Appellant filed three pro se motions for post-judgment relief 

with the district court. The district court evaluated all three motions as made under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and denied each. 

In August 2014, Appellant filed two separate notices of appeal, one relating to 

the district court’s final judgment, and the other relating to the denial of his three 

motions for post-judgment relief. 

This court has no jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s appeal of the final 

judgment because Appellant far exceeded the time limit to file a direct appeal of the 

district court’s ruling. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) provides that a notice of appeal in 

a civil case “must be filed . . . within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order 

appealed from.” Appellant filed his notice of appeal over four months after the 
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deadline expired, and this court may not now consider his appeal. See Certain 

Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Evans, 896 F.2d 1255, 1256 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Appellant’s post-judgment motions were filed more than twenty-eight days 

after the district court’s final judgment, and we therefore construe them as motions 

for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See Ysais v. Richardson, 603 F.3d 1175, 

1178 & nn.2–3 (10th Cir. 2010). 

We review the denial of relief for an abuse of discretion, see Servants of 

Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2000), keeping in mind that Rule 

60(b) relief should be granted only in exceptional circumstances. See ClearOne 

Commc’ns v. Bowers, 643 F.3d 735, 754 (10th Cir. 2011). 

 The district court considered the merits of each of these motions, including 

Appellant’s assertions that he was not aware of motions to dismiss his claims made 

by Appellees and that he did not have an opportunity to respond to them before a 

final judgment was ordered. The district court did not find these assertions 

credible—noting in particular that Appellant’s counsel filed responses to Appellees’ 

motions—and therefore denied Appellant’s motions for post-judgment review. 

Under our deferential standard of review in this case and the narrow grounds for 

relief provided by Rule 60(b), we are not persuaded the district court abused its 

discretion in rejecting Appellant’s arguments. 

We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s denial of post-judgment relief and 
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hold that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of the underlying judgment. We 

GRANT Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge