J-S13027-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

MARK SUPIK IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

RICHARD R. LINGENFELTER T/D/B/A 

SPIRIT OF THE NORTH CAMPGROUND 

 Appellee No. 1498 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order August 11, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County 

Civil Division at No(s): 68 C.D. 2012 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 07, 2015 

 Appellant, Mark Supik, appeals from the August 11, 2014 order 

granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Appellee, Richard R. 

Lingenfelter t/d/b/a Spirit of the North Campground (Lingenfelter). After 

careful review, we affirm. 

We summarize the relevant factual and procedural background of this 

case as follows. Appellant leased a campsite lot at Spirit of the North 

Campground (the Campground) from Lingenfelter. Appellant’s Complaint, 

1/19/12, at 3, ¶ 3. At approximately 8:00 a.m. on the morning of January 

23, 2010, Appellant left his trailer at the Campground to use the public 

facilities. Id. at 4, ¶ 7, 8. The road toward the facilities was covered in 

snow and ice. Id. at 4, ¶ 10. Appellant slipped and fell three times and 
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claimed injuries to his head, neck, back, and wrist. Id. at 4, ¶ 13; 

Lingenfelter’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/4/14, at Exhibit A (Answer 

to Lingenfelter’s First Set of Interrogatories at 3-4, ¶ 19). 

 Almost two years later on January 19, 2012, Appellant filed a 

complaint alleging negligence against Lingenfelter. Lingenfelter filed an 

answer and new matter on February 23, 2012. On March 4, 2014, after 

discovery had concluded, Lingenfelter filed a motion for summary 

judgment.1 Appellant filed a response in opposition to Lingenfelter’s motion 

for summary judgment on April 3, 2014 to which Lingenfelter responded on 

April 10, 2014. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on July 

21, 2014 and granted Lingenfelter’s motion for summary judgment on 

August 11, 2014. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 10, 

2014.2 

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1

 We note Lingenfelter filed his notice of service of discovery on March 1, 

2012. Appellant failed to respond. Lingenfelter then filed a motion to 

compel on May 22, 2012, which the trial court granted on the same day. 

Appellant failed to comply with the order, and Lingenfelter filed a motion for 

sanctions on July 12, 2012. Thereafter, Appellant responded to the 

discovery request, and Lingenfelter withdrew his motion for sanctions on 

August 31, 2012. A deposition of Appellant was ultimately conducted on 

October 9, 2012. The docket does not reflect that Appellant sought any 

discovery from Lingenfelter in this matter. 

2

 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925. In its Rule 1925 opinion, the trial court relies on 

its analysis in its August 11, 2014 opinion granting summary judgment. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/2/14. 
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We first observe the required “statement of the question involved” 

section is conspicuously absent from Appellant’s brief. See Appellant’s Brief 

at 1-11; Pa.R.A.P. 2111(4) (requiring a “[s]tatement of the questions 

involved” section to be included in each appellant’s brief); Pa.R.A.P. 2116 

(requiring, in relevant part, “[t]he statement of the questions involved must 

state concisely the issued to be resolved, expressed in the terms and 

circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail[]”). Despite this 

blatant omission and noncompliance with our rules of appellate procedure, 

Appellant’s “summary of the argument” section informs this Court that 

Appellant challenges the entry of summary judgment because Appellant 

believes “[t]he trial court ignored and discounted evidence that created an 

issue of material fact.”3 Appellant’s Brief at 5. While we note, with strong 

disapproval, this glaring defect in Appellant’s brief, it does not preclude 

meaningful appellate review, so we proceed to examine Appellant’s claim. 

See Green v. Green, 69 A.3d 282, 285 n. 2 (Pa. Super. 2013) (observing if 

an appellant’s nonconformance with the rules of appellate procedure does 

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3

 Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement preserved challenges to the trial 

court’s grant of summary judgment. Specifically, Appellant averred that the 

trial court misapplied the summary judgment standard and the hills and 

ridges doctrine and erred in granting the motion for summary judgment 

against “the weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented at the 

hearing.” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/30/2014. 
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not hinder review of the issues or prejudice the parties, this Court will 

address the merits of the appeal).4 

 Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is well 

settled. Our task is “to determine whether the trial court abused its 

discretion or committed an error of law[,] and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Rodriguez v. Kravco Simon Co.,--- A.3d ---, 2015 WL 720553, 

at *1 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). 

In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter 

summary judgment, we focus on the legal standard 

articulated in the summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 

1035.2. The rule states that where there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party

is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary 

judgment may be entered. When the non-moving 

party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may

not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order 

to survive summary judgment. Failure of a nonmoving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an 

issue essential to his case and on which [he] bears

the burden of proof ... establishes the entitlement of 

the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. 

Lastly, we will review the record in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as 

to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 

must be resolved against the moving party. 

Cigna Corp. v. Executive Risk Indem., Inc., --- A.3d ---, 2015 WL 

836933, at *3 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “[O]ur responsibility as 

an appellate court is to determine whether the record either establishes that 

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4

 We note Lingenfelter responded to the substance of Appellant’s argument 

and did not contend this defect in Appellant’s brief resulted in prejudice. 
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the material facts are undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of facts to 

make out a prima facie cause of action, such that there is no issue to be 

decided by the fact-finder.” Reinoso v. Heritage Warminster SPE LLC, --

- A.3d ---, 2015 WL 161934 at *3 (en banc) (citation omitted). 

Consequently, if the record contains evidence that would allow a fact-finder 

to return a verdict in favor of the non-movant, then summary judgment is 

not proper. Id. 

 Appellant challenges the trial court’s finding that no genuine issue of 

material fact existed. Appellant’s Brief at 8. Specifically, the trial court 

found Appellant’s falls resulted from the generally icy conditions on the flat 

surfaces at the Campground. Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/14, at 4. Therefore, 

the trial court reasoned, the hills and ridges doctrine protected Lingenfelter 

from liability because Appellant was unable to establish his falls were a 

result of an unreasonable accumulation of snow or ice in ridges or 

elevations. Id. Appellant contends that the trial court’s application of the 

hills and ridges doctrine is inapplicable and that issues of fact remain. 

Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant advances the following argument. 

The existence of the photographs [taken at 

Campground] depicting the character of the ridges 

and calling into question whether the hills and ridges 

doctrine applies, as well as testimony from 

[A]ppellant concerning the cause of his slip, when 

taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party[,] create several issues of material fact that 

must be left to the jury. 
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Id. Lingenfelter responds by asserting that, “[Appellant’s] evidence of 

generally slippery conditions and icy roadways covered by fresh snow are 

not sufficient to establish liability[.]” Lingenfelter’s Brief at 8. Further, 

“[t]here is nothing of record by which it can be inferred that there was 

anything more than a natural accumulation of snow/ice on the road and 

steps.” Id. at 11. 

 We now turn to an examination of the hills and ridges doctrine to 

determine if the trial court erred in applying it to the facts of the instant 

case. The hills and ridges doctrine is a “long standing and well entrenched 

legal principle ....” Biernacki v. Presque Isle Condominiums Unit 

Owners Ass’n, Inc., 828 A.2d 1114, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

[T]he doctrine of hills and ridges provides that an

owner or occupier of land is not liable for general

slippery conditions, for to require that one’s walks be 

always free of ice and snow would be to impose an 

impossible burden in view of the climatic conditions 

in the hemisphere. Snow and ice upon a pavement 

create merely transient danger, and the only duty 

upon the property owner or tenant is to act within a 

reasonable time after notice to remove it when it is 

in a dangerous condition. 

Harvey v. Rouse Chamberlin, Ltd., 901 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(citation omitted). Further, in order to recover for a fall on an ice or snow 

covered surface, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following. 

(1) [T]hat the snow and ice had accumulated on the 

sidewalk in ridges or elevations of such size and 

character as to unreasonably obstruct travel and 
J-S13027-15 

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constitute a danger to pedestrians traveling thereon; 

(2) that the property owner had notice, either actual 

or constructive, of the existence of such condition; 

(3) that it was the dangerous accumulation of snow 

and ice which caused the plaintiff to fall. 

Biernacki, supra at 1117 (citation omitted). 

 Instantly, the trial court explained its rationale in light of the evidence 

of record as follows. 

In his answers to interrogatories and 

[deposition] testimony, [Appellant] described 

generally icy conditions across the hard surfaces at 

the Campground. He also noted that all the areas 

were snow-covered and that more sleet and snow 

had fallen the night before his accident. Nowhere 

did he describe ridges and elevations of snow and 

ice, however, nor did anyone else on his behalf. 

The photographs do not suggest that 

Lingenfelter allowed ice and snow to unreasonably 

accumulate in ridges or elevations, either. As Photos 

One through Three depict, the buildup [of snow] 

near where [Appellant] fell cannot reasonably be 

characterized as anything more than mild, and Photo

Four does not cast doubt on that characterization. 

Rather, it was shot from a different angle from which 

relative elevations could not be determined, whereas 

the other photographs plainly depicted that the 

vertical difference between the road surface and the 

tops of the snow banks was minimal. No reasonable 

jury could conclude otherwise. 

Assuming, however, that a reasonable jury 

could agree that the photographs depicted 

unacceptable ridges or elevations, Lingenfelter would 

still be entitled to summary judgment based on 

[Appellant’s] failure to produce evidence tending to 

show that they were the cause of his fall. Most 

clearly describing the mechanics of it, he specified 

only that he “slipped and fell on the steps while 

dislodging a chunk of ice from the restrooms,” and 
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that he “stopped there [at the bottom of the steps 

...], and there was a piece of ice right there, 

probably.” The latter statement, insofar as it 

described causation, was merely conjecture, and 

neither lent itself to the reasonable inference that an 

unreasonable accumulation of ice and snow at the 

bottom of the steps precipitated his fall. 

Because [Appellant] is unable as a matter of 

law to establish liability against Lingenfelter, [], 

[Lingenfelter] is entitled to summary judgment in 

this case. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/14, at 4 (citations omitted). 

 We agree with the trial court that Appellant failed to demonstrate that 

the snow and ice had accumulated in ridges or elevations such that it 

unreasonably obstructed travel and constituted a danger to pedestrians, and 

Appellant failed to produce evidence that a dangerous accumulation of snow 

or ice caused him to fall. See Biernacki, supra. 

 In response to Lingenfelter’s interrogatories, Appellant recounts the 

events leading to his falls. 

[Appellant], on the morning of January 23, 2010[,] 

was traveling from his campsite to the facility 

designated by the [C]ampground as the restroom 

area. To use the restrooms, [Appellant] had to cross 

open land and a roadway, each of which had fresh 

snow on top of old ice. [Appellant] slipped and fell 

on the ice going to the restroom, injuring his elbow, 

back and head. 

... 

On the way out of the restroom facility, and while 

exercising care on the snow and ice covered steps, 

[Appellant] slipped and fell on the steps while 
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dislodging a chunk of ice from the roof of the 

restrooms. ... 

Lingenfelter’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/4/14, at Exhibit A (Answer 

to Lingenfelter’s First Set of Interrogatories at 3-4, ¶ 19).5 In response to 

an inquiry about the weather conditions at the time of the incident, Appellant 

reported there were “[s]cattered snow showers, though not at the time of 

injury. Some blowing snow. Lighting was daylight during partly cloudy 

day.” Id. at 4, ¶ 21. Further, Appellant testified regarding his falls at his 

deposition as follows. 

[Attorney for Lingenfelter]: 

Q. What were the weather conditions like when you 

drove up to the [C]ampground prior to your fall? 

[Appellant]: 

A. There was a little snow; snowing a little bit. 

Q. And tell me about what you remember of the 

weather from the time that you got to your trailer 

until the time of your fall. 

A. It was snowing lightly, and it was icy and that, 

and that’s it. It was just snowing lightly. 

Q. You said it was icy? 

A. I said snowing lightly, and underneath the snow

there was ice. 

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5

 Appellant’s answer to Lingenfelter’s first set of interrogatories does not 

contain pagination. For ease of reference, we have assigned each page a 

corresponding page number. 
J-S13027-15 

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Q. And was there ice when you got to the 

[C]ampground? 

A. Huh-uh (no). It was cold. 

Q. So how long were you at the trailer prior to your 

fall? 

A. A day, a day before or so. 

... 

Q. So tell me about your trip from your cabin, 

across the turf, to the time you fell. 

A. Okay. Everything was all good in the hood till I 

got to the road to go to the trailer, and it was all ice. 

I was walking slow, and I fell twice before I got 

there. I had to crawl. And then I went up in there, 

and then coming down, I slipped, and then I got 

hurt. 

Id. at Exhibit B (N.T., 10/9/12, at 25-26, 31). 

The record clearly demonstrates that conditions at the Campground 

were icy because of recent snowfall and that Appellant’s falls occurred while 

walking on flat, snow and ice covered surfaces.6 While the photographs 

relied on by Appellant suggest a slight buildup of snow in the area where 

Appellant contends he fell for the third time, nowhere in his complaint 

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6

 To the extent Appellant attempts to argue the motion for summary 

judgment was improper because discovery had not concluded, we find this 

claim meritless and unsupported by the record. Appellant’s Brief at 8. As 

noted, Lingenfelter sought discovery several times from Appellant before 

Appellant complied with the orders of the trial court. Moreover, at no time 

from the filing of the complaint onward did Appellant seek any formal 

discovery from Lingenfelter. See Appellant’s Brief at 8. 
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against Lingenfelter, his answer to interrogatories, or in his deposition 

testimony, does he attribute his fall to an unreasonable accumulation of ice 

or snow in ridges or elevations obstructing his travel. See id. at Exhibit B 

(Photographs One through Four); see generally Appellant’s Complaint, 

1/19/12, 3-6; Lingenfelter’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/4/14, at 

Exhibit A (Answer to Lingenfelter’s First Set of Interrogatories at 1-5); id. at 

Exhibit B (N.T., 10/9/12, at 3-51).7 Rather, Appellant consistently 

maintained that the surface of the road and stairs were generally slippery 

and icy. Moreover, Appellant unequivocally stated his third fall occurred as 

he was coming down the stairs. Lingenfelter’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment, 3/4/14, at Exhibit B (N.T., 10/9/12, at 31). A reasonable factfinder, therefore, could not conclude any accumulation of snow in the area 

surrounding the base of the stairs obstructed his path down the stairs. See 

Reinoso, supra; Biernacki, supra. Nor does Appellant contend, at any 

time, that his two falls preceding his entry into the facilities, which occurred 

on the road, were the result of snow or ice accumulation in ridges or 

elevations. 

Based on the foregoing and our review of all the evidence of record, 

we conclude Appellant has failed to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue 

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7

 Appellant testified his girlfriend took these photographs of the area right 

after the incident occurred. Lingenfelter’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 

3/4/14, at Exhibit B (N.T., 10/9/12, at 39). 
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essential to his case on which he bore the burden of proof. See Cigna 

Corp., supra. In particular, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Appellant, he has failed to adduce evidence that there was an 

unreasonable accumulation of ice or snow that unreasonably obstructed his 

travel or constituted a danger to pedestrians or that the possible buildup of 

snow was the cause of his falls. See id.; see Biernacki, supra. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in 

favor of Lingenfelter, and the August 11, 2014 order is affirmed. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/7/2015