## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Suprem e Court

Sheffler v. Comm onwealth Edison Co. , 2011 IL 110166

Caption in S upreme Court: FRANCI S SHEFF L ER et al.
, Appellants, v. COMMONWEAL TH EDI SON COMPANY, Appellee

.

Docke t No. 110166

Filed
Rehea ring denied J une 16, 2011

September 26, 2011

Held ( Note : Thi s s

yl lab us

con st it u te s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er o

f D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Where a plaintiff’s complaint is based upon alleg ations concerning a uti l i t y ’s infrastruc ture and its provision of elec trical service s and seeks relief based upon sy stemic defe cts in the provision of elec trical service s

or the repa ir of those service s when a power outag e occur s, that complaint seeks repa

rations and is within the exclusive juris diction of the I llinois Commerce Commi ssion under section 16-125 of the Public Utiliti es Act; additionally
, section 8-101 of the Act does not require an elec trical utilit y to assig n priority in power restorat i o n t o those households listed on the utilit y ’s life-suppor

t reg istry

.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Appellate Court for the First District; hear d in that court

on appea l from the Circuit Court of C o o k County
, the Hon. Rita M. Novak, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Appellate c ourt judg ment aff irmed.Counsel on

Appea l L arr y D. Drury
, I lan J

. C h orowsky
, J ohn H. Alexander and Robert A. L ang endorf

, all of Chicag o, for a

ppellants.

J ohn J oseph Hamill, Erinn L

. Wehrman, Eliz abeth L

. L iebschutz and Nang ah N. Ta

bah, of Jenner & Bloc k L L P, of Chicag o, for a ppellee.

Peter D. Coblentz
, of Rosenthal, Murphey
, Coblentz & Donahue
, and Norman T. Finkel and Richard M. Goldwasser
, of Scho en b er g Finkel Newma n & Rosenberg L L C, all of Chicag o, for amicus curiae Villag e of Dee rfield.

Michae l M. Conway
, Theodore T. Eidukas, Kather ine E. L i cu p and J onathan W. Gar lough, of Foley & L ardne r L L P, of Chicag o, for amici curiae The Peoples Ga s L ight & Coke Company et al.

J ustices J USTI CE THOMAS delivere d the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion. Chief J ustice Kilbride and J ustices Fr eema n, Gar man, Kar meier, Bur

ke, and The is concurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, F ranc es Sheffler , Mark Resnik, and D ebra Sloan, individually and on behalf of J ason Sloan, filed a complaint on behalf of a putative class agai n s t defe ndant, Co mm o nwea lth Edison Company (ComEd), seeking damag es and injunctive r e li e f f o r p o w e r outag es to their homes following sever e storms. Plaintiffs filed an initial complaint, followed by a first, second and third amende d complaint. The circ uit court dismiss ed plaintiffs’ third amende d complaint with prejudice
, and denied p l ai ntiffs leave to file a fourth amende d complaint. On appe al, the Appe llate Court, First District, af firmed. 399 I ll. App. 3d 51. ¶ 2 This court g rante d plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appea l. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010). I n addition, pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Ru l e 3 4 5 (ef f. Sept. 20, 2010), we allowed the Villag e of Dee rfield to file a brief amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiffs. We also permitted the Peoples Gas L ight and Coke Company
, North Shor e Ga s Company and Norther n I llinois Gas Company
, d/b/a Nicor Gas Company
, to file a brief amici curiae on behalf of def endant.

¶ 3 BA CKGROUND ¶ 4 On Aug ust 23, 2007, sever e storm sy stems aff ecte d the Chicag o are a, resulting in the loss

-2-of electrica l power to many of C omEd’s customers, including pl aint i ff s

. As a result of t he
power outag es, plaintiffs filed t h eir complaint and amende d complaints. The orig inal complaint was filed on Aug ust 28, 2007. That complaint was filed by plaintiffs Sheffler and Resnik as a c lass action complaint. ¶ 5 Count I of the orig inal complaint was broug ht und er t h e P u b l i c Utiliti es Act (the Ac t) (220 I L CS 5/5-101 et seq. (W es t 2006)) and alleg ed that ComEd had a duty to act as a

rea sonably car eful publi c uti lity to provide continuous power to plaintiffs and the putative class mem b er s. Plaintiffs alleg ed that ComEd was neg lige nt in that it failed to provide continuous, adequate, eff

icient and reliable power to plaintiffs and the putative class, failed
to provide adequate war

ning prior to the power outag e, and failed to adequately maintain its fac iliti es to provide continuous, adequate, eff icient and reliable power to plaintiffs and to the putative class. Plaintiffs alleg ed that ComEd brea ched its duties beca use its c ompany -wide
manpower planning proce ss is inadequate, its distribution sy stem did not keep p ac e wi t h
sy stem g rowth and the need for re fu rb i s h ment, and the distribution sy stem beca me excessively loaded and did not adequately allow for conting encie s for a failure

. Plai ntiffs contende d that ComEd’s neg lige nce and failur e to act directly and prox imately cause d the
power outag es, and cause d plaintiffs and the putative class members t o s u ffer proper ty damag e and o t h er financ ial damag es. Plaintiffs reque sted a temporar y restra ining order and/or a p re l iminary injunction “enjoining COMED from its prac tice of attempting to unilatera lly settle the claims such as here in and requiring the Plaintiffs and the class to sign

a re lease of all said cla ims with respect ther eto.” ¶ 6 Count I I of the orig inal complaint wa s fo r b re ac h of contra ct implied in law or fa ct. Plaintiffs alleg ed that ComEd impliedly ag ree d to pro v id e c o n ti n u o u s , a d e q

u a te, eff icient and reliable elec tric service to plaintiffs and the c lass, that plaintiffs and the c lass paid ComEd for their elec tric service
, but ComEd brea ched the contra ct implied in law or fac t by failing to provide such e lectric service

. ¶ 7 On September 19, 2007, plaintiffs we re gi v en l ea v e to file an amende d class ac tion complaint, wh i ch al s o added plaintiff Debr a Sloan, individually and as leg al g uardia n of J ason Sloan. The first amende d complaint contained four counts. Count I was ag ain broug ht under the Act seeking a temporar y restra ining order and/or preliminary injunction, and added claims that ComEd was neg lige nt in failing to provide priority to disabled persons in restoring their power afte r a power outag e or i n t erruption, and in failing to establish and provide priority power to persons reg istered in ComEd’s life support reg istry (see 220 I L CS 5/8-204 (West 2006)). Count I Iag ain alleg ed a br eac h of contra ct implied in law or fa ct. ¶ 8 Count I I I of the first amende d complaint sough t an i n j unction on behalf of the Sloan class. Count I I I alleg ed that plaintiff Sloan was the pare nt and leg al g uardia n of J ason Sloan,

a disabled adult, who require d the use of a ventilator to brea the 24 hours a day
, and who require d pace maker s in both his lun gs and his hear t. Plaintiffs alleg ed that Sloan was reg istered in ComEd’s life support reg istry and that Sloan lost her elec trical power on Aug ust 23, 2007. Sloan connec ted her son to a temporary g ener ator and telephoned ComEd about the loss of power

. Plaintiffs alleg ed that the ComEd repr esentative was rude and dismiss ive. Moreove r, due to the power outag e, Sloan’s base me n t f lo o d e d
, c a using her back- up g ener ator to fail.

-3-¶ 9 Count I I Ifurther alleg ed that ComEd ref

used t o g ive any priority to restoring power to Sloan’s residenc e, ref

used any assistance to Sloan, and would not g ive Sloan an anticipated time that her power would be re s t o re d

. P laintiffs further alleg ed that ComEd, in brea ch of its duty of car e to plaintiff and its other customers on the life support reg istry
, failed to war n t hat in the event of an outag e, ComEd would not act to restore power to sustain their l i fe support sy stems. Plaintiffs soug ht a temporar y restra ining o rd er an d /or a preliminary injunction enjoining ComEd from ref using to respond on a priority b as i s t o immediately
restore power , and from ref using to offe r assistance to persons reg istered in their life support reg istry

. Count I V o f p l ai n t i ffs’ complaint soug ht a decla ratory judgme nt on behalf of the Sloan class. ¶ 10 ComEd t h er ea ft er filed a motion to dismiss the first amende d complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of

the Code of Civil Procedur e (the Code) (735 I L CS 5/ 2-615 (West 2006)). On November 8, 2007, the circ uit court dismiss ed counts I I I and I V of the fi rs t amende d complaint, and struck c ounts I and I I , with leave to r eplea d. ¶ 11 Plaintiffs filed their second amen d ed co m p l ai n t o n De ce m ber 6, 2007. The sec ond amende d complaint contained five counts. Count I alleg ed neg lige nce, claiming that ComEd had a duty to act as a rea sonably car eful public u t i l i ty to provide continuous power to plaintif fs an d the putative class members, to preve nt controllable interruptions or loss of
power , to provide adequate, eff icient, reliable
, just, rea sonable and environmentally safe service
, to promote the safe ty , health, comfort and convenie nce of its customers, and to proper ly maintain and publicize a life support re gi s try

. Plaintiffs alleg ed that ComEd wantonly , car elessly

and neg lige ntly acte d or failed to act in brea ch of its duties. Plaintiffs alleg ed that, as a result of ComEd’s neg lige nce, they sustained damag es in the form of spoile d fo od, water damag e to walls, furniture
, fix tures, appliance s, furna ce and water heate rs, medica l and elec trical e quipment, and re pair c osts. ¶ 12 Count I I of the second amende d complaint was broug ht under the Act, and ag ain soug ht

a t em p o ra ry restra ining order and/or a preliminary injunction enjoining ComEd from its “pra ctice and policy of unilatera lly settling claims and requiring the Plaintiffs and the Class members to sign a rele ase of all claims, demands and cause s of action with re s p ect to the
power outag e of Aug ust 23, 2007 and there afte r, as alleg ed here in.” Count I I I ag ain alleg ed

a brea ch of contra ct implied in law or fac t, and count I V soug ht an injunction, enjoining ComEd “from its prac tice of ref using to respond on a priority basis to immediately

restore power , ref

using to offe r assist ance to persons re gi s t ere d in their L ife S upport Reg istry
, or, minimally
, providing persons reg istered in their L ife Support Reg istry regular and fre quent updates a s to when it is anticipated that powe r will be re stored, if at all.” ¶ 13 Fi n al l y , count V of the second amende d complaint soug ht a decla rator y j u d gm en t d et er m i ning the rig hts of the parties “including without limit ation as to the propriety o f ComEd’s alleg ed ref

usal to respond on a priority basis to immediately (or otherwise) restore power , ref

usal to offe r assistance to persons reg istered in their L ife Support Reg istry
, failure
to provide persons reg istered in their L ife Support Reg istry reg ular and fre quent updates as to when it is anticipated that power will be restore d, if at all, publication of the L ife Support Reg istry
, and sharing of the L ife Support Reg istry with resc ue/emer g ency response authorities.” Plaintiffs also soug ht a decla ratory judgme nt conce rning ComEd’s obliga tions

-4-to repa ir and maintain power and related equipment, and to plan for and respond to outag es.

¶ 14 ComEd f

iled a motion to dismiss the second amende d complaint pursuant to se ction 2- 615. The circ uit court struck count s I
, I I and I I I of plaintiff’s second amende d complaint, with leave to reple ad. The circ uit court dismiss ed counts I V and V without leave to reple ad. ¶ 15 On Aug ust 4, 2008, plaintiffs filed their third amende d complaint, the complaint at issue in this case

. The third amende d complaint contained five counts. Count I alleg ed neg lige nce, count I I alleg ed a violation of the Act, count I I I alleg ed brea ch of contra ct implied in law/f ac t , count I V soug ht an injunction, and count V alleg ed a violation of the Consumer Fr aud and Dec eptive Business Practice s Act (Consumer Fr aud Act) (815 I L CS 505/1 et seq. (West 2006) ). The rele vant alleg ations of the third amende d complaint are discussed infra

. ¶ 16 ComEd moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ third amende d complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code. The circ uit court g rante d ComEd’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ third amende d complaint in its entirety with prejudice pursuant to section 2-615. The circ uit court stated that:
“what is actua lly at issue here is that what this lawsuit is about and what the plaintiffs’ theor

y of the c ase is is [ sic ] t hat they are actua lly seekingrelief based on
sy stematic defe cts in the provision of the elec trical service s or in the repa ir of those service s once an outag e occur s. And in the Court’s view, these are the ty pe of broadbased alleg ations and claims that can’ t survive as a matter of law. *** [T] he alleg ations at their core are very much like the alleg ations in the Lewis E. v. Spagnolo

case [ 1 86 I ll. 2d 198 (1999)]. *** The complaint is rea lly looking for relief that whether it’s char acte rized as damag es re l i ef o r there is a count for injunctive or decla ratory relief or an action under the Consumer Fr aud Act, the bottom line is that the plaintiffs’ alleg ations g o to the way Commonwealth E dison provides service s and th e ad equac y of its response when those service s fail for whateve r multit ude of

rea sons may exis t. I don’t think the law provides a relief for the kinds of claims that

are stated ***.” ¶ 17 I n aff

irming the circ uit court, the appellate court first ad d re s s ed the propriety of the circ uit court’s order dismiss ing the portions of plaintiffs’ complaint seeking injunctive relief

. The appellate court held that plaintiffs’ complaint clea rly soug ht an adjudication of ComEd’s level of service and its response to a power outag e when an outag e occur s. 399 I ll. App. 3d
at 66. The appellate court held that the injunctive relief reque sted by plaintiffs was proper ly addre ssed by the I llinois Commerce Commi ssion (the Commi ssion) and not the circ uit court. Id. at 67. Fur

ther, even if those claims wer e proper ly befor e the circ uit court, the circ uit court did n ot err in dismiss ing those claims pursuant to Lewis E. v. Spagnolo
, 186 I ll. 2d 198 (1999). As in Spagnolo
, plaintiffs’ reque sts for injuncti v e re l i ef soug ht to preve nt some unspecifie d injuries or damag es t o them that had not occur red an d might never occur. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 67. ¶ 18 Wit h reg ard to plaintiffs’ claims for leg al relief
, the appel late court held that the re lief
soug ht by plaintiffs implicated rate s, as those claims relat ed d i re ctl y to the Commi ssion’s
rate -setting functions for elec trical power service s. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 69. The appellate court conclude d that plainti ff

s ’ p ray er for relief perta ining to damag es was predic ated on

-5-alleg ations that ComEd was not providing adequate service under the Act. Id

. at 70. I f those

claims wer e allowed to proce ed in the circ uit court, the circ uit court would be place d in the posi t i on of assessing what constitutes adequate service and whether ComEd fulfilled its responsibility of providing adequate service s. Id

. Noting t h at it could aff irm the circ uit court’s dismiss al on any basis in the rec ord, the appellate court held that plaintiffs’ complaint

was proper ly dismiss ed beca use the circ uit court did not have jurisdiction of the complaint, which is a g round for

dismiss al under

section 2-619( a)( 1) of the Code

. ¶ 19 T h e ap p ellate court also held that plaintiffs’ claim for damag es was b ar re d b y t h e decision in In re Illino i s B el l Switching Station Liti gation
, 161 I ll. 2d 233 (1994). 399 I ll. App. 3d at 70. As in that c ase, the plaintiffs’ cla ims we re barr ed by ComEd’s ta riff, so that the circ uit court did not have jurisdiction over those claims. Id . at 73. ¶ 20 Finally
, the appellate court held that the circ uit court d i d n o t ab u se its discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to file a fourth amende d complaint. 399 I l l

. App. 3d at 76. The proposed fourth amende d complaint contained one count alleg i n g t h at ComEd violated section 16-125 of the Act (220 I L CS 5/16-125 (West 2006)). The appellate court found that jurisdiction over the damag e remedies under section 16-125 is in the C ommissi on and not the circ uit court. Id

.

¶ 21 ANAL YSI S ¶ 22 On appea l, plaintiffs challeng e the appellate court’s decision aff irming the circ uit court’s dismiss al of plaintiffs’ third amende d complaint and the circ uit court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a fourth amende d complaint

. Specifica lly
, plaintiffs argue that the appellate court err ed in fi nding that their claims for money damag es fell within the Commi ssion ’s j urisdiction. Plaintiffs also argue that the lower courts err ed in finding that their alleg ations conce rning the life support reg istry did not state a claim. Finally
, plaintiffs
argue that t h e circ uit court abused its discretion in denying them leave to file their fourth amende d complaint. Plaintiffs do not challeng e the dismissal of their c laims for injunctive relief

. ¶ 23 We first addre ss plaintiffs’ claim that the appellate court err ed in finding that plaintiffs’ third amende d complaint was proper ly dismiss ed beca use the ci rcuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ case

. This court revie ws decisions g ranting motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 de novo

. Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co.
, 221 I ll. 2d 558, 579 (2006). ¶ 24 Wit h reg ard to plain t i ff s ’ l ega l cl ai m s , t h e appellate court held that the portion of plaintiffs’ complaint seeking money damag es in essenc e allege d that ComEd’s level of service and restoration eff orts following a power outag e are substandard. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 69. The appellate court held that those claim s d i re ct l y related to the Commi ssion’s rate

setting functions for electric al power service s, fundame ntally alleg ing t h at C o m E d should provide it s customers a g reater level of service, which raised a reg ulatory question of how ComEd should rec over the costs of raising the level of service it provides. Id. The appellate
court conclude d that questions of how ComEd should eff ectuate an improvement in service and whether ComEd’s customers should pay more for th e elec trical service s provided by

-6-ComEd fell square ly within the Comm ission’s jurisdiction over rates. Id. ¶ 25 I n so holding, the appellate court noted that ComEd’s filed tariff specific ally stated “that when ‘ larg er, more , or diffe rent’ se rvice s or facilities are reque sted, the C ommissi on must deter mine whether the improvements would be ‘re asonably and technica lly fea sible’ without having a signific ant adver se impact on the reliability and eff icien cy o f ComEd’s overa ll
sy stem.” 399 I ll. App. 3d at 70 (quoting I ll. Com. Comm’n No

. 1 0
, Or i g. Sheet No. 20). Allowing plaintiffs’ claims to proce ed would place the circ uit court in the position of having
to deter mine what constitutes adequat e service
, as well as whether ComEd fulfilled its responsibilities of providing adequate service
, a deter mination within the Commi ssion’s jurisdiction pertaining to rates. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 70. ¶ 26 Finally
, the appellate court h eld that plaintiffs’ claims for damag es wer e barr ed by the decision in Illinois Bell Sw i t ch i n g Station
, 161 I ll. 2d 233, wher e the court held that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was barr ed by the defe ndant’s tariff

. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 70. The appellate
court found that, like the Illinois Bell S w itching Station case , the plaintiffs’ claims in this

case wer e barr ed by ComEd’ s t ariff, which limit ed ComEd’s liability for any failure to supply elec tricity , or for

interruption or re versa l of the supply of ele ctricity

. Id . at 73. ¶ 27 I n this court, plaintiffs argue t h at t h e l o we r co u rts have now held that virtually any challeng e to ComEd’s service s that result in damag es is automatically deeme d a cha lleng e to the way that ComEd does business, so that those claims must be adjudicate d by the Commi ssion. Plaintiffs maintain, howe v e r, that suits for compensatory damag es are proper ly broug ht in the circuit cour t. ¶ 28 As noted, in addition to finding that plaintiffs’ leg al claims fell within the Commiss ion’s jurisdiction over rate s, the appellate court also found that plaintiffs’ leg al claims wer e barr ed by ComEd’s tariff

. Setting uti lity rate s is a legislative function. People ex r el

. Ha r t i g a n v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n
, 117 I ll. 2d 120, 142 (1987). A tariff is a public document setting forth service s being offe red, the rate s and char g es with respe ct to service s, and the g overning rules, reg ulations, and practice s relating to those service s. Ada ms v. N o r t hern Illi nois Gas Co.
, 211 I ll. 2 d 3 2
, 55 (2004). Section 9-102 of the Act require s public utilit ies such as ComEd to file tariff

s with the Commi s s i o n

. 220 I L CS 5/9-102 (West 2006). Gene rally a tariff is draf

ted by the regulated utilit y , but when the tariff is duly filed with the Commi ssion, the tariff binds the utili ty

and the customer, and g overns their relationship. Adams , 211 I ll. 2d at 55. Once the Commi ssion approve s a tariff
, the tariff “ ‘is a law, not a contra ct, and has the fo rc e and eff

ect of a statute.’ ” Id. (quoting Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. v. Sankey Brothers, Inc. , 67 I ll. App. 3d 435, 439 (1978)). ¶ 29 Tarif

f provisi ons are usually ref err ed to as l iability

limit ations, which re flec t the status of public utilit ies as reg ulated monopolies whose operations ar e s u b j ect to extensive restric tions, the require ments of uniform, nondiscriminatory rate s, and the g oal of universal service
, achie ved throug h the pres ervation of utilit y price s that virtually all customers can aff ord. Adams , 211 I ll. 2d at 56-57. The theory underly ing liability limit ations is be cause a public utilit y is strictly regulated, its liability should be define d and limit ed so that it may be able to provide service at rea sonable rate s, and rea sonable rate s depend in part on a rule limit ing liability

. Id . at 57.

-7-¶ 30 As noted, in holdin g t h at p l ai n t i ff s ’ cl aims for damag es in this case wer e barr ed by ComEd’s tariff

, the appellate court found the decision in Illinois Bell Switching Station
, 161 I ll. 2d 233, controlling

. I n that case , a telephone switching station caug ht fire, and plaintiffs alleg ed that the fire was due to the neg lige nt or willful failure of I llinois Be ll to take fire
preve ntion measure s. As a result of the fire, many I llinois Be ll cu s t o m ers wer e without telephone service for approximately a m o n t h

. Consequently
, the customers filed a class action complaint seeking to rec over economic loss es i ncurr ed due to the l oss o f t el ep hone service
, pursuant to section 5-201 of the Act (220 I L CS 5/5-201 (West 1992)). I llinois Be ll
argued that its filed tariff define d the limit s of its liability for interruptions in service
, while the plaintiffs arg

ued that the tariff should not bar their claims beca use the tariff was ag ainst public policy and conflicte d with provisions of the Act. Illinois Bell Switching Station
, 161 I ll. 2d at 242-43. ¶ 31 I n reje cting the plaintiffs’ argument, the Illinois Be ll Switching Station court noted that I llinois Be ll’s tariff listed among its g ener al reg ulations a service interruption exclusion. The exclusion provided that:
“ ‘The liability of the Company for damag es arising out of mistakes, omissi ons, interruptions
, d el ay s, err ors or defe cts in transmission occur ring in the course of furnishing service *** shall in no event exceed an amount equivalent to the proportionate char g e to the customer for the period of service duri n g which such mi s take, omission, interruption, delay
, err or or defe ct in transmission occur s. No other liability shall in any case attach to the Company .’ I llinois Be ll Telephone Company Tarif

f, I llinois Commerce Commi ssion, No. 5, pt. 1, § 5, par. 3.1.” Illinois Bell Switching Stati on , 161 I ll. 2d at 242. ¶ 32 T h e p l ai n t i ff s ar gu ed t h at t h e t ar i ff ’s ex culpatory clause barr ing rec overy for
conseque ntial da

mag es due to inter

ruptions in se rvice was a g ainst public policy

. The court reje cted that c laim, noting that:
“B ell [was] nowher e char g ed with the duty to provide co m pletely uninterrupted service

. Rather, it is required t o p ro v ide ‘ser vice and fac iliti es which are in all
respe cts adequa

te, eff icient, reliable and environmenta lly safe and which *** constitute the l ea s t -cost means of meeting the utilit y ’s service obliga tions.’ (220 I L CS 5/8-401 (West 1992).) Adequate, eff icient and rel i ab l e service is not tantamount to infallible service

. Tempora ry disruptions may occur without reduc ing Be ll’s service to a leve l less than adequate, eff icient or reliable

. Thus, the tariff ’s provision which limit s Be ll’s liability in the event such a disruption in service occur s is not contrary

to the Act or the rules.” Id . at 243-44. There fore
, the Illinois Bell Switching Station court h el d t h at the exculpatory lang uag e in I llinois Be ll’s tariff proper ly limit ed claims from disruption of service to a rebate of the costs for the missed service
, and was not in contravention of the Act, the rules of the Commi ssion,
or ag ainst public policy

. Id . at 244. ¶ 33 I n this case , the appellate court noted that at the time of the Aug ust 2007 storms at issue, ComEd’s tariff on f

ile with the Commi ssion provided, inter alia , that: “The Company [C omEd] shall not be responsible in damages fo r an y failure to

-8-supply or deliver elec tricity
, or for interruption, or reve rsal of the supply or delivery
, if such failure
, interruption, or reve rsal is without willful defa ult or neg lige nce on its part, nor for interruptions, by underf reque ncy rela

y s or o t h er wise, to prese rve the integ rity of the Company ’s sy stem or interc onnecte d sy stems. The Cus tomer wil l be entitl ed to a reduction in char g es for service equal to the Monthly Customer Charg e for any billing month in which service to the customer is interrupted for a period of 12 consec utive hours or more due to any of the following conditions: (i) Company equipment malfunctio n n ot cause d by weather; (ii) Commonwealth Edison employ ee or its contra ctor err or; (i i i ) acc ident involving Commonwealth Edition employ ee or its contra ctor; (iv) damag e to company equipment cause d by Commonwealth Edison employ ee or its contra cto r; o r (v) overloa ded C ompany distribution equipment not caused by Customer neg lige nce.” I ll. Com . Comm’n No. 4, 10th Revised Sheet No. 56. ¶ 34 Ba sed upon Illinois Bell Switching Station and the above tariff
, the appellate court in this

case held that plaintiffs’ claims wer e barr ed by the tariff

. We ag ree

. L ike the telephone utilit y in Illinois Be ll Switching Station
, ComEd also is r equire d to pr ovide “ser vice and fac iliti es which are in all respe cts adequate, eff icient, reliable and environmental l y s af e and which, consisten t wi t h these obliga tions, constitute the least-c ost means of meeting the utilit y ’s service obligations.” 220 I L CS 5/8-401 (West 2006). As Illinois Bell S witching Station

rec og nized, adequa

te, eff icient and reliable service is not tantamount t o infallible service

. Thus, temporar

y disruptions may occur without re du cing ComEd’s service to a level less than ade quate, e fficie nt or reliable

. ¶ 35 Fur

ther, I llinois courts have rec og nized that wher e a utilit y tariff speaks to a specific duty
, the tariff may be controlling
, but wher e the tariff does not addre ss a particula r situation, the

common law applies a

nd a common law duty

analy sis must be applied. Adams
, 211 I ll. 2d
at 60-61. Her e, ComEd’s tariff speaks to its duty to supply elec tricity
, specific ally providing
t h at C o m Ed shall not be responsible in damag es for any failure to supply elec tricity or for interru p t i o n i f the failure
, interruption or reve rsal is without willful defa ult or neg lige nce. The tariff further states that a customer will be entitled to a reduc tion in char g es if his service is interrupted for a period of 12 consec utive h o u rs or more if ComEd’s equipment malfunction was not cause d by the weather. Be cause the tariff speaks to power interruptions and fa ilure, and e quipment malfunction, the tarif f controls. ¶ 36 At oral argument, howeve r, plaintiffs’ counsel argued that t h e t ariff does not apply to plaintiffs’ neg lige nce c laims, as the tariff specific ally states that its liabili ty is lim ited only i f t h e failure or interruption is without willful defa ult or neg lige nce. Plaintiffs’ couns el
ag ree d that willful defa

ult was not at i ssue, as the complaint did not alleg e will ful d ef ault. I t is clea r, howeve r, that even though cou ched in terms of neg lige nce, the basis for the entirety of plaintiffs’ complaint, incl u d in g th e n e g lige nce claim, is an equipment malfunction causing a power outag e that was prec ipitated by the weather. Plaintiffs’ complaint contains the following fac tual alleg ations:

“1. *** [O] n or about Aug ust 23, 2007 and there afte r, COMED failed to provide, and to timely restore power to Plaintiffs and o t h er customers in I llinois including

-9-Cook County ; in total, on inform a ti on and belief more than 30,000 ComEd customers in I llinois , including Plaintiffs, in the wa ke of the Aug ust 2007 storm ***;
* * *
7. On or about Aug ust 23, 2007, a storm–which was, incidentally
, rea sonably predic table and foreseea

ble–af fec ted parts of I llinois including Cook County and those parts whe re Plaintiffs re side.
* * *
12. The storms of Aug ust 2007 prec ipitated an interruption of power in excess of 30,000 ComEd customers, including Plaintiffs[ ,] and ComEd did not restore their
power within 24 hours.
* * *
30. Plaintiff Resnick was without power for sever al day s following the August 23, 2007 Chicag o are a storm where, i n Wil mette, I llinois literally dozens of inadequately

maintained powe r lines wer e dama g ed ***.” ¶ 37 I n addition, plaintiffs define the putative class as “Any and all p er s o n s an d en t i t i es located in the State of I llinois
, that suffe red damag es as a result of elec tric power outag es or interruptions from August 23, 2007 through the date of judgme nt.” ¶ 38 The tariff specific ally exempts from damag e claims equipment malfunctions cause d by

weather. As noted, althoug h plaintiffs attempt to state a claim for neg lige nce, their claims are entirely based upon equipment malfunctions cause d by weat h er

. Beca use plaintiffs’ complaint implicates the provision of ComEd’s tariff
, the tariff controls acc ording to its
terms and bars plaintiffs’ third amende d complaint. There fore
, the appellate court proper ly aff irmed the dismissal of that complaint with prejudice

. ¶ 39 Even assuming, arguendo
, that plaintiffs’ neg lige nce claim was not barr ed by ComEd’s tariff
, the appellate court corr ectly held that the claim was p ro perly dismiss ed beca use jurisdiction of the complaint lies in the Commi ssion and not the circ uit court. ¶ 40 Our deter

mination of whether the appellate court proper ly held that the Commi ssion had jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ third amende d complaint require s an examination of the role of the Commi ssion with reg ard to public utilit ies. The Commi ssion exis ts to maintain a balanc e betwee n the rate s char g ed by utilit ies and the service s perf ormed. Village of A

pple River v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n
, 18 I ll. 2d 518, 523 (1960). I t has long been rec og nized that “in
matters relating to service s and rate s of utilit ies technica l data and expert opinion, as well as complex technolog ical and scientific data, make it essential that the matter be considere d by

a tribunal that is itself cap ab l e o f p assi ng upon complex data.” Id. The Commi ssion is to deter mine that a utilit y ’s rate s are just and rea sonable and that its ser vices are adequate. Id. Thus, the l eg islature has gi v en t h e C ommissi on broad powers, so that the C ommissi on on its own initiative can promulg ate order s, rules or regulat i o n s fi x i ng adequate service standards a

nd requiring

adequate fa cilities. Id. ¶ 41 The Com mission’s exclusive jurisdiction over rates i s s et fo rth in section 9-252 of the Act, which pr ovides:
“When complaint is made to the Commi ssion conce rning any rate or other char g e of

-10-any public utilit y and the Commi ssion finds, afte r a hear ing, that the public utilit y has char g ed an excessive or unjustly discriminatory amount for its product, commodity

or service
, the Commi ssion may order that the public utilit y make due repa ration to the complainant ther efor , with interest at the leg al ra te from the date of

pay ment of such excessive or unjustly discriminatory

amount.

***
All c omplaints for the re cover y of dama g es shall be f

iled with the Commi ssion within 2 y ear s from the time t h e produce
, commodity or service as to which complaint is made was furnished or perf ormed, and a petition for the enfor ceme nt of

an order of the Commi ssion for the pay ment o f m o n ey shall be filed in the proper court within one y ear from the date of the o rd er ***.” 220 I L CS 5/9-252 (West 2006).
I t has long been rec og nized t h at t h e “evide nt intent and purpose of the leg islature in providing a method by which repa ration may be rec overe d and in requiring that an application there for shall be first made to the commission, prec ludes an action at law for such
repa ration until the commission has hear d a claim there for.” Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis v. Public Utilities Comm’n , 304 I ll. 312, 317 (1922). ¶ 42 As the appellate court noted, if a cl ai m i s fo r re p ar at i o n s , j urisdiction is in the Commi ssion, while jurisdiction of an action for civil damag es lies in the circ uit court. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 68. Our appellate court has explained that a claim is for repa rations when the

essenc e of the claim is that a utilit y has char g ed too much for a service
, while a claim is for civil damag es when the essenc e of the complaint is that the utilit y has done something else to wrong the plaintiff. Flournoy v. Am eritech , 351 I ll. App. 3d 583, 585 (2004). ¶ 43 I n contra st to the Commi ssion’s j u ri s d i ct i o n , t h e jurisdiction of the circ uit courts for violations of the Act is set forth in sec tion 5-201 of the Ac t, which states that:
“In case any public utilit y shall d o , cause to be done or permit to be done any act, matter or thing prohibited, forbidden or decla red to be unlawful, or shall omit to do
any act, matter or thing require d to be done either by any provisions of this Act or any rule, reg ulation, order or decision of the Commi ssion, issued under authority of this Act, the public utilit y shall be liable to the persons or corpor ations aff ecte d there by for all loss, damag es or injury cause d there by or resulting there from, and if the court shall find that the act or omission was wilful, the court may in addition to the actua l damag es, awa

rd damag es for the sake of example and by the way of punishment. An action to rec over for such loss, damag e or injury may be broug ht in the circ uit court by any person or corpor ation.” 220 I L CS 5/ 5-201 (West 2006). ¶ 44 Plaintiffs char acte rize their complaint as a suit for compensatory d a ma g e s that is properly broug ht in the circ uit court pursuant to section 5-201. Plaintiffs point to the damag es alleg ed in their complaint, that plaintiffs and putative class members suffe red persona l injury
, proper ty damag e and f

inancial da

mag es, includingthe loss of use of pr operty , and costs of
repa ir and repla ceme nt of proper ty

. Plaintiffs alleg ed that plaintiffs Resnick and Sheffler suffe red damag e to the ir baseme nt a nd persona l pr operty , house, appliance s, and food, had
to seek alternative living arr ang ements, and had to hire some o n e t o repa ir the damag e.

-11-Consequently
, plaintiffs contend that their clai m s seeking leg al damag es wer e proper ly

befor e the c ircuit court pur suant to section 5-201. ¶ 45 I n support, plaintiffs note that in a simil ar c ase, Village of Deerfield v. Comm onwealth Edison Co. , 399 I ll. App. 3d 84, 89 (2009), the A ppellate Court, Second D istrict, held that the circ uit court did have jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s c laims beca use t he complaint did
not alleg e excessive or discriminatory rate s, but rathe r alleg ed defic ien t p erformanc e by ComEd, which the plaintiff a ttacked thr oug h a number of theorie s, including contrac t, tort and violation of the Public Utiliti es Ac t. ¶ 46 At issue in the Village of Dee rfield case wer e tw o co u n t s o f the plaintiff Villag e of Dee rfield’ s complaint ag ainst ComEd: count I
, titled “B rea ch of C o ntrac t,” which alleg ed that chronic elec trical outag es occur red within the village as a result of various brea ches of C o m Ed’s duties under a fra nchise ag ree ment; and count I I I
, titled “Civil Damag es for Violation of Public Utiliti es Act
, ” wh i ch alleg ed the exis tence of a statutory duty and a willful violat i on of that duty

. Id

. at 85. Count I I I soug ht class cer tification for all ComEd
customers in the village
, and alleg ed that potential class customers suffe red damag es “such

as ‘spoiled food, purcha se of elec tric g ener ators to deal with [C omEd’s] unreliable service
, proper ty damag e, temporar

y housing, [and] extra municipal and policing service s.’ ” Id . at 85-86. ¶ 47 Th e ci rc u i t co u rt i n V i l l a g e o f Dee rfield dismiss ed the plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice
, finding that the Commi ssion had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, and that the third count of plaintiff’s complaint wa s b ar re d by Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. , 91 I ll. 2d 69 (1982). Village of Deerfield , 399 I ll. App. 3d at 86. ¶ 48 Upon review, t he appellate court noted t hat the question of jurisdiction g ener ally turns

on the nature of the relief sough t , s o i f a p laintiff seeks ordinary civil damag es, the court sy stem has subject matter jurisdiction. Id

. at 89. I n contra st, the Commi ssion has exclusive jurisdiction over claims that rate s are excessive or discriminatory

. Id

. at 87. Th e ap pellate
court held that the circ uit court did have jurisdiction over t h e Vi l l ag e of Dee rfield’ s complaint, as the complaint did not alleg e excessive or discriminatory rate s, but rathe r alleg ed defic ient perf

ormanc e by ComEd. Id

. at 89. The court hel d
, h o we v er, that even though the circ uit court had orig inal jurisdiction of the plaintiff’s compla int, the Commi ssion had primar

y jurisdiction. Id . at 93. Ther efor e, the appe llate cour t held that the circ uit court should stay further proce eding s, while reta ining jurisdiction, so that the Commi ssion could consider the case

. Id. ¶ 49 I n a supplemental opinion issued upon denial of rehe aring
, the Village of Dee rfield court acknow ledg ed the appellate court’s decision in this case, but stated that it did not find the appellate court’s opinion persua sive. Id. at 98. The court also questioned whethe r t he leg islature could remove from the circ uit court’s jurisdiction common law tort and contra ct claims ag ainst ComEd, even if cast as a claim for repa rations under the Act. Id

. The appellate
court in this case likewise decli n ed to follow the court’s analy sis in Village of Dee rfield
, reiter ating it s fi n d i ng that the complaint befor e it implicated rate s, which is within the Commi ssion’s jurisdiction. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 77. ¶ 50 As both the appellate court in this case and the Village of Dee rfield courts re cog nized,

-12-courts focus on the nature of the relief soug ht ra t h er t h an the basis for seeking relief in

deter mining whether an action falls within the jurisdiction of the Commi ssion. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 68; Village of

Dee rfield
, 399 I ll. App. 3d at 89. The appellate court in this case held that the relief soug ht by plaintiffs was predic ated on alleg ations that ComEd was not pr oviding adequate service under the Act. We ag ree

. Al t h oug h plaintiffs point to their reque st for damag es as evincing the fac t that their complaint falls outside the Commi ssion’s jurisdiction, it is cle ar t h at t h e relief soug ht by plaintiffs g oes direc tly to ComEd’s service and infrastruc ture, whic h is within t he Commissi on’s orig inal jurisdiction. ¶ 51 W i t h re gard to duty
, plaintiffs’ neg lige nce claim alleg ed that ComEd had a du t y t o : “timely restore power (e.g

. within 24 hours); to preve nt controllable interruptions of power ; to provide adequate, eff

icient, reliable
, just, rea sonable, and environmenta lly safe service ; to promote t h e s af

et y , health, comfort and convenie nce of its customers; and to proper ly maintain, rec ord and publicize a L ife Support Reg istry .” ¶ 52 Plaintiffs then alleg e that ComEd brea ched its duty when it neg lige ntly acte d or failed to act in that it: “(a ) failed to timely restore power to Plaintiffs and Class members homes; (b) failed
to preve nt controllable interruptio n s o f p o wer to Plaintiffs and the members of the Class; (c) failed to provide adequat e wa rn i ng to Plaintiffs and the members of the Class prior to the power outag e; (d) fai l ed t o i mmediately and adequately prepa re and/or maintain its fac iliti es, personne l and back- up elec tric companies so as to preve nt co ntrollable interruptions of power and timely restore power ; (e) failed to proper ly repa ir and maintain power i nfra structure (e.g
., lines and equipment

connec ted to eac h of Plai ntiffs’ residenc es); (f) failed to implement an adequate company -wide manpower planning proce ss f o r o uta g e s a

n d r e p a ir
, d e s p it e k

n o w le d g e of potential for storms on a par with that of August 2007; (g ) fail ed to adequately maintain sy stem g rowth and ref urbishment of power equipment; (h) failed to provide adequate, eff

icient, reliabl e , a

n d e nv ir o nme n ta ll y s a f

e service s and fac iliti es; (i) failed
to promote safe ty , health, comfort and convenie nce of its patrons, customers, and the public; and (j) failed to proper ly
, adequately and timely restore power for persons in the L ife Support Reg istry
, and, moreove r, failed to g ive priority to such persons including Plaintiffs De bra a nd J ason Sloan.” ¶ 53 Thus, as t h e ap p el l at e co u rt h el d
, t h e nature of the relief soug ht by plaintiffs is
compen s ati on for ComEd’s alleg edly inadequa te service
, which direc tly relates to the Commi ssion’s rate -setting functions for elec trical power service s. That rate s and service are inext rica bly tied toge ther was rec og nized more than 50 y ear s ag o in Village of Apple River
, 18 I ll. 2d at 523, when the court found that the Commi ssion exis ts to maintain a balanc e betwee n the rate s char g ed by utilit ies and the service s perf ormed. The Village of

Apple River
court observe d that it is e ssential that the Commi ssion c onsider matters relating to service s and rate s of utilit ies, g iven the complex data underly ing those matters. Id

. The court there fore held that the Commi ssion is to deter mine that a utilit y ’s rate s are just and rea sonable and that its service s are adequa

te. Id

. As the appellate court in t his case rec og nized, allowing plaintiffs’ claims to proce ed in the circ uit court would place the circ uit court in the position of ass essi ng what constitutes adequate service
, and whether ComEd has fulfilled its

-13-responsibility of providing adequate servic e. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 70. ¶ 54 As indicated, howeve r, there is tension betwee n the decision in this case and the Village of Dee rfield decision. The Village of Dee rfield court narr owly interpre ted re p arations as limit ed to claims of excessive or discriminatory rate s, ultimately concluding that the plaintiff’s complaint in that case did not alleg e excessive or discriminatory rate s, but rathe r defic ient perf

ormanc e by ComEd. V

illage of Dee rfield
, 399 I ll. App. 3d at 89. The court there fore held that the relief soug ht was not repa rations for an illega l rate , so that the circ uit court ha d jurisdiction of the plaintiffs’ c omplaint. ¶ 55 Neither party in Village of Dee rfield filed an appea l from that decision, and the dec ision does not set fort h i n detail t he specific allega tions of t he plainti ffs’ complaint in that case

. T h erefore we will not addre ss the appellate court’s ultimate conclusion t hat t he Vill ag e of De er field’s complaint did not seek repa rations. Howeve r, we find that the Village of D e e r fie ld court err ed in narr owly interpre ting repa rations as excluding any claims c o n c e r n in g service

. As was held in the Village of Apple River decision, the Commi ssion “is to deter mine that the rate s are just and rea sonable and that the service s are adequate.” Village of Apple River
, 18 I l l

. 2 d at 523. Consequently
, complaints conce rning the adequa cy of ComEd’s service s fall within the jurisdiction of the Commi ssion and fall within the rubric of “re parations.” ¶ 56 To the ex t en t t h at t h e V i llage of Dee rfield decision stands for the proposition that a challeng e to the adequa cy of ComEd’s service can never be considere d repa rations, we

overr ule that portion of the decision. Where, as in this case , a plaintiff’s complaint is based
upon alleg ations conce rning ComEd’s infrastruc ture and its provision of elec trical service s, and seeks relief based upon sy stemic defe cts in the provision of elec trical service s or the
repa ir of t hose se rv ices when a power out ag e occurs, that complaint seeks repar ations and is within t he exclusive jurisdiction of the Commiss ion. ¶ 57 Plaintiffs next argue that the lower courts err ed in dismiss ing their claims conce rning the life support re gi s t ry wi th prejudice
, asser ting that they have stated a claim pursuant to the Consumer Fr aud Act. The life support reg istry is se t f orth in section 8-204 of the Act. That section provides:
“Eve ry public utilit y company which furnishes elec tricity to residential cu stomers shall (a) maintain a reg istry of those individuals who are depende nt on an elec trically
operated respirator, dialy sis machine or any other e lectric ally

operated l ife-suppor

t equipment ***.” 220 I L CS 5/ 8-204 (West 2006). ¶ 58 Plaintiffs alleg ed that ComEd:

“fa iled to g ive priority to re s t o re power of persons signe d-up in its L ife Support Reg istry despite the fac t that ComEd has conce ded that the first priority in restoring
power is life safe ty

. *** ComEd, while collecting Plaintiff Sloan’s name for the L ife Support Reg istry
, did nothing to p rot ect his interests or those of the L ife Support Reg istry Class, in that it eff ectively treated them, e.g ., in the wake of the Aug ust 23, 2007 power outag e, in materia lly the same manner as any other ComEd customer in the eve nt of an outag e or othe rwise.” ¶ 59 Plaintiffs’ Consumer Fr aud Act claim alleg ed that ComEd knew or should have known

-14-that it fail ed to sufficie ntly establish policies and proce dures to preve nt controllable

interruptions of power and to timely respond to those int er ru p t i o n s , in order to protec t the health, safe ty , comfort and convenie nce of its customers, including those on the life support reg istry . Plaintiffs claimed that ComEd’s conduct was unfair in violation of the Consum er Fr aud Act beca

use ComEd’s conduct “off ends public policy
, is immora l
, u n et hical, oppressive, unjust, unconsciona ble and unscrupulous, violates public poli cy

. ” P laintiffs further alleg ed that as a direc t result of its unscrupulous conduct, ComEd “has cause d Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ residenc es to sustain damag e due to ComEd’s failure to preve nt controllable interruption of power , tim el y restore power to their residenc es (and businesses), and/or restore power L ife Support R egi s try customers in priority fashion.” Plaintiffs asser t that rathe r t han invest in adequate resource s to perf orm its duties, ComEd enric hed its principals and ma nag ers. ¶ 60 I n aff

irming the dismiss al of plaintiffs’ third amende d complaint, the appellate court did
not specific ally addre ss plaintiffs’ C o nsumer Fr aud Act claims. I n this court, plaintiffs

co n t en d that they stated a claim that the failure to restore power to life support regi s t ry customers cause d damag es to the Sloan plaintiffs in violation of public policy and the Consumer Fr aud Act. Plaintiffs argue that a prac tice can offe nd public policy in violation of the Consumer Fr aud Act if the prac tice violates a standard of con d u ct s et o u t by exis ting
statute or co m m o n law doctrine. Plaintiffs claim t hat by knowing ly failing to g ive priority to customers in its life support reg istry “in death-threatening situations,” ComEd brea ched its duties under section 8-101 o f t h e Act to promote the safe ty , health, comfort and convenie nce of

its patrons. ¶ 61 T h e circ uit court dismiss ed plaintiffs’ complaint, including its Consumer Fr au d Ac t claim, pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code. A section 2-615 motion to dismiss challeng es the l eg al s ufficie ncy of a complaint, and allege s only defe ct s o n the face of the complaint. Board of Directors of Bloomfield Club Rec reation Ass’n v. The Hoffman Group, Inc. , 186 I ll. 2d 419, 423 (1999). The critica l inquiry in deciding a section 2-615 motion to dismiss is whether the alleg ations of the complaint, considere d in a light most favor able to the plaintiff,

are sufficie nt to state a cause of action upon which relief can be g rante d. Id

. at 424. A cause of action will be dismiss ed on the pleading s only if it clea rly appea rs that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of fac ts that will entitle it to relief

. Id

. This court revie ws a circ uit court’s ruling

on a sec tion 2-615 motion t o dismiss de novo

. Id

. ¶ 62 The e lements of a c laim under the Consumer F raud A ct ar e:

“(1) a dec eptive ac t or prac tice by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intent that the plainti ff rely on the dece ption; and (3) the occur renc e of the dece ption during a

course of conduct involving trade or commerc e.” Robinson v

. Toyota M otor Credit Corp. , 201 I ll. 2d 403, 417 (2002).
Recove ry may be had for unfair as w ell as dec eptive conduct. Id

. In measuring unfairne ss, courts consi der “(1) whether the prac tice offe nds public policy ; (2) whether it is immoral, unethi ca l
, o p pressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it cause s substantial injury to consumers.” Id . at 417-18. ¶ 63 Al t h o u gh p l ai n t i ff s u s e t h e wo rd s “i m m oral, uneth i ca l
, o p p re s s i v e, u n j u s t ,

-15-unconsciona ble and unscrupulous” to descr ibe ComEd’s conduct, plai n t i ff s have not and
cannot alleg e a dece ptive act or prac tice, or unfair conduct, by ComEd. Plaintiffs argue that they have alleg ed unfairne ss beca use ComEd’s prac tices offe nd public policy

. Specifica lly
, plaintiffs argue that ComEd wa s obligated pursuant to se ction 8-101 of the Act to promote the safe ty and health of its patrons per the public policy of the state and, presumably
, violated that obligation in failing to g ive restoration priority to customers in the life support reg istry

. ¶ 64 There is no merit to this claim. Section 8-101 provides that a public utilit y “shall fur nish, provide, and maintain such service instrumentalities, equipment, and fac iliti es as shall promote the saf

ety , health, comf

ort, and convenie nce of its patrons, employ ees, and public and as shall b e i n all respe cts adequate, efficient, jus t, and reasonable .” 220 I L CS 5/8-101 (West 2006). This broad public policy
, howeve r, does not impose a duty on ComEd to assig n priority in power restora

tion to those listed on the life support reg istry

. I ndeed, even section 8-204 of the Act, which conce rns the life support reg istry
, does not require ComEd to use the
reg istry to assig n priority to households on the reg istry i n i t s p ower restoration eff orts. Plaintiffs do not alleg e any specific public policy requiring ComEd to g ive priority to life support reg istry

households in restoring power

. ¶ 65 As an aside, we note that the rec ord in this case details the difficulty in requiring ComEd
to assig n priority to life support reg istry households. I n response to the plaintiffs’ petition for a temporary restra ining order o r a preliminary injunction, ComEd submitt ed the aff idavits of Timothy McGuire and Phy llis Batson. McGuire ’s aff idavit s t at ed t h at he is the vice president of Construction and Maintenanc e for ComEd. McGuire testified that ComEd prioritizes restoration with the highe st priorities for restoration g oing to critica l instit utions such as hospitals, police and fire depar tments, and u rge n t ca re center s, followed by senior citizen fac iliti es and high rise buildings. McGuire also testified that basing power restoration

on the life support reg istry would be ineffic ient and dang erous, as ComEd would be require d to identify

the needs of m any isolated individual customers across a very larg e g eog raphic

are a. ¶ 66 Phy llis Ba

tson, the vice president of Customer Contact for ComEd, testified that ComEd

uses the life support reg istry to identify customers who ar e o n life support sy stems befor e their elec trical service s are disconnec ted for nonpay ment, to fore war

n the customers of possible planned power interruptions, and to help local emer g ency service s identify those on life support sy stems. As of Jul y 2007, there wer e approx imately 4,900 persons throughout ComEd’s service are a who we re listed on the life support reg istry

. ¶ 67 Plaintiffs’ Consumer Fr aud Act claim fails for the additional rea son that plaintiffs cannot alleg e that ComEd intended that plaintiffs rely on its purportedly unfair conduct in not g iving

re s t o ra t ion priority to those on its life support reg istry

. I n fac t, it is clea r from plaintiffs ’ complaint that ComEd specific ally notifie d plaintiff Sloan that her prese nce on the life support reg istry did not g ive her priority in restoration service s. Attached as exhibi t A to p l aintiffs’ first amende d complaint, which was incorporated by ref ere nce into the t h i rd amende d compl ai nt, is a J une 14, 2007, letter from ComEd to Debbie Sloan notify ing her that the addition of her acc ount to the life support reg istry “Doe s not g uara ntee uninterrupted elec tric service ” and “Doe s not provide priority restoration of y our elec tric service when an interruption occur s.” Consequently
, plaintiffs cannot alleg e that ComEd intended plaintiffs

-16-to r ely on an alleg ed public policy to g ive power restoration pr iority to life support reg istry

households. ¶ 68 Plaintiffs cannot state a claim ag ainst ComEd for violation of the Consumer Fr aud Act. Acc ording ly
, we find that the appellate court proper ly aff irmed the circ uit court’s dismiss al of the Consumer F raud A ct claim with pre judice. ¶ 69 Finally
, plaintiffs argue that the lower co u rt s er re d i n denying them leave to file their fourth amende d complaint. The decision to g rant a motion to amend pleading s is within the discretion o f t h e ci rcuit court, and a revie wing court will not reve rse the circ uit court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. Board of Directors of

Bloomfield Club
, 186 I ll. 2d at 432. This court applies four fac tors in deter mining whether the circ uit court proper ly denied

a party ’s motion to amend. This court considers whether : (1) the proposed amendment would

cure the defe ctive pleading ; (2) the proposed amendment would surprise o r p re j u dice the opposing party ; (3) the proposed amendment was timely filed; and (4) the moving party had previous opportunities to amend. Id

. ¶ 70 Plaintiffs’ proposed fourth amende d class action complaint contained one count alleg ing

a v iolation of section 16-125 of the Act (220 I L CS 5/16-125 (West 2006)). T h e fo u rt h amende d complaint soug ht damag es pursua nt to sections 16-125(e) and (f ) of the A ct. ¶ 71 The circ uit court held that the leg islature intended the Commi ssion to have jurisdiction of claims under section 16-125. The appellate court ag ree d, holding that “[ o ] u r re v i ew of section 16-125 of the Act leads us to the conclusion that the l egi s l ature intended for the Commi ssion to have jurisdiction over the damag es reme dies under the section.” 399 I ll. App. 3d at 75. ¶ 72 Section 16-125 provides, in pe rtinent part:

“(e ) I n the event that more than 30,000 cu s t o m ers of an elec tric utilit y are subjected to a continuous power interruption of 4 hours o r m o re that results in the transmission of power at less than 50% of the standard voltag e, or that results in the total loss of power transmission, the uti l i t y shall be responsible for compensating
customers aff

ecte d by that interruption for 4 hours or more for all actua l d amage s, which shall not include conseque ntial damag es, suffe red as a re s u l t o f the power interruption. *** A waiver of the require ments of this subsection may be g rante d by the Commi ssion in instances in which the utilit y can show that the power interruption

was a result of a

ny one or more of the following cause s: (1) Unpr eventa

ble damag e due to we ather events or c onditions.
* * * (f) I n the event of a power surg e or other fluctuati o n t h at cause s damag e and aff ects more than 30,000 customers, the elec tric utilit y shall pay to aff ected
customers the repla ceme nt value of all g oods damag ed as a result of the power surg e

o r o t h er fl uctuation unless the utilit y can show that the power surg e or oth er fluctuation wa s due to one or mor e of the following cause s: (1) Unpr eventa

ble damag e due to we ather events or c onditions.
* * *

-17-(h) Remedies provided for under this Section may be soug ht exclusively throug h the I llinois Commerce Commi ssion as provid ed u nder Section 10-109 of this Act. *** (i) The provisions of this Sec tion shall not in any way diminis h or repla ce other civil or administrative reme dies available to a customer or a class of customers.” 220 I L CS 5/ 16-125 (West 2006). ¶ 73 The appellate court noted that section 16-125(h) of the Act vests juris d i ct i o n i n t h e Commi ssion for actions seeking damag e reme dies under section 16-125. 399 I ll. App. 3d at 75. Acc ording ly
, beca

use the Commi ssion has j u ri sdiction over the damag es reme dies provided in section 16-125, the circ uit court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint to seek damag es pursuant to section 16-125 of the Act. Id

. at 76. ¶ 74 On appea l, plaintiffs argue that the appellate court err ed in failing to rea d subsection (i) of section 16-125 along with subsection (h). Plaintiffs claim that subsection (i), which states that the provisions of section 16-125 “shall not in any way diminis h or repla ce other civil or administrative reme dies available ,” rea d with subsection (h), which provides that reme dies under section 16-125 “may be soug ht exclusively throug h” the Commi ssion, establishes that

a consumer may p u rsue section 16-125 relief throug h the Commi ssion in addition to the circ uit court. Plaintiffs rea d “may” in subsection (h) as allowing a consumer to bring his section 16-125 c laim either be fore the Commiss ion or the circ uit court. ¶ 75 We disag ree with p l aint iffs’ interpre tation of section 16-125. I t is well settled that the primary objective in construing a s t at u t e is to asce rtain and g ive eff ect to the intent of the leg islature. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc

. , 238 I ll. 2d 455, 461 (2010). The plain lang uag e of the statute is the most reliable indication of leg islative intent, and when the lang uag e of the statute is clea r, it should be applied as written without resor t to aids

or tools of interpre tation. Id

. This court will not depar t from the plain lang uag e of the statute by re a ding into it exceptions, limit ations or conditions that conflict with the leg islative intent. Id

. ¶ 76 Her e, the meaning of section 16-125 could not be more clea r. Subsection (h) pr ovides
t h at an y re m edies soug ht under section 16-125 are to be broug ht exclusively throug h the Commi ssion. Subsection (i) mere ly provides that if a customer has s ome other cause of action ag ainst ComEd, the filing of a claim pursuant to section 16-125 does not prec lude that

cause of ac tion. ¶ 77 As C omEd argues, t he word “may” in subsection (h) mere ly provides a customer with
t h e option of bring ing a claim if he chooses, but does not forc e him to b ri n g a cl ai m

. Apply ing plaintiffs’ construction of the word “may” in subsection (h) as providing that a customer can bring a claim befor e the Commi ssion or befor e the circ uit court would rende r the word “ex clusively ” in subsection (h) superf luous. A statute should be construed, if possible, so that no word is rende red meaning less or superf luous. Kean v. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc.
, 235 I ll. 2d 351, 368 (2009). Fur ther, as ComEd notes, plaintiffs’ con s t ru ct i o n of subsection (h) would lead to an absurd result by providing that a person may seek a reme dy under section 16-125 either befor e the Commi ssion or the circ uit court, but if he chooses to

-18-seek his reme dy befor e the Commi ssion, he may only do so exclusively at the Commi ssion.

A court construing the lang uag e of the statute will assume that the leg islature did not intend
to produce an absurd or unjust result. Hubble v. Bi-State Dev elopment Agenc y of the IllinoisMissouri Distri ct , 238 I ll. 2d 262, 283 (2010). ¶ 78 As the lower

courts found, r emedies soug ht pursuant to section 16-125 must be soug ht

e xc lu s iv e ly thr oug h the Commi ssion. Consequently
, the circ uit court had no jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ proposed fourth amende d complaint and, there for e, the proposed amendment would not cure the defe ctive pleading

. The appellate court thus corr ectly held that the circ uit
court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to file a fourth amende d complaint seekingdamag es under section 16-125 of

the Act.

¶ 79 CONCL USI ON ¶ 80 For

all of the for eg oing r easons, we aff irm the dec ision of the appellate court.

¶ 81 Appellate c ourt judg ment aff irmed.

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