In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1318

JOSEPH E. CORCORAN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RON NEAL, Superintendent,*

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:05-CV-389 JD — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge. 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 5, 2013 — DECIDED APRIL 14, 2015

Before BAUER, WILLIAMS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In 1997 Joseph Corcoran shot and

killed four men at his home in Fort Wayne, Indiana. A jury

* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c), we have substituted Ron Neal, Superintendent, for Bill Wilson as the named respondent.
2 No. 13-1318

convicted him of four counts of murder and recommended the

death penalty. The trial judge agreed and imposed a death

sentence in accordance with the jury’s recommendation.

After his appeals in state court had run their course,

Corcoran sought federal habeas relief on multiple grounds. We

resolved some of his claims in earlier opinions and Corcoran

has abandoned others; only two issues remain. Corcoran

argues that the trial judge impermissibly relied on nonstatutory aggravating factors and failed to consider mitigating

evidence when deciding whether to impose the death penalty.

In a thorough opinion, the district court rejected these claims

and denied the writ.

We affirm. First, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the

trial judge did not in fact rely on nonstatutory aggravating

factors. We previously disagreed with that determination, but

our earlier decision—now vacated—did not adequately

grapple with the deference owed to state-court factual findings

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Giving the matter a fresh

look through the lens of AEDPA’s deferential standard of

review, we now conclude that the state supreme court’s factual

determination was not unreasonable.

Second, the Indiana Supreme Courtreasonablydetermined

that the trial judge considered all proffered evidence in

mitigation. The sentencer’s obligation to consider mitigating

evidence in a capital case does not require that the evidence be

credited or given any particular weight in the final sentencing

decision.
No. 13-1318 3

I. Background

This case has a long and complex history in state and

federal court, most of which is not relevant here and can be

found in our earlier opinions. See Corcoran v. Wilson

(“Corcoran XI”), 651 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011); Corcoran v.

Levenhagen (“Corcoran IX”), 593 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2010); and

Corcoran v. Buss (“Corcoran VII”), 551 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2008).

We will repeat the facts and procedural history only as

necessary to resolve the remaining claims.

On the evening of July 26, 1997, Corcoran was in his

bedroom in the Fort Wayne home he shared with his sister

when he heard men talking downstairs and became angry

because he thought they were talking about him. He loaded his

rifle and went downstairs to confront them. In the living room,

he found his brother Jim Corcoran; their sister’s fiancé, Scott

Turner; and two of Jim’s friends, Timothy Bricker and Doug

Stillwell. Corcoran shot the first three men at close range,

killing them. Stillwell tried to escape, but Corcoran chased him

into the kitchen and killed him too with a shot to the back of

the head.

Corcoran was charged in state court with four counts of

murder. Indiana sought the death penalty based on the

statutory aggravating circumstance of multiple murders. See

IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(7)–(8) (1997).1

1 Our citations are to the version of the statute in effect in 1997. See Jacobs v.

State, 835 N.E.2d 485, 491 n.7 (Ind. 2005) (“[W]e reaffirm our commitment

to the general rule that ‘courts must sentence defendants under the statute

(continued...)
4 No. 13-1318

Under Indiana’s death-penalty statute, if the defendant is

found guilty, the jury hears evidence in the penalty phase of

trial and can recommend “the death penalty, or life imprisonment without parole, or neither.” Id. § 35-50-2-9(e). Before

recommending death, the jury must find two things: (1) the

prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt one or

more of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute; and

(2) “any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by

the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.” Id.

§ 35-50-2-9(k)(2). At the time of these crimes, the jury’s weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances was not

binding on the trial judge; the statute then in effect provided

that “[t]he court shall make the final determination of the

sentence, after considering the jury’s recommendation, and the

sentence shall be based on the same standards that the jury

was required to consider.” § 35-50-2-9(e).2

So in 1997 (as now) the statutory aggravating factors serve

to limit the sentencer’s initial determination of death eligibility

and the weighing process that determines whether the death

penalty is imposed. See Corcoran v. State (“Corcoran I”),

739 N.E.2d 649, 655 (Ind. 2000). This makes Indiana a so-called

1

 (...continued)

in effect at the time the defendant committed the offense.’” (quoting

Payne v. State, 688 N.E.2d 164, 165 (Ind. 1997))).

2 After Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Indiana amended its deathpenalty statute to make the jury’s decision final. See Ritchie v. State,

809 N.E.2d 258, 263 n.1 (Ind. 2004). The amended statute provides that “[i]f

the jury reaches a sentencing recommendation, the court shall sentence the

defendant accordingly.” IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (2002).
No. 13-1318 5

“weighing” state. See Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 217 (2006)

(“We identified as [weighing states] those in which the only

aggravating factors permitted to be considered by the sentencer were the specified eligibility factors.”); Hough v. Anderson,

272 F.3d 878, 904–05 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing the difference

between weighing and nonweighing states). 

The jury found Corcoran guilty and recommended the

death penalty. The trial judge agreed and imposed a death

sentence, announcing herfindings both orally and in a written

sentencing order. Combining the judge’s oral and written

statements, the court made the following findings.

First, the judge assigned “high weight” to the multiple

murders as aggravating circumstances. She then addressed the

tenmitigating circumstancesCorcoran’s counsel had proposed,

ultimately rejecting six and finding four proven.

More specifically, the judge found that the following

circumstances were proven and deserved weight asmitigators:

(1) Corcoran was under the influence of a mental or emotional

disturbance at the time of the crimes (a personality disorder,

though the experts did not agree about how to classify it);

(2) Corcoran cooperated with the authorities during the

investigation; (3) he had a limited criminal history; and (4) he

was genuinely remorseful for the crimes. The judge gave the

first of these factors “medium weight.” The other three, she

said, deserved only “low weight.”

The judge rejected the other mitigating factors proffered by

the defense. Two related to Corcoran’s mental capacity.

Counsel argued that Corcoran’s mental disorder impaired his

ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, thus
6 No. 13-1318

diminishing his culpability. The judge rejected this argument

based largely on the testimony of several doctors who examined Corcoran for competency and also for a possible insanity

defense. The judge characterized the expert evidence as

“ambiguous” because the doctors could not agree on how to

diagnose Corcoran’s personality disorder. She also noted that

Corcoran had called the police after the murders and kept his

young niece away from the crime scene (she was in the home

at the time of the crimes). The judge thought these actions

demonstrated that Corcoran knew right from wrong and did

not deserve mitigation credit for reduced culpability due to

mental disease or defect.

For similar reasons, the judge was also unpersuaded by

Corcoran’s argument that his ability to competently assist in

his own defense was compromised by mental illness. This

argument focused on the fact that he had rejected a favorable

plea bargain. The judge emphasized that Corcoran was

assisted by capable counsel and had competently chosen to

exercise his right to a trial. 

The judge then considered and quickly rejected the remaining mitigators proposed by the defense. Counsel argued that

Corcoran had continually admitted his guilt through all stages

of the legal process. That was not true; Corcoran stood on his

pleas of not guilty and went to trial. Counsel also argued that

Corcoran deserved mitigation credit for behaving well in jail.

The judge disagreed, noting that Corcoran had two conduct

reports, and besides, good behavior is expected of prisoners.

Counsel argued that Corcoran’s act of shielding his niece from

the trauma of seeing four dead bodies deserved weight as a
No. 13-1318 7

mitigating factor. The judge was not persuaded that keeping

the girl away from the gruesome crime scene was evidence of

good character. Finally, counsel urged the court to treat

Corcoran’s age at the time of the murders (he was 22) as a

mitigating factor. The judge summarily rejected this argument,

saying, “I don’t consider your age of 22 to be a mitigating

circumstance.” 

The judge then weighed the proven aggravating and

mitigating circumstances and found that the former outweighed the latter. As relevant here, the judge made the

followings remarks in her oral sentencing statement:

I’m required to balance aggravating circumstances proved by the State of Indiana against

the mitigating circumstances proved by the

Defense. That has been a very difficult process,

and not a process that I have ever taken lightly,

and certainly would never take lightly,

Mr. Corcoran. 

... [T]he knowing and intentional murders of

four innocent people is an extremely heinous

and aggravated crime. That makes you,

Mr. Corcoran, amass murderer. [The prosecutor]

is right. I don’t think in the history of this county

we’ve had a mass murderer such as yourself. It

makes you, Mr. Corcoran, a very dangerous, evil

mass murderer. And I am convinced in my heart

of hearts, Mr. Corcoran, if given the opportunity,

you will murder again.
8 No. 13-1318

In her written order, the judge also stated that the knowing

and intentional killing of four “innocent victims” is a “particularly heinous” crime.

Based on these remarks, Corcoran argued on direct appeal

that the judge impermissibly relied on “future dangerousness”—a nonstatutory aggravating factor—in deciding

whether to impose the death penalty. Corcoran I, 739 N.E.2d at

657. The Indiana Supreme Court credited this argument and

remanded the case, explaining that the sentencing court “must

limit its consideration of aggravating circumstances to those

specified in the death penalty statute.” Id. at 655 (citing

Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 955 (Ind. 1994); § 35-50-2-9(b)).

The court also noted, however, that Indiana law permits the

judge to consider the circumstances of the crime as context for

the balancing process, id. at 657, and as part of the judge’s

“personal conclusion” that death is the “appropriate punishment for this offender and this crime,” a required step in

Indiana capital cases, id. at 655.

Importantly here, the state high court acknowledged that

it’s sometimes difficult to distinguish between permissible

consideration of context and impermissible consideration of

nonstatutory aggravating circumstances: 

Because the circumstances of a crime often

provide “an appropriate context for consideration of the alleged aggravating and mitigating

circumstances,” ... reference to the nature and

circumstances of the crime in the sentencing

statement “does not necessarily compel a conclusion that such matters were improperly consid-
No. 13-1318 9

ered and weighed as aggravating circumstances.”

Id. at 657 (quoting Prowell v. State, 687 N.E.2d 563, 567 (Ind.

1997)). In the end, however, the court concluded that the trial

judge’s reference to Corcoran’s future dangerousness—and

also her remarks about the innocence of the victims and the

heinousnessofthe crimes—raised “a significant possibility that

[she] may have relied upon non-statutory aggravating factors

in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.” Id. Accordingly, the court sent the case back to the trial court with

instructions to redetermine “whether to impose the death

sentence, life without parole, or a term of years” and to “issue

a new sentencing statement.” Id.

On remand the judge again assigned the multiple-murders

“high weight” as statutoryaggravating circumstances. Without

revisiting her prior findings on the mitigation evidence, the

judge again concluded that the aggravating circumstances

outweighed the proven mitigating circumstances. Then,

specifically addressing the reason for the remand, the judge

wrote this: 

The trial [c]ourt, in balancing the proved aggravators and mitigators, emphasizes to the

Supreme Court that it only relied upon those

proven statutory aggravators. The trial [c]ourt’s

remarks at the sentencing hearing, and the

language inthe original sentencing order explain

why such high weight was given to the statutory

aggravator of multiple murder, and further

support the trial [c]ourt’s personal conclusion
10 No. 13-1318

that the sentence is appropriate punishment for

this offender and these crimes.

With that, the judge reimposed the death penalty, and the case

returned to the Indiana Supreme Court. 

This time around the court held that the death sentence

complied with Indiana law:

We are now satisfied that the trial court has

relied on only aggravators listed in Indiana Code

§ 35-50-2-9(b). In response to our remand, the

trial court stated, “[I]n balancing the proved

aggravators and mitigators, [the trial court]

emphasizes to the Supreme Court that it only

relied upon those provenstatutory aggravators.”

There is no lack of clarity in this statement and

no plausible reason to believe it untrue.

Corcoran v. State (“Corcoran II”), 774 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ind. 2002)

(internal citation omitted) (alterations in the original).

Corcoran had also challenged the judge’s decision not to

reconsider her earlier mitigation findings on remand. The

Indiana Supreme Court found no error and at length reviewed

and approved the trial judge’s evaluation of the mitigation

evidence in the original sentencing proceeding: 

Corcoran’s argument that the trial court did

not consider six of the proffered mitigating

circumstances iswithoutmerit. As the mitigating

circumstances were not the focus of our concern,

we are not surprised that the trial court’s second

order analyzed only those aggravating and
No. 13-1318 11

mitigating circumstances it found pertinent to

the task on remand.

The trial judge had in fact analyzed

Corcoran’s proffered mitigators in the course of

its original sentencing. Our review of the record

also persuades us that the trial court properly

rejected the remaining factors in the original

sentencing order. Corcoran claimed first that his

mental disease affected his capacity to appreciate

or conform his conduct. As we discuss in greater

detail below, the trial court did not err in rejecting it.

In a related vein, Corcoran also asked the

court to consider the fact that he shielded his

young niece from the bloodshed as a mitigator.

But this fact cuts both ways. His actions demonstrate a keen awareness of the events that were

to follow, and suggest to us that his capacity to

appreciate the criminality of his conduct was not

inhibited.

Third, Corcoran argues that his mental disease prevented him from competently assisting

in his defense, stemming primarily from his

refusal of favorable plea recommendations

offered by the State. The State’s pleas would

have kept Corcoran in jail for life, but Corcoran

rejected each. He chose instead to exercise his

constitutional right to a jury trial, therefore

creating the potential for a lesser sentence, a
12 No. 13-1318

favorable jury recommendation, or an outright

acquittal. Corcoran’s choice will not act simultaneously as a mitigator for his benefit.

The remaining three factors are also without

merit. Corcoran was twenty-two at the time of

the murders, and offered his age as a mitigator.

Although chronological age is not the end of the

inquiry for young adults, considering both the

seriousness of this crime and the fact that

Corcoran is well past the age of sixteen where

the law requires special treatment, we find no

abuse of discretion. The fifth rejected factor was

Corcoran’s good behaviorin jail priorto sentencing. We agree with the trial court that this is

expected of persons who are incarcerated. Even

if it is an appropriate mitigator, its weight is

modest and we find no abuse of discretion here

either. Finally, Corcoran asserted that his admission of guilt through all phases of the legal

process should be a mitigating circumstance. Of

course, Corcoran did not admit his guilt in the

sense that one does in pleading guilty. Corcoran

demanded a jury trial and subjected the victims’

families and loved ones to a trial. The trial court

did not abuse its discretion in declining to find

this mitigator.

... [T]he trial court explicitly identified the proven mitigating circumstances and listed the specific facts and reasons that led the court to find
No. 13-1318 13

their existence. The trial court fulfilled its

resentencing duties.

Corcoran II, 774 N.E.2d at 500–01 (citations omitted). Finally,

the court consideredandrejectedCorcoran’s argument that the

death penalty was manifestly unreasonable. Id. at 501–02. The

court was satisfied that the “quadruple killing” outweighedthe

proven mitigators and thus affirmed the sentence. Id.

Protracted postconviction proceedings followed.3 After

exhausting state remedies, Corcoran applied to the federal

court in Northern Indiana for a writ of habeas corpus, raising

eight separate claims. There’s no need to retrace them all here.

It’s enough to say that the case has been before the district

court twice, before this court three times (this is the fourth),

and before the Supreme Court twice.4 The parties now agree

that only two claims remain: Corcoran argues that the trial

judge impermissibly considered nonstatutory aggravating

factors and failed orrefused to consider his proffered evidence

in mitigation. The district court rejected bothclaims anddenied

the writ.

3

See Corcoran v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. 2006); Corcoran v. State,

827 N.E.2d 542 (Ind. 2005); and Corcoran v. State, 820 N.E.2d 655 (Ind. 2005).

4

In reverse chronological order, the opinions and orders can be found at

Corcoran v. Buss, No. 3:05-CV-389 JD, 2013 WL 140378 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10,

2013); Corcoran v. Wilson, 651 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011); Wilson v. Corcoran,

562 U.S. 1 (2010); Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 593 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2010);

Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 558 U.S. 1 (2009); Corcoran v. Buss, 551 F.3d 703

(7th Cir. 2008); and Corcoran v. Buss, 483 F. Supp. 2d 709 (N.D. Ind. 2007).
14 No. 13-1318

II. Discussion

A federal court may grant a state prisoner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus only if the prisoner “is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Wilson v. Corcoran

(“Corcoran X”), 562 U.S. 1, 1 (2010) (“Federal courts may not

issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners whose confinement does not violate federal law.”).

Federal collateral review of state criminal judgments is

“highly deferential.” See McManus v. Neal, No. 12-2001,

2015 WL 667466, at *12 (7th Cir. Feb. 17, 2015). Under AEDPA

a federal court may grant a state prisoner’s application for

habeas corpus only when the state-court proceeding “resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, orinvolved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the [s]tate court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).

This standard is “‘difficult to meet.’” White v. Woodall,

134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (quoting Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct.

1781, 1786 (2013)). “Unreasonable” in this context means more

than just incorrect; it “‘means something like lying well outside

the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion.’” West v.

Symdon, 689 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hardaway v.

Young, 302 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002)). Stated differently, an

unreasonable application of federal law is not merely wrong

but “objectively unreasonable”; “even ‘clear error’ will not

suffice.” White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702. “Clearly established federal
No. 13-1318 15

law” for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) means “only the holdings, as

opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions.” Id.

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

The deference owed to state criminal judgments extends

just as strongly—perhaps more so—to the state court’s factual

findings. A state court’s factual determinations are cloaked

with a presumption of correctness on federal habeas review,

and the prisoner has the burden to rebut the presumption by

clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also

Kidd v. Lemke, 734 F.3d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 2013). “[A] state

court’s decision is factually unreasonable only when it ‘rests

upon fact-finding that ignores the clear and convincing weight

of the evidence.’” McManus, 2015 WL 667466, at *12 (quoting

Goudy v. Basinger, 604 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir. 2010)).

If the prisoner carries this burden and shows that the state

court’s decision was legally or factually unreasonable, the

federal court reviews the prisoner’s claim of constitutional

error de novo. Id.

We review the district court’s denial of the writ de novo.

Ruhl v. Hardy, 743 F.3d 1083, 1090 (7th Cir. 2014).

* * *

Corcoran challenges two aspects of the Indiana Supreme

Court’s decision in Corcoran II: (1) the court’s determination

that the trial judge did not rely on nonstatutory aggravating

factors in her resentencing order, see 774 N.E.2d at 499; and

(2) the court’s determination that the judge did not refuse or

fail to consider the proffered evidence in mitigation, id. at 500–
16 No. 13-1318

01. These are factual findings. See Parker v.Dugger, 498 U.S. 308,

320 (1991) (explaining that a state court’s characterization of

what the trial judge found is a finding of historical fact).

Accordingly, Corcoran has the heavy burden to overcome the

presumptionof correctness and show that the state court’s factfinding is unreasonable. He has not carried that burden.

A. Nonstatutory Aggravating Circumstances

Following the remand in Corcoran I, the trial judge issued a

new sentencing order and unambiguously stated that she

relied only on proven statutory aggravators (the multiple

murders) in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. She also explained that her remarks at the original

sentencing proceeding about the circumstances of the

crimes—the comments that troubled the supreme court andled

to the remand—were offered to explain the “high weight” she

assigned to the statutory aggravators and to support her

“personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and these crimes.”

The Indiana Supreme Court accepted this explanation and

pronounced itself “satisfied that the trial court has relied on

only aggravators listed in Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b).”

Corcoran II, 774 N.E.2d at 499. As we’ve noted, that’s a factual

finding, so we must presume it to be correct, and Corcoran has

the burden to rebut it by clear and convincing evidence.

Corcoran has not identified any evidence to rebut the

presumption, though to be fair this is not the kind of factual

finding that can be rebutted in the traditional sense by pointing
No. 13-1318 17

to witness testimony and exhibits in the record. The question

before the state supreme court in Corcoran IIdid not require the

resolution of an evidentiary conflict. Instead, the court was

faced with a choice to either accept or reject the judge’s

assurance that she did not rely on nonstatutory aggravators.

The court accepted it. The question for us is whether that

decision was unreasonable—whether it ignores the clear

weight of the evidence or lies outside the boundaries of fairminded disagreement. 

To put this inquiry in proper context, it’s helpful to retrace

the court’s remand instructions in Corcoran I. First, the state

high court reminded the trial judge that she must “limit [her]

consideration of aggravating circumstances to those specified

in the death penalty statute.” Corcoran I, 739 N.E.2d at 655. The

court also explained, however, that Indiana law permits the

sentencing judge to consider the circumstances of the crime as

context for the balancing process, id. at 657, and to amplify her

“personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and this crime,” id. at 655 (citing

Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1262 (Ind. 1995)). The judge’s

duty to explain why the sentence is “appropriate punishment

forthis offender and this crime” implies an obligation to reflect

and comment on the specific characteristics of the offense and

the offender in arriving at that conclusion.

So under state law the statutory aggravating factors

“channel[] and limit ... the sentencer’s discretion” in important

ways, Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988), but

capital sentencing does not take place in a factual straightjacket. The trial judge commits error if she treats nonstatutory
18 No. 13-1318

aggravating factors as formal aggravators. Corcoran I,

739 N.E.2d at 657 (explaining that the reviewing court looks to

“the role of non-statutory aggravating matters” in the judge’s

sentencing statement). But the judge may properly refer to

background facts as context for the balancing process and to

explain the judge’s “personal conclusion” that the death

penalty is appropriate punishment in light of the nature of the

offense and the character of the offender. Id. at 655, 657.

With the benefit of these remand instructions, the trial

judge stated in her resentencing order that she relied only on

“proven statutory aggravators”—that is, the multiple

murders—inweighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. She also explained that her remarks at the original

sentencing (the ones that led to the remand) were intended

only as explanatory context forthe “high weight” she assigned

to the multiple murders as statutory aggravators and to

support her personal conclusion that the death penalty was

appropriate punishment.

The Indiana Supreme Court took the judge at her word and

found that she “relied on only aggravators listed in Indiana

Code § 35-50-2-9(b).” Corcoran II, 774 N.E.2d at 499. Corcoran

challenges that finding as unreasonable. His argument rests

almost entirely on our now-vacated opinion in Corcoran IX.

There we said that “unlike the Indiana Supreme Court, we are

far from ‘satisfied that the trial court has relied only on

aggravators listed in Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b).’”

Corcoran IX, 593 F.3d at 551. We construed the trial judge’s

comments as “add[ing] weight to a statutory aggravator based

on the non-statutory aggravators” and noted that “factor
No. 13-1318 19

weighting is part of factor ‘balancing,’ the very process in

which the trial court disclaimed reliance only on aggravators

listed in [the statute].” Id.

Corcoran argues that we “got it right” in Corcoran IX and

urges us to stick with our earlier interpretation of the judge’s

resentencing statement. But our interpretation is not the only

reasonable way to read this record. The state supreme court

was entitled to see things differently as long as its decision did

not ignore the clear weight of the evidence and falls within the

boundaries of fair-minded disagreement. White, 134 S. Ct. at

1702.

Having revisited the matter, we now acknowledge that our

decision in Corcoran IX did not hew as closely as it should have

to the deferential standard of review mandated by AEDPA.

Although we found the state supreme court’s decision

“unreasonable,” in doing so we did not give the state court’s

decision the deference it was due. Line-drawing in this area can

be difficult, as the Indiana justices emphasized in Corcoran I.

739 N.E.2d at 657. There’s room for reasonable disagreement

about how to interpret this record. The state high court

credited the judge’s statement that she followed the law, and

underAEDPA that decision is entitled to substantial deference.

We cannot say that the state supreme court either ignored the

clear weight of the evidence or reached a decision that no fairminded jurist could reach. In short, the state court’s decision

was not unreasonable.
20 No. 13-1318

B. Mitigating Circumstances

Corcoran’s final argument is that the judge’s analysis of his

proffered mitigating evidence violated the rule of Eddings v.

Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). In Eddings a capital defendant

presented mitigation evidence that as a child he had been

physically abused by his father. Id. at 107. The sentencing judge

rejected this evidence as a matter of law: “Nor can the [c]ourt

in following the law, in my opinion, consider the fact of this

young man’s violent background.” Id. at 109 (quotation marks

omitted). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded,holding

that the sentencing court in a capital case must admit and

consider all relevant mitigating evidence. “Just as the State

may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering

any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to

consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.”

Id. at 113–14; see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4

(1986) (“[T]he sentencer may not refuse to consider or be

precludedfromconsidering any relevant mitigating evidence.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.

586, 604 (1978) (“[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments require that the sentencer ... not be precluded

from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the

offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less

than death.”).

Corcoran argues that the judge violatedEddings by refusing

to consider two of his proffered mitigators: (1) his age at the
No. 13-1318 21

time of the murders; and (2) his good behavior while in prison.5

But the judge did consider these two proposed mitigators, if

only summarily. In her oral statement at sentencing, the judge

specifically stated that she did not believe Corcoran’s age of 22

was a mitigating circumstance. She spent a bit more time on

Corcoran’s claim about his good behavior in jail. At the

sentencing hearing, she noted that “there are two reports from

the police department in this file, from the jail, that don’t

exactly indicate your good behavior.” She added the following

in her written sentencing order: “As good behavioris expected

of incarcerated individuals, the [c]ourt does not consider this

to be a mitigating circumstance.”

Without specifically referring to Eddings, the Indiana

Supreme Court considered Corcoran’s argument and rejected

it as “without merit.” Corcoran II, 774 N.E.2d at 500. That

conclusion was not unreasonable. Here, unlike in Eddings, the

judge’s oral and written statements do not suggest that she

thought she was foreclosedfromconsidering the two proposed

mitigators as a matter of law. To the contrary, the judge admitted Corcoran’s evidence, discussed his claims, and said she did

not agree that his age or good behavior in jail were mitigating

circumstances. Regarding the good-behavior claim in particu5 Corcoran also argues that the trial judge erred by not reconsidering all of

his proposed mitigators on remand. The Indiana Supreme Court rejected

this argument as a matter of state law. Corcoran v. State (“Corcoran II”),

774 N.E.2d 495, 500 (Ind. 2002). We know of no principle of federal

constitutional law that prohibited the judge from relying on her earlier

findings. 
22 No. 13-1318

lar, she also pointed out that the evidence did not run in

Corcoran’s favor in the first place.

We have previously explained that “[t]he rule of Eddings is

that a sentencing court may not exclude relevant mitigating

evidence[,] [b]ut of course, a court may choose to give mitigating evidence little or no weight.” Allen v. Buss, 558 F.3d 657,

667 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Baird v. Davis,

388 F.3d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[The Supreme Court] has

made clear that a sentencing court in balancing aggravating

and mitigating circumstances bearing on the imposition of the

death penalty is not required to give any fixed weight to any

particular mitigating circumstance.”). In other words, the

sentencer’s obligation to consider all mitigating evidence in a

capital case does not imply a duty to credit the evidence or

give it weight in the final analysis.

Corcoran relies on Wright v. Walls. 288 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.

2002), but that case is distinguishable on several fronts. In

Wright the trial judge’s remarks at sentencing were “strikingly

similar to those in Eddings.” Id. at 943. Here, in contrast, the

trial judge made no categorical statements of exclusion.

Moreover, Wright was decided under the less deferential

“pre-AEDPA” standard of review. See id. at 941–42.

Our more recent decision in Allen v. Buss provides better

guidance. 558 F.3d at 667. In Allen the trial judge heard

evidence of the defendant’s traumatic and dysfunctional

childhood but did not mention it in his written sentencing

order. Id. at 665–66. After reviewing several other proffered

mitigators, the judge’s order simply stated that “[the court]

finds no other circumstances appropriate for consideration as
No. 13-1318 23

a mitigating factor.” Id. at 666. On appeal the defendant argued

that the judge ignored the evidence of his difficult childhood.

The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the judge

“hadproperly considered his mitigating evidence,” andfurther

noting that “‘[a]ccepting the facts alleged about Allen’s

childhood does not compel a finding of mitigating circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 790 (Ind.

1997)).

We deferred to the state court’s decision, finding it a

“plausible” interpretation of the judge’s sentencing order. Id.

at 667. We can go further in this case; here the judge was not

silent on the subjects of Corcoran’s age and behaviorin jail. She

clearly addressed both factors and simply declined to credit

them as mitigating circumstances. The Indiana Supreme Court

reasonably concluded that this satisfied the judge’s obligation

to consider Corcoran’s proffered evidence in mitigation.

III. Conclusion

Forthe foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

denying Corcoran’s petition for habeas relief is AFFIRMED.