NO. 07-05-0287-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL B JUNE 28, 2006

______________________________ SEAN DOU GLAS WAS HINGTON, Appellant

v. THE STA

TE OF TEX

AS, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 108 TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NO. 50,904-E; HON. RICHARD DAMBOLD, PRESIDING

_______________________________ Memorandum Opinion

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. Appella nt, Sean Douglas Washington, appeals his conviction for possessing a controlled substance, namely cocaine, by claiming that the evidence is legally and factually insufficientto show that the substance was in his care, cu stody, or control. We affirm the judgment of the tria l court. Background Officer Michael Rolan testified th at over th e course of severa l weeks prior to December

3, 2004, he had observed a new model red Saturn Vue parked at a motel on Amarillo Bouleva rd, a locale wher e drug ac

tivity wa s known to occ ur. He had also2

obser ved differen t people visit the room adjacent to the parked vehicle, stay for several minutes, and then le ave . The latter conduct was consistent with drug activity, accordi ng to the off icer. Around midnight on December 3, 2004, Rolan o b served the same vehicle being driven by appel lant. Then, around 3:50 a.m., Rol an again saw app ellant d riving th e same vehicle down Ama rillo Bo ulevard and pull ing into the Sund own Motel . A short tim e later, appellant

left the motel in the vehicle, and the officer followed it to see if he was returning to the Delux Inn, the place where the officer spi ed appellant on other occasions. Whi l e doing so, the officer saw appella nt c hange lanes without signaling and effected a traffic stop. Upon asking appellant where hewas going, appellant said he had just left work and

was going home. The officer knew this to be untrue because he had seen appellant driving around earlier. Appellant later changed his story and said that

he was returning from his girlfriend’s house. And, upon a reques t for proof of insu rance, ap pellant was unab le to provide any. As the officer attempted t o cite appellant for the omission, appellant interrupted him seve ral timesfirst toask if he could take a dip of snuff, then to ask why he had been sto pped eve n though Rolan h ad alrea dy told h im, and then to ask an additional question which Rolan bel ieved wa s meant to distract him. The officer eventuall y asked a ppellan t for c onsent to search the vehicle, which consentappellant gave. While the search progressed, appel lant agai n a ttempted to “distract”the officer by inf orming hi m that he k new of so me one wh o had controlled substances. The officer nonetheless continued his search and found (hidden in one of the vehi cle ’s cigarette lighters), a plastic bag containing several rocks of crack cocaine.3

Thereafte r, a search of appellant uncovered $200 in denominations of $10 and $20 bills. Those dealing crack often carried such denominations since one crack rock sold for $20, accordin g to Rola n. Law The standards by which we review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence

are well es tablishe d. W e refer the p arties to Jackson v . Virgin ia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S .Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1 979), Zuniga v . State, 144 S. W.3d 477 (Tex . Crim. Ap p. 2004), Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), and King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Cri m. App. 20 00) for th eir expl anation. Next, the State i s obligated to prove that the accused exercised care, custody, control, or management over the controlled substance whileknowing it to be a controlled subst ance. Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). This can be done through the use of circumstantial evidence. Moreover, when the accused is n ot in sole control of the premises or th e instrumentality in which the drug is found, several indicia have bee n deemed useful i n assessi ng guilt

. Theyinclude such things as whether 1) the controlled substance was in plain sight, 2) the defendant own ed or c ontrolled the premises, 3) he had easy access to the drug, 4) the drug was found near him, 5) a strong residual odor of the drug existed, 6) any drug paraphernalia was i n plain sight or near the defendan t, 7) the accused was intoxicated when arrested, 8) hedisplayed a consciousness of guilt, 9) he had a special connection to the contraband, 10) the place where the drug wa s found was encl osed, and 11) the a ccused u ttered aff irm ative statements connecting him to the drug

. Jones

v. State, 963 S.W.2 d 826, 83 0 (Tex. A pp.–Texarkana 19 98, pet. ref’d); Williams v. State, 906 S.W.2d 58, 65 n.2 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1995, pet. ref’d). T he number4

of factors established is not as importantas the degree to which they tend to affirmatively link the def enda nt to the contraban d. Wallace v. State, 932 S.W.2d 51 9, 524 (Tex. App.–Tyler

1995, pe t. ref’d). Furthermo re, the evi dence ten ding toestablish the link need notbe so strong as to exclude every other reasona ble hy pothes is exce pt one of guilt. Jones v. State, 963 S.W.2 d at 830. Applica tion of Standard Viewing the evid ence in a light m ost favora ble to th e judgmen t, we fi nd evidence illustr ating that 1) appellant was the sole occupant of the vehicle where the drugs wer e found, 2) the car had been obtained by appel lant ’s mother and gran dmother fo r him to drive, 3) appellant made the car payments, 4) appellant’s mother and grandmother never drove the car although appellant’s grandmother believed that appellant’s friends may have done so, 5) the

officer h ad never seen anyone but a ppellan t drive th e car, 6) the cl ear baggie was found enclosed in a cigarette outlet i n the center console within easy access of appellant, 7) appellant had on his person an a mount of cash in denominations consistent with that utilized in drug transactions, 8) appellant li ed abou t where he w as going, 9) appe llan twas observed earlier in an area where drug dealing was prevalent, 10) appellant’s conduct of drivin g to loca tions on Amarill o Boulevard or having people visit him in motels on that boulevard l iken toconduct pursued by those dealing in drugs, 11) appellant

attempted to distract the officer during the vehicle s earch, and 12) appellant’s vehicle had previously been observed over a course of several weeks at a motel known for drug dea ling. Surv eillance in dicating drug acti vity can be an aff irmative link, Smith v. State, 176 S.W.3d 907, 917 (Tex. App.–Da llas 200 5, no pet .), as can contraband located in enclosed5

spaces, and conflicting statements by those attempting to conceal their criminal activities. Robinson v. State, 174 S.W.3d 320, 327 -28 (Tex . App.–Ho uston [1 stDist.] 20 05, pet. r ef’d). These factors, combined with thefacts that appellant was the permanent possessor of the vehicle, its sole occupant at the time the drugswere fou nd, and h is attemp ts to distract the officer are sufficient to aff irmatively link him to the contraband found in hi s vehicle. Furthermore, although the full series of indicia are not satisfied, the foregoing facts when taken as a whole do not un dermine o ur confid ence in the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s issues, hold that h is conviction has the supp ort of both l egally a nd factua lly suffi cient evi dence, an d affirm th e judgmen t.

Per Curiam Do not publish.