Filed 11/20/20 In re A.N. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re A.N. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F.O.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B305208

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

18CCJP02285A–C)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County. Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.

Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.
2

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant 

County Counsel, and Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________

Appellant F.O. appeals from the juvenile court orders

terminating her parental rights and freeing the minors for 

adoption.1 She argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in 

failing to find the “beneficial parental relationship exception” to 

adoption applies. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. 

(c)(1)(B)(i).)2 We affirm.

FACTS

On April 10, 2018, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition on 

behalf of five-year-old A.N., four-year-old S.N., and three-year-old 

G.N. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The 

petition alleged the minors were at risk because of the parents’ 

history of violent altercations in front of them. On March 15, 

2018, the father strangled the mother, causing her to lose 

consciousness; he also threatened to kill her and burn down the 

minors’ house. On April 6, 2018, the mother punched the father 

with a closed fist, and he scratched her eye. The father had a 

history of drug abuse, including methamphetamine, and the 

mother would allow him to have access to the children in 

1 Appellant F.O. previously filed a petition for extraordinary 

relief under rule 8.452 of the California Rules of Court. (F.O. v. 

Superior Court, B299479.) The petition was denied on the 

ground it was inadequate. (Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 

Cal.App.4th 570, 577–584.)

2 All statutory references, unless otherwise designated, are 

to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

violation of a domestic violence restraining order and a criminal 

protective order. The minors were detained and placed with a

paternal great aunt and her partner. Monitored visits were 

ordered.

On July 2, 2018, the juvenile court sustained the petition, 

declared the minors dependents of the court, and provided 

reunification services and monitored visits. The minors were 

provided cognitive behavioral services beginning in January 

2019, “to reduce trauma related symptoms of anxiety and 

nightmares.” A.N. was “yelling and not listening to her elders in 

placement and at school.” She was receiving trauma focused 

therapy “to address the PTSD that she is experiencing.” S.N. was 

“experiencing flashbacks” and was having “anger outbursts and 

shutting down (refusing to talk), especially after contact with 

mother.” G.N. had “symptom of anxiety, (i.e. feeling nervous and

fearful in response to talking about mommy/event)” and was 

having “difficulty falling asleep, flashback[s] and nightmares.” In 

March 2019, it was reported that the mother’s monitored visits 

with the minors “have been sporadic.”

On June 4, 2019, mother was found in partial compliance 

with her court-ordered case plan, and reunification services were 

terminated. One month later, reunification services for the 

father were also terminated.3

On November 12, 2019, the Department submitted its 

report for the section 366.26 hearing. The minors continued to 

reside with the paternal great aunt and her partner; they felt 

loved and cared for. “The children report that they like visiting 

with mother [twice a month] but enjoy being able to return to 

their home with caregivers.” Telephone calls with the mother are 

3 Presumed father S.N. is not a party to this appeal.
4

monitored. The two oldest “have reported that they speak with 

mother on the phone, but at times do not want to speak with 

her.” In August 2019, the oldest “cried because she was afraid 

that CSW would return her to the care of mother . . . .” It was the 

recommendation of the Department that all parental rights be 

terminated and the minors be placed for adoption.

In the Last Minute Information for the Court, the 

Department reported that on September 30, 2019, it met with the 

mother who stated that, “she did not know why she was being 

punished when she was the victim. CSW asked mother if she 

acknowledged her role in failing to protect her children by 

remaining in a harmful relationship and exposing her children to 

harmful situations. Mother stated that she would take the 

responsibility of what father did to her in front of the children but 

she was also a victim.” The caregivers reported that on October 

26, 2019, “mother told [A.N.] that she was going to live with her 

again and needed to tell the judge that she wanted to live with 

her. [A.N.] shared with CSW that mother scared her . . . .” The 

Monday after the visit, A.N. became ill at school. “It appears that 

A.N. often feels ill after having visits with mother and going to 

the [nurse’s] offices is a recurring behavior.” The October 26 visit 

also made the monitor uncomfortable. The mother was on her 

telephone and at times was attempting to make contact with her 

boyfriend who was taking pictures from the upper level of the 

mall. The monitor was no longer willing to monitor the visits. 

The caregivers also reported that “mother’s phone calls are not 

consistent and at times mother will attempt to call after the 

scheduled times.”

The 366.26 hearing was finally scheduled for March 12, 

2020. In the Last Minute Information for the Court, the monitors 
5

for the mother’s visits, which are held in the Department’s 

offices, “have stated that the visits are unhealthy as the children 

do not listen to mother. On one of the visits, [a monitor] reported 

that [G.N.] asked mother to teach him how to spell, ‘I hate you’

and then gave the letter to mother and on the same visit spit on 

mother.” The minors “have reported that they enjoy visits with 

mother now because mother promises them toys and candy.” The 

therapist indicated that the minors had progressed well and 

therapy was no longer needed.

At the hearing, the mother testified that the children seem 

happy to see her at these visits, call her “mom,” and are 

disappointed when the visits are over. She brings them snacks 

and little gifts and talks with them about what is going on in 

their lives. She knows their likes and dislikes and tries to help 

them deal with situations when they fight over a toy or become 

argumentative. She talks with the minors over the telephone 

when they want to. When asked about doctor’s appointments and 

other health related issues, she said she is aware “like 50 

percent. I’m not always aware of their appointments or—but 

when I am made aware of it, I will follow up and, you know, how 

did it go.” The mother also submitted a progress report from 

Abundance Guidance Center. It was offered to show she has 

learned skills that would show she has the ability to interact 

appropriately with the minors.

The mother argued the court should find the beneficial 

parental exception applies and not terminate the mother’s 

parental rights. The Department recommended that the juvenile 

court select adoption as the permanent plan and terminate 

mother’s parental rights. Minor’s counsel supported the 

Department and also asked the court to select adoption and 
6

terminate parental rights. On March 12, 2020, the court found 

the minors adoptable, concluded the exception did not apply, and 

terminated the mother’s parental rights.

DISCUSSION

At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court “‘shall 

terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption” 

if it finds that “it is likely the child will be adopted.” (In re Celine 

R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Here, the paternal aunt and her 

partner have indicated they wish to adopt the minors.

There is an exception to this rule known as the “beneficial 

parental relationship exception.” Subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) of 

section 366.26 requires termination of parental rights “unless” 

the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with 

the child and the child would benefit from continuing the 

relationship.” Here, the court found that “mother has maintained 

regular and consistent visitation and contact,” but then stated

that, “I can’t find that that parental role and relationship 

outweighs the benefits of permanence in adoption for the 

children, nor that it would be detrimental to terminate that 

relationship . . . .”

The analytical framework is well established. First, the 

burden was on the mother to prove “her relationship with the 

children would outweigh the well-being they would gain in a 

permanent home with an adoptive parent. [Citation.] Evidence 

of frequent and loving contact is not enough to establish a 

beneficial parental relationship. [Citation.] The mother must 

also show she occupies a parental role in the children’s lives.” (In 

re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1300 (Noah G.); see also 

In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 [makes no 
7

sense to forgo adoption when no real parental relationship 

shown].)

Second, the standard of review in “evaluating the juvenile 

court’s determination as to the factual issue of the existence of a 

beneficial parental relationship, [courts] review for substantial 

evidence. [Citation.] But whether termination of the parental 

relationship would be detrimental to the child as weighed against 

the benefits of adoption is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” 

(Noah G., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1300–1301.)

Finally, “[i]n the context of the dependency scheme 

prescribed by the Legislature, we interpret the ‘benefit from 

continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ exception to mean the 

relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree 

as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a 

permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the 

court balances the strength and quality of the natural 

parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the 

security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If 

severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the 

child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that 

the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is 

overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” 

(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)

Here, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing 

evidence that the beneficial parental relationship exception did 

not apply. This was not a close case. It is evident from the record 

that there was no parent/child relationship between the mother 

and any of her children, much less a substantial, positive 

emotional attachment. The minors had been traumatized by the 

history of extreme domestic violence. After successful trauma 
8

therapy, A.N. at best felt sorry for the mother; the younger 

siblings were impressed at the monitored visits with promises of 

toys and candy. In contrast, the minors spoke of safety and 

feeling cared for with the caregivers, traits one associates with a 

parental relationship. Nothing in the record, and in particular 

nothing in the mother’s testimony at the hearing, suggested she 

had a parental relationship with the minors.

The mother points to In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 

where the reviewing court found the mother had met the 

parental relationship standard. But that case is clearly 

distinguishable. There, the mother did all her programs to 

maintain her sobriety and to become a better parent. (Id. at p. 

77.) The children were very attached. (Ibid.) Here, mother had 

completed a residential treatment program but did not complete 

her domestic violence program due to excessive absences. She

did not show a commitment to improving herself in a way that 

would allow her to become a better parent. It was more about 

keeping the minors from father. Settling accounts with the other 

parent is not a compelling reason to apply the exception.

Appellant’s backup argument is that the court should have 

ordered a permanent plan of legal guardianship. It does not 

appear this argument was raised below and therefore it has been 

waived. Even if the issue had been properly preserved, it does 

not survive critical analysis. Once the juvenile court determines 

parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the 

preferred choice if adoption is likely. It cannot select a less 

secure and permanent placement such as legal guardianship. (In 

re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728.)

Finally, appellant argues this appeal has “critical 

importance. The question is how we treat battered women and 
9

how we will continue to treat them in the future.” Mother has 

continually argued she was the victim of domestic violence and 

that there is something perverse in an order terminating her 

parental rights but allowing father “access” to the minors because 

the paternal great aunt and her partner will likely be the 

adoptive parents. Even if the premise were accepted, the focus of 

this appeal is whether the court selected the appropriate 

permanent plan and whether the exception applied as to the 

mother. Why the minors were taken into the dependency system,

and whether the father might have “access” to them after 

adoption, is irrelevant.

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court terminating parental rights 

are affirmed.

SALTER, J.

We Concur:

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

STRATTON, J.

 Judge of the Orange Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.