J-S19018-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

HAGGAI U. CHARLEMAGNE

Appellant No. 1840 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 27, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0001931-2013

BEFORE: STABILE, J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED APRIL 07, 2015

Appellant Haggai U. Charlemagne appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.

Appellant was charged with involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,1

unlawful contact with minor,2statutory sexual assault,3aggravated indecent 

assault,4incest of minor,5endangering the welfare of children,6corruption of 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(8).

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302(b)(2).

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a).
J-S19018-15

- 2 -

minors,7indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age,8and 

tampering with evidence.9 The charges stemmed from the sexual abuse of 

Appellant’s niece. 

On January 29, 2014, Appellant pled guilty to unlawful contact with a 

minor and statutory sexual assault. For each offense, the standard 

sentencing guidelines range was 12 to 24 months’ imprisonment, with an 

aggravated range of 36 months. The maximum sentence for each offense 

was 240 months’ imprisonment.

On May 27, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a 36 to 72 

month term of imprisonment for unlawful contact with a minor and a 

consecutive 36 to 72 month term of imprisonment for statutory sexual 

assault. The aggregate sentence was 72 to 144 months’ imprisonment. 

Appellant’s convictions subjected him to the lifetime registration requirement 

of the Sex Offenders Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9799.10, et seq., and to possible deportation. 

On June 4, 2014, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of 

sentence, which the trial court denied on June 5, 2014. On June 24, 2014, 

____________________________________________

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).

8 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8).

9 18 Pa.C.S. § 4910(1).
J-S19018-15

- 3 -

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by 

imposing a manifestly excessive sentence at the highest 

end of the aggravated range of the Pennsylvania 

Sentencing Guidelines, by failing to consider the relevant 

sentencing criteria of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code, 

including the personal characteristics of the Defendant, his 

rehabilitative needs, the need for protection of the public 

and the presence of mitigating circumstances?

2. Did the Trial Court err and abuse its discretion by 

imposing a manifestly excessive sentence at the highest 

end of the aggravated range of the Pennsylvania 

Sentencing Guidelines, by failing to state sufficient reasons 

on the record for the sentence imposed?

Appellant’s Brief at 6. Both issues challenge discretionary aspects of 

Appellant’s sentence. 

“Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle a 

petitioner to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 

1064 (Pa.Super.2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 

912 (Pa.Super.2000)). Before this Court can address a discretionary 

challenge, we must engage in a four-part analysis to determine: 

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant 

preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes 

a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary

aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise 

statement raises a substantial question that the sentence

is appropriate under the sentencing code. 
J-S19018-15

- 4 -

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super.2013) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa.Super.2006)); see 

also Allen, 24 A.3d at 1064.

Appellant raised the issues in timely post-sentence motions, filed a 

timely notice of appeal, and included a statement of reasons pursuant to 

Rule 2119(f) in his brief. We must, therefore, determine whether his issues 

present substantial questions and, if so, review the merits.

“The determination of whether a particular issue raises a substantial 

question is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. 

Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa.Super.2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Fiascki, 886 A.2d 261, 263 (Pa.Super.2005)). A substantial question exists 

where a defendant raises a plausible argument that the sentence violates a 

provision of the sentencing code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of 

the sentencing process. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Titus, 816 A.2d 

251, 255 (Pa.Super.2003)).

Appellant first asserts that the trial court imposed an excessive 

sentence and failed to consider the relevant sentencing criteria, including his 

personal characteristics, his rehabilitative needs, the need for protection of 

the public, and the presence of mitigating circumstances. Appellant’s Brief 

at 13-15, 16-22. This raises a substantial question for our review. 

Commonwealth v. Gonzales, -- A.3d ---, 2015 PA Super 13, at *15 

(Pa.Super.2015) (claim of excessiveness coupled with failure to consider 

mitigating factors raised substantial question); Commonwealth v. Dodge, 
J-S19018-15

- 5 -

77 A.3d 1263, 1272 n.8 (Pa.Super.2013) (“Careful litigants should note that 

arguments that the sentencing court failed to consider the factors proffered 

in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721 does present a substantial question whereas a 

statement that the court failed to consider facts of record, though 

necessarily encompassing the factors of § 9721, has been rejected.”). 

Appellant next claims the trial court imposed an excessive sentence 

without stating sufficient reasons on the record. Appellant’s Brief at 13-15, 

22-23. Such a claim raises a substantial question for our review. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Macais, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa.Super.2009) (claim trial 

court failed to adequately state its reasons for sentence imposed raises 

substantial question); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 829 A.2d 334, 338 

(Pa.Super.2003) (same). 

Because the claims raise substantial questions, we will review their 

merits. Further, because Appellant’s issues are interrelated, we will address 

the issues together.

“Sentencing is a matter vested within the discretion of the trial court 

and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa.Super.2010) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 967 A.2d 1001 (Pa.Super.2009)). “An abuse 

of discretion requires the trial court to have acted with manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of 

support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. 

Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa.2007)). 
J-S19018-15

- 6 -

“A sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its 

reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in 

question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s 

consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.” 

Crump, 995 A.2d at 1283 (citing Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 

1247 (Pa.Super.2006)). Further, “where the trial court is informed by a presentence report, it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate 

sentencing factors and considerations.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 

A.2d 1128, 1134 (Pa.Super.2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 

Pa. 88, 101–102, 546 A.2d 12, 18–19 (1988)).

Here, the trial court discussed Appellant’s “history of assaultive 

behavior,” including that he was on bail for a child endangerment charge 

when he committed the offenses at issue. N.T., 5/27/2014, at 7, 11. The 

court noted simple assault and harassment charges were also filed against 

Appellant, but did not proceed because the victim, Appellant’s wife, refused 

to testify. Id., at 11-12. The trial court noted Appellant attempted to 

deflect responsibility for the crime by saying “some pretty unforgiveable 

things about the victim of this offense” and “attempt[ing] to paint the victim 

as a ‘promiscuous youngster.’” Id. at 12. The court noted that although 

Appellant did not qualify as a sexually violent predator, his sexual offender’s 

assessment indicated his conduct was consistent with paraphilic interests 

and his behavior was predatory in nature. Id. The court noted aggravating 

circumstances, including the failure to accept responsibility and the attempt 
J-S19018-15

- 7 -

to deflect responsibility onto the minor victim. Id. The trial court also 

reasoned that Appellant only attempted to take responsibility when he was 

before the court, with the threat of a lengthy sentence. Id. at 12-13. The 

trial court then noted the reasons set forth in the presentence report, which 

it adopted in its entirety, and sentenced Appellant as set forth above. Id. at 

13. 

The trial court acted within its discretion when it sentenced Appellant. 

Although the trial court discussed only the aggravating factors, it considered 

the pre-sentence report and adopted all reasons set forth therein. See 

Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1134 (where trial court has pre-sentence report, “it is 

presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and 

considerations”). Further, the trial court stated sufficient reasons for the 

sentence imposed.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/7/2015