UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4239

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY T. CHAMPION,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District 

Judge. (3:13-cr-00097-JRS-1)

Argued: January 27, 2015 Decided: April 10, 2015

Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Davis wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Diaz joined.

ARGUED: Daniel Paul Watkins, WILLIAMS MULLEN, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen Wiley Miller, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON 

BRIEF: John S. Davis, V, WILLIAMS MULLEN, Richmond, Virginia, 

for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, OFFICE 

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge:

Anthony T. Champion appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(i) for transportation of stolen firearms found in the 

trunk of a car he was operating. Champion contends the denial of 

his motion to suppress evidence from the vehicle search was 

erroneous because the mere odor of burnt marijuana in the 

passenger compartment is insufficient to establish probable 

cause to search the trunk of a car. The government responds that 

the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the car gave troopers 

probable cause to search any part of the car that could contain 

marijuana, including the trunk. We conclude that resolution of 

the issue framed by the parties is unnecessary in this case. The 

totality of the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop, 

based on several facts in addition to the strong odor of burnt 

marijuana, reveals that the troopers had probable cause to 

search for contraband in both the passenger compartment and the 

trunk of the car. Accordingly, we affirm.

In considering a district court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress, we review its “legal determinations de novo and actual 

findings for clear error.” United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d

660, 664 (4th Cir. 2011). When a district court has denied a 

suppression motion, “we construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted).
3

On January 13, 2013, Trooper A.B. Treakle was patrolling 

Northbound Interstate 95 when he pulled over a car that appeared 

to be speeding and violating a Virginia law that prohibits

dangling objects that obstruct the driver’s view of the highway. 

When Trooper Treakle attempted to stop the car, the driver, 

Appellant Champion, did not immediately pull over to the left 

lane where he could have easily stopped. Rather, he started to 

drive erratically, forcing Trooper Treakle to catch up to the 

speeding car. Eventually, Trooper Treakle caught up to the car, 

which was now pulled over on the right shoulder of the highway. 

Champion exited the car, walking in the travel lane. A passenger 

in the car, Karissa Wyatt, moved into the driver’s seat. In 

addition to Wyatt, who was Champion’s girlfriend, there was a 

third passenger in the car, Gabriel Shealy, who was holding a 

puppy. 

When Trooper Treakle confronted Champion about his erratic 

driving, Champion eventually told the trooper that he did not 

have a driver’s license. After talking to Champion, who was 

still outside of the car, the trooper approached the driver’s 

side of the car to talk to the passengers. As soon as he got to 

the window of the car, he smelled a “fairly strong” odor of 
4

marijuana.1 J.A. 26. It was at this point that Trooper Treakle 

decided that “a search of the vehicle” was necessary and that 

“this was no longer a traffic stop.” J.A. 26-27. He therefore 

requested a back-up trooper and, in the meantime, ran the 

passengers’ drivers licenses in the computer system. 

When the back-up trooper arrived, the troopers handcuffed 

Champion and placed him in a police car. Trooper Treakle asked 

Champion if there was any contraband in the car, and Champion 

responded “none that I know of.” J.A. 107. The passengers were 

ordered out of the car, searched, and positioned outside of the 

car with the back-up trooper while the search proceeded. 

Trooper Treakle first commenced a search of the passenger 

compartment of the car, looking specifically for marijuana. As 

he did so, the back-up trooper approached Treakle and told him 

that the passengers stated that their destination was 

Washington, D.C., which was inconsistent with Champion’s earlier 

assertion that his destination was Boston. The passengers also 

had admitted that they had smoked marijuana inside the car.2

 

 1 Trooper Treakle was accompanied by his drug detection dog 

while patrolling the interstate. He testified that he did not 

take the dog out to sniff the car because if a trooper smells 

marijuana, the protocol is to not run the dog. J.A. 32.

2 There is some inconsistency in the hearing testimony. The 

back-up trooper first testified that only one of the passengers 

admitted that she smoked marijuana inside the car, J.A. 54, but 

then later stated that “they stated that they were smoking 

(Continued)
5

At some point after this interaction, Trooper Treakle gave 

the car keys to his back-up and instructed him to search the 

trunk. The search of the trunk revealed a “thin drawstring-style 

gym bag,” J.A. 57, part of the contents of which, when the bag 

was first touched, was immediately recognized as the handle of a 

firearm. The bag contained nine firearms. After Mirandizing

Champion, the troopers questioned him, and he admitted he

purchased the guns but denied that they were stolen or that he 

was a felon.

After the return of the indictment, Champion filed a motion 

to suppress the firearms and the statements he made after he was 

Mirandized. As to the search, the district court denied the 

motion, concluding, in part, that the “Troopers ha[d] probable 

 

inside the vehicle.” J.A. 65. There is also some dispute between 

the parties over the timing of the passengers’ admission that 

they smoked marijuana inside the car. Ultimately, the district 

court found that one of the passengers “told [the back-up 

trooper] that she and her companions had been smoking ‘weed’ 

while driving on the highway” and that this admission occurred 

while Trooper Treakle was searching the passenger compartment of 

the car (in other words, before the search of the trunk 

occurred). J.A. 107. 

Champion does not challenge these factual findings, which 

are amply supported by the evidence. Consequently, to the extent 

that he contends we should assess the evidence of probable cause 

sufficient to search the trunk as of (or prior to) the moment 

when Trooper Treakle first commenced the search of the passenger 

compartment, we reject his contention. Rather, we assess the 

sufficiency of the evidence based on all of the facts known to 

the troopers before the search of the trunk commenced.
6

cause to search the trunk of the vehicle once they smell[ed] 

marijuana in the passenger compartment.” J.A. 108. The factual 

support for the existence of probable cause was bolstered, the 

court reasoned, because the strong odor of marijuana was 

“corroborated by the statement of Ms. Wyatt that each of the 

occupants had possessed and smoked marijuana in the car while on 

the highway.” J.A. 108. Champion subsequently pled guilty to the 

indictment count of possession of a stolen firearm, but reserved 

the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.3 This 

appeal followed. 

As mentioned above, the parties have sought to draw us into 

their debate over whether the mere odor of burnt marijuana in 

the passenger compartment of a vehicle is ever sufficient to 

give rise to probable cause to search the trunk of the vehicle, 

a question we have not specifically addressed in a published 

opinion and as to which there exists a circuit split. Compare

United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 

1995)(“[A]n officer obtains probable cause to search the trunk 

of a vehicle once he smells marijuana in the passenger 

compartment and finds corroborating evidence of contraband.”),

with United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 686-87 (5th Cir. 

 3 Champion concedes, of course, that if probable cause 

supported the search of the vehicle, no warrant was necessary. 
7

1995)(citing cases in which the court had held that “the smell 

of marihuana alone may be ground enough for a finding of 

probable cause”), United States v. Winters, 221 F.3d 1039, 1041 

(8th Cir. 2000) (affirming the lower court’s conclusion that 

“once the trooper smelled marijuana, he had probable cause to 

search the entire vehicle, including the trunk and all 

containers therein, for controlled substances”), and United 

States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Kayras’s 

detection of the smell of burnt marijuana while he was 

conducting the search for an open container gave him probable 

cause to search the entire vehicle for drugs.”). But we find it 

unnecessary to choose sides in this debate.

Here, the district court’s determination of probable cause 

relied on more than the mere odor of marijuana.4 Because the 

record reveals other facts which amply support a finding of 

probable cause, this case does not necessitate resolving the 

more difficult question that the parties present. 

 4 Although the district court seemed to adopt a categorical 

rule when it stated that the “Troopers [had] probable cause to 

search the trunk of the vehicle once they smell[ed] marijuana in 

the passenger compartment,” J.A. 108, the court went on to say 

that its finding of probable cause was supported by the 

statement of one of the passengers that “each of the occupants 

had possessed and smoked marijuana in the car while on the 

highway.” J.A. 108. Its determination of probable cause, 

therefore, does not rely solely on the trooper’s testimony that 

he smelled marijuana emanating from the passenger compartment of 

the car.
8

We hold that the district court did not err in finding 

there existed probable cause to search the trunk of the car. As 

we explained in United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 

2010):

Probable cause is not readily, or even usefully, 

reduced to a neat set of legal rules. However, the 

Supreme Court has described it as existing where the 

known facts and circumstances are sufficient to 

warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief 

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. 

When assessing probable cause, we must examine the 

facts from the standpoint of an objectively 

reasonable police officer, giving due weight to 

inferences drawn from those facts by . . . local law 

enforcement officers.

Id. at 591-92 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Here, several factors in the aggregate amounted to probable 

cause for the troopers to believe that contraband existed 

generally within the car, including the trunk. 

First, the strong odor of marijuana is the most obvious 

factor supporting a finding of probable cause. See United States 

v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 2004) (“We have 

repeatedly held that the odor of marijuana alone can provide 

probable cause to believe that marijuana is present in a 

particular place. . . . While smelling marijuana does not assure 

that marijuana is still present, the odor certainly provides 

probable cause to believe that it is.”). Trooper Treakle’s 

undisputed testimony that he recognized the “strong odor” of 

marijuana immediately upon his approach to the vehicle, coupled 
9

with Champion’s tantalizingly ambiguous response to his inquiry 

whether there was contraband in the car (“none that I know of”) 

provide compelling evidence that it was reasonable for him to 

conclude that there was a “fair probability” that marijuana (or 

other contraband) was located generally within the car. See

Kelly, 592 F.3d at 592. 

Second, Ms. Wyatt’s admission that the occupants of the car 

had been smoking “weed” while driving on the highway further 

supports the conclusion that the troopers had probable cause to 

search the trunk, and not just the passenger compartment, for 

contraband. This admission is especially important here because 

of the temporal element: the passenger admitted that the 

occupants had been smoking “weed” while on the highway on which 

they were pulled over. Thus, the admission established a fair 

probability that contraband, specifically marijuana, was present

in the car at the time it was pulled over. And, since even 

personal use quantities of marijuana can be stored in a trunk, 

there was a fair probability that marijuana would be found in 

the trunk. See United States v. Turner, 119 F.3d 18, 20-21 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s argument that evidence of 

personal use of marijuana is insufficient to support a finding 

of probable cause to search the trunk of the car and collecting 

cases in which police officers were justified in searching the 

trunk of cars after finding evidence of marijuana use). 
10

Finally, the occupants’ inconsistent answers as to their 

travel plans also contribute to a finding of probable cause to 

search the trunk for contraband insofar as the inconsistencies 

supported an inference of ongoing criminal activity. See United 

States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 445 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding 

that a defendant’s “uncertainty and confusion about his 

destination” supported a finding that probable cause existed to 

search his car for contraband); United States v. Guevara, 731 

F.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming a finding of probable 

cause to search a car in part on the basis that the defendant 

and her sister “gave inconsistent answers about which relative 

they were going to visit, and neither of them knew the address 

of their final destination”). 

In sum, a reasonable law enforcement officer could conclude 

on this record that (1) the inconsistencies in the accounts of 

the occupants’ journey, combined with (2) the strong odor of 

marijuana, (3) the admission that the occupants smoked

marijuana in the car during the trip, and (4) Champion’s 

apparent “uncertainty” whether there was contraband in the 

vehicle he himself was driving (allegedly all the way to Boston

from Virginia) were, in the aggregate, indicative of criminal 

activity, such as (but not necessarily limited to) distribution 

or possession of illegal narcotics. As such, there was probable 

cause to search the trunk, as both distribution and possession 
11

quantities of narcotics can be found in the trunk of a car. 

Thus, in light of the totality of the circumstances, there was 

a fair probability that the car contained contraband and that 

it was stored in the trunk. It follows that the district court 

correctly denied the motion to suppress the firearms discovered 

during a lawful search of the vehicle by the troopers. 

The judgment is

AFFIRMED.