alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ELLIS D. THOMAS, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-0106 (UNA)

)

D.C. LAW ENFORCEMENT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and 

his pro se complaint. The Court will GRANT the application and, for the reasons stated below, 

DISMISS the complaint.

The Court is mindful that complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent 

standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Even pro se litigants, however, must comply with the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the 

grounds upon which the Court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader 

seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The purpose of the minimum standard of Rule 8 is to give fair notice 

to the defendants of the claim being asserted, sufficient to prepare a responsive answer, to 

prepare an adequate defense and to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. 

Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Thomas-Smith has made false reports about him to 

various police forces in the Washington, D.C. area over the course of 20 years, and that 
2

defendant Lindsey is responsible for “never ending entrapment techniques” and “[t]errorizing 

[plaintiff] at [his] jobs, relationships, etc.” Compl. at 4. Further, he alleges he has been 

assaulted physically “multiple times over the years” “by multiple officers” assigned to various 

divisions of the Metropolitan Police Department. See id. at 5. For the injuries allegedly 

sustained, plaintiff demands an award of $7,750,000. See id.

As drafted, this complaint runs afoul of Rule 8(a). What few factual allegations plaintiff 

makes are far too vague to put any defendant on notice of plaintiff’s legal claims. It is not 

enough, for example, that defendants are “depriving [plaintiff] of a job” or harassing, stalking, 

and retaliating against him, Compl. at 4, without identifying specific incidents or explaining how 

and when defendants have caused plaintiff harm. 

The Court will grant plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and will dismiss 

the complaint. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.

DATE: January 25, 2023 /s/

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Judge
# FY14 Purchases by Vendor
391 A.2d 676

#### Commonwealth v. Burgess, Appellant.

Submitted June 23,1977.

George B. Ditter and Calvin S. Drayer, Jr., Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant; Ross Weiss, First Assistant District Attorney, and William T. Nicholas, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Order affirmed.

WATKINS, former P. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
653.05707
Exhibit 31.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  I, James A. Morris, certify that:  1.   I have reviewed this Annual Report (the Report) on Form 10-KSB of the small business issuer;  2.   Based on my knowledge, this Report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Report;  3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this Report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this Report;  4.   The small business issuers other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the small business issuer and have:  a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this Report is being prepared;  b) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report my conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this Report based on such evaluation; and  c) disclosed in this Report any change in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuers most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuers fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting; and  5.   The small business issuers other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuers board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions);  a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting.  Date:9/14/07By:/s/James A. MorrisJames A. MorrisSecretary and Director
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Wise Metals Group LLC (the “Company”) for the quarter ending March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the“Report”), I, Kenneth Stastny, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: July 9, 2009 

 

A signed original of this written statement, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwiseadopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0275n.06

Case No. 14-5627

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTOINNE GOODLOE,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

KENTUCKY

BEFORE: NORRIS, SUTTON, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. In 2008, Antoinne Goodloe pleaded guilty to a crack-related offense. 

See 21 U.S.C. § 846. He received a 121-month sentence, one month above the then-applicable 

mandatory minimum. After the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 lowered that minimum to sixty 

months, Goodloe moved for a sentence reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court 

obliged him one month, but refused to apply the new minimum retroactively. That refusal, 

Goodloe now argues, violates both the Act and the Constitution. But United States v. Blewett, 

746 F.3d 647, 650 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc), holds otherwise. Because the old minimum still 

applies to his case, Goodloe received the maximum reduction the law permits.

For these reasons, we affirm.
[THE LEBRECHT GROUP, APLC LETTERHEAD]


                                 April 16, 2002

E-Rex,  Inc.
11645  Biscayne  Boulevard,  Suite  210
Miami,  FL  33181
Attn:  Carl  E.  Dilley,  President

     RE:     FEE  PROPOSAL

Dear  Mr.  Dilley:

     This letter will confirm our understanding whereby you have agreed to issue
to Brian A. Lebrecht, principal of The Lebrecht Group, APLC, 2,000,000 shares of
common  stock  (the  "Shares")  of  E-Rex,  Inc.  (the  "Company")  as  partial
consideration  for legal services rendered to the Company in the area of general
corporate  legal services and preparing the Company's filings as required by the
Securities  Exchange  Act  of 1934 (the "Services").  Upon sale of any or all of
the  Shares,  an  amount  equal  to 75% of the net proceeds will be applied as a
credit  against amounts due from the Company to The Lebrecht Group, APLC for the
Services.

     If  this letter correctly sets forth our agreement, please indicate by your
signature  below.  Other  than  as set forth herein, the terms and conditions of
the  Engagement Agreement between the Company and The Lebrecht Group, APLC shall
remain  in  full  force  and  effect.

                         Sincerely,


                         /s/ Brian A. Lebrecht, Esq.
                         ______________________________
                         Brian  A.  Lebrecht,  Esq.
                         The  Lebrecht  Group,  APLC

     The  undersigned  hereby confirms and agrees that this letter, executed and
effective  this  16th  day  of  April,  2002,  sets  forth  my understanding and
agreement  with  The  Lebrecht  Group,  APLC.

E-Rex,  Inc.
a  Nevada  corporation

/s/ Carl E. Dilley
____________________________________
By:     Carl  E.  Dilley
Its:     President
#### In the Matter of the Claim of John Somers, Respondent, v Texaco, Inc., et al., Appellants. Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

—Appeals from two decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed July 18, 1989 and March 23, 1990, which, *inter alia,*ruled that claimant sustained a permanent partial disability.

*843Whether a claimant’s disability is schedulable is a question of fact within the exclusive province of the Workers’ Compensation Board to resolve and its determination of the issue must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence *(Matter of Donahue v Thomas H. Bradley, Inc.,*90 AD2d 611). The record in this case contains substantial evidence to sustain the finding that claimant had a permanent partial disability and that his condition was not amenable to a schedule loss evaluation. The medical evidence showed that claimant had continuing pain in his right shoulder, that it interfered with his ability to perform his regular work and two physicians opined that the condition was probably permanent. Although there was medical evidence which could have supported a contrary conclusion, this conflicting proof was properly resolved as a factual determination by the Board *(see, Matter of Andrews v T & G Floor & Wall Covering,*122 AD2d 355). The employer’s remaining contentions on appeal have been considered and deemed to be lacking in merit.

Mahoney, P. J., Casey, Weiss, Mikoll and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decisions are affirmed, with costs.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A24A1472. CHANEY WAYNE ALLEN v. THE STATE.

On April 16, 2024, Chaney Wayne Allen filed a pro se notice of appeal, seeking

review of the trial court’s March 15, 2024 order denying his motion to correct void

sentence. We lack jurisdiction because the appeal is untimely.

To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the

order on appeal. OCGA§ 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal

is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Davis v. State, 330 Ga.

App. 711, 711 (769 SE2d 133) (2015). Allen’s notice of appeal was filed 32 days after

entry of the order on appeal.The notice is datedApril 13, 2024—before the expiration

ofthe 30-day appeal period—but was not stamped“filed”by the trial court clerk until

April 16. We recognize that, as a pro se prisoner, Allen depends upon correctional

personnel to dispatch his mail.

June 07, 2024
Nevertheless, even if he acted promptly afterreceiving the trial court’s order,1

“his filing did not get to the superior court in time. Sowe have no jurisdiction over his

appeal.” Ebeling v. State, 355 Ga. App. 469, 470 (844 SE2d 518) (2020).

Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office,Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

1

In his notice of appeal, Allen claims that he did not receive the trial court’s

order until April 10.

06/07/2024
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-2332
CHRISTINE SANDRA MCLENDON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus MARIA KILLIEUM, Doctor; MICHAEL TAYLOR, Deputy; JOSEPH SAMUELS, Deputy, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge. (CA-95-776) Submitted: February 13, 1997 Decided: February 25, 1997 Before WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Christine Sandra McLendon, Appellant Pro Se. C. Lamar Garren, MARTIN & RAYNOR, P.C., Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. McLendon v. Killieum , No. CA-95-776 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
M A N D A T E

TO THE 359TH DISTRICT COURT of MONTGOMERY COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before our Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas, on the 30th day of 

December, 2014, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your judgment between

JOHN RUSSELL COFFMAN, Appellant,

v.

CELESTE ELANE COFFMAN Appellees.

CAUSE NO. 13-12-00303-CV (Tr.Ct.No. 11-01-00804-CV)

was determined; and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. Costs of the appeal are adjudged 

against appellant.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

December 30, 2014.



WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court of Appeals 

for the Thirteenth District of Texas, in this behalf, and in all things have it duly 

recognized, obeyed and executed.

WITNESS, the Hon. Rogelio Valdez, Chief Justice of our Court of Appeals, with the seal 

thereof affixed, at the City of Edinburg, Texas this 13th day of April, 2015.

Dorian E. Ramirez, CLERK
Court of Appeals

First District of Texas

301 Fannin Street

Houston, Texas 77002-2066

SHERRY RADACK

 CHIEF JUSTICE

TERRY JENNINGS

EVELYN KEYES

LAURA CARTER HIGLEY

JANE BLAND

MICHAEL MASSENGALE

HARVEY BROWN

REBECA HUDDLE

RUSSELL LLOYD

 JUSTICES

CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

 CLERK OF THE COURT

JANET WILLIAMS

 CHIEF STAFF ATTORNEY

PHONE: 713-274-2700

FAX: 713-755-8131

 www.txcourts.gov/1stcoa.aspx

August 19, 2015

Nelda T. Garcia

Administrative Assistant IV

Office of the Attorney General

Criminal Appeals Division 

William P. Clements Bldg. 8th Floor

300w. 15th Street

Austin, Texas 78701

Nelda.garcia@texasattorneygeneral.gov

(512) 475-3321

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 01-13-00298-CR

Trial Court Case Number: 11-11635

Style: Corwin Demetrius Johnson v The State of Texas

We are forwarding the records for the above referenced cause via the FTP site.

Sincerely,

Christopher A. Prine, Clerk of the Court

By Jesse Rodriguez, Deputy Clerk IV
#### Rosalie Gowan, Also Known as Rosalie Wallace, Appellant, v Paul A. Menga, Respondent.

—Case held, decision reserved, motion to relieve counsel of assignment granted, and new counsel to be assigned. Memorandum: Petitioner’s attorney has moved to be relieved of his assignment on the ground that no nonfrivolous issues exist on appeal. We find that there are nonfrivolous issues overlooked by counsel; therefore, we relieve counsel of his assignment and assign new counsel to file a brief addressing all nonfrivolous issues found by counsel upon a review of the record. In our view, a nonfrivolous issue exists regarding whether the record supports the court’s determination to award respondent custody of the parties’ child and to deny petitioner all visitation rights. Visitation is a joint right of the noncustodial parent and child *(see, Weiss v Weiss,*52 NY2d 170, 175; *Twersky v Twersky,*103 AD2d 775). "Absent extraordinary circumstances, where visitation would be detrimental to the child’s well-being, a noncustodial parent has a right to reasonable visitation privileges” *(Twersky v Twersky, supra,*at 775-776; *see also, Matter of Dervay v Dervay,*111 AD2d 462, 463; *Matter of Schack v Schack,*98 AD2d 802). A second nonfrivolous issue concerns the fact that the Judge who presided over the fact-finding hearing initially directed that a social investigation be conducted, reserved decision pending receipt of the report, but did not render a decision. Rather, without explanation, a different Judge made the custody determination based *978solely upon his review of the reports of the social investigations. (Appeal from Order of Ontario County Family Court, Henry, Jr., J.—Custody.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Denman, Lawton, Lowery and Davis, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2  Certification Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant To Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002    The undersigned hereby certifies, in my capacity as an officer of NSTAR Electric Company, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:(i)the enclosed Annual Report of NSTAR Electric Company on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and(ii)the information contained in such Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of NSTAR Electric Company.  Dated: February 11, 2010By:_/s/ JAMES J. JUDGE_____James J. JudgeSenior Vice Presidentand Chief Financial Officer
<Page>




                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the use of our report
dated March 20, 2002, covering the audited financial statements of Separate
Account A, (and to all references to our Firm) included in or made a part of
this Registration Statement File No. 33-71686 for First Fortis Life Insurance
Company Separate Account A on Form N-4.

/s/ Arthur Andersen LLP

Hartford Connecticut
April 17, 2002
ELECTRONIC RECORD

WW

COA# 01-12-01146-CR OFFENSE: 29.02 (Robbery)

Jay Scott Garrison, Jr. v. The State

STYLE: ofTexas COUNTY: Harris

COA DISPOSITION: AFFIRM TRIAL COURT: 178th District Court

DATE: 02/26/2014 Publish: NO TC CASE #: 1302172

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Jay Scott Garrison, Jr. v. The State of

STYLE: Texas

PRO sg Petition

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS:

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DATE: f/OiJ&^A^K /f ZOlj

JUDGE: f,l* Us**«-<.

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CP^ o^/#i/^rf

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CCA#: mwt

CCA Disposition:

DATE:

JUDGE:

SIGNED: PC:

PUBLISH: DNP:

JWH^ MOTION FOR

REHEARING IN CCA IS:

JUDGE:

ELECTRONIC RECORD
EXhibit 10.16


 


THIRD
AMENDMENT TO LICENSE AGREEMENT


 


THIS
THIRD AMENDMENT TO LICENSE AGREEMENT made this 7th day of February 2022.


 


TEXAS
MEDICAL CENTER (“Licensor”), and BIOLIFE4D INC., a Delaware C-Corporation (“Licensee”) are parties
to a certain License Agreement (“License”) dated April 3, 2018 with respect to premises identified as Lab J-307 located at
2450 Holcombe Boulevard, Houston, Texas 77021-2040.


 


	 	A.	The Licensee wishes to modify their footprint in JLABS @ TMC
and Licensor has agreed to accommodate this request.




 


NOW,
THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, which is incorporated herein by reference, for mutual promises contained herein, and for
other good and valuable considerations, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, Licensor and Licensee hereby agree
as follows:


 


		1.	Effective
                                            March 1st, 2022 Licensee shall have access to Office J-615.



 


		2.	Section
                                            2.1 of the License shall be amended to reflect an increase in the License Fee in the amount
                                            of $2,500.00 for a total License Fee in the amount of $6,867.20 per month.



 


		3.	Section
                                            2.5 of the License shall be amended to reflect that on or before the Effective Date, Licensee
                                            shall deposit with licensor the additional amount of $5,700 for a total Security Deposit
                                            of $13,700.



 


		4.	Except
                                            as amended by this 3rd Amendment, all other terms of the License shall remain
                                            in full force and effect.



 


(signatures
on the following page)


 




    	 



     


    

 


IN
WITNESS WHEREOF, Licensor and Licensee have caused their duly authorized representatives to execute this 3rd Amendment as
of the date first written.


 


	 	LICENSOR:
	 	 
	 	TEXAS
    MEDICAL CENTER
	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/
    William F. McKean
	 	Name:	William
    F. McKean
	 	Title:	President
    and Chief Executive Officer


 


	 	LICENSEE:
	 	 
	 	BIOLIFE4D
    INC.
	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/
    Steven Morris
	 	Name:	Steven
    Morris
	 	Title:	CEO