alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document

 
AMENDMENT #2 TO PAR PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC. SEVERANCE PLAN FOR SENIOR OFFICERS


        THIS AMENDMENT #2 TO PAR PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC. SEVERANCE PLAN FOR SENIOR OFFICERS (this “Amendment”) is made and entered into effective as of May 23, 2022.


RECITALS:


    A.    WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend that certain Par Pacific Holdings, Inc. Severance Plan for Senior Officers dated effective as of March 7, 2017, as amended May 1, 2017 (the “Agreement”) on the terms set forth herein to clarify certain matters.  
AGREEMENT:
1.    Defined Terms.  All capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Agreement. 


2.    Amendments to Agreement (Executive Definition).  The definition of Executive in Section 2.16 of the Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:


“Executive” means an individual directly employed by the Company Group on a regular, full-time basis who, with respect to the Company, is the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, the General Counsel, the Executive Vice President – Refining and Logistics, the Executive Vice President – Retail, the Chief Human Resources Officer, or the Chief Information Officer.  The definition of Executive shall also include any other person employed by the Company or its Affiliates who is specifically approved for participation in the Par Pacific Holdings, Inc. Severance Plan for Senior Officers by the Board.


3.    Amendments to Agreement (Director Resignation).  A new Section 11.10 is hereby added to the Agreement:


“11.10     Director Resignation.  Notwithstanding any provision of this Plan to the contrary, any Executive otherwise eligible for severance benefits hereunder who is also a member of the Board shall not be entitled to receive any severance benefits hereunder unless and until such Executive resigns as a member of the Board.”
4.    Ratification of Agreement.  Except as expressly set forth in this Amendment, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and is ratified and confirmed in all respects. 


5.    Governing Law.  This Amendment shall be interpreted, construed, and constructed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware without regard to its conflicts of law provisions, except as may be superseded by applicable laws of the United States.














IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment is hereby adopted effective as of the date first set forth above.  
PAR PACIFIC HOLDINGS, INC.


By:     /s/ Jeffrey R. Hollis            
Name: Jeffrey R. Hollis    ___________
Title:   Vice President, General Counsel and  Secretary
OFFICIAL NOTICE FROM COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

P.O. BOX 12308, CAPITOL STATION, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711

STATE ©F TEXAS

PENALTY FOR

3/23/2015 PRIVATE USE .*

OCHOA, ADRIAN Tr. Ct. N&%l3^W2^tWAILEDFROMz,pfal?-F82?879-03

On this day, the application for 11 07 Writ of Habeas Corpus has been received

ie Court. .," --

' * " Abel Acosta, Clerk

and present

ADRIAN OCHOA

GOREEUNIT-TDC# .6532

iJT
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CARMON E. WARREN,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

J. SHAWNEGO,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 13-16525

D.C. No. 1:03-cv-06336-AWISKO

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 14, 2014** 

Before: LEAVY, GOULD, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

Carmon E. Warren, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

district court’s order denying his motion for relief from judgment of the dismissal

of his action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We dismiss this appeal

for lack of jurisdiction.

FILED

APR 09 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Warren failed to appeal within 30 days of April 23, 2013, the date of the

district court’s order denying his motion for relief from judgment. See Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1) (“[T]he notice is timely if it is

deposited in the institution’s internal mail system on or before the last day for

filing.”); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 273 (1988) (“[D]elivery of a notice of

appeal to prison authorities would not under any theory constitute a ‘filing’ unless

the notice were delivered for forwarding to the district court.”). Accordingly,

Warren’s notices of appeal were untimely and we lack jurisdiction. See

Stephanie-Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 476 F.3d 701, 703

(9th Cir. 2007) (“A timely notice of appeal is a non-waivable jurisdictional

requirement.”).

Even if we had jurisdiction, we would affirm the district court’s order

denying Warren’s motion for relief from judgment, because Warren failed to

demonstrate extraordinary circumstances warranting such relief. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 60(b)(6); E.D. Cal. R. 230(j)(3)-(4) (setting forth grounds for reconsideration

under local rules); see also Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014)

(explaining that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to exhaust

available administrative remedies before filing suit).

DISMISSED.

2 13-16525
4. C. Table of Contents.

### RULEMAKING FILE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PUBLIC HEARING TO CONSID ER ADOPTION OF PROPOSED

AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFO RNIA CONSUMER PRODUCTS

REGULATION

1. Updated Informative Digest

2. Executive Order R-08-016

3. Resolution 08-30

4. Final Statement of Reasons

5. Notice of Decision and Response to Significant

Environmental Issues

6. Economic and Fi scal Impact Statement

7. Certificate of Mailing

8. Staff Report, Initia l Statement of Reasons

9. Transcript of Public Hearing

10. Slide Presentation

11. Written Comments Received During 45-Day

Comment Period

12. Certificate of Mailing

13. Written Comments Received During 15-Day

Comment Period

14. References Used by ARB Staff
#### Phillip A. REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. 4024.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

May 11, 1979.

*22Patrick J. McKay, of Pettyjohn & Pes-tinger, Anchorage, for appellant.

Thomas M. Wardell, Dist. Atty., Kenai, Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

OPINION

Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CON-NOR, BOOCHEVER, BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is a sentence appeal.

Upon pleas of guilty, defendant was convicted of one felony count and one misdemeanor count of receiving and concealing stolen property. He was sentenced to three years, the maximum, on the felony count, *23and one year, the maximum, on the misdemeanor count. These were to be served consecutively to each other and to a sentence then being served for a parole revocation on an earlier offense. However, three years of the combined sentences were suspended, with defendant to be on probation for five years. In addition to other conditions of probation, defendant was to enroll in a TASC 1 program, was to make restitution of $958, and was not to consume nonprescription drugs or alcohol.

Defendant was twenty-five years of age at the time of sentencing. He had an extensive record of antisocial behavior, including three residential burglaries as a juvenile and, as an adult, convictions for illegal possession of moosemeat, receiving and concealing stolen property, several convictions of burglary in a dwelling, one conviction of passing a forged check, and convictions on two previous occasions for attempting to pass forged checks. Additionally, he had one probation violation and one parole violation on his record.

Defendant contends that the court was clearly mistaken in characterizing him as the worst type of offender. We are unpersuaded. The court had before it an extensive presentence report and the past record of the defendant, from which it could reasonably draw its conclusions.

Similarly, in prohibiting the use of drugs and alcohol as a condition of probation, the court acted reasonably. There was copious evidence before the court that alcohol played a substantial role in defendant’s criminal behavior, and that he had in the past been addicted to heroin, although reportedly he had achieved a cure for that addiction.

The trial court ordered that the defendant receive no credit for time served since his arrest. This was proper in view of the court’s action in making the sentences consecutive to the time to be served on the parole revocation, for the time served from defendant’s arrest should properly have been credited toward the parole revocation sentence. AS 11.05.040; AS 33.15.200. Given the defendant’s extensive criminal record and lack of rehabilitation, we do not think that the total sentences were excessive.

Defendant argues that the five year probationary period exceeded the statutory máximums which could be imposed for the underlying offenses and, therefore, was excessive. This claim is without merit. *See Tiedeman v. State,*576 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1978).

AFFIRMED.

1

. “Treatment Alternatives to Street Crimes.”
##### 



Exhibit 31.2
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 17 CFR 240.13a-14
PROMULGATED UNDER
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of
Celanese Holdings LLC;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this quarterly report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented
in this quarterly report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:
 (a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly report
is being prepared;(b)
    
    [Reserved](c)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and(d)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) that occurred during
the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the
case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of registrants Board of Directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
 (a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and(b)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/ John J. Gallagher IIIJohn J. Gallagher IIIExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 8, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 05-41749

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

FLORENCIO JIMENEZ-ESTEBAN,

Defendant, Appellant,

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

Before DAVIS, SMITH and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Appellant Florencio Jimenez-Esteban(“Jimenez”) pleaded

guilty to being illegally present in the United States following

deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b). On October

31, 2005, the district court sentenced him to serve 24 months in
1See United States v. Jimenez-Esteban, 195 F.App'x 267 (5th

Cir. 2006).

2127 S.Ct. 625 (2006).

3Lopez, 127 S.Ct. At 629-633.

2

the custody of the Bureau of Prisons followed by 2 years of

supervised release.

Jimenez appealed from the judgment of conviction and sentence,

arguing that his prior conviction for possession of a controlled

substance was not an aggravated felony and challenging the

constitutionality of the sentencing enhancement he received based

on this finding. We affirmed the judgment.1

Jimenez filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari with

the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted the petition,

vacated our judgment, and remanded the case to this court for

further consideration in light of Lopez v. Gonzales.

2

In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that a state felony

conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance that was

not punishable as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances

Act was not a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and

hence not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).3

Jimenez argues that, in light of Lopez, his conviction for

possession of a controlled substance does not qualify as an

aggravated felony because that crime was punishable only as a

misdemeanor under the federal Controlled Substances Act and,
4See United States v. Rosenbaum-Alanis, –-F.3d ---, 2007 WL

926832 (5th Cir. March 29, 2007). 

3

accordingly, the district court erred in enhancing his sentence

based on the conviction. 

On remand, the parties advise that Jimenez completed the

imprisonment component of his sentence and was deported to Mexico,

although his term of supervised release is ongoing. Under these

circumstances, even assuming Lopez error, because the defendant has

been deported and is unable (without the permission of the Attorney

General) to reenter the United States and be present for a

resentencing proceeding as required by Rule 43, there is no relief

we are able to grant him and his appeal is moot.4 The appeal is

therefore DISMISSED.
116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 80 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Approving the request of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs 

for a waiver under section 1703E(f) of title 38, United 

States Code. 

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 That Congress approves the request for a waiver under 
2 

•HJ 80 EH 

1 section 1703E(f) of title 38, United States Code, as sub2 mitted by the Secretary on December 6, 2019. 

Passed the House of Representatives January 13, 

2020. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. J. RES. 80 

JOINT RESOLUTION 

Approving the request of the Secretary of Veterans 

title 38, United States Code. Affairs for a waiver under section 1703E(f) of
Order entered April 10, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01424-CV

MARTIN PHILIP KOCH, Appellant

V.

BOXICON, LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 429-04678-2012

ORDER

We GRANT appellant’s April 9, 2015 motion for an extension of time to file an 

amended brief. We ORDER the amended brief tendered to this Court on April 9, 2015 filed as 

of the date of this order.

We DENY as premature appellee’s April 8, 2015 motion for an extension of time to file a 

brief. Appellee’s brief is due within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this order. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.6(b).

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
**Exhibit 12****CELANESEHOLDINGS LLC****COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES (unaudited)**                   **Three Months Ended** **Six Months Ended**  **June 30,** **June 30,** **June 30,** **June 30,**  **2006** **2005** **2006** **2005**  **(In $ millions, except ratio of earnings to combined fixed**  **charges)****Earnings:**                Earningsfrom continuing operations before tax andminority interest  160   133   335   180 Less:                Equity in net earnings of affiliates  (18)  (12)  (39)  (27)Plus:                Income distributions from equity investments  19   10   36   46 Amortization of capitalized interest  1   2   2   3 Total fixed charges  75   73   147   228    Total earnings as defined before combined fixed charges  237   206   481   430    **Fixed charges:**                Interest expense  63   59   124   199 Capitalized interest  2   1   3   2 Estimated interest portion of rent expense  9   6   18   12 Guaranteed payment to minority shareholders  1   7   2   15    Total combined fixed charges  75   73   147   228    Ratio of earnings to combined fixed charges  3.2   2.8   3.3   1.9
In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

MELANIE A. FRAMPTON, * 

 * No. 13-892V

 Petitioner, * Special Master Christian J. Moran 

 * 

v. * Filed: March 17, 2015

 * 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Attorneys’ fees and costs; award

AND HUMAN SERVICES, * in the amount to which respondent 

 * does not object.

 Respondent. * 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

Jeffrey Golvash, Brennan, Robins & Daley, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, for petitioner; 

Ryan Pyles, United States Dep’t of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. 

UNPUBLISHED DECISION ON FEES AND COSTS1

On March 13, 2015, petitioner filed a stipulation of fact concerning final 

attorneys’ fees and costs in the above-captioned matter. Previously, petitioner 

informally submitted a draft application for attorneys’ fees and costs to respondent 

for review. Upon review of petitioner’s application, respondent does not object to 

the amount requested. The Court awards the amount to which respondent does not 

object.

On November 12, 2013, Melanie Frampton filed a petition for compensation

alleging that the trivalent influenza (“flu”) vaccine, which she received on or about 

November 12, 2010, caused her to develop paresthesias, a myelopathy, and/or 

myelitis. Petitioner received compensation based upon the parties’ 

1

 The E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (Dec. 17, 

2002), requires that the Court post this ruling on its website. Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 18(b), the 

parties have 14 days to file a motion proposing redaction of medical information or other 

information described in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4). Any redactions ordered by the special 

master will appear in the document posted on the website. 

 
stipulation. Decision, filed February 3, 2015. Because petitioner received 

compensation, she is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 

300aa-15(e). 

Petitioner seeks a total of $16,182.51 in attorney and paralegal fees and 

$918.63 in costs. In compliance with General Order No. 9, petitioner has incurred 

no out-of-pocket litigation expenses while pursuing this claim. Respondent has no 

objection to the amount requested for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

After reviewing the request, the Court awards the following:

A lump sum of $17,101.14 in the form of a check made payable to 

petitioner and petitioner’s attorney, Jeffrey Golvash for 

attorney’s fees and other litigation costs available under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 300aa-15(e).

The Court thanks the parties for their cooperative efforts in resolving this 

matter. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly. 

Any questions may be directed to my law clerk, Christina Gervasi, at (202) 

357-6360. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

 s/Christian J. Moran

 Christian J. Moran

 Special Master

2
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON



### ORDER ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

Appellate case name: Maxine Adams and Cecil Adams v. Rebecca Ross

Appellate case number: 01

- 11

- 00098

- CV

Trial court case number: 980231

Trial court: County Civil Court at Law No. 1 of Harris County, Texas

Appellants ’ motion for rehearing is DENIED

.

It is so ORDERED

.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Harvey Brown

Acting for the Court

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higl ey and Brown

.

Date: May 15, 2013
#### Kenneth E. SCHLOSKY and Merlyn M. Schlosky, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, v. MOBILE PREMIX CONCRETE, INC., Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and Alan W. Buchanan d/b/a Mountain Flatwork, Defendant.

No. 82CA0288.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

Nov. 26, 1982.

*1318Robert C. Ozer, P.C., Robert C. Ozer, Conifer, for plaintiffs-appellants and cross-ap-pellees.

Thomas C. Seawell, Lois T. Levinson, Denver, for defendant-appellee and cross-appellant.

KELLY, Judge.

The plaintiffs, Kenneth E. and Merlyn M. Schlosky, appeal the judgment of the trial court dismissing their amended complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. A judgment was entered against the defendant Buchanan, and he is not a party to this appeal. The defendant, Mobile Premix Concrete, Inc., cross-appeals the trial court’s denial of its request for attorneys’ fees under the provisions of § 13-17-101, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Cum.Supp.), and seeks attorneys’ fees on appeal under § 13-17-103, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Cum.Supp.). We affirm.

The plaintiffs are seeking to recover for alleged abuse of process, slander of title, and outrageous conduct. Both their original and their amended complaints were dismissed by the trial court, and we agree that the amended complaint wrought no substantial change in the nature of the relief sought.

The gravamen of each claim is that the defendant filed a lien statement against the plaintiffs’ property, that the six-month period allowed for foreclosure under § 38-22-110, C.R.S.1973, had elapsed without action by the defendant, and that the defendant’s refusal to release the lien created a cloud upon the plaintiffs’ title. The trial court ruled correctly that the plaintiffs’ allegations failed to provide a basis for the relief sought.

A mechanic’s lien is extinguished upon the claimant’s failure to initiate an action within the statutory six-month period. Section 38-22-110, C.R.S.1973; *Cox v. Bankers Trust Co.,*39 Colo.App. 303, 570 P.2d 6 (1977); *Rogers Concrete, Inc. v. Jude Contractors,*38 Colo.App. 26, 550 P.2d 892 (1976). There having been no notice of commencement of the action filed, there could be no cloud upon the plaintiffs’ title. *See Kalamath Investment Co. v. Asphalt Paving Co.,*153 Colo. 109, 384 P.2d 938 (1963). Therefore, no basis exists for the plaintiffs’ claims of abuse of process, *Aztec Sound Corp. v. Western States Leasing Co.,*32 Colo.App. 248, 510 P.2d 897 (1973); slander of title, *McNichols v. Conejos-K Corp.,*29 Colo.App. 205, 482 P.2d 432 (1971); or outrageous conduct, *Rugg v. McCarty,*173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753 (1970).

We conclude, as did the trial court, that this action is not frivolous. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the request of the defendant for attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 13-17-101, C.R.S.1973. We also conclude that the defendant is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under § 13-17-103, C.R.S.1973.

The judgment is affirmed.

COYTE and PIERCE, JJ., concur.