UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4805

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DWAYNE DENARD TERRY, a/k/a Dee, a/k/a Fakin Jamaican,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. 

(4:11-cr-02054-RBH-2)

Submitted: March 30, 2015 Decided: April 10, 2015

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

W. James Hoffmeyer, LAW OFFICE OF W. JAMES HOFFMEYER, Florence, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Nancy Chastain Wicker, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Dwayne Denard Terry pled guilty pursuant to a written plea 

agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute and to distribute 5 kilograms or more of powder 

cocaine, 280 grams or more of crack cocaine, and 100 kilograms 

or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). 

Terry and the Government negotiated a Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(c)(1)(C) agreement, stipulating that a 240-month sentence 

would be appropriate. The district court accepted the plea and 

imposed the stipulated sentence. In accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Terry’s counsel has filed a 

brief certifying that there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal, but questioning the validity of Terry’s guilty plea. 

Although notified of his right to do so, Terry has not filed a 

supplemental brief. We affirm. 

Terry challenges his plea on the ground that the district 

court did not take special care to assure that his plea was 

knowing and voluntary, where his plea agreement was linked to 

that of his codefendant. A guilty plea is valid where the 

defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently pleads 

guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances 

and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 

748 (1970). To assure that this standard is satisfied, Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 11 requires a district court to “inform the defendant 
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of, and determine that he understands, the nature of the 

charge(s) to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum 

penalty, the maximum possible penalty and various rights.” 

United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). An 

appropriately conducted Rule 11 proceeding raises “a strong 

presumption that the plea is final and binding.” United 

States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court’s

substantial compliance with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11 raises this presumption in favor of the validity of Terry’s 

plea.

The promise of leniency to a third party in a plea 

agreement, although a legitimate prosecutorial tool that does 

not render a plea per se invalid, “might pose a greater danger 

of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the 

risks a defendant must consider.” United States v. Morrow, 914 

F.2d 608, 613 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834, 838 (4th Cir. 

1982). Accordingly, “[s]pecial care must be taken to determine 

the voluntariness” of such a plea. Morrow, 914 F.2d at 613. 

Here, the Government acted in good faith by securing an 

indictment against both defendants before initiating plea 

negotiations and by informing the district court that Terry’s

and his codefendant’s plea agreements were linked together. See
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Harman, 683 F.2d at 837 (prosecutor negotiated in good faith 

where he secured indictment against third party before offering 

leniency); Morrow, 914 F.2d at 613 (questioning validity of plea 

where Government did not inform district court of promise of 

leniency to third party). Furthermore, Terry and his 

codefendant were represented by different attorneys, eliminating 

the possibility that Terry’s attorney sacrificed his bargaining 

position to secure a plea agreement for the codefendant. See

Harman, 683 F.2d at 837-38 (underscoring importance of separate 

counsel where plea involves promise of leniency to third party). 

Finally, Terry readily admitted guilt at the plea hearing and 

did not raise any issue regarding the validity of his plea when 

the district court formally accepted the plea at sentencing, a 

time when Terry was in the courtroom outside the presence of his 

codefendant. Accordingly, the record does not support the claim 

that Terry’s plea was involuntary or unknowing.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in 

this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 

therefore affirm Terry’s conviction and the term of supervised 

release imposed by the district court. We dismiss Terry’s

appeal as to his sentence of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742(a), (c) (2012); United States v. Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 

932 (10th Cir. 2005) (sentence imposed in accordance with Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and statute governing 
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offense of conviction not subject to appellate review). This 

court requires that counsel inform Terry, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Terry requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Terry.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART