IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-50339

In the Matter of: BPRE, L.P.,

Debtor

______________________________________________________

BPRE, L.P., 

Appellant,

v.

RML WAXAHACHIE DODGE, L.L.C., et al,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

Nos. 6:10-CV-267, 6:12-CV-227

Before JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and REEVES,* District Court 

Judge.

PER CURIAM:**

* District Judge of the Southern District of Mississippi, sitting by designation. 

**Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 7, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 14-50339 Document: 00512996468 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/07/2015
No. 14-50339

Following a bench trial before the bankruptcy court, Plaintiff-Appellant 

BPRE, L.P. (“BPRE”) appeals the final judgment entered by the district court 

adopting the bankruptcy court’s report and recommendation that BPRE “take 

nothing” on its various state-law claims against Defendant-Appellee RML 

Waxahachie Dodge, L.L.C. and related RML entities (collectively “RML”). We 

AFFIRM. 

First, BPRE contends that the bankruptcy court committed reversible 

error by denying its request for a jury trial based on BPRE’s failure to timely 

comply with the bankruptcy court’s local rules pertaining to jury demands. 

We review the bankruptcy court’s denial of an untimely motion for jury trial 

for abuse of discretion. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London v. Corporate 

Pines Realty Corp., 355 F. App’x 778, 780 (5th Cir. 2009). However, because 

“the seventh amendment confers a fundamental right,” this “modifies the usual 

approach to review of abuse of discretion.” Daniel Intern. Corp. v. Fischbach 

& Moore, Inc., 916 F.2d 1061, 1064 (5th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, we have held 

that a trial court typically “should grant a motion for jury trial . . . in the 

absence of strong and compelling reasons to the contrary.” Certain 

Underwriters at Lloyds London, 355 F. App’x at 780 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Nevertheless, we have also repeatedly recognized that it is not an 

abuse of discretion to deny an untimely motion for a jury trial “when the failure 

to make a timely jury demand results from mere inadvertence on the part of 

the moving party.” Farias v. Bexar Cnty. Bd. of Trs. for Mental Health Mental 

Retardation Servs., 925 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); accord Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London, 355 F. App’x at 780 

(“Inadvertence alone does not relieve a party from waiver of the right to jury 

trial.”). 

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 Case: 14-50339 Document: 00512996468 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/07/2015
No. 14-50339

Here, the bankruptcy court denied BPRE’s jury demand because BPRE 

failed to comply with the Addendum to Scheduling Order in Appendix L-7016-

a of the Local Rules of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western 

District of Texas. As BPRE concedes, that rule required it to file within thirty 

days of the Scheduling Order a written request for a Pretrial Conference, along 

with a separate brief containing the various components specified in the local 

rule. The Scheduling Order was entered on December 31, 2009, thus 

requiring BPRE to file its request for a Pretrial Conference and the separate 

brief by January 30, 2010. However, BPRE did not file its request for a PreTrial Conference until more than two weeks later on February 16, 2010, and 

did not file a separate brief addressing its right to a jury trial until April 12, 

2010. Based on our review of the record and the parties’ arguments on appeal, 

we are not convinced that BPRE’s failure to timely comply with the rule 

resulted from anything other than “mere inadvertence.” See Farias, 925 F.2d 

at 873. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court’s 

denial of BPRE’s request for a jury trial. 

In addition, BPRE argues that the district court erred in concluding that 

BPRE take nothing on its state-law claims for breach of lease, fraud by nondisclosure, tortious interference, civil conspiracy, quantum meruit, unjust 

enrichment, and trespass. Based on our careful review of the record, as well 

as the parties’ respective briefs and oral arguments, we conclude that the 

evidence presented at trial amply supported the district court’s final judgment

that BPRE take nothing on these claims.

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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 Case: 14-50339 Document: 00512996468 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/07/2015