FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

Nos. 1D20-3022

1D20-3693

_____________________________

A.P., mother of J.F., F.S., M.D.

and M.D., JR., minor children,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILIES,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

James P. Nilon, Judge.

September 2, 2021

BILBREY, J.

A.P., the mother of four minor children, appeals two final 

orders entered by the trial court in this consolidated appeal from a 

termination of parental rights (TPR) action. Because the trial 

court properly applied the governing law to the competent, 

substantial evidence presented, we affirm both orders.

The first order was entered on September 24, 2020, following 

an adjudicatory hearing spanning six days and concluding August 

10, 2020. See § 39.809, Fla. Stat. (2019). That first order tracked

the court’s earlier oral pronouncement after the hearing which 
2

found two statutory grounds for termination of A.P.’s parental 

rights and that TPR was the least restrictive means to protect all 

four children from additional harm. The court also found TPR was 

in the manifest best interests of M.D. and M.D., Jr., considering 

all the elements listed in section 39.810, Florida Statutes (2019). 

Yet considering the greater mental health needs of J.F. and 

F.S., and the possibility that permanent placement could be 

delayed by their needs, the court found the evidence insufficient to 

establish that TPR was in the manifest best interests of J.F. and 

F.S. Accordingly, the court terminated A.P.’s parental rights as to 

M.D. and M.D., Jr., but denied termination as to J.F. and F.S., 

without prejudice to DCF to seek further proceedings. In 

anticipation of such additional proceedings, the trial court directed 

DCF to conduct additional “staffing” for J.F. and F.S. 

The second order on appeal was entered after DCF’s motion 

for rehearing following the denial of TPR as to J.F. and F.S. and

following the subsequent evidentiary hearing spanning three more 

days on that motion. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.265. In its written order 

filed in November 2020, the court reiterated its findings of the 

statutory grounds and least restrictive means elements for TPR as 

to J.F. and F.S. The court also found that DCF had proved on 

rehearing, by clear and convincing evidence, that TPR was in these 

two children’s manifest best interests. The trial court therefore 

terminated A.P.’s parental rights to J.F. and F.S. on rehearing. 

In her appeal of the first order (our case number 1D20-3022), 

A.P. argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove either of 

the statutory grounds for TPR or that TPR was the least restrictive 

means to protect M.D. and M.D., Jr., from harm. In addition, A.P.

seeks reversal of the trial court’s finding TPR to be in the manifest 

best interests of M.D. and M.D., Jr., and the court’s termination of 

A.P.’s parental rights to those two children.

Following rehearing, A.P. then appealed the second order (our 

case number 1D20-3693), asserting that the trial court failed to 

timely rule on DCF’s motion for rehearing and thus rehearing was 

“deemed denied.” See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.265(b)(3). Failing this 

argument, A.P. argues that the court’s order on rehearing was not 

supported by any “new and material evidence” as required by rule 

8.265(a)(4), Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. She repeats her
3

challenge to the trial court’s finding the two statutory grounds for 

TPR and that TPR was the least restrictive means to protect J.F. 

and F.S. Finally, A.P. challenges the court’s determination on 

rehearing and under section 39.810 that termination of her 

parental rights to J.F. and F.S. was in these children’s manifest 

best interests. We reject all of A.P.’s arguments as discussed 

below. 

Standard of Review

Review of evidentiary determinations in TPR cases is limited 

to whether there is competent, substantial evidence to support the 

trial court’s findings. Section 39.809(1) requires that to grant TPR, 

the trial court must find clear and convincing evidence of:

(1) at least one of the statutory grounds for TPR;

(2) that TPR is in the children’s manifest best interests;

and 

(3) that TPR is the least restrictive means of protecting 

the children from harm. 

B.T. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 300 So. 3d 1273, 1277 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2020).

A trial court’s finding that the evidence is clear and convincing 

enjoys a presumption of correctness and will be overturned only if

clearly erroneous or lacking evidentiary support. N.L. v. Fla. Dep’t 

of Child. & Fam. Servs., 843 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

The appellate court will not conduct a de novo proceeding, reweigh 

the testimony presented at final hearing, or substitute its 

judgment for that of the trier of fact. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. 

A.L., 307 So. 3d 978, 982–83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). 

Proceedings and Evidence in Common

By order entered in June 2018, all four children were taken

into DCF custody (sheltered), as allowed by section 39.402(1)(a), 
4

Florida Statutes (2018). At the time, J.F. was nine, F.S. was six, 

M.D. was two and a half, and M.D., Jr., was eighteen months old. 

The court adjudicated all four children dependent in July 2018. 

DCF prepared a case plan for A.P. with a primary goal of 

reunification and filed the plan that same month. 

A.P. was evaluated by DCF providers and diagnosed with 

various psychological conditions relating to her substance abuse, 

trauma from horrific child abuse by her mother, and domestic 

violence by the father of M.D. and M.D., Jr. The three older 

children, J.F., F.S. and M.D., were also evaluated and diagnosed 

with post-traumatic stress disorder and other trauma and anxietyrelated conditions attributed to A.P. and A.P.’s failure to protect 

them. The oldest two children were the most severely affected: 

J.F. had been involuntarily committed at least once, and F.S. 

suffered auditory hallucinations more than once. M.D., Jr., was 

too young for any diagnosis but as of the adjudicatory hearing had 

been in foster care placements for over half his life. 

The services provided by DCF under A.P.’s case plan led to

some success, and in February 2019, M.D. and M.D., Jr., were 

returned to A.P.’s home. Following reunification, despite one child 

breaking a leg and the occurrence of other concerning incidents, 

DCF case workers hesitated to again remove these children in the 

interests of stability. 

J.F. and F.S. were returned to A.P.’s home some weeks later, 

their return delayed by their serious behavioral and mental health 

issues. Even though services were ongoing during this 

reunification, A.P. had a positive drug test in May 2019; resumed 

contact with the father of M.D. and M.D., Jr., in violation of the 

case plan and a court order; and failed to provide J.F. and F.S. with 

their prescribed medications. Upon DCF’s emergency shelter 

petition, the court ordered the children returned to DCF’s custody

(resheltered) in June 2019. 

Various counselors and other service providers continued to 

work with A.P. on her case plan, as slightly modified after all the 

children were resheltered in June 2019. A.P. had additional 

positive drug tests during August 2019 but maintained negative 

tests afterward. Yet A.P. repeatedly violated the conditions of her 

supervised visitation with all four children by discussing the case 
5

with them; struggled to maintain her composure when the 

youngest child became confused about who his mother was; and 

discouraged the children from speaking to or trusting DCF 

personnel. Finally, A.P. violated the court-ordered limitations on 

communications in place to protect J.F. and F.S. from 

unsupervised contact with her and to prevent any contact between 

J.F. and abusive members of A.P.’s family. 

DCF petitioned for termination of A.P.’s parental rights as to 

all four children in January 2020, eighteen months after the 

children were adjudicated dependent. See § 39.802, Fla. Stat.

(2019). DCF alleged sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(e)1., 

Florida Statutes (2019), as grounds for TPR. DCF also alleged that 

TPR was the least restrictive means to protect the children and 

was in the children’s manifest best interests under section 39.810. 

First Statutory Ground for TPR — § 39.806(1)(c)

The trial court found the evidence clear and convincing that 

A.P. engaged in conduct towards all four children showing “that 

the continuing involvement of the mother in the parent-child 

relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, 

mental or emotional health” of each of the four children 

“irrespective of the provision of services” as set out in section 

39.806(1)(c). These findings tracked the statute and are supported 

by competent, substantial evidence.

The evidence presented at the multi-day adjudicatory hearing 

included the testimony of nine witnesses for DCF and eleven 

witnesses for A.P., including A.P. DCF’s witnesses described the 

psychological diagnoses of A.P. and the three eldest children; A.P.’s

conduct towards the children, both individually and as a group 

while A.P. was subject to her case plan; and the effects of A.P.’s 

actions upon the children’s safety, well-being, and physical, 

mental, and emotional health. The expert testimony was 

consistent that while A.P. had made progress on her case plan 

since the children were resheltered, a safe reunification of A.P. and 

the children was impossible at the time of the adjudicatory 

hearing. A.P.’s expert witness testified that although she had 

never spoken to any of the children personally, her evaluation of 

A.P. and review of the records in the case convinced her that with 

further counseling and services, a staggered reunification of A.P. 
6

and the children, one by one beginning six months to a year after 

the hearing, could succeed.

On appeal of this finding, A.P. argues that her evidence that 

she had benefitted from the services provided by DCF and she 

would continue to improve her ability to safely parent the children 

with more services precluded TPR on this ground. But A.P.’s 

reliance on Q.L. v. Department of Children and Families, 280 So. 

3d 107 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), is misplaced. 

In Q.L., “because there was no evidence that the mother 

suffered from any ‘condition,’ the Department was required to 

prove that future harm to the children was likely based on her past 

conduct.” 280 So. 3d at 114. In contrast, in this case, A.P. was

diagnosed with multiple psychological conditions. The trial court 

had evidence that these conditions had and would continue to 

hinder A.P.’s ability to control her emotions; to place the children’s 

emotional needs above her own; and to set boundaries between the 

children and members of A.P.’s family with histories of torturous 

abuse of A.P., as well as reportedly sexual abuse of J.F. and F.S.

A.P.’s contention is that her progress with her therapy 

outweighs DCF’s evidence that her past conduct and failure to 

protect the children severely damaged the three older children’s 

mental and emotional health and that the children continue to 

suffer from the emotional trauma inflicted by A.P. But this 

contention improperly requests this court to re-weigh the evidence,

which we cannot do. See J.B. v. C.S., 186 So. 3d 1142 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2016). In addition, Florida law does not require an indefinite 

provision of services when a parent shows the inability to safely 

reunify within a reasonable time. S.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & 

Fams., 202 So. 3d 769, 782 (Fla. 2016). A.P. fails to demonstrate a 

deficiency in the evidence to support the trial court’s finding the 

ground for TPR under section 39.806(1)(c) for all four children, 

based on A.P.’s conduct towards each of them over the course of 

these proceedings.

Second Statutory Ground for TPR — § 39.806(1)(e)1.

The trial court also found the ground for TPR alleged by DCF 

under section 39.806(1)(e)1. — that A.P. “failed to substantially 

comply for a period of twelve months with the Case Plan after the 
7

shelter of the children or the adjudication of the minor children, to 

the degree that further reunification efforts are without merit and 

not in the best interest of” all four children. The court detailed in 

the first order the specific testimony it relied in finding this 

statutory ground for TPR proven as to all four children. 

On appeal, A.P. argues that she had substantially complied 

with her case plan, with only minor incidents of bad judgment after 

the reshelter. She attributes the expiration of time for compliance 

with her case plan to traumatic events in her life beyond her 

control and by DCF’s scheduling of her trauma counseling only 

after her drug abuse had been addressed. 

Section 39.806(1)(e)1. provides that a parent’s failure to 

complete a case plan within twelve months constitutes evidence of 

continuing abuse unless the failure is caused by the parent’s 

poverty or DCF’s failure to make reasonable efforts to reunify the 

parent and children. At the time of the hearing, two years had 

passed since A.P.’s initial reunification case plan was filed. There 

was no evidence that A.P.’s positive drug tests, misbehavior during 

supervised visits with the children, violation of contact limitations

to protect J.F. and F.S., and other acts detailed in the trial court’s 

order were caused by poverty or any deficiency in DCF’s efforts to 

reunify the family. 

Time is of the essence for permanency of the children. See, 

e.g., § 39.001(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2019) (policy to ensure that no child 

remains in foster care” more than a year); F.C. v. Dep’t of Child. & 

Fams., 315 So. 3d 110, 111 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2020) (affirming TPR 

upon evidence that father failed to substantially comply with case 

plan after twelve months). A.P.’s position that the children should 

remain in limbo even longer because of her somewhat improved 

situation is against public policy and not in the children’s best 

interests. See S.M., 202 So. 3d at 782 (holding that “there is a 

strong policy incentive in achieving permanency for children in 

care as quickly as possible” and that permanency should not be 

indefinitely delayed). 

A.P. fails to demonstrate the lack of clear and substantial 

evidence to support the trial court’s finding section 39.806(1)(e)1.

as a ground for TPR for all four children based on A.P.’s failure to 

substantially and timely comply with her case plan. 
8

TPR as Least Restrictive Means

The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that 

TPR was the least restrictive means to protect all four children, 

applying the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in S.M. The trial 

court noted that “time is of the essence and preservation of the 

parental bond shall not be at the cost of a child’s future” in finding 

that A.P. had completed many services but “has not complied to 

the extent necessary.” The evidence was undisputed that two 

years had passed since the children were first sheltered and that 

A.P.’s actions led to the resheltering of the children. 

Furthermore, no witness testified that the children could 

currently be safely reunified with A.P. A.P.’s proposed less 

restrictive means was to continue the children in foster care even 

longer, while she availed herself of additional therapy and other 

services for an unspecified period. But this proposal ignored all 

four children’s need for permanency and long-term stability. The 

older children’s serious mental health issues caused by A.P.’s 

actions and the stress of uncertainty in their situations shows why 

public policy favors permanence and security for the children. See

§§ 39.001(1)(h), 39.0136, Fla. Stat. (2019). 

As we stated, in Department of Children & Families v. B.C., 

185 So. 3d 716, 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), the least restrictive means 

test does not “stand as an impenetrable barrier to achieving what 

is ultimately in the child’s best interest.” Further, the “test is not 

intended to preserve the parental bonds at the cost of a child’s 

future.” Id. (citations omitted). And speculation of what the 

Department “could have done with unlimited resources or 

unlimited time” is not the least restrictive means test. J.P. v. Dep’t 

of Child. & Fams., 183 So. 3d 1198, 1205 n.8. 

Here, the trial court’s finding that termination of A.P.’s 

parental rights the least restrictive means of protecting the 

children correctly balanced A.P.’s due process rights and the public 

policy in favor of permanency for the children in the dependency 

system. A.P. shows no deficiency in the evidence to support the 

trial court’s finding. 
9

Manifest Best Interests of M.D. and M.D., Jr.

Turning to the manifest best interests of M.D. and M.D., Jr., 

the trial court made particular findings under each statutory 

factor listed in section 39.810(1)–(11) in the first order on appeal. 

Weighing the statutory facts, the court found the evidence clear 

and convincing that TPR was in the manifest best interests of both 

M.D. and M.D., Jr. A.P. does not challenge any specific factor on 

appeal but argues that the court improperly considered A.P.’s 

ability to parent all four children rather than limiting its 

determination to A.P.’s ability to parent M.D. and M.D., Jr.,

individually. 

Contrary to A.P.’s position, the trial court did not base its 

findings of M.D.’s and M.D., Jr.’s manifest best interests on the 

mental health needs or potential difficulty placing J.F. or F.S. The 

trial court discussed each of the statutory factors referring only to 

M.D. and M.D., Jr., not the older children. The court recognized 

that M.D. and M.D., Jr., had been placed together but not with the 

older children “in five separate placements” while the case was 

pending. The court clearly stated in its order that J.F. and F.S. 

“are in a different position than” M.D. and M.D., Jr. The record 

simply fails to support A.P.’s position that the trial court’s 

determination of M.D. and M.D., Jr.’s manifest best interests 

improperly rested on evidence pertaining to J.F. and F.S. 

Proceedings on Rehearing as to J.F. and F.S.

A.P. claims that the trial court erred in granting rehearing as 

to the issue of J.F.’s and F.S.’s manifest best interests. She bases 

this claim first on the trial court not ruling on the motion for 

rehearing within ten days of its filing resulting in the motion being 

“deemed denied.” Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.265(b)(3). A.P. also argues that 

rehearing was improper since DCF did not present “new and 

material evidence” such that rehearing could have been granted. 

Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.265(a)(4).

As noted above, in the September 24, 2020, order following the 

first adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found the evidence 

insufficient to prove that TPR was in J.F.’s and F.S.’s manifest best 

interests. DCF’s motion for rehearing was filed on September 14, 
10

2020, after the court’s oral pronouncement but ten days before the 

written order was entered.1 

The day after the motion for rehearing was filed, the trial 

court considered several motions including DCF’s motion for 

rehearing. While A.P. objected to DCF’s motion for rehearing as 

untimely filed, she did not request an immediate ruling on the 

motion. At this hearing, the court did not specifically articulate 

that rehearing was granted or denied, but the court and the parties 

continued to proceed as if rehearing had been granted. The court 

coordinated dates with the parties for the court to hear additional 

testimony on the manifest best interests issue. 

When the court reconvened on September 25, 2020, the court 

announced that DCF’s motion for rehearing was granted “only as 

it applies to the manifest best interests” of J.F. and F.S. See Fla. 

R. Juv. P. 8.265(c)(1) (stating that rehearing may be granted to all 

or any of the parties on all or any of the issues; orders granting 

rehearing must state specific issues to be reheard). A.P. objected, 

arguing, as she argues here, that none of the evidence would be 

“new and material” as required by rule 8.265(a)(4). However, A.P. 

did not assert that the motion for rehearing was deemed denied at 

this point under rule 8.265(b)(3). After the court instructed DCF 

to limit the evidence to matters occurring “since the conclusion of 

the trial,” DCF presented the testimony of its witnesses on 

rehearing over several days. 

A.P. fully participated in the rehearing and presented her 

expert witness’ testimony on the second day of the hearing. DCF 

offered rebuttal with the testimony of two more witnesses on the 

third hearing date. At the end of the evidence the court orally 

pronounced its ruling on rehearing — finding TPR in the manifest 

best interests of J.F. and F.S. and terminating A.P.’s parental 

1 Although it may seem unusual to file a motion for rehearing 

before a written order has been entered, this appears to be allowed

under rule 8.265(b)(1). Rule 8.265(b)(1) permits a motion for 

rehearing as soon as “immediately after the court announces its 

judgment” and requires such a motion to be “within 10 days of the 

entry of the order.” Regardless, that aspect of the motion for 

rehearing is not challenged here. 
11

rights to these children. That oral pronouncement was later 

reduced to writing.

A.P. then moved to vacate the court’s order granting DCF’s 

motion for rehearing and terminating her parental rights as to J.F. 

and F.S. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.270. In that motion A.P. asserted 

for the first time that the September 25th order was not timely 

entered under rule 8.265(b)(3). She therefore claimed that it was

procedurally denied before the court took any evidence or rendered

its order on the merits on rehearing. A.P.’s motion to vacate was 

denied based on the court’s finding that it had “effectively granted” 

rehearing on September 15th during the scheduling conference 

setting the matter for further proceedings. A.P. then timely filed 

her notice of appeal of the order granting rehearing and 

terminating her parental rights as to J.F. and F.S.

A.P.’s claim that DCF’s motion for rehearing was deemed

denied under rule 8.265(b)(3) was not preserved. See G.M. v. Dep’t 

of Child. & Fams., 969 So. 2d 569, 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding 

“possible defects in the procedural posture” of a case are “waived 

and not preserved” if not “argued below”).2 But even if this issue 

was preserved for appellate review by A.P.’s motion to vacate, A.P. 

fails to establish that reversal is required. 

DCF’s written motion for rehearing was considered by the 

trial court the day after it was filed. As mentioned, the parties and 

the court proceeded as if the motion was granted by setting time 

for further testimony. A.P. fully participated with counsel and 

with her own witness in the hearings on rehearing, so there is no 

question that she was afforded due process. Any error by the trial 

court in failing to explicitly announce on the record on September 

15th that partial rehearing was granted on the limited issue of the 

manifest best interests of J.F. and F.S. was harmless since it was 

clear to all parties that further proceedings were going to occur. 

2 We also note that since no appeal had been filed when the 

trial court explicitly granted rehearing on September 25, 2020, 

there is no issue of the trial court lacking jurisdiction when that 

order was entered. It therefore cannot be the case that the order 

granting rehearing or the subsequent second order, now on appeal, 

was void. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.270(b)(4). 
12

See D.M. v. Dep’t Child. & Fam. Servs., 979 So. 2d 1007, 1010 (Fla. 

3d DCA 2008) (applying harmless error in an appeal following 

TPR). 

A.P. also challenges the order on rehearing as unsupported by 

“new and material evidence” as described in rule 8.265(a)(4). A.P. 

contends that DCF could have discovered this evidence before and 

produced it at the adjudicatory hearing prior to the first order. The 

record refutes A.P.’s claim. After complying with the court’s 

direction to conduct additional “staffing” for J.F. and F.S., DCF

presented testimony on rehearing by five witnesses who described 

J.F.’s and F.S.’s behaviors, mental states, and emotional 

conditions after the adjudicatory hearing in early August 2020. 

The evidence presented and considered by the trial court was new 

and material as to these children’s manifest best interests. 

A.P. fails to establish reversible error in the timing of the 

court’s order on rehearing or the “new and material” character of 

the evidence to support it under rule 8.265. 

Manifest Best Interests of J.F. and F.S.

Finally, A.P. appeals the trial court’s determination of the 

manifest best interests of J.F. and F.S. in the order entered 

November 23, 2020. But A.P. does not contest specific statutory 

factors addressed by the trial court under section 39.810, Florida 

Statutes. Rather, A.P. argues generally that she will bond with 

these children more closely than any adoptive parent could, that 

these children’s mental and emotional special needs will make 

placement difficult and possibly delay placement, and that A.P.’s 

ability to support the children has financially improved and 

stabilized since the children were resheltered. 

The trial court’s order on rehearing included detailed findings 

of the manifest best interests factors for J.F. and F.S. under section 

39.810(1)–(11). The court specified the evidence it relied on for 

each factor and assigned weight and credibility to conflicting 

evidence received on rehearing. Although she does not refer to the 

subsections of the statute in her briefs, A.P.’s arguments relate to 

factors (2) (“ability and disposition of parent or parents to provide 

child with food, clothing, medical care . . . and other material 

needs”); (3) (“capacity of parent or parents to care for child to 
13

extent child’s safety, well-being, and physical, mental, and 

emotional health will not be endangered upon child’s return 

home”); (5) (“love, affection, and other emotional ties between child 

and parent or parents, siblings, and other relatives, and the degree 

of harm to the child from termination of parental rights”); (6)

(“likelihood of an older child remaining in long-term foster care 

upon [TPR], due to emotional or behavioral problems”); and (7)

(“likelihood that the child will enter into a more stable and 

permanent family relationship as a result of” TPR).

Here, A.P. essentially repeats her request that this court 

reweigh the evidence on the statutory factors and decide these 

factors contrary to what was found by the trial court. She asks 

that we find that her improved circumstances after years of 

services should outweigh the other statutory factors the trial court

relied on, including the public policy favoring permanency and 

stability for dependent children. As discussed above, this we 

cannot not do. See also Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. A.L., 307 So. 3d 

978, 982–83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

A.P. establishes no deficiency in the evidence to support the 

trial court’s determination of the manifest best interests of J.F. 

and F.S. upon evaluation of the statutory factors listed in section 

39.810 and as expressed in the written order on rehearing. Our 

review of the record on appeal, including the transcripts of the 

rehearing proceedings, revealed competent, substantial evidence 

to support the trial court’s determinations of the manifest best 

interests of J.F. and F.S. 

Conclusion

A.P. demonstrates no deficiency in the evidence supporting 

the trial court’s finding grounds for termination of A.P.’s parental 

rights as to all four children, under sections 39.806(1)(c) and 

39.806(1)(e)1. Likewise, A.P. establishes no error in the trial 

court’s finding that TPR is the least restrictive means to protect 

all four children under the circumstances of this case, and that 

TPR is in the manifest best interests of M.D. and M.D., Jr., under

section 39.810, Florida Statutes. In addition, in her second appeal, 

A.P. fails to establish reversible error in the trial court’s grant of 

rehearing, under rule 8.265, and fails to demonstrate a deficiency 

in the evidence to support the trial court’s determination of the 
14

manifest best interests of J.F. and F.S. upon rehearing. For these 

reasons, the orders on appeal are 

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS and MAKAR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Melissa Joy Ford, Assistant Conflict Counsel, and Michael Titus, 

Assistant Conflict Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil 

Regional Counsel Region One, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ward L. Metzger, Department of Children and Families, 

Jacksonville, for Appellee.

Thomasina F. Moore, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Laura J. 

Lee, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division, Statewide Guardian ad 

Litem Office, Tallahassee, for Appellee.