IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1828

Filed November 2, 2022

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BRIANA NICOLE JENKINS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Christopher Kemp

(plea), Brendan E. Greiner (initial sentencing hearing), and Gregory D. Brandt (final 

sentencing hearing), District Associate Judges.

Claiming a procedurally-defective sentencing process occurred, the 

defendant appeals requesting her convictions be vacated. APPEAL DISMISSED.

Erin Patrick Lyons of Lyons Law Firm, PLC, Waterloo, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller (until withdrawal) 

and Benjamin Parrott, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
2

GREER, Judge.

After being charged with five counts of violation of a custodial order,

1 Briana 

Jenkins signed and filed a petition to plead guilty in April 2021. In that filing, she 

agreed to plead guilty to one of the counts and enter an Alford plea2to another, in 

exchange for dismissing the three other counts. The agreement also framed the 

sentencing terms. Now, Jenkins challenges the sentencing process following 

acceptance of the plea agreement and argues the convictions should be vacated 

so she can withdraw her guilty pleas. Her focus is on the sentencing process and 

that it did not follow the mandatory parameters of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 

2.10. But Jenkins also asserts she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea 

“following its de facto rejection.” Because we lack jurisdiction to resolve this 

matter, we dismiss Jenkins’s appeal.

Background Facts and Proceedings.

In the petition to plead guilty, the plea agreement was detailed as:

I will enter an Alford plea to Count IV; guilty plea to Count V; Minimum 

fines: both to run concurrent with each other and to the pending 

appeal in Iowa Supreme Court No. 20-1602; the no-contact order 

may be modified by the Dallas County court in DRCV 042150; 

Counts 1–3 will be dismissed; and, until such modification, if any, the 

no contact order will remain in effect. This agreement also provides 

1 Under Iowa Code section 710.6(2) (2020), a violation of a custodial order occurs 

when

[a] parent of a child living apart from the other parent . . . conceals 

that child or causes that child’s whereabouts to be unknown to a 

parent with visitation rights or parental time in violation of a court 

order granting visitation rights or parental time . . . without the other 

parent’s consent.

This offense is a serious misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 710.6(2).

2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding a defendant can

plead guilty to a crime without admitting to the underlying facts that establish the 

crime).
3

that the [S]tate is not bound by the agreement if I commit a new crime 

or violate a court order before sentencing.

The Court HAS AGREED TO BE BOUND by the plea 

agreement, and it is understood that if the Court does not accept this 

plea agreement I have the right to withdraw these pleas and proceed 

to trial.

Once Jenkins filed her plea petition, the court entered an order accepting the plea 

and setting sentencing. The order followed the plea agreement terms Jenkins 

detailed in her filing, accepting her guilty plea to count V and her Alford plea to 

count VI. At the July sentencing hearing, a judge different from the plea court

judge presided. Issues arose that resulted in the sentencing court continuing the 

hearing “to allow the parties to brief . . . the issue about the plea.” The issues 

raised at sentencing caused Jenkins to terminate her relationship with her thencounsel. In his motion to withdraw, Jenkins’s then-counsel noted

[t]hose issues include but are not limited to whether formal [Iowa 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10] approval of the plea agreement was

required or not; and detrimental reliance by Ms. Jenkins on the plea 

agreement codified in the plea agreement and outlined in emails that 

will be filed at a later time between the parties as well as the trial 

court previously. 

The sentencing court raised a concern over whether the plea court was required 

to treat the plea as having been made under rule 2.10. The sentencing court 

referenced “paragraph number 2 of page 2 of that plea petition, [which] states 

specifically, ‘The Court has agreed to be bound by the plea agreement, and it is

understood if the Court does not accept this plea agreement, you have the right to 

withdraw these pleas and proceed to trial.’” The court then asked Jenkins’s

counsel, “[D]id you inform [the plea court] this was going to be a 2.10 plea?” 

Jenkins’s counsel stated, “It was my understanding it was going to be—that this 

was going to be a bound plea agreement” and “the [plea court] was accepting this 
4

deal.” Yet Jenkins’s counsel told the sentencing court, “I didn’t use the words 

‘2.10,’ your honor.” When asked about this concern, the State commented “I have 

emails between [both counsel and the court] that, I guess, would support—would 

tend to support the position there was no indication that it was a 2.10 plea.” As the

State points out in its appellate brief, the order accepting the plea in no way

indicated that the court agreed to be bound by the agreement and the only persons

who signed the petition to plead guilty were Jenkins and her then-counsel. But the 

sentencing court felt the parties should brief the concerns over the plea acceptance 

before sentencing could take place. 

After obtaining new counsel in August, Jenkins attended a second, final

sentencing hearing held in November 2021 before a judge different than either the 

plea or initial sentencing proceedings. Jenkins’s new counsel confirmed:

So I was appointed after the plea was entered in this case. The 

prosecutor was generous in kind of informing me about the context 

of the case, and he pointed me to a particular transcript that I had

requested on my client’s behalf just to kind of get up to speed on the 

case. That was a transcript from a July hearing in front of [the initial

sentencing judge]. That was reported by [a court reporter3].

We had previously moved to continue this sentencing hearing 

in SRCR342701 to review that transcript to kind of understand the 

context of the case. Ultimately, it was my opinion that review of the

of that transcript wouldn’t really have any impact on the outcome 

because the State was willing to abide by the terms of the original 

plea agreement. But on my client’s behalf, I requested that transcript 

and wanted to make sure that we had an opportunity to review that

if it was reasonably possible.

Likewise, Jenkins’s new counsel withdrew a request to continue the hearing 

because “the transcript is not going to change the State’s position about going 

3 The court reporter had not finished the transcript at the time of the final sentencing 

as she had passed away.
5

along with this plea agreement, and obviously the court has gone along with the 

plea agreement.” Referencing the court’s decision to not continue the final

sentencing hearing and her counsel’s statements, Jenkins told the final sentencing 

court, “I don’t know what he’s just talking about, but that wasn’t part of me. You 

already said you’re not going to continue it. That’s the only thing. I mean, I don’t 

have to have a new public defender, no. That’s fine.”

At no time did Jenkins ever request to withdraw her pleas. And, at this final 

sentencing hearing, the plea agreement between the State and Jenkins was 

considered and the final sentencing court followed the agreement4 contained in 

Jenkins’s petition to plead guilty. Following the sentencing, Jenkins appealed, 

cloaking her issue as involving the sentencing process.5

Good Cause to Appeal.

We first address the State’s request that we dismiss this appeal. The State 

winnows Jenkins’s claim to one of “good cause” because the court had confusion 

over the application of rule 2.10 to the plea agreement—an issue the State 

contends involves the guilty pleas themselves rather than sentencing. Jenkins

clarifies that even though the appeal is “based on a guilty plea,” she is appealing

“from a defect in her sentencing procedure; i.e., whether or not she had the right

4 The court ordered confinement to the Iowa Department of Corrections for a term 

of one year, running the sentences for the two counts concurrently, along with 

another matter that involved a four-year sentence. The other three counts charged 

were dismissed. The sentencing court suspended the $430 fine.

5 We note the request to withdraw her guilty pleas was never formally made before 

the district court. And as much as Jenkins is challenging her guilty pleas, she has 

not preserved error because she never moved in arrest of judgment. See Iowa R. 

Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a).
6

to withdraw her guilty plea after the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s de facto rejection[6] of it [in the

initial sentencing hearing].” Because she appeals the sentencing procedures, she

contends she established the statutorily required “good cause.” It is Jenkins’s

burden to establish good cause to pursue an appeal of her conviction after

pleading guilty. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2021); see also State v. Damme,

944 N.W.2d 98, 104–05 (Iowa 2020) (finding good cause where the challenge is

only to the sentence imposed and not the guilty plea or resulting conviction).

Thus, we start with Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) as it applies:

1. Right of appeal is granted the defendant from:

(a) A final judgment of sentence, except in the following cases:

. . . .

(3) A conviction where the defendant has pled guilty. This

subparagraph does not apply to a guilty plea for a class “A” felony or

in a case where the defendant establishes good cause.

Damme interpreted “good cause” in this code section as meaning a “legally

sufficient reason.” 944 N.W.2d at 104–05. And as State v. Boldon teaches, “what 

constitute[s] a legally sufficient reason [for good cause] [is] context-specific.” 954 

N.W.2d 62, 69 (Iowa 2021), declined to follow on other grounds in State v. Patten, 

___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2022 WL 12104322, at *3 (Iowa 2022). By definition, a 

legally sufficient reason is a reason that would allow a court to provide some relief. 

State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 2021) (finding that the failure to move

in arrest of judgment precluded a challenge over the guilty plea). Here, the court 

6 While Jenkins argues the court’s action in the initial sentencing hearing was a de 

facto rejection of her guilty pleas, the court order accepting the pleas was never 

set aside, and Jenkins provides no legal analysis supporting this argument. See 

Baker v. City of Iowa City, 750 N.W.2d 93, 102–03 (Iowa 2008) (finding a party’s 

failure to support conclusory statements with legal authority and argument requires 

the appellate court to assume a partisan role of advocacy, which we will not do).
7

formally accepted the plea agreement and then at sentencing followed it without 

reservation or changes. Thus, Jenkins has no remedy because she got what she 

bargained for and she has not established good cause to appeal. See Damme, 

944 N.W.2d at 105; State v. McCarroll, No. 20-0641, 2021 WL 4592616, at *2

(Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2021) (dismissing appeal on defendant’s challenge to a 

sentence imposed that was agreed to in the plea bargain for failure to establish 

good cause). Here, no one disputes that the sentence imposed was the same as 

that agreed upon by the parties,7 so Jenkins has not advanced a legally sufficient 

reason to appeal as a matter of right. See Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109. We are 

without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id. at 110. The appeal must be dismissed.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

7 Jenkins admits in her appellate brief that “the judge at the [final sentencing 

hearing] had already imposed on Ms. Jenkins the sentence envisioned by the April 

22, 2021, plea agreement.”