[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-11234

Non-Argument Calendar

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Agency No. A206-838-227

MARIA HERNANDEZ-GUEVARA, et al., 

 Petitioners,

versus

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

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Petition for Review of a Decision of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

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(January 8, 2020)

Before MARCUS, WILSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Maria Hernandez-Guevara and her son seek review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) final order adopting and affirming the Immigration 

Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 

Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The agency denied 

relief, in part, because Hernandez-Guevara did not allege a cognizable particular 

social group under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and because she 

did not establish the necessary likelihood of torture by the Honduran government 

or with its acquiescence. We affirm the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions and deny 

Hernandez-Guevara’s petition.

I. ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

To start, Hernandez-Guevara did not abandon her opportunity to challenge 

the BIA’s determinations regarding asylum and withholding of removal. We will 

consider Hernandez-Guevara’s arguments because she adequately identified the 

issues and relevant arguments in her brief. See Cole v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 712 F.3d 

517, 530–31 (11th Cir. 2013). Despite the dearth of citations to the record and 

applicable law, she sufficiently developed her arguments—certainly making more 

than “passing references” to the core issues—to avoid abandonment or waiver. See 

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681–82 (11th Cir. 2014). 

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We review only the BIA’s decision, “except to the extent that it expressly 

adopts the IJ’s opinion.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 

2001). Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision here, we review both decisions. 

See id.

Hernandez-Guevara seeks asylum as a refugee. She has the burden of 

proving statutory “refugee” status. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 

1158(b)(1)(B)(i). To establish refugee status, an applicant must prove “persecution 

or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” INA 

§ 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).

At issue here, first, is whether Hernandez-Guevara asserted a cognizable 

“particular social group,” a question of law that we review de novo. See Gonzalez 

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). While the 

INA does not define “particular social group,” we have applied Chevron deference 

to the BIA’s formulation of the criteria that must be satisfied. Castillo-Arias v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1196–97 (11th Cir. 2006). A “particular social 

group” is “a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable 

characteristic.” Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301, 1308–09 (11th 

Cir. 2019) (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), 

overruled on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 

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1987)). The characteristic must be unchangeable or fundamental to individual 

identities or consciences. Id. at 1309. The group must be socially distinct within 

the relevant society and defined with particularity, not overbroadly or 

amorphously. Id. The common characteristic must be something other than the 

risk of being persecuted. See Rodriguez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1302, 1310 

(11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 

594–95 (BIA 2008) (finding that people who resist joining gangs are not part of a 

socially distinct group within Honduran society). 

Here, the IJ and BIA properly found that Hernandez-Guevara’s asserted

social group—Honduran women who have been victimized by the Mara 18 for 

opposition to their acts—did not constitute a particular social group under the INA. 

For one, Hernandez-Guevara provides no evidence suggesting that the group is 

recognized as distinct in Honduran society. See Perez-Zenteno, 913 F.3d at 1309.

Further, her group is amorphous and lacks particularity. See id. Women of all 

ages and backgrounds could be members. And only the human imagination limits 

potential forms of victimization, making definition impossible. The same is true 

for forms of opposition. Beyond that, the group is defined by the alleged 

persecution, which cannot create a particular social group. See Rodriguez, 735

F.3d at 1310. Therefore, we agree with the IJ and BIA; Hernandez-Guevara’s 

asserted group is not cognizable.

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Because the IJ and BIA properly held that Hernandez-Guevara’s alleged

group is not cognizable, we need not address her challenge to the factual findings 

that she failed to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future 

persecution. Also, because Hernandez-Guevara cannot show a particular social 

group for asylum, she likewise cannot show one for purposes of proving 

withholding of removal. See INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). 

Accordingly, the IJ and BIA did not err in denying Hernandez-Guevara’s asylum 

and withholding of removal claims.

II. CAT

Turning to Hernandez-Guevara’s CAT relief claim, we must address the 

government’s argument that we lack jurisdiction because she failed to exhaust her 

administrative remedies. We “may review a final order of removal only if . . . the 

alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to [her] as of right.” INA 

§ 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). The exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional 

and precludes review of a claim not presented to the BIA. Amaya-Artunduaga v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). To exhaust an 

issue, all we require is that the party raise before the BIA the “core issue” now on 

appeal, not the specific reasons the IJ gave for denying relief. Montano Cisneros v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1224, 1228 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008). A petitioner need not 

have used “precise legal terminology” or provided the BIA with “a well-developed 

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argument,” so long as she gave the BIA sufficient information to allow it to review 

and correct any errors. Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (alteration accepted). “This is not a stringent requirement.” Id.

Here, Hernandez-Guevara exhausted her administrative remedies. In her 

brief to the BIA, she raised the “core issue” of the IJ’s denial of her CAT claim. 

See Montano Cisneros, 514 F.3d at 1228 n.3. She provided a legal standard 

evoking torture and the more-likely-than-not standard, argued that the IJ erred in 

weighing the evidence, and stated that she had established that she would more 

likely than not be tortured upon return to Honduras. Indeed, the BIA then 

addressed these arguments in its decision. Though her arguments were not 

necessarily well developed, she gave the BIA sufficient information to allow it to 

review and correct errors as to the weighing of the evidence. See Indrawati, 779 

F.3d at 1297. 

Turning to the merits, we uphold a denial of CAT relief if it is supported by 

substantial evidence; the record must compel reversal. See Alim v. Gonzales, 446 

F.3d 1239, 1254–55, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006). The applicant bears the burden of 

proving that it is more likely than not that she would be tortured if removed to the 

proposed country of removal. Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 

1242 (11th Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). To qualify as torture, the requisite 

pain and suffering must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent 

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or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 

8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). Acquiescence requires that the government, prior to the 

activity constituting torture, be aware of such activity and fail to intervene. 

Reyes-Sanchez, 369 F.3d at 1242. 

Hernandez-Guevara argues that, if she returns to Honduras, it is more likely 

than not that she will be killed or kidnapped by the Mara 18 with the government’s 

acquiescence because the gang’s crimes are a normal occurrence and the police do 

not protect citizens from the gang. Though some record evidence may support a 

contrary conclusion, the record does not compel us to find that Hernandez-Guevara 

would more likely than not suffer torture by the Honduran government or with its 

acquiescence. See Alim, 446 F.3d at 1254–55. The Honduran constitution and 

laws prohibit government torture, and the government formed a commission to 

address the problem of persons displaced by violence and gang activity. More 

specifically to Hernandez-Guevara, the police responded to the report her family 

filed concerning the incident where the Mara 18 tied and beat her and her 

grandparents and shot her cousin. Thus, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and 

BIA’s denial of Hernandez-Guevara’s claim for CAT relief.

PETITION DENIED.

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