alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### James SHAFFER and Karin Shaffer, husband and wife, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Larry L. LEE, Individually and as Fremont County Coroner, and Edward McAuslan, Individually and as Fremont County Deputy Coroner, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 5295.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Sept. 4, 1980.

F. M. Andrews, Robert 0. Anderson, of Andrews & Anderson, P. C., Riverton, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellants.

Arnold B. Tschirgi, Fremont County and Prosecuting Atty., Lander, signed the brief on behalf of appellees. Appellees submitted the case upon their brief.

Before RAPER, C. J., and McCLIN-TOCK, THOMAS, ROSE and ROONEY, JJ.

ROONEY, Justice.

Appellants-plaintiffs requested relief in the district court which had for its effect the prevention of exhumation of the body of their 20-month-old son, Robert. Robert and two other minor children of appellants died in a fire which consumed appellants’ mobile-home residence near Arapahoe. A coroner’s jury made a report of an inquest into the deaths. After Robert’s body was interred, the inquest was either continued or a second one was started. The county coroner authorized the exhumation of Robert’s body in connection therewith. As indicated, this action was instituted to prevent the exhumation.

Appellees-defendants answered the complaint and moved the court for an order authorizing the exhumation. After a trial, and on March 17, 1980, the district court denied the relief requested by appellants and gave to appellees “leave to effect the disinterment and the autopsy for such further scientific examination as seems to be indicated on the facts.” The ruling was incorporated in an order dated and filed March 19, 1980.

This appeal is from such action by the district court.

The body was actually disinterred on March 20, 1980.

*780Such being the case, the issue here presented is moot since the relief requested could not be carried into effect. Therefore, it will not be considered on appeal. *State ex rel. Schwartz v. Jones,*61 Wyo. 350, 157 P.2d 993 (1945); *Cheever v. Warren,*70 Wyo. 296, 249 P.2d 163 (1952); *Belondon v. State ex rel. Leimback,*379 P.2d 828 (1963); *Matter of Estate of Frederick,*Wyo., 599 P.2d 550 (1979).

An order dismissing the appeal is issued contemporaneously herewith.
U.S. Department of Transportation Office of the Secretary ofTransportation

MEMORANDUM
From: Susan L. Kurland Assistant Secretary o

and International A Assistant Secretary February 17, 2012 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE Washington, DC 20590

To: Docket DOT-OST-2012-0001; 2012 Chicago-Cancun Combination Service Proceeding
Subject: Report ofCommunication Pursuantto 14 CFR 300.3

On Friday, February 10,2012,I received a telephone call from Robert Kneisley, Associate General Counsel at Southwest Airlines. Robert Goldner, a member ofmy staff, was also present for this call. Mr. Kneisley stated that Southwesthadjustlearned that AirTran Airways, which is owned by Southwest, had posted Chicago-Cancun flights, for which AirTran does not currently have authority to operate, on its website for a number ofdays this month. The Chicago-Cancun service is the subject ofan ongoing, contested carrier selection proceeding at the Department and AirTran is one ofthe applicants seeking the award ofthatauthority. According to Mr. Kneisley, boththe northbound and southbound flights were advertised online from February 3-6, while northbound only flights remainedposted until the afternoon of February 8. Duringthis period, AirTran sold 28 tickets. Mr. Kneisley stated that all of purchasers have been notified that the flights were inadvertently posted, that AirTran did not have current authority to operate the service, and that the cost ofall tickets purchased have been refunded. He further informed me that Southwest was conducting an investigation to determine howthe flights gotposted onto AirTran's website.
Ithanked Mr. Kneisley for informing me ofthe matter. Mr. Kneisley subsequently called Mr. Goldner on February 15, to reportthat Southwesthad determined that AirTran had undertaken a crew scheduling contingency in the eventthat it was ultimately awarded Chicago-Cancun authority and had inadvertently applied real flight numbers that resulted in the flights being prematurely posted onthe company's website.Ihave forwarded the informationprovided by Mr. Kneisley to the Department's Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings for theirreview.

cc: Robert Kneisley
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y A lton Thomas Davis,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk November 22, 2010

s1115 

# Order

November 22, 2010

141596

CORONA CONSTRUC TION, INC.,Plaintiff/Counter DefendantAppellee,

v SC: 141596 COA: 295576 Wayne CC: 08-109892-CK CHERYL GRAY,Defendant/Counter PlaintiffAppellant,

and

GREGORY GRAY a nd GRAY & GRAY PRODUCTIONS, INC., Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 6, 2010 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In re Mark Eugene Engle

No. 06-15-00055-CR

Original Mandamus Proceeding

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Morriss, 

Justice Moseley and Justice Burgess

participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that Relator is not entitled to the 

relief sought. Therefore, we deny the petition.

RENDERED APRIL 14, 2015

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
No. 1-14-000685-CR

In the 

Court of Appeals 

For the 

First District of Texas 

At Houston 



No. 1408986

In the 262nd Judicial District Court 

Of Harris County, Texas 



KANAVIUS DORSEY, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

Appellee



STATE’S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF 



TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS: 

 THE STATE OF TEXAS, pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 2 & 10.5, moves for 

an extension of time in which to file its appellate brief and in its motion, would 

show the Court the following: 

1. The appellant was charged with aggravated robbery (CR.-17). A jury 

convicted appellant of the charged offense (CR 141-142). An agreement 

was reached between appellant and the State regarding punishment and 

the court sentenced appellant to 20 years confinement in the Institutional 

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (CR.-5). Appellant 

filed notice of appeal (CR.-145). 

ACCEPTED

01-14-00685-CR

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

4/15/2015 12:59:37 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK

 FILED IN 1st COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 4/15/2015 12:59:37 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
2. The State’s brief was due April 13, 2015. The State hereby requests an

extension for the filing of the State’s brief until May 13, 2015. 

3. The following facts are relied upon to show good cause for an extension

of time to allow the State to file its brief:

The State has been working on and has filed the following briefs in the last 

thirty days.

Ex Parte McGuire

14-14-01010-CR

State’s Brief filed March 16, 2015

Le v. State

14-14-00043-CR

State’s Brief filed March 24, 2015

Efran Lopez

14-14-00758-CR

State’s Brief filed April 8, 2015

Allen v State

14-14-00842-CR

State’s Brief due April 8, 2015

Furthermore, the undersigned attorney has been assigned the following 

briefs in addition to the brief in this cause number.

Jackson v. State, 

14-14-00472-CR

State’s Brief due April 27, 2015

Moreno v. State

14-14-00455-CR

State’s Brief due April 27, 3025
4. This is the State’s second request for an extension of time to file its brief. 

WHEREFORE, the State prays that this Court will grant the requested 

extension.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Kimberly Stelter

KIMBERLY STELTER

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002-1923

(713) 755-5826

Stelter_Kimberly@dao.hctx.net

TBC No. 19141400
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing instrument will be served by 

efile.txcourts.gov to:

Mandy Miller

Attorney at Law

2910 Commercial Center Blvd., 

Ste. 103-201

Katy, Texas 77494

mandy@mandymillerlegal.com

/s/ Kimberly Stelter

KIMBERLY STELTER

Assistant District Attorney

Harris County, Texas

1201 Franklin, Suite 600

Houston, Texas 77002-1923

(713) 755-5826

April 15, 2015
Page 1 of 1 Express Terms 6 NYCRR Part 205 , Architectural and Industrial Maintenance (AIM) Coatings

Sections 205.1(a) through 205.1(b)( 1 ) remain unchanged. Paragraphs 205.1(b)( 2) and (3 ) are modified to read as follows: (2 ) any aerosol coating product; [and] (3) an y architectural coating that is sold in a container with a volume of one liter (1.057 quart) or less[.] ; and A new section 205.1(b)(4) is added to read as follows: (4) an y asphalt pavement and asphalt based surface coating regulated under Part 241 of this Title. Sections 205.2 through 205.8 remain unchanged.
<Page>



                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the use in the Statement of Additional Information
constituting part of this Post-Effective Amendment No. 2 to the registration
statement (Form N-4 No. 333-43886) (the "Registration Statement") of our report
dated February 15, 2002, relating to the financial statements of Fortis
Benefits Insurance Company, which appears in such Statement of Additional
Information. We also consent to the use in the Statement of Additional
Information constituting part of this Registration Statement of our report
dated April 6, 2001, relating to the financial statements of Fortis Benefits
Insurance Company Variable Account D, which appears in such Statement of
Additional Information. We also consent to the reference to us under the
heading "Independent Public Accountants" in such Statement of Additional
Information.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP
Minneapolis, Minnesota
April 17, 2002
Memorandum 

U.S. Department of 

Transportation "-1' 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Subject: 

From: 

To: 

Notice of Communication in Docket: 

DOT -OST -OST-2012-0029 

Special Rules for Ronald Reagan 

Airport (beyond-perimeter e 

Secretary Ray LaHood 

Chief, Dockets 

ington National 

s) 

In accordance with Dep ment rules (14 CFR Part 

communication. 

Date: MAR 2 9 2012 

On March 27, 2012, during a telephone conversation with Lt. Governor Gavin 

Newsom of California, he raised the subject of the Department's proceeding to 

allocate eight slot exemptions to new entrant and/or limited incumbent carriers for 

operations between Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) and 

airports beyond the 1,250-mile DCA perimeter. The Lt. Governor expressed his 

support for the applications proposing nonstop service from DCA to San Francisco 

and San Diego. 

I informed the Lt. Governor that, while I appreciated his interest in this case, I 

could not comment on its merits because the proceeding was under active 

consideration by the Department. 

Please place this memorandum in the appropriate Docket. 

cc: Lt. Governor Gavin Newsom
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-21-00115-CV 

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF ANNA DINA REYNA AND 

TIMOTHY MICHAEL TEAGUE AND IN THE INTEREST OF 

O.M.T. AND T.Z.T., CHILDREN 

 

On Appeal from the 46th District Court 

 Wilbarger County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 29268, Honorable Dan Mike Bird, Presiding 

June 10, 2021 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. 

Appellant Timothy Michael Teague, proceeding pro se, appeals from the trial 

court’s Temporary Orders issued in a pending divorce proceeding between Teague and 

Appellee, Anna Dina Reyna. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 

Generally, appellate courts only have jurisdiction over final judgments, those that 

dispose of all pending parties and claims. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 

195 (Tex. 2001). We have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory 

orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 967 
2

S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex. 1998). A temporary order issued in a divorce proceeding is

neither a final judgment nor an interlocutory order made immediately appealable by 

statute. See In re Marriage of Henry, No. 14-21-00080-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2388, 

at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 30, 2021, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) 

(dismissing appeal from temporary orders issued in a divorce proceeding for want of 

jurisdiction).

By letter of May 19, 2021, we notified Teague that it did not appear that a final 

judgment or appealable order had been issued by the trial court and directed him to show 

how we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Teague has filed a response but did not 

demonstrate grounds for continuing the appeal.

Because Teague has not presented this Court with a final judgment or appealable 

order, the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

Per Curiam
Grain Inspection Advisory 

Committee Meeting

National Grain Center

September 5-6, 2018
Program Updates

• AMS Merger
Program Updates

• AMS Merger

• FGIS Restructuring
Program Updates

• AMS Merger

• FGIS Restructuring

• Continued Operations Focused on Service

• Grading 

• QMP

• International Affairs

• Scientific Research

• Initiated Hiring Process

• Increased Transparency

• Increased Industry Relations

• Advisory Committee
Questions
EXHIBIT 99.1

                         CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                          18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT BY
               SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Annual Report of Secured Diversified
Investment, Ltd., on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2002
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), the undersigned, Clifford L. Strand, Chief Executive
Officer and Munjit Johal Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a)
     or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
     the Company.



Date: February 12, 2003                /s/ Clifford L. Strand
                                       Clifford L. Strand,
                                       Chief Executive Officer



Date: February 12, 2003                /s/ Munjit Johal
                                       Munjit Johal,
                                       Chief Financial Officer
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA , Respondent ,

v.

RUDY HELENICK , Petitioner

.
No. 1 CA

- CR 16

- 0236 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR

- 127204 The Honorable Margaret R. Mahoney , Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELI EF DENIED

COUNSEL
Maricopa County Attorney’ s Office , Phoenix By Diane Meloche Counsel for Respondent
Rudy Helenick , Tucson Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined. FILED 8-17-2017STATE v. HELENICK Decision of the Court

2 B R O W N , Judge:

¶1 Rudy Helenick petitions this court for review of the summary dismissal of his untimely and successive notice s of post

- conviction relief. We have considered the petition for review and, for the reasons stated, grant review and deny relief.
¶2 A jury convicted Hel e nick of six counts of first degree burglary, si x counts of armed robbery, and nineteen counts of kidnap ping

. The trial court sentenced him a s a repetitive offender to consecutive and concurrent terms of imprisonment totaling 84 years. This court affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Helenick , 1 CA

- CR 7241 (Ariz. App. Mar. 14, 1985) (mem. decision).
¶3 Between 2001 and 2013 , Helenick commenced multiple proceedings for post

- conviction r e lief, all of which were unsuccessful. In November 2015 and February 2016, Hel e nick filed notices of post

conviction relief , seeking to raise claims o f si gnificant change in the law and violation of the International Covenant o n Civil and Political Rights ( “ ICCPR ” ). The trial court summarily dismissed the notices , finding that Hel e nick failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in an untime ly and successive post

- conviction proceeding . This petition for review followed.
¶4 On review, Hel e nick argues he is entitled to relief on the grounds of significant change in the law based on Montgomery v. Louisiana , 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) , and violation of the IC CPR

. We review the summary dismissal of a post

- conviction relief proceeding for abuse of discretion. State v. Bennett , 213 Ari z. 562, 566, ¶ 17 (2006).
¶5 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief. In summarily dismissing the notices, the court issued a ruling that identified, addressed, and correctly resolved the claims that Helenick sought to raise. Further, the court did so in a thorough, well

- reasoned manner that will allow any future court to understand the ruling

. UnderSTATE v. HELENICK Decision of the Court

3 these circumstances, “[n]o useful purpose would be served by this court rehashing the trial court’s correct ruling in a written decision.” State v. Whipple , 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993). Adopting the trial court’s ruling,

we grant review and deny relief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARCELINO RAMIREZ MARTINEZ, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-72907 

Agency No. A088-761-482 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 29, 2022**

Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,*** District Judge.

Petitioner Marcelino Ramirez Martinez (“Ramirez Martinez”), a native and 

citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for 

the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

FILED

AUG 9 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

(“BIA”) denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a 

motion to reopen. Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny 

the petition in part and dismiss it in part.

1. Ramirez Martinez argues that the BIA abused its discretion by denying

his untimely motion to reopen. We disagree. A petitioner must file a motion to 

reopen within ninety days of the entry of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). If a motion to reopen is untimely 

filed, the filing deadline may be equitably tolled if the petitioner was “prevented 

from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as [he] acts with due 

diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error.” Iturribarria v. I.N.S., 321 

F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003). The BIA found that Ramirez Martinez did not act 

diligently in pursuing his motion to reopen. On appeal, he does not address the 

BIA’s due diligence finding and has consequently waived any challenge to it. 

Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1152, 1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004). Because Ramirez 

Martinez’s lack of diligence precludes any claim for equitable tolling, the BIA did 

not abuse its discretion by denying Ramirez Martinez’s motion to reopen. Bonilla, 

840 F.3d at 583–84.

2. Ramirez Martinez further argues that the BIA erred in denying his 

request for sua sponte reopening. We have jurisdiction “to review Board decisions 
3 

denying sua sponte reopening for the limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning 

behind the decisions for legal or constitutional error.” Id. at 588. Ramirez 

Martinez does not argue before this court that the BIA made a legal or 

constitutional error in its denial. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review 

Ramirez Martinez’s challenge to the BIA’s denial of his request for sua sponte 

reopening and therefore dismiss it.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN 

PART.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Mathis, Appellant.

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Daniel FitzGerald, J.), rendered on November 1, 1989, convicting defendant upon a plea of guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and sentencing defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of *8V3*to 25 years, unanimously affirmed.

We are unpersuaded that the sentence imposed was unduly harsh or severe. Taking into account, "among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction”, we perceive no abuse of discretion warranting a reduction in sentence. *(People v Farrar,*52 NY2d 302, 305.)

*428Further, defendant was sentenced in accordance with his plea bargain and within statutory guidelines. "Having received the benefit of his bargain, defendant should be bound by its terms.” *(People v Felman,*141 AD2d 889, 890, *lv denied*72 NY2d 918.) Concur—Rosenberger, J. P., Kupferman, Ross, Asch and Kassal, JJ.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 July 27, 2018

p0723

Order 

Clerk

July 27, 2018

156633 & (12)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 156633

COA: 339375

Wayne CC: 07-006974-FC

EPIGMENIO GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion to add issues is GRANTED. The application for 

leave to appeal the September 21, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and 

it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishing 

entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
EXHIBIT 23.1





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





BRT Apartments Corp. and Subsidiaries


Great Neck, New York





We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-213162, 333-190686, 33-160569, 333-128458 and 333-118915) and Form S-8 (Nos. 333-223620, 333-210168, 333-101681, 333-104461, 333-159903 and 333-182044) of BRT Apartments Corp. and Subsidiaries of our reports dated December 10, 2018, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedule, and the effectiveness of BRT Apartments Corp. and Subsidiaries' internal control over financial reporting which appears in this form 10-K.





/s/ BDO USA, LLP





New York, New York


December 10, 2018