In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15Ȭ2336

JULIO ESTRADAȬHERNANDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A091Ȭ335Ȭ563

____________________

ARGUED MARCH 2, 2016 — DECIDED MARCH 17, 2016

REȬISSUED AS OPINION APRIL 8, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and KANNE, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM.ȱ ȱ Julio EstradaȬHernandez is a 34ȬyearȬold

Mexican citizen who has been removed from the United

States as an alien convicted of controlledȬsubstance offenses,

a firearm offense (an aggravated felony), and crimes involvȬ
2 No. 15Ȭ2336

ing moral turpitude. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). First an immiȬ

gration judge and then the Board of Immigration Appeals

rejected his efforts to avoid removal, and so he has now

turned to this court for relief. We find no reason to upset the

BIA’s decision, however, and so we deny his petition for reȬ

view.ȱȱȱ

I

EstradaȬHernandez and his mother entered the United

States unlawfully when he was a small child. They adjusted

their status to that of lawful permanent residents (LPRs) in

1989, when EstradaȬHernandez was seven. His mother beȬ

came a naturalized citizen when he was 16, but a quirk of

immigration law prevented her naturalization from conferȬ

ring citizenship on him automatically. His parents were marȬ

ried, though apparently not happily so. He could have beȬ

come a citizen in one of two ways: either both of his parents

would have had to naturalize before he turned 18, or they

would have had to become legally separated. See CitizenȬ

ship through parents, https://www.uscis.gov/usȬ

citizenship/citizenshipȬthroughȬparents (last visited Mar. 9,

2016). Neither of those things happened.

Over the next 15 years, EstradaȬHernandez was convictȬ

ed of several state crimes, including three controlledȬ

substance violations, two retail theft convictions, and one

charge of felonȬinȬpossession of a firearm. Eventually the

Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and CusȬ

toms Enforcement (ICE) section became aware of his crimiȬ

nal record and his LPR status. ICE instituted removal proȬ

ceedings against him in January 2015, charging him with beȬ

ing removable as an alien who after admission to the UnitȬ

ed States was convicted of three controlledȬsubstance crimes,ȱȱ
No. 15Ȭ2336 3

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and one aggravated felony convicȬ

tion stemming from a firearm violation,

id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). EstradaȬHernandez was later charged

with two additional grounds of removal—one for a firearm

violation, id. § 1227(a)(2)(C), arising out of the same convicȬ

tion as the aggravated felony charge, and one based on conȬ

victions for two or more crimes involving moral turpitude,

id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), stemming from two shoplifting inciȬ

dents.

At EstradaȬHernandez’s removal hearing, the IJ informed

him of his right to representation at no cost to the governȬ

ment and asked whether he wished to have the case continȬ

ued in order to secure counsel. EstradaȬHernandez did not

respond; instead, he asked why he was being detained and

explained that he thought he had become a citizen when his

mother naturalized. The IJ explored the issue and deterȬ

mined that EstradaȬHernandez had never obtained citizenȬ

ship because his parents had remained legally married. The

following colloquy then took place:

IJ: Well, it does not appear to me, sir, you are a

citizen of the United States ... Do you want me to conȬ

tinue your case to give you more time to get a lawyer?

EstradaȬHernandez (EȬH): No.

IJ: Do you wish then to represent yourself?

EȬH: Yes, I mean what other choices do I have?

IJ: Well, I’m willing to continue the case to

give you time to contact the lawyers on that list that

you received or any other lawyer that you might wish

to contact.
4 No. 15Ȭ2336

EȬH: I’ve tried to—I’m sorry.

IJ: Or any other lawyer that you might wish—

EȬH: I’ve already contacted them.

IJ: If you wish to represent yourself today, it’s

your right to do so. It includes your right to speak on

your own behalf and to present witnesses and eviȬ

dence in court. You have the right to inspect evidence

that the Government presents against you and you

may object to such evidence by asking that the Court

not consider it. You have the right to question any

witness who testifies in your case and if this Court

rules against you, you would have the right to appeal

to a higher court which is known as the Board of ImȬ

migration Appeals. Do you understand these rights?

EȬH: Yes, sir.

The IJ then proceeded with the hearing, in the course of

which EstradaȬHernandez admitted that he had been conȬ

victed of three state controlledȬsubstance offenses (all inȬ

volving possession of cocaine), retail theft, and possessing a

firearm as a felon. EstradaȬHernandez could not remember

the other theft that was the basis for the charge of removabilȬ

ity as an alien “convicted of two or more crimes involving

moral turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), but the govȬ

ernment offered proof of that conviction by submitting court

documents from Cook County. The IJ asked EstradaȬ

Hernandez whether he feared being harmed if he were reȬ

turned to Mexico, even offering to continue the case to give

him more time to consider whether he wished to apply for

asylum. EstradaȬHernandez once again declined the IJ’s offer

of a continuance. The IJ then pronounced that he was reȬ
No. 15Ȭ2336 5

movable on all four grounds charged by the government and

entered an order of removal.ȱȱ

Only then did EstradaȬHernandez finally obtain counsel.

He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing

that remand was warranted to allow him to withdraw the

admissions he had made while unrepresented. He asked the

Board to “issue a published decision requiring immigration

judges to enter a contested plea to all charges in the notice to

appear when a noncitizen is appearing in pro per regardless

of the reason why he appears without counsel.” Due process

requires such a rule, he asserted, because asking uncounȬ

seled aliens to admit or deny the allegations against them

has the effect of shifting the burden of proof, rather than reȬ

quiring the agency to prove charges by clear and convincing

evidence.ȱȱ

EstradaȬHernandez also argued that he was not subject to

removal for the aggravated felony conviction because his adȬ

justment of status does not qualify as an admission to the

United States and thus § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)—which provides

that “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at

any time after admission is deportable” (emphasis added)—

does not apply to him. Finally he argued that the IJ erred in

finding that his conviction for possessing a firearm as a felon

qualified as an aggravated felony because the state crime

that was the predicate for that conviction—possessing coȬ

caine, 720 ILCS 570/402(c)—is punishable by imprisonment

for “one year or more,” rather than a term of more than one

year, and therefore the state crime “does not squarely ‘fit in’

within the express statutory language of the federal definiȬ

tion.”
6 No. 15Ȭ2336

The Board rejected all of EstradaȬHernandez’s arguments

and upheld the removal order. It concluded that EstraȬ

daȬHernandez was afforded due process because the IJ fully

complied with the statutory requirement to inform him of

his right to obtain counsel, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4), and ofȬ

fered repeatedly to continue the case to allow EstradaȬ

Hernandez to obtain representation. The Board dismissed

any suggestion that the IJ shifted the burden of proof regardȬ

ing the charges set forth in the Notice to Appear; the govȬ

ernment properly supported its charges with evidence of

each conviction. As for the question whether EstradaȬ

Hernandez’s firearms conviction was an aggravated felony

for immigration purposes, the Board observed that this court

already had resolved the question in the government’s favor.

NegreteȬRodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2008). The

Board rejected EstradaȬHernandez’s contention that he was

not removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(iii) because he was

never “admitted” at a border; it held that Abdelqadar v. GonȬ

zales, 413 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2005), establishes that adjustment

of status qualifies as an admission for purposes of

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

II

EstradaȬHernandez pins his hopes in this petition on his

effort to persuade us that the alleged “denial of the right to

counsel,” which “includes the substantial interference with

that right,” amounted to “a denial of due process under the

Fifth Amendment.” He contends that the IJ “coerced and

discouraged him from pursuing legal representation” by inȬ

forming him that he did not derive citizenship through his

mother and then by accepting admissions he made in the abȬ

sence of counsel. And, he asserts, the IJ “excus[ed] the DeȬ
No. 15Ȭ2336 7

partment from carrying on its own burden of proof” by findȬ

ing him removable based on his own admissions.ȱȱ

The suggestion of coercion is baseless. The IJ repeatedly

offered to continue the case so that EstradaȬHernandez could

try to contact a lawyer, but EstradaȬHernandez explicitly deȬ

clined those offers, confirmed his wish to proceed pro se, and

stated that he already had contacted the pro bono attorneys

on the list he had been provided. Moreover, it would be imȬ

possible for EstradaȬHernandez to show prejudice from

counsel’s absence, because the government presented eviȬ

dence to support each conviction. Although 8 U.S.C. §

1229a(b)(4) confers a statutory right to hire one’s own lawyer

in an immigration hearing, that right is not derived from the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a criminal proceeding.

The latter right does not apply to removal proceedings,

which are regarded as civil in nature. See Magala v. Gonzales,

434 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005); Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498,

500 (7th Cir. 2001); Leslie v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 611

F.3d 171, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2010). Due process protections do

apply in all civil proceedings, including removal hearings,

Stroe, 256 F.3d at 500, but we presume that any removal proȬ

ceeding satisfies due process when it is conducted in accordȬ

ance with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). That statute requires only

that a noncitizen be given an opportunity to hire a lawyer.

Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 884–85 (7th Cir.

2007). The IJ made it clear to EstradaȬHernandez that he had

this right.ȱȱ

Although EstradaȬHernandez represented at one point

that the sole issue on appeal was his complaint about the

supposed denial of counsel, he raises two other arguments

as well, both of which the Board rejected. First, without adȬ
8 No. 15Ȭ2336

dressing the Board’s contrary conclusion, he contends that

he is not removable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which applies

only to aliens who have committed an aggravated felony afȬ

ter admission. His theory is that his adjustment of status,

which occurred after he had entered the United States unȬ

lawfully, does not qualify as an “admission” under

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Ergo, he reasons, he committed no

felonies, aggravated or otherwise, after admission because

he was never “admitted.” He bases this argument on AbdelȬ

qadar v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2005), which he calls

the “seminal case” holding that an alien who is not inspected

by an immigration officer at entry has never been admitted

and is not subject to removal under § 1227. Abdelqadar, EstraȬ

da says, has been “consistently followed [in the Seventh CirȬ

cuit], as it must, by a series of published decisions with full

unconditional approval.”

That is not what Abdelqadar holds. Indeed, that case is

distinctly unhelpful for EstradaȬHernandez. Citing Matter of

RosasȬRamirez, 22 I. & N. 616 (BIA 1999) (en banc), the AbdelȬ

qadar court endorsed the Board’s interpretation that, for an

alien who had entered the United States illegally, an adjustȬ

ment of status is an “admission” for purpose of

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because the adjustment of status is the

first point at which that individual is lawfully in the United

States. Abdelqadar, 413 F.3d at 672–73. Otherwise, illegal enȬ

trants would be exempt from removal and would, paradoxiȬ

cally, enjoy greater rights than lawful immigrants. Id. at 673;

see also OcampoȬDuran v. Ashcroft, 254 F.3d 1133, 1134–35

(9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting argument that alien who adjusted to

lawful status after illegal entry was never admitted for purȬ

poses of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)). EstradaȬHernandez mistakenly

relies on an inapposite passage from Abdelqadar, in which we
No. 15Ȭ2336 9

rejected the Board’s view that the word “admission” in anȬ

other part of the statute, § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), referred to the

most recent, rather than the initial, entry. 413 F.3d at 673–74.

Indeed, we cautioned in Abdelqadar that “the whole point of

contextual reading is that context matters—and the context

of the word ‘admission’ in [one part of the statute] differs

substantially from its context in [another].” Id. at 674. See

LemusȬLosa v. Holder, 576 F.3d 752, 757 (7th Cir. 2009).

EstradaȬHernandez argues finally that the Board erred by

concluding that his state conviction under 720 ILCS § 5/24Ȭ

1.1(a) for being a felon in possession of a firearm qualifies as

an aggravated felony for purposes of removal. See

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The state crime does not

“squarely fit [ ] with the express statutory language of [the

analogous federal offense, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)],” he conȬ

tends, because his predicate state felony conviction for posȬ

session of cocaine is punishable by imprisonment of not less

than one year, while federal law defines a felony as a crime

punishable by a sentence of more than one year. But as the

government correctly points out, the relevant inquiry is

whether the Illinois felonȬinȬpossession offense (of which EsȬ

tradaȬHernandez was convicted) qualifies as an aggravated

felony, and this court already has concluded that it does. See

NegreteȬRodriguez v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 497, 500–02 (7th Cir.

2008).

Finally, it is worth noting that EstradaȬHernandez chalȬ

lenges only the IJ’s finding that he is subject to removal

based on an aggravated felony conviction. He has not chalȬ

lenged the IJ’s ruling that he was also subject to removal

based on convictions for two or more crimes involving moral

turpitude, three controlled substance convictions, and a conȬ
10 No. 15Ȭ2336

viction for a firearm offense. Given our finding that the reȬ

moval proceedings were not tainted by any due process vioȬ

lation and the ample support the government furnished, we

DENY the petition for review.