J-S15038-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TERRELL DARNELL SMITH

Appellant No. 1207 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 17, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0005207-2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED APRIL 14, 2015

Appellant Terrell Darnell Smith appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas following his jury trial 

convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”) of a controlled substance, 

Schedule I, and DUI of a controlled substance, Schedule I or II metabolite.1 

We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

On June 26, 2013, at approximately 2:19 a.m., Trooper Jonathan Confer

activated the lights in his police car to pull over a vehicle driving on 

Interstate 83. N.T., 11/8/13, at 4-6. Appellant, who was driving a blue 

Mazda Protege on Interstate 83 in front of the targeted vehicle, believed the 

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1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii), respectively.
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trooper had activated his lights to initiate a stop of his vehicle. N.T., 

5/15/14, at 137-38. Both vehicles pulled over to the side of the road. N.T., 

11/8/13, at 6. The targeted vehicle parked directly in front of the police 

vehicle, and Appellant’s vehicle parked about nine or ten car lengths in front 

of the targeted vehicle. Id. at 14. After Trooper Confer and his partner 

approached the targeted vehicle, Trooper Confer left his partner with the 

targeted vehicle and approached Appellant’s vehicle to determine why 

Appellant pulled his vehicle to the side of the road. Id. at 6. Trooper Confer 

observed Appellant’s bloodshot and glassy eyes and noticed a strong odor of 

alcohol emanating from Appellant. Id. at 7. Appellant admitted to drinking 

alcohol and smoking marijuana earlier that evening, and Trooper Confer 

conducted field sobriety tests. Id. at 8. Trooper Confer then arrested 

Appellant for DUI. Id. at 13. A subsequent blood test revealed the 

presence of marijuana and a small amount of alcohol in Appellant’s blood.2 

N.T., 5/15/14, at 122, 125.

On November 4, 2013, Appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress 

evidence. The court conducted a suppression hearing on November 8, 2013 

and denied Appellant’s suppression motion.

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2 Specifically, Appellant’s blood alcohol level was .024, and there were Delta9 THC of 3.9 nanograms per milliliter and Delta-9 Carboxy THC of 85 

nanograms per milliliter in his blood, which indicated the presence of 

marijuana. N.T., 5/15/14, at 122, 125.
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On May 16, 2014, a jury found Appellant guilty of DUI controlled 

substance, Schedule I (Count 3), and DUI controlled substance, Schedule I 

or II metabolite (Count 4).3 On June 17, 2014, the court sentenced 

Appellant to 90 days to 5 years’ incarceration and a fine of $1,500.00 on 

Count 3. The court imposed no further sentence on Count 4. On July 18, 

2014, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.4

On July 28, 2014, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

and Appellant timely complied on August 15, 2014.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

WHETHER THE TROOPER SUBJECTED APPELLANT TO AN 

UNLAWFUL INVESTIGATORY DETENTION UNDER THE 4TH

AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 BECAUSE THE 

TROOPER LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION OR PROBABLE 

CAUSE TO CONDUCT A TRAFFIC STOP ON APPELLANT’S 

VEHICLE?

WHETHER THE SUPPRESSION COURT ERRED IN FINDING 

THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PULL OVER 

AFTER THE TROOPER ACTIVATED HIS EMERGENCY LIGHTS 

BECAUSE APPELLANT’S BELIEF THAT THE TROOPER 

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3 The jury acquitted Appellant of Counts 1 (DUI: general impairment/ 

incapable of safe driving, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1)), 2 (careless driving, 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3714(a)) and 5 (DUI: controlled substance – combination, 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(3)). 

4 Along with his notice of appeal, Appellant filed a petition to file a notice of 

appeal nunc pro tunc because he failed to file his appeal within 30 days of 

sentence. The court granted Appellant’s petition. Thus, we have jurisdiction 

to decide this appeal.
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SUBJECTED HIM TO A SEIZURE WAS REASONABLE UNDER 

THE 4TH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 8?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

For ease of disposition, we will address Appellant’s claims together. 

Appellant argues that the police officers did not have probable cause or 

reasonable suspicion to stop Appellant. Appellant claims that when he saw 

the flashing lights, he thought he was subject to a traffic stop, and that this 

belief was reasonable. He claims that the stop was an illegal investigatory 

detention that entitles him to suppression of evidence. We disagree. 

We review the denial of a suppression motion as follows:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial 

court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from 

those facts are correct.

We may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and 

so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the record supports the findings of the 

suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may 

reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal 

conclusions based upon the facts. 

Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 103 A.3d 115, 118 (Pa.Super.2014) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26–27 (Pa.Super.2008) (en 

banc )).

Where...the appeal of the determination of the suppression 

court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression 

court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate 

court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the 
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conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to 

plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.2010), cert. denied, 131 

S.Ct. 110, 178 L.Ed.2d 32 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

There are three types of interactions between police officers and 

citizens. Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 1126-27, 

(Pa.Super.2003). “Interaction between citizens and police officers, under 

search and seizure law, is varied and requires different levels of justification 

depending upon the nature of the interaction and whether or not the citizen 

is detained.” Id. 

Such interaction may be classified as a “mere encounter,” 

an “investigative detention,” or a “custodial detention.” A 

“mere encounter” can be any formal or informal interaction 

between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an 

inquiry by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this 

interaction is that it carries no official compulsion to stop 

or respond.

In contrast, an “investigative detention,” by implication, 

carries an official compulsion to stop and respond, but the 

detention is temporary, unless it results in the formation of 

probable cause for arrest, and does not possess the 

coercive conditions consistent with a formal arrest. Since 

this interaction has elements of official compulsion it 

requires “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful activity. In 

further contrast, a custodial detention occurs when the 

nature, duration and conditions of an investigative 

detention become so coercive as to be, practically 

speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.

“The protection against unreasonable searches and 

seizures afforded by the Pennsylvania Constitution is 

broader than that under the Federal Constitution.” 
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Commonwealth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 573 

(Pa.1997). However, “[i]n determining whether 

reasonable suspicion exists for a Terry[

5

] stop, the inquiry 

is the same under either Article 1, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution or the Fourth Amendment of the 

United States Constitution.” Commonwealth v. 

McClease, 750 A.2d 320, 324 (Pa.Super.2000).

To determine if an interaction rises to the level of an 

investigative detention, i.e., a Terry stop, the court must 

examine all the circumstances and determine whether 

police action would have made a reasonable person believe 

he was not free to go and was subject to the officer’s 

orders. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 723 A.2d 644, 646 

([Pa.]1999). An investigative detention, unlike a mere 

encounter, constitutes a seizure of a person and thus 

activates the protections of Article 1, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. 

Melendez, 676 A.2d 226, 229 ([Pa.]1996). To institute 

an investigative detention, an officer must have at least a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Sierra, 

supra at 176, 723 A.2d at 647. Reasonable suspicion 

requires a finding that based on the available facts, a 

person of reasonable caution would believe the intrusion 

was appropriate. See Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 

A.2d 1153 (Pa.2000).

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 1127-29 (Pa.Super.2003).

The remedy for illegal seizures and searches “is exclusion of the fruits 

of the illegal police conduct—under both the Fourth Amendment and under 

Article I Section 8. That general rule of exclusion, of course, is subject to 

numerous exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182, 187 

(Pa.2014). The exclusionary rule was created to “deter deliberate, reckless, 

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5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
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or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic 

negligence.” Id. at 193 (internal citations omitted).

The suppression hearing testimony revealed that Trooper Confer 

engaged his emergency lights to pull over the vehicle driving directly behind 

Appellant, and that the Trooper did not intend to stop Appellant. However, 

Appellant also pulled over his vehicle, mistakenly believing that Trooper 

Confer intended to stop him. When Trooper Confer approached Appellant’s 

vehicle to ascertain why Appellant stopped, Appellant’s bloodshot eyes and 

odor of alcohol made his intoxication immediately apparent. Appellant then 

admitted to drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana earlier that evening.

Based on this evidence, the trial court correctly determined that the 

incident began as a mere encounter which transformed into a custodial 

detention after the Trooper observed Appellant’s intoxication:

We note that, if anything, we’d call this an inadvertent 

stop. The police didn’t actually stop [Appellant]. 

[Appellant] stopped voluntarily. So there’s nothing wrong 

with the stop.

I guess it’s defense counsel’s argument that the troopers 

didn’t have the right to even approach the vehicle, which 

we don’t believe is correct, and we don’t believe it was an 

investigative detention.

Accordingly, we don’t believe the troopers did anything but 

have a mere encounter with [Appellant] which then gave 

them probable cause to believe that [Appellant] was under 

the influence. 

And based on the trooper’s testimony surrounding the field 

sobriety tests, we believe that the arrest was proper. So 

we’ll deny the motion to suppress. 
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N.T., 11/8/13, at 28-29.

The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and its 

legal conclusions are correct. See Gillespie, supra. We see no error in the 

trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s suppression motion. Accordingly, 

we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Wecht joins in the memorandum.

Judge Lazarus files a concurring statement in which Judge 

Wecht and Judge Jenkins join.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/14/2015