NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2021 IL App (3d) 190207-U

Order filed November 8, 2021

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2021 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

TAMIL ADAMS, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 13th Judicial Circuit, 

La Salle County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-19-0207 

Circuit No. 18-CF-214 

Honorable 

Howard C. Ryan Jr., 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Schmidt concurred in the judgment.

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: (1) The State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) defendant’s 

sentence was not grossly disparate; (3) defendant’s felony murder conviction and 

sentence do not violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois 

Constitution; (4) the automatic transfer provision is not unconstitutional on its 

face or as-applied to defendant; (5) the court properly admitted other-crimes 

evidence; (6) the court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress; and

(7) defendant was not provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 2 Defendant, Tamil Adams, appeals his conviction for felony murder. Defendant argues:

(1) the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) his sentence 
2 

was grossly disparate to that of his codefendant; (3) the felony murder statute violates the 

proportionate penalties clause; (4) the automatic transfer provision is unconstitutional; (5) the 

court erred by admitting other-crimes evidence; (6) the court erred by denying his motion to 

suppress statements; and (7) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The State charged defendant by indictment with felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) 

(West 2018)). In the indictment, the State alleged that on or about May 22, 2018, defendant, 

while committing a robbery, shot and killed Maria Delatorre. Defendant was 16 years old at the 

time of the offense. The matter was automatically transferred to adult court. 705 ILCS 405/5-130 

(West 2018).

¶ 5 Prior to trial, the State moved to admit evidence of defendant’s other crimes. The State 

sought to introduce evidence that defendant had committed a prior robbery with a handgun at the 

same location that the murder occurred, 213 West 9th Street, Streator, Illinois. The motion 

identified three juveniles who would testify that while at 213 West 9th Street, defendant utilized 

a gun and robbed them of “weed” and money. While the juveniles did not provide an exact date 

and their timelines differed slightly, they indicated this previous robbery took place within a few 

months prior to the murder. The State sought to introduce this evidence to show defendant’s 

knowledge of the residence, knowledge that individuals who were often at the residence 

routinely had illicit drugs and money, and motive and intent to commit a robbery at the 

residence. The court granted the motion over defendant’s opposition, allowing the other-crimes 

evidence to be admitted with a limiting instruction. 

¶ 6 Defendant moved to suppress statements he made to officers on May 23, 2018. He argued 

that his statements were not voluntary as required by the fifth amendment. In this regard, 
3 

defendant argued that he was 16 years old, he had difficulty reading, at the time of the statements 

over 12 hours had elapsed since his arrest and he was exhausted, defendant’s mother did not 

want him interviewed until she arrived on May 24, defendant was not informed that his mother 

was coming on May 24, and defendant was not allowed to consult with a concerned adult.

¶ 7 During the hearing on the motion, the court acknowledged that the burden was on the 

State, but had the defense put on its evidence first. After inquiring about the process and hearing 

the court’s explanation, defense counsel stated, “That makes perfect sense and I think it’s frankly 

a better system anyway.” Defendant testified that he had completed tenth grade. Defendant could 

read and write, but he could not comprehend everything that he read. Defendant did not have to 

read anything during the course of the police interview. Defendant stated that hours had passed 

between his arrest and when he was questioned by officers. At the beginning of the interrogation, 

he felt tired, hungry, and scared. Defendant had not been fed. Defendant testified that when 

asked, he said he wanted an attorney. Defendant later changed his mind and agreed to speak with 

the officers because the officers told him they would not tell him why he was being detained 

unless he talked to them. Defendant did not understand all the questions asked of him because he 

was confused and had never been interrogated before. The officers never asked if defendant 

wanted a parent or other adult present for the interrogation. If defendant knew he could have 

called his mother or father, he would have. Defendant would have liked to have his parents 

present for the questioning.

¶ 8 Streator Police Detective Jason Moore testified that defendant arrived at the Streator 

Police Department at approximately 5:15 a.m. on May 23. Because defendant was 16 years of 

age, Moore attempted to contact a family member for defendant. Moore determined that 

defendant had an aunt, Arista Stevenson, that lived in Streator and attempted to contact her at her 
4 

residence but was unsuccessful because he had an incorrect address. Moore then called Streator 

High School in search of contact information. Moore was able to obtain a contact number for 

Stevenson. Moore called Stevenson, and she identified herself as defendant’s aunt. Moore 

advised Stevenson that defendant was in custody. Stevenson then went to the Streator Police 

Department. Stevenson did not have a phone number for defendant’s parents but was able to 

contact defendant’s mother through Facebook messenger. Stevenson advised Moore that 

defendant’s mother told her to tell the officers not to speak with defendant because she would not 

be able to make it to the police department until the next day. Moore did not ask defendant for 

his mother’s or father’s phone number. Moore did not tell defendant that his mother wanted to be 

present for the interview.

¶ 9 Moore ultimately attempted to interview defendant at approximately 1 p.m. on May 23.

Streator Police Detective Troy Dodge was also present. Defendant did not appear to be under the 

influence of alcohol or drugs. Defendant was coherent. Moore did not promise defendant 

anything for making a statement. Moore did not coerce or threaten defendant. Defendant was

provided access to a restroom when needed. Dodge advised defendant of his Miranda rights. 

Defendant was specifically asked if he wanted a lawyer and defendant said that he did.

¶ 10 At that time, Moore and Dodge ended the interview and exited the interview room.

Moore then went to put defendant in a cell or on a bench. As Moore was doing that, defendant 

told Moore he would talk to Moore without a lawyer. Defendant initiated this conversation and 

said he wanted to talk to Moore about the case. Moore did nothing to initiate that conversation. 

Moore then contacted Dodge and they, along with defendant, went back into the interview room.

Dodge again read defendant the Miranda warnings and defendant agreed to answer questions 

without an attorney. Moore did not promise defendant anything and he did not coerce or threaten 
5 

defendant. Defendant then spoke to Moore and Dodge for a brief time. To the best of Moore’s 

knowledge, the statements made by defendant were freely and voluntarily given. Moore never 

told defendant that he would not tell defendant what he was being detained for unless defendant 

agreed to talk with him. Defendant’s answers were responsive to the questions Moore asked.

¶ 11 From the time defendant arrived at the police station at approximately 5:15 a.m. until he 

was questioned around 1 p.m., Moore did not provide defendant with food because defendant did 

not request any. Moore did not offer defendant coffee or caffeine prior to the interview.

Defendant did not request anything from Moore. 

¶ 12 The State introduced the recording of defendant’s interview. The recording shows that 

defendant’s answers are responsive to Moore’s and Dodge’s questions. It also shows that 

defendant was Mirandized. Further, the recording shows Moore confirm with defendant what 

had happened after the initial interview was terminated when defendant requested a lawyer—that 

when Moore was putting him on a bench, defendant told Moore he would talk to Moore without 

a lawyer.

¶ 13 The court ultimately denied the motion to suppress. It found that defendant’s statements 

were made freely and voluntarily, given the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that 

defendant initially requested a lawyer, and the officers stopped the interview. The court found

that defendant then reinitiated the conversation and was again Mirandized. The court stated that 

defendant was not denied any food or water and was not denied use of the restroom. Further, the 

court specifically noted that it watched the interrogation and that “[t]his young man knew his 

rights.” Specifically, toward the end of the interview, defendant said they were done talking and 

the interview was over. The court stated “[defendant] knew his rights when he was going through 

this.” The court did not believe defendant “was of such infirm years in his mind or his views that 
6 

he was unable to or was coerced or overborne by any police adult presence.” It noted defendant 

was calm and “[defendant] knew what he was doing, and he had [a] great conversation.”

¶ 14 The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The following summarizes the trial testimony and 

evidence pertinent to this appeal. On May 22, 2018, Maria Delatorre lived at 213 West 9th Street 

in Streator, Illinois. She lived there with her three children, Anthony C., Mariah C., and Elijah D.

On the evening of May 22, Delatorre was shot and killed outside of her residence.

¶ 15 Dominic H. testified that he was 16 years old and lived in Streator. Anthony was his 

friend, and he would hang out at Anthony’s house at 213 West 9th Street. It was common for 

Dominic and other friends to hang out at Anthony’s house. While there, they would typically 

drink alcohol and smoke marijuana. Approximately two months before Delatorre’s murder, 

Dominic saw defendant at Anthony’s house for the first time. Defendant was there with his 

“sister” Anaya. On that day, they drank alcohol and smoked marijuana. 

¶ 16 The second time that Dominic saw defendant at Anthony’s house was approximately one 

month before Delatorre’s murder. On that evening, Dominic, Anthony, defendant, and Chase N.

were present. They were smoking marijuana in Anthony’s bedroom. Dominic fell asleep. When 

Dominic awoke, defendant was holding a gun in Dominic’s face. Defendant told Dominic to 

empty his pockets, and Dominic told defendant he did not have anything other than his cell 

phone. Defendant told Dominic to give him the phone and defendant would put it in the mailbox.

Defendant pointed the gun at Anthony and Chase and took approximately $500 to $600 from 

Chase and approximately 20 grams of marijuana that belonged to Dominic, Anthony, and Chase.

None of them were selling marijuana. Defendant took all of their phones and told them he would 

put the phones in the mailbox and not to go out there until 10 minutes had passed. Defendant 

also said that if they contacted his sister “he was coming back for murder.” Defendant then left 
7 

the house. Dominic waited 10 to 15 minutes then went outside, grabbed his phone from the 

mailbox, and ran home. Dominic did not tell anybody about this event and did not contact the 

police.

¶ 17 Anthony C. testified that he was 15 years old and on May 22, 2018, he was living at 213 

West 9th Street with his mother, Delatorre, and his siblings, Mariah and Elijah. At that time, he 

had a group of friends that he would hang out with in his bedroom. Anthony knew defendant and

that defendant’s nickname was Tarentino. Anthony met defendant through a friend, Brandon W., 

approximately one month before May 22. Anthony, Brandon, and defendant hung out in 

Anthony’s bedroom. Typically, when Anthony and his friends hung out in his bedroom they 

would talk, smoke marijuana and drink alcohol.

¶ 18 Anthony saw defendant again the day after meeting him. Defendant was at Anthony’s 

house along with Jase H., Chase, and Dominic. At some point, Jase left and Anthony, defendant, 

Dominic, and Chase continued hanging out in Anthony’s bedroom. Defendant told them he knew 

someone in Chicago that he could rob and asked Chase if he could use Chase’s gun that Chase

had with him. Defendant then “snatched” the gun from Chase. Defendant pointed the gun at 

Chase’s head and demanded Chase give him his money and marijuana. Anthony stated that 

defendant also pointed the gun at Anthony and Dominic and “demanded [we] give him our 

things.” Anthony was not sure how much money or marijuana defendant took that day. The 

marijuana defendant took belonged to Chase. Defendant told them he would leave their cell 

phones in the mailbox. Defendant left and took the gun with him. Dominic, Chase, and Anthony

waited approximately three minutes and then went to the mailbox where they found their cell 

phones. Chase and Dominic then went home. Anthony did not report the incident to police 

because he did not want to get his friends in trouble.
8 

¶ 19 On May 22, Anthony was home with Delatorre and his siblings. Delatorre and his 

siblings left the house around 6 p.m. Anthony was then home alone and cleaning his bedroom.

Anthony’s dog was with him in his bedroom. Anthony identified a photograph marked as the 

State’s exhibit No. 2 as a photograph of his back door, and his bedroom window. There was a 

couch underneath the window. Anthony began getting ready for bed. Anthony then saw his 

bedroom doorknob twist. Anthony shouted to see who was there, but no one answered. Anthony 

opened his bedroom door and after not seeing anyone there, he checked his window. Anthony 

saw two black males standing by the back door and recognized one of them as defendant. 

Anthony recognized defendant from a prior encounter and previously being robbed by defendant. 

Anthony did not recognize the other black male and described him as having a beard.

¶ 20 Anthony asked who was there or what they wanted, and defendant said he had the money 

to give back. Defendant said it was Anaya’s brother. Anthony knew Anaya and said she and 

defendant called each other cousins. After Anthony refused to open the door, defendant came 

toward the window and pulled a gun from his waist and “said to open the F’ing door.” Anthony 

testified that the gun was gray and was not “one of those old-fashioned guns where you can see 

the barrel.”1 Anthony testified that defendant did not say what he wanted and did not demand 

anything from him. Defendant pointed the gun at Anthony while Anthony was at the window. In 

an aggressive tone, defendant told Anthony to open the door. Anthony then agreed to open the 

door. However, Anthony’s dog was barking so he tried to put the dog in his cage, but the dog 

pulled away from him and jumped toward the window. Anthony heard a gunshot. Defendant was 

at the window when Anthony heard the gunshot. Anthony could not say for certain that 

1

The parties later stipulated that Anthony told detectives on May 23, that the gun was “an oldfashioned gun” where “you can see the barrel.”
9 

defendant fired the gunshot because he was not looking at the window when the gunshot was 

fired. The other black male did not approach the window and was off to the side. Anthony never 

saw a gun or any weapon on the other black male.

¶ 21 When Anthony heard the first gunshot he ran toward the front door. While running, 

Anthony saw Mariah in the kitchen and told her to run. Mariah ran out the front door, followed 

by Anthony. Anthony ran into the woods across the street.

¶ 22 A few hours later, in the middle of the night, Anthony gave a statement to the police.

Anthony did not tell them the truth at that time because he did not want to get his friends in 

trouble. Anthony did not immediately mention defendant to the police. He was “[i]n total 

disbelief, shocked” and “shut down.”

¶ 23 Anthony admitted that people would come to his house to buy marijuana out of his 

bedroom from Chase. Anthony did not always know when people were coming to buy 

marijuana. There was usually money and marijuana in Anthony’s bedroom.

¶ 24 Valentin Chavez testified that he was with Delatorre on May 22, 2018. Delatorre, along 

with Mariah, Elijah, and a male driver that Chavez did not know picked Chavez up from work. 

When they arrived at Delatorre’s home, Mariah exited the car first and entered the house. Chavez 

began walking toward the house. He heard gunshots and saw Mariah crying and running out of 

the house. Chavez also saw Anthony run out of the house after Mariah. Chavez turned around 

and saw Delatorre fall down. He heard the gunshots prior to Delatorre falling down. He heard 

five gunshots and they sounded like they were coming from inside the house. Chavez did not see 

who fired the gunshots.

¶ 25 Mariah C. testified that she was 10 years old. On May 22, 2018, at approximately 7 or 8 

p.m., Mariah, Delatorre, and Elijah left their house at 213 West 9th Street to pick up Chavez. A 
10 

man Mariah believed to be named Donny drove them. When they arrived back home, Mariah 

noticed a black car parked in front of her house that was not there when they left. Mariah exited

the car and ran into the house. Mariah entered through the front door, into the living room and 

then the kitchen. From the kitchen, Mariah could see to Anthony’s bedroom. Mariah saw 

Anthony and their dog in Anthony’s bedroom. Anthony loudly told Mariah to run. Mariah ran 

toward the front door. While she was running out of the house, Mariah heard one or two 

gunshots. Mariah ran toward the woods and heard more gunshots. When Mariah reached the 

edge of the woods she stopped and looked back toward her house. Mariah saw two black males 

running under the carport. One of the males “had like twisty hair kind of.” One of them had a 

short gray gun, a handgun. It was a small gun that is held in the hand. The black males ran to the 

black car that had been parked in front of the house. A female was in the black car. Once the 

males entered the black car, it sped off.

¶ 26 Mariah then entered the house looking for her dog because she heard him crying. When 

she did not find him, Mariah came outside and saw her mother, Delatorre, on the ground 

bleeding. Mariah was interviewed by the police a few hours after this happened. At that time, she 

“was kind of shocked” and “a little upset.” Mariah admitted that during the interview she told the 

police that there was a shotgun. During her trial testimony, Mariah indicated that she believed a 

shotgun and a pistol were the same thing. Mariah testified that the gun she saw the black male 

holding was as she described it during her trial testimony. Mariah also admitted telling the police 

that both males had guns—one long gun and one short gun. Mariah also spoke with the police 

about Brandon driving a black car, but testified it was not Brandon’s car. Mariah did not see 

Brandon at the time Delatorre was shot. Mariah reiterated that a female was driving the black 

car.
11 

¶ 27 Andrew Kochis testified that he lived approximately four or five houses away from 213 

West 9th Street. On May 22, 2018, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Kochis was pulling into his 

driveway and heard a loud pop, another pop, and then four more pops back to back. Almost 

immediately, he saw a black four-door sedan speeding past his house.

¶ 28 Hashim Waite testified that he was 25 years old and lived in Chicago. Defendant had 

been his friend for approximately two years. Defendant’s nickname is Tarentino. Waite knew

Ashanti Roberts from his neighborhood. On May 22, 2018, Waite was with defendant. They 

made plans to “go hit this lick,” which Waite explained meant to commit a robbery. Waite and 

defendant made the plan to commit a robbery about a week before May 22. Defendant started 

this conversation. Defendant originally stated they needed to commit the robbery in Kankakee 

but Waite later learned it was actually in Streator where defendant wanted to commit the 

robbery. Waite had never been to Streator before May 22. Defendant told Waite that they were 

“going to get some weed and some money,” and defendant knew where it was because defendant 

had “robbed them before.” Waite elaborated that defendant had told Waite that he had previously 

robbed these juveniles—the intended targets of the robbery—with their own gun. 

¶ 29 Waite was willing to take part in the robbery because he needed money. Waite thought it 

was going to be an easy robbery based on defendant’s description of the prior robbery. On May 

22, Waite met with defendant and Roberts. Neither Waite nor defendant had a car, but Roberts 

had a black four door car. Waite drove them from Chicago to Streator. Defendant put the address 

into the GPS. They initially went to the wrong address. Waite then pulled into a parking lot and 

defendant “was doing something on the phone and just got the address.” Defendant then put the 

new address into the GPS. Waite could not remember the address other than that it was on 9th 

Street. Waite, Roberts, and defendant went to Streator “[t]o hit the lick.”
12 

¶ 30 When Waite, Roberts, and defendant left Chicago in Roberts’s car, Waite had a loaded

Browning .9-millimeter firearm. When they arrived at the second location that defendant had 

entered into the GPS they parked in front of the house. When they exited the car, Waite gave 

defendant the gun. Waite did not know why he gave the gun to defendant. Roberts got into the 

driver’s seat. Waite and defendant then walked to the back of the house, with defendant leading 

the way. They went to the back door. Waite identified the back of the house they were at on May 

22 in the photograph marked as People’s exhibit No. 2. Defendant walked into the house through 

the back door. Waite stood outside. Defendant returned saying there was a big dog in the house.

¶ 31 After defendant came back out of the house, a young person stuck his head out of the 

window asking who was there. Defendant said it was Anaya’s brother. The young person asked 

if it was defendant. Defendant said he was trying to give the young person his stuff back. Waite 

told the young person to open the door and let them in. Waite then noticed headlights in the 

driveway. Defendant pulled the gun out and pointed it at the young person. While pointing the 

gun at the young person, defendant “said give me that shit.” Defendant looked like he was going 

to go through the window. Defendant fired a shot through the window and ran into the house 

through the back door. As soon as defendant entered the house, Waite heard four gunshots.

Defendant exited the house and said they were “supposed to be gone.” Waite asked defendant if 

“he grab[bed] the shit,” because that is what they went to Streator for. Defendant told Waite to 

“come on” and they started running toward the car. Waite heard three more gunshots when they 

were in the front yard. At that time, Waite turned and looked at defendant “to make sure he 

wasn’t shooting in [Waite’s] direction.”

¶ 32 Waite and defendant entered the black car. Waite yelled at defendant because he was not 

supposed to shoot the gun. Waite took the gun from defendant and wiped it off to get any prints 
13 

off of it. Defendant told Waite he thought he shot two or three people. Minutes after leaving the 

scene, a squad car with its lights activated got behind the black car. A second squad car got in 

front of them, but they went around that squad car. There was a car chase and Roberts lost 

control of her car and crashed. Prior to the crash, when the police were behind them, Waite gave 

the gun to defendant to run with because he did not want to be caught with it. Waite, defendant, 

and Roberts exited the car and ran. Waite was apprehended approximately 10 minutes later.

¶ 33 Waite admitted to having two prior felony convictions—aggravated unlawful use of a 

weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Additionally, at the time Waite was 

testifying, he was charged with murder. In exchange for Waite providing truthful testimony in 

the present case, the State agreed to instead file a home invasion charge against him, to which 

Waite would plead guilty and be sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. Waite would be eligible 

for day-for-day good-conduct credit.

¶ 34 Donald Shultheis testified that on May 22, 2018, he spent the day with Delatorre. That 

evening, Shultheis, Delatorre, Mariah, and Elijah went in Shultheis’s truck to pick up Chavez.

After stopping at Circle K, they went to Delatorre’s house. When they arrived, Shultheis noticed 

a black car beyond the driveway that was not there when they left the house. Delatorre opened 

the door to the truck and while she and Shultheis were talking, Shultheis heard two gunshots. He 

knew they were gunshots because he had spent time in the military. Shultheis saw two black 

males run from behind the house, underneath the carport, and then by his truck. Shultheis 

testified that the males got to the front of Shultheis’s truck, and one fired “two shots right in front 

of my face.” The shots were fired across the hood of his truck. At that point, Delatorre fell.

Shultheis ducked down and when he stood up, he saw the males entering the black car. He heard 

at least one gunshot when they were driving off. Shultheis saw one gun and it was a pistol.
14 

¶ 35 Brandon W. testified that on May 22, 2018, he was 15 years old. He did not drive and did 

not have access to a car.

¶ 36 Retired Village of Dwight Police Officer Mark Scott testified that on the evening of May 

22, 2018, he was involved in a vehicle pursuit. The vehicle crashed, and he saw a black male exit 

the vehicle and run. A female, that Scott thought was Caucasian, wearing a light blue jacket or 

sweatshirt exited the driver’s door and ran in the same direction. Around 4:20 a.m. the next 

morning, Scott received a call that a black male and black female walked out of the field and 

were heading toward Circle K. Scott proceeded to that location and observed a black male and a 

black female wearing a light blue shirt or jacket walking into the gas pump area. Scott 

recognized the light blue shirt as the one the female driver who exited the crashed vehicle was 

wearing. Those individuals were taken into custody, and Scott identified defendant as the black 

male. 

¶ 37 Livingston County Sheriff’s Deputy Emily Anderson Frobish testified that while working 

on May 22, 2018, she received a call that a shooting had just occurred in Streator and a black 

four-door car had left the scene traveling southbound on Route 23. Frobish headed westbound on 

Route 17 hoping to intercept the vehicle. She encountered a speeding vehicle matching the 

description, began following it, and eventually activated her lights. Frobish pursued the vehicle.

The vehicle crashed and Frobish observed two black males exit the passenger side. Frobish 

pursued one male but lost sight of him.

¶ 38 Pursuant to stipulations of the parties and testimony from law enforcement and crime 

laboratory personnel, the following information was presented at trial. Shell casings and 

projectiles from a .9-millimeter firearm were recovered from the crime scene. A Browning .9-

millimeter handgun was recovered approximately 35 feet northeast of where Roberts’s car 
15 

crashed following the police chase. The recovered shell casings and projectiles came from the 

recovered Browning .9-millimeter handgun. Testing of the shell casings and handgun revealed 

neither fingerprints suitable for comparison nor a human DNA profile. Gunshot residue testing 

revealed that Roberts and Waite “may not have discharged a firearm with either hand” and that if 

either discharged a firearm the particles were removed, not deposited, or not detected. Defendant 

could be excluded from having contributed to major DNA profiles collected from various articles 

of clothing found in Roberts’s vehicle; however, various articles of clothing also had minor DNA 

profiles that were potentially incomplete and unsuitable for comparison.

¶ 39 The jury found defendant guilty. The court polled the jury and each juror responded 

affirmatively that their verdict was guilty. Juror Ronald Widmer responded “Yeah.” The 

transcripts did not reveal any other statements by Widmer. 

¶ 40 Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion for new trial and a supplemental motion for 

new trial. As relevant here, at the hearing on the motion, counsel argued that hours after the 

verdict was read, Widmer called defense counsel and stated that he was not aware he could 

maintain his decision of not guilty when the other jurors decided to vote guilty. Additionally, 

defense counsel alleged that during polling of the jury, Widmer hesitated and was shaking his 

head while he said “Yeah.” Further, that after the last juror was polled, Widmer turned to the 

defense table and said “I’m sorry, man. I tried.” Counsel noted his unsuccessful attempts to 

obtain an affidavit from Widmer. 

¶ 41 The court denied the motion. In doing so, it noted the absence of an affidavit from 

Widmer, but also stated that the transcript does not bear out that Widmer made the statements as 

represented by counsel and that the court “would be confident that the reporter would catch that 

if that statement was made.” Further, the court stated it did not see Widmer shake his head and 
16 

that the answer “[y]eah” was not “an uncommon term for a positive reaction or a response.” The 

court determined it was not hesitant or ambiguous such that the court should have made further 

inquiry. The court also found that it could not get into how the jury or a particular juror came to 

its decision short of certain circumstances not present in this case.

¶ 42 The matter proceeded to sentencing. The court set forth the sentencing range of 20 to 60 

years’ imprisonment and noted that it could impose a firearm enhancement. The court declined 

to impose the firearm enhancement. It sentenced defendant to 35 years’ imprisonment followed 

by 3 years’ mandatory supervised release. Defendant appeals.

¶ 43 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 44 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 45 Defendant argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove him guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition to generally pointing to discrepancies in witness 

testimony, defendant argues that the State failed to prove he was attempting to commit a robbery, 

as charged, and that Delatorre was not killed during the commission of the attempted robbery or 

as a direct and foreseeable consequence of it.

¶ 46 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether 

the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, permits any rational trier of fact to 

find the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 

255, 272 (2008). “A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so 

improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People 

v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Witness credibility and the weight given to testimony are 

determinations left to the trier of fact. People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 95 (1991). “When the facts 

in a case give rise to more than one inference, a reviewing court shall not substitute its judgment 
17 

for that of the trier of fact unless the inference accepted by the trier of fact is inherently 

impossible or unreasonable.” People v. Price, 225 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1035 (1992). We will not 

retry the defendant and must allow all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the 

State. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 42.

¶ 47 First, as to defendant’s general arguments regarding the various discrepancies between 

witnesses, such discrepancies are to be expected when several persons witness an event under 

traumatic circumstances and were issues for the jury to resolve as the trier of fact. See People v. 

Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶¶ 65-66. 

¶ 48 Turning to defendant’s more specific arguments, he first asserts that the evidence was 

insufficient to establish he was attempting to commit a robbery, which is the predicate forcible 

felony alleged in the indictment. “A person commits robbery when he or she knowingly takes 

property *** from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the 

imminent use of force.” 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 2018). 

¶ 49 Here, testimony from Waite and Anthony readily establish that defendant attempted to 

commit a robbery. First, Waite testified that the plan was to commit a robbery. Defendant, Waite,

and Roberts drove from Chicago to Streator to Anthony’s residence to commit the robbery.

Defendant had told Waite that he previously robbed juveniles at this residence. Waite further 

testified that while defendant was pointing the gun at Anthony, defendant told Anthony to “give 

me that shit.” While Waite may have some credibility issues due to his prior crimes and the fact 

that he was a codefendant, his testimony is consistent with other evidence and credibility 

determinations are for the trier of fact. See Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 95. Anthony testified that 

defendant pointed the gun at him. Anthony also testified about a prior incident where defendant 

had robbed him and his friends, which is indicative of defendant’s intent in this instance.
18 

Viewing the foregoing in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was attempting to commit a robbery. See Ross, 229 Ill. 

2d at 272. 

¶ 50 Defendant next argues that the State failed to prove that Delatorre was killed during the 

commission of the attempted robbery or as a direct and foreseeable consequence of it. He argues 

that the attempted robbery had ended at the time Delatorre was killed.

¶ 51 As charged in this case, an individual commits felony murder when he kills an individual 

without lawful justification and in performing the acts which cause death “he is attempting or 

committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder.” 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 

2018). “A killing that occurs during the course of an escape from a forcible felony is within the 

operation of the felony-murder rule.” People v. Klebanowski, 221 Ill. 2d 538, 549 (2006).

¶ 52 Here, testimony at trial readily established that Delatorre was shot and killed while 

defendant was fleeing the scene after his failed robbery attempt. In other words, the killing 

occurred during the course of defendant’s escape from a forcible felony and is thus, within the 

operation of the felony-murder rule. See id. Our supreme court has rejected defendant’s 

argument that he is not accountable for felony murder when the killing occurred after the forcible 

felony—here, attempted robbery—had ended. See id. at 545-51. Additionally, while defendant 

raises the issue of who fired the gun and indicates it may have been Anthony, our supreme court 

has noted it is immaterial whether the killing is actually committed by defendant, an accomplice, 

or a third party reacting to the commission of the felony. See People v. Allen, 56 Ill. 2d 536, 544-

45 (1974). Based on the foregoing, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Delatorre was killed during the commission of the attempted robbery or as a direct and 

foreseeable consequence of it.
19 

¶ 53 B. Sentencing Disparity

¶ 54 Defendant argues that his sentence is grossly disparate in violation of due process and the 

Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause in comparison to the sentence imposed upon 

Waite.

¶ 55 As an initial matter, as argued by the State, defendant has forfeited this issue by failing to 

raise it in the circuit court. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988) (generally, a 

defendant must object to an error at trial and raise the issue in a posttrial motion in order to 

preserve it for appellate review). Defendant acknowledges that he did not raise the issue in the 

circuit court but asserts in his reply brief that this argument raises issues of substantial 

constitutional rights, which appears to be an attempt at arguing for plain error review. See People 

v. Lindsey, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1034 (2000) (noting that an error can amount to plain error if 

“the defendant was deprived of substantial rights”). The first step in plain error review is to 

determine if an error occurred. People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). Whether a 

defendant was denied due process is a question of law reviewed de novo. People v. Stapinski, 

2015 IL 118278, ¶ 35. 

¶ 56 “Our supreme court has found that fundamental fairness requires that ‘similarly situated’ 

codefendants, who were involved in the same crime, should not ‘receive grossly disparate 

sentences.’ ” People v. Guerrero, 2020 IL App (1st) 172156, ¶ 53 (quoting People v. Fern, 189 

Ill. 2d 48, 58 (1999)) (citing U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 11). “To 

prevail on a claim of disparate sentencing, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he 

and his codefendant were both (1) equally culpable and (2) ‘similarly situated with respect to 

background, prior criminal history, and potential for rehabilitation.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. 
20 

Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d 133, 139 (2004)). “[A] plea of guilty is a relevant mitigating factor.”

People v. Banks, 241 Ill. App. 3d 966, 984 (1993).

¶ 57 Here, defendant’s claim of grossly disparate sentences fails under the first prong because 

he and Waite were not equally culpable. Although defendant and Waite were legally equally 

culpable for felony murder, they were not equally culpable factually. Specifically, it was 

defendant’s plan to commit the robbery and defendant provided the location. In fact, Waite had 

never been to Streator. Per Anthony and Waite’s testimony, defendant pointed the gun at 

Anthony, not Waite. Further, Waite’s testimony and inferences from Anthony’s testimony 

indicate that defendant fired the shot that killed Delatorre. Additionally, Waite agreed to plead 

guilty to home invasion and a guilty plea is a relevant mitigating factor. See id. Because we find 

no error, we need not move on to the second step of plain error review.

¶ 58 C. Proportionate Penalties Challenge to the Felony Murder Statute

¶ 59 Defendant argues that the felony murder statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2018)) 

violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution on its face and as applied to 

him. In this regard, defendant asserts that felony murder and home invasion as defined by section 

19-6(a)(5) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (id. § 19-6(a)(5)) are identical offenses but have 

different sentences.

¶ 60 The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, 

¶ 57. “A statute is facially invalid only if there is no set of circumstances under which the statute 

would be valid.” Id. ¶ 58. “An as-applied challenge requires a showing that the statute violates 

the constitution as it applies to the facts and circumstances of the challenging party.” People v. 

Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36. The proportionate penalties clause is violated when offenses 
21 

with identical elements are subject to different penalties. People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 521 

(2005). 

¶ 61 Felony murder occurs when an individual is killed during the commission of a forcible 

felony or escape after committing a forcible felony. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2018); 

Klebanowski, 221 Ill. 2d at 549. A person commits a home invasion under section 19-6(a)(5) 

when he enters a dwelling place of another without authority, knowing or having reason to know 

one or more persons is present and “[p]ersonally discharges a firearm that proximately causes 

great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person 

within the dwelling place.” 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(5) (West 2018). 

¶ 62 While defendant asserts he is making a facial challenge, he makes no cogent argument in 

this regard. Regardless, a cursory look at the elements of felony murder and the home invasion 

statute cited by defendant clearly establishes that the two offenses have different elements, such 

that there are many circumstances under which the felony murder statute would not violate the 

proportionate penalties clause. As examples, felony murder contains no element that defendant 

personally discharge a firearm and the home invasion statute has no requirement that an 

individual is killed.

¶ 63 Turning to the as-applied challenge, defendant asserts that a home invasion in violation of 

section 19-6(a)(5) which results in death by a firearm is also a felony murder under section 9-

1(a)(3), but the offenses are subject to different penalties. Defendant fails to make any argument 

as to how this applies to his circumstances or how this fact makes defendant’s conviction or 

sentence unconstitutional. See People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 29 (“A 

reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with *** cohesive arguments presented; 

this court is not a repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and 
22 

research ***.”). Notably, robbery was the forcible felony underlying defendant’s felony murder 

charge, not home invasion. To the extent defendant was attempting to say his alleged conduct 

amounted to both a home invasion under section 19-6(a)(5) and a felony murder under section 9-

1(a)(3), his argument fails. Defendant’s conduct did not amount to a home invasion under that 

section. Specifically, defendant did not shoot and kill a person within the dwelling place because 

Delatorre was not in the dwelling when defendant entered. See People v. Kolls, 179 Ill. App. 3d 

652, 656 (1989) (“The statute requires that the injury be inflicted on a person who was within the 

dwelling when the defendant made his unauthorized entry ***”). Based on the foregoing, 

defendant’s proportionate penalties challenge to the felony murder statute fails.

¶ 64 D. Constitutionality of the Automatic Transfer Provision

¶ 65 Defendant argues that the automatic transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 

(705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 2018)) violates due process and the Illinois Constitution’s 

proportionate penalties clause on its face and as applied to defendant. Further, while specifically 

stating defendant is not raising an eighth amendment issue, he nonetheless asserts the automatic 

transfer provision violates it. As set forth above, the constitutionality of a statute is reviewed 

de novo. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 57.

¶ 66 At the outset, we note that defendant’s arguments in this regard are not clearly defined or 

cohesively presented. See Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶ 29. To the extent defendant’s 

arguments can be deciphered, his attempted facial challenge(s) fail because the supreme court 

has held that the automatic transfer provision does not violate due process, the eighth 

amendment, or the proportionate penalties clause. See People v. Patterson, 2014 IL 115102, 

¶¶ 89-110. 
23 

¶ 67 Defendant’s attempts to distinguish Patterson and the cases cited therein appears to be 

his attempt at an as-applied challenge. Defendant argues, apparently based on the facts of this 

case, that the prosecutor has unbridled discretion on whether to charge a 16-year-old defendant 

with home invasion with a firearm causing death or the automatically transferable crime of 

felony murder. But there are plenty of circumstances where the prosecutor has no discretion on 

what to charge based upon the facts of the case as the facts will support only one possible charge. 

More importantly, and as stated above, this was not a case where the prosecutor had such 

discretion because defendant’s conduct did not amount to a home invasion which caused a death 

by a firearm of an individual within the dwelling. See supra ¶ 63. Thus, this as-applied challenge 

likewise fails.

¶ 68 E. Other-Crimes Evidence

¶ 69 Defendant argues that the circuit court erred by allowing evidence of a prior robbery 

defendant was alleged to have perpetrated.

¶ 70 A court’s decision to admit other-crimes evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 182 (2003). An abuse of discretion exists when the court’s 

decision is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable or when no reasonable person would take the 

position of the circuit court. Id. Evidence of other crimes is admissible to prove intent, identity, 

motive and any other relevant material fact other than propensity. Id. at 170; Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) 

(eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (providing that evidence of other crimes is admissible for some purposes such 

as proof of motive, intent, knowledge and identity). This evidence can be excluded “if the 

prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value.” Id.; Ill. R. Evid. 

403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (providing that relevant “evidence may be excluded if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”). 
24 

¶ 71 Here, the evidence of the prior robbery of Anthony by defendant at the same location as 

the current offense is highly probative of defendant’s knowledge, intent and motive. Specifically, 

this evidence helped establish that defendant had knowledge that juveniles were routinely at the 

address and usually had drugs and money. Further, it is probative of motive and intent to commit 

another robbery of these juveniles because it was undisputed that none of the victims of the prior 

robbery reported it to police until after Delatorre was killed, making these juveniles seemingly 

easy targets. Further, defendant’s argument in his brief that the evidence was inadmissible to 

prove intent because the intent to commit a robbery was not being contested, seemingly 

contradicts defendant’s argument that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 

had attempted to commit a robbery. Regardless, “the State can introduce otherwise admissible 

other-crimes evidence to prove intent even where the defendant does not put intent directly in 

issue.” People v. Davis, 2019 IL App (1st) 160408, ¶ 63. Additionally, the court gave a limiting 

instruction regarding this evidence, which limited any potential prejudice and defendant makes 

no argument that the jury failed to follow the instruction. See People v. Petrakis, 2019 IL App 

(3d) 160399, ¶ 24. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in 

admitting the other-crimes evidence.

¶ 72 F. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Statements

¶ 73 Defendant argues that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress statements 

made to the police. He largely relies on the fact that a parent or concerned adult was not present 

while he was questioned and argues that his statements were involuntary.

¶ 74 “[W]e review de novo the ultimate question of whether defendant’s confession was 

voluntary after examining the totality of the circumstances” but will only overturn the circuit 

court’s factual findings “if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Patterson, 2014 
25 

IL 115102, ¶ 37. In examining the totality of the circumstances “[r]elevant factors to consider 

include the minor’s age, mental capacity, education, physical condition, the legality and length of 

the interview, and physical or mental abuse by the police, as well as the presence of a concerned 

adult and any attempts by the police to prevent or frustrate that contact.” Id. ¶ 58. “[A] juvenile’s 

confession should not be suppressed merely because he was denied an opportunity to confer with 

a concerned adult.” Id. ¶ 65.

¶ 75 As an initial matter, defendant objects to the manner in which the hearing on the motion 

to suppress was conducted. However, he did not object during the hearing and in fact, his 

counsel told the court he believed it was “a better system.” Further, the court explicitly 

acknowledged the burden was on the State. Thus, defendant forfeited this argument and in any 

event it is without merit. 

¶ 76 Here, while defendant relies almost exclusively on the fact that he did not have a parent 

or concerned adult present, our supreme court has specifically stated that that fact alone is not 

reason enough to suppress a juvenile’s statement. See id. Additionally, defendant never 

requested to speak with his parents or a concerned adult. Further, Moore’s testimony at the 

hearing showed that he made reasonable efforts to contact defendant’s parents. While defendant 

asserts that after he invoked his right to an attorney the officers told him they would not tell him 

why he was being detained unless he talked to them, this was rebutted by Moore’s testimony.

The court determined that defendant reinitiated the conversation and thus, impliedly found that 

Moore’s testimony was credible on this point. This factual determination is not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence and thus, we will not overturn it.

¶ 77 Further, the recording of the interview shows that defendant’s answers were responsive to 

the questions being posed such that there is no indication that defendant had trouble
26 

understanding the process. More importantly, and as noted by the court, defendant ultimately did 

assert his rights and terminated the interview, further indicating he understood his rights and was 

capable of asserting them. Additionally, Moore testified that he made no promise or threats to 

defendant to convince him to speak and none were shown in the recording. Although defendant 

was not provided with food, Moore testified that defendant never requested any, such that he was 

not denied food. Defendant was 16 years old at the time of the interview, which the supreme 

court has indicated is “ ‘on the older end of the juvenile scale.’ ” Id. ¶ 67 (quoting People v. 

Murdock, 2012 IL 112362, ¶ 44). Based on the totality of these circumstances we conclude the 

circuit court did not err by denying the motion to suppress.

¶ 78 G. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 79 Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena a “juror 

who claimed he misunderstood the jury instructions and was not aware he could maintain his 

verdict of not guilty.”

¶ 80 In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show 

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “[I]f [an] ineffective-assistance claim can 

be disposed of on the ground that the defendant did not suffer prejudice, a court need not decide 

whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.” People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 

74 (1997). To show prejudice, “defendant must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Id.

¶ 81 In this matter, counsel moved for a new trial on the ground that a juror had contacted him 

and told counsel he was unaware he could maintain his verdict of not guilty. Counsel 
27 

unsuccessfully attempted to obtain an affidavit from the juror and advised the court of his efforts.

Counsel did not subpoena the juror to testify and defendant faults counsel for doing so. However, 

even if counsel had subpoenaed the juror and the juror testified about his confusion regarding 

maintaining a not guilty verdict, the motion for new trial would still have been denied and thus, 

the outcome would have been the same. This is because “the use of affidavits or testimony to 

show ‘the motive, method or process by which the jury reached its verdict’ [i]s not permitted” to 

impeach the jury verdict. People v Preston, 76 Ill. 2d 274, 288 (1979) (quoting People v. 

Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d 507, 511 (1978)). Thus, defendant cannot establish prejudice and his claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

¶ 82 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 83 The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed. 

¶ 84 Affirmed.