J-S13007-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

GLADYS V. RAMAEKERS, 

 Appellee No. 251 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order Entered January 17, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0002504-2013 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 13, 2015 

 The Commonwealth appeals from the suppression court’s January 17, 

2014 order granting Appellee’s, Gladys V. Ramaekers, pretrial motion to 

suppress evidence.1 After careful review, we affirm. 

 The suppression court set forth the facts of this case, as follows: 

 On June 20, 2013, between 7:45 and 7:50 p.m., there 

were three vehicles stopped at a red traffic light in the main 

westbound lane of West 8th Street, at the intersection of West 8th

Street and Pittsburgh Avenue, in the City of Erie, Pennsylvania. 

The first vehicle at the light was operated by an unidentified 

driver. The second vehicle was operated by ... [] Appellee .... 

The third vehicle in line was operated by Dedra Lynn Cavanagh 

(“Cavanagh”). Next to the main west bound lane was a turning 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The Commonwealth has certified in its notice of appeal that this order 

terminates, or substantially handicaps, the prosecution of Appellee’s case, 

thus permitting the Commonwealth’s appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). 
J-S13007-15 

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lane for westbound traffic intending to turn left onto Pittsburgh 

Avenue. 

 While the light was still red, [Appellee] suddenly backed up 

into the left turning lane, pulling up close to and stopping 

alongside the driver’s side of the vehicle operated by Cavanagh. 

The unidentified driver exited the first vehicle, pointed to 

[Appellee’s] vehicle and yelled, “She’s drunk.” The unidentified 

driver returned to her vehicle. After approximately ten seconds, 

the light turned green, and the driver of the first vehicle pulled 

over into a parking lot area. [Appellee] pulled back into the 

main westbound lane of West 8th Street in front of Cavanagh’s 

stationary vehicle, and proceeded through the intersection. 

After waiting for [Appellee’s] vehicle to proceed ahead of hers, 

Cavanagh followed [Appellee’s] vehicle. Upon passing through 

the intersection, the vehicles entered Millcreek Township. 

 Cavanagh called 911 to report what had occurred. She 

reported to 911 what the driver of the first vehicle said, and that 

[Appellee] nearly sideswiped her [vehicle]. Cavanagh remained 

on the phone with the 911 Operator, who transferred the call to 

Millcreek [Police] Dispatch, while Cavanagh continued to follow 

[Appellee’s] vehicle west along West 8th Street. 

 Cavanagh followed [Appellee’s] vehicle for several miles to 

Valerio’s Restaurant, located at the intersection of West Lake 

and Powell Roads in Millcreek Township. Cavanagh followed 

[Appellee’s] vehicle into the parking lot at Valerio’s. She 

observed [Appellee] park her vehicle and enter the restaurant. 

Three marked Millcreek Township Police cruisers pulled into the 

parking lot of Valerio’s. Cavanagh spoke with one of the officers, 

who asked Cavanagh where ... [Appellee’s] vehicle was and 

where ... [Appellee] was. After Cavanagh identified [Appellee’s] 

vehicle and reported ... [Appellee] had entered the restaurant, 

the officer told Cavanagh she could leave. 

 Cavanagh did not make any observation about the manner 

in which [Appellee] had operated her vehicle until [Appellee] 

backed up in the turning lane next to Cavanagh’s vehicle on 

West 8th Street. Cavanagh had no way of knowing if ... 

[Appellee] was drunk. Cavanagh did not know the driver of the 

first vehicle. Cavanagh did not know if the first driver had any 

reason to know whether or not [Appellee] was drunk. Cavanagh 

did not observe ... [Appellee] commit any traffic violations while 

she followed [Appellee] several miles to Valerio’s Restaurant. 
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 Millcreek Township Police Officer Kevin Guica (“[Officer] 

Guica”) testified [that] a call came in through Dispatch to all the 

police cars working that day at approximately 7:54 p.m. that a 

possibl[y] intoxicated driver was [traveling] westbound on West 

8

th Street. [Officer] Guica acknowledged it was the first driver, 

as conveyed through Cavanagh, who made the claim ... [that 

Appellee] was under the influence. The information from 

Dispatch led [Officer] Guica to Valerio’s Restaurant. 

 When [Officer] Guica arrived at the parking lot of Valerio’s 

in a marked uniform and a marked police cruiser, there were 

already two other Millcreek Township police cruisers at the 

scene. One of the police officers was speaking with Cavanagh. 

The officers determined [Appellee] was the registered owner of 

the vehicle and obtained her description. The officer reported to 

[Officer] Guica ... [that Appellee] had been driving alone and 

entered the restaurant alone. 

 [Officer] Guica entered Valerio’s and approached 

[Appellee]. There were other patrons in the restaurant. 

[Officer] Guica asked [Appellee] if the vehicle outside was hers 

and if her name was Gladys Ramaekers. After [Appellee] 

responded affirmatively to both questions, the officer asked 

[her], “Would you mind speaking with us outside in regards to a 

complaint received?” ... [Appellee] cooperated and agreed to 

speak with the officers outside. 

 [Appellee] got up out of her chair and walked out of the 

restaurant of her own accord, escorted by [Officer] Guica. She 

had no trouble getting up out of her chair. During the entire 

time [Officer] Guica observed [Appellee] in the restaurant and as 

she exited the restaurant, [Appellee] exhibited no balance, 

coordination or dexterity problems. She did not sway or 

stumble. 

 Once in the parking lot, the officers told [Appellee] they 

had received a complaint about an erratic driver who was 

possibly intoxicated. [Appellee] told the officers she had two 

glasses of wine at her residence prior to arriving at Valerio’s. 

[Officer] Guica testified he could smell the odor of an alcoholic 

beverage. [Officer] Guica noted no signs of coordination, 

dexterity or balance problems. Although [Officer] Guica initially 

testified he noted an apparent speech defect while [Appellee] 

was outside the restaurant, he testified the defect was not 
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significant enough for him to remember and record in the official 

report he prepared. 

 [Officer] Guica asked [Appellee] to participate in the 

following field sobriety tests: reciting the alphabet, the one leg 

stand test, the walk and turn test, and a [portable breathalyzer 

test (PBT)]. [Appellee] was clearly upset over the entire 

situation. She maintained she was not intoxicated and declined 

to perform each test. 

 After [Appellee] refused the PBT, [Officer] Guica arrested 

her for [driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI)]. 

 [Officer] Guica transported [Appellee] to a local hospital 

for a blood draw. [Officer] Guica read the O’Connell[2] warnings 

to [Appellee] at the hospital. [Appellee] consented to the blood 

draw, which occurred at approximately 8:56 p.m. [Appellee] 

was charged by summons on June 24, 2013. 

... 

[Appellee] was charged with [DUI] – General Impairment 

(Incapable of Safe Driving); [DUI] – Highest Rate of Alcohol 

(BAC 0.16% or Higher); and Driving on Roadways Laned for 

Traffic, a summary offense. [Appellee] filed an Omnibus Pretrial motion on December 3, 2013[,] and Supplemental Omnibus 

Pre-Trial Motion on December 10, 2013, seeking suppression of 

the blood alcohol evidence. 

... 

A hearing on [Appellee’s] Suppression Motion was held on 

January 15, 2014. The Suppression Motion was granted on 

January 17, 2014. The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal 

on February 12, 2014.

Suppression Court Opinion (SCO), 5/30/14, at 1-5 (footnotes and citations 

to the record omitted). 

____________________________________________ 

2 Commonwealth v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1989). 
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The Commonwealth filed a timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal. Herein, it raises the following question 

for our review: 

Did the suppression court err and/or abuse its discretion by 

granting [Appellee’s] Motion to Suppress Evidence where a 

Millcreek Township police officer properly engaged in a mere 

encounter with [Appellee] at Valerio’s [R]estaurant after 

speaking with a known citizen who had witnessed [Appellee] 

driving her vehicle, at which time he gleaned information that 

led him to formulate reasonable suspicion and eventually 

probable cause to believe [Appellee] was unlawfully driving 

under the influence of alcohol, leading to the lawful arrest of 

[Appellee] for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol? 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. 

 We begin our assessment of the Commonwealth’s claim by noting our 

scope and standard of review: 

When reviewing an Order granting a motion to suppress we are 

required to determine whether the record supports the 

suppression court's factual findings and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn by the suppression court from those findings 

are accurate. In conducting our review, we may only examine 

the evidence introduced by [the] appellee along with any 

evidence introduced by the Commonwealth which remains 

uncontradicted. Our scope of review over the suppression court's 

factual findings is limited in that if these findings are supported 

by the record we are bound by them. Our scope of review over 

the suppression court's legal conclusions, however, is plenary. 

Commonwealth v. Gutierrez, 36 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Henry, 943 A.2d 967, 969 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citations omitted)). 

 Here, the Commonwealth first disputes the suppression court’s 

determination that “[a]n investigative detention of [Appellee] occurred inside 
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Valerio’s Restaurant, after [Appellee] was approached by Officer Guica and 

asked to step outside.” SCO at 6. The Commonwealth also disagrees with 

the suppression court’s alternative conclusion that, “[a]ssuming arguendo an 

investigative detention of [Appellee] did not occur inside the restaurant, 

then it occurred the moment she stepped outside the restaurant into the 

parking lot where three marked Millcreek Township Police cruisers were 

parked and other Millcreek Township Police officers were located.” Id. at 7. 

Instead, the Commonwealth maintains that Appellee was not detained until 

“Officer Guica requested that [Appellee] perform field sobriety tests....” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 13. 

In Commonwealth v. Ellis, 662 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 1995), our Supreme 

Court explained the “three categories of interactions between citizens and 

the police.” Id. at 1047. 

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for 

information) which need not be supported by any level of 

suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to 

respond. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 

75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 

S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). The second, an 

“investigative detention” must be supported by a reasonable 

suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of 

detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to 

constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. See Berkemer 

v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 

(1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 

889 (1968). Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be 

supported by probable cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 

U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); 

Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 532 Pa. 62, 614 A.2d 1378 

(1992). 
J-S13007-15 

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Id. at 1047-1048 (footnote omitted). Pertinent to the instant case is the 

distinction between a “mere encounter” and an “investigative detention.” On 

this issue, our Court has stated: 

[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter 

constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances 

surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police 

conduct could have communicated to a reasonable person that 

the person was not free to decline the officer's requests or 

otherwise terminate the encounter. 

Commonwealth v. Martin, 705 A.2d 887, 890-891 (Pa. Super. 1997). 

The facts of Martin closely mirror those in the present case. There, a

police detective received an anonymous tip that Martin was selling drugs at a 

café. Id. at 890. Upon arriving at the café, the detective approached 

Martin, “asked if he could speak with him[,] and asked [Martin] ‘to step 

outside.’” Id. Martin “said, ‘Okay[,]’” and “then walked out of the café and 

into an adjacent public parking lot.” Id. We concluded that this interaction 

constituted a mere encounter, stating: 

We find that [Martin] was not seized by [the] [d]etective ... when 

he initially exited the café. Prior to leaving the café, [Martin] was 

not questioned extensively by [the] [d]etective .... Rather, the 

detective merely approached [Martin], indicated that he would 

like to speak with him and asked him if he would “step outside.” 

There is no indication that [Martin] was told that he was required 

to leave the café. Rather, the detective simply asked for his 

cooperation. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 

311, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (per curiam) (“The initial contact 

between the officers and respondent, where they simply asked if 

he would step aside and talk with them, was clearly [a] 

consensual encounter.”). Moreover, [the] [d]etective ... 

approached and spoke to [Martin] in a non-threatening manner. 

There were neither threats nor any show of force. There was no 

evidence of any attempts at coercion or intimidation by the 
J-S13007-15 

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detective. Accordingly, we find that [Martin] left the café 

voluntarily, and, therefore, that he was not “seized.” See Sibron 

v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 

917 (1968). 

Id. at 891 (footnote omitted). 

 Here, Officer Guica testified at the suppression hearing that he entered 

Valerio’s Restaurant and saw Appellee sitting at a table. N.T., 1/15/14, at 

37. He approached her and asked if her “Chrysler Crossover” was parked 

outside, to which Appellee “said, yes....” Id. at 38. The officer then asked 

Appellee if her name was Gladys Ramaekers, and Appellee again “said, yes.” 

Id. Officer Guica then asked Appellee if she “would ... mind speaking with us 

outside in regards to a complaint received....” Id. Officer Guica testified 

that Appellee “cooperated, complied, and walked outside....” Id. The officer 

stated that he at no point put his hands on Appellee to escort her outside. 

Id. at 39. Instead, Appellee “walked on her own” out of the restaurant. Id. 

 As in Martin, we conclude that Officer Guica’s interaction with

Appellee inside the restaurant was a mere encounter. While Officer Guica 

asked Appellee questions regarding her name and vehicle, and stated that 

police had received a ‘complaint,’ the officer did not say anything specific 

enough to indicate to Appellee that she was suspected of driving under the 

influence of alcohol. Instead, he merely asked her to step outside to speak 

with him. There is no indication that the officer told Appellee that she was 

required to come outside, that he spoke to her in a threatening or coercive 

manner, or that he physically escorted her from the restaurant. Accordingly, 

as in Martin, we conclude that Officer Guica’s interaction with Appellee 
J-S13007-15 

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inside Valerio’s Restaurant constituted a “mere encounter” requiring no 

quantum of suspicion on Officer Guica’s part.3 

 Next, we must assess the suppression court’s alternative conclusion 

that Appellee was seized when she stepped outside the restaurant and into 

the parking lot. In reaching this determination, the suppression court 

emphasized that Appellee was confronted in the parking lot by “three 

marked Millcreek Township Police cruisers ... and other Millcreek Township 

Police officers....” SCO at 7. The court reasoned that “[o]nce outside for 

questioning, in the presence of uniformed officers and marked police cruisers 

in the restaurant parking lot, [Appellee] was under an official compulsion to 

respond.” Id. at 7-8. 

 In disputing the court’s determination that Appellee was seized at this 

point, the Commonwealth initially challenges the court’s factual finding that 

multiple police officers and police cruisers were parked outside when 

Appellee exited the restaurant. The Commonwealth states: 

There was no testimony whatsoever at the suppression hearing 

as to how many police cruisers or police officers remained in the 

restaurant parking lot at the time Officer Guica and [Appellee] 

came outside. Although there was testimony that three marked 

____________________________________________ 

3

 We acknowledge that unlike the plain-clothed detective in Martin, Officer 

Guica was in full uniform. However, in Martin, the detective was familiar 

with Martin from prior interactions; thus, as in the present case, Martin knew 

he was being approached by a police officer. See Martin, 705 A.2d at 890 

(stating that the detective “knew Martin” from prior interactions, and 

addressed Martin by his first name inside the café). 
J-S13007-15 

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cruisers had been there initially, there was no testimony relating 

to when those cruisers and officers left the scene. 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 13. 

 We disagree with the Commonwealth’s argument. It is undisputed 

that multiple officers were present when Officer Guica went into the 

restaurant to locate Appellee. Once inside, Officer Guica asked Appellee if 

she would “mind speaking with us outside” and testified that Appellee 

“agreed to speak with us.” N.T. at 38 (emphasis added). The officer further 

testified that once outside, “[w]e told [Appellee] that, you know, this 

department received a complaint about an erratic driver, possibly intoxicated 

driver, [and] inquired whether or not she had been drinking prior to her 

arrival to the restaurant.” Id. at 39 (emphasis added). These portions of 

the record support the suppression court’s factual finding that there were 

multiple officers and marked patrol cars present in the parking lot when 

Appellee exited the restaurant with Officer Guica. 

 Additionally, we ascertain no error in the suppression court’s legal 

determination that Appellee was seized once she exited the restaurant and 

was questioned by the officers. Again, Martin is instructive. After Martin 

“exited the café, he was immediately confronted by two additional officers, 

both of whom were in uniform. [The] [d]etective ... then informed [Martin] 

that the police came to the café because they received a tip that he was 

selling drugs.” Martin, 705 A.2d at 891. Based on these circumstances, we 

found that Martin was seized, reasoning: 
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As in Commonwealth v. Wright, 448 Pa. Super. 621, 672 A.2d 

826, 829 (1996), we find that “the combination of the 

threatening presence of several officers and the indication that 

appellant was suspected of criminal activity [requires the 

conclusion that] a reasonable person would believe that he was 

not free to leave.” A statement by a law enforcement official that 

a person is suspected of illegal activity is persuasive evidence 

that the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution have been implicated. Florida v. 

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) 

(White, J., plurality); Wright, supra. We believe that [Martin] 

could conclude reasonably that the police suspected him of 

selling illegal narcotics based on the detective's recitation of the 

anonymous tip and that he could conclude reasonably that he 

was not free to leave. Accordingly, we find that [Martin] was 

seized by the police when he was questioned in the parking lot. 

See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 535 Pa. 501, 636 A.2d 619 

(1994) (holding that appellant was seized where he was 

confronted by four officers who indicated that they were 

“working narcotics” and were part of a drug interdiction 

program); [Interest of] Jermaine, [582 A.2d 1058 (Pa. Super. 

1990)] (indicating that the threatening presence of several 

officers and unsupported accusations of criminal activity 

constitute a “seizure”). 

Id. at 891. 

 Similarly, here, when Appellee exited the restaurant, she was 

confronted by several uniformed police officers. Officer Guica then informed 

Appellee that they had “received a complaint about an erratic driver, 

possibly intoxicated driver.” N.T. at 39. Officer Guica then asked Appellee 

“whether ... she had been drinking prior to her arrival to the restaurant[,]” 

id., thereby indicating to Appellee that she was the person they suspected of 

driving under the influence of alcohol, and that she was not free to leave. 

Thus, at that point, Appellee was seized. 
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 Next, we must determine if the officers possessed reasonable 

suspicion to validate Appellee’s seizure. After careful review, we conclude 

that they did not. As the suppression court points out, 

[t]he information the police received that [Appellee] may have 

been drinking came from the unidentified first driver, as 

conveyed through Cavanagh. The reliability of that information 

of the unidentified first driver is low and could not be tested. 

The basis for the first driver’s alleged comment as relayed by 

Cavanagh is speculative. Cavanagh possessed no independent 

information concerning any alcohol consumption by [Appellee], 

and only observed [Appellee] allegedly back up next to her 

vehicle, then pull ahead when the traffic light turned green. 

During the several miles Cavanagh followed [Appellee’s] vehicle, 

Cavanagh observed absolutely no abnormal driving activity on 

the part of [Appellee]. All the police knew at the time [they 

arrived at the restaurant] was [that Appellee] was the owner of 

a certain registered vehicle in the parking lot, [Appellee’s] 

identity, the report by Cavanagh that [Appellee] allegedly 

backed up her vehicle next to Cavanagh’s on West 8th Street, 

and the information from the unidentified first driver as relayed 

by Cavanagh. 

SCO at 7. When Officer Guica approached Appellee inside the restaurant, 

she fully complied in responding to his questions and his request that she 

step outside to speak with him. N.T. at 38. The officer testified that 

Appellee rose from her chair and walked out of the restaurant “of her own 

accord,” without swaying or stumbling. Id. at 64. Officer Guica conceded 

that he did not “notice any dexterity, coordination or balance problems at 

all” while interacting with Appellee inside the restaurant. Id. 

The Commonwealth maintains that “Officer Guica smelled the odor of 

an alcoholic beverage coming from [Appellee], he observed her to have 

glossy eyes and slightly slurred speech, her answers to his questions were 
J-S13007-15 

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discombobulated and non-responsive, she could not recall (or claimed not to 

recall) engaging in any type of erratic driving behavior, and [she] admitted 

she had consumed two glasses of wine prior to driving.” Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 12. However, these observations were all made after Officer Guica 

detained Appellee. Namely, Officer Guica testified that he “could smell the 

odor of an alcoholic beverage” on Appellee after he escorted her outside, 

informed her that they were investigating a “possibly intoxicated driver,” and 

asked her if she had anything to drink. N.T. at 39. Further, it was during 

the officer’s ensuing questioning of Appellee that he observed that she had 

glossy eyes, her speech “was a little bit slurred[,]” and “[h]er responses to 

the questions were a little ... discombobulated....” Id. at 41-42. Again, 

these observations by Officer Guica all took place after Appellee was 

detained and, therefore, the suppression court properly declined to consider 

them in determining if the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to seize 

Appellee. 

 In sum, we conclude that the record supports the suppression court’s 

factual findings, and the court did not err in determining that Appellee was 

detained at the point when she emerged from the restaurant with Officer 

Guica to find several police officers in the parking lot, was informed that the 

officers were investigating a possible DUI, and was asked if she had 

consumed any alcohol prior to arriving at the restaurant. We also ascertain 

no error in the court’s determination that the officers lacked reasonable 
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suspicion to justify Appellee’s seizure at that point. Accordingly, we affirm 

the suppression court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. 

 Order affirmed. 

 Judge Stabile joins this memorandum. 

Judge Mundy concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/13/2015