Filed 7/16/24 In re A.L. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re A.L., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B333748

(Super. Ct. No. 2018009981)

(Ventura County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.L.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

A.L. appeals from the juvenile court’s order transferring 

him to criminal court. (See Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 801, subd. (a).) 

He contends insufficient evidence supports the transfer order, 

and remand is required for the court to consider his history of 

childhood trauma and sexual abuse. We affirm.

1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 2018, Juan Gutierrez was shot in the head. He 

died a few days later. A subsequent investigation revealed that 

A.L., then 16 years old, was robbing two men at gunpoint when 

Gutierrez rode by on his bicycle. The two exchanged words, and 

A.L. shot Gutierrez. A.L. then fled the scene. The handgun used 

to kill Gutierrez was found in A.L.’s possession when police 

arrested him later that week.

In an interview with police, A.L. denied knowing Gutierrez 

and denied that he was present at the scene of Gutierrez’s 

murder. A.L. later said that Gutierrez had threatened him

previously, and admitted he was present at Gutierrez’s shooting. 

He also admitted he was a member of a local gang. 

In a section 602 petition, prosecutors alleged that A.L. 

murdered Gutierrez. They moved to transfer A.L.’s case to adult 

criminal court pursuant to section 707.

A.L. opposed the transfer motion because his “background, 

family history, [and] trauma . . . strongly support[ed] his 

amenability to juvenile court treatment.” A.L.’s childhood was 

“chaotic and unpredictable.” His parents argued and threw

objects at each other. His mother used methamphetamine and 

was frequently under the influence of alcohol. He and his 

siblings had to ask neighbors for food. County social workers 

were often called to their house. 

A.L. suffered a hairline fracture to his skull after he was 

hit by a car at age four. When he was seven, his mother’s 

boyfriend touched his “weenie.” A.L. later told a social worker 

that the boyfriend also “grabbed his private” in front of his 

mother. 
3

The juvenile court transferred A.L.’s case to criminal court 

in October 2019. In January 2023, the criminal court remanded 

A.L.’s case in light of Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. 

Sess.), which requires that transfer decisions be supported by 

clear and convincing evidence (Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1; see § 707, 

subd. (a)(3)).

A second transfer hearing occurred between August and 

October 2023. At that hearing prosecutors introduced transcripts 

from the 2019 transfer hearing. They also introduced probation 

reports prepared for that hearing and updated for the 2023

hearing. 

The probation reports did not discuss programs that would 

be available to A.L. should he remain in the juvenile system. But 

they did note that A.L. had “not sought out the services or 

conducted himself in a manner that would suggest a true interest 

in rehabilitating himself.” They recommended transferring A.L. 

to criminal court. 

One of the reports said that A.L. accrued 72 write-ups 

while at the juvenile facility between July 2018 and October 

2019. Ten of those were for fighting, with others for gang-related 

graffiti, threatening staff, failing to follow directives, refusing to 

attend school, and possessing contraband. 

A.L. accrued another 87 write-ups between October 2019 

and April 2023, including for communicating with inmates 

outside his housing unit, possessing altered razors, and 

destroying property. He had also been involved in 11 fights. 

A.L. accrued another six write-ups in the following four 

months, including one for an assault that led to the victim’s 

hospitalization.
4

Dr. Blake Carmichael, a psychologist at the University of 

California–Davis, testified at the transfer hearing. He said that 

he evaluated A.L. prior to his 2019 transfer hearing and 

determined that his potential for rehabilitation in the juvenile 

system was “[u]nlikely given the time frame [sic].” Dr. 

Carmichael’s opinion in 2023 remained the same: He did not 

think there was a “substantial chance” A.L. could be rehabilitated 

by age 25.

In Dr. Carmichael’s opinion, the closure of the Division of 

Juvenile Justice posed challenges for implementing programming 

in county facilities. His understanding was that implementation

of Ventura County’s programs was “still in progress or under

development.” He admitted that he had not spoken with program 

providers, however, but was “provided with a listing as of 

January [2023] of what [was] available at the juvenile facility.” 

He also spoke “with someone in the Ventura County system 

about those services.” That person was not involved in providing 

services, “but they were familiar with the programming at the 

juvenile facility.” 

The juvenile court granted the transfer motion, concluding

that clear and convincing evidence supported transferring A.L. to 

criminal court. It found that two of the five criteria set forth in 

section 707, subdivision (a)(3) supported retaining juvenile court 

jurisdiction: A.L. had minimal contact with law enforcement and 

had not failed at prior rehabilitation attempts. But the other 

three factors weighed in favor of transferring the matter to 

criminal court: A.L. was in the middle of robbing two people when 

he shot Gutierrez, and later lied about his role in the murder. 

These facts showed a considerable degree of criminal 

sophistication and underscored the gravity of A.L.’s offense. But
5

“what stood out the most” to the court was A.L.’s “significant 

disciplinary history and lack of programming”—including 

write-ups accrued just weeks before the 2023 transfer hearing. 

This indicated that A.L. could not be rehabilitated in the three 

years before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expired. The court 

thus concluded that A.L.’s “case remains a criminal matter for 

the adult court.”

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the evidence

A.L. contends insufficient evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s transfer order. He maintains the prosecutor “did not 

present evidence demonstrating that existing programs at the 

Ventura [secure youth treatment facility] were unlikely to result 

in [his] rehabilitation, why those specific programs were unlikely 

to work in this particular case, or that they would take more than 

three years to accomplish the task of rehabilitating him.” We 

disagree.

When prosecutors allege that a minor aged 16 years of age 

or older has committed a felony, they may request that the 

juvenile court transfer the minor to criminal court. (§ 707, subd. 

(a)(1).) Before the court can grant such a request, prosecutors 

must prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is 

not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the 

juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

5.770(a).) This requires the court to consider: (1) the minor’s 

“degree of criminal sophistication,” (2) “[w]hether the minor can 

be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction,” (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history,” (4) 

the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to 

rehabilitate the minor,” and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity 
6

of the offense alleged . . . to have been committed by the minor.” 

(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) 

We review the juvenile court’s findings on these five 

criteria and its “ultimate finding ‘that the minor is not amenable 

to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile 

court’ ” for substantial evidence. (In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 

Cal.App.5th 152, 165 (Miguel R.).) This requires us to 

“ ‘determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains 

substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could 

have made the finding of high probability demanded by’ the clear 

and convincing evidence standard.” (Ibid.)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s transfer

order. Dr. Carmichael reviewed the programs that would be

available to A.L. in Ventura County and opined that they would

be “unlikely” to rehabilitate him in three years. Dr. Carmichael’s

review of these programs stands in contrast to the cases on which

A.L. relies, in which there was no description or consideration of

the programming potentially available to the minors there. (See

Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 199-200;

J.N. v. Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 721-722.) A.L.

faults Dr. Carmichael for not identifying the “ARISE” program

when forming his opinion. But the ARISE program is “the secure 

youth treatment facility in San Bernardino County.” (Miguel R., 

supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 161.) There was thus no need for 

Dr. Carmichael to consider it; his review of Ventura County 

programs provided a sufficient basis for his opinion that A.L. was 

not amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction. (Cf. In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1286-

1287 [highlighting need for expert opinion on programming

available to minors].) 
7

Childhood trauma and sexual abuse

A.L. contends the matter must be remanded for the 

juvenile court to consider the effect of his childhood trauma, 

involvement in the child welfare system, and sexual abuse on his 

degree of criminal sophistication. We again disagree.

As set forth above, when a juvenile court is deciding 

whether to grant a transfer request, one of the criteria it must

consider is “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by 

the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i).) At the time of A.L.’s 2023 

transfer hearing, the court was permitted to “give weight to . . .

the effect of the minor’s family and community environment and 

childhood trauma on the minor’s criminal sophistication.”

(Former § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) Pursuant to Senate Bill No.

545 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.), the court now must give weight to the 

effect of childhood trauma when evaluating the minor’s degree of 

criminal sophistication. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii).) The court 

must also give weight to “the minor’s involvement in the child 

welfare” system and their status as a victim of sexual abuse. 

(Ibid.)

Senate Bill No. 545 applies retroactively to cases that are 

not yet final on appeal. (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 

169-170.) But we do not believe it requires remanding the case 

here. “ ‘ “[Minors] are entitled to [transfer] decisions made in the 

exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the [juvenile] court. 

[Citations.] A court [that] is unaware of the scope of its 

discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed 

discretion’ than one whose [transfer decision] is or may have been 

based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a 

[minor]’s record.” [Citation.] In such circumstances . . . the 

appropriate remedy is to remand for [a new transfer hearing]
8

unless the record “clearly indicates” that the [juvenile] court 

would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been 

aware that it had such discretion.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v.

Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424, alterations omitted.)

The record here reveals such a clear indication. In 

opposing the transfer motion, A.L. detailed his childhood trauma, 

involvement in the child welfare system, and sexual abuse. The 

juvenile court considered this evidence, which would have been 

relevant to A.L.’s degree of criminal sophistication. (See Miguel 

R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 170 [effect of minor’s family and 

community environment and childhood trauma were factors for 

the court to consider in analyzing the minor’s degree of criminal 

sophistication prior to Senate Bill No. 545].) A.L. does not 

explain why he believes the court would reach a different transfer 

decision if it considered this evidence again.

Additionally, when explaining why it ordered A.L. 

transferred to criminal court, the juvenile court emphasized that 

the most significant of the five factors set forth in section 707, 

subdivision (a)(3) was the limited time A.L. would remain under 

its jurisdiction. The court did not believe that three years was 

sufficient time to rehabilitate A.L. given his significant 

disciplinary history while in custody. That timeframe has now 

been shortened. We are thus persuaded that the record clearly 

indicates that the juvenile court would order A.L. transferred 

under the current version of section 707. 
9

DISPOSITION

The November 8, 2023, order transferring A.L. from 

juvenile court to criminal court is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Gilbert A. Romero, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Claudia Y. Bautista, Public Defender, and Thomas 

Hartnett, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.