UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1906

JAMES J. ROWE, and; SHARON H. ROWE,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

AURORA COMMERCIAL CORP., f/k/a Aurora Loan Services, Inc., 

a Delaware Corporation; NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC, a Texas 

Limited Liability Company,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

CITIBANK, N.A.; LEHAM XS TRUST MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH 

CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-6,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Beckley. David A. Faber, Senior

District Judge. (5:13-cv-21369)

Submitted: January 29, 2015 Decided: April 7, 2015

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

L. Lee Javins, II, Guy R. Bucci, Mark A. Barney, BUCCI, BAILEY & 

JAVINS, LC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. John C.
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Lynch, Jason E. Manning, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP, Virginia Beach, 

Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Appellants James and Sharon Rowe appeal from the 

district court’s order dismissing their civil action contesting 

the terms related to a note of obligation on their real 

property in South Carolina against the loan servicers. The 

Rowes also appeal the district court’s determination in the same 

order that granting the Rowes leave to amend their complaint to 

add additional claims would be futile because the claims were 

barred or did not state a claim. The Rowes argue that the 

district court erred in: (1) finding that they did not state a 

claim for actual fraud; (2) not sufficiently ruling on their 

constructive fraud claim; (3) denying leave to amend to add a 

claim under the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code for 

unconscionable conduct; and (4) finding that it would be futile 

to assert claims against the creditor under the Truth in Lending 

Act because the statute of limitations had run and there were 

insufficient or inapplicable circumstances of equitable tolling. 

We affirm.

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim de novo. Weidman v. Exxon Mobil Corp., __ F.3d 

__, 2015 WL 103954, *4 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 2015) (No. 13-2007). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
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556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The plausibility standard 

is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more 

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); 

see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 n.1 (4th Cir. 

2009) (noting that the Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-56 

(1957), standard was explicitly overruled in Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 562-63)). 

“On appeal from a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), we review the district court’s 

factual findings with respect to jurisdiction for clear error 

and the legal conclusion that flows therefrom de novo.” In re 

KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2014) 

(citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 2015 

WL 231968 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2015) (No. 13-1241). “On review of a 

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we consider a case de novo,” evaluating 

“whether the complaint states a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” United States ex rel. Oberg v. 

Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136 

(4th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

“Generally, we review a district court’s denial of a motion for 

leave to amend for abuse of discretion,” “[b]ut where, as here, 

the district court denied such a motion on grounds of futility, 
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we employ the same standard that would apply to our review of a 

motion to dismiss.” United States ex rel. Ahumada v. NISH, 756 

F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations and internal quotations 

omitted).

We have carefully reviewed the briefs and record 

before us and, with the appropriate standards of review in mind, 

conclude that the district court did not err in granting the 

motion to dismiss the contested claims and denying leave to 

amend the complaint as to the claims the Rowes unsuccessfully 

sought to add. Rowe v. Aurora Commercial Corp., No. 

5:13-cv-21369 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 1, 2014). We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED