Nos. 11-338 and 11-347


# I n the Supreme Court of the United State s

**D OUG**  **D ECKER** 
**, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS**  **O REGON**  **S TATE**  **F ORESTER** 
**, ET** 

**. AL** 
**., PETITIONERS** 

v. **N ORTHWEST**  **E NVIRONMENTAL**  **D EFENSE**  **C ENTER**  **, ET AL** 

**.**

**G EORGIA**  **-P ACIFIC**  **W EST** 
**, I**  **NC**
**., ET AL** 
**., PETITIONERS** 

v. **N ORTHWEST**  **E NVIRONMENTAL**  **D EFENSE**  **C ENTER**  **, ET AL** 

**.**

ON WRIT OF CERTIORAR I

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

**S COTT**  **C. F**  **ULTON**

General Counsel
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Washington, D.C. 20460 **D ONALD**  **B. V**  **ERRILLI ,**  **J R** 

**.** Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

**I GNACIA**  **S. M**  **ORENO**

Assistant Attorney General
**M ALCOLM**  **L. S**  **TEWART**

Deputy Solicitor General

**E THAN**  **G. S**  **HENKMAN**

Deputy Assistant Attorney

General

**P RATIK**  **A. S**  **HAH**

Assistant to the Solicitor General
**A**

**ARON P.**  **A VILA**  **J UDY**  **B. H**  **ARVEY**

Attorneys
Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov (202) 514-2217**(I)** QUESTIONS PRESENTED
**1. Whether the court of appe als erred in holding that**  **a suit in which liability depends on the interpretation of Clean Water Act (CWA) regula**  **tions, and in which the court rejected the construction of the regulations prof**  **fered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), may be adjudicated under th**  **e CWA’s citizen suit provi sion, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a), rather**  **than under the CWA’s ju dicial review provision, 33 U.S.C. 1369(b).** 
**2. Whether the court of a ppeals erred in not defer**  **ring to EPA’s interpretation of the Phase I industrial**  **stormwater regulation, 40 C. F.R. 122.26(b)(14), that run**  **off from logging roads does not constitute a stormwater**  **discharge “associated with industrial activity.”** 
**3. Whether the court of a ppeals erred in not defer**  **ring to EPA’s interpretation of the Silvicultural Rule, 40** **C.F.R. 122.27(b)(1), that runoff from logging roads con stitutes silvicultural nonp**  **oint-source pollution. (III)**  TABLE OF CONTENTS
**Pag e**  **Interest of the United States ............................................................1** 
**Statement ............................................................................................2 Summary of ar**  **gument .................................................................... 11 Argument .......................................................................................... 13**  **I. The CWA confers jurisdiction over this citizen**
**suit...................................................................1 5**  **II. The court of appeals erred in failing to defer to EPA’s interpretation of its regulations..................20**  **A. An agency’s interpretation of its regulation is controlling unless it conflicts with the text or**  **structure of the regulation................................20 B. The court of appeals erred in not deferring to**  **EPA’s view that channeled runoff from logging roads does not give rise to a stormwater**  **discharge “associated with industrial activity” ......23 C. The court of appeals erred in not deferring**  **to the EPA’s interpretation of the silvicultural rule that runoff from logging roads constitutes**  **nonpoint-source pollution ... ..............................28**
**Conclusion ........................................................................................ 33**

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

**Cases:**

Auer **v.** Robbins **, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) .................... 10, 11, 20, 24**

Bowles **v.** Seminole Rock & Sand Co. **, 325 U.S. 410 (1945) .................................................................... 11, 20, 22, 29** 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. **v.** NRDC **, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ............. 31**
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council **, 557 U.S. 261 (2009) ................................................ 21** Crown Simpson Pulp Co. **v.** Costle **, 445 U.S. 193 (1980) ...... 16**

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. **v.** Train **, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) ................................................................................ 10, 16** **IV**

**Cases—Continued: Page**

Entergy Corp. **v.** Riverkeeper, Inc. **, 556 U.S. 208 (2009) ...... 31** Environmental Def. **v.** Duke Energy Corp.

**, 549 U.S. 561 (2007) .................................................... 17, 19, 22**  Environmental Def. Ctr. **v.** EPA **, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004) ........ 7, 25**  League of Wilderness Defenders **v.** Forsgren

**, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002) ............................................... 31** 

NRDC **v.** Costle **, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) .............................................................................. 3, 13, 31** 

NRDC **v.** EPA **, 673 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879 (1982) ................................... 10, 16** 

NRDC **v.** EPA **, 966 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992) .................. 10, 17**

NRDC **v.** Train **, 396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975), aff’d 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) .................................... 31**  National Cotton Council of Am. **v.** EPA **, 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1505**  **(2010) ................................................................................ 10, 16** National Wildlife Fed’n **v.** Gorsuch **, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ...................................................................... 31** 

Robertson **v.** Methow Valley Citizens Council

**, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) ................................................................ 20**  Pauley **v.** BethEnergy Mines, Inc. **, 501 U.S. 680 (1991) ...... 26**
Talk Am., Inc. **v.** Michigan Bell Tel. Co.

**, 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011) ............................................................ 20** 

United States **v.** Larionoff **, 431 U.S. 864 (1977) .................... 21**

**Statutes and regulations:**

**Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments,**
**33 U.S.C. 1251** et seq. **: 33 U.S.C. 1251(a) .................................................................2** 
**33 U.S.C. 1288(b)(2)(F) .................................................... 31 V** 

**Statutes—Continued: Page**

**33 U.S.C. 1311(a) .................................................................2**
**33 U.S.C. 1314(f) ..................................................................3**
**33 U.S.C. 1314(f)(A) ......................................................... 31**

**33 U.S.C. 1329 ......................................................................3**

**33 U.S.C. 1342 ......................................................................3**

**33 U.S.C. 1344 ......................................................................3**
**33 U.S.C. 1362(12)(A) ..........................................................2**
**33 U.S.C. 1362(14) ........................................................ 2, 13**

**33 U.S.C. 1365 ......................................................................7**
**33 U.S.C. 1365(a) .............................................. 2, 10, 11, 17**
**33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1) .......................................................... 16**
**33 U.S.C. 1365(f) ............................................................... 16**
**33 U.S.C. 1369(b) .............................................. 2, 10, 11, 16**
**33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) ....................................... 10, 16, 17, 23**
**33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) .............................................. 10, 16**
**33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(F) .............................................. 10, 16**
**33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(2) .................................................** passim **Water Quality Water Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 69 (33 U.S.C. 1342(p)) .............................................4**  **33 U.S.C. 1342(p) ......................................................** passim **33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(2) ........................................... 5, 6, 23, 32 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(2)(B) ........................ 5, 11, 13, 14, 23, 25**  **33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(3) ............................................................5 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(4)(A) .......................................... 5, 24, 26**  **33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(4)(B) ................................................ 5, 25 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(5) ..................................................... 6, 25**  **33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(6) ......................................... 7, 15, 23, 25**

**40 C.F.R.:**
**Section 125.4(f ) (1975) ..............................................................3** **VI**

**Regulations—Continued: Page**

**Section 125.4( j**  **) (1975) .............................................................3**
**Section 122.26(a)(9)(i) ...............................................................6**
**Section 122.26(b) .................................................................... 27**
**Section 122.26(b)(14) ................................................. 2, 6, 9, 25**
**Section 122.26(b)( 14)(ii) .................................................. 12, 24** 

**Section 122.27 ......................................................................... 25**
**Section 122.27(b)(1) ............................................. 2, 4, 7, 12, 28**
**Section 125.54(a)(1) (1976) .......................................................4**

**Miscellaneous:**

**45 Fed. Reg. (May 19, 1980) ......................................................30**
**p. 33,290 ................................................................................... 30**
**p. 33,447 ....................................................................................30 55 Fed. Reg. (Nov. 16, 1990) ..................................................... 25** 
**p. 47,990 ................................................................................... 25**
**p. 48,008 ....................................................................................25**
**p. 48,011 ................................................................................... 25 64 Fed. Reg. (Dec. 8, 1999) ..........................................................7** 
**p. 68,722 ......................................................................................7**
**p. 68,734 ......................................................................................7 77 Fed. Reg. (May 23, 2012) ........................................... 7, 15, 27** 
**p. 30,473 ......................................................................................7**
**p. 30,474 ................................................................................... 27**
**p. 30,479 ............................................................................... 7, 15 (1)**  

# I n the Supreme Court of the United State s

**No. 11-338**

**D OUG**  **D ECKER** 
**, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS**  **O REGON**  **S TATE**  **F ORESTER** 
**, ET** 

**. AL** 
**., PETITIONERS** 

v.

**N ORTHWEST**  **E NVIRONMENTAL**  **D EFENSE**  **C ENTER**  **, ET AL** 

**.**

**No. 11-347**

**G EORGIA**  **-P ACIFIC**  **W EST** 
**, I**  **NC**
**., ET AL** 
**., PETITIONERS** 

v.

**N ORTHWEST**  **E NVIRONMENTAL**  **D EFENSE**  **C ENTER**  **, ET AL** 

**.**

ON WRIT OF CERTIORAR I

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES **The questions presented invo lve both jurisdictional**  **and substantive issues pertai ning to the application of** 
**the National Pollutant Disc harge Elimination System**  **(NPDES) permitting program to stormwater discharges**  **from logging roads. The Uni ted States has a substantial**  **interest in the proper resolu tion of those questions.**  **Congress has entrusted the Environmental Protection 2** 

**Agency (EPA) with enforcement of the Clean Water Act (CWA), including administration of the NPDES pro**  **gram, and the proper interpr etation of two of EPA’s**  **NPDES regulations (40 C.F.R. 122.26(b)(14),**  **122.27(b)(1)) is at issue in this case. The th**  **reshold issue involving 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)**  **and 1369(b) potentially af fects the availability of av**  **enues for enforcing the CWA and challenging EPA action. At the Court’s invitation,** 
**the United States filed a brie f amicus curiae**  **at the peti tion stage of this**  **case.**

STATEMENT **1. a. In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water**  **Pollution Control Act Amendments (often referred to as the CWA). 33 U.S.C. 1251**  et seq **. The CWA establishes a comprehensive program de**  **signed “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity**  **of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits th**  **e “discharge of any pollu tant”—defined as “any addition**  **of any pollutant to navi gable waters from any point source”—except “as in**  **compliance with” specified pr ovisions of the Act. 33**  **U.S.C. 1311(a), 1362(12)(A). The Act defines “point source” as** 

**any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, in cluding but not limited to**  **any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete**  **fissure, cont ainer, roll**  **ing stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating cr**  **aft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.**  **This term does not include agricultural stormwater di**  **scharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.** 

**33 U.S.C. 1362(14). For most point-source discharges,**  **regulated entities achieve co mpliance by**  **following the 3** 

**terms of an NPDES permit is sued by EPA or an author**  **ized State pursuant to CWA Section 402, 33 U.SC. 1342,**  **or a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers un**  **der CWA Section 404, 33 U.S.C. 1344.**  **Other CWA pro visions establish mechanisms other than permits to ad**  **dress discharges from “nonpoint sources.”**  E.g. **, 33 U.S.C. 1314(f), 1329.** **b. After the CWA was enacted in 1972, EPA strug gled with the task of regula**  **ting stormwater discharges**
**from the hundreds of thousa nds of potential point sourc**  **es. In 1973, to conserve the agency’s enforcement re**  **sources for more significant sources of pollution, the EPA promulgated a rule th**  **at exempted certain dis charges—**  e.g. **, discharges from stormwater runoff and from silvicultural activities, including forest-land run**  **off—from the NPDES permitting requirements. See**
NRDC **v.** Costle **, 568 F.2d 1369, 1372-1373 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing 40 C.F.R. 125.**  **4(f) and (j) (1975)). In**
NRDC **v.** Costle **, the district court invalidated that ex emption as conflicting with CWA Section 402, and the** 
**D.C. Circuit affirmed. The D.C. Circuit concluded that,**  **under the statutory scheme as it existed at that time,**
**EPA did “not have authorit y to exempt categories of**  **point sources from the permit requirements of § 402.”** 
Id **. at 1377; see** id **. at 1383 (“We find a plain Congres sional intent to require permit**  **s in any situation of pollu tion from point sources.”). The court acknowledged,**  **however, that “[t]here is an initial question, to what ex**  **tent point sources are involved in agricultural, silvicul**  **tural, and storm sewer runoff.”** Id. **at 1377. The court stated that the statutory de**  **finition of “point source” “suggests that there is room**  **here for some exclusion by**  **interpretation.”** Ibid.**4**

**In that vein, EPA also promulgated regulations that further define the term “point**  **source” as it applies to various activities and facilities, including silvicultural**  **sources. In 1976, the agency adopted the Silvicultural**  **Rule, which defined four catego ries of silvicultural facili**  **ties as point sources but excl uded from that definition**  **(** inter alia **) “road construction and maintenance from which runoff results from precipitation events.” 40**  **C.F.R. 125.54(a)(1), cmt. (1976) . The current version of**  **the Silvicultural Rule, as am ended in 1980, maintains the**  **same definition of “silvicultural point source” but now excludes (in pertinent part**  **) “road construction and**
**maintenance from which**  **there is**  **natural runoff.” 40**  **C.F.R. 122.27(b)(1). 1**  **EPA has construed that rule to mean that logging roads ar**  **e not silvicultural point sources, even if the runoff**  **from logging roads flows through a ditch, channel, or**  **culvert before being re**
**leased into waters of the Uni ted States. See J.A. 27, 39.** **c. In 1987, Congress amended the CWA to take ac count of the unique challeng**  **es that EPA faces in manag ing the water quality impacts of stormwater discharges.**  **Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 69 (33 U.S.C. 1342(p)).**

**1 The Silvicultural Rule reads as follows:** 

Silvicultural point source **means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance related to rock crushing, gravel washing, log**  **sorting, or log storage facilities which are operated in connection with silvicultural activities and from which pollutants are dis** **charged into waters of the United States. The term does not in clude non-point source silvicultural activities such as nursery op**  **erations, site preparation, reforestation and subsequent cultural treatment, thinning, prescribed burning, pest and fire control,**  **harvesting operations, surface drainage, or road construction and**
**maintenance from which there is natural runoff.**

**40 C.F.R. 122.27(b)(1). 5** 

**CWA Section 402(p), which a ddresses “discharges com**  **posed entirely of stormwater ,” established a temporary**  **moratorium on NPDES permit requirements for such**  **discharges, with the exception of five categories of dis**  **charges listed in 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(2). Section 402(p)**  **also required EPA to establ ish regulations setting forth**  **permit-application requiremen ts for specified categories**  **of stormwater point-source discharges and to conduct** 
**studies to determine what other discharges should be** **regulated to protect water quality. The statute contem plated that those regulati**  **ons would be promulgated through a phased approach,**  **the first commonly referred**
**to as Phase I and the second as Phase II. 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(4)(A) and (B).**  **Phase I covers the five enumerated categories of stormwater discharges, incl**  **uding stormwater discharg**
**es “associated with industri al activity.” 33 U.S.C.**  **1342(p)(2)(B). The 1987 amen dment requires NPDES** **permits for those discharges and directs EPA to regu late them accordingly. 33 U.**  **S.C. 1342(p)(3) and (4)(A).**
**The CWA does not define th e term stormwater dis**  **charge “associated with indu strial activity.” In 1990,**  **EPA promulgated Phase I regu lations that define that** 

**term as**
**the discharge from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying stor**  **m water and that is di rectly related to manufact**  **uring, processing or raw materials storage areas at an**  **industrial plant. The term does not include discharg**  **es from facilities or ac tivities excluded from the NPDES program under**  **this part 122. For the categ ories of industries identi**  **fied in this section, the te rm includes, but is not lim**  **ited to, storm water discharges** **from * * * immedi**
**ate access roads * * * us** **ed or traveled by carriers 6** 

**of raw materials, manufact ured products, waste ma** **terial, or by-products used or created by the facili** **ty[.] * * * The following** **categories of facilities are considered to be engaging**  **in “industrial activity” for purposes of paragraph (b)(14):** 

*** * ***

**(ii) Facilities classified as Standard Industrial Classi**  **fications 24 (except 2434) , 26 (except 265 and 267), 28**  **(except 283), 29, 311, 32 (e xcept 323), 33, 3441, 373.** 

**40 C.F.R. 122.26(b)(14). 2**  **Phase II covers stormwater discharges other than**
**those enumerated in 33 U. S.C. 1342(p)(2). The 1987** 
**amendment authorizes EPA to designate, as part of**  **Phase II, any additional stormwater discharges “to be regulated to protect water qu**  **ality.” 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(5) and (6). Under Section 402(p)(6), EPA must “establish a**  **comprehensive program” that “shall, at a minimum, (A)**  **establish priorities, (B) esta blish requirements for State**  **stormwater management pr ograms, and (C) establish**  **expeditious deadlines.” 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(6). The pro**  **gram “may include performa nce standards, guidelines,** **guidance, and management practices and treatment re quirements, as appropriate.”**  Ibid **. EPA is authorized to require NPDES permits for Ph**  **ase II discharges, but it is not required to do so.**  Ibid.**In 1999, EPA promulgated regulations that designat ed two categories of**  **stormwater point-source discharges (neither of which is relevant**  **to this case) for Phase II**

**2 The regulation incorporates by reference the enumerated** **Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. “Logging” is a sub category (2411) of SIC code 24.**  Standard Industrial Classifications
Manual **, Div. D, Major Group 24, Industry Group 241, 2411 Logging, available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html.** **7**

**regulation under Section 402(p)(6). 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,734 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codified**  **in pertinent part at 40 C.F.R. 122.26(a)(9)(i)). EPA**  **also reserved the authority to designate additional disc**  **harges for Phas e II regula** 
**tion at a later date.** Ibid

**. 3**  **2. Respondent commenced this action under the CWA’s citizen-suit provisio**  **n, 33 U.S.C. 1365. Respond ent alleged that stormwater**  **discharges associated with two logging roads in Oregon**  **violate the Act because the roads at issue collect, ch**  **annel, and discharge storm**
**water runoff to waters of th e United States—without**  **NPDES permits—via ditches, pipes, and culverts. II J.A. 2-3, 7-9 (First**  **Amended Complaint).**
**Petitioners are state offi cials and private timber**  **companies who control the re levant logging roads and**  **were named as defendants in this suit. Supported by the United States as amicus curiae, petitioners moved to**  **dismiss the complaint for fail ure to state a claim. The**  **district court granted the mo tion. The court held that,** 
**under EPA’s Silvicultural Ru le, 40 C.F.R. 122.27(b)(1),**  **discharges from logging roads were not required to have** 

3 **In 2003, the Ninth Circuit remand ed to EPA the question wheth**  **er to regulate stormwater discharges from forest roads under Phase**
**II. See** Environmental Def. Ctr. **v.** EPA **, 344 F.3d 832, 863, cert. de nied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004). EPA cont**  **inues to review available infor mation on the water-quality impacts of stormwater discharges from**  **forest roads, including logging roads, as well as existing practices to control these discharges. On May 23, 2012, EPA announced that it**  **“is considering designating a subset of stormwater discharges from forest roads for appropriate action” under the agency’s Phase II**  **rulemaking authority.** Notice of Intent to Revise Stormwater Regulations to Specify that an NPDES Permit is not Required for Stormwater Discharges from Logging Roads and to Seek Comment on Approaches for Addressing Water Quality Impacts from Forest Road Discharges **, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,473, 30,479. 8** 

**NPDES permits because EPA had categorized natural** 
**runoff from those roads and ot her sources as “non-point**  **source” pollution. Pet. App. 53-77. 4**  **3. The court of appeals re versed. Pet. App. 1-52.**  **5**

**a. As in the district cour t, the government filed an**  **amicus brief arguing that, under EPA’s Silvicultural Rule, all precipitation-driven runoff from logging roads**  **is not currently regulated under the NPDES permitting**  **program, even if it flows th rough a ditch, channel, or** **culvert before being discharged into waters of the Unit ed States. See I J.A. 27, 39.**  **The court of appeals re jected that interpretation of the regulation. Pet. App.** 
**34-37. The court stated that “there are two possible**  **readings of the Silvicultural Rule,” and it acknowledged**  **that the interpretation advanced in the government’s**
**amicus brief “reflects the inte nt of EPA in adopting the** 
**Rule.”** Id. **at 36. The court conclu ded, however, that an**  **alternative reading of the rule was preferable because it**  **would “allow [the court] to construe the Rule to be con**  **sistent with the statute,” in particular, the CWA’s defini**  **tion of “point source.”** Id **. at 37. The court held that the**
**Silvicultural Rule does no t exempt from NPDES re**  **quirements stormwater runoff from logging roads that**  **is systemically collected and channeled through man** 
**made ditches and culverts be fore being discharged into** 
**waters of the United States.** Ibid

**. b. Petitioners and the government further argued**  **that, even if such channeled runoff from logging roads**

4 **References to “Pet. App.” are to the appendix to the petition for a**
**writ of certiorari in No. 11-338.**

5 **The initial court of appeals op inion was published at 617 F.3d**  **1176, but the discussion in this br ief cites the superseding opinion,** **which was published at 640 F.3d 1063 and is reprinted in the appen dix to the certiorari petition.** **9**

**constitutes a “point source” discharge, such discharges** **are not subject to NPDES permitting requirements un der EPA’s stormwater regu**  **lations promulgated pursu ant to 33 U.S.C. 1342(p). Pet.**  **App. 37-48. Petitioners and the government contended,**  **in particular, that the discharges at issue here ar**  **e not “associated with indus trial activity” as EPA has defined that term. See**  id **. at 44-47; 40 C.F.R. 122.26(b)(14).**  **The court of appeals re jected that understanding of EPA’s regulatory defini**  **tion. The court found it “undisputed that ‘logging,’ which is covered by SIC [Sta**  **ndard Industrial Classifica tion] 2411 (part of SIC 24), is**  **an ‘industrial activity.’ ”**  **Pet. App. 44-45. The court construed the regulation’s**
**reference to “immediate access roads”—defined in EPA’s Phase I stormwater rule preamble to mean**  **“roads which are exclusively or primarily dedicated for**  **use by the industrial facility ”—as covering the roads at** 
**issue here.** Id **. at 45-47. 4. a. Petitioners filed petitions for rehearing in the**  **court of appeals. The cour t of appeals thereafter or**  **dered a response and posed tw o threshold questions: (1)**  **“Can a suit challenging EPA’s interpretation of its regu**  **lations implementing the Clean Water Act’s permitting requirements be brought un**  **der the Act’s citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)**  **?” (2) “Must a suit chal lenging EPA’s decision to ex**  **empt the discharge of a pol lutant from the Clean Water Act’s permitting require** **ments be brought under the Act’s agency review provi sion, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)?” I J.A. 7 (Docket entry No.**  **106). Section 1369(b) authorizes**  **private parties to obtain direct court of appeals revi**  **ew of certain EPA actions, including actions taken in “promulgating any effluent** 
**limitation or other limitation under section 1311” or “in** **10**

**issuing or denying any permit under section 1342.” 33**  **U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) and (F). EPA’s NPDES regula**  **tions are generally subject to immediate appellate re**  **view under that provision. See,** e.g. **,** National Cotton Council of Am. **v.** EPA **, 553 F.3d 927, 932-933 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 1**  **30 S. Ct. 1505 (2010);** NRDC **v.** EPA **, 966 F.2d 1292, 1296-1297 (9th Cir. 1992);** NRDC **v.** EPA **, 673 F.2d 400, 404-406 (D.C . Cir.), cert. denied, 459**  **U.S. 879 (1982) (citing** E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. **v.** Train **, 430 U.S. 112, 136 (1977)). Such review must be**  **sought within 120 days after the relevant EPA action,**  **unless a challenge is “based solely on grounds which**  **arose after such 120th day.” 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1). Any**  **action “with respect to which review could have been ob**  **tained under [Section 1369(b)(1 )] shall not be subject to**  **judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for en**  **forcement.” 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(2). In response to the court**  **of appeals’ questions,**
**the United States filed anot her amicus brief. The gov**  **ernment expressed the view that, although Section 1369(b)(2) would preclude the**  **court in a Section 1365(a) citizen suit from invalidating the EPA regulations impli**  **cated by this case, Section 1369(b)(2) did not necessarily**  **preclude the court from interpreting those regulations differently than EPA had interpreted them. I J.A. 55-**  **57. The government further argued, however, that the court was required to defer**  **to the agency’s interpreta tion so long as that interpr**  **etation was not “plainly erro**
**neous or inconsistent with th e regulation.” I J.A. 58**  **(quoting** Auer **v.** Robbins **, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). The court of appeals denied**  **rehearing and issued a superseding panel opinion.**  **Pet. App. 1-52. In a new section entitled “Subject Mat**  **ter Jurisdiction,” the court held that Section 1369(b) “d**  **oes not bar a citizen suit 11** 

**challenging EPA’s Silvicultural Rule interpretation first adopted in its initial amicus brie**  **f in this case.” Pet. App.**
**8-10. The court adhered to th e remainder of its opinion.** 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT **I. The courts below properly exercised jurisdiction over this action pursuant to**  **the CWA’s citizen-suit pro vision. Because the EPA regu**  **lations relevant to this case (the Silvicultural Rule and the Phase I industrial**  **stormwater regulation) could have been challenged in a**  **court of appeals under 33 U. S.C. 1369(b) at the time**  **they were promulgated, they are not subject to judicial**  **review in this citizen suit brought under 33 U.S.C. 1365(a). The court of appeals**  **did not declare either of those rules invalid, however,**  **but rather rejected the in terpretations of those rules**  **set forth in the govern**
**ment’s amicus brief. Althou gh the court should have de**  **ferred to EPA’s reasonable construction of its own rules, it did not err in entertaining this citizen enforcement** 
**suit. II. The court of appeals mi**  **sinterpreted both of the EPA regulations at issue in**  **this case. Properly con strued, each of those rules independently dictates the**  **conclusion that NPDES permit s are not required for the**  **discharges at issue. A. EPA’s construction of its own rule is “controlling”** **unless that construction is “plainly erroneous or incon sistent with the regulation.”**  Auer **v.** Robbins **, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). That principl**  **e applies even where, as here, the court is preclude**  **d from determining whether the regulation so construed**  **is consistent with the gov erning statute. See**  Bowles **v.** Seminole Rock & Sand
Co. **, 325 U.S. 410, 414, 418-419 (1945). B. The CWA requires NPDES permits for storm**  **water discharges “associated wi th industrial activity,” 33** **12**

**U.S.C. 1342(p)(2)(B), but th e Act does not define that** 
**term. EPA has construed it s Phase I industrial storm**  **water regulation not to requ ire such permits for storm**  **water discharges from logging roads. That position re** 
**flects a reasonable construction of the regulation’s text.**  **The Phase I regulation refers to discharges from “[f]a** 
**cilities classified as Standa rd Industrial Classification[]**  **24,” which include logging es tablishments. 40 C.F.R.**  **122.26(b)(14)(ii). EPA has co nstrued that reference,**  **however, as encompassing only discharges from the four subcategories of silvicultura**  **l facilities it had already identified as point sources in the Silvicultural Rule,** 
**which do not include runoff from logging roads. Be**  **cause the stormwater discharges at issue in this case are**  **not covered by EPA’s Phase I regulations, the judgment**  **of the court of appeals shou ld be reversed, without re**  **gard to whether those discha rges are “point**  **source” dis charges under the Act and**  **the Silvicultural Rule. C. Because the Phase I regulation (properly con**  **strued) provides a sound basi s for concluding that peti**  **tioners were not required to obtain NPDES permits, the** 
**Court need not deter mine whether the Silvicultural Rule**  **also compels the same result . If the Court reaches the**  **issue, however, it should sustain EPA’s interpretation of the Silvicultural Rule, under wh**  **ich no permit is required**
**for “natural runoff ” from logging roads. The storm**  **water discharges at issue he re do not implicate any of**  **the four types of silvicultura l facilities (“rock crushing,**  **gravel washing, log sorting, [and] log storage facilities”)**  **that the rule specifically id entifies as “[s]ilvicultural**  **point source[s].” 40 C.F.R. 122.27(b)(1). And while the** 
**Silvicultural Rule does not state explicitly whether its** 
**reference to “natural runoff ” includes systematically** **13**

**channeled runoff, EPA’s resolu tion of that ambiguity is**  **entitled to judicial deference under** Auer

**. The court of appeals rejec**  **ted EPA’s reading on the ground that it would render the Silvicultural Rule incon** 
**sistent with the CWA’s definit ion of “point source.”** 
Seminole Rock **, however, precludes th at sort of inquiry**  **under the circumstances pres ented here because EPA’s**  **interpretation of its Rule is controlling. In any event,**  **the CWA’s definition of “point source,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(14), affords EPA “room he**  **re for some exclusion by interpretation,” particularly wi**  **th respect to silvicultural**

**sources.** NRDC **v.** Costle **, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977).** 

ARGUMENT

**The 1987 CWA amendments re flect Congress’s de**  **termination that, although po int-source stormwater dis**  **charges can significantly affect the quality of navigable waters, a blanket requiremen**  **t of NPDES permits for all such discharges was an unwi**  **eldy regulatory tool. Con gress accordingly enacted a more nuanced scheme that**  **was specifically designed fo r stormwater. The essence** 
**of that scheme was to iden tify limited categories of**  **stormwater discharges for which NPDES permits would**  **still be required by statute, while giving EPA broad dis**  **cretion to devise appropriat e measures for addressing**  **stormwater discharges outs ide the defined categories.**  **The court of appeals’ decision in this case depends on the proposition that the discharges at issue here were** 
**“associated with industrial activity” within the meaning**  **of an EPA regulation th at implements the 1987 CWA**  **amendment, specifically 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(2)(B). The** 
**court did not hold that the statutory language compels**  **that conclusion, but instead interpreted the terms of the**
**EPA rule itself. The court reached that conclusion de-** **14**

**spite the government’s unequivocal explanation, in its**
**amicus brief in the Ninth Ci rcuit, that EP** **A holds a con trary view about the meaning of**  **the regulation. If this Court rejects that aspect of**  **the court of appeals’ analy sis, and holds that the pertinent discharges are not “as** 
**sociated with industrial acti vity” for purposes of Section**  **1342(p)(2)(B) and EPA’s Phase I regulations, the case** 
**will be at an end. It will then be unnecessary for the** **Court to decide whether, under the Act and the Silvicul tural Rule, EPA has discretion to determine which dis**  **charges of stormwater from logging roads are point**  **source discharges. For two basic reasons, a determination that petition**  **ers’ discharges are not “assoc iated with industrial activi**  **ty” would be the soundest and most straightforward**  **way of deciding this case. First, Section 1342(p) reflects**  **Congress’s more recent, and more specific, direction to**  **EPA regarding control of stormwater discharges. The Silvicultural Rule, by contra**  **st, was promulgated prior to**
**the 1987 CWA amendments un der a statutory regime** **that required NPDES permits for all point-source dis charges of pollutants, incl**  **uding discharges of storm water. That regime, which fueled multiple agency ef**  **forts (including the Silvicul tural Rule) to accommodate**  **the CWA’s broad application in light of the practical dif**  **ficulties of including all poten tially covered sources, has**  **effectively been superseded with respect to discharges**  **composed entirely of st ormwater. See pp. 3-7,**  supra

**. 6** 

**6 In implementing its responsibility to protect the Nation’s inter**  **est in maintaining and improving the quality of its waters, EPA in its May 23, 2012, Federal Register notice stated that it is considering the** **possibility of regulating a subset of stormwater discharges from for est roads, through means other than NPDES permits, pursuant to its** **15**

**Second, determining that NPDES permits are not required pursuant to the in**  **dustrial stormwater regula**
**tion would obviate the need for the Court to resolve the**  **difficult question, which arises only with respect to the Silvicultural Rule, of whether**  **a court may reject EPA’s interpretation of its rule on the ground that the inter**  **pretation would be inconsisten t with the Act. Petition**  **ers contend that the court of appeals exceeded the limits imposed by 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(2) because its decision im**  **plicitly invalidated the pert inent EPA rules. With re** **spect to EPA’s regulatory definition of “discharge asso**
**ciated with industrial activi ty,” that argument clearly**  **lacks merit. Although the co urt of appeals erred in fail**  **ing to defer to the agency’s co nstruction of that rule, the**  **court’s contrary interpretation cannot be viewed as any**  **thing other than an interpreta tion of the rule. With re**  **spect to the Silvicultural Rule , however, the line between**  **interpretation and invalidation is less clear, since the court of appeals’ stated re**  **ason for rejecting EPA’s con**
**struction of that rule was that the rule, as EPA con**  **strued it, would be inconsis tent with the CWA. By re**  **solving this case on the basis of the Phase I stormwater regulation, the Court can avoi**  **d the issue of “statutory avoidance” raised by the**  **interplay between Section 1369(b)(2) and various principles of regulatory interpre** 
**tation.**

I. THE CWA CONFERS JURISDICTION OVER THIS CITIZEN SUIT **The CWA’s citizen-suit provision authorizes private citizens to bring enforcemen**  **t actions against any person “who is alleged to be in vi**  **olation of (A) an effluent**

**Section 402(p)(6) stormwater rulemaking authority. 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,479.** **16**

**standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order**  **issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to** 
**such a standard or limitati on.” 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1).** 
**The violations that are redres sable through a citizen suit**  **include,** inter alia **, discharges of pollutants into waters**
**of the United States withou t an NPDES permit. See 33**  **U.S.C. 1365(f) (defining the term “effluent standard or**  **limitation under this chapter ”). Section 1369(b), by con**  **trast, provides for immediat e review by a court of ap**  **peals of various EPA actions, including the promulgation**  **of NPDES regulations. 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1); see pp. 9-**  **10,** supra

**. 7**  **A review proceeding under Section**

7 **Section 1369(b)(1) authorizes direct court of appeals review of**
**“the Administrator’s action * *** *** (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311, 1312,**  **1316 or 1345 of [the Act], [or] (F) in issuing or denying any permit under section 1342 of [the Act].” 33**  **U.S.C. 1369(b)(1)(E) and (F). In**
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. **v.** Train **, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), the Court construed that provision to**  **authorize review of EPA’s indus try-wide regulations establishing un**  **iform effluent limitations for par ticular categories of plants. See**  id **. at 115, 136. The Court explained that a contrary result “would produce the truly perverse situation in**  **which the court of appeals would review numerous individual actions issuing or denying permits pursuant to [CWA Section 402] but would**  **have no power of direct review of the basic regulations governing**
**those individual actions.”** Id **. at 136. Based on** Train **, courts of ap peals have understood Section 1369(b**  **)(1)(E) to authorize direct re view of NPDES permitting regulations, including EPA’s consolidated**  **permitting regulations, which set forth “a complex set of procedures for issuing or denying NPDES permits.”**  NRDC **v.** EPA **, 673 F.2d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 879 (1982). This Court also**  **has interpreted Section 1369(b)(1)(F) to encompass actions that are “functionally similar” to the issuance or denial of an NPDES permit.**  Crown Simpson Pulp Co. **v.** Costle **, 445 U.S. 193, 196 (1980). Courts of appeals have since relied on that provision to review NPDES per**  **mitting regulations. See** National Cotton Council of Am. **v.** EPA

**, 17** 

**1369(b)(1) must be commenced within 120 days of the**  **challenged action, unless the basis for the su**  **it arises af ter that period.**  Ibid

**. Section 1365(a) clearly confer**  **s jurisdiction over this citizen suit, in which respondent alleges CWA violations**  **arising from petitioners’ di scharges into waters of the** 
**United States. See 33 U.S. C. 1365(a) (“The district**  **courts shall have jurisdicti on, without regard to the** 
**amount in controvers y or the citizenship of the parties,** 
**to enforce * * * an effluent** **standard or limitation.”). Although petitioners purport**  **to challenge the court of appeals’ “jurisdiction,” thei**  **r challenge, properly con ceived, does not go to that**  **court’s jurisdiction. Rather, the disputed issue here conc**  **erns the range of arguments the courts below could properly consider in determining**  **whether petitioners were li able under the Act for dis**  **charges of pollutants wi thout an NPDES permit.** **Any EPA action that could have been challenged un der Section 1369(b)(1) “shall no**  **t be subject to judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for enforce**  **ment.” 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(2). Because a citizen suit is a**  **“civil * * * proceeding for enforcement” within the** **meaning of that provision, th e court in such a suit may**  **not disregard pertinent EPA regulations on the ground that they are inconsistent wi**  **th the statute, since that would constitute the “judicial**  **review” of EPA action that Section 1369(b)(2) forbids. Cf.**  Environmental Def. **v.** Duke Energy Corp. **, 549 U.S. 561, 581 (2007) (explaining that a lower court’s “implicit**  **invalidation” of a pertinent EPA rule was “a form of judi**  **cial review implicating” an analogous limitation of review**  **under the Clean Air Act). By contrast, courts in CWA**  **citizen suits often must** in-

**553 F.3d 927, 932-933 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1505 (2010);**  NRDC **v.** EPA **, 966 F.2d 1292, 1296-1297 (9th Cir. 1992). 18** 

terpret **applicable EPA regulation s in order to determine** 
**whether the defendant has vi olated any “effluent stand** 
**ard or limitation.” Under that rubric, the cour**  **t of appeals’ interpreta tion of EPA’s “associated with industrial activity” regu**  **lation raises no jurisdicti onal concern under Section**  **1369(b)(2). As we expl ain below (pp. 23-27,**  infra **), the court’s interpretation**  **of that rule is** erroneous **, both be cause it is contrary to the**  **most natural reading of the regulatory text, and because th**  **e court failed to give ap propriate deference to EPA’**  **s interpretation of its own rule. Nothing in the court’s**  **analysis sugges ts, however,** 
**that the decision was an ything other than an**  interpretation **(as opposed to invalidation) of the “associated with**
**industrial ac tivity” rule.**  **The court of appeals’ trea tment of the Silvicultural**  **Rule presents a closer question. The court adopted an interpretation of that rule th**  **at “does not reflect the in tent of EPA,” based on a deter**  **mination that the court’s**
**own construction “would allow [the court] to construe** 
**the Rule to be consistent with the statute.” Pet. App. 37.**  **Petitioners contend that the court of appeals’ ruling amounts to an implicit invalidation of the rule, which**  **Section 1369(b)(2) bars. See 11-338 Pet. Br. 38-39; 11-** 
**347 Pet. Br. 52-54. This Court’s decision in** Duke Energy **indicates, however, that Section 1369(b)(2) generally**  **does not preclude the court in a CWA citizen suit from**  **invoking what might be ter med “statutory avoidance”**  **principles in resolving a regulatory ambiguity.**
**The Court in** Duke Energy **distinguished, for purpos es of an analogous Clean Ai**  **r Act judicial-review provi sion, “between a purposeful**  **but permissible reading of the regulation adopted to bring it into harmony with the**  **Court of Appeals’s view of the statute, and a determina-** **19**

**tion that the regula tion as written is invalid.” 549 U.S.**  **at 573. The present case falls into the former category.** 
**The Silvicultural Rule’s refe rence to “natural runoff ”** **associated with logging roads neither clearly encom passes nor clearly excludes**  **the sort of channeled runoff**
**that is at issue in this case. The court of appeals’ con**  **struction therefore qualifies as a “purposeful but per**  **missible reading of the” Silvicultural Rule, rather than a de facto invalidation. Compare**  Duke Energy **, 549 U.S. at 581 (where court of appe**  **als’ interpretation was “doomed” by the “text of th**  **e [pertinent] regulations,”**
**court’s decision constituted “a n implicit invalidation of**  **those regulations”). The question of the court of appeals’ treatment of the** 
**Silvicultural Rule is further complicated by the fact that,**  **in choosing an interpretation the court believed neces**  **sary to render the rule cons istent with the statute, the**  **court of appeals rejected EPA’ s own construction of that**  **rule as set forth in the gove rnment’s amicus brief. As**  **we explain below, the court of appeals erred in rejecting** 
**EPA’s construction of the Silv icultural Rule. That error,**  **however, is properly viewed as a misapplication of gen**  **eral administrative-law princi ples rather than as a viola**  **tion of Section 1369(b)(2).** Duke Energy **suggests that the court of appeals did not**  **violate Section 1369(b)(2) by**  **engaging in statutory avoidance, but** Seminole Rock **precluded the court from reje cting EPA’s interpretation** 
**of the Silvicultural Rule on the ground that**  **it would con flict with the Act. See pp. 21-22, 28-30,**  infra

**.**

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO DEFER TO EPA’S INTERPRETATION OF ITS REGULATIONS **Two independent rationales support the district**
**court’s conclusion that NPDE S permits are not required** **20**

**for discharges of systematic ally collected and channeled**  **runoff from logging roads. First, under EPA’s interpre** 
**tation of its Phase I stormw ater regulations, the dis**  **charges at issue here are not “associated with industrial** **activity.” Second, under EPA’s interpretation of its Sil vicultural Rule, such discharges do not constitute “point**  **source” discharges. The cour t of appeals identified no** **sound basis for rejecting the agency’s definitive inter pretations of its own rules.** 

A. An Agency’s Interpretation Of Its Regulation Is Controlling Unless It Conflicts With The Text Or Structure Of
The Regulation **Where (as here) resolution of a citizen suit turns on**  **the interpretation of ambi guous regulatory terms, a**  **court must defer to the agen cy’s interpretation of its**  **own rule, as presented in an amicus brief, unless that interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with**  **the regulation.”** Auer **, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting** Robertson **v.** Methow Valley Citizens Council **, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (quoting**  Bowles **v.** Seminole Rock & Sand Co.

**, 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))); see,**  e.g. **,** Talk Am., Inc. **v.** Michigan Bell Tel. Co. **, 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265 (2011) (“The FCC as**  amicus curiae **has advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulati**  **ons, and we defer to its views.”). The**  Auer**inquiry focuses solely on the regula tory text and structure. If an agency’s interpretation is** **not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula tion,” the agency’s interpreta**  **tion of its regulation be comes “controlling.”**  Auer **, 519 U.S. at 461; see,** e.g. **,** Coeur Alaska, Inc. **v.** Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council **, 557 U.S. 261, 278 (2009) (finding that EPA’s in terpretation of its regulation**  **s was “not plainly errone ous or inconsistent with the regulations, and**  **so we ac-** **21**

**cept it as correct”) (inter nal quotation marks and brack**  **ets omitted). After a court defers to the agency’s linguistically**  **plausible construction of its own regula**  **tion, it typically may then consider any contenti**  **on that the regulation, so construed, is inconsistent wi**  **th the governing statute.**
**See** United States **v.** Larionoff **, 431 U.S. 864, 872-873 (1977) (“Since [the agency’s] interpretation is not plainly**  **inconsistent with the wording of the regulations, we ac**  **cept the Government’s readin g of those regulations as**  **correct. This, however, does not end our inquiry. For**  **regulations, in order to be va lid, must be consistent with**  **the statute under which they are promulgated.”). Under**  **some judicial-review provisions, however, a court that is**  **authorized to interpret an ag ency regulation is barred** **from passing on the regulation’s validity. In that cir cumstance, the court must as**  **sess the propriety of the agency’s interpretation based on the**  Auer **standard alone,**  i.e. **, by determining whether the agency’s con**
**struction conflicts with the text and structure of the regulation. The court may not reject an agency inter**  **pretation that would otherwis e be entitled to deference** 
**based on the court’s view that a different construction is**  **necessary to prevent a confli ct with the governing stat** 

**ute.**
**In** Bowles **v.** Seminole Rock & Sand Co. **, 325 U.S. 410 (1945), the seminal precursor to**  Auer **, the Court applied that framework in interpreting regulations promulgated**  **by the Office of Price Admi nistration under the Emer**  **gency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56** 
**Stat. 23. 325 U.S. at 411. The Court an**  **nounced the standard, later reiterated in**  Auer **, that an agency’s in terpretation is controlling “unl**  **ess it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”**  Id **. at 414. The 22** 

**Court explained that, in cons truing the pertinent regula**  **tion, its “** only tools **, therefore, are the plain words of the**  **regulation and any relevant interpretations of the Ad** 
**ministrator.”** Ibid **. (emphasis added). After affording the administrative interpreta**  **tion controlling weight un** **der that standard, the Court did not address the statu tory or constitutional validi**  **ty of the regulation so con**
**strued. See** ibid **. (stating that the “o nly problem” before**  **the Court was “to discover the meaning of ” particular regulatory provisions, while noti**  **ng that “[t]he legality of the result reached by this pr**  **ocess * * * is quite a differ** **ent matter”). Rather, the Co urt held that it lacked au**  **thority to decide that separa te question because, under**  **the applicable statutory regi me, questions of regulatory**  **validity were required to be presented in the first in**  **stance to the Emergency Court of Appeals.** Id **. at 418-**
**419. The same principle applies he**  **re. In order to adjudi cate respondent’s citizen suit**  **against petitioners, the court of appeals was required**  **“to discover the meaning,”**
Seminole Rock **, 325 U.S. at 414, of the pertinent EPA**  **regulations. If EPA had not proffered an interpretation**  **of those regulations th at was entitled to**  Auer **deference, the court would have been requ**  **ired to construe the rules de novo, and it might have adopted “a purposeful but**  **permissible reading of the regu lation adopted to bring it**  **into harmony with the [court ’s] view of the statute.”**  Duke Energy **, 549 U.S. at 573. Th e court could not,**  **however, permissibly invoke “statutory avoidance” prin**  **ciples as a ground for rejecting an agency interpretation of the regulation that sa**  **tisfied the criteria for** Auer**def**

**erence. 8** 

**8 In its brief in opposition to the petitions for certiorari, respondent**  **disavowed any argument that either the Silvicultural Rule or the 23** 

B. The Court Of Appeals Erred In Not Deferring To EPA’s
View That Channeled Runoff From Logging Roads
Does Not Give Rise To A Stormwater Discharge “Associated With Industrial Activity” **The 1987 CWA amendment established an exception, with respect to stormwater**  **discharges, to the Act’s gen eral requirement that point-**  **source discharges of pollu**
**tants to waters of the Uni ted States require NPDES**  **permits. See 33 U.S.C. 1342( p). The Act continues to**  **require NPDES permits for st ormwater discharges in** **five enumerated categories, 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(2), includ ing those “associated with indu**  **strial activity,” 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(2)(B). Pursuant to Se**  **ction 402(p)(6), EPA is au thorized, but not required, to designate additional** 
**sources of stormwater for regulation, either through**  **NPDES permits or through other regulatory mecha** 
**nisms.**
**The Act does not define the term “associated with in dustrial activity,” but**  **the 1987 amendment required EPA to promulgate regulations relating to industrial** 
**and other Phase I stormwater discharges. 33 U.S.C.**  **1342(p)(4)(A). In 1990, EPA is sued Phase I regulations**  **that,** inter alia **, define “storm water discharge associat ed with industrial activity” to mean** 

**Phase I regulation violates the CWA, and reaffirmed that it is not seeking to invalidate either regulation in this litigation. Br. in Opp.**  **20-21. This case therefore does not present the question whether, under the CWA’s judicial-review pr**  **ovisions, clarification of EPA’s interpretation of its preexisting**  **rule can provide a new opportunity**
**for review of the rule itself. S ee 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) (requiring ap**  **plication for review within 120 days of the regulation’s promulgation, unless “such application is based solely on grounds which arose after** **such 120th day”); 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(2) (precluding review in enforce ment proceedings of EPA actions “with respect to which review could** 
**have been obtained” un der Section 1369(b)(1)).** **24**

**the discharge from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying stor**  **m water and that is di rectly related**  **to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an**  **industrial plant. The term does not include discharg**  **es from facilities or ac tivities excluded from the NPDES program under**  **this part 122. For the categ ories of industries identi**  **fied in this section, the te rm includes, but is not lim** **ited to, storm water discharges from * * * immedi**
**ate access roads * * * us** **ed or traveled by carriers of raw materials, manufact**  **ured products, waste ma terial, or by-products used**  **or created by the facility.**

**40 C.F.R. 122.26(b)(14). To identify the categories of**  **“facilities” engaged in “indus trial activity,” EPA’s regu**  **lation further incorporates by reference Standard In**  **dustrial Classification (SIC) codes, including SIC code**  **24, of which “logging” is subcategory 2411. 40 C.F.R.**  **122.26(b)(14)(ii). As explained above (pp. 20-22,**  supra **), EPA’s inter pretation of its regulation defining “associated with in** **dustrial activity” is controlling unless that interpreta tion is “plainly erroneous or**  **inconsistent with the regu**
**lation.”** Auer **, 519 U.S. at 461. Re lying primarily on the**  **regulation’s reference to SI C code 2411, the court of ap** **peals construed EPA’s rule to treat the discharges at is sue here as discharges “assoc**  **iated with industrial activi ty.” Pet. App. 44-47. The**  **government’s amicus brief ex plained, however, that “EPA**  **primarily referenced this SIC code to regulate traditional**  industrial **sources such**
**as sawmills.” I J.A. 42. That understanding is con**  **sistent with EPA’s explanation, at the time the rule was**  **promulgated, that “[e]stablishments identified under SIC 24 (except 2434) are engage**  **d in operating sawmills, planing mills and other mills engaged in producing lum-** **25**

**ber and wood basic materials .” 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990,**  **48,008 (Nov. 16, 1990). The government’s amicus br**  **ief further explained that “[b]y not excluding SIC code**  **2411 (the logging subcate gory), EPA intended to reference only the four subcate**  **gories of silvicultural faciliti es it had already defined as**  **point sources in” the Silvicultural Rule—** i.e. **, rock crush ing, gravel washing, log sorting, and log storage.** 
**I J.A. 43. 9**  **Those facilities are more closely associated**
**with traditional industrial activities than are logging**  **roads, which are often used for recreational purposes** 
**rather than as “immediate access roads” to those facili ties. I J.A. 44. EPA’s interpretation is also consistent** 
**with the terms of SIC code 2411, which defines “log**  **ging” facilities as “** establishments **primarily engaged in cutting timber and in producing**  **. . . primary forest or**

9 **That understanding is buttressed by the fact that EPA’s defini tion of “storm water discharge asso**  **ciated with industrial activity” expressly exempts activities that are “excluded from the NPDES** **program under this part 122,” 40 C.F.R. 122.26(b)(14), including un der the Silvicultural Rule, 40 C.F.R. 122.27. See also 55 Fed. Reg. at**  **48,011 (preamble stating that EPA did not intend “to change the scope of 40 CFR 122.27 in this rulemaking,” and that “**  **‘storm water discharge associated with industrial**  **activity’ does not include sources**
*** * * which are excluded unde** **r 40 CFR 122.27”). In the preamble**  **to the 1990 Phase I regulations, EPA stated its intent to examine the**  **scope of the Silvicultural Rule as it related to stormwater discharges in the course of two studies requ**  **ired under CWA Section 402(p)(5).**
Ibid **. Based on those studies, EPA promulgated the Phase II rule in 1999. That rule was challenged in**  Environmental Defense Center **v.** EPA **, 344 F.3d 832, 860-863 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004), and the court of appeal**  **s remanded to EPA the question whether stormwater discharges from forest roads should have been**  **regulated pursuant to Section 402(p)(6). That remand would have been pointless if such runoff was already regulated under Phase I**  **pursuant to Section 402(p)(2)(B). 26** 

**wood raw materials . . . in the field.” Pet. App. 45**  **(emphasis added). Thus, while the text of the regulation might not foreclose respondent’s alternative reading of** **the term “associated with industrial activity,” EPA’s in terpretation of its own rule**  **is reasonable and therefore**
**should have been afforded** Auer **deference. See** Pauley

**v.** BethEnergy Mines, Inc. **, 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991) (“While it is possible that th**  **e claimants’ parsing of these impenetrable regulations wou**  **ld be consistent with ac cepted canons of construction, it is axiomatic that the**  **Secretary’s interpretation [of the regulations] need not** 
**be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other**  **standards. Rather, the Secr etary’s view need be only** 
**reasonable to warrant deference. ”) (citations omitted).**  **With respect to the Silvic ultural Rule, the court of**  **appeals identified the need for consistency with the gov**  **erning statute as its ration ale for rejecting EPA’s under**  **standing of its own regulati on. See Pet. App. 36-37.**  **With respect to the regulato ry definition of “discharge** 
**associated with industrial activity,” by contrast, the** 
**court did not hold that the CWA compelled its expansive** 
**construction of the rule. 10**  **Any such con tention would be** 

**10 Although the State petitioners contend otherwise (11-338 Pet. Br.**  **40-42), this aspect of the court of a ppeals’ opinion is best read as rest**  **ing on the text of the industrial stormwater rule, not on any view that CWA Section 402(p) compelled EPA to**  **treat forest-road discharges as “associated with industrial activity.” See,**  e.g. **, Pet. App. 46 (“The [Phase I regulation’s] definition of**  **a ‘facility’ engaging in industrial activity’ is very broad.”);**  id **. at 47 (reasoning that because EPA con sidered logging activities to be “industrial in nature” by virtue of the**  regulation’s **reference to the logging SIC code, EPA could not ex empt such activities from NPDES**  **permits); see also 11-347 Pet. Br. 39, 43 (describing court of appeals’**  **rejection of EPA’ s interpretation**  **of industrial stormwater rule as “the product of a myopic focus on isolated snippets of regulatory**  **language” and as “second-guessing 27** 

**implausible. As noted ab ove, the 1987 amendment did**  **not define the term “associated with industrial activity,” but rather directed EPA to promulgate regulations im**  **plementing that provision. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(p)(4)(A).**  **That language gives EPA significant discretion to define**
**both what will coun t as “industrial activity,” and what**  **stormwater discharges bear a sufficiently close nexus to**  **such activity as to be “associated with” it.**  **Whatever the precise limits of that discretion, the**  **statutory term “discharge asso ciated with industrial ac**  **tivity” does not ineluctably cover channeled runoff from all logging roads. Thus, even**  **if the desire to avoid a conflict with the governing**  **statute could provide a sound basis for rejecting an agency**  **interpretation that would**
**otherwise be entitled to deference under** Seminole Rock
**and** Auer **(but see pp. 20-22,** supra **), any such justifica**
**tion would be abse nt here. Under th**  **ese circumstances, the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to defer to EPA’s interpreta**  **tion of its own regulatory de finition is contrary to basic**  **administrative-law principles. 11** 

**EPA’s expert judgment concerning its own regulation”). That dis cussion stands in sharp contrast to the court of appeals’ discussion of** **the Silvicultural Rule, in which it explicitly characterized EPA’s in terpretation as “inconsistent with [CWA] § 502(14).” Pet. App. 37.** 

11 **In response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, EPA issued a notice in the Federal Register indicating its intent “to propose revisions to**  **its Phase I stormwater regulations (40 C.F.R. 122.26) to specify that**  **stormwater discharges from logging roads are not included in the definition of ‘storm water discharge associated with industrial activi**  **ty.’ ” 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,474. EPA thus has expressed its intent to**  **amend Section 122.26(b) to respond to the Ninth Circuit’s contrary**  **reading of the regulation by making explicit the interpretation ad**  **vanced in the government’s 2007 amic us brief. On September 4, 2012,**  **EPA published a notice of proposed rulemaking to that effect.** Notice of Proposed Revisions to Stormwater Regulations to Clarify that an NPDES Permit is not Required for Stormwater Discharges from**28**

C. The Court Of Appeals Erred In Not Deferring To The
EPA’s Interpretation Of The Silvicultural Rule That
Runoff From Logging Roads Constitutes NonpointSource Pollution **Properly construed, the Phase I regulation provides an adequate and independent**  **basis to conclude that pe titioners were not required**  **to obtain an NPDES permit for the alleged discharges at**  **issue here. Accordingly,**
**the Court need not decide whether the Silvicultural Rule—promulgated under a**  **regulatory framework pre dating the 1987 stormwater amendment—also excludes**  **such discharges from the NPDES permitting scheme.**  **If the Court reaches the questi on, however, it should re**  **verse the court of appeals’ conclusion that stormwater** **runoff from logging roads that is collected and chan neled by a system of ditche**  **s and culverts requires a permit under the Silvicultural Rule.**  **The Silvicultural Rule specif ically identifi**  **es four cat egories of silvicultural facili**  **ties (“rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, [and] log storage facilities”) as**  **“[s]ilvicultural point source[s ].” 40 C.F.R.**  **122.27(b)(1). Discharges of pollutants fr**  **om those enumerated indus**
**trial activities are different in kind from stormwater**  **discharges associated with precipitation-driven runoff**  **from logging roads. The Sil vicultural Rule further pro**  **vides that the term “[s]ilvi cultural point source” does**  **not include “harvesting operatio** **ns * * * or road con**
**struction and maintenance from which there is natural**

Logging Roads **, 77 Fed. Reg. __ (forthcoming), available at http://www.ofr.gov/OFRUpload/**  **OFRData/2012-21432_PI.pdf. EPA’s proposed regulatory approach, if and when finalized, effectively** **would render moot the court of appeals’ conclusion that such dis charges are subject to NPDES permitting requirements under the**  **current regulatory scheme. 29** 

**runoff.”** Ibid. **Although the rule does not specifically**
**confirm that the reference to “natural runoff ” encom**  **passes systematically channe led runoff, neither does it**  **suggest that such runoff sh ould be treated as a “point**  **source” discharge. The government unequivocally expressed in its ami**  **cus brief EPA’s view that, un der the Silvicultural Rule,** 
**channeled “natural runoff ” fr om logging roads does not**  **require a permit. That brie f explained that “the term** 
**‘natural runoff ’ in the silvic ultural rule categorically ex**  **cludes [from the definition of silvicultural point source]**  **all stormwater runoff from forest roads, even where the roads include channels, ditches,**  **or culverts.” I J.A. 39. EPA’s interpretation of its**  **Silvicultural Rule was not “plainly erroneous or inconsis**  **tent with the regulation”; indeed, it was the more ling**  **uistically plau sible reading** 
**of the rule. The court of appeals therefore should have** 
**deferred under** Auer **to that inte rpretation.**  **The court of appeals did not disagree that EPA’s reading was consistent with**  **the terms of the Silvicultur al Rule. Rather, it rejected EPA’s reading on the ground**  **that the agency interpretation would bring the rule into** 
**conflict with the CWA’s definiti on of “point source.” Pet.**  **App. 36-37. That mode of an alysis was erroneous. As**  **discussed above (pp. 20-22,** supra **), if an agency has of fered a definitive interpretation of its own regulation** 
**that is otherwise entitl ed to deference under**  Seminole
Rock **and** Auer **, a court may not adopt a different inter pretation based on principles**  **of “statutory avoidance.” That principle applies even**  **when the pertinent judicial review scheme prevents the court from taking what**  **would ordinarily be the logica l next step of determining**  **whether the regulation, as construed by the agency, is 30** 

**consistent with the gove rning statute. See**  Seminole
Rock **, 325 U.S. at 414, 418-419. 12**  **In any event, the CWA does not compel the court of**  **appeals’ conclusion that the discharges at issue required a permit. Just as a**  **court must defer under** Seminole
Rock **and** Auer **to an agency’s reasonable construction of its own regulation,**  **a court must defer to EPA’s regulato**  **ry interpretation of an am biguous CWA provision unless** 

12 **The court of appeals’ opinion, as well as the government’s amicus brief at the rehearing stage,**  **relied in part on when EPA first announced its official interpretation of the Silvicultural Rule as ex**  **cluding systematically channeled runoff from logging roads from NPDES permit requirements. See Pet. App. 9-10; I J.A. 59-60 & n.5.**  **The timing is not clear: although the government had previously con**  **tended that EPA’s interpretation dated back to 1976, it argued on rehearing that EPA’s interpretation was first articulated during this**  **litigation. Compare I J.A. 33-34 with I J.A. 59-60 & n.5. That diver**  **gence arises from respondent’s emphasis, as the litigation developed, on the ambiguous term “natural runoff,” which was added to the Sil**  **vicultural Rule in 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290, 33,447 (May 19, 1980). The rule itself does not specify whether runoff that is systemically**  **conveyed by channels, ditches, or culverts is “natural” (thereby con**  **stituting nonpoint-source pollution), and the EPA’s pre-2007 written statements did not definitively resolve that specific issue.** 

**On further reflection, however, the timing question is irrelevant to**
**the resolution of this case. Even assuming that EPA’s interpretation**  **was first announced during this litigation, the court of appeals could not properly invoke principles of “statutory avoidance” to reject an**  **agency interpretation of the Silvicultural Rule because that would be a misapplication of**  Auer **principles. Quite apart from the restrictions imposed by Section 1369(b)(2) on**  **“judicial review” of EPA regula tions, the background rule of administrative law set forth in**  Seminole
Rock **foreclosed the court’s approach. See pp. 20-23,** supra **. That is, a court can never reject an agency’s interpretation of a regulation**  **that is consistent with the regulation’s text and structure, and then substitute the court’s own interpretation of the regulation that it** 
**views as more consistent with the statute. 31** 

**the statute dictates a different interpretation. See** Entergy Corp. **v.** Riverkeeper, Inc. **, 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009) (citing**  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. **v.** NRDC **, 467 U.S. 837, 843- 844 (1984)). The CWA’s definiti**  **on of “point source,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(14), gives EPA mean**  **ingful discretion in dis tinguishing between point and**  **non-point sources. “[T]he concept of a ‘discrete conveyance’**  **” in the statutory defi nition, for example, “suggest**  **s that there is room here for some exclusion by interpretation.”**  NRDC **v.** Costle

**, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see**  id. **at 1382 (“[T]he power to define poin**  **t and nonpoint sources is**
**vested in EPA and should be reviewed by the court only**  **after opportunity for full agency review and examina**  **tion.”) (citation omitted); see also** League of Wilderness Defenders **v.** Forsgren **, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002);**  National Wildlife Fed’n **v.** Gorsuch **, 693 F.2d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1982). That is**  **particularly true with re spect to silvicultural so**  **urces of pollution. See** Costle

**, 568 F.2d at 1377 (noting “quest**  **ion, to what extent point**
**sources are involved in * * *** **silvicultural * * * run** **off ”);** NRDC **v.** Train **, 396 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (D.D.C. 1975) (“Congress intended fo**  **r the agency to determine, at least in the agricultural**  **and silvicultural areas, which activities constitute point and nonpoint sources.”), aff ’d,**  **568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 13**  **Thus, read in light of the Act as a whole, the CW**  **A’s definition of “point source” does not foreclose EPA from determining that** 

**13 The CWA elsewhere refers to silvicultural activities as gener**  **ating pollution from nonpoint so urces. See 33 U.S.C. 1288(b)(2)(F)**  **(referring to “agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint sources of pollution”); 33 U.S.C. 1314(f)(A) (addressing identification**  **and control of “nonpoint sources of pollution” from “agricultural and** **silvicultural activities, including runoff from fields and crop and for est lands”).** **32**

**channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads should be treated as nonpoint-source discharges.**  **It should be acknowledged, however, that EPA’s lati**  **tude to distinguish between point-source and nonpoint**  **source stormwater discharg es served a significantly**  **greater practical need when the Silvicultural Rule was adopted in 1976, and amended**  **to its present form in 1980, than it does under the**  **current statutory scheme. Until 1987, designating partic**  **ular categories of storm water discharges as nonpoi**  **nt-source discharges was EPA’s only statutory mechanism for insulating them** **from NPDES permitting requirements. Congress rec ognized the shortcomings of that rigid approach, and it** 
**enacted the 1987 amendment to provide EPA a greater**  **range of regulatory options to address the distinct is** 
**sues that stormwater discha rges pose. That amendment**  **gives EPA substantial discre tion to designate which**  **stormwater discharges, other than the five categories**  **listed in Section 402(p)(2), ar e subject to the Act, and to**  **determine whether to address those discharges through means other than permits.**  **Because EPA’s regulatory definition of “discharge associ**  **ated with industrial activi ty” is part of the agency’s**  **effort to implement that cur rent, more nuanced statutory**  **scheme, it represents the most appropriate ground on wh**  **ich to decide this case. See pp. 13-15,**  supra

**. 33** 

CONCLUSION**The judgment of the court of appeals should be re**
**versed.**

**Respectfully submitted.**

**S COTT**  **C. F**  **ULTON**

General Counsel
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency **D ONALD**  **B. V**  **ERRILLI ,**  **J R** 

**.** Solicitor General

**I GNACIA**  **S. M**  **ORENO**

Assistant Attorney General
**M ALCOLM**  **L. S**  **TEWART**

Deputy Solicitor General

**E THAN**  **G. S**  **HENKMAN**

Deputy Assistant Attorney

General

**P RATIK**  **A. S**  **HAH**

Assistant to the Solicitor General
**A**

**ARON P.**  **A VILA**  **J UDY**  **B. H**  **ARVEY**

Attorneys

**S EPTEMBER**  **2012**