alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Alston, Chafin and Senior Judge Haley 

FAIRFAX COUNTY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2012-14-4 PER CURIAM 

 APRIL 14, 2015 

MATTHEW DOMYANCIC 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (David P. Bobzien, County Attorney; Peter D. Andreoli, Jr., Deputy 

County Attorney; Karen L. Gibbons, Senior Assistant County 

Attorney; Jamie M. Greenzweig, Assistant County Attorney, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 (Jack T. Burgess; Burgess & Perigard, PLLC, on brief), for appellee. 

 Fairfax County (hereinafter “employer”) appeals an October 27, 2014 decision of the 

Workers’ Compensation Commission awarding Matthew Domyancic medical benefits and 

attorneys’ fees.1 We have reviewed the record and the commission’s opinion and find that this 

appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the commission in its 

final opinion. See Domyancic v. Fairfax Cnty., JCN 2274883 (Oct. 27, 2014).2

 We dispense 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

1

 In a separate, related appeal, we affirmed the commission’s August 7, 2014 decision 

finding that Domyancic had not failed to report a return to work and that his 

psychiatric/psychological conditions were a compensable consequence of the original work 

injury. See Fairfax Cnty. v. Domyancic, Record No. 1625-14-4 (Apr. 14, 2015). 

2

 We do not address employer’s argument that the medical records of Drs. Krochmal and 

Brod were inadmissible. Employer cites no ruling from the record excluding these records, and 

does not include their admissibility among it assignments of error on appeal. Rule 5A:20(c) 

requires an appellant’s opening brief to contain “[a] statement of the assignments of error with a 

clear and exact reference to the page(s) of the transcript, written statement, record, or appendix 

where each assignment of error was preserved in the trial court.” See Winston v. 

Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 74, 82, 654 S.E.2d 340, 345 (2007) (where appellant did not 

include an argument in his questions presented (now assignments of error), the Court would not 

address it on appeal). 

UNPUBLISHED 
 - 2- 

with oral argument and summarily affirm because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

See Code § 17.1-403; Rule 5A:27. 

 Affirmed.
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

In the interest of T.M.J., a child * From the 326th District

 Court of Taylor County,

 Trial Court No. 7299-CX.

No. 11-14-00277-CV * April 9, 2015

 * Memorandum Opinion by Bailey, J.

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is 

no error in the order below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, 

the order of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
AMS Boneless Beef Supplier Pathogen Performance: Non-O157 STECs - Fiscal Year: 20231/,2/,3/

E. coliO26 E. coliO45 E. coliO103 E. coliO111 E. coliO121 E. coliO145

# LotsTested

Supplier (% ofTotal) # Positive % Positive # Positive % Positive # Positive % Positive # Positive % Positive # Positive % Positive # Positive % Positive

S1 64 (2.6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S4 1,323 (53.5) 1 0.08 0 0 1 0.23 3 0.23 0 0 1 0.08

S6 142 (5.7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S10 463 (18.7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S11 17 (0.7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S21 109 (4.4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S29 170 ( 6.9) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S43 46 (1.9) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S44 130 (5.3) 1 0.77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S49 1 (0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

S50 10 (0.4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 2,475 (100.0) 2 0.08 0 0 1 0.04 3 0.12 0 0 1 0.04

1/A full description of the boneless beef purchase program specification is available at https://www.ams.usda.gov/selling-food/product-specs#Beef.

2/Production Dates: October 1, 2022 to December 31, 2023.

3/Non-O157:H7 STEC Critical Limit: Positive (+) Result / 325g.
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Wise Metals Group LLC (the “Company”) for the quarter ending June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the“Report”), I, Kenneth Stastny, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: August 31, 2009 

 

A signed original of this written statement, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwiseadopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest.
**REGULATORY EVALUATION**

**Directorate Identifier:** 2012

- NM

- 075

- AD

**Executive Order 12866:** Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:** Is the AD significant? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **Regulatory Flexibility Act:** Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? YES ( ) explain NO (X) **Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:** This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. I s it appropriate t o include specific requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of transportation? YES ( ) explain NO (X)
#### Miller et ux., Appellants, *v.*Wayne Title and Trust Company.

Argued November 16, 1942.

Before Keller, P. J., Cunningham, Baldrige, Stadteeld, Rhodes, Hirt, and Kenworthey, JJ.

*Samuel Lichtenfeld,*with him *Archie Levy,*for appellants.

*Samuel A. Montgomery,*with him *Harold D. Green-well,*for appellee.

December 8, 1942:

Per Curiam,

This appeal is from an order refusing judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.

The general principles governing such cases are so well established that it would serve no useful purpose to restate them here; nor would that end be served by detailing the facts of the case or the manner in which they are set forth in the pleadings here involved. It is sufficient to say that on appeals from orders of this nature we do not reverse unless it is clear and free *537from doubt that the court below erred in refusing judgment. On a review of the pleadings as a whole, giving due consideration to the arguments of counsel, we are not satisfied that the court was guilty of error in refusing judgment.

Following the usual course pursued in such cases, we shall not disturb the order appealed from nor discuss the applicable principles of law involved in the case, until an opportunity is had to develop all the facts at trial: *Kaster v. Penna. Fuel Supply Co.,*300 Pa. 52, 150 A. 153.

Appeal dismissed.
EXHIBIT 23.1
**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**
We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-60865)pertaining to the Hawk Corporation 1997 Stock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8No. 333-68583) pertaining to the Friction Products Co. Profit Sharing Plan; S.K. Wellman RetirementSavings and Profit Sharing Plan; Helsel, Inc. Employee’s Retirement Plan; Helsel, Inc. Employee’sSavings and Investment Plan; Sinterloy Corporation 401(k) Plan; Hawk Motors, Inc. Employees’ 401(k)Plan; Hawk Corporation 401(k) Savings and Retirement Plan; and Quarter Master Industries, Inc.Profit Sharing Plan and Trust and in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-47220) pertainingto the Hawk Corporation 2000 Long Term Incentive Plan of our report dated March 29, 2005, withrespect to the consolidated financial statements of Hawk Corporation and subsidiaries included inthis Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2004.
/s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP                                            
Cleveland, Ohio
April 9, 2015

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

LONNIE EARL HARRIS, Appellant

NO. 14-14-01022-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. The 

record indicates that the appeal should be DISMISSED. The Court orders the 

appeal DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion.

We further order appellant pay all costs expended in the appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15A1214. LUCIOUS L. JOHNSON v. THE STATE.

Lucious Johnson was convicted in 1996 of three counts of aggravated assault,

one count of rape, and one count of false imprisonment. His convictions were

affirmed by this Court in Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. App. 677 (520 SE2d 221) (1999). 

Johnson later filed a motion to vacate a void sentence and an extraordinary motion

for new trial. The trial court merged two of his convictions and vacated his sentence

as to one count but otherwise denied the motions, and we again affirmed on appeal. 

Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. App. 294 (612 SE2d 29) (2005). Johnson then filed

another motion to vacate a void sentence, along with other pro se motions. The trial

court denied the motions, and once more we affirmed, this time in an unpublished

opinion. Johnson v. State, Case No. A13A1411 (decided July 16, 2013). Johnson

subsequently filed additional pro se motions, including a motion for an out-of-time

appeal and a motion for relief from convictions due to actual innocence. The trial

court denied the motions on the ground that its prior orders were “res judicata as to

these matters.” Johnson filed an application for discretionary appeal from this order,

which we dismissed, specifically noting that Johnson was not entitled to an out-oftime appeal and that a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an

appropriate remedy in a criminal case. Johnson v. State, Case No. A15D0225

(dismissed February 2, 2015). This case is a direct appeal from the trial court’s order

denying Johnson’s pro se motions on res judicata grounds. We lack jurisdiction. 

Because Johnson has already had a direct appeal, he cannot appeal from the

trial court’s denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. See Richards v. State,

275 Ga 190 (563 SE2d 856) (2002). Moreover, “[i]t is well established that any issue

April 08, 2015
that was raised and resolved in an earlier appeal is the law of the case and is binding

on this Court, and that the law of the case doctrine is not confined to civil cases, but

applies also to rulings made by appellate courts in criminal cases.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Ross v. State, 310 Ga. App. 326, 327 (713 SE2d 438) (2011).

Prior to this appeal, Johnson filed numerous appeals challenging orders of the trial

court. In all these appeals, we affirmed the trial court’srulings denying Johnson’s pro

se motions. We are precluded from revisiting an issue that has already been decided. 

See Ross, supra at 328. Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

04/08/2015
**Exhibit 32.2****CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER****PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**     In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of CopanoEnergy, L.L.C. (the “Company”) onForm 10-Q for thequarter ended March 31, 2006 (the “Report”) filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 10,2006, I, Matthew J. Assiff, Senior Vice President and ChiefFinancial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to hisknowledge:          (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of    section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of    1934 as amended; and           (2) The information contained in the Report fairly    presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and    results of operations of the Company.     /s/ Matthew J. Assiff           Matthew J. Assiff     Senior Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerMay 10, 2006
STEAM ELECTRIC

C B I R E P L AC E M E NT P A G E

EPA

- HQ

- OW

- 20 09

- 0819

DCN:

________________________________________

T H E FO LL OW ING H AS BEE N R E M O V E D BE CAUSE IT

C O N T AINS C O N F ID E N T IAL B USIN E SS IN FO RMA T I O N

(C B I) P E R 4 0 C F R P ART 2

, SU B P ART B

. SE 04 331A0 37
Exhibit32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the QuarterlyReport of Ames True Temper, Inc. (the"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period endingMarch 26, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission onthe date hereof (the "Report"), I, JudySchuchart, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|  |           |                                                                                                                     |
|--|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  | (1)  | TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |

|  |           |                                                                                                                                                    |
|--|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  | (2)  | The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Company. |

|  |
|--|
|  |  |
|  |

JudySchuchartChief Financial Officer (Principal FinancialOfficer)May 9, 2005

----
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 10-7



                  DESCRIPTION OF 2004 COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS
                          WITH LUBIN, DELANO & COMPANY



            During 2004, Lexington Precision Corporation (the "Company")
compensated Michael A. Lubin, its Chairman of the Board, and Warren Delano, its
President, indirectly through payments to Lubin, Delano & Company, an investment
banking firm of which they are the only partners. These compensation
arrangements provided for payment to Lubin, Delano & Company of a basic fee of
$700,000, and provided for a possible incentive fee based upon attaining an
operating profit target for the Company and possible transaction fees as might
be agreed upon by the Company and Lubin, Delano & Company in connection with
acquisitions, divestitures, financings and other similar transactions.
**Exhibit 31.1****Rule 13a-14(a) Certification of the Chief Executive Officer**I, J. Michael Allen, President and Chief Executive Officer, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Georgia Trust Bancshares, Inc. 2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report. 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presentedin this report; 4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly duringthe period in which this report is being prepared;  b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and  c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’sfourth fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the small business issuer’s internal control over financialreporting; and5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small businessissuer’s auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer’s board of directors(or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control overfinancial reporting.Date: August 15, 2005                     /s/ J. Michael Allen         J. Michael Allen, President and C.E.O.             (Principal Executive Officer)
I look to the session.  I have been doing alot of research on CBD Oil and it looks like the "Old West."   What is hope comes from the Round Table discussion is the standardization of terminology, or a an "official Glossary of terms" that can be followed so that the average uniformed person who has an interest in taking CBD Oil knows how to evaluate it.   

Sincerely,

Louis Goglia, DBA, LLB
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0073

Filed April 8, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

VINCENT DUNCAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Mary E. Chicchelly, 

Judge.

A defendant appeals his convictions for second-degree sexual abuse,

lascivious acts with a child, and assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. 

AFFIRMED.

Chad R. Frese of Kaplan & Frese, L.L.P., Marshalltown, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney 

General, Brent Heeren, County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Eisenhauer, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
2

VAITHESWARAN, P.J.

Vincent Duncan was tried to the court, and was found guilty of seconddegree sexual abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and assault with intent to 

commit sexual abuse. See Iowa Code §§ 709.3, .8(2), and .11 (2013). Duncan 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court’s findings 

of guilt. He specifically asserts “the testimony at trial of the witnesses present at 

the house . . . contains numerous inconsistencies and contradictions.” 

The record does contain inconsistencies and contradictions, many of 

which the district court resolved after weighing the credibility and motives of the 

testifying witnesses. This was the court’s prerogative. See State v. Dewitt, 811 

N.W.2d 460, 476 (Iowa 2012) (“[C]redibility determinations are an essential 

function of the fact finder.”); State v. Weaver, 608 N.W.2d 797, 804 (Iowa 2000) 

(“Determinations of credibility are in most instances left for the trier of fact, who is 

in a better position to evaluate it.”). 

Of greatest concern is the testimony of the child witness who, like the child 

witnesses in State v. Smith, 508 N.W.2d 101 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993), made certain 

unrealistic statements. However, as the district court found, the child was the 

first person to raise the issue of sexual contact with Duncan, she “consistently”

described the sex act in a statement to a child protective worker and in her trial 

testimony, she “corrected” the worker when the worker identified a different 

person as the perpetrator, she identified the defendant as the perpetrator at trial, 

she “made no other allegations of contact, sexual, assaultive, or otherwise, 

against” Duncan, and “at no point” did she recant her statements. These findings 

are all supported by substantial evidence. See Weaver, 608 N.W.2d at 803-04
3

(setting forth standard of review). When combined with the district court’s finding 

that her “demeanor was appropriate and she was a very credible young witness,”

we conclude her account was not so “inconsistent, self-contradictory, lacking in 

experiential detail, and . . . border[ing] on the absurd” as to require reversal. See

Smith, 508 N.W.2d at 103. 

We affirm the district court’s findings of guilt and Duncan’s conviction and 

sentence.

AFFIRMED.