THE ATTBRNJZY GENERAL 

OF TEXAS 

June 26, 1974 

The Honorable Richard E. Bowers 

County Attorney 

County of Brewster 

Alpine, Texas 79830 

Opinion No. H- 335 

Re: Basis upon which the attorney’s 

fees provided by Art. 7332, V. T. C. S. 

are to be calculated. 

Dear Mr. Bowers: 

Your opihion request requires us to determine the basis upon which 

the Tattorney’s fees for collection of delinquent taxes, provided by Art. 7332, 

V.T.C.S., are to be calculated. Art. 7332 provides, in part: 

The Countv or”District Attornev shall represent 

the state and county in all suits against delinquent 

taxpayers, and all sums collected shaKbe paid over 

immediately to the County Collector. 

. . . . 

In all cases, the compensation of said. attorney 

shall be such reasonable attorneys fees as may be 

incurred not exceeding ten per cent (10%) of the 

amount sued for. 

Under Art. 733.3, V. T. C.S., the attorney’s fees set under Art. 7332 are to 

be recovered from the delinquent taxpayer as court costs for the benefit of 

the county. The district attorney and county attorney are not personally 

entitled to such fe’es because they are compensated on a salary basis. Banks 

v. State, 362 S. W. 2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App., Austin, 1962, error ref’d n. r. e. ). 

po 1546 
The Honorable Richard E. Bowers page 2 (H-335) 

Also see, Attorney General Opinions G-6400 (1945); V-601 (1948) and 

WW-675 (1959). 

Your question arises from the situation where an independent school 

district represented by a private attorney, files suit for the collection of 

delinquent school taxes, and, subsequently, the state and county enter the 

suit in order to urge their claims for delinquent taxes against the defendant. 

Other taxing entities such as a city or local water district may also intervene 

in the suit. There is usually a wide variation in the amount sought by each 

taxing entity. You ask whether in this situation the county or district 

attorney’s fee provided by Art. 7332 is to be assessed on the basis of the 

amount sued for by the independent school district which initiated the action 

or whether instead it should be based only on the amount, oft the claims 

entered by the state and county. In other words, if a school district has 

filed suit on a claim of. $l,OOD.in delinquent s’choolltaxea;and the, county ‘, ‘:. 

attorney intervenes with a claim of $100 in delinquent county and state 

taxes, under Art. 7332 should the county attorney’s maximum ten per 

cent fee by $100 or merely $10. 

In resolving this question it is important to distinguish between 

delinquent tax proceedings brought on behalf of the state and county and 

those initiated by an independent school district. The latter are governed 

by Art. 7343, V. T. C! S. ,whiCh ,permits an independent school district to 

hire a private attorney to collect delinquent school taxes and to pay him as 

much as fifteen per cent of the amount ultimately recovered. Bell v. 

Mansfield Independent School Dist. s 12~9 S. W. 2d 629 (Tex. 1939). If a 

private attorney is hired by a school district his fees cannot be taxed as 

court costs. Arnold v. Crockett Independent School Dist., 389 S. W. 2d 

608 (Tex. .Civ. App., Tyler, 1965), rev’d on other grounds, 404 S. W. 2d 

27 (Tex. 1966). 

Art. 7332, on the other hand, directs the county or district attorney 

to represent the state and county in all suits against delinquent taxpayers and 

provi,des that for such represemation an attorney’s fee not to exceed ten per 

cent of the amount sued for is to be paid. This fee is to be collected from the 

delinquent taxpayer as part of the court costs. Art. 7333, V. T. C. S. 

p, 1547 
The Honorable Richard E., Bowers page 3 (H-335) 

In construing Art. 7332, this office has held that the attorney’s 

fees provided therein are intended as compensation for services rendered 

and that when no services are rendered then no fee can be charged or 

allowed. Attorney General Opinion O-1695 (1940). This office has also 

held that when a county or district attorney represents both an independent 

school district as well as the state and county in a delinquent tax proceeding 

he is entitled to the fees prescribed by Art. 7332 as to each taxing unit. 

Attorney General Opinion V-742 (1948). 

These opinions indicate that the attorney’s fee provided for in Art. 

7332 was originally intended as compensation and therefore should be related 

to the services actually rendered by the county or district attorney on 

behalf of his client. This objective is hdrdly served if the fee is based on an 

amount sued for by another party to the suit not represented by the county or 

district attorney. 

Thus in the situatEon you describe it would~ be improper under Art. 

7332 to compute the county attorney’s fee on the basis of the amount sought 

by an independent school district not actually represented by the county 

attorney, When the county or district attorney represents only the state 

and county in a delinquent tax proceedin,g, his fee should be computed on 

the basis of the amount sought by those entities. That amount is “the 

amount sued for” as contemplated in Art. 7332. 

SUMMARY 

The attorney’s fees provided in Art. 7332 are 

intended to reflect services rendered and are to be 

calculated on the basis of the amount sued for by the 

taxing entities actually represented by the county or 

district attorney. 

Attorney General of Texas 

p. 1548 
The Honorable Richard E. Bowers page 4 (H-335) 

o,q 

DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

pq 1549