J-S24006-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

HARRY JACKSON

Appellant No. 1082 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 27, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1135721-1982

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 08, 2015

Appellant, Harry Jackson, appeals pro se from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his serial 

petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. On March 26, 1983, a jury found Appellant guilty of firstdegree murder and possessing instruments of crime. The court sentenced 

Appellant on July 14, 1983, to life imprisonment. This Court affirmed the 

judgment of sentence on December 5, 1984. See Commonwealth v. 

Jackson, 488 A.2d 1164 (Pa.Super. 1984). Our Supreme Court denied 

allowance of appeal on April 4, 1985. On April 30, 1987, Appellant filed his 

first petition for collateral relief, which the court dismissed on November 19, 

1990. This Court affirmed the order denying relief on May 8, 1991, and our 

Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on October 31, 1991. See 
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Commonwealth v. Jackson, 595 A.2d 191 (Pa.Super. 1991), appeal 

denied, 529 Pa. 617, 600 A.2d 534 (1991). 

On May 8, 2012, Appellant filed the current, serial pro se PCRA 

petition. The court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice on March 7, 2014; 

Appellant responded on March 18, 2014. The court dismissed Appellant’s 

petition as untimely on March 27, 2014. On April 9, 2014, Appellant timely 

filed a pro se notice of appeal. No Rule 1925(b) statement was ordered, and 

Appellant filed none.

The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 

___ Pa. ___, 91 A.3d 162 (2014). A PCRA petition must be filed within one 

year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at the conclusion of direct review or 

at the expiration of time for seeking review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). 

The three statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness provisions allow for 

very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be 

excused; and a petitioner asserting a timeliness exception must file a 

petition within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), (b)(2). Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final on June 3, 1985, upon expiration of the time to file a 

petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See

U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 20.1 (effective August 1, 1984; allowing 60 days to file 
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petition for writ of certiorari). Appellant filed the current petition on May 8, 

2012, which is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant 

now attempts to invoke the “new constitutional right” exception to the 

PCRA’s time bar under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), claiming Lafler v. Cooper, 

___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012) and Missouri v. 

Frye, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012) set forth newly 

recognized constitutional rights, held to apply retroactively.1 Nevertheless, 

this Court has specifically held that neither Lafler nor Frye created a new 

constitutional right. See Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270 

(Pa.Super. 2013) (explaining Lafler and Frye simply applied Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel and ineffectiveness test to circumstances where 

counsel’s conduct resulted in plea offer lapsing or being rejected to 

defendant’s detriment; petitioner’s reliance on these decisions to satisfy 

Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) exception to PCRA’s time restrictions is unavailing). 

Thus, the court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely.

Order affirmed. 

____________________________________________

1 The Supreme Court decided Lafler and Frye on March 21, 2012. Thus, 

Appellant complied with the sixty-day rule per 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/8/2015