UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4694

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

FRANK WOOD THOMAS, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

District Judge. (3:05-cr-00104-FDW-CH-19) 

Submitted: March 12, 2009 Decided: May 18, 2009 

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Thomas A. Will, Jr., THE LAW OFFICE OF THOMAS A. WILL, JR., 

Gastonia, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Following a lengthy trial, Frank Wood Thomas was 

convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute and to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Thomas was sentenced by 

the district court to the statutory mandatory minimum of 240 

months’ imprisonment, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006). 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

 Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts there are 

no meritorious issues for appeal but questions whether the 

district court erred in denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion 

for judgment of acquittal. Thomas filed a pro se supplemental 

brief, joining in counsel’s argument. The Government elected 

not to file a responding brief. 

 We review de novo the district court’s denial of a 

Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. 

Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 160 (4th Cir. 2006). “In conducting such 

review, we must uphold a jury verdict if there is substantial 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, 

to support it.” Id. Both direct and circumstantial evidence 

are considered, and the government is permitted “all reasonable 

inferences that could be drawn in its favor.” United States v. 

Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008). The defendant “must 

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carry an imposing burden to successfully challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Martin, 523 F.3d 

281, 288 (4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 

238 (2008). 

 To prove conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute and to distribute a controlled substance, the 

government must establish that: (1) two or more persons agreed 

to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute the 

substance; “‘(2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and 

(3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of 

this conspiracy.’” United States v. Yearwood, 518 F.3d 220, 

225-26 (4th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 

857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 137 

(2008). The defendant may be convicted of conspiracy without 

knowing all the conspiracy’s details, so long as the defendant 

enters the conspiracy understanding its unlawful nature and 

willfully joins in the plan on at least one occasion. Burgos, 

94 F.3d at 858. 

 With these standards in mind, our thorough review of 

the trial transcript convinces us that Thomas was involved in 

“‘a loosely-knit association of members linked . . . by their 

mutual interest in sustaining the overall enterprise of catering 

to the ultimate demands of a particular drug consumption 

market’” — Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Burgos, 94 F.3d 

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at 858 (quoting United States v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1054 (4th 

Cir. 1993)). “[W]hile many conspiracies are executed with 

precision, the fact that a conspiracy is loosely-knit, 

haphazard, or ill-conceived does not render it any less a 

conspiracy — or any less unlawful.” Id. We therefore conclude 

that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

verdict. To the extent Thomas argues the Government’s case 

rested in large part on the unreliable testimony of the 

cooperating witnesses, it is not the province of this court to 

second-guess the credibility determinations of the factfinder. 

See United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 283 (4th Cir. 2007). 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We deny Thomas’s motion for remand. This court requires 

that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are

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adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED