J-S08019-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

EDWARD TERANTINO

Appellant No. 1662 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of April 30, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-45-CR-0001847-2013

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED APRIL 06, 2015

Edward Terantino appeals his April 30, 2014 judgment of sentence. 

Herein, Terantino alleges, inter alia, that the weight of the evidence did not 

support the jury verdict and that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

imposed an excessive sentence. Terantino’s counsel has filed a petition to 

withdraw as counsel, together with an Anders brief.1 We find that 

Terantino’s counsel has satisfied the Anders/Santiago requirements and 

that Terantino has no meritorious issues to pursue on appeal. Consequently, 

we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw as counsel, and we affirm 

Terantino’s judgment of sentence.

____________________________________________

1 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. 

McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981), abrogated in part by 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). 
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On July 10, 2013, Pocono Mountain Police responded to a 911 call at 

127 Nelson Drive, in Blakeslee, Pennsylvania. During the call, the dispatcher 

heard arguing between Terantino and his stepdaughter, Dawn Loveland 

(“Loveland”), heard Terantino say that he was going to “pull the trigger,” 

and heard Loveland pleading with him to leave the residence. Loveland’s 

five-year-old daughter, I.L., also was heard crying in the background of the 

call. When officers arrived, they made contact with Terantino, who told an 

officer that he would not negotiate, he would not leave the residence 

willingly, and he would not allow Loveland and her daughter to leave. 

Terantino subsequently allowed I.L. to leave the residence. I.L. told police 

that Terantino was pointing a gun at Loveland. Terantino later released 

Loveland and was taken into custody. 

Terantino was charged with two counts of kidnapping, two counts of 

false imprisonment, two counts of terroristic threats, simple assault, 

unlawful restraint, endangering the welfare of a child, two counts of 

recklessly endangering another person, possession of instruments of a 

crime, and resisting arrest.2

On February 6 and 7, 2014, Terantino was tried by a jury. On 

February 7, 2014, the jury found Terantino guilty of one count of false 

imprisonment, one count of terroristic threats, simple assault, unlawful 

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2901(a)(3), 4304(a), 2706(a)(1), 2701(a)(3), 2902 

(a)(1), 4304(a), 2705, 907(a), and 5104, respectively.
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restraint, endangering the welfare of a child, possession of instruments of a 

crime and resisting arrest. On April 30, 2014, Terantino was sentenced to 

an aggregate term of four to eight years’ incarceration. 

On May 2, 2014, Terantino timely filed a petition for reconsideration of 

his sentence. On May 5, 2014, the motion was denied without a hearing. 

On June 2, 2014, Terantino timely filed a notice of appeal. On June 3, 2014, 

the trial court ordered Terantino to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On June 24, 2014, 

counsel filed a statement of intent to file an Anders brief in lieu of 1925(b) 

statement, and on July 8, 2014, the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

Terantino raises seven issues for this Court’s consideration: 

I. Whether the jury verdict rendered in this case was against 

the weight of the evidence presented at trial?

II. Whether the Commonwealth engaged in prosecutorial 

misconduct during the trial?

III. Whether the trial court erred in not granted a mistrial 

based on the alleged misconduct of the Commonwealth 

during trial?

IV. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the 911 call into 

evidence and allowing it to be played to the jury during 

trial?

V. Whether the trial court erred in not instructing the jury 

regarding the inconsistencies in the testimony of [I.L.]?

VI. Whether the trial court erred in giving the jury a written 

copy of the kidnapping charge during deliberations? 

VII. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion 

when sentencing [Terantino]?
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Anders Brief at 8. 

Because counsel for Terantino proceeds pursuant to Anders and 

Santiago, this Court first must pass upon counsel’s petition to withdraw 

before reviewing the merits of the issues presented by Terantino. 

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en 

banc). Prior to withdrawing as counsel under Anders, counsel must file a 

brief that meets the requirements established by our Supreme Court in 

Santiago. The brief must provide the following information:

(1) a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; 

(2) reference to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal; 

(3) counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to 

the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Counsel also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to his client. 

Attending the brief must be a letter that advises the client of his rights to 

“(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; 

or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s 

attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.” 

Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2007); see

also Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010). 
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Finally, to facilitate our review of counsel’s satisfaction of his obligations, she 

must attach to her petition to withdraw the letter that she transmitted to her 

client. See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 

2005).

Our review of counsel’s petition to withdraw and the accompanying 

brief demonstrates that counsel has satisfied the Anders requirements. 

Counsel has provided a procedural history detailing the events relevant to 

this appeal with appropriate citations to the record. Anders Brief at 9-10. 

Counsel also has articulated Terantino’s position and has analyzed the 

information presented to the sentencing court in favor of his appeal with 

appropriate citations to the record and case law. Ultimately, counsel has 

concluded that Terantino has no non-frivolous bases for challenging his 

sentence. Id. at 23. 

Counsel also has sent Terantino a letter informing him that she has 

identified no meritorious issues to pursue on appeal; that counsel has filed 

an application to withdraw from Terantino’s representation; and that 

Terantino may find new counsel or proceed pro se. Counsel has attached 

the letter to her petition to withdraw, as required by Millisock. See Petition 

to Withdraw as Counsel, 10/7/2014. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel 

has complied substantially with Anders’ technical requirements. See 

Millisock, 873 A.2d at 751. 

We must now conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether this appeal is, as counsel claims, wholly frivolous, or if 
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any meritorious issues may remain. Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 (“[T]he 

court—not counsel—then proceeds, after a full examination of all the 

proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it 

may grant counsel’s request to withdraw[.]”) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 

744). 

In Terantino’s first issue, he claims that his convictions were against 

the weight of the evidence presented at trial. Anders Brief at 12. We 

disagree. 

Our standard of review on this matter is well settled:

The finder of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of the 

evidence, as the fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none of 

the evidence presented and determines the credibility of the 

witnesses.

As an appellate court, we cannot substitute our judgment for 

that of the finder of fact. Therefore, we will reverse a jury’s 

verdict and grant a new trial only where the verdict is so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. A 

verdict is said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks 

one’s sense of justice when “the figure of Justice totters on her 

pedestal,” or when “the jury’s verdict, at the time of its 

rendition, causes the trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, 

and causes him to almost fall from the bench, then it is truly 

shocking to the judicial conscience.”

Furthermore,

where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, 

an appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether 

the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on 

the weight claim.
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Commonwealth v. Cruz, 919 A.2d 279, 281-82 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citations omitted). “A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the 

evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict.” Commonwealth. v. Lyons, 

79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 

A.2d 745, 751–52 (Pa. 2000)). 

Preliminarily, we observe that Terantino actually challenges the 

sufficiency and not the weight of the evidence. See Lyons, supra. 

Moreover, during Terantino’s trial, the Commonwealth introduced the 

testimony of a number of police officers who were on scene at the time of 

the incident. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 2/6/2014, at 41-47, 55-105. The 

Commonwealth also introduced the testimony of both victims, N.T., 

2/6/2014, at 50-55; N.T., 2/7/2014, at 2-32, the handgun in Terantino’s 

possession during the incident, and the recording of the 911 call made by 

Dawn Loveland during the incident. In his defense, Terantino testified to his 

state of mind, his remorse, and explained why he was arguing with Loveland 

the day of the incident. N.T., 2/7/2014, at 117, 126-27, 131. 

We have reviewed the record and, as demonstrated above, the 

evidence was more than adequate to support the verdict, and we will not 

substitute the jury’s credibility determinations for our own. Consequently, 

the verdict did not shock the conscience of the trial court, and we conclude 

that the court acted within the bounds of its discretion in ruling on the 

weight claim. We reject Terantino’s claim that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. This issue would not merit relief. 
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In Terantino’s second issue, he claims that the Commonwealth 

committed prosecutorial misconduct during the trial. Anders Brief at 14-15. 

We disagree. 

“[P]rosecutorial misconduct does not take place unless the unavoidable 

effect of the comments at issue was to prejudice the jurors by forming in 

their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, thus impeding 

their ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict.” 

Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 250 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

Here, Terantino argues that a certain moment of disagreement 

between the trial court and the Commonwealth triggered prosecutorial 

misconduct. Anders Brief at 15. Their conversation, in pertinent part, 

proceeded as follows:

[The Commonwealth]: So she was lying the other day when she 

said that you threatened to shoot her?

[Terantino]: Sir, it won’t be the first time. 

[The Commonwealth]: Oh, okay, So she’ [sic] just a liar?

The Court: That’s argumentative. What’s your next question?

[The Commonwealth]: Your Honor, if you could wait for the 

defense to make an objection.

The Court: No. I will interrupt you when necessary[.]

N.T. 2/7/2014, at 141. 

This single instance of such an exchange between the trial court and 

the prosecutor did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct, as it did not 
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prejudice the jurors, or impede their ability to weigh the evidence 

objectively. In fact, Terantino fails to explain why this brief spat between 

the trial court and the Commonwealth amounted to prosecutorial 

misconduct. Anders Brief at 15-16. Even had the jurors been affected, 

Terantino would have benefited from the perception of the court siding 

against the Commonwealth, which would mitigate in his favor. Thus, he 

cannot show that this incident caused the jury to form a fixed bias and 

hostility against him. Therefore, this issue is frivolous and without merit. 

In his third issue, Terantino argues that the trial court erred by not 

granting a mistrial, based upon the alleged prosecutorial misconduct of the 

Commonwealth during trial. Anders Brief at 16. Again, we disagree. 

It is well-settled that the review of a trial court’s denial of a 

motion for a mistrial is limited to determining whether the trial 

court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely 

an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will . . . discretion is abused. A trial court may grant a 

mistrial only where the incident upon which the motion is based 

is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing 

and rendering a true verdict. A mistrial is not necessary where 

cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Brooker, 103 A.3d 325, 332 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 650(b) provides: “When an 

event prejudicial to the defendant occurs during trial only the defendant may 

move for a mistrial; the motion shall be made when the event is disclosed. 
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Otherwise, the trial judge may declare a mistrial only for reasons of manifest 

necessity.” Pa.R.Crim.P 650(b). Accordingly, if the defendant fails to 

request a mistrial, the issue of whether the trial court erred by not ordering 

a mistrial is ordinarily waived on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Therefore, 

because Terantino failed to move for a mistrial, see N.T., 2/7/2014 at 141, 

this issue is now waived. Moreover, even if Terantino had filed a motion for a 

mistrial, we have already determined that he failed to demonstrate how the 

dialogue between the trial court and the prosecutor “formed in the jurors’ 

minds a fixed bias and hostility toward him such that they could not weigh 

the evidence objectively and render a fair verdict.” Commonwealth v. 

Arrington, 86 A.3d 831, 853 (Pa. 2014). Therefore, Terantino is not 

entitled to the grant of a new trial on his meritless claim of prosecutorial 

misconduct. Id. Accordingly, we find that this issue is also frivolous and 

without merit. 

In Terantino’s fourth issue, he claims that the trial court erred by 

admitting a recording of a 911 call into evidence, and allowing the jury to 

hear it during trial. Anders Brief at 18. Specifically, he challenges the 

admission of the 911 call made by Loveland from her cellphone during the 

incident at issue, and her conversation with the dispatcher, which was the 

subject of the recording. We disagree.

Our standard of review of challenges to the admissibility of evidence is 

well settled:
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Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial 

court clearly abused its discretion. Admissibility depends on 

relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically 

tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a 

fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable 

inference or presumption regarding a material fact. 

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon 

facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing 

and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill 

will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is 

abused.

Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citation omitted).

The 911 call was introduced by the Commonwealth to establish 

elements of Terantino’s crimes of false imprisonment, possession of 

instruments of a crime, and simple assault. Terantino essentially argues 

that the admission and playing of the 911 call was prejudicial. 

Because all relevant evidence presented by the Commonwealth is 

meant to prejudice a defendant, exclusion is limited to evidence so 

prejudicial that it would:

inflame the jury to make a decision based upon something other 

than the legal propositions relevant to the case. As this Court 

has noted, a trial court is not required to sanitize the trial to 

eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration 

where those facts form part of the history and natural 

development of the events and offenses with which [a] 

defendant is charged.
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Commonwealth v. Serge, 837 A.2d 1255, 1261 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Palmer, 700 A.2d 988, 992-993 (Pa. Super. 

1997)). The recording of the 911 call was relevant to establish elements of 

Terantino’s crimes, as it provided the jury a perspective into the home 

during the ongoing incident, and was direct evidence that Terantino was 

armed and held the two victims in the home against their will. Thus, we 

conclude that the probative value of the call outweighed the danger of unfair 

prejudice. Moreover, both victims, including Loveland, who made the call, 

testified at trial. N.T., 2/6/2014, at 8-12, 17-32, 53-55; N.T., 2/7/2014, at 

161-62. Therefore, Terantino had the opportunity to confront Loveland and 

cross-examine her. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

admitted the 911 call and allowed it to be played to the jury. Consequently, 

this issue is frivolous and without merit. 

In his fifth issue, Terantino asserts that the trial court erred by failing 

to convey an inconsistency in I.L.’s testimony to the jury during instructions. 

Anders Brief at 18. We disagree. 

Preliminarily, Terantino failed to preserve this challenge by objecting 

to the trial court’s instructions at the trial. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Moreover, this 

challenge would not merit relief.

“In addressing challenges to jury instructions, we consider the 

challenged portions in light of the entire instruction, and we acknowledge 

that trial courts have broad discretion in phrasing the charge so long as the 
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law is clearly, adequately and accurately described.” Commonwealth v. 

Cam Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 88 (Pa. 2009). 

Here, Terantino contends that the trial court was obligated to bring 

I.L.’s inconsistent testimony to the jury’s attention. In her testimony, I.L. 

stated that she was present at the home with her mother the entire time 

that her mother was held inside the home by Terantino. N.T., 2/6/2014, at 

49-55. However, a police officer testified that I.L. was released from the 

home around 12:06 p.m., id. at 63, and that her mother did not exit the 

home until 1:40 p.m. Id. at 65. 

“Questions concerning inconsistent testimony and improper motive go 

to the credibility of the witnesses. [The Court] cannot substitute its 

judgment for that of the jury on issues of credibility.” Commonwealth v. 

DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. 2004). The trial court instructed the jury 

on its duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies 

without objection, and without a request for a specific instruction regarding 

the inconsistent testimony. N.T., 2/7/2014, at 197-99. Because the jury 

alone was responsible for questions concerning inconsistent testimony, the 

trial court had no further obligation to alert the jury to any inconsistencies in 

I.L.’s testimony. Therefore, the trial court did not err when giving the jury 

instructions. This issue would not merit relief. 

In Terantino’s sixth issue, he claims that the trial court erred in giving 

the jury a written copy of the elements of his kidnapping charge during 

deliberations. Anders Brief at 19. We disagree. 
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Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 646(B) states that “[t]he trial 

judge may permit the members of the jury to have for use during 

deliberations written copies of the portion of the judge’s charge on the 

elements of the offenses, lesser included offenses, and any defense upon 

which the jury has been instructed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(B).

Here, the jury returned during deliberations with several questions for 

the trial court. One particular question involved the elements of the charge 

of kidnapping. See N.T., 2/7/2014, at 216. The trial court decided, without 

objection from either side, to send written copies of the elements of the 

crime of kidnapping out to the jury. Id. The trial court only supplied the 

jury with the elements of kidnapping, and the jury acquitted Terantino of 

both counts of kidnapping. Because the trial court was permitted under Rule 

646(B) to provide the jury with a written copy of the elements of 

kidnapping, it did not err in doing so. Furthermore, Terantino suffered no 

prejudice, as he was acquitted of the kidnapping charges. Consequently, we 

conclude that this issue is frivolous and without merit. 

In Terantino’s seventh and final issue, he claims that the trial court 

erred and abused its discretion when imposing his sentence because his 

sentence was excessive and the court disregarded mitigating factors. See 

Anders Brief at 21. We disagree. 

A claim that a sentence is excessive presents a challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of sentence. Commonwealth v. Ahmad, 961 A.2d 

884, 886 (Pa. Super 2008). “A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a 
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sentence must be considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right 

to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 

A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

To obtain review of the merits of a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of a particular sentence, an appellant must include a Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f) statement in his brief. Therein, “the appellant must show that 

there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code.” McAfee, 849 A.2d at 274. A substantial 

question requires a demonstration that “the sentence violates either a 

specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code 

or a particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 627 (Pa. 2002)). “Our inquiry 

must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the 

facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the appeal 

on the merits.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 

727 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc)) (emphasis omitted). “An appellant’s 

failure to comply with Rule 2119(f) may be waived if the Commonwealth 

does not object to the defect.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 

525 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). 

In the instant case, Terantino failed to file a Rule 2119(f) statement, 

but the Commonwealth, having elected not to file a brief in this matter, has 

raised no objection to its omission. Moreover, even if the Commonwealth 
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had objected, we still would be obliged to make an independent 

determination as to whether this issue is wholly frivolous. See

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 578 A.2d 523, 525 (Pa. Super. 1990). 

Consequently, we review Terantino’s judgment of sentence to determine 

whether it presents a substantial question regarding excessiveness, and, if 

so, whether any such argument warrants the preparation of an advocate’s 

brief by appointed counsel or vacatur of the sentence. “[T]his Court has 

held that an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that 

the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.” 

Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1007 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

Therefore, we will proceed to review the merits of the claim. 

Sentencing is a matter that is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court, which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that 

discretion. Commonwealth v. Dykes, 541 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 1988). 

To constitute an abuse of discretion, a sentence must either exceed the 

statutory limits or be patently excessive. Commonwealth v. White, 491 

A.2d 252 (Pa. Super. 1985).

Here, the trial court imposed the sentence after reviewing a presentence investigation and hearing statements from Terantino offering his 

remorse. Sentencing Notes of Testimony (“Sentencing N.T.”), 4/30/2014, at 

5-6. Terantino was sentenced to consecutive prison terms within the 

aggravated range for his convictions of endangering the welfare of a child 
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and unlawful restraint. The trial court stated its reasons for imposing the 

sentences in the aggravated range:

I do think there are aggravating factors here. I understand why 

Ms. Loveland continues to have fear and suffers from anxiety 

over what she was put though that day and worries that she 

may have to deal with it again in the future. I think that’s an 

aggravating factor. I also feel that Mr. Terantino has not come 

to grips with his actual problem here, and that is his 

unwillingness to allow Ms. Loveland to live her own life and be 

free of his influence. Once she expressed her desire to do that, 

that’s what should have happened, and instead we have this 

situation with a gun being introduced.

Id. at 11. 

In addition, Terantino was sentenced to a consecutive term in the 

standard range for his conviction of terroristic threats, and to a concurrent 

term in the standard range for possession of instruments of a crime. The 

total aggregate sentence imposed by the sentencing court was four to eight 

years’ incarceration. Id. at 12-13. Therefore, because the sentence 

imposed was within the statutory range of each crime of which Terantino 

was convicted, and based upon the underlying history of this case and the 

trial court’s detailed explanation for the sentence it imposed, id. at 8-11, we 

discern no abuse of the broad discretion vested in the trial court when 

imposing Terantino’s sentence. 

As set forth above, we have reviewed counsel’s Anders brief carefully, 

and find that it complies with the technical requirements imposed by those 

precedents. We further find that counsel has taken all steps necessary to 

ensure that her client’s interests are protected. We have conducted an 
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independent review of the record and conclude that counsel’s 

characterization and analysis of the record are accurate, and that no nonfrivolous challenges to Terantino’s judgment of sentence will lie. Moreover, 

our review has revealed no other non-frivolous issues that merit 

consideration on appeal. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw 

granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2015