UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4723

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MAURICE ANTONIO DAVIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Jackson L. Kiser, 

Senior District Judge. (3:99-cr-50015-JLK-1; 3:99-cr-00063-JLK1; 3:00-cr-00045-JLK-1)

Submitted: March 30, 2015 Decided: April 10, 2015

Before KEENAN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Fay F. Spence, First 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Anthony P. Giorno, Acting United States Attorney, 

Jean B. Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Steven F. 

Bans, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Maurice Antonio Davis appeals the district court’s judgment 

revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to 

serve a term of 45 months’ imprisonment. Davis argues that the 

district court erred in denying his request for a continuance 

and in admitting hearsay evidence at the revocation hearing 

without engaging in the balancing test required by Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) and our decisions in United States v. Ferguson, 

752 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Doswell, 670 

F.3d 526 (4th Cir. 2012). Finding no reversible error, we 

affirm the district court’s judgment.

I.

Davis argues the district court abused its discretion by 

proceeding with the supervised release hearing while the appeal 

of his state court conviction, which was the basis for the 

revocation, was pending. We review a district court’s denial of 

a motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Midgett, 488 F.3d 288, 297 (4th Cir. 2007). Because a 

defendant is provided the full panoply of due process rights at 

trial, including that the offense be proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt, a conviction, provides sufficient grounds to conclude, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated the 

terms of supervised release. See United States v. Spraglin, 418 

F.3d 479, 480-81 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); United States v. 
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Fleming, 9 F.3d 1253, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 

Accordingly, Davis’s state court conviction, although pending 

appeal, provided the district court sufficient basis to revoke 

supervised release. Therefore, the district court did not abuse 

its discretion when it denied Davis’s request to continue the 

hearing until the conclusion of his state appeal.

II.

Davis next argues that the district court erred when it 

admitted a transcript from his state trial proceedings and 

denied his request to confront the state trial witnesses without 

determining whether the interests of justice required the 

witnesses to appear. As part of the “minimum requirements of 

due process,” a defendant at a revocation hearing shall have 

“the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses 

(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for 

not allowing confrontation).” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 

471, 489 (1972); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) 

(providing defendant “is entitled to . . . an opportunity to 

appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness 

unless the court determines that the interest of justice does 

not require the witness to appear”).

We conclude, however, that any error by the district court 

in this regard is harmless. Ferguson, 752 F.3d at 617. The 

erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is harmless where “the 
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error had no substantial and injurious effect or influence on 

the outcome” of the supervised release hearing. Id. at 618 

(internal quotation marks omitted). An error is harmless, for 

instance, where the district court relied on a basis for 

revoking supervised release independent of the erroneously 

admitted hearsay evidence. Doswell, 670 F.3d at 531. 

Here, Davis admitted at the revocation hearing that he had 

been convicted of three felony offenses in state court. This 

admission provided sufficient grounds for revoking supervised 

release. Admittedly, during the supervised release hearing, the 

district court placed considerable focus on the evidence 

presented at Davis’s state trial and found that Davis committed 

the felonies underlying his conviction. In its written judgment 

of revocation, however, the district court cited only Davis’s

admission that he had been convicted of three felonies in state 

court as its basis for revoking supervised release.

As a general rule, where a district court’s written 

judgment and its oral pronouncement conflict with respect to the 

reason for revocation, the oral pronouncement of the sentence 

controls. Doswell, 670 F.3d at 531-32 n.3 (citing United States 

v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 283 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003)). But if the 

oral pronouncement of sentence is ambiguous, we look to the 

written judgment to resolve the ambiguity. Osborne, 345 F.3d at 

283 n.1.
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We conclude that the purpose of the district court’s 

discussion of the trial transcript and its oral pronouncement 

regarding its basis for revoking supervised release were 

ambiguous. Because the written judgment relies only on Davis’s

admission of his state conviction, however, and evidence of a 

conviction is sufficient to warrant revoking supervised release, 

any error regarding the admission of the trial transcript was 

harmless.

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment 

revoking Davis’ supervised release. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this Court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED