In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2743

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GARY L. FRANCE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:00-cr-01061-1 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 23, 2015 — DECIDED APRIL 7, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and TINDER, Circuit 

Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. In 2002, Dr. Gary France was 

ordered to pay $800,000 in restitution to victims of a 

fraudulent billing scheme he committed. By 2014, however, 

France had paid less than $11,000 toward that amount, so 

the government moved under the Mandatory Victims 

Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a), to garnish 

monthly payments of $16,296 from France’s privately 
2 No. 14-2743

purchased disability insurance policy. France maintains that 

these payments are at least partially exempt from 

garnishment, and his ex-wife, Theresa Duperon, seeks to 

exempt a portion of the payments that she receives for child 

support. The district court allowed the government to 

garnish the entire amount. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In the mid-1990s, France owned and operated a dental 

business in Chicago. During this time, he engaged in a 

lucrative scheme to fraudulently bill insurers for employees 

of the City of Chicago and the Chicago Transit Authority. 

For that scam, he pleaded guilty in April 2002 to mail fraud. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Meanwhile, in 1996, France closed his 

solo dental practice after being injured in a car accident and 

started collecting monthly benefits from a disability income 

policy he had purchased through his dental business. In 

1999, he agreed to give a portion of these monthly payments, 

for a limited time, to Western United Life Insurance 

Company in exchange for a lump sum of more than 

$300,000. He then transferred this money into various 

accounts in the names of other people, including Duperon 

(his then-wife), before filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition 

in early 2000. He failed to disclose the lump sum payment or 

subsequent transfers in the bankruptcy petition and in fact 

made affirmative declarations concealing their existence. For 

that reason, at the same time he pleaded guilty to mail fraud, 

France pleaded guilty to knowingly making a false 

declaration under penalty of perjury. See 18 U.S.C. § 152(3).

In August 2002, the district court sentenced France to a 

total prison term of 30 months and ordered him to pay 

$800,000 in restitution to the City of Chicago Law 
No. 14-2743 3

Department and the Chicago Transit Authority. In 

September 2002, the government recorded notice of this lien 

in California, where France had relocated. Two months later, 

the trustee appointed in France’s bankruptcy proceedings 

obtained an order giving the trustee title to ongoing 

payments from the disability insurance. (The Chapter 7 case 

began with the United States trustee serving as trustee for 

the estate, but later, in 2002, a private attorney was 

appointed as trustee, as is standard practice. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 586(a)(1) (requiring United States trustee to maintain a 

panel of private trustees for cases filed under Chapter 

7); United States Trustee Program, About the Program, 

http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/index.htm visited 

Mar. 13, 2015).)

In July 2003, France and Duperon divorced and reached a 

marital settlement under which Duperon was to receive 

payments for child support through 2019 from the disability 

insurance payments. The payments would increase up to 

$7,000 per month. A California court approved the 

settlement in August 2003. 

In February 2004, France’s insurance company filed an 

interpleader action in California to resolve conflicting claims 

to the insurance proceeds from the bankruptcy trustee, 

France, France’s sister, and Duperon. In March 2005, these 

parties reached a settlement agreement, which the 

bankruptcy court approved, purporting to control all other 

judgments in regard to the insurance policy. The settlement 

did not mention the restitution lien from France’s criminal 

case, and it appears that the bankruptcy trustee was never 

notified of it.
4 No. 14-2743

In May 2013, the government filed in France’s criminal 

case in the Northern District of Illinois citations to discover 

assets in accordance with Illinois law that were directed at 

France, his insurer, and Duperon. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1402

(authorizing procedure for creditor to prosecute 

supplementary proceedings to discover assets). France 

moved to quash the citation primarily on the basis that his 

disability payments were exempt from garnishment under 

California law. But the insurance company responded to the 

citation by informing the government that it was 

distributing monthly payments of $9,296 to France and 

$7,000 to Duperon, for a total of $16,296. France’s insurer 

also began withholding the $9,296 that had been going to 

France.

In February 2014, based on the information from the 

insurance company, the government moved to garnish the 

entire monthly distributions under § 3613(a), which provides 

as follows:

(a) Enforcement.— The United States may 

enforce a judgment imposing a fine in 

accordance with the practices and procedures 

for the enforcement of a civil judgment under 

Federal law or State law. Notwithstanding 

any other Federal law (including section 207 

of the Social Security Act), a judgment 

imposing a fine may be enforced against all 

property or rights to property of the person 

fined, except that—

(1) property exempt from levy for taxes 

pursuant to section 6334(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), 

(5), (6), (7), (8), (10), and (12) of the 
No. 14-2743 5

Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall be 

exempt from enforcement of the 

judgment under Federal law;

(2) section 3014 of chapter 176 of title 28 shall 

not apply to enforcement under Federal 

law; and

(3) the provisions of section 303 of the 

Consumer Credit Protection Act 

(15 U.S.C. 1673) shall apply to 

enforcement of the judgment under 

Federal law or State law.

In response to the government’s motion, France’s insurer 

began withholding Duperon’s payments in addition to 

France’s, and France and Duperon asserted that the 

payments—or at least a portion of them—were exempt from 

garnishment. In addition to asserting state law exemptions, 

France argued that the payments were partially exempt 

under § 3613(a)(3) as “earnings” under the Consumer Credit 

Protection Act (CCPA), which sets a ceiling of 25% per week 

for garnishment of “disposable earnings.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1673(a)(1). He emphasized that the Eighth Circuit recently 

held that payments from private disability insurance 

constitute “earnings” under the CCPA in United States v. 

Ashcraft, 732 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2013). Duperon additionally 

argued that the government should be estopped from 

undermining the interpleader settlement involving the 

bankruptcy trustee.

The district court rejected France’s and Duperon’s 

arguments and ordered garnishment of the entire disability 

payments. The court noted that France had “arguably 

waived his right to claim the CCPA statutory exemption” by 
6 No. 14-2743

not asserting it when first served with the citation for 

discovery of assets. The court concluded that, in any event, 

the disability payments were not compensation paid for 

personal services, and thus did not fall under the CCPA’s 

definition of earnings. See 15 U.S.C. § 1672(a). The court 

distinguished Ashcraft on the grounds that, unlike the 

defendant there, “France was self-employed,” and thus the 

payments were “not a benefit of his employment.” The court 

also concluded that state law exemptions did not apply 

because the government was proceeding under federal law.

As for Duperon, the district court acknowledged that 26 

U.S.C. § 6334(a)(8), which is incorporated into § 3613(a)(1), 

exempts payments for support of minor children if ordered 

by a court judgment “entered prior to the date of levy.” But 

the court reasoned that, assuming Duperon had standing to 

assert the exemption, the government’s restitution lien was 

superior to her interest, having been entered well before the 

couple’s divorce. Moreover, the court noted that France no 

longer had a minor child because the couple’s daughter had 

turned 19. The court also rejected Duperon’s estoppel 

argument, concluding that the government was not bound 

by the results of the California litigation because it was 

unaware of those proceedings, and that the bankruptcy 

trustee had acted as a representative of the estate, not the 

government. 

The district court also noted that, at that time, France had 

paid only $10,223.04 toward the restitution judgment. At 

argument, the government reported that, as a result of the 

garnishment order, it had already recovered almost 

$250,000. At that rate, counsel stated, the restitution 

judgment will be paid in three to four years.
No. 14-2743 7

II. DISCUSSION

France’s lead argument on appeal is that the disability 

payments are exempt from garnishment because they are 

“earnings” under § 1672(a). The district court observed that 

France had “arguably” waived this argument by not 

asserting it when the government first sought to discover his 

assets, but we are not persuaded that waiver is appropriate 

here. As France notes, and the government does not dispute, 

the CCPA contains no requirement that a debtor 

affirmatively assert an exemption, and in fact, § 1673(c) 

states that “[n]o court ... may make, execute, or enforce any 

order or process in violation of this section,” suggesting the 

exemption is automatic. Moreover, the only authority the 

district court cited in support of waiver, Guess?, Inc. v. 

Chang, 912 F. Supp. 372, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1995), is 

distinguishable because it involved an exemption under 

state law, not the MVRA or CCPA.

Moving to the merits, we start with the text of the 

MVRA, which incorporates the cap on garnishment of 

“disposable earnings” found in § 1673 into a list of 

exemptions from garnishment. 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(3). 

“Disposable earnings” is defined in § 1672(b) as “that part of 

the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction 

from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be 

withheld.” 15 U.S.C. § 1672(b). “Earnings” is defined as 

“compensation paid or payable for personal services, 

whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, 

or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a 

pension or retirement program.” Id. § 1672(a).

Based on that language, we held in United States v. Lee, 

659 F.3d 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2011), that the government may 
8 No. 14-2743

not garnish more than 25% of the monthly payments from a 

defendant’s 401(k) and defined benefit pension. The Fifth 

Circuit has decided likewise. United States v. DeCay, 620 F.3d 

534, 544 (5th Cir. 2010); compare United States v. Laws, 352 F.

Supp. 2d 707, 714 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding that retirement 

annuity payments that had already passed to the debtor 

were not earnings). We have never, however, had occasion 

to address whether the CCPA, as incorporated into the 

MVRA, also covers payments made pursuant to a privately 

purchased disability policy.

As recognized by the district court, the only appellate 

decision to squarely address this issue is the Eighth Circuit’s 

decision in Ashcraft. There, the court emphasized that the 

Supreme Court, in Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 651 

(1974), endorsed the view that “earnings” as defined in the 

CCPA are “limited to periodic payments of compensation 

and do not pertain to every asset that is traceable in some 

way to such compensation.” Id. (alterations and quotations 

omitted). Citing that interpretation, the Eighth Circuit 

concluded that payments made pursuant to a disabilitybenefits plan purchased by Ashcraft’s former employer were 

“earnings” because they were “designed to function as wage 

substitutes” and thus were “not merely ‘traceable in some 

way’ to Ashcraft’s compensation, but [were] themselves a 

direct component of [her] compensation.” Ashcraft, 732 F.3d 

at 864.

The district court concluded that France, unlike Ashcraft, 

was “self-employed,” but that description is not truly 

accurate: France incorporated his dental business, and his 

insurance policy, like Ashcraft’s, was purchased through a 

corporate entity. France’s policy is distinguishable from 
No. 14-2743 9

Ashcraft’s for another reason: unlike Ashcraft’s insurance, 

France’s policy essentially functioned as business-loss 

insurance because his business depended entirely on his 

ability to perform dental work and his insurance covered 

only his ability to perform that occupation. We are not 

convinced, however, that this distinction provides a 

principled basis for distinguishing the reasoning in Ashcraft

from the situation here, since the disability payments are still 

arguably designed to function as a wage substitute.

The government seems to recognize that the district 

court’s reason for distinguishing Ashcraft is problematic and 

thus argues that, even if Ashcraft is on point, it was wrongly 

decided. The government urges us to examine how the 

CCPA applies in the context of § 3613(a), noting that, although 

Ashcraft technically involved the MVRA, the Eighth Circuit’s 

decision did not address interpretation of the list of 

exemptions in § 3613(a) and, in fact, failed to even cite that 

provision. This oversight is critical, the government argues, 

because “[i]n drafting § 3613, Congress deliberately included 

and excluded various kinds of disability income, and the 

exclusion of private disability cannot be considered an 

accident or oversight that should be judicially corrected.”

We agree. Section 3613(a)(1), which selectively 

incorporates exemptions from the Internal Revenue Code, 

makes express exceptions for two specific types of disability 

payments, workmen’s compensation, 26 U.S.C. § 6334(7), 

and military-related disability payments, id. § 6334(10), 

without mentioning private disability insurance. Further, the 

list in § 3613(a)(1) does not include § 6334(11), which exempts 

certain forms of public assistance, including Social Security 

disability payments. Although somewhat “beleaguered,” the 
10 No. 14-2743

canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius—“the expression 

of one thing suggests the exclusion of others”—remains a 

compelling interpretive guide when “‘the items expressed 

are members of an ‘associated group or series,’ justifying the 

inference that items not mentioned were excluded by 

deliberate choice, not inadvertence.’” Exelon Generation Co. v. 

Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 676 F.3d 566, 571 

(7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 

149, 168 (2003)). Furthermore, “[w]here Congress explicitly 

enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, 

additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of 

evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Andrus v. Glover 

Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980); see In re Robinson, 764

F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying this concept to 

§ 3613(a)). Here, where Congress elected to incorporate the 

exemptions for certain forms of disability payments and not 

others, we think that a plain reading of the MVRA leads to 

the conclusion that it does not cover France’s disability 

payments. 

This reading is further supported by the opening 

paragraph of § 3613(a), which states that the statute operates 

“[n]otwithstanding any other Federal law (including section 

207 of the Social Security Act).” According to the Supreme 

Court, “in construing statutes, the use of such a 

‘notwithstanding’ clause clearly signals the drafter’s 

intention that the provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section 

override conflicting provisions of any other section.”

Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993). For that 

reason, several circuits have read § 3613(a) broadly as 

superseding other statutory provisions safeguarding a 

defendant’s assets. See, e.g., Robinson, 764 F.3d at 561–62

(collecting cases and holding that MVRA supersedes 
No. 14-2743 11

bankruptcy stay); United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1047 

(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that MVRA supersedes 

ERISA’s non-alienation provisions); United States v. Hyde, 497 

F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that MVRA supersedes 

Bankruptcy Code provisions). This case law underscores the 

importance of not adopting an expansive reading of the 

exemptions to § 3613(a). 

Furthermore, we note that not only did Ashcraft fail to 

examine the MVRA, it also, in our view, relied on Kokoszka

for a proposition that decision does not support. In Kokoszka, 

the Supreme Court limited the reach of the CCPA’s definition 

of earnings, adopting the view that earnings do not include 

“every asset that is traceable in some way to such 

compensation” and concluding that the cap on garnishment 

does not apply to income tax refunds. 417 U.S. at 651. At the 

very least, this language cautions against stretching the 

definition of “earnings” to include wage substitutes that are 

not explicitly mentioned in the statute.1

France alternatively argues that his disability payments 

are exempt under 28 U.S.C. § 3014(a)(2), which allows a 

debtor to elect to exempt property that is exempt under the 

law of the state where the debtor has been domiciled for at 

least 180 days. He argues that in California, where he is 

domiciled, disability insurance benefits are exempt from 

garnishment. Notably, § 3613(a)(2) states that § 3014 “shall 

1 Because this opinion creates a split with the Eighth Circuit,

we circulated it in advance of publication to all judges of this court in 

regular active service, pursuant to Circuit Rule 40(e). None voted to hear 

the case en banc.

 
12 No. 14-2743

not apply to enforcement under Federal law.” But France

argues that this provision is inapplicable because the 

government used an Illinois procedural mechanism to seek 

discovery of his assets. He points to Paul Revere Insurance 

Group v. United States, 500 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 2007), in 

which the Ninth Circuit held that California law exempted 

disability income from garnishment of a restitution lien.

This argument is unpersuasive. As the government 

observes, although it issued a discovery citation under 

Illinois law, it did so only because Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)

explicitly authorizes use of state procedure in obtaining 

discovery from a judgment debtor. More than that, once it 

obtained the information about France’s assets from his 

insurer, the government moved for garnishment solely 

pursuant to § 3613. That fact sets this case apart from Paul

Revere, where, critically, “the government elected to use 

California state law to create and enforce its judgment lien.” 

500 F.3d at 963 (emphasis added). In contrast, as the district 

court noted, the government here is enforcing a federal 

judgment lien and moved for garnishment under federal 

law. For that reason, we are convinced that state law 

exemptions are inapplicable to the government’s 

enforcement efforts.

As for Duperon, she maintains that the district court 

erred in concluding that the child support she received from 

the insurance disbursements are not exempt under 

§ 6334(a)(8). As a preliminary matter, however, we note that, 

although not meaningfully addressed in the appellate briefs, 

we are concerned about Duperon’s standing to assert the 

exemption. In the district court, Duperon asserted standing 

under States v. Kollintzas, 501 F.3d 796, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2007), 
No. 14-2743 13

which allowed a defendant’s wife to participate in an appeal 

regarding collection proceedings against her husband under 

the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act because she was 

a person with interest in property subject to collection. But 

Duperon’s interest in this case appears to be limited to her 

role as a representative for her daughter, who is no longer a 

minor—a fact that Duperon more or less ignores. We need 

not resolve the appeal on this basis, however, because, as 

will be discussed, we are not persuaded that any interest 

Duperon (or her daughter) possesses trumps the 

government’s restitution lien. 

Duperon contends that, although the restitution order 

was entered before the marital settlement, the restitution lien 

did not attach to France’s interest in the policy proceeds 

because the bankruptcy trustee, as administrator of the 

bankruptcy estate, obtained title to all of France’s assets 

when he filed for bankruptcy in 2000. See 11 U.S.C. 

§ 541(a)(1) (stating that, with limited exceptions, “all legal or 

equitable interests of the debtor in property” become part of 

the bankruptcy estate). Thus, in Duperon’s view, the 

government’s restitution lien attached to only the $9,296 that 

France began receiving after the California interpleader 

settlement, when the trustee relinquished its title to the 

insurance policy. Duperon emphasizes that a restitution lien 

is treated like a tax lien, 18 U.S.C. § 3613(c), and that the 

Supreme Court, in United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266, 275 

(1965), held that a bankruptcy trustee’s authority to settle 

outstanding debts, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019, prevailed over 

a prior unrecorded federal tax lien.

But adopting Duperon’s view would lead to the 

troubling result that, by concealing information from the 
14 No. 14-2743

bankruptcy trustee—part of the basis for his criminal 

conviction—France might be able to shield a portion of his 

insurance payments from government collection. This 

concern underscores an important difference between this 

case and Speers, where the trustee knew about the preexisting, unrecorded tax lien and specifically concluded that 

it was invalid as to him. 382 U.S. at 268. Here, in contrast, the 

government recorded its lien in the midst of the bankruptcy, 

and it appears that the trustee was never formally notified of 

it before entering the settlement. 

More importantly, as the government emphasizes, 

Duperon’s arguments run headlong into the text of the 

MVRA. As other circuit courts have held, the language in 

§ 3613(a) stating that the statute operates “[n]otwithstanding

any other Federal law” appears to supersede conflicting 

provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See Robinson, 764 F.3d at 

557 (holding that “§ 3613 supersedes the automatic stay and 

allows the government to enforce restitution orders against 

property included in the bankruptcy estate”); Hyde, 497 F.3d 

at 108 (holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not 

“restrict[ ] the reach of the MVRA’s clear language”). As 

further pointed out by the Sixth Circuit in Robinson, § 3613(e) 

explicitly dictates that a bankruptcy discharge shall not

“discharge liability to pay a fine pursuant to this section, and 

a lien filed as prescribed by this section shall not be voided 

in a bankruptcy proceeding,” suggesting “that Congress had 

the potential effects of the Bankruptcy Code in mind when it 

drafted § 3613(a).” Robinson, 764 F.3d at 561–62. Finally, as 

also noted in Robinson, § 3613(c) states that a restitution lien 

“arises on the entry of judgment” without making any 

exception for pending bankruptcy matters. Id. at 562 

(“Conspicuously, the Bankruptcy Code, including the 
No. 14-2743 15

automatic stay, is absent from [§ 3613(a)’s] list of exceptions 

....”). For these reasons, we are convinced that the 

bankruptcy proceedings here did not limit the reach of the 

MVRA as Duperon suggests.

Finally, Duperon argues that equitable estoppel should 

apply to bar the government from garnishing her childsupport payments because the bankruptcy trustee, a party to 

the interpleader settlement, is part of the Department of 

Justice and thus, in her view, “in privity” with the United 

States Attorney’s Office. Based on this understanding, she

argues that the government should be bound by a provision 

in France’s criminal plea agreement stating that the plea did 

not limit any “judicial civil claim, demand, or cause of action 

whatsoever of the United States or its agencies.”

The district court found this argument to be “wholly 

without merit,” and we agree. As the government notes, it is 

a high standard to apply equitable estoppel against the 

government. See Matamoros v. Grams, 706 F.3d 783, 793–94 

(7th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has never affirmed a 

finding of estoppel against the government. And that is not 

for lack of review. The Court, in fact, has reversed every 

finding of estoppel that it has reviewed.”) (internal 

quotations and alterations omitted). Although the United 

States Trustee Program is indeed part of the Department of 

Justice, 28 U.S.C. § 586, see Bell v. Thornburg, 743 F.3d 84, 88 

(5th Cir. 2014) (explaining the history of the Trustee 

Program), the Supreme Court has long recognized that 

“[t]he bankruptcy trustee is the representative of the estate 

of the debtor, not an arm of the Government,” Cal. State Bd. 

of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844, 849 (1989)

(internal quotations and alterations omitted); see also 11 
16 No. 14-2743

U.S.C. § 101(27) (excluding a trustee who is serving as 

trustee in a bankruptcy case from the definition of 

“governmental unit”). Further, as often occurs, the United 

States Trustee here recruited a private attorney to serve as 

trustee, providing a further layer of separation between the 

trustee and the prosecuting attorneys. Because Duperon has 

provided no persuasive reason to allow the actions of a 

private bankruptcy trustee to estop the criminal enforcement 

efforts of the Department of Justice, we affirm the district 

court’s refusal to apply equitable estoppel.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.