United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 14-2901

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

James W. Eddy, also known as Wes Eddy

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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 Submitted: April 2, 2015

 Filed: April 9, 2015 

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, BOWMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

James Eddy directly appeals following imposition of sentence by the district

court after he pleaded guilty to drug offenses. His counsel has moved to withdraw 1

The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri.
and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the

sentences are unreasonable and that the court incorrectly calculated the drug quantity

at issue. Eddy has filed a supplemental pro se brief, arguing that (1) he received

ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the court incorrectly calculated his criminal

history and the drug quantity; and (3) the court erred in failing to resolve factual

disputes underlying his guilty plea. Eddy has also moved to strike the Anders brief

and to correct what he alleges are errors and omissions in the plea hearing transcript.

As to the motion to correct the plea transcript, we deny it. Even if the additions

and changes Eddy seeks were made, it would not affect the validity of his guilty plea.

As to the arguments on appeal, Eddy’s written plea agreement contains an

appeal waiver, which we conclude should be enforced. See United States v. Scott,

627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that court of appeals conducts de novo

review of validity and applicability of appeal waiver). Although Eddy was

proceeding pro se at the time he entered into the plea agreement and pleaded guilty,

we are satisfied based on the record that both the plea and the waiver were entered

into knowingly and voluntarily. The waiver bars all the claims that counsel and Eddy

raise on appeal—with the possible exception of ineffective-assistance claims—and

we conclude that no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver in

these circumstances. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–91 (8th Cir.

2003) (en banc) (explaining that waiver is enforceable when appealfalls within scope

of waiver, plea agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and voluntarily,

and no miscarriage of justice would result).

As to any ineffective-assistance claims thatfall outside the scope ofthe waiver,

we defer them to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings. See United States v. Looking Cloud,

419 F.3d 781, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2005). Finally, having reviewed the record

independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous

issues outside the scope of the waiver.

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Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. We deny as moot Eddy’s motion to strike

counsel’s brief, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, subject to counsel

informing appellant about procedures for seeking rehearing or filing a petition for

certiorari.

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