1 Filed 3/30/15 P. v. Rizvi CA1/3 Received for posting 4/2/15 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. MUJAHID WAQAR RIZVI, Defendant and Appellant. A138370
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 05-111371-5)

In re MUJAHID WAQAR RIZVI, on Habeas Corpus. A142686

Defendant Mujahid Waqar Rizvi (Rizvi) wa s convicted by a jury of three counts of committing a sexual act with a child age 10 or younger in viola tion of Penal Code, section 288.7, subdivision (b), acquitted by the jury of committing a lewd act upon a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a )), and was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. Rizvi committed the crimes on one da y in June 2011, when he was 54 years old, against his nine-year-old niece, Jane Doe. In this appeal, Rizvi contends that th e court erred by discouraging the jury from requesting readbacks of tria l testimony, and limiting cro ss-examination about Doe’s sexual knowledge. In his petition for habeas corpus, Rizvi argues that his counsel was2 ineffective for failing to call witnesses who would testify that his character is not
consistent with that of a child molester. 1 Rizvi’s arguments are well-presented, but we are not persuaded of any reversible
error in his case. We affirm the judgment and deny the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Rizvi was married to Z. Rizv i (Z.). They have two adul t daughters, F. and M., and a son, H., who was 10 years old at the time of th e alleged crimes. Z.’s sister, S. A. (S.), is Doe’s mother. S. her husband A. Sh. (A.) ha ve two other children, Doe’s older brother Sy. and a younger brother K.. At the time in question, Rizvi and Z. lived in Lafayette,
and S. and A. lived in Walnut Creek. Z. and S. have a brother, F., who lived in Concord with his wife Q. and their children. S. and A. worked in a family business at a Baskin Robbins in Danville. On May 15 or 16, 2011, A. left home and went to th e East Coast. As detailed further below, conflicting evidence was presente d as to whether, when A. left, he was abandoning the family or looking for better work. After A. le ft, S., Doe, and Doe’s brothers stayed with Z. and Rizvi during the week, and w ith F. and Q. on the weekends. Doe was 11 years old when she testified at trial. She said that Rizvi drove her to the Baskin Robbins from his Lafayette home on a Monday in June 2 011. She said that while she was sitting in the front passenger seat Rizvi put a coat over her legs, put his finger under her shorts into the private part where she peed, and moved his finger around
inside her. He asked her whet her it felt good or she did not lik e it. They stayed at the Baskin Robbins for five or ten minutes, and then drove to her family’s home in Walnut
Creek. S. testified that Rizvi had agreed to get A.’s car fixed.
Doe testified that on the drive to Walnut Creek, Rizvi put his finger in her private part as he had done on the wa y to Danville. They got to he r house, and when they went into the garage, he licked her fingers. Ri zvi got on his knees wh ile she stood in the

1 We ordered the petition c onsolidated with the appeal, and deferred deciding whether to issue an order to show cause. We hereby grant the reque st in Rizvi’s petition to take judicial notice of th e record in this appeal.3 garage, and again put his finger in her privat e and moved it around. They got into A.’s car, and he continued to penetrate her while he drove it to his home. Doe said that after
what he did to her it hurt to urinate.
Doe testified to another incident that wa s the basis for the lewd act charge. It allegedly occurred one morning a day or two before the acts just described, in the bedroom at Rizvi’s house where she slept with her brothers and S. Doe said that Rizvi
came into the room while her brothers were as leep after S. left for work, and “started doing weird things. Like licking my leg or something. And I think he kissed my butt.” Although, she admitted that she did no t remember this incident well. Doe testified that, two or three days afte r the incidents during the drive to Baskin Robbins, she told Rizvi’s son H. “the basic stuff” about what Rizvi had done to her, and asked H. if Rizvi “ever did anything to him.” H., age 12 at trial, te stified that Doe told him “that my father was touching her in an uncomfortably bad way and she didn’t like it,
and she asked me what to do.” H. said he to ld Doe to ask Rizvi to stop. He said, “I learned that in my Boy Scouts wh en I read the safety handouts that they gave to us.” Doe testified that, later that day, she told Rizvi “t hat he needed to stop.” They were in the hallway of Rizvi’s house, H. was coming out of his bedroom into the hallway, and Rizvi said, “shh.” H. testified that he heard Doe as k Rizvi to stop, and that Rizvi replied, “All right.”
S. testified that Doe told her about the molestations on July 1, when they were staying with F. and Q. in Conc ord. S. reported the molestati ons to Rizvi’s wife Z. that night. S., Z., and Rizvi’s daughter M. went to the polic e on July 4. On July 5, H. was interviewed at the Lafayette Police Department. The interview was audiotaped, and the tape was played for th e jury. H. said that Doe asked him “has your dad ever like . . . touched you or kissed you in these places? And I’m like no. And she’s like he’s been doing it to me. And she like, what should I do? And . . . I didn’t believe her because um usually she lies about stuff but this time I don’t think she would lie about that. So I . . . said are you . . . telling the truth? She said yeah. I asked her again multiple times and she said yeah every time. I’m like if he’s doing this tell him . . .4 loud and clear to just stop it.” A few minutes later, H. saw Doe “at the end of the hallway in my house talking with my dad and she wa s [sort of] like mumbling so I couldn’t hear what . . . she said but it sounded like can you please stop from doing this and then . . . my dad . . . said okay I’ll stop . . . .” H. was asked whether this conversation occurred in the hallway or the garage, and he reiterated that it happ ened in the hallway. On July 5, Doe was interviewed at the Martinez Children’s Interview Center. The interview was videotaped, and the tape was pl ayed for the jury. Doe’s account of the
molestations and direction to Rizvi to st op was generally consistent with her trial testimony, although she did not remember at trial that Rizvi kissed her butt and private part when they were in the ga rage in Walnut Creek as she reported in the interview.
Rizvi denied that he molested Doe. Rizvi testified that S. told him on May 13 that A. was threatening to leave and divorce her because she was not being respectful to his mother and sister. On May 14 , A. told Rizvi “I’ve had enough,” and he left home the next day. A. had been managi ng the Baskin Robbins. A. told Rizvi that he did not care about the business, and the store was closed fo r two and a half days after he left. Rizvi testified that S., Doe, and he r brothers were sad and depre ssed after A. abandoned them. Doe told him at a family gather ing that she missed A. and said, “if I hurt myself, he’d be back.” A. returned home two days after learning of Doe’s allegations. A. testified that he went to Virginia and Washington D.C. to look for work because he was not making enough money at the Baskin Robbins. He denied that he abandoned the family or told S. he wanted a divorce. When he spoke with Doe on the phone while he was away, he told her that he would arrange fo r the family to join him if he found work, and that he would return home in one and a half to three months if he did
not. Z. testified that S. never said A. wanted a divorce. Z. said she told the police that S. and A. fought because S. “didn’t want him to leave in May, she wa nted him to leave a
little later.” S. testified that she and the children “never want ed to go with [A.] and we wanted to stay over here, and later on we decided that we should go.”
Doe denied that A. had abandoned the fa mily. She denied asking Rizvi whether A. would return if she got hurt, saying, “N o. Why would I ask him that?” Doe was5 asked, “[D]id you make up wh at you told us about your un cle so that your dad would come back?” She answered, “No. Why would I do that? That’s a very bad thing to do. That’s very serious.” Rizvi’s older sister R. Rizvi (R.), testified for the defense that when her 22-yearold daughter Sa. Za. (Sa.) was nine or ten year s old, Sa. stayed at Rizvi’s house three or
four hours after school. R. saw Rizvi duri ng this time because he returned home from work around the time she would pick up her da ughter. R. said that she never saw Rizvi behave inappropriately with a child. Rizvi’ s 18-year-old niece, T. Fatima, testified that
she lived with Rizvi for about a year when she was eight or nine years old. She said he always behaved appropriately with her, but she could not remember ever being alone
with him.
Rizvi testified that he had been a nervou s driver ever since he got into a rollover accident in 1987. R., who was riding in the car when the accident o ccurred, said that he was especially nervous driving on freeways. Rhonda Carlson testified that Rizvi had
been her boss for most of 25 years and that he drives “lik e a little old lady,” “with both hands on the steering wheel . . . .” This te stimony led to cross-examination about Rizvi’s driving record, which included mu ltiple accidents and citations. When Rizvi’s wife, Z., Doe’s mother, S., and M. went to the police on July 4, Z. and S., assisted by M. as an Urdu interpreter, were intervie wed by Contra Costa Sheriff Adam Hernandez. Called as a defense witness, Hernandez testified th at Z. told him A. had abandoned Doe’s family. Z. said H. to ld her that when he heard Doe tell Rizvi, “[n]o, stop it,” Doe and Rizvi were in the gara ge of his home, not the hallway, and he did
not see them. S. said Doe to ld her that the incident in the bedroom happened after, not before, the drive to Baskin Robbins, and that it happened in the middle of the night, not in the morning. S. said Doe to ld her that Rizvi was not on his knees when he molested her in the garage in Walnut Creek. Doe said he sat on a chair and had her stand over his face. On cross-examination, Rizvi was asked, “You don’t believe that [H.] would make up the situation where [Doe] came to talk to him, do you?” He answered, “No.” He was asked, “[Y]ou do believe that [D oe] is a truthful child, don’t yo u? A. Yes and no. Q.6 And you have told other people that you believe that she’s a truthful child; isn’t that true?
A. Yes.” Presentation of evidence and arguments at trial took about three and a half days, and the jury deliberated for about one and a half days before reaching the verdicts. II. APPEAL (A138370)
A. Instructional Issue
Rizvi contends that the court’s instructi ons improperly discouraged the jury from requesting readbacks of trial testimony. (1) Record At the beginning of trial, the court inst ructed the jury pursu ant to CALCRIM No. 104 (“Evidence”): “The court reporter is maki ng a record of ever ything that was said during the trial. If you decide that it is ne cessary, you may ask that the court reporter’s record be read to you. You mu st accept the court reporter’s record as accurate.” After these standard instructions, the court added:
“But do not let the ability to request a readback of testimony at the end [of] the trial to substitute for listening carefully to the testimony while it is being given. There are two reasons for this: First, listening to words read off a page is not the same as observing a witness, including the demeanor a nd the way they speak wh en they testify. Second, readback is not automatic or quick. Trish [,the reporter in the courtroom,] is very good and the realtime transcript I get is very helpful, but there are mistranscriptions
in it and it’s not an official tran script. There are several steps that need to be taken before testimony can be read to you. “To start with, the court reporters’ superv isor must find another court reporter to take Trish’s place here, because we likely will already be on the next trial. Then Trish
must review and correct the notes so that the not es can be turned into a transcript that is complete and accurate. Then she must stri p out all objections and rulings and matters stricken by the Court so that the transcript only contains testimony.7 “Then the lawyers and I must review the transcript to ma ke sure it is complete and responsive to your request. Then Trish must go into the jury deliberation room and read the testimony to you. “This can take hours, even days dependin g on how much readba ck you request. I don’t mean to dissuade you fro m asking for readback. If you need it you will get it. I simply ask you to recognize at the outset that the ability to ask for readback should not take place of paying careful attention during trial.” At the close of evidence, the court inst ructed the jury pursu ant to CALCRIM No. 202 (“Note-Taking and Reading Back of Testimony”): “You have been given notebooks and may have taken notes durin g the trial You may use your notes during deliberations. Your notes are for your own individual use to help you remember wh at happened during the trial. Please keep in mind that your no tes may be inaccurate or incomplete. [¶] If there’s a disagreement about the testimony and s tipulations at trial, you may ask the court reporter’s record be read to you. It is the record that must guide your deliberations, not your notes. You must accept the cour t reporter’s record as accurate.” After these standard instructions, the co urt added: “But please remember what I told you at the beginning of trial about readba ck. If you need readback of testimony, we will provide it to you. But please make sure . . . to make your re quest as limited as possible to meet your needs. For example, if you were uncl ear about when Officer Jones turned on his siren, you would request testim ony of Officer Jones about when he turned on his siren rather than the testimony about th e siren or the testimony of Officer Jones. [¶] Everybody understand? [¶] As narrow as possible.” The jury was given copies of the in structions, which included the court’s supplemental instruction to CALCRIM Nos. 104 and 202. The parties stipulated that “if read back is requested, counsel will be made aware of the request and have the opportunity to co nfer with the reporter before read back” and that “once approved, th e court will confer with counsel over where it will take place.” According to a minute order, the jury was escorted to the deliberation room at 2:58 p.m on December 6, 2012. The reporter’s transc ript for the day ended at 3:08 p.m. At8 3:30 p.m., the jury requested: “Transcrip t of [Doe’s] testimony in court about bedroom incident, specifically about brothers sleeping in the room,” and “Transcript of Z. on stand talking about H. saying ‘[Doe] got to ride in front seat. Why don’t I get to ride in front seat[?]’ ” The jury deliberated for a full day on December 10, and for two hours on December 11, and asked the court two questi ons during that time. Neither the minute orders nor the reporter’s tran script through the time of ju ry deliberations mention the court’s response to the December 6 transcript requests. (2) Review Penal Code section 1138 provides: “After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there be any disagreement between them as to the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law ar ising in the case, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon being brought into co urt, the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the pr osecuting attorney, and the defendant or his counsel, or after they have been called.” “Pur suant to section 1138, the jury has a right to rehear testimony and instructions on request during its delibera tions. . . . [A] violation of the statutory mandate implicat es a defendant’s right to a fair trial. . . .” ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1007, disa pproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) Rizvi argues that the court’s amplifi cations of CALCRIM Nos. 104 and 202
violated section 1138 and his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial by coercing the jury into foregoing a request for a readback of testimony. He focuses on the portions of the instructions th at detailed the steps required to prepare a readback, and the court’s statement that the process could take “hours, even days”—a claim Rizvi views as “almost certainly an exaggeration.” However, our Supreme Court has squarely held that “[m]erely informing the jury of the time it may take for rehearing testimony is not impermissible jury coercion.” ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 506 ( Hillhouse ).) Accordingly we must reject Rizv i’s challenge to the supplemented
instructions.9 Hillhouse upheld instructions regarding readba cks that were more “coercive” than
those here. The trial court in Hillhouse told the jury “ ‘If you want readback of testimony, and I find it to be on a material point , then I’ll direct the c ourt reporter to go in and read back testimony. [¶] And when you as k for a witness’ testimony to be read back, the entire testimony of that witne ss is read back so that ever ything is in context. . . . [¶] . . . And if you request it and I find it to be on a material point, you certainly will have that available to you.’ ” ( Hillhouse, supra , 27 Cal.4th at p. 505, fn 5, italics omitted.) These instructions could have discouraged re quests for readbacks because the court gave no guarantee that the requests would be honor ed. The court said the requests would be granted only if it found the testimony to be “material.” Here, in contrast, the court assured the jury that it would receive any readback it requested. The defendant in
Hillhouse argued that the instructions might have ca used the jury to fo rego a readback of testimony from a witness whose testified at le ngth, but the court rejected that argument with its holding as we have quoted. In support of that holding, the Hillhouse court cited People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 202–203 ( Anjell ). ( Hillhouse, supra , 27 Cal.4th at pp. 506–507.) The jury in Anjell requested readbacks of testimony from three witnesses. In response, the court informed the jury that the readbacks would take from five and one-half to seven hours. ( Anjell
, supra , at p. 202, fn. 4.) The court cont inued: So you can see that if you add up those three you have got an awful lot of hours of testimony. Now that is not to say that you can’t have that if that’s what yo u need in your deliberations. . . . And what I am going to ask you to do is retire to the jury room and have a discussion as to what you need and then you write me a nother note and let me know and whatever it is that the jury decides they need, that’s wh at you’re entitled to have if you need it . . . .” ( Ibid. , italics omitted.) The jury re turned a verdict an hour and a half later, without requesting a readback of testimony. The court found that “[a] fair readi ng of the [instructions] . . . show[ed] no
violation of section 11 38. They went no fu rther than to inform the jurors of the time involved in rereading the reque sted testimony, so that they could make a knowledgeable10 decision as to whether they desired to hear it. The court did not attempt to discourage a reading, and in fact emphasized that the ju rors were ‘entitled’ to have the testimony reread if they felt it was needed.” ( Anjell
, supra , 100 Cal.App.3d at pp. 202–203.) Likewise here, as a whole the instructions were not improperly coercive. The court explained that it was not trying to dissuade rea dback requests, and twic e told the jury that any such requests would be granted. Rizvi’s instructional argument fails under Hillhouse and Anjell

. B. Evidentiary Issue
Rizvi contends that the court errone ously limited defense cross-examination concerning Doe’s sexual knowledge. (1) Record Before trial, defense investigators obtai ned statements from Rizvi’s relatives that
Doe and her brothers had wa tched inappropriate television programming. Rizvi’s brother, Agha Rizvi (Agha) recalled Rizvi telling him this before he was arrested. R.’s
husband said his wife told him that Z. said Doe and her brothers “watched inappropriate movies (sexually explicit) or TV shows . . . through Netflix on an account their father A. had given them the pass code.” R. said Z. “co mplained A. was a bad father for giving his password for adult movies to one of the childre n. R. stated, accord ing to Z., the children were continually watching adult movies. R. wa s not clear, but either Z. or S. had made A. change his password so the children co uld no longer access the adult movies.” The prosecution filed a moti on in limine to exclude on hearsay, foundational, and Evidence Code section 352 grounds “questioning on an allegation that S. and/or A. . . . allowed one, some, or all of her children to watch pornography on Netflix and/or Z.[’s] . . . concern over the children having access to pornography . . . .” The motion stated that Z.
“denies that the children have watched pornographic materi al, acknowledges that S.’s
oldest son does know the Netflix account numbe r, and denies complain ing to any witness about the children watching sexualized movies.” When the motion was argued, the prosec ution told the court that the defense planned to explore whethe r Doe had seen the movie Precious , and objected on the ground11 that the acts in question in the case—“oral co pulation, digital penetr ation, and licking of the legs”—were not depicted in the movie. The court stated: “The child’s sexual knowledge and exposure to the particular types of acts at issue here is a fair area for inquiry to rebut any suggestion that a child of this age would not know of such acts or invent them unless they happen.” However, th e court told defense counsel, “unless you have specific information, not just that the brother may ha ve had the Netflix password, but in fact that this particular complaining wi tness witnessed particular acts . . . I think it would be unduly consumptive of time and confusing to the ju ry and inviting speculation to say that because her brother had access to the Netflix passwor d and they may have watched a movie that the parents didn’t know they were watching, and, therefore, she must have had exposure to thes e kinds of activities . . . .” Defense counsel responded: “I’m going to ask her open-ended questions about her sexual knowledge. Had she ever heard of anyt hing like this before the time she made the accusation. If so, where? We may find out th at there was another movie we don’t even
know about or her mother told her or it was di scussed with her little friends. I have to be
able to cross-examine her.” The prosecutor said she wo uld not object to “narrowly tailored” questions such as, “Before this in cident, did you know th at anyone would put their mouths to the private parts of a person? . . . [¶] . . . But if she responds no, then . . . no further questioning should o ccur.” The court said, “I think the questions, such as those that [the prosecutor] posited, are appropr iate. Is this something you ever heard of before. If so, how? If not, then that’s the answer.”
The court then ruled as follo ws: “I think that what [defense counsel] is proposing is not, per se, inappropriate. I think it’s appropriate to find out what this child had heard about, had perhaps even seen depictions of that relate to the conduct at issue here at the time of the incident alleged he re. A fishing expedition about what movies they may have seen and a side story about kids getting in trouble for misusing the Netflix password is not particularly helpful, is confusing, is unduly cons umptive of time and invites speculation. So unless she sa ys in her testimony yes, on Ne tflix I saw somebody doing this to another person, if she said that in an swer to an open-ended question, Did you ever12 see anything like that on a movie, then you ca n get into it. Otherwise, the speculation about, Well, they must have seen pornography because th ey had the Netflix password, we’re not going to get there.”
Defense counsel then stated that Rizvi had “discovered them watching Precious and they were reprimanded and got in trouble fo r it. [¶] . . . [¶] I’m looking at a separate issue of anger towards my client for what he did.” Counsel said, “I ’m not married to the
movie Precious . It is the fact that . . . she was upset about being turned in to her aunt, her mother and her father were called, and shortly thereafter they had this allegation.” The court ruled that “any motivation[s] that the co mplaining witness [had] to fabricate are fair game. . . . [¶] . . . I don’t want to get the whole Precious issue in this case unless there’s something in Precious that really suggests exposure to the kinds of conduct alleged here. If you want to ask . . . were she and the othe r kids caught watching a movie they weren’t supposed to watch and got in trouble for th at because the defendant told her father, I think that’s okay.” The prosecutor objected, “If you’re going to allow the question of were you caught watching movies that you shouldn’t have been watching, it invites this jury to speculate
as to how bad that movie was.” The court told the prosecutor, “I’d have to disagree with you on that one. . . . [¶] . . . I’m ordering [d efense counsel] not to ask the question in such a way that it suggests what the cont ent of the movie was.” The prosecutor continued to protest “it’s going to be open for speculation to this jury as to what kind of
movies the defendant was disc iplining the children for watching. The court said, “[T]he question has to be phrased in such a way that it’s content neutral. So it’s not a question about, Did you watch pornography? Did you watch something that was sexually suggestive that you weren’t su pposed [to]? It’s simply, Were you caught watching a movie in a setting where you weren’t supposed to and did you get in trouble for that?” During Doe’s cross-examination, defens e counsel asked whether she had ever gotten in trouble with Rizvi for watching mo vies on Netflix, and she answered, “No.
Wait—I never watch Netflix.” She said that her brother did not have the password to the family’s Netflix account. The following exchanges ensued: “Q. . . . [Y]ou watch TV,13 right? [¶] A. Yeah. I watch TV, like kid shows. [¶] Q. And the TV’s on sometimes when parents are watching TV? A. My parents don’t watc h anything inappropriate. [¶] Q. Have you ever heard the word ‘mol estation’ prior to the time you made the allegations in this case? . . . [¶] A. Do I ha ve to answer this? [¶] The Court: Yes, just have you ever heard the word. [¶] [A.] No. Like, I don’t think so.”
H. testified on cross-exam ination that Rizvi caught him, Doe, and Doe’s older brother Sy. watching Netflix. He said th at his parents controlled the programs he watched, and that he got in trouble becaus e he was on Netflix and his parents were not monitoring what he was watching.
Discussion of Netflix and Doe’s movie wa tching resumed with the court after the People rested their case. De fense counsel stated: “I wa nted to ask [Doe] what was
watched to see her sexual knowle dge, but the Court said I wasn’t allowed to. [¶] . . . [¶] I felt the Court’s ruling was too narrow, that I should have been ab le to ask her what movies have you watched, but I abided by the Court’s ruling.” In response to those comments, the court reviewed th e transcript of its ruling that the defense could ask Doe whether she had seen any of the sexual acts sh e reported in a movie, and said to defense counsel, “I didn’t remember that I shut you down completely , and, in fact, I did not.”
Defense counsel then noted that Doe’s watc hing Netflix programs was relevant to the extent that Rizvi got her in trouble for that conduct and thus gave her a motive to falsely accuse him. The court said, “[A]gain, I’m not shutting you down. I’ve let you go into the Netflix stuff, but only on . . . the issue of [Doe’s] motivati on. So that unless . . . she felt that she had been wronged by [Rizvi] in connec tion with this, it’s all a sideshow.” In the defense case, A. testified that he had a Netflix account, and gave the password only to Rizvi and Z. Z. testified that Doe’s brother Sy. also had the password, but Sy. testified that he did not. Sy. re membered Rizvi coming in to the room to see whether he, H., and Doe were watching m ovies on Netflix, but did not recall Rizvi getting upset with them on those occasions. Ri zvi testified that he saw Sy., H., and Doe watching Netflix and that he called A. and asked him to chan ge the password.14 In closing argument, the defense main tained that Doe and H.’s conflicting testimony about being caught watching Netf lix, and Z. and Sy.’s conflicting testimony about Sy. having a password, showed that the witnesse s supporting Doe “all lie.” Defense counsel next argued that Doe was not cr edible in denying that she had ever heard
the word “molest” before she made her a llegations against Rizvi. The prosecutor responded that the Netflix evidence was relevant if at all on issues of credibility, and said, “[Y]ou can’t speculate and try to intermix it like defense counsel did with what [Doe] knew or didn’t know. Nice try.” (2) Review Rizvi contends that the court improperl y limited his cross-examination of Doe concerning possible sources of her sexual knowledge. “A ch ild’s testimony in a molestation case involving oral copulation and sodomy can be given an aura of veracity by his accurate description of the acts. This is because knowledge of such acts may be unexpected in a child who had not been subjected to them.” ( People v. Daggett (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 751, 757.) To rebut the in ference that the comp laining witness must have gained knowledge of sex through th e defendant’s acts, the defense may elicit evidence about other possible sources of that knowledge. ( Ibid. )
The trial court here drew a line between Do e’s prior exposure to the specific acts of molestation she alleged and her prior exposu re to other sexual matte rs. The court ruled
under Evidence Code section 352 that evidence of Doe’s prio r knowledge of the acts she alleged, including knowledge gained from movi es, was admissible, but that evidence of her knowledge of other sexual activities was not. Rizvi argues that he should have been permitted to ask Doe whether she had seen Precious “or any other movies with sexual themes,” and he submits “[t]hat Precious did not depict the iden tical sexual acts as those alleged by [Doe] is immaterial.”
A court has “ ‘broad discretion’ unde r Evidence Code section 352 ‘to exclude
even relevant evidence “if its probative value is subs tantially outweighed by the probability that its admission w ill . . . create substantial da nger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” ’ ” ( People v. Merriman (2014) 6015 Cal.4th 1, 60.) “An appellate court review s a court’s rulings re garding relevancy and admissibility under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] We will not reverse a court’s ruling on such matte rs unless it is shown ‘ “the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capri cious, or patently absu rd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.]” ( Id. at p. 74; see People v. Vargas (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 506, 543, 545 [trial c ourts “have wide discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence”; no abuse of disc retion under Evid. Code, § 352 unless court “ ‘ “exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances considered” ’ ”].)
The line the court drew in this case wa s a reasonable one. Doe’s prior knowledge of the acts she alleged was directly relevant to the veracity of her charges. Her exposure
to other sexual matters was not. The court could reasonably conclude that the probative value of evidence of Doe’s having watched movies with “sexual themes” other than sodomy and oral copulation w ould be substantially outweigh ed by the probability that
such evidence would create a su bstantial danger “of confusing the issues.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352,
and no violation of Rizvi’s constitutional rights (see, e.g., People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503 [discretionary evidentiary ruling did not violate right to present a defense]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620 [ordinary rules of evidence generally do not infringe on the right to present a defense; rejecting argument that
restricted cross-examination viol ated rights to confrontation, du e process, and a fair trial]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [exclusion of defense evidence on a subsidiary point is not a de privation of due process]). Nor was there any prospect of prejudice from the court’s ruling. Rizvi fairly
observes that Doe was defensive on the sta nd when she was questioned about what she
had watched on TV and whether she had h eard the word “molestation” before she
accused him of sexual conduct. Given that testimony, Rizvi is likely correct that Doe would have denied watching “adult-oriented movies” if sh e had been questioned along those lines. Rizvi argues th at if Doe “denied watching Precious or other adult-oriented movies on television, defense counsel could have followed up by eliciting evidence from16 H. about the specific movies they had watc hed together. By so doing, counsel would have accomplished two objectives at once: he would have de monstrated an alternative source for [Doe’s] precocious sexual knowledge an d he would have proved that she lied in her trial testimony. [¶] As a result of the trial court’s ruling, [D oe’s] testimony took on a false air of veracity—as defense counsel was unable to show that she was being coy about her exposure to sexually-oriented movies and television shows.” This reasoning greatly exaggerates the pot ential effect of the excluded evidence.
Doe’s defensiveness about wh at she watched on television gave the defense room to argue that she was being untruthful about her exposure to sexually-oriented programs, and one more negative response from her would not have signi ficantly strengthened that argument. The defense was able to call Do e a liar because H. said Doe had watched something on Netflix and Doe sa id she did not. Any furthe r conflicting testimony by the two about what they had seen on TV would merely have provided cumulative impeachment on the same subject. There is no reasonable probability that the excluded
evidence would have aff ected the outcome. (Evid. Code, § 354 [exclusion of evidence is prejudicial only if it causes a mi scarriage of jus tice]; see also People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 208 [“ ‘limitation on cross-examination pertaining to the credibility of a witness does not violate the c onfrontation clause un less a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness’s credibility had
the excluded cro ss-examination been permitted’ ”].) III. PETITION (A142686) In his habeas corpus petition Rizvi ar gues that his counsel was incompetent
because he failed to raise a “ Stoll defense,” in which expert testimony is presented to provide circumstantial character evidence that the defendan t did not commit the charged
offenses because he or she does not fit the profile of a child molester. (See People v.
Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1161 ( Stoll ).) A. Legal Standards “The law governing [an ineffective assist ance of counsel] cl aim is settled. ‘A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel by both the state17 and federal Constitutions. [Cita tions.] “Construed in light of its purpose, the right entitles
the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance.” ’ [Citation.] It is [a] defendant’s burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of trial counsel. [Citation.] . . .
‘ “In order to demonstrate ineffective assistan ce of counsel, a defendant must first show counsel’s performance was ‘deficient’ because his ‘representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . under prev ailing professional norms.’ [Citations.] Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel’s performance or lack thereof. [Citation.] Prejudice is shown when there is a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would ha ve been different. A reasonable probability is a probability su fficient to undermin e confidence in the outcome.’ ” ’ [Citation.] [¶] Reviewing cour ts defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fa lls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436–437.) B. Expert Testimony
After the verdicts were rendered and before the sent encing hearing, the defense obtained a psychological evalua tion of Rizvi from Dr. John Kincaid. Dr. Kincaid
interviewed and tested Rizvi for over six hour s, and concluded that he was “at low risk for recidivism” and “a strong candidate for pr obation.” A Rorschach test suggested that Rizvi might have “a tendency toward impulsive outbursts of unwarranted emotion and/or ill-advised behavior.” However, his scores on an HSAQ-SV test assessing sexual interest in children “suggest[ed] that he does not find children sexy, nor does he endorse attitudes
of sexual entitlement.” His zero score on a STAT IC-2002R test predicting future risk of
sexual re-offense on a scale of -2 to 13 put him in “the Low Risk category.” While this appeal was pending, the defe nse obtained a psychological evaluation of Rizvi from Dr. Steven Barron, wh ich is attached as an exhib it to the petition. Dr. Barron
interviewed and tested Rizvi for four and one half hours, and found “little indication . . . that Mr. Rizvi was predisposed to commit a sexual offense against a child.” Rizvi’s minus one score on the Static-99R test predic ting sexual recidivism put him in the “Low18 Risk Category,” with an estimat ed 2.1 percent risk of reoffending over five years. He was given the MSII Adult Male Form te st, “designed to measure the sexual characteristics of an adult male alleged to have committed a sex offense or sexual misconduct. . . .” His “highl y defensive” responses on th e “Dissimulation Scale” and
“Sexual Denier Scale” were “either a defens ive attempt to demonstrate he has no sexual problems, or reflect[ed] actually held hyperc ritical sexual attitudes [ possibly] influenced by his religiously conservative background.” The Stable- 2007 test, which measures “stable dynamic risk factors” showed “no sta tic factors present that increase his risk for sexual offending. . . . As for dynamic factors, there was l ittle indication of overarching personality characteristics, skill deficits, or lear ned behaviors that relate to risk for sexual offending.” Dr. Barron acknowledged that his test re sults were “in large part reliant on Mr. Rizvi’s self-report. Use of objective sexual interest measures, such as the penile plethysmograph and/or the Able Assessment for Sexual Inte rest” could have permitted “a more definitive opinion as these measures are less susceptible to attempts by the examinee to manage their presentation.” However, prison policy pr ohibited display of the images of children and a dults used in these tests to measure sexual arousal. Dr.
Barron noted that these tests could have been administered to Rizv i in an outpatient setting while he was awaiting trial. 2 Also attached to Rizvi’s petition is the declaration of Benjamin Rice, a criminal defense attorney for 33 years who had represen ted clients in over 75 jury trials, including homicide and sex cases. In Rice’s view, Stoll expert evidence, “when it exists in a case,” is “a keystone element of defense” beca use “it provides objective support for a
defendant’s assertions of innocence.” He opined that effective appointed trial counsel would have requested funds for Stoll psychological testing where, as here, the defendant

2 When restrictions on Rizvi’s moveme nts while on bail were discussed in connection with Rizvi’s custod y credits, the prosecutor stated that “he was given wide latitude . . . to be able to go where he wanted to go.”19 faces life in prison, has no prior sex offens es, is charged with cr imes against a single victim, and continuously and consis tently professes his innocence. Rizvi’s trial counsel, Patrick Clancy, execute d a declaration, attached as an exhibit to an addendum to the habeas petition, st ating that his decision not to retain a Stoll expert “was a conscious tactical choice.” He discu ssed the decision with Ri zvi and Rizvi agreed with it. Based on his 36 years of experien ce working almost exclusively on sex offense cases, Clancy said, “I have come to find Stoll experts have a weak scientific basis for their opinions which is easily impeached thro ugh cross-examination. ” He said, “In my years of debriefing juries I have found that juries are highly suspect of ‘bought and paid for testimony’ from psychiatrist[s] and psycholo gist[s].” Clancy was also concerned that
his use of Stoll testimony could have led the c ourt to order, under Penal Code section 1054.3, that Rizvi be evaluated by a mental health expert selected by the prosecution, with potentially adverse consequences to the defense. (See Pen. Code, § 1054.3, subd. (b)(1) [court may order de fendant to submit to examination by a prosecution-retained mental heath expert if the defendant places his or her “mental state” in issue through proposed ment al health expert testimony].) Clancy’s declaration established that he rejected use of a Stoll defense based on years of experience showing that the defense was scientifically weak, easily impeached, and viewed by juries with suspicion. Rizvi argues that “such a one-size-fits-all approach becomes unreasonable where it ignore[s] the uniqu e peculiarities of a given case. In light of [his] age and spotless character and backgr ound, his case almost screamed out for a
Stoll expert.” But even if there were good reasons for presenting a Stoll defense in this case it does not mean there were no good reas ons not to do it. De fense counsel made a
deliberate tactical decision and articulated reas onable grounds to support it. “[I]t is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s de fense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable” ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 68 9), and we decline to reach that conclusion here. Rizvi’s disagreement with his trial counsel’s t actics is insufficient to overcome ‘ “the20 strong presumption that counsel ’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ ” ( People v. Lucas
, supra , 12 Cal.4th at p. 437.) 3 C. Lay Testimony
Rizvi contends that his counsel was ine ffective because he failed to call additional lay witnesses to testify to his good character with children. (Evid. Code, § 1102, subd. (a) [allowing admission of such evidence].) As we have noted, Rizvi called two such witnesses, his sister R. and his niece T. Fa tima, who testified about Rizvi’s behavior toward girls of Doe’s age.
In his declaration in connection with the habeas petition, counsel stated: “It is my opinion that the use of lay witnesses on the issue of Stoll character carries greater weight with the jury than expert te stimony on the same issue. La y witnesses were interviewed and prepared to testify in th e Rizvi trial. The DA opposed most of the lay witnesses on the grounds that they were not the same age as the alleged victim at the time they were around Mr. Rizvi. The court ag reed and limited my pool of Stoll lay character witnesses
to witnesses that were around the same age as the alleged victim at the time that the witness was around Mr. Rizvi. [¶] . . . Mr. Rizvi’s pool of good Stoll character witnesses was severely limited. His wife, Z., aligned herself in the case against her husband and
with her niece . . . . Z. testified at a bail hearing about Mr. Rizvi’s devious character and
lack of trustworthiness. His two adult dau ghters had also aligned themselves with the mother’s side of the family and against M r. Rizvi. Both daughters refused to be

3 In view of this conclusion, we need not decide whether, as Rizvi claims, there was no basis for counsel’s concern about the potential for a court-ordered examination by a prosecution expert under Penal Code section 1054.3, subdivision (b). Rizvi notes that no reported case has permitted the prosecutor to retain an expert under this statute in response to expert testimony under Stoll , but the apparent absence of any case law on point does not establish that counsel’s c oncern was unfounded. Rizvi submits that Stoll testimony would have put his character at issue, not his mental state, but it is not clear that this is an operative dis tinction under the statute. (See Stoll
, supra , 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1166–1167 (dis. opn. of Lucas, C.J.) [“ackno wledge[ing] that California courts have allowed expert opinion on the subject of a defendant’s mental state, including character evidence indicating the like lihood that he could not have committed the charged offenses”].)21 interviewed by my investigator. I could not put onto the stand to testify witnesses that I did not know what they w ould say on the stand.” Rizvi observes that, contrary to counsel’s declaration, the cour t did not definitively limit lay character testimony to his behavior with children of Doe’s age. When the subject was discussed early in the trial, the court said that testimony concerning children over age 14 was “potentially” excludable. Ho wever, a ruling on the point was deferred, and none was thereafter sought. Rizvi dism isses counsel’s discussion of testimony from his wife and daughters as a “red herring” beca use he has never suggested that they should
have been called as character w itnesses for the defense. Before he was sentenced, Rizvi filed about 60 letters of support attesting to his good character, mostly from family members, coworkers at Copy Central in Berkeley
where he had worked fo r nearly 30 years, and U.C. Berk eley faculty and associates who knew him through his work. Rizvi argues that so me of these individuals, in particular his work colleagues, Rhonda Carlson and Craig Fairbanks, and his brother Agha, should
have been called to attest to hi s good character with children. Fairbanks, the chief executive officer of Copy Central, hired Rizvi and worked with him for nearly 30 years. Fairbanks wrote: “So far as I [k]now, [Rizvi] has never been accused of any inappropriate sexual behavi or of any kind and I would not have and
still wouldn’t have hesitated to leave him alone with my daughters.” Agha wrote that he had been confined to a wheelchair for 50 years after suffering a spinal injury, and had been on dialysis since 1999 when his kidneys failed. He
described the extensive care Ri zvi had given him throughout hi s life. Agha stated that Rizvi “has supported me physically, emotionally and financially. He was to me my eyes, ears, my arms and legs. He became a perfect substitute for my physical short comings. He is essential to my surviv al. Your honor, with out him I find myself totally helpless and my survival in his absence w ill be very difficult, almost im possible.” Agha said, “No one I know believes that [Rizvi] can do anything heinous or abhorrent.” Carlson, who testified at trial about Rizv i’s driving rather than his character with children, wrote that before sh e worked at Copy Central, sh e was director of the Child22 Assault Prevention Project at Bay Area Women Against Rape in Oakland. She said her son and daughter had suffered ch ild sexual abuse. She stated: “I have seen [Rizvi] with my own children and his children and children of families he’s close to. I’ve been around men who make my sensors go off. [Rizvi] is not one of them! I’ve seen [Rizvi] hugging children and kissing children and putting them on his lap. Not one of them reacted in any way that made me wonder.” We find no reasonable probability that ch aracter evidence from any of these three
witnesses would have led to a different outcome. Carlson was impeached at trial with admissions that Rizvi employed both her and her son, and could cause them to be fired. Agha could have been impeached with his great dependence on Rizvi for care and support. Fairbanks said he would not have hesitated to leave Rizvi alone with his daughters, but he did not say that he or anyone he knew had ever in fact done so.
We have reviewed the other letters fro m individuals Rizvi identifies as potential witnesses concerning his char acter with children, and are not persuaded that testimony from any of these individuals would have cha nged the verdicts, eith er. The letters from T. Fatima’s parents and older sisters did no t suggest that their testimony would have added anything material to the testimony F. provided. Rizvi’s older brother Abbas wrote that he had a 29-year-old daughter and a 24 -year-old son who love d Rizvi and said “he did not do anything to them,” but the extent of Rizvi’s contac t with them wh en they were around Doe’s age is not apparent. Others w ho wrote in Rizvi’s support stated only that they had worked or socialized with Rizvi and had not seen or heard of any impropriety on his part in those contexts. Thus, even if counsel c ould be faulted for failing to present additional lay character testimony, we are unable to conc lude that the omission was prejudicial.
IV. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The petition fo r a writ of habeas corpus is summarily denied. (See People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 737.)23 _ ____________ ____________ Siggins, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ McGuiness, P.J.

_____________ ____________ Pollak, J.