UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4141

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

TERAH JAVAN SHELTON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District 

Judge. (3:07-cr-00329-CMC-1) 

Submitted: October 8, 2008 Decided: November 3, 2008 

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Jan S. Strifling, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Mark 

C. Moore, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Terah Javan Shelton pled 

guilty to possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or 

more of cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. 

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2008). The district 

court sentenced Shelton to 262 months in prison. Shelton’s 

counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in his view, there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal. Counsel questions whether the 

district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure in accepting Shelton’s guilty plea and 

whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing 

Shelton. Shelton filed a pro se supplemental brief asserting 

that the Government reneged on promises made to him. 

 Counsel raises as a potential issue the adequacy of 

the plea hearing but concludes that there were no deficiencies 

in the district court’s Rule 11 inquiries. Our careful review 

of the record convinces us that the district court substantially 

complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Shelton’s 

guilty plea and ensured that Shelton entered his plea knowingly 

and voluntarily and that the plea was supported by an 

independent factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 

F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). 

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 Counsel next questions whether the district court 

abused its discretion by denying Shelton’s motion for a downward 

variance sentence. We review the sentence imposed by the 

district court for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United 

States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Our review of the record 

leads us to conclude that the district court followed the 

necessary procedural steps in sentencing Shelton, properly 

calculating the guideline range and considering that 

recommendation in conjunction with the factors set forth in 18 

U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). See Gall, 128 S. 

Ct. at 597. We also find that the district court meaningfully 

articulated its refusal to vary from the guideline range and its 

decision to sentence Shelton at the bottom of the range. See

id.; Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007) 

(upholding presumption of reasonableness for within-guideline 

sentence). Thus, we conclude that the sentence is reasonable. 

 In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record for any meritorious issues and have found none.∗

 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This 

court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of 

his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

 ∗ We have reviewed the claims in Shelton’s pro se 

supplemental brief and find them to be without merit. 

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further review. If the client requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED