No. 14-0917 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 

HIGHWAY 205 FARMS, LTD. and MAURICE E. MOORE, JR., 

Petitioners, 

v.

CITY OF DALLAS,

Respondent. 

Appeal from the 

Fifth District Court of Appeals at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00951-CV

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REVIEW 

AND CITY’S APPENDIX 

WARREN M. S. ERNST City Attorney’s Office

Dallas City Attorney 1500 Marilla Street, Room 7D North 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

Barbara E. Rosenberg 

Texas Bar No. 17267700 Telephone: 214-670-3519 

James B. Pinson Telecopier: 214-670-0622 

Texas Bar No. 16017700 barbara.rosenberg@dallascityhall.com 

Christopher D. Bowers james.pinson@dallascityhall.com 

Texas Bar No. 02731300 chris.bowers@dallascityhall.com 

Sonia T. Ahmed sonia.ahmed@dallascityhall.com 

Texas Bar No. 24082605 

Assistant City Attorneys 

ATTORNEYS FOR THE CITY OF DALLAS 

FILED

14-0917

4/13/2015 11:26:11 AM

tex-4860096

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK
i

IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.3(a), the 

following is a supplement to the list of counsel in the Petitioners’ Identity of 

Parties & Counsel:

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant/Plaintiff:

Sonia T. Ahmed

Dallas City Attorney’s Office

1500 Marilla Street, Room 7BN

Dallas, Texas 75201 
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ......................................................... i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iv

EXPLANATION OF RECORD CITATIONS....................................................... vii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................................................................. viii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................x

RESPONSE TO ISSUES PRESENTED ................................................................ xii

1. Petitioners fail to present an error for the court of 

appeals’ dismissal of the City’s appeal for want of 

jurisdiction.

2. Petitioners do not present argument and authority 

that the county court’s order of dismissal for want 

of prosecution was an appealable judgment.

3. Petitioners’ appeal is moot.

4. The county court’s order is void because it does 

not have subject-matter jurisdiction to dismiss an 

eminent domain proceeding for want of 

prosecution during the administrative phase.

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................................................................5

ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................6

I. Petitioners failed to assert that there was an appealable 

judgment in the trial court or that the court of appeals’ dismissal 

for want of jurisdiction of the City’s appeal was error, which is 

necessary for the Court’s jurisdiction and for the Court to 

conduct a review of the merits........................................................................ 6
iii

II. The appeal is moot.......................................................................................... 9

III. The trial court does not have authority to dismiss a 

condemnation proceeding for want of prosecution in the 

administrative phase. .................................................................................... 10

A. The county court did not have inherent power to dismiss 

a statement in condemnation for want of prosecution 

during the administrative phase...........................................................10

B. The Property Code does not provide the county court 

with jurisdiction to dismiss a statement in condemnation 

during the administrative phase...........................................................16

C. Rule 165a does not apply to the administrative 

proceeding. ..........................................................................................18

PRAYER..................................................................................................................19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................21

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4..........................................23

APPENDIX

Order Reinstating Case ...................................................................................... Tab 1

Special Commissioners’ Award......................................................................... Tab 2

Objections to Special Commissioners’ Award .................................................. Tab 3

Notice of Deposit of Special Commissioners’ Award....................................... Tab 4

Trial Setting........................................................................................................ Tab 5
iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Amason v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,

682 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1984) .....................................................................9, 11

Bevil v. Johnson,

307 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. 1957) ...........................................................................14

Blasingame v. Krueger,

800 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

1990, orig. proceeding)..................................................................................12

City of Austin v. Travis Cnty. Landfill Co., L.L.C.,

73 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. 2002) .............................................................................7

City of Carrollton v. OHBA Corp.,

809 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no writ).............................. 11, 13

City of Dallas v. Highway 205 Farms, Ltd.,

No. 05-13-00951, 2014 WL 3587403 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jul. 

22, 2014, orig. proceeding [mand. pending], pet filed)................... ix, x, 4, 10

City of W. Univ. Place v. Martin,

123 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1939) ...........................................................................9

Clanton v. Clark,

639 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1982) .........................................................................14

Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith,

307 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. 2010) ...........................................................................7

Dickey v. City of Houston,

501 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. 1973) .................................................................. 10, 11

Fin. Comm’n v. Norwood,

418 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2013) ...........................................................................x

Fortune v. Killebrew,

23 S.W. 976 (Tex. 1893) ...............................................................................14
v

Guitar Holding Co., L.P. v. Hudspeth Cnty.

Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1,

263 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. 2008) ...........................................................................7

Gulf Energy Pipeline Co. v. Garcia,

884 S.W.2d 823 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994, orig. 

proceeding) ....................................................................................... 11, 12, 13

Hicks Bldg. & Equip. Co., Inc. v. Buice,

371 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. 1963) .........................................................................7, 9

Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals,

808 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding) .............................................17

In re Hereweareagain, Inc.,

383 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2012, orig. proceeding)..................................................................................14

In re Jamail,

156 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, orig. proceeding) .......................8

In re State,

325 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, orig. proceeding) .....................15

In re State,

65 S.W.3d 383 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, orig. proceeding) .........................15

John v. State,

826 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1992) .................................................................. 10, 18

Nunn v. New,

226 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1950) (orig. proceeding) ...........................................18

Patrick Media Grp., Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit,

879 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1994, writ denied) ..........................11

Peak Pipeline Corp. v. Norton,

629 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1982, no writ)......................................12

Pearson v. State,

315 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. 1958) .............................................. x, 8, 10, 11, 14, 16
vi

Ramos v. Richardson,

228 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2007) .......................................................................6, 7

Rose v. State,

497 S.W.2d 445 (Tex.1973) ..........................................................................18

Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp.,

549 U.S. 422 (2007).........................................................................................x

State v. Giles,

368 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. 1963) (orig. proceeding) ...........................................10

Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen.,

354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010) .......................................................................6, 7

Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip.,

994 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1999) .........................................................................14

STATUTES

Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.001..........................................................................................x

Tex. Prop. Code § 12.007 ..........................................................................................8

Tex. Prop. Code § 21.014 ................................................................................. 15, 17

Tex. Prop. Code § 21.015 ........................................................................................15

Tex. Prop. Code § 21.018 ........................................................................................18

Tex. Prop. Code § 21.019 ........................................................................................17

RULES

Tex. R. App. P. 53.4..................................................................................................6

Tex. R. App. P. 55.2..................................................................................................6

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1...................................................................................................6

Tex. R. App. P. 53.2...............................................................................................6, 9
vii

EXPLANATION OF RECORD CITATIONS

For the convenience of the Court, the City will adopt the citations to the 

record that the Petitioners used:

CR [page]: for the Clerks Record.

SCR [page]: for the Supplemental Clerk’s Record.

[Volume] RR [page]: for the Reporter’s Record.

Additionally, the City will cite:

City’s App’x Tab [number]: for additional documents attached to the City’s 

response.

Pet. Brief at [page]: for the Petition for Review.

NFIB Br. at [page]: for the Brief of Friends of the Court, National 

Federation of Independent Business and NFIB Small Business Brief.

AutoNation Br. at [page]: for the Brief of Friends of the Court, AutoNation 

and Billingsley.
viii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This is an eminent domain proceeding. The City 

of Dallas filed a Statement in Condemnation on 

August 30, 2011. (CR 6-9.) The county court at 

law appointed special commissioners. (SCR 4-7.) 

The special commissioners’ hearing was set for 

May 8, 2013. (SCR 8-10.)

Course of Proceedings: On March 7, 2013, Highway 205 Farms, Ltd. and 

Maurice E. Moore, Jr., filed a motion to dismiss 

for want of prosecution. (CR 34-8.) The City 

opposed. (CR 39-43.)

Trial Court: Judge Erleigh Wiley, County Court at Law, 

Kaufman County, Texas (dismissal). Judge 

Dennis P. Jones, County Court at Law, Kaufman 

County, Texas (denial of reinstatement).

Trial Court’s Disposition: The court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss 

(1 RR 7-23). On April 17, 2013, the court 

dismissed the administrative proceeding for want 

of prosecution before the commissioners could 

hold their hearing. (CR 80 [Pet. App’x Tab 1].) 

The City timely filed a verified motion to reinstate,

asserting the court did not have jurisdiction to 

dismiss. (CR 81-91.) On June 21, 2013, the court 

denied the motion to reinstate. (CR 100 [Pet. 

App’x Tab 2].)

Parties in Court of Appeals: Appellant: The City of Dallas.

Appellees: Highway 205 Farms, Ltd. and Maurice 

E. Moore, Jr.

Court of Appeals: Memorandum opinion by Justice Evans, joined by 

Justices Fillmore and Lewis.

Court of Appeals’

Disposition: On July 22, 2014, the court of appeals held that the 

trial court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss the 
ix

eminent domain proceeding for want of 

prosecution while the administrative phase of the 

proceeding was pending, making the dismissal a 

clear abuse of discretion. City of Dallas v. 

Highway 205 Farms, Ltd., No. 05-13-00951, 2014 

WL 3587403, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 

2014, orig. proceeding [mand. pending],pet. filed)

(mem. op.). The court granted the mandamus and 

ordered the trial court to vacate its dismissal order 

and reinstate the case. Id. The court dismissed the 

appeal for want of jurisdiction. Id.

Administrative Action: On August 4, 2014, the trial court reinstated the 

case. (City’s App’x Tab 1.) On January 21, 2015, 

the special commissioners held a hearing and 

entered an award. (City’s App’x Tab 2.) 

County Court Action: On January 30, 2015, Petitioners filed objections 

to the award of the special commissioners. (City’s 

App’x Tab 3.) The commissioners’ award has 

been deposited with the registry of the court. 

(City’s App’x Tab 4.) A trial date has been set. 

(City’s App’x Tab 5.)
x

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Petitioners claim that this Court has jurisdiction under section 22.001 of the 

Texas Government Code. (Pet. at xiii.) They refer only to the subsections of the 

code that provide jurisdiction for construction of a statute or matters of law of 

importance to the state. (Id. [citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.001(a)(3), (6)]). 

Petitioners have ignored the prerequisite to those subsections that provides

jurisdiction only in cases that have been brought to the court of appeals from 

appealable judgments of the trial courts.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.001. 

Here, the court of appeals held that there was not an appealable judgment 

and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Highway 205 Farms, Ltd., 2014 

WL 3587403, at *2-4. According to this Court’s holdings, appellate courts do not 

have appellate jurisdiction of a condemnation proceeding until a timely objection is 

made to a commissioners’ award. Pearson v. State, 315 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Tex. 

1958). “[T]he jurisdiction of the appellate court as to the merits of a case extends 

no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken.” Id. at 938. 

“‘Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause; it may not 

assume jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits of the case.’” Fin. 

Comm’n v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 578 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Sinochem Int’l 

Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007)).
xi

Because the dismissal order is not an appealable judgment, the appellate 

court was correct that there was no judgment in the trial court, which deprives this 

Court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. The Court should deny 

the petition for review for want of jurisdiction.
xii

RESPONSE TO ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Petitioners fail to present an error for the court of appeals’ dismissal of the 

City’s appeal for want of jurisdiction. 

2. Petitioners do not present argument and authority that the county court’s 

order of dismissal for want of prosecution was an appealable judgment. 

3. Petitioners’ appeal is moot.

4. The county court’s order is void because it does not have subject-matter 

jurisdiction to dismiss an eminent domain proceeding for want of prosecution 

during the administrative phase.
1

No. 14-0917

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

HIGHWAY 205 FARMS, LTD. and MAURICE E. MOORE, JR.,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF DALLAS,

Respondent.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS:

The Fifth District Court of Appeals at Dallas dismissed the City of Dallas’s

appeal for want of jurisdiction. There is no judgment in an eminent domain 

lawsuit until a judgment is entered after objections to a special commissioners’ 

award are filed. The Petitioners assert only that the county court had authority to 

dismiss for want of prosecution during the administrative phase. (Pet. at 4.) The

petition does not address whether there was a judgment to appeal. The failure to 

address whether the trial court order was appealable is reason enough to deny this

petition for review, but the controversy is also moot and the petition fails to present 

error.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The court of appeals correctly recited the facts of this case. 

On August 30, 2011, the City filed a Statement in Condemnation seeking fee 

simple title to property for the Lake Tawakoni 144-inch Raw Water Transmission 

Pipeline Project in Kaufman County. (CR 6-9.) The City sought portions of six 

parcels of property for which Highway 205 Farm, Ltd. is the owner of record and 

Maurice E. Moore, Jr. has a mineral interest. (CR 6, 10-28.) This proceeding was 

filed after the governing body of the City approved Resolution No. 081245, which 

authorized and required the condemnation of that property. (CR 7.) The City had 

previously made an offer to purchase the land before commencing this proceeding, 

but the parties were unable to agree upon the terms of a voluntary conveyance. 

(CR 8.) As a result, the City provided the owners with the landowner’s bill of 

rights statement and filed suit in Kaufman County in an exercise of its power of 

eminent domain under the procedures required by chapter 21 of the Texas Property 

Code. (CR 8.) Accordingly, the county court appointed special commissioners. 

(CR 39-50.) The county court signed an Order Appointing Special Commissioners 

on August 31, 2011. (SCR 4-5.) The court subsequently signed an Order 

Removing a Special Commissioner, Lee Schaffer, and Appointing a Replacement, 

Don Burt, on October 24, 2011. (SCR 6-7.) The commissioners’ oaths were filed 

with the court on November 18, 2011. (CR 29-31.)
3

On March 7, 2013, Highway 205 Farm, Ltd. and Maurice E. Moore, Jr. 

(hereinafter “Landowners” or “Petitioners”) filed a motion to dismiss for want of 

prosecution. (CR 34-43.) In their motion to dismiss, Landowners argued that the 

City failed to prosecute “pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165(a) and the 

Court’s inherent authority to control its docket.” (CR 34.) The motion to dismiss 

was predicated on an alleged 18 months of inactivity. (1 RR 8.) The City filed a 

response to the motion to dismiss asserting that the trial court did not have 

jurisdiction to dismiss the condemnation proceeding because it was an 

administrative proceeding. (CR 39-43.) Landowners filed a reply. (CR 48-54.)

On March 11, 2013, four days after the motion to dismiss was filed, the 

Special Commissioners issued a written order that scheduled the special 

commissioners’ hearing to take place on May 8, 2013. (SCR 8-10.) On March 21, 

2013, the trial court set a hearing on Landowners’ motion to dismiss for April 17, 

2013. (CR 39-40.) On March 27, 2013, the City served Highway 205 Farms, Ltd. 

with a notice of hearing ordered by the special commissioners. (CR 39-40.) The 

notice said that the Special Commissioners would hear the parties on May 8, 2013. 

(CR 44.)

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. (1 RR 7-23.) On 

April 17, 2013, the trial court signed an Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss for Want of Prosecution. (CR 80.)
4

On May 9, 2013, the City filed a verified motion to reinstate. (CR 81-91). 

The City again argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss the 

Statement in Condemnation. Landowners filed a response. (CR 92-99.)

On June 21, 2013, the trial court heard the motion and signed an Order 

Denying the City’s Motion to Reinstate. (CR 100; 2 RR 7-26.) Because the trial 

court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss the administrative proceeding, the City 

submitted a petition for writ of mandamus complaining of the dismissal for want of 

prosecution and the denial of the City’s verified motion to reinstate. City of Dallas 

v. Highway 205 Farms, Ltd., No 05-13-00951, 2014 WL 3587403, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas July 22, 2014, pet filed) (mem. op.). The City also brought an 

appeal of the dismissal order. The appellate court consolidated the appeal and the 

mandamus. Id.

On July 22, 2014, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not have 

jurisdiction to dismiss for want of prosecution the eminent domain proceeding 

during the administrative phase of the case, making the dismissal a clear abuse of 

discretion. Id. at *4. The court granted the mandamus and ordered the trial court 

to vacate its dismissal order and reinstate the case. Id. The court dismissed the 

appeal for want of jurisdiction. Id.

On August 4, 2014, the county court reinstated the case. (City’s App’x Tab 

1.) On January 21, 2015 the special commissioners held a hearing and entered an 
5

award. (City’s App’x Tab 2.) On January 30, 2015, Landowners filed objections 

to the award of the special commissioners. (City’s App’x Tab 3.) The 

commissioners’ award has been deposited in the registry of the trial court. (City’s 

App’x Tab 4.) A trial date has been set. (City’s App’x Tab 5.)

On January 12, 2015, Landowners filed this petition for review in an attempt 

to appeal from the court of appeals’ dismissal of the City’s appeal, a dismissal 

concluding that the trial court’s order was void and not appealable. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioners have not sought review of an appealable judgment. The court of 

appeals dismissed the City’s appeal for want of jurisdiction because the dismissal 

for want of prosecution in the county court was entered in the administrative phase 

before the proceeding became a lawsuit. Without an appealable judgment, the 

Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the petition on the merits. Because 

Petitioners have not brought an issue or argument about the appealability of the

court of appeals’ judgment, Petitioners have waived any basis for the reversal of 

the judgment. Moreover, a commissioners’ hearing has been held in this case, 

objections to the commissioners’ award have been filed by the Petitioners, and the 

case has been set for trial, eliminating the underlying controversy about the 

Petitioners’ motion to dismiss the administrative proceeding. Thus, the 

controversy has become moot.
6

Finally, if the merits are reached, Texas jurisprudence provides that the 

county court cannot interfere with the special commissioners’ hearing. The 

dismissal for want of jurisdiction was void. 

Accordingly, the Court should deny the petition for review.

ARGUMENT

I. Petitioners failed to assert that there was an appealable judgment in the 

trial court or that the court of appeals’ dismissal for want of jurisdiction 

of the City’s appeal was error, which is necessary for the Court’s 

jurisdiction and for the Court to conduct a review of the merits.

The court of appeals’ disposition of the City’s appeal did not reach the 

merits of the trial court’s dismissal. The court dismissed the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction. Petitioners have failed to present an issue or argument that the court 

of appeals’ entry of the dismissal of the City’s appeal for want of jurisdiction is 

erroneous. (Pet. at xvii, 6-21.) Petitioners are required to discuss that issue before 

the merits of the trial court’s dismissal for want of prosecution can be reached.

When filing an appeal, the burden lies on the petitioner to raise and discuss 

any issues the appeal is based on. Ramos v. Richardson, 228 S.W.3d 671, 673 

(Tex. 2007) (per curiam). The rules of procedure require that a party present the 

issues to be decided by this Court in the party’s petition and brief on the merits. 

Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen., 354 S.W.3d 336, 352 (Tex. 

2010) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, 53.2(f), 53.4, 55.2(f)). “[I]ssues not presented 

in the petition for review and brief on the merits are waived.” Tex. Comptroller of 
7

Pub. Accounts, 354 S.W.3d at 352 (quoting Guitar Holding Co., L.P. v. Hudspeth 

Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 263 S.W.3d 910, 918 (Tex.

2008)); Ramos, 228 S.W.3d at 673 (refusing to address an argument raised in 

petitioners’ merits brief because petitioners failed to make it in their petition for 

review); City of Austin v. Travis Cnty. Landfill Co., L.L.C., 73 S.W.3d 234, 241 n. 

2 (Tex. 2002) (precluding consideration of an argument raised below because the 

respondent disclaimed the argument before the Supreme Court). If a petitioner 

does not present the error at all, the Court does not have a basis for reversing the 

judgment of the court of appeals. Hicks Bldg. & Equip. Co., Inc. v. Buice, 371 

S.W.2d 44, 45 (Tex. 1963) (the court entered a judgment of refusal, no reversible 

error, because the petitioners failed to bring forth and discuss the error of the lower 

court). In fact, if the petitioners’ brief lacks any discussion of the error, it is 

waived. Ramos, 228 S.W.3d at 673. The Court does not “stretch for a reason to 

reverse that was not raised.” Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 

776 (Tex. 2010).

Petitioners’ issue only asserts the authority of the trial court to dismiss a 

condemnation proceeding in the administrative phase. (Pet. at xvii.) Petitioners do 

not argue that a dismissal for want of prosecution in the trial court is an appealable 

judgment. They cannot, because as discussed in Section III below, an appellate 

court does not have appellate jurisdiction of a condemnation proceeding until a 
8

timely objection is made to a commissioners’ award. Pearson, 315 S.W.2d at 939. 

Here, because the dismissal order was entered before objections were filed, the 

dismissal was not an appealable judgment. See id. at 939 (holding that the trial 

court was statutorily authorized to enter the judgment in the absence of objections 

and such judgment was not appealable because objections were not filed and so it 

was not considered a judgment in a civil case).

Petitioners do not argue that the dismissal for want of prosecution of the 

administrative proceeding is an appealable judgment. Instead, they argue that the 

City’s filing of a lis pendens with the Statement in Condemnation makes the 

condemnation proceeding in the administrative phase a lawsuit. (Pet. at 12-14.) 

The Texas Property Code explicitly authorizes the City to file a lis pendens in the 

deed records when it files a statement in condemnation in an eminent domain 

proceeding. Tex. Prop. Code § 12.007(a) (“After the plaintiff’s statement in an 

eminent domain proceeding is filed . . . , a party to the action . . . may file for 

record . . . a notice that the action is pending.”). Whether a matter is a lawsuit or 

an administrative proceeding is not controlled by the lis pendens, which is merely 

notice that the eminent domain matter is pending. Instead, a court looks at the 

actual proceeding to determine whether a lis pendens is allowed under the statute. 

In re Jamail, 156 S.W.3d 104, 107 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, orig. proceeding). 

Here, the nature of the proceeding is established in chapter 21 of the Property 
9

Code. The proceeding when filed is administrative in nature. Amason v. Natural 

Gas Pipeline Co., 682 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1984). Thus, there is no judgment to 

appeal. The Court has no appellate jurisdiction.

Further, because Petitioners have failed to present an issue or argue whether 

there is an appealable judgment, they have waived any error in this case. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 53.2(i). Accordingly, the Court does not have a basis to reverse the 

court of appeals. See Hicks Bldg. & Equip. Co., Inc., 371 S.W.2d at 45. The Court 

should deny the petition for review.

II. The appeal is moot.

Appellate courts do not decide cases where no actual controversy exists 

between the parties at the time of the hearing. City of W. Univ. Place v. Martin, 

123 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex. 1939). Petitioners’ complaint was that the eminent 

domain proceeding had been pending too long in the administrative phase and 

should remain dismissed. On August 4, 2014, the trial court reinstated the case. 

(City’s App’x Tab 1.) On January 21, 2015, the special commissioners held a 

hearing and entered an award. (City’s App’x Tab 2.) On January 30, 2015, 

Petitioners filed objections to the award of the special commissioners. (City’s 

App’x Tab 3.) The case is now a lawsuit. The City has deposited the award with 

the registry of the court, entitling it to possession. (City’s App’x Tab 4.) The case 

has been set for trial. (City’s App’x Tab 5.) The controversy about dismissing the 
10

proceeding in the administrative phase is moot. For that reason, the Court should 

deny the petition for review.

III. The trial court does not have authority to dismiss a condemnation 

proceeding for want of prosecution in the administrative phase.

If the Court considers the ability of the trial court to dismiss for want of 

prosecution in the administrative phase, there is no statute or rule that provides 

subject-matter jurisdiction to a county court or gives a county court the capacity to 

act as a judicial tribunal until after the commissioners’ award has been filed and a 

party objects. Petitioners and Amici cite none. The Court should deny the petition 

for review for the following reasons.

A. The county court did not have inherent power to dismiss a 

statement in condemnation for want of prosecution during the 

administrative phase.

The court of appeals correctly held that the county court did not have 

inherent authority to dismiss for want of prosecution the proceeding in the 

administrative phase, because it was not a civil proceeding at the time of the 

dismissal. Highway 205 Farms, Ltd., 2014 WL 3587403, at *3 (citing Dickey v. 

City of Houston, 501 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. 1973)). In fact, an eminent domain 

proceeding is an administrative proceeding until a party files an objection (appeal) 

to the award of the special commissioners. John v. State, 826 S.W.2d 138, 141 n.5 

(Tex. 1992); State v. Giles, 368 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Tex. 1963) (orig. proceeding); 

Pearson, 315 S.W.2d at 937; Gulf Energy Pipeline Co. v. Garcia, 884 S.W.2d 823 
11

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, orig. proceeding); Patrick Media Grp., Inc. v. 

Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 879 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1994, writ 

denied). Without a timely-filed objection, an eminent domain proceeding never 

becomes a civil case. Dickey, 501 S.W.2d at 294. Only after the commissioners 

have been appointed and sworn and an award has been filed, and only by filing 

objections to the award, may the condemnee invoke the legal jurisdiction of the 

trial court. City of Carrollton v. OHBA Corp., 809 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1991, no writ). Thus, under Texas law, the first phase of an eminent 

domain proceeding is an administrative proceeding, not a judicial case. Id. (citing 

Amason, 682 S.W.2d at 241). The judge acts purely as an administrative agent. 

Id.; see Gulf Energy Pipeline Co., 884 S.W.2d at 822 (“The statute expressly gives 

the court administrative jurisdiction to appoint the commissioners, receive their 

opinion as to value, and render judgment based upon the commissioners’ award.”). 

A condemnation proceeding is not within the general jurisdiction of the county 

court. Pearson, 315 S.W.2d at 937. “[T]he filing of timely objections confers 

jurisdiction upon the county court to hear and determine the issues in the exercise 

of its judicial powers.” Id. at 937. 

Petitioners and Amici agree that an eminent domain proceeding consists of 

two distinct parts. They agree that the county court dismissed the condemnation 

on Petitioners’ motion during the administrative phase. (Pet. at 6; NFIB Br. at 15-
12

16; AutoNation Br. at 10.) Petitioners claim that the county court at law has 

inherent authority to enter a dismissal for want of prosecution because a court has 

inherent authority to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction. (Pet. at 14-15, 17-19.) 

However, the case law is unambiguous. A county court at law has no authority to 

interfere with the administrative proceedings of the special commissioners; instead,

the trial court’s jurisdiction, except for the appointment of the special 

commissioners, begins only after objections are filed to the special commissioners’ 

decision after the special commissioners’ hearing. Peak Pipeline Corp. v. Norton, 

629 S.W.2d 185, 186 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1982, no writ). And a court has no 

authority during the administrative proceeding to grant a continuance, set the 

hearing dates, or dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution on a motion of 

the property owner. See Gulf Energy Pipeline Co., 884 S.W.2d at 823 (stating that 

the Property Code does not give the trial court power to oversee the exercise of the 

commissioners’ powers during the administrative proceeding but does delegate to 

the commissioners the authority and limited discretion to administer the time and 

place of the commissioners’ hearing). 

In the administrative phase, the county court cannot exercise judicial 

powers. Blasingame v. Krueger, 800 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) (“As distinguished from the county judge in his 

administrative capacity, there is nothing which the county court can hear and 
13

determine by the exercise of its judicial powers in a special commissioners 

proceeding.”). Moreover, the county court does not have jurisdiction to set 

deadlines within which a special commissioners’ hearing must be held. In Gulf 

Energy Pipeline Co., the court considered the propriety of the district court’s 

resetting the special commissioners’ hearing of several related eminent domain 

proceedings to a later date and granting to the landowners a 60-day continuance of 

the special commissioners’ hearing. Gulf Energy Pipeline Co., 884 S.W.2d at 822. 

The conclusion was that without an objection to the commissioners’ award, the 

proceeding never becomes a civil case. Id. at 822-23. The orders resetting the 

commissioners’ hearing and granting the continuance were outside the scope of the 

trial court’s jurisdiction during the administrative proceeding. The trial court had 

no authority to grant the continuance or set the hearing dates, and entering these 

orders was a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 823. A trial court does not have 

jurisdiction to abate a condemnation proceeding after the commissioners have been

appointed and sworn. OHBA Corp., 809 S.W.2d at 589. The legal jurisdiction 

could not even be invoked by the condemnee requesting declaratory and injunctive 

relief to abate or seek declaratory relief in the administrative phase. Id. 

There is no dispute that this proceeding was in the administrative stage when 

it was dismissed for want of prosecution. The commissioners’ hearing was set but 

had not been held. Petitioners and Amici assert that the county court has inherent 
14

power to control his docket by dismissing for want of prosecution. (Pet. at 17-19; 

NFIB Br. at 13-14; CR, at 35, 93-4.) However, the right to dismiss for want of 

prosecution is the right to dismiss a lawsuit, not an administrative proceeding. See 

Bevil v. Johnson, 307 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. 1957) (describing judicial discretion in 

a civil lawsuit, noting no statutory authority). All the cases Petitioners cite to the 

Court involve a court’s inherent powers in a lawsuit, not a condemnation 

proceeding in the administrative phase. (See Pet. at 19-20 [citing Villarreal v. San 

Antonio Truck & Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1999) (dismissing negligence

suit)]; NFIB Br. at 13 [citing Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982)

(dismissing will contest); In re Hereweareagain, Inc., 383 S.W.3d 703, 705 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding) (reversing sanctions)].) 

The Court has said that “a statutory proceeding in which the controversy is 

not submitted to and determined by the court as a judicial tribunal ‘is neither a suit 

at law nor a case in equity’ even though the same culminates in a judgment.” 

Pearson, 315 S.W.2d at 937 (quoting Fortune v. Killebrew, 23 S.W. 976, 978 

(Tex. 1893)). Thus, at the administrative stage the county court cannot enter a 

judgment or exercise judicial powers. See Pearson, 315 S.W.2d at 937 (holding 

that when there is no objection to an award, the court’s order directing that the 

award be recorded and making the same the judgment of the court does not 

constitute a judgment in a civil case). The county court does not gain jurisdiction 
15

as a court until the objections are filed to the commissioners’ award. In re State, 

325 S.W.3d 848, 851 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, orig. proceeding). Thus, the 

county court had no authority to decide the proper time for or timing of a 

commissioners’ hearing. 

Petitioners and Amici claim that the trial court must have authority to 

dismiss administrative proceedings for want of prosecution or statements in 

condemnation could remain pending indefinitely and the court could do nothing. 

(Pet. at 6; NFIB Br. at 23; AutoNation Br. at 8, 14-16.) Amici complain that a 

court should be able to compel the commissioners to hold a hearing. (NFIB Br. at 

25.) The issue here is not about compelling the commissioners to hold a hearing—

the special commissioners had scheduled a hearing within weeks of the 

dismissal—the issue here is about preventing a hearing. The commissioners have 

the duty to schedule the commissioners’ hearing. Tex. Prop. Code § 21.015(a). 

Moreover, the special commissioners themselves may compel the attendance of 

witnesses and the production of testimony, administer oaths, and punish for 

contempt in the same manner as a county judge. Id. § 21.014 (c); In re State, 65 

S.W.3d 383, 386 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, orig. proceeding). And because the 

special commissioners schedule the hearing, a property owner can request that the 

special commissioners set the hearing just as the condemnor can. The solution is 

to request a setting—not the dismissal of the condemnation proceeding.
16

Accordingly, the county court does not have any inherent authority to 

dismiss an administrative proceeding. The county court’s jurisdiction to control its 

docket begins when the administrative proceeding is complete. The county court

here did not have the jurisdiction to dismiss the administrative proceeding, because 

the proceeding was not yet a civil case. Thus, the order is void.

B. The Property Code does not provide the county court with 

jurisdiction to dismiss a statement in condemnation during the 

administrative phase.

A condemnation proceeding is not within the general jurisdiction of the 

county court. Pearson, 315 S.W.2d at 937. “An action to condemn is a special 

statutory proceeding, wholly administrative in nature, at least until the 

commissioners’ decision is filed with the county judge.” Id. at 936-37. “[T]he 

filing of timely objections confers jurisdiction upon the county court to hear and 

determine the issues in the exercise of its judicial powers.” Id. at 937. The power 

of the county court as a judicial tribunal in eminent domain proceedings is thus 

limited to that which has been conferred upon it by statute. Id. at 937-38. The 

statute does not provide for dismissal on a motion of the property owner during the 

administrative phase. Petitioners and Amici cite section 21.019 of the Property 

Code for authority that a county court can dismiss on motion of the landowner in 

the administrative phase. (Pet. at 15-17; NFIB Br. at 19-20.) That section 

provides that the condemning authority can move to dismiss and the property 
17

owner can seek dismissal in the judicial phase if the condemning authority does 

not have the right to take. Tex. Prop. Code § 21.019. The statute entitles a

condemnor to dismiss a condemnation proceeding prior to taking possession of the 

property. Id. § 21.019(a); Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 808 S.W.2d 56, 60 

(Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding). The condemnor can have monetary obligations for 

dismissing after the special commissioners have made an award. Tex. Prop. Code 

§ 21.019(a), (b). The statute does not provide the property owner the right to seek 

dismissal in the administrative phase. The plain language of section 21.019(c) 

shows that it only applies during the judicial, not the administrative, phase when it 

refers to “[a] court that hears and grants a motion to dismiss a condemnation

proceeding made by a property owner seeking a judicial denial of the right to 

condemn or that otherwise renders a judgment denying the right to condemn.” Id.

§ 21.019(c). The right to condemn is not an issue in the administrative phase. The 

special commissioners’ only duty is to assess the damages of the owner to the 

property being condemned. Id. § 21.014. Petitioners sought to dismiss for want of 

prosecution. The statute does not provide for a dismissal on that basis. 

Here, the trial court acted during the administrative phase and hindered the 

commissioners from holding a hearing. Accordingly, the county court had no 

jurisdiction to dismiss the case for want of prosecution.
18

C. Rule 165a does not apply to the administrative proceeding.

Petitioners and Amici assert the county court had authority to dismiss 

pursuant to rule 165a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The use of this rule 

assumes that there is a civil proceeding for the rule to apply to—which there is 

not—when the pre-objection procedures are set by statute. See John, 826 S.W.2d

(distinguishing default procedures under rule 239a and section 21.049 of the Texas 

Property Code). The Court, in promulgating rules of civil procedure, was not 

attempting to prescribe rules to govern any procedure except judicial proceedings. 

Nunn v. New, 226 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex. 1950) (orig. proceeding). It is when the 

objections are filed that the court must “try the case in the same manner as other 

civil cases.” Tex. Prop. Code § 21.018(b). At that time, an eminent domain 

proceeding, like other civil cases, is subject to the rules of civil procedure. Rose v. 

State, 497 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex. 1973) The existence of these rules does not 

change the nature of the eminent domain proceeding before objections are filed. It 

is an administrative proceeding and the rules of civil procedure do not apply. 

Accordingly, the county court did not have jurisdiction to dismiss for want of 

prosecution under the rules. Thus, the Court should deny the Petitioners’ petition 

for review.
19

PRAYER

Petitioners have not brought a petition for review of an appealable judgment. 

The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and the 

Petitioners do not complain about the dismissal. Further, the condemnation 

proceeding was reinstated, and the commissioners held a hearing and entered an 

award. The Petitioners objected. The award has been deposited. The case has 

been set for trial. Because of the posture of the eminent domain proceeding, the 

Court should deny this petition as moot or because Petitioners have waived any 

complaint about the court of appeals judgment. Finally, if the merits are 

considered, the county court could not exercise its judicial powers in the 

administrative phase of an eminent domain proceeding, so the dismissal for want 

of prosecution was void. Accordingly, this Court should deny this petition for 

review. 
20

Respectfully submitted,

WARREN M. S. ERNST

Dallas City Attorney

/s/ Barbara Rosenberg

Barbara Rosenberg

Texas Bar No. 17267700

Christopher D. Bowers

Texas Bar No. 02731300

James B. Pinson

Texas Bar No. 16017700

Sonia T. Ahmed

Texas Bar No. 24082605

Assistant City Attorneys

City Attorney’s Office

1500 Marilla Street, Room 7D North

Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: 214-670-3519

Telecopier: 214-670-0622

barbara.rosenberg@dallascityhall.com

chris.bowers@dallascityhall.com

james.pinson@dallascityhall.com

sonia.ahmed@dallascityhall.com

ATTORNEYS FOR CITY OF DALLAS
21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 13, 2015, a copy of the foregoing document 

was served in accordance with Rule 9.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 

(1) through an electronic filing manager (EFM) upon each person listed below if 

the email address is on file with the EFM or (2) by email (if the address is 

available) or first-class mail upon each person below who does not have an email 

on file with the EFM:

Eddie Vassallo

Charles A. Salazar

Hayley D. Ailshie

Vassallo & Salazar, P.C.

3710 Rawlins Street, Suite 1200

Dallas, Texas 75219

Kimberly S. Keller

Keller Stolarczyk PLLC

234 W. Bandera Road, #120

Boerne, Texas 78006

Attorneys for Relators, Highway 205 Farms, LTD., and Maurice E. Moore, 

Jr.

Stephen F. Malouf

Jeremy C. Martin

Jonathan Nockels

Malouf & Markels LLP

3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 800

Dallas, Texas 75219

Attorneys for Amici, AutoNation, Inc. & Billingsley Company
22

Leif A. Olson

The Olson Firm PLLC

4830 Wilson Road, Suite 300

Humble, Texas 77396

Attorney for Amici National Federation of Independent Business and NFIB 

Small Business Legal Center

/s/Barbara Rosenberg

Attorney for the City of Dallas
23

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4

Certificate of Compliance with Type-Volume Limitation, 

Typeface requirements and Type Style Requirements

1. This brief complies with the type volume limitation of Tex. R. App. P. 

9.4(i)(2) because:

⁯ this brief contains 4,482 words, excluding the parts of the brief 

exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements and the type style 

requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because:

⁯ this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using 

Microsoft Office Word 2010 in 14-point Times New Roman.

/s/Barbara Rosenberg

Attorney for City of Dallas

Dated: April 13, 2015
APPENDIX

Order Reinstating Case ...................................................................................... Tab 1

Special Commissioners’ Award......................................................................... Tab 2

Objections to Special Commissioners’ Award .................................................. Tab 3

Notice of Deposit of Special Commissioners’ Award....................................... Tab 4

Trial Setting........................................................................................................ Tab 5
TAB 1
TAB 2





























TAB 3


CITY OF DALLAS, 

vs. 

HIGHWAY 205 FARMS, LTD., 

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 

KAUFMAN COUNTY, TERRELL 

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

and TRINITY VALLEY COMMUNITY 

COLLEGE DISTRICT 

No.84262CC 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

IN COUNTY COURT 

AT LAW 

KAUFMAN COUNTY, TEXAS 

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT, REPURCHASE DISCLOSURES, APPLICATION FOR WRIT 

OF POSSESSION, AND INVESTMENT INSTRUCTIONS 

NOW COMES the City of Dallas (hereafter, "City"), a municipal corporation situated in 

Dallas County, Texas, Petitioner in the above entitled and numbered condemnation proceeding, 

and respectfully shows the Court: 

1. The written Award of Special Commissioners has been filed with the Judge in these 

proceedings, whereby the amount of damages awarded against Petitioner by the special 

commissioners is THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED 

SIXTY-THREE DOLLARS AND N0/100 ($357,263.00) (hereafter, the "Award"). 

2. The City desires to enter upon and take possession of the property sought to be taken in 

these proceedings pending litigation and, in order that it may do so, the City has deposited said 

amount into the Registry of the Court by delivery to the District Clerk the following described 

check, to wit: numbered 967718, dated March 24, 2015, payable to "Kaufman County" subject to 

the order of the Defendants, in the amount of the Award. 

3. By reason of said deposit, and pursuant to Texas Property Code §21.021(a)(2) and 

§21.021 (c), the City is now entitled to enter upon and take possession of said property. 

4. In accordance with Texas Property Code section 21.023, notice is hereby given that the 

owner or the owner's heirs, successors, or assigns may be entitled to repurchase the property 

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT, REPURCHASE DISCLOSURES, APPLICATION 

FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION, AND INVESTMENT INSTRUCTIONS Page 1 of5 

Filed: 3/25/2015 8:09:19 AM

Rhonda Hughey,

District Clerk

Kaufman County, Texas

Maria Olivares

TAB 4
under the provisions of Subchapter E of Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code (a copy of which 

is attached hereto as Exhibit A) or request from the City certain information relating to the use of 

the property and any actual progress made toward that use, and that the repurchase price is the 

price paid to the owner by the entity at the time the entity acquired the property through eminent 

domain. 

5. The City requests that the deposit of money in the Court's registry be invested and 

the interest distributed according to law. 

6. Defendants are entitled under existing law to withdraw part or all of the amount deposited 

at any time; To the extent consistent therewith, the investment should be for a period of at least 6 

months. 

7. The City's federal tax identification number is: 75-6000508. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Petitioner prays this Honorable Court order 

the clerk to issue a writ of possession of the property condemned herein to the City of Dallas, 

together with such other orders which may appear necessary and proper for the enforcement of 

the City's right to enter upon and take possession of said property; and that the Court order the 

clerk to invest the deposited funds in an interest bearing account in accordance with Section 

117.053(c) ofthe Texas Local Government Code. 

Respectfully submitted, 

OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 

CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS 

WARREN M. S. ERNST 

City Attorney 

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT, REPURCHASE DISCLOSURES, APPLICATION 

FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION, AND INVESTMENT INSTRUCTIONS Page 2 of5 
By fu- · CHRISTOPHER C. GUNTER 

Senior Assistant City Attorney 

State Bar of Texas No. 24025750 

CHRISTOPHER J. CASO 

Senior Assistant City Attorney 

State Bar of Texas No. 03969230 

Dallas City Hall 

1500 Marilla Street, 7BN 

Dallas, Texas 75201 

(214) 670-3519- Voice 

(214) 670-0622- Fax 

Christopher. gunter@dallasci tyhall. corn 

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 

CITY OF DALLAS 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served upon all 

parties in compliance with Rule 2la of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this the 251

h day of 

March, 2015. 

Highway 205 Farms, LTD., 

and Maurice E. Moore, Jr 

Ms. Hayley D. Ailshie- viaE-Service 

Mr. Eddie Vassallo - via E-Service 

Kaufman County 

Jeffrey Brown- viaE-Service 

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT, REPURCHASE DISCLOSURES, APPLICATION 

FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION, AND INVESTMENT INSTRUCTIONS Page 3 of5 
EXHIBIT A 

TEXAS PROPERTY CODE, CHAPTER 21 

SUBCHAPTER E. REPURCHASE OF REAL PROPERTY FROM CONDEMNING ENTITY 

Sec. 21.101. RIGHT OF REPURCHASE 

(a) A person from whom a real property interest is acquired by an entity through eminent domain for a 

public use, or that person's heirs, successors, or assigns, is entitled to repurchase the property as provided by 

this subchapter if: 

( 1) the public use for which the property was acquired through eminent domain is canceled before the 

property is used for that public use; 

(2) no actual progress is made toward the public use for which the property was acquired between the 

date of acquisition and the 1Oth anniversary of that date; or 

(3) the property becomes unnecessary for the public use for which the property was acquired, or a 

substantially similar public use, before the 1Oth anniversary of the date of acquisition. 

(b) In this section, "actual progress" means the completion of two or more of the following 

actions: 

(I) the performance of a significant amount of labor to develop the property or other property 

acquired for the same public use project for which the property owner's property was acquired; 

(2) the provision of a significant amount of materials to develop the property or other property 

acquired for the same public use project for which the property owner's property was acquired; 

(3) the hiring of and performance of a significant amount of work by an architect, engineer, or 

surveyor to prepare a plan or plat that includes the property or other property acquired for the same public use 

project for which the property owner's property was acquired; 

( 4) application for state or federal funds to develop the property or other property acquired for the 

same public use project for which the property owner's property was acquired; 

(5) application for a state or federal permit to develop the property or other property acquired for the 

same public use project for which the property owner's property was acquired; 

( 6) the acquisition of a tract or parcel of real property adjacent to the property for the same public use 

project for which the owner's property was acquired; or 

(7) for a governmental entity, the adoption by a majority of the entity's governing body at a public 

hearing of a development plan for a public use project that indicates that the entity will not complete more than 

one action described by Subdivisions (1)-(6) before the lOth anniversary of the date of acquisition of the 

property. 

(c) A district court may determine all issues in any suit regarding the repurchase of a real property 

interest acquired through eminent domain by the former property owner or the owner's heirs, successors, or 

ass1gns. 

Sec. 21.102. NOTICE TO PREVIOUS PROPERTY OWNER REQUIRED. 

Not later than the I 80th day after the date an entity that acquired a real property interest through eminent 

domain determines that the former property owner is entitled to repurchase the property under Section 21.101, 

the entity shall send by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the property owner or the owner's heirs, 

successors, or assigns a notice containing: 

( 1) an identification, which is not required to be a legal description, of the property that was acquired; 

(2) an identification of the public use for which the property had been acquired and a statement that: 

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT, REPURCHASE DISCLOSURES, APPLICATION 

FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION, AND INVESTMENT INSTRUCTIONS Page 2 of5 
(A) the public use was canceled before the property was used for the public use; 

(B) no actual progress was made toward the public use; or 

(C) the property became unnecessary for the public use, or a substantially similar public use, 

before the 1Oth anniversary of the date of acquisition; and 

(3) a description of the person's right under this subchapter to repurchase the property. 

Sec. 21.1021. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION REGARDING CONDEMNED PROPERTY. 

(a) On or after the lOth anniversary of the date on which real property was acquired by an entity through 

eminent domain, a property owner or the owner's heirs, successors, or assigns may request that the 

condemning entity make a determination and provide a statement and other relevant information regarding: 

( 1) whether the public use for which the property was acquired was canceled before the property was 

used for the public use; 

(2) whether any actual progress was made toward the public use between the date of acquisition and 

the 1Oth anniversary of that date, including an itemized description of the progress made, if applicable; and 

(3) whether the property became unnecessary for the public use, or a substantially similar public use, 

before the 1Oth anniversary of the date of acquisition. 

(b) A request under this section must contain sufficient detail to allow the entity to identify the specific 

tract of land in relation to which the information is sought. 

(c) Not later than the 90th day following the date of receipt of the request for information, the entity shall 

send a written response by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the requestor. 

Sec. 21.1022. LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR REPURCHASE RIGHT. Notwithstanding Section 21.103, the 

right to repurchase provided by this subchapter is extinguished on the first anniversary of the expiration of the 

period for an entity to provide notice under Section 21.102 if the entity: 

( 1) is required to provide notice under Section 21.1 02; 

(2) makes a good faith effort to locate and provide notice to each person entitled to notice before the 

expiration of the deadline for providing notice under that section; and 

(3) does not receive a response to any notice provided under that section in the period for response 

prescribed by Section 21.103. 

Sec. 21.103. RESALE OF PROPERTY; PRICE. 

(a) Not later than the 180th day after the date of the postmark on a notice sent under Section 21.102 or a 

response to a request made under Section 21.1021 that indicates that the property owner, or the owner's heirs, 

successors, or assigns, is entitled to repurchase the property interest in accordance with Section 21.10 1, the 

property owner or the owner's heirs, successors, or assigns must notify the entity of the person's intent to 

repurchase the property interest under this subchapter. 

(b) As soon as practicable after receipt of a notice of intent to repurchase under Subsection (a), the entity 

shall offer to sell the property interest to the person for the price paid to the owner by the entity at the time the 

entity acquired the property through eminent domain. The person's right to repurchase the property expires on 

the 90th day after the date on which the entity makes the offer. 

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT, REPURCHASE DISCLOSURES, APPLICATION 

FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION, AND INVESTMENT INSTRUCTIONS Page 3 of5 
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REGISTER OF ACTIONS

CASE NO. 84262CC

City of Dallas Vs. Highway 205 Farms, LTD, Maurice Moore, Jr., et al §

§

§

§

§

Case Type: Condemnation

Date Filed: 08/30/2011

Location: DC County Court at Law

PARTY INFORMATION

Lead Attorneys

Defendant Highway 205 Farms, LTD Hayley D Ailshie

  Retained

214­559­7200(W)

Defendant Kaufman County

Defendant Moore, Maurice E, Jr. Hayley D Ailshie

  Retained

214­559­7200(W)

Defendant Terrell Independent School Disrict

Defendant The Dow Chemical Company

Defendant Trinity Valley Community College District

Plaintiff City of Dallas Christopher C Gunter

  Retained

214­670­4288(W)

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

OTHER EVENTS AND HEARINGS

08/30/2011 Original Petition (OCA)

08/31/2011 Order Appointing Special Commissioners

10/24/2011 Order

Removing A Special Commissioner and And Appointing A Replacement Lee Schaffer is removed and CON BURT Is Appointed

11/18/2011 Oath of Special Commissioners

DON BURT

11/18/2011 Oath of Special Commissioners

ROBERT REPKA, JR.

11/18/2011 Oath of Special Commissioners

WILLIAM JORDAN

09/26/2012 Notice of Appearance

and Designation of Lead Counsel

03/07/2013 Motion to Dismiss

FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION

03/21/2013 Notice of Hearing

03/27/2013 Notice

of Special Commissioners' Hearing

03/27/2013 Notice

of Special Commissioners' Hearing

03/27/2013 Order

Setting Hearing

03/27/2013 Order

Setting Hearing

03/27/2013 Order

Setting Hearing

04/05/2013 Response

Plf's ­ to Def's Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution

04/15/2013 Response

Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion TO Dimiss For Want of Prosecution

04/17/2013 DWOP  (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Jones, Dennis P.)

04/17/2013 Notice

of Special Commissioners' Hearing

04/17/2013 Notice

of Special Commissioners' Hearing

04/17/2013 Other

TAB 5
1st amended statement in condemnation

04/17/2013 Order to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution

05/09/2013 Motion for Reinstatement

Plaintiff's

05/09/2013 Order

setting hearing

05/13/2013 Order

Setting Hearing

05/29/2013 CANCELED Motion to Reinstate (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Jones, Dennis P.)

Reset

06/12/2013 CANCELED Motion to Reinstate (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Jones, Dennis P.)

Reset

06/19/2013 Response

Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Verified Motion To Reinstate

06/21/2013 Motion to Reinstate (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Jones, Dennis P.)

06/21/2013 Order Denying

Plf''s Motion to Reinstate

07/12/2013 Notice of Appeal

accelerated

07/12/2013 Request for Preparation of Reporter's Record

07/12/2013 Request for Preparation of Clerk's Record

07/29/2013 Clerk's Record Sent Electronic

08/27/2013 Motion to Consolidate

City's

08/27/2013 Other

Mandamus Record

07/29/2014 Order

from court of appeals

08/04/2014 Order

to Reinstate Case

12/23/2014 Order

Setting Hearing

12/23/2014 Order

Setting Hearing

12/23/2014 Order

Setting Hearing

01/21/2015 Award of Special Commissioners

01/22/2015 Notice

Offical Notice From Supreme Court of Texas

01/30/2015 Objection

to Award of Special Commissioners ­ Env #3959198

02/10/2015 Waiver

Acceptance of Sercive ­ Env #4083639

03/12/2015 Notice

03/12/2015 Jury Fee Paid (OCA)

03/16/2015 Notice

of Jury Trial

03/18/2015 Letter

to Judge

03/25/2015 Notice

of Deposit of Award

12/07/2015 Jury Trial (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Jones, Dennis P.)

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Attorney Gunter, Christopher C

Total Financial Assessment 369.00

Total Payments and Credits 369.00

Balance Due as of 04/03/2015 0.00

08/30/2011 Transaction Assessment 217.00

09/16/2011 Payment Receipt # DC­100875 City Of Dallas (217.00)

07/16/2013 Transaction Assessment 112.00

07/17/2013 Transaction Assessment 10.00

07/29/2013 Transaction Assessment 20.00

07/29/2013 Transaction Assessment 10.00

08/20/2013 Payment Receipt # DC­112355 City of Dallas (122.00)

08/23/2013 Payment Receipt # DC­112428 Bo Moore (30.00)

Plaintiff City of Dallas

Total Financial Assessment 30.00

Total Payments and Credits 30.00

Balance Due as of 04/03/2015 0.00

03/12/2015 Transaction Assessment 30.00

03/12/2015 EFile Payment Receipt # DC­121049 City of Dallas (30.00)