SERVED: JULY 2, 2014 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION __ \_:: __ ,":; 

In The Matter Of: 

BAER AIR, INC. 

Respondent 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC ?~-~ ~ ~r ~Pi -': ~ "'[ . -· ~ ' 

Docket No. FAA-2014-0112 

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Case No. 2011S0150234 

ORDER FINDING RESPONDENT FILED A TIMELY REQUEST FOR HEARING 

AND DENYING FAA'S MOTION TO DISMISS 

On May 1, 2014, the FAA filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 

("Motion"). 

On May 21,2014, the Respondent, Baer Air, Inc. filed an Answer opposing the FAA's 

Motion to Dismiss ("Answer"). 

On May 23,2014, the FAA filed a Reply to the Respondent's Response to the FAA's 

Motion to Dismiss ("Reply"). 

On June 17, 2014, an Order Continuing the Rule 16 Litigation Scheduling Conference 

was filed. 

I. Brief Factual Summary 

q: 30 

It was undisputed that on May 24,2014 and May 25,2011 the FAA conducted a safety 

inspection of the Respondent's facilities. (Complaint, 1 ~ 4.) Approximately two (2) years later, 

on April30, 2013, the FAA served the Respondent with a Notice ofProposed Civil Penalty. 

Two and a half(2 ~)months later, on July 15,2013, Mr. Jeffrey L. Levy notified the FAA, via 

email correspondence, that he was an attorney who would be representing the Respondent in the 

civil penalty action. (Response, 2 ~ 3; Levy Affidavit~ 4, 10-11; Ex. A, 3-4.) Mr. Levy then 

acted on behalf of the Respondent in settlement negotiations with the FAA. (Response, 2; Levy 
Affidavit~ 5-10.) During negotiations, Mr. Levy told the FAA that if settlement discussions 

failed, the Respondent wanted a formal hearing. (Levy Affidavit~~ 7, 10.) 

The FAA asserts that approximately ten months later, on March 5, 2014, it properly 

served a Final Notice of Proposed Civil Penalty ("FNPCP") on Mr. William L. Baer, the 

president of the Respondent. (Motion, 1; Exs. 1 and 2.) It was undisputed that the FAA did not 

attempt any service of the FNPCP on Mr. Levy, the Respondent's attorney. The FAA asserts that 

the FNPCP was served on Mr. Baer by certified mail, return receipt requested. (Motion, 1; Exs. 2 

and 3.) Although the FAA's certificate of service (Motion, Ex. 1 page 5) was not signed or dated, 

it was undisputed that a "James Toler" signed for, and received, the certified mailing on March 

10,2014 (Motion, Exs. 2 and 3). The FAA first asserted that the date of receipt is included in 

counting the fifteen days (Motion, 1 ), but then presented a time calculation that did not include 

counting the date ofreciept 1 Thus, according to the FAA, the last date for filing a timely request 

for hearing was March 25, 2014. (Motion, 1.) As a result, the FAA argues that the Respondent's 

March 26, 2014 filing was late, and that this court has no jurisdiction to even consider the issues 

presented. (Motion, 1-2; Reply, 2.) 

The Respondent first objects that service was not effectuated on the Respondent's 

designated agent, its attorney, Mr. Levy. The Respondent alternatively argues good cause; its 

President, Mr. Baer, was out of the office from March 10, 2014, through March 25, 2014, 

because ofhis pilot flight training in Denver, Colorado. (Response, 3 ~ 11; Levy Affidavit, 2 ~ 

12.) On March 26, 2014, Mr. Baer returned to the office, opened the certified mailing, and 

immediately contacted Mr. Levy, the Respondent's attorney. (Response, 3 ~ 11; Levy Affidavit, 

2 ~ 13; Ex. C, 2.) That same day, Mr. Levy contacted the FAA on behalf of the Respondent about 

the FNPCP. (Response, 3 ~ 14; Levy Affidavit, 3 ~ 14; Ex. C, 2.) In this March 26, 2014 email 

contact, Mr. Levy objected to the FAA's service choice, since he was still the attorney of record, 

and the FAA had not served him with the FNPCP. (Ex. C, 2.) In addition, that same day, March 

26, 2014, the Respondent filed a request for hearing. (Motion, 1; Response, 4 ~ 15; Levy 

1 Given the FAA's correct calculation of time after the March 10,2010 receipt, it appears that the FAA intended to 

say that the 15 day time clock began to run immediately after the date of receipt. (Motion, 1 ). Pursuant to 14 C.F .R. 

§ 13.212(b), "[t]he date of an. act, event, or default, after which a designated time period begins to run, is not 

included in a computation of time under this subpart." Although 14 C.F .R. § 13 .16(g)(2) appears in a different 

subpart (i.e., subpart C), the governing subpart in this proceeding is subpart G, which lists the Rules of Practice. 

Thus, the fifteen day time clock begins the day after the date of receipt. This provides the responding party with the 

full fifteen days as provided by the regulation. The FAA's actual time calculation reflects the full15 day period. 

Page 2 of 11 
Affidavit, 3 ~ 15; Ex. B.) Lastly, the Respondent alternatively argues that the FAA waived the 

right to file its Motion upon filing the Complaint, pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.208(a). 

II. Jurisdiction 

The FAA argued that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because "the 

regulatory window had closed." (Motion, 2 and Reply, 2.) This is incorrect. The Rules of 

Practice contained in 14 C.F.R., part 13, subpart G, provide that when a request for hearing is 

filed, the court's jurisdiction is established, and the court has full jurisdiction to address all issues 

involving the case. See 14 C.F.R. § 13.201(a) and 14 C.F.R. § 13.16 (i). Thus, upon motion, the 

court may first consider the question whether the request for hearing was timely or untimely 

filed. If the request for hearing was untimely filed, then, as the FAA correctly noted (Reply, 2), 

the respondent has the burden to show good cause before such an untimely request is excused In 

re Carl P. Langton, FAA Order No. 93-12, page 6 (Mar. 25, 1993)(An untimely request for 

hearing will be excused only upon a showing of good cause). 

III. Proof of Service and Receipt of the FNPCP 

Pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§ 13.16(g)(2), a respondent must, within 15 days of receipt ofthe 

FNPCP, either pay the proposed penalty or request a hearing. In re Canuck Industries, FAA2000-7726, FAA Order No. 2002-14, Decision and Order, 2 (May 10, 2002), modified on other 

grounds, FAA Order No. 2002-17, Order Granting Petition to Modify (May 24, 2002). 

There have been multiple arguments raised by the parties in this Motion. All arguments 

have been considered. However, only certain matters will be discussed herein. 

A. The FAA has the Burden of Proof in Establishing Proper Service 

Pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§ 13.224, the FAA has the burden of proof in demonstrating proper 

service and receipt of the FNPCP. See also, Steven Baicker-McKee, et.al, Federal Civil Rules 

Handbook, West Publishing (2012) (Rule 4- Burden of Proving Service ofProcess)(The burden 

of proof of service is on the party attempting service.) 

The FAA asserts that the Respondent's fifteen (15) day time clock for filing a timely 

request for hearing began to run immediately after March 10, 2014, the date the Respondent 

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allegedly "received" the certified mailing of the FNPCP at its business address. (Motion, 1.) 

Thus, according to the FAA, the last day for the Respondent to file a timely request for hearing 

was March 25,2014. 

B. Who Must be Served- Designation of Respondent Agent or Respondent Attorney 

To effectuate service of a FNPCP, 14 C.F.R. § 13.16 provides: 

If not previously done in response to a notice of proposed civil penalty, a corporation or 

company may designate in writing another person to receive documents in that civil 

penalty action. 

14 C.F .R. § 13 .16(g)(2) also specifically requires proof of the date of receipt of the 

FNPCP by either the Respondent or its designated agent before the fifteen day time clock begins 

to run. 

The record is silent regarding when (if ever) the Respondent itself notified the FAA that 

it had hired Mr. Levy as counsel, and was specifically designating Mr. Levy, pursuant to 14 

C.F.R. § 13.16(g), to accept service on its behalf. However, even without a party's specific 

written designation for alternate service under 14 C.F.R. § 13.16(g), or an attorney's formal 

filing of a Notice of Appearance, the FAA Administrator has recognized that service on a 

respondent's attorney-who has been identified to the FAA in some fashion as acting the 

respondent's representative-is well-established in these proceedings. 

Although the regulation does anticipate that a respondent may designate in writing 

alternative means of service, nothing in this provision undermines the settled principle, 

routinely followed in a variety of litigation contexts and generally required by the rules of 

professional conduct, that service on a party is effectively accomplished by service on 

identified counsel. 

Canuck Industries, at 4.2 

The "settled principle" recognized by the FAA Administrator is the long established 

federal service practice codified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1), which requires service to be "made 

on the [party's] attorney, unless the court orders service on the party." Rule 5 (b) 1; See, Steven 

Baicker-McKee, et.al, Federal Civil Rules Handbook, West Publishing (2012)(Rule 5- Service 

2 In the year 2002, at time of the FAA Administrator's Decision and Order in the Canuck case, the regulation was 

contained in 14 C.F .R. § 13 .16( e). In 2005, and again in 2006, the regulation was amended. The applicable 

regulatory language is now found in 14 C.F .R. § 13 .16(g). 

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on Attorney, Not Party); See also, Wright, Miller, et.al., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 

5. Serving and Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers) (the requirement to serve a party's attorney 

should be "followed literally"); U.S. E.E.O.C., 2010 WL 5391269,2 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (if a party 

is represented by an attorney, service must be made on the attorney). 

The FAA Administrator in Canuck Industries also referenced "the rules of professional 

conduct" in acknowledging that once a respondent obtains counsel, service on the respondent 

may be "effectively accomplished" on respondent's counsel. Canuck Industriesat 4. 

Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") addresses 

communications with a person represented by counsel. Rule 4.2 prohibits an attorney from 

having direct contact with a party who is represented by counsel, except in cases where the 

attorney has a court order granting such direct contact, or the party's attorney has authorized 

such direct contact. MRPC, Rule 4.2. According to the American Bar Association ("ABA"), 

Rule 4.2 is considered the "no contact" rule. ABA Annotated MRPC (7th Ed. 2011 ). "If a person 

is represented in a particular matter, lawyers must go through his counsel if they are to 

communicate with him about it." ABA Annotated MRPC, Annotation (7th Ed. 2011). The 

purpose of Rule 4.2 is to "preserve the lawyer-client relationship." (/d.). Rule 4.2 also 

"contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen 

to be represented by a lawyer." (ABA Annotated MRPC, Comment 1 (7th Ed. 2011). 

Thus, once a person or an organization is represented by an attorney, "service shall be 

made upon the attorney." Wright, Miller, et. al., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 5. 

Serving and Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers); See also, ABA Annotated MRPC, Comment 

7 (ih Ed. 2011) (in the case of an organization, Rule 4.2 also prohibits contact with a constituent 

of the organization who "supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization's lawyer 

concerning the matter"). 

C. Proof of Receipt of FNPCP by Respondent 

The FAA submitted proof of service of the FNPCP by certified mailing to Mr. Baer, the 

Respondent's President, at the Respondent's business address. The FAA argues that such proof 

of service ofthe FNPCP to the Respondent's business address by"certified mailing is proper and 

sufficient service. The first question in this case, however, is whether service on Mr. Baer, the 

Page 5 of 11 
president ofthe Respondent, instead ofMr. Levy, the Respondent's attorney, was proper. If such 

service was not proper, the second question is whether the submitted facts support a finding that 

1) the Respondent has received sufficient notice of a pending legal action to satisfy general 

service requirements, and 2) when such notice occurred. 

1. Identification of Respondent Attorney 

It should be noted that in FAA proceedings, the means of identifying an attorney 

representative for service pursuant to 14 C.F .R. § 13.16 is not limited to the formal filing of a 

notice of appearance. See, e.g., Canuck Industries at 1-2 (Attorney called the FAA, sent written 

notice confirming his representative status, and participated in settlement negotiations). 

In the case herein, it is clear that Mr. Levy was the Respondent's attorney, and that this 

representative status was firmly established prior to the issuance of the FNPCP. The submitted 

materials demonstrate that approximately ten (10) months prior to the issuance of the FNPCP, 

Mr. Levy contacted the FAA in writing, identified himself as the Respondent's representative, 

and then participated in settlement negotiations with the FAA on behalf of the Respondent. For 

example, on July 13,2013, Mr. Levy contacted the FAA by email and identified himself as 

counsel on behalf of the Respondent. (Response, 2 ~ 3; Levy Affidavit ~ 4, and 10-11; Ex. A, 3-

4.) In this same email, Mr. Levy requested participation in settlement negotiations. The FAA 

began to communicate directly with Mr. Levy about the case. (Response, Ex. A.) Mr. Levy then 

participated in settlement negotiations with the FAA on behalf of the Respondent. Subsequently, 

on March 26,2014, Mr. Levy re-contacted the FAA on behalfofthe Respondent about the 

certified mailing of the FNPCP. The FAA then continued to communicate with Mr. Levy in his 

representative capacity about the FNPCP. (Response, Ex. C.) Nothing in the record suggests that 

Mr. Levy's representative status had been suspended or terminated between the conclusion of 

settlement negotiations in 2013 and the mailing of the FNPCP in 2014. 

2. No Proof of Receipt by Respondent's Attorney 

At the time of the alleged service of the FNPCP, Mr. Levy was still of counsel, but the 

FAA chose not to serve him with the FNPCP. The FAA also did not notify Mr. Levy that the 

FNPCP had been mailed to his client. (Response, Ex. A, 2.) Had the FAA done so, it is highly 

possible that Mr. Levy could have acted promptly to preserve his client's rights by reiterating in 

Page 6 of 11 
an email or a letter to the FAA his client's previous oral request for a hearing (made during the 

2013 settlement negotiations). In any event, the FAA presented no proof of receipt by Mr. Levy 

of the FNPCP, because the FAA did not serve Mr. Levy, the Respondent's attorney, with the 

FNPCP. 

3. FAA ProofofService on Respondent's President-March 10, 2014 

Instead, the FAA presented proof of service and receipt on the Respondent's President, 

Mr. Baer. The evidence is clear that on March 10, 2014 a "James Toler" acknowledged receipt of 

the certified mailing addressed to Mr. Baer. The Respondent does not dispute that "James Toler" 

was authorized to pick up certified mailings on behalf of the company. The Respondent also 

asserts that this certified mailing was taken to Mr. Baer's office, and left unopened in Mr. Baer's 

in-box while Mr. Baer was out of town attending a job-related flight training program. 

The FAA argues that this proof establishes receipt by the Respondent, and the triggering 

of the fifteen ( 15) day clock pursuant to 14 C.F .R. § 13 .16. However, as discussed supra, this 

argument is not persuasive, because it is a settled principle that service should have been on Mr. 

Levy, the Respondent's designated representative. "[A]lthough it may seem counterintuitive, 

service upon a party represented by an attorney does not comply with the rule." Wright, Miller, 

et. a/. supra; See In the Matter of Alpine Aviation, Inc., F AA-2005-22218, Order of Chief 

Administrative Law Judge, 3 (Nov. 2, 2005) (Where a respondent is represented by an attorney, 

all communications-including the FNPCP-must be ~ent to the attorney). 

4. First Constructive Notice to Respondent's Attorney of FNPCP -March 26, 2014 

Although Mr. Levy was never served with the FNPCP, it is undisputed that he received 

constructive notice of the FNPCP on March 26, 2014, the date Mr. Baer returned to his office, 

found the FAA's certified mail envelope, opened it, and contacted Mr. Levy about it. That same 

day, Mr. Levy contacted the FAA and objected to service of the FNPCP directly upon his client. 

In addition, Mr. Levy helped ensure that his client filed a request for hearing that same day. 

5. Date Established for Receipt of the FNPCP- March 26, 2014 

Despite the lack of service of the FNPCP on Mr. Levy, a date of service in this case may 

be determined. It should be noted that the provisions in 14 C.F .R. § 13 .16(g), and discussed in 

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FAA case decisions and orders, are very similar to the provisions in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) and (h). 

Thes~ federal rule provisions provide guidance on the underlying purpose of service, and what 

"other means" of effective service may be considered by the court. 

Two of the many reasons supporting the "settled principle" of requiring service on an 

attorney representative (rather than directly on a party) are to ensure notice of a lawsuit reaches a 

party, and to help "expedite preparation of the case for prompt adjudication on the merits." See, 

Wright, Miller, et.al., supra; See also, Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 1999) (the 

rules favor notice to counsel rather than actual notice to the client). 

In addition, the overall, primary purpose of the service rules is to ensure that the 

responding party is timely notified that "a legal action has been filed" and to ensure that the 

responding party has "a fair opportunity to answer the pleading and raise defenses and 

objections." Steven Baicker-McKee, et.al, Federal Civil Rules Handbook, West Publishing 

(2012) (Rule 4 -The Goal ofService). 

In this case, it is clear that both Mr. Baer and Mr. Levy had actual notice of the FNPCP 

on March 26, 2014. As demonstrated by the materials submitted, the same day Mr. Levy and his 

client actually knew about the FNPCP, Mr. Levy was instrumental in expediting contact with the 

FAA about the FNPCP and ensuring that a writteri response to the FNPCP was filed. 

Thus, the lack of actual service by the FAA ofthe FNPCP on Mr. Levy does not require a 

finding that no service was effectuated. Instead, based on all the evidence submitted in this case, 

there are sufficient facts to support a finding that the date of March 26, 20 14-the known date of 

actual receipt by Mr. Baer and constructive notice to Mr. Levy-satisfies the basic purpose of 

notice and process requirements. In other words, both Mr. Levy and his client received notice on 

March 26, 2014 that the FAA had filed "a legal action." On March 26, 2014 Mr. Levy also had 

sufficient notice from his client as to what that legal action entailed, so that he could help ensure 

that his client responded expeditiously to the notice. While the situation was not ideal, it does 

meet the minimum service requirements of giving ~otice and opportunity to respond. 

Page 8 of 11 
6. March 26, 2014 Request for Hearing- Timely Filed 

Given the fact that March 26, 2014 is deemed to be the date of receipt of service by the 

Respondent of the FNPCP, then it follows that the Respondent's filing of a request for hearing 

that same day was timely pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.16. Thus, the alternative issue ofwhether 

the Respondent established good cause for filing an untimely request for hearing is moot. 

IV. Preclusion or Waiver 

As an alternative defense, the Respondent argued that the FAA's Motion was improper 

because the FAA had already filed a Complaint. According to the Respondent, once the FAA 

filed a Complaint, the FAA was precluded from filing, or waived its opportunity to file, a motion 

challenging the timeliness of the Respondent's request for hearing. (Response, 4.) The 

Respondent asserted that the plain language of 14 C.F.R. § 13.208(a) supported this argument. 

The Respondent also cited FAA v. Harbon Airlines, FAA Docket No. CP96NM0250 (1996 FAA 

LEXIS 1534)(1996) as support. 

Section 13.208 provides: 

The agency attorney shall file the original and one copy of the complaint with the 

hearing docket clerk, or may file a written motion pursuant to§ 13.218(f)(2)(i) of 

this subpart instead of filing a complaint, not later than 20 days after receipt by 

the agency attorney of a request for hearing. 

14 C.F.R. § 13.208(a) (emphasis added). 

The plain language of section 13.208(a) places a requirement on the FAA to file a 

complaint not later than 20 days after receipt by the agency attorney of a request for hearing. As 

an alternative, the FAA attorney may choose to file a written motion to dismiss, as specified in 

14 C.F.R § 13.218(f))(2)(i), in lieu of filing a complaint within 20 days of receipt of a request 

for hearing, without running afoul of the 20-day filing deadline for a filing a complaint. 

In Harbon Airlines, the court found that the language of 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(f))(2)(i) 

required the FAA to make a flling choice, and to choose whether to file a Complaint or a Motion 

to Dismiss. 

Page 9 of 11 
Section 13.218(f))(2)(i) states that the agency may file a "motion to dismiss a request for 

hearing instead of filing a Complaint" (emphasis added). In this case, the FAA filed 

both which is improper. Once the agency filed the Complaint, it effectively waived its 

right to challenge the timeliness of the request for hearing. 

Harbon Airlines, at 1 (emphasis in orginal). 

In its Reply in this case, the FAA did not discuss the Harbon Airlines ruling, but did 

argue that the language of 14 C.F.R. § 13.208(a) provided a permissive option which was not 

mandatory. (Reply, 1-2.) The FAA also argued that 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(f))(2)(i) simply outlined 

procedural requirements in filing any motion, was not restrictive, and had simply been "misread" 

by the Respondent. (Reply, 2.) The FAA did not provide any particular authority for its position, 

but instead relied on a reasoned interpretation of the regulations. 

A brief review of the Federal Register demonstrates no specific history of what the 

drafters of the language "instead of filing a complaint" meant to convey in section 13.208(a). 53 

Fed. Reg. 34646, 34650 (Sept. 7, 1988). Based on the plain language of the regulation, however, 

it is quite possible that the drafters intended the FAA to address one issue at a time. That way, a 

respondent has the opportunity to fully concentrate on answering either a complaint or a motion 

to dismiss at the start of litigation. Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.209, a respondent is required to 

file a detailed answer to a complaint within 30 days of service. Pursuant to 14 C.F .R. § 

13.218( d), a respondent is required to file an answer to a motion to dismiss within 10 days of 

service. Simultaneous or closely timed filings by the FAA of both a complaint and a motion to 

dismiss might easily lead a respondent to commit error in the timing of filing its answers, or 

force the respondent to move for relief from strictly construed time limits, or object to immediate 

requests for discovery, leading to more litigation on procedural issues. 

However, since this court has found herein that the Respondent filed a timely request for 

a hearing, this alternate defense raised by the Respondent need not be further addressed at this 

time. 

IV. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.205(a)(8), 13.218(f)(2)(i), 

13.208, and after reviewing all relevant caselaw, regulations, statutory authority, and being fully 

advised; 

Page 10 of 11 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. Based on the evidence submitted, the FAA has proved that the Respondent was properly 

served with, and received, the FAA's March 5, 2014 Final Notice ofProposed Civil 

Penalty on March 26, 2014. 

2. The Respondent's March 26, 2014 Request for Hearing is accepted as timely filed. 

3. The FAA's Motion to Dismiss is denied, on the grounds that the Respondent filed a 

timely Request for Hearing. 

4. The Rule 16 Litigation Scheduling Conference set for July 9, 2014, at 10:30 a.m. ET, is 

reconfirmed. The parties shall access the Conference by dialing 202-493-2343. 

Attachment: Service List 

Page 11 of 11 

\ 
Docket No. FAA-2014-0112 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

· SERVICE LIST- BY U.S. MAIL 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence A venue, S. W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2Wl 0003 

Mr. Vincent J. Bennett 

Complainant's Counsel 

ONE COPY 

Senior Attorney, Office of the Regional Counsel, ANE-7 

Federal Aviation Administration 

12 New England Executive Park 

. Burlington, MA 01803 

TEL: 781-238-7044 . 

FAX: 781-238-7055 

Mr. Gregory S. Winton 

Mr. Jared M. Allen 

Respondent's Counsel 

The Aviation Law Firm 

1997 Annapolis Exchange Parkway 

Suite 300 

Annapolis, MD 21401 

TEL: 301-294-8550 

FAX: 866-568-9886 

Judge J.E. Sullivan 

U.S. Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-6941 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

Baer Air, Inc. 

Respondent 

Mr. William L. Baer, President 

150 South Apollo Boulevard 

Melbourne, FL 32901 

3 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2Wl000, Washington, 

DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.