1 

2020 IL App (5th) 190444-U 

NO. 5-19-0444 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIFTH DISTRICT 

________________________________________________________________________ 

In re ADOPTION OF LOGAN L. and ) Appeal from the 

BRAYDEN N. ) Circuit Court of 

 ) Madison County. 

(Belinda Warren, ) 

 ) 

 Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. 18-AD-126 

 ) 

James Lyons III, ) Honorable 

 ) Martin J. Mengarelli, 

 Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Justices Cates and Barberis concurred in the judgment. 

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court’s determinations that respondent was an unfit parent and 

that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minor children’s 

best interest were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 2 Respondent, James Lyons III, is the biological father of the minor children, Logan 

L., born on October 13, 2015, and Brayden N., born on March 26, 2013. Petitioner, Belinda 

Warren, is the paternal great aunt of the minor children. The circuit court found respondent 

to be an unfit parent based upon respondent’s stipulation of unfitness and further 

determined that the termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minor children’s 

NOTICE

Decision filed 05/20/20. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and 

may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).
2 

best interests. Respondent now appeals, arguing that the circuit court’s findings were 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit 

court’s judgment. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 Petitioner filed a petition for adoption of the minor children on October 17, 2018. 

The petition for adoption alleged that respondent was an unfit parent based on depravity 

pursuant to section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2018)), 

because respondent had more than three felony convictions, including one felony 

conviction that occurred within the previous five years. Respondent’s felony convictions 

listed within the petition for adoption were as follows: 

“a. 16-CF-2167, Madison County, Illinois, Domestic Battery/Bodily Harm, 

sentenced to 30 months’ incarceration; 

b. 12-CF-1837, Madison County, Identity Theft/Knows ID Stolen, 

sentenced to probation 30 months[;] 

c. 08-CF-2847, Madison County, Obstruct Justice/Destroy evidence, 

sentenced to 2 years, 6 months incarceration; 

 d. 09-CF-105, Jersey County, Aggravated Domestic Battery, 3 years 

incarceration; 

e. 06-CF-834, Madison County, Felon Probationer Escape Off Ret 

Theft/Display Merch/>$150, Sentenced to 24 months probation[;] 

f. 06-CF-144901 and 902, St. Clair County, Retail Theft, sentence to 24 

months probation.” 

The petition for adoption further alleged that respondent was an unfit parent pursuant to 

section 1(D)(a) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(a) (West 2018)), because

respondent had abandoned the minor children. 
3 

¶ 5 Respondent was incarcerated within the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), 

when the petition for adoption was filed. Respondent had been incarcerated within the

IDOC since August 25, 2016. In response to the petition for adoption, respondent filed a 

pro se entry of appearance and a motion to dismiss on November 14, 2018. On November 

16, 2018, the circuit court appointed counsel to represent respondent concerning the 

petition for adoption. 

¶ 6 On March 29, 2019, the circuit court conducted a hearing on respondent’s parental 

fitness. Respondent was present at the hearing with counsel. At the beginning of the 

hearing, the follow dialogue transpired: 

 “THE COURT: *** It’s my understanding that the Respondent is going to 

stipulate to the unfitness portion; is that correct? 

 [RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. 

 THE COURT: I still need to hear what evidence the Petitioner believes they 

would be able to prove and what you’re stipulating to, okay?” 

¶ 7 Petitioner then submitted three exhibits regarding respondent’s criminal history. 

Exhibit 1 demonstrated respondent’s aggravated domestic battery conviction on July 20, 

2009, in matter 09-CF-105, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Jersey County, Illinois. Respondent 

had pled guilty to aggravated domestic battery in violation of section 12-3.3 of the Criminal 

Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3 (West 2008)) and was sentenced to three years’ 

incarceration and two years of mandatory supervised released. Exhibit 1 further indicated 
4 

that on June 26, 2009, respondent struck Holly M. Naylor1 in the face with a TV tray which 

caused a large laceration between her eyes and fractured Naylor’s nasal cavity. 

¶ 8 Petitioner’s exhibit 2 demonstrated respondent’s felony convictions on charges of

forgery and possession of a forging instrument on February 7, 2019, in matter 1811-

CR03592-1, St. Charles City, Missouri. Petitioner’s exhibit 3 was a copy of respondent’s 

pretrial services criminal history in case 17-CF-2379, Third Judicial Circuit, Madison 

County, Illinois. The pretrial services criminal history indicated that, along with numerous 

misdemeanor convictions dating back to 1993, respondent had felony convictions in 2006, 

2008, 2009, 2012, and 2016.2

¶ 9 There were no objections to the exhibits and the circuit court admitted the exhibits 

into evidence. Petitioner also orally stated for the record that respondent was convicted of 

at least three felonies, with one felony conviction within the previous five years, as required 

for a finding of depravity pursuant to section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(i) (West 2018)). Petitioner also read respondent’s felony convictions into the 

record. The circuit court confirmed that respondent was stipulating to the same. 

 “THE COURT: And, [respondent’s counsel], it’s my understanding that 

you’re stipulating to that; is that correct? 

1

Holly M. Naylor is the biological mother of the minor children. Naylor was determined unfit and 

her parental rights were terminated by the circuit court concurrent with respondent but are not at issue in 

this appeal.

2

06-CF-834, Madison County, Illinois: felon probationer escape and retail theft; 08-CF-2847, 

Madison County, Illinois: obstruction of justice/destroying evidence; 09-CF-105, Jersey County, Illinois: 

aggravated domestic battery; 12-CF-1837, Madison County, Illinois: identity theft; and 16-CF-2167, 

Madison County, Illinois: domestic battery/bodily harm. 
5 

 [RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.” 

¶ 10 The circuit court then held: 

“THE COURT: Okay. Based upon the evidence presented to the Court, the 

Court finds that the Respondent James Lewis Lyons, III, has had at least three felony 

convictions with at least one felony conviction in the last five years, and based upon 

the stipulation will find him depraved in regards to the unfitness. So, he’s found 

unfit by clear and convincing evidence by the stipulation.” 

¶ 11 The circuit court entered a written order the same day as follows: 

“Cause called on fitness as to the defendant, James L. Lyons, III. The 

Defendant, after consultation with his attorney stipulates to the findings of unfitness 

pursuant to 750 ILCS 50/1(i) and to the criminal history as found in the pretrial 

services criminal history presented in 17-CF-2379.” 

The circuit court’s written order was signed by the judge, respondent, respondent’s counsel, 

petitioner, and petitioner’s counsel. 

¶ 12 On June 17, 2019, the circuit court entered a nunc pro tunc order stating that the 

circuit court’s written order of March 29, 2019, failed to indicate that a hearing was 

conducted on March 29, 2019, in which evidence was presented, and that the circuit court 

found a factual basis for the acceptance of the respondent’s stipulation of unfitness. As 

such, the circuit court’s order of March 29, 2019, was amended to reflect that the circuit 

court found a factual basis for respondent’s unfitness stipulation. 
6 

¶ 13 On August 12, 2019, the circuit court held a hearing concerning the best interest of 

the minor children. Respondent was present at the hearing and represented by counsel. At 

the beginning of the hearing, the circuit court stated: 

“THE COURT: Okay, and for the record, on June 17, 2019, the mother was 

found unfit after a hearing, and on March 29, 2019, the father stipulated and the 

Court found the factual basis for a stipulation as to unfitness.” 

¶ 14 The circuit court further indicated that the parties were present and were proceeding 

with the best interests portion of the termination proceedings pursuant to the factors set 

forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 

405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018)). At this point, respondent orally requested new counsel. 

Respondent informed the circuit court that he wanted: 

“to consolidate the guardianship and the Order of Protection that [petitioner] has 

because it all involves the same thing, and to hire a private counsel or another 

lawyer, I guess, to do all of that. [Current counsel] only been appointed on the 

adoption.” 

¶ 15 Petitioner objected based on the timing of respondent’s request, and the circuit court 

denied respondent’s oral motion for new counsel. The circuit court heard the following 

evidence at the best interest hearing. 

¶ 16 A. Testimony of Petitioner 

¶ 17 Petitioner testified that she was 65 years old and in good health. She stated that she 

was retired from the U.S. Marine Corps and that there was nothing that prevented her from 

taking care of the minor children. Petitioner resided in South Roxana, Illinois, with the 
7 

minor children and her mother. At the time of the hearing, petitioner stated that Brayden 

was six years old and Logan was three years old. The minor children had resided with 

petitioner since November 17, 2015. 

¶ 18 According to petitioner’s testimony, in November 2015, petitioner was contacted 

by her daughter and informed that respondent needed a place for his children to reside. 

Petitioner contacted respondent directly and respondent had stated that “they were down 

and out with money and stuff like that.” Petitioner told respondent that she would provide 

a home for the minor children for a period of one month. Respondent informed petitioner 

that he would only need a place for his minor children for two weeks. Respondent, 

however, did not come for the minor children in two weeks, or in a month. Petitioner 

testified that respondent never made any effort to have the minor children returned to him 

until petitioner filed for guardianship in 2017. At that time, petitioner stated respondent 

“fought it” but “they went back after almost a year” and petitioner obtained guardianship 

of the minor children in 2018. 

¶ 19 Petitioner testified that respondent never took the minor children for medical care. 

Petitioner stated that the minor children were currently on public aid but would be covered 

under petitioner’s military medical insurance if she were allowed to adopt the minor 

children. According to petitioner, respondent had also not provided any financial support.

Petitioner stated that, on one occasion, respondent and the minor children’s mother 

“brought over like two or three yogurts for Brayden.” 

¶ 20 Petitioner also testified that respondent did not visit the minor children. Petitioner 

stated that she had attempted to give respondent a Wednesday and a Sunday for visitation 
8 

for two to three hours, but petitioner could “probably count on one hand when [respondent] 

actually came and spent time.” Petitioner testified that in the two years before petitioner 

was granted guardianship, respondent and/or the minor children’s mother had visited the 

minor children less than 10, but probably no more than 7, times. Petitioner testified that 

she worked with respondent on visitation until around December of 2016 but then stopped 

because respondent and/or the minor children’s mother were not showing up. 

¶ 21 When specifically asked about the respondent, petitioner testified that respondent 

had probably been to visit the minor children approximately three times and the last visit 

would have been in March 2016, for Brayden’s third birthday. Petitioner stated it was the 

only birthday of the minor children that respondent attended. Petitioner did admit that 

respondent sent a lot of correspondence to her and the minor children. The correspondence

directed to petitioner, however, accused petitioner of molesting the minor children and 

“things of that nature.” Petitioner stated that she had obtained an order of protection against 

respondent based on respondent’s correspondence. The order of protection has been in 

place continuously since February 2017 and currently expires in 2021. Petitioner further 

stated that respondent was convicted of violating the order of protection and intimidating 

a witness in a proceeding in the circuit court of Madison County, Illinois, cause number 

17-CF-2288. 

¶ 22 Petitioner stated that the minor children were “happy adjusted kids.” According to 

petitioner, the minor children have their own room and love their home. The minor children 

have stayed in the same home and have not been required to move, so the minor children 

are familiar with, and have friends in, the neighborhood. Petitioner testified that Brayden 
9 

is doing well in school and Logan is doing well in pre-K school. Further, petitioner’s 

mother, daughter, granddaughters, and sister are in the area and often interact with the 

minor children. The minor children refer to petitioner as “mom” and petitioner’s daughter 

as their sister. Petitioner acknowledged that Logan had asthma and that there were a few 

medical issues in the beginning, but further stated that Logan was under medical care and 

his asthma was under control. 

¶ 23 Petitioner testified that there had never been any criminal activity in her home in the 

last five years, no episodes of domestic violence, and no police calls. According to 

petitioner, the minor children are in a stable home and they are loved. 

¶ 24 Petitioner admitted that the minor children have a sister and two brothers and that 

the minor children have no contact with their siblings. Petitioner also admitted that she 

smokes approximately a half of a pack of cigarettes a day, but does so outside of the house. 

Petitioner acknowledged that smoking was potentially harmful to children, especially a 

child with asthma. Petitioner also acknowledged that there was an issue with the air quality 

in South Roxana due to a refinery, and an issue with toxic soil, but petitioner had no current 

plans of moving. Petitioner stated that if a move was necessary for the minor children’s 

health, she would relocate. 

¶ 25 Although respondent is petitioner’s nephew, petitioner freely admitted that she no 

longer cared about respondent. Petitioner testified that “[respondent] is a piece of crap, 

okay. He is. It’s not his first domestic and it won’t be his last. He will hurt those kids.” 

Petitioner contends that respondent had threatened to burn her house down, and that she 

believed that respondent would harm the minor children. Because of the threats, petitioner 
10 

does not speak about the respondent around the minor children. Petitioner also stated that 

she does not take the minor children to visit respondent in prison because petitioner 

believes a prison is not a place for children. According to petitioner, respondent had ample 

time to have a relationship with the minor children instead of obtaining felony convictions.

¶ 26 Finally, petitioner admitted that respondent contacted the Department of Children 

and Family Services (DCFS) alleging that petitioner abused the minor children, and that 

DCFS determined that the allegation was unfounded. Petitioner also acknowledged that

her brother filed a DCFS complaint against her in 1995, accusing petitioner of sexually 

abusing him. 

¶ 27 B. Testimony of Jayme Warren 

¶ 28 Jayme Warren3 testified that is she is the petitioner’s daughter and the respondent’s 

cousin. Jayme stated that she speaks with her mother daily and still communicates with the 

respondent through telephone calls and letters. Jayme stated that she sees the minor 

children at least once a week and attempts to take the minor children overnight about once 

every other week. According to Jayme, the minor children are happy, excitable, and 

growing mentally and physically. Jayme stated that she talks to the minor children about 

their feelings and tells them about her cousin, but she does not clarify to the minor children

that her cousin is the minor children’s father. 

¶ 29 Jayme testified that in her communication with respondent, she inquires how 

respondent is doing, what classes respondent is taking, and tells respondent about the minor 

3

Since the witness’s and petitioner’s surnames are Warren, this court will refer to the witness by 

her first name to avoid any potential confusion.
11 

children. Jayme testified that when she talks about the minor children to respondent, 

respondent states that he misses them, and Jayme believes respondent. Jayme also stated, 

however, that she believed respondent “misses the idea of them more.” By that, Jayme 

explained that thinking about having fun with children can sound great, but having fun is 

not always what it turns out to be because parenting is more involved than hanging out at 

a beach because “[y]ou have to deal with the sand in the shorts, and yes, and there is more 

to it than the, Oh, let’s go out for a day.” 

¶ 30 Jayme stated that she loved the respondent and believed that respondent loved the 

minor children. When asked whether she believed respondent would harm the minor 

children, Jayme stated that she could not be sure since respondent got frustrated easily. 

Jayme testified that she had never witnessed, or heard of, respondent harming the minor 

children, but that she had seen respondent hurt other people. Jayme did not believe that 

respondent could harm the minor children because petitioner was protective and would not 

allow respondent near the minor children. Jayme stated that her mother loved the minor 

children and that the minor children loved petitioner. According to Jayme, the minor 

children are well integrated in petitioner’s home. 

¶ 31 Jayme testified that respondent and the minor children had lived with respondent’s 

mother and out of state for a while. Jayme stated that since respondent had been in Illinois, 

respondent and the minor children had lived in various motels and respondent had not 

provided the minor children with a stable home. From what Jayme had observed, 

respondent had not demonstrated the financial ability to take care of the minor children.

Jayme testified that she believed that the best thing respondent did was to place the minor 
12 

children with petitioner because the minor children were living in a motel and money was 

tight when the minor children were residing with respondent. 

¶ 32 C. Testimony of Respondent 

¶ 33 Respondent testified that he is the father of the minor children. Respondent stated 

that he was present at Brayden’s birth. Thereafter, respondent and Brayden resided with 

respondent’s mother for 21⁄2 to 3 years. After residing with his mother, respondent moved 

with Brayden to California for about six months and then returned when respondent’s 

mother’s health got worse. Respondent and Brayden then resided in Granite City, staying 

“in motels and whatnot” because respondent’s mother had moved in with petitioner and 

petitioner was caring for respondent’s mother. Respondent’s mother died a few months 

after respondent returned from California. Respondent stated that Brayden was happy, and 

that Brayden loved respondent and that respondent loved Brayden. 

¶ 34 Respondent stated that a few months after returning from California, he began 

working for a guy in Granite City and that the work involved traveling out of state. 

Respondent was making minimum wage, but respondent contended that Brayden had good 

clothes, good shoes, and was well fed and well taken care of during this time. Respondent 

stated that he was attempting to get a house but stopped working as much and got 

incarcerated. Respondent testified that he was doing his best. 

¶ 35 Respondent stated that in November 2015 he had contacted petitioner because of

financial hardship. Respondent was working for a fencing company at that time and was 

going to Kansas City for work. Respondent stated that he knew the minor children’s mother 

would not do well caring for the minor children on her own, so he contacted petitioner for 
13 

help. Respondent stated that the minor children were only at petitioner’s house for four or 

five months that year and that he visited the minor children during that period. Respondent 

also stated that he had provided Brayden with clothes, toys, new shoes, and a few things, 

but was in and out of town due to work. Respondent was then incarcerated. 

¶ 36 Respondent stated that he was not happy about petitioner having the minor children 

because respondent was aware of how petitioner tried to control everything. But 

respondent’s mother had just died, and they were residing in a motel, so they needed 

assistance. Respondent testified that he was struggling to pay the rent by the day and he 

wanted a place where the minor children would not be moved around. Respondent testified 

that the minor children’s mother was not really the best parent by herself and that 

respondent’s family had helped raised Brayden before respondent’s mother’s death. 

¶ 37 Respondent stated that, after he left the minor children with petitioner, he visited 

pretty regularly at first, but then petitioner began interfering with respondent’s visitation. 

Respondent testified that he would attempt to call petitioner and could not reach her for 

weeks. Respondent asserted that the petitioner would “make up excuses” why respondent 

could not come to visit the minor children. 

¶ 38 According to respondent’s testimony, petitioner did not inform respondent that she 

had filed for guardianship by forging his signature. Respondent stated that he went to court 

and that petitioner’s guardianship of the minor children was denied because respondent 

informed the court that he never signed the documents. Respondent visited the minor 

children once or twice after that but did not want to remove the minor children from 

petitioner’s care. Respondent stated that he was incarcerated on August 25, 2016, and was 
14 

not able to visit the minor children due to his incarceration. Respondent testified that 

petitioner then got guardianship because respondent was incarcerated, and the minor 

children’s mother did not contest it. 

¶ 39 Respondent testified that the day after petitioner received guardianship, petitioner 

obtained an order of protection that included the minor children. Respondent stated that he 

was served with the order of protection on February 2, 2017, while incarcerated at a federal 

correctional center. Respondent testified that he could not contact the minor children

because of the order of protection. Respondent stated that he had gotten abrasive in his 

letters because petitioner had not responded to the 9 or 10 letters respondent had sent to 

petitioner over several months, asking about the minor children. 

¶ 40 Respondent testified that he had raised Brayden for two years and was with Brayden 

every day, so respondent was upset that petitioner would not give him any information 

pertaining to Brayden’s welfare. Respondent testified that petitioner was forcing 

respondent to become adversarial when there was no need to be so. Respondent admitted 

that he began telling petitioner that “she was no good and an old bitch.” Respondent, 

however, claimed that he never made any threats of violence towards petitioner or anyone 

else. 

¶ 41 After the order of protection, respondent stated that he wrote to Jayme. Respondent 

testified that in one of his letters to Jayme, the state’s attorney misconstrued a statement in 

the letter as a threat. Respondent stated that he only pled guilty to intimidating a witness 

because he could not afford an attorney, and that respondent did not believe his chances 

were good at trial. Respondent contended that he had filed several motions in an attempt 
15 

to have the circuit court rehear the guardianship case because it was clear that petitioner 

was not going to allow respondent contact with the minor children. Respondent stated that 

he has fought the order of protection “tooth and nail” because of the minor children, but 

that the circuit court has continued to deny his motions. Respondent testified that he would 

like to speak with the minor children but has not been allowed any contact since being 

incarcerated. 

¶ 42 Respondent submitted various photographs of respondent with Brayden between the 

ages of one to three years old. Also submitted were two photographs of the minor children 

at petitioner’s home, and respondent asserted that he visited the minor children 10 to 15 

different times while the minor children were in petitioner’s care. These photographs were 

admitted into evidence without objection. Respondent further asserted that he brought 

Brayden a blanket, some toys, “some Nikes,” a box of fruit and yogurt and “things like 

that.” Respondent further testified that he had offered his Link card to petitioner, but

petitioner refused to accept it. According to respondent’s testimony, the last time he saw 

Brayden was the day before respondent was incarcerated on August 24, 2016. Respondent 

stated that he was released in August 2017, however, the order of protection was still in 

place, and respondent could not contact the minor children. In January 2018, respondent 

was again incarcerated for a parole violation. 

¶ 43 Respondent testified that he has taken four or five courses while incarcerated, 

including GEO drug rehabilitation, the behavior modification program, and lifestyle 

redirection and restoration maintenance. Respondent stated that he had also completed 

anger management and was currently enrolled in an automobile body repair course. 
16 

Respondent further noted that he was signed up for a class called “Inside-Out Dad,” to be 

a better father for the minor children. Respondent testified that once he is released from 

prison, respondent’s father has agreed to allow respondent the opportunity to perform 

automobile body repair and maintenance out of a shop his father has an interest in until 

respondent can move on to something else. Respondent stated that, ultimately, his 

employment goal was to work on barges. 

¶ 44 Respondent also testified that he had earned “good time” for completing the courses 

and he expected to be released in approximately 50 days. Respondent stated that he would 

be required to complete four years of mandatory supervised release where respondent 

would be “on a short leash” and could be taken back into custody for any violation. 

¶ 45 Respondent further stated that he spent considerable time with petitioner when he 

was a child and lived with petitioner “throughout his childhood” in Bethalto, Illinois. 

Respondent’s mother also resided with petitioner at the time. According to respondent’s 

testimony, petitioner was operating a foster home, and respondent witnessed petitioner 

have a relationship with a 15-year-old girl. Respondent further testified that petitioner had 

respondent sleep with her without any pants on, and would enter the bathroom while 

respondent was showering or using the toilet. Further, petitioner’s brother came forward 

and accused petitioner of sexually molesting him as a child. Respondent stated that because 

of those incidents, he was concerned as to petitioner’s true motives in keeping respondent 

away from the minor children. Respondent stated that he struggled with the decision to

take the minor children to petitioner but knew that petitioner’s mother and daughter were 

also present, so respondent believed the minor children would be alright. 
17 

¶ 46 Respondent stated that after being released, he had “places to go and try to find a 

house.” Respondent also stated that there was $700 in a settlement from his grandfather 

and that respondent was “going to work up from that.” Respondent argued that adoption 

would not be in the best interest of the minor children, where the minor children had a 

father who loved them, never abused them, and never had a DCFS investigation. 

¶ 47 The circuit court requested a recommendation from the minor children’s guardian 

ad litem. The guardian ad litem’s recommendation to the circuit court was that it was in 

the minor children’s best interests that the parental rights of respondent be terminated so 

that petitioner could move forward with adopting the minor children. At the conclusion of 

the August 12, 2019, hearing, the circuit court took the matter under advisement. 

¶ 48 On August 14, 2019, the circuit court issued a written order finding that respondent 

had stipulated on March 29, 2019, to be an unfit parent due to depravity. The circuit court 

indicated that it had found a factual basis for respondent’s stipulation and had accepted the 

same. The circuit court also indicated that it had considered the testimony and exhibits 

tendered at the August 12, 2019, hearing. In evaluating the minor children’s best interests, 

the circuit court stated that it used the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile 

Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018)), and the circuit court specifically 

addressed each factor in its written order. The circuit court then determined: 

“Based upon the above, the Court finds that the Petitioner has proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it is in the minors’ best interests that any and all 

parental rights flowing to and through [respondent] *** with respect to the minors 

are hereafter permanently terminated. 
18 

The Court does not make this decision lightly. It was quite obvious to the 

Court that [respondent] loves his boys and that he did have a relationship with 

Brayden prior to the boys being in [petitioner’s] care. It was also quite obvious that 

there is a lot of hostility between [petitioner] and [respondent]. If and when 

[petitioner] does in fact adopt both boys, the Court hopes that [petitioner] and 

[respondent] may be able to work through their differences so that [respondent] may 

be a part of the boys’ lives once he gets out of prison.” 

¶ 49 Respondent appeals arguing that the circuit court’s findings that respondent was an 

unfit parent and that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the minor children’s 

best interests were against the manifest weight of the evidence 

¶ 50 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 51 Before proceeding to an analysis of the issues raised on appeal, we note that 

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018), except for good cause 

shown, this court is to issue a decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of 

appeal. The notice of appeal in this matter was filed on October 21, 2019. Accordingly, the 

decision in this case was due to be filed on or before March 19, 2020. However, the 

following events resulted in the placing of this appeal on the docket for March 25, 2020: 

(1) two motions for extension of time to file the record on appeal, dated November 20, 

2019, and December 10, 2019; and (2) a motion for extension of time to file an appellant 

brief, dated January 10, 2020. For these reasons, we find good cause to issue this order past 

the deadline and proceed to the issues respondent raises on appeal. 
19 

¶ 52 A. Unfit on the Grounds of Depravity 

¶ 53 On appeal, respondent urges this court to reverse the circuit court’s finding that he

is an unfit parent as set forth in section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) 

(West 2018). Respondent contends that the circuit court had insufficient evidence of his 

felony convictions because the evidence presented at the fitness hearing was a copy of a 

pretrial services criminal history that, respondent argues, cannot reach the clear and 

convincing standard necessary for the circuit to find respondent an unfit parent. Respondent 

further argues that the circuit court was required to closely scrutinize respondent’s 

character and credibility at the fitness hearing and failed to do so. Finally, respondent 

argues that the circuit court failed to inquire as to whether respondent understood what 

information was being used as the basis for a stipulation at the fitness hearing. 

¶ 54 To terminate a parent’s parental rights in a proceeding commenced under the 

Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)), the circuit court must first find, by clear 

and convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 61 (1993). A 

finding of parental unfitness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001). A finding is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the 

determination is arbitrary, unreasonable, and not based on the evidence. In re G.W., 357 

Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1059 (2005). The circuit court’s finding of unfitness is given great 

deference because it has the best opportunity to view and evaluate the parties and their 

testimony. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006). This court, therefore, does 

not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. In re M.A., 325 Ill. 
20 

App. 3d 387, 391 (2001). Each case concerning parental fitness is unique and must be 

decided on the particular facts and circumstances presented. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 

340, 354 (2005). 

¶ 55 1. Evidence of Respondent’s Felony Convictions 

¶ 56 Section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act provides, inter alia, a rebuttable presumption 

that a parent is depraved if the parent has been criminally convicted of at least three felonies 

under federal law, or the laws of any state, and at least one of the felony convictions 

occurred within five years prior to the filing of the petition or motion seeking termination 

of parental rights. Because the presumption is rebuttable, a parent may still present 

evidence showing that, despite the convictions, the parent is not depraved. The 

presumption, however, can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(i) (West 2018). 

¶ 57 In this matter, respondent did not present any evidence to overcome the presumption 

of unfitness. Instead, respondent stipulated to the evidence and to his parental unfitness.

On appeal, respondent does not state that his felony convictions were misrepresented or 

incorrect but argues that a copy of a pretrial services criminal history was insufficient to 

reach the clear and convincing standard. Respondent, however, did not object to the 

evidence admitted at the time of the fitness hearing and did not raise the issue within 

respondent’s motion to reconsider, or for a new trial. 

¶ 58 To preserve an alleged error for appellate review, a party must object at trial and file 

a written posttrial motion addressing the alleged error. In re William H., 407 Ill. App. 3d 

858, 869-70 (2011). “Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court 
21 

below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived.” 

In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242 (2001). As such, respondent has waived the issue 

of whether a copy of pretrial services criminal history was sufficient to reach the clear and 

convincing standard.

¶ 59 2. Acceptance of Respondent’s Stipulation 

¶ 60 Respondent next argues that the circuit court failed to inquire as to whether 

respondent understood that respondent’s parental unfitness, and the evidence in support his 

unfitness, was being stipulated to at the hearing on March 29, 2019. Respondent, however, 

provides no statutory or precedential support for his argument that the circuit court was 

required to inquire whether respondent understood the proffered stipulation. 

¶ 61 The circuit court, as a requirement of due process, was obligated to determine 

whether a factual basis existed for an admission of parental unfitness before it accepted 

respondent’s stipulation. In re Tamera W., 2012 IL App (2d) 111131, ¶ 32. However, the 

circuit court is not required to admonish respondent regarding the consequences of his 

admission, or to inquire regarding the voluntariness of his admission. Id. ¶ 34. In this 

matter, the circuit court went through each of respondent’s felony convictions which 

formed the basis of respondent’s stipulation and found that a factual basis existed for an 

admission of parental unfitness before it accepted respondent’s stipulation. As such, we 

find respondent’s argument that the circuit court was required to conduct an inquiry into 

respondent’s understanding of his stipulation is without merit.
22 

¶ 62 3. Respondent’s Character and Credibility

¶ 63 Respondent’s argument that the circuit court was required to inquire into 

respondent’s character and credibility at the fitness hearing is misplaced. Respondent cites 

to In re J’America B., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1046 (2004), which states that, “[i]n 

determining depravity, the trier of fact is required to closely scrutinize the character and 

credibility of the parent.” The underlying circuit court proceeding in J’America was a 

hearing on parental fitness in which depravity was contested and rebuttal evidence was 

presented. Here, respondent did not contest parental unfitness, and presented no evidence 

to rebut the presumption of his parental unfitness. As such, the circuit court was not 

required to scrutinize respondent’s character and credibility at the fitness hearing since 

respondent’s parental unfitness was undisputed. 

¶ 64 Based on the above, we find that the circuit court had sufficient evidence to find a 

factual basis for respondent’s stipulation of parental unfitness, and that the circuit court 

was not required to inquire on respondent’s understanding of the stipulation. We further 

find that the circuit court was not required to scrutinize respondent’s character and 

credibility at the fitness hearing. As such, the circuit court’s determination that respondent 

was an unfit person pursuant to section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act was not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2018). 

¶ 65 B. Termination of Parental Rights 

¶ 66 Once a finding of parental unfitness is made, the circuit court must then determine 

whether it is in the best interests of the child that the parental rights be terminated. In re 

J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 337-38 (2010). During this stage of the proceedings, the focus of the 
23 

circuit court’s scrutiny shifts from the rights of the parents to the best interests of the child. 

In re B.B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 686, 697 (2008). In determining the best interests of the child, 

the circuit court is required to consider certain enumerated factors in the context of the 

child’s age and developmental needs. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018). These factors 

include (a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, and 

clothing; (b) the development of the child’s identity; (c) the child’s background and ties, 

including the familial, cultural, and religious ties; (d) the child’s sense of attachments, 

which includes where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued, 

the child’s sense of security and familiarity, the continuity of affection for the child, and 

the least disruptive placement alternative for the child; (e) the child’s wishes and long-term 

goals; (f) the child’s community ties, including church, school, and friends; (g) the child’s 

need for permanence, which includes the child’s need for stability and continuity of 

relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives; (h) the uniqueness 

of every family and child; (i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; 

and (j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. Id. The circuit court’s 

best interests determination does not need to contain an explicit reference to each of these 

factors. In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. 

¶ 67 Respondent acknowledges that the circuit court’s written order of August 14, 2019, 

addressed all of the statutory best interest factors that the circuit court was required to 

consider. However, respondent argues that those factors were skewed in petitioner’s favor 

because petitioner had systematically attempted to remove respondent from the lives of the 

minor children. Respondent argues that the circuit court’s determination that it was in the 
24 

minor children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence because the circuit court failed to consider petitioner’s 

alienation of respondent from the minor children. Respondent argues that if the adoption

case had been consolidated with the guardianship and order of protection cases, the circuit 

court would have been able to address petitioner’s conduct and not rely solely on the 

testimonies of the parties at the best interests hearing. It is respondent’s position that the 

circuit court failed to mention that the only reason respondent did not have a relationship 

with the minor children was because of the actions of the petitioner. 

¶ 68 In this matter, it is clear that the circuit court was aware of the hostility between the 

parties when making its determination that termination of respondent’s parental rights was 

in the best interests of the minor children. The circuit court noted the hostility between 

respondent and petitioner in the circuit court’s written order, as follows: 

“It was also quite obvious that there is a lot of hostility between Belinda and James. 

If and when Belinda does in fact adopt both boys, the Court hopes that Belinda and 

James may be able to work through their differences so that James may be a part of 

the boys’ lives once he gets out of prison.” 

¶ 69 As stated above, the circuit court’s best interests determination does not need to 

contain an explicit reference to each factor taken under consideration. Further, concerning 

respondent’s argument on the consolidation of the cases, the circuit court’s written order 

noted that, “[s]ince this Judge is already assigned the aforementioned cases, there was no 

need for the consolidation.” 
25 

¶ 70 Respondent also argues that the circuit court ignored respondent’s testimony that 

would have impacted the circuit court’s findings. Respondent states that he testified that 

he had a job upon release and that he would be released within three months of the hearing. 

The circuit court’s written order, however, contradicts respondent’s argument that the 

circuit court ignored his testimony. The circuit court noted in its order that respondent 

indicated that he would like to get employment as a barge worker, but also indicated that 

while barge work was a good paying job, it usually required many weeks away from home

at a time. Further, the circuit court noted that respondent would be released later that year, 

but also noted that respondent was required to serve four years of mandatory supervised 

release wherein respondent could be returned to jail for any violations. As such, there is no 

indication that the circuit court ignored respondent’s testimony. 

¶ 71 Respondent next argues that the circuit court ignored the fact that the minor children 

have three siblings, and that the minor children would have no relationship with those 

siblings if the adoption proceeded. Other than the fact that the minor children have siblings, 

there was no evidence presented at the best interests hearing concerning the location of the 

siblings, who had custody of the siblings, or whether the siblings had previous contact with 

the minor children. There was also no testimony at the best interests hearing that the minor 

children would have any contact with their siblings if respondent’s parental rights were not 

terminated. The only testimony at the best interests hearing concerning the minor children’s 

familial ties was that the minor children interacted with many biological family members 

at petitioner’s home. Respondent’s argument that the circuit court ignored the fact that the 

minor children have three siblings is without merit. 
26 

¶ 72 Finally, respondent argues that the circuit court did not take into consideration that 

respondent raised Brayden for the first 21⁄2 years of Brayden’s life and that there was no 

evidence presented demonstrating that the minor children were detached from respondent. 

In the circuit court’s written order, the court noted in several of its findings that it had no 

doubt that both petitioner and respondent loved the minor children. The circuit court also 

specifically stated that: 

“The Court does not make this decision lightly. It was quite obvious to the 

Court that James loves his boys and that he did have a relationship with Brayden 

prior to the boys being in Belinda’s care.”

¶ 73 The circuit court acknowledged respondent’s relationship with Brayden but also 

acknowledged that Logan had resided with petitioner for all but the first five weeks of his 

life. The circuit court further noted that Brayden had lived more than half of his life with 

petitioner. As such, it is clear that the circuit court did consider the fact that respondent 

raised Brayden for the first 21⁄2 years of Brayden’s life but also considered that petitioner 

had raised Brayden since that time and had raised Logan for all but the first five weeks of 

his life. 

¶ 74 Based on the above, the circuit court’s determination that termination of 

respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the minor children was not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 75 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 76 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
27 

¶ 77 Affirmed.