UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4390

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

VENDAI LAPRIEST IRICK,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4397

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RODNEY JERROLD DEVIN BYRD,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4407

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

DENZEL TIMOTHY RASHEEM SHIVERS,
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 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:13-cr-00339-NCT-1; 

1:13-cr-00339-NCT-3; 1:13-cr-00339-NCT-2)

Submitted: March 12, 2015 Decided: April 13, 2015

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ferris R. Bond, BOND & NORMAN, Washington, D.C.; John J. 

Cacheris, JC LAW CENTER, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellants. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Kyle D. 

Pousson, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Vendai Irick, Rodney Byrd, and Denzel Shivers pleaded 

guilty to interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012). The district court sentenced 

Shivers and Irick to 136 months’ imprisonment and three years’ 

supervised release, and Byrd to 175 months’ imprisonment and 

three years’ supervised release. On appeal, Irick contends the 

district court plainly erred by failing to reduce Irick’s total 

offense level for playing a mitigating role in the offense. All 

of the appellants contend that the district court imposed 

unreasonable sentences. We affirm.

Because Irick did not allege in the district court that he 

was entitled to an offense level reduction for playing a 

mitigating role in the offense, we review this issue for plain 

error. United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 189-90 (4th Cir. 

2011). To demonstrate plain error, Irick must show that an 

error (1) occurred, (2) was plain, and (3) affected his 

substantial rights. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 

732 (1993).

The Sentencing Guidelines provide graduated offense level 

reductions when a defendant plays a “mitigating role” in the 

charged offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2

(2013). If the defendant was a “minimal participant,” the court 

should reduce the total offense level by four. USSG § 3B1.2(a). 
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If the defendant was a “minor participant,” the court should

reduce the total offense level by two. USSG § 3B1.2(b). If the 

defendant “fall[s] between” the two gradations, the court should

reduce the total offense level by three. USSG § 3B1.2(c).

This reduction applies to any defendant who is 

“substantially less culpable” than his codefendants. USSG 

§ 3B1.2 n.3(A). We have previously held that a district court 

did not clearly err in refusing to apply the reduction to the 

driver in a drug-running scheme, where the driver was aware of 

the scheme and participated in prior deliveries, and the amount 

involved was “hardly insubstantial.” United States v. McCrary, 

887 F.2d 485, 488 (4th Cir. 1989).

After reviewing the record, we likewise conclude that the 

district court did not plainly err in failing to award Irick the 

mitigating role reduction. Irick scouted the jewelry store that 

appellants later robbed and admitted to committing two other 

robberies with his codefendants. Furthermore, Irick assisted in 

robbing cash and goods worth over $400,000—“hardly [an] 

insubstantial” amount.

Appellants next argue that the district court abused its 

discretion by imposing unreasonable sentences. See Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (providing standard of 

review). In reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we first 

ensure that the district court committed no “significant 
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procedural error,” including insufficient consideration of the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors or inadequate explanation of 

the sentence imposed. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 

(4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In its explanation, the district court need not 

“robotically tick” through every § 3553(a) factor on the record, 

particularly when its sentence is within the properly calculated 

Sentencing Guidelines range. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 

339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). At the same time, the district court 

“must make an individualized assessment based on the facts 

presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. “This individualized 

assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, but it must provide 

a rationale tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate 

to permit meaningful appellate review.” United States v. 

Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

We conclude that the district court committed no such 

procedural error. The court balanced the seriousness of the 

offense and the need to protect the public and deter others from 

such conduct, against appellants’ youth, immaturity, and drug 

use. While the district court often grouped its references to 

appellants, it also clearly differentiated between their 

individual conduct. Moreover, this grouping was hardly 
6

inappropriate, given that appellants presented many of the same 

considerations.

We must also examine the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentences, considering the “totality of the circumstances.” 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed must be “sufficient, 

but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the purposes of 

sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A properly calculated, 

within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal, and 

an appellant bears the burden to “rebut the presumption by 

demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 

445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Appellants’ sentences fell within their respective 

Guidelines ranges. As explained above, the district court 

effectively balanced the serious, premeditated, and dangerous 

nature of the offense against appellants’ youth, immaturity, and 

drug use. 

Contrary to Irick’s arguments on appeal, the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying him a variance. Indeed,

he played just as significant a role in the crime as his 

codefendants.

We similarly find nothing to support appellants’ assertion 

that the district court improperly enhanced their sentences due
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to unproven, uncharged conduct. The court properly considered 

such conduct in analyzing appellants’ history and 

characteristics and fashioning a within-Guidelines sentence.

Finally, the district court’s failure to explicitly 

consider the negative collateral consequences that appellants 

will suffer as a result of their imprisonment does not warrant 

reversal. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court

imposed reasonable sentences. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED