DISMISS and Opinion Filed April 15, 2020 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-01190-CV JAMES MCCOLLUM AND FRANK D . MCCOLLUM, III, Appellants V. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIAT ION AS LEGAL TITLE TRUSTEE FOR TRUMAN 2016 SC6 TI TLE TRUST, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-03726-C MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burns, Jus tice Whitehill, and Justice Nowe ll Opinion by Chief Justice Burns Appellants James McCollum and Frank D. McCollum, III (Frank) ap peal from the trial court’s judgment in a forcible detainer action a warding possession of the property to appellee. 1 After appellee notified the C ourt that the property had been destroyed by fire hours befo re the writ of possession was to be executed and was no longer habitable, we instructed the parties to file lett er briefs addressing

1 James McCollum participated at trial and filed a timely notice of appeal. Frank, who did not participate at trial or file a timely post-judgment motion, fil ed a timely notice of restricted appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 30.–2– whether the appeal is now moot. See Olley v. HVM, LLC , 449 S.W.3d 572, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (appellate c ourts lack jurisdiction over moot controversies). A forcible detainer action is i ntended as a speedy and inexpen sive way to obtain immediate possession of property. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San
Antonio , 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006) . A judgment of possession in such an action is not a final determination as to whether the eviction is wrongful, but merely a determination of the ri ght to immediate possession. Id. When a party is no longer in possession of the property and cannot demonstrate a meritori ous claim of right to current, actual possession, the cas e is moot and the reviewing court must vacate the judgment and dismiss the appeal. See id . at 788. Any challenges to the validity of the underlying substitute trustee’s deed and the foreclosure sa le, even if meritorious, cannot be resolved in a forcible -detainer action and cannot for m the basis of a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual posse ssion. See Schlichting
v. Lehman Bros. Bank FSB , 346 S.W.3d 196, 199 (Tex . App.—Dallas 2011, pet. dism’d); Snowden v. Quach , No. 05-18-01040-CV, 2019 WL 5119273, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 7, 2019 , no pet.) (mem. op.). The record before this Court demonstrates that the property was sold at a foreclosure sale. At that time, appellants became tenants at s ufferance. Appellee subsequently acquired the prope rty. In his letter brief, Frank asserts the appealed judgment is void because in rendering the judgment, the county court necessarily–3– determined title to the propert y. We disagree. Following the foreclosure sale, Frank filed a wrongful foreclosure laws uit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank. Frank appealed and the court of appeals aff irmed the trial court’s judgment. See McCollum v. The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. , 481 S.W.3d 352, 363 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.). Thus, title to the property has been determined and Frank’s argument that the appealed judgment is v oid lacks merit. Frank also asserts this appeal is not moot because the collater al consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applies. In order to invoke the collateral consequences exception, Frank mu st show both that a concrete di sadvantage resulted from the judgment and that the disadvantage will persist even i f the judgment is vacated and the case dismissed as moot. See Marshall , 198 S.W.3d at 789. Although Frank’s argument is difficult to decipher, he appears to argue the disadvantages that will persist in the future are financial rui n caused by the destruction of the house by the fire, damage to his personal re putation and credit, and that a judgment from this Court will impede his efforts to pursue tort claims for alleged wrongs. We disagree. Th e property loss was suffered b y appellee, not Frank. Furthermore, one purpose of vacating the underlying jud gment if a case becomes moot during an appeal is to prevent prejudice to the ri ghts of the parties when appellate review of the judgment on its merits is preclude d. See Marshall , 198 S.W.3d at 788; see also Reule v. RLZ Investments , 411 S.W.3d 31, 33 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (declining to apply collateral consequen ces–4– exception when party complained that the judgment hurts reputat ion and credit but failed to explain why consequen ces would persist once judgment vacated). Appellants are no longer in posse ssion of the property. Becau se appellants have shown neither a potentially m eritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property nor th at the collateral consequences exception to mootness doctrine applies, we conc lude this appeal is moot, vac ate the trial court’s judgment, and dismiss the appeal. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.3(a).

191190F.P05 /Robert D. Burns, III/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE–5– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

JAMES MCCOLLUM AND FRANK D. MCCOLLUM, III, Appellants
No. 05-19-01190-CV V.
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS LEGAL TITLE TRUSTEE FOR TRUMAN 2016 SC6 TITLE TRUST, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-03726-C. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burns. Justices Whitehill and Nowell participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appe al is DISMISSED

. It is ORDERED that appellee U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS LEGAL TITLE TRUSTEE FOR TRUMAN 2016 SC6 TITLE TRUST recover its costs of this appeal from appella nts JAMES MCCOLLUM AND FRANK D

. MCCOLLUM, III.
Judgment entered April 15, 2020.