COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, Beales and Decker 

Argued by teleconference 

RAYMOND NATHANIEL MARTIN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1793-13-1 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS 

 APRIL 7, 2015 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 

John W. Brown, Judge 

 (Stephanie G. Johnson; Stephanie G. Johnson, P.C., on brief), for 

appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. 

 Susan Baumgartner, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Raymond Nathaniel Martin (“Martin”) appeals his conviction by the Circuit Court of the 

City of Chesapeake (the “trial court”) for failure to return bailed property in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-117, based upon Martin’s failure to comply with the terms of his plea agreement. 

Martin’s single assignment of error alleges the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea because Martin was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 

counsel, pursuant to Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). For the following reasons, we 

find Martin’s argument is procedurally barred and therefore do not to reach the merits of his 

appeal. 

 To the extent Martin claims ineffective assistance of counsel, this claim is “not 

reviewable on direct appeal and thus can be raised only in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Sigmon 

v. Dir. of the Dep’t of Corr., 285 Va. 526, 533, 739 S.E.2d 905, 908 (2013). Accordingly, we 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

UNPUBLISHED 
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find that Martin’s argument relating to ineffective assistance of counsel is not properly before 

this Court. 

 Additionally, Martin’s assignment of error was not preserved below and, consequently, is 

waived. Rule 5A:18 states that no ruling of the trial court “will be considered as a basis for 

reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except 

for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.” “The main 

purpose of requiring timely specific objections is to afford the trial court an opportunity to rule 

intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals.” 

Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 44, 400 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1991) (citation omitted). 

 Martin argues on appeal that the trial court “erred in denying the motion to withdraw the 

Appellant’s guilty plea and withdraw from the Appellant’s plea agreement.” This phrasing 

presumes that the issue of whether to allow Martin to withdraw his guilty plea was ever before 

the trial court. However, Martin never moved to withdraw his guilty plea, either orally or in 

writing. At the first scheduled sentencing hearing on April 12, 2012, Martin’s new counsel, 

Mr. Hugh E. Black, III (“Mr. Black”) informed the trial court that Martin’s previous counsel, 

Ms. Heather B. Crook (“Ms. Crook”), had failed to advise appellant of the ramifications of his 

guilty plea on his immigration status and requested a continuance to further investigate that 

issue. At the next court date on September 27, 2012, Mr. Black requested an evidentiary 

hearing, explaining: “I think that based on Padilla v. Kentucky, the holding of the United State 

Supreme Court, Mr. Martin would be entitled to ask that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty 

plea and set this back down for trial.” (Emphasis added). 

 Despite Martin’s failure to actually move to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court held 

an evidentiary hearing on December 12, 2012 for the limited purpose of determining whether 

Ms. Crook had properly advised Martin of the ramifications of a guilty plea on his immigration 
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status. Martin waived attorney-client privilege only to the issue of immigration discussions, 

despite the trial court’s warning that a limited waiver would prevent an examination into all the 

issues that would be raised if Martin ultimately moved to withdraw his guilty plea. To clarify the 

purpose of the hearing, the prosecutor stated, “Judge, to be clear, I don’t think that [Martin’s 

counsel] is making this motion to withdraw the guilty plea. . . . I think he is focusing solely on 

the Padilla issue.” Martin’s counsel responded, “Correct, Judge.” 

 After hearing testimony from Ms. Crook and Martin, the trial court asked Martin to 

clarify the purpose of his motion. Mr. Black replied, 

[T]o allow the defendant, Judge—the court to vacate the 

defendant’s conviction at this point. . . . Because of Padilla v. 

Kentucky. The Supreme Court holding says: To satisfy this 

responsibility, we now hold that counsel must inform—in this case 

a female—her client whether his plea carries risk of deportation. 

That is the holding when you summarize Padilla v. Kentucky. 

That is what the Supreme Court said they must be told. They use 

the word “must.” 

The sentencing order noted that an evidentiary hearing had been held pursuant to Martin’s 

motion “to investigate the possible impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on the defendant’s plea.” At 

no point did Martin suggest to the trial court that he sought to withdraw his guilty plea. Instead, 

his counsel clarified that he only sought a narrow ruling under Padilla, which pertains to 

ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a defendant’s immigration status and does not 

address the issue of withdrawing a guilty plea. Because there was no motion to withdraw 

Martin’s guilty plea before the trial court, “there is no ruling for us to review.” See Fisher v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 447, 454, 431 S.E.2d 886, 890 (1993) (citations omitted). For the 

first time on appeal, Martin requests this Court to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. This 

request has come far too late and in the wrong forum. Accordingly, we find that Martin’s appeal 

is procedurally barred and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.