NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MARK C. JACKSON,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7008

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-1366, Judge William A. Moorman.

______________________ 

Decided: April 13, 2015

______________________ 

MARK C. JACKSON, Starke, FL, pro se. 

AGATHA KOPROWSKI, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., 

ALLISON KIDD-MILLER; Y. KEN LEE, AMANDA BLACKMON, 

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 
2 JACKSON v. MCDONALD

______________________ 

Before WALLACH, MAYER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM

Petitioner Mark C. Jackson appeals from a decision of 

the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(Veterans Court) that reaffirmed an order dismissing Mr. 

Jackson’s petition for writ of mandamus as moot. Because the Veterans Court did not abuse its discretion in 

dismissing Mr. Jackson’s petition, we affirm. 

I 

Mr. Jackson served honorably for the United States in 

active duty from July 1989 to July 1993. In October 2002 

and March 2005, Mr. Jackson applied for Vocational 

Rehabilitation and Education (VRE) benefits, which are 

intended to enable veterans with service-connected disabilities to become employable and to obtain and maintain 

suitable employment. 38 U.S.C. § 3100; 38 C.F.R. § 21.70. 

Prior to obtaining approval from the Department of 

Veterans Affairs (VA) to receive VRE benefits, Mr. Jackson purchased a computer and other equipment that he 

intended to use for community college classes. At the 

time, Mr. Jackson had not yet enrolled in any classes and 

had not received authorization from the VA to purchase 

the computer. His request for reimbursement for the 

computer and other equipment was denied in August 

2005. In March 2006, the VA also denied Mr. Jackson’s

VRE benefits based on its conclusion that Mr. Jackson’s 

vocational goal of working as a computer systems analyst 

was not reasonably feasible.

Mr. Jackson appealed both benefit denials, and the 

Board of Veterans Appeals (Board) subsequently remanded to the appropriate regional offices in October 2006, 

September 2009, and February 2012 for further development of the record. On May 6, 2013, the VA regional 
JACKSON v. MCDONALD 3

office in St. Petersburg, Florida issued a Supplemental 

Statement of the Case (SSOC) addressing the issues on 

remand from the Board. Among other findings, the SSOC 

explained that the regional office could not make a determination on the feasibility of Mr. Jackson’s vocational 

goals because Mr. Jackson had not completed a required 

evaluation or provided certain evidence that would have 

allowed the regional office to reevaluate its 2006 feasibility determination.

On May 9, 2014, Mr. Jackson filed a petition for a writ 

of mandamus with the Veterans Court. Among other 

things, Mr. Jackson charged that the regional office and 

the VA had unreasonably delayed in acting on his claims 

after they had been remanded from the Board. Several 

days later, Mr. Jackson filed a subsequent “motion to 

clarify,” contending that a denial of his petition for writ 

would deprive him of his Fifth Amendment rights. On 

May 30, the Veterans Court issued an order denying Mr. 

Jackson’s petition and dismissing his motion to clarify. 

The next day, Mr. Jackson filed a motion that the Veterans Court construed as a motion for single-judge reconsideration of the denial. On June 25, the Veterans Court 

granted single-judge reconsideration of its May 30 denial 

and also ordered the Acting Secretary to respond to Mr. 

Jackson’s petition.

The Acting Secretary submitted a timely response on 

July 8, arguing that because Mr. Jackson failed to complete certain required evaluations, he had not demonstrated that the VA’s delay in adjudicating his claim was 

unreasonable or an arbitrary refusal to act. While maintaining that the VA’s denial of Mr. Jackson’s benefit 

claims was proper, the Acting Secretary forwarded Mr. 

Jackson’s claim files to the Board for review of the regional office’s continued denial of Mr. Jackson’s claims. On 

July 31, 2014, the Veterans Court vacated its May 30 

order and, after reconsidering Mr. Jackson’s claims, 

issued a final order dismissing his mandamus petition as 
4 JACKSON v. MCDONALD

moot and denying his motion to clarify. The next day, Mr. 

Jackson filed a motion for a panel decision, which was 

granted. A panel of judges on the Veterans Court then 

issued an order adopting the July 31 single-judge order. 

This appeal followed.

II

Our jurisdiction to review decisions by the Veterans 

Court is limited by statute. Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 F.3d 

1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), 

we have exclusive jurisdiction “to review and decide any 

challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation . . . or 

any interpretation thereof.” We also have jurisdiction “to 

interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the 

extent presented and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(c). Absent a constitutional issue, we lack jurisdiction to “review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, 

or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the 

facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2); Cayat 

v. Nicholson, 429 F.3d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For 

appeals involving petitions for a writ of mandamus, we 

have jurisdiction to “review the [Veterans Court’s] decision whether to grant a mandamus petition that raises a 

non-frivolous legal question,” but cannot “review the 

factual merits of the veteran’s claim.” Beasley v. Shinseki, 

709 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2013). We review the 

Veterans Court’s denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion. See Lamb v. Principi, 284 

F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

The remedy of mandamus is a “drastic” one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations. Kerr v. United 

States Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 402 

(1976). Courts may issue a writ of mandamus only if 

three conditions are satisfied: 1) the petitioner must 

demonstrate that he lacks adequate alternative means to 

attain the desired relief, thus ensuring that the writ is not 

used as a substitute for the appeals process, 2) the peti-
JACKSON v. MCDONALD 5

tioner must demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to 

the writ, and 3) the court must be convinced, given the 

circumstances, that the issuance of a writ is warranted. 

Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 

380–81 (2004).

Here, Mr. Jackson sought action on the denial of his 

VRE benefit and computer reimbursement claims by the 

regional office. The Veterans Court found that Mr. Jackson had not demonstrated that the VA’s delay in processing his claims amounted to an unreasonable arbitrary 

refusal to act. Furthermore, the Veterans Court noted 

that in response to its June 25 order to the VA to respond 

to Mr. Jackson’s mandamus petition, the VA did act on 

Mr. Jackson’s claims, forwarding his appeal to the Board 

for action. In light of the Secretary’s actions, the Veterans Court then dismissed Mr. Jackson’s petition for a writ 

as moot. The Veterans Court also denied Mr. Jackson’s 

motion to clarify, finding that the motion failed to state 

with particularity the specific grounds upon which it was 

based or to describe the relief sought.1

1 As part of this motion, Mr. Jackson appeared to 

allege that the VA violated his Fifth Amendment right to 

liberty and perpetuated a violation by the State of Florida 

of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Mr. Jackson does not explain how his petition is connected to these constitutional claims. Nor did the Veterans 

Court decide any constitutional issues in its orders on Mr. 

Jackson’s petition. Merely characterizing arguments as 

constitutional does not give rise to separate constitutional 

claims. See Flores v. Nicholson, 476 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. 

Cir. 2007). Thus, Mr. Jackson’s conclusory references to 

Due Process Clause violations, without more, are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue within the scope of our 

jurisdiction. See Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999) (“[C]haracterization of [a] question as constitu-

 
6 JACKSON v. MCDONALD

We also note that less than a week after dismissing 

Mr. Jackson’s mandamus petition and less than a month 

after the Acting Secretary forwarded Mr. Jackson’s appeal 

to the Board, the Board issued a ruling on Mr. Jackson’s 

appeal. No. 04-31 819A, 2014 WL 5094720 (Bd. Vet. App. 

Aug. 4, 2014). In its ruling, the Board affirmed the August 2005 denial of reimbursement for Mr. Jackson’s 

purchase of a computer and other equipment, but concluded that the VA should have supported Mr. Jackson’s 

vocational efforts to pursue a career as a computer systems analyst, and thus reversed the VA’s March 2006 

denial of VRE benefits to Mr. Jackson as improper. Id. at 

*2, 22. 

Because Mr. Jackson obtained the relief he sought in 

his petition for writ of mandamus when the VA reviewed 

his claim file and forwarded his appeal to the Board, the 

Veterans Court did not abuse its discretion by subsequently dismissing Mr. Jackson’s petition as moot. The 

decision of the Veterans Court’s is therefore 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

tional in nature does not confer upon us jurisdiction that 

we otherwise lack.”).