Affirmed and Opinion Filed April 6, 2015 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00064-CR 

TASHIMA NICOLE EVERHART, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F13-00363-S 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Whitehill 

Opinion by Justice Francis 

Following a bench trial, Tashima Nicole Everhart was convicted of fraudulent use or 

possession of fifty or more items of identifying information, and the trial court sentenced her to 

twenty-five years in prison. In one issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to 

establish the offense is a first-degree felony. We affirm. 

Bank of America received a tip on its ethics hotline that one of its employees, Erica 

Tiller, was stealing routing, account, and check numbers and selling them to people to use for 

fraudulent purposes. As proof, the caller faxed lists of the account and routing numbers. The 

bank traced the caller’s phone number to appellant. In the meantime, Detective William Hutson 

of the Cedar Hill Police Department was investigating a case in which several counterfeit checks 

were confiscated from a suspect. During his investigation, he began contacting the banks to see 
 –2– 

if any of the checks had been used fraudulently and met with Bank of America’s fraud 

investigator. As a result of that meeting, Hutson began an investigation into appellant and 

learned she was on probation and also had outstanding traffic warrants. He contacted appellant’s 

probation officer and learned the date of appellant’s next scheduled meeting. Hutson arrived at 

the meeting, told appellant why he was there, and asked for identification. Appellant gave him a 

driver’s license with her name, picture, and date of birth, but the driver’s license number 

belonged to someone else. After confirming the outstanding warrants, Hutson arrested appellant. 

During a search of her purse, he found a sheet of paper containing a handwritten list of more than 

fifty Texas driver’s license numbers. 

Hutson ran the numbers through the Texas Department of Public Safety database and 

printed a list of the names associated with each number. He noticed that in many instances, the 

numbers belonged to different individuals with similar or identical first and last names. For 

example, there were twelve individuals named “Mary Whitehead,” eight named “Mary 

McCormick,” and eight named “Linda Sims.” Hutson also found receipts for purchases made by 

checks, some showing “Check Declined” and others that Hutson later determined involved 

fraudulent activity. He also found checks in the name of Linda Sims with different routing and 

account numbers and a checkbook in appellant’s name that had handwritten routing and account 

numbers. Hutson obtained warrants to search Hutson’s vehicle and phone. A search of Hutson’s 

vehicle uncovered mail belonging to other individuals, a driver’s license in the name of Linda 

Sims with appellant’s picture, various receipts, and some checks. A search of her phone revealed 

text messages between her and Tiller, including one with account and routing numbers. 

Four witnesses, whose driver’s license numbers were found in appellant’s possession, 

testified appellant did not have their permission to have their numbers. 
 –3– 

Appellant testified she was the person who called the bank’s hotline. She said she and 

Tiller were former friends, and she had obtained banking information from Tiller in the past and 

ended up on probation for “forgery and stuff.” In the fall of 2011, appellant started receiving 

banking information from Tiller again. After a couple of months, she decided to report Tiller 

because she believed Tiller had done some things “behind her back.” Appellant claimed her only 

purpose in continuing to obtain information from Tiller was so she could turn Tiller in. 

Appellant said Tiller also sent her the Texas driver’s license numbers found in her possession 

and that she planned to turn that information in as well but was arrested before she had the 

chance. She acknowledged telling the police she obtained the numbers from someone else and 

also said she never told police she was gathering banking and other identifying numbers so that 

she could turn Tiller in. She admitted she did not have consent to possess any of the driver’s 

license numbers found in her possession but denied any fraudulent intent. Finally, appellant 

admitted that while this charge was pending, she was arrested in Mississippi. She said she and a 

friend were passing bad checks using other individuals’ routing, account, and driver’s license 

numbers, explaining that she needed to “make some money.” 

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979). This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to 

weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Clayton v. 

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

A person commits fraudulent use or possession of identifying information if she obtains, 

possesses, transfers, or uses identifying information of another person without the other person’s 

consent and with intent to harm or defraud another. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.51(b)(1) (West 
 –4– 

Supp. 2014). Consent in this context means assent in fact, whether express or apparent. 

Id. § 1.07(a)(11); Ngetich v. State, No. 05-12-00734-CR, 2013 WL 6795896, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Dec. 20, 2013, no pet.). Assent in fact means there must be an actual or real agreement 

after thoughtful consideration. Blair v. State, 398 S.W.3d 220, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); 

Ngetich, 2013 WL 6795896, at *2. Apparent consent means assent in fact that, while not 

communicated expressly, is no less clear and manifest to the understanding for not having been 

explicitly verbalized. Blair, 398 S.W.3d at 229; Ngetich, 2013 WL 6795896, at *2. When a 

person possesses the identifying information of three or more individuals, the law presumes the 

person has the intent to harm or defraud another. Id. at § 32.51(b-1)(1). An offense under 

section 32.51 is a state jail felony if the number of items obtained, possessed, transferred, or used 

is less than five; it is a first-degree felony if the number of items is fifty or more. See id. at § 

32.51(c)(1), (4). 

Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding she committed a first-degree felony 

because the evidence at trial was sufficient to support only a state jail felony. Specifically, she 

argues the State had to prove she possessed fifty items or more without consent, but the State 

presented the testimony of only three people “who affirmed that [a]ppellant had [their] 

information without their consent.”1

 Thus, she asserts the State proved possession of only three 

items, which is a state jail felony. After reviewing the record, we disagree. 

When cross-examining appellant, the State’s questioning primarily focused on appellant’s 

intent in obtaining the driver’s license numbers. The prosecutor elicited testimony from 

appellant that she initially told police she did not know Tiller, did not call the bank, that she got 

the driver’s license numbers from someone named Michael, and was going to use them to rent an 

apartment. Appellant was asked to explain why she had a driver’s license with her picture and 

 1

 Actually, four witnesses testified appellant did not have their consent to possess their Texas driver’s licenses. 
 –5– 

the information of a “Linda Sims,” and appellant replied she had it so she could “play it off” with 

Tiller and continue getting information. The prosecution also asked appellant about numbers 

found in her checkbook, and appellant said those numbers were sent to the bank although she 

could not locate them in the documents produced by the bank and admitted into evidence. At 

that point, the following occurred: 

[PROSECUTOR]: So any - - and the routing and checking numbers that are in 

this checkbook - - in the book, are for the sole purpose of getting Erica Tiller 

caught? 

[APPELLANT]: Uh-huh. 

[PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Okay. So you’d agree with me that you didn’t have 

consent of any of these 87 people to be in possession of their driver’s license 

numbers, correct? 

[APPELLANT]: No, ma’am. 

* * * 

[PROSECUTOR]: And so it is your testimony that you’re in possession of all 

these numbers, right? And that nobody gave you permission to be in possession 

of these numbers - - the owners of the driver’s license numbers didn’t give you 

permission? 

[APPELLANT]: No, ma’am. 

[PROSECUTOR]: So you’re only contention here is whether you had intended to 

harm anybody by doing it, correct? 

[APPELLANT]: Correct. 

Putting appellant’s responses to the questions in context of her surrounding testimony, it 

would be reasonable for the trial court to conclude appellant was agreeing with the prosecutor 

that she did not have permission to have the numbers. Such an interpretation is supported by 

appellant’s testimony that her “only contention” was that she did not intend to harm anyone. 

Moreover, appellant testified she obtained the list of driver’s license numbers from Tiller, who 

appellant said stole them and either sold or gave them to her. Four of the people whose names 

were on the list testified they did not know appellant and she did not have their consent to 
 –6– 

possess their numbers. Given the circumstances under which appellant obtained the numbers, 

coupled with the four witnesses’ testimony that she did not have their permission, the trial court 

could have reasonably inferred that the owners of the remaining numbers likewise did not give 

appellant consent to possess their driver’s licenses. See Ngetich, 2013 WL 6795896, at *2. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s verdict, we conclude 

there was sufficient evidence to establish that appellant possessed fifty or more items of 

identifying information without consent, thus making the offense a first-degree felony. We 

overrule the sole issue. 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

140064F.U05 

 

/Molly Francis/ 

MOLLY FRANCIS 

JUSTICE 
 –7– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

TASHIMA NICOLE EVERHART, 

Appellant 

No. 05-14-00064-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. F-1300363-S. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Francis; 

Justices Lang-Miers and Whitehill 

participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered April 6, 2015.