J-S17036-15 

___________________________ 

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

STANFORD ALLEN RUSSELL 

 Appellant No. 1551 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 12, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0002015-2013 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2015 

 Appellant, Stanford Allen Russell, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, following 

his jury trial conviction for attempted rape by forcible compulsion, simple 

assault, and harassment (18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a) (3121(a)(1) related), 

2701(a)(1), and 2709(a)(1), respectively). We affirm. 

 The trial court’s opinion fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts 

and procedural history of this case.1 Therefore, we have no reason to 

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1

 On page 4 of the trial court’s opinion, the court cites to Commonwealth 

v. Rhoades, 510 A.2d 1217, 1225 (Pa. 1986). Nevertheless, the correct 

spelling is Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1225 (Pa. 1986). 
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restate them.2 

 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT 

[APPELLANT’S] MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL 

AS TO THE BURGLARY AND ATTEMPTED RAPE? 

____________________________________________ 

2

 As a general rule, this Court has jurisdiction only over final orders. 

Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638 (Pa.Super. 2005). “A direct 

appeal in a criminal proceeding lies from the judgment of sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 497 (Pa.Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 599 Pa. 691, 960 A.2d 838 (2008). If a defendant in a 

criminal case files a timely post-sentence motion, the judgment of sentence 

does not become final for the purposes of an appeal until the trial court 

disposes of the motions or the motions are denied by operation of law. 

Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692 A.2d 158, 160 (Pa.Super. 1997). The 

denial of a timely post-sentence motion becomes the triggering event for 

filing a notice of appeal. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2). Generally, where a 

defendant timely files a post-sentence motion, the court shall decide the 

motion within 120 days of the filing; otherwise, the motion shall be deemed 

denied by operation of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). When an 

appellant files a notice of appeal before the court has ruled on his postsentence motions, the judgment of sentence has not become “final,” and 

any purported appeal will be interlocutory and unreviewable. Borrero, 

supra. In those circumstances, the proper remedy is to quash the appeal, 

relinquish jurisdiction, and remand for the trial court to consider the postsentence motions nunc pro tunc. Id. at 161. Nevertheless, if the court 

subsequently denies an appellant’s post-sentence motions, “[this Court] will 

treat [an] appellant’s premature notice of appeal as having been filed after 

entry of [an] order denying post-sentence motions.” See Commonwealth 

v. Ratushny, 17 A.3d 1269, 1271 n. 4 (Pa.Super. 2011). Instantly, the 

court sentenced Appellant on August 12, 2014, and Appellant timely filed a 

post-sentence motion on August 15, 2014. On August 26, 2014, the court 

entered an order amending Appellant’s judgment of sentence to reflect credit 

for time served. Thereafter, Appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 

23, 2014, before the court ruled on his post-sentence motion. The court 

subsequently denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on October 1, 2014. 

Thus, we will relate Appellant’s premature notice of appeal forward to 

October 1, 2014, to resolve any jurisdictional impediments. See id. 
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DID THE COMMONWEALTH FAIL TO PROVE BEYOND A 

REASONABLE DOUBT THAT [APPELLANT] ENTERED THE 

RESIDENCE WITH THE INTENT TO COMMIT A RAPE? 

DID THE COMMONWEALTH FAIL TO PROVE BEYOND A 

REASONABLE DOUBT THAT [APPELLANT] TOOK A 

SUBSTANTIAL ATTEMPT TOWARD COMMITTING A RAPE? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 7).3 

 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the 

standard we apply is as follows: 

[W]hether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the 

light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In

applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain 

its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005) 

____________________________________________ 

3

 Appellant explicitly withdraws his second issue on appeal in light of the 

jury’s “not guilty” verdict for burglary. (Appellant’s Brief at 7). Therefore, 

we will not address Appellant’s second issue. 
J-S17036-15 

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(quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super. 

2003)). 

 After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Steve P. 

Leskinen, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed November 20, 2014, at 3-5) 

(finding: (1) Victim testified Appellant exercised physical force in attempt to 

have sexual intercourse with Victim against her will; evidence of Appellant’s 

use of physical force against Victim included photographs of scratches and 

bruises on Victim’s body, and Sergeant Reese’s testimony that he observed 

Victim’s injuries; jury found photographs and Sergeant Reese’s testimony 

were consistent with Victim’s account of events; Appellant’s comment to 

Victim that if she would just give Appellant sex he would not have to force 

himself on Victim was indicative of rape by forcible compulsion; court 

properly denied Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal for attempted 

rape; (3) Appellant grabbed Victim, jumped on top of her, held her down, 

and attempted to remove bottom half of her clothing while demanding she 

have sex with him despite Victim’s demand that Appellant stop and leave her 

residence immediately; Appellant’s actions constituted substantial step 

toward committing rape by forcible compulsion; jury properly found 

Commonwealth sustained its burden of proof for attempted rape). The 
J-S17036-15 

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record supports the trial court’s decision; therefore, we have no reason to 

disturb it. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/13/2015 

 
1 

ISSUE NO. 2: 

DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF 

ACQUITTAL AS TO THE BURGLARY AND 

A TIEMPTED RAPE? 

DID THE COMMONWEALTH FAIL TO PROVE 

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE 

DEFENDANT ENTERED THE RESIDENCE 

"ISSUE NO. 1: 

Defendant raises three (3) issues in his "Concise Statement": 

Sexual Offender's Assessment Board and was sentenced to seven (7) to fourteen (14) 

years of incarceration to run concurrent with Case Nos. 1756 of 2005 and 174 of 2014. 

August 12, 2014, he was deemed a sexually violent predator by the Pennsylvania 

Simple Assault, and the undersigned convicted him of summary Harassment. On 

8, 2014, a jury convicted Defendant of Attempted Rape by Forcible Compulsion and 

filed on behalf of Defendant Stanford Allen Russell (hereinafter "Defendant"). On April 

Before this Court is a "Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal" 

LESKINEN, J. 

Meghann E. Mikluscak, Esq. Assistant District Attorney 

Michael J. Garofalo, Esq. for the Defendant 

OPINION 

STANFORD ALLEN RUSSELL, 

v. 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL DIVISION 

No. 2015 of 2013 

Defendant. 

IN THE COUR. T OF COMMON PLEAS OF FAYETTE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

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which were documented in photographs, during the approximately fifteen (15) minute 

altercation with Defendant. Id. Even though Ms. Ross did not contact police until the 

Ms. Ross stated that she feared for her life and sustained scratches and bruises, 

just give me pussy, this wouldn't happen." Id. 

holding me on top of my bed, was trying to grab my shorts and pull them down." Id. at 

pp. 31-32. Ms. Ross "begged him to leave," and Defendant told her, "Bitch, if you would 

Ross, Defendant "got in my bed on top of me, had his one hand around my throat, 

bed, and she demanded that he "get off' her and "get home" before he awakened her 

children. Id. Defendant left the bedroom but quickly returned. Id. According to Ms. 

Defendant entered her bedroom, he "grabbed" and "hugged" Ms. Ross while she was in 

he had no reason to believe he was welcome into her home. Id. at pp. 30-31. When 

particular evening, Ms. Ross stated that she did not invite Defendant into her home, and 

partners, and Defendant fathered one of Ms. Ross's children. Id. at p. 44. On that 

Pennsylvania. N. T., April 7, 2014, p. 29. Defendant and Ms. Ross are former intimate 

of Franki Ross located at 1001 Sycamore Street, Connellsville, Fayette County, 

During the evening hours of August 27, 2013, Defendant entered the residence 

BACKGROUND 

arguments. 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court cannot agree with Defendant's 

UNINVITED WITH THE INTENT TO COMMIT A 

RAPE? 

DID THE COMMONWEAL TH FAIL TO PROVE 

BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE 

DEFENDANT TOOK A SUBSTANTIAL ATTEMPT 

TOWARDS COMMITTING A RAPE?" 

ISSUE NO. 3: 

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First, Defendant argues that the Court erred in denying his Motion for Judgment 

of Acquittal as to the Burglary and Attempted Rape. Since Defendant was ultimately 

acquitted of Burglary, the Court will only address the Attempted Rape charge. 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant filed a timely Post-Sentence Motion on August 15, 2014, which this 

Court denied on October 1, 2014. This timely appeal followed. 

Defendant's jury trial took place before this Court on April 7-8, 2014, and he was 

acquitted of the Burglary charge but convicted of the remaining charges. On August 12, 

2014, Defendant was deemed a sexually violent predator by the Pennsylvania Sexual 

Offender's Assessment Board, and this Court subsequently sentenced him to seven (7) 

to fourteen (14) years of incarceration to run concurrent with Case Nos. 1756 of 2005 

and 174 of 2014. 

evening of August 28, 2014, Sergeant Ryan Reese of the City of Connellsville Police 

Department was still able to observe the physical injuries on Ms. Ross's body and take 

a statement from her. Id. at pp. 60-61. 

Defendant was charged with Burglary, Attempted Rape by Forcible Compulsion, 

Simple Assault, and summary Harassment. On December 16, 2013, the charges were 

bound over to the Court of Common Pleas by Magisterial District Judge Ronald J. 

Haggerty, Jr. On January 21, 2014, Defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus was denied by the Honorable Gerald R. Solomon, Senior 

Judge. 

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4 

stature than Ms. Ross. For these reasons, the Court denied Defendant's Motion. 

Forcible Compulsion. It should be noted that Defendant was substantially larger in 

would not have to force himself on her was also indicative of an Attempted Rape by 

Furthermore, Defendant's demand to Ms. Ross that if she would just give him sex, he 

properly found to be consistent with her account of the events that had occurred. 

bruises on Ms. Ross's body and Sgt. Reese's observations of them, which the jury 

result of that physical force was evidenced in the photographs of the scratches and 

physical force in an attempt to have sexual intercourse with her against her will. The 

ordeal with Defendant on the evening in question. She stated that he exercised 

In common usage, therefore, the phrase ''forcible compulsion" clearly 

connotes more than the exercise of sheer physical force or violence as the 

Superior Court has so limited section 3121(1) in this case and others. The 

phrase also connotes the act of using superior force-physical, moral 

psychological, or intellectual-to compel a person to do a thing against 

that person's volition and/or will. 

Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 510 A.2d 1217, 1225 (Pa. 1986). 

In the case sub judice, the victim, Ms. Ross, testified in great detail as to her 

Court has defined "forcible compulsion" as follows: 

forcible compulsion." See, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121 (a)(1). The Pennsylvania Supreme 

defined in relevant part as "engaging in sexual intercourse with a complainant by 

For the purposes of this case, Rape is the specific crime in question, which is 

step toward the commission of that crime." See, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901 (a). 

"with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial 

In accordance with Pennsylvania law, a person commits Criminal Attempt when. 

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5 

For the aforementioned reasons, this Court disagrees with Defendant's 

assertions that the denial of his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was improper, and that 

CONCLUSION 

As stated by Ms. Ross, Defendant grabbed her, jumped on top of her, held her 

down, and attempted to remove the bottom half of her clothing while demanding that 

she have sex with him. During the entire incident, Ms. Ross demanded that he stop and 

leave her residence immediately. Those actions constituted a substantial step toward 

committing Rape by Forcible Compulsion; therefore, the jury properly found that the 

Commonwealth met its burden of proof. 

Third and finally, Defendant claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he took a substantial step toward committing the crime 

of Rape by Forcible Compulsion. 

Next, Defendant argues that the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Defendant entered Ms. Ross's residence uninvited with the intent 

to commit a rape therein. Again, the jury acquitted Defendant of Burglary, which is 

defined as in relevant part as follows: "[W]ith the intent to commit a crime therein, the 

person: enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied 

portion thereof that is adapted for overnight accommodations in which at the time of the 

offense any person is present." See, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502 (a)(1). By acquitting him, it is 

evident that the jury did not believe the Commonwealth met its burden of proof with 

respect to that charge. Accordingly, this issue need not be further addressed by this 

Court. 

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the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant 

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