-UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COU NCIL

Un 3-W21 MEETING IN PAN AMA

GOVERNMENT

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D O C u iV ic N : 3

H E A R I N G

BE FO RE TH E

JO L3 1973

T H E L I B R A R Y 

KANSAS STATE UNlV EHSi TY

SUBCOMMITTEES ON

INTER-AMERICAN A FFAIR S AN D INTERNA TIONAL 

ORGANIZATIO NS AND MOVEMENTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN D TH E

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PANAMA CANAL

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

MERCHANT MARINE AND FIS HERIE S 

HOUSE OF REP RESENT ATIV ES

NINE TY -THIED CONGRESS

95-803 O

U.S. GOVERNM ENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTO N : 1973
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAI RS

THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairma n

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin

»

A .

WAYNE L. HAYS, Ohio

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina 

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida 

CHARLES C. DIGGS, J r., Michigan 

ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania 

DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota 

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York 

JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa 

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indi ana 

ABRAHAM KAZEN, Jr., Texas 

LESTER L. WOLFF, New York 

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York 

GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania 

ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina 

JOHN W. DAVIS, Georgia 

OGDEN R. REID, New York 

MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts 

LEO J. RYAN, California 

CHARLES WILSON, Texas 

DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr., Michigan

WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD, California 

PETER H. B. FRELINGHU YSEN, New Jersey 

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan 

H. R. GROSS, Iowa

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois 

VERNON W. THOMSON, Wisconsin 

PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois 

JOHN BUCHANAN, Alabama 

J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida 

GUY VANDER JAGT, Michigan 

ROBERT H. STEELE, Connecticut 

PIERRE S. (PETE) du PONT, Delaware 

CHARLES W. WHALEN, J r., Ohio 

ROBERT B. (BOB) MATHIAS, California 

EDWARD G. BIESTER, J r., Pennsylvania 

LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas 

BENJAMIN A GILMAN, New York 

TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio

Marian A. Czarnecki, Chief of St af f

Subcommittee on I nteb-Amebican Affairs

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Cha irma n

ABRAHAM KAZEN, J r., Texas

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York 

ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina 

MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts

ROBERT H. STEELE, Connecticut 

H. R. GROSS, Iowa

PETE R H. B. FRELINGHU YSEN, New Jersey 

CHARLES W. WHALEN, J r., Ohio

R. Michael Finley, Subcom mittee St af f Consu lta nt

Bernadette M. J en kin s, St af f Assista nt

Subcommittee on I nternational Organizations and Movements

DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota, Cha irma n

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida 

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina 

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York 

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York 

OGDEN R. REID, New York

Robert B. Boettcher, Subc om mi tte e Sta ff Consu lta nt

J alayne Bruce, Sta ff Ass is ta nt

H. R. GROSS, Iowa

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois

PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois

ROBERT B. (BOB) MATHIAS, California

LARRY WINN, J r., Kansas

COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FIS HE RIES

Subcommittee on Panam a Canal

ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California, Cha irma n

JOHN M. MURPHY, New York 

FRANK M. CLARK, Pennsylvania 

FRANK A. STUBBLEFIELD, Kentucky 

RALPH H. METCALFE, Illinois 

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland 

BO GINN, Georgia

DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi

GENE SNYDER, Kentucky 

CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio 

EDWIN B. FORSYTHE, New Jersey 

WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD, California 

EDWARD YOUNG, South Carolina

(H)
C O N T E N T S

LIST OP WIT NES SES

Page Herz, Martin F., Deputy Ass ista nt Secreta ry of State for Intern ational 

Organization Affairs____________________________________________ 14

Scali, Hon. J ohn A., U.S. Ambassador to th e United N ations____________ 2

Ward, Hon. David H., special representativ e, U.S. Office of Interoce anic

Canal Negotiations, Dep artm ent of State _________________________ 20

APP ENDIX

Article entitle d “U.S. Vetoes U.N. Security Council Resolution on Pan ama 

Canal Treaty Negotiations,” from the Department of State Bulletin

dated April 23, 1973___________________________________________ 27

(in)

UN ITED NATIO NS SECURIT Y COUNCIL MEETING

IN PANAMA

W EDN ESD A Y, A PR IL 3, 19 73

H ouse of R epresentatives,

Committee on F oreign Affairs,

Subcommittees on I nter-American A ffairs and

I nternational Organizations and Movements.

Committee on Merchant Marine and F ish eri es,

Subcommittee on th e P anama Canal,

Washing ton, D.C. The joint subcommittees’ meeting began at 10:13 a.m. in room 2172, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (cochairman 

of the session) presiding.

Mr. Fascell. This morning the Subcommittees on Inter-American 

Affairs and on Internationa l Organizations and Movements of the 

Foreign Affairs Committee and the Subcommittee on the Panam a 

Canal of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee meet in a 

unique joint session to receive a report on the recently completed 

United Nations Security Council session in Panama.

Cochairing the meeting with me this morning are Congressman 

Donald M. Fraser, chairman of the Subcommittee on Internatio nal 

Organizations and Movements and Congressman Robert L. Leggett, 

chairman of the Subcommittee on the Panam a Canal.

We are delighted to welcome the ranking minority member on the 

full Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Malliard. He is also on the 

Leggett subcommittee, so he is wearing two or three hats today.

While the agenda for the U.N. Security Council session was “Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with 

provisions and principles of the charter,” the meeting actually focused 

prim arily on United States-Panam a relations and the future status 

of the Panama Canal. The meeting was climaxed by the United States 

casting of its third veto in the United Nations.

Because the extraordinary session of the Security Council may have 

major implications for the United Nations system itself, for relations 

between the United States and Panama, and for the future of the 

Panama Canal, Chairmen Frase r, Leggett, and I agreed th at this join t 

session would present a useful and constructive forum for receiving a 

repo rt on the Panam a meeting.

We are pleased to welcome before us this morning the Honorable 

John A. Scali, U.S. Perm anent Representative to the U nited Nations.

(1)
2

We hope tha t Ambassador Scab’s first appearance today in Congress 

as an Ambassador will be somewhat more pleasant than his baptism 

of fire during his first U.N. appearance.

Accompanying Ambassador Scab are :

Hon. David H. Ward, special representative, U.S. Office of Interoceanic Canal Negotiations, Department of State; Martin F. Herz, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization 

Affairs; and Miss Kathry n N. Folger, Office of Congressional Relations, Department of State.

Mr. Ambassador.

STA TEM ENT OF HON. JOHN A. SCALI, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO TH E 

UN ITED NAT IONS

Ambassador Scali. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no prepared statement. I thought perhaps our session today 

would be most useful if I made myself available to answer questions.

In a few preliminary comments, perhaps I could help set the stage. 

We left for this meeting in Panama with serious reservations about 

whether it would contribute to an improvement of relations with the 

Panam anian Government, and whether the whole concept was one 

which would assist the United Nations Security Council to strengthen 

peace and security. As you so accurately said, the agenda item did not 

include Panama per se, but was a broad sweep, catch-all which permitted Panama to be discussed as the main issue.

I arrived with the intent, and I hope I conducted myself with the 

purpose, of talking in low key in a responsible way about the problems that were to be discussed.

The atmosphere at the meeting, despite assurances th at we had received, escalated a bit in terms of rhetoric. I sought not to reply in 

kind and to descend to the level of some of the critics, but to maintain some kind of firmness and dignity and yet to demonstrate the 

flexibility with which the United States intends to address the Panama Canal question, and our relations with Panama generally.

Unhappily, despite 7 very, very full days of debate and discussion, 

we wound up with a veto. I think tha t under the circumstances, in 

view of the history and in view of some ra ther curious maneuvers in 

the background, th at we had no alternative.

But, despite this, we look forw ard to tomorrow and the next day 

and our relations with Panama, we hope, will continue in the spirit 

of friendship and that this issue which now is one which occupies 

so much of our time can be resolved by friendly direct negotiations.

I am available to reply to any questions.

Mr. F ascell. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. My question has to do 

with why we used the veto if the only thin g we objected to was procedure and not substance. Why didn’t we just do something to stop the 

meeting to start with ?

Ambassador Scali. I moved into this job at a time when going to 

Panama for a special meeting of the Security Council was almost an 

accepted fact. As I understand it, when the votes were counted back 

stage they were 14 to 1 in favor of going to Panama.
3

The reason the lineup was like this was tha t the P anamanians over 

a period of years had been very persistent and skillful in persuading 

other members of the Security Council that this would be a wise move.

So, we decided that we would go to Panama and would not be 

dragged down there kicking and screaming since the votes were a lready against us, but go there with every desire to participa te constructively in a discussion.

Now the reason we wound up-----

Mr. Fascell. Excuse me but what I am try ing to get at is whether 

there was some procedural reason why we could not stop the meeting?

Ambassador Scali. Tha t issue was not a vetoable item.

Mr. F ascell. In other words, we could not have used our veto to 

stop the meeting. We used the veto when we could.

Ambassador Scali. That is right. We could use it only on a m atter 

of substance. The whole idea of where a meeting was to be held is 

always regarded as a matter of procedure which is not subject' to veto.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Leggett.

Mr. Leggett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I want to welcome you on behalf of the Panama 

Canal Zone Subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee to this new format, amalgamous committee where we have 

joined prim arily to save your time and help all of us interpollenate 

together and develop an agreeable posture with respect to the national 

problem you have been faced with right off the bat.

I might state there are probably better ways to spend a honeymoon 

than you did down there. I admire the courage of your wife and her 

patience. We wish you much happiness.

I would say this, tha t in general I think that the United States is 

very proud of your actions down there, and I do not believe that you 

either overcommitted or undercommitted the United States.

From what you said here today, you have not locked the door. 

You have indicated that the idea of being forced into a conclusion 

with respect to negotiations which had been bilateral and pending now 

for a t least 6 years, in the open since the 1967 aborting of an attempted 

offer, you have indicated t hat there are possibilities for resolution of 

this matter.

I would hope that we could proceed now to some type of resolution. 

I believe that the U.N. is perhaps not the place for the resolution of 

what we consider to be a bilateral problem between the Panamanian 

Government and the United States.

We are very pleased to have the very distinguished Panam anian 

Ambassador, Dr. Gonzalez Revilla, present here today. I might state 

tha t some years ago th at might not have been the case. We many times 

had meetings like this in star chamber sessions where we would review 

with you your personal thoughts.

This is a public meeting. The public is invited. Our Zonian friends 

are invited. The Panamanians are invited. We want to expose fully 

as best we can the thinking of the United States in this very important 

matter.
4

I would state tha t on behalf o f our subcommittee, and some of the 

subcommittee members who have generally talked this over, we are 

interested in perhaps your mediation of this dispute.

It has been thrust on the U.N. as a problem. I do not thin k it should 

be, resolved by the U.N. I do think that you have a very keen capacity 

for diplomatic action and considering the fact t hat we have had some 

interruption in our diplomatic relations with Panama, due to the death 

of Congressman Bow, which was very unfortunate and we do not 

exactly know where we are going on that appointment now, the fact 

tha t we have not had continuous negotiations with the special White 

House ambassador staff, including Ambassador W ard, for the resolution of this dispute, I would hope that you could continue to lend your 

offices and be helpful in bringing this matter to a positive resolution.

I would ask you this general question. Of course, I have talked to 

you in the middle of these negotiations when I was down there in Panama and in the Canal Zone there a few weeks ago.

What were the compromises th at were made, if you are able to tell 

us, in the original form of the resolution ? How was it bettered by the 

compromises and why was it still unpalatable to the American delegation down there ?

Ambassador Scali. First, Mr. Congressman, than k you for your 

good wishes and generous comments. I will seek to maintain an active 

interest in the Panam anian problem, and I will do my best to play a 

constructive role.

In specific answer to your question, the resolution underwent about 

six metamorphoses. I t started out as a fa irly hard line resolution proposed by Panama and Peru in which four or five of the unalined nations joined. As a result of many, many discussions behind the scenes 

with the Panamanian Foreign Minister and twice with General Torrijos, we came within five words of a resolution which would meet the 

legitimate interests of the United States and also accommodate the just 

aspirations of Panama.

At the point when we seemed on the verge of success and after I had 

consulted the Department of State to determine what additional flexibility I had, I went in to see Foreign Minister Tack and offered him 

what I thought were words tha t would please many and still meet the 

problems.

I found tha t he then executed a 180° turn and reverted to an earlier 

hard line resolution of the kind which he knew in advance was unacceptable to us. This was a surprising turnabout because I thought 

perhaps we had discovered the formula which would allow Panama 

and the United States jointly to sponsor a resolution which in effect 

noted tha t the discussion had been held, tha t both governments had 

expressed their point of view, and urged both sides to return to the 

conference table.

For reasons best known to the Panamanian Government, there was a 

decision made to revert to the earlier resolution. T hat left me with no 

alternative but to veto.

Mr. Leggett. Let me ask two more questions. The particular words 

of the resolution we objected to, could you give us them, and could you 

also, for our record if you are able to give us the form of resolution 

you were prepared to accept ?
4

I would state tha t on behalf of our subcommittee, and some of the 

subcommittee members who have generally talked this over, we are 

interested in perhaps your mediation of this dispute.

It has been thrust on the U.N. as a problem. I do not think it should 

be,resolved by the U.N. I do thin k th at you have a very keen capacity 

for diplomatic action and considering the fact tha t we have had some 

interruption in our diplomatic relations with Panama, due to the death 

of Congressman Bow, which was very unfortunate and we do not 

exactly know where we are going on that appointment now, the fact 

tha t we have not had continuous negotiations with the special White 

House ambassador staff, including Ambassador W ard, for the resolution of this dispute, I would hope that you could continue to lend your 

offices and be helpful in bringing this matter to a positive resolution.

I would ask you this general question. Of course, I have talked to 

you in the middle of these negotiations when I was down there in Panama and in the Canal Zone there a few weeks ago.

Wha t were the compromises that were made, if you are able to tell 

us, in the original form of the resolution ? How was it bettered by the 

compromises and why was it still unpalatable to the American delegation down there ?

Ambassador Scali. Firs t, Mr. Congressman, thank you for your 

good wishes and generous comments. I will seek to maintain an active 

interest in the Panam anian problem, and I will do my best to play a 

constructive role.

In specific answer to your question, the resolution underwent about 

six metamorphoses. I t started out as a fairly hard line resolution pro ­

posed by Panama and Peru in which four or five of the unalined nations joined. As a result of many, many discussions behind the scenes 

with the Panamanian Foreign Minister and twice with General Torrijos, we came within five words of a resolution which would meet the 

legitimate interests of the United States and also accommodate the just 

aspirations of Panama.

At the point when we seemed on the verge of success and after I had 

consulted the D epartm ent of State to determine what additional flexibility I had, I went in to see Foreign Minister Tack and offered him 

what I thought were words tha t would please many and still meet the 

problems.

I found tha t he then executed a 180° turn and reverted to an earlier 

hard line resolution of the kind which he knew in advance was unacceptable to us. This was a surprising turnabout because I thought 

perhaps we had discovered the formula which would allow Panama 

and the United States jointly to sponsor a resolution which in effect 

noted tha t the discussion had been held, tha t both governments had 

expressed their point of view, and urged both sides to return to the 

conference table.

For reasons best known to the Panamanian Government, there was a 

decision made to revert to the earlier resolution. Tha t le ft me with no 

alternative but to veto.

Mr. Leggett. Let me ask two more questions. The particu lar words 

of the resolution we objected to, could you give us them, and could you 

also, for our record if you are able to give us the form of resolution 

you were prepared to accept ?
6

Mr. Gross. If you were under no illusions, I wish you would so state 

it at the beginning.

Ambassador Scali. I think my predecessor George Bush spelled out 

the objections at th at time, but unfortunately our views did not prevail.

Mr. Gross. In the 14 to 1 vote th at took this session to Panama, did 

Britain vote to go there ?

Ambassador Scali. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gross. Why, do you know ?

Ambassador Scali. I think they counted the votes and decided that 

since they couldn’t lick the opposition, they would join them. B ut this 

is my reading, sir.

Mr. Gross. On the basis tha t those tha t go along the most get along 

the best, something of that kind, would you say ?

Mr. F ascell. It sounds like Congress.

Mr. Gross. Yes, exactly so, and the admonition tha t one of the 

speakers of the House gave us at one time. Now the 13-to-l vote in 

Panam a with one abstaining, what happened to the British do you 

have any idea ?

Ambassador Scali. They were the ones who abstained

Mr. Gross. I know, but what happened to them? After voting to 

take us down there to get a real good clobbering in the eyes of the 

rest of the world, why did they abstain a t th at juncture, have you any 

idea?

Ambassador Scali. It was never fully explained, sir, in the public 

comments. I thought tha t the comments made to me privately indicated a belief tha t the British felt that in view of the circumstances, 

in view of the fact tha t it was going to be a lopsided vote that they 

would look better internationally if they abstained.

Mr. Gross. Why did we take such a clobbering in this deal ?

Ambassador Scali. It is very difficult, Mr. Congressman, to persuade many unalined countries, in addition to some Communist countries, that the United States is not an easy ta rget when discussions 

of this kind occur. You can talk with them as earnestly and as sincerely as you can behind the scenes, bu t when they look around and 

know pretty much in advance what the votes are going to be, you 

don’t make much impact on them.

Mr. Gross. Do you thin k we ought to turn the other cheek and 

raise our contribution to the support of this puerile outfit known 

as the United Nations? Do you th ink we ought to now raise our contribution from 25 percent back up to 31 percent or do you thin k we 

ought to give it a nice meat ax cut ?

Ambassador Scali. Mr. Chairman, I am strongly in favo r of the 

vote which reduced the U.S. contribution from 31.5 percent to 25 percent. At this time, however, I don’t think I would be in favor of any 

further reductions.

Mr. Gross. Why not? We have just been pu t through a wringer in 

the eyes of the rest of the world. W hy not cut them another 10 or 15 

percent ?

Ambassador Scali. It has been a very difficult battle to persuade the 

members of the United Nations to reduce our portion to 25 percent. 

I think we would stand very little chance of reducing it further.
7

Mr. Gross. I have more questions, but go ahead.

Mr. Fascell. Go ahead.

Mr. Gross. Why did you walk out of the Security Council meeting 

in Panama, as you apparently did, Mr. Scali, a fter we had taken this 

beating and rush to a press conference to say tha t despite the vote the 

negotiations on the canal would go right on ?

By what authority did you make this remark? Wouldn’t a better 

statement have been that this jeopardizes our negotiation with respect 

to the canal instead of saying we don’t take this very seriously. I am 

not tryin g to put words in your mouth, but this is what I gained from 

the newspaper accounts of what happened after you had to impose the 

veto.

Ambassador Scali. Mr. Chairman, I had my news conferences du ring my stay there. I think th at at my last news conference I said tha t 

I thought that even though we retained a spirit of good will and 

friendship for the Panamanian people and this Government and 

wanted to resolve this problem face to face in negotiation, I thought 

that the result had complicated our relationship.

I will say here today I thin k it is possible tha t it has set back our 

relationship. I think I also said it, however, in Panama and in expressing a desire to continue bilateral negotiations with a nation tha t has 

tradition ally been our friend for many years.

I don’t think that I am doing harm or a disservice to the need for 

us eventually to agree with Pana ma on an arrangement which looks 

afte r the just aspirations of Panam a, but also accommodates the 

legitimate interests of the United States.

Mr. Gross. I doubt, Mr. Scali, that it was within your province to 

say whether the negotiations would go forward.

Ambassador Scali. Mr. Congressman, I can only say tha t in tha t 

area I have carefully followed the instructions tha t were relayed to 

me by the approp riate authorities.

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Stubblefield.

Mr. Stubblefield. Thank you. I have no questions, but I would 

like to state from our reading of the accounts of your actions down 

there, Mr. Ambassador, that you acted in an exemplary fashion tha t 

is appreciated by all of us.

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. F relinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I t is a pleasure to 

see you here, Mr. Ambassador. I would like to follow up on what Mr. 

Gross was asking. First of all, what additional costs were involved 

in holding a session in Panama, do we know ?

Ambassador Scali. We estimate that it cost the Government of Pan ­

ama up to a half million dollars. I am not aware of what estimates we 

have on what it cost the United States and other countries. I would 

assume it would be in the neighborhood of $15,000 to $20,000 for us 

alone.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Did the U.N. not have to make additional 

outlays in order to hold a meeting in Panama, or did Panama pay the 

entire bill ? I can imagine the propaganda value to Panama is certainly 

well worth the $500,000 they may have put up. This on the spot, 

public slap at the relationship between us is worth a few hundred
8

thousand dollars. What did it cost the U.N.? And what was the 

U.S. share of the cost to the U.N. ?

Ambassador Scali. As I understand it, the Government of Panama 

succeeded in persuading members to go to Panama with the assurance 

tha t it would pick up the tab for the U.N.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I s tha t wThat happened ? The Panam anian 

Government made a contribution to the U.N. for the cost of holding 

the meeting there?

Ambassador Scali. My understanding is tha t the Panamanian 

Government has promised to pick up the expenses th at represent the 

difference between holding the meeting in New York and holding it 

in Panama.

Mr. F relinghuysen. The arguments that Panama used to persuade 

members of the Security Council to hold a meeting in Panama escape 

me entirely. Was it simply monetary? That it would be a tax-free 

junket? Or was there something of substance th at made it seem wise? 

Holding a meeting in Panam a did hold at least the potential of a 

direct confrontation between Panama and the United States.

I can see why we might have had reservations about the wisdom 

of such a location, but what persuaded the other members of the 

Security Council to think it wTas a wise move to hold a meeting there ?

Ambassador Scali. It was p rima rily because of the meeting tha t 

was held the previous year in Addis Ababa. A t tha t time in the first 

meeting th at the Security Council had ever had outside of New York 

it was looked upon as a salute, a recognition, a gesture to all of Africa. 

Those Africans who supported it felt tha t it increased the prestige 

of the region and gave the delegates of the Security Council an opportunity to see firsthand some of the problems tha t they discussed in 

New York.

A similar reasoning prevailed when Panama made its bid. They 

called it a gesture of respect f or all of Latin America and sought to 

assure the Security Council tha t the Panama Canal would not necessarily dominate the discussion.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. Of course, it did dominate the discussion. It 

did provide a wonderful opportunity for a gesture of anti-Americanism by many countries, particularly in Latin America. If there really 

is interest in maintaining the prestige of the United Nations, I would 

think, this exercise is very dangerous. If we go around lending the 

U.N. as an institution, using it to criticize, ridicule, or provoke opinions against individual members, this will weaken the basic institution. I agree with Mr. Gross. It is not going to increase the enthusiasm 

of Members of Congress, Lord knows, about the value of the U.N., to 

have this kind of an exercise, having the U.N. lend itself to what 

quite obviously was a well-thought-through exercise on the Pan amanians’ part.

Ambassador Scali. I completely agree with you. I was seeking to 

explain the reasons and justification that the Panamanians used in persuading the other members to go along with the idea of having a Security Council meeting in Panama. I agree th at it creates dangerous 

precedent. I t puts the Security Council in the position of becoming a

g

ressure device for exerting diplomatic pressure on members of the 

ecurity Council in an area of high tension.
I would hope the members of the Security Council would think very 

carefully the next time such a meeting is proposed before we injure 

the reputation of the United Nations and the Security Council. Specifically its main task is to preserve peace and security. I can tell you 

I will do my very utmost to try to prevent another meeting of the Security Council from being held outside of headquarters in circumstances such as this.

Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am glad my questions provoked that response. It does seem to me essential to recognize th at this was a very 

unhappy and unwise development which reflects on the institution of 

the Security Council itself.

Mr. Fascell. All propaganda has a price, especially when an issue 

becomes more importa nt than an agreement. I don’t know what the 

effect of the Panamanian position will be in the Congress on PanamaUnited States relationships. That remains to be seen. I can say tha t 

whatever advantage was gained around the world from the propaganda, an equal disadvantage was gained in the Congress of the United 

States.

I would like to introduce the other chairman who is here. He had 

another meeting and was delayed. He is Congressman Don Fraser, 

chairman o.f the Subcommittee on Internationa l Organizations and 

Movements.

Mr. Fraser. Thank you very much. I want to welcome the Ambassador. I have been in New York recently in connection with the Law 

of the Sea Conference. I hope we may have an opportunity to have 

some future sessions with you on other aspects of our involvement in 

the U.N. Today I want to express my welcome to you. We are delighted 

to have you here.

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Ambassador, we certainly appreciate your being 

here. We appreciate your activity on behalf of the Un ited States a t the 

United Nations. We know the decision to go to Panama was made prior 

to your appointment. You received a letter from Colonel Noriega during the period of deliberation in Panama, is that true ?

Ambassador Scali. It was not a letter. It was a message from Colonel Noriega which was in typew ritten form. It said tha t it was, in 

turn , a message from General Torrijos.

Mr. Murphy. Would you submit a copy of that message for the 

record ?

Ambassador Scali. I don’t have a copy with me, but I would be 

pleased to do so.1 *

Mr. Murphy. Did that message come to you before or after the 

change in position by Foreign Minister Tack ?

Ambassador Scali. It came before, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you see any relationship between tha t message 

and the change in attitud e on behalf of the Panam anian Government ?

Ambassador Scali. It is conceivable. The fact tha t I rejected the 

message was a factor in Foreign Minister Tack’s change in position 

later. Let me describe to you as best I can remember what the message 

wras. This came on the 21st, the last day of the conference, some few7

hours before the vote was to be taken. It said that the Panamanian

1

 Th e classified le tt er was subsequ ently subm itted and is retained in the files of the

Inter -A me ric an Subc omm ittee .
10

people and students would not understand a veto and if Ambassador 

Scali were to veto, he had better do it from Tocumen, which is the 

airport. The message came from Colonel Noriega to an authorized 

source in the U.S. Government before I arrived at the Embassy in the 

morning.

There was a second telephone call from Colonel Noriega before I 

arrived to make sure I had received the message. Once I received the 

message I immediately asked for an appointment to see General 

Torrijos.

Mr. Murphy. Did you see General Torrijos ?

Ambassador Scali. I did. I told General Torrijos that if the message 

was accurate, I wanted him to know that if there were to be a veto it 

would be not from the airport, but from the Security Council chamber. I also said tha t if there were to be any violence or any disturbances 

tha t we would hold him responsible. I also said tha t the members of 

my delegation were not afraid. I was told by General Torrijos tha t 

there perhaps had been a misunderstanding, that this message had 

been relayed by one of his people as a precaution, as pa rt of the cooperation that usually exists between Panam anian and American security 

officials.

He assured me that i t was not meant as a threat. In view of what he 

said, I accepted his description of what was intended.

Mr. Murphy. Was t ha t a personal meeting, a face-to-face meeting, 

with General Torrijos ?

Ambassador Scali. Yes, sir, it was.

Mr. Murphy. I t was rather strange tha t a colonel in the Guardia 

Nacional would take the time to communicate directly with the 

Ambassador to the United Nations from the United States.

Ambassador Scali. I found it unusual, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you feel there were any thi rd p arty forces operating in tha t conference?

Ambassador Scali. I suspect, and I have no firm evidence, tha t the 

Soviet, Chinese, and Yugoslav representatives were urging the P ana ­

manians to adopt a very rigid position and not to accept a compromise, 

but to negotiate until they were sure they could have an American 

veto.

Mr. Murphy. And these third party forces influenced the Pan amanian position at the meeting?

Ambassador Scali. Well, I have some evidence of some of the advice 

tha t was given by the Soviets and Yugoslavs. I have no direct evidence of what the Chinese advice was, but I do know that the Chinese 

speech totally supported the Panam anian position.

Mr. Murphy. Who were the appropria te authorities tha t you dealt 

with in the State Department ?

Ambassador Scali. A ll my messages went to the Secretary of State. 

I dealt also with the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 

and with Mr. Samuel DePalma, the Assistant Secretary of State for 

International Organization Affairs.

But I also was in contact with members of the White House and 

members of the Defense Department.

Mr. Murphy. Who told you to veto the resolution ?

Ambassador Scali. My instructions came from the Secretary of 

State.
11

Mr. Murphy. The Congress was very carefully watching the operation of the United Nations in Panama and 60 Members of the House 

had signed a letter asking the President to communicate to you to 

veto a resolution that would come out. Many Members of the Congress, 

many members of this committee, in fact all three subcommittees have 

very carefully watched over the years the progress of the negotiations 

between the United States and Panama.

We have seen more now than ever before the intrusion of third pa rties and third forces in trying to influence these negotiations. I think 

tha t your statement tha t we are probably furthe r a part now than we 

were last year or several years ago is true. We certainly exhort you to 

continue your staunch work on behalf of an American position and 

interest in these negotiations and at the United Nations.

Thank you.

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Snyder.

Mr. S nyder. Mr. Scali, if the Panam anians’ purpose in having this 

meeting down there was to strengthen world opinion for their position, 

do you have any reading as to whether or not they succeeded ?

Ambassador Scali. I think they have made some temporary points 

in Latin America. I noted with some interest tha t the comment of 

Foreign Minister Tack was th at Ambassador Scali may have vetoed 

the resolution, but Latin America has vetoed the United States. There 

is considerable sympathy for a small country standing up against the 

United States in any part of the world.

But I also believe tha t many of the Latin American nations recognize tha t this is a bilateral issue and tha t Panam a and the United 

States are destined by geography and because of their past associations to work this out face to face and man to man. I also believe there 

was some resentment on the pa rt of L atin American delegations that 

the Government of Panama converted the meeting into a virtual onenote issue—namely, the Panam a Canal—at a time when some of them 

had been assured th at it would be a forum for discussing Latin American problems generally.

Mr. Snyder. Do you have any reading as to world opinion in regard 

to their tactics and in regard to the message that you made reference to 

a while ago ?

Ambassador Scali. I have seen no accurate polls. I have seen some 

dispatches which indicate tha t it was well recognized in Europe that 

this was a pressure exercise directed against the United States and 

tha t there was no alternative but to veto a one-sided resolution.

Mr. Snyder. Did you submit any new trea ty drafts to Panama immediately before this session ?

Ambassador Scali. No, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Snyder. Are you aware of any tha t were submitted ?

Ambassador Scali. No, sir.

Mr. Snyder. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Harring ton.

Mr. Harrington. Mr. Scali, I ’d like to follow along Mr. Sndyer’s 

line of questioning but perhaps from a different perspective. However, 

I don’t wish to place you in the position of having to answer for a 

policy that was in large measure decided before perhaps you arrived at 

the scene.
12

I am wondering if I could, since I take a somewhat different tack 

than perhaps some of the other questioners, ask, given the context of a 

largely nonexistent policy in dealing with Latin America, and, given 

the talk of the present administration of reducing our contribution to 

the U.N., what can you do to further the effort to resolve this thing in 

an amicable fashion with the Panamanians?

I would also add, if I could, that a very clear message emerged from 

our allies in Western Europe from the conference that was held in the 

Netherlands last Monday and Tuesday—that it was time fo r us to consider ourselves as one among equals and not necessarily as one who had 

grown accustomed to running the show, be it the U.N. show or something else.

I wonder if you could comment on this message ?

Ambassador Scali. Mr. Congressman, first let me say in commenting on one of the remarks you made tha t I do not detect within the 

administration insensitivity to the United Nations. Before I took this 

appointment I discussed at considerable length with the President his 

attitude toward the United Nations, what his plans were and some 

of the initiatives tha t we could conceivably sponsor. I have been a 

newsman most of my life and I am a fairly difficult man to convince. 

I am not a registered Republican. I was convinced by the President 

tha t he has plans for using the United Nations not only to advance the 

security interests of the United States, but to help insure and guarantee a long lasting peace.

So my role is going to be in tha t direction. I don’t intend to stand 

up and shout and scream and to wave the flag unnecessarily. However, 

when there are moments when I have to stand up and be counted, when 

it is necessary to veto, when all reasonable avenues have been exhausted, I will do so. This doesn’t mean tha t I believe that the United 

States has a policy to push people around because I don’t believe tha t 

is true.

Now, precisely where we are going in our relations with Panama 

I think, in large measure depends on the Panamanian Government 

itself. I believe th at General Torrijos does want a settlement of the 

Panama Canal issue. I am not sure this is true of all of the people 

around him. All we can do in these circumstances is to continue negotiations at an app ropriate moment and to test their sincerity even as they 

test our sincerity.

I can assure you based on the background study tha t I have had to 

do, and it has been intensive, tha t there exists on the American side a 

flexibility and a good will and the kind of reasonable concessions tha t 

can and should solve this dispute to the mutual advantage of both 

sides.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Winn.

Mr. Winn. I have no questions.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. Hamilton. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Forsythe.

Mr. F orsythe. No questions.

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Bowen.

Mr. Bowen. Thank you.
13

Mr. Ambassador, as we look back over the history of the U.N., we 

see as an obvious matter of fact tha t the Soviet Union has had to resort to vetoes so frequently because they have not had the majority on 

their side. We have had to resort to them infrequently because we have 

had the majorities on our side.

Yet we find ourselves very decisively outmaneuvered, outplanned 

in this instance. Appa rently Panam anian diplomacy has been more 

skillful than American in a matter affecting our vital interest. As a 

sort of postmortem, looking into it, the decisions which led to the 

holding of the meeting in Panama and the actual head count there, I 

am wondering what might we have done to plan more effectively, to 

do a more effective lobbying job, to try to muster support fo r our position if we had to go back and do it all over again.

Apparently it would seem tha t we were rath er thoroughly outmaneuvered in some fashion. Wha t might you have to say on that 

subject, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador Scali. Mr. Congressman, we first of all have to start 

with the issue. The Panama Canal to those who study it superficially 

looks like the classic example of colonialism in the Western Hemisphere. Tha t is before you begin to study it in depth and recognize 

tha t the United States has already revised tha t treaty in 1936 and 

1955 and was on the verge of revising it a third time to Panama’s 

benefit in 1967 and is prepared to revise it a fourth time in any new 

negotiation. So at a time when you have nationalism sweeping the 

world, it looks like a case that you could very easily sell if you are a 

less developed country. And you have 132 countries as your potential 

allies in the United Nations.

So much of it has to do with the case per se as it appears to a 

large number of nonalined countries. I would suspect that it is almost 

inevitable that such a case can be sold a second time, but that is not 

the im portant point as I see it. The important point is what happened.

Now Panama may have received 13 votes, but it didn’t get the important vote. It didn’t get the vote of .the United States. It didn’t get 

the vote of the United States not because we want to be hard-nosed, not 

because we want to be inflexible, not because we don’t care about 

Panama because we do.

We support Panama’s just aspirations as much and indeed more 

than some of the countries tha t voted with Panam a at tha t Security 

Council meeting. I don’t know whether there is anything that we 

could have done in addition to prepare ourselves to avoid being, as 

you call it, outmaneuvered.

I am confident tha t there was an awful lot of work done behind the 

scenes and tha t even though it was a lop-sided vote in the Security 

Council, there are an awful lot of other countries in the United Nations who understand our position and who recognize tha t in the circumstances th at the United States did the right thing.

Mr. Bowen. Certainly I feel tha t as the others have commented, the 

responsibility would not be yours personally, but I think we are all 

distressed that it would appear to some tha t maybe our homework 

was not handled properly. Let’s say in an instance in which we have 

very strong and persuasive arguments to make for our position and 

in light of p ast votes in the Security Council in which we have been

95-803 0 — 71 3
14

able to do a good job of bringing support to our position, we somehow 

failed to do so in this instance and I think that is what is of concern 

to so many.

Ambassador Scali. Mr. Herz would like to answer that.

STATEMENT OF MARTIN F . HERZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY

OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. Herz. Mr. Chairman, if I may just run down the membership 

of the Security Council this year, it may perhaps help to answer 

Congressman Bowen’s question. Now in order to get a procedural 

vote passed in the Security Council you need nine votes. The question 

was: Can we prevent Panama from getting 9 of the 15 votes on the 

Security Council on its proposal to hold the meeting there during 

the month when they were going to be chairman of the Security 

Council?

Now you have among the five permanent members two whose support was certain to be given. That is China and U.S.S.R. In addition, 

you had two Latin American countries, Panam a and Peru. Tha t is 

four. Furthermore, you had three countries from Afr ica: Sudan, 

Guinea, and Kenya. For reasons that Ambassador Scali has explained, 

there was a feeling tha t since the Africans had had their turn to have 

a Security Council meeting on th eir continent, it was only courteous 

and fai r tha t they should give the Latin Americans the same. That 

brings it up to seven.

In addition to that you have the Yugoslavs whose vote has been 

characterized by Ambassador Scab’s description of their role in P an ­

ama. Then you have India, which in this instance alined itself with 

not only the other nonalined countries but those alined against us, and 

Indonesia which under the circumstances did not hesitate to go along.

That is 10 votes. I t is true tha t there were others who hesitated and 

not only did we work with those countries in explaining our position, 

but also with the others. The position of Australia might have gone 

one way or the other and Austria might have gone one way or the 

other and the same is true of France and the United Kingdom. It 

was clear to us th at our job was to explain the reasons to these countries why holding the meeting in Panama at the invitation of the 

Panam anian Government was not a good thing for the Security Council, that indeed there was not a genuine parallel about holding the 

meeting in Panam a for a particular purpose that we know, and holding the meeting in Africa. We made these points, made them quite 

insistently to the various countries.

But I think, for the reasons I explained, in view of the composition 

of the Council it was not really a question of whether we would be 

able to prevent the vote from going that way. As so often happens 

in parliamentary bodies when it seems the majority exists, other countries climb on the bandwagon. I think that is a partia l explanation.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Kazen. I owe you an apology. You were the first 

member here.

Mr. Kazen. Mr. Ambassador, this is only the third veto the United 

States has cast?

Ambassador Scali. Yes, sir.
15

Mr. Kazen. Could you tell us how many vetoes Russia has used?

Ambassador Scali. They used the veto 109 times.

Mr. Kazen. Of course China has not had any.

Ambassador Scale Yes, they have. They vetoed on India-Pa kistan.

Mr. Kazen. How long have they been in the United Nations?

Ambassador Scale About 2 years now.

Mr. Kazen. Has France ever used a veto ?

Ambassador Scale I believe they have, sir.

Mr. Kazen. In other words, the major powers in the U.N. have at 

one time or other all used the veto, right ?

Ambassador Scale That is my understanding, yes, sir.

Mr. Kazen. This was an issue tha t directly affected the United 

States and another member and no one else ?

Ambassador Scale Yes, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Kazen. What effect do you think tha t this action in Panama, 

the whole exercise, has had on the Organization of American States ?

Ambassador Scale There was a common theme expressed by some 

of the speakers led by Foreign Minister Roa of C uba ; namely, that the 

reason they were discussing it before the United Nations Security 

Council was because the OAS, despite its long history, was now outdated and not a suitable vehicle for discussing something as important 

as this.

In my remarks I disagreed with that. I pointed out that the OAS is 

the oldest of the regional organizations, tha t it has a distinguished 

record and t hat indeed in 1964 the United States and Panama agreed 

within the OAS to seek a new arrangement for the Panama Canal. 

I happened to disagree with those who say tha t the OAS is obsolete. 

I suspect that it will exist longer than those who are trying to bury it 

prematurely.

Mr. Kazen. Do you see in the future any more attempts to weaken 

it?

Ambassador Scale The Foreign Ministers of the American states 

are due to meet here tomorrow to discuss the futu re of the OAS. I fully 

anticipate tha t there will be moves made to revise the charter and the 

operations of this organization with the justification tha t times have 

changed and it should have a more meaningful role.

I am not certain what the result will be.

Mr. Kazen. My understanding is that Peru is going to be very active 

in this.

Ambassador Scale That is my understanding, too, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. K azen. Mr. Ambassador, I too think you did what you had to 

do in the best interests of this country. I know tha t you will continue 

to do the kind of job that has to be done. Your background and experience makes you qualified to hold your present position and I know 

tha t you will make valuable contributions to the policies of this 

country.

Thank you.

Ambassador Scale Thank you, sir.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. F raser. T hank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I can a ppreciate tha t your responsibilities were to represent the position of
16

the executive branch and the Department of State but there probably 

was once a day in American foreign policy when the United States 

might have been able to count on the votes of countries such as Austria, Australia, sometimes India, certainly Indonesia under its present 

government, Kenya, Peru, the United Kingdom. But we were alone on 

this vote. Is there a message for us ?

Ambassador Scali. I am not sure that this specific meeting produced 

tha t kind of message. One of the unhappy facts was that we were 

meeting in Panama where, despite the fact tha t it is a cross-center of 

communications and travel, it is still pretty far from the home offices 

and quite a few of the delegates who went there went with instructions 

they had received in New York and which were never changed. This 

was an issue where you pit the big United States against a tiny country 

about the size of South Carolina with only P/2 million people.

No matter how good your case, it is very difficult to win under circumstances like that.

Mr. Fraser. Is this the kind of issue tha t will sway the vote of 

Australia or France ?

Ambassador Scali. I want to point out, Mr. Congressman, as I think 

you are aware th at there is a new labor government in Australia and 

it is seeking to pursue a somewhat more independent course in foreign 

policy, whereas I think we probably would have had the vote of the 

old Australian Government. I thin k tha t in the uncertainties tha t 

perhaps we lost the vote of the present Australian Government.

Mr. F raser. Let’s pursue tha t a moment. The British Government is 

conservative and did not vote with us.

Ambassador Scali. Yes, it abstained.

Mr. F raser. An abstention was the best we could get from one of our 

closest allies, an ally with a conservative government. You don’t get a 

message out of this ?

Ambassador Scali. I don’t know what kind of message you are 

looking for. The message to me is tha t at a minimum perhaps I should 

work harder. I am not sure th at this reflects an international disillusionment with the role of the United States. I know tha t we have just 

finished a long and very difficult war where some of our traditional 

allies have criticized us.

All we can do is move on from this point to seek to explain our policies and indeed to adopt policies which are calculated to look after 

the security and welfare of the American people, to be as generous and 

forthcoming as we can in whatever assistance we provide to other 

nations and to do so with the spirit of compassion and generosity.

Mr. F raser. Mr. Ambassador, there is a principle that suggests th at 

the simplest hypothesis is usually the best. It may be that the message 

is that most of the countries in the world disagree with us on this 

position, or at least that this is true of those represented in the Security Council.

Ambassador Scali. That is a conceivable hypothesis.

Mr. F raser. There have been a lot of countries burned by U.N. resolutions over the years, during the days when the end of colonialism was 

underway, in the Middle East and in relation to the problems of So uthern Africa, and now the United States is finding tha t it is the subject 

of U.N. resolutions or, at least one in particular. Do you think tha t 

the right response from the United States is to stand injured in pride
17

an d t o ru n the flag up th e pole a no ther 12 fee t an d dou ble our defense 

ap prop riations ?

W ha t is th e righ t response to th is ? Should no t we as a m atur e n ation 

un de rstand th at we may no t be in the pr ev ailin g cu rre nts of world 

opinion an d th at if we are g oing to act m atu rely we m ust un de rst an d 

th at we are only 1 of 130 natio ns?

Am bassa dor Scali. We ll, Mr. Congressman, I don ’t see that we pr opose to r un the flag up an othe r 12 feet. I am sure th at there are d iploma tic b att les th at we will lose despite th e me rits of th e case in the fu ­

ture. I do n’t detect any fee ling on the par t of t he a dm inist ratio n th at 

the Pa na man ian experie nce is one which proves th at we are out of th e 

broad s tre am of in tern ationa l p ublic opinion .

Mr. F raser. I m eant on thi s issue. I di dn ’t mean in ou r gen era l fo reign policy.

Am bassa dor Scali. Well, I a m ye t to be convince d, b ased on t he ex ­

am inati on of the tac tic s we have confronted , th at we are wr ong 

on the issue of Pa na ma. I str on gly susp ect, M r. Con gressm an, t hat if 

you had been s itting there in my place un de rgoing the same experience 

and ha ving to nego tia te wi th someone who tu rn s 180 degrees in the 

space o f a few ho urs at a tim e when you are about to make an ar ra ng ement with the m th at yo ur insti nc t may hav e been to m ake a veto too.

Mr. F raser. I am no t argu in g th e veto. You did it un de r instr uc ­

tion s. Th e only p oint I am try in g to m ake, an d pe rhap s I am being too 

wordy abo ut it, is the f ac t t h at we lost. We were th e only one t o s tand 

up on ou r side. Ev en ou r closest ally, a con servative gov ern me nt, did 

not stan d with us. It seems to me we ou gh t to get th is negotiation 

com pleted.

One las t point. I t seems to me th at the fund am en tal interest of the 

Uni ted States is to have in tern ationa l access th ro ug h the canal, to h ave 

it ru n effectively and efficiently. T hat is our real int ere st.

Am bassa dor Scali. Rea lly th at is one of ou r interests.

Mr. F raser. W hy c an ’t we b ring an in tern ationa l bod y into th e pictu re th at would gu aran tee righ ts here on be ha lf of the in tern ationa l 

com munity . We are talk in g about the Uni ted St ates versus Pa na ma 

bu t neither cou ntr y stan ds elected by any body to be trus tee f or a wo rld ­

wide in terest in access between the tw o oceans. These a re sel f-a ppoin ted 

respon sibilities. I kno w Pa na m a doesn’t favo r th is bu t th at doe sn’t 

impress me a bit. Why don’t we move in the direc tio n of b rin ging a n 

in tern ationa l agency i n that will prote ct th e real in terest we hav e alon g 

wi th the othe r n ati ons of th e wor ld.

Am bassa dor Scali. W hen you say Pa na ma doesn’t favo r thi s, you 

are sa yin g quite a bit. It is thei r rea l estate. I t hi nk th ey would tak e as 

dim a view of th at as they do of the prese nt arr an ge men t. I am no t 

sure th e Un ite d States favors it eit her. As a m at te r of f ac t I wo uld lik e 

to look v ery, v ery carefully in to th at . I am not su re t h at in tern at io na lizing th e canal would g ua rantee that it is run as efficiently as i t now is.

Eve r since th e can al was bu ilt , in the more th an 60 years it has been 

in existence, it has never been closed once. E ac h ye ar a la rg er num ber 

of ships successfully tr an si t i t. I recognize the in tent and scope of yo ur 

question, wh eth er pe rhap s a m ore modern arra ng em en t ca n be made. I 

very mu ch believe th at a t some point the re will be a sa tis factor y res olu ­

tio n of th e diffe rences with the Pa na man ian Gover nm ent . I th in k per-
18

haps th at is to be preferred over some mechanism which internationalizes it.

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. Bingham. Than k you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I am 

sorry I did not hear your opening comments. Am I right we had no 

objection to the third operative para graph of the resolution which 

“urges the Government of the United States of America and the 

Republic of Panama to continue negotiations in a high spirit of friendship, mutual respect and cooperation and to conclude without delay 

a new treaty aimed at the prompt elimination of the causes of conflict 

between them.”

Ambassador Scali. There have been so many operative parag raphs 

tha t it is a little difficult for me to recall now, but if I do remember 

accurately, we had no objection to tha t because that, in effect, urged 

both sides to get back to the table and negotiate this on a bilateral 

basis.

Mr. Bingham. That was my understanding from press accounts of 

the negotiation. I am very interested in the form of pa ragraph 2 of the 

operative paragraphs. As you may know, I have had some experience 

with U.N. resolutions. This para graph contains the language that I 

know the U.S. found objectionable, but it starts out, “takes note of the 

willingness shown by the Government of the United States of America 

and the Republica of Panama to establish in a formal instrument 

agreements,” et cetera and “to conclude a new just and fair trea ty 

concerning the present Panama Canal which would fulfill Panama’s 

legitimate aspirations and guarantee full respect for Pana ma’s sovereignty over all of its territory.”

Now this was characterizing our position as a willingness to move in 

tha t direction. It was not urging us to move in that direction. It was 

taking note of the willingness. We might not have so characterized 

our position, but why did we have to get so excited about something 

which was a description of a position as they saw it ?

Ambassador Scali. Mr. Congressman, we go back to square one 

on this which is tha t we do not believe that the United Nations Security Council has any business spelling out the precise terms of what 

an ongoing bilateral negotiation should be. We think that its primary purpose is to preserve and maintain the peace and security of 

the world.

At a time when there is an ongoing bilateral negotiation, I thin k it 

is to the advantage of everyone, including the Security Council, just 

to encourage people to go back to the table.

Mr. Bingham. Except that th is phraseology, and I am sure it was 

very deliberate on somebody’s part, was not statin g what the negotiation should be but was taking note of the willingness of the parties 

to do certain things. This was a rath er favorable interpretation , you 

might say, of what we had demonstrated was our position.

Without belaboring the matter further, I would like to express the 

view as one member of this committee th at we could have very well 

abstained on this resolution, expressing our disagreement with some 

of the phraseology. It was not a resolution tha t had binding force. 

We will get a similar resolution overwhelmingly passed by the General 

Assembly. While I am not opposed in principle to our using the veto—
19

indeed perhaps we too long delayed in using the veto—I thin k i t was 

a mistake in th is instance.

Ambassador Scali. Mr. Congressman, I want to add only one other 

comment and that is that as you said that perhaps it did not accurately characterize our willingness because it was incomplete. Fo r that 

reason it was decided that it was a one-sided operative paragraph 

which might complicate rath er than improve the negotiation process.

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Young.

Mr. Young. No questions.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Fountain.

Mr. F ountain. Mr. Scali, what was the basic reason for the veto?

Ambassador Scali. The basic reason, Mr. Congressman, was a fun ­

damental belief tha t the United Nations Security Council should not 

be put in the position where it can dictate the terms of a bilateral 

settlement when there are ongoing bilateral negotiations. We believe 

that the resolution as presented did do tha t and that in addition it 

presented a one-sided view which took into account Pana ma’s just aspirations b ut which did not accurately and completely recognize the 

legitimate interests of the U.S. Government.

Mr. F ountain. Then our veto in p art was our unwillingness to recognize the right of the United Nations to be holding the meeting on 

this par ticu lar subject?

Ambassador Scali. Th at is correct.

Mr. F ountain. I concur with the gentleman. I would have done the 

same thing.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Steele.

Mr. Steele. Th ank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I would 

like to ask a question about our basic position regarding the canal. I t is 

our position, is it not, that we should continue to operate the canal 

and be in a position to defend the canal. Aren ’t those the two main ingredients in our position ?

Ambassador Scali. Well, we are prepared to continue accommodating our position to Panama ’s objectives to the maximum extent permitted by one essential reality: for a specified period of time the 

United States must continue to be responsible for the operation and 

defense of the canal, not only to itself and to Panama, b ut also to all 

of the other nations of the world which have long trusted in the U.S. 

operation of this waterway in developing the ir ocean trade.

Mr. Steele. Operation and defense are the two key ingredients. 

Does the Panamanian Government have any desire to operate the 

canal at this point ? Are they making requests in this direction ?

Ambassador Scali. The answer, if I recall the question now, is no, 

they have not expressed a desire to operate the canal by themselves.

Mr. Steele. So the real question hinges on the defense of the cana l; 

is that correct ?

Ambassador Scali. No. The real question hinges on the defense of 

the canal and the specific period of time tha t we and the Panamanians 

should be responsible for operating the canal.

Mr. Steele. Well, I am just trying to determine exactly what is in 

contention at the present time. The Panam anians, you say, are not 

interested in operating the canal at the present time. Th at is not, therefore, in issue, I take it.
20

Ambassador Scali. Excuse me. I have sitting at my side here Ambassador Ward who has been in the business of seeking to negotiate 

this for some time. This is a highly complex and complicated area 

where even words have specific code meanings. So, if I may, I would 

like to ask Ambassador Ward to answer that.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID H. WARD, SPECIAL REPR ESEN TATIVE , U.S. OFFICE OF INTEROCEANIC CANAL NEGOTIATIONS,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador Ward. Mr. Congressman, in addition to the defense 

issue there is the question of what rights we do consider necessary for 

operating the canal in a secure way. There is also the question of the 

financial benefits tha t Panam a would get from the canal and the 

matter of the period of time in which we would gradually allow the 

expansion of Panam a’s role in the zone and the entry of Panamanian 

businesses into the zone, et cetera.

Mr. Steele. But we do keep coming down to the defense issue. If it 

is operation of the canal in a secure way, we are talk ing about one form 

of defense. We keep coming down to the defense issue. We are then 

talking about two kinds of defense. First, we are talking about defending the canal from people in the area, who would be the Panamanians. 

Second, are we also talk ing about defending the Panama Canal at a 

time of international crisis or war against a nuclear power, for example. Are these the two elements of defense ?

Ambassador Ward. Our position is tha t, as in the past, we want to 

be able to defend the canal against any thre at tha t may arise. Obviously there is a very broad range of hypothetical threats.

Mr. Steele. By being physically present in the Canal Zone, are we 

in any better position to defend the canal against nuclear weapons or 

strategic attack ? W hat are we really defending the canal against, isn’t 

it the Panam anians ?

Ambassador Ward. I would not agree with tha t. I think the concept 

is tha t certain defense installations in the vicinity of the canal are 

useful for dealing with different types of problems that might arise. 

We feel they are consistent with Panama’s sovereignty. They are not 

unlike defense installations we have in other parts of the world. 

Our hope is th at we may continue them in the vicinity of the canal.

Mr. Steele. Thank you very much.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Leggett.

Mr. Leggett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Scali, I think you have weathered the first round very well. I 

think ypu can pretty well tell by the questions that have been asked 

tha t there is probably a spectrum of political opinion on the Panama 

Canal issue in the Congress. There are those tha t want to abide rather 

catatonically to the 1903 agreement in spite of the statements and representations tha t were made in the OAS in 1964. There are those who 

would draw parallels to the colonizations tha t have occurred in the 

pas t and also, I think, there is kind of a medium view in between the 

idea tha t this is strictly a colonial empire of the United States which 

perhaps has a multifaceted aspect in the center, which relates to American posture in negotiating some kind of agreement.
21

I think there are those in the Congress who perhaps would want to 

offer to Panama more aspects of control and operation in the canal 

than they have really asked for. I think tha t it is rath er difficult to 

take the middle position as opposed to the other extremes.

I think it is rath er ironic th at the Soviets and some of the Communist countries should take the position tha t we should be much more 

flexible in this area of totally giving up control and maintaining sovereignty considering their immutable position with considerable violence in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the immutable position on the Kamchatka position, in view of the action of the United States in turning 

back the Bonin Islands, turn ing back Okinawa and modifying this 

particular agreement in three aspects.

I think we are going a country mile in offering to return many 

aspects of sovereignty to the Panamanian Government. The message 

I get out of this is t ha t we have allowed the Security Council to be 

more or less stacked after considering the fact tha t we have a veto so 

that we can protect ourselves. Considering th at this is only our thir d 

veto, I think we can take considerable pride in the fact that we have 

exercised the restraint we have in the past and in the fact tha t it has 

been the Soviets who have really laid the broad pattern against the 

world public opinion in past years.

I would hope, of course, th at we are not nowT reversing tha t trend 

and star ting a polarization against the U nited States. I think obviously with three Communist countries on the Security Council, three or 

four small Latin countries tha t are concerned with tuna, copper, oil 

and perhaps Culebra and some of the other hot issues in Latin America 

and more or less disinterested African nations not really involved in 

international commerce to any great extent, the result here was probably foreseeable.

I personally think it was too bad that the United States could not 

have displayed in this forum bette r for the world audience its real 

record in the Panama Canal Zone. I think that we have not discriminated, i f my memory is not faulty. I think there is only one ship 

in the history of the canal tha t we have ever blocked from entrance 

and t ha t was a Japanese ship at the beginning of W orld Wa r II.

The Communists really have nothing to complain about. As for 

inflation, I don’t think anybody is going to carry on a boycott of the 

U.S. rates in the Canal Zone because we have not changed the rates 

for Communists, Americans, or any other nation since 1914. I think 

that many of the nations that have rather capriciously exercised the ir 

rather summary action in approving this resolution have forgotten 

the real international manner in which the Un ited States has managed 

this canal very effectively and well for a great number of years.

That is not to say, as far as I am concerned, that there are not a great 

number of matters tha t are now negotiable. There are. Clearly there 

is a lot of area in the Canal Zone that we don’t need for our operations 

and I thin k the country of Panama does. I personally thin k tha t operation of the canal at 1914 rates with container deck cargo going free 

is an abomination tha t perhaps a lot of people could complain about.

I thin k Panama is entitled to a much better break as fa r as sharing 

in the $200 million gross revenues of the canal other th an perhaps ju st 

$60 million that they get in wages out of the canal and the $2 million 

they get more or less by largess or grace of this Government. I can well
22

understand why you would veto a resolution which glosses over the 

interests of the United States as the resolution tha t we vetoed did. 

To concede that the total sovereignty in the area belongs to the P ana ­

manian Government and tha t doesn’t recognize the interests of the 

United States which we obviously have there.

So having made th at statement, I would like to ask you this: Mr. 

Bingham has indicated tha t the General Assembly will forthw ith take 

this matter up and we will obviously then be thumped again. Is this 

the way you program the fu ture action of the General Assembly ?

I note one of the last clauses in the Security Council resolution states 

tha t the Council decides to keep the question under consideration. 

What do you make of this ?

Ambassador Scali. We know of no specific move yet to bring up 

the issue of the Panama Canal before the United Nations Assembly 

this fall. I suspect, however, tha t it will be brought up. If it is, I suspect there is going to be a rather vigorous debate on it. I n view of the 

fact tha t there are so many nonalined countries and that there is an 

almost automatic solidarity among them on issues th at they believe 

tha t they should be united on, there is a prospect th at we could get outvoted on this.

Mr. Leggett. What would be the ramifications of that ?

Ambassador Scali. It would be another resolution of the General 

Assembly which would have no binding effect.

Mr. Leggett. Could you produce fo r us the written message for our 

record tha t you received from Colonel Noriega ?

Mr. Fascell. He has already agreed to do that.

Ambassador Scali. I promise to do that. I wish to make an additional point here if I can. I am very grate ful to the Government of 

Panama for providing the kind of security fo r me and my delegation 

tha t they did provide. I had three Panamanian security agents assigned to me fulltime. These men were efficient and thoroughly cooperative with me and with our people. When General Torrijos assured me 

tha t no personal threat was intended, he also added that he would 

personally guarantee my safety.

I accepted this. If General Torrijos wishes to assure us tha t the 

whole thing was a misunderstanding, why, I for one am willing to consider it a closed incident and go on from this point.

Mr. Leggett. Were there any demonstrations down there by students or others against the United States before or afte r you cast the 

veto?

Ambassador Scali. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Mailliard.

Mr. Mailliard. Ambassador Scali, may I just express my personal 

view that this was a pretty tough nut to throw at you first crack out of 

the box in the job you have, which is never an easy one. I think you 

have conducted yourself with great distinction. I hope tha t the rest 

of them are not quite as tough as this.

Ambassador Scali. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Mailliard. I want to ask Mr. Ward—I wonder if you could 

give us the more recent chronology of the negotiations. How long have 

they been going on? When did we have our last meeting? Are there 

any moves in the wind to meet again or has th is event in Panama kind 

of cooled thing s off f or th e tim e b ein g ?
23

Ambassador Ward. We began negotiations in Jun e of 1971. We had 

indicated our willingness to negotiate several months before, in October 1970. The Panamanian delegation arrived in June of 1971. There 

were quite intensive negotiations during the rest of tha t year which 

resulted in a number of quite specific drafts.

During 1972 there were ha rdly any negotiations at all. We finally 

went to Panama in December of 1972 and were given a written statement of the Panamanian position. We replied to that in late Febru ary 

or early March, with a written statement of our position which concluded with an offer to resume negotiations at any point. Of course, 

even before we had delivered that statement there had been a standing 

offer to continue negotiations. We have not heard since the delivery of 

this statement from Panama in regard to the negotiations and we do 

not at this time know what their intentions are.

Mr. Mailliard. So it is on dead center ?

Ambassador Ward. We are simply waiting to see what their response 

offer will be.

Mr. Mailliard. So, in other words, the last real direct communication was more than a year ago ?

Ambassador Ward. Well, I would not say that, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Mailliard. You did meet in December of last year ?

Ambassador Ward. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mailliard. That was the last meeting?

Ambassador Ward. Yes, last December we had meetings at which 

this written statement was delivered. We discussed the statement. We 

gave an oral reply to it’ and subsequently we gave a written reply to it.

Now I should mention that th ere have been other informal discussions of this problem, as there always are between various officials of 

our Government and theirs.

Mr. Mailliard. Back about 6 years ago, maybe it was longer, I sort 

of lose track o.f time, when Mr. Irw in was doing the negotiating, I 

expressed the view at tha t time with a different government in Pa nama and a different administration here tha t I doubted very much 

tha t the most skillful negotiators could negotiate a treaty th at could be 

successfully brought through the constitutional processes of both 

governments.

I am not sure that I see much sign of change.

Ambassador Ward. We are, of course, very much interested in knowing the views of Congress on the potentiality for getting any given 

settlement through. Toward th at end we try to keep in close touch with 

both the House and Senate.

Mr. Mailliard. Am I correct that under the present Panamanian 

Government there is no necessity for any legislative actions?

Ambassador Ward. I thin k that is correct. I could not really comment on the necessity but they have said several times that they plan 

to submit any new treat y to a plebiscite, but not, I think, to any legislative procedure.

Ambassador Scali. If I can add something there, General Torrijos 

recently is quoted as saying th at if and when there is an agreement, it 

would be ratified throughout the country by various groups even as the 

1903 agreement, if you recall, was ratified community by community 

and group by group.
24

Mr. Mailliard. So this is not a constitutional process but his intention of submitting any agreement to popular plebiscite ?

Ambassador Scali. I don’t think it is a constitutional requirement. 

I think he would undertake this as a gesture to the Panamanian people 

to show that he would not move without their full approval.

Mr. Mailliard. And you only have to cope with the U.S. Senate, not 

with a plebiscite. Thank you.

Mr. Fascell. Ambassador Scali, as I understand the situation, the 

issue of the canal may be in the U.N. General Assembly; and tha t no 

decision has yet been made as to what the U.S. position will be if that 

occurs.

Ambassador Scali. We are now in the process of stock taking and 

trying to decide what impact the meeting in Panama has had on our 

overall position. We will go on from that point, sir.

Mr. F ascell. Mr. Ambassador, let me suggest at this point that, 

while we are in the process of formulating our policy in the General 

Assembly, due consideration be given to consultation with both 

bodies of Congress.

I think it would be a serious mistake to go into the United Nations 

General Assembly with a policy about which no one in the Congress 

knows anything.

Ambassador Scali. Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with you. I intend 

to consult with Members of the House and Senate and the appropriate 

committees.

Mr. F ascell. As far as the negotiations themselves are concerned, 

as I understand it, we have written to the Panamanian Government 

in response to their last position and in our communication we have 

detailed the U.S. response and have offered to resume formal negotiations at any time tha t it is convenient to the Government of Pa nama. Is that correct ?

Ambassador Ward. Yes, sir, tha t is correct.

Mr. Fascell. Is it also correct that the negotiating position of the 

Government of Panam a is on the public record and t ha t th e negotiating position of the U.S. Government is on the public record?

Ambassador Ward. Mr. Chairman, shortly after our visit down there 

in December the Panamanian Government made public th eir own position. They also stated a version of our position. This statement was 

accurate in some respects and inaccurate in others. It did not reflect 

our flexibility and our willingness to search for different solutions. 

So we do not associate ourselves with tha t public statement of our 

position.

Mr. F ascell. S o there has been no correction on the public record 

of the Panam anian interpretation of the U.S. position and there has 

been no spreading on the public record of the U.S. response to the last 

Panam anian statement?

Ambassador Ward. Ambassador Scali made a broad summary of 

our position while he was in Panama.

Mr. F ascell. All the major points have been put on the record but 

a verbatim account of the response has not, correct?

Ambassador W ard. That is correct. Mr. Chairman, I would like to 

emphasize tha t these negotiations which were quite intense during 

1971 stopped at the end of that year and we have not had any real 

occasion to change our position since th at time since active negotia-
25

tions have not resumed. So our statement of position is where we were 

at tha t moment.

Mr. Fascell. Are the Panamanian negotiators the same people this 

year as last year?

Ambassador Ward. I don’t think we know exactly who they are at 

this time, sir.

Mr. F ascell. The U.S. negotiators are the same persons ?

Ambassador Ward. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. F ascell. Th ank you very much, Ambassador Ward. Mr. Kazen.

Mr. Kazen. Wh at, Mr. Ambassador, is your role in the negotiations?

Ambassador Scali. I have no direct role in the negotiations, Mr. 

Congressman.

Mr. Kazen. This broad statement tha t you made, in what capacity 

did you speak ?

Ambassador Scali. Mr. Congressman, it was made in my formal 

presentation to the Security Council in which I read some very carefully prepared remarks which were included as part of my speech. I 

would be very happy to read tha t very brief section to you. It involves 5 minutes.

Mr. K azen. No, I was not interested in that. I was interested in the 

mechanics of it. If on the one hand we take the position tha t the 

United Nations has no interest in this particular issue because i t is a 

bilateral position and our Ambassador to the U.N. gets in on that, I 

was wondering where your duties as far as the negotiations on this 

matter begin and end.

Ambassador Scali. I can understand why you ask tha t question. At 

no time did I get involved in the actual negotiations of a new understanding with the Panam anian Government. My only negotiations and 

discussions were involved in tryi ng to work out the language of a 

specific resolution which would not do violence to the prospect for 

further bilate ral negotiations.

Mr. Mailliard. Th ank you.

Mr. Leggett. Mr. Chairman, just so we can understand the status 

of the record, according to Ambassador Ward, we have made the last 

offer to the Panamanian Government. I t is ra ther ironic then that they 

should be badgering us to the U.N. to reach an agreement when they 

have not to date responded to our last restatement of the case; is that 

correct ?

Ambassador Ward. I t certainly is true tha t we feel the best way to 

proceed is through quiet private bilateral negotiations and that we 

have indicated our willingness to go along tha t route.

Mr. Leggett. And we are now waiting to hear from them ?

Ambassador Ward. That is correct, sir.

Mr. F ascell. The temptation to beat a drum may just be too great 

notwithstanding our best efforts and intentions. On behalf of Congressman Fraser, Congressman Leggett and myself let me thank you 

gentlemen for appearin g and joining us in this discussion. Ambassador 

Scali, I join in the compliments to you. sir. We are delighted to have 

you in your first appearance in this joint meeting. You have acquitted 

yourself extremely well. You have been candid and responsive and displayed both a great capability and a sensitive awareness which should 

be very helpful to these subcommittees and the Congress.

The hearing today is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m. the subcommittees adjourned.]

AP PE ND IX

[F ro m D ep art m en t o f S ta te B u ll eti n d ate d A pr il 23, 1973]

U.S. Vetoes U.N. Security Council Resolution

on Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations

The United Nations Security Council met

at Panama March 15-21. Following are

stateme nts made in the Council on March

20 and 21 by U.S. Representative John Scali,

together ivith the text of a dra ft resolution

which was vetoed by the United States on

March 21.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 20

U SU N pre ss re le ase 21 date d M ar ch 21

I join previous speakers to express my 

gratitu de to the President, the Government, 

and the people of Panama for the admirable 

organization of this meeting by the Panamanian Government and for the welcome 

and hospitality that we have received here. 

It is indeed an exhilaratin g experience to 

see the determination, dedication, and devotion of the Panamanian people which is 

evident in the bustling economic activity, 

reflected most visibly in the pace of construction we see around us.

“Consideration of measures for the maintenance and strength enin g of internat iona l 

peace and security in Latin America in 

conformity with the provisions and principles of the Charter’’—tha t is the agenda 

item. For more than a centu ry, the nations 

of Latin America have demonstrated an 

enviable and unparalleled record in achieving and maintaining international peace and 

security on this continent. They not only 

have avoided maj or internat iona l conflicts 

within the hemisphere but have also created 

a viable framework for the peaceful resolution of the ir differences. Latin American 

statesm en have eloquently set forth principles of international consultation and conciliation springing from the idea and view 

that international conflict in this area can 

and must be resolved peacefully. Many of 

these principles have found their way into 

the United Nations Charte r and into the 

practice of the United Nations.

We note with particu lar pleasure the 

active role played by the people and leaders 

of our host country, Panama, who have 

been in the fore fron t of the development of 

the inter-A merican system since the founding of the ir country. In fact, the first seeds 

of pan-Americanism were planted here by 

Simon Bolivar, at the Panama Congress 

of 1826.

Mr. President, the United States sets 

gre at store by its close and fruitful association with the countries of Latin America. 

We fully share the ir deep and genuine concern for the continuation of peace, prosperity, political stability, and economic and 

social development in this hemisphere.

The countries of this region were among 

the original supporters of the United Nations and have remained among the most 

faithful and dedicated of its members. All 

of us recognize their role in the United 

Nations and their contributions to inte rnational peace and security. Many L atin American countries have participated directly in 

U.N. peacekeeping operations, operations 

which go to the hea rt of this organization’s 

purposes. All have contributed in many 

ways to the resolution of disputes among 

nations and of the problems confrontin g 

the world. We are all aware of the high 

competence of Latin American juris ts in 

the field of international law and the un-
28

wave ring support in this hemisphere for 

the sanc tity of solemn tre aty obligations 

even as the search for constructive change 

continues.

It is in fact the absence of tru ly thre ate ning internatio nal issues within the Latin 

American area which led my government 

to question the necessity of our meeting 

away from U.N. Headquarters at this time. 

Our delegation expressed the views of the 

United States very clearly. Meetings of the 

Security Council, whether at Hea dquarters 

or away, should be based on its primary 

ch arter responsibility to maintai n inter ­

national peace and security.

While the Charter of the United Nations 

confers this responsibility on the Security Council, it also provides—indeed, in 

artic le 33, it specifically enumerates—many 

ways to resolve international issues before 

such mat ters are brought directly before 

the Council. A look at the efforts now 

underway with regard to nearly all the 

major problem areas of the world underscores this wide variety of channels, both 

inside and outside the United Nations, 

which can be used to achieve the charter 

goal of practicin g tolerance and living 

together in peace with one another as good 

neig hbo rs:

—The United States and the Soviet Union 

have undertaken with each othe r to do th eir 

utmost to avoid military confrontation and 

to respect the sovereign equality of all 

countries.

—The United States and the People’s 

Republic of China have unde rtaken to 

broaden the unde rstan ding between the ir 

peoples, and this process has taken new 

strid es in recent weeks.

—The United States, together with other 

parties to the Viet-Nam conflict, has arrived 

at a cease-fire agreement for Viet-Nam, 

and othe r interested nations have pledged 

in Paris their full support and cooperation 

in strengthening peace in Indochina.

—In Europe, the United States is p articipating in prelim inary discussions in Helsinki 

and Vienna aimed at specific and practical 

improvements in East-West relatio ns.

These have all been due in large measure 

to the wise and imaginative leadership of 

our President, Richard Nixon, as he pursues his gre at goal of a generation of peace 

for all mankind.

Because of his diplomatic initiatives, his 

courage to try new approaches, the world 

is on the threshold of cooperation and 

friendship among nations undreamed of ju st 

a few y ears ago.

The Unique Inter-A merican Community

In looking back at what has been achieved, 

and forward to what remains to be done, 

one is struck by the variety of means, the 

wealth of institutions, and the host of relationships which can be turned to positive 

effect.

In this hemisphere our peoples over a 

period of 50 years have established relationships that, in our view, make us a unique 

community. There are of course a number 

of bilateral questions in this hemisphere 

that remain unresolved—many have been 

mentioned at this table—but progress is 

being made in many of these through patient 

negotiations. Fo r instance, the United States 

and Panama have been seeking—thro ugh 

negotiation—a new status for the Panama 

Canal which would brin g it into harmony 

with contem porary political realities.

With respect to multilate ral relationships 

in this hemisphere, the regional institutions 

and arrangemen ts we have developed and 

the broad and deep contacts join ing our 

governm ents and our citizens have grown 

into what is now known as the interAmerican system. That system is characterized not only by formal institutions but also 

by a sense of solid arity and a community 

of common interests and objectives on which 

we seek to build a lasting foundation for 

truly effective inter-American cooperation. 

We have a common faith in the benefits of 

freedom, the importance of the individual, 

the power of reason, and the rule of law. 

The conclusion that the inter-American 

system is indeed a foundation of some 

permanence is supported by the significant
29

intellectual, economic, security, and political 

ties which furth er draw us together.

A system that is both progressive and 

evolving, and is notable for its continuing 

usefulness to its membership, is a system 

which is also able to accommodate diversities. 

The most obvious of these are the different 

cultural backgrounds, economic conditions, 

and political institutions which remind us 

that we are individual nations as well as 

members of a hemisphere community.

The Organization of American States is 

the keystone of the inter-Am erican system. 

The OAS exists as a regional organization 

within the meaning of chapter VIII of the 

United Nations Charter. It is also the oldest 

inte rnat iona l organization of its kind in the 

world, dati ng from 1890. It has grown from 

an institut ion concerned prim arily with commercial affairs into an organization devoted 

to the peace and security of the hemisphere. 

It is also deeply involved in the region’s 

economic and social development, educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation, 

human rights, juridical affairs, and technical assistance and training, to mention 

but a few. As it has grown, it has increased 

its capacity to achieve its essential purpo ses; 

these are to strength en the peace and security of the continent, to prev ent possible 

causes of difficulty, and to insu re the peaceful settlemen t of disputes. It also provides 

for common action on the part of the member 

states in the event of aggression. It assists 

in the search for solutions to political, jurid ­

ical, and economic problems when they 

aris e among the members, and in the area 

of development it is concerned with the 

promotion of cooperative social and economic 

action.

The United States has also warmly supported the many activities of the United 

Nations in the area of economic and social 

development in Latin America. However, 

for most of the 1960’s, the U.S. Government 

was the m ajo r external contributor of assistance to Latin America in seeking its economic and social development. As we agreed 

to do a t Pu nta del Este in 1961, the United 

States provided over $10 billion for the

development of the American republics during the period 1961-72. We k ept our promised word.

In the pas t few years, the countries of 

Latin America have increased the ir reliance 

upon the major multilate ral lending institu ­

tions for the bulk of the ir official external 

capital assistance. In recognition of this si tuation, the United States has channeled an 

increasing propo rtion of its loan funds to 

Latin America through multilateral institu ­

tions, part icularly the Inter-American Development Bank. In December of last year, for 

example, the United States formally signed 

the replenishment agreement under which 

it agreed to provide $1 billion to the 

Fund for Special Operations of the Bank. 

The total flow of U.S. funds through all 

channels, bilateral and multilateral, has 

never been higher.

As a result, the total assistance received 

by Latin America from all sources is going 

up steadily. The United States has given 

special and increasing attention to the economic and social concerns of th e hemisphere. 

Total lending commitments by AID, the 

Inter-American Development Bank, and the 

World Bank to Latin America in 1972 more 

than doubled those of 1964.

The United States has had a long and 

cordial relationship with the independent 

nations of this hemisphere. Recognizing the 

principle of sovereign equality and respect 

for the right of states to pursue their own 

development, the United States is building 

a constantly evolving relationship with L atin 

America, a relationship which we trus t will 

become even more cordial and mutually 

beneficial.

Issues Before Other U. N. Bodies

Mr. President, I would like to reflect 

briefly regarding the U.S. position on some 

other issues which have been raised in 

statements before th e Council.

The United States has always been, and 

continues to be, a stro ng advocate of the 

Latin American nuclea r-free zone. We signed 

Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition
30

of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 

(Treaty of Tlatelolco) on April 1, 1968. The 

protocol went into effect for the United 

States on May 12, 1971. By these actions, 

the United States pledged itself to respect 

the denuclearized status of Latin America, 

not to contribute to any violation of the 

trea ty, and not to use or threate n to use 

nuclear weapons aga inst any of the contracting parties.

The question of perm anen t sovereignty 

over natura l resources is currently an active 

item in the U.N., specifically in the ECOSOC 

[Economic and Social Council] Committee 

on Natural Resources and the Seabed Committee. We do not question the principle of 

“perm anen t sovereignty.” However, at the 

same time we wish to point out that we do 

not believe that complex issue is properly 

before this Council. In accepting the principle of permanent sovereignty we strongly 

reaffirm our support for the principles of 

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803, 

including, inte r alia, the observance in good 

faith of foreign investment agreements, the 

payment of app ropriat e compensation for 

nationalized property as required by int ernational law, and the recognition of arb itration or internat iona l adjudication.

Similarly, we believe th at the question 

of multinational corporations, which has 

been raised in different contexts, should not 

be brou ght before this Council. It is presently under discussion in several other more 

app ropr iate U.N. bodies. A group of eminent 

individuals, appointed by the Secretary 

General under ECOSOC Resolution 1721 of 

July 28, 1972, is studying the impact of 

m u lti n a ti o n a l corporations. UNCTAD 

[United Nations Conference on Trade and 

Development] is doing a study of the restric tive business practices of multinational 

corporations. Finally, ILO [Inte rnational 

Labor Organization] is looking into the relationships of activities of such corporations 

to social policy. We fail to see what the 

Security Council can effectively accomplish 

in this particular field.

We happen to shar e the judgment of the 

ECOSOC resolution that these corporations

“are frequently effective agents for the 

tra ns fer of technology as well as capital to 

developing countries.” No country has to 

welcome or even accept foreign investment. 

And if it does so, it of course may establish 

its own rules. However, it also has the obligation, in th at case, to abide by those rules, 

to compensate the investor for retroactive 

changes in the rules, or in the case of exprop riation or nationalization of priv ate 

property, to make adequate provision for 

ju st compensation as required by international law.

Negotiatio n of New Panama Canal Treaty

And now I come to discuss U.S. relations 

with Panama. Our close and mutually beneficial frien dship has a long history, characterized, to be sure, by occasional differences 

and friction. But the bonds linking our two 

peoples continue stro ng and vibrant.

We rejoice in the progress achieved by 

Pa na ma; it has been striking. Over the past 

fou r y ears the economy has been growing a t 

a rate of 7-8 percent, one of the highest 

rates of growth in the world.

Outside help has contributed to this rate 

of growth, but there has also been a high 

level of labor and investment by the dedicated Panamanian people. My country is 

happy tha t it was able in 1972 to disburse 

in various ways approximately $227 million, 

with direct effect, and stimulate the Panamanian economy. In fact, our loans and 

gra nts to Panama repr esen t the highest 

per capita level of U.S. assistance anywhere 

in the world, in pa rt because of our frie ndship but mostly because P anam a has demonstrate d a high capacity to program and 

utilize financial assistance effectively.

We believe that all mankind has been 

well served by the Panama Canal since its 

completion nearly 60 years ago. Durin g 

those years it has never been closed, and it 

has been tran sited by an ever-increasing 

number of ships carryin g cargo to and from 

all p arts of the world.

Although the 1903 t rea ty still governs the 

basic relationship between the United States 

and Panama concerning the canal, that re-
31

lationship was significantly revised, as well 

as reaffirmed, in the treaties of 1936 and 

1955. On both occasions the United States 

relinquished importa nt rights and provided 

important new benefits for Panama.

In 1964, recognizing tha t a comprehensive 

modernization of our relationship should be 

undertaken, the United States began negotiations with Panama with thre e essential 

objectives in view, which remain valid today:

1. The canal should be available to the 

world’s commercial vessels on an equal basis a t reasonable cost.

2. So th at the canal should serve world 

commerce efficiently, the United States 

should have the right to provide additional 

canal capacity.

3. The canal should continue to be operated and defended by the United States for 

an extended but specified period of time.

It was recognized then, as it is today, 

that these objectives would require the conclusion of a new trea ty or treatie s to replace 

the 1903 tr ea ty and its amendments. By 1967 

thre e dr aft treaties had been negotiated and 

agreed to by the two nego tiating teams. At 

that time the Panamanian Government did 

not move to rat ify the treatie s, but in October of 1970 requested the United States to 

renew negotiations. The United States agreed 

to do so, and negotiations were in fac t renewed in June 1971, when the Panamanian 

nego tiating team arrived in Washington.

During the intensive negotiations which 

followed, the United States has fully recognized th at the relationship originally defined 

in the 1903 tre aty needs to be brou ght into 

line with the realities of the world today 

as well as with the mutual interests of both 

countries.

The United States is ready to conclude 

a new tre aty promptly. At the same time, 

we believe it necessary th at the United 

States continue to be responsible for the 

operation and defense of the canal for an 

additional specified period of time, the length 

of which is one of many issues to be negotiated.

As a result of the persistent efforts made 

by both sides, significant progress has been 

made in the tre aty talk s toward reaching 

mutual understanding on maj or principles.

Mr. President, I would like to make clear 

that the United States, no less tha n others 

who have spoken at this table, supp orts 

Panama’s ju st aspirations. The U.S. negotiators, cognizant of those aspirations, have 

already recognized t h a t:

1. The 1903 canal tre aty should be replaced by a new modern trea ty.

2. Any new canal tre aty should be of 

fixed duration, reje ctin g the concept of perpetuity.

3. Panama should have retu rned to it a 

substantial ter ritory now pa rt of the Canal 

Zone, with arra nge ment for use of other 

areas. Those other areas would be the minimum required for U.S. operations and defense of the canal and would be integrated 

into the legal, economic, social, and cultu ral 

life of Panama on a timetable to be agreed 

upon.

4. Panama should exercise its jurisdiction 

in the canal area pursuant to a mutually 

agreed timetable.

5. Panama should receive substantially 

increased annual payments for the use of its 

ter ritory relatin g to the canal.

Accordingly, those who attac k the 1903 

Treaty are atta cking a phantom foe, a nonexistent enemy. The 1903 trea ty has already 

been revised significantly to Panama’s advantage. We were on the verge of changing 

it a third time in 1967, and we are ready to 

change it again—to write a new tre aty — 

when negotiations continue in the spirit of 

friendship and cooperation that should be the 

hallmark of Panama-U.S. relations.

We recognize that much remains to be 

settled; yet we believe the above points 

represent a subs tantial foundation of important principles and are confident that 

with continued good will by reasonable men 

on both sides, and some patience, a mutually 

satisfactory trea ty can result.

Mr. President, in reviewing the relation-
32

ships among the 532 million activ e and 

dynamic people residing in this hemisphere, 

it would be incorrect to leave the impression 

ther e are no problems or no issues needing 

attention. Obviously there are, as the re are 

anywhere. But we know that both the good 

will and the diplomatic machinery already 

exist within the area to resolve these problems.

The question then arise s as to wh at contributio n the Council can make at this 

meeting and what the Council will carry back 

to United Nations Headqua rters as a result 

of its meeting in Latin America.

Fo r Latin American issues, as for issues 

in othe r parts of the world, the members 

of the Council must look to what thi s body 

can actua lly accomplish, the consistency of 

their proposed actions with the provisions 

of the charter, and the ir impact on the 

chances of resolving existing differences.

Fo r the Council to take a partis an stand 

or reflect only a parochial viewpoint would 

risk undermining the processes of bilateral 

and regional diplomacy which have served 

this hemisphere so well.

Fo r the Council to pronounce itself on a 

wider range of issues not directly concerned 

with the maintenance of internat iona l peace 

and security risks diluting the results already achieved in othe r United Nations 

organ s and would make many question the 

seriousness of the Council’s purpose in holding its meeting here.

We have been engaged in discussion since 

March 15, Mr. President, and much of what 

has been said is valuable, constructive, and 

informative. Tha t in itself is a positive element. But this series of meetings can be 

productive, Mr. President, in other ways. 

Tomorrow evening we should be able to 

adjourn to retu rn to New York and say tha t 

our deliberations have contributed renewed 

vigor to the effective, realistic, and ha rmonious search for the realization of the 

objectives of the United Nations, not only 

in Latin America but everywhere. If we 

can do th at, Mr. President, then these meetings will have been a success.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 21

U SU N pre ss re le ase 26 da te d M arc h 22

Despite the fact that the Representative 

of Panama has expressed himself numerous 

times before this Council over the past week 

on the Panama Canal, he chose to deliver 

another litany this afternoon on the Panamanian version of history and the actual 

situation today. I have no intention of 

subjecting the distinguished members of this 

Council to a statement of similar length.

However, he continues to stress the convention of 1903. In fact we have heard a 

gre at deal in recent days of how the 

Isthmian Canal Convention was imposed on 

the people of Panama. Let us put the facts 

of the situation in the Security Council record. After the convention of 1903 was signed, 

it was sent to Panama for ratification. After 

ratification by the Panama nian Government, 

the tre aty was sent ar ound the country for 

consideration by the various elected municipal councils. The ratification of the tre aty 

with the United States was overwhelmingly 

approved by these elected councils, with 

unanimous expressions of approval of the 

treaty. So much for the imposition of a 

trea ty.

Now, in 70 years’ time the views of the 

Government and people of Panama have 

changed with respect to the arrangem ents 

of 1903. Tha t is not surprising. The views 

of the Government and people of the United 

States of America have also changed with 

respect to the tre aty of 1903. That is what 

our two governments are negotiating about— 

to work out new arrangements to meet the 

just aspirations of Panama and the legitimate inte rest s of the United States.

I believe, Mr. President, it is useful to 

clarify for the record this historical aspect 

of our relationship.

We reg ret having had to cast a negative 

vote on this resolution, because there is so 

much in it with which we could agree. But 

our negative vote should have come as no 

surpris e to our host, the Republic of Pana-
33

ma, in view of the repeated exchanges of 

views that we have had abou t this meeting 

and about how it migh t end—and I am 

ref erring not only to discussions during 

this Security Council meeting but also to 

those th at took place even before the Republic of Pan ama had pressed its campaign to 

have this meeting take place on its territory .

In those discussions the United States 

made clear its serious concern tha t a meeting 

designed to put pressure on one p arty to an 

on-going bilateral negotiation could make 

those negotiations more difficult and impair 

the utility of this maj or organ of the United 

Nations. Up to the moment of our dep artu re 

for Panama, we continued to receive ass urances th at everything would be done to 

maintain an atmosphere of moderation and 

restraint. I reg ret to say th at while this 

proved tru e of the situation outside this 

chamber—and for this I wish to express 

our appreciation to our host—it has not 

been tru e of some of the statements made 

here.

Members of this Council should know tha t 

my delegation has made strenuou s and repeated efforts in friendly conversations with 

our Pan amanian hosts to arrive at a mutually acceptable form for a resolution' 

bu t this very sincere effort has been rejected. I wish the members of the Council 

to know, however, th at we were and are 

prep ared to acknowledge the just asp ira ­

tions of the Republic of Panama, for we do 

recognize those aspirations, along with the 

interests of the United States.

I have said th at we reg ret havin g had to 

cast a negative vote on the Panamanian 

resolution because there is so much in it with 

which we could agree. As I have made clear, 

we agree with the Republic of Panama on 

the need to replace the 1903 convention by 

a totally new instrum ent reflecting a new 

spirit, we agree th at such a new instrum ent 

should not run in perpetu ity but should have 

a fixed term, and we agree on the progressive 

integration into the legal, economic, social, 

and cultu ral life of Panama of even those 

areas used for the operation and defense 

of the canal.

Why, then, when there is so much in it 

with which we agree, did we not vote in 

favo r of th e resolution or, as we were urged, 

at least abstain ? Essentially, fo r two reasons.

Fi rst and foremost, as I have repeatedly 

pointed out both in public and in private, 

it is because all these matter s are in process 

of bilateral negotiations. We do not consider 

it helpful or appropriate for the Security 

Council to adopt a resolution dealing with 

mat ters of substance in a continuing negotiation—and I may note that the Foreign 

Minister of Panama has himself spoken of the 

negotiations as continuing and not as having 

been broken off. Indeed, as many members 

know, we have only recently made certain 

new approaches to the Government of Panama. We believe it would be a disservice 

to the negotiations and an improper use of 

the Security Council if bilateral negotiations 

were subjected to this kind of outside pressure.

I am not, of course, suggesting here that 

those who cast affirmative votes on the 

resolution intended to exe rt any improper 

influence, but this is how the resolution 

would have been perceived in many q uarters.

The Panamanian resolution, in our view, 

is unbalanced and incomplete and is therefore subject to serious misinterp retation. 

Furth er, the resolution is cast in the form 

of sweeping generalities, when we know 

that the real difficulties lie in the application 

of these generalities. Although it is tru e 

that the United States and Panama have 

reached common understanding over a number of imp ortant general principles, differences over some principles and many mat ters 

of detail remain. Finally, the present resolution addresses the points of interest to 

Panama but ignores those legitimate interests imp ortant to the United States.

The Panama Canal is not a work of natur e or—as some have trie d to put it— 

a natura l resource. The canal is a very 

complex enterprise, and the working-out 

of a new regime for it cannot be accomplished by the wave of a hand or the quick 

stroke of a pen. It requires thoughtful and 

meticulous negotiation to achieve a fair 

reconciliation of interests. We have been and
are prepared for such a negotiation. But 

the resolution th at was ju st voted upon oversimplifies the issue to the point where it 

could have rendered a disservice.

This brings me back to what I said at 

the beginning of my intervention. It has 

been clear from the first mention of the idea 

th at holding a Security Council meeting 

here to focus on this problem could complicate the process of negotiation. The United 

States is disappointed that othe rs failed 

to appreciate this risk when lending their 

sup por t to this meeting. Surely it should 

have been made obvious that the new treaty 

which we sincerely wish to negotiate with 

Pan ama must be acceptable to our Congress 

and people, as well as the Government and 

people of Panama.

Finally, I would respectfully suggest tha t 

we all assess with great care the nature and 

outcome of this meeting so as to avoid any 

repetition of a course of action th at could 

prove damaging to the role and reputatio n 

of the Security Council. It would be most 

unfo rtunate if the Security Council were 

to be transformed into a small replica of 

the General Assembly, thereby impairing its 

capacity to deal effectively with specific 

issues affecting peace and security.

The U.S. delegation will not be leaving 

Panama in a spirit of rancor, fa r from it. 

Our friendship for Panam a, for the people 

of Panama and of Latin America in general, 

is too deep for that. We continue to be willing 

to adjust any differences peacefully and in 

a sp irit of give-and-take. We are, specifically, 

prepared to continue the negotiations and 

to carry them forward with good will and 

seriousness at whatever time the Government of Panama chooses. We believe tha t 

both Panama and the United States are 

destined by geography and common ideals 

to cooperate for their mutual advantage 

and to protect the interests of world commerce transi ting the canal. Th at will continue to be the policy of the United States, 

and I am confident tha t in the end we shall 

reach an accord which both governments 

can firmly support and which will s trengthen 

the close bonds of frien dship between our 

peoples.

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION '

The Security Council,

Having considered the question of the Panama 

Canal under the item entitled “Consideration of 

measures for the maintenance and strengthening 

of international peace and security in Latin America in conformity with the provisions and 

principles of the Cha rter”,

Recalling tha t it is a purpose of the United 

Nations to bring about, in conformity with the 

principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or 

situations which might lead to a breach of the 

peace,

Bearing in mind that the Republic of Panama 

is sovereign over its territory and that the free 

and fruitful exercise of sovereignty by peoples and 

nations over their natural resources should be 

fostered through mutual respect among States, 

based on their sovereign equality [General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1803 (XVII) and 

3016 (XXVII)],

Having heard the statements made before it by 

the representatives of the members of the Council 

by Latin American Ministers for Foreign Affairs 

and by representatives of other States and organizations specially invited,

1. Takes note that the Governments of the Republic of Panama and the United States of America in the Join t Declaration signed before the 

Council of the Organization of American States, 

acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, on 

3 April 1964, agreed to reach a just and fair 

agreement, with a view to the prompt elimination 

of the causes of conflict between them;

2. Takes note also of the willingness shown by 

the Governments of the United States of America 

and the Republic of Panama to establish in a 

formal instrument agreements on the abrogation of 

the 1903 convention on the Isthmian Canal and 

its amendments and to conclude a new, jus t and 

fair treaty concerning the present Panama Canal 

which would fulfil Panama’s legitimate aspirations 

and guarantee full respect for Panam a’s effective 

sovereignty over all of its territory;

3. Urges the Governments of the United States 

of America and the Republic of Panama to continue negotiations in a high spirit of friendship, 

mutual respect and co-operation and to conclude 

without delay a new trea ty aimed at the prompt 

elimination of the causes of conflict between them;

4. Decides to keep the question under consideration.

1

 U.N. doc. S/10931/Rev.l; the draft resolution 

was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a 

permanent member of the Council, the vote being 

13 in favor, 1 against (U.S.), with 1 abstention 

(U.K.).