MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2018	ME	41

Docket: Pen-17-35

Argued: November	15,	2017

Decided: March	22,	2018

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

KEITH	COLEMAN

MEAD,	J.

[¶1]		Keith	Coleman	 appeals	 from	a	judgment	of	conviction	 for three	

counts	 of	murder,	17-A	M.R.S.	 §	201(1)(A)	 (2017),	and	 one	 of	gross	 sexual	

assault	(Class	A),	17-A	M.R.S.	§	253(1)(C)	(2017),	entered	by	the	trial	court	

(Penobscot County,	A.	Murray,	J.)	 following	 a	 jury	trial;	 he	 also	 appeals	 his

sentences	of life imprisonment	on	each	of the	murder	counts.	 See 15	M.R.S.	

§§	2151,	2152	(2017);	M.R. App. P. 20 (Tower	2016).

1 Coleman	argues	that	

the	court (1) abused	its	discretion	by limiting	his	cross-examination	 of	 the	

State’s	Chief	Medical	Examiner, (2)	clearly	erred	by finding	that	the State	had	

sufficiently	 established	 the	 chain	 of	 custody	 of	 the sexual	 assault	 kit used

 1	 	 This	 appeal	 was	 filed	 before	 September	 1,	 2017; therefore, the	 restyled	 Maine	 Rules	 of	

Appellate	Procedure	do	not	apply.		See	M.R.	App.	P.	1.
2

during	the	autopsy	of	one of	the victims,	and	(3)	applied	an incorrect standard	

of	 proof	 and	 abused	 its	 discretion in determining the	 facts	 considered at

sentencing.	 	 Coleman	 also	 asserts that there	 was insufficient	 evidence	 to	

support	the	jury’s	guilty	verdict	on	the	gross	sexual	assault	charge	and that

the	 State	 committed	 prosecutorial	 misconduct	 in	 its	 opening	 statement.

Although we	 conclude	 that the	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion by	 foreclosing	

Coleman’s	cross-examination	of	 the Chief	Medical	Examiner concerning his	

termination	 from	 his	 position	 as	 Chief	Medical	 Examiner	in	Massachusetts,	

the error	was	harmless	in	the	face	of	the	overwhelming	evidence	of	Coleman’s	

guilt.	 We are	unpersuaded	by	the	remainder	of	his	arguments	and affirm	the	

judgment	and	sentences.

I.		FACTS

[¶2]		“When	viewed	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	jury's	verdict,	the	

record	 supports	 the	 following	 facts.” State	 v.	 Diana,	 2014	 ME	 45,	 ¶	 2,	

89 A.3d 132 (alteration	omitted)(quotation	marks	omitted). The bodies of	an

eight-year-old	girl,	her	ten-year-old brother,	and	the	children’s	mother	were	

found	in	their	home	in	Garland	on	the	evening	of	December	20,	2014.	 Keith	

Coleman,	 the	mother’s on-and-off	boyfriend	 of	a	 few	 years,	had	been	living	
3

with	the victims in	their	home	for	about	a	year prior	to	their	deaths but was	

absent	from	the	home	when	their bodies	were	discovered.

[¶3]	 	 By	 all	 reports, Coleman’s	 and	 the	 mother’s	 relationship	 was	 a	

tumultuous	 one,	 plagued	 by	 incidents	 of	 Coleman’s	 physical	 abuse	 of	 the	

mother.	 Shortly before	the	deaths,	the	mother told	Coleman	that	he	needed	

to	deal	with	his	drinking	or	move	out;	she was	also	considering	reconciling	

with	her	daughter’s	father.	 Coleman	was	very	upset	by	this	situation	and	told

a	coworker,	on	 three	different	occasions,	 that	he	“wouldn’t	have	a	problem	

with	killing	them	all.”

[¶4]		The	children	were	last	seen on	December	19,	2014,	as	 they	left	

school	on	the	final day of	classes before	Christmas	vacation.	 On	the	same	day,	

the	mother	made	her last known communication in	a	text	message	to	her	aunt	

concerning a	 fight	 she and	 Coleman had that	 day.	 On	 the	 morning	 of	

December	20,	 shortly	after	 7:00	a.m., Coleman	drove	 away	 from	 the	home,	

then	returned	about	five	to	ten	minutes	later,	and	left	by	10:00	or	11:00	a.m.	

in	 the	 family’s	 tan	minivan.	 Coleman	 stopped	 at	 a	local	 store	 for	 beer	 and

cigarette	rolling	papers	before	driving	to	Bangor	to	return	a	remote-control	

car	at	a	store,	a	gift	he	had	intended	to	give	to	the	son.	Coleman	later arranged,	

via	 direct	 messaging	 from	 one	 of	 his	 Facebook	 accounts,	 to	 meet	 up	 with	
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friends	in	Bucksport. While	messaging	with	his	friends	in	Bucksport,	he	sent	

another	set	of	Facebook	messages, telling	another	friend that	he	was	“[o]n	the	

run	for	capital	murder”	and	asking “[c]ould	you	send	me	anything	to	get	me	

to	the	hood.”

[¶5]	 	 During	 the	 afternoon	 of	 December	 20,	 after	 repeated	 failed	

attempts	 to	 reach	 the	 mother,	 the	 aunt whom the	 mother had texted	 the	

previous	day asked	another niece	to go	to the home	and check	on	the	mother	

and	the	children.	 At	around	9:00	p.m.,	the	niece	and	a	number	of	other	family	

members	 arrived	 at	 the	 home,	 broke	 through	 the	 locked	 front	 door,	 and	

discovered	 the	 mother’s	 body	 in	 one	 bedroom	 and	 the	 daughter’s	 body	 in	

another;	the	daughter	was	found gagged	and on	her	back, each	leg dangling	

off	the	end	of	the	bed	on	either	side	of	one	of	its	corners.	 The	family	members

called	9-1-1	and	awaited	the	first	responders’	arrival	outside	of	the	home.	The	

first	 to	arrive	was	a deputy	 from the	Penobscot	County	Sheriff’s	Office	who	

located	the	son’s	body	in	the	third	bedroom, underneath	a	pile	of	bedding.

[¶6]	 	 The	 next	 morning in	 Bucksport, law	 enforcement officers

responded	to	an	apartment where	Coleman	reportedly	had	spent	the previous

night	and	took	Coleman,	who	was	cooperative,	into	custody.	 At	the	time	of	his	

arrest,	Coleman was	in	possession	of	the	family’s	tan	minivan,	the	mother’s	
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EBT	 card, and her purse.	 Coleman	 was	 interrogated	that	 evening for	 five	

hours	 by	 two	 detectives;	 slightly	 over	 four	 hours	 into	 questioning,	 he	

admitted	to	“killing	[the	mother] and	the	kids.”

[¶7]	 	 On	 December	 21	 and	 22,	 2014,	 the	 Medical	 Examiner’s Office	

performed	the	victims’	autopsies	and	concluded	that	the	cause	of	death	for	all	

three	 was	 asphyxiation	 by	 ligature	 strangulation.	 During	 the	 daughter’s	

autopsy,	the	Chief	Medical	Examiner, Doctor	Mark	Flomenbaum, detected	no	

trauma	to	her	genitals	and	found	that	her	hymen	was	intact,	but	he	observed	

blunt	force	trauma	to	her	face; two	superficial	abrasions	on	her	buttocks,	each	

slightly	less	than	an	inch	long; and	what	he	suspected	was	dried	blood	in	her	

vaginal	 area	 and	 on	 the	 crotch	 of	 the	 pink	 shorts	 she	 was	 wearing.	 The	

daughter	also	had	a	plastic	shopping	bag	stuffed	tightly	into	her	mouth	and	

throat,	which, Dr.	 Flomenbaum opined, occluded	 the	 passage	 of	 all	 air	 and	

sound.	 These	observations	prompted either Dr.	Flomenbaum or the assisting	

nurse, acting	under	his	supervision, to	collect four swabs from	the	daughter’s	

vaginal	area using	a	sexual	assault	kit.	 During	the afternoon	of	December	22,	

the	four	swabs	were	dried	and	placed	together	in	an	envelope	inside	the	kit,	

which	was	 sealed and	left in	 the	Medical	Examiner’s	Office.	 The	 sealed	 kit	

remained	there until	December	24 at	10:00 a.m.,	when	the	same state	police	
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detective who	had	been	present	at	the	autopsy retrieved the	kit and	brought	

it	to	a temporary	evidence	locker	and,	later, to	the Maine	State	Police Crime	

Laboratory for	testing.

[¶8]		On	December	31,	2014,	a	crime laboratory technician	confirmed	

that	 the	items	 of	 evidence	 delivered	 by	 the	 state	 police	detective	 from	 the	

autopsy	 were	 contained	 in	 sealed	 bags,	 with	 the	 seals	 unbroken,	 and	

processed	the	individual	items.	 Two	of	the	four	swabs	in the	envelope	labeled	

“vaginal	swabs”	as	well	as	the	stained	cutting	from	the shorts tested positive	

for, and were verified	as containing, blood	and	semen. Samples	of	the	vaginal	

swab	with	 the	highest	concentration	of	forensic	material	and	of	 the	stained	

shorts	were	sent	for	DNA	analysis.

[¶9]		Mixtures	of	DNA were found	on	the ligatures associated	with	the	

victims.	 The	mixture	on	the	ligature found	on the	mother	was consistent	with

the	DNA	profiles	of Coleman, the	mother,	and at	least	one	unknown	donor;	a

ligature	found	 on	the	daughter revealed	DNA consistent	with Coleman, the	

daughter,	and	at	least	one	other	unknown	donor; on another	ligature	found	

on	 the	 daughter,	 there	 was	 DNA matching her	 and	 at	 least	 one unknown	

donor; a ligature found	on	the son	contained	DNA	 that	was	consistent	with

the	 son,	 the	 daughter,	 and	 at	 least	 one	 unknown	 donor.	 	 A forensic	 DNA	
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analyst	found	that	a sample	from	the	daughter’s	stained	shorts	had	too	little	

material	for	DNA	analysis	of	the	sperm	or	blood.	 The	vaginal	swabs	contained

two	DNA	profiles—one obtained from	skin	cells,	which	was consistent	with	

the	 daughter, and	 the	 other	 from	 sperm	 cells,	 which	 was consistent	 with	

Coleman.	 The	DNA	analyst	calculated that	there	was	a	statistical	possibility	

of	less	than	1	in	300	billion	that	the	sperm	fraction	profile	came	from	someone	

other	than	Coleman.

II.		PROCEDURAL	HISTORY

[¶10]		Coleman	was initially charged	by	complaint	with	three	counts	of	

murder	and later	with one	count	of	gross	sexual	assault	and was subsequently

indicted	by	the	Penobscot	County	Grand	Jury for	those	charges.		17-A	M.R.S.	

§§ 201(1)(A); 253(1)(c). At his	arraignment,	Coleman	entered	pleas	of	not	

guilty.

[¶11] On	September	13,	2015,	the	State	moved in	limine to	bar	Coleman	

from	 cross-examining	 the	 medical	 examiner, Dr. Mark Flomenbaum,

concerning a	Connecticut	judge’s	finding	that Dr.	Flomenbaum’s testimony as	

an	expert	witness for	a	defendant	in	a	child	death	case was	not	credible; and,

Dr.	Flomenbaum’s removal	from	his	previous	position	as	the	Massachusetts	

Chief	 Medical	 Examiner.	 The	 court	 reserved	 ruling	 on	 the	 motion	 until	
8

hearing	 Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s	testimony	 and	 later granted	 the	 State’s	 motion	

over	 Coleman’s	 repeated	 objection.

2 The	 court found	 that the	 Connecticut	

court’s	 credibility	 determination	 was	 not	 a	 specific	 instance	 of	 conduct	

probative	 of	a character	 for	 truthfulness.		See M.R.	Evid.	608(b).	 The	court	

additionally	 found that Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s removal	 from	 an	 administrative	

position	in	Massachusetts	was not	only irrelevant	to	his	medical	findings	in	

an	individual	autopsy	but	also was likely to confuse,	and	needlessly	add	 to,	

the	issues	more	properly	before	the	jury;	the	court	therefore	foreclosed	any	

cross-examination on	this	issue	pursuant	to	M.R. Evid.	403.

[¶12]		On	November	10,	2016,	after	an	eleven-day	trial,	the	jury	found	

Coleman	 guilty	 on	 all charges and the	 court	 continued	 the	 matter	 for	

sentencing.	 On	January	19,	2017,	the	court	imposed concurrent sentences of	

life	imprisonment	on	each	of	the	murder	counts	and	a	concurrent	twenty-year	

term	of	imprisonment	for	the	gross	sexual	assault.	 Coleman	appealed	directly	

from	his	conviction,	pursuant	to M.R.	App.	P.	20 and 15	M.R.S.	§ 2151.	 Upon	

his	application, the	Sentence	Review	Panel	granted	him	leave	to	appeal from

 2	 	 The	 court	 referenced	with	 approval	 two	trial	 court decisions	in	 unrelated	 cases	 that	 had	

similarly	limited	impeachment	of	Dr.	Flomenbaum.	 State	v.	Davis,	No.	AROCD-CR-2013-137	Unified	

Criminal	 Docket	 (Aroostook	 Cty.,	 August	 29,	 2016)	 (order	 granting	 motion	 in	 limine);	 State	 v.	

Haji-Hassan,	CUMCD-CR-2014-7716	Unified	Criminal	Docket	(Cumberland	Cty.,	August	10,	2016)	

(order	on	motion	for	in	camera	review),	appeal	docketed,	No.	Cum-17-149	(Apr.	7,	2017).
9

his	 sentence. State	 v.	 Coleman,	 No.	 SRP-17-60	 (Mar.	 13,	 2017). We

consolidated	 our review of	 his	 sentence with	 his	 direct	 appeal.		

M.R. App. P. 20(h).

III.		DISCUSSION

A. Limitation	on	Coleman’s Impeachment	of	Dr.	Flomenbaum

[¶13]	 	 Prior	 to	 trial	 and	 again	 at trial,	 Coleman sought, pursuant	 to	

M.R. Evid.	608(b), to	impeach	Dr.	Flomenbaum’s character	for	truthfulness	by	

inquiring	on	cross-examination	into (1)	his	expert testimony in	a	May	2016	

child	death	case that	a	Connecticut	judge	found	was	not	credible	and	(2) his	

termination	 as	 Massachusetts’s	 Chief	 Medical	 Examiner due	 to	 his	

administrative	shortcomings	and	lack	of	candor	with	his	superiors.	 Coleman	

made	 an	 offer	 of	 proof consisting	 of a	 letter	 from	 a	 Connecticut	 State’s	

Attorney	 regarding	 a judge’s	 finding	 that	Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s	 testimony	was	

not	 credible; the	 transcript	 of	 that	 testimony; a	 newspaper story	 about	

Dr. Flomenbaum’s	 termination	 in	 Massachusetts; and	 the	 Massachusetts	

Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion	 affirming Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s	 for-cause	

termination. See Flomenbaum	 v.	 Commonwealth,	 889	 N.E.2d	 423	

(Mass. 2008).	 On	appeal,	Coleman	asserts	that	the	court	committed	an	abuse	

of	discretion and	violated	his	constitutional right	to	effectively	cross-examine	
10

a	 witness	 when	 it	 denied	 him	 the	 opportunity	 to	 further	 impeach	

Dr. Flomenbaum with evidence	 of these	 circumstances.	 	 See	 U.S.	 Const.	

amends.	VI,	XIV; Me.	Const.	art.	I,	§	6;	M.R. Evid. 608(b).

[¶14]		We	afford a	trial	court	wide	discretion	in	its	evidentiary	rulings	

pursuant	to	M.R.	Evid.	403 and	608(b) and	review	such	rulings	for	an	abuse	

of	discretion.		State	v.	Maderios,	2016	ME	155,	¶¶	10-11,	149	A.3d	1145;	State	

v.	Williams,	 2012	 ME	 63,	 ¶	 42,	 52	 A.3d	 911. Rule	 608(b)	 prohibits	 use	 of	

extrinsic	evidence	 of	 specific	instances	 of	a	witness’s	conduct,	 other	 than	 a	

criminal	 conviction	 pursuant	 to	 M.R.	 Evid.	 609,	 to	 attack	 or	 support	 that	

witness’s	character	for	truthfulness	but	allows	a	court	to	permit “a	witness’s	

credibility	[to]	be	attacked	through	cross-examination on	specific	instances	of	

the	 witness’s	 prior	 conduct	 that	 are	 probative	 of	 truthfulness	 or	

untruthfulness.”		Williams,	2012	ME	63,	¶	42,	52	A.3d	911 (emphasis	added)

(citation	omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶15] In	determining	whether	specific	instances	of	a	witness’s	conduct	

are	 sufficiently	 probative	 of	 the	 witness's	 character	 for	 truthfulness	 or	

untruthfulness,	a court	may	consider (1)“the	importance	of	the	witness	to	the	

case”; (2)	“how	probative	of	truthfulness	or	untruthfulness	the	bad	acts	are”;

and	 (3)	 “[t]he	 reliability	 of	 the	 information	 that	 the	 bad	 acts	 in	 fact	
11

occurred . . . .”		State	v.	Almurshidy, 1999	ME	97,	¶	30,	732	A.2d	280;	see	Field	

&	 Murray, Maine	 Evidence §	 608.2 at 299	 (6th	 ed.	 2007).	 	 The	 limited	

opportunity	to	inquire,	on	cross-examination,	into	specific acts	by	the	witness	

relating	 to the	 witness's	 character	 for	 truthfulness	 or	 untruthfulness,	

however,	 does	 not	 open	 the	 door	 to	 the	 admission	 of	 extrinsic	 evidence	

relating	 to	 those	 acts.3 Almurshidy, 1999	 ME 97,	 ¶	 25	 n.4,	 732	 A.2d	 280	

(“[P]ursuant	to	Rule	608(b)(1),	extrinsic	evidence	.	.	.	is	not	admissible.”).		Nor	

does the	 limited	 opportunity	 to	 inquire	 into	 specific	 acts	 on	

cross-examination	override	our	well-established	rule	that	opinion	testimony	

on	a	particular	witness’s	credibility	is	inadmissible. See State	v.	Woodburn,	

559	A.2d	343,	346	(Me.	1989);	State	v.	Caulk,	543 A.2d 1366,	1372	(Me.	1988).	

We	now	analyze each of the	proffered specific	instances of	Dr.	Flomenbaum’s	

conduct in	turn.

1) Connecticut	Testimony	and	Judge’s	Credibility	Determination

[¶16]		We have not	dealt	with	the	admissibility	pursuant	to	Rule	608(b)	

of	past	judicial	credibility	determinations	concerning an	expert	witness.		We

have, however,	done	so	in	the	context	of	expert	opinions	regarding another	

 3 If	a	cross-examiner	asks	a	question	regarding	a	specific	act,	after	satisfying	the	court	that	he	

has	a	good	faith	basis	to	ask	the	question,	and	the	witness	denies	the	act,	the	questioner	is	left	with	

the	answer	and	cannot	offer	extrinsic	evidence	to	rebut	the	witness’s	answer.	 See	Field	&	Murray,	

Maine	Evidence	§	608.2	at	299	(6th	ed.	2007).
12

witness’s	credibility.		See	Woodburn,	559	A.2d	at 346	(affirming	the	exclusion	

of	 a psychologist’s	 expert	 testimony	 that	 the	 child	 victim	 was	 unable	 to	

distinguish	 truth	 from	 falsehood) (citing	 M.R.	 Evid.	 608(a),	 (b)). Coleman

contends	 that	 evidence	 of Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s	 responses	 to	 a Connecticut	

prosecutor’s	 questions	 about	 his	 termination	 from	 Massachusetts	 and	 a

Connecticut	 judge’s	 finding	 that	 Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s	 “testimony	 [was]	 not	

credible”	are	proper	subjects	for impeaching Dr. Flomenbaum’s	credibility	as	

a	witness	pursuant	to	Rule	608(b).

[¶17]		In	May	2016,	Dr.	Flomenbaum appeared in	his	personal	capacity	

as	a	forensic	expert	at	a	trial	in	the	Connecticut	Superior	Court on	behalf	of	

the	defendant	in	a	criminal	case.	Coleman	asserts	that if	the	court	had	allowed	

him,	he	would	have	asked	Dr.	Flomenbaum about	 this	exchange	during	 the

State’s	Attorney’s cross-examination	in	that	case:

[State’s	 Attorney]:	 And	 you	 were	 [working	 for	 Massachusetts]	

for—I	can’t	recall	from	your	direct—how	many	years?

[Dr.	Flomenbaum]:	Two	years.

.	.	.	.	

[State’s	Attorney]:	Two	years	before	they	fired	you?

[Dr.	Flomenbaum]:	No.	Two	years	before	I	left.
13

[State’s	 Attorney]:	 Well,	 didn’t	 the	 [S]tate	 of	 Massachusetts	

terminate	you,	Doctor?

[Dr.	Flomenbaum]:	The	governor	did.	Yes,	he	did.

State	 v.	 Bumgarner-Ramos,	 No.	 WMM-CR13-0151026-T	 (Conn.	 Super.	 Ct.

May 11,	2016).		

[¶18]		Although	we	have	said	that	“falsifying	testimony	is .	.	. probative	

of	 whether	 someone	 has	 a	 truthful	 or	 untruthful	 character,”	 the	 above

exchange	 cannot	 be	 construed	 in	 any	 sense	 as	 falsification	 of	 testimony.

See Almurshidy,	1999	ME	97,	¶	30	n.6,	732 A.2d	280.	Dr.	Flomenbaum appears	

to	have simply	disagreed	with	the	characterization	that	he	was	fired	but,	more	

importantly,	 he	 also	 acknowledged—in	 his	 very	 next	 answer—that	 his	

employment	 was	 indeed	 terminated. Bumgarner-Ramos,	 No.	

WMM-CR13-0151026-T.	 Even	considering	Dr.	Flomenbaum’s	importance	to	

the	State’s	case, this	instance	of	his	conduct	completely	lacks	any	relevance	or	

probative	value	regarding	his	character	for	truthfulness.	 See State	v.	Ericson,	

2011	 ME	 28,	 ¶	 20,	 13	 A.3d	 777;	 Almurshidy,	 1999	 ME	 97,	 ¶	 30	 n.6,	

733 A.2d 280.

[¶19]	 	 Coleman next points	 to	 the judge’s	 finding, in	 the same	

Connecticut	case, that	Dr.	Flomenbaum’s	“testimony [was] not	credible	and

[that	the	court] rejects	Dr.	Flomenbaum’s conclusions	[concerning	the	cause	
14

of	death].”	 Bumgarner-Ramos,	No.	WMM-CR13-0151026-T (Conn.	Super.	Ct.	

May	 17,	 2016).	 Coleman contends	 that	this	 instance of	Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s	

conduct is admissible	impeachment	evidence	on	the	authority	of	United	States	

v.	 Cedeño, where	 the Court	 of	 Appeals	 for	 the Second	 Circuit held	 that the	

defendant	should	have	been	allowed	to	cross-examine	a government	witness

about	a judge’s	finding	in	a	prior	case	that the witness had	lied	while	testifying	

under	 oath,	 but	 ultimately concluded	 that	 this error	 was	 harmless.	

644 F.3d 79,	81,	82-83 (2d	Cir.	2011);	see Fed. R.	Evid.	608(b).

[¶20]	 	 It	 is	 not	 clear	 that the Connecticut	 court’s	 finding	 regarding	

Dr. Flomenbaum’s	 testimony	would	 be	 admissible in	 this	 case	 according	 to

Cedeño,

4 which	is	distinguished from	these	facts by the judicial finding	at	issue

there,	i.e.,	a determination that	the witness	had	lied under	oath in	a	previous	

case.		544	F.3d	at 81,	83.		Furthermore,	several	of	the cases	cited	in	Cedeño

specifically	differentiate	between a finding	that	a witness	had	lied	or	was	not	

credible	and	 a	court finding	 the	“defense	witnesses	more	credible	 than	 the	

 4		The	Second	Circuit’s	approach	contrasts	with	others	that	allow	impeachment	by	inquiry	into	

the	underlying	facts	of	a	past	judicial	or	executive	branch	proceeding	but	disallow	questions	about	

the	 proceeding’s	 conclusions	 or	 consequences,	 which	 are	 extrinsic	 evidence.	 	 See	

Fed. R. Evid. 608(b),	 Advisory	 Committee’s	 Note to	 2003	 amend.;	 United	 States	 v.	 Whitmore,	

384 F.3d	 836,	 836-37	 (D.C.	 Cir.	 2004);	 United	 States	 v.	 Davis,	 183	 F.3d	 231,	 256,	 257	 n.12	

(3d Cir. 1999);	Deary	v.	City	of	Gloucester,	9	F.3d	191,	196-97	(1st	Cir.	1993);	United	States	v.	Lopez,	

944	 F.2d	33,	 37-38	 (1st Cir.	1991);	Waymire	 v.	Miami	 Cty.	 Sheriff’s	Office,	 2017	U.S.	Dist.	 LEXIS	

160918,	at	*6-7	(S.D.	Ohio	Sept.	29,	2017).
15

government’s	 witness.”	 United	 States	 v.	 Whitmore,	 359	 F.3d	 609,	 620

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (quotation	marks	omitted);	see also United States	v.	Dawson,	

434	 F.3d	956,	959	 (7th Cir.	2006) (approving	 of the	exclusion	 of questions	

about	 past	 judicial	 credibility	 findings	 “when	 the	 witness	 .	 .	 . had	 been

disbelieved	in	 only	 one	case	 or where	it	was	unclear	whether	 and	why	 the	

witness’s testimony	had	been	 rejected.”).	 We	need	not	decide	whether the	

Second	Circuit’s	approach	should	be	applied in	Maine	in	cases where	the	court	

is	 left	 with	 an	 inescapable	 conclusion	 that	 the	 witness	 has previously lied	

under	oath because in	Dr.	Flomenbaum’s	case	no	such	conclusion	is	possible

on	 the	 facts	 presented	 here.	 	 See	 Cedeño,	 644	 F.3d	 at	 81-83.	 	 The	 obvious	

conclusion	to	be	drawn	from	reading	the	transcript	of	the	Connecticut	trial	is	

that	the	judge	was	presented	with	conflicting	expert	opinions	and	elected,	as	

typically	 happens,	 to	 find	 one	 credible	 and	 the	 other	 not—a	 far	 cry	 from	

finding	that	a	witness	lied.

[¶21]	 	 We	 note	 also	 that	 the	 overarching, bright-line	 rule	 of	

M.R. Evid. 608(a)	 prevents	 the	 admission	 of personal	 opinions	 regarding a	

witness’s	 credibility	 or	 truthfulness.	 See	Woodburn,	 559	 A.2d	 at 346.	 	The	

Connecticut	judge’s	opinion	of	Dr.	Flomenbaum’s	testimony	is	just	the	sort	of	

opinion	evidence	prohibited	by	Rule	608(a).	 The court acted	well	within	its	
16

discretion	 to preclude	 Coleman’s	 inquiry	 on	 cross-examination	 into

Dr. Flomenbaum’s testimony and	the	judge's	finding	on	the credibility	issue

in	the	Connecticut	case. See	id.;	Caulk,	543	A.2d	at	1372.

2) Dr.	Flomenbaum’s	Prior	Employment	Termination

[¶22]	 	 Coleman	 next	 argues that the	 reasons	 for Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s

removal	 as Massachusetts	 Chief	 Medical	 Examiner—that	 according	 to	 the	

Massachusetts	 Supreme	 Judicial	 Court	decision included his	 administrative	

shortcomings	 and	 lack	 of	 candor	 with	 his	 superiors5—are	 also	 specific	

instances	of	Dr. Flomenbaum’s	conduct	that	are	probative	of	his	character	for	

truthfulness.	 Coleman	postulates	 that Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s termination from	

his	prior	employment	may	provide a motive	or bias on Dr. Flomenbaum’s	part

to	 please the	 Attorney	 General’s	 Office	 and	 thereby	 secure	 his	 continued	

employment in Maine’s	 Office	 of	 the	 Chief	 Medical	 Examiner,	 which	 is	 a	

division	within	 the	Office	 of	 the	 Attorney	 General.	 Coleman contends	 that,

“[g]iven	 the	 importance	 of	 Dr. Flomenbaum,	 his	 testimony,	 and	 his	

credibility,”	this	bias	was	another	proper	avenue	for	cross-examination and

 5		The	Massachusetts	decision	cited	actions	by	Dr.	Flomenbaum	including	his	delayed	reporting	

of	a	missing	body	and	underestimation	of	the	backlog	of	bodies	awaiting	autopsies.		Flomenbaum	

v.	Commonwealth,	889	N.E.2d	423,	430-31	(Mass. 2008).
17

that	the court	abused	its	discretion by excluding this	impeachment evidence	

pursuant	to	M.R.	Evid.	401	and	403.

[¶23]		If Dr.	Flomenbaum’s administrative	capabilities	are	relevant	to	

his	collection and	supervision of	the	sexual	assault	kit	evidence,	then	it	was	

error	for	the	court	to	exclude this	impeachment	evidence unless	its	probative	

value	 was	 substantially	 outweighed	 by	 the	 risks	 of	 unfair	 prejudice	 or	

confusion	of	the	jury	and	the	issues before	it.		M.R.	Evid.	401,	403. The	State	

sought	 to	 qualify	Dr.	 Flomenbaum as	 an	 expert	when	it	inquired about	 his	

education,	 experience, and the number	 of	 autopsies	 he	 had	 performed.	 In	

response,	Dr.	Flomenbaum provided	a	summary	of	his	medical	training	and	

employment	 history,	 including	 his	 time	 as	 Massachusetts	 Chief	 Medical	

Examiner,	and	an	estimate	 that	he	had	conducted	3,000	 to	4,000	autopsies.	

At	 the	 time Dr.	 Flomenbaum conducted	 the	 daughter’s autopsy,	 he	 was	

Maine’s	Chief	Medical	Examiner and he	supervised	or	personally	undertook

the	 collection	 of	 the sexual	 assault	 kit	 and the other	 evidence	 from	 the	

daughter’s	autopsy.

[¶24]		Evidence	of Dr.	Flomenbaum’s	administrative	shortcomings	and	

lack of	candor	with his superiors	when	he	was	the Chief	Medical	Examiner in	

another	state are relevant	to	his	performance of	his	administrative	duties	as	
18

the	 State	 of	 Maine’s	 Chief	 Medical	 Examiner,	 contrary	 to	 the trial court’s

findings.		See United States v. York,	933	F.2d	1343,	1365-66	 (7th	Cir.	1991)

(affirming	expert	medical	doctor’s	impeachment	with	questioning about his

allegedly	 unprofessional	 conduct	 at	 his	 previous	 position	 as	 Chief	 Medical	

Examiner),	 overruled	 on	 other	 grounds	 by	Wilson	 v.	Williams,	182	 F.3d	 562	

(7th	 Cir.	 1999).	 Additionally, the circumstances	 of	 Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s	

termination are	directly	relevant	to	an	aspect	of	his	professional	credentials	

that	the	State	used	to qualify	Dr.	Flomenbaum as	an	expert in	this	case.		See id.;

Maderios,	2016	ME	155,	¶¶	10-11,	149	A.3d	1145;	State	v.	Filler,	2010	ME	90,	

¶¶	17-20,	3	A.3d	365	 (“[E]vidence	 tending	 to	impeach	 [the	State’s	primary	

witness’s]	 credibility	 has	 greatly	 enhanced	 probative	 value.” (quotation

marks	 omitted)).	 	In	 establishing	Dr.	Flomenbaum's	 expert	 credentials,	 the	

State	included the	fact	that	he	had previously	held	a	prestigious	position—a	

fact	 that may	 be	 properly	 tempered	 by	 the	 fact	 of	 his	involuntary	 removal	

from	that	position.

[¶25]	 We must next decide	 whether	 the court’s error	 in limiting

cross-examination	 of	 a	 state’s	 witness was harmless based	 upon “‘the	

importance	of	the	witness’[s]testimony	in	the	prosecution’s	case,	whether	the	

testimony	was	cumulative,	the	presence	or	absence	of	evidence	corroborating	
19

or	contradicting	the	testimony	of	the	witness	on	material	points,	the	extent	of	

cross-examination	otherwise	permitted,	and,	of	course,	 the	overall	strength	

of	the	prosecution’s	case.’”		State	v.	Johnson,	2009	ME	103,	¶	18,	982	A.2d	320	

(quoting Delaware	 v.	 Van	 Arsdall, 475	 U.S.	 673,	 684	 (1986)). In	 this	 case,	

Dr. Flomenbaum’s	 testimony	 was just one	 of	 many	 pieces	 of	 evidence	

presented	 at	 trial.	 	 In	 addition	 to	that	 evidence, the	 court	 heard	 testimony	

from the	detectives	who	recounted Coleman’s	confession	to	the	murders; the	

family	 members	 and	 first	 responders	 who	 established that,	 of the three	

victims,	only	the daughter was	found gagged	and	straddling	the	end	corner	of	

a bed,	thus	supporting in	part a	finding	that	she	was	sexually	assaulted;	and	

two	 forensic	 analysts	 from	 the crime	 laboratory who	 corroborated	

Dr. Flomenbaum’s	testimony by	positively	identifying	blood	and	semen on	the	

sexual	assault	kit	samples,	as	well	as	matching	Coleman’s	DNA	with	that	in	the	

sperm	found	on	the	daughter	and	with	the	DNA	found	on one	of the	ligatures.	

We	 conclude that	 the	 court’s	 error	 was	 harmless,	 in	 part, because	 despite	

Dr. Flomenbaum’s	importance	to	the	State’s	case on	the	gross	sexual	assault	

charge, the	State	presented significant circumstantial	evidence	to	corroborate	

that the	 blood	 and	 semen	 evidence	 Dr.	 Flomenbaum collected	 was	 as	 he	

characterized	 it	 in	 his	 testimony.	 In	 addition,	 Coleman	 was able	 to
20

cross-examine Dr.	Flomenbaum generally as	to	his	credibility	and alleged bias	

in	favor	of	the	State,	which	decreased	any	prejudice	resulting	from	the	lack	of	

cross-examination	 regarding	 the	 Massachusetts	 termination.6 The	 above	

factors	 along	 with	 the	 other	 circumstantial	 evidence and	 “the record	 as	 a	

whole	demonstrate[	]	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	the	error	did	not	affect	

the	substantial	rights	of	the	defendant	or	contribute	to	the	verdict	obtained.”		

State	v.	Norwood,	2014	ME	97,	¶	14,	97 A.3d 613;	Johnson,	2009	ME	103,	¶	18,	

982	A.2d	320.

[¶26]	 	 In	 sum,	 we conclude	 that	 the	 circumstances	 surrounding	

Dr. Flomenbaum’s	termination	from	his	employment	in	Massachusetts	due	to	

his	administrative	shortcomings	and	lack	of	candor	are	arguably probative	of	

his	ability	to	supervise	and	process the	taking	of	forensic	samples and	could	

have tempered the	jury’s	 view of his administrative	 skill	and	candor	in	 his	

work	in	Maine.	 See York,	933 F.2d at 1365-66; Filler,	2010	ME	90, ¶¶	17-20,	

3 A.3d 365.	 	 Although	 the	 court	 erred	 by finding	 that	 this	 impeachment	

evidence	was	not	 at	all	 relevant in	 this	 case and by precluding	 any	 related	

 6	 	 Coleman’s	 cross-examination	 of	 Dr.	 Flomenbaum,	 while	 not	 as	 extensive	 as	 he	 wished,	

satisfied	 his	 right	 to	 confront	 an	 adverse	 witness.	 	 The	 Confrontation	 Clause	 guarantees	 an	

adequate	and	effective,	but	not	unlimited,	cross-examination,	and	the court’s	error	in	limiting	this	

questioning	did	not	 rise	 to	a	deprivation	 of	Coleman’s	constitutional	 right.		See State	v.	Johnson,	

2009	ME	103,	¶	15,	982	A.2d	320;	State	v.	Brown,	321	A.2d	478,	485	(Me.	1974).
21

questioning, those errors were harmless	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 overwhelming	

evidence	of	Coleman’s	guilt.7

B. Prosecutorial	Misconduct

[¶27]	 	 We review	 preserved	 claims	 of	 prosecutorial	 misconduct	 for	

harmless	error.		State	v.	Pillsbury, 2017	ME	92,	¶	18,	161	A.3d	690;	State	v.	

Dolloff,	2012	ME	130,	¶¶	31-34,	58	A.3d	1032.		According to	this	standard,	we	

disregard “[a]ny	 error,	 defect,	 irregularity, or	 variance	 that	 does	 not	 affect	

substantial	 rights.”	 	 M.R.U.	 Crim.	 P.	 52(a).	 	 Coleman	 complains	 about	 the	

State’s	 opening	 statement that	 evidence	 from	 “vaginal	 swabs”	would	 show	

“sperm found	 on	 a	 young	 girl’s	 vagina” because	 he	 claims that the	 swabs	

should	have	been	referred	 to as	“external	genitalia” swabs,	in	keeping	with

the	sexual	assault	kit’s	protocol.	 Several	witnesses for	the	State testified	that	

sexual	 assault	 kits indeed have	 separate	 envelopes	 and	 instructions	 for	

“vaginal	swabs,”	used	for	internal	vaginal	collections,	and for collections	from	

“external	 genitalia.”	 Dr. Flomenbaum testified	 that	 he	 labeled	 the	 sexual	

 7		Coleman	correctly	notes	that	he	did	not	confess	to	the	sexual	assault	charge,	on	which	it	was	

the	State’s	burden	to	prove	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	genital-to-genital	contact	occurred.	 See	

infra ¶¶ 29-30.	 Dr.	Flomenbaum’s	testimony	provided support	for	such	a	 finding. Specifically,	

Dr. Flomenbaum	 testified that	 the	daughter	was	gagged;	that	she	had	blunt	 force	 trauma	 to	her	

face;	that	the	abrasions	on	her	buttocks and blood	around	her	vagina	and	in	the	crotch	of	her	shorts	

suggested	that	she	was	alive	when	the	abrasions	occurred;	and	he	concluded	that	her	intact	hymen	

ruled	 out	 penetrative	 sex	 but	 not	 necessarily	 direct	 genital	 contact.	 Neither	 Coleman	 nor	 the	

Massachusetts	 termination	 proceedings	 challenged	 Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s forensic	 abilities	 in	

performing	autopsies	and	reporting	his	findings.
22

assault	kit	swabs,	taken	from	the	daughter’s	“vaginal	area” between	the	labia	

majora	and	minora, as	vaginal	swabs.

[¶28]		The	State used	these	terms in	its	opening	statement, as	the	Chief	

Medical	Examiner	did,	to	accurately	describe	where	the	evidence	of	a	sexual	

act	was	found—inside	the	labia	majora	and	external	to	the	hymen,	not from	

deeper	 within the	 victim’s	 vagina,	 as	 Coleman	 claims	 the	 prosecutor	 said.8

The	 State’s	 opening	 statement,	 which	 was	 preceded and	 followed by	 the	

court’s	admonitions that	the	opening	statements	were	not	evidence, was free	

of	 any	 misconduct	 and	 was “fairly	 based	 on	 the	 facts	 [anticipated] in	

evidence.”		State	v.	Cote,	2017 ME	73, ¶	27,	159	A.3d	831	(quotation	marks	

omitted);	State	v.	Lockhart,	2003	ME	108,	¶¶ 47-49,	830	A.2d	433.

C. Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence	of	Gross	Sexual	Assault

[¶29]	 	 Next,	 Coleman	 contends	 that	 there	 was insufficient	 evidence	

supporting	his	conviction	for	gross	sexual	assault,	namely	that	there	was	not	

proof	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	of	direct	genital-to-genital	contact or	proof

that	 the	 victim	 was	 alive	 at	 the	 time that	 such	 contact	 occurred.		

See 17-A M.R.S.	§§ 251(1)(C), 253(1)(C), 508 (2017). We	review a	challenge	

that	there	is	insufficient	evidence	to	support	the	jury’s	verdict by viewing	all	

 8 The	 forensic	 evidence	indicated	 that	 the	 semen	was	 found	 between	 the	labia	 majora	 and	

minora, external	to	the	intact	hymen.
23

the	 evidence	 and	 reasonable	inferences	 drawn	 therefrom	in	 the	light	most	

favorable	to	the	State.		See	State	v.	Diana,	2014	ME	45,	¶	2,	89	A.3d	132; State	

v.	Skarbinski,	2011	ME	65,	¶	6,	21	A.3d	86.

[¶30]		Section	253(1)(C)	requires,	in	this	case,	proof	of	a	sexual	act,	in	

the	 form	 of	 direct	 genital-to-genital	 contact,	 with	 a	 person	 who	 was	 not	

Coleman’s	 spouse and	who	 had	 not	 reached	 twelve	 years	 of	 age.	 	Coleman	

concedes	that	the	daughter	was	unmarried	and	under	twelve	years	old.	 We

have repeatedly	 said that	 “[a]	 criminal	 conviction	 may	 be	 based	 solely	 on	

circumstantial	evidence	.	.	.	as	long	as	the	evidence	supports	a	finding	that	each	

element	of	the	crime	is	proved	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.”		State	v.	Moores,	

2009	ME	102,	¶	10,	982 A.2d	318;	see also State	v.	Cheney,	2012	ME	119,	¶	42,	

55	A.3d	473.		Despite	the	lack	of	direct	evidence	of how	Coleman’s	semen	was	

deposited	 on	 the	 victim’s	 genitalia,	 the	 jury	 could	 have	 rationally	 inferred,	

beyond	a	reasonable	doubt,	that	a	sexual	act	(i.e.,	genital-to-genital	contact)

had	occurred	while	the	victim	was	alive	based	on	the	circumstantial	evidence	
24

presented	at	trial.	 See	17-A	M.R.S.	§ 251(1)(C);	State	v.	Poblete,	2010	ME	37,	

¶	30,	993	A.2d	1104;	State	v.	Chad B.,	1998	ME	150,	¶¶	7-8,	715	A.2d	144.

D. Chain	of	Custody	of	the	Sexual	Assault	Kit

[¶31]	 	 Coleman	 next	 asserts that	 the	 court	 erred	 by finding	 that	 the

State	had	established	a	proper	chain	of	custody	of the sexual	assault kit,	which	

was stored	under	unknown	conditions	at	the	Medical	Examiner’s Office	from	

the	afternoon	of	December	22	until	10:00	a.m.	on	December	24,	2014.	 We	

review for	clear	error	a	 finding	 that	an	item	 of	physical	evidence	 has	been	

authenticated	by	a	sufficient	chain	of	custody.		Diana,	2014	ME	45,	¶¶	26-27,	

89	 A.3d	 132;	 see M.R.	 Evid.	 901(a).	 	 A chain	 of	 custody	 “need	 [not]	 be	

ironclad,”	and	“a	minor	break	goes	to	the	weight	of	the	evidence	rather	than	

its	 admissibility.”	 Diana,	 2014	 ME	 45,	 ¶ 26, 89	 A.3d	 132	 (alteration	 in	

original) (quotation	marks	omitted)	(quoting	Field	&	Murray,	Maine	Evidence

§	901.3	at	543). The sexual	assault	kit	samples	were sealed	and	consistently

in	 the	custody	of	 the Maine	State	Police,	 the Medical	Examiner’s Office,	and	

then the	crime	laboratory,	before finally returning	to the	Maine	State	Police’s	

evidence	 locker.	 The	 court	 did	 not	 clearly	 err	 or	 otherwise	 abuse	 its	

discretion	in	admitting	 the	 sexual	assault	 kit	in	evidence because	 the	State	
25

accounted	for	the	kit’s	location	and	sealed	condition	at	all	relevant	times.		See

id.

E. Sentencing

[¶32]		Coleman	finally argues	for	the	first	time	on	appeal	that	we	should	

adopt a	 clear	 and	 convincing	 standard	 of	 proof	 for	 aggravating	 factors	

considered	at	sentencing.	 He	contends that	the	sentencing	court	abused	its	

discretion	in	considering as	aggravating	 factors,	upon	a	less	 than	clear	and	

convincing quantum	of	proof, his	prior	domestic	violence	against	the	mother	

and	the	victims’	conscious	fear	and	suffering.	 Where	a	challenge	to	the	court’s	

application	of	a	standard	of	proof	at	sentencing	is	unpreserved,	we review	the	

court’s	actions	for obvious	error.		See	State	v. Butsitsi,	2015	ME	74,	¶¶	19,	22,	

118	A.3d	222;	State v.	Schofield,	2005	ME	82,	¶	28,	895 A.2d	927.	 As	Coleman	

acknowledged	in	his	brief,	we	have	instructed	sentencing	courts	to	consider	

any	 “reliable	 and	 relevant”	 evidence	 of	 mitigating	 or	 aggravating	 factors.	

State	v.	Waterman,	2010	ME	45,	¶	48,	995 A.2d 243.		This	is	precisely	what	the	

court	did	in	Coleman’s	case,	and	we	decline	to announce a	new	standard.

[¶33]		Considering	the	sentence	that	the	court	imposed,	we	review the	

court’s	 application	 of	 the	 first	 step	 of	 the	 sentencing	 analysis—the	

determination	of	a	basic	sentence—de	novo and we	review the	court’s	second	
26

step of	the	analysis—the	determination	of	the	final sentence—for	an	abuse	of	

discretion.	 	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §§	 1201(1)(A),	 1252-C (2017);	 Waterman,	

2010 ME 45,	 ¶	 42,	 995	 A.2d	 243;	 State	 v.	 Cookson,	 2003 ME	 136,	 ¶ 38,	

837 A.2d	 101.	 	 Here	 the	 court	 found	 the	 existence	 of	 several	 aggravating	

factors justifying a	life	sentence:	(1)	multiple	deaths,	(2) a	murder	committed	

in	the	presence	of	a	child,	(3) a murder	accompanied	by	sexual	assault,	and

(4)	the	domestic	violence	nature	of	the	murders.9		See	Waterman,	2010 ME 45,	

¶	45,	995	A.2d	243;	State	v.	Shortsleeves,	580 A.2d 145,	149-50 (Me. 1990).	On	

balance,	 the	 court	 determined that	 the	 mitigating	 circumstances10 were	

greatly	 outweighed	 by those	 and additional	 aggravating	 factors, including	

Coleman’s	clear	mind,	free	from	the	influence	of	any	substances, at	the	time	of	

the	crimes; the	impact	of	the	victims’	deaths	on	their	family	and	community;

Coleman’s	 prior	 acts	 of	 domestic	 violence; the	 victims’	 conscious	 suffering	

and	 fear; and	 Coleman’s	 lack	 of	 remorse and consciousness	 of	 guilt	 in	 his

confession.	 	 See State	 v.	 Hamel,	 2013	 ME	 16,	 ¶	 6,	 60 A.3d 783; Schofield,

 9		The	court	also	found	that	the	cause	of	the	deaths	by	strangulation	was	an	aggravating	factor	

for	 sentencing	 purposes.	 	 Although	 not	 specifically	 listed	 among	 the	 Shortsleeves factors,	

strangulation	has	been	cited	in	other	life	sentence	cases.		See	State	v.	Dwyer,	2009	ME	127,	¶	38,	

985	A.2d	469;	State	v.	Wilson,	669	A.2d	766,	767-69 (Me.	1996).

10		The	sentencing	court	found	the	following	mitigating	factors:	Coleman’s	age	at	the	time	of	the	

crime,	his	history	of	substance	abuse	and	mental	health	issues,	his	lack	of	a	significant	criminal	

record,	the	absence	of premeditation,	the	evidence	that	he	has	family	and	friends	that	love	him,	and	

the	terrible	circumstances	of	his	childhood.
27

2006 ME	 101,	 ¶ 14,	 904	 A.2d	 409;	 Cookson,	 2003 ME 136,	 ¶¶ 39-41,	

837 A.2d 101;	Shortsleeves,	580	A.2d	at 150-51.	 Coleman’s	challenge to	his	

final	 sentence,	 attacking just	 two	 of	 the several aggravating	 factors, is	

unpersuasive, and	 the court	acted	well	within	its	discretion	in arriving at	a

maximum	sentence	of	life	imprisonment	on the	murder	counts.

The	entry	is:

Judgment and	sentences affirmed.

Jeremy	Pratt,	Esq.	(orally),	 and	Ellen	Simmons,	Esq.,	Camden,	 and	 Logan	 E.	

Perkins, Esq.,	Perkins	Law	Office,	Belfast,	for	appellant	Keith	Coleman

Janet	 T.	Mills,	 Attorney	 General, and	Donald	W.	Macomber,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen.	

(orally), Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Penobscot	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2014-4662

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY