UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

SEKAZI MTINGWA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NORTH CAROLINA AGRICULTURAL AND

TECHNICAL STATE UNIVERSITY;

CHARLES D. BUSSEY, General;

No. 96-1780

EDWARD B. FORT, Doctor; EDWARD

HAYES, Doctor,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

MATTHEW F. WARE, Doctor,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.

James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-95-482-2)

Submitted: May 15, 1997

Decided: June 6, 1997

Before RUSSELL, HALL, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Deborah N. Meyer, MEYER, JORDAN & MCGIBNEY, P.A., Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Attorney Gen-
eral of North Carolina, Thomas J. Ziko, Special Deputy Attorney

General, Celia Grasty Jones, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh,

North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Dr. Sekazi Mtingwa, while employed as the Chairman of the

Department of Physics at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical

State University1 (University), recommended that Dr. Matthew Ware,

an Assistant Professor in the department, not be reappointed after the

1992-93 academic year. Ware then commenced the University's internal hearing procedure contesting Mtingwa's recommendation. Ultimately, the University's Board of Trustees (Board) determined that

Mtingwa's decision not to reappoint Ware should be overturned on

the grounds that Mtingwa had personal malice against Ware. Thereafter, two local publications carried articles stating that Mtingwa had

decided not to reappoint Ware because of "malice" and because he

"disliked Ware." Mtingwa filed an action in the district court seeking

relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and state libel law on the

grounds that the negative and untruthful comments by Ware and University officials, which were subsequently published, caused his negotiations with another university for a teaching and research position

to be terminated. Although Mtingwa does not allege, nor do the facts

reveal, that he was terminated or demoted as a result of his alleged

malice toward Ware, Mtingwa seeks a "due process hearing" to clear

his name and damages.2 The district court granted the Defendants'

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1 Mtingwa is still employed as a physics professor at the University.

2 Although Mtingwa was not given notice or present at the meeting in

which it was decided that he had denied Ware's reappointment because

of "malice," Mtingwa has failed to allege any specific University policy

or procedure that would have entitled him to be present at that meeting

or granted him a hearing at which he could defend himself against the

Board's finding of malice.

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motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) with regard to the

§ 1983 action and dismissed the libel claim without prejudice to

Mtingwa's opportunity to seek state court remedies. Mtingwa appeals

raising one issue: that he has a protected liberty interest under the

Fourteenth Amendment in his future employment opportunities

actionable under § 1983. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Damage or injury to a person's reputation, absent an injury to some

other right or status previously recognized by state law, does not

deprive a plaintiff of any "liberty" interest protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). A public

employee alleging that his employer has harmed his reputation cannot

establish a claim under § 1983 unless he can show the stigma to his

reputation occurred in the course of a negative employment action

such as termination or demotion. Id. at 709-10; Board of Regents v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Even if Mtingwa's future career

opportunities may be adversely affected by the University's statements he "cannot complain that he has been made unemployable; he

remains employed." Johnson v. Morris, 903 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir.

1990) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Siegert v.

Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991) (holding that because "alleged defamation was not uttered incident to the termination of Siegert's

employment . . . it is not recoverable in a Bivens action"); Stone v.

University of Maryland Med. Sys., 855 F.2d 167, 172 n.5 (4th Cir.

1988) ("public employer's stigmatizing remarks do not deprive an

employee of a liberty interest unless they are made in the course of

a discharge or significant demotion"). Thus, because it is undisputed

that the University officials' allegedly defamatory comments did not

occur incident to Mtingwa's termination or other serious adverse

employment action, Mtingwa has no remedy under the Fourteenth

Amendment or § 1983. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234; Paul, 424 U.S.

at 709-10, Johnson, 903 F.2d at 999.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order dismissing the

action. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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