UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4456

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES LEWIS NELSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4457

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMES LEWIS NELSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, 

District Judge. (1:02-cr-00054-MR-1; 1:08-cr-00091-MR-DLH-1)

Submitted: February 25, 2015 Decided: April 8, 2015

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles R. Brewer, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Richard Lee Edwards, Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, James Lewis Nelson appeals the 

district court’s judgment revoking his term of supervised 

release in two criminal cases and sentencing him to 11 months’ 

imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal but suggesting that a lower 

sentence would have been appropriate given that Nelson’s 

violative conduct — particularly, his ongoing marijuana use —

was in response to his otherwise untreated anxiety and 

depression. We view this argument, which counsel concedes is 

raised for the first time on appeal, as a challenge to the 

substantive reasonableness of Nelson’s sentence. Although 

advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Nelson 

has not done so. The Government has declined to file a response 

brief. Following our careful review of the record, we affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a 

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States 

v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will affirm a 

revocation sentence if it falls within the prescribed statutory 

range and is not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437–39 (4th Cir. 2006). In making this 

determination, we first consider whether the sentence imposed is 

procedurally or substantively unreasonable, applying the same 
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general considerations employed in review of original criminal 

sentences. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry takes a more 

deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the 

exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for 

[G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 

652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Only if we find the sentence unreasonable will we consider 

whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally 

reasonable if the district court considered the policy 

statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing 

Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors applicable 

to revocation sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Crudup, 

461 F.3d at 439. Although a district court must provide a 

statement of reasons for the sentence it imposes, it “need not 

be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence 

as it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence[.]” 

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A 

revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district 

court stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should 

receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. 
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We review the lone issue raised in counsel’s Anders brief 

for plain error, as this argument was not pressed in the 

district court. See United States v. Lemon, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 

294329, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2015) (reviewing for plain 

error newly raised argument to undermine supervised release 

revocation sentence). Nelson’s challenge to the substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence fails on this record. After 

properly considering the advisory policy statement range of 6 to 

12 months’ imprisonment and responding to the arguments made by 

counsel and Nelson, the court sentenced Nelson near the top of 

the policy statement range. The court explained that the 11-

month sentence was appropriate given that the court’s prior 

extensions of leniency were met by Nelson’s repeated abuse of 

the court’s trust. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, 

pt. A(3)(b) (2008) (providing revocation sentence “should 

sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust”). We 

discern no substantive unreasonableness, plain or otherwise, in 

the district court’s reliance on this factor to sentence this 

defendant. That Nelson used marijuana in an effort to selfmedicate does not countenance a different result, given that 

Nelson did not avail himself of the probation officer’s efforts 

to secure him mental health treatment.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the records in 

these cases and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We 
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therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Nelson, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Nelson requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Nelson. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED