FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAFAEL MATEOS SANDOVAL;

SIMEON AVENDANO RUIZ, 

individually and as class 

representatives,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

COUNTY OF SONOMA; SONOMA 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; STEVE 

FREITAS,

Defendants,

and

CITY OF SANTA ROSA; SANTA ROSA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT; TOM 

SCHWEDHELM,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 16-16122

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-05817-

TEH
2 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

RAFAEL MATEOS SANDOVAL;

SIMEON AVENDANO RUIZ, 

individually and as class 

representatives,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

COUNTY OF SONOMA; SONOMA 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; STEVE 

FREITAS,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

CITY OF SANTA ROSA; SANTA ROSA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT; TOM 

SCHWEDHELM,

Defendants.

No. 16-16131

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-05817-

TEH
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 3

RAFAEL MATEOS SANDOVAL;

SIMEON AVENDANO RUIZ, 

individually and as class 

representatives,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF SONOMA; SONOMA 

COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; STEVE 

FREITAS; CITY OF SANTA ROSA;

SANTA ROSA POLICE DEPARTMENT;

TOM SCHWEDHELM,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16132

D.C. No.

3:11-cv-05817-

TEH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Thelton E. Henderson, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 11, 2018

San Francisco, California

Filed December 21, 2018

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wallace;

Concurrence by Judge Watford
4 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment and its denial of class certification in an action 

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law by two 

plaintiffs whose vehicles were impounded for 30 days 

because they had not been issued California driver’s 

licenses. 

California Vehicle Code § 14602.6(a)(1) provides that a 

peace officer may impound a vehicle for 30 days if the 

vehicle’s driver has never been issued a driver’s license. 

California authorities interpreted section 14602.6 as 

applying to individuals who had never been issued a 

California driver’s license. Applying this interpretation, law 

enforcement officials impounded plaintiffs’ vehicles for 30-

days even though plaintiffs attempted to have friends with 

valid California licenses take possession of the vehicles. 

Citing Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194, 1196–97 (9th 

Cir. 2017), the panel first noted that 30-day impounds under 

section 14602.6 are seizures for Fourth Amendment 

purposes and that the only issue in this case was whether the 

impounds were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

The panel held that although the state’s interest in keeping 

unlicensed drivers off the road provided a “community 

caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment, the 

application of the exception turned on the facts and 

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 5

circumstances of each case. The panel determined that 

defendants had failed to provide any justifications for the 

impounds other than general arguments that such impounds 

were justified as a deterrence or penalty. The panel rejected 

these arguments, at least on the facts of this case, and held 

that the district court did not err by granting summary 

judgment for plaintiffs on their Fourth Amendment claims. 

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment for plaintiffs on their claim that the County of 

Sonoma and the City of Santa Rosa were liable for money 

damages as final policymakers who caused the constitutional 

violations. The panel held that the impoundment of 

plaintiffs’ vehicles was not caused by state law, but by the 

defendants’ policies of impounding vehicles when the driver 

had never been issued a California driver’s license. 

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of class 

certification for lack of commonality and typicality. The 

panel held that because a 30-day impoundment is only 

unconstitutional when it continues in the absence of a 

warrant or any exception to the warrant requirement, the 

district court correctly concluded that members of the 

proposed classes would not be able to establish a Fourth 

Amendment violation based solely on the 30-day impounds. 

The district court further did not abuse its discretion by 

finding the plaintiffs atypical.

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of defendants on the California Bane Act 

claim. The panel held that under the circumstances of this 

case, it was legally unclear whether the 30-day impounds 

were “seizures” at all within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment until this Court issued a decision in Brewster in 

2017. The plaintiffs’ vehicles were impounded in 2011, well 
6 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

before this date, and at that point the County and City could 

not have had the requisite specific intent to violate the 

plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.

Concurring, Judge Watford stated that California 

Vehicle Code § 14602.6 is constitutionally deficient not 

because it runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment, as the Court 

held in Brewster, but because the post-seizure hearing it 

affords does not comply with the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment.

COUNSEL

Timothy T. Coates (argued) and Alison M. Turner, Greines 

Martin Stein & Richland LLP, Los Angeles, California; 

Robert L. Jackson, Assistant City Attorney, City Attorney’s 

Office, Santa Rosa, California; for DefendantsAppellants/Cross-Appellees City of Santa Rosa, Santa Rosa 

Polic Department, and Tom Schwedhelm.

Anne L. Keck (argued), Keck Law Offices, Santa Rosa, 

California; Richard W. Osman, Bertrand Fox Elliott Osman 

& Wenzel, San Francisco, California; for DefendantsAppellants/Cross-Appellees County of Sonoma, Sonoma 

County Sheriff’s Office, and Steve Freitas.

Donald W. Cook (argued), Los Angeles, California; Alicia 

Roman, Law Office of Alicia Roman, Santa Rosa, 

California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Morris G. Hill, Senior Deputy; Thomas E. Montgomery, 

County Counsel; Office of County Counsel, San Diego, 

California; for Amicus Curiae California State Association 

of Counties.
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 7

OPINION

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

California state law provides that a peace officer may 

impound a vehicle for 30 days if the vehicle’s driver has 

never been issued a driver’s license. Relying on this statute, 

local authorities in California impounded two vehicles 

because their drivers had not been issued California driver’s 

licenses. The drivers then sued the municipalities under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state civil rights law, contending that 

the impounds violated the Fourth Amendment. The district 

court granted summary judgment to the defendants on 

plaintiffs’ state law claims, denied class certification, and 

granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their section 

1983 claims. The defendants now appeal from the district 

court’s summary judgment on the section 1983 claims; the 

plaintiffs cross-appeal from the denial of class certification 

and summary judgment on the state law claims. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I.

California Vehicle Code § 14602.6(a)(1) provides:

Whenever a peace officer determines that a 

person was . . . driving a vehicle without ever 

having been issued a driver’s license, the 

peace officer may either immediately arrest 

that person and cause the removal and seizure 

of that vehicle or, if the vehicle is involved in 

a traffic collision, cause the removal and 

seizure of the vehicle without the necessity of 

arresting the person in accordance with [other 

law]. A vehicle so impounded shall be 

impounded for 30 days.
8 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

Drivers whose vehicles are impounded under this section are 

entitled to notice and a storage hearing, at which they may 

challenge the impoundment. Id. § 14602.6(a)(2). The 

storage agency must release the vehicle to the driver if the 

seizure was unauthorized. Id. § 14602.6(d)(1)(D).

Section 14602.6 does not define “driver’s license.” 

Following a similar practice of local officials throughout the 

state, the Sonoma County Sherriff’s Office interpreted 

section 14602.6 as applying to individuals who had never 

been issued a California driver’s license. The County 

impounded drivers’ vehicles for 30 days—pursuant to the 

statute—when they had never been issued a California 

driver’s license, even if they had a license from another 

jurisdiction.

On January 27, 2011, a County deputy sheriff stopped a 

truck driven by Rafael Mateos Sandoval for a minor traffic 

infraction. Upon learning that Sandoval did not have a 

California driver’s license, the deputy sheriff decided to 

impound his truck under section 14602.6, even though 

Sandoval had a valid driver’s license from Mexico and his 

friend had a California driver’s license and offered to take 

possession of the vehicle. Sandoval sought to regain 

possession of his truck, but the officer conducting the storage 

hearing denied Sandoval’s request, on the basis that his 

license was invalid for California residents and that the tow 

and storage was authorized by state law and local policy. 

Sandoval appealed, but County officials again denied his 

request, stating that “the tow and impound . . . were done 

legally and within policy.” Sandoval then filed a complaint 

with the Sheriff’s office, and that office again affirmed that 

“the deputies acted properly, in accordance with state laws 

and our [Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office] policies.” 

Sandoval did not regain possession of his vehicle until the 
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 9

30 days expired, when he paid the storage fees and a friend 

with a California driver’s license took possession of the 

truck.

Officials in the City of Santa Rosa adopted the same 

interpretation as the County, and impounded vehicles when 

the drivers had never been issued a California driver’s 

license. On September 1, 2011, Santa Rosa police officers 

stopped Simeon Ruiz at a checkpoint, where they learned 

that he did not have a California driver’s license. Although 

Ruiz had an expired Mexico driver’s license and a friend 

with a valid California driver’s license who could have taken 

possession of the vehicle, the officers decided to impound 

Ruiz’s vehicle under section 14602.6. Ruiz unsuccessfully 

attempted to have his truck returned the following day, and 

the official conducting his storage hearing later denied his 

request after being shown Ruiz’s Mexico driver’s license.

Ruiz did not regain possession of his vehicle until the 

30 days expired and he paid the storage fees.

Sandoval and Ruiz sued the County and City asserting 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the California Bane Act, 

Cal. Civil Code § 52.1, for the alleged violation of their 

Fourth Amendment rights. Early in the case, the parties 

stipulated to a determination of whether the City’s actions 

violated Ruiz’s Fourth Amendment rights, assuming the 

initial seizure was lawful. The district court granted 

summary judgment to Ruiz, holding that the 30-day 

impound of his vehicle was unreasonable and therefore 

unconstitutional. The district court held in a later order that 

the impound of Sandoval’s vehicle was also unreasonable, 

and granted summary judgment to him as well.

Sandoval and Ruiz then sought to certify a class, with 

themselves as class representatives, for all individuals who 

had their vehicles impounded without a warrant by the 
10 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

County and City for driving without having been issued a 

California driver’s license. They also sought to certify 

subclasses for individuals who had been issued foreign 

licenses. The district court denied class certification, holding 

that the classes were numerous but the subclasses were not, 

and that the plaintiffs had failed to show commonality and 

typicality for their proposed classes.

Sandoval and Ruiz also sought to hold the County and 

City liable for money damages as the final policymakers 

who caused the constitutional violations. The defendants 

opposed, arguing that section 14602.6 permits impoundment 

when the driver has never been issued a California driver’s 

license, and that they could not be liable for enforcing state 

law. The district court concluded that section 14602.6 did 

not permit impoundment for drivers who had previously 

been issued foreign driver’s licenses, and that the 

municipalities’ policies interpreting section 14602.6 to do 

so—contrary to the law—thus caused the constitutional 

violations.

Sandoval and Ruiz also sought summary judgment on 

their state law claims, arguing that the Fourth Amendment 

violations established Bane Act liability. The County and 

City also moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 

constitutional violations were not sufficiently egregious for 

liability to attach. The district court concluded that the Bane 

Act requires threats, intimidation, or coercion apart from that 

inherent in the seizure, and, finding none in this case, granted 

summary judgment to the defendants. The district court 

entered final judgment against the County and City for 

approximately $4,000 each.

The County appeals, arguing that the district court erred 

by concluding that it violated the Fourth Amendment and by 

holding it liable as a final policymaker. The City appeals, 
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 11

asserting the same arguments. The plaintiffs cross-appeal, 

asserting that the district court abused its discretion by 

denying class certification and erred by granting summary 

judgment to the defendants on their Bane Act claims.

II.

We review summary judgment de novo. Szajer v. City of 

Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011). “We review 

de novo an ultimate holding that there was, or was not, a 

seizure in violation of the fourth amendment.” Martinez v. 

Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 1987). We review 

summary judgment on a Monell claim de novo. Truth v. Kent 

Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on 

other grounds by Los Angeles Cty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 

29, 33–34 (2010).

We review the denial of class certification for abuse of 

discretion. Jimenez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 765 F.3d 1161, 1164 

(9th Cir. 2014). “A class certification order is an abuse of 

discretion if the district court applied an incorrect legal rule 

or if its application of the correct legal rule was based on a 

‘factual finding that was illogical, implausible, or without 

support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the 

record.’ ” Id. (quoting Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 

510, 513 (9th Cir. 2013)). We review summary judgment on 

state law claims de novo. Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell 

Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016).

III.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a claim for parties who suffer a 

violation of their federal rights by a person acting under 

color of state law. To prevail on a section 1983 claim based 

on the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that the 

state actor’s conduct was an unreasonable search or seizure. 
12 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

Mendez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 897 F.3d 1067, 1074–75 (9th 

Cir. 2018). Moreover, where the plaintiff seeks to hold a 

municipality liable, the plaintiff must show that the Fourth 

Amendment violation was caused by the municipality’s 

policy, custom or usage. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of 

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). The County and 

City argue that the district court erred in both decisions 

because the warrantless impounds did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment and, even if they did, because the municipalities 

were only enforcing state law. We address each argument in 

turn.

A.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. 

Const. Amend. IV. We have previously held that 30-day 

impounds under section 14602.6 are seizures for Fourth 

Amendment purposes. Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194, 

1196–97 (9th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the only issue in this 

case is whether the impounds here were “reasonable” under 

the Fourth Amendment.

Generally, “[a] seizure conducted without a warrant is 

per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject 

only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 

exceptions.” Id. at 1196 (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 

249 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2001)). The parties do not 

dispute that neither the County nor City officials who 

impounded the plaintiffs’ vehicles had warrants authorizing 

the impound, so we begin from the premise that the 

impounds were unreasonable. We then examine whether any 

“specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” to 

the warrant requirement apply that would make the 

impounds reasonable. See id.
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 13

The County argues that such an exception exists because 

we should categorically balance California’s interest in 

deterring unlicensed drivers against drivers’ interests in 

maintaining possession of their vehicles. But as explained in 

Brewster, the state’s interest in keeping unlicensed drivers 

off the road is governed by the “community caretaking” 

exception, which permits government officials to remove 

vehicles from the streets when they “jeopardize public safety 

and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.” Id. (quoting 

United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 

2012)). Whether this exception applies turns on the facts and 

circumstances of each case. Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 

429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the 

community caretaking exception does not categorically 

permit government officials to impound private property 

simply because state law does. See id. (“[T]he decision to 

impound pursuant to authority of a city ordinance and state 

statute does not, in and of itself, determine the 

reasonableness of the seizure under the Fourth 

Amendment”).

Moreover, the County’s framing of the issue is incorrect. 

Even if we were to balance California’s interest against all 

California driver’s interests, as is sometimes appropriate, see 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 538 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 

concurring), the County would still be wrong to rely on a 

deterrence or administrative penalty rationale to support 

California’s interests. See Brewster, 859 F.3d at 1196 (“The 

exigency that justified the seizure vanished once the vehicle 

arrived in impound and Brewster showed up with proof of 

ownership and a valid driver’s license”); Miranda, 429 F.3d 

at 866 (“The need to deter a driver’s unlawful conduct is by 

itself insufficient to justify a tow under the ‘caretaker’ 

rationale”). Whatever force those rationales may have in the 

forfeiture context, where a court approves the deprivation, 
14 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

see Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996), they do 

not permit the continued warrantless seizure of a vehicle 

once the community caretaking function is discharged. 

Miranda, 429 F.3d at 866. The County having failed to raise 

any other reason why the warrantless impound of Sandoval’s 

vehicle might satisfy the Fourth Amendment, we hold that 

the district court did not err in granting summary judgment 

to Sandoval on this issue.

The City relies on similar arguments, which we likewise 

reject as foreclosed by our case law. See Brewster, 859 F.3d 

at 1196–97; Miranda, 429 F.3d 864–66. The City comes 

closer to the mark with its argument that, even if section 

14602.6 impounds are not per se reasonable, the impound of 

Ruiz’s truck in particular did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. As we intimated in Brewster, a prolonged 

seizure may not violate the Fourth Amendment if the 

government retains justification for the seizure after the 

initial justification dissipates. See 859 F.3d at 1197 (“A 

seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment only to the 

extent that the government’s justification holds force. 

Thereafter, the government must cease the seizure or secure

a new justification”); see also United States v. Sullivan, 

797 F.3d 623, 634–35 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that 21-

day warrantless seizure was reasonable under the totality of 

the circumstances). Thus, the impoundment of Ruiz’s 

vehicle might nonetheless be reasonable if the City had a 

justification for continuing to seize the vehicle once it was 

safely towed.

The City’s argument fails, however, because no such 

justification exists. Once Ruiz was able to provide a licensed 

driver who could take possession of the truck, the City’s 

community caretaking function was discharged. Cf. 

Brewster, 859 F.3d at 1196 (“The exigency that justified the 
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 15

seizure vanished once the vehicle arrived in impound and 

Brewster showed up with proof of ownership and a valid 

driver’s license”). The City argues that its continued 

possession was necessary because Ruiz did not have a valid 

driver’s license. But, even if Ruiz could not have driven his 

vehicle on California’s roads, he could have lent the truck to 

a friend, sold the truck, used it for storage, or taken any other 

innumerable possible actions that a property owner can 

lawfully take with his or her property. The City has not 

provided us with any reason that a government may 

warrantlessly interfere with private possessory interests in 

this way, beyond its general argument that such impounds 

are justified as a deterrent or penalty. Because we reject 

those arguments, at least on the facts of this case, the district 

court did not err by entering summary judgment in favor of 

Ruiz.

B.

A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under 

section 1983 for the actions of its officers. Monell, 436 U.S. 

at 691. Instead, a plaintiff who claims to be injured by a 

municipality’s unconstitutional actions must show that those 

actions constituted government policy. Id. The district court 

held that the County and City had a policy of impounding 

vehicles for 30 days that caused the Fourth Amendment 

violations, and thus that Monell liability attached.

On appeal, the County and City do not dispute that they 

had a policy of impounding vehicles for 30 days when the 

drivers had never been issued a California driver’s license. 

Instead, they argue that the 30-day impounds were mandated 

by state law, and that they cannot be liable under section 

1983 for enforcing state law. However, California Vehicle 

Code § 310 defines “driver’s license” as “a valid license to 

drive the type of motor vehicle or combination of vehicles 
16 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

for which a person is licensed under this code or by a foreign 

jurisdiction.” California Vehicle Code § 100 provides: 

“Unless the provision or context otherwise requires, these 

definitions shall govern the construction of this code.” 

Accordingly, a driver who has been issued a driver’s license 

in a foreign jurisdiction for the type of vehicle seized has not 

driven that vehicle “without ever having been issued a 

driver’s license,” and section 14602.6 does not authorize 

impounding their vehicles. The impoundment of plaintiffs’ 

vehicles was thus not caused by state law, but by the 

defendants’ policies of impounding vehicles when the driver 

had never been issued a California driver’s license. The 

district court did not err by granting summary judgment to 

the plaintiffs on this issue.

The City argues at great length that section 14602.6 

applies to any driver who has never been issued a California 

driver’s license. But the City’s arguments cannot overcome 

the plain language of section 310, which includes licenses by 

a foreign jurisdiction. See People v. Watson, 171 P.3d 1101, 

1104 (Cal. 2007) (“We begin with the plain language of the 

statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary 

and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory 

context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s 

enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of 

legislative intent”). Moreover, conspicuously absent from 

the City’s briefs are any California court decisions applying 

its definition, which would change our analysis. See Ryman 

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 505 F.3d 993, 994 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(“[W]hen . . . a federal court is required to apply state law, 

and . . . there is no relevant precedent from the state’s highest 

court, but . . . there is relevant precedent from the state’s 

intermediate appellate court, the federal court must follow 

the state intermediate appellate court decision unless the 

federal court finds convincing evidence that the state’s 
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 17

supreme court likely would not follow it” (emphasis in 

original)). In fact, at least one California court has stated that 

the district court’s interpretation may have merit. Thompson 

v. City of Petaluma, 231 Cal. App. 4th 101, 110 (2014).

Given the plain meaning of section 14602.6, the 

County’s argument that state law caused the violation of 

Sandoval’s rights is without merit. We thus need not decide 

whether the County’s and City’s policies of towing pursuant 

to section 14602.6 could have given rise to liability under 

Monell even if the statute had authorized the impoundment 

of the plaintiffs’ vehicle. See Evers v. County of Custer, 

745 F.2d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding Monell 

liability over county’s argument that “it was merely acting 

according to state law, rather than carrying out County 

policy,” because policy was discretionary); see also 

California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 

4th 1144, 1148 (2008) (interpreting section 14602.6 as 

making impoundment discretionary).

The County additionally argues that the district court 

erred because it failed to find that the County was 

deliberately indifferent to Sandoval’s Fourth Amendment 

rights. We have reviewed the record of the County’s motion 

before the district court and it does not appear that this 

argument was presented. As such, this issue is forfeited. See 

United States v. Flores-Payon, 942 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 

1991) (“Issues not presented to the trial court cannot 

generally be raised for the first time on appeal”).

IV.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides that 

members of a class may sue as representatives for that class, 

but only if four requirements are satisfied: numerosity, 

commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Commonality 
18 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

requires the plaintiff to show that the class members’ claims 

“depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature that 

it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that 

determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that 

is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 

stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 

(2011). The test for typicality “is whether other members 

have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based 

on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and 

whether other class members have been injured by the same 

course of conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 

497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schwartz v. Harp, 

108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). The district court 

declined to certify plaintiff’s proposed classes for lack of 

commonality and typicality.

“We review a district court’s class certification for abuse 

of discretion.” Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr., __ F.3d __ 

No. 15-56460, 2018 WL 6175617, at *3 (May 3, 2018), as 

amended Nov. 27, 2018 (quoting Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 

536 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2008)). “A district court 

applying the correct legal standard abuses its discretion only 

if it (1) relies on an improper factor, (2) omits a substantial 

factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in weighing

the correct mix of factors.” Id. (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). We conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion.

The plaintiffs argue that because warrantless seizures are 

per se unreasonable, every member of their proposed classes 

could establish liability solely because their vehicles were 

impounded for 30 days. The plaintiffs thus argue that the 

district court committed a legal error requiring reversal. But, 

as this opinion makes clear, a 30-day impound does not 

necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment. Instead, such a 
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 19

prolonged seizure is only unconstitutional when it continues 

in the absence of a warrant or any exception to the warrant 

requirement. See Brewster, 859 F.3d at 1197. Thus, the 

district court correctly concluded that members of the 

proposed classes would not be able to establish a Fourth 

Amendment violation based solely on the 30-day impound. 

The district court then weighed whether class certification 

would be appropriate in light of the facts that (1) the 

plaintiffs had licensed drivers who were able to pick up their 

cars, whereas other drivers may not have, (2) the plaintiffs 

were forced to wait the full 30 days, whereas other drivers 

may not have been, and (3) that other plaintiffs may have 

never been licensed in a foreign jurisdiction, whereas 

plaintiffs were, and concluded that the plaintiffs were 

atypical. This determination does not reflect legal error or a 

“clear error in judgment,” and the plaintiffs do not argue that 

the district court failed to appropriately consider the relevant 

factors. See Sali, 2018 WL 6175617, at *3. The district court 

therefore did not abuse its discretion by finding the plaintiffs 

atypical. In light of this conclusion, we need not reach 

whether the district court erred by determining the plaintiffs’ 

proposed class lacked commonality.

V.

The California Bane Act creates a cause of action against 

a person if that person “interferes by threat, intimidation, or 

coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment by any 

individual or individuals of rights secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States.” Cal. Civ. Code 

§ 52.1. The California Supreme Court has not definitively 

interpreted the elements of this claim, and both we and the 

California Courts of Appeal have struggled to articulate 

clearly when Bane Act liability attaches. Compare Lyall v. 

City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th Cir. 2015) 
20 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

(concluding that plaintiff in search and seizure case must 

allege coercion apart from that inherent in detention); Allen 

v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 69 (2015) 

(same), with Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 

1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiff must allege 

specific intent to violate arrestee’s rights); Cornell v. City & 

Cty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 801–02 (2017) 

(same). In this case, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ 

motion for summary judgment and granted the City’s and 

County’s because the plaintiffs failed to identify any threats, 

intimidation, or coercion apart from the coercion inherent in 

storing their vehicles, following our decision in Lyall.

As a straightforward application of Lyall, the district 

court did not err. But after the briefs were filed in this case, 

we decided Reese v. County of Sacramento, which 

substantially clarified the legal standard to be applied in a 

Bane Act claim. In that case, the district court granted 

summary judgment to police defendants after they shot the 

plaintiff in his home. 888 F.3d at 1035–36. The district court, 

like the district court here, did so by applying the rule that 

there must be a showing of coercion independent from the 

coercion inherent in the Fourth Amendment violation itself. 

Id. at 1042. We reversed, concluding that Lyall’s 

independent coercion rule only applies when the plaintiff 

shows that the defendant negligently violated the plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights, and that the coercion inherent in a 

Fourth Amendment violation could support a Bane Act 

claim if the coercion occurred with “specific intent to violate 

the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.” 

Id. at 1043, 1044 n.5 (quoting Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 

801).

Reese requires us to hold that the district court erred to 

the extent it concluded that the plaintiffs were required to 
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 21

show “transactionally independent” threats, intimidation, or 

coercion separate from the Fourth Amendment violation. See 

id. at 1043. Nonetheless, the district court correctly denied 

the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment because the 

plaintiffs are incorrect that proving a Fourth Amendment 

violation vicariously triggers Bane Act liability. Instead, 

proving a Bane Act claim here requires specific intent to 

violate protected rights, meaning the plaintiffs must have 

shown that the County and City impounded their vehicles 

with specific intent to violate their Fourth Amendment 

rights. See id. at 1043–44. Plaintiffs did not demonstrate that 

they were entitled to summary judgment on this point.

Turning to the district court’s summary judgment in 

favor of the defendants, the undisputed facts show that the 

defendants violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. 

The defendants were therefore required to demonstrate that 

there was no dispute of material fact as to specific intent if 

they were to prevail. The specific intent inquiry for a Bane 

Act claim is focused on two questions: First, “[i]s the right 

at issue clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the 

circumstances of the case,” and second, “[d]id the defendant 

commit the act in question with the particular purpose of 

depriving the citizen victim of his enjoyment of the interests 

protected by that right?” Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 803 

(alterations omitted). So long as those two requirements are 

met, specific intent can be shown “even if the defendant did 

not in fact recognize the unlawfulness of his act” but instead 

acted in “reckless disregard” of the constitutional right. Id. 

(alteration omitted).

If there was no dispute of material fact that the right was 

not clearly delineated and plainly applicable, or that the 

defendants lacked the particular purpose of depriving the 

plaintiffs of their protected interests, we may affirm the 
22 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

district court’s summary judgment on this alternative 

ground. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 

261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[S]ummary judgment 

may be affirmed on any ground supported in the record, 

including reasons not relied upon by the district court”).

We conclude that the plaintiffs’ right was not clearly 

delineated and plainly applicable in this case. At a broad 

level of generality, it is of course indisputable that the right 

to be free from warrantless seizures of personal property is 

well-established and clearly delineated. But the California 

Court of Appeal has indicated that we must look to whether 

there is anything “vague or novel about [the application of 

the right] under the circumstances of this case.” Cornell, 

17 Cal. App. 5th at 803. Under the circumstances of this 

case, it was legally unclear whether the 30-day impounds 

were “seizures” at all within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment until we issued our decision in Brewster in 

2017. The plaintiffs’ vehicles were impounded in 2011, well 

before this date, and at that point the County and City could 

not have had the requisite specific intent to violate the 

plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Alviso v. Sonoma 

Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 186 Cal. App. 4th 198, 214 (2010) 

(rejecting the claim that Brewster validated). The district 

court therefore did not err by granting summary judgment to 

the defendants.

AFFIRMED.
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 23

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I recognize that the Fourth Amendment analysis in this 

case is controlled by Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194 (9th 

Cir. 2017), a decision I joined. After giving the matter 

further consideration, I am now of the view that we reached 

the right result in Brewster but for the wrong reason. 

California Vehicle Code § 14602.6 is constitutionally 

deficient not because it runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment, 

as we held in Brewster, but because the post-seizure hearing 

it affords does not comply with the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment does, of course, have something 

to say about the government’s ability to seize your car 

without a warrant and keep it for 30 days. As we noted in 

Brewster, however, the initial warrantless seizure authorized 

under § 14602.6 will seldom raise any Fourth Amendment 

concerns on its own. Id. at 1196. The statute is typically 

invoked when a police officer pulls a car over and arrests the 

driver for driving on a suspended or revoked license, or 

without having been licensed at all. In that scenario, the 

officer will usually be justified in seizing the vehicle without 

a warrant under the community caretaking exception 

because the vehicle must be removed from the roadway and 

the driver obviously can’t drive it back home himself.

The doctrinal leap we took in Brewster was to hold that 

a vehicle remains “seized,” within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment, even after being impounded. That meant the 

city had to offer a valid Fourth Amendment justification both 

for its decision to impound the vehicle in the first place and 

for its continued retention of the vehicle without a warrant. 

We held that the community caretaking exception justified 

the initial warrantless impoundment, but once the vehicle 

had been removed from the roadway, that exception no 
24 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

longer sufficed. The city therefore had to offer a “new 

justification” for holding onto the vehicle, which it simply 

failed to do. Id. at 1197.

I no longer view Brewster’s holding that the Fourth 

Amendment seizure continued throughout the 30-day 

impoundment period as correct. Under certain 

circumstances, the concept of a continuing seizure may 

fairly describe the government’s retention of property. But 

a seizure requires “some meaningful interference with an 

individual’s possessory interests in that property.” Soldal v. 

Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992). So if you don’t have 

a valid possessory interest in property, it can’t be seized from 

you for Fourth Amendment purposes. In my view, that is 

the effect of § 14602.6: It deprives the owner of a valid 

possessory interest in her vehicle by authorizing a temporary 

30-day civil forfeiture of that interest. A valid forfeiture of 

one’s possessory interest in property ends a Fourth 

Amendment seizure, just as a criminal conviction ends a 

Fourth Amendment seizure of the person. See Manuel v. 

City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 n.8 (2017). Once the 

forfeiture imposed by § 14602.6 is upheld, the government 

does not need to obtain a warrant authorizing the continued 

retention of the vehicle. The forfeiture determination itself 

grants such authorization.

The real question, which we did not address in Brewster, 

is whether the forfeiture authorized by § 14602.6 is 

constitutionally valid. 859 F.3d at 1196 n.2, 1197. I think it 

is. Deterring unlawful conduct is a permissible objective of 

forfeiture statutes. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 

452 (1996). Section 14602.6 is designed to deter those who 

are caught driving without a license from engaging in that 

conduct again, and to deter others who lack a valid license 

from driving in the first place. A state legislature could 
SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA 25

rationally conclude that you will be less likely to drive 

without a license if you know that, in addition to any other 

penalties that may be imposed, you can lose possession of 

your car for 30 days if you get caught.

Section 14602.6 appears to withstand the principal 

constitutional objections that might be interposed. There is 

a tight nexus between the property to be forfeited and the 

underlying wrongdoing involved (driving without a valid 

license), so we need not confront the outer limits of the 

government’s authority to impound property as a means of 

deterring misconduct unrelated to that property. The nature 

of the deprivation (dispossession for 30 days) is not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the underlying 

wrongdoing, so we don’t face the concerns that might be 

raised if the statute authorized permanent forfeiture of title 

to the vehicle. And the statute has built-in protections that 

allow “innocent owners” to reclaim their vehicles without 

having to suffer the 30-day impound. See Cal. Vehicle Code 

§ 14602.6(d), (f).

If § 14602.6 clears these constitutional hurdles, no work 

remains for the Fourth Amendment to do. So long as there 

is probable cause to believe the vehicle is subject to 

forfeiture, it may be impounded without a warrant, whether 

or not the community caretaking exception applies. See 

Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 561 (1999). Fourth 

Amendment concerns could arise if an owner were not 

afforded a prompt hearing at which to contest the validity of 

the temporary forfeiture, given the relatively brief 

impoundment period. See Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 

54 (2d Cir. 2002). But the statute addresses those concerns 

by requiring prompt notice to the owner and by providing 

the right to a hearing within two days of making the request. 

Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 14602.6(a)(2), (b), 22852(b), (c). 
26 SANDOVAL V. CITY OF SANTA ROSA

Because that time frame is sufficiently short, little would be 

accomplished by requiring the government to obtain a 

warrant pending the final forfeiture decision. The owner will 

know within a matter of days whether the vehicle is subject 

to forfeiture, and that determination will be made following 

an adversarial hearing at which she can contest the 

government’s evidentiary showing.

Section 14602.6 does suffer from one constitutional 

deficiency, which I alluded to at the outset. When the 

government seeks to obtain property through forfeiture, it 

must comply not only with the demands of the Fourth 

Amendment but also with those of the Due Process Clause. 

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 

43, 52 (1993). Section 14602.6 provides the right to a 

prompt hearing to contest the impoundment, but this hearing 

may be conducted by an officer or employee of the police 

department responsible for seizing the vehicle. Cal. Vehicle 

Code § 22852(c). Due process does not demand a fullblown jury trial in this context, but it surely entitles an owner 

to a hearing before a neutral decision-maker. See Goldberg 

v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). The plaintiff in Brewster

did not receive such a hearing, and neither did the plaintiffs 

in this case. That fact alone renders the impoundment of 

their vehicles unlawful.