UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

APP DYNAMIC EHF,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 14-1504 (JEB)

ERLING ORMAR VIGNISSON, 

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

While this case arises from an otherwise commonplace business relationship gone sour, 

the parties are not the typical ones to enter this Courthouse’s doors. On one side stands Plaintiff 

App Dynamic ehf, an Icelandic computer-startup company; on the other is Defendant Erling 

Ormar Vignisson, a former employee and an Icelandic citizen living in Sweden. Their falling 

out has precipitated this suit alleging, inter alia, breach of contract, an invalid U.S. copyright 

registration, and fraud on the U.S. Copyright Office. In moving to dismiss, Defendant raises

three different grounds for jettisoning the case: lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. The Court need look no farther than the first to 

grant the Motion.

I. Background 

According to the Complaint, which the Court must credit at this stage, App Dynamic was

founded by Pratik Kumar and his wife as an Icelandic computer-software-development company

that produces applications for both Apple and Microsoft operating systems. See Compl., ¶¶ 3, 9. 

In 2008, Kumar began to develop his first application, called Remote Jr. See id., ¶¶ 10-11. The 

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initial version, 1.3, was released in April 2009; Kumar continued to develop the application and 

released a second version, 2.0, two months later. Id., ¶¶ 12-13. 

In August of 2009, he hired Vignisson to handle tasks related to Remote Jr., such as 

marketing, updating website content, providing customer services, and creating updated graphics 

and user-interface elements. Id., ¶ 15. A third version, 2.2, was subsequently released during 

Vignisson’s employment on November 10, 2009. Id., ¶ 22. The two men “agreed that Kumar 

would exclusively own any work created by Defendant related to Remote Jr.TM in performance 

of his duties, along with any rights, such as copyright, to those works.” Id., ¶ 15. Defendant 

would receive 20% of the profits as compensation, and this agreement was finalized with a 

handshake. Id. Such memorialization, impressively, seems to be the rule in Iceland.

In April 2010, when Vignisson’s work performance did not meet Kumar’s standards, 

Defendant was fired. Id., ¶ 27. Kumar requested that Vignisson deliver the master graphic and 

icon files of the app in return for payment through the end of April, and the parties agreed to this 

with another good, old-fashioned handshake. Id. Defendant, however, did not turn over the 

master files and instead wrote Kumar an email claiming that he Vignisson was a copyright owner 

of Remote Jr. and demanding additional compensation. Id., ¶¶ 28-29. 

On June 16, 2011, using these master files, Vignisson registered U.S. Copyright 

Registration No. VA1-805-490 entitled “Remote Jr. – iPhone Application Design.” Id., ¶¶ 33-

35, 43. On the registration form, Defendant claimed that he was the copyright owner, did not 

limit his claim, listed the date of first publication as the date that version 2.2 was released, and 

certified that all statements were correct. Id., ¶¶ 36-38, 42. 

On April 26, 2012, Vignisson next sent Apple a cease-and-desist letter, demanding that it

stop the sales of Remote HD, a later version of the application that Kumar had developed. Id., ¶¶ 

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30-31, 44. He threatened further action against the company if it did not comply and attached his 

new U.S. copyright registration. Id., ¶¶ 44-45. In March 2014, Vignisson sued Plaintiff and 

Kumar in the District Court of Reykjaness, Iceland, for allegedly infringing Defendant’s new 

U.S. copyright over Remote Jr. Id., ¶ 48. The suit was dismissed on December 17, 2014. See

Opp., Exh. J (Verdict of the District of Reykjanes in case no. E330/2014) at 9.

Plaintiff has responded by filing this action, which alleges the following:

Count I: Breach of contract relating to the oral agreements wherein Defendant assigned 

copyright interests to Kumar. See Compl., ¶ 54. 

Count II: Declaratory judgment that Plaintiff is the copyright owner of the works claimed 

in U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA 1-805-490. Id., ¶ 62.

Count III: Declaratory judgment that such U.S. copyright registration is invalid. Id., ¶¶ 

65-66, 68.

Count IV: Declaratory judgment that Defendant committed fraud upon the U.S. 

Copyright Office when he knowingly falsified material information on his application, which he 

intended the office to rely upon in granting the copyright registration. Id., ¶ 74.

Vignisson has now filed a Motion to Dismiss. In a rather unorthodox practice, which the 

Court does not endorse, he filed three separate Memoranda supporting his Motion, one making

each of the following arguments: (1) the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); (2) it further lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant under 

Rule 12(b)(2); and (3) Count II of the Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted under Rule 12(b)(6). 

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II. Legal Standard

As the Court addresses only the question of personal jurisdiction, it will articulate just 

that standard. Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss a suit if the court lacks 

personal jurisdiction over him. Personal jurisdiction determines the court’s “authority over the 

parties . . . , so that the court’s decision will bind them.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 

U.S. 574, 577 (1999). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists. 

See FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In deciding 

whether the plaintiff has shown a factual basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the 

court resolves factual discrepancies in favor of the plaintiff. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological 

Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). When personal jurisdiction is challenged, “the 

district court has considerable procedural leeway in choosing a methodology for deciding the 

motion.” 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 

1351 (3d ed. 2004). The court may rest on the allegations in the pleadings, collect affidavits and 

other evidence, or even hold a hearing. See id.

III. Analysis

In analyzing the present Motion, the Court first sets forth some general principles 

regarding personal jurisdiction and then considers the government-contacts exception. After 

concluding that it has no jurisdiction under the facts alleged, the Court subsequently addresses 

whether jurisdictional discovery is appropriate and ends by examining the consequences of a 

finding of no jurisdiction here.

A. Personal Jurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction may take the form of general or specific jurisdiction. General 

jurisdiction exists where a non-resident defendant maintains sufficiently systematic and 

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continuous contacts with the forum state, regardless of whether those contacts gave rise to the 

claim in the particular suit. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 

408, 414-15 (1984). In this case, Plaintiff makes no allegation (in either the Complaint or its

Opposition) that Vignisson has had any “systematic and continuous contacts” with this forum. 

This Court, therefore, cannot exercise general jurisdiction over him.

This leaves the possibility of specific jurisdiction. “In contrast to general, all-purpose 

jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected 

with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 

S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, 

specific jurisdiction exists where a claim arises out of the non-resident defendant’s contacts with 

the forum. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8; see also United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 

828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “A plaintiff seeking to establish specific jurisdiction over a non-resident 

defendant must establish that specific jurisdiction comports with the forum’s long-arm statute 

and does not violate due process.” FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 1094-95 (internal citation omitted). 

It turns out, however, that the Court need not weigh the due-process implications here 

because resolution of the jurisdictional question hinges on the District’s long-arm statute. That 

statute, which has been given an “‘expansive interpretation’” in the District of Columbia, Helmer 

v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), enables a court to exercise

personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant where a claim arises from his transacting any 

business in the District. See D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1). Plaintiff argues that Vignisson 

“transact[ed] business” here by “intentionally and fraudulently register[ing] a U.S. Copyright . . . 

with the U.S. Copyright Office located in the District of Columbia.” Compl., ¶ 6. This, App 

Dynamic concludes, subjects him to jurisdiction here.

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B. Government-Contacts Exception

Defendant does not deny that his copyright registration constitutes a “contact” with the 

District of Columbia, but he nonetheless contends that an exception to the transacting-business 

prong of the District’s long-arm statute protects him. He cites the so-called “governmentcontacts principle,” which provides that entry into the District by non-residents for the sole

purpose of contacting federal governmental agencies cannot serve as a basis for personal 

jurisdiction. See Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Srvs. LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 13, 25 (D.D.C. 2014); 

Freiman v. Lazur, 925 F. Supp. 14, 24 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Envtl. Research Int’l, Inc. v. 

Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976)). This exception derives from the 

“unique character of the District as the seat of the national government,” and it recognizes that

there is a “correlative need for unfettered access to federal departments and agencies for the 

entire national citizenry.” Envtl. Research, 355 A.2d at 813. To rule otherwise “would pose a 

threat to free public participation in government” and “would threaten to convert the District of 

Columbia into a national judicial forum.” Id.

Plaintiff rejoins that the government-contacts exception does not apply here because 

“fraudulent petitions to the federal government are not protected by the government contacts 

exception.” Opp. at 16. Although such an “exception to the exception” does exist, it is 

considerably narrower than App Dynamic believes. In fact, in its most recent articulation by the 

D.C. Court of Appeals, the fraud exception is limited to those petitions that use “the government 

as an instrumentality of fraud, and thereby cause[] unwarranted government action against 

another . . . .” Companhia Brasileira Carbureto De Calcio v. Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 35 

A.3d 1127, 1134 (D.C. 2012) (Companhia II) (internal citations omitted). The background to 

this D.C.C.A. opinion may prove useful at this point.

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Companhia originated as a federal action brought here by Brazilian corporations against 

American corporations based outside of the District of Columbia. See Companhia Brasileira 

Carbureto De Calcio v. Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 640 F. 3d 369, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 

(Companhia I). The Brazilian plaintiffs alleged that the American defendants had submitted 

fraudulent petitions to the U.S. International Trade Commission, located here in Washington, 

which had led to the ITC’s imposing duties on the Brazilian plaintiffs’ products. Id. The district 

court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit for lack of personal jurisdiction under the governmentcontacts exception. Id. 

On appeal, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that the “scope of the government contacts 

exception is unsettled [ ] under the D.C. Court of Appeals’ precedent.” Id. at 371-72. The 

Circuit also noted that since the D.C.C.A. “is of course the controlling authority for interpretation 

of D.C. law, and that court promulgated the government contacts exception,” it was “appropriate 

to certify to the D.C.C.A.” the following question:

Under District of Columbia law, does a petition sent to a federal 

government agency in the District provide a basis for establishing 

personal jurisdiction over the petitioner when the plaintiff has 

alleged that the petition fraudulently induced unwarranted 

government action against the plaintiff?

Id. at 371. 

The D.C.C.A. answered the certified question in the affirmative. The exception it set 

forth is a narrow one: a non-resident “who uses the government as an instrumentality of fraud,

and thereby causes unwarranted government action against another, forfeits the protection of the 

government contacts exception.” Companhia II, 35 A.3d at 1134 (emphasis added). Put another 

way, those who enter the District “to fraudulently induce unwarranted government action against 

others, and succeed in doing so,” will not “be able to avoid defending their actions in this 

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jurisdiction by cloaking themselves in the government contacts doctrine.” Id. at 1133. It is 

noteworthy, for our purposes, that the D.C.C.A. emphasized the provoking of government action 

against another; it did not premise jurisdiction on the mere filing of a fraudulent petition. 

Reading the fraud exception in this circumscribed manner is in keeping with that court’s 

reasoning. In laying the foundation of the doctrine, it noted the “legitimate concern that 

recognizing a fraud exception to the government contacts principle could expose the District to 

an ‘unrelenting wave’ of litigation . . . largely negat[ing] the government contacts exception.” 

Id. at 1134 (citing Nichols, 783 F. Supp. at 243, and Companhia I, 640 F.3d at 373). The court

thus emphasized that “[c]ases in which this fraud exception applies should be rare indeed . . . . It 

will not be sufficient to allege that the petitioner presented an unbalanced view of the issue or 

even that he made a false statement.” Id. In addition, “[u]nsupported allegations that a 

defendant has fraudulently induced unwarranted government action against the plaintiff will not 

be sufficient to invoke the fraud exception.” Id. at 1134-35 (citing Nichols, 783 F. Supp. at 243-

44). 

Courts in this district have followed this mandate, holding that the contours of this “very 

narrow fraud exception” are “crystal clear” in requiring both using the government as an 

instrumentality of fraud and thereby causing “unwarranted government action against another.” 

Morgan v. Richmond Sch. of Health and Tech., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D.D.C. 2012) 

(holding fraud exception to government-contacts doctrine inapplicable where no allegations that 

government agency committed any actions against plaintiff); see also Shaheen v. Smith, 994 F.

Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding narrow fraud exception inapplicable because 

government agency – the SEC – did not take any action against plaintiff as result of defendants’ 

actions). 

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App Dynamic nonetheless maintains that this case fits within the fraud exception because 

Vignisson made multiple misrepresentations to the “Copyright Office with the goal of ensuring

that the Copyright Office issued a copyright registration to Defendant in a form that Defendant

could use against Plaintiff.” Opp. at 18. After the Office registered Vignisson’s copyright 

application, moreover, he “began to affirmatively wield the copyright in attempts to harm 

Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s business relationships.” Id. at 19.

This is not enough. The fraud exception is limited to petitions to a federal government 

agency that fraudulently induce “unwarranted government action against the plaintiff.” 

Companhia II, 35 A.3d at 1130, 1134-35 (emphasis added); see also Companhia I, 640 F.3d at 

371. The fatal flaw here – despite Defendant’s allegedly unbecoming conduct – is that there is 

nothing in the record that suggests that the U.S. Copyright Office took any unwarranted action 

against Plaintiff. Had the Office, for example, imposed a duty upon it for the Remote HD app or 

forced Apple to stop sales of the app, this might be a different situation. In the instant case,

however, the only actions taken against Plaintiff thus far have been by Defendant; the Copyright 

Office has done no more than register the copyright. App Dynamic’s allegation of fraud, 

therefore, does not fall within the exception announced in Companhia, and the governmentcontacts doctrine applies to bar personal jurisdiction. 

C. Jurisdictional Discovery

Plaintiff alternatively argues that if the Court is not inclined to find personal jurisdiction, 

it should nonetheless permit jurisdictional discovery. See Opp. at 20-21. App Dynamic

generally cites EV-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1996), to argue that

“[a] plaintiff faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is entitled to 

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reasonable discovery, lest the defendant defeat the jurisdiction of a federal court by withholding 

information on its contacts with the forum.” Id. at 676. 

“It is well established that the ‘district court has broad discretion in its resolution of 

[jurisdictional] discovery problems.’” FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Naartex, 722 

F.2d at 788). The standard for permitting jurisdictional discovery is “quite liberal.” Diamond 

Chem. Co. v. Atofina Chems., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2003). This Circuit has held 

that “if a party demonstrates that it can supplement its jurisdictional allegations through 

discovery, then jurisdictional discovery is justified.” GTE New Media Srvs. Inc. v. BellSouth 

Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 

“Although discovery should be granted freely, it can be denied when the plaintiff has 

failed to present facts that could establish jurisdiction.” Acker v. Royal Merchant Bank & 

Finance Co., No. 98-392, 1999 WL 1273476, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 1999) (citing Caribbean 

Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). “[I]n 

order to get jurisdictional discovery a plaintiff must have at least a good faith belief that such 

discovery will enable it to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” 

Caribbean Broad, 148 F.3d at 1090. “[M]ere conjecture or speculation” that discovery could 

lead to personal jurisdiction is insufficient for a court to permit it. See FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 

1094. “Therefore, a plaintiff must include some facts about what additional discovery could 

produce.” Shaheen, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 89. “Where there is no showing of how jurisdictional 

discovery would help plaintiff discover anything new, ‘it [is] inappropriate to subject 

[defendants] to the burden and expense of discovery.’” Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, 290 F. 

Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing COMSAT Corp. v. Finshipyards S.A.M., 900 F. Supp.

515, 524 n.4 (D.D.C. 1995)).

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In this case, App Dynamic contends it is entitled to discovery because “Defendant has 

traveled many times to the U.S.” Opp. at 20-21. Kumar admits, however, that he “do[es] not 

know specifically where in the U.S. [Defendant] has been, or what he has done while there.” 

Opp., Exh. A (Declaration of Pratik Kumar), ¶ 4. Vignisson responds that this hardly establishes

a good-faith belief that, as a resident of Sweden, he “stealthily has the type of continuous and 

systematic” presence in the District necessary for general jurisdiction. See Reply at 10-11 (citing

Alkanani, 976 F. Supp. at 21. Defendant further argues that App Dynamic has no basis to 

believe that he had other contacts with the District regarding this intellectual property – beyond 

the aforementioned communications with the Copyright Office – such that “Plaintiff’s claims can 

be said to arise out of such contacts as required for specific jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Additionally, Defendant submitted a second declaration acknowledging studies in Florida and 

travel to the U.S. on vacation and for conferences, but denying travel to the District of Columbia 

and visits regarding Remote Jr. See Reply, Exh. A (Second Declaration of Erling Vignisson), ¶¶

6-8. 

Vignisson’s position carries the day since App Dynamic has not demonstrated how 

discovery would help establish jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not alleged a single potential contact or 

pointed to any fact that, if discovered, would “indicate that a court in the District of Columbia 

might . . . assert jurisdiction” over Vignisson. Caribbean Broad, 148 F.3d at 1089. Its request to 

seek “jurisdictional discovery of other, unalleged contacts between [Defendant] and the District 

of Columbia” is “based on mere conjecture or speculation.” NBC-USA Housing, Inc., TwentySix v. Donovan, 741 F. Supp. 2d 55, 61 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing FC Inv. Grp., 529 F.3d at 1093). 

Requesting jurisdictional discovery because Plaintiff believes Defendant has traveled to this 

country “many times” does not constitute the required “detailed showing of what discovery it 

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wishes to conduct or what result it thinks such discovery would produce.” United States v. 

Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 116, 130 n.16 (D.D.C. 2000). Travel “many times” to this 

country includes possible travel to not only the District of Columbia, but also to 50 states and 

additional territories, spanning almost 4 million square miles. 

Plaintiff rejoins by citing GTE New Media, where the court permitted jurisdictional 

discovery even though the record before the court was “plainly inadequate,” and there was 

“absolutely no merit to [the plaintiff’s] bold claim” of jurisdiction. 199 F.3d at 1351-52. 

Such reliance is misplaced. Although the court permitted discovery despite an “inadequate”

record, the plaintiffs there at least cited what specific information and facts they would target to 

establish jurisdiction. Id. at 1349-51. Discovery was also permitted because there existed 

confusion regarding the actions of the parent company versus those of its subsidiaries, and 

jurisdictional discovery could help analyze which company made what contacts and where. Id.

at 1352.

Plaintiff here, in contrast, offers no specifics of any facts that could establish jurisdiction. 

Cf., e.g., Diamond Chem., 268 F. Supp. 2d at 15-16 (allowing discovery because plaintiffs

pointed to specific activity of companies that would show managerial control, flow of funds, and 

knowledge of and participation in conspiracy); Davis v. Grant Park Nursing Home, LP, 639 F.

Supp. 2d 60, 74-75 (D.D.C. 2009) (permitting jurisdictional discovery of specific documents that 

would reveal alleged exertion of control between defendant corporations); In re Fort Totten 

Metrorail Cases, 756 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D.D.C. 2010) (permitting jurisdictional discovery of

additional information on sales data and defendant’s knowledge about use of its products). 

Although Plaintiff asserts that jurisdictional discovery should be “freely given,” its 

request is insufficient and constitutes nothing more than a “speculative fishing expedition.” 

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Shaheen, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 89. As this Circuit recently held, “To nonetheless allow Plaintiff to 

conduct jurisdictional discovery would require this Court to construe this Circuit’s admittedly 

liberal jurisdictional discovery standard in such a way as to render it meaningless.” NBC-USA, 

741 F. Supp. 2d at 61. This Court thus declines the request.

D. Consequences

Although App Dynamic never raised the issue, the Court last addresses the consequences 

of its ruling. Assuming arguendo that no personal jurisdiction exists over Vignisson anywhere 

in the United States, does that mean that no U.S. court could ever review the validity of a U.S. 

Copyright Office registration procured by a fraudulent filing? As it turns out, this is the wrong 

question. The authority to invalidate or cancel Defendant’s copyright registration lies with the 

Copyright Office itself. 

The Register of Copyrights is vested with the exclusive and comprehensive authority to 

set regulations consistent with copyright statutes. See 17 U.S.C. § 701(a) (“All administrative 

functions and duties under this title, except as otherwise specified, are the responsibility of the 

Register of Copyrights . . . .”); 17 U.S.C. § 702 (“The Register of Copyrights is authorized to 

establish regulations not inconsistent with law for the administration of the functions and duties 

made the responsibility of the Register under this title.”). Title 37 C.F.R. § 201, et seq. defines

the procedures to cancel a copyright, and nowhere in those regulations is judicial cancellation 

discussed. It appears, instead, that cancellations are limited to the Copyright Office alone. See

37 C.F.R. § 201.7(a) (“Cancellation is an action taken by the Copyright Office whereby [] the 

registration is eliminated on the ground that the registration is invalid under the applicable law 

and regulations . . . .”). 

Caselaw on this issue is scarce, but the Ninth Circuit has also held: 

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[T]here is an administrative process for cancellation, albeit illdefined, in the Copyright Office. Referral . . . is therefore 

appropriate for the Register of Copyrights to determine to what 

extent administrative cancellation remedies are available to third 

parties who seek registration cancellation. In sum, this case 

requires the resolution of an issue within the jurisdiction of an 

administrative body exercising statutory and comprehensive 

regulatory authority over a national activity that requires 

expertise and uniformity in administration. 

Syntek Seminconductor Co., Ltd. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Additionally, the Third Circuit recently held that the district court had erred in ordering a 

cancellation of a copyright registration “because there is no statutory indication whatsoever that 

courts have such authority,” and, indeed, “there is substantial indication that courts do not have 

such authority.” Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d 55, 75 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit,

however, did emphasize that “[t]his does not mean that courts have no place in the cancellation 

process and that aggrieved parties are without recourse to the courts”; although “courts may not 

directly cancel copyright registrations, courts have an oversight role in the administrative 

functions of the Copyright Office.” Id. at 76. “Thus, aggrieved parties may challenge an 

unfavorable decision by the Copyright Office in a cancellation matter by challenging its decision 

in court under the APA.” Id.

The Third Circuit further noted that “[i]t goes without saying that courts are authorized to 

police copyright registrations through authorship and infringement claims” because “a 

registration does not secure or create a copyright, as a right, or guarantee success on the merits of 

a claim . . . .” Id., at 76-77. Additionally, the court made clear, it was

in no way holding that courts are incapable of invaliding underlying 

copyrights. While the two concepts are undoubtedly related, the 

distinction matters. Holding that federal courts have the authority 

to cancel registrations would essentially be declaring that the 

judicial branch has the authority to order a legislative branch agency 

that is not a party to the litigation to take an affirmative action . . . . 

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Courts have no authority to cancel copyright registrations because 

that authority resides exclusively with the Copyright Office.

Id. at 77. 

Plaintiff may thus pursue its dispute regarding registration through the Copyright Office. 

And, of course, an Icelandic court would presumably have the authority to determine the validity 

of App Dynamic’s contract and copyright claims. Plaintiff, therefore, may seek appropriate

relief in the proper fora should it so desire.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction and denies Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery. 

/s/ James E. Boasberg

 JAMES E. BOASBERG

 United States District Judge

Date: April 10, 2015

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