J-A32009-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIAM R. ALEXANDER

Appellant No. 579 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 4, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001713-2012

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 07, 2015

Appellant, William R. Alexander, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on January 4, 2013, by the Honorable Jeffrey P. Minehart, 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the pertinent facts as follows.

On the evening of August 26[], 2011[,] at approximately 

10:00 p.m., the victim approached [Alexander] on East Collum 

Street in the Germantown area of Philadelphia. The victim, 

having been waiting for [Alexander] to come down the street, 

put his arms out in front of [Alexander] so as to incite a 

confrontation. [Alexander] then struck the victim multiple times 

in the face with a closed fist, rendering the victim unconscious. 

[Alexander] then fled the scene. Reporting to a radio call, police 

arrived at the scene and found the victim lying in the road still 

unconscious. The victim was transported to Albert Einstein 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Medical Center, and medical staff pronounced him dead at 10:49 

p.m. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/21/14 at 2 (unnumbered). 

Alexander was subsequently charged with third-degree murder1and 

involuntary manslaughter.2 Following a non-jury trial, on November 8, 

2011, the trial court convicted Alexander of third-degree murder. On 

January 4, 2013, the court sentenced Alexander to 16 to 32 years’ 

incarceration. Alexander filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial 

court denied on January 17, 2013. This timely appeal followed. 

Preliminarily, we are constrained to note that Alexander has waived his 

third issue on appeal, in which he challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. “It is well settled that [w]hen a challenge to the discretionary 

aspect of a sentence is raised, an appellant must provide a separate 

statement specifying where the sentence falls in the sentencing guidelines, 

what provision of the sentencing code has been violated, what fundamental 

norm the sentence violates, and the manner in which it violates the norm. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).” Commonwealth v. Sarapa, 13 A.3d 961, 962 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (internal quotes and citation omitted). Even if properly 

preserved in a post-sentence motion, “such a claim is waived if an appellant 

does not include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief and the opposing 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a). 
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party objects to the statement's absence.” Commonwealth v. Foster, 960 

A.2d 160, 163 (Pa. Super. 2008), aff’d, 17 A.3d 332 (Pa. 2011). 

Here, Alexander has failed to provide a Rule 2119(f) statement in his 

brief, and the Commonwealth has objected to this omission. See 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 16. Accordingly, we are constrained to find 

Alexander’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence is waived. 

We have reviewed Alexander’s remaining issues raised on appeal, 

along with the briefs of the parties and the certified record. Having 

determined that the Honorable Jeffrey P. Minehart’s January 21, 2014 

opinion ably and comprehensively disposes of Alexander’s issues raised on 

appeal, with appropriate reference to the record and without legal error, we 

will affirm on the basis of that opinion.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Olson joins the memorandum.

Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/7/2015
verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

On January 11th, 2013, defendant filed a timely post-sentence motion alleging that the 

sentenced defendant to 16 to 32 years' incarceration with credit for time served. 

the victim, David Woody, during which defendant killed Mr, Woody. Defendant waived his 

right to a trial by jury, and on November 81h, 2011, this Court found defendant guilty of thirddegree murder, Sentencing was deferred until January 4t\ 2013, on which date this Court 

Defendant, William Alexander, was charged with third-degree murder -and involuntary 

manslaughter following an altercation that occurred on August 26th, 2011 between himself and 

PROCEDURAL H.ISTORY 

OPINION 

WILLIAM ALEXANDER 

vs. NO. CP-5 J-CR-0.001713-2012 

COPRT OF COMMON PLEAS 

. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

111111111 Hiil 111111111 

7106966061 

CP-51-CR-0001713-2012 C~m. v. Alexander, 'Miiiam R. 

Op1rnon 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

.'\- 

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Court stated the following: 

evidence be delineated. In Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000), our Supreme 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and a claim that challenges the; weight of the 

Before addressing defendant's claims it is necessary that the distinctions between a claim 

larger in stature. 

the verdict was inappropriate under the facts because the victim was much younger than him and 

the victim accosted him the third time; and, 4.) was unarmed. In addition; defendant states that 

he: 1.) was not the aggressor; 2.) attempted to flee each time; 3.) only hit the victim twice after 

the weight of the evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict because 

In his first claim, defendant argues that his third-degree murder conviction was against 

DISCUSSION 

dead at 10:49 p.m, 

victim was transported to Albert Einstein Medical Center, and medical. staffpronounced him 

call, police arrived at the scene and found the victim lying in the road still unconscious. The 

fists, rendering the victim unconscious. Defendant then fled the scene. Responding to a radio 

to incite a confrontation; Defendant then struck the victim multiple times· in the face with closed 

been waiting for defendant to come down the street; put his arms out in front of defendant so as 

On the evening of August 261\ 2011 atapproximately 10:00 p.rn., the victim approached 

defendant on East Collum Street in the Germantown area of Philadelphia. The victim, having 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

the verdict. It also asked that the sentence be stayed or reduced. On January 17, 2013, this Court 

denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal and a 

requested Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

I. 

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A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence · is a 

question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the 

verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime 

charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 533 Pa. 412, 625 

A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1993). Where the evidence offered to support the 

verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to 

human experience and the laws of nature,· then the evidence is 

insufficient as a matter of law. Commonwealth v. Santana, 460. Pa. 

482, 333 A.2d 876 (Pa. 1975). When reviewing a sufficiency claim 

the court is required to view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit 

of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 

Commonwea]th v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630 (Pa. 

1991). 

A motion for new tria1 on the grounds that the verdict is 

contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is 

sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 336 Pa. Super. 120, 485 A.2d 459 (Pa. Super. 1984). 

Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in 

the light most favorab]e to the verdict winner. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 

3 8 n. 11. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence · is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 648 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1994). 

A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the 

testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have 

arrived at a different conclusion. Thompson, supra. A trial judge 

must do more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses . and 

allege that he would not have assented to the verdict if he were a 

juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, 

the role of the trial judge is to determine that "notwithstanding all 

the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore 

In order .to address this c1aim we find it :necessary to delineate 

the distinctions between a claim challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence and a claim that challenges the weight of the evidence. 

The distinction· between these two challenges is critical. HN5A 

claim challenging the sufficiency of the .evidence, if granted, 

would preclude retrial under the double jeopardy provisions of the 

· Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, 

Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,' Tibbs v. Florida,457 

U.S. 31, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652, 102 S. Ct .. 2211 (1982); Commonwealth 

v. Vogel, 501 Pa. 314, .461 A.2d 604 (Pa.· I 983), whereas claim 

challenging the weight of the evidence if granted would permit a 

second trial. Id. · · 

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asserting that the evidence was insufficient because he acted in self-defense, it is clear that no 

To the extent that defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence appears to be 

23 (Pa. Super. 2007)). Consequently, it is suggested that this claim be deemed waived. 

959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Flores, 921 A.2d 517, 522- 

.. 

appeal, a defendant's 1925(b) statement must "specify the element or elements upon which the 

. 

I 

evidence was insufficient" in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Commonwealth v. Williams, 

Superior Court has repeatedly stated that, when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on 

Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. This is fatal to his claim because the 

the evidence, defendant has failed to state which element of the clime of third-degree murder the 

Defendant's sufficiency claim is also Jacking in merit. In challenging the sufficiency of 

weight claim. 

as to shock one's sense of justice, and therefore no relief should be granted on defendant's 

cause ofdeath was homicide. Given these facts, the verdict! is not so contrary to the evidence so 

body of the victim indicating that the victim died from blunt trauma to the head arid that the 

eyewitness reported that defendant's first punch knocked: the victim off of his feet and that 

defendant continued to strike the victim as the victim· lay on the ground almost motionless. 

Further, this Court heard evidence from the medical examiner who. conducted the autopsy on the 

f 

eyewitness who observed defendant striking the victim multiple times including a blow to the 

head at a time when the victim was incapable of fighting back· or· defending himself. The 

. weight of the evidence. At trial, this Court, sitting as fact-finder, heard direct testimony from an 

; 

· With these standards in mind, the Court will first !address· defendant's· challenge to the 

Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751-752 (footnote omitted). 

them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny 

justice." Id. · 

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claim no relief would be due thereon. 

could have retreated in complete safety. Thus, even had defendant preserved his self-defense 

continuing" the fight with the victim and also that once he knocked the victim to the ground he 

record. The record establishes that defendant was not free from fault in "provoking or 

crime of third-degree murder because the killing was committed in self-defense is belied by the 

' Any assertion that the evidence was insufficient to. prove that defendant committed the 

Chine, 40 A.2d at 1243. 

As a general rule, an individual is justified in using force 

upon another person "when the actor believes that such force· is 

immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself 

against the use of unlawful ·force by such other person on the 

present occasion." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a (emphasis added) . 

. However, the Commonwealth may disprove a claim that a 

defendant's use of deadly force was justifiable by establishing that: 

1) the defender did not reasonably believe deadly force was 

necessary to protect himself from imminent danger of death or 

great bodily harm, 2) the defender provokedthe incident, or 3) the 

defender violated a duty to retreat with safety or avoid the danger. 

defense of self-defense, stating: 

In Commonwealth v. Chine, 40 A.3d 1239 (Pa. Super. '2012), the Superior Court discussed the 

Commonwealth v. MacArthlll', 629 A.2d 166, 168 (Pa. Super l 993). 

in which the fists are used, the ferocity and duration of .the attack, and provocation, if any." 

' . 

the use of fists depending on particular circumstances including "the assailant's size, the manner 

consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty." Id at 597-98. Malice may be inferred from 

merely ill-will but, rather, wickedness of disposition; hardness of heart, recklessness of 

of culpability, namely malice. See Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592. "Malice is not 

See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). Third degree murder must be committed with the appropriate level 

commits a murder which is neither intentional nor committed during the perpetration of a felony. 

relief need be granted on such a claim. The crime of third degree murder occurs when one 

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This was a case of self defense. The verdict should. not have 

gone higher than involuntary manslaughter. The defendant .threw two 

quick punches, and he did not pounce on Mr. Woody when he was down. 

The defendant did not intend to kill Mr. Woody, only to disable him 

enough to get away from him. When the defendant left the scene, he did 

not know Mr. Woody was dead. From the pathology reports, we know 

that Mr. Woody was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. 

Defendant's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, Issue 2. 

The second claim set forth in defendant's 1925(b) statement alleges: 

should be denied because it lacks merit. 

insufficient to prove malice, no relief would be due thereon. Accordingly, defendant's first issue 

should be rejected. Clearly, given these facts, even had defendant alleged that the evidence was 

defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to prove the requisite degree of recklessness 

Bridges, 381 A.2d at 540. The holding of Bridges clearly applies here and, accordingly, 

conviction. The Supreme Court stated that "[tjhe requisite malice can be inferred from such 

'reckless' conduct. A fact-finder could infer malice from the circumstances of the beating .... " 

that the appellant participated in the beating, standing alone, was sufficient to sustain the murder 

the victim who was then stabbed by one of the assailants .. The Supreme Court held that the fact 

appellant Bridges joined with others in an attack involving the throwing of punches and kicks at 

Supreme Court sustained a conviction for third-degree murder where the facts show that 

serious bodily injury to the victim. In.Commonwealth v. Bridges, 381 A.2d 125 (Pa. 1977), our 

brain swelling. Such acts manifest a conscious disregard of the fact they likely would cause 

The blows inflicted by defendant to the victim's head were so severe that they resulted in fatal 

actions manifested recklessness and recklessness of consequences sufficient to establish malice. 

Commonwealth failed to prove that he acted with malice, by jumping on the victim after the 

victim fell to the ground and then delivering numerous· blows and kicks to him, defendant's 

In addition, to the extent that defendant's sufficiency claim rests on an assertion that the 

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.manslaughter also does not entitle him to relief A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter 

Defendant's contention that the verdict should not have risen higher than involuntary 

safety. Thus, the defense of imperfect self-defense was not available to him. 

Instantly, the evidence shows that defendant could have retreated in complete 

Tilley, 595 A.2d at 582 (Pa. 1991 ). 

This self-defense claim is imperfect in· only one respect -- an 

unreasonable rather than a reasonable belief that deadly force 

-was required to save the actor's life. All other principles of 

justification under 18 Pa. C.S. § 505 must [still be met in order 

to establish] unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter. 

A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual 

commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he 

believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed;. would justify the killing under 'Chapter j of this title. (relating 

to general principles of justification), but his belief is 

unreasonable. 

18 Pa. C.S. § 2503(b ) -. In explaining what elements are necessary 

to establish unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter, which is 

sometimes referred to as "imperfect self-defense," we have stated; 

Under 18 Pa. C. S. § 2503(b): 

stated: 

defense no relief is due on such a claim as well. In Commonwe~lth v. Bracey, the Supreme Court 

To the extent that defendant may be claiming that tliis claim involves imperfect selfshould be denied for lack of merit. 

disproving this defense. Therefore, for the reasons previously discussed, the self-defense claim 

claim, as noted in the discussion of the previous issue, the Commonwealth met its burden of 

not have risen higherthan involuntary manslaughter. With respect to defendant's self-defense 

In this claim, defendant is raising two separate issues. The first alleges, without 

explication, that the case was one involving self defense. He then argues that the verdict should 

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(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice 9f appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly.preserved at sentencing 

or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.; (3) 

whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa:R.A.P. 211'9(f); and (4) 

considered on its merits, a court must first determine: 

To decide whether a defendant's appeal of the discretionary aspect of his sentencing is to be 

. . . 

record to indicate manifest unreasonableness, partiality, bias, or ill-will in the judgment. Id . 

. 

892 A.2d 843, 847-48 (Pa. Super. 2006). A sentence will only be overturned on appeal where a manifest 

abuse of discretion is found. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 525. A finding of an abuse of discretion requires the 

defendant [and], of course, the court must consider the sentencing guidelines." Commonwealth v. Pullin, 

public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the 

weapon. Sentencing is a discretionary issue solely to be decided by the sentencing judge. 

Commonwealth v .. Pol!.fil:g, 832 A.2d 517, 525 (Pa.Super.2003). "When imposing a sentence, the 

sentencing court must consider the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 (b), that is, the protection of the 

:f 

Defendant's final claim on appeal is that the sentence imposed was excessive and harsh because 

the victim was the aggressor, defendant attempted to avoid an'. altercation, and defendant .did not use a 

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, it is suggested that no relief be granted with respect 

to this claim. 

intoxicated tends to . demonstrate that defendant could have retreated in complete safety. 

I 

substantial risk that his actions could cause his death. In addition, the fact that the victim was 

. .. . ' 

degree murder because in attempting to disable the victim, defendant disregarded the very 

clearly were intentional, As he notes in the body of this claim, he struck the victim· "only to 

disable him enough to get away from him.". This was st~fficient to sustain the crime of thirdThe crime of involuntary manslaughter was not at Issue here because defendant's actions 

... he.causes the death of another person." 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a). 

when, "as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in: a reckless or grossly negligent manner 

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1 On January 111\ 2013, defendant filed a post-sentence motion to stay or reduce the sentence. 

2 Defendant had a prior record score of 5 and an offense gravity score of 14 and the sentencing guidelines suggested 

a sentencing range of 192-240 months, plus/minus 12 months. 

minimum sentence recommended by the guidelines cannot be considered an abuse of discretion. 

sentence when he committed the instant offense. In light of these facts, sentencing defendant to the 

previously sentenced to nine-and-a-half years in a federal prison and was on supervised release from that 

multiple times. Defendant had 39 previous arrests and l3 convictions on his record. Defendant was 

Defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of killing the victim by punching him 

not alone raise a substantial question. 

within the recommended limits of the sentencing guidelines, the sentence will not be found excessive. 

Commonwealth ~. Co1:]n, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 20ll). Finally, defendant has not alleged 

anything more than that the sentence was unduly harsh because of certain mitigating factors, which does 

·, 

information). In addition, when a sentencing court reviews a pre-sentence report and imposes a sentence 

t 

where sentencing court had benefit of PSI, law assumes court was aware of and weighed relevant 

sentencing guidelines'. See Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362 (Pa.Super. 2005) (stating 

Court reviewed a pre-sentence report prior to imposing the minimum sentence recommended by the 

question. See Comm011wealth v. Cleveland, A.2d 1046 (Pa. Super. 1997). 

Here, defendant should be denied relief because he faHed to raise a substantial question. This 

sentencing court did not give enough weight to mitigating factors alone does not raise a substantial 

sentencing process. Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.2d 365·, 371 (Pa. Super. 2012). A claim that the 

I 

. sentence imposed violates either a provision of the Sentencing Code or a fundamental norm of the 

· In order to fulfill requirement ( 4) and show a substantial question, defendant must show that the 

. · Here, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and the issue was properly preserved in a motion 

to reconsider and modify the sentence'. 

whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is 

not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Commonwealth v. Mo..JJa, 992 A.2d 162, 169 (Pa.Super.2010) . 

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DATE:~ 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed. 

' ' 

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