J-S21019-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JUAN SMITH

Appellant No. 1684 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 30, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0600141-1995

BEFORE: BOWES, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED APRIL 08, 2015

Appellant Juan Smith appeals pro se from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his fourth 

petition seeking relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 

We affirm. 

The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this appeal as follows:

[Appellant] entered a guilty plea to first degree murder, 

robbery, and burglary before [the Honorable] Jane Cutler 

Greenspan on October 25, 1995. On the same day, 

[Appellant] was sentenced by Judge Greenspan to serve a 

life sentence and to consecutive sentences of incarceration 

on the other offenses, which in the aggregate totaled 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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fifteen to thirty years. [Appellant] did not file a direct 

appeal.

[Appellant] filed his first [PCRA] petition on January 10, 

1997. The petition was dismissed on August 21, 1997, 

after counsel filed a Finley/Turner1 no-merit letter. 

[Appellant’s] appeal to the Superior Court was withdrawn 

on December 17, 1997. 

1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 54 A.2d 927 (Pa.1983); 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 

(Pa.Super.1988).

[Appellant] filed his second [PCRA] petition on April 19, 

2004. After counsel was appointed, the petition was 

dismissed on March 16, 2005. The Superior Court affirmed 

the dismissal on March 28, 2006, and the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court denied allocatur on August 29, 2006.

[Appellant] filed his third petition on December 26, 2006. 

It was dismissed on June 16, 2008. The Superior Court 

affirmed the dismissal on August 11, 2009, and the 

Supreme Court denied allocatur on February 12, 2010.

[Appellant] filed [his fourth PCRA] petition that is the 

subject of the instant appeal on May 18, 2012. After 

conducting an extensive and exhaustive review of the 

record and applicable case law, this court determined that 

it did not have jurisdiction to consider [Appellant’s] PCRA 

petition because [Appellant’s] petition for [PCRA] relief was 

untimely filed. 

PCRA Court Opinion, filed September 3, 2014, pp. 1-2.

On January 28, 2014, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice, to 

which Appellant responded on February 19, 2014. On April 30, 2014, the 

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition for relief. On May 19, 2014, 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The court did not order Appellant 

to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal, and he did not file one. 
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Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

WHETHER THE PCRA COURT ERRED DISMISSING 

APPELLANT’S POST-CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION AS 

UNTIMELY IN LIGHT OF THE EXCEPTION THAT WAS 

INVOKED PURSUANT TO 42 PA.C.S. 9545(B)(1)(III)[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues he has invoked the 

constitutional right exception to the PCRA time bar. Specifically, he 

contends that the United States Supreme Court decision in Martinez v. 

Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), recognized the constitutional 

right of the effective assistance of counsel in a collateral proceeding. 

Appellant claims his PCRA counsel was ineffective by failing to properly raise 

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Further, Appellant suggests Martinez should 

apply retroactively because of this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 

Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270 (Pa.Super.2012). Appellant is incorrect. 

The timeliness of a PCRA petition implicates the jurisdiction of both 

this Court and the PCRA court. Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 

52 (Pa.Super.2011), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa.2012). “Pennsylvania 

law makes clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA 

petition.” Id. To “accord finality to the collateral review process[,]” the 

PCRA “confers no authority upon [appellate courts] to fashion ad hoc

equitable exceptions to the PCRA timebar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 
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23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa.2011). With respect to jurisdiction under the PCRA, 

this Court has further explained: 

The most recent amendments to the PCRA...provide a 

PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, 

shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying 

judgment becomes final. A judgment is deemed final at 

the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of 

time for seeking the review. 

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super.2010) 

(citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1210 (Pa.2011); 

see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545. This Court may review a PCRA petition filed 

more than one year after the judgment of sentence becomes final only if the 

claim falls within one of the following three statutory exceptions, which the 

petitioner must plead and prove:

(i) the failure to raise the claim was the result of 

interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution 

or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 

provided in this section and has been held by that court 

to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, if a petition pleads one of these 

exceptions, the petition will not be considered unless it is “filed within 60 
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days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(2).

Additionally, a heightened standard applies to a second or subsequent 

PCRA petition to avoid “serial requests for post-conviction relief.” 

Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1043 (Pa.2011). A second or 

subsequent PCRA petition “will not be entertained unless a strong prima 

facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may 

have occurred.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1251 

(Pa.2006). Further, in a second or subsequent post-conviction proceeding, 

“all issues are waived except those which implicate a defendant’s innocence 

or which raise the possibility that the proceedings resulting in conviction 

were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice which no civilized society can 

tolerate occurred.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 660 A.2d 614, 618 

(Pa.Super.1995).

Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on or about 

November 27, 1995, when the time period for filing a direct appeal to this 

Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). As the instant PCRA petition 

was not filed until May 18, 2012, it is patently untimely unless Appellant has 

pleaded and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA time bar. 

Appellant purports to invoke the 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii)

constitutional right exception. To qualify for this exception, a petitioner 

must plead and prove that he is entitled to the benefit of a new 
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constitutional right recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the provided time period, and that 

the right has been held by that court to apply retroactively. In Martinez, 

the Supreme Court of the United States held:

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral 

proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal 

habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective 

assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral 

proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that 

proceeding was ineffective.

Martinez, supra. at 1320. The Court explained:

The holding here ought not to put a significant strain on 

state resources. When faced with the question whether 

there is cause for an apparent default, a State may answer 

that the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is 

insubstantial, i.e., it does not have any merit or that it is 

wholly without factual support, or that the attorney in the 

initial-review collateral proceeding did not perform below 

constitutional standards.

This is but one of the differences between a constitutional 

ruling and the equitable ruling of this case. A 

constitutional ruling would provide defendants a 

freestanding constitutional claim to raise; it would require 

the appointment of counsel in initial-review collateral 

proceedings; it would impose the same system of 

appointing counsel in every State; and it would require a 

reversal in all state collateral cases on direct review from 

state courts if the States’ system of appointing counsel did 

not conform to the constitutional rule. An equitable ruling, 

by contrast, permits States a variety of systems for 

appointing counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings. 

And it permits a State to elect between appointing counsel 

in initial-review collateral proceedings or not asserting a 

procedural default and raising a defense on the merits in 

federal habeas proceedings. In addition, state collateral 
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cases on direct review from state courts are unaffected by 

the ruling in this case.

Id. at 1319-20. 

Appellant incorrectly relies on this Court’s decision in Lofton for the 

proposition that Martinez has been held to apply retroactively. The Lofton 

Court stated:

The legislature failed to contemplate that it is longstanding 

precedent that persons are generally entitled to the 

retroactive applicability of decisions when they are 

pursuing an identical issue on direct appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 469 A.2d 146, 148 

([Pa.]1983) (“we hold that where an appellate decision 

overrules prior law and announces a new principle, unless 

the decision specifically declares the ruling to be 

prospective only, the new rule is to be applied retroactively 

to cases where the issue in question is properly preserved 

at all stages of adjudication up to and including any direct 

appeal.”); Commonwealth v. McCormick, 519 A.2d 442 

([Pa.Super.]1986) (discussing various retroactivity 

approaches utilized in Pennsylvania); cf. Griffith v. 

Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 

(1987) (holding new federal constitutional rules apply 

retroactively to cases on direct appeal).

Lofton, supra. at 1276. 

Unfortunately for Appellant, Lofton does not hold that all 

constitutional decisions apply retroactively to collateral proceedings, but 

speaks specifically to direct appeals. As Appellant is seeking collateral relief, 

this Court’s decision in Lofton does not affect him.2

____________________________________________

2

Further, Lofton was decided by this Court, not the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania or the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Because neither the United States Supreme Court nor the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Martinez applies retroactively, 

we need not determine whether Martinez governs the present appeal. 

Appellant has failed to plead and prove the constitutional exception to the 

PCRA time bar. Thus, Appellant’s petition remains time-barred, and the 

PCRA court properly denied it. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/8/2015