IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK )

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ) C.A. No. K23L-08-008 NEP

)

) Tax Parcel No. 9-00-08100-01-1500-000

Plaintiff, )

) In Rem

v. ) Sci. Fa. Sur Mortgage Action

)

)

WILSON L. MILES, ) Mortgage Book 1103, Page 254

) Assignment Book 6798, Page 30

Defendant. )

Submitted: December 7, 2023

Decided: March 11, 2024

ORDER

Upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

GRANTED

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (the “SJ Motion”)

filed by Plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association (“JPMorgan”).

1

 

2. On July 13, 2001, Defendant Wilson L. Miles (“Mr. Miles”) executed

and delivered a mortgage to Washington Mutual Home Loans, Inc. on the property 

known as 1933 Taraila Road, Hartly, Delaware 19953, Tax Parcel No. 9-00-08100-

1 Mot. for Summ. J. (D.I. 8). 
2

01-1500-000 (the “Mortgage”).2 The mortgage was subsequently assigned to 

JPMorgan.3

3. On August 9, 2023, JPMorgan filed a scire facias sur mortgage 

foreclosure complaint (the “Complaint”) against Mr. Miles in which it sought 

foreclosure of the mortgaged property in its name because of his failure to pay the 

monthly installments.

4

 Mr. Miles has signed a promissory note secured by the 

Mortgage.5 JPMorgan, either directly or through its agent, has possession of the 

promissory note, which has been duly endorsed.

6

 

4. On August 22, 2023, service was returned non est; the Sheriff’s Return 

stated as follows: “Vacant Lot. Appears Mobile home was removed [sic].”7 It was 

the first attempt at service.8 

5. On September 18, 2023, following an additional service attempt, the 

Sheriff’s Return indicated that certified copies of the alias writ of scire facias had 

been posted on the subject property on September 6, 2023, and mailed to Mr. Miles 

by both certified and first-class mail on September 8, 2023.9 

6. On September 29, 2023, Sharonda Miles (“Ms. Miles”), Mr. Miles’s 

daughter, wrote a letter to the Court on behalf of her father (the “Letter”).

10

 She did 

so because Mr. Miles was “unable to do so currently” and due to the “urgency of this

matter” was “unable to seek legal advisement to assist him in preparing a response 

to the complaint.”11 The Letter explains that, in November of 2022, Mr. Miles was 

2 Compl. (D.I. 1) ¶ 3; id., Ex. A (Mortgage). 

3 Compl. ¶ 3.

4

Id. ¶¶ 1, 4. 

5

Id. ¶ 1. 

6

Id. 

7 D.I. 3. 

8 Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 2. 

9 D.I. 6. 

10 D.I. 7. The Letter was signed by both Mr. Miles and Ms. Miles.

11 Id.
3

hospitalized due to “a serious life-threatening medical condition” that left him 

physically and cognitively impaired; that because of this, he had not been able to 

tend to his personal affairs; and that he “would not intentionally avoid fulfilling his 

obligation.”

12

 The Letter indicates that Mr. Miles can now “verbalize and designate” 

a power of attorney, and asks the Court to dismiss JPMorgan’s Complaint so that Mr. 

Miles can resume payments and retain his property.13 

7. On November 13, 2023, JPMorgan filed the SJ Motion.14 JPMorgan

points out that the Letter does not deny Mr. Miles’s failure to pay the monthly 

installments for the Mortgage and does not plead a recognized affirmative defense, 

and that therefore there is no dispute of a material fact.15 

8. On November 15, 2023, the Court sent a letter to the parties setting a 

deadline of November 29, 2023, to respond to the SJ Motion.

16

 

9. No response has been filed with the Court. 

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

10. Summary judgment is appropriate in a situation in which the record 

demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”17 The Court “(i) construes 

the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; (ii) detects, but does 

not decide, genuine issues of material fact; and (iii) denies the motion if a material 

fact is in dispute.”18 A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit 

12 Id. 

13 Id. 

14 Mot. for Summ. J. 

15 Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. JPMorgan also searched the records maintained by the Department of Defense, 

Defense Manpower Data Center (the “DMDC”) and determined that, according to DMDC records, 

Mr. Miles is not presently engaged in active military service as contemplated by the 

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. Id. ¶ 5. 

16 D.I. 9. 

17 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). See also Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995). 

18 US Dominion, Inc. v. Fox News Network, LLC, 2023 WL 2730567, at *17 (Del. Super. Mar. 31, 
4

under governing law.”19 

11. At the outset, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion and must 

demonstrate that the undisputed facts support the moving party’s claims or 

defenses.20 If the moving party meets this initial burden, then the burden shifts to 

the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact.21 

12. The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.”22 To meet its burden, the non-moving 

party must identify likely admissible evidence in the record that generates such an 

issue.23 Mere denials and unsupported conclusory denials in an affidavit do not 

constitute admissible factual evidence.24 

13. An important function of summary judgment is “to secure the just, 

speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”25 If the Court “finds that no 

genuine issues of material fact exist, and the moving party has demonstrated [its] 

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, then summary judgment is 

appropriate.”26 

III. ANALYSIS

14. In a scire facias sur mortgage action, the defendant must plead payment

2023) (quoting CVR Refin., LP v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 2021 WL 5492671, at *8 (Del. Super. 

Nov. 23, 2021)). 

19 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

20 Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680–81 (Del. 1979) (citing Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 

467, 470 (Del. 1962)). 

21 Id. at 681 (citing Hurtt v. Goleburn, 330 A.2d 134, 135 (Del. 1974)); see also Brzoska, 668 A.2d 

at 1364. 

22 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). 

23 Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Bogel, 269 A.3d 992, 1018 (Del. Super. 2021). 

24 Kennedy v. Giannone, 527 A.2d 732, 1987 WL 37799, at *1 (Del. June 16, 1987) (TABLE). 

25 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (citations omitted). 

26 Brooke v. Elihu-Evans, 1996 WL 659491, at *2 (Del. Aug. 23, 1996) (citing Oliver B. Cannon 

& Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 312 A.2d 322, 325 (Del. Super. 1973)). See also Jeffries v. Kent 

Cnty. Vocational Tech. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 743 A.2d 675, 677 (Del. Super. 1999). 
5

or satisfaction, or avoidance of the mortgage.27 “A plea in avoidance must ‘relate to 

the mortgage sued upon, i.e., the plea must relate to the validity or illegality of the 

mortgage documents.’”28 Examples include “acts of God, assignment, conditional 

liability, duress, exception, forfeiture, fraud, illegality, justification, nonperformance of condition precedents [sic], ratification, unjust enrichment and 

waiver.”29 An unsupported denial does not, by itself, raise a genuine issue of 

material fact.30 

15. Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 56(e), when a motion for 

summary judgment is “made and supported,” the non-moving party “may not rest 

upon the mere allegations or denials of the [non-moving] party’s pleading,” but 

“must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”31 

Further, “[i]f the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if 

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.”32 

16. Here, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Although the Court 

sympathizes with Mr. Miles, he does not deny that he has failed to make payments 

pursuant to the Mortgage, and he does not raise an affirmative defense in the Letter. 

Furthermore, he has not responded to JPMorgan’s SJ Motion by the deadline set by 

the Court. 

17. Therefore, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 56(e), summary 

judgment shall be entered in JPMorgan’s favor and against Mr. Miles. 

27 Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Nickel, 2011 WL 6000787, at *2 (Del. Super. Nov. 18, 2011). 

28 Id. (quoting Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. G-Wilm. Assocs., L.P., 2002 WL 31383924, at *2 (Del. Super. 

Oct. 18, 2002) [hereinafter ANI Co.]). 

29 Id. (citing ANI Co., 2002 WL 31383924, at *2). 

30 Teeven v. Kearns, 1993 WL 1626514, at *4 (Del. Super. Dec. 3, 1993). 

31 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e). 

32 Id. 
6

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that JPMorgan’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judgment is hereby entered in favor of 

JPMorgan and against Mr. Miles as follows: 

Principal Balance $ 23,871.28

Interest33 $ 1,782.18

Escrow Advances $ 1,544.99

Recoverable Balance $ 40.00

Suspense Balance $ (246.71)

TOTAL $ 26,991.74

 

NEP:tls

oc: Prothonotary

cc: Janet Z. Charlton, Esquire - Via File & ServeXpress

Chase N. Miller, Esquire - Via File & ServeXpress

Wilson L. Miles, Pro Se - Via U.S. Mail

33 Plus interest accruing from August 1, 2023, at the per diem rate of $4.50, and late charges and 

advances to the date of confirmation.