alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

September 15, 2009

H.P. LARGE, ET AL. v. GREENE COUNTY, TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Greene County

No. 05CV754 Thomas J. Wright, Judge

No. E2009-02764-COA-R3-CV - FILED DECEMBER 28, 2009

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., dissenting.

I am troubled by the majority’s determination that the record before leads inescapably to the

legal conclusion of a permanent nuisance/inverse condemnation. I do not believe the defendant has

presented facts negating or otherwise rebutting the plaintiffs’ theory of temporary nuisance.

The two plaintiffs make the following identical statement in their respective affidavits:

For several years, since the completion of the aforementioned bridge,

my property has flooded several occasions per year.

There is evidence in the record that the bridge in question was not constructed according to

specifications or in accordance with the permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers. The

defendant – who had the initial burden on its summary judgment motion – has not presented any

facts as to the nature and extent of the flooding to the plaintiffs’ respective properties; nor has it

offered any facts reflecting that the offending bridge cannot, as a practical matter, be remedied to

stop the flooding.

A temporary nuisance has been defined as a nuisance that can be corrected by the expenditure

of money. Pate v. City of Martin, 614 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tenn. 1981). The defendant has not put

before us any evidence showing that the improperly constructed bridge cannot be corrected “by the

expenditure of money” in such a way as to stop the flooding caused by it. This is its obligation on

summary judgment. Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2008). In my

opinion, the defendant has not met its burden of negating an element of the plaintiffs’ temporary

nuisance theory or otherwise demonstrated that they cannot make out their causes of action. I

believe the motion should have been denied and this case allowed to proceed.
-2-

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

_______________________________ 

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE
---

|CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO                     
|----------------------------------------------
|18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
|SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

The undersigned, Mark Lana, of HS3 Technologies, Inc., hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)      the
quarterly report on Form 10-Q of HS3 Technologies, Inc. for the three months
ended September 30, 2009 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of HS3 Technologies, Inc.

Dated November 16, 2009

|/s/ Mark Lana                                              | 
|---------------------------------------------------------- | 
|Mark Lana                                                  | 
|Chief Executive Officer, Treasurer, Secretary and Director | 
|(Principal Financial Officer, Principal Financial Officer  | 
|and Principal Accounting Officer)                          | 

---
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Respondent

 v.

TERRENCE MCALEER,

 Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 501 EAL 2014

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 8th day of April, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED.
ANTONIO ANDREU,

Petitioner,

v.

JULIE L. JONES, Secretary,

Florida Department of Corrections,

Respondent.

____________________________/

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-4721

Opinion filed April 9, 2015.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari -- Original Jurisdiction.

Antonio Andreu, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee; Jennifer Parker, General Counsel, 

and Barbara Debelius, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Corrections, 

Tallahassee, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied on the merits.

ROWE, MARSTILLER, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.
```

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 84 (Monday, May 2, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Page 24463]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-10642]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meetings

TIME AND DATE: 11 a.m., Friday, May 6, 2011.

PLACE: 1155 21st St., NW., Washington, DC, 9th Floor Commission 
Conference Room.

STATUS: Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Surveillance and Enforcement Matters.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Sauntia S. Warfield, 202-418-5084.

Sauntia S. Warfield,
Assistant Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011-10642 Filed 4-28-11; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
```
Exhibit 10.24
 
 004725-0021-11976-NY01.2763253.2 3  Employee agrees to enter into this Agreement with Aramark as a condition of employment  pursuant to which Aramark will limit Employee’s right to compete against Aramark during and  following termination of employment on the terms set forth in this Agreement.  Intending to be  legally bound, the parties agree as follows:  ARTICLE 1.  NON-DISCLOSURE AND NON-DISPARAGEMENT:  Employee shall not,  during or after termination of employment, directly or indirectly, in any manner utilize or  disclose to any person, firm, corporation, association or other entity, except where required by  law, any Proprietary Information which is not generally known to the public, or has not  otherwise been disclosed or recognized as standard practice in the industries in which Aramark is  engaged.  Employee shall, during and after termination of employment, refrain from making any  statements or comments of a defamatory or disparaging nature to any third party regarding  Aramark, or any of Aramark’s officers, directors, personnel, policies or products, other than to  comply with law.  ARTICLE 2.  NON-COMPETITION:  A. Subject to Article 2. B. below, Employee, during Employee’s period of employment with Aramark, and for a period of one year following the voluntary or involuntary termination of employment, shall not, without Aramark’s written permission, which shall be granted or denied in Aramark’s sole discretion, directly or indirectly, associate with (including, but not limited to, association as a sole proprietor, owner, employer, partner, principal, investor, joint venturer, shareholder, associate, employee, member, consultant, contractor or otherwise), or acquire or maintain ownership interest in, any Business which is competitive with that conducted by or developed for later implementation by Aramark at any time during the term of Employee’s employment.  For purposes of this Agreement,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 L. Employee expressly acknowledges and agrees that Aramark's Incentive Compensation Recoupment Policy, as the same may be amended from time to time, is binding on Employee and that Employee is a Covered Employee as defined in that policy. M. This Agreement shall be binding upon, inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by the Company and Employee, and their respective heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns. Employee acknowledges and agrees that this Agreement, including its provisions on post-employment restrictions, is specifically assignable by Aramark. Employee hereby consents to such future assignment and agrees not to challenge the validity of such future assignment. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, and intending to be legally bound, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be signed. ARAMARK SERVICES, INC. Date: . 7  By::  Date: NAME  00472S-002l•l 1976-NY0l.27632Sl.l 15 /s/ Lynn B. Mckee /s/ Grant Shih
 004725-0021-11976-NY01.2763253.2  16  Schedule 1  Prior Works*  * If no Prior Works are listed, Employee certifies that there are none.
```

[Federal Register: January 24, 2011 (Volume 76, Number 15)]
[Notices]               
[Page 4095]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr24ja11-33]                         

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

 
Sunshine Act Meetings

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

Sunshine Act Meetings

TIME AND DATE: 11 a.m., Friday, February 11, 2011.

PLACE: 1155 21st St., NW., Washington, DC, 9th Floor Commission 
Conference Room.

STATUS: Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: Surveillance and Enforcement Matters.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Sauntia S. Warfield, 202-418-5084.

Sauntia S. Warfield,
Assistant Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011-1523 Filed 1-20-11; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
```
International Commodity Procurement Division Purchases

FY2020 ‐ Quarter 4

Commodity Qty in MT PO Value Average Cost

BEANS, BLACK BAG‐50 KG 470 $369,499.30 $786.17

BEANS, PINTO BAG‐50 KG 150 $228,565.50 $1,523.77

BEANS, SMALL RED BAG‐50 KG 530 $775,940.90 $1,464.04

CORN, YELLOW BAG‐50 KG 230 $60,950.00 $265.00

CORNMEAL BAG‐HP‐25 KG 13,870 $6,920,661.10 $498.97

CORNMEAL, SOY‐FORT BAG‐HP‐25 KG 50 $30,137.00 $602.74

CORN‐SOY BLEND PLUS BAG‐HP‐25 KG 12,690 $9,990,855.40 $787.30

CSB SUPER CEREAL PLUS BOX‐10/1.5 KG 6,000 $11,016,991.12 $1,836.17

FLOUR, ALL PURPOSE BAG‐50 KG 220 $111,623.60 $507.38

LENTILS BAG‐50 KG 4,080 $2,330,890.10 $571.30

OIL, SOYBEAN, CRUDE, DEGUMMED BULK 5,000 $3,895,000.00 $779.00

OIL, VEGETABLE BOTTLE, PLS‐6/4 L 670‐719 1,030 $1,146,124.30 $1,112.59

OIL, VEGETABLE CAN‐6/4 L 11,970 $14,737,110.63 $1,231.12

OIL, VEGETABLE PAIL‐20 L 360 $496,964.09 $1,380.28

PEAS, GREEN, SPLIT BAG‐50 KG 60 $32,852.40 $547.54

PEAS, GREEN, WHOLE BAG‐50 KG 410 $152,237.10 $371.31

PEAS, YELLOW, SPLIT BAG‐50 KG 34,000 $13,387,715.90 $393.76

PEAS, YELLOW, WHOLE BAG‐50 KG 8,090 $2,871,163.40 $354.90

RICE, 2/7 LG, W‐MLD BAG‐50 KG 2,470 $1,477,769.60 $598.29

RICE, 3/15 LG, W‐MLD, FORT BAG‐50 KG 1,430 $883,868.70 $618.09

RICE, 5/20 LG, W‐MLD BAG‐50 KG 9,200 $5,390,924.00 $585.97

RICE, 5/20 LG, W‐MLD, FORT BAG‐50 KG 8,629 $4,875,021.52 $564.97

RICE, 5/20 MG, W‐MLD BAG‐50 KG 2,530 $1,613,052.10 $637.57

RICE, 5/20 MG, W‐MLD, FORT BAG‐50 KG 1,000 $662,910.00 $662.91

RICE, MILLED BULK 25,050 $15,537,012.00 $620.24

SALMON, PINK CAN‐24/14.75 OZ 360 $2,337,261.81 $6,492.38

SORGHUM BAG‐50 KG 20,970 $5,560,251.10 $265.15

SORGHUM BULK 110,360 $26,145,948.40 $236.92

SOYBEAN MEAL BULK 84,030 $33,179,730.00 $394.86

WHEAT, HARD RED WINTER BAG‐50 KG 130 $42,250.00 $325.00

WHEAT, HARD RED WINTER BULK 255,670 $58,425,388.90 $228.52

WHEAT, SOFT WHITE BULK 66,190 $14,169,169.40 $214.07

Grand Total 687,229 $238,855,839.37

Commodity Qty in EA PO Value Average Cost

BAGS, WOVEN POLYPROPYLENE‐ 50 KG 6,329,000 $3,173,165.51 $0.5014
Exhibit
32.2




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Kentucky First Federal Bancorp (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending December 31, 2010 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, R.
Clay Hulette, the Treasurer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





/s/R. Clay HuletteR.
      Clay HuletteVice
      President and Chief Financial OfficerFebruary
      15, 2011
REGULATORY EVALUATION

Directorate Identifier: ___2012_______-NM-____113______-AD

Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific 

requirements for aircraft operated in Alaska, where aviation might be the only mode of 

transportation?

YES ( ) explain NO (X)
Supreme Court ofthe United States

Office ofthe Clerk

Washington, DC 20543-0001

April 3, 2015

Scott S. Harris

Clerk of the Court

(202)479-3011

Clerk

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

P.O. Box 12308

Capitol Station

Austin, TX 78711

Re: Darnell Delk

v. Texas

No. 14-9172

(Your No. WR-21,415-11)

Dear Clerk:

The petition for a writ of certiorari in the above entitled case was filed on

March 25, 2015 and placed on the docket April 3, 2015 as No. 14-9172.

Sincerely,

Scott S. Harris, Clerk

by

Melissa plalock

Case Analyst

'<L 50

RECEIVED IN

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

APR 06 2015

Abel Acoeta, Clerk
J-S04036-15

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

VERNON HALL,

Appellant No. 392 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 28, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0000752-2012, 

CP-35-CR-0001776-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

CONCURRING STATEMENT BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2015

I join in the decision of my learned colleagues. I write further only to 

address several key points in light of our remand. First, Appellant is 

proceeding pro se because PCRA counsel was permitted to withdraw under 

Turner/Finley practice. Since, contrary to Appellant’s representation in his 

brief, he did not raise a credit for time served complaint in his underlying 

PCRA petition, and the record does not reveal the issue, I do not fault 

counsel for not addressing the claim. See Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 

A.3d 1177, 1190 n.9 (Pa.Super. 2012). Nonetheless, because Appellant’s 

nonwaivable position may raise a question of fact that cannot be resolved by 

the current record, he is entitled to counsel for purposes of any evidentiary 
J-S04036-15

- 2 -

hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904. Of course, Appellant may elect to waive 

that right after an appropriate colloquy. 

Finally, I voice my strong disapproval of the PCRA court’s intentional 

disregard of Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 based on this Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Bond, 630 A.2d 1281 (Pa.Super. 1993). Bond cannot 

be read to eviscerate a criminal rule of procedure in Turner/Finley cases. 

Pointedly, Bond is appropriately limited to the precise facts therein, and did 

not hold that Rule 907 notice is not mandatory in Turner/Finley cases. 

Moreover, in my view, Bond is no longer sound law in light of our Supreme 

Court’s subsequent decision in Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875 (Pa. 

2009), which requires petitioners to file a response to a Rule 907 notice to 

preserve issues of Turner/Finley counsel ineffectiveness. The failure of the 

court to supply such a notice would preclude petitioners from complying with 

Pitts. Accordingly, I would urge the PCRA court to abide by the clear 

mandate of Rule 907.

With these additions in mind, I join the distinguished majority.
|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | /s/ A. Brian Davis       |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------|

|   | A. Brian Davis |
|--------|----------------|

|   | Chief Financial Officer and Vice President, Finance |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------|

|   | (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) |
|--------|----------------------------------------------|

----
EXHIBIT 32.1

Certification of Principal Executive Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.SD.C. 1350 (Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

I, Frederik Warnaars, President and Chief Executive Officer of Aurelio Resource Corporation, certify, to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2007 of Aurelio Resource Corporation that:



| | (1) | The Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained and incorporated by reference in the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of Aurelio Resource Corporation.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/s/ Frederik Warnaars                
|Frederik Warnaars                    
|President and Chief Executive Officer

May 15, 2007
1 of 3

NO. 04-14-00678-CR 

RONJEE MIDDLETON § IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT 

 § 

 § 

 VS. § COURT OF APPEALS 

 § 

 § 

STATE OF TEXAS § SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 

TO FILE STATE’S BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE FOURT COURT OF APPEALS: 

 NOW COMES Nicholas “Nico” LaHood, Criminal District Attorney of 

Bexar County and Counsel for the State of Texas, and files this Motion asking that 

the Court extend the time for filing the State’s brief.

Appellant was found guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. On 

September 19, 2014, he was sentenced to 27 years in the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal 

on September 19, 2014. The clerk’s record was filed on November 6, 2014 and a 

supplemental clerk’s record was filed on December 19, 2014. The reporter’s 

record was filed on November 18, 2014 and a supplemental reporter’s record was 

filed on February 5, 2015. Appellant filed his brief on March 9, 2015. The State’s 

brief was due April 8, 2015. This is the State’s first motion requesting an extension 

of time and the State requests a 30 day extension to May 7, 2015. 

ACCEPTED

04-14-00678-CR

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

4/8/2015 11:33:34 AM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK
2 of 3

This extension is not sought for the purpose of delaying this appeal. The 

State requests an extension for the following reasons:

1) Counsel would like more time to thoroughly read the record in this case, 

as well as to research and write the State’s brief.

2) Counsel has recently been transferred to the Appellate Division of the 

District Attorney’s Office.

3) Due to the restructuring of the District Attorney’s Office, counsel has 

been assisting the trial division with intake and presentment of cases to 

the grand jury. 

4) Counsel recently filed the following brief in the Fourth Court of Appeals:

a. In the Interest of D.M., Children, 04-14-00858-CV.

 Therefore, counsel respectfully asks the Court to grant this extension of

time to file the State’s brief in this case. 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Counsel for the State prays 

that the Court grant an extension of time to May 7, 2015 for filing the State’s brief.

Respectfully submitted,

Nicholas “Nico” LaHood

Criminal District Attorney

Bexar County, Texas

/s/ Jennifer D. Rossmeier

____________________

Jennifer D. Rossmeier

State Bar No. 24079247

Assistant Criminal District Attorney

101 W. Nueva Street

 San Antonio, Texas 78205-3030

Phone: (210) 335-2734

Fax: (210) 335-2436

Email: jennifer.rossmeier@bexar.org
3 of 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Jennifer D. Rossmeier, Assistant District Attorney, Bexar County, Texas, 

certify that a copy of the foregoing motion was delivered via electronic service to 

Michael D. Robbins, on April 8, 2015. 

/s/ Jennifer D. Rossmeier
#### Weakland, Appellant, *v.*Cymbria Coal Company.

*Mines and mining*— Conveyance *of coal*— Surface *support*— Con*struction of deed.*

A grantee of coal underlying the surface incurs no liability for injury to the surface by mining operations where the grant provides that he shall have a right to enter upon the land and to mine *404and remove tbe coal without any liability for damages arising or resulting from the exercise of such rights and privileges.

Argued Oct. 1, 1918.

Appeal, No. 39, Oct. T.,. 1918, by plaintiff, from order of O. P. Cambria Co., June T., 1916, No. 130, refusing to take off nonsuit, in case of William J. Weakland v. Cymbria Coal Company.

Before Brown, C. J., Stewart, Frazer, Waiting, Simpson and Fox, JJ.

Affirmed.

Trespass to recover damages for injuries to the surface of coal land caused by defendant’s mining operations.

Motion to take off compulsory nonsuit. Before O’Con-nor, J.

From the record, it appeared that the defendant was the owner of coal underlying plaintiff’s land under a lease which provided, inter alia, that defendant should have “exclusive privilege, right and liberty of entering at will upon any and all parts of said land and searching for, quarrying, mining, raising, delivering, ‘taking and

carrying away said coal, etc.,......”

’ “As well as of doing all other acts and things concerning the mining, quarrying, working or removing at any and all times hereafter of said coal, and appertaining to the manufacture of said coke and the products thereof on, from and under any and all parts of said land by the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns,. or by its servants, employees or lessees as fully as if they were the actual owners of the hereinbefore described land, and all of the said rights, liberties and privileges to be used and exercised without any liability for damages arising or resulting from the use and exercise of the same as aforesaid, and possession is hereby given to the party of the second part, its successors and assigns forever, for the purposes above mentioned.”

By reason of defendant’s .mining operations, injury. was caused to the surface of plaintiff’s land.

*405October 23, 1918:

The court entered a compulsory nonsuit which it subsequently refused to take off. Plaintiff appealed.

*Error assigned*was in refusing to take off nonsuit.

*Philip N. Shettig,*with him *M. D. Kittell,*for appellant.

*John E. Evans,*with him *Charles S. Evans,*for appellee.

Per Curiam,

The grant under which the defendant company acquired title to the coal underlying the surface owned by the appellant, indicates in clearest terms the intention of the grantor that it should not be liable for damages for failure to support the surface, and, as the appellant acquired title subject to the grant to the appellee, the nonsuit was properly entered: Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Company, 217 Pa. 449; Kellert v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal & Iron Co., 226 Pa. 27; Stilley v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo Co., 234 Pa. 492.

Judgment affirmed.
Exhibit 10.23


 


	CERTAIN
    IDENTIFIED INFORMATION HAS BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THIS EXHIBIT BECAUSE IT IS BOTH NOT MATERIAL AND IS THE TYPE THAT THE REGISTRANT TREATS
    AS PRIVATE OR CONFIDENTIAL.