J-A07006-15 

2015 PA Super 75 

CHRISTOPHER M. BOBACK IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

JENNIFER O. ROSS AND DAVID A. ROSS 

APPEAL OF: DAVID A. ROSS No. 941 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order May 9, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): AR 13-004860 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J. 

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 14, 2015 

 David A. Ross (“Garnishee”) appeals from the May 9, 2014 order that 

states in pertinent part: 

Execution on the Judgment against Garnishee David A. Ross 

shall be held in abeyance so long as the Judgment is paid to 

Plaintiff Christopher M. Boback at the rate of Four Hundred 

Dollars ($400.00) per month for twenty (20) consecutive months 

beginning as of the date of this Order by having Plaintiff 

Christopher M. Boback intervene as a judgment-creditor in the 

case captioned as Jennifer O. Ross vs. David A. Ross, Docket No. 

FD-12-001508-011, PACSES Case No. 440113454 (Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania) and by 

having Plaintiff Christopher M. Boback added as an alternate 

payee to the Order of Court dated January 24, 2014 ... so that he 

shall collect his Judgment in installments of $400.00 per month 

for 20 consecutive months from the payments collected and 

disbursed by the Pennsylvania State Collection and 

Disbursement Unit (“Pa SCDU”).” 

Trial Court Order, 5/9/14, at ¶ 5. The trial court also directed that “the 

Department of Court Records shall assess the amount of the unliquidated 

Judgment filed against Garnishee David A. Ross on April 21, 2014, to be 

fixed in the amount of $8,000.00[.]” Id. at ¶ 4. After review, we reverse. 
J-A07006-15 

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 Garnishee and Jenifer O. Ross (“Wife”) were formerly husband and 

wife and are the parents of three children. During a portion of the divorce 

litigation, namely, the child and spousal support proceedings, Christopher M. 

Boback (“Boback”) represented Wife against Garnishee. On October 18, 

2013, Boback withdrew from his representation of Wife due to unpaid fees. 

Wife retained new counsel and on January 21, 2014, Garnishee and Wife 

entered into consent orders relating to custody and support and signed a 

marital settlement agreement (MSA). Pursuant to the MSA, Garnishee was 

required to pay Wife alimony and child support through PACSES by way of a 

wage attachment on Garnishee’s wages. 

 On October 22, 2013, Boback filed a civil complaint against Wife 

seeking the outstanding attorney’s fees due him. A verdict was rendered in 

the amount of $7,483.80 for Boback and against Wife when she failed to 

appear at the scheduled hearing on February 18, 2014. Judgment was 

entered on March 17, 2014. Thereafter, Boback began execution 

proceedings, directing interrogatories to Garnishee, who in his answer 

acknowledged that he owed Wife monthly alimony and child support 

payments.1 Based on this acknowledgment, on April 21, 2014, Boback filed 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The pertinent question and the answer provided by Garnishee to Boback’s 

interrogatories states: 

1. At the time you were served or at any subsequent time did 

you owe [Wife] any money or were you liable to [Wife] on any 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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a praecipe for judgment by admission against Garnishee in an unliquidated 

amount. Boback also filed a motion for a hearing to assess the amount of 

the judgment. On May 9, 2014, Garnishee moved to strike the judgment 

and for attorney’s fees “on the grounds that it was inappropriate for the 

Department of Court Records to have entered judgment against [Garnishee] 

based on his answers to the interrogatories....” Garnishee’s brief at 7. 

 Rather than holding a hearing on May 9, 2014, the trial court heard 

argument on Garnishee’s motion to strike the judgment and on Boback’s 

motion to fix the amount of the judgment. The court then entered the 

above-quoted order, essentially entering judgment in Boback’s favor against 

Garnishee for $8,000.00, directing Boback’s intervention in Garnishee’s and 

Wife’s support case, and permitting Boback to receive $400.00 per month 

for 20 months from Garnishee’s payments to Pa SCDU until Boback’s 

judgment was paid. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

negotiable or other written instrument, or did [Wife] claim that 

you owed [Wife] any money or were liable to [Wife] for any 

reason? 

ANSWER: Nothing other than the monthly alimony and child 

support payment I owe her each month. 

Garnishee’s Answers to Interrogatories, 4/21/14, ¶ 1. 
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 Garnishee filed a timely appeal,2 and now raises the following issues 

for review: 

A. Did the Allegheny County Department of Court Records err in 

granting a Judgment by Admission against Garnishee, Ross? 

B. Did the trial court err in refusing to strike or open the 

judgment by admission against Garnishee, Ross? 

C. Did the trial court err in entering judgment against 

Garnishee, Ross, without an evidentiary hearing, in the amount 

of $8,000? 

Garnishee’s brief at 5. 

 We begin by noting that Pa.R.C.P. 3146(b) authorizes the entry of 

judgment against a garnishee based on admissions contained in answers to 

interrogatories. Rule 3146(b) states in pertinent part that: 

(b)(1) ... [t]he prothonotary, on praecipe of the plaintiff, shall 

enter judgment against the garnishee for the property of the 

defendant admitted in the answer to interrogatories to be in the 

garnishee's possession, subject to any right therein claimed by 

the garnishee, but no money judgment entered against the 

garnishee shall exceed the amount of the judgment of the 

plaintiff against the defendant together with interest and costs. 

The entry of judgment shall not bar the right of the plaintiff to 

proceed against the garnishee as to any further property or to 

contest any right in the property claimed by the garnishee. 

Pa.R.C.P. 3146(b)(1). However, “[a]dmissions of a garnishee in answers to 

a judgment creditor’s interrogatories will support the entry of a judgment 

thereon ‘only in a clear case, where there is a distinct admission of liability 

____________________________________________ 

2

 No order requesting the filing of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement was issued 

by the trial court, therefore, Garnishee did not file a statement. 
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by the garnishee....’” Ruehl v. Maxwell Steel Co. Inc., 474 A.2d 1162, 

1163-64 (Pa. Super. 1984) (quoting Bartram Building and Loan Assoc. v. 

Eggleston, 6 A.2d 508,510 (Pa. 1939)). The Ruehl case further discussed 

this principle by quoting the following comment from Goodrich-Amram 2d § 

3146(b):1.1: 

Certainly if there is any doubt regarding the garnishee's 

admission, the prothonotary cannot and should not enter 

judgment on the plaintiff’s praecipe. The prothonotary, who acts 

in this regard in a purely ministerial capacity, can enter 

judgment only if the answers are clear and unequivocal; to 

analyze or interpret the garnishee’s answers would be in effect 

to exercise a judicial function, which is in excess of his powers. 

The prothonotary should be guided by the usual practice in 

assumpsit actions. Conformity to that practice is in fact dictated 

by Rule 3145(a). In assumpsit, judgment on admissions in the 

pleadings -- perhaps the closest analogue to judgment against 

the garnishee on the basis of admissions in his answer -- cannot 

be entered unless some part of the plaintiff’s claim is 

“unequivocally and unqualifiedly admitted to be due by the 

defendant’s answer.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 

Ruehl, 474 A.2d at 1164. “Where judgment against a garnishee is 

improperly entered on the basis of admissions in the garnishee’s answers to 

interrogatories, the judgment may be stricken.” Id. 

 Because Garnishee’s three issues are interrelated, we address them 

together. Garnishee first argues that the court erred in granting judgment 

by admission against him based upon the court’s assumption that alimony 

and child support “constitute a ‘debt’ for purposes of garnishment....” 

Garnishee’s brief at 10 (citing Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/14, at 2). Garnishee 

also asserts that the Department of Court Records (DCR) should not have 
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entered judgment on Boback’s praecipe, based solely on Garnishee’s answer 

to Boback’s interrogatory in that the answer was “ambiguous and did not 

admit that he owed [Wife] a debt.” Id. at 11. Garnishee further claims that 

“the DCR could not clearly determine that [Garnishee] has or had any of 

[Wife’s] ‘property’ in his possession that might be subject to garnishment 

and as a result, should have refused to enter judgment by admission.” Id.

at 11-12. 

 Additionally, Garnishee contends that only “debts [that] are not 

dependent upon a contingency but are certain and payable are properly 

attachable in garnishment proceedings.” Id. at 13 (citing Brown v. 

Canderola, 708 A.2d 104, 108 (Pa. Super. 1998) (“Only such debts as are 

not dependent upon a contingency but are certain and payable are properly 

attachable in garnishment proceedings.”)). Then, providing a number of 

examples, Garnishee indicates that “[s]upport payments, whether in the 

form of alimony or child support, are subject to a wide variety of 

contingencies.” Id. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(e) (providing that upon 

substantial and continuing changed circumstances of either party, the 

alimony “order may be modified, suspended, terminated or reinstituted or a 

new order made.”). 

Also, in connection with this point, Garnishee discusses whether 

Garnishee’s support obligation is in fact a “debt” that can be garnished. 

Garnishee, noting the limited number of cases dealing with this subject, 
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provided this Court at argument with a recent case that discussed this 

subject, i.e., whether alimony and support are recognized as debts. See 

Uveges v. Uveges, 103 A.3d 825 (Pa. Super. 2014). The Uveges case 

deals with a former wife’s right to attach her ex-husband’s disability benefits 

that he was receiving under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 

Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. This Court affirmed 

the trial court’s decision allowing the attachment so that the wife could 

recoup the $2,500.00 per month permanent alimony, with arrearages of 

$56,912.80, as prescribed by the parties’ agreement. In arriving at its 

decision, this Court in Uveges stated that “Pennsylvania precedent has 

recognized that a spouse’s alimony and/or support obligations are not 

‘debts.’” Id. at 830. The Uveges decision relied in part on Parker v. 

Parker, 484 A.2d 168, 169 (Pa. Super. 1984), concluding that 

[an] anti-attachment clause in the statute governing the 

husband's service-connected disability Veterans' Administration 

benefits did not preclude the trial court from considering those 

monthly payments as a source of income for alimony pendente 

lite purposes. This Court noted that the purpose of the antiattachment clause was “to protect the recipient of the benefits 

from claims of creditors, and to afford some degree of security to 

the recipient’s family and dependents.” Parker, 484 A.2d at 

169 (citations omitted). Given this purpose, we concluded that 

the anti-attachment clause did not apply “since a wife seeking to 

recover alimony pendente lite is not a ‘creditor’ of her husband, 

the claim not being based on a debt.” Id.

Uveges, 103 A.3d at 828 (citing Parker, 484 A.2d at 169) (emphasis 

added). See also Hogg v. Hogg, 816 A.2d 314 (Pa. Super. 2003) (stating 

“[t]raditionally, the Bankruptcy Code has protected non-debtor spouses and 
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children by precluding discharge of a debtor spouse’s alimony and support 

obligations”). 

 What we glean from the above-stated case law is that the support/ 

alimony due Wife is not a debt that is owed to her by Garnishee, nor is Wife 

a creditor. Therefore, Boback’s praecipe for judgment by admission should 

not have been entered against Garnishee. This is “consistent with the 

historical treatment by Pennsylvania appellate courts of anti-attachment 

clauses vis-à-vis a claim for support or alimony.” Uveges, 103 A.3d at 830. 

Moreover, we note that the court’s determination that Boback was owed 

$8,000.00 was not based upon any evidence of record, since the court did 

not hold a hearing at which evidence could have been presented to establish 

the specific amount owed to Boback at this juncture. As for Garnishee’s first 

issue, alleging an error by the DCR, it appears from the certified record that 

the DCR entered judgment by admission at the direction of the trial court; 

however, under the circumstances here, the DCR should not have entered 

judgment in that the monies owed Wife from Garnishee were dependent on 

possible future changes in circumstances. See Brown, supra. Accordingly, 

we reverse the determination that Boback holds a judgment by admission 

against Garnishee. Boback is not entitled to receive $400.00 per month for 

20 months from payments collected by the Pa SCDU. 

 Order reversed. 
J-A07006-15 

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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/14/2015