J-A04004-15

2015 PA Super 70

IN RE: P.Z., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

APPEAL OF: M.L., FATHER,

Appellant No. 1507 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order August 19, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at No(s): TPR 20 OF 2014

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2015

M.L. (“Father”) appeals from the order terminating his parental rights 

to his minor child, P.Z. We affirm. 

P.Z. was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, during February 2012. He 

has never been in the care of either parent. At birth, M.Z. (“Mother”) tested 

positive for methadone and marijuana.1 P.Z. also had methadone in his 

system and displayed withdrawal symptoms for approximately two months. 

Upon discharge from the hospital, P.Z. was transferred to the Children’s 

Home. Allegheny County Children Youth and Family (“CYF”) obtained 

emergency custody of P.Z. during April 2012, and the juvenile court 

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the birth mother. She 

did not appeal that order. 
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adjudicated him dependent the following month. When P.Z. was threemonths old, the juvenile court placed him in his current, pre-adoptive foster 

home. 

Father resides in Arizona, the state where P.Z. was conceived. When 

Mother returned to Pennsylvania to give birth, Father remained in Arizona. 

CYF contacted Father during May 2012. Father requested custody and 

visitation with his son and stated that he would commence the required 

measures in Arizona to facilitate that contact. Father not only failed to 

initiate those processes, but he also neglected to participate in the 

adjudication of his son’s dependency. Nevertheless, since P.Z.’s original 

permanency goal was reunification, CYF developed a Family Service Plan 

(“FSP”) for Father and advised him of his enumerated goals, including, inter 

alia, to execute a confirmation of paternity, meet the child’s basic financial 

demands, address domestic violence, understand and address P.Z.’s 

developmental and physical delays, obtain housing, and cooperate with CYF 

and service providers. 

Although Father proclaimed his certainty of P.Z.’s lineage, he failed to 

execute an acknowledgement of paternity at the outset of the dependency 

proceedings. Instead, Father waited until September 2012, when he 

obtained the results of a court-ordered paternity test confirming his genetic 

relationship with P.Z. Over the next twenty-one months, CYF exhausted 

substantial resources in order to reunify P.Z. with Father, including providing 

Father with bus fare from Arizona on one occasion and airfare and hotel 
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accommodations for at least three other five-day visitations with P.Z. 

Nonetheless, Father’s compliance with the FSP goals was minimal. He 

ignored the requests of the caseworker assigned to the case in Arizona in 

order to determine if his home was a suitable placement option, and he did 

not execute documents, submit his fingerprints for a criminal background 

check, or complete the necessary in-home visits. Likewise, Father failed to 

satisfy the parenting component of the FSP and it remains unclear whether 

the anger management course that he completed satisfied his goal relating 

to domestic violence. 

In the meantime, during July 2013, Neil C. Rosenblum, Ph.D., the 

court-appointed evaluator, performed the first of three interactional 

evaluations between P.Z. and his pre-adoptive foster mother. Dr. 

Rosenblum concluded that, in light of the fact that P.Z. was near the zenith 

of the attachment process with the foster mother and mindful of the 

excellent care that she provided the child since May 2012, the recommended 

disposition of the dependency proceedings was adoption. Following the 

August 2013 permanency review hearing, during which the juvenile court 

noted Father’s continued lack of progress toward reunification, the juvenile 

court directed CYF to file a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. 

Instead, CYF initiated a “permanency round table,” i.e., an internal audit 

including top CYF officials, supervisors and caseworkers, as well as 
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representatives from the Alliance For Infants and Toddlers and The Annie E. 

Casey Foundation.2 See N.T., 6/25/13, at 212-213. The result of the 

internal audit was to increase CYF’s reunification efforts despite the juvenile 

court’s order and Father’s documented failures. Accordingly, CYF declined to 

file the petition for termination at that juncture.

CYF did not file the underlying petition to terminate parental rights 

until February 7, 2014, six months after the juvenile court’s initial directive 

and upon the court’s additional findings of minimal progress by Father and 

reiterations of its instruction to the agency. Three months after the agency 

complied with the juvenile court’s edict to file the petition to terminate 

Father’s parental rights, CYF attempted to withdraw the petition, and when 

that was fruitless, it filed a motion for a continuance seeking to postpone the 

hearing pending its continued reunification efforts.3

Thereafter, at the outset of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

addressed another motion to withdraw that had been filed by CYF the 

____________________________________________

2 Malika Mason, the CYF caseworker assigned to this family, identified “the 

Casey Foundation [as] a large organization [that] provides funding to the 

[Department of Children and Families] offices throughout the country. They

do assessments of our cases [and] determine [whether] we are . . . on the 

right track[.]” N.T., 6/25/14, at 213. We presume that the ‘Casey 

Foundation’ that Ms. Mason referred to was, in fact, The Annie E. Casey 

Foundation.

3 The trial court did not specifically address CYF’s May 8, 2014 motion to 

withdraw. Instead, as noted in the body of this opinion, the court denied a 

subsequent, yet identical, motion to withdraw that CYF filed on the eve of 

the evidentiary hearing. 
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previous day. CYF and Father’s counsel argued in favor of withdrawing the 

petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. The guardian ad litem

opposed the motion for withdrawal. Following argument, the trial court 

denied CYF’s motion and immediately commenced the evidentiary hearing. 

Specifically, the court concluded,

[T]he Court having listened to arguments of all counsel, finds 

persuasive that the Adoption and Safe Families Act,[4] which 

requires the state to file a [p]etition for TPR [(termination of 

parental rights)] unless one of the three exceptions [was] in fact 

applicable to this case, finds that the Motion to Withdraw the 

Petition is denied. That the Adoption and Safe Families Act could 

not possibly have meant that the state’s filing should be a pro 

forma filing, and in fact[,] a filing would assume that the state 

would proceed on a TPR.

____________________________________________

4

In 1988, our legislature amended the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-

6375, to conform to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), 42 

U.S.C. § 671-679. In In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (emphasis 

added), our Supreme Court outlined the relevant aspects of the statutes as 

follows:

ASFA was enacted to combat the problem of foster care drift, 

where children . . . are shuttled from one foster home to 

another, waiting for their parents to demonstrate their ability to 

care for the children. This drift was the unfortunate byproduct of 

the system’s focus on reuniting children with their biological 

parents, even in situations where it was clear that the parents 

would be unable to parent in any reasonable period of time. 

Following ASFA, Pennsylvania adopted a dual focus of 

reunification and adoption, with the goal of finding permanency 

for children in less than two years, absent compelling reasons. 

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1); 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9) 

(requiring courts to determine whether an agency has 

filed a termination of parental rights petition if the child 

has been in placement for fifteen of the last twenty-two 

months).
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N.T., 6/25/14, at 18.

Thus, having just sought to withdraw its petition to terminate Father’s 

parental rights, CYF dutifully presented testimony from Dr. Rosenblum and 

the family’s caseworker and then rested its case. The trial court then 

continued the hearing until July 21, 2014. When the parties reconvened, 

Father confirmed that CYF had rested its case-in-chief and then moved for 

dismissal due to the agency’s failure to establish the statutory grounds for 

termination under 23 Pa.C.S § 2511(a). CYF indicated that it did not object 

to the dismissal of the case on those grounds; however, the guardian ad 

litem argued that the agency had, in fact, presented clear and convincing 

evidence to support terminating Father’s parental rights. Additionally, the 

guardian ad litem noted that the court had not permitted her to present any 

witnesses on the matter. After an extended argument concerning CYF’s 

burden of proof, the guardian ad litem’s singular responsibility to represent 

P.Z.’s best interest, Father’s rights, and the quantum of evidence that CYF 

had adduced at that juncture, the trial court denied Father’s motion to 

dismiss. Following additional testimony by Father’s and the guardian ad 

litem’s witnesses and a subsequent proceeding concerning an unavailable 

witness, the trial court entered the above captioned order terminating 
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Father’s parental rights to P.Z. pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) and § 

2511(b). Father filed a timely appeal.5

Father complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) by filing a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal concomitant with his notice of 

appeal. The Rule 1925(b) statement raised five issues, which Father 

reiterates on appeal as follows:

I. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its discretion in moving 

forward with the Petition to involuntarily terminate the parental 

rights of [Father] when the [c]ounty sought to withdraw its 

[p]etition because the county did not feel that involuntarily 

terminating the parental rights of [Father] would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the minor child P.Z.;

II. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its discretion in 

denying Appellant's Motion to Dismiss the Petition to 

Involuntarily Terminate the Parental rights of [Father] at the 

close of [CYF’s] [c]ase in [c]hief;

III. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its discretion in 

finding that [CYF] met [its] burden of proof by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parental rights of [Father] should 

be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a) (2), (5),(8);

IV. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its discretion in 

finding that [CYF] met [its] burden of proof by clear and 

convincing evidence that [it] provided reasonable services to 

____________________________________________

5 CYF declined to appeal the order terminating Father’s parental rights or 

challenge the court’s decision to deny its motion to withdraw the petition. 

Indeed, by the end of the termination hearing, the agency argued in favor of 

the termination of parental rights. See N.T., 8/13/14, at 19 (“[A]fter review 

of the record, the agency is now seeking termination of the parental rights of 

[Father] pursuant to Sections 2511[(a)(2), (5) and (8)], and section B, 

believing that grounds do exist to terminate [Father’s] parental rights.”). 
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[Father] sufficient to timely reunify [Father] with his minor child 

P.Z.;

V. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred and/or abused its discretion in finding 

that [CYF] met their burden of proof by clear and convincing 

evidence that terminating the parental rights of [Father] would 

best meet the needs and welfare of P.Z. pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511 (b)[.]

Father’s brief at 1-2. 

While Father presents five distinct issues in his statement of questions 

presented, the argument section of his brief reduced those issues into three 

arguments, two of which are redundant.6 First, Father assails CYF’s effort in 

providing him services toward reunification and complains that the trial court 

erred in denying the agency’s motions to withdraw the petition on this basis. 

Next, Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that CYF adduced to 

establish the statutory grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights. As a

sub-issue, Father argues that the court erred in denying his motion to 

dismiss the case at the close of the agency’s case-in-chief. Finally, 

reiterating his initial argument, Father posits that considering his indigent 

status and responsibilities in Arizona, the court erred in finding that CYF 

____________________________________________

6

Father’s brief abandons the argument that terminating his parental rights 

would not serve P.Z.’s needs and welfare pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S § 2511(b). 

Thus, we need not address that claim. Nevertheless, as noted in the body of 

this opinion, we confront P.Z.’s needs and welfare in addressing whether CYF 

established the statutory grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), and we confirm that terminating 

Father’s parental rights best satisfies P.Z.’s developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare.
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provided him reasonable services. We address Father’s first and third issues 

collectively, and for the following reasons, we find no basis for relief.

At the outset, we observe that the trial court, guardian ad litem, and 

CYF all contest Father’s ability to challenge the trial court’s decision to deny 

CYF’s motion to withdraw the petition. The focus of this collective position is 

that Father did not file the underlying motion to withdraw and CYF, the party 

that filed the pertinent motion, declined to appeal from the order terminating 

Father’s parental rights. The trial court adds that, by the close of the 

evidentiary hearing, CYF altered its position and, in fact, argued in favor of 

termination. Thus, the court and both appellees argue that Father does not 

have standing to raise this argument on appeal.

We reject the bare claim that Father lacks standing on appeal to 

challenge the trial court’s denial of the agency’s motion to withdraw the 

petition. Notwithstanding the absence of any citation to legal authority in 

support of this collective position, we observe that, as the aggrieved party 

appealing a final order, Father can challenge all previous interlocutory 

orders. See Quinn v. Bupp, 955 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Pa.Super. 2008) (“It is 

established that a notice of appeal filed from the entry of the final order in 

an action draws into question the propriety of any prior non-final orders.”). 

More importantly, the record bears out that, contrary to the foregoing 

assertions, Father, in fact, “join[ed] in asking the petition be withdrawn.” 

N.T., 6/25/14, at 4-5. In light of Father’s explicit request, the fact that CYF 

declined to appeal the order terminating parental rights or argue that the 
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trial court erred in denying the motion to withdraw is irrelevant. Father 

joined the agency’s motion to withdraw, that joint request for relief was 

denied, and Father now seeks to rectify what he perceives as the trial court’s 

error. Hence, we address the merits of Father’s argument.

The crux of Father’s primary position is that, since CYF did not provide 

him the necessary services to achieve reunification, the juvenile court should 

not have applied a rote consideration of the ASFA timing mechanisms in 

denying the agency’s motion to withdraw the petition to terminate parental 

rights. Father’s position relies upon the portion of the internal audit wherein 

the agency determined that additional services were needed to reunify 

Father with P.Z. He adds that the circumstances of his life in Arizona and 

the seven-month delay in confirming paternity exacerbated CYF’s 

deficiencies. Essentially, Father argues that he fit within a statutory 

exception to the Juvenile Act’s time constraints outlined in § 6351(f)(9)(iii). 

We disagree. 

Pursuant to §6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, “[a]t each permanency 

hearing, a court shall determine all of the following:

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last 

22 months or the court has determined that aggravated 

circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts to prevent or 

eliminate the need to remove the child from the child's parent, 

guardian or custodian or to preserve and reunify the family need 

not be made or continue to be made, whether the county agency 

has filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights 

and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified family to 

adopt the child unless: 
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(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best suited to the 

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child; 

(ii) the county agency has documented a compelling reason for 

determining that filing a petition to terminate parental rights 

would not serve the needs and welfare of the child; or 

(iii) the child's family has not been provided with necessary 

services to achieve the safe return to the child's parent, guardian 

or custodian within the time frames set forth in the permanency 

plan.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9)(i-iii). 

The statute does not establish a litmus test that requires a juvenile 

court to alter the course of reunification due simply to the amount of time a 

child has been in placement. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010). It does, however, create a mechanism for keeping juvenile courts 

alert to the potential for foster care drift, i.e., "where children [languish] in 

the foster care system while their parents unsuccessfully [attempt] to regain 

custody.” Id. at 186. Thus, once a child’s placement in foster care reaches 

the fifteen-month threshold, juvenile courts are mandated to query whether 

the agency has initiated proceedings to terminate parental rights. In In re 

D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 674 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme Court highlighted the 

significance of § 9351(f)(9) as follows, “the statutory language ensures that 

termination petitions are timely filed. Specifically, if a child has been in 

custody for 15 of the last 22 months, the court must inquire as to whether a 

termination petition has been filed, absent the listed exceptions of 

subsections (i)-(iii), including whether the parents have been provided 

necessary services.” The Court continued, “Requiring a court to inquire 
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whether an agency has filed for termination promotes timely permanency for 

children rather than subjecting them to foster care drift.” Id. at 674-675. 

Herein, following the August 26, 2013 permanency review hearing, the 

trial court entered an order in compliance with § 6351(f). The order found 

that Father had made minimal compliance with the permanency plan, 

minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances that led to P.Z.’s 

original placement, and that, as of that date of the permanency hearing, 

P.Z. had been in placement for sixteen months. Accordingly, the juvenile 

court directed the agency to file a petition to terminate Father’s parental 

rights pursuant to § 6351(f)(9). Significantly, there was no indication in that 

order that CYF either identified a compelling reason to forego the 

termination of rights at that juncture or declared that the family had not 

been provided sufficient reunification services. See CYF Exhibit 3 

(Permanency Review Order, 8/26/13, at 1-2, 4). To the contrary, the trial 

court explicitly found that CYF used reasonable efforts toward finalizing the 

permanency plan goal of reunification. Id. at 1. 

In denying CYF’s motion to withdraw the involuntary termination 

petition, the trial court reasoned that it would be unreasonable to require the 

agency to file a petition for termination yet permit it to withdraw the petition 

absent one of the enumerated exceptions. As none of the exceptions was

apparently applicable and since P.Z. had been in placement for twenty-seven 

months by that juncture, the court denied the agency’s petition to withdraw. 
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We find no basis to disturb the trial court’s determination. The 

certified record reveals that CYF expended substantial resources on its 

reunification efforts. The agency contacted Father in Arizona prior to the 

adjudication of dependency. N.T., 6/25/14, at 118. Father declined to 

participate in the adjudication hearing and failed to execute an 

acknowledgment of paternity. Id. at 135. He did not submit to the DNA 

test verifying P.Z.’s paternity until September of 2012, seven months later. 

Id. In the meantime, Father was not eligible to receive services. However, 

CYF continued to treat him as the putative father, developed FSP goals for 

him, and notified him of his goals by telephone and mail. Id. at 98, 136, 

145. Additionally, CYF invited him to participate by telephone in 

permanency meetings. Id. at 136. 

Once paternity was established, CYF referred Father to an Arizona 

child service agency under the Interstate Compact for the Placement of 

Children ("ICPC"), 62 PS § 761. The referral process required a home study, 

a criminal record check, and a social history interview. Without the 

interstate compact, Father could not have custody of P.Z. in Arizona and CYF 

could not refer Father to services out of state. N.T., 6/25/14, at 142. CYF 

submitted the ICPC documents to Arizona on January 10, 2013, and the 

Arizona agency denied ICPC referral the ensuing May. Id. at 141-142. One 

of the reasons that the Arizona agency rejected the ICPC request stemmed 

from the agency’s determination that Father was unable to provide a safe 

and stable home. Additionally, Father did not complete the required 
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documentation process or fingerprinting requirements. He also failed the 

criminal background check component of the ICPC review. 

Despite the foregoing defaults, which proved insurmountable for 

Father, CYF provided him transportation and hotel fare to meet with P.Z. 

The first meeting occurred during April 2013, when P.Z. was fourteen 

months old. Id. at 142-143. The agency also established roughly two 

months of online contact between Father and P.Z. via Skype; however, that 

contact terminated abruptly after Father broke his tablet and failed to inform 

CYF of his unavailability. Id. at 164-165. After the trial court ordered CYF 

to file a petition to terminate parental rights due to Father’s demonstrated 

lack of initiative, the agency increased its reunification efforts. Id. 165-167. 

It delayed filing the petition for six months, and in the meantime, it provided 

Father extensive services, including airfare to Pittsburgh and 

accommodations to visit with P.Z. during November of 2013 and January, 

March, and April of 2014. Id. at 166, 169-171. CYF also reinitiated the 

Skype contacts in March 2014. Id. at 166. Additionally, based upon 

Father’s ephemeral interest in relocating to Pittsburgh, the agency referred 

him to the Urban League and Holy Family for assistance in locating and 

obtaining housing. Id. at 176-177. However, as of the date of the 

termination proceedings six to eight months later, Father had yet to commit 

to relocating to Pittsburgh. Id. at 178. 

The foregoing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that 

CYF made reasonable efforts to promote reunification. Father’s argument 
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that he was not provided with necessary services to achieve reunification 

within the fifteen-to-twenty-two-month time frame is meritless. 

Additionally, we observe that, contrary to Father’s position, the trial court’s 

denial of the petition to withdraw was not tantamount to an order 

terminating his parental rights. Indeed, CYF was still required to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination under 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a) and (b). Accordingly, we reject Father’s claim that 

the trial court erred in denying CYF’s motion to withdraw the petition to 

terminate his parental rights. 

Next, we encounter Father’s contention that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to dismiss CYF’s petition at the close of the agency’s 

case-in-chief. This issue has two components. First, Father argues that the 

court erred as a matter of law in concluding that it was required to consider 

evidence adduced by the guardian ad litem prior to ruling on the agency’s 

motion. Second, Father argues that CYF did not present sufficient evidence 

to endure his challenge. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the 

trial court did not commit an error of law and that CYF satisfied its burden of 

proving the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. 

Initially, we reject Father’s assertion that the trial court denied his 

motion to dismiss based upon its inaccurate belief that it had to hear 

evidence from the guardian ad litem before assessing the petition. Indeed, 

in complete contrast to Father’s assertion that the trial court permitted CYF 

to share its statutory burden of proof with the guardian ad litem, the record 
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makes clear that the trial court assessed the agency’s evidence 

independently and concluded that the petition to terminate Father’s parental 

rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Significantly, the 

court rendered its conclusion before Father or the guardian ad litem

introduced any evidence in this case. After discussing the agency’s burden 

of proof and the guardian ad litem’s role in the termination proceedings, the 

trial court had the following exchange with Father’s counsel: 

[Father’s Counsel]: Your honor, I respectfully—I understand 

very well what the Court stated. However, again, it is not the 

[guardian ad litem’s] petition, it is not the [guardian ad litem’s] 

burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence, so that is the 

grounds and especially if the Court states that the Court did not 

find [CYF’s] testimony credible—

The Court: I am talking about the [CYF] caseworker. I did 

not find the [CYF] caseworker’s testimony credible about her 

opinion about what she believes is the best interest of this child. 

I did not find her credible. But other than that, I believe that 

there are sufficient facts that [CYF] has proven based on the 

facts of this case and what has happened for [P.Z.] and what the 

father has done or failed to do, but there is clear and 

convincing evidence right now. 

N.T., 7/21/14, at 10 (emphasis added). 

As demonstrated by the foregoing excerpt, the record belies Father’s 

argument that the trial court eased CYF’s burden of proof or shifted part of it 

to the guardian ad litem. In reality, the trial court did not consider any 

evidence adduced by the guardian ad litem when it denied Father’s motion 

to dismiss the termination proceedings. The court simply measured CYF’s 
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evidence and examined the credibility of the two witnesses that it presented. 

Father’s argument is meritless. 

Finally, the record sustains the trial court’s conclusion that CYF 

established the statutory grounds to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). This Court reviews the determination of the 

trial court for an abuse of discretion. In re D.C.D. 105 A.3d 662, 670-671 

(Pa. 2014) (“When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a 

termination of parental rights petition, an appellate court should apply an 

abuse of discretion standard, accepting the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations if they are supported by the record, and reversing only if the 

trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion.”). This is a highly 

deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the court’s 

decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also 

support a contrary determination. In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 477 (Pa.Super. 

2010). As noted, CYF has the burden of proving the statutory grounds for 

termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 

A.3d 1098 (Pa. 2011). 

Requests to terminate the parental rights of a biological parent are 

governed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). The statute provides in pertinent 

part, 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . . . 
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical 

or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for 

a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent 

cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period 

of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve 

the needs and welfare of the child. 

. . . .

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 

months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

The test for terminating parental rights consists of two parts. In In re 

L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007), we explained:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

Initially, we reject Father’s preliminary contention that the trial court 

erred in considering Dr. Rosenblum’s testimony in determining whether CYF 

adduced sufficient evidence to terminate parental rights. He maintains that 

Dr. Rosenblum only confronted P.Z.’s needs and welfare under § 2511(b) 

rather than the substantive allegations under § 2511(a). Father is mistaken. 

It is beyond argument that § 2511(a)(5) and (8) specifically require 

petitioners to establish that “termination of the parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child.” Likewise, since Dr. Rosenblum 

also addressed Father’s parenting ability, finding Father’s skills marginal, 

and opined that Father lacked capacity to parent P.Z., his testimony also 

was relevant in establishing the statutory grounds outlined in § 2511(a)(2), 

i.e., “The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the 
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parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care.” Thus, no 

relief is due. 

Next, we review the merits of the court’s decision to terminate 

parental rights. We need only agree with the court’s decision as to one 

subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and the subsection (b) analysis in order 

to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Herein, the certified record supports the 

trial court’s determination that CYF established the statutory grounds to 

terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and 

(b). Hence, we do not address the remaining statutory grounds.

We have explained our review of the evidence pursuant to 

§ 2511(a)(8), as follows: 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) 

The child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or 

more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

Thus, in order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(8) in the case at bar, 

CYF was required to produce clear and convincing evidence that: (1) P.Z. 

has been removed from Father for at least twelve months; (2) the conditions 

which led to the child’s removal continue to exist; and (3) involuntary 

termination of parental rights would best serve P.Z.’s needs and welfare. 
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See In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

Herein, P.Z. was placed with CYF during April 2012, when the newborn 

displayed sustained symptoms from opiate withdrawal and Father was 

physically absent and unavailable to parent. The agency plainly satisfied the 

threshold requirement that the child be removed for at least twelve months. 

Furthermore, as it relates to the continued existence of the conditions that 

predicated P.Z.’s removal, the certified record demonstrates that Father 

remains unable to provide essential parental care. Likewise, the record 

establishes that terminating Father’s parental rights would best serve P.Z.’s 

needs and welfare. Hence, for the reasons we discuss below, we sustain the 

trial court’s conclusion that CYF satisfied its burden of proof.

During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Rosenblum testified that between 

July 2013 and April 2014, he conducted two interactional evaluations 

between P.Z. and Father and performed one individual evaluation with 

Father.7 N.T., 6/25/14, at 23. Additionally, over that period, Dr. Rosenblum 

performed three interactional evaluations between P.Z. and his long-term 

preadoptive foster mother. Id. at 23. Dr. Rosenblum identified problematic 

____________________________________________

7 CYF also presented testimony from its caseworker, Ms. Malika Mason, who 

outlined the agency’s interactions with Father and opined that termination 

was not warranted because Father complied with all of his FSP goals. 

However, noting that Ms. Mason failed to demand that Father support his 

asserted accomplishments with documentation verifying that he actually 

completed the required programs and services, the trial court found that Ms. 

Mason’s testimony and opinions lacked credibility. See Trial Court Opinion, 

10-15-14, at 5-6, 8-11. 
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patterns in Father’s behavior regarding “the stability of his personal 

functioning, the direction of his lifestyle, and personality characteristics that 

would not be able to provide a stable family life, or secure family life for his 

son.” Id. at 35. 

Dr. Rosenblum found Father’s parenting to be limited and marginal. 

Id. at 67. He characterized Father’s parenting style as passive, nonresponsive, and incapable of providing P.Z. structure. Id. Dr. Rosenblum 

highlighted that Father failed to engage P.Z. in learning activities or set 

limits during the interactional evaluations. He also observed that, although 

Father was pleasant and used appropriate tones with P.Z., Father was not 

proactive, instructional, or capable of establishing behavioral boundaries. 

Id. at 67-68. Dr. Rosenblum stated, “he did not set limits, [he] allowed 

[P.Z.] to climb dangerously [and] throw toys indiscriminately.” Id. Thus, 

Dr. Rosenblum outright rejected the position that Father demonstrated 

sufficient parenting abilities. He stated, “So I would definitely disagree with 

any conclusion that father displays age appropriate parenting skills for 

[P.Z.]” Id. at 68. 

As it relates to P.Z.’s wellbeing and the absence of a meaningful 

parent-child bond, Dr. Rosenblum stressed that, while P.Z. was familiar with 

Father, no attachment existed. Id. at 34, 40. He explained, “There is no 

history of father engaging in a caregiving relationship with [P.Z.], having to 

take responsibility for him over an extended period of time.” Id. at 40. He 
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continued, “An attachment comes out of a care giving role and out of a 

repeated history of living and continuing a relationship with someone and 

having them meet a variety of developmental needs over a period of time, 

[such as] what I observed between [P.Z.] and foster mother.” Id. at 40-41. 

For example, Dr. Rosenblum referenced an incident during one of the fatherson interactional evaluations during which P.Z. began requesting his foster 

mother. Dr. Rosenblum testified that Father did an adequate job of 

consoling the child; however, the incident was evidence that P.Z. “had not 

identified father as a surrogate or alternative caregiver who could calm 

him[,] reassure him and make him feel fully comfortable.” Id. at 32. He 

opined that the parent-child relationship had not started early enough for 

P.Z. to develop an attachment to Father. Thus, Dr. Rosenblum concluded 

that terminating Father’s parental rights best served P.Z.’s needs and 

welfare and that, in light of the nurturing, supportive, and secure 

environment that the preadoptive foster mother provides, the evidence 

warranted proceeding with adoption. Id. at 41-42, 50. Tellingly, when 

Father’s counsel suggested a hypothetical possibility of utilizing subsidized 

permanent legal custody (“SPLC”) in lieu of adoption, Dr. Rosenblum 

reinforced, “in [P.Z.’s] case[,] I believe that adoption is far more superior 

than SPLC.” Id. at 55. 

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we find that the record 

sustains the trial court’s determination that CYF established the statutory 
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grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and 

confirms that terminating Father’s parental rights best satisfies P.Z.’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare under § 2511(b). 

Thus, we affirm the trial court order terminating Father’s parental rights to 

P.Z. pursuant to § 2511(a) and (b). 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/10/2015