SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA 

En Banc

CONNIE WILHELM, a citizen and ) Arizona Supreme Court 

qualified elector of Maricopa ) No. CV-08-0269-AP/EL 

County, ROBERT A. SHANK, a ) 

citizen and qualified elector of ) Maricopa County 

Maricopa County, and EDWARD P. ) Superior Court 

TACZANOWSKY, a citizen and ) No. CV2008-017368 

qualified elector of Pima County, ) 

 ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) O P I N I O N 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

 ) 

JANICE K. BREWER, in her ) 

official capacity as Secretary ) 

of State for the State of ) 

Arizona; and THE BOARDS OF ) 

SUPERVISORS OF APACHE, COCHISE, ) 

COCONINO, GILA, GRAHAM, GREENLEE, ) 

LA PAZ, MARICOPA, MOHAVE, ) 

NAVAJO, PIMA, PINAL, SANTA CRUZ, ) 

YAVAPAI, and YUMA COUNTIES, in ) 

their official capacities, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants/Appellees, ) 

 ) 

 and ) 

 ) 

HOMEOWNERS' BILL OF RIGHTS ) 

COMMITTEE, an unincorporated ) 

association, ) 

 ) 

 Real Party in Interest. ) 

 ) 

_________________________________ ) 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

The Honorable Sam J. Myers, Judge

Affirmed

________________________________________________________________
2

GAMMAGE & BURNHAM, PLC Phoenix

 By Lisa T. Hauser

 Gregory J. Gnepper

 Heather J. Boysel

Attorneys for Connie Wilhelm, Robert A. Shank, and 

Edward P. Taczanowsky

TERRY GODDARD, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix

 By Tanja K. Shipman, Assistant Attorney General 

 Barbara A. Bailey, Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Janice K. Brewer

TERENCE C. HANCE, COCONINO COUNTY ATTORNEY Flagstaff

 By Jean E. Wilcox, Deputy County Attorney

Attorneys for Coconino County Board of Supervisors

BARBARA LAWALL, PIMA COUNTY ATTORNEY Tucson

 By Daniel S. Jurkowitz, Deputy County Attorney

Attorneys for Pima County Board of Supervisors

DAVIS, COWELL & BOWE, LLP San Francisco, CA

 By Andrew J. Kahn 

 Elizabeth A. Lawrence 

Attorneys for Homeowners’ Bill of Rights Committee

________________________________________________________________

R Y A N, Justice 

¶1 Connie Wilhelm and others (“Wilhelm”) challenged the 

petition form circulated by the Homeowners’ Bill of Rights 

Committee (“proponents”) in an action under Arizona Revised 

Statute (“A.R.S.”) section 19-122(C) (2002). The petition 

proposed an initiative measure called the Homeowners’ Bill of 

Rights. Wilhelm sought an order barring the Secretary of State 

from placing the measure on the 2008 general election ballot. 

After a hearing, a superior court judge rejected Wilhelm’s 

claims. Wilhelm timely appealed, and we affirmed the superior 

court’s judgment by order. This opinion explains our order. We 
3

have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3), of the Arizona 

Constitution and A.R.S. § 19-122(C). 

I 

A 

¶2 When considering challenges to the form of initiative 

petitions, Arizona courts follow a rule of “substantial 

compliance.” Feldmeier v. Watson (Citizens for Responsible 

Growth), 211 Ariz. 444, 447-48, ¶¶ 14-15, 123 P.3d 180, 183-84 

(2005). The rule recognizes that before errors in petition 

formalities will be found to bar a measure from the ballot, a 

court must determine whether the petition, considered “as a 

whole,” “fulfills the purpose of the relevant statutory or 

constitutional requirements, despite a lack of strict or 

technical compliance.” Id. Our analysis generally considers 

several factors, “including the nature of the constitutional or 

statutory requirements, the extent to which the petitions differ 

from the requirements, and the purpose of the requirements.” 

Id.

¶3 Wilhelm contends that this petition is not legally 

sufficient “(1) because it has no title, (2) its text is not 

full and correct and (3) its petition summary is invalid.” 

Wilhelm also asks this Court to reconsider the “substantial 

compliance” standard. We decline to reconsider our standard of 

review for initiative petitions and conclude that the petition 
4

substantially complied with the statutory and constitutional 

requirements. 

B 

¶4 We begin with the claim that the measure includes no 

title because the measure’s name neither precedes its text, nor 

is centered to indicate it is, in fact, a title. The superior 

court concluded that the petition has a title that complies with 

Arizona law. 

¶5 The Arizona Constitution and a statute require that 

when an initiative petition is circulated for signatures, a copy 

of the measure including its “title and text” must be included. 

Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(9) (“Each sheet containing 

petitioners’ signatures shall be attached to a full and correct 

copy of the title and text of the measure so proposed . . . .”); 

A.R.S. § 19-112(B) (“The signature sheets shall be attached at 

all times during circulation to a full and correct copy of the 

title and text of the measure or constitutional amendment 

proposed or referred by the petition.”). 

¶6 We have held that the title and text provision merely 

requires “some title and some text.” Meyers v. Bayless, 192 

Ariz. 376, 378, ¶ 10, 965 P.2d 768, 770 (1998) (quoting Barth v. 

White, 40 Ariz. 548, 556, 14 P.2d 743, 746 (1932)). We further 

stated that a “title should precede the measure.” Id. at 378, 

¶¶ 11-12, 965 P.2d at 770. Although the title in Meyers
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appeared in the substantive text of the initiative, we 

nonetheless found substantial compliance with the constitutional 

requirement. Id. We explained that a provision that identified 

“Article 2” as the “CITIZENS CLEAN ELECTIONS ACT” qualified as a 

title because it was offset from the other text and because 

there was only one article, avoiding any confusion. Id. at ¶ 

12. 

¶7 Section 1 of the petition here bears the heading of 

“Title” and provides, “This act may be cited as the ‘Homeowners’ 

Bill of Rights.’” Thus, the “title” is clearly denominated as 

such and is contained in its own section. We conclude that the 

“title” in this petition complies with the requirements of 

Article 4, Part 1, Section 1(9) and A.R.S. § 19-112(B). 

¶8 Wilhelm, however, suggests that the Court’s review of 

the title requirement has “eroded” since Barth was decided. She 

contends that our cases interpreting Article 4, Part 2, Section 

13, the single-subject rule, should dictate the result in this 

case. 

¶9 In contrast to Article 4, Part 1, Section 1(9), the 

single-subject rule expressly requires that acts “embrace but 

one subject” to be included in a title, and provisions not 

encompassed in the title are “void.” Art. 4, pt. 2, § 13. 

Article 4, Part 1, Section 1(9), on the other hand, has no 

equivalent provisions. Cf. Feldmeier, 211 Ariz. at 447, ¶ 13, 
6

123 P.3d at 183 (“[I]f the Constitution expressly and explicitly 

makes any departure fatal, the initiative cannot be placed on 

the ballot.”) (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and citation 

omitted). Further, even in applying the explicit charge of the 

single-subject rule, our interpretation is not “narrowly 

technical,” and thus “we construe legislation liberally in favor 

of its constitutionality.” Clean Elections Inst., Inc. v. 

Brewer, 209 Ariz. 241, 243, ¶ 4, 99 P.3d 570, 572 (2004) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Consequently, 

we are not persuaded by Wilhelm’s argument. 

C 

¶10 In 1991, the Legislature amended the initiative 

statutes to require that the petition form include text of “no 

more than one hundred words” describing “the principal 

provisions of the proposed measure . . . .” 1991 Ariz. Sess. 

Laws, ch. 1, § 6 (3d Spec. Sess.) (codified and amended at 

A.R.S. § 19-102(A)). The statute also requires that the 

petition contain the following notice:

[T]his is only a description of the proposed 

measure . . . prepared by the sponsor of the 

measure. It may not include every provision 

contained in the measure. Before signing, 

make sure the title and text of the measure 

are attached. You have the right to read or 

examine the title and text before signing. 

A.R.S. § 19-102(A). Here the petition included a summary and 

the required notice. But Wilhelm claims that the summary in 
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this case is fatally defective because it fails to refer to one 

provision of the proposed measure. 

¶11 The summary stated the following: 

Ten-year warranty on new homes. Right to 

demand correction of construction defects or 

compensation. Homeowners participate in 

selecting contractors to do repair work. 

They can sue if no agreement with the 

builder. No liability for builders’ 

attorney and expert fees but homeowner can 

recover these costs. Homeowners can 

sometimes recover compensatory and 

consequential damages. Disclosure of 

builders’ relationships with financial 

institutions. Model homes must reflect what 

is actually for sale. Right to cancel 

within 100 days and get back most of the 

deposit. Prohibiting sellers’ agents from 

participating in false mortgage 

applications. 

The summary did not refer to a proposed amendment to A.R.S. § 

12-552, which proposes extending the statute of repose for 

certain actions concerning “real property” from eight to ten 

years. 

¶12 Wilhelm concedes that the legislature did not intend 

that every feature of a measure be included in the 100-word 

description. Nevertheless, Wilhelm maintains that without the 

repose term the summary here is misleading both on its face and 

in the context of the measure’s broader presentation. The 

summary plainly omits any reference to the extension of the 

statute of repose, which Wilhelm contends may affect not only 
8

home construction, but also other property litigation.1 Further, 

petition signers who read the summary would have to read the 

entire measure to find the statute of repose provision in the 

very last section. This is particularly important, Wilhelm 

argues, because although traditionally statutory sections are 

presented in numerical order, the framers of this measure placed 

the proposed amendment to A.R.S. § 12-552 at the back, not the 

front, of the initiative text. Wilhelm argues that by omitting 

the section from the summary and placing it in the back of the 

text, the proponents sought to mislead voters. 

¶13 In rejecting Wilhelm’s arguments, the superior court 

relied on our decision in Kromko v. Superior Court (Miller), 168 

Ariz. 51, 811 P.2d 12 (1991). In that case, the text of the 

measure under review included short titles that were not 

specifically called for by statute. Id. at 57-59, 811 P.2d at 

18-20. We concluded that the short titles were accurate, if 

incomplete, and noted that “[w]e cannot say that a title’s 

failure to describe every aspect of a proposed measure always 

creates the degree of fraud, confusion, and unfairness 

sufficient to invalidate the petition upon which the title 

                                                           

1

 We do not address what A.R.S § 12-552 would mean if the 

measure is approved by the voters and becomes law. Cf. Winkle 

v. City of Tucson, 190 Ariz. 413, 415, 949 P.2d 502, 504 (1997) 

(“Voter initiatives, part and parcel of the legislative process, 

receive the same judicial deference as proposals before the 

state legislature — courts are powerless to determine their 

substantive validity unless and until they are adopted.”). 
9

rests.” Id. at 60, 811 P.2d at 21. Further, any fear of fraud 

was mitigated by the fact that the measure itself was available 

to voters for inspection and the omitted information was not 

contrary to the thrust of the measure. Id.

¶14 We agree with the superior court. The omission of the 

proposed extension of the statute of repose in the proponents’ 

description of the measure was not fraudulent and did not create 

confusion or mislead. The proponents included the warning 

required by the legislature and informed signers that the 

summary had been prepared by initiative supporters and advised 

them to review the entire measure. Thus, potential signers were 

warned that the summary description may not be complete or 

unbiased. 

¶15 Substantively, the proposed amendment regarding the 

statute of repose is consistent with the ten-year warranty that 

both the summary and the text highlight. In this context, the 

order of the statutory provisions does not create fatal falsity 

under the standard declared in Kromko. Id. at 59, 811 P.2d at 

20 (agreeing with criticism of short titles that “contain[] 

either untrue representations designed to defraud potential 

signatories, or highly inflammatory language calculated to 

incite partisan rage”). Neither the initiative measure nor the 

summary improperly obscures the proposed two-year extension to 
10

the statute of repose.2

D

¶16 Wilhelm also claims that the petition is defective 

because part of the initiative text was not properly capitalized 

to indicate newly proposed language. Section 19-112(B) requires 

that the text of an initiative provision “indicate material 

added or new material by printing the letters of the material in 

capital letters.” In this case, some limited material was not 

capitalized, including “a caption and an incomplete sentence.” 

¶17 The language in question was presented in the 

following way: 

12-1365.02. Applicability; claims and actions

A purchaser may bring an action against a seller for 

violation of section 12-1365.01 and shall be entitled to 

recover in such action ANY OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING RELIEF. 

(a) INJUNCTIVE OR OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF TO 

RESTRAIN ANY VIOLATION OF SECTION 12-

1365.01; 

(b) RESCISSION OF ANY CONTRACT TO PURCHASE A 

DWELLING MADE IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 12-

1365.01; 

(c) ANY ACTUAL DAMAGES CAUSED BY ANY VIOLATION 

OF SECTION 12-1365.01; 

(d) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR WILLFUL VIOLATION 

OF SECTION 12-1365.01; AND 

(e) REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES, REASONABLE EXPERT 

WITNESS FEES AND TAXABLE COSTS. 

                                                           

2 In Kromko, the plaintiff submitted evidence that signers 

were misled. Id. at 59, 811 P.2d at 20. In contrast, the 

superior court here stated that “[p]laintiffs submitted no 

evidence that any voter was misled or confused by” any of the 

issues raised. 
11

Wilhelm contends that because the title and the first portion of 

the provision are not capitalized, § 19-112(B) was violated and 

therefore the petition was fatally defective. The superior 

court concluded that the error was not fatal because the context 

of the provisions made clear that the language not capitalized 

is new. 

¶18 The purpose of A.R.S. § 19-112(B) is to call attention 

to amended and added language. Any failure of the present 

petition not to comply is not fatal for two reasons. First, the 

provision with regard to capitalization is less critical to the 

statute’s purpose when entirely new provisions, rather than the 

amendment of existing provisions, are proposed. Second, the 

context confirms that “[v]iewed as a whole” these provisions 

envision new laws, regardless of the typography. See Feldmeier, 

211 Ariz. at 449, ¶ 25, 123 P.3d at 185. The non-capitalized 

language derives its meaning from the capitalized sections 

preceding it. Consequently, the failure to capitalize the 

language did not cause the measure to fail to substantially 

comply with the statutory requirements. 

E 

¶19 Finally, we decline Wilhelm’s invitation to revisit 

our standard of substantial compliance review for initiative 

petitions. Wilhelm argues that this Court’s standard for 

evaluating initiative petitions has eroded such that the 
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requirements to place a measure before voters are “near 

extinction.” As a result, she claims, voters have become too 

empowered, the process has been abused, and some support 

restricting the process. We do not believe, however, that the 

possibility that some people may favor modifying the 

constitutional and statutory laws for initiatives is a 

sufficient reason for us to abandon our long-established 

standard of substantial compliance under the laws as they now 

exist. 

II 

¶20 Based on the forgoing, we affirm the superior court’s 

judgment. 

 _______________________________________ 

 Michael D. Ryan, Justice 

CONCURRING: 

_______________________________________ 

Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice 

_______________________________________ 

Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice 

_______________________________________ 

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice 

_______________________________________ 

W. Scott Bales, Justice