2015 IL App (1st) 143181

No. 1-14-3181

Opinion filed March 20, 2015 

 FIFTH DIVISION

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT 

In re MICHAEL D., ) 

a Minor ) 

 ) 

(The People of the State of Illinois, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

Michael D., a Minor, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant). ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County.

No. 13 JD 20137

The Honorable

Richard F. Walsh, 

Judge, presiding.

 

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices McBride and Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 OPINION
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¶ 1 Defendant Michael D., a minor, was found guilty of one count of theft by 

deception, and placed on supervision for one year pursuant to a newly enacted 

provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act). Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. 

Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 2012)). 

¶ 2 The new provision allows a trial court to "enter an order of continuance 

under supervision" even after "a finding of delinquency." Pub. Act 98-62, § 5

(eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 2012)). Prior to the 

amendment of the Act, a trial court could enter a supervision order only before

a finding of delinquency (In re Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d 134, 146 (2010)), and a 

supervision order before a delinquency finding was an interlocutory order that 

was generally not appealable.1 In re M.W.W., 125 Ill. App. 3d 833, 835 (1984);

In re A.M., 94 Ill. App. 3d 86, 90 (1981).

¶ 3 The question before us is whether we are also without jurisdiction to 

consider a supervision order entered after a delinquency finding, which the 

2014 amendment now permits. The State argues that we lack jurisdiction, while 

defendant argues that we have jurisdiction and should proceed to review his

substantive claims challenging the underlying finding of guilt. 

 1 One exception to this general rule is a restitution order, which has been 

held to be immediately appealable when also part of a supervision order. E.g., In 

re Shatavia S., 403 Ill. App. 3d 414, 417 (2010) (recognized "the authority to 

review restitution orders as a part of the conditions of a minor's supervision"). 

However, defendant does not contest his order of restitution so this exception is not 

at issue.
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¶ 4 For the following reasons, we agree with the State and conclude that the 

supervision order is interlocutory and that we lack jurisdiction to review it.

¶ 5 BACKGROUND

¶ 6 The facts of the underlying offense do not affect the resolution of the 

jurisdictional issue. Thus, we recite here only the procedural history of the 

case.

¶ 7 On October 30, 2013, the State filed a petition for adjudication of 

wardship which alleged that Michael D., who was then 16 years old, committed 

two counts of theft. Count I alleged that on or about September 27, 2013, 

defendant knowingly obtained control over stolen property, namely an "Iphone," under such circumstances as would have reasonably induced him to 

believe that the property was stolen, and with the intent to deprive the owner 

permanently of its use and benefit.

¶ 8 Count II alleged that defendant obtained, by deception, control over the 

property of another, namely, $160 in cash, with the intent to deprive that person

permanently of his money. 

¶ 9 After a bench trial, on April 21, 2014, the court stated "[t]here will be a 

finding of guilty" and then entered a written "Trial Order," which was a 

preprinted form. The order, as completed by the court, stated: "The court 
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having heard the evidence and arguments at trial enters a finding of: Guilty of 

count(s) 1 + 2 of the petition." 

¶ 10 On July 14, 2014, defendant filed a motion to reconsider. On August 11, 

2014, after hearing argument from both sides, the trial court stated: "On your 

motion to reconsider I have found him not guilty on Count 1. Your motion to 

reconsider is denied on Count 2." The trial court then entered a written 

"Continuance Order," which stated "Motion to Reconsider Granted for Ct #1, 

denied for Ct #2" and which continued the case for sentencing. 

¶ 11 In the presentence report, dated October 20, 2014, the probation officer 

recommended that "the minor be placed on 1 year Supervision" with certain 

conditions, such as community service. 

¶ 12 At the sentencing hearing on October 20, 2014, the State asked for "one 

year probation," and defense counsel responded: "Supervision is definitely 

something that we would argue for as [a] means of disposition in this case." 

The only condition of supervision to which defense counsel objected was a 

referral to "Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities, Inc." (TASC), for a 

drug evaluation. The trial court held: "I am going to follow the 

recommendation of the probation officer, and place the minor on one year 

supervision with the probation officer." The court also ordered the conditions 

recommended by the presentence report including the TASC referral, and 
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advised defendant of his appeal rights. A six-month progress report was set for

April 20, 2015, and the trial court appointed the State Appellate Defender to 

represent defendant on appeal.

¶ 13 In a written order entitled "Probation (Supervision) Order" order, dated 

October 20, 2014, the trial court adopted the probation officer's 

recommendation and placed defendant on "supervision" for one year with 

certain conditions, such as community service. The order, which is a preprinted 

form, provided the court with the option of circling either "Probation" or 

"Supervision," and the court circled "Supervision," so the order states: "you 

have been placed on Supervision." The order informed defendant that, if he 

violated the terms of his supervision, the court could revoke it and "sentence 

you on the original offense." A "Progress Report/Termination Hearing" was set 

for "4-20-14," which contained a transcription error with respect to the year.

¶ 14 On October 20, 2014, the trial court also entered a "Sentencing Order" 

which was another preprinted form and which stated: "No finding or judgment 

of guilty entered. The minor is placed on supervision for a period of 1 year." 

The sentencing order reiterated the conditions stated in the supervision order 

and stated that the "case is continued." 

¶ 15 On October 20, 2014, the trial court also entered a written order 

appointing the State Appellate Defender "for purposes of an appeal in this 
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matter," and on October 23, 2014, the State Appellate Defender filed a notice of 

appeal. This appeal followed.

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 The threshold question is whether we have jurisdiction to consider a 

juvenile supervision order entered after a finding of guilt. The State argues that 

we lack jurisdiction; and defendant argues that we have jurisdiction and should 

proceed to consider his substantive claims challenging the trial court's finding

of guilt.

¶ 18 Defendant's postdelinquency supervision is permitted by a new provision 

of the Act (Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-

615(1) (West 2012))). Neither party cited a case discussing the 2014 

amendment. Only one reviewing court has cited the 2014 amendment, and that 

case concerned an unrelated issue. In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶¶ 4, 52 

(the 2014 amendment, which allowed a trial court to order post-guilt 

supervision even over the State's objection, did not render moot the State's 

appeal from the circuit court's order declaring unconstitutional the Act's 

prohibition of pre-guilt supervision without the State's approval).

¶ 19 For the following reasons, we conclude that the order appealed from is an 

interlocutory order, and that we lack jurisdiction to review it. In re Lance H., 
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7 

2014 IL 114899, ¶ 12 (we must always consider our own jurisdiction "[a]s a 

threshold inquiry"). 

¶ 20 I. Standard of Review

¶ 21 The issue of whether the Act and the applicable Supreme Court Rules 

authorize appellate jurisdiction in this case is a question of statutory 

interpretation, which we review de novo. People v. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, 

¶ 34 (citing People v. Elliott, 2014 IL 115308, ¶ 11). The primary objective of 

statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature's intent, which is best 

indicated by the plain language of the statute itself. State ex rel. Pusateri v. 

Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 2014 IL 116844, ¶ 8 (citing Citizens Opposing 

Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 23). Where the 

language is plain and unambiguous, we apply the statute without resort to 

further aids of statutory interpretation. In re Lance H., 2014 IL 114899, ¶ 11. 

However, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, we will interpret the statute in the 

way most favorable to the defendant. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 31 (citing 

People v. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d 295, 302-04 (2004)). We also consider the statute 

in its entirety, the reason for the law, the problems that the legislature intended 

to remedy with this law, and the consequences of construing it one way or the 

other. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 34 (we "also consider the reason for the law 

and the problems intended to be remedied"); People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 
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114121, ¶ 21 (we consider "the statute in its entirety, its nature and object, and 

the consequences of construing it one way or the other").

¶ 22 II. Stages of a Juvenile Proceeding

¶ 23 Since we must consider the Act in its entirety, we briefly describe here 

the overall scheme of the Act.

¶ 24 The Act provides for three distinct stages of a juvenile delinquency 

procceding: "[(1)] the findings phase, [(2)] the adjudicatory phase, and [(3)] the 

dispositional phase." In re Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d 134, 144 (2010); In re 

Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 365 (2009); People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 226 

Ill. 2d 445, 451 (2007).

¶ 25 The first or "findings" stage consists of a trial, which was previously 

called an " 'adjudicatory hearing.' " Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at 144. Our 

supreme court no longer uses the term "adjudication" to refer to the finding of 

guilt or delinquency which concludes the first stage, apparently because it was 

too easily confused with the adjudication of wardship, which concludes the 

second stage. Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at 144; Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at 365 

("the adjudication phase" is "where the court determines whether *** to make 

the minor a ward of the court"). 

¶ 26 During the first or "findings" stage, "the trial court applies the reasonable 

doubt standard of proof and the rules of evidence that would be followed in a 
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criminal case, to determine whether the minor is guilty as charged and should 

thus be adjudged delinquent." Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at 144-45; Samantha V., 

234 Ill. 2d at 365; Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 452. "In a juvenile delinquency case, a 

finding of guilt and a finding of delinquency are one and the same." Veronica 

C., 239 Ill. 2d at 145. In the case at bar, the trial court stated in open court and 

in its "Trial Order" and "Continuance Order" that it found defendant guilty of 

one count of the wardship petition. Thus the first or "findings" phase was 

complete, concluding with the trial court's reconsidered finding of guilt or 

delinquency on August 11, 2014.

¶ 27 If a trial court decides to order supervision, it may do so either before or 

after a finding of guilt. Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 

ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 2012)). 

¶ 28 The second stage is "the adjudication phase, where the court determines 

whether it is in the best interests of the minor and the public to make the minor 

a ward of the court." Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at 145; Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 

at 365; Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 453. "Under the Juvenile Court Act, a dipositional

order is not to be entered until after the court has adjudged the minor a ward of 

the court." In re M.W.W., 125 Ill. App. 3d 833, 836 (1984). "It has been held 

that a minor need not be explicitly adjudged to be a ward of the court in order to 

give the court jurisdiction to enter a dispositional order. [Citation.] An 
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adjudication of wardship may be implied from the circumstances of the case." 

(Emphasis in original.) In re M.W.W., 125 Ill. App. 3d at 836 (citing In re J.N., 

91 Ill. 2d 122, 129 (1982)).

¶ 29 If the minor is made a ward of the court, the matter proceeds to the third 

or "dispositional phase, where the court fashions an appropriate sentence that 

will best serve the minor and the public." Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at 145;

Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at 365; Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 453. Section 5-710 of the 

Act is entitled "Kinds of sentencing orders," and it lists the kinds of sentencing 

orders which a trial court may enter during this third or dispositional stage. 705 

ILCS 405/5-710 (West 2012). This section provides for probation, conditional 

discharge, detention and other options, but it does not list supervision as an 

option at this point. 705 ILCS 405/5-710 (West 2012); Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d 

at 146 (section 5-710 of the Act lists "the only dispositional alternatives 

remaining" after a finding of guilty and " 'continuance under supervision' is not 

listed among them"). 

¶ 30 Supervision is different from the options listed in section 5-710 of the 

Act, in that it is "the most lenient" outcome possible for delinquency petitions, 

"except for dismissal of the petition." In re T.W., 101 Ill. 2d 438, 440 (1984). 

With supervision, the trial court may terminate the supervision "at any time if 

warranted by the conduct of the minor," or "vacate the finding of delinquency 
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or both." Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-

615(1) (West 2012)).

¶ 31 Both the second and third stages of a juvenile proceeding occur at 

"sentencing," which is then a bifurcated proceeding encompassing both stages. 

Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at 145. In the case at bar, the parties and the court 

referred to the proceeding on October 20, 2014, as a sentencing proceeding, and 

the trial court entered a "Sentencing Order" after its conclusion. However, the 

trial court never expressly stated that it had made the minor a ward of the court, 

and the "Sentencing Order" stated: "No finding or judgment of guilty entered. 

The minor is placed on supervision for a period of 1 year."

¶ 32 Thus, the parties do not agree whether the second and third stages were 

completed or whether defendant's supervision constitutes a final disposition or 

sentence from which he may appeal.

¶ 33 III. The New and Old Provisions

¶ 34 We now set forth the 2014 amendment and the prior 2012 law to 

ascertain the differences between them and hence the purpose of the 

amendment. 

¶ 35 The key difference is that the new law allows a trial court to "enter an 

order of continuance under supervision" even after "a finding of delinquency," 

(Pub. Act 98-62 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 
No. 1-14-3181

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2012))), while the 2012 law permitted a trial court to enter such an order only 

before a finding of delinquency. 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 2012) (the order 

could be entered either "before proceeding to adjudication, or after hearing the 

evidence at trial"); In re Danielle J., 2013 IL 110810, ¶ 35 (under the old 

statute, "a continuance under supervision was statutorily precluded once a 

finding of guilt was entered" (emphasis in original)); Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at

146 (once the trial "court had already found respondent guilty," supervision was 

"no longer" an option under the old statute). 

¶ 36 A. The New Provisions 

¶ 37 Effective January 1, 2014, section 5-615(1) of the Act was amended so 

that it now reads:

"(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under supervision 

for an offense other than first degree murder, a Class X felony or a 

forcible felony:

 (a) upon an admission or stipulation by the appropriate 

respondent or minor respondent of the facts supporting the petition 

and before the court makes a finding of delinquency, and in the 

absence of objection made in open court by the minor, his or her 

parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor's attorney or the State's 

Attorney; or
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 (b) upon a finding of delinquency and after considering the 

circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and condition 

of the minor, if the court is of the opinion that:

 (i) the minor is not likely to commit further crimes; 

 (ii) the minor and the public would be best served if the minor 

 were not to receive a criminal record; and 

 (iii) in the best interests of justice an order of continuance 

 under supervision is more appropriate than a sentence otherwise 

 permitted under this Act." Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) 

 (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 2012)). 

¶ 38 Since the trial court made "a finding of delinquency" in the case at bar,

subsection (b) applies, not subsection (a). Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) 

(amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 2012)). As we previously observed, 

"[i]n a juvenile delinquency case, a finding of guilt and a finding of delinquency 

are one and the same." Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at 145. The trial court 

expressly stated in open court that it found defendant guilty of one count of the 

wardship petition. "When the oral pronouncement of the court and the written 

order are in conflict, the oral pronouncement controls." People v. Jones, 376 

Ill. App. 3d 372, 395 (2007) (citing People v. Smith, 242 Ill. App. 3d 399, 402 

(1993)). See also People v. Lewis, 379 Ill. App. 3d 829, 837 (2008) ("When a 
No. 1-14-3181

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trial court's oral pronouncement conflicts with its written judgment, the oral 

pronouncement controls" (citing People v. Savage, 361 Ill. App. 3d 750, 762 

(2005) and People v. Smith, 242 Ill. App. 3d 399, 402 (1993)). Thus, the trial 

court made a "finding of delinquency" as stated in subsection (b), and 

subsection (b) applies rather than subsection (a). 

¶ 39 In addition to amending subsection (1) to add the option of post-guilt 

supervision, the 2014 law also made changes to subsections (4) and (7) of 

section 5-615. Subsection (4) was amended to add the words: "or vacate the 

finding of delinquency or both." Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) 

(amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(4) (West 2012)). Thus, subsection (4) now 

reads: "The court may terminate a continuance under supervision at any time if 

warranted by the conduct of the minor and the ends of justice or vacate the 

finding of delinquency or both." Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) 

(amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(4) (West 2012)). Since the 2014 amendment 

added, with the same stroke of the pen, both the option of post-guilt supervision 

and the authority to vacate the finding of guilt, there is no doubt that the trial 

court's authority to vacate applies to post-guilt supervision. The 2014 

amendment does not place any limits on the trial court's discretion to vacate its 

prior findings of guilt, except that the trial court's termination of supervision 

must be "warranted by the conduct of the minor and the ends of justice." Pub. 
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Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(4) (West 

2012)). 

¶ 40 In addition to adding the option of post-guilt supervision and the 

authority to vacate the guilty finding upon which that supervision was based,

the 2014 law also added that, if defendant violates the terms of his supervision, 

the court may then proceed to "adjudication and disposition." Pub. Act 98-62, 

§ 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(7) (West 2012)). This 

change indicates that post-guilt supervision occurs prior to "adjudication" of 

wardship. Previously the Act stated that, after a violation, "the court may 

proceed to [(1)] findings and [(2)] adjudication and [(3)] disposition" (705 ILCS 

405/5-615(7) (West 2012)), which are the three stages of a juvenile proceeding. 

E.g., Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at 144. After the 2014 amendment, the Act stated 

that "the court may proceed to [(A)] findings, adjudication, and disposition or 

[(B)] adjudication and disposition." Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) 

(amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(7) (West 2012)). The first clause, which 

existed prior to the 2014 amendment, covers cases prior to "findings" of guilt, 

while the second clause, which was added in 2014, covers the newly enacted 

post-guilt supervision. This change indicates that post-guilt supervision occurs 

prior to completion of the second stage, which is adjudication of wardship.
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Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at 145; Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at 365; Stralka, 226 Ill. 

2d at 453. 

¶ 41 B. The Old Statute

¶ 42 Prior to the 2014 amendment, section 5-615(1) of the Act stated: 

 "(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under supervision 

for an offense other than first degree murder, a Class X felony or a 

forcible felony (a) upon an admission or stipulation by the appropriate

respondent or minor respondent of the facts supporting the petition and 

before proceeding to adjudication, or after hearing the evidence at the 

trial, and (b) in the absence of objection made in open court by the minor, 

his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor's attorney or the 

State's Attorney." 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 2012). 

¶ 43 Thus, the old statute permitted the trial court to order "supervision" only 

prior to the trial court's finding of guilt. 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West 2012);

Danielle J., 2013 IL 110810, ¶ 35 (under the old statute, "a continuance under 

supervision was statutorily precluded once a finding of guilt was entered" 

(emphasis in original)); Veronica C., 239 Ill. 2d at 146 (once the trial "court had 

already found respondent guilty," supervision was "no longer" an option under 

the old statute). 
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¶ 44 IV. Jurisdiction Issue

¶ 45 Defendant argues that we have jurisdiction over this appeal because the 

order imposing supervision was a final judgment, and we have jurisdiction to 

hear appeals from "final judgments." In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 126 (1982) 

("Except where a rule of this court provides for an interlocutory appeal, the 

appellate court has jurisdiction to review only final judgments." (citing Ill. 

Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6)); Ill. S. Ct. R. 660(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001) (permitting 

"[a]ppeals from final judgments in delinquent minor proceedings" pursuant to

"the rules applicable to criminal cases"); In re B.C.P., 2013 IL 113908, ¶ 5 

(Rule 660(a) "covers appeals in delinquent minor cases, but it expressly 

incorporates the criminal appeals rules only as to final judgments"). 

¶ 46 "A judgment is final if it decides the controversy between the parties on 

the merits and fixes their rights, so that, if the judgment is affirmed, nothing 

remains for the trial court to do but to proceed with its execution." In re J.N., 

91 Ill. 2d at 127. "In criminal cases, there is no final judgment without a 

sentence." In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d at 127. "Similarly, in proceedings under the 

Juvenile Court Act, the dispositional order results in the final judgment." In re 

J.N., 91 Ill. 2d at 127; In re Justin L.V., 377 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1079 (2007) 

("the dispositional order in a juvenile delinquency proceeding will be 
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considered a final order"). "In determining whether a judgment is final, one 

should look to its substance rather than its form." In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d at 128. 

¶ 47 The parties are in agreement that a minor can generally not appeal an 

order of supervision entered pursuant to the old statute, and case law supports 

this point. In re A.M., 94 Ill. App. 3d 86, 90 (1981). See also In re M.W.W., 125 

Ill. App. 3d 833, 835 (1984) ("if in fact the order here is an order for 

continuance under supervision *** as it so states on its face, then the State's 

assertion of unappealability is correct"). Cf. Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill. 2d 163, 

167 (1989) (an adult order of "supervision is not a final judgment," because it 

"merely defers the proceedings until the conclusion of the period of 

supervision" and it "does not terminate the litigation" or "settle the rights of the 

parties"). 

¶ 48 One exception to this general rule is a restitution order, which has been 

held to be immediately appealable when part of a supervision order. For 

example, in Shatavia S., 403 Ill. App. 3d at 417, cited by both parties, the 

appellate court held that a minor could appeal a restitution order which was a 

condition of his pre-guilt supervision under the old statute. Shatavia S., 403 Ill. 

App. 3d at 417. See also In re T.W., 268 Ill. App. 3d 744, 745 (1994) (rejected

the State's argument about lack of jurisdiction and heard the minor's "appeal 

from a restitution order entered as conditions of a minor's supervision"); In re 
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D.R., 219 Ill. App. 3d 13, 15 (1991) (heard an appeal from a restitution order 

entered as a condition of a minor's supervision, where the State did not object to 

jurisdiction).

¶ 49 Both parties argue that the Shatavia S. case is not controlling here, and 

we agree. In Shatavia S., the appellate court emphasized that the minor was 

appealing his restitution and not a finding of guilt. Shatavia S., 403 Ill. App. 3d 

at 417. By contrast, in the case at bar, defendant's counsel specifically asked the 

trial court to consider supervision, and the only condition to which he objected 

was the TASC referral. On appeal, defendant does not challenge any of the

conditions of his supervision or the court's decision to impose supervision as 

opposed to another option. He appeals only the underlying finding of guilt. 

Thus, the parties are correct that Shatavia S. is not controlling here.

¶ 50 Defendant argues that post-guilt supervision is "akin" to a sentence of 

supervision in adult court (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(h) (West 2012)), which is a 

judgment from which an adult defendant may appeal. Section 5-6-3.1 of the 

Unified Code of Corrections governs supervision in adult cases, and it 

specifically provides: "A disposition of supervision is a final order for the 

purposes of appeal." 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(h) (West 2012). See also Ill. S. Ct. R. 

604(b) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014) (a defendant who has been placed under supervision 

pursuant to section 5-6-3.1 may appeal). 
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¶ 51 Similar to juvenile supervision, adult supervision may end with the 

dismissal of charges, but there are significant differences. With juvenile 

supervision, "[t]he court may terminate a continuance under supervision at any 

time if warranted by the conduct of the minor and the ends of justice or vacate 

the finding of delinquency or both." Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) 

(amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(4) (West 2012)). With adult supervision, the 

court must wait to "the conclusion of the period of supervision," and then, "if 

the court determines that the defendant has successfully complied with all of the 

conditions of supervision," the court must dismiss the charges. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-

3.1(e) (West 2012). 

¶ 52 The differences are that, with adult supervision, (1) the court must wait

for the conclusion of the supervisory period; and (2) the court may dismiss the 

charges only if the defendant successfully complied with all the conditions 

imposed with the supervision. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(e) (West 2012). By contrast, 

with juvenile supervision, (1) the court may vacate the finding of guilt at any 

time; and (2) the court may do so, without first finding that the minor complied 

with all his or her supervisory conditions, so long as this action is "warranted by 

the conduct of the minor and the ends of justice." Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 

1, 2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(4) (West 2012)). 
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¶ 53 Even if we were persuaded that a juvenile supervision order was similar 

to an adult one, we still would not have the power to review it. First, although

both section 5-6-3.1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections Code)

(730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(h) (West 2012)) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(b)

(eff. Dec. 11, 2014) indicate that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review

adult supervision orders, those provisions apply only to adult supervision 

orders. The text of Rule 604(b) contains the cites of the sections to which it 

applies. While it includes a cite to section 5-6.3.1 of the Corrections Code 

which governs adult supervision orders, Rule 604(b) does not include a cite to 

any portion of the juvenile Act. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(b) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014). As 

for section 5-6.3.1, it is part of chapter V of the Corrections Code, which 

provides the sentencing options for adult offenders and those juveniles subject 

to adult sentences. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)(ii) (West 2012) (chapter V of the 

Corrections Code provides "adult criminal sentence[s]" as well as sentences for 

juveniles subject to adult sentences); In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 42. Since 

defendant is neither an adult nor a juvenile subject to an adult sentence, Section 

5-6.3.1 does not affect our jurisdiction to hear defendant's appeal.

¶ 54 Second, only two supreme court rules provide appellate courts with 

jurisdiction to review juvenile orders, and neither rule provides jurisdiction 

here. Ill. S. Ct. R. 660 (eff. Oct. 1, 2001); R. 662 (eff. Oct. 1, 1975). Rule 660 
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provides jurisdiction to review only "final" judgments in juvenile cases (Ill. S.

Ct. R. 660(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001)), and the 2014 amendment augmented the 

interlocutory nature of the juvenile supervision order, by providing the trial 

court with the power to vacate it at anytime (Pub. Act 98-62, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 

2014) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-615(4) (West 2012))). This case is set for a 

progress report on April 20, 2015, and the trial court may vacate at that time the 

very conclusion which the juvenile is now asking us to review.

¶ 55 The second rule, Rule 662, provides jurisdiction to review interlocutory 

juvenile orders in very limited cases, such as when the trial court fails to enter a 

disposition order within 90 days of the adjudication of wardship or when the 

trial court enters an order revoking probation or conditional discharge. Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 662(a), (b) (eff. Oct. 1, 1975). The parties do not argue that either one of 

these limited circumstances applies to this case. 

¶ 56 The supreme court rules do not authorize our review, and, wisely so, 

because review at this point in the case would not be efficient, where the trial 

court could still vacate its prior conclusion. However, even if we were 

persuaded that the rules should be modified to allow review now, we are the 

wrong court to consider this issue. While the Illinois Supreme Court has the 

constitutional power to modify the rules as it sees fit, the appellate court is 

"bound to follow the rules as written." In re B.C.P., 2013 IL 113908, ¶ 8. 
No. 1-14-3181

23 

Defendant does not argue that Rule 604(b) as currently written permits his 

appeal, but only that his situation is "akin" to the situation allowed by Rule 

604(b) and thus it should be applied by analogy. That is an argument that must 

be made to a different court. B.C.P., 2013 IL 113908, ¶ 7. 

¶ 57 CONCLUSION

¶ 58 For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed for lack of 

jurisdiction.

¶ 59 Appeal dismissed.