In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-1889

MOHAMED ABDUL MATHIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN F. KERRY, Secretary of State,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:11-cv-05157— Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.

ARGUED NOVEMBER 13, 2014 — DECIDED APRIL 7, 2015

Before POSNER, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Mohamed Abdul Mathin claims that

he was born in the United States but his request for a United

States passport was denied by the State Department after an

investigation into his claim of citizenship. He then filed an

action in district court under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 2201(a) seeking a declaration that he is a United States

national for the purpose of obtaining a United States passport.
2 No. 14-1889

After a trial on the matter, the district court denied his request

for declaratory relief, holding that Mathin had failed to

establish that he was a United States national. Mathin now

appeals that determination to this court.

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1503, any person who claims a right

or privilege as a national of the United States and is denied

such right or privilege can institute an action for a judgment

declaring him to be a national of the United States. Section 1503

authorizes a de novo determination by the district court of the

status of the plaintiff as a United States citizen or national.

Hizam v. Kerry, 747 F.3d 102, 108 (2nd Cir. 2014). Because the

Government has a “strong and legitimate interest in ensuring

that only qualified persons are granted citizenship,” the

Supreme Court has recognized that “doubts ‘should be

resolved in favor of the United States.’” Berenyi v. District

Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 630, 637

(1967); Bustamante-Barrera v. Gonzalez, 447 F.3d 388, 394-95 (5th

Cir. 2006). 

Mathin’s action for a declaration of United States

nationality is premised on the claim that his Indian-citizen

parents, Mohamed Ziaudeen (“Ziaudeen”) and Asiaumma

Abdul Majid (“Asiaumma”), traveled to the United States for

business while his mother was 8 months pregnant with him,

and that he was born prematurely in Chicago on September 23,

1965. The issue, then, is whether the district court erred in

determining that Mathin had produced insufficient evidence

that he was born in the United States. In this appeal following

the bench trial, we review findings of fact for clear error and

issues of law de novo. Cohen Development Co. v. JMJ Properties,

Inc., 317 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2003). We will consider a fact
No. 14-1889 3

finding to be clearly erroneous only if, after reviewing all of the

evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed. Id.; Anderson v. City of Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (2014).

I.

Mathin maintains that his parents had traveled to the

United States and were staying at the home of a friend,

Thomas Nielsen, in Chicago, Illinois, when Mathin was born in

that home on September 25, 1965. According to Mathin, a

midwife, Margaret Roper, was present at the birth, as well as

the midwife’s 17-year-old niece Judith Roper (“Roper”),

Thomas Nielsen (“Nielsen”), and Nielsen’s mother Ina Nielsen,

along with Mathin’s mother and father. Of those individuals,

only Mathin’s father was still living at the time of the district

court trial. Mathin further stated that after his birth, he was

taken to Norwegian American Hospital for examination.

 There are no contemporaneous records available

supporting those events. No birth certificate was filed by his

parents, the midwife, or the hospital. Mathin was unable to

provide any records from Norwegian American Hospital

indicating that he was examined there. Mathin testified that he

tried to obtain such hospital records but that the hospital had

experienced a flood and fire and his records could not be

located. He did not provide any evidence from the hospital

confirming that records from that time period had been

destroyed, or that it had suffered a flood and fire. Furthermore,

although the State Department attempted to verify the trip

through the visa or passport records, it was unable to find any

record of the trip. 
4 No. 14-1889

Mathin testified that approximately a month after his birth,

his mother returned to India with him. He maintained that he

traveled on his mother’s passport at that time, and that he

continued to travel on his mother’s Indian passport until his

mother’s death when he was 13 years old. At that time, his

father obtained an Indian passport for him, which identified

India as Mathin’s place of birth. 

Mathin traveled to the United States numerous times using

his Indian passport during the 1990s. He resides in Florida

with his wife and two children, all of whom are United States

citizens. He applied for United States passports for his children

in 1993 and 1995. Each time, he represented that he was born

in India. The district court found credible Mathin’s testimony

that he represented his birthplace as India on the advice of his

attorney because of his Indian passport. 

Mathin applied for a delayed birth certificate with the State

of Illinois in 1996, which was also the year that his five-year

visa was set to expire leaving him without immigration status.

The Illinois Department of Public Health issued him that

delayed birth certificate based on two documents submitted by

Mathin – an affidavit from Judith Roper attesting that he was

born in Chicago, and his 1988 marriage certificate translated

into English which listed his birthplace as the United States. In

1996, 2007 and 2010, Mathin applied for a United States

passport. He submitted the delayed birth certificate and the

underlying documents in support of his 1996 passport

application, which was denied. Mathin applied for a passport

again in 2007, and in this application he included affidavits

purportedly created by his parents in 1966 regarding the

circumstances of his birth. Mathin also included a 2007 letter
No. 14-1889 5

from a lawyer in India named S. Krishnamurthy indicating that

he found the affidavits from Mathin’s parents after conducting

a search of his warehouse. Mathin subsequently withdrew that

2007 passport application. Finally, Mathin submitted another

passport application in 2010 which the State Department

denied after an investigation.

Mathin brings this action under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) which

allows anyone who claims a right or privilege as a national of

the United States that has been denied to seek a judgment

declaring him to be a national of the United States. Pursuant to

22 C.F.R. § 51.40, Mathin has the burden of demonstrating his

citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence.

Mathin acknowledges that the burden of proving

citizenship rests with him, and that the primary form of

documentary evidence to meet that burden is a

contemporaneous official birth certificate, which Mathin lacks.

See 22 C.F.R. § 51.42(a). He properly contends, however, that

the absence of contemporaneous official birth records is not

dispositive, and that secondary evidence can establish his

birthplace. Such evidence may include, but is not limited to,

“hospital birth certificates, baptismal certificates, medical and

school records, certificates of circumcision, other documentary

evidence created shortly after birth but generally not more

than 5 years after birth, and/or affidavits of persons having

personal knowledge of the facts of the birth.” 22 C.F.R. §

51.42(b).

In addition to his own testimony, Mathin sought to meet

that burden by introducing exhibits including: the delayed

record of birth issued by the State of Illinois stating that he was
6 No. 14-1889

born in Chicago; the affidavits purportedly prepared in 1966

by Mathin’s mother and father attesting that he was born in

Chicago; an affidavit purportedly by Thomas Nielsen

addressed to the Consulate General of India in New York and

dated October 15, 1965, stating that Mathin was born in his

home in Chicago; and videotaped deposition testimony of his

father corroborating that he was born in Nielsen’s home in

Chicago. 

The district court considered all of that evidence and

Mathin’s testimony, and determined that Mathin had failed to

meet his burden of establishing by a preponderance of the

evidence that he was born in Chicago and therefore was a

United States citizen.

II.

Mathin raises a number of challenges to that determination

on appeal. First, Mathin argues that the district court erred in

the probative weight that it gave to the evidence. Specifically,

he asserts that the delayed birth certificate granted by the State

of Illinois should have been given more weight by the court

and regarded as primary evidence that he was born in the

United States. He further asserts that his testimony and the

deposition testimony of his father should have been accorded

more weight by the court, and that the affidavits attesting to

his birth were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule and

should have been given significant probative weight. Finally,

he argues that the Investigative Management System Report of

Investigation (“IMS Report”) from the Diplomatic Security

Service of the Department of State (“DSS”), proffered by the
No. 14-1889 7

government at trial, constituted inadmissible hearsay and

should not have been considered. 

We need not address Mathin’s repeated arguments that the

affidavits he presented were admissible under exceptions to

the hearsay rule, and that the court erred in refusing to

consider them, because those arguments are inconsistent with

the district court’s holding. The district court noted at the

outset that the government had objected to the admission of

Mathin’s exhibits containing the affidavits and the letters from

Nielsen on grounds of authenticity and hearsay. The district

court explicitly rejected those challenges to admissibility,

noting that those objections might be well taken in another

type of case, but that the “affidavits are admissible in this

proceeding.“ Dist. Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law After Trial (March 3, 2014) at 11. The court thus concluded

that it would weigh all of the evidence introduced by Mathin,

and would resolve any doubts as to authenticity and reliability

of the hearsay in light of all the evidence in the case. Because

the court held that the documents proffered by Mathin were

admissible, we consider only Mathin’s challenge on appeal to

the court’s weighing of the evidence and consideration of

authenticity and reliability, as well as his challenge to the IMS

Report introduced by the government. 

A.

We begin with Mathin’s challenge to the government’s

evidence. Mathin asserts that the court erred in admitting the

IMS Report under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), which

provides that a record or statement of a public office is not

excluded as hearsay if “it sets out ... factual findings from a
8 No. 14-1889

legally authorized investigation ... and the opponent does not

show that the source of information or other circumstances

indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” 

The IMS report reflected the results of the DSS investigation

into Mathin’s claim that he was born in the United States. The

IMS report included information dating back to the 1996

investigation of his first passport application. As part of that

investigation, Special Agent Scott Bultrowicz visited Judith

Roper’s home based on the affidavit she provided attesting to

Mathin’s birth. The agent spoke with Roper’s roommate,

Florence Neel, who told him that Roper was pressured into

providing the affidavit, and that when Roper learned her

actions were illegal, she experienced a nervous breakdown

with physical complications for which she was living in a

medical care facility at the time of the agent’s visit. Neel also

stated that she personally had witnessed Mathin offer Roper

$500 in return for her assistance in signing the affidavit. The

DSS concluded that the Roper affidavit was obtained through

coercion and bribery, and Mathin was arrested in 1996 for

passport fraud, although he was not subsequently prosecuted. 

 The 1996 investigation also determined that the marriage

certificate was fraudulent in that the original in India did not

list a place of birth but the version submitted by Mathin

indicated he was born in the United States. The agent

investigating the passport application in 2010, Special Agent

Benjamin Hammond, relied on those determinations from the

1996 investigation, and also determined that the affidavits

submitted by Mathin that were purportedly from his parents

were false or fraudulent because they were not original

documents and could not be independently corroborated. 
No. 14-1889 9

Mathin argues that the court erred in admitting the IMS

Report. He asserts that a report following a government

investigation is not automatically trustworthy, and that the

person making the report must have observed matters

firsthand and acted pursuant to a legal duty. Mathin contends

that the factual findings and conclusions made by Agent

Hammond in the IMS Report relied upon the opinions and

conclusions of Agent Bultrowicz in the 1996 investigation, and

faults Agent Bultrowicz for failing to interview Roper

personally. 

The district court properly rejected that challenge to the

admissibility of the IMS Report generally. The public records

exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) constitutes a

recognition that information may be passed among multiple

public officials before being recorded in a document, and

accordingly a report will not be excluded merely because the

author did not have firsthand knowledge of the reported

matters. Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013).

Therefore, the inclusion of information from Agent Bultrowicz

was not a bar to admissibility. Mathin has presented no

support for his argument that the report was inadmissible

because the investigation could have been more thorough.

Moreover, the district court properly limited its consideration

of the IMS Report to merely the conclusion that the affidavit

and the marriage certificate were fraudulent. The court did

consider the statements by Neel in the report, as those

statements were hearsay within hearsay. Id. (Rule 803(8) does

not remove the hearsay bar for a statement by a

nongovernmental third-party contained in a police report.)
10 No. 14-1889

Accordingly, we find no error in the court’s consideration of

the IMS Report.

B.

We turn, then, to Mathin’s challenges to the court’s

consideration of his evidence. Mathin first argues that the

delayed certificate of birth from the State of Illinois, although

not conclusive, should have been considered to be significant

evidence that he was a United States citizen. He asserts that

such a birth certificate is not casually issued by the State of

Illinois and that it is issued only when warranted by the

evidence. 

The district court recognized that the issuance of the

certificate by Illinois was evidence favorable to Mathin’s claim

of citizenship. In determining the weight to be given to that

evidence, however, the court examined the documents which

formed the basis for the issuance of that certificate. Mathin

testified that in seeking the delayed certificate of birth, he

provided the State with an affidavit from Judith Roper, who

was the midwife’s niece who was present at his birth, a

marriage certificate from India that stated his place of birth as

the United States, and affidavits from his father and Nielsen.

The delayed certificate of birth issued by Illinois references

only two documents, the Roper affidavit and the marriage

certificate, and states that the certificate was issued based on

those documents. Therefore, in assessing the weight to be

given to the delayed certificate of birth, the district court

properly considered only those two underlying documents.

The court determined that there were credibility problems with

both of those documents which cast doubt on the conclusion
No. 14-1889 11

inherent in the delayed birth certificate that he was born in the

United States. We defer to a district court’s credibility

determinations unless clearly erroneous, and here the holding

by the court is well supported in the record. See Furry v. United

States, 712 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 2013).

First, the marriage certificate from India that Mathin

submitted to the court, which was an English translation of the

original, listed his place of birth as the United States, but the

DSS investigated Mathin’s passport application for fraud and

determined that the translated marriage certificate was

fraudulent. With assistance from the United States Consulate

in Mumbai, India, the State Department determined that the

original marriage certificate in India listed no place of birth for

Mathin and therefore provided no support for his claim of

citizenship. The inclusion of a birthplace in the English

“translation” was thus fraudulent, and could properly cause

the district court to doubt not just the reliability of the delayed

certificate of birth, but also the credibility of Mathin in general. 

 The Roper affidavit presented credibility concerns as well.

The district court noted that Roper’s affidavit stated that

Mathin was born in the Humboldt Park community, a

neighborhood on the northwest side of Chicago, which was

inconsistent with Mathin’s claim that he was born in the 10900

block of South St. Louis, a southwest side region, and with

Mathin’s statement in another document that his mother lived

at 10733 South St. Louis Avenue one year before his birth.

Moreover, the court stated that the timing of the documents

was suspicious in that both documents were submitted by

Mathin at the time he was applying for a United States

passport. Finally, the court considered that the State
12 No. 14-1889

Department had determined that the Roper affidavit was

fraudulent. Mathin argues that the court erred in concluding

that the Roper affidavit was inadmissible hearsay, but as we

have stated the court in fact held that it was admissible. 

In the end, though, the fundamental difficulty with

Mathin’s argument is that he ultimately seeks a reweighing of

the facts from this court, and that is not the province of this

court on appeal. It is of no value on appeal to argue that the

district court could have found in his favor. We will accept the

court’s fact findings unless they are clearly erroneous - that is

unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been made. Buechel v. United States, 746 F.3d 753,

756 (7th Cir. 2014); Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573. “As long as the

district court’s conclusions are ‘plausible in light of the record

viewed in its entirety,’ we will not disturb them.” Buechel, 746

F.3d at 756, quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74. Mathin fails

to present arguments that would approach that burden, and

therefore cannot succeed in his challenge. 

That problem is apparent as well in his challenge to the

court’s treatment of his testimony and that of his father.

Mathin decries the district court’s decision to give little

probative value to the testimony of Mathin and his father

Ziaudeen, but again ultimately he seeks a reweighing of the

evidence that is inappropriate on appeal. For instance, he

challenges the court’s failure to credit the testimony of his

father. Ziaudeen testified that Mathin was born in the home of

Nielsen, a family friend, in Chicago, and that Nielsen arranged

for the family’s travel back to India. Ziaudeen further stated

that it was not until Mathin was 18 years old that he informed

Mathin that Mathin was born in the United States. 
No. 14-1889 13

The district court’s determination that Ziaudeen lacked

credibility is well-supported. Ziaudeen’s testimony was

inconsistent on a number of critical issues. For instance,

evidence was introduced at trial that a special agent from the

Chennai consulate interviewed Ziaudeen, and that he stated

that he had traveled with his wife to the United States, but that

he had to depart for Hong Kong and left his wife in the care of

Nielsen in Chicago, where she prematurely delivered a baby

boy. He told the agent that he did not know whether the baby

was born at home or in the hospital, and stated that one month

later his wife came back to India with the baby. He further

stated that his wife was uneducated and did not register the

baby’s birth, and that he did not keep in contact with Nielsen.

That was inconsistent with his deposition testimony that he

was present at Mathin’s birth and that they departed for India

together. Details such as the presence at the birth of one’s child

are the type of facts that a person would be expected to

remember. It was also inconsistent with Mathin’s testimony

that Nielsen was a close family friend who kept in touch by

sending numerous greetings cards over the years following

Mathin’s birth. 

The district court noted a number of discrepancies in

Ziaudeen’s testimony such as his explanation as to why he

created the 1966 affidavit with his attorney regarding the place

of Mathin’s birth. Ziaudeen initially testified that he created the

1966 affidavit for Mathin to obtain an Indian passport, but later

stated it was to get Mathin into school although Mathin was

less than a year old at the time of the affidavit. The district

court could properly deem Ziaudeen’s testimony incredible in

light of the inconsistencies. 
14 No. 14-1889

Mathin nevertheless asserts that the court erred in finding

that Ziaudeen lacked credibility, arguing that Ziaudeen

suffered from health problems and the court should have

considered that in assessing any inconsistencies. The court

heard the testimony regarding those health problems,

however, and there is nothing in the record that indicates the

court disregarded that in making the credibility determination.

Mathin wants us to make a contrary credibility determination,

but the finding by the court was not clearly erroneous and it is

not our role to reweigh evidence. See Furry, 712 F.3d at 993.

Moreover, the health issues that Mathin points to as an

explanation for the inconsistencies are not the type of issues

that would impact memory or the ability to effectively relay

information. The only health issues established in the record

concern Ziaudeen’s difficulties in standing or sitting for long

periods of time, and his age of 79. There was no evidence of

any issues with memory or mental health that would impact

his ability to recall facts. In fact, Mathin acknowledged in his

testimony at trial that his father did not have cognitive

problems or difficulties with memory generally. Nor is Mathin

arguing that a prior recollection is more reliable; Mathin

instead is asserting that as to testimony given on the same date,

one response should be credited over another. The district

court did not clearly err in considering the testimony as a

whole, and in light of the circumstances as a whole,

determining that Ziaudeen’s testimony was not credible. 

Similarly, there was no error in the court’s failure to credit

Mathin’s testimony as to where he was born. His knowledge

stemmed only from his claims that Ziaudeen and Asiaumma

told him that he was born in the United States. Although
No. 14-1889 15

Mathin argues that his reputation among his family was that

he was born in the United States, he did not provide evidence

from any of his five living siblings corroborating that fact.

Mathin argues that his mother’s statement was not

inadmissible hearsay because Federal Rule of Evidence 804

allows testimony as to a declarant’s family history if the

declarant is unavailable as a witness. The district court found

that Mathin’s testimony, which was not based on first-hand

knowledge but was based on purported statements from his

parents, was of little value. We have already discussed the

court’s credibility determination as to Mathin’s father

Ziaudeen. As to Mathin’s claim that his mother told him he

was born in the United States, Mathin’s testimony was

internally inconsistent on that point. He stated that his mother

did not tell him he was born in the United States until he was

13 years old, at which time she told him in the presence of

Ziaudeen. Yet Mathin acknowledged that he did not recall her

telling him that information, and that his knowledge stemmed

solely from Ziaudeen’s retelling of the conversation. On crossexamination, Mathin stated that his mother never told him that

he was born in the United States. Therefore, the district court

did not err in failing to find that testimony probative of his

birthplace. 

Finally, Mathin asserts that the court erred in failing to

credit the 1966 affidavits that he submitted in support of his

claim from his mother and father, and from Krishnamurthy.

The 2007 letter from Krishnamurthy stated that he had located

affidavits from Ziaudeen and Asiaumma upon a search of his

warehouse. He also attested that he witnessed the signatures

of Ziaudeen and Asiaumma on their affidavits. The affidavits
16 No. 14-1889

of Ziaudeen and Asiaumma recite that they traveled to the

United States where Asiaumma delivered Mathin in Chicago

on September 9, 1965. The affidavits from Mathin’s parents

were purportedly created in 1966, but the district court

properly determined that those documents should not be

credited. 

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16), statements in an

ancient document that is at least 20 years old and whose

authenticity is established are not excluded as hearsay. The

district court noted that it had significant doubts as to the

authenticity of the documents under Federal Rule of Evidence

901(b)(8), which provides that an ancient document can be

authenticated by showing that it is at least 20 years old, was in

a place where, if authentic, it would likely be, and is in a

condition that creates no suspicion about its authenticity. The

requirement that the document be free of suspicion relates not

to the content of the document, but rather to whether the

document is what it purports to be, and the issue falls within

the trial court’s discretion. United States v. Firishchak, 468 F.3d

1015, 1021 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374,

1379 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kalymon, 541 F.3d 624, 632-

33 (6th Cir. 2008). “[T]he mere recitation of the contents of

documents does not authenticate them or provide for their

admissibility.” Firishchak, 468 F.3d at 1021.

The district court properly held that there was reason to

doubt that the affidavits were what they purported to be.

Although the affidavits were purportedly created

approximately nine months after Mathin’s birth, the affidavits

lacked any details that might be expected in a document

created shortly after such an event, such as precisely where
No. 14-1889 17

Mathin was born, arrival and departure dates for their travel,

and contact information as to Nielsen or other witnesses.

Significantly, the affidavits also lacked any declared purpose

for their creation. The testimony of Ziaudeen’s father as to the

purpose of the affidavits was notably inconsistent. Ziaudeen

first testified that he did not have any idea as to why he would

have created such an affidavit in 1966. Subsequently in the

deposition, Ziaudeen testified that he created the affidavit to

help Mathin obtain an Indian passport. An affidavit attesting

to his birth in the United States, however, could not aid in

securing an Indian passport for Mathin. Moreover, Mathin

testified that he traveled on his mother’s Indian passport until

he was 13 years old, which is also inconsistent with the notion

that the affidavit was created in order to secure an Indian

passport for Mathin. The court did not err in concluding that

the failure to identify any purpose for the affidavit, as well as

the dearth of details in the affidavit itself, cast doubt on the

claim that it was in fact created by his parents in 1966. The

fortuitous timing of Krishnamurthy’s discovery of the affidavit

in the warehouse further creates doubt as to the legitimacy of

the affidavits, as does the court’s determination that

Ziaudeen’s testimony was incredible. Those findings are wellsupported in the record, and the court did not err in

determining that those affidavits were not reliable evidence as

to his birth.

Finally, Mathin presented an affidavit addressed to the

Consulate General of India in New York dated October 15,

1965—approximately one month after Mathin’s birth—signed

by Thomas Nielsen and witnessed by Margaret Roper, Ina

Nielsen and Judith Roper, affirming that Mathin was born at
18 No. 14-1889

Nielsen’s house on September 23, 1965. The stated purpose of

the affidavit was to obtain a travel permit to travel to India,

and Nielsen allegedly discovered the document among his

mother Ina Nielsen’s possessions upon her death. Mathin also

submitted an affidavit from Nielsen dated April 13, 2000

declaring that the 1965 affidavit was true and correct and was

provided to the Indian Consulate General to allow Mathin to

travel to India. A notary attested that the signature in that

April 2000 affidavit was that of Nielsen. 

There are myriad problems with this affidavit, including

once again difficulties in establishing that the document was in

fact created at the stated date. Mathin failed to establish the

date of origin, nor was there any basis to conclude that the

document was kept in a place where, if authentic, it would

likely be. As the district court noted, Mathin failed to explain

why Ina Nielsen would have had in her possession an original

letter delivered to the Indian Consulate General in 1965. Nor is

it conceivable that Nielsen would create and forward such an

affidavit to establish the birth, yet not assist Mathin’s parents

in simply obtaining a birth certificate for Mathin at the time of

birth, particularly given Mathin’s claim that he was taken for

examination to a hospital following his birth. Mathin also

failed to produce any evidence that under Indian law in 1965

an undocumented infant could travel on his mother’s passport.

The insurmountable obstacle to credibility, however, is the

uncontested evidence that Nielsen’s signature on the April

2000 affidavit which was verified by the notary is starkly

different from the signature on the 1965 affidavit. Mathin

asserts that signatures may change over time, but the

differences in the handwriting are so stark that Mathin
No. 14-1889 19

acknowledged to the district court that the signatures were in

fact different. Mathin submitted three greeting cards that he

claimed to have received from Nielsen, and there is no dispute

that those signatures were also distinct from the others; in fact

the name Nielsen was even spelled differently, as “Nelson,” in

those cards. The district court properly determined that those

disparities created a strong reason to suspect that the Nielsen

affidavit was fraudulent. There is no error in that quite

reasonable conclusion. In short, although Mathin has presented

multiple arguments as to why the district court could have

reached different fact findings in this case, he has failed to

demonstrate that the district court’s findings were clearly

erroneous. 

The court’s determination is well-supported in the record.

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.