1The effective date for the version of Rule 61 in effect at the time of the filing of the

motion was May 6, 2013.

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SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

RICHARD F. STOKES SUSSEX COUNTY COURTHOUSE

 JUDGE 1 THE CIRCLE, SUITE 2 

GEORGETOWN, DE 19947 

TELEPHONE (302) 856-5264 

April 8, 2015

John F. Brady, Esquire

Connections CSP

Legal Department

20163 Office Circle

Georgetown, DE 19947

Leontay T. Smith

SBI # 007

James T. Vaughn Correctional Center

1181 Paddock Road

Smyrna, DE 19977

State of Delaware v. Leontay Smith, Def. ID# 1206002919 (R-1)

Dear Mr. Brady and Mr. Smith:

Defendant Leontay Smith (“defendant”) filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant

to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61"), asserting vague claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel.1

A superceding indictment dated February 4, 2013, charged defendant with 150 crimes,

including multiple counts of burglary in the second degree, attempted burglary in the second 
degree, attempted burglary in the third degree, conspiracy in the second degree, theft greater than

$1,500.00, attempted theft less than $1,500.00, theft under $1,500.00, theft less than $1,500.00 of

a senior, criminal mischief, theft of a firearm, attempted theft of a firearm, and possession of

burglar’s tools.

On April 3, 2013, defendant pled guilty to four counts of burglary in the second degree, 

nine counts of theft of a firearm, two counts of burglary in the third degree, and three counts of

conspiracy in the second degree. During the plea colloquy, defendant affirmed that he understood

the nature of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty; he understood the maximum sentence

he was facing; he knew he must serve a minimum of four years in jail; he had reviewed his trial

rights set forth in the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea form; he had discussed those rights with

his attorney; he understood those rights and waived them by entering the plea; no one had forced

him to enter the plea or promised him anything in exchange for it; he committed the offenses to

which he was pleading guilty; he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation of him; and he

wished to enter a plea of guilty to the charges. A presentence investigation was undertaken and

defendant confessed to committing the crimes, as he did when the police interviewed him at the

time of one of his arrests. The Court imposed its sentence on May 10, 2013. This sentence was

modified on June 3, 2013, to reflect restitution amounts. It was corrected on April 8, 2015, to

reflect he was sentenced on a theft of a firearm charge rather than a possession of burglar’s tool

charge. Importantly, defendant must serve 11 years at Level 5 before he will serve various levels

of probation.

Defendant did not appeal his sentence. He filed his motion for postconviction relief on

October 18, 2013. He alleges trial counsel was ineffective on two grounds. His support for these 

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2

2015 WL 301982 (Del. Super. Jan. 21, 2015).

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claims are: “Plea deal” and “unfulfilled plea agreement”. Mr. Brady was appointed as counsel to

represent defendant in this postconviction proceeding.

In a September 29, 2014, letter to postconviction counsel, the Court noted the inadequacy

of defendant’s claims. Postconviction counsel thereafter moved to withdraw, asserting that he

reviewed the record and trial counsel’s file and he could not pursue an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. Defendant was given the opportunity to present further arguments, but he did not

do so.

There are no procedural bars. However, because defendant fails to meet the standard

required to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the claims fail. As explained in

State v. Hohn:

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 ***To successfully articulate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a

claimant must demonstrate: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient, and 2)

“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” FN19 To prove

counsel's deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel's representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness.FN20 Moreover, a defendant must

make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk

summary dismissal.FN21 ***

FN 19 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988) (citing Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)) (applying second prong Strickland

analysis in the context of a guilty plea); See also Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).

FN 20 Albury, 551 A.2d at 60.

FN 21 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).

Defendant has not met this standard. Furthermore, a review of the record in this case,

including the file, plea colloquy, and presentence report, establishes no basis for an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.

For the foregoing reasons, the postconviction motion is DENIED and postconviction

counsel’s motion to withdraw is deemed moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 Very truly yours,

/s/ Richard F. Stokes

 Richard F. Stokes

cc: Prothonotary’s Office

 Martin J. Cosgrove, Jr., Esquire

 Michael R. Abram, Esquire

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