2015 UT App 86

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

JEFFREY GALLUP,

Defendant and Appellant.

Memorandum Decision

No. 20131143-CA

Filed April 9, 2015

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Darold J. McDade

No. 131400869

Douglas J. Thompson, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Daniel W. Boyer, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Memorandum 

Decision, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and

KATE A. TOOMEY concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶1 Jeffrey Gallup appeals from his conviction for driving 

under the influence of alcohol. Gallup pled guilty to DUI after 

the district court denied his motion to suppress certain evidence 

obtained during the traffic stop, but he reserved his right to 

appeal the court’s suppression decision. Gallup argues on appeal 

that the factual findings made by the district court in denying his 

motion to suppress are clearly erroneous and that its legal 

conclusions are erroneous because they rely on the flawed

factual findings. We affirm the district court’s decision.

¶2 Alcohol-enforcement agents conducting a covert 

inspection of a bar for liquor law violations watched Gallup 
State v. Gallup

drinking in that bar for several hours.

1 The agents saw Gallup 

drink several beers between approximately 9:00 p.m. and 1:00

a.m. Around 1:00 a.m., the agents saw Gallup leave the bar, walk 

to his vehicle, and drive out of the bar’s parking lot. The agents 

followed Gallup and pulled him over after they saw him commit 

two traffic violations. Gallup was arrested and charged with DUI 

after he failed field sobriety tests.

¶3 Gallup filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained 

during the traffic stop, arguing that the stop and subsequent 

investigation were not supported by reasonable suspicion. The 

district court held an evidentiary hearing on Gallup’s motion. 

Agent Jalaine Hawkes, one of the alcohol-enforcement agents 

who watched Gallup at the bar, testified at the hearing that she 

saw Gallup order multiple drinks between 9:00 p.m. and 1:00

a.m., but she could not remember the exact number. Agent

Steven Marble, another alcohol-enforcement agent who watched 

Gallup that same night, did not testify. After the hearing, Gallup 

submitted a supplemental memorandum to his motion to 

suppress. Gallup attached as an exhibit to his supplemental 

memorandum the police report Agent Marble prepared after 

Gallup’s arrest. In this report, Agent Marble stated that he saw

Gallup drink “at least 8 beers.”

¶4 Before entering a final ruling, the court allowed the 

parties to present further oral argument on the motion to 

suppress. At argument, the prosecutor stated that the stop was 

justified based on the agents’ observations that Gallup drank “at 

least eight beers” at the bar before driving. At the conclusion of 

1. “In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a suppression motion, 

we consider the facts in a light most favorable to the trial court’s 

findings.” State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 

1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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State v. Gallup

oral argument, the district court denied the motion to suppress, 

basing its decision on “the testimonies from the officers that they 

saw the defendant drink at least eight beers at the bar.” Gallup 

appeals that ruling.

¶5 “A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed 

for correctness, including its application of the law to the facts.” 

State v. Tripp, 2010 UT 9, ¶ 23, 227 P.3d 1251. We review the 

district court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. Id.

¶6 First, Gallup challenges the district court’s factual finding 

that “[t]he officers observed [Gallup] consume at least eight 

beers before leaving the bar.” Gallup argues that the court’s 

finding detailing the number of beers the alcohol enforcement 

agents saw Gallup consume was not supported by the evidence 

presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The detail of 

“eight beers” was only in Agent Marble’s police report, which 

was not admitted at the evidentiary hearing but rather was

attached as an exhibit to Gallup’s supplemental memorandum 

filed after that hearing. While it is true that Agent Hawkes was 

not able to specifically testify at the hearing as to the number of 

drinks Gallup consumed, Gallup himself attached Agent 

Marble’s report containing the statement of that number to his 

supplemental memorandum and asked the district court to 

consider other statements Agent Marble had made in that report.

¶7 “[O]n appeal, a party cannot take advantage of 

an error committed [below] when that party led the trial court 

into committing the error.” State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 

(Utah 1993). “While the invited error doctrine is crafted to 

discourage[] parties from intentionally misleading the trial court 

so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal, it is 

also intended to give the trial court the first opportunity to 

address the claim of error.” State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶12, 

86 P.3d 742 (alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Even inadvertent errors that are not 

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State v. Gallup

“conscious attempt[s] to mislead the trial court” may fall within 

the invited error doctrine when they lead the district court into 

making legal errors. Id.

¶8 In this case, Gallup provided the district court with Agent 

Marble’s statement in an exhibit attached to his supplemental 

memorandum. Gallup sought to use Agent Marble’s report to 

impeach Agent Hawkes, arguing that a particular statement in 

Agent Marble’s report demonstrated that Agent Hawkes’s and 

Agent Marble’s testimonies “are contrary to one another and not 

credible.” Even though Gallup did not affirmatively seek to 

admit the agent’s statement into evidence at the hearing, Gallup 

placed the agent’s report before the court and asked the court to 

consider it. Cf. Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, ¶ 48, 

214 P.3d 865 (holding that any error based on admission of a 

report was invited where the plaintiffs introduced a trooper’s 

report into evidence “on their own accord”). As a result, we 

conclude that Gallup led the district court into relying on Agent 

Marble’s statement because had Gallup not provided the court 

with the report, the court would have heard only that Gallup 

consumed several alcoholic drinks that evening, but not 

specifically “at least eight beers.”

¶9 Even if the doctrine of invited error did not apply, 

however, Gallup failed to preserve his challenge to the district 

court’s reliance on the report. “As a general rule, claims not 

raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.” State v. 

Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Because Gallup did not object when 

the State referenced Agent Marble’s statement during argument

or when the district court found orally and in writing that the 

agents saw Gallup drink at least eight beers, he has failed to 

preserve his argument that the district court could not properly 

consider that evidence.

20131143-CA 4 2015 UT App 86
State v. Gallup

¶10 Gallup also has not preserved his claims that the district 

court made inadequate findings regarding conflicting evidence 

and witness credibility.2 A party must “challenge in the trial

court the adequacy of the court’s factual findings to preserve an 

adequacy of the findings issue for appeal.” In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, 

¶ 59, 201 P.3d 985; see also State v. Titus, 2012 UT App 231, ¶ 11, 

286 P.3d 941. “[R]equiring a party to object to the adequacy of 

the detail of the trial court’s findings before appeal allows the 

trial judge to address and correct, if necessary, the level of detail 

in his or her findings before the case moves forward.” In re K.F., 

2009 UT 4, ¶ 62.

¶11 Gallup relies on State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1994), and State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 

1990), for the proposition that findings of fact must be 

sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful appellate review. But 

the requirement that district courts provide detailed findings 

does not overcome Gallup’s failure to bring the asserted error to 

the district court’s attention.

Judicial economy would be disserved if we 

permitted a challenge to the adequacy of the detail 

in the findings to be heard for the first time on 

appeal. Not only is an error in the detail in the 

findings easy for a trial judge to correct, but it is an 

error that is best corrected when the judge’s

findings are fresh in the judge’s mind. Further, it is 

2. To the extent Gallup challenges as clearly erroneous the 

district court’s factual finding that officers “observed [Gallup] 

stumble out of the bar to his vehicle,” we conclude that the 

finding is sufficiently supported by Agent Hawkes’s testimony 

that Gallup “stumbled on the sidewalk” and then walked 

“unsteadily” to his vehicle. Gallup has demonstrated no 

infirmity in the evidentiary support for this finding. 

20131143-CA 5 2015 UT App 86

 
State v. Gallup

a waste of judicial resources for an appellate court 

to entertain such a challenge when the only likely 

remedy is merely a remand to the trial court for 

more detailed findings. We decline to offer such a 

remedy unless the [appellant] first provided the 

trial court the opportunity to correct the error.

In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 63. Gallup did not object to the district 

court’s oral or written findings below, and he has therefore 

failed to preserve this claim for appeal.

¶12 Finally, Gallup argues that the district court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous because they relied on the challenged 

factual findings. Because Gallup failed to demonstrate error in 

the district court’s factual findings, we reject his argument that 

the district court erred in relying on those findings.

¶13 We conclude that Gallup invited any error in the district 

court’s factual finding concerning the number of beers and failed 

to preserve his other challenges to the court’s findings. We

affirm the district court’s denial of Gallup’s motion to suppress.

20131143-CA 6 2015 UT App 86