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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

DEANGELO SCOTT and RYAN 

PRATT, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 

Defendant. 

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Civil Action No. 14-817 (GK) 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Plaintiffs DeAngelo Scott and Ryan Pratt ("Plaintiffs") bring 

this putative class action against the Government of the District 

of Columbia ("Defendant" or "the District"), alleging violations 

of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution, as well as common-law conversion, in relation to the 

District's "post and forfeit" procedures. 

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to 

Dismiss Complaint [Dkt. No. 19]. Upon consideration of the Motion, 

Opposition [Dkt. No. 22], Supplemental Opposition [Dkt. No. 23], 

Reply [Dkt. No. 24], the entire record herein, and for the reasons 

set forth below, the Motion shall be granted. 
I . Background 

A. Factual Overviewl 

On April 05, 2008, Mr. Scott and Mr. Pratt, who is Mr. Scott's 

stepson, were arrested outside their D.C. apartment at 

approximately 8:00 p.m. Compl. at ~~ 15-36 [Dkt. No. 1]. Mr. Scott 

was charged with possession of an open container of alcohol 

pursuant to D.C. Code § 25-lOOl(a) (1), and Mr. Pratt was charged 

with disorderly conduct pursuant to D.C. Code§ 22-1321(1). Compl. 

at ~~ 47, 53. 

The District's "post and forfeit" procedure allows persons 

charged with certain misdemeanors to "post and forfeit an amount 

as collateral . . . and thereby obtain a full and final resolution 

of the criminal charge." D.C. Code § 5-335.01. When Mr. Scott and 

Mr. Pratt arrived at the police station, they were given the option 

to "post and forfeit" in return for their release that evening. 

Mr. Scott posted and forfeited $25, and Mr. Pratt posted and 

forfeited $35. Compl. ~~ 52, 58. Neither Mr. Scott nor Mr. Pratt 

filed a motion to set aside the forfeiture within the 90-day 

period, as set forth in the statute. D.C. Code§ 5-335.0l(d)(6). 

1 For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the factual 

allegations of the complaint must be presumed to be true and 

liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Aktieselskabet AF 

21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 

2008); Shear v. Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., 606 F.2d 1251, 1253 (D.C. 

Cir. 1979). Therefore, the facts set forth herein are taken from 

Plaintiffs' Complaint [Dkt. No. 1] 

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B. Procedural Background 

1. The Fox Case 

On December 15, 2010, Barbara Fox and Hamilton P. Fox, III 

filed a Complaint comprised of both non-class claims for false 

arrest and putative class claims challenging the District's "post 

and forfeit" procedure. See Fox v. District of Columbia, 2010-cv2118 (D.D.C. 2010) (ABJ) ("Fox") [Dkt. No. 1]. The parties agree 

that the Fox case, decided by Judge Amy Jackson, tolled the statute 

of limitations for the Plaintiffs' claims in the present case, but 

disagree as to when the tolling ceased. 

On March 30, 2012, Judge Jackson dismissed all of the class 

claims in Fox, but permitted the Foxes to amend their complaint to 

add two new class claims. See Fox v. District of Columbia, 851 

F.2d 20 (D.D.C. 2012) ("Fox I"). On February 15, 2013, Judge 

Jackson dismissed the two new class claims, leaving only the Foxes' 

individual claims. See Fox v. District of Columbia, 923 F.2d 302 

( D. D. C. 2 O l 3) ( "Fox I I" ) . 

On April 26, 2013, Mr. Fox2 filed a motion to direct an entry 

of final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) as to the 

dismissal of his class "post and forfeit" claims. Fox, Dkt. No. 72. 

2 Mrs. Fox was not included in the putative class action claims 

challenging the "post and forfeit procedure. Her sole claim was 

against a police sergeant in his individual capacity, which was 

dismissed on February 20, 2013. See Fox v. District of Columbia, 

924 F. Supp. 2d 264, 266 (D.D.C. 2013). 

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Judge Jackson denied this motion on October 3, 2013. Fox, Dkt. 

No. 80. On February 28, 2014, Mr~ Fox settled his individual claims 

and final judgment was entered. 

2. The Present Case 

Plaintiffs filed this Complaint, which was assigned to this 

Judge, on May 16, 2014. The Complaint alleges violations of the 

Fourth and Fifth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well 

as common-law conversion. See Compl. at ~~ 111-146. The class 

action claims in the present case are virtually indistinguishable 

from those that were brought in the Fox case. The Plaintiffs are 

also represented by one of the same attorneys that represented the 

plaintiffs in Fox. 

On June 12, 2014, before the District of Columbia had filed 

an appearance in the case (and before Plaintiffs had even filed 

their Affidavit of Service on the Court's docket), Plaintiffs filed 

a Motion for Class Certification [Dkt. No. 5] . Prior to this 

Court's Order on the Motion for Class Certification, the District 

filed the present Motion to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot.") on August 29, 

2014 [Dkt. No. 19]. On October 3, 2014, this Court denied without 

prejudice the Motion for Class Certification due to the pending 

Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' failure to comply with Local 

Civil Rule 7(m). 

In its Motion to Dismiss, the District argues that the case 

must be dismissed because it is time-barred (Fed. R. Civ. 

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P. 12(b) (1)) and because none of the six counts state a valid legal 

claim (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6)). Plaintiffs filed their Opposition 

("Pls.' Opp'n") on October 9, 2014 [Dkt. No. 22], and a 

Supplemental Opposition ("Pls.' Supp. Opp'n) on October 17, 2014 

[Dkt. No. 23]. The District filed its Reply ("Def.'s Reply") on 

November 10, 2014 [Dkt. No. 24]. 

II. Legal Standards 

A. Standard of Review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) 

As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts possess 

only those powers specifically granted to them by Congress or 

directly by the U.S. Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The plaintiff bears the 

burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See Shuler 

v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In deciding 

whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under 

Rule 12 (b) (1), the court must "accept all of the factual 

allegations in [the] complaint as true [.]" Jerome Stevens 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 

327 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may also 

consider matters outside the pleadings, and may rest its decision 

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on its own resolution of disputed facts. See Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. 

of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 

B. Standard of Review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) 

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a plaintiff 

need only plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face" and to "nudge [ ] [his or her] claims across 

the line from conceivable to plausible." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "[O]nce a claim has been stated 

adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts 

consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563. 

Under the Twombly standard, a "court deciding a motion to 

dismiss must not make any judgment about the probability of the 

plaintiffs' success . [,] must assume all the allegations in 

the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) [, and] 

must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences 

derived from the facts alleged." Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 

2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). The court does not, 

however, accept as true "legal conclusions or inferences that are 

unsupported by the facts alleged." Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign 

Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation 

omitted) . Furthermore, a complaint which "tenders 'naked 

assertion [s] ' devoid of 'further factual enhancement'" will not 

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suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in Iqbal): 

III. Analysis 

A. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Time-Barred 

1. D.C. Statute of Limitations 

The parties agree that Plaintiffs' putative class action 

claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See 

Carney v. American Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 

("The Supreme Court has held that in states with multiple statutes 

of limitations, claims under section 1983 are governed by the 

residual or general personal injury statute of limitations (like 

[D.C. Code] section 12-301(8)) .") (citing Owens v. Okure, 

488 U.S. 235, 243-50 (1989)); D.C. Code § 12-301 (8) (providing 

three year limitation for claims not otherwise prescribed) . 

Plaintiffs' cause of action stems from their arrest and "post 

and forfeiture," which took place on April 5, 2008. Therefore, the 

three-year statute of limitations on their claims began running on 

April 5, 2008. 

2. Tolling by Fox 

American Pipe and its progeny stand for the proposition that 

the filing of a class action complaint freezes the statute of 

limitations for all proposed class members. See American Pipe & 

Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 539 (1974); Crown, Cork & Seal 

Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 (1983) ("The filing of a 

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class action tolls the statute of limitations 'as to all asserted 

members of the class."') (quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554) 

It is undisputed that under the American Pipe doctrine, the 

filing of the Fox putative class action on December 15, 2010, 

tolled the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' claims. At the 

time of Fox's filing, Plaintiffs had 112 days remaining in their 

three-year limitations period. Def.'s Mot. at 7. Therefore, once 

tolling ceased, they had 112 days in which to file their claims. 

See American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 538 ("Since the class action was 

filed with 11 days yet to run in the period as tolled . . . , the 

intervenors had 11 days after entry of the order denying them 

participation in the class suit in which to move to file their 

intervention motion.") 

Whether Plaintiffs timely filed their case depends on when 

the Fox case ceased to toll Plaintiffs' claims. American Pipe and 

the subsequent cases expanding it deal predominately with denials 

of class certification, which terminated tolling, but do not 

address the present situation in which all the class claims in a 

case were dismissed prior to the court reaching a class 

certification decision. 

The question is therefore, when a court never reaches the 

issue of class certification, when does a putative class action 

cease to toll the claims of its proposed class members? The 

Defendant argues that tolling ceased for Plaintiffs' claims when 

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the last of the class claims in Fox were dismissed. Plaintiffs 

argue that tolling did not cease until final judgment was entered 

on Mr. Fox's entire case, including his individual claims. Under 

Defendant's interpretation, Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit 

342 days after the limitations period ended, while under 

Plaintiffs' interpretation, their Complaint would be considered 

timely. See Def.'s Mot. at 7-8; Pls.' Mot. at 34-38. 

3. Tolling Ended Upon the Dismissal of the Class 

Claims 

The question of whether the dismissal of all class claims in 

a putative class action terminates tolling for purported class 

members is a question of first impression for this Court. Indeed, 

the parties do not identify any courts that have previously 

addressed this specific issue. For the reasons below, the Court 

finds that dismissal of all class claims in a suit term_inates 

tolling and causes the limitations period for each absent class 

member to resume running. 

The Seventh Circuit held in Sawyer v. Atlas Heating and Sheet 

Metal Works, Inc. that "[t]olling lasts from the day a class claim 

is asserted until the day the suit is conclusively not a class 

action." 642 F. 3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2 011) (voluntary dismissal of 

class action terminates tolling) . Plaintiffs argue that a case is 

only "'conclusively not a class action' when class action treatment 

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has been denied or the case is entirely over." Pls.' Opp'n at 36. 

Plaintiffs read Sawyer too narrowly. 

Allowing tolling to continue for all absent class members 

through the entire pendency of what had become an individual 

lawsuit by Mr. Fox--due to the dismissal of all class claims--

would not further the objectives and justifications for class 

action tolling. The American Pipe court found that unless the 

filing of a class action tolled the statute of limitations, 

potential class members would be induced to file motions to 

intervene or separate actions in order to protect themselves 

against the possibility that certification would be denied. 

414 U.S. at 553. It found that not permitting class action tolling 

would frustrate the principal purposes of the class action 

procedure--promotion of efficiency and economy of litigation. Id. 

The efficiency of the class action mechanism evaporates once 

the class claims are dismissed, and it becomes necessary for the 

absent members to pursue their own individual interests. To permit 

tolling to continue for all absent class members beyond the 

dismissal of all class claims furthers neither the efficiency nor 

the economy of litigation. Indeed, such a rule would only serve to 

draw out litigation, effectively extending the statute of 

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limitations long past what the Supreme Court envisioned in American 

Pipe. 

In Crown, Cork & Seal, the Supreme Court "signaled that 

American Pipe tolling extends as far as is justified by the 

objectively reasonable reliance interests of the absent class 

members." Bridges v. Dep't of Maryland State Police, 441 F.3d 197, 

211 (4th Cir. 2006); 462 U.S. at 353-54. Once all class claims are 

dismissed from a case, proposed class members are no longer 

justified in relying on the case to protect their interests, and 

therefore the rationales underlying class action tolling are no 

longer applicable. 

Plaintiffs' proposed rule--that tolling continue after the 

dismissal of all class claims- -would prejudice defendants and 

expose them to unreasonably protracted tolling. Courts are 

required to make a class certification decision "at an early 

practicable time." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23 (c) (1) (A). This requirement 

ensures that the tolling period is limited in scope and protects 

against "abuse and perpetual tolling" under American Pipe. 

Bridges, 441 F.3d at 212. Plaintiffs' rule would have the opposite 

effect, all but ensuring perpetual tolling. 

Such a rule would also create the undesirable result that a 

plaintiff need only plead a class claim in order to toll claims 

for countless absent class members throughout the course of the 

plaintiff's entire individual litigation--even class claims that 

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were quickly dismissed as non-meritorious would still suffice to 

attach tolling to the entire life of the plaintiff's individual 

case. Such a rule would be inconsistent with the rationales of 

American Pipe and the reasonable reliance interests of absent class 

members. 

Plaintiffs put forward several arguments for why a case cannot 

be considered "conclusively" not a class action even when all class 

claims have been dismissed. Plaintiffs' first argument for why 

tolling continued until the final resolution of the Fox case is 

that the order dismissing the class claims in Fox was merely 

interlocutory. Pls.' Opp'n at 38. They argue that because the class 

claims "could have been resurrected at any time," the case could 

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not be considered "conclusively not a class action." Id. 

This argument is unpersuasive for the. very simple reason that 

orders denying class certification are also interlocutory, and yet 

the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that class certification 

denials cause tolling to cease. See American Pipe, 414 U.S. 

at 552-53; Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 345. The fact that an 

order is interlocutory does not mean that a case cannot 

conclusively be "not a class action." 

Next, Plaintiffs argue that the District could have avoided 

the present class action by litigating the class certification 

motion in Fox prior t"o moving to dismiss the claims. Pls.' Opp'n 

at 40. This is an impractical solution. Requiring defendants to 

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litigate class-certification prior to moving to dismiss meritless 

claims, or else run the risk of facing perpetual tolling, does not 

make sense. It would force defendants to waste time and resources 

litigating the validity of a class, even if the underlying claims 

are baseless. 

Plaintiffs' next argument is that "tolling continues through 

the date of the decision on an appeal if an appeal reverses a 

dismissal where there has been no final adverse determination of 

class claims." Pls.' Opp'n at 41. Plaintiff argues that it 

logically follows that tolling has to extend until the end of the 

case before it can extend to the end of the appeal. Id. The cases 

Plaintiffs cite provide very little support for this argument, 

however. If class action allegations were explicitly reinstated, 

tolling might be made retroactive. But it does not necessarily 

follow that tolling must continue through the end of a case, 

particularly where no appeal has been taken. 

Plaintiffs' final argument relies on the "forfeiture rule," 

as discussed in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat'l Student Mktg. 

Corp. 461 F. Supp. 999, 1012 (D.D.C. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 

650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). The contours of the "forfeiture 

rule"· are not well-defined, but suggest that an individual who 

pursues a separate lawsuit while a class action is pending may 

forfeit the benefits of the class action. In Wachovia, the court 

found that plaintiffs who had filed a separate, individual action 

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while class certification was pending, and later opted out of the 

class, had forfeited the benefits of the class, including tolling. 

The court reasoned that to permit plaintiffs to benefit from class 

action tolling in order to file otherwise time-barred suits would 

"sanction duplicative suits and violate the policies behind 

American Pipe." Id. at 1013. 

Plaintiffs attempt to show that the "forfeiture rule" 

conflicts with a holding that tolling ceased upon dismissal of the 

class claims. This is not the case. Once the class claims in Fox 

were dismissed, the case ceased to be a class action. At that 

point, the Plaintiffs in this case were at no risk of forfeiting 

anything upon filing their individual case. Contrary to 

Plaintiffs' argument, the policy rationales of efficiency and 

avoiding duplicative suits are not burdened by the Court's holding. 

Plaintiffs caution that the Court's holding today "would have 

required Mr. Scott and Mr. Pratt and other absent class members to 

file their own suits while Mr. Fox's suit was still pending," 

thereby discouraging efficiency and sanctioning duplicative suits. 

Pls.' Opp'n at 42. Yet this is precisely the point. Once the Foxes' 

case was no longer a class action, the case no longer represented 

class interests, and Mr. Scott, Mr. Pratt, and absent class members 

were required to pursue their own individual remedies. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that a case is 

"conclusively not a class action" once all class claims have been 

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dismissed. The Fox case, when filed, included individual claims 

relating to Mr. Fox's alleged wrongful arrest and class claims 

challenging the "post and forfeit" process. On March 30, 2012, 

Judge Jackson dismissed the "post and forfeit" claims. On February 

15, 2013, Judge Jackson declined to reconsider the dismissal and 

dismissed the two remaining post and forfeit claims. This left 

only Mr. and Mrs. Fox's individual claims. It was at that point 

that the case was "conclusively not a class action." Sawyer, 642 

F. 3d at 563. 

On February 16, .2013, the 112 days remaining in Plaintiffs' 

statute of limitations period began to run again. 3 The limitations 

period expired on June 8, 2013, 342 days before Plaintiffs filed 

the present lawsuit. Def. 's Mot. at 8. Therefore, Plaintiffs' 

Complaint was not timely filed and this Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear the case. 

3 In their Supplemental Opposition, Plaintiffs note that tolling 

of their conversion claim is governed by 28 U.S.C. § l3q7(d), in 

addition to American Pipe. Section 1367 (d) provides that "[t] he 

period of limitations for any [related state law] claim asserted 

. . . . shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period 

of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a 

longer tolling period." Even with the additional 30 days, 

Plaintiffs' conversion claim was filed 312 days late and is timebarred. 

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B. Failure to State a Claim 

Having found Plaintiffs' Complaint to be untimely, the Court 

need not reach Defendant's contention that Plaintiffs have failed 

to state a claim. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 

Complaint shall be granted. An Order shall accompany this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

April 9, 2015 

Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF 

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