This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0986

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, judgment creditor,

Respondent/Co-Appellant,

vs.

Justin Beauchane,

Judgment Debtor,

and

North Star Mutual Insurance Company, garnishee,

Respondent,

United Fire and Casualty Company, garnishee,

Appellant.

Filed April 6, 2015

Affirmed

Ross, Judge

Red Lake County District Court

File No. 63-CV-11-30

James P. Young, Young Law Office, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent State 

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company)

Matthew W. Moehrle, Eric S. Oelrich, Rajkowski Hansmeier Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota 

(for respondent North Star Mutual Insurance Company)

Stephen M. Warner, Beth A. Jenson Prouty, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & 

Pikala, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant United Fire and Casualty Company)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Kirk, Judge; and Reilly, Judge. 
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

ROSS, Judge

This insurance-coverage case arose after Justin Beauchane left his insured pickup 

truck in the middle of the street tied to a tree that he wanted to pull down, and a 

motorcyclist who swerved to miss the rope struck Beauchane’s uninsured Chevy Blazer, 

which Beauchane had just moved out of the tree’s path. The motorcyclist’s insurer paid 

the motorcyclist $45,000 and brought a subrogation claim against Beauchane. Beauchane 

stipulated to judgment against him but his two insurers denied coverage, leaving the three 

insurance companies—one insuring the motorcycle, one insuring the pickup, and one 

insuring Beauchane’s home—playing hot potato with the coverage obligation. The 

district court interpreted the insurance contracts and held that Beauchane’s auto insurer 

has the obligation. We construe the contracts similarly and affirm. 

FACTS

One Sunday morning in June 2007, Justin Beauchane prepared to remove a dead 

tree from the edge of his Red Lake Falls property. He tied a rope around the tree about 25 

feet up. He positioned his 1993 Chevrolet Silverado about four feet from the curb in the 

street bordering his lot. And he tied the rope’s other end to the truck’s trailer hitch, 

angling the rope from the truck up into the tree. Beauchane activated the truck’s hazard 

lights and left it in the middle of the street. He went to his 1984 Chevrolet Blazer in the 

driveway and began moving it toward the street and out of the tree’s fall path. 

At about that time, Joshua Sandness was riding his motorcycle on the same street. 

He traveled on a course that would take him between Beauchane’s pickup and the curb
3

and into the rope. Beauchane was in the Blazer moving it down the driveway toward the 

street when he noticed the motorcycle. He immediately realized it was headed for the 

rope. Beauchane stopped the Blazer at the mouth of the driveway and tried to alert the 

motorcyclist. Sandness swerved to duck under the rope, lost control of the motorcycle, 

veered toward the Blazer, and hit the Blazer’s front bumper and then the ground. 

Sandness came to rest in Beauchane’s yard with the motorcycle on top of him. The crash 

injured his leg and required surgery. 

Beauchane’s home insurer (North Star Mutual Insurance Company) and his auto 

insurer for the Silverado (United Fire & Casualty Company) both refused to cover 

Sandness’s injuries. Sandness had been riding his father’s motorcycle, which was insured 

by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. No one insured the Blazer. 

Sandness settled with State Farm for $45,000. State Farm brought this subrogation action

against Beauchane sounding in negligence. Beauchane tendered his defense to his 

insurers, and they both denied coverage. 

Beauchane and State Farm entered into a Miller-Shugart settlement agreement. 

Beauchane agreed to judgment against him and State Farm agreed to seek recovery only 

against Beauchane’s insurers. United Fire and North Star continued to deny coverage. 

The district court entered judgment against Beauchane based on the MillerShugart agreement, and all three insurance companies brought motions for summary 

judgment to determine which of the insurers held the duty to cover. The district court 

granted State Farm’s motion in part, deciding that United Fire’s policy covered 
4

Sandness’s injuries. It granted North Star’s motion, holding that the homeowner policy 

did not cover the mishap. United Fire and State Farm separately appeal. 

D E C I S I O N

United Fire asks us to reverse the summary-judgment decision based on three 

principal arguments. It argues that its auto policy does not cover Sandness’s injuries

because the injuries did not arise from the “use” of an insured vehicle, as that term is

defined by caselaw. It also maintains that State Farm failed to mention the insured 

vehicle in its negligence claim against Beauchane and that this precludes coverage. And it 

argues that, if its policy does cover Sandness’s injuries, State Farm’s payment to 

Sandness was merely a voluntary payment rather than payment to a genuinely 

“uninsured” motorist, preventing subrogation. In addition to disputing these arguments, 

State Farm maintains that the injuries are covered under Beauchane’s homeowner policy 

with North Star. These coverage arguments on appeal present legal and contractinterpretation questions, which we review de novo. Star Windshield Repair, Inc. v. W. 

Nat’l Ins. Co., 768 N.W.2d 346, 348 (Minn. 2009). We address each argument in turn.

I

United Fire argues that Sandness’s injuries are not covered under its vehicle 

liability policy. The United Fire policy covered Beauchane “for the ownership, 

maintenance or use of” the Silverado. We apply a three-question test to decide whether 

an injury arose from the use of a vehicle. Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 

878 (Minn. 1987). To hold that the injuries resulted from the use of the insured vehicle, 

the vehicle must be an “active accessory” to the injury, there must not be any “act of 
5

independent significance” defeating causation, and the injury must result from use of the 

vehicle “for transportation purposes.” Id.

The Silverado was an “active accessory” to Sandness’s injury.

We answer the first question—whether the Silverado was an “active accessory” to 

Sandness’s injury—in favor of United Fire’s duty to cover. Whether a motor vehicle is an 

“active accessory” causing injury requires a showing “less than proximate cause . . . [but] 

more than the vehicle being the mere situs of the injury.” Id. (quotation omitted). The 

requirement is met if “the injury is a natural and reasonable incident or consequence of 

the use of the vehicle.” Tlougan v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 310 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Minn.

1981) (quotation omitted). Applying this standard, we have held that the vehicle need not 

“actively cause” the injury; it is sufficient if it is “actively connected with the injury.” Ill.

Farmers Ins. Co. v. Marvin, 707 N.W.2d 747, 752–53 (Minn. App. 2006). 

On this standard, we reject United Fire’s contention that because Sandness did not 

collide with the Silverado, the Silverado was not an active accessory to Sandness’s 

injuries. A vehicle can be an active accessory to injury even if its mere positioning 

creates the injury-causing hazard. See, e.g., Haagenson v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & 

Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1979) (holding that the plaintiff’s injury arose from the 

use of a parked vehicle when the plaintiff slipped while entering and fell into a power 

line). The Silverado’s positioning obstructed Sandness’s course in traffic, misleading 

Sandness to suppose he had a clear route between the Silverado and the curb. After 

Sandness made the commitment to that route and the rope suddenly became evident, he 

had only four options, all bad. He could attempt to veer most radically to the left of the 
6

truck and into the face of potentially oncoming traffic; he could veer less radically to the 

left directly into the Silverado; he could continue onward into the rope; or he could 

swerve to the right and try to duck the rope. Because the Silverado’s positioning with its 

rope by itself required Sandness to attempt the immediate, injury-resulting course 

correction, we hold that the Silverado was “actively connected” to Sandness’s injury. 

This is our conclusion regardless of whether the Silverado and the rope constituted two 

interdependent hazards or a single conjoined hazard. 

We are not persuaded otherwise by United Fire’s contention that the only hazards 

were the rope and the Blazer and that the same injury would have occurred if the rope 

had been tied to something other than the Silverado. The rope wasn’t tied to something 

other than the Silverado, and if the Silverado had not been positioned in the street, 

Sandness would not have needed to drive to its right along the curb and toward the rope.

No “act of independent significance” broke the causal link.

We answer the next question—whether an act of independent significance broke 

the causal link between the Silverado’s use and Sandness’s injury—also in favor of 

United Fire’s coverage. An act of independent significance separating the vehicle’s use 

and the claimed injuries defeats coverage. Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878. United Fire argues 

that Beauchane’s placing a rope across the road was an act of independent significance. It

argues alternatively that the Blazer was an intervening cause. Both arguments fail.

The record indicates that Beauchane created a single hazard by connecting the 

rope to the Silverado and the tree. His placement of the tethered truck constituted the 

hazard; placing and tethering the truck are how he used the truck. We therefore reject 
7

United Fire’s contention that Beauchane’s placing the rope across the road was 

independent. The Blazer was stopped and off, essentially parked in the driveway, when 

Sandness’s motorcycle hit it. It was the thing collided with, not the collision’s cause. One 

can reasonably foresee that forcing a motorcyclist off the road could result in his 

colliding with off-road objects and sustaining injuries like those that Sandness suffered. 

See Lennon v. Pieper, 411 N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. App. 1987) (“If injury is foreseeable, 

then the party is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, even though he could 

not have anticipated the particular injury which did happen.”). And even if Beauchane 

was negligent in operating the Blazer, negligent acts are not independently significant. 

Marvin, 707 N.W.2d at 756. We hold that no act of independent significance broke the 

causal link between the Silverado’s use and Sandness’s injury.

Sandness’s injuries resulted from use of the Silverado “for transportation purposes.” 

We similarly answer the third question—whether Sandness’s injuries resulted

from use of the Silverado “for transportation purposes”—in favor of United Fire’s 

coverage obligation. This is because the phrase, “for transportation purposes,” carries a 

broader meaning than is suggested by its literal terms. The requirement arises from a 

statute that defines “maintenance or use of a motor vehicle” as “maintenance or use of a 

motor vehicle as a vehicle.” Minn. Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 3 (2014) (emphasis added). The 

phrase does not describe merely driving things or people from place to place; it also

specifically includes even occupying, entering, and exiting a vehicle. Id. 

United Fire argues that Beauchane was using the truck only to anchor the rope, not 

to drag the tree. See Waldbillig v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 321 N.W.2d 49, 50, 53 
8

(Minn. 1982) (holding that an injury caused by a device mounted to the back of a truck 

was not an injury arising from a transportation purpose). But Beauchane told the United 

Fire investigator, “[F]or the angle that I needed to pull the tree down the vehicle was 

parked in the street.” Under this evidence, the rope tethered to the truck was the means 

“to pull the tree down.” Preparing to use a vehicle to move items can constitute use for 

transportation purposes, even if the vehicle is parked when the injury occurs. See, e.g.,

Kern v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 526 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Minn. App. 1995) (holding that 

truck was used for transportation when newly purchased material was blown from the

truck while it was parked); Kemmerer v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 513 N.W.2d 838, 843 

(Minn. App. 1994) (holding that use for transportation purposes occurred when a rope 

that secured a kayak to a parked truck snapped, causing injury), review denied (Minn. 

June 2, 1994) ; see also Norwest Bank Minn., N.A. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 588 

N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn. 1999) (holding that a transportation purpose existed when a 

couple died from exhaust fumes emanating from the car they parked in their garage and 

neglected to turn off). Because Beauchane positioned the tethered truck preparing “to pull

the tree down,” we hold that Sandness’s injuries arose from use of the truck for a 

transportation purpose.

II

United Fire offers an alternative argument against coverage. It argues that the 

Miller-Shugart settlement agreement is unenforceable because State Farm’s negligence 

complaint, from which the settlement arose, did not specify any vehicle covered by 

United Fire’s motor-vehicle policy. It contends that without initial notice that the 
9

Silverado was involved, it cannot be bound by the settlement between State Farm and 

Beauchane. The argument does not persuade us. 

United Fire points to the elements triggering an insurer’s duty to defend,

recognizing that liability insurers generally owe both a duty to defend and to indemnify 

their insureds and that the duty to defend is generally broader than the duty to indemnify.

See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Chiropractic Mut. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d 411, 

415 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. April 29, 1993). The complaint allegations 

ordinarily trigger the insurer’s duty to defend. Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. v. Integrity 

Mut. Ins. Co., 819 N.W.2d 602, 616 (Minn. 2012). An insurer must provide a defense if 

any part of the action against its insured is arguably within the scope of coverage. 

Johnson v. AID Ins. Co. of Des Moines, Iowa., 287 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Minn. 1980). But 

information outside the complaint can also establish a duty to defend, so an insurer 

cannot assume that its duty to defend extends only to the allegations a third party includes 

in the complaint. Iowa Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 276 Minn. 

362, 370, 150 N.W.2d 233, 238 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Cargill, Inc. v. 

Ace Am. Ins. Co., 784 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. 2010). United Fire knew long before the 

Miller-Shugart agreement that the Silverado played a role in the collision. And not only 

has United Fire identified no basis for any prejudice to it resulting from the complaint’s 

lack of reference to the Silverado, its counsel reasonably acknowledged at oral argument 

that it would have made the same arguments it has made in this litigation even if the 

Silverado had been specifically identified sooner. Although United Fire is correct that 
10

earlier specific notice should have occurred, the delay in notice here is no ground for us 

to reverse.

III

United Fire contends that if its vehicle policy covers Sandness’s injuries, 

Beauchane cannot be an “uninsured motorist.” It reasons that State Farm’s erroneous 

payment to Sandness as a supposed uninsured motorist was therefore merely a voluntary

payment, and voluntary payments do not trigger subrogation. See First Nat’l Bank of St. 

Paul v. McHasco Elec., Inc., 273 Minn. 407, 414, 141 N.W.2d 491, 496 (1966) 

(observing that a lender is subrogated to another party’s rights if the lender advanced its 

loan to satisfy a prior commitment).

United Fire’s argument overlooks the fact that coverage here was previously 

denied or at least reasonably uncertain. An insurer’s duty to pay uninsured motorist 

benefits may be triggered by a liability insurer’s coverage denial. See Fryer v. Nat’l 

Union Fire Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Minn. 1985). In Fryer, the supreme court 

noted that policy language defined an uninsured motor vehicle as “one for which the 

liability insurer ‘denies coverage,’” and it held that “so long as the denial exists, the 

motor vehicle is deemed to be uninsured.” Id. United Fire denied coverage here, and

Sandness’s affidavit confirms that it did so before State Farm paid Sandness. Because the 

record does not include State Farm’s policy definitions (including the definition of 

uninsured vehicle), we cannot determine whether State Farm properly determined that the 

Silverado is an uninsured motor vehicle under its policy. But as we have previously 

explained, “[i]f the liability is not clear and the insurance company acts in good faith to 
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pay the loss, even the fact that the loss was not covered does not necessarily make the 

insurance company a volunteer.” Northland Ins. Co. v. Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging 

Co., 415 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Minn. App. 1987). On that ground we have refused to penalize 

an insurer for “promptly, albeit erroneously, paying what it believed it owed” when the 

insurer was unaware whether another insurer was obligated to extend primary coverage. 

Hoiland ex. rel. Hoiland v. Minneapolis Children’s Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 241, 244 

(Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. Aug. 23, 1990). For all of these reasons, we do 

not fault the district court for refusing to treat State Farm’s payment as voluntary. We 

therefore need not consider United Fire’s argument that a voluntary payment would 

defeat State Farm’s subrogation right. 

IV

State Farm argues that North Star’s homeowner’s policy may alternatively cover 

Sandness’s injuries. Our decision to affirm the district court as to United Fire’s coverage 

obligation resolves the appeal. We add that State Farm’s argument fails on the plain 

language of the North Star policy. North Star’s policy excludes coverage for injuries 

resulting from “the ownership, operation, maintenance, [or] use . . . of [Beauchane’s] 

‘motorized vehicles’,” and the exclusion applies “regardless of other causes or 

‘occurrences’ that contribute to or aggravate” the injury. Because we have concluded that 

Sandness’s injuries arose from Beauchane’s use of his Silverado, we also hold that North 

Star’s exclusion generally applies. And although a homeowner policy may still cover 

injuries involving a vehicle if “two independent acts, one vehicle-related and one 

nonvehicle-related, were involved,” Waseca Mut. Ins. Co. v. Noska, 331 N.W.2d 917, 
12

921 (Minn. 1983), the exception does not apply here. The exception applies when the 

collision’s causes “could have operated independent of a motor vehicle to cause the loss.” 

State Farm Ins. Cos. v. Seefeld, 481 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Minn. 1992). It does not apply 

where, as here, there exists only a remote possibility that the injuries could have occurred 

without a vehicle involved. Here, the middle-of-the-road placement of the tethered 

vehicle was the negligent act causing the collision and Sandness’s injuries. 

Affirmed.