[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

No. 14-12440

Non-Argument Calendar

_________________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cr-00225-RAL-MAP-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

STORMY GIDDENS, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________________

(April 8, 2015)

Before MARTIN, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Stormy Giddens, Jr., appeals his sentence of one year and 364 days, which 

the district court imposed after the revocation of his second term of supervised 

release. Mr. Giddens originally pled guilty in 2008 to selling, exchanging, 

Case: 14-12440 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 1 of 3 
2

transferring, and delivering counterfeited and altered obligations of the United 

States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 473. 

On appeal, Mr. Giddens argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), which governs 

the revocation of supervised release, violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 

under the principles set out in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Int’l Union, United Mine 

Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994), because it permits defendants to 

receive a sentence of imprisonment and a new term of supervised release upon 

findings made by a judge, not a jury, and by a preponderance of the evidence, not 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Although we generally review a district court’s revocation of supervised 

release for an abuse of discretion, we review de novo a constitutional challenge to a 

statute. See United States v. Cunningham, 607 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). 

In relevant part, § 3583(e)(3) states that a district court may “revoke a term of 

supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the 

term of supervised release . . . if the court . . . finds by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” In 

Cunningham, we held that “§ 3583(e)(3) does not violate the Fifth or Sixth 

Amendments because the violation of supervised release need only be proven by a 

Case: 14-12440 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 2 of 3 
3

preponderance of the evidence, and there is no right to trial by jury in a supervised

release revocation hearing.” Cunningham, 607 F.3d at 1268.

Mr. Giddens concedes that our decision in Cunningham forecloses his 

argument. See Appellant’s Brief at 11 n.2 (“Mr. Giddens recognizes that this 

Court rejected the argument in Cunningham. Thus, Mr. Giddens is presenting this 

issue primarily for en banc or certiorari review.”). We are bound to follow our 

prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this Court en banc or by 

the Supreme Court. See United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th 

Cir. 2008). Because Cunningham has not been overruled by our Court en banc or 

by the Supreme Court, we affirm the district court’s revocation of Mr. Giddens’ 

term of supervised release. 

AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-12440 Date Filed: 04/08/2015 Page: 3 of 3