Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 68A01-1408-JT-342 | April 14, 2015 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Nathaniel S. Connor

Winchester, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

James D. Boyer

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of J.M., Mother, and C.W., 

Child,

J.M.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

April 14, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

68A01-1408-JT-342

Appeal from the 

Randolph Circuit Court

The Honorable Jay L. Toney, Judge

Cause No. 68C01-1311-JT-154

Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] J.M. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to her child, C.W. (“Child”). She raises two issues on appeal, which we 

consolidate and restate as: whether sufficient evidence was presented to 

support the termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On June 5, 2004, Child was born to Mother. K.B. was the legal father of Child

and voluntarily terminated his parental rights on December 11, 2013. V.W. 

was Mother’s live-in boyfriend for approximately twenty-three years, including 

at the time that Child was removed from the home; V.W. may also be the 

biological father of Child. 

[4] On March 15, 2012, Child and a sibling were removed from the care of Mother

by the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) based on allegations of 

unsanitary and unsafe conditions in the home due to the presence of dog feces, 

piles of trash, piles of laundry and dirty dishes, numerous electrical items in the 

bathroom sink, and numerous holes in the bathroom wall. Additionally, there 

were allegations that V.W. had sexually abused Child’s sibling. Child was 

placed in foster care after removal from the home.

[5] On March 16, 2012, DCS filed a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) petition, 

alleging unsanitary and unsafe living conditions, V.W.’s ownership of 

unregistered guns, and V.W.’s threats of suicide if the children did not do what 

V.W. wanted. On July 11, 2012, the juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a 
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CHINS. On August 16, 2012, the juvenile court issued its dispositional order, 

which, in relevant part, ordered Mother to participate in services and to: 

maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing and keep home structurally sound, 

sanitary, and safe; assist in formulating and enacting a plan to protect children 

from abuse or neglect; actively participate in home-based counseling and 

demonstrate positive results as a result; complete a parenting assessment and 

successfully complete all recommendations developed as a result; attend all 

scheduled visitations and comply with all visitation rules; and provide Child 

with a “safe, secure, and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and 

neglect and be an effective caregiver who possesses the necessary skills, 

knowledge, and abilities to provide [Child] with this type of environment on a 

long-term basis to provide [Child] with permanency.” Appellant’s App. at 37-38. 

On November 20, 2013, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. Evidentiary hearings were held on March 19 and 20, 2014 and April 14, 

2014.

[6] During the hearing dates, the following testimony and evidence was presented. 

Prior to Child’s removal, in February 2012, the family received home and 

school based services through Centerstone, which were initially directed toward 

the older children and later toward Child due to the behaviors of Child. DCS 

became involved when it was reported that Child’s older sibling disclosed to her 

therapist that V.W. sexually abused her. Before removal, Child interacted 

poorly with peers, had boundary issues, lacked focus, failed to do her 

homework, and had poor hygiene. Immediately after being placed in foster 
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care, Child exhibited behaviors such as extreme tantrums, refusing to shower, 

bed wetting, and urinating and defecating in her pants, even in public. Child’s 

therapist attributed such behaviors to Child having experienced trauma while 

living in Mother’s home and stated that Child had disclosed that V.W. watched 

the children touch themselves or masturbate, the older siblings instructed Child 

to masturbate, and Child would masturbate in front of her family members. 

When Child was first removed, she was placed in foster care from March 15, 

2012 to mid-August 2012. As she became more familiar with her foster home 

and the foster parents’ routine, she was easier to direct, had better hygiene, and 

completed her homework on time. Structure, discipline, and routine greatly 

impacted her improvement.

[7] Supervised visits between Mother and Child began in April 2012, occurred in 

Mother’s home, and included parenting instruction during the visits. Mother 

would generally apply the instruction during the visit, but would not retain or 

apply it to future visits. Sometimes after these supervised visits, Child’s 

behavior would regress, but not significantly. However, in April 2013, the visits 

became unsupervised, and Child’s behaviors again became severe and included, 

throwing fits and screaming, stealing, kicking and hitting doors and walls, 

picking her skin until she bled and wiping blood on the walls, spitting, pulling 

her hair out, wetting the bed, and going to the bathroom in closets and other 

inappropriate places. By mid-June 2013, the behaviors became so severe that 

the foster parents had trouble finding babysitters.
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[8] During this time, Mother told Child that she knew where the foster parents 

lived and could come over at any time. Foster mother saw Mother drive past 

the house on several occasions, and one time, Mother parked in a parking lot 

across the street from the foster home and was visible from Child’s room. 

Because of this, Child would stare out the window and exhibit anxious 

behaviors such as picking at her hair and skin. 

[9] Throughout the CHINS case, Mother had several service providers who offered 

parenting instruction to Mother. Early in the case, a service provider wanted 

Mother to have additional parenting education instead of just during visitations. 

Mother, however, claimed she would get additional education on her own. 

Mother did not retain the instruction she received during the visitations, and 

although she had an understanding of parenting, she was not able to apply what 

she knew. Mother’s progress was inconsistent, and there was never any 

resolution of the things that the service providers worked on with her. For 

example, Mother was aware that Child was allergic to red dye in food and that 

it adversely affected Child’s behavior, but Mother did not limit Child’s intake of 

food containing red dye. Although Mother was informed about additional 

parenting services, she refused to participate, citing work, visitations, and lack 

of time. During visitation, Mother would not make time to help Child with her 

homework and would often distract her. Additionally, although Mother knew 

the rules, she did not apply them consistently and often fell back to old 

behaviors.
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[10] In August 2013, Child returned to Mother for a trial home visit, which was 

supported by several service providers because they believed that Mother 

needed an opportunity to demonstrate if she could succeed with parenting 

Child after participating in services for a year. Not long after the trial home 

visit began, DCS was alerted that Child’s behaviors worsened, particularly at 

school. Child was not able to function in a regular classroom and exhibited 

behaviors such as rolling on the floor, picking off pieces of the bulletin board, 

and scribbling violently on paper. During this time, Child lost weight, came to 

school unkempt, often fell asleep in the classroom, and stole food and other 

things from other children. Child also had bathroom issues, including spending 

long periods of time in the restroom and wiping feces on the toilets and 

restroom walls. 

[11] On September 10, 2013, Child had a psychological evaluation, and she was 

diagnosed with anxiety disorder not otherwise specified and disruptive disorder. 

Child had previously been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and was 

taking medications for ADHD and anxiety. At the time of her evaluation, the 

doctor did not see any signs that would cause him to believe that Child had 

autism spectrum disorder.

[12] In late September 2013, the trial home visit with Mother ended out of concern 

for Child’s well-being and safety. After her removal from Mother’s home, DCS 

placed Child with a second foster family due to the original foster parents’ belief 

they could no longer care for Child because of her anxiety about Mother’s visits 

and driving by the foster home. Child lived continually in the second foster 
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home until the time of the termination hearing. However, two days after she 

first moved there, Child removed all her clothing and said, “Look at me,” and 

at other times, she pulled down her pants and said, “Bite me.” Tr. at 130, 132. 

Child also defecated in her hand and smeared feces “everywhere,” urinated 

behind her bed, swore, and ignored people and talked over them. Id. at 131. 

Child’s behaviors improved shortly after moving into her new foster home, and 

these behaviors stopped by the end of December 2013. Child responds well to 

the parenting style and structure of her foster home.

[13] When the trial home visit ended, the juvenile court ordered therapeutically 

supervised visitation with Mother and Child. Amber Moody (“Moody”), a 

therapist with Centerstone who supervised these visits, observed that Child had 

very little attachment to Mother. Child did not show much excitement in 

seeing Mother, there was little engagement during the visits, and Child was not 

sad when the visits ended. Mother was not very welcoming and warm toward 

Child and would sometimes fall asleep or be on her phone during the visits. As 

the visitations progressed, Child still seemed estranged from Mother, and due to 

this, Moody recommended that the visits be reduced due to lack of progress. 

When Moody informed Mother, Mother did not ask why or request more 

visitations.

[14] Barbara Bush (“Bush”), also from Centerstone, supervised seven visits with 

Mother and Child. At one of these supervised visits, Child went to the 

bathroom, locked herself in a stall, and would not unlock the door when Bush 

asked her to do so. Bush observed Child over the stall partition to be having a 
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bowel movement and inserting her fingers in her anus and wiping feces on the 

rail in the stall. Bush described Child as being “zoned out.” Id. at 288. Both 

Bush and Mother told Child to stop, but Child did not respond. Bush crawled 

under the stall to get Child. Mother had little reaction to the situation and 

asked to go outside to smoke.

[15] At the time of the termination hearing, Child had been removed from Mother’s 

home for over two years, except for the seven weeks during the trial home visit, 

and had not seen Mother for at least ten weeks prior to the hearing. Child had 

been in two different foster homes and showed improvement in her behaviors 

not long after moving into each one. Child’s behaviors worsened when Child 

visited with Mother. The DCS plan for Child was adoption by her foster 

parents. On July 9, 2014, the juvenile court issued its detailed findings, 

conclusions, and order1terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother now 

appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[16] We begin our review by acknowledging that this court has long had a highly 

deferential standard of review in cases concerning the termination of parental 

rights. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. When 

reviewing a termination of parental rights case, we will not reweigh the 

 

1 We commend the juvenile court for the thoroughness of its findings, which greatly aided in our appellate 

review.
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evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 

265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence 

and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. 

Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the 

evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child 

relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d at 14. 

[17] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child, the juvenile court 

entered specific findings and conclusions. When a trial court’s judgment 

contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered 

standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 

143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the 

findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. 

Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to 

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s 

decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 

1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. 

[18] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In 

re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind. 2011). These parental interests, however, are 

not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining 

the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. In re J.C., 994 

N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In addition, although the right to raise 
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one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home 

available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is 

unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. 

[19] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State is 

required to allege and prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services; 

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State’s burden of proof for establishing these 

allegations in termination cases “is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In 

re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2). 

Moreover, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 

4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. 

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added). 

[20] Mother argues that DCS failed to prove the required elements for termination 

by sufficient evidence. Specifically, Mother contends that DCS failed to present 

sufficient evidence that the conditions that resulted in Child being removed 
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would not be remedied. She asserts that the initial reasons for removal of Child 

from the home have been remedied, and the only condition not remedied is 

Child’s mental health issues, which were not evaluated and monitored 

sufficiently by DCS prior to termination. Mother also argues that DCS failed to 

present sufficient evidence that the continuation of the parent-child relationship 

posed a threat to Child. She alleges that, because Child’s mental health issues 

were not adequately and appropriately evaluated, any correlation between 

Child’s behavior and Mother’s visits was “superficial.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. 

Mother, therefore, claims that the juvenile court’s judgment was clearly 

erroneous.

[21] In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

led to a child’s removal and continued placement outside the home would be 

remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 

989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, “we must ascertain what conditions 

led to their placement and retention in foster care.” Id. Second, “we 

‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 

not be remedied.’” Id. (citing In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ind. 2010)

(citing In re A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997))). In the second 

step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness at the time of the termination 

proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and 

balancing a parent’s recent improvements against “ ‘habitual pattern[s] of 

conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect 

or deprivation.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 
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N.E.2d at 1231). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has 

discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily than efforts made only 

shortly before termination.” Id. Although trial courts are required to give due 

regard to changed conditions, this does not preclude them from finding that 

parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior. Id.

[22] Here, the evidence showed that Child was removed from Mother’s home based 

on allegations of unsanitary and unsafe conditions in the home due to the 

presence of dog feces; piles of trash, laundry, and dirty dishes; numerous 

electrical items in the bathroom sink; and many holes in the bathroom wall. 

There were also allegations that V.W. had sexually abused Child’s sibling. 

Additionally, before removal, services were offered to Child due to reported 

behaviors of interacting poorly with peers, having boundary issues, lacking

focus, failing to do her homework, and having poor hygiene. 

[23] Although Mother moved away from V.W. and into a home that was clean and 

appropriate for children during the underlying proceedings, Child’s main need 

was structure. Mother was provided services during the CHINS proceedings, 

but was unable to retain or apply the instruction given to future visits with 

Child. Child’s behavior improved significantly when subjected to the structure 

and routine of her foster homes, but would worsen after visits with Mother, 

particularly during the seven-week trial home visit. The importance of 

parenting instruction was highlighted early in the underlying case, and Mother 

was provided with parenting instruction from at least four service providers. 

Despite being told to obtain more education than what was provided during 
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visitations, Mother refused offered help from the service providers, instead 

indicating she wished to get it on her own. Mother failed to address her 

parenting issues. 

[24] Mother’s ability to parent Child did not improve even with the instruction given 

by the service providers. During visitations with Child, Mother did not show 

any progress and was resistant to the instruction. Additionally, Mother’s 

relationship with Child did not improve. Mother was not warm and welcoming 

to Child and would sometimes fall asleep during visits or be on her phone. 

Child showed very little attachment to Mother, and the two were not bonded.

[25] Mother’s argument focuses on Child’s emotional and psychological issues and 

her contention that DCS failed to sufficiently evaluate and monitor these issues

prior to termination. The evidence showed that Child’s behaviors were 

developed while in Mother’s care and worsened when Mother had contact with 

Child. Such behaviors were being dealt with and corrected when Child was in 

foster care and away from Mother’s care and custody. Based on the evidence 

presented, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in finding that there 

was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal 

and the reasons for continued placement of Child outside Mother’s home 

would not be remedied.

[26] Mother also contends that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Child. However,
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we need not address such argument. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is 

written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the 

juvenile court need only find that one of the three requirements of subsection 

(b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. A.D.S., 987 

N.E.2d at 1156. Therefore, as we have already determined that sufficient 

evidence supported the conclusion that the conditions that resulted in the 

removal of Child from Mother’s care would not be remedied, we will not 

address any argument as to whether sufficient evidence supported the 

conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat 

to the well-being of Child. Additionally, Mother has a section in her brief 

contending that the “juvenile court’s judgment violated [her] Fourteenth 

Amendment rights.” Appellant’s App. at 19. Mother’s argument, however, 

focuses on the basis for the termination of her parental rights and not a separate 

due process violation. We, therefore, treat her argument as a part of her 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and do not separately address it. 

[27] We will reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear 

error’--that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) 

(quoting In re Egly, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). Based on the record 

before us, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s 

parental rights to Child was clearly erroneous. Further, Mother’s arguments 

are merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of 
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the witnesses, which we cannot do on appeal. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265. 

We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s judgment. 

[28] Affirmed.

Friedlander, J., and Crone, J., concur.