Hon. Drew S. Davis 

County Attorney 

San Augustine Cou,nty 

San Augustine, Texas 

Dear Mr. Davis: 

July 9, 1951 

Opinion No. V-1202 

Re: The tax situs of personal 

property owned by a resident 

of San Augustine County and 

located in an adjoining county. 

You request the opinion of this office as to the taxable 

situs of personal property, including livestock, where the taxpayer 

owns such property not only in the county of his residence, but also in an adjoining county. 

There is no question as to the taxable situs of the property which he owns and which is situated in the county of his residence. To. Con&, Art. VIII, Sec. 11. Hence it is not necessary 

to notice this thher. 

This leaves only the question of the taxable situs of the 

personal property in the adjoining county in which the taxpayer does 

not reside, We are not able to say categorically, in the absence of 

more detailed and specific facts, that all of the parsonal.property 

of the taxpayer, including that owned in the adjoining county, should 

be rendered and the taxes paid thereon in the county of his residence, 

or that a part should be rendered and paid in the adjoining county. 

We should keep in mind that under the law of this State taxable situs 

for the purpose of ad valorem taxation is determined as of January 1. 

In the determination of the tax situs of .tax .situs of twable personal property in general, the following constitutional and 

statutory provisions require consideration: 

“All proper.ty, whether owned by persons or corporations shall be assessed for taxatitn, and the taxes 

paid in the county where situated . . . (Tex. Const., 

Art, VIII, Sec. 11) 

“All property, real and personal, except such as 

is required to be listed and assessed otherwise, shall 

be listed and assessed in the county where it is situated; and all personal property, subject to taxation and 

temporarily r,emoved from the State or county, shall 

be listed and assessed in the county of the residence of 

the owner thereof, or in the county where the principal 

office of such owner is situated.” (Art. 7153, V.C.S.) 
Hon. Drew S. Davis, Page 2 (V-1202) 

It is observed that the term “in the county where situated” appears in the Constitution, and the term “in the county where 

it is situated” appears in the statute; thus the same terms are employed. A judicial construction of the term “where situated” appears 

in the case of Great Southern Life Insurance Co. v. City of Austin, 

112 Tex. 1, 243 S.W. -5 ) . I n this case the Court said: 

“Our ‘Constitution, therefore, in declaring that 

property shall be taxed where situated, has done no 

more than declare the commod-lsare. The purpose 

of the Constitution in declaring that property should 

be taxed in the county where situated, was merely to 

define the general jurisdictional unit for the exercise 

of the taxing power, and to confine the exercise of that 

power to the subjects of taxation within that unit. It 

did not define what was meant by the words ‘where 

situated’ . . . it evidently meant property where situated for the purpose of taxation under, the general prinms of law as then understood.” (243 S.W. at 780.) 

In this case the Court further said, “no sovereignty or 

taxing district could exercise the power of taxation except as to 

property actually or constructively within its jurisdiction. This 

rule applies to counties and municipalities, as well as states. ~; .” 

(243 S.W. at 780.) 

We are aware of the often referred to maxim of “mobilia sequuntur personam, ” meaning that personal property, that is, 

movables, follow the person.. In the early economic life, personal 

property occupied a position of minor importance. for the simple 

‘reason that personal property played an insignificant part in the 

economic life of the owner. In brief., it had little to do with profits 

or advancement of the economic condition of the owner. Such protection as was afforded the owner in the possession and enjoyment 

of such property was rendered by organized society at the owner’s 

domicile, hence there originated the rule of “mobilia sequuntur personam. ” 

The ownership and use of personal property in the economic life of the country and its citisens has, in modern times, become increasingly important and has given rise to a relaxation of 

the dogmatic rule embodied in the maxim, and the Supreme Court 

of Texas has recognized this relaxation. This~is apparent from the 

statement in the Great Southern Life Insurance Company case: 

“It is true that the actual situs of certain classes 

of visible and tangible personal property . e . may have 

a situs for taxation where they are permanently kept, 

separate and apart from the domicile of the owner. . . .” 

(243 S.W. at 781.) 
Hon. Drew S. Davis, Page 3 (V-1202) 

We think it now clearly established in this State that 

“actual situs” of property for the purpose of taxation is controlling 

over the residence of the owner if the property is used in the nonresident county permanently and not merely temporarily and incidentally. In the case of City of Ft. Worth v. Southland Greyhound 

Lines, Inc., 67 S.W.2d 354 (T Civ. App. 1931). approved b th 

Supreme Court in answer to :zitified questions in 123 Tex. 1’3. 6’1 

S.W.2d 361 (1933), there was no special statutory provision or legislative history affecting taxable situs. as is present in cases dealing with rolling stock of railroads. But the Court looked only to 

Section 11 of Article VIII of the Constitutionand Article 7153. quoted 

above, which require taxation of personal property ‘where situated” 

or “in the county where it is situated.” Plaintiff’s principal office 

and domicile was at San Antonio, where it rendered its buses for 

taxation. The taxpayer admitted a taxable situs in Fort Worth of 

certain personal property as of January 1, 1930, including tools and 

supplies used in its Fort Worth garage and repair shop, office furniture, and certain moneys on hand as of that date, and tendered into court the taxes due on these items. The plaintiff sought in this 

suit an injunction against the tax collector of the City of Fort Worth 

to prevent the city from taxing or collecting taxes’on certain motor 

buses~placed upon the city tax rolls. The Court held in effect that 

the’ buses were only temporarily rather than permanently employed 

in the City of Port Worth and sustained the taxpayer’s contention 

that they were taxable in San Antonio, Bexar County, where it had 

its main office. The taxpayer conceded that the portion of its property permanently located in Fort Worth had a taxable situs there 

and was properly taxable there, and tendered the appropriate amount 

of taxes. No question was raised before the court as to this property. But since it had its actual s.itus by reason of the permanency 

of its location and the purpose for which it was used at that location 

by the taxpayer, the actual situs prevailed over the residence of 

the taxpayer as to this property. 

The case of Clampett, Sheriff v. Johnson, 42 S.W. 866 

(Tex. Civ. App. 1897), deals exclusively with the taxable situs of 

livestock in a county not the residence of the owner. In this case, 

I resident of Runnels County owned some 1400 head of cattle. On 

3r about November 2. 1893, by virtue of a pasturage contract, he 

moved the cattle to Sterling County and there pastured them until 

ibout April 1, 1894. Under his contract he had the privilege of pas- 

:uring the cattle until May 1 but returned the cattle to Runnels Coun- 

:y about April 1. prior to the expiration of the time allowed under 

:he contract. Both Runnels County and Sterling. County asserted the 

Tight to tax the cattle. The Court held that the cattle had acquired 

i taxable situs as of January 1 in Sterling County. The Court pred- 

‘.cated its decision upon the authority of Section 11, of Article VIII 

,f the Constitution and Article 7153, V.C.S., both of which require 

:he payment of taxes where situated. Therefore, the correct rule 
Hon. Drew S. Davis, Page 4 (V-1202) 

seems to be that where tangible personal property has an actual 

physical location in a county and is there dedicated and used in 

the county in the furtherance of the taxpayer’s business operations, 

it there acquires a taxable situs distinct from the domicile of the 

owner. Waggoner v. Whaley. 50 S.W. 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, 

error ref.) 

We have assumed from your opinion request that there 

is not involved the question of inter-county pasturage which is governed by Article 7155, V.C.S.. and have treated the matter in so far 

as livestock is concerned by the rules established for other tangible personal property. Of cours~e, if county line pasturage is involved, the taxable situs is governed by Article 7155, which provides 

for an apportionment between the counties as the acreage of the respective counties bears to the total acreage in all the counties. 

SUMMARY 

Personal property may acquire a taxable situs 

in a county distinct from the residence of the owner if 

it is permanently kept, used. and dedicated by the owner 

as of January 1 of the taxable year to uses in connection 

with the operation of his business in that county, as distinguished from a temporary or mere incidental use; 

and this is true as to all tangible personal property, including livestock. Article 7155 provides an exception 

in cases of county-line pasturage. 

Yours very truly, 

PRICE. DANIEL 

Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

W. V. Geppert 

Taxation Division 

Jesse P. Luton, Jr. 

Reviewing Assistant 

Charles D. Mathews 

First Assistant 

BY 

L. P. Lollar 

Assistant 

LPL/mwb