Nos. 2--07-- 0299 & 2--07--0300 cons. File d: 1-14-08

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE CITY

OF N APER VILL E, ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ) o f D u P ag e C o un t y. Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) ) v. ) No. 05-- TR--145344 ) JACK MANN, ) Ho no r ab le ) Ke nne t h M o y, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________ _____ _____________

_ THE CITY

OF N APER VILL E, ) Ap peal f rom th e Ci rcui t Court ) o f D u P ag e C o un t y. Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) ) v. ) No. 05-- TR--149739 ) JACK MANN, ) Ho no r ab le ) Ke nne t h M o y, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Judge, Presi din g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JU STI CEMc LA

RE N del i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: At iss ue in

t hese co nso lidat ed a ppe als is whet her t he t rial co ur t er re d in vaca t ingorders t hat dis charged

defend ant , Ja ck M ann, fro m cou rt sup er vision. Defend ant ar gue s t hat , d ue t o t he passage of tim e, the trial court 's j urisdi

ction to vacate the disc

harge orders la

psed. We agree. Na pe rville po lice officer s issue d sp eed ing t icket s t o d efenda nt on Septembe r 28, 2005 (case N o. 05--TR--145344), and on October 5, 2005 (case No. 05--T R--149739). Bot h cas es wer e prosecuted by the City

of Napervil

le (Ci ty) under the City's traff

ic ordinan ces. On October 20, 2005,Nos. 2 --07- -0299 & 2-- 07--03 00 cons.

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defend ant en t er ed gu ilt y ple as in bot h cas es a nd wa s plac ed o n sup er vision fo r six mo nt hs. As co ndit ions of supervi

sion, defen

dant was req

u i red to pa y f i ne s a nd costs, p erf

orm threeda y s of servi ce i n th e Sh eri f f 's W ork A l tern ati ve Prog ram (SW AP) ( ca se No. 05--TR

--1497 39), and a t t end t r affic school (case

No. 05-- TR--145344). Defendan t was to report to the trial court on April 13, 2006, bu t he faile d t o ap pe ar o n t ha t da t e, an d t he co ur t iss ue d a be nc h w ar r an t fo rhis arrest in each case. That sam

e day, the City

fi le d petitions

to revoke defend ant 's su per vision, alle gin g that he had fai le d to compl y w ith the c onditions of superv is ion. Def

endan t was arrested on the bench wa rra n ts and released on bond. On

June 7, 2006, the trial

co ur t dis ch ar ge d d efe nd an t fr o m su pe rvisio n in b oth cases. On Jun

e 13, 2006, in

each cas e the Ci

ty f il ed an d serve d a n

otice of a motion to recons i der. In nei ther case did the C ity

fi le an actual motion. The n

ot ic es indicat ed t hat t he mot ions w ou ld be he ard on J une 21, 2006. On Jul y 12, 2006, def

endan t file d special

and lim ited appearances to contest th e trial court 's j urisdi

ction. Def

endan t contended that t he trial court 's j urisdi

ction ha d expi red because more than

30 da y s had el aps ed s i nc e the tria l courthad discharged

him f ro m supe rvisio n, a nd the Ci ty ha d fai le d to fi le a tim el y m ot ion f or reco nsi deration. In addi

tion, def endan t o rall y a rgued that to im pose additional

puni shm ent after the di scharge would violate the doubl e j eopardy cl auses of the Uni ted St ates Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. V) and our state constitution (Ill . Const. 1970, art. I, §10). In re spo nse, t he Cit y asser t ed t hat t he o rd er s discha rg ing defend ant had be en dr aft ed a nd pres en ted to the trial

courtby a Du Pag e Co unt y assist ant St at e's At t or ney who was pr ese nt in the cou rtroom and wh o was lab oring un

der the mi staken bel ie f that defend ant was being pr os ecu t ed by t he Sta te. The C i

ty al so asserted that it had i ntended t o mak e an o ra l mot ion t o r eco nsider on J uneNos. 2 --07- -0299 & 2-- 07--03 00 cons.

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21, 2006, butdefen

dant's attorney h

ad asked t he Cit y for a co nt inuance so t hat he co uld r eview t he case an d un dertake an y ne ces sary

legal r ese ar ch. The Ci

ty ag re ed , a n d th e m atte r w as con ti n ue d to Ju ly 12, 2006 . T he Ci

ty mai n tai n ed th at th e c on ti n ua n ce toll ed th e ti me f or i t to f i l e i ts m otion to recon sider. On Fe br ua ry 14, 200 7, th

e tri al cou rt en tere d a n or der i n e ach c as e vac ati

ng the di scha rge of defend ant 's su per vision and con ti nu i ng the ca se f or a h ea ri ng on t he pe t itio n t o r evo ke s upe rvisio n. De f enda nt appealed pursuant to Supr em e Court Rule 604(f) (210 Il l. 2d R. 604(f

)) and we consolidated the appeals. Bef ore ex aminin g t he ar gu men t s o n app ea l, a f ew words ab out our ju

ri sdi cti on are i n orde r. Su pr eme Court Rul e 604(f) perm its an appeal from an order deny

in g a m ot ion to dismi

ss a cri mi nal pr oc eed ingon the grounds of f ormer jeo pa r dy. Defe

ndan t's prin ci pal argumen t in the tri al

court was that the court 's j urisdi

ction ha d l aps ed due to the pa ssa

ge of tim e. However, as noted, defendan t also oral l y argu ed th at i m pos i ti on of an y f ur th er pu n i sh men t wou l d v i ol ate t he double j eopar dy cl

auses. In our v i ew , th i s was suf f i ci en t to qu alify

as a mot ion t o d ismiss, and t he t rial co ur t 's o rd er s vac at ing t he di scha rge of su pervi si on were , f or al l pra cti cal pur pos es , a den

i al of the motion. Furt her, because defend ant was movi

ng to di sm i ss not a proc ee di ng to rev okehi s s upe rvi si on but ra t her a pr oc eed ing to re i n sta te his con vi cti ons, th e proce edi

ng was cri

m i na l . Cf. People v . Trim

arco , 36 4 I ll. App. 3d 549, 553 ( 20 06 ) . Ac co r di ng ly, our juri sdiction i s proper. Mo reover, when j urisdi ction ex is ts under Ru le 60 4( f) , we may vacate, o n g r o un ds o t he r t ha n a vio lat io n o f t he gu ar an t ee ag ain st do ub le j eopardy , a void order. People v . Bosley

, 233 Il l . Ap p. 3d 13 2, 138 ( 1992) . T ur ning t o t he mer it s, de fen da nt ar gu es , as he did be lo w, t ha t t he gu ar an t ee ag ain st do ub le je opardy fo r ec lo se s fu rt he rpu nis h men t an d th at, i n an y ev en t, the tr i al cou rt l acke d j uri sd

i cti on toNos. 2 --07- -0299 & 2-- 07--03 00 cons.

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v ac ate t he dis charge of s

upervi sion. Because the l atter argumen

t is persuas iv

e, i t i s u n n ec es sa ry to de ci de th e f orm er poi n t. Sec ti on 5--6--3.1( e) of the Uni

fi ed Code of Corrections (730 I LCS 5/5--6 --3. 1(e) ( West 2004) ) pr ovid es t hat "[a ]t t he co nclusio n of t he per iod of su per vision, if the c ou rt det er mines tha t t he defend ant has s

uc ce ss f ul l y com pl i ed wi th a l l of the con di ti ons of sup er vision, the court shal l di scharge t he de fendant and e nt er a judg ment dis mi ssi ng the ch arges." The di sm

is sal under thi s secti on does not con sti tute an ac qu i tta l, an d t he st at e a nd fed er al d o ub le je o pa r dy c lau se s d o no t fo r bid re insta t ement of a convi

ction that has b een discharged i n error. See Pe o ple v. Os wa ld , 10 6 I ll. App. 3d 645 , 646-4 7 (198 2). The pr o se cu t io n ma y mo ve fo rr ec o nsid er at io n o f a fin al j ud gm en t wi thi n 30da y s af ter i ts en try. Pe o ple v. He il , 71 I ll. 2d 458 , 461 (1 978). H owever, if no such m

ot ion i s m ade wi thin that period, the trial

court l osesj uri sdi

cti on to vacate or m

odi f y i ts j udgm en t. Pe opl e v . M i n n i ti , 37 3 I ll. App. 3d 55 , 65 ( 20 07 ) . He r e, t he Cit y file d o nly noticesof motions for re co nsider at ion, not t he m oti ons them se lve s. T his cou

rt hashe l d that " [a] noti

ceof moti on i s n ot a m oti on a nd doe s n ot sa t isfy a stat ute o r rule that r equires the fi li ng of a m ot ion." People v . MacArthur , 313 Ill . App. 3d 864, 86 8 ( 20 00 ) . T hu s, t he no t ice s d id n o t ex t en d t he t r ial c o ur t 's ju r isd ict io n beyond the 30-day period, whi

ch en ded on Jul

y 7, 2006. The City ar gue s t hat by

ask ingthat t he h

earin g on the Ci

ty's motion to reconside

r be del ay ed, defend ant t olled t he t ime for filing the mot ion. The ar gument is me ritless b ecause "[l

]ack of sub

je ct ma t ter jurisdiction i s not subj ect to wai ver [ci tation] and can

not be cured through co n se n t of th e parties." People v . Fl

owers , 20 8 I ll. 2d 2 91, 303 (2 003 ). Citing Clay v. Kuhl , 189 Il l . 2d 603 (2000 ), t he Ci ty argues t hat "t he t olling o f a st at ut e o f li mitat ions is a ppr op riat e in tho se inst ance s whe re t heNos. 2 --07- -0299 & 2-- 07--03 00 cons.

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defend ant acti

ve l y m i sleads the p l ai ntif f ." It hardly

fol lows, however, that co nduct th at tol l s a sta tute of l im itations wil l e xtend the trial

court's j uri sdi cti on. Af ter all , a statut e of l

im itations is si mpl y a n affirmative defen

se thatma y b e wai ved if n ot properly

in voked ( In re Parentage of Janssen , 29 2 I ll. App. 3d 21 9, 22 8 ( 19 97 ) ) , wh er ea s la ck o f jur isd ic t ion is not subjec t t o w aiver. In a ny event , t he City's ar gument is no t we ll gr o un de d in fact. Apparen tly the Ci ty i s of the v

ie w that defen

dant caused j urisd i cti on t o lap se by re que st ing

a c on ti n ua n ce f rom th e date wh en th e C i ty pl an n ed to pres en t i ts m oti on or ally. Ther e is no evidenc e, how ever , t hat de f enda n t activel y m is le d t he Cit y abou t t he consequenc es of fai

li ng to fi le a tim ely motion to reconsider. Rat her, it is the Ci ty ' s carelessn

ess, ra th er th an an y de ce pti on b y de f en da n t, that l ed to th e l ap se of j uri sd i cti on i n th e tr i al cou rt. The Ci ty also notes remarks by

the tri al court sug gestin

g tha t the court

be li eved tha t one of defend ant 's atto rney

s m ay have expl oitedt he as sist ant St at e' s At t o rne y's c o nfu sio n in p er mit t ing him t o p re par e t he o rd er s discha rg ing defen dant from supervision and h

ad m is le dthe c ourt. The c ourt in dic atedthat t he attor ney

's conduct bordered on f

raud. The

rem arks were unca lled for . T her e is no direct evi den ce of an y m i scon duct an d no f ai r ba si s f or in f erri ng th at an y occurre d. W

ha t the rec ord tends to show i s that the City fai le d to moni

to r its cases

and t hat t he as sist ant St at e's Att or ney pr ese nt in the court roo m was unab le to determi

ne wh ic h cases he was r es po nsib le for prosecuting. Indee d, t he Ci ty concedes

that it r o ut ine ly ac ce pt s he lp fr o m as sis t an t St at e' s At t o rne ys inprepa ri ng orders to be si gne d by the c ourt. Eve

n i f the a ssi stan t State's Attorne y excee ded h

i s au thori ty h ere, there is no r eas on t o be lieve tha t defend ant 's at t or ney nece ssar ily wo uld have recognized that any thin g was am is s or that he was guil

ty of an ythi ng other than an h

onest mistake. In an y even t, th e C i ty doe s n ot expl ai n how an y f raud in securi ng the di scharge

o r de r s w o uld aff ect the ti me peri od duri ng w hi ch the C i ty c oul d m

ove to set the orders

aside. It is tr ue t hat if theNos. 2 --07- -0299 & 2-- 07--03 00 cons.

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orders were void, t he y co uld be se t as ide at an y t ime u nd er se ct io n 2
- - 14 01 ( f) o f t he Co de o f Civ il Procedu re (735 ILCS 5 /2--14 01(f) (West 2006)). See Ford M otor Credi t Co. v. Spe

rry , 21 4 I ll. 2d 371, 379 (2 005 ) ( not ing t hat sec t ion 2
-- 140 1( f) co difies a co mmon-law ru le allowing a void judg ment to be attacked at any

tim e, and a peti

tion to vacate brought under that su bs ec ti on need not sat isfy the usual prerequisi

tes fo rr elie f un de rse ct io n 2
- - 14 01 ) . Ho we ve r , no t alljudgm ents obtain

ed by fraud arevoi d. In r e A do pt io n of E.L. , 315 Ill . App. 3d 137, 154 (2000). "Cour ts disti ngui sh b etween fraud t hat pr event s a c ou rt fro m acqu iringj urisd i cti on or merely gives t he co ur t co lor able jur isdict ion, and f raud occ urri ng a f ter t he court 's

va li d acq ui si ti on of j urisd i cti on, such asf alse tes ti mony or conc eal men t." E.L. , 315 Ill . App. 3d at 154. Only the form er type of f

raud--whi ch is someti

me s calle d "ex trin sic f raud" --ren

ders a j udgm en t void. E.L. , 31 5 I ll . App. 3d at 15 4. Extrinsi c fraud "occurs in si tuations where an

unsucces sf

ul pa rty has been prevented

from f ull y ex hi bi ting his case by be i ng kept a wa y f rom the court or is kept

from gai ni ng knowledge of the suit." E.L. , 315 Ill . App. 3d at 154. Clearl

y, that did not o ccur here. Fin ally, th e C i

ty cites Peo ple v. Bryant , 369 Il l . Ap p. 3d 54 (2006 ), i n w hi ch i t was h eld, in ter alia , t ha t t he St at e fo r feit ed ap pe llat e r ev ie w of whethe r the trial court erred in

grantin g an oral m oti on t o wit hd r aw a g uilt y ple a. Su ffice it to say that Bryant is inappo site beca use t he t rial co ur t 's jurisdiction was n

ot at issue in that case. The t ri al court excee ded i

ts j uri sdi cti on wh en i t entere d the

Feb ruary 14, 200 7, o rder s vaca t ingthe dis charge of de fen dant's supe

rvi sion. The Feb

ruary 14, 2007, orders a

re the ref ore vo id and m ust be vaca

ted. Vacated. BOW MA N an d ZEN OFF , JJ., c oncu

r.