IV 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 24 

Expressing the sense of Congress that the report of Special Counsel Mueller 

should be made available to the public and to Congress. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 7, 2019 

Mr. NADLER (for himself, Ms. WATERS, Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. CUMMINGS, Mr. 

ENGEL, and Mr. NEAL) submitted the following concurrent resolution; 

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of Congress that the report of Special 

Counsel Mueller should be made available to the public 

and to Congress. 

Whereas, on January 6, 2017, the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence released a report concluding that 

‘‘Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence 

campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election’’, 

that the goal of this campaign was ‘‘to undermine public 

faith in the US democratic process’’, and that ‘‘Putin 

and the Russian Government developed a clear preference 

for President-elect Trump’’; 

Whereas, on March 20, 2017, the Director of the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified that he was authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that 


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•HCON 24 IH 

the FBI is investigating whether ‘‘there was any coordination’’ between individuals associated with the Trump 

presidential campaign and the Russian Government; 

Whereas part 600 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, 

as in effect on March 7, 2019 (in this resolution referred 

to as ‘‘Special Counsel Regulations’’), provides for the 

appointment of a Special Counsel when the Attorney 

General or Acting Attorney General ‘‘determines that 

criminal investigation of a person or matter is warranted 

and—(a) That investigation . . . by a United States Attorney’s Office or litigating Division of the Department 

of Justice would present a conflict of interest for the Department or other extraordinary circumstances; and (b) 

That under the circumstances, it would be in the public 

interest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume 

responsibility for the matter’’; 

Whereas the Special Counsel Regulations call for any individual named as Special Counsel to be a ‘‘lawyer with a 

reputation for integrity and impartial decision making 

and with appropriate experience to ensure that both the 

investigation will be conducted ably, expeditiously and 

thoroughly, and that investigative and prosecutorial decisions will be supported by an informed understanding of 

the criminal law and Department of Justice policies’’; 

Whereas, on May 17, 2017, the Acting Attorney General appointed former FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III to 

serve as Special Counsel ‘‘to ensure a full and thorough 

investigation of the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election’’, including an examination of ‘‘any links and/or coordination between the 

Russian government and individuals associated with the 

campaign of President Donald Trump’’, ‘‘any matters 


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that arose or may arise directly from the investigation’’, 

and ‘‘any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. 

600.4(a)’’; 

Whereas the Acting Attorney General explained that he had 

appointed Special Counsel Mueller because he ‘‘determined that it is in the public interest . . . to . . . appoint a Special Counsel to assume responsibility for this 

matter . . . based upon the unique circumstances, the 

public interest requires [him] to place this investigation 

under the authority of a person who exercises a degree 

of independence from the normal chain of command . . . 

[and that] a Special Counsel is necessary in order for the 

American people to have full confidence in the outcome. 

Our nation is grounded on the rule of law, and the public 

must be assured that government officials administer the 

law fairly’’; 

Whereas Special Counsel Mueller has previously served in the 

Department of Justice as a prosecutor, United States Attorney, and Director of the FBI under both Republican 

and Democratic administrations, and his selection as the 

Special Counsel elicited bipartisan praise recognizing his 

reputation for competence, fairness, and nonpartisanship; 

Whereas the Special Counsel’s investigation has thus far resulted in the public indictment of 34 individuals and 3 

companies, 7 guilty pleas, and 1 conviction following a 

jury trial; 

Whereas the Special Counsel Regulations provide that ‘‘[a]t 

the conclusion of the Special Counsel’s work, he or she 

shall provide the Attorney General with a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions 

reached by the Special Counsel’’; 


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Whereas, on January 15, 2019, at his confirmation hearing 

before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Attorney 

General William Barr testified ‘‘I . . . believe it is very 

important that the public and Congress be informed of 

the results of the special counsel’s work. For that reason, 

my goal will be to provide as much transparency as I can 

consistent with the law’’; 

Whereas, on February 22, 2019, the chairs of six committees 

of the House of Representatives wrote to Attorney General Barr to inform him of their expectation that he will 

make Special Counsel Mueller’s report public ‘‘to the 

maximum extent permitted by law’’; 

Whereas transparency is consistent with the overall purpose 

and intent of the Special Counsel Regulations and the accompanying Department of Justice commentary, which 

notes the importance of ‘‘ensur[ing] congressional and 

public confidence in the integrity of the process’’; 

Whereas the need for transparency is most pronounced with 

regard to investigations that involve the President or individuals associated with his campaign as the President 

is responsible for the appointment of the senior leadership of the Department of Justice; 

Whereas the Department of Justice’s United States Attorney’s Manual indicates that in public filings and proceedings, prosecutors ‘‘should remain sensitive to the privacy and reputation interests of uncharged third-parties’’, 

that is, of persons who the Department considers may be, 

but are not yet criminally charged; 

Whereas this general nonstatutory policy of sensitivity to the 

‘‘interests of uncharged third-parties’’ should be inapplicable to a sitting President because the Department of 


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Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel has previously written 

that ‘‘a sitting President is constitutionally immune from 

indictment and criminal prosecution’’; 

Whereas the Department of Justice has on numerous recent 

occasions provided investigatory information to Congress 

and the public concerning investigations of high-level 

public officials in both pending and closed cases; 

Whereas in the only other instance where a Special Counsel 

was appointed under the Special Counsel Regulations (in 

1999, concerning the 1993 confrontation in Waco, 

Texas), both the interim and final reports provided by 

the Special Counsel were released to the public by the Attorney General; and 

Whereas the allegations at the center of Special Counsel 

Mueller’s investigation strike at the core of our democracy, and there is an overwhelming public interest in releasing the Special Counsel’s report to ensure public confidence in both the process and the result of the investigation: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 

2 concurring), That Congress— 

3 (1) calls for the public release of any report 

4 Special Counsel Mueller provides to the Attorney 

5 General, except to the extent the public disclosure of 

6 any portion thereof is expressly prohibited by law; 

7 and 


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1 (2) calls for the full release to Congress of any 

2 report Special Counsel Mueller provides to the Attor3 ney General. 

Æ 


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