This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

23161 

Vol. 77, No. 75 

Wednesday, April 18, 2012 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 

[NRC–2012–0031] 

RIN 3150–AJ11 

Onsite Emergency Response 

Capabilities 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed 

rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC or the Commission) 

is issuing this Advance Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) to begin 

the process of potentially amending its 

regulations to strengthen and integrate 

onsite emergency response capabilities. 

The NRC seeks public comment on 

specific questions and issues with 

respect to possible revision to the NRC’s 

requirements for onsite emergency 

response capabilities, and development 

of both new requirements and the 

supporting regulatory basis. This 

regulatory action is one of the actions 

stemming from the NRC’s lessonslearned efforts associated with the 

March 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi 

Nuclear Power Plant accident in Japan. 

DATES: Submit comments by June 18, 

2012. Comments received after this date 

will be considered if it is practical to do 

so, but the NRC is only able to ensure 

consideration of comments received on 

or before this date. 

ADDRESSES: You may access information 

and comment submissions related to 

this document, which the NRC 

possesses and is publicly available, by 

searching on http://www.regulations.gov 

under Docket ID NRC–2012–0031. You 

may submit comments by any of the 

following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2012–0031. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–492–3668; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. 

• Email comments to: 

Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you 

do not receive an automatic email reply 

confirming receipt, contact us directly at 

301–415–1677. 

• Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 301– 

415–1101. 

• Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, Attn: 

Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. 

• Hand deliver comments to: 11555 

Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 

20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. 

(Eastern time) Federal workdays; 

telephone: 301–415–1677. 

For additional direction on accessing 

information and submitting comments, 

see ‘‘Accessing Information and 

Submitting Comments’’ in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Robert H. Beall, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– 

3874; email: Robert.Beall@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Accessing Information and Submitting 

Comments 

II. Background: Fukushima Dai-ichi and the 

NRC Regulatory Response 

III. Background: Onsite Emergency Response 

Capabilities 

A. Emergency Operating Procedures 

B. Severe Accident Management 

Guidelines 

C. Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines 

D. Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities 

Versus Emergency Preparedness 

IV. Discussion and Request for Public 

Comment 

A. ANPR Purpose 

B. Rulemaking Objectives/Success Criteria 

C. Applicability to NRC Licenses and 

Approvals 

D. Relationship Between Recommendation 

8 and Other Near-Term Task Force 

Recommendations 

E. Interim Regulatory Actions 

V. Public Meeting 

VI. Rulemaking Process and Schedule 

VII. Related Petition for Rulemaking Actions 

VIII. Available Supporting Documents 

I. Accessing Information and 

Submitting Comments 

A. Accessing Information 

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2012– 

0031 when contacting the NRC about 

the availability of information for this 

notice. You may access information 

related to this ANPR, which the NRC 

possesses and is publicly available, by 

the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2012–0031. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may access publicly 

available documents online in the NRC 

Library at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search, 

select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and 

then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced in this notice (if 

that document is available in ADAMS) 

is provided the first time that a 

document is referenced. A table listing 

documents that provide additional 

background and supporting information 

is in Section VIII of this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

B. Submitting Comments 

Please include Docket ID NRC–2012– 

0031 in the subject line of your 

comment submission, in order to ensure 

that the NRC is able to make your 

comment submission available to the 

public in this docket. 

The NRC cautions you not to include 

identifying or contact information in 

comment submissions that you do not 

want to be publicly disclosed. The NRC 

posts all comment submissions at 

http://www.regulations.gov as well as 

enters the comment submissions into 

ADAMS. The NRC does not edit 

comment submissions to remove 

identifying or contact information. 

If you are requesting or aggregating 

comments from other persons for 

submission to the NRC, then you should 

inform those persons not to include 

identifying or contact information in 

their comment submissions that they do 

not want to be publicly disclosed. Your 

request should state that the NRC will 

not edit comment submissions to 

remove such information before making 

the comment submissions available to 

the public or entering the comment 

submissions into ADAMS. 

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23162 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 75 / Wednesday, April 18, 2012 / Proposed Rules 

II. Background: Fukushima Dai-ichi 

and the NRC Regulatory Response 

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 

earthquake struck off the coast of the 

Japanese island of Honshu. The 

earthquake precipitated a large tsunami 

that is estimated to have exceeded 14 

meters (45 feet) in height at the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power 

Plant site (hereinafter referred to as the 

site or the facility). The earthquake and 

tsunami produced widespread 

devastation across northeastern Japan, 

resulting in approximately 25,000 

people dead or missing, displacing tens 

of thousands of people, and 

significantly impacting the 

infrastructure and industry in the 

northeastern coastal areas of Japan. At 

the time of the earthquake, Fukushima 

Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 were in 

operation. Units 4, 5, and 6 had been 

shut down for routine refueling and 

maintenance activities, and the Unit 4 

reactor fuel had been offloaded to the 

Unit 4 spent fuel pool. 

As a result of the earthquake, the 

three operating units at the site 

automatically shut down, and offsite 

power was lost to the entire facility. The 

emergency diesel generators started at 

all six units, providing alternating 

current (AC) electrical power to critical 

systems; overall, the facility response to 

the seismic event appears to have been 

normal. 

Approximately 40 minutes after 

shutdown of the operating units, the 

first large tsunami wave inundated the 

site, followed by multiple additional 

waves. The tsunami resulted in 

extensive damage to site facilities and a 

complete loss of AC electrical power at 

Units 1 through 5, a condition known as 

station blackout (SBO). One diesel 

generator remained functional on 

Unit 6. 

Despite the actions of the operators 

following the earthquake and tsunami, 

cooling was lost to the fuel in the Unit 

1 reactor after several hours, in the Unit 

2 reactor after about 70 hours, and in the 

Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours, 

resulting in damage to the nuclear fuel 

shortly after the loss of cooling. 

In the days following the Fukushima 

Dai-ichi nuclear accident, the NRC 

Chairman directed the NRC staff to 

establish a senior-level agency task force 

to conduct a methodical and systematic 

review of the NRC’s processes and 

regulations to determine whether, in 

light of the events in Japan, the agency 

should make additional improvements 

to its regulatory system, and to make 

recommendations to the Commission for 

its policy direction. This direction was 

provided in a tasking memorandum 

dated March 23, 2011, from the NRC 

Chairman to the NRC Executive Director 

for Operations (COMGBJ–11–0002) 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML110950110). 

In SECY–11–0093, ‘‘Near-Term Report 

and Recommendations for Agency 

Actions Following the Events in Japan’’ 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML11186A959), 

dated July 12, 2011, the Near-Term Task 

Force (NTTF) provided its 

recommendations to the Commission. 

The staff requirements memorandum 

(SRM) for SECY–11–0093 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML112310021), dated 

August 19, 2011, directed the NRC staff 

to identify and make ‘‘recommendations 

regarding any Task Force 

recommendations that can, and in the 

staff’s judgment, should be 

implemented, in part or in whole, 

without unnecessary delay.’’ 

In SECY–11–0124, ‘‘Recommended 

Actions To Be Taken Without Delay 

from the Near-Term Task Force Report’’ 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML11245A127), 

the NRC staff provided 

recommendations to the Commission on 

actions that, in the staff’s judgment, 

should be initiated without unnecessary 

delay, and requested that the 

Commission provide direction for 

moving forward on these 

recommendation (subsequently referred 

to as ‘‘Tier 1’’ recommendations). The 

Commission approved the staff’s 

proposed actions in the SRM for SECY– 

11–0124 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML112911571), dated October 18, 2011. 

In SECY–11–0137, ‘‘Prioritization of 

Recommended Actions to Be Taken in 

Response to Fukushima Lessons 

Learned’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML11269A204), the NRC staff requested 

that the Commission approve the staff’s 

prioritization of the NTTF 

recommendations. In the SRM for 

SECY–11–0137 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML113490055), dated December 15, 

2011, the Commission approved the 

staff’s proposed prioritization of the 

NTTF recommendations and supported 

action on the Tier 1 recommendations, 

subject to the direction in the SRM. 

With respect to regulatory action 

regarding onsite emergency response 

capabilities, the Commission directed 

the NRC staff to initiate a rulemaking on 

NTTF Recommendation 8, in the form 

of an ANPR. This document responds to 

that Commission direction. 

In November 2011, the Institute of 

Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 

issued INPO–11–005, ‘‘Special Report 

on the Nuclear Accident at the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power 

Station’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML11347A454). In the SRM for SECY– 

11–0137, the Commission directed NRC 

staff to consider INPO–11–005 in its 

development of the technical bases for 

any proposed regulatory changes. 

III. Background: Onsite Emergency 

Response Capabilities 

A. Emergency Operating Procedures 

Emergency Operating Procedures 

(EOPs) are required procedures 

designed to mitigate the effects of a 

design basis accident and place the 

plant in a safe shutdown condition. The 

EOPs are required by Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 

Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, 

‘‘Instructions, Procedures, and 

Drawings,’’ and are included in the 

administrative control sections of 

licensee’s technical specifications. 

Licensed operators are trained and 

evaluated in the implementation of 

EOPs through initial license training. 

The NRC evaluates licensed operator 

candidates’ knowledge of EOPs during 

an initial written examination, as 

required by 10 CFR 55.41 and 55.43, 

and an initial operating test, as required 

by 10 CFR 55.45. For proficiency, 

licensed operator requalification 

training programs, required by 10 CFR 

55.59, routinely train and evaluate 

licensed operators on their knowledge 

and ability to implement the EOPs. 

B. Severe Accident Management 

Guidelines 

During the 1990s, the nuclear 

industry developed Severe Accident 

Management Guidelines (SAMGs) as a 

voluntary industry initiative in response 

to Generic Letter 88–20, Supplement 2, 

‘‘Accident Management Strategies for 

Consideration in the Individual Plant 

Examination Process,’’ dated April 4, 

1990 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML031200551). SAMGs provide 

guidance to operators and Technical 

Support Center (TSC) staff in the event 

of an accident that progresses beyond a 

plant’s design basis (and therefore 

beyond the scope of the EOPs). The 

nuclear power industry owners’ groups 

(i.e., industry organizations with 

representatives from the various nuclear 

plant owners that provide industry 

oversight for various plant designs) 

developed generic guidelines specific to 

the individual plant designs. Given the 

voluntary nature of the initiative for 

SAMGs, their implementation 

throughout the industry has been 

varied, as noted by NRC inspection 

results for Temporary Instruction 2515/ 

184, ‘‘Availability and Readiness 

Inspection of Severe Accident 

Management Guidelines (SAMGs)’’ 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML11115A053). 

The guidelines themselves were 

implemented by individual licensees, 

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but because the NRC has not developed 

a regulatory requirement for SAMGs, the 

training, evaluation, and procedure 

control requirements for SAMGs vary 

from plant to plant. 

C. Extensive Damage Mitigation 

Guidelines 

Following the terrorist events of 

September 11, 2001, the NRC ordered 

licensees to develop and implement 

specific guidance and strategies to 

maintain or restore core cooling, 

containment, and spent fuel pool 

cooling capabilities using existing or 

readily available resources that can be 

effectively implemented under the 

circumstances associated with loss of 

large areas of the plant due to 

explosions or fire. These requirements 

were subsequently imposed as license 

conditions for individual licensees and 

formalized in the Power Reactor 

Security Requirements final rule (74 FR 

13926; March 27, 2009) in 10 CFR 

50.54(hh)(2). As a result, Extensive 

Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) 

were developed in order to provide 

guidance to operating crews and TSC 

personnel on the implementation of the 

strategies developed to address these 

large area events. The events at the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power 

Station following the March 11, 2011, 

earthquake and tsunami highlighted the 

continued potential benefits of these 

strategies in mitigating the effects of 

prolonged SBOs and other events that 

challenge key safety functions. The NRC 

has not developed a specific regulatory 

requirement for training on EDMGs. 

D. Onsite Emergency Response 

Capabilities Versus Emergency 

Preparedness 

This ANPR focuses on the 

effectiveness of accident mitigating 

procedures and the training and 

exercises associated with these 

procedures. When using the term 

‘‘accident mitigating procedures’’ in this 

document, the NRC is referring to EOPs, 

SAMGs, and EDMGs. The licensee’s 

emergency preparedness plan and 

implementing procedures, which are 

required by 10 CFR 50.47 and 50.54(q) 

and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, are 

being evaluated through other NTTF 

recommendations, and the associated 

efforts are referred to in the questions in 

Section IV.D. However, the licensee’s 

emergency preparedness plan and 

implementing procedures are not the 

subject of this ANPR. 

IV. Discussion and Request for Public 

Comment 

A. ANPR Purpose 

In SECY–11–0124, the NRC staff 

recommended that the agency engage 

stakeholders during rulemaking 

activities ‘‘so that the regulatory action 

and licensee actions taken effectively 

resolve the identified issues and 

implementation challenges are 

identified in advance.’’ The NRC staff 

proposed interaction with stakeholders 

to support development of the 

regulatory basis, a proposed rule, and 

implementing guidance for 

strengthening and integrating the onsite 

emergency response capabilities. In the 

SRM for SECY–11–0124, the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to 

issue an ANPR prior to developing the 

regulatory basis for a proposed rule. 

Accordingly, the NRC’s objective in this 

ANPR is to solicit external stakeholder 

feedback to inform the NRC staff’s 

efforts to evaluate regulatory approaches 

for strengthening the current onsite 

emergency response capability 

requirements. 

In the SRM for SECY–11–0124, the 

Commission also encouraged NRC staff 

to develop recommendations that 

continue to realize the strengths of a 

performance-based system as a guiding 

principle. The Commission indicated 

that, to be effective, approaches should 

be flexible and able to accommodate a 

diverse range of circumstances and 

conditions. The Commission stated that 

for ‘‘consideration of events beyond the 

design basis, a regulatory approach 

founded on performance-based 

requirements will foster development of 

the most effective and efficient, sitespecific mitigation strategies, similar to 

how the agency approached the 

approval of licensee response strategies 

for the ‘loss of large area’ event’’ 

addressed in 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2). 

Consistent with the Commission’s 

direction in the SRM for SECY–11– 

0124, the NRC is open to flexible, 

performance-based strategies to address 

onsite emergency response capability 

requirements. This ANPR is structured 

around questions intended to solicit 

information that (1) supports 

development of such a framework and 

(2) supports assembling a complete and 

adequate regulatory basis that enables 

rulemaking to be successful. In this 

context, commenters should feel free to 

provide feedback on any aspects of 

onsite emergency response capability 

that would support this ANPR’s 

regulatory objective, whether or not in 

response to a stated ANPR question. 

B. Rulemaking Objectives/Success 

Criteria 

The NRC is considering development 

of a proposed rule that would amend 

the current onsite emergency response 

capability requirements. Currently, the 

regulatory and industry approaches to 

onsite emergency response capability 

are fragmented into the separate 

strategies that were discussed in Section 

III of this document. By promulgation of 

an onsite emergency response capability 

rule, the NRC would be able to establish 

regulations that, when implemented by 

licensees, would strengthen and 

integrate the various onsite emergency 

response strategies. Specifically, the 

proposed requirements for onsite 

emergency response capability would 

strive to accomplish the following goals: 

1. Ensure that effective transitions are 

developed between the various accident 

mitigating procedures (EOPs, SAMGs, 

and EDMGs) so that overall strategies 

are coherent and comprehensive. 

2. Ensure that command and control 

strategies for large scale events are based 

on the best understanding of severe 

accident progression and effective 

mitigation strategies, and well defined 

in order to promote effective decisionmaking at all levels and develop 

organizational flexibility to respond to 

unforeseen events. 

3. Ensure that the key personnel 

relied upon to implement these 

procedures and strategies are trained, 

qualified, and evaluated in their 

accident mitigation roles. 

4. Ensure that accident mitigating 

procedures, training, and exercises are 

appropriately standardized throughout 

the industry and are adequately 

documented and maintained. 

The NRC is seeking stakeholders’ 

views on the following specific 

regulatory objectives: 

1. What is the preferred regulatory 

approach to addressing NTTF 

Recommendation 8? 

For example: 

a. Should the NRC develop a new 

rule, or could the requirements that 

would provide for a more strengthened 

and integrated response capability be 

accomplished by a method other than a 

rulemaking? Provide a discussion that 

supports your position. 

b. If a new rule is developed, what 

type of supporting document would be 

most effective for providing guidance on 

the new requirements? Provide a 

discussion that supports your position. 

2. The NTTF recommendation for 

emergency response procedures stressed 

that the EOP guidelines should be 

revised to establish effective transitions 

between EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs in 

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23164 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 75 / Wednesday, April 18, 2012 / Proposed Rules 

an effort to promote a more integrated 

approach to onsite emergency response. 

The NRC is interested in stakeholder 

opinions on the best course of action for 

revising and maintaining these 

procedures to accomplish this objective. 

For example: 

a. Should the SAMGs be standardized 

throughout the industry? If so, describe 

how the procedures should be 

developed, and discuss what level of 

regulatory review would be appropriate. 

Should there be two sets of standard 

SAMGs, one applicable to pressurized 

water reactors (PWRs) and one 

applicable to boiling water reactors 

(BWRs), or should SAMGs be developed 

for the various plant designs in a 

manner similar to EOPs? Provide a 

discussion that supports your position. 

b. What is the best approach to ensure 

that procedural guidance for beyond 

design basis events is based on sound 

science, coherent, and integrated? What 

is the most effective strategy for linking 

the EOPs with the SAMGs and EDMGs? 

Should the transition from EOPs to 

SAMGs be based on key safety 

functions, or should the SAMGs be 

developed in a manner that addresses a 

series of events that are beyond a plant’s 

design basis? Provide a discussion that 

supports your position. 

c. The NTTF Recommendation 8 

strongly advised that the plant owners’ 

groups should undertake revision of the 

accident mitigating procedures to avoid 

having each licensee develop its own 

approach. Is this the best course of 

action? What additional scenarios or 

accident plans should be considered for 

addition to SAMG technical guidelines 

as a result of the lessons learned in 

Japan? Provide a discussion that 

supports your position. 

d. In the SRM for SECY–11–0137, the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to 

consider the November 2011 INPO 

report, INPO–11–005, in the 

development of the technical bases for 

Recommendation 8. How should this 

document be used by industry in 

developing SAMGs and the NRC in 

developing any proposed regulatory 

changes? Provide a discussion that 

supports your position. 

e. Should there be a requirement for 

the SAMGs and EDMGs to be 

maintained as controlled procedures in 

accordance with licensee quality 

assurance programs? Provide a 

discussion that supports your position. 

f. Should the SAMGs and EDMGs be 

added to the ‘‘Administrative Controls’’ 

section of licensee technical 

specifications? Provide a discussion that 

supports your position. 

g. In a letter dated October 13, 2011 

(ML11284A136), the Advisory 

Committee on Reactor Safeguards 

(ACRS) recommended that 

Recommendation 8 be expanded to 

include fire response procedures. In 

their letter, ACRS stated that some 

plant-specific fire response procedures 

can direct operators to perform actions 

that may be inconsistent with the EOPs, 

and that experience has shown that 

parallel execution of fire response 

procedures, abnormal operating 

procedures, and EOPs can be difficult 

and complex. Should efforts to integrate 

the EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs include 

fire response procedures? Are there 

other procedures that should be 

included in the scope of this work? 

Provide a discussion that supports your 

position. 

h. What level of effort, in terms of 

time and financial commitment, will be 

required by the industry to upgrade the 

accident mitigating procedures? If 

possible, please include estimated 

milestones and PWR/BWR cost 

estimates. 

3. The NTTF established the 

identification of clear command and 

control strategies as an essential aspect 

of Recommendation 8. What 

methodology would be best for ensuring 

that command and control for beyond 

design basis events is well defined? For 

example: 

a. Should separate procedures be 

developed that clearly establish the 

command and control structures for 

large-scale events? Should defined roles 

and responsibilities be included in 

technical specifications along with 

associated training and qualification 

requirements? Provide a discussion that 

supports your position. 

b. Should the command and control 

approach be standardized throughout 

the industry or left for individual 

licensees to define? Provide a 

discussion that supports your position. 

c. What level of effort, in terms of 

time and financial commitment, will be 

required by the industry to develop 

these command and control strategies? 

If possible, please include estimated 

milestones and PWR/BWR cost 

estimates. 

4. As the guidelines for accident 

mitigating procedures are revised and 

the command and control strategies are 

developed, personnel who will be 

implementing these procedures must be 

adequately trained, qualified, and 

evaluated. What would be the best 

approach for ensuring that the 

personnel relied upon to implement the 

revised procedures are proficient in the 

use of the procedures, maintain 

adequate knowledge of the systems 

referenced in these procedures, and can 

effectively make decisions, establish 

priorities, and direct actions in an 

emergency situation? For example: 

a. Should a systems approach to 

training be developed to identify key 

tasks that would be performed by the 

various roles identified in the new 

strategies? Provide a discussion that 

supports your position. 

b. Should the current emergency drill 

and exercise requirements be revised to 

ensure that the strategies developed as 

a result of this ANPR will be evaluated 

in greater depth? Provide a discussion 

that supports your position. 

c. Should the revised accident 

mitigating procedures, specifically 

SAMGs and EDMGs, be added to the 

knowledge and abilities catalogs for 

initial reactor operator licenses? Provide 

a discussion that supports your 

position. 

d. What level of plant expertise 

should be demonstrated by the 

personnel assigned to key positions 

outlined by the accident mitigation 

guidelines and command and control 

strategy? Should these personnel be 

required to be licensed or certified on 

the plant design? Provide a discussion 

that supports your position. 

e. What training requirements should 

be developed to ensure emergency 

directors and other key decision-makers 

have the command and control skills 

needed to effectively implement an 

accident mitigation strategy? Provide a 

discussion that supports your position. 

f. What should the qualification 

process entail for key personnel 

identified in the new strategies? How 

would this qualification process ensure 

proficiency? Provide a discussion that 

supports your position. 

g. What level of effort, in terms of 

time and financial commitment, will be 

required by the industry to develop and 

implement these training, qualification, 

and evaluation requirements? If 

possible, please include estimated 

milestones and PWR/BWR cost 

estimates. 

C. Applicability to NRC Licenses and 

Approvals 

The NRC would apply the new onsite 

emergency response capability 

requirements to power reactors, both 

currently operating and new reactors, 

and would like stakeholder feedback. 

Accordingly, the NRC envisions that 

the requirements would apply to the 

following: 

• Nuclear power plants currently 

licensed under 10 CFR part 50; 

• Nuclear power plants currently 

being constructed under construction 

permits issued under 10 CFR part 50, or 

whose construction permits may be 

reinstated; 

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• Future nuclear power plants whose 

construction permits and operating 

licenses are issued under 10 CFR part 

50; and 

• Current and future nuclear power 

plants licensed under 10 CFR part 52. 

D. Relationship Between 

Recommendation 8 and Other NearTerm Task Force Recommendations 

The NRC notes that there is a close 

relationship between the onsite 

emergency response capability 

requirements under consideration in 

this ANPR effort and several other nearterm actions stemming from the NTTF 

report (and identified in SECY–11–0124 

and SECY–11–0137). Regulatory actions 

taken in response to these other 

activities might impact efforts to amend 

onsite accident mitigating procedures 

and training. In this regard: 

1. What is the best regulatory 

structure for integrating the onsite 

emergency response capability 

requirements with other postFukushima regulatory actions, such that 

there is a full, coherent integration of 

the requirements? 

2. Recommendations 4.1 and 4.2 

address SBO regulatory actions and 

mitigation strategies for beyond design 

basis external events, respectively. The 

implementation strategies developed in 

response to Recommendations 4.1 and 

4.2 will require corresponding 

procedures. The NRC recognizes the 

need for coordinating efforts under 

Recommendations 4.1, 4.2, and 8. What 

is the best way to integrate these three 

regulatory efforts to ensure that they 

account for the others’ requirements, yet 

do not unduly overlap or inadvertently 

introduce redundancy, inconsistency, or 

incoherency? 

3. Recommendation 9.3 addresses 

staffing during a multiunit event with 

an SBO. Should staffing levels change as 

a result of a revised onsite emergency 

response capability or should these 

duties be assigned to existing staff? 

4. Recommendation 10.2 addresses 

command and control structure and 

qualifications for the licensee’s 

decision-makers for beyond design basis 

events. Should this recommendation be 

addressed concurrently with 

Recommendation 8? 

E. Interim Regulatory Actions 

The NRC recognizes that 

implementation of multiple postFukushima requirements could be a 

challenge for licensees and requests 

feedback on how best to implement 

multiple requirements, specifically 

onsite emergency response capability 

requirements, without adversely 

impacting licensees’ effectiveness and 

efficiency. It will take several years to 

issue a final rule. Should the NRC use 

other regulatory vehicles (such as 

commitment letters or confirmatory 

action letters) to put in place interim 

coping strategies for onsite emergency 

response capabilities while rulemaking 

proceeds? 

V. Public Meeting 

The NRC plans to hold a category 3 

public meeting with stakeholders during 

the ANPR public comment period. The 

public meeting is intended as a forum 

to discuss the ANPR with external 

stakeholders and provide information 

on the feedback requested in the ANPR 

to support development of onsite 

emergency response capability 

requirements. 

The meeting is not intended to solicit 

comment. Instead, the NRC will 

encourage stakeholders at the meeting to 

provide feedback in written form during 

the ANPR comment period. To support 

full participation of stakeholders, the 

NRC staff plans to provide 

teleconferencing and Webinar access for 

the public meeting. Since the intent of 

the meeting is not to solicit or accept 

comments, the meeting will not be 

transcribed. The NRC will issue the 

public meeting notice 10 calendar days 

before the public meeting. 

Stakeholders should monitor the 

NRC’s public meeting Web site for 

information about the public meeting: 

http://www.nrc.gov/public involve/ 

public-meetings/index.cfm. 

VI. Rulemaking Process and Schedule 

Stakeholders should recognize that 

the NRC is not obligated to provide 

detailed comment responses to feedback 

provided in response to this ANPR. If 

the NRC develops a regulatory basis 

sufficient to support a proposed rule, 

there will be an opportunity for 

additional public comment when the 

regulatory basis and the proposed rule 

are published. If supporting guidance is 

developed for the proposed rule, 

stakeholders will have an opportunity to 

provide feedback on the implementing 

guidance. 

VII. Related Petition for Rulemaking 

Action 

The NTTF report provided a specific 

proposal for onsite emergency actions 

that was subsequently endorsed by the 

National Resources Defense Council 

(NRDC) in a petition for rulemaking 

(PRM), PRM–50–102 (76 FR 58165; 

September 20, 2011), as a way to 

address licensee training and exercises. 

In connection with NTTF 

Recommendation 8.4, ‘‘Onsite 

emergency actions,’’ the NRDC 

requested in its petition that the NRC 

‘‘institute a rulemaking proceeding 

applicable to nuclear facilities licensed 

under 10 CFR 50, 52, and other 

applicable regulations to require more 

realistic, hands-on training and 

exercises on Severe Accident Mitigation 

[sic] Guidelines (SAMGs) and Extreme 

Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) 

for licensee staff expected to implement 

the strategies and those licensee staff 

expected to make decisions during 

emergencies, including emergency 

coordinators and emergency directors.’’ 

The Commission has established a 

process for addressing a number of the 

recommendations in the NTTF Report, 

and the NRC determined that the issues 

raised in PRM–50–102 are appropriate 

for consideration and will be considered 

in this Recommendation 8 rulemaking. 

Persons interested in the NRC’s actions 

on PRM–50–102 may follow the NRC’s 

activities at www.regulations.gov by 

searching on Docket ID NRC–2012– 

0031. 

VIII. Available Supporting Documents 

The following documents provide 

additional background and supporting 

information regarding this activity and 

corresponding technical basis. The 

documents can be found in ADAMS. 

Instructions for accessing ADAMS are in 

the ADDRESSES section of this document. 

Date Document 

ADAMS Accession Number/ 

Federal Register Citation 

April 4, 1990 ............................................ Generic Letter 88–20, Supplement 2, ‘‘Accident Management Strategies for Consideration in the Individual Plant Examination Process’’.ML031200551 

August 28, 2007 ...................................... Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50—General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants 72 FR 49505 

August 28, 2007 ...................................... Final Rule: Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants ........ 72 FR 49352 

March 27, 2009 ....................................... Final Rule: Power Reactor Security Requirements .................................................. 74 FR 13926 

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23166 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 75 / Wednesday, April 18, 2012 / Proposed Rules 

Date Document 

ADAMS Accession Number/ 

Federal Register Citation 

March 23, 2011 ....................................... Memorandum from Chairman Jaczko on Tasking Memorandum-COMGBJ–11– 

0002—NRC Actions Following the Events in Japan.

ML110950110 

April 29, 2011 .......................................... Temporary Instruction 2515/184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe 

Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs).

ML11115A053 

May 26, 2011 ........................................... Completion of Temporary Instruction 2515/184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMGs), at Region IV Reactor Facilities.ML111470264 

May 27, 2011 ........................................... Region I Completion of Temporary Instruction (TI)-184, Availability and Readiness 

Inspection of Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMGs).

ML111470361 

June 1, 2011 ............................................ Completion of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) at Region III 

Sites—Revision.

ML111520396 

June 2, 2011 ............................................ Completion of Temporary Instruction (TI) 184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines (SAMGS) at Region II Facilities— 

Revision.

ML111530328 

July 12, 2011 ........................................... SECY–11–0093—‘‘The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident’’.

ML11186A959 

ML111861807 

(Enclosure) 

August 19, 2011 ...................................... SRM–SECY–11–0093—Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan.ML112310021 

September 9, 2011 .................................. SECY–11–0124, ‘‘Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay from the 

Near-Term Task Force Report.’’.

ML11245A127 

ML11245A144 

(Enclosure) 

October 3, 2011 ....................................... SECY–11–0137, ‘‘Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned.’’.ML11269A204 

ML11272A203 

(Enclosure) 

October 18, 2011 ..................................... Staff Requirements Memorandum—SECY–11–0124—Recommended Actions to 

be Taken Without Delay From The Near-Term Task Force Report.

ML112911571 

July 26, 2011 ........................................... NRDC’s Petition for Rulemaking to Require More Realistic Training on Severe 

Accident Mitigation Guidelines (PRM 50–102).

ML11216A242 

September 14, 2011 ................................ Letter to Geoffrey H. Fettus, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. from Annette Vietti-Cook, In Regards to the NRC Will Not Be Instituting a Public Comment Period for PRM–50–97, PRM–50–98, PRM–50–99, PRM–50–100, PRM– 

50–101, and PRM–50–102.

ML112700269 

October 13, 2011 ..................................... Initial ACRS Review of: (1) The NRC Near-Term Task Force Report on 

Fukushima and (2) Staff’s Recommended Actions to be Taken Without Delay.

ML11284A136 

November 30, 2011 ................................. INPO–11–005, Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi

Nuclear Power Station.

ML11347A454 

December 15, 2011 ................................. Staff Requirements Memorandum—SECY–11–0137—Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to the Fukushima LessonsLearned.ML113490055 

March 14, 2012 ....................................... Summary of the Public Meeting to Discuss Implementation of Near-Term Task 

Force Recommendation 8, Strengthening and Integration of Onsite Emergency 

Response Capabilities Such As EOPS, SAMGS, and EDMGS, Related to the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Power Plant Accident.

ML12073A283 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day 

of April 2012. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Michael F. Weber, 

Acting Executive Director for Operations. 

[FR Doc. 2012–9336 Filed 4–17–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0413; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NM–257–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 

Boeing Company Model DC–10–10, DC– 

10–10F, DC–10–15, DC–10–30, DC–10– 

30F (KC–10A and KDC–10), DC–10–40, 

DC–10–40F, MD–10–10F, MD–10–30F, 

MD–11, and MD–11F airplanes. This 

proposed AD was prompted by fuel 

system reviews conducted by the 

manufacturer. This proposed AD would 

require adding design features to detect 

electrical faults, to detect a pump 

running in an empty fuel tank, and to 

ensure that a fuel pump’s operation is 

not affected by certain conditions. We 

are proposing this AD to reduce the 

potential of ignition sources inside fuel 

tanks, which, in combination with 

flammable fuel vapors, could result in 

fuel tank explosions and consequent 

loss of the airplane. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by June 4, 2012. 

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