2022 UT App 63

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SOUTH WEBER CITY,

Appellee,

v.

COBBLESTONE RESORT LLC, WONAE MIER,

AND DUSTIN SHIOZAKI,

Appellants.

Opinion

No. 20210028-CA

Filed May 12, 2022

Second District Court, Farmington Department

The Honorable Robert J. Dale

No. 200700543

Matthew J. Morrison, Attorney for Appellants

Robert C. Keller, Danica N. Cepernich, and 

Nathanael J. Mitchell, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, 

in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and JILL M. POHLMAN

concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 Cobblestone Resort LLC, Wonae Mier, and Dustin Shiozaki 

(collectively, Cobblestone) appeal the district court’s order 

granting South Weber City’s (South Weber) motion to enjoin the 

ongoing use of a property owned by Cobblestone for short-term 

or vacation rentals without a valid business license. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In August 2018, Cobblestone purchased a residence with a 

pool (the Property) located in South Weber. At the time of the 
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purchase, Cobblestone’s intent was to “expand the [P]roperty” 

and operate “a successful Airbnb business.” Shortly after 

purchasing the Property, Cobblestone began renting it as a shortterm rental (STR).

¶3 The Property is and has always been located within South 

Weber’s agricultural zone. Since 2016, the permitted uses for an 

agricultural zone have been limited to the following:

• accessory uses and buildings;

• agriculture;

• animal keeping on lots at least one-half acre 

in area;

• dwellings, one-family;

• farm industry on parcels or lots five acres or 

larger;

• fruit and vegetable stands of the sale of 

produce grown on the premises or of 

agricultural products used on the premises;

• home occupations, except preschools and 

daycare;

• mobile businesses; and pets, the keeping of 

household pets.

See South Weber, Utah, Code § 10-5E-2. STRs were not included 

among the conditional uses for an agricultural zone. See id. § 10-

5E-3.

¶4 In May 2019, South Weber adopted an ordinance (the 

Ordinance) regulating “short-term or vacation rentals.” Among 

other things, the Ordinance required a conditional use permit “for 

each unit used as a short-term or vacation rental, regardless of the 

zone, type, or primary use of the property.” Id. § 10-18-3(A). The 

Ordinance further required that “[a]s a condition of receiving a 

conditional use permit and prior to conducting business, the 

applicant shall . . . [a]pply for and pay the annual City business 

license fee, with the license to be issued after the conditional use 
South Weber v. Cobblestone

20210028-CA 3 2022 UT App 63

permit is granted.” Id. § 10-18-3(D)(2). At the same time that the 

Ordinance was enacted, South Weber also added “short-term or 

vacation rental” to the list of businesses for which “it shall be 

unlawful . . . to operate . . . within [South Weber] without first 

making an application to [South Weber] and obtaining a business 

license.” Id. § 3-2-1(A)(7).

¶5 Following enactment of the Ordinance, Cobblestone 

applied for a conditional use permit so that it could continue 

using the Property as an STR. It also submitted an application for 

a business license.

¶6 In August 2019, South Weber City’s Planning Commission 

held a meeting during which it approved Cobblestone’s 

conditional use permit application subject to a number of 

conditions. After the conditional use permit was approved, the 

South Weber City Manager “reminded those in attendance [at the 

meeting] that the conditional use permit is not the business 

license” and that “there are still a few steps that need to be 

reviewed for the business license for [the Property].”

¶7 Approximately one month later, Cobblestone was issued a 

series of three “strikes” for violations of the conditional use 

permit. Thereafter, the Planning Commission met to discuss 

concerns over the conditional use permit. Based on the evidence 

that had been presented, the Planning Commission voted to 

immediately revoke Cobblestone’s conditional use permit.

¶8 In November 2019, the South Weber City Council held a 

meeting during which it discussed revoking Cobblestone’s 

conditional use permit. The City Council acknowledged there was 

some “misunderstanding” regarding whether the power to 

revoke a conditional use permit belonged to the Planning 

Commission or to the City Council, but ultimately it agreed with 

the Planning Commission’s decision and voted to immediately 

revoke Cobblestone’s conditional use permit.
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¶9 Cobblestone appealed the City Council’s decision 

administratively. In its appeal, Cobblestone argued, among other 

things, that its use of the Property as an STR was “a continuously 

maintained nonconforming use.” It simultaneously filed an 

affidavit of conforming use with South Weber. In April 2020, the 

City Council’s decision was reversed on procedural grounds and 

the matter was remanded to the City Council for further action.

1

¶10 In June 2020, police were dispatched to the Property after 

a neighbor witnessed an altercation involving people renting the 

Property, during which a firearm was discharged multiple times.2

One month later, South Weber filed a complaint in district court 

seeking to enforce its ordinances against Cobblestone and for 

declaratory judgment that Cobblestone’s use of the Property as an

STR is not a legal nonconforming use and that it is therefore 

subject to the Ordinance. South Weber also filed a motion for a 

temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 

preventing Cobblestone from operating any business at the 

Property. In its motion, South Weber argued it was entitled to 

injunctive relief pursuant to Utah Code section 10-9a-802. Under 

that section, a municipality may seek enforcement of its 

ordinances by instituting, among other things, injunctions 

enjoining the unlawful use, and “[a] municipality need only 

establish the violation to obtain the injunction.” Utah Code Ann.

1. South Weber did not take any action on Cobblestone’s pending 

business license application from October 2019 through April 

2020 because it considered the conditional use permit—a 

predicate for an STR business license—to be revoked.

2. South Weber also received a number of complaints from 

neighbors that the Property had been used for other revenuegenerating activities, all of which would require a business 

license. These activities include renting the Property as a studio 

for a boudoir photography business; private pool parties; and 

special events, including a wedding reception.
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§ 10-9a-802(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021). Shortly thereafter, the 

parties stipulated to a partial preliminary injunction under which 

Cobblestone was enjoined from using the Property for any 

business activity except “short term rental.”

¶11 In November 2020, the district court held a hearing on the 

request for injunction. At the close of the hearing, the court 

granted South Weber’s motion and enjoined Cobblestone, under

Utah Code section 10-9a-802, from operating the Property as an

STR without a valid business license. The court held that 

Cobblestone’s use of the Property as an STR without a business 

license was a violation of the Ordinance, that Cobblestone’s use of 

the Property did not constitute a nonconforming use that would 

exempt it from the Ordinance, and that none of the defenses 

Cobblestone raised precluded entry of the injunction. In its 

written order, the court explained that STRs “are not included” in 

the South Weber City Code’s (South Weber Code) list of permitted 

uses, and “[t]hey would have to be . . . for [Cobblestone] to prevail 

on [its] claim that [its] use of the Property is a nonconforming 

use.” The court also noted the use of the Property as an STR did

not fall within the definition of “Dwelling, one-family,” which 

was one of the “permitted uses closest to [Cobblestone’s] use of 

the Property.”

¶12 Following entry of the district court’s order, the parties 

filed a stipulation and motion for final judgment. The court 

granted the motion and entered a final judgment on December 4, 

2020, providing that the preliminary injunction “remains in full 

force and effect unless altered by this Court or any ruling on 

appeal.”3

3. Although not part of the record on appeal, since the entry of the 

district court’s order, South Weber has denied Cobblestone’s 

application for a business license. Cobblestone appealed, and the

(continued...)
South Weber v. Cobblestone

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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶13 Cobblestone now appeals and raises two issues for our 

review. First, Cobblestone argues the district court erred in 

interpreting the South Weber Code to determine that 

Cobblestone’s use of the Property as an STR was not a permitted, 

legal nonconforming use. “The proper interpretation and 

application of a statute is a question of law which we review for 

correctness, affording no deference to the district court’s legal 

conclusions.” Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, ¶ 16, 136 P.3d 1242

(quotation simplified). “We apply the same standard to the 

[district] court’s interpretation of an ordinance.” Town of Alta v. 

Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

¶14 Second, Cobblestone argues that even if its use of the 

Property as an STR does not constitute a legal nonconforming use 

that would exempt it from the business license requirement, 

South Weber should be estopped from enforcing the Ordinance’s 

business license requirement under the doctrine of equitable 

estoppel. “The issue of whether equitable estoppel has been 

proven is a classic mixed question of fact and law.” Iota, LLC v. 

Davco Mgmt. Co., 2012 UT App 218, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 681 (quotation 

simplified). Therefore, we grant the district court’s decision “a fair 

degree of deference when we review . . . whether the requirements 

of the law of estoppel have been satisfied.” Id. (quotation 

simplified). We will overturn a district court’s decision to grant an

injunction only if the court abused its discretion. See Carrier v. 

Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, ¶ 26, 37 P.3d 1112.4

South Weber City Council denied that appeal in May 2021, 

upholding the denial of the application.

4. Cobblestone also argues the doctrine of unclean hands should 

be invoked against South Weber to prevent enforcement of the 

(continued...)
South Weber v. Cobblestone

20210028-CA 7 2022 UT App 63

ANALYSIS

I. Cobblestone’s Use of the Property as an STR Was Not a 

Permitted, Legal Nonconforming Use.

¶15 Cobblestone first argues the district court erred in 

determining that its use of the Property as an STR prior to the

adoption of the Ordinance was not a permitted, legal 

nonconforming use. We disagree.

¶16 The South Weber Code specifies the zoning classifications 

applied to property within South Weber. It provides,

No land shall be used or occupied, no building or 

structure shall be designed, erected, altered, used or 

occupied for use, except for uses specifically 

permitted on the land upon which the building or 

structure is located or erected or use established as 

permitted in the regulations for the zone in which 

said land is located.

South Weber, Utah, Code § 10-11-6(A). However, the South 

Weber Code also allows

for the continuation of use of any building 

structures, . . . which either existed as a legal use 

before the effective date hereof or which was lawfully 

operated or used thereafter in accordance with the 

provisions of the ordinance codified herein, but 

injunction. But this argument is inadequately briefed because 

Cobblestone fails to provide “meaningful legal analysis” 

explaining why South Weber’s actions in pursuing the injunction 

amount to unclean hands or sufficient “citation to relevant legal 

authority.” See Fraughton v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2019 UT App 

6, ¶ 21, 438 P.3d 961 (quotation simplified). Thus, we do not 

address it further.
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which by reason of amendment to this title became 

a use which is not permitted in the zone in which it 

is located.

Id. § 10-10-1 (emphasis added).

¶17 In May 2019, South Weber adopted the Ordinance, which 

required a conditional use permit and a business license for a 

property to be used as an STR. Id. § 3-2-1(A)(7); see also id. § 10-18-

3. Thus, pursuant to the South Weber Code, the Property could be 

exempt from the Ordinance only if its use as an STR “existed as a 

legal use before the effective date” of the Ordinance or if the 

Property had been “lawfully operated or used” after the 

Ordinance was enacted. See id. § 10-10-1.

¶18 Cobblestone’s Property is, and always has been, located in 

an agricultural zone, with the permitted uses expressly 

enumerated in the South Weber Code. See id. § 10-5E-2; id. § 10-1-

10A. Although an STR is not expressly listed as a permitted use in 

an agricultural zone—which fact Cobblestone acknowledges—it 

nevertheless contends the use of the Property as an STR fits into 

the statutory definition of “dwelling” and therefore qualifies as a 

permitted use.

¶19 Prior to the adoption of the Ordinance, one of the 

permitted uses in an agricultural zone was “Dwellings, onefamily.” The South Weber Code defined “dwelling” as “[a] 

building designed and used for residential purposes including 

one-, two-, three- or four- family units, but not including 

apartments, boarding houses, hotels, lodging houses or tourist 

courts.” Id. § 10-1-10. Relying on this definition, the district court 

concluded Cobblestone’s use of the Property as an STR “does not 

fall within the definition of” “Dwelling, one-family.” Specifically,

the court concluded the use of the Property as an STR “does fall 

within” the enumerated exclusions from the permitted use of 

“dwellings,” i.e., “boarding house” or “lodging house.”
South Weber v. Cobblestone

20210028-CA 9 2022 UT App 63

¶20 On appeal, Cobblestone contends the district court 

incorrectly interpreted the Ordinance by construing its terms 

restrictively rather than adhering to the “presumption . . . that 

would prefer permission to the property owner unless required 

otherwise.” Specifically, Cobblestone points to the court’s 

interpretation of the term “dwelling,” and posits the court erred 

in concluding the use of the Property as an STR did not fall within 

this permitted use.

¶21 First, Cobblestone argues the use of the Property as an STR 

prior to the adoption of the Ordinance was permitted as a 

“dwelling” because a “dwelling” is merely “[a] building designed 

and used for residential purposes.” See id. But this argument is 

unpersuasive because it focuses on only the building as a 

structure itself rather than the structure’s use and wholly ignores 

the restriction that all dwellings located in an agricultural zone be 

limited to “one-family” dwellings. By neglecting to address the 

“one-family” restriction, Cobblestone has failed to “provide 

sufficient argument for ruling in its favor.” See Pinder v. Duchesne 

County Sheriff, 2020 UT 68, ¶ 36, 478 P.3d 610 (quotation 

simplified). Therefore, Cobblestone has not met its burden of 

persuasion on appeal.

¶22 Second, Cobblestone takes issue with the district court’s 

determination that the use of the Property as an STR falls within 

the exclusion from the definition of dwelling. In particular, it 

asserts the court erred in ruling that the “usual meaning of 

‘lodging’ included [STRs].” The court rejected Cobblestone’s 

argument that “use of the Property is not as a boarding house, 

hotel, lodging house, or tourist court,” concluding instead that the 

use of the Property as an STR “does fall within these forms of 

uses.” It reasoned that “Boarding house and/or rooming house”

is defined in the South Weber Code as “[a] building used for the 

purpose of providing meals or lodging, or both meals and lodging 

for pay or compensation of any kind for three (3) or more persons.” 

(Quoting South Weber, Utah, Code § 10-1-10.) And while 
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20210028-CA 10 2022 UT App 63

“lodging” is not defined in the South Weber Code, the court 

explained the dictionary definition and the “usual meaning” of 

that term “includes the[] type of [STRs] for which the Property has 

been used.”

¶23 We see no error in the district court’s interpretation of the 

South Weber Code on this point. In defining “lodging,” the court 

first looked to the South Weber Code. Finding that the term was

not defined, the court then consulted two separate dictionaries to 

ascertain the term’s “usual meaning.” See South Weber, Utah,

Code § 10-1-10 (providing that words not defined in the South 

Weber Code “shall be given their usual meaning as found in the 

English dictionary unless the context of the words clearly indicate 

a different meaning”). The first dictionary the court looked to 

defines “lodging” as “[a] place in which someone lives or stays 

temporarily.” Lodging, Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.l

exico.com/en/definition/lodging [https://perma.cc/AT5W-JV4S].

The second similarly defines “lodging” as including “sleeping 

accommodations” and “a temporary place to stay.” Lodging, 

Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionar

y/lodging [https://perma.cc/BX5C-96FE]. In relying on these 

definitions, the court correctly determined the use of the Property 

as an STR falls within the South Weber Code’s definition of 

“Boarding house and/or rooming house” and therefore is exempt 

from being classified as a “dwelling.”5

¶24 In sum, the district court correctly determined that 

Cobblestone’s use of the Property as an STR does not fit within

the South Weber Code’s definition of dwelling. Thus, 

5. Cobblestone also appears to argue the district court’s definition 

of the word “lodging” was incorrect because the court adopted 

dictionary definitions that were “more restrictive . . . of private 

property rights.” However, the alternative definitions that 

Cobblestone cites would also dictate that use of the Property as an

STR would constitute lodging.
South Weber v. Cobblestone

20210028-CA 11 2022 UT App 63

Cobblestone’s use of the Property as an STR was not a permitted, 

legal nonconforming use, and its operation as such constitutes a 

violation of the Ordinance. Accordingly, the court did not abuse 

its discretion by granting South Weber’s motion for an injunction 

under Utah Code section 10-9a-802.

II. The District Court Did Not Err in Rejecting Cobblestone’s 

Equitable Estoppel Argument.

¶25 Cobblestone next argues that even if its use of the Property 

as an STR does not constitute a legal nonconforming use, thereby 

requiring it to have a business license, South Weber should be 

estopped from enforcing the Ordinance’s business license 

requirement under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

¶26 Equitable estoppel has three elements: (1) “a statement, 

admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a 

claim later asserted”; (2) “reasonable action or inaction by the 

other party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party’s 

statement, admission, act or failure to act”; and (3) “injury to the 

second party that would result from allowing the first party to 

contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure 

to act.” Hall v. Peterson, 2017 UT App 226, ¶ 29, 409 P.3d 133

(quotation simplified).

¶27 “Generally, the doctrine of estoppel is not assertable 

against the state and its agencies.” McLeod v. Retirement Board, 

2011 UT App 190, ¶ 20, 257 P.3d 1090 (quotation simplified). 

However, Utah courts have recognized a narrow exception to this 

general rule for “unusual circumstances where it is plain that the 

interests of justice so require.” Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Board, 795 

P.2d 671, 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quotation simplified). In cases 

where a claimant asserts estoppel against a governmental entity, 

the exception applies only if the claimant “show[s] that the entity 

made very clear, well-substantiated representations.” Myers v. 

Utah Transit Auth., 2014 UT App 294, ¶ 20, 341 P.3d 935 (quotation 

simplified). Absent a “specific statement or written 
South Weber v. Cobblestone

20210028-CA 12 2022 UT App 63

representation” by the government, the exception does not apply 

and the estoppel claim fails. Anderson v. Public Service Comm’n, 839 

P.2d 822, 828 (Utah 1992).

¶28 Cobblestone posits South Weber should be estopped from 

requiring Cobblestone to obtain a business license to operate the 

Property as an STR for two main reasons. First, South Weber was 

aware that Cobblestone was operating an STR without a business 

license for many months, but it did not complain of the missing

license before filing for injunctive relief. Second, South Weber’s 

“website expressly stated that [South Weber] no longer required 

a business license for rental use of property.” Neither argument is 

persuasive.

¶29 First, South Weber’s failure to enforce the Ordinance, 

including the business license requirement, prior to initiating the 

proceeding for injunctive relief is insufficient to invoke the 

exception allowing a claimant to assert estoppel against a 

governmental entity. Our supreme court has long recognized that

“failure to enforce zoning for a time does not forfeit the power to

enforce.” Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803 (Utah 

Ct. App. 1992); see also Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 

138 (Utah 1976) (“Ordinarily a municipality is not precluded from 

enforcing its zoning regulations[] when its officers have remained 

inactive in the face of such violations.”). Accordingly, assuming 

without deciding that South Weber did not consistently enforce 

the Ordinance, such failure to enforce does not render South 

Weber powerless to enforce its regulations at a later time.

¶30 Second, the statements on South Weber’s website 

regarding the business license requirements for rental properties 

do not apply to STRs. During the relevant time period, South 

Weber’s website stated, “As of August 2016, South Weber no 

longer requires a business license for a rental unit.” (Emphasis 

added.) And at that time, section 3-2-1(A) of the South Weber 

Code defined “Rental Units” as “[a] building or part of a building 
South Weber v. Cobblestone

20210028-CA 13 2022 UT App 63

that is used or designated for use as a residence by one or more 

persons, and is available to be rented, loaned, or leased for a 

period of one month or more.” (Emphasis added.) As an STR, the 

Property does not fit within this statutory definition of “Rental 

Units.” Consequently, South Weber’s website did not contain a 

“specific statement or written representation” that would warrant 

estopping South Weber from enforcing its business license 

requirement for STRs. See Anderson, 839 P.2d at 828.

¶31 The district court correctly concluded Cobblestone had not 

proved that South Weber should be estopped from enforcing the 

Ordinance. Because Cobblestone’s use of the Property as an STR 

without a valid business license violates the Ordinance, South 

Weber was entitled to its requested injunction under Utah Code 

section 10-9a-802. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion 

in granting South Weber’s motion.

CONCLUSION

¶32 The district court did not abuse its discretion by enjoining 

Cobblestone’s use of the Property as an STR without a business 

license in violation of the Ordinance. The court correctly 

determined that Cobblestone’s use of the Property as an STR prior 

to the adoption of the Ordinance was not a permitted, legal 

nonconforming use. The court also properly rejected 

Cobblestone’s argument that South Weber should be estopped 

from requiring Cobblestone to obtain a business license to operate 

the Property as an STR. We therefore affirm.