NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 10a0476n.06 No. 09-5245 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v. RO Y B UR CH AM , De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ON APPEALFROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE

B e fo re : MA RTI

N, RY AN , a

nd KE TH L ED GE , Ci rc uit

Judg e s. BO YCE F. MARTI

N, J R., Circuit J udg e. Def endant- appellant Roy Bur cham was convicte d of possession of stolen fire arms, pursua nt to 18 U.S.C

. § 922(j), and of being a felon in possession of tho se fi re arm s, purs ua

nt t o 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( g ). Ho w the a uth or iti e s c a me int o p os se ssi on of tho se firea rms is the primary subject of Bur cham’ s appea l. He also appea ls a n evidentiar

y ruling that, he

c la ims , p re ve nte d h im f

ro m im pe a c hin g on e of

the g ov e rnme nt’ s w itn e sse s. We a ff ir m. I. On Janu ary 19 , 2 00 2, Of

fi c e rs A. C. B ro wn

and Jame s K e llum, bo th o f t he Me mph is, Ten n e s s e e Po li c e D e p artm e n t, w e r e o np a tr o l w h e nth e y r e c e iv e d w o r d th a t o th e r

o f f ic e r s wer e

sear ching for B urcha

m as a suspec t in an ag g ravated assault invol ving a baseba ll bat. Office rs Br own and Ke llum had previously hear d from a c onfidential informa nt that Bu rcham had stolen some fire arms and still was in possession of t hose firearms. They proce eded to the a rea wher e they believed Bur cham might be found. Sure enoug h, the offic ers f ound Bur cham sitting in his truck atNo. 09-5245

United States v. Burc ham Pag e 2

a g a s st a tio n. A w oma

n, la te r i de nti fi e d a s Jennif e r K ins e lla , B ur c ham’ s g ir lf ri e nd, w a s w ithhim in the truck. The off icer s detained B urcha

m and found a

baseb al l b at in the cab of the truck, so they

arr ested him on the agg ravated assault char g e. Other office rs t ranspor ted Burcham to jail. Officer s B ro wn and Ke llum r e ma ine d o n th e sc e ne wi th K ins e lla and qu e sti on e d h e r a

bo ut t he sto le n f

ir e a rm s that they had pre viously

hear d about. What ha

ppened next is disputed and will be discussed in more de ta il b e low . B ut, a t th e e nd of the se dis pu te d e ve nts , th e of fi c e rs fo un d the mse lve s in a sto ra g e un it

re nte d b y B ur c ham, wher e the y

dis c ov e re d s e ve ra l f

ir e arm s th a t th e y

su bs e qu e ntl y

de te rm ine d to have be en stolen. Afte r unsucc essfully seekingto suppress the fire arms as a product of an impermissible searc h, Bur cham pr ocee ded to trial. The jur y convicted Bur cham on a ll counts, and he wa s eventua lly

sentenc ed to ninety -two months’ incar cer ati o n fo l l o wed by two y ear s of supervised r elea se. B ur c ham no w t ime ly

a pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his mot ion

t o s u p pr e ss t he fi re a rm s,

as we ll as one of the c ourt’s evide ntiary ruling s during trial. II. A. M ot ion to Suppr e ss The c ircumstance s surrounding how the off icer s g ained a cce ss to the storag e unit wer e d i s p uted. Off

icer s Br own testified at the he aringon the motion to suppress, as did Bur cham a nd Ki ns e lla . T he pr os e c uto r a lso pr of fe re d th e te sti mony

of Of fi c e r K e llum. T he vers io ns of e ve nts

o f f e r e d b y t h e t w o c a mp s d i f

f e r e d dr a s t i c a l l y.No. 09-5245

United States v. Burc ham Pag e 3 Offic ers B rown a

nd Kellum testified that they had hea rd fr om an i nformant that Burc ham had stolen some firea

rms and was keeping them at a storag e unit

. Offic er K ellum even indicated that he knew f rom the informa

nt wher e the storag e unit was located. The officer s claimed that they asked Ki ns e lla if sh e kn e w a

ny thi ng a bo ut t he fi re arm s a

nd the sto ra g e un it. Th e y te sti fi e d th a t K ins e lla responde d in the aff

irmative and indicated that she had a cce ss to the unit, including the ac cess c ode for the f acility ’s g ate and the key

to the lock on the individual storag e unit. She signe d a handw ritten statement indicating that Bur cham told her that he had purcha sed som e firear ms that had been stolen from a huntinglodge by

another man, that he ha d then re -sold the fire arms to his brother, a nd that the fire arms we re in a

mini-storag e unit at 5570 Summer Avenue . She also signe d a conse nt form indicating that she wa s awa re of her r ight to re fuse c onsent to sear ch the s t o ra ge u n i t and that her permission to searc h the unit was g iven voluntarily and abse nt any

threats or promises. The office rs testified that Kinsella thereaf ter accompa

nied them to the storag e unit and provide d the ac cess c ode and key . They

descr ibed her

as having been cooper ative the entire time. T he off icer s also indicated that the manag er of

the fa cility

initially said that the off

icer s neede d a wa

rra nt, but he backe d off

w h e nh e l e ar

n e d t h a tK i n s e l l a

h a d t h e a c c e s s c o d e an d

t h e k e y. Kinsella and B urcha

m testified to a vastly

differ ent cha in of eve nts. Primar ily , they testified that Kinsella did not know the ac cess c ode for the storag e fa cility

and did not h av e the key to the lock on the storag e unit. I nstead, Bur cham claimed that he kept a key to the lock on his key ring and kept the ac cess code written on a piece of paper in his wallet and that the of fice rs must have take n these items from his truck afte r he w as take n to jail. They testified that Kinsella did not have

a uth or ity to c on se nt t o a

se arc h of t

he sto ra g e un it a

nd that he r c on se nt w a s c oe rc e d b y the of fi c e rs .No. 09-5245

United States v. Burc ham Pag e 4 Following the hea ring on the suppression motion, the mag istrate judg e issued a Re port and Recommendat i o n reje cting Kinsella’s a nd Bur cham’ s testimony

and cr editing that of the off icer s

and , o n th a t f

a c tua l ba sis , c on c lud ing that the mot ion sh ou ld be de nie d. B ur c ham ob je c te d to bo th the mag istrate judg e’s c redibility deter min a ti o n a n d h is le g a l c onclusion. The district cour t therea fter issue d an o rd er adopting the mag istrate’s r ecommendation in whole, finding that the mag istrate’s conclusion wa s not clear ly err oneous. Following trial, Bur cham a ppeale d t h e s u p p ression ruling on seve ral ba ses, one of which being th a t t

h e d is tr ic t c o u rt e mp lo y e d th e w r o n g s ta

n d ar d o f r e v ie w in

r u li n g u p o nB u r c h am’s obje c ti o n s to th e ma g is tr a te ’ s Re p o rt an d Re c o mm e n d a ti o n . T h e g o v e r n me n t c o n c e d e d th a t the

c ourt ha d im pr op e rl y e mpl oy e d th e “ c le arl y

e rr on e ou s” sta

nd ard of re vie w i ns tea d of eng a g ingin a de novo r eview of

the conteste d portions of the mag istrate’s r eport a s requi re d b y 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). We ther efor e re manded the c ase to the district court with instructions to eng ag e in a de novo revie w of the por

tions of the mag istrate’s f

indings to which B urcha

m objected. On r emand, the c ourt iss ue d a se c on d o rd e r a do pti ngthe magi st ra te ’s fi nd ing s and

the re fo re de nyingthe mot ion to

su pp re ss. On

thi s se c on d a

pp e a l, B ur c ham c on te nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt a g a in fa ile d to e ng a g e in a de novo revie w of the m ag istrate’s credibility deter mination and that the court incorr ectly analy zed the issue of Kinsella’ s authority to consent to the sea

rch. 1. De Novo R eview of Cre dib ility Dete rm ination The mag istrate found the testimony of Off icer s Br own and K e ll u

m c r e d ib le a

nd the testimony of B urcha m and Kins ella incredible and thus acc epted the of fice rs’ ve rsion of eve nts as the fa ctual basis for r uling upon the motion to suppress. Burcha m objected to this cre dibilit y finding . I n rulingNo. 09-5245

United States v. Burc ham Pag e 5

u p o nBu rc h am ’s o b

j ec t i o n , t h e c o u rt wa s “b o t h s t at u t o ri l y an d co n s t i tu t i o n al l y re qu i re d ” to en gage in a de novo revie w. United States v. W orley , 193 F.3d 380, 383 n.6 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Bur cham c laims that the court failed in this task when it issued its order on r emand a dopting the mag istrate’s c redibility deter mination. B urcha

m f ocuses on the cour

t’s statement that “[t] here is no basis f

or finding the testimony of the office rs incre dible as a matter of law and the Court finds that it is not so,” (Order of Fe b. 19, 2009, at 5), as evidence that the court did not eng ag e in a de novo

re vie w. B ur c ham argue s th a t th e c ourt ’s “no t in credib le a s a ma tte r o f l aw” fo rm

ulatio n is jus t another way of say ing “ not clear ly

err o n eous,” w hich we a cknowledg ed wa s incorre ct when w e

rema nded the c ase the first time. Th ou g h w e a c kn ow le dg e that f in di ng test imo ny

“ no t in c re dib le a s a

ma tte r o f l aw” is a somewhat stra

ng e choic e of dic tion, we do not ag ree that it evidence s the employ ment of something other than de novo revie w. Fir st, we explicitl y instructed the c ourt that it must enga g e in a de novo

re vie w. On

re mand , th e c ourt

re pe a te dly

re c og nize d th a t it ha d e rr e d in i ts f ir st o rd e r a

nd tha t it mus t eng ag e in a de novo revie w. I ndeed, in the s entenc e im mediately prec eding the sentenc e on which Bur cham f

ocuses, the c ourt stated “[a]fter reviewing de novo the pl eading s, the evidenc e pre sented at t h e s u p p re s s i o nh ea ri n g, an d

t h e r ep o rt an d re co m m en d at i o n , t h e C o u rt agr ee s wi t h t h e f i n d i n gs and conclusions of the mag istrate judg e.” ( Id. ) We or din ari ly a c c e pt as g ive n tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt s do that which we expressly direc ted them to do, see W estside Mothers v. Olszewski , 454 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing t he mandate rule), and which the y have e x pressly

indicated that they have done

.No. 09-5245

United States v. Burc ham Pag e 6 S ec o n d , t he entire ty of the c ourt’s discussion of the diff eringtestimony

at the suppre ssion hear ing indica

tes that it was eng ag ing in its o wn d etermination of the parties’ cre dibilit y . For example, the court obser ved that Kinsella de nied g iving the of fice rs the ac cess c ode or the key be c a us e sh e po sse sse d n e ith e r, bu t th a t th e of fi c e rs ne ve rt

he le ss t oo k h e r w iththe m to the un it. (O rd e r o f F e b. 19 , 2 00 9, at 3. ) T he ob vio us inf e re nc e fr om t

his ob se rv a tio n is that th e of fi c e rs wo uld not need to take Kinsella with them if they alre ady had the co d e and the key . Simi larly , the cour t observe d that Kinsella denie d having hear d from B u rcham that the g uns were stolen but had

never theless sig ned a ha

ndwritten st at em en t indicating just that. ( Id. at 4.) The se ar e the sorts of

o b s e r v a ti o n s an d

e xp r e s s io n s o f s k e p ti c is m in d ic a ti v e o f a d e n o v o c r e d ib il it y d e te r mi n a ti o n . We

are there fore comforta

ble t hat t he court employ ed the appropr iate standa rd of r eview in r

uling upon B ur c ham’ s o bje c tio ns to t he ma g istrate ’s re po rt , an d we wi ll pr oc e e d on the ba sis that th e of fi c e rs ’ version of e vents is the operative fac tual predic ate. 2. Kinsella’s Authority to C onsent to Searc h Bu rc h am n ex tar gu es t h at , ev en i f t h e o ff i ce rs ’ v er s i o ni s cr ed i t ed , t h e s ea rc h o f t h e s t o ra ge

un it w a s st ill imp e rm iss ibl e be c a us e Ki ns e lla

wa s n ot list e d as an a

uth or ize d use r o n th e un it’ s le a se ag re e me n t a n d d id n o t h a v e a u th o r it y f r o m B u r c h a m to e n te r th e u n it o r a ll o w o th ers to ente r. Whether B urcha

m is corre ct turns on the conc ept of a ppare nt authority

. Police may obtain consent to se arc h a location from any one having“common author ity over or other sufficie nt relationship to the premises”; the defe ndant himself nee d not have g iven conse nt. United States v. Mc Cauley , 548 F .3 d 440 , 446 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . F ur the r, a c tua l a

uth or ity is not r eq u i re d

. T he conse nt of someone possessing appar ent authority will render

a sea rchNo. 09-5245

United States v. Burc ham Pag e 7 permissible. Illinois v. Rodriguez , 4 97 U. S. 1 77 , 1 88 (1 99 0) . App are nt a uth or ity e xists “ if the fa c ts available to the office r at the moment w arr ant . . . a man of rea sonable c aution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the pre mises.” Id. (i nte rn a l quot a tio n ma rk s o mit te d) (e lli ps is in orig inal). Under this formulation o f apparent a uthority , we do not have any trouble finding that the of fi c e rs re a so na

bly be lie ve d K ins e lla

to h a ve a uth or ity to con se nt t o a

se arc h o f t

he sto ra g e un it. Acc ording to the office rs’ testimony , Kinsella, Burcha m’s g irlfriend, w as coope rative a nd provided the m the a c c e ss co de and the ke y to the un it. Gi ve n the natur e of sto ra g e un its , it is r e a so na

ble to assume that someone close to the de fenda nt with b o t h t h e ac ce s s code a nd key to the unit has authority to enter the unit and to allow others to do so. Confirming this, the facility ’s manag er w ent from re questing a wa

rra nt to allowing unimpede d entry when he lear

ned that Kinsella ha d the code and key , a re action that implies the g ener al under standing that possession of the code and key

to a storag e unit are stron g i n d i ca t o rs of a cce ss and authority . Finally , Kinsella willingly signe d a consent-to- sear ch for

m, and it would be odd for some one to g rant c o n s en t t o s ea rc h a plac e over wh ic h she ha d no au tho ri ty

. We the re fo re a g re e wi th the dis tr ic t court tha t th e of fi c e rs re a so na

bly believed th a t K in s e ll a h a d a u th o r it y to c o n s e n t to s e ar c h th e s to r a g e u n it , an d th u s w e a f f ir m the de nia l of the mot ion

to s up pr e ss. B. Evi de nt iar y R uling The g overnme nt’s g ener al t heory at t rial was that two men had stolen firea rms from a hunting lodge and then sold the stolen wea pons to B urcha

m, w ho then sold them to his brother. One of the orig inal t h i ev es was a

man named B edfor d Watson. W atson had a lrea dy pled g uilty

to char g esNo. 09-5245

United States v. Burc ham Pag e 8 relating to the stolen fir ear ms. He cooper ated with the g overnme nt a nd testified ag ainst Bur cham i nh o p es o f r ec ei v i n g fa v o rab l e t re at m en ti nt h e f o rm o f a m o t i o nfr o m t h e go v ern m en t s e e k i n g a reduc tion in W atson’s sentenc e. Watson’s status as a c ooper at i n g witness and his hope for the g ov e rnme nt’ s b e ne vo le nc e wa s d isc los e d d ur inghis dir e c t exam inatio n by the g ov e rnme nt. An d it was discussed at leng th during his c ross-examination by Bur cham’ s attorney , espec ially with reg ard to h owit m ig ht m oti vate Wat so n to lie re g ard ingB ur c ham to a pp e a se the g ov e rnme nt. During Watson’s testimony on direc t examination, i t was disclosed that Watson had made

a false statement to pr ison officials re g ardinga fig ht that had occ urre d in prison. This disclosure was made pursuant to the re quirement of Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150 (1972), that prose cutors communicate impea chment information reg ardingits witnesses to the defense. Watson initially had denied involvement in the f ight, but he later admitted that he was involved. In response to a leading question by

the prosec utor reg ardingthe ca use of the fig ht, Watson confirmed that the fig ht was due to a c ard g a me . B ur c ham’ s a tto rn e y ne ve r c ro ss- e xami ne d Wat so n r e g a rd ingthe c a

us e of the fi g ht. During Bur ch am ’s d ef

en se ca se, his attorney

indicated his intention to call a witness who would testify

that the cause of the fig ht w as not a car d g ame, but rather was Watson’s coope ration with the g overnme nt ag ainst Bur cham. B urcha m sought to introduce thi s ev i d en ce to impea ch Watson’s credibility . The g overnme nt objected to Burcha m calling this witness, and the court sided wi t h t h e go vernme nt. The cour t initi ally rested its dec ision to ex clude the w itness as being an

a tte mpt to i ntr od uc e e xtri ns ic e vid e nc e to atta c k a wi tne ss’ c ha

ra c te r f or tr uthful nes s, wh ic h is prohibited under F eder al Rule of Evidenc e 608(b) . The c ourt later r ev i s ed it s rea soning f or excluding the witness to rest on g rounds of rele vance and cumulativene ss. Burc ham claims that theNo. 09-5245

United States v. Burc ham Pag e 9 district court’s e x clusion of this evidence was re versible e rror . We rev i ew a district cour t’s evidentiar

y ruling for a

buse of discr etion. United States v. Jenk ins , 593 F.3d 480, 484 ( 6th Cir. 2010) ( citing G en. Elec

. C o . v. Jo i n er , 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1 99 7) ). Th ou g h it

is c le ar w hy B ur c ham so ug ht to int ro du c e thi s a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e —to dis c re dit Watson’s damag ing te stimony —it is l ess clea

r how, i.e. u n d er what rule of evide nce, B urcha m planned to introduce the evidenc e. Reg ardle ss, t h ere had alr eady been voluminous evidenc e reg ardingWatson’s less-than-stellar cre dibilit y

and his incen t i v e to t estify to the g overnme nt’s lik ing

. Thus , we c a

nn ot say that the c ourt ' s con c lus ion that a dd iti on a l a tta c k o n Watso n’ s c re dib ili ty would be cumulative w as an a buse of discr etion. We theref ore f ind no error

. III . For the re asons set for

th above, we AF F IRM

.