### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 4 -00 335 -CV

Eliz abe th G oo dso n , A ppe lla nt

v. Adelina Castellanos , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WI LLIAM SO N COUNTY , 277TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 02- 758- F 277 , HO NORAB LE KEN ANDERSO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N Eliz abeth Go o d s o n trave led to Kazakstan to adopt K.G . After returningfrom Ka zak sta n, Go od so n a

nd he r g ir lf ri e nd , A de lin a

Ca ste lla no s, fi le d a

joi nt pe tit ion

to a do pt K .G . in B e xar County , and a dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d th e a do pti on . Su

bs e qu e nt t o th e a do pti on , th e re la tio ns hip be tw e e n G oo ds on

and Ca ste lla nos end ed, and

Ca ste lla no s f ile d a su it a ff e c tin g the pa

re nt- c hil d
re la tio ns hip . A ft e r a

tr ia l, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

e nte re d a

n o rd e r a pp oin tin g Ca st ell ano s a s th e so le
mana g ingc on se rv a tor

of K. G. a nd

or de re d G oo ds on

to p ay a tto rn e y ’s fees and

c hil d s up po rt
. Goodson appe als the judg ment of the dist rict court. We will aff irm the j udg ment of the district cour t in part and r ever se and r emand in par t.
BACK GR OUND I n 1 99 7, Go od so n a

nd Ca ste lla

no s beg an da tin g , an d, sh or tly the re a ft e r, the c ou

ple b e g an li v in g in G o o d s o n ’ s h o me . D u r in g th e ti me th e c o u p le li v e d to g e th e r , G o o d s on beg an
rese arc hing a doption options . During her searc h, Goodson found K.G. in Kazakstan and beg an thePrior to trial, both parties filed complaints with Child Protective Servic es alleg ing that K.G. 1 h a d b e e na b u s e d w h i l e i nt h e o t h e r

p art y’ s c u s t o dy.

2 adoption proce ss. She filed an a pplication with an adoption ag ency and initiated the Immigration and Naturalization S ervic e proc edure to allow K.G. to enter the United States. I n September 2000, G oodson travele d to K azakstan and adopted K.G., who was thre e y e ars old a t th e tim e . T he Ka zak sta nia n ad op tio n ce rt if

ic a te lis ts Go od so n as the a do pti ve pa re nt. Up on re tur nin g to Te xas, Go od so n o bta ine d a Te xas b ir th c e rt if ic a te fo r K .G . a

nd fi le d a c e rt if ic a te
o f a d o p t i o nw i t h t h e D e p art m e n to f H e a l t h , b o t h o f w h i c h i d e n t i f

i e d G o o d s o na s K
. G
. ’ s m o t h e r . In Marc h 2001, Goodson and Castellanos f iled a joint petition to adopt K.G. in Be x ar County . A B exar County dis tr ic t c ourt

g ra nte d th e a do pti on , and the de c re e sp e c if ie d th a t a pa re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip exis ted betwe en K.G. a

nd Goodson and K.G . and Castellanos. I n April 2002, the relationship betwe en Goodson and Castellanos e nded. L ater that month, Castellanos filed a sui t aff ectingthe par ent-c hild relationship. After a hea ring , the district 1 court issued tempora

ry order s appointing G oodson and Castellanos as te mporary joint manag ing
conser vators for K.G. and spe cif

y ing that Castellanos had the e x clusive rig ht to establish K.G.’s pr ima ry re sid e nc e . In a dd iti on , th e c ourt or de re d G oo ds on

to pay c hil d sup po rt

and pr ov ide he a lth ins ur anc e fo r K. G. Pr ior to the tr ia l, the dis tr ic t c ourt a pp oin te d an a mic us a tto rn e y , Ed Wal sh , to
re pr e se nt t

he be st i nte re sts of

K. G. B oth

pa rt ie s w e re re qu ir e d to dep os it $5, 00 0 in to a n a c c ount t o pa y fo r t he se rv ic e s p ro vid e d b y

the a mic us . Aft er th e tr ia l, t

he jur y de te rm ine d th a t Ca ste lla no s sh ou ld b e a

pp oin te d s ole
mana g ingc on se rv a tor

fo r K .G. an d c on c lud e d th a t G oo ds on sh ou ld p ay

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Castellanos. Subsequently , the cour t issued an orde r that appointed Caste llanos as the sole mana g ing3

conser vator of K.G., a

ppointed Goodson as the possessor y conser vator of K .G., orde red G oodson to make month ly

c hil d s up po rt

pa y me nts in t

he a mou nt o f $ 78 8. 00 and

pa y fo r K .G .’ s h e a lth insurance , and re quired Goodson to pay $45,854.41 in attorney ’s fee s to Ca stellanos and $5,035.50 in attorney ’s fees t o Walsh. The order also decla red that Goodson was given the standard posse ssion rig hts descr ibed in the family code. See Tex. F am. Code Ann. §§ 153.311-.317 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006). On the sa

me day it issued the order, the court a lso relea sed an opinion conc luding that two members of

the same se x may

not jointl y

adopt a c hild un d er T ex as law. G oodson appea ls the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

DI SCU SSIO N Goodson raise s ten issues on appea l. First, Goodson ar g ues that the trial c ourt err ed in rende ring its judgment bec ause the Be x ar County adoption order

is void. S econd, she asser ts that she should have been appointed as K.G.’ s sole manag ing c onservator bec ause, a s K.G.’s mother, she is entitled to the presumption i n favor of naming pare nts sole manag ing c onserva tors. Next, she argues that, bec ause she is the sole leg al par ent of K.G ., the district court viol ated he r constitutional rig ht to make dec isions concer ning K .G.’s ca

re, c ustody , and contr ol free from g overnme ntal interfe renc e by appointing Castellanos as t he sol e manag ing c onservator. I n addition, she argues that the district court a

bused its discretion by

(1) f ailing to a dmit evidence c oncer ning Ca ste l l an os’s brother a nd showing that Castellanos allowed pe rsonal conta ct betwe en her b ro t h er and K.G. a nd (2 ) o rd e ri ngGo od so n to pa y c hil d sup po rt

and a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. F ina lly , s he argue s th a t th e re is ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt the a mou nt o f c hil d s up po rt

awa rd e d o r the awa

rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.4

The Be xa r Co unt y A dopt ion is N otVo id

I n her f irst issue, Goodson co n tends that the district court e rre d when it issued a ju d gm en t i n favor

of Castellanos bec ause the Be x ar County adoption decr ee is void. F urther, Goodson asser

ts that, beca

use t he decre e is void, Castellanos has not been a war ded any

leg al par ental rig hts over K.G
. Ad d itionally , Goodson argues that, bec ause she previously obtained a f

inal adoption order

from Ka zakstan, she is the only leg ally rec og nized parent for

K.G. Fi n al l y , she argues that Castellanos’s c laims are ba rre d by res judicata a n d t h at Castellanos does not have sta nd ingto m a int a in t

his su it. Jurisdiction Go od so n a rgue s th a t th e B e xar

County a do pti on de c re e is v oid and su bje c t to collater al attac k. See E

mployers Cas. Co. v. Block, 744 S.W .2d 940, 943 (Tex. 1988 ) ( co l l ateral attack is attempt to avoid eff ect of one judgme nt in proce eding initiated f or differ ent p u rp o se), overruled on othe r grounds by State Farm Fire &Cas. Co. v. Gandy , 925 S.W .2d 696 (Tex. 1996). Specifica lly , Goodson argues that the B exar County district court lacked subjec t matter jurisdiction
over a n adoption of a ch i l d b y two members of the same se x and lac ked jurisdiction to issue the adoption decr ee. T here fore , she asse rts that the dec ree is su b j ec t t o co l l ateral attac k. Se e Au sti n Indep. Sc h. Dist . v. Sierra Club , 4 95 S.W. 2d 87 8, 88 1 ( Te x. 19 73 ) (

jud g me nt m ay

be c oll a te ra lly attacke d on g rounds that cour t has: (1) no jurisdiction over party or over proper ty , (2) no jurisdiction over subjec t matter, (3) no jurisdiction to enter par ticular judg ment, or ( 4 ) n o ca pacity to act as
c ourt ); W oodfin v. Coleman , 931 S.W .2d 383, 384 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) ( same). I n support of these a s s er t i o n s, Goodson ref ers to var ious definitions found in the family code a s proof that two individuals of the same sex cannot both be parents of one child. See,I n 2003, section 162.001 wa s amende d. See Act of May 21, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 493, 2 § 1, sec. 162.001, 2003 Te x . Gen. L aws 1764, 1764. The cu rr ent ver sion of subsection 162.001(b)( 3) allows an individual who is not the for mer steppa

rent of the ch i l d t o ad opt if the individual is the manag ing conser vator or has had “ac tual car e, possession, a nd control of the c hild” for a presc ribed pe riod of time. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 162.001 ( West S upp. 2006). 5 e.g. , Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 101.024 ( definition of par ent), 101.025 (W es t 2002 & Supp. 2006) (def inition of pa

rent-c hild r elationship). Goodson also ref ers to se ction 192.008 of the he alth and safe ty code, which states that a supplementary birth cer tificate f or an a dopted child “must be in the names of the adoptive par ents, one of w hom must be a fema le
. . . and the other of whom must be
a ma le ” and no te s that Ca ste lla no s’ s name do e s no t a

pp e ar o n e ith e r K .G .’ s b ir th c e rt if ic a te or his Texas c ertifica

te of adoption. See Te x. He a lth& Sa fe ty Cod e Ann. § 1 92 .0 08 (a ) ( Wes t 20 01 ); see also id. § 192.002(c) , (d) ( Wes t 2 0 0 1 ) (r ef err ing to soc ial secur ity

numbers of “ the mother a nd fathe r” on birth c ertifica

tes). F ina lly , G oo ds on

c ite s to the fa

mil y c od e pr ov isi on in e ff

e c t duri ng the re le va

nt t ime that specifie d who may adopt a child. See Act of Ma y 16, 1997, 75th L eg ., R.S., ch. 561, § 14, sec. 162
. 0 0 1 , 1 9 9 7 T e x. G e n . L aw s 1 9 8 3 , 1 9 9 1 ( “ f o r me r s e c ti o n1 6 2
. 0 0 1 ” )
. F o r

me r s e c ti o n1 6 2
. 0 01 spe c if ie d th a t an a d o p ti o n ma

y o c c u r w h e n ( 1 ) th e c h il d ’ s p ar e n ta l r e lati o n s h ip s w it h eac h living pare nt have be en ter

minated, or a

suit seeki n g termination of the r elationships has bee n filed; (2) the spouse of a pare nt w hose relationship has not bee n terminated de sires to adopt the c hild; or (3) a for mer steppa

rent wa nts to adopt the child and has be en ca ring for him. Id. Goodson argues that 2 Castellanos was not eligible under this section beca use (1) Goodson was the only leg al par ent, andI n support of her claims, Goodson also ref ers to an attorne y

g ener al opinion written in 1939. 3 See Op. Tex. Att’y

Gen. No. 0- 532 (1939). The opinion specified that the s t atut es in eff ect at the time the opinion wa s written only allowed a

child to be adopted by

a sing le per son or by

a mar ried couple. Id. F urth er, th e op ini on state d th a t th e law p ro hib ite d “ joi nt” a do pti on s b y

tw o p e op le unless the two people wer e a husba nd and a w ife. Id. Finally , the l etter stated that the adoption of a child by two single women wa s illega l. Id. Go o d s o n ’s re l i an ce o n t h i s o p i n i o ni s m i s p l ac ed
. Fi rs t , at t o rn ey gen er al o p i n i o n s , al t h o u gh persua sive, are not binding author ity
. See Commissioners Court v. Agan , 9 4 0 S. W. 2 d

7 7 , 8 2 ( T e x. 19 97 ); see also Bradley

v. Swearingen , 525 S.W .2d 280, 282 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1975, no writ) (disag ree ing w ith differe nt attorney g ener al opinion). Second, the law relating to the a doption of c hil dr e n d e sc ri be d in the le tte r is no long e r in ef fe c t. F ina lly , th e c ur

re nt p ro vis ion

of the fa mil y code a uthoriz i n g wh o m ay adopt a c hild is broader tha n the 1939 statute and doe s not lim it the people who may

adopt a c hild to only

single individuals and marrie d couples. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 162.001 (West Supp. 2006). 6 her pa renta l rig hts were n o t t er m i nated; (2) Castellanos and Goodson we re ne ver le g ally marrie d; and (3) Castellanos was not a f ormer ste ppare nt of K.G. 3 We disag ree with Goodson’s contention that the ad o p t i o n d ecree is void. Tex as district courts ar e c o u rt s o f general jurisdiction. Du ba i P e tro le um Co. v . Ka zi , 12 S.W .3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000). Ar t i cle five, section eig ht of the Texas Constit ution provides that a district cour t’s jurisdi c ti o n

“ c o n s is ts o f

e x clusive, appe llate, and or igina l jurisdiction of all actions, proce eding s, and
reme dies, except in case s where exclusive, ap p el late, or or igina l jurisdiction may be conf err ed by thi s Con sti tut ion or oth e r law on so me oth e r c ourt , tr ibu na l, o r a dmi nis tr a tiv e bo dy .” Te x. Con st.
art . V , § 8; se e als o Kaz i , 1 2 S .W .3 d at 7 6 ( dis tr ic t c ourt ha d ju ri sd ic tio n o ve r c la im b e c a us e
wro n gfu l d eath claim was within constitutional jurisdi ction of cour t, not because party

satisfied statutory require ments). The g overnme nt code f urther spe cifies that district c ourts “may hear and de te rm ine any

c a us e that is c og niza

ble by c ourt s of law or e qu ity and may g ra nt a ny re lie f t hat c ou ld be g ra nte d b y e ith e r c ourt s o f l aw o r e qu ity .” Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 2 4. 00 8 ( Wes t 20 04 ). Un le ssTh e re is n o d isp ute that th e dis tr ic t c ourt ha d p e rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r t he pa rt ie s in thi s 4 suit. 7 the leg islature or Cong ress ha s provided that a claim be he ard e lsewher e, district cour ts are pr esumed to have subject matter jurisdi ction over a claim. Kaz i , 12 S.W .3d at 75. Fur ther, the mode rn trend is to “‘re duce the vulnera bility of final j u d gm ents to attack on the g round that the tribunal lac ked subject matter jur isdiction.’” Id. at 76 (quoting Restatement (Second) of J udg ments § 11 cmt. E, at 113 (1982)) . Moreove r, the fa mily code spe cifica lly

authorizes district courts to i s s u e adoption order s. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 162.016 ( West 2002).

As s u mi n g w it hout deciding that the district court e rre d in issuing the adoption dec ree , the er ror wa s based on a

n err oneous construc tion of statutes, and the judg ment would be base d on
an er roneous holding of substantive law. The se er rors would not deprive the district cour t of jurisdiction over the adoption and would not render the de cre e void. See Lawrencev. Lawrence , 911 S.W .2d 450, 452 n.1 (Tex. App.—Tex ar k an a 1995, wr it denied) (judg ment based on e rrone ous ho ldi ng s of sub sta

nti ve law is not v oid ); Stinson v. Stinson , 668 S.W .2d 840, 841 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1984, writ ref

’d n.r.e .) (pa

rty could not collater ally

attack divor ce de cre e even if cour t
e rr on e ou sly

re nd e re d ju dg me nt b e c a

us e e rr or of su

bs tanti ve law do e s no t re nd e r jud g me nt v oid ); see als o M e din a v . Yzaguir

re , 304 S.W .2d 715, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1957, no writ) (mother’ s consent wa s irregular and did not comply with require ments of st atute, but this did not deprive c ourt of jurisdiction and did not rende r adoption dec ree void). 4

Moreove r, the district cour t’s alleg ed er

ror would not have de prived it of jurisdiction to enter this par

ticular a doption order. A district c ourt does not ha ve jurisdiction to enter

a par ticular order when the action complained of “strike s at the ver y power of the c ourt to rende r the judg ment.”8

Sierra Club , 495 S.W .2d at 882. Howe ver, a s descr ibed pre viously , district courts have jurisdiction
ov e r ad op tio ns , an d the fa mil y c od e sp e c if

ic a lly a uth or ize s d istri c t c ourt s to iss ue a do pti on or de rs . See Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 162.016. There fore , the district c ourt’s issuance of the adoption dec ree did not run afoul of the court’s pow er to e nter judg ments.

Acc ording ly , we conclude that the di strict court was not deprive d of subject matter jur isd ic tio n o ve r t

he a do pti on

or de pr ive d of the jur isd ic tio n to e nte r the a do pti on de c re e a t is su e in this case. C

f

. B e r r yv . B e rry , 786 S.W .2d 672, 673 (Tex. 1990) (althoug h judgme nt may be
e rr on e ou s, it is n ot v oid

if c ourt ha d ju ri sd ic tio n o ve r p art ie s and su bje c t matte r) ; see also Hube nak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co. , 14 1 S.W. 3d 17 2, 18 2- 83 (T e x. 20 04 ) (f a ilure to f ulf ill pr op e rt y code r equire ment was not jurisdictional ). Consequently , Goodson may not collatera lly

attack the adoption decr ee. Se e Re iss v . R e iss , 118 S.W .3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003) (nonjurisdictional claims may
re nd e r j udgment voida

ble , in wh ic h c a se jud g me nt m a y be c or re c te d thro ug h o rd ina

ry a pp e llate proce ss, but may

not be used to collate rally attack judg ment). Fur thermore , Goodson did not attack the va lidity of the a doption within the dea dline mandated by

statute. I n Marc h 20 0 1 , the B exar County district court, af

ter c onsidering the qualifications of both parties, conc luded that g ranting the adoption was in the be st interests of K.G. and is sued t he adoption decre e. Ne ither par ty appea led the adoption dec ree , and Goodson did not
a tta c k it s v a lid ity

un til July

20 03 . H ow e ve r, se c tio n 1 62 .0 12 of the fa mil y c od e pr oh ibi ts a ll
c ha lle ng e s to an a do pti on de c re e if th ey are fil e d mo re tha n s ix mon ths a ft e r a

n a do pti on

or de r i s signe d. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 162.012 (West 2002)
. Section 162.012 of the fa mily code, e ntitled

“ Di re c t or Col la te ra l A tta c k, ” pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:Under the prior version of section 162.012, parties were allowed to challeng e an a doption 5 decr ee two y ear s afte r the order was e ntere d. See Act of Ma y 25, 1973, 63rd L eg ., R.S., ch. 543, § 1, sec. 16.012, 1973 Te x . Gen. L aws 1411, 1431. In 1997, t h e t i m e t o contest an a doption was re du c e d to six month s. Th e bil l ana ly sis a c c omp a nying the a me ndme nt s pe c if ie s th a t th e purp os e of the amendment was to na rrow the time period in which a n adoption may

be conte sted. See Se nate Com m. o n Jur isp ru de nc e , B ill An a ly sis , S. B . 5 2 ( 19 97 ); see also Act of May 28, 1997, 75th L eg ., R.S., ch. 601, § 1, sec. 162.012, 1997 Te x . Gen. L aws 2118, 2118 (a mendment). I n descr ibing this public policy , the district court c ommented: 6 Th e r e ar e v a li d r e a s o n s f o r a d o p ti o n s to b e u n a s s a il a b le a f te r a s ix- mo n th period. Th e tho us and s o f a do pti ve pa re nts thr ou g ho ut T e xas a

re e nti tle d to kn owthat th e ir adopti o n is absolutely

final as they

g o about the business of r aising their childre n.
9 (a) Notwithstanding Rule 329, Te x as Rules of Civil P roce dure, the vali d i t y of an adop t i on order

is not subject to attack af ter six m onths after

the date the order

was signe d.
Id. ; see I n re C.R.P. , 192 S.W .3d 823, 826 (Tex. App.—Fort W o rt h 2006, no pet.) (va lidity of 5

a do pti on or de r is no t su

bje c t to a tta c k a ft e r six- mon th de a dline ex pi re s) ; see also Tune v. Tex as Dep ’t of P ub . S

afe ty , 23 S.W .3d 358, 363 (Tex. 2000) (cour ts must enforce plain meaningof unambig uous statute).

B y e na c tin g thi s sta tut e , the le g isl a tur e c le arl y e vid e nc e d it s in te nt t

hat it is the pu bli c policy of this State that adoptions cannot be attacked mor e than six m onths after the issuance of the
a do pti on on any ba sis
. Se e Ho bb s v . V

an Sta v e rn , N o . 0 1

- 0 5
- 0 0 6 3 2

- C V , 2 0 0 6 T e x . A p p . LE X IS 6 95 2 9 , at * 8 (Houston [1st Dis t.] Nov. 2, 2006, no pet. h.) ( no exception exi sts for cha lleng ing adoption p ast six -month limi tation, not even on g rounds that adoption is purportedly void). The jus tif ic a tio ns in f

a vo r o f t his de a dli ne are nume ro us . To e nc oura g e a do pti on s, a do pti ve pa re nts sh ou ld b e a ssu

re d th a t, a ft e r a re a so na

ble a mou nt of tim e , the ir pa

re nta l cla ims may no t be b ruta lly10

re vo ke d d

ue to a pr oc e dura l e rr or , b ir

th p are nts c ha

ng ingthe ir

min d y e ars la te r, or

a c ha ng e in
re la tio ns hip wi th a

no the r p are nt. Th e de str uc tio n o f a

pa re nt- c hil d relatio ns hip is a tr a umatic
e xpe ri e nc e that c an le a d to e mot ion a l de va statio n fo r a ll the pa rt ie s inv olv e d, and all rea so na ble eff orts to preve nt this out come must be invoked w hen ther e is no indication that the destruction of the exist ing pa

rent-c hild relationship is in t he b es t i n t er es t of the child. See Catholic Charities v. H arper , 3 3 7 S.W .2d 111, 114 (Tex. 1960) (“It would hardly have be en in contemplation of the L eg islature that, af

ter these steps [t owards adoption] had bee n taken, involving not only expense, tim e and tr ou ble , b ut w hat is imp or

tant t he fo rm a tio n o f t ie s o f l ov e and a ff e c tio n, a ll o f t

his sh ou ld be nu lli fi e d a

nd se t a t na ug ht f or no re a so n o the r t

ha n th a t th e natur a l pa

re nts have c ha

ng e d th e ir minds and desire to have the c hildren r est ored to them.” ). This dea dline also comports with the public policy

of this State to pr ovide children w ith a stable environme nt in which to be ra ised. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.001(a) (2) (West 2002) (“The publi c poli cy of t his state is to . . . provide
a sa fe , s ta ble , a nd no nv iol e nt e nv ir on me nt f or the c hil d. ” ); see also id. § 160.607(a) (W es t S u p p. 2006) (pr eventing challeng e to pare ntag e of child with presumed father if not filed within four y ear s of birth of child), § 161.211 (West 2002) (prohibiting direc t or collater al attac k on validity of orde r te rm inatin g pa

re nta l ri g hts mor e tha

n s ix mon ths a ft e r o rd e r i s is su e d) ; In re B.L.D. , 113 S.W .3d 340, 353 (Tex. 2003) (section 162.211 was enacte d to “ensur e that children’s lives ar e not kept in limbo”).

Goodson argues t hat construingsection 162.012 as pr ohibiting her from attac king the
va li d i t y o f t h e B e xa

r C o u n t y a d o p t i o n w i l l l e a d t o a b s u r d r e s u l t s . F o r e xamp l e , s h e ar g ue s th a t, under this i nterpre tation, if an individual is able to obtain an adoption orde r for a pet or for a dead
c hil d, the a do pti on

wi ll b e c ome un a ssa ila

ble aft er six month s. F ur the r, sh e argue s th a t th is11

const ru ct i o n will allow for an a doption of a child by a sex offende r and a

n adoption obtained by fr a ud or dure ss t o b e c ome inc on te sta ble six mo nth s a ft e r t

he de c re e iss ue s. We first note that our interpr etation of sec tion 162.012 does not prohibit all attacks
on an adoption decr ee. Parties have the option of appea ling an adoption decr ee as th ey d o any judgme nt. Second, in construing laws, we must a ssume that judge s will give e ffe ct to the direc tives of the leg islature and will f ollow the law acc ording ly and cannot assume that judge s will violate the power entrusted to them by the people of this S tate by eng ag ing in a ctions that are unauthorized and
c ontr ary to ou r laws . T his a ssumpt ion is v ita l to the wo rk ing s o f o ur g ov e rnme nt a

nd se e ms esp eci ally

a pp ro pr ia te wh e n th e le g isl a tur e pr ov ide s c le ar p ri nc ipl e s a nd dir e c tiv e s f

or jud g e s to follow. I n this reg ard, the leg islature has c lear ly stated throug hout the family code that judge s are to make dec isions that are in the be st interests of the c hildren involved.

Finally , we a

re not c onfronted w ith any of the hy pothetica l s i t u ations descr ibed by Goodson. See Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n , 141 S.W .3d 158, 164 (Tex. 2004) (cour ts prohibited from i s s u ing a dvisory

opinions). There is no alleg ation that the adoption of K.G . by Castellanos was ob ta ine d thro ug h f

ra ud or dure ss. On the c on tr ary , bo th pa rt ie s wi lli ng ly

e nte re d th is a

rr ang e me nt,
and Go od so n o nly

a tte mpt e d to re vo ke th e Bexar County a do pti on a ft e r h e r r e la tio ns hip wi th Castellanos ende d. Moreove r, if an a doption turns out to not be in the best intere st of the child, the family code p r o v id e s me th o d s f

o r te rminating the par ent-c hild relationship, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001-.007 (West 2002 & Supp. 2006), and for the remova l of a child from an a busive home, see id. §§ 262.001-.307(West 2002 & Supp. 2006).12

Fundamental Error

Alternatively , Goodson contends that the a doption decr ee is void beca use the B exar C o u n t y d i s t r i c tc o u rtc o m m i t t e d f u n d a m e n t a l e r

r o r w h e n i t i s s u e d t h e a d o p t i o n d e c r e e . S p e c i f i c a l l y, Go od so n c on te nd s th a t th e a do pti on de c re e vio la te s th e pu

bli c int e re st o f t he stat e of Te xas t hat a child have at most one parent of eac h sex. F un dame nta l e rr or is prese nt w he n th e re c or d s ho ws that “ the pu bli c int e re st i s direc tly or adve rsely

aff ecte d as that intere st is decla red in the s tatutes or the Constituti on of Texas.” Texas Dep’ t of Transp. v. T. Brown Const ructors, Inc. , 947 S.W. 2d 65 5, 65 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 1997, pet. denied)
. Howeve r, due to the policy conce rns favoring prese rvation of e rror during trial or duringappea l, the fundame ntal err or doctrine is a d i s cr ed ited doctrine that is used in rare circ umstances only
. In re B.L.D. , 113 S.W .3d at 350. The doctrine has bee n employ ed to re view issues of jurisdiction and ce rtain ty pes of e rror s in juvenile delinquency case s. Id. The doc trine has not been e mploy ed in this area of the law , and we decline the i n v i t at i o n to do so. Cf. id. at 351 (r e fu sin g to a

pp ly fu nd a me nta l e rr or

do c tr ine to p are nta l- te rm inatio n c a se s) ; In re R.L.H. , 771 S.W .2d 697, 702-03 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1989, writ denied) (there is no blanket exception for fa iling to comply with rules of a

ppellate pr ocedure in family law ca ses that would war rant a pplication of fundame ntal err or doctrine ).

To support her argument that it is the publ ic i ntere st of t his State that a child have no more than one pare nt of the same sex, Goodson corr ectly points out that various provisions of the he a lthand

sa fe ty c od e and the fa mil y c od e , in c lud ing c e rt a in p ro vis ion s in c ha pte r 1 60 of

the fa mil y code, use the sing ular for

ms of the words “mother” and “f ather ” whe n descr ibing pa rents. See T e x.13

Fam. Code Ann. §§ 101.024 (de finition of pare nt), .025 (def inition of parent-c hild relationship), § 16 0. 20 1 (We st 2002 ) ( sp e c if y ingwa y s in wh ic h mo the r- c hil d r e la tio ns hip and fathe r- c hil d
re la tio ns hip may

be e sta blish ed); Te x. He a lth& Sa fe ty Cod e Ann. §§ 19 2. 00 2( c ), (d ) ( bir th
c e rt if ic a te mus t ha

ve sp a c e fo r s oc ia l se c ur ity numbe rs of

mot he r a nd fathe r) , . 00 8( a ) ( bir

th
c e rt if ic a te may c on ta in o ne ma le and

on e fe ma le a do pti ve pa

rent) . In a dd iti on , G oo ds on re fe rs to
se c tio n 1 60 .1 02 of

the fa mil y c od e , w hic h state s that an “ a dju dic a te d fathe r” is “ a man who has be en adjudicate d . . . to be the father of a child,” and r easons that a simil ar nume ri ca l re striction to one individual must apply to a n individual de emed to be the mother of a child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160 .1 02 (We st 2 00 2) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also id. § 1 60 .1 06 (p ro vis ion s o f c ha pte r r e la tin g to deter mination of paternity

also apply

to determination of maternity ). Dra wing from these statutory provisions, Goodson asserts that cha pter 160 of the family

code articulates an intention on behalf of the leg is l at u re t h at chil dren ha ve only one par ent of e ach se x , and insists that any family code pr ov isi on tha t mi g ht p ro hib it the inv a lid a tio n of an a do pti on of a c hil d b y tw o me mbe rs of

the same sex, i ncluding section 162.012, must y ield to the policy articulated in chapte r 160. See id. § 160.002 (West 2002) (if another

provision of family

code c onflicts with chapter 160, chapte r 160 pre vails). Howeve r, there is no direct stateme nt of public policy found in the family

code or the constitution prohibit ing the adoption of a child by two individuals of t he same sex. Se e T. B ro wn Constructors, Inc. , 9 47 S.W. 2d a t 65 9 ( fu

nd a me nta l e rr or

is p re se nt w he n p ub lic in ter est th a t is de c lare d i n st atute s o r c on sti tut ion is d ir e c tly

or a dv e rs e ly

a ff e c te d; j ud g me nt w a s f

un dame nta lly
err oneous beca

use trial court usurped power of executive and violated separ atio n o f p o wer s pr ov isi on of c on sti tut ion ); see also Te x. Const. a rt . I , § 32 (d ir e c tly

statin g that ma

rr ia g e c an o nly14

consist of one man a

nd one woman). A ccor dingly , any conce rn with the propr iety of this adoption must y ield to the direc tly

stated public policy

of this State prohibiting a dire ct or collateral attack on
a jud g me nt m or e tha

n six mon ths a ft e r an a do pti on is or de re d an d pro vid ingc hil dr e n w itha sta ble home environme nt. See Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. §§ 16 2. 01 2 (s ix-m on th de a dli ne ); 15 3. 00 1 ( ov e ra ll pu bli c po lic y

of State ); W

risten v. Kosel , 7 42 S.W. 2d 86 8, 87 0 (Tex . App .— Ea stl and 19 87 , w ri t denied) (whe n both pare nt s l o v e child, public intere st is neither direc tly nor adve rsely

aff ecte d by qu e sti on of wh ic h pare nt is a

pp oin te d ma

na g ingc on se rv a tor

of c hil d) ; se e als o V

an Sta v e rn , 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 9529, at *9-10 (re jecting argument that appointment of both members of same-se x couple a s joint m anag ing c onservators violated public policy ). F ina lly , in

arguin g that th e a do pti on is v oid , G oo ds on wo uld have us ig no re he r r ole in the adoption of K.G. by Castellanos. Goodson and Castellan o s t o get h er hire d a lawy er f or the purpose of m ak i n g Castellanos a c o-equa l leg al par ent of K.G . and filed a joint petiti on for the adoption of K.G. I mportantly , K.G. re g ards both Goodson a nd Castellanos as his pare nts, and the three of them lived as a

family for y ear s. I t w o u l d b e i n equit able a nd unconsciona

ble to allow Go od son to inv ok e the jur isd ic tio n o f a c ourt fo r t he so le purp os e of

c re a tin g a

pa re nt- c hil d
re lat io ns hi p betw e e n Ca ste lla no s and K. G. and the n s ub se qu e ntl y

a llo w h e r t o d e str oy

that sa me relationship because he r re lationship with C astellanos had e nded. See A tkinson Gas Co. v. Albrecht , 87 8 S. W.2 d 2 36 , 2 40 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 94 , w ri t de nie d) (p art y may no t a c c e pt b e ne fi ts of statute and the n asser

t rig ht inconsistent with posi tion pr eviously taken for pur pose of avoiding
c or re sp on din g e ff

e c ts o r o bli g atio ns ); Marshall v. Lockhe ad , 245 S.W .2d 307, 308 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1952, wr it ref’ d n.r.e.) (one w ho acc epts and re t ains fruits of judg ment is estoppedI n her f irst issue, Goodson also contends that, beca use t he Kazakstan adoption order was 7 a full and f

inal judgme nt, the adoption aff orded he r the status of K.G .’s mother, i n cl u d i n g al l the rig hts and responsibilities attendant with that status, a nd, there fore , Castellanos was pr eclude d from being awa

rded a ny p ar en t al ri ghts by

the doctrine of re s judicata. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 162.023(a) (West Supp. 2006) (adoption order issued by fore ign country is “ac corde d full faith and c re dit by” Te xas c ourt s a s lo nga s o rd e r d oe s n ot v iol a te “fu nd a me nta l pr inc ipl e s o f h uma n r ig hts or the laws or

pu bli c po lic y of

thi s st a te ” ); see also id. § 152.105(a) (cour t shall treat for eig n country as i f i twe re s t at e w i t h i nUn i t edS t at es ), (b ) ( W es t2 0 0 2 ) ( cu s t o dy d et er m i n at i o n s m ad e b y

fo re i gn county in substantial conformity with require ments of family code w ill be rec og nized in Tex as). Howeve r, bec ause w e have concluded t hat t he ti me for contesting the B exar County adoption has expired, we need not addre ss this sub-issue. Fur ther, we note t hat, i f applica ble, the prope r plac e to have r aised this defe nse would have been dur ing the Be x ar County adoption proce eding
. See T e x. R. C iv. P. 9 4 ( re s ju dic a ta

is a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e that must be ple a de d to be e ff e c tiv e ); Compass Bank v. MFP Fin. Serv

s., Inc. , 152 S.W .3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. fil ed) ( if not pleade d, a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e is w a ive d) . T he re c or d co nta ins no ind ic a tio n tha t Goo ds on ra ise d th is d e fe ns e duri ngthat pr oc e e din g , a

nd , ind e e d, bo th pa

rt ie s we re re pr e se nte d by

the same a tto rn e y

and joi ntl y filed the pe tition for adoption.
15 fr om l a te r a sse rt ingits inv a lid ity ); see also V.C. v. M

.J.B. , 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000) (parent ha s

“ a bs olute a bil ity to ma int a in a zone of a uto no mou s p ri va c y

fo r h e rs e lf

and he r c hil d. Ho we ve r, if sh e wi sh e s to ma int a in t

hat zon e of

pr iva c y sh e c ann ot i nv ite a

thi rd pa rt y to func tio n as a

pa re nt t o her c hild an d c an n o t c e d e o v e r to th a t p arty p ar e n ta l a u th o r it y th e e xe r c is e o f w h ic h ma y c r e a te a profound bond with the c hild”). Utiliz ation of the court for this ty pe of beha

vior is not something we will allow. F or

a ll the re a so ns pr e vio us ly g ive n, we c on c lud e that the a do pti on de c re e is n ot v oid and that the time for

attackingthe validity

of the a doption has passed. 716

Standing F ina lly , in he r fi rs t iss ue , Go od so n a lso argue s th a t Ca ste lla no s h a d n o s tand ingto f

ile a suit aff ectingthe par ent-c hild rel at i onship. I n her pe tition, C astellanos asse rted that she ha d standing to file suit because she wa s a par ent of K.G. Howeve r, Goodson asserts that Castellanos could not demon s t ra t e t h at she had standingto file this suit beca use the B exar County

adoption decr ee is void.

Howeve r, we have a lrea dy conclude d that the B exar County adoption decr ee is not
v o i d , an d , t h e r e f

o r e , b o t h G o o d s o nan d

C a s t e l l an o s p o s s e s s p ar e n t a l r i g h t s t o K
. G
. A c c o r d i n g l y, Ca s te ll an o s h a d s ta

n d in g to f il e th is s u it
. See T ex. Fam. Code Ann. § 102.003(a ) (West 2002 & Supp. 2006) (spec ify ing w hich par ties may file suit affe cting pare nt-child relationship). Moreover , se c tio n 1 02 .0 03 of

the fa mil y c od e c on fe rs sta

nd ing to any pe rs on wh o ha s h a d “ a c tua l c are , c on tr ol,
and po sse ssi on of the c hil d for a t lea st six mon ths e nd ingno t mo re tha n 9 0 d ay s p re c e din g the date of the filing of the pe tition.” Id. § 102.003(a) (9). As noted by the di strict court, it is undisputed that both pa rties had “ac tual car e, custody , control and posse ssion of [K.G.] for more than six months (18
m o n t h s fr o m Oc t o b er 2 0 0 0 t o Ap ri l 2 0 0 2 ) a n d t h at p er i o d

en d edl es s t h an 9 0 d ay s b ef o re t h e f i l i n g” of the suit. Se e Va n S

tav e rn , 200 6 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 95 29 , at *6 (c ounty c ourt or de r c re a te d p a re ntc hil d r e la tio ns hip be tw e e n s a me -s e x a do pti ve pa re nt an d ch ild , an d, thu s, pa re nt ha d stand ingin s uit aff ectingpare nt child relationship).

F or a ll the re a so ns pr e vio us ly dis cus se d, we ov e rr

ule Go od so n’ s f

ir st i ssu e in i ts entirety
.17

P ar e nt al P r e sum pt ion and C ons ti tu ti ona l R igh t

I n her se cond and third issues on a ppeal, Good s o n co n t ends that the district cour t
err ed in appointing Castellanos as the sole mana g ing c onservator bec ause G oodson is entitled to the presumption favor i n g p ar ents over non- pare nts in the appointment of manag ing c onservators and beca use she ha s a constitutional rig ht to make dec isions concer ning the car e, custody , and contr ol
o f K
. G
. w it

h o u t u n w ar

r an te d g o v e r

n me n ta l in te r f

e r e n c e. S ee Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131( a) (West 2002) (unless cour t finds that it is not in best interest of child, cour t shal l appoint pare nt as
mana g ingc on se rv ator ); Tro x e l v . G ra nv ill e , 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality) (liber ty interest of pa re nts in c a re , c us tod

y , a nd c on tr ol of the ir c hil dr e n is pe rh a ps old e st o f f

un dame nta l r ig hts ); In re M

. W. , 9 59 S.W. 2d

66 1, 66 5 (T e x. Ap p. —T y le r 19 97 , wr it de nie d) (r ig ht of pa re nt to ra ise c hil d is
e sse nti a l r ig ht) . Sp e c if

ic a lly , s he a sse rt s th a t, b e c a us e the B e xar

County a do pti on is v oid , s he is K.G. ’s o n l y p ar en t. As such, she a rg ues that she should have been a ppointed the sole mana g ing
conser vator of K .G. and should not have been r equire d to pay child support. Fur

ther, she a rg ues that the district court err ed when it limited her possession of K.G. to the “ standard posse ssion” descr ibed in the family

code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 153.311- 153.317 (standar d possession). Howeve r, as discusse d p re v i o u s l y , we h av e c o n cl u d edt h at t h e B ex ar C ounty adoption is not void. C onsequently , this case does not constitute a sui t by a non-parent ag ainst a par ent for custody of a c hi l d; rather , this case is a suit af fec ting the pa

rent-c hild relationship betwee n two individuals with co-equal l ega l rig hts to a child. Acc ording ly , Goodson is not entitled to a presumption that Castellanos is not also entitled to. Moreove r, although Goodson conte nds that the district court er

red by appoint i n g a n o n-par ent as the sole ma nag ing c onseravtor of K.G., she18

premises this argument solely on her a ssertion that Castenellos’s adoption of K .G. was inva lid and do e s no t a sse rt that the re is no e vid e nti ary su pp or t f or the a pp oin tme nt o f C a ste ne llo s, a s a pa re nt, as the sole mana g ing c onservator.

Be cause the suit inv o l v es t wo par ties with equal par ental cla ims, the court was authorized to awa

rd sole conse rvatorship to Castellanos, see id. § 153.005 (West 2002) (cour t may appoint one sol e manag ing c onservator or joint manag ing c onservators); to issue a standar d possession order a

war ding G oodson standard posse ssion, see id. §§ 153.251(d) ( standard posse ssion order applies to children t hree y ear s of ag e or olde r), .252 ( West 2002) (rebuttable presumption exis ts that standard possession or d er is in best interests of child), .311-.317 ( standard posse ssion order ) ; an d to r e qu ir e G o o d s o n to ma k e c h il d s u

p p o rt p ay me n ts an d p r o v id e h e a lt

h in s u r an c e for K.G., see id. § 1 54 .0 01 (We st 2 00 2 & Sup p. 20 06 ) (a uth or izin g c ourt to or de r e ith e r p are nt o r b oth pare nts to make child support pay ments), §§ 1 5 4
. 1 8 2 -.183 (West 2002) (a llowing c ourt to order pa re nt t o p a y

fo r o r p ro vid e he a lthins ur anc e fo r c hil d) . A c c or din g ly , w e ov e rr ule the se iss ue s.

Evid ence A gainst Castellanos’s Brother

I n her fourth and fifth issues on appea l, G oodson argues that the district court a bused its dis c re tio n w he n

i t r u l e d t h a t e v i d e n c e r e g a

r d i n g C a ste lla no s’ s b ro the r, An tho ny

Ca ste lla no s, c ou ld not be admitted. Specific ally , Goodson argues t hat t he dis trict court should have admitted evidenc e demonstrating that Anthony is a reg istered sex offe nder and that Anthony had contact with K.G. She argues that t his evidenc e was rele vant t o the deter mination of whether

Castellanos was a

n eff ective19

pare nt. I n its temporar

y and fina l orders, the district court prohibited Castellanos fr om allowing K .G. to have a ny contac t with Anthony
. The rule s of evidenc e g overn the admissibili ty of evide nce. U nder r ule 401, evidenc e is “rele vant” if it has the “tendenc y to make the exis tence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the deter mination of the ac tion more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence .” Tex. R. Evi d. 401. Subject to a fe w exceptions, rele vant evidenc e is admissible but “may be excluded if its probative value is substa n t ially outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury .” Id. R. 402, 403. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Id. R. 402.

We r e vie w a

tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on to e ith e r a dmi t or e xclu de e vid e nc e fo r a n a bu se of discre tion. In re J.P.B., 18 0 S.W. 3d 57 0, 57 5 (T e x. 20 05 ). A tr ia l c ourt a bu se s it s d isc re tio n if it acts without refe renc e to any g uiding r ules and princ iples or if the act complained of is arbitra ry and unreasonable
. McD aniel v. Y arbrough , 898 S.W .2d 251, 254 (Tex. 1995). I n decidingwhether
e vid e nc e sh ou ld b e e xclu de d, the c ourt mus t we ig h the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the e vid e nc e a g a ins t “ its potential for unf

air prejudice or confusion” and must e x amine the nece ssity and probative eff ect of the evidenc e. In re C.J.F. , 134 S.W .3d at 356. Be cause the g uiding principle in a suit affe cting the pare nt-child relationship i s the best intere st of the child, the exclu s i o n o f evide nce unde r rule 403 should be done “ sparing ly .” I n r e J

. W. , 113 S.W .3d 605, 612 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pe t. denied). I n explaining its ruling, the district c ourt stated: [C ]onsi deringthe re levanc e and pr ejudicial value, I am at this time g oing to rule that it ha s very , very littl e rele vance with r espec t to the issues the jury is g oing to de cide.Goodson also testified that K.G. stopped the se beha viors within a fewday s of her talking 8 to him. No m ed i cal e vidence was introduce d conce rning the alleg ed ra shes, and one of K.G.’ s

9 pediatric ians testified that it is not necessar ily unusual for a child to have a rash simil ar to the one descr ibed by

Goodson. 20 I t is highly prejudicia l. I t is the sort of thing that avera g e citizens have a hy sterica l rea ction to. .
. . I d o t hink it has a hig h level of pr ejudicial value for virtua lly no rele vance . I n the tempora

ry order s hear ing, Goodson testified that, ea rly on in their relationship, Ca ste lla no s in fo rm e d h e r that An tho ny wa s a re g ist e re d s e x off e nd e r. F ur

the r, Go od so n s ta te d th a t,
a ft e r be ing inf

or me d of An tho ny ’s status a s a re g ist e re d sex off e nd e r, sh e did

no t w ant A nth on y

to have a ny acc ess to K.G. and be lieved that was Castellanos’s desire as well. Howe ver, she testified that, a fe w m on ths pr ior

to t he he ari ng , s he le arn e d th a t Ca ste lla no s h a d ta

ke n K .G . to a

fa mil y reunion a nd t h at An t h o n y

had attende d the eve nt. Goodson also stated that whe n she aske d Castellanos about the visit, Castellanos replied, “ Oh, don’t worry about i t. Anthony is ok now. He has cha ng ed.” I

n addition, Goodson testified that, afte r the visit, K.G. beg an display ing unchar acte ristic behavior s that she believe d wer e consistent with sexual abuse. She stated that K.G.
rea ched f or her g enital ar ea twi ce an d moved his fac e close to her g enital ar ea on mor e than one
occa sion. Although Goodson was prohibited from discussing Anthony during trial, she did testify 8 that she believe d that K.G. had be en sexually abused. Fur ther, she stated that K.G . beg an exhibiti ng sy mp t o m s s h e b e l i e v e d

w e r e c o n s i s t e n tw i t h s e xu a l a b u s e , i n c l u d i n g e xtr e m e m o o d s wi ng s, excessive cr

y ing, withdrawa l, bed-w etting, nightmar es, fear of g oing to be d, and ra shes in his ge nital
are a. 921 Castellanos also testified duringthe temporar y order s hear ing a

nd stated that she ha s not and would neve r let K.G. be alone with A nthony . Fur ther, she te stified that the only time K.G. has ever been in the same place as Anthony was during Castellanos’s pare nts’ anniver sary dinner. Ad dit ion a lly , s he state d th a t th e dinne r wa s at a p ub lic re sta ur ant, tha t a ll m e mbe rs of

he r i mme diate family attended the event, that the e vent only lasted a c ouple of hours, that K.G. wa s with her for the whole eve nt, and that K.G. wa s never alone with Anthony
. I n subsequent hea

ring s and during bench confe renc es at trial, Goodson also ar g ued that there was a

possibili ty

that K.G. had g one fishing wi t h An t h o n y after the tempora ry order s prohibiting c ontact with Anthony wer e issued. Howe ver, G oodson failed to pre sent any evidenc e substantiating this claim. When asked a bout this poss ibilit y at t rial, t he amicus attorney stated that he had n o i n d i ca tion that K.G. had bee n allowed ne ar A nthony afte r the tempora

ry order s issued. Fur ther, Goodson’ s attorney

admitted in the confe renc e that K.G. told the amicus attorney that he

“ did n’ t g o fishing w ith Uncle — with Uncle Anthony .” (Empha sis added). F inally , Castellanos’s
a tto rn e y argue d th a t, w he n K .G . w a s d isc us sin g the fi sh ingtr ip w ith“ An tho ny ,” he wa s r e fe rr ingto a school fr iend named A nthony , not his uncle.

Gi ve n Ca ste lla

no s’ s te sti mony , we c ann ot c on c lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt a bu se d it s discretion whe n it init ially conclude d that the potential for unf air pr ejudice that could result from admitting the c ontested ev idence substantially outweig hed the little probative va lue the evide nce offe red. The onl y evidenc e offere d indicates that the family g ather ing occur red in a public place and
wa s a t t e n d e d b y s e v e r a l m e mb e r s o f C a s t e l l an o s ’ s f a m i l y an d t h a t K
. G
. w a s n e v e r a lon e wi th An tho ny . A c c or din g ly , th e di str ic t c ourt c ou ld r e a so na

bly c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e ha d li ttl e22

probative va lue for e valuating Castellanos’s ability to a ct as an eff ective pare nt f

or K.G. In addition, people of ten have an under standably emotional rea ction to the su gges tion that a reg istered se x offe nder w as allowe d near a child. Ac cording ly , the district court c ould ha ve rea sonably

conclude d that this inst inctual re action may have be en inappr opriately primed by

the mere mention of t he fa ct that A nth on y

wa s a re g ist e re d s e x off

e nd e r a nd c on c lud e d that, un de r the c ir c ums tanc e s p re se nt i n t h i s c a s e , a d m i s s i o no f

t h e e v i d e n c e i nqu e s t i o nw o u l d h a v e u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c e d C a s t e l l an o s . In addition, give n that no evidenc e wa s proffe red to substantiate the claim that K.G. ha d g one fishing with Anthony

and g iven the admission that K.G. stated he did not go f ishing with his uncle, we cannot c onclude that t h e d i s t ri ct cour t abused its discretion whe n it reaf firmed its orig inal ruling prohibiting the introduc tion of evidenc e re g ardingAnthony
.

M o re o v er , p ri o r t o t ri al , Go o d s o nan d C as t el l an o s agr ee d t o al l o w K. G. t o u n d er go a psy cholog ical eva luation by Dr. Poole. In his report, Dr . Poole noted that, despite beingadvised by Goodson that she belie v ed K. G. had bee n sexually abused, he found no evide nce that any of K. G. ’s be havio ra l pr ob le ms w e re the re su lt o f p hy sic a l or se xua l a bu se . D ur ing tr ial , Dr. Poo le reiter ated his conc lusion and stated that, despite Goodson’s conce rns, he be lieved K.G. should re side with Castellanos.

Ba sed o n al l t h e pre cedingevidenc e, we cannot c onclude that the district c ourt’s actions we re w ithout reg ard to guidingrules or pr inciples. Ther efor e, we conclude that the district
c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n a

nd ov e rr ule Go od so n’ s f

ourt h a nd fi ft h is su e s o n a

pp e a l.

Child Sup port

I n h e r s ixth i ssu e on

a pp e a l, G oo ds on

argue s that the d ist

ri c t c ourt a bu se d it s discretion in orde ring her to pa y child support beca

use she is K.G.’s only

pare nt. We have alr eady23

a dd re sse d th is c on te nti on and c on c lud e d that the dis tr ic t c ourt wa s a uth or ize d to or de r G oo ds on to pay child support. There fore , we c onclude that the district c ourt did not abuse it s d i s cre tion and
overr ule this issue on appea l. Al te rn a tiv e ly , in

he r s e ve nth

iss ue , G oo ds on argue s tha t the re is le g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf f i c i e n te v i d e n c e t o s u

p p o rtt h e a m o u n to f

c h i l d s u p p o rto r d e r e d

b y t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt
. I ni ts te mpo ra ry an d f i na l or de rs , th e dis tr ic t c ourt re qu ir e d G oo ds on

to p ay Ca ste lla no s $ 78 8. 00 pe r m on th in c hil d s up po rt

and to p ro vid e he a lthins ur anc e fo r K .G . A lth ou g h Go od so n a dmi ts that th e c hil d support order ed in the tempora ry order was c onsistent with her income for 2001, she insists that the fi na l or de r w a s im

pr op e r and ex c e ssi ve be c a us e he r a nnua l in c ome wa s mu c h le ss i n 2 00 2 th a n it was in 2001. Courts have the discretion to deter mine the appropr iate amount of child support, and
we will not disturb the trial court’s conclusion unless it is shown that the district court a bused that discretion. In re L.R.P. , 98 S.W .3d 312, 313 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2003, pet. dism’d). Under this standard of r eview, the fac tual and leg al sufficie ncy of the evidenc e ar e not independe nt g rounds for a

ppeal but ar e re levant conside rations when deter mining whe ther the tria l court abuse d its discretion. Id. ; see also City of Keller v. W ilson , 1 68 S.W. 3d

80 2, 82 7 ( Te x. 20 05 ) ( e vid e nc e is leg ally sufficie nt if it “would enable rea sonable and fair- minded people to r eac h the ver dict under
re vie w” ); W

alker Ins. Se r

v s . v . B o ttle R ock P ower Corp. , 108 S.W .3d 538, 548 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (e vidence is factua lly insufficient if c ourt’s ruling “is so contra ry to the
overw helming w eig ht of the evidenc e as to be clea rly wrong and manife stly

unjust”). As long as the court’s de termination is supported by evidenc e of a “substantive and probative char acte r,” the cour t did not abuse its discretion. S a n ch ez v. Sanc hez , 9 15 S.W. 2d 99 , 1 02 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 1996, no writ).24 Goodson argues that the amount of child support order ed is imprope r be ca u s e h er fi na nc ia l si tuatio n c ha

ng e d b e tw e e n th e tim e the c ourt fi rs t or de re d h e r t o p ay

c hil d s up po rt

in i ts te mpo ra ry or de r a nd the c ourt ’s fi na l ju dg me nt. At tr ia l, G oo ds on te sti fi e d c on c e rn inghe r i nc ome in 2 00 1 a nd in 2 00 2. He r ea

rn ing s in 2001 we re ov e r $65 ,0 00
. B a se d on th is i nc ome , s he a dmi ts that the amount of c hild support origina lly order ed, $788.00 per month, was appr opriate w hen the court issued its temporar

y order s. Howeve r, Goodson conte nds that, in 2002, she had a significa ntly reduc ed income. At trial, she testified that she was laid off from her job in the computer industry an d t h at she wa s
un a ble to o bta in a

no the r job in the c omp ute r ind us tr y . F ur the r, sh e te sti fi e d that he r a nnua l in c ome in 2002 was appr ox imately $30,000. Finally , she st ated that, due to a downturn in the m arke t, it was difficult to g et a job in the hig h-tec h industry and that it was he r b el i ef t h at, eve n if she we re employ ed full-time, she w ould only make be tween $30,000 a nd $40,000 per y ear . Ba sed on this testimony , Goodson insists t hat the amount of c hild support ordere d is i mpe rm iss ibl y

hig h und e r t

he fa mil y c od e . In d e te rm ini ngthe pr op e r a mou nt of chi ld su

pp or t,
c ourt s are to c on sid e r ( 1) a ll of th e par e nt’ s sa lary inc ome ; ( 2) int e re st, div ide nd s, and ro y a lty inc ome ; ( 3) se lf

-e mpl oy me nt i nc ome ; (4) re nta l inc ome ; and (5 ) al l othe r inc ome the pa re nt r e c e ive s. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.062 (West 2002)
. Ba sed on her testimony reg ardingher a ctual income, she insists that her monthly child support pay ment is ove r $350 too high. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 15 4. 06 1 ( Wes t Su

pp . 2 00 6) (c ha

rt fo r ca lc ulatin g ne t monthly inc ome a ft e r ta xati on ), .1 25 (We st 2002) (c hild support guidelines state that, for one child, child support monthly obligation is 20% of net re source s). Alternatively , she insists that, even if the amount awa rded was based on the amount of m oney she st ated she could pot entially ear n as a full-time employ ee ($40,000 a y ear ), t he amount
awa rded w as more tha

n $200 too high. See id. §§ 154.061, .125.25 Goodson’s arg uments ignor e the f act that the duty

to pay child support is not li mited to the pare nt’s ability

to pay from cur rent e arning s, and the c ourt may consider all sources that might be used to pa

y child support. Se e In re S. B. C. , 952 S.W .2d 15, 18 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997,
no pe t.) (i t w a s p ro pe r f

or c ourt to c on sid e r e qu ity

pe rs on ha d in hi s home wh e n o rd e ri ngc hil d support). The f

amily code specifie s that, in de termining a par ent’s re source s, the court may , when appropr iate, “a ssign a

rea sonable amount of deemed i n co me attributable to a ssets that do not
c ur re ntl y pr od uc e inc ome .” Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 54 .0 68 (We st 200 2) . I n a dd iti on , c ourt s mu st also consider

“whe ther certain property that is not producing income ca n be liquidated without an
unrea sonable fina

ncial sac rifice .” Id. I n add i t i o n to testimony

reg ardingher e arning s, Goodson also testified re g arding various investments and r eal e sta t e she possessed a nd reg ardingtwo companies she started or planned on star

ting. F irst, she testified that, althoug h she did not expect to make any money from them in 2002, she had ope ned a hor se-br eedingco mpany and wa s planning on starting her ow n int e rn e t c omp any . N e xt, sh e state d th a t sh e ha d r e c e iv ed st ock s worth o ve r $ 50 0, 00 0 f ro m a previous job but further

specifie d that she had a lrea dy sold the stock, paid t axes on the sale, use d part of the money

to tr avel to K azakstan, and spent $240,000 to purcha se prope rty , build a house, and se t up her hor se-br eedingcompany . Finally , she related that she had another home, which she was g oing to s e ll i n the ne ar futur e . T he c ourt c ou ld h a ve c on sid e re d th e se a sse ts, in a dd iti on to h e r e arn ing s, when it made its child support dete rmination and dete rmined that the re mainder of the proc eeds f

rom the sale of her stock and deeme d income from her second home or potential value from a sa le of the home supported the a

mount of child support awa rded. See id.26 Finally , it should be noted that, other than he r 2001 tax return, her testimony reg ardingher e stimations for he r income, and her a ssertions reg ardingvarious purc hases she made, Goodson provided little evidenc e re g ardingher f inancial status. S he fa iled to show how much money rema ined from the sa le of he r stock, how much mone y she had in saving s or investments, or the a mou nt o f e qu ity sh e po sse sse d in he r se c on d ho me . Mo re ov e r, Go od so n fa ile d to de mon str a te what the value of her horse-br eeding company was or w hat potential profits she a nticipated making in the future. Gi ve n th a t e vid e nce w a s in tr od uc e d in dic a tin g that G oo ds on po sse sse d s ize a

ble financ ial assets, the district cour t’s decision not to alter the c hil d s u p p o rt award fr om its previous deter mination is not unrea sonable or ar b itrary and is not, theref

ore, a n abuse of

discretion. Ac c or din g ly , w e ov e rr

ule Go od so n’ s se ve nth

iss ue on a pp e a l.

At to r ne y’ s F e e s t o A m ic us

I n her e ighth a

nd ninth issues on appea l, G oodson argues that the district court a bused its discr etion when it or dere d her to pa y attorney ’s fe es to Walsh for leg al servic es he pr ovided as an amicus attorney

and that ther e is leg ally an d fa ct u al ly insufficient e vidence to support the $5 ,0 35 .5 0 a

wa rd
. I n g e ne ra l, we re vie w a tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on

to a wa rd a tto rn e y ’s fe e s f

or an a bu se of discre tion, and if a fe e is awa rded, w e d et er m i ne whe ther the f ee is supporte d by

sufficie nt evidenc e. See Allison v. Fire Ins. Exc h. , 98 S.W .3d 227, 262 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. abate d); Hu nt v . B ald

win , 68 S.W .3d 117, 135 n.8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, no pet.).The fa mily cod e provisions in eff

ect at the time of the appointment authorized the c ourt 10 to appoint an “ad l item attorney” but made no specific ref ere nce to a

n “amicus attorney .” See Act of May 25, 1995, 74t h L eg ., R.S., ch. 751, § 15, secs. 107.011-.012, 1995 Te x . Gen. L aws 3888, 3894. Although not dire ctly mentioned in prior provisions, the family code now makes a distinction be tw e e n th e tw o ty

pe s of at tor

ne y s and a llo ws a c ourt to ap po int e ith e r ty pe of a tto rn e y

in a fa mil y law ca se. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 107.003-.004, .021 (West Supp. 2006). Under the cur rent provisions of the family code, an amicus attorney is define d as “an attorney appointed by

the cour t

. . . wh os e ro le is to pr ov ide le g a l se rv ic e s ne c e ssa ry to a ssi st t

he c ourt in p ro te c tin g a

c hil d’ s b e st interests rather than pr ovide leg al service s to the child,” while an attorney ad litem is defined a s “an attorney who provides leg al service s to a person, including a child” and ow es the pe rson the duty of undivided loy alty

and compe tent repr esentation. Id. § 107.001 (West Supp. 2006). Both ty pes of attorney s are g iven the same repr esentational powers a nd duties, see id. § 107.003, but a n attorney ad litem has additional duties, including provid i n g leg al advice for the c hild and following the child’s direc tives, see id. § 107.004. The c urre nt ve rsion of the family code mandates an aw ard of rea sonable attorney ’s fe es for 11 both attorney s ad litem and a m icus attorney s. See Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. §§ 10 7. 01 5, .0 23 (We st Supp. 2006). 27

This case was orig inally

filed in 2002, and Walsh was a ppoi n t ed as an “amicus attorney” in Aug ust 2003. The re levant fa mily code pr ovision in effec t during the time of the 10 appointment specifie d that appointed attorne y s were “ent i t l ed t o ” reasonable attorney ’s fe es. Ac t of May 25, 1995, 74th L eg ., R.S., ch. 751, § 15, sec. 107.015, 1995 Te x . Gen. L aws 3888, 3894. 11 Be cause this statute stated that the at t o rn ey wa s entitled to attorney ’s fe es, the statute wa s not discretionar

y . See B ocquet v . Herring , 972 S.W .2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998). Although the awa

rd of attorney ’s fee s was mandatory under the previous family code provision, the amount awa rded still had to be supported by evidenc e. Cf. Manon v. Tejas Toyota, Inc. , 162 S.W .3d 743, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (pa rty must prove that fe e s are reas ona

ble ); see also Torrington Co. v. Stutzman , 46 S.W .3d 829, 852 (Tex. 2000) (g ener ally , attorney ’s fe es must be supported by evidenc e); I

n r e R

. D

. Y. , 5 1 S. W. 3 d

3 1 4 , 3 2 5 ( T e x.28

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (attorne y ’s fee awa rd must be supported by

competent evidenc e). The supreme c ourt has identified e ight f actor s that a f

ac t -finder may consider w hen deter mining what a re asonable amount of attorne y ’s fe es shoul d be: (1) the time and labor require d, the novelty

and diffic ulty

of the que stions invol ved, and the skill required to per form the leg al service proper ly ; (2) the likelihood that the accepta nce of the par

ticular e mploy

ment will preclude other e m p l o y

ment by the lawy er; (3) the fe e customar ily char g ed in the loca lity

for similar leg al service s; (4) the amount involved and the re sults obtained; (5) t he time limitations imposed by the
c lie nt o r t he c ir c ums tanc e s; ( 6) the natur e and le ng th o f t

he pr of e ssi on a l r e la tio ns hip wi th t he c lie nt; (7) the e x perie nce, reputation, a nd ability of the lawy er or lawy ers perf orming the servic es; and (8) whether the fee is f

ix ed or conting ent on results obtained or unc erta inty of collec tion before the leg al service s have be en re ndere d. Art h u r Andersen &Co. v. Perry E quip. Co. , 945 S.W .2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997). The only

evide n ce co n cer

ning attorney ’s fe es for

the amicus a

ppear s in two letters sent by Walsh to t he district cour t. The fi rst letter wa s sent in ear ly Fe bruar y 2004. I n that letter, Walsh s t at ed t h at the total amount of attorne y ’s fe es he w as owe d was $11,835.50. He further
s p ec i fi edt h at h e h adal re ad y b ee np ai d

$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 o f th at fe e b y

Go o d s o nan d

C as t el l an o s , l ea v i n g a ba lanc e of $1 ,8 35 .5 0. I n a dd iti on , Wa lsh wr ote that hi s b ill ingra

te wa s $ 25 0 p e r h our b ut t hat, i n an ef fort to save the par

ties money , he was o n l y b i l l i n g the par ties $200 per hour

for se rvice s p e r f o r m e d a f t e r t h e j u r y t r i a l b e g an . F i n a l l y , t h e l e t t e r s t a t e d t h a tt h e p r o p o s e d

f i g u r e w a s o n l y a preliminary es t i m at e an d did not include char g es for leg al servic es that will be per formed in the future. A ttached to the letter was an invoice spec ifying the various ser vices he had per formed, the29

amount of time spent o n ea ch service, a nd the cor

respondingchar g e for

the servic e. L ater

that month, W alsh sent another letter t o the cour

t stating that his final bill for attorney ’s fe es not previously

paid was $5,035.50, a

nd the district court orde red G oodson to pay the amount re quested. No t estimony was presented at trial conce rning Walsh’s attorney ’s fees, and no evidence other than the two letters summarized above was prese nted to the court. Cf. Garcia v. Martinez , 988 S.W .2d 21 9 (T e x. 19 99 ) (gua

rd ian a d lit e m te sti fi e d a

bo ut numbe r of ho ur s wo rk e d, ho ur ly fe e , e tc .) ; In re R

. D

. Y. , 51 S.W .3d at 325 (c ourt could re asonably infer from t estimony

and list of attorney ’s servic es provided that dollar f

igur e sug g ested by

attorney was re asonable ). Althoug h the orig inal letter provided a

n invoice for

service s rende red up to the date spec ified in the letter, no similar invoice was provided c oncer

ning the service s provided from ear ly Fe bruar y to the end of Februa

ry explaining the incre ase in fees owed from $1,835.50 to $5,035.50. I n addition, no evidenc e conc erningany of the eig ht fac tors listed in Andersen was provide d conce rning the incre ase in attorney ’s fee s. Furthe r, none of the evidenc e provided to the district c ourt was g iven in the form of a sworn stateme nt. See Ba nd a v . G ar c ia b

yGa rc ia , 95 5 S.W. 2d 27 0, 27 2 (T e x. 19 97 ) ( no rm a lly , atto rn e y ’s state me nts mus t be sworn to be considere d evidenc e).

I n light of the lack of

evidenc e re g ardingattorney ’s fe es, we conclude that the awa rd of atto r n e y ’ s f e e s w a s n o t s u

p p o rte d b y s u f f ic ie n t e v id e n c e . A c c o r d in g ly , w e s u s ta in G o o d son’s issue on appea l a

nd rema nd the case for further proce eding s consistent with this opinion. Se e In re A.M. , 974 S.W .2d 857, 865 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (althoug h family code spe cifies that a tto rn e y

a d li te m is e nti tle d to fee s, c ourt re mand e d c a se fo r d e te rm inatio n o f r e a so na ble attorney ’s fe es: no evidenc e wa s offe red suppor ting attorney

ad litem’s fe es and a d litem’s statement30

in co ur t abo ut num

be r of ho ur s w or

ke d w a s uns wo rn ); see also Boc quet v. He rring , 972 S.W .2d 19, 21-22 (Tex. 1998) (if court finds evidenc e of attorney ’s fe es insufficie nt, it may rema nd for f urther pr oc e e din g s) ; W

oo lle tt v . Maty as tik, 23 S.W .3d 48, 53 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) (appe llate cour

t remande d case beca

use re quest for attorney ’s fe es was not supported by aff idavit or evidenc e).
Attor ney’s F ees t o Castellanos

I n h e r f ina l is su e on

a pp e a l, G oo ds on

argue s th a t th e dist ri c t c ourt a bu se d it s discretion in o rd er i n g Goodson to pay attorney ’s fe es to Castellanos. The district c ourt’s orde r stated:

I T I S ORDERED that good c ause e x ists to award [Castellanos] a j u d g ment of $45,854.41 for leg al servic es throug h trial of this case re ndere d in relation to the child and in t h e n at u re of child support, with interest at 10 per cent pe r y ear compounded a

nnually from the date the judg ment is signed until paid. First, Goodson a

rg ues that, bec ause the Be x ar County adoption decr ee is void, she should have bee n appointed as K .G.’s sole mana g ing c onservator and, ther efor e, should not ha ve bee n order ed to pay
a tto rn ey ’s fees . H ow e ve r, a s d isc us se d p re vio us ly , w e have c on c lud e d th a t th e B e xar County
a do pti on is n ot v oid

and that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s a uth or ize d to a

pp oin t Ca ste lla

no s a s th e so le manag ing c onservator.

Al te rn a tiv e ly , G oo ds on

a sse rt s that th e re is n o s ta tut or y a uth or ity a llo wi nga

c ourt to
awa rd attorney ’s fee s “in the nature of child support.” See F inley v. M ay , 1 5 4 S. W. 3 d 1 9 6 , 1 9 9 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (c oncluding that trial court e rre d in awar ding at t o rn ey ’s fees “in the31

natur e of c hil d s up po rt ” and

mod if y in g j ud gmen t a c c or din g ly ); see also Travele rs Indem. Co. v. M a y f i e ld , 923 S.W .2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996) (attorne y ’s fe es may not be re cover ed fr om opposing party unless rec overy

is provided for by statute or by contra ct betwee n parties) . Finally , Goodson argues that the district cour t abused its discretion whe n it or dere d postjudgment interest of 10 % per y ear . Specifica lly , she asserts that the finance code required a postjudgment rate of 5 %
. See T e x. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 304.003 (spec ify ing post judg ment interest rate ), .004 (West 2006) (spec ify ing that postjudgment intere st rate will be published in Texas Reg ister).

Ho we ve r, to m a ke the se c la ims on a pp e a l, G oo ds on

wa s r equ ir ed to pr e se nt t he se
co m p l aints to the trial court. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 33 .1 (p re se rv inge rr or ); see also W ohlfahrt v. H olloway , 172 S.W .3d 630, 639 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (er ror reg arding postjudgment int ere st is waived if not complained of at trial level) ; Harlingen Irrigation Dist. Cam er o n C o u nty No. 1 v. Caprock Communic ations Cor p. , 4 9 S. W. 3 d

5 2 0 , 5 3 4 ( T e x. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied) (er ror reg arding attorney ’s fees i s waived if not presente d to trial court). A fter r eviewingthe re cord, we can find no motion or obje ction reg ardingthe manner in whi ch t h e attorney ’s fe es we re a war ded or r eg ardingthe postjudgme nt interest fig ure use d. Ac c or din g ly , w e c on c lud e that G oo ds on fa ile d to pr e se rv e thi s c omp la int fo r a pp e a l an d o ve rr

ule thi s issue.
CO NC LU SION

B e c a us e we have c on c lud e d th a t ( 1) the a do pti on de c re e is no t vo id, (2 ) the tim e to
a tt a c k th e d e c r e e h a s p a s s e d , ( 3 ) G o o d s o n w a s n o t e n ti tl e d to a p ar e n ta l p r e s u mp ti o n over Ca ste lla no s, (4 ) t he dis tr ic t court did no t impr op e rl y vio la te Go od so n’ s rig ht t o th e c are of he r c hil d32

by appointing a

nonpare nt as the sole mana g ing c onservator of K.G., ( 5) t h e d i s t ri ct co urt did not abuse its discr etion by excluding evidenc e conce rning Castellanos’s brother or by order ing G oodson to pay child support, (6) the district c ourt did not err in the a mount of child support order ed, and (7) Goodson failed to pr eser

ve her complaint conce rning the m anner in which the attorney ’s fe es we re order ed or the amount of postjudgment interest order ed, we aff irm the portion of the district court’s judgme nt appointing Castellanos a s sole managin g conservator a nd Goodson as possessory
c on se rv a tor

and re qu ir ingGo od so n to pa y c hil d s up po rt

and a tto rn e y ’s fees to Ca ste lla no s. Howeve r, bec ause we concluded t hat t he amount of attorney ’s fe es orde red to be paid to the amicus attorney was not supported by

sufficie nt evi d en ce , we r ever se and r emand this ca se for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

David Pury ear , J ustice

Be fore Chief J ustice L aw a nd J ustices Patterson and Pury ear Affir med in Part; Reverse d and Remande d in Part Filed: January

19, 2007