### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 5-00260 -CR

M ic hae l Hi dal go , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 403RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 3022 460 , HO NORAB LE B RENDA KENNEDY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury convicted Mic hael He nry Hidalg o of ag g ravated as s ault with a dea dly wea pon,
a seco nd-deg ree felony
. SeeTex. P enal Code A nn. § 22.02(a) (2) ( West S upp. 2006). The jur y assessed pun i s hment at eig hteen y ear s’ conf inement and a

fine of $10,000. H idalg o raises thre e points of error

on appea l. I n his first and sec ond points, Hidalgo a sserts that the district cour t erre d b y r e f u s i n g t o g i v e j u r

y i n s t r u c t i o n s o n s e l f

- d e f e n s e an d o n a s s a

u l t a s a l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d

o f f e n s e . In his third point, Hida lgo claims that his tria l c ounsel’s failure to object to the admission into evidence of a poc ket-knife and an a wl constituted ineffect i v e assi stance of counse l. We will affirm the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

BACK GR OUND On Octobe r 12, 2002, at approximately 7:30 p.m., L ouis O’B rien pa rked his air

port shuttle van next t o the pumps at the Airpor t E x p re s s gas st ation on Hig hway 71. He g ot out and2

started to wa lk inside to buy cig are ttes and food. O’ Br ien testified that bef ore he enter ed the store Hi da lg o p ull e d u

p a nd be g an to ob

je c t th a t O ’B ri e n w a s b loc kin g the pu mp s bu t no t g e tti ngfu e l. O’B rien stated that he held up his hand a s if to tell Hidalgo to wa it and then enter ed the store
.

O’B rien fur

ther testified that while he was paying f or cig are ttes Hidalg o came inside the store a

nd continued to complain in a b u s i v e l an guag e, ultimately asking O’B rien to move the
s h u t t l e s o t h at H i d a l g o co u l d get gas . Hi d al go t h en ap p ro ac h edO’ Br i en , wh o wa s we ar i n g a Supershuttle company

shirt, got “ in his fa ce , ” an d made a disparag ing c omment about airport worke rs. Ther e is some disag ree ment as to what happene d next. Accordingto store cler k Migue l Castelan, O’ Br ien shoved Hida lgo ba ck a few fee t. O’B rien stated that he did not shove Hidalg o, but tried to conci l i at e h i m instead. Reg ardle ss, the men continued to ar g ue and e ventually left the sto re a t Ca ste lan’ s r e qu e st.

O’B rien testified that when he a nd Hidalg o went outside, Hidalg o “g ot in h is face ag ain” a nd continued to insult him, at which point O’ Br ien claims that he shoved Hidalg o awa y for the first time, only

to have Hida lgo c ome back and conf ront him y et ag ain. Acc ording to O’B rien’s testimony , afte r he shove d Hidalg o awa y a sec ond time, H idalg o said “I am g oing to g et y ou, . . . I am g oing to kill y ou,” then pulled a sharp instrument f rom his poc ket and beg an to cha rg e O’ Br ien, who started to ba ck up. O’Br i en t es t i fi ed that during this pursuit Hidalgo c ut him with t he shar p ins tr ume nt. Ev id ence presen te d at tr ia l sh ow e d th a t th e c ut r e su lte d in a thr e e -i nc h la c e ratio n in O’B rien’s a

bdomen that re quired numer ous staples to cl o s e. Castelan testified that whe n he threatened to ca ll 911 after H idalg o wounded O’ Br ien, Hi dalg o returne d to his vehicle and left the sce ne.3 Hi da lg o w a s a

pp re he nd e d p ur su ant to a

n a rr e st w arr ant o n N ov e mbe r 1 3, 20 02 , w hil e standing next t o his truck at the e nd of his own drivew ay . During t h e ar rest, De tective Rober

t R i ch m an ap p ro ac h edHi d al go an d i d en t i fi edh i m s el f a s a p o l i ce o ff i ce r, at wh i ch t i m e H i d al go
re a c he d in to h is p oc ke t. F e ari ngthat H ida lg o mi g ht b e g oin g fo r a we a po n, Ric hma

n d re w h is h an d gu nan d

o rd er edHi d al go t o p u th i s h an d s o nt o p o f t h e c ar , wh i ch h e di d
. Up o nco n d u ct i n g a
sear ch, Richman found a

lockbac k folding knife in Hidalg o’s pocke t and saw a n awl in plain view on the seat of Hidalg o’s truck. B oth the pocketknife and the a wl wer e admitt ed int o evidenc e at trial without objection.
DI SCU SSIO N Ins tr uc ti on o n Se lf- De fens e

I n his f irst point, Hidalgo a sserts that the district cour t erre d by ref using to instruct the jury on the law of self-de fense in the fac e of appa rent da ng er. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 9.31 (West 2003). Whil e Hidalg o did not testify at trial, he a

rgues that he w as entitled to the instruction based on the testimony

of O’B rien a

nd Castelan. A def endant is entitled to an i nstruction on any defe nsive issue raise d by

the evidenc e, whether that evidenc e is wea

k or strong , unimpeache d or contra d i cted, and reg ardle ss of the trial court’s opinion about the c redibility of the def ense. Gran ge r v . S

tate , 3 S.W. 3d

36 , 3 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Va nB ra c k

le v . S tate , 1 79 S.W. 3d 70 8, 71 2 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 05 , n o p e t.) . T his ru le is de signe d to e nsure that the jury , not the trial court, de cides the r elative c redibility of the e vidence
. Gra n g er , 3 S.W .3d at 38. A def endant ne ed not testify

to raise the de fense
. Boge t v . S tate , 40 S.W .3d 624, 626 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001), aff’d , 74 S.W .3d 23, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).4

The testimony of witnesses, even those called by the State, may

raise a defe nsive issue. Jack

son v. Sta te , 11 0 S.W. 3d 62 6, 63 1 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14t h Di st. ] 200 3, pe t. r e f’ d) ; Sh e lv in v . S tate , 884 S.W .2d 874, 878 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, writ ref’ d). Howe ver, a lthough it m ay happen, it is rar e for the issue of self-de fense to be ra ised when the defe ndant fa ils to t estify
. Se e Lav e rn v . S tate , 48 S.W .3d 356, 3 6 0 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, pet. re f’d) . I n decidingwhether a d e f e n s iv e th e o r

y is r a is e d , th e e v id e n c e is v ie w e d in th e li g h t m o s t f

a v o r a b le to th e defe nse. Granger , 3 S.W .3d at 38.

A per son is just ified i n using force when a nd to the deg ree he re asonably believes the forc e is immediate ly

nece ssary

to protect himself a g ainst another pe rson’s use or attempted use of
u n la w f u l f o r c e . T e x. Pe n a l C o d e A n n . § 9
. 3 1 ( a ) ( We s t 2 0 0 3 )
. A p e r s o nh a s th e r igh t t o d e fend himself from appa

rent da ng er to the same extent as he would if the dang er w ere rea l. Ha me l v . S tate , 916 S.W .2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Whether a de fenda nt’s beliefs we re r easona

ble under the circ u m s t an ce s i s a fact question for the jury to decide. Ha

y es v . S tate , 728 S.W .2d 804, 808 (T ex . C ri m . App. 1987). The forc e used by a def endant must be re asonable from the de fenda nt’s point of view. Cf. Dy

so n v . S tate , 67 2 S.W. 2d 46 0, 46 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 84 ) (“ A pe rs on ha s a ri g ht t o d e fe nd

fr om a pp are nt d ang e r t o th e same e xten t a s h e wo uld ha d th e da

ng e r b e e n r e a l; provided he acte d upon rea sonable a pprehe nsion of dang er a s it appear ed to him at the time.”). B e c a us e the re is no e vid e nc e in the re c or d su g g e sti ng that Hi da lg o reaso nably believed that it was immediately nece ssary

to stab O’Brien in orde r to protec t himself from O’B rien’s use of force, he was not entit led to a jury instruction on self-de fense
. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. § 9.31(a ). While there is evide nce that O’B rien shoved H idalg o twice be fore Hidalg o wounded5

O’B rien with the shar

p instrument, the re is no evidenc e of actions or words f rom Hidalg o indicating that O’B rien’s c onduct put Hidalg o in r easona ble appre hension of dang er, nor do the c ircumstance s of the incide nt sugg est such an inf ere nce. Rather, the e vidence in the re cord r evea ls that Hidalg o was the ag g ressor thr oug hout the sequenc e of e vents leadingup to the stabbing
.

Whil e Hidalg o primarily contends that he was e ntitled to an instructi o n on selfdefe nse beca

use there is some evidenc e that O’B rien was the first to use phy sical forc e, the e vidence also shows that Hidalg o beg an the a g g ression by verba lly insulti ng O’B rien and “g etting in his fa ce” when h e was unha

ppy with O’B rien’s pa

rking . Although H idalg o’s phy sical ag g ressivene ss and insults l ed O’ Br ien to push him a way , the evidenc e demonstrates that Hidalg o’s offe nsive behavior continued undeter

red w hen he immediate ly returne d to confront O’ Br ien ag ain. Viewingthe evidenc e in the re cord in the light most favora ble to the def

endant, we cannot sa

y that Hidalg o’s
a c tio ns , s tatin g that he wa s g oin g to “ g e t” and “ kil l” O’ B ri e n and th en c ha sin g and sta bb inghim , ref lect that Hildalg o rea sonably believed his a ctions wer e necessar y to preve nt an im mediate da ng er posed by O’B rien. Rather , the evidenc e sug g ests a cont i n u ati on and esc alation of Hida lgo’ s ag g ressive be havior in attac king O ’B rien.

I n s up po rt

of his argume nt t

hat he wa s e nti tle d to an in str uc tio n, Hi da lg o r e fe rs to Sm ith v . S

tate . 6 7 6 S. W. 2 d 5 8 4 ( T e x. Cr im
. Ap p . 1 984). I n Smi th , the Court found that a nontestifying de fenda

nt was entitled to a jury

instruction on self-de fe n s e based on w itness testimony
conce rning the words and actions of the def endant. Id. at 585-87. But in Sm ith , the evidenc e showe d that the complainant wa s the ag g ressor thr oug hout the sequenc e of e vents leading u p to the defe ndant’s attac k on him, that the complainant was holdinga gun during the strug g le with the6

de fe nd ant, and

that th e de fe nd ant tr ie d to e nd the c on fr on tatio n b y te lli ngthe c omp la ina

nt t hat he did not want to fig ht. Id. at 586.

He re , we ar e p re s en t ed wi t h t h e o p p o s i t e s ce n ar i o . T h e e v i d en ce s h o ws t h at Hi d al go maintained ag g ressive be havior lea ding up to the stabbing, that O’B rien was not wielding a wea pon during the strug g le (thoug h Hidalg o was), a nd that Hidalg o esc al at ed t h e conf rontation by

telling O’ B ri e n th a t he wa s g oi ng to “ge t” him and “ kil l” him

be fo re c ha sin g him

do wn and sli c inghis
a bd ome n. B e c a

us e the e vid e nc e he re pr e se nts a si tu ati on th at is the op po sit e of the sit uatio n in Sm ith , H ida lg o’ s r e lia

nc e on that c a se is mispl ace d. B e c a us e the re is n o e vid e nc e in t he re c or d d e mon str a ti ng that H ida lg o r e a so na bly believed his a ctions were nece ssary to protec t himself, Hidalg o was not entitled to a jury instruction on self-de fense
. Se eRe e d v . S tate , 70 3 S.W. 2d 38 0, 38 4 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 ). We overrule Hidalg o’s first point of er ror.
Ins tr uc ti on o n As sa ultas a Le sse r -I nc lude d Offe nse

I n h is s e c on d p oint, H ida lg o c la ims that t he tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis re qu e st fo r a jur y ins tr uc tio n o n a ssa

ult a s a le sse r- inc lud e d of

fe ns e un de r the c ha

rg e of a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult with a dea dly

wea pon. A def

endant is entitled to a les s er -i n cl u ded off ense instruc tion in the jury char g e if (1) the re quested c harg e is a lesse r-include d offe nse of the of fense char g ed, and ( 2) the
re c or d c on ta ins so me e vid e nc e that w ou ld p e rm it a ratio na l jur y to fi nd tha t th e de fe nd ant i s guil ty only of the lesse r-include d offe nse. Ro us se au v . S tate , 855 S.W .2d 666, 672-73 (Te x . Crim. App. 1 9 9 3 ). I no t h er

wo rd s , t h er e m u s tb e s o m e e v i d en ce fr o m wh i ch a ra t i o n al j ury co u l d ac qu i tHi d al go of ag g ravated assault with a deadly wea pon while convicting him of the lesse r-include d offe nse of7

simple assault. Bi

gn all v . S tate , 8 87 S.W. 2d

21 , 2 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). I n ma kin g thi s decision, the court evaluates the evidenc e in the context of the entire rec ord, but doe s not consider whether the evidenc e is cre dible, controve rted, or in conflict with other evidence
. Ha v ar d v . S tate , 800 S.W .2d 195, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on re h’g ).

F or the purp os e s o f t

his a pp e a l, we wi ll a ssume on the fa c ts o f t

his c a se that si mpl e assault i s a lesser-included offense of t he S tate’s charg e of ag g ravated assault with a deadly wea pon. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. §§ 22.01(a) (1) (def ining simple a ssault); § 22.02(a) (2) ( West S upp. 2006) (d e fi nin g a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult wi th d e a dly

we a po n)
. With re sp e c t to the se c on d pr on g of the ana ly sis , Hidalg o cl aim s that a jury could conc lude that either he had no w eapon at all or that the shar p instrument he wielded ag ainst O’B rien was not a deadly wea pon. Howeve r, the re cord is devoid of
e vid e nc e that cou ld pe rm it a ratio na l jur y to fi nd Hi da lg o guil ty

of on ly the le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e (simple assault) unde r either theory , and Hidalg o has fa iled to direct us to any evidenc e supporting either c ontention. The State, on the other hand, prese nted evidenc e that the sharp instrument use d b y H id a lg o to a tt a c k

an d w o u n d O ’ B r ie nw a s a

d e a d ly w eapon. See McC

ain v . S tate , 22 S.W .3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (pointing out that statute mer ely require s that deadly

wea pon be
one ca pable of cau s ing de ath or ser ious bodily injury in either its actua l or intended use)
. Specifica lly , the State elicited e vidence throug h the t estimony of O’Brie n that Hidalg o stated he w as g oing to “kill” him, charg ed towar d him with a sharp instrument, and then sla shed his abdomen ( an
are a c on ta ini ng nume ro us vit a l org ans ) c re a tin g a “ larg e ” la c e ratio n r e qu ir ingnume ro us sta ple s to close. Additionally , both O ffice r Br enda Be rmudez and Off icer Michae l Young s testified reg arding O’ B ri e n’ s st a te me nt that H ida lg o h a d s la sh e d h im w itha kn if e . O ff ic e r B e rm ud e z te sti fi e d th a t,8

based o n her e x perie nce, a folding knife used to slash someone is capa ble of inflicting death or
se ri ou s bo dil y inj ur

y . Ca ste lan te sti fi e d that he wi tne sse d Hi da lg o wi e ldi nga sh iny ob je c t, c a pa ble of cutting O’B rien, that mig ht have be en a silver knife or tool. Fur

thermore , at trial Detec tive Robert Richman testified reg arding the kni fe seized from Hidalgo’ s pocket a nd the awl se ized from his truck at the time of his ar

rest. Richman testified that either instrument used by Hidalg o in the manner descr ibed by

O’Br ien could have cause d the lace ration in O’B rien’s a bdomen and that e ither instrument was ca

pable of causingdeath or

serious bodily

injury
. On one ha nd, we note that the sharp inst rument her e may not be a de adly

wea pon per se, and that the injury

sustained by

O’B rien may

not be a se rious b o d i l y i n jury as a matter of law
. Howeve r, based on this re cord, Hidalg o has fa iled to offer any evidenc e that could pe rmit a rational jury to find that he was g uilty

of only simple assault under his theory that the sharp instrument use d
wa s n o ta d ea d l y

we ap o n . T o re ce i v e a ni n s t ru ct i o no na l es s er -i n cl u d edo ff en s e, i ti s n o ten o u gh that th e jur

y may dis be lie ve c ru c ia l e vid e nc e pe rt a ini ngto t he g re a te r o ff

e ns e ; th e re mus t be so me eviden ce d irec tly

g erma ne to the lesser -included of fense for the f

act- finder to c onsider bef ore a n instruction on the lesser- included off ense is wa rr an t ed
. Bi

gn all , 887 S.W .2d at 24. Her e, a jur y instruction on the lesser- included o ff en s e was not wa

rra nted bec ause the re w as no evide nce pr e se nte d a t tr ia l that c ou ld pe rm it a ratio na l fa c t- fi nd e r to fi nd that Hi da lg o c omm itt e d o nly sim ple assault on the basis that the sha rp instrument used wa s not a d ea d l y wea pon, and ther e wa s no evidenc e sug g esting that Hi d al go attacke d O’B rien without a we apon. We over rule Hida lgo’ s second point of e rror .9

Ineff ect ive Assistance of Counsel I n his thi rd po int , Hi da lg o c la ims that his tr ia l c ouns e l’ s f a ilure to o bje c t on

the ba sis of insufficie nt foundation t o the admis sion into evidenc e of the pocket knife a nd the awl discove red duri ngHi da lg o’ s arr e st c on sti tut e s in e ffecti ve ass ist anc e of c ouns e l. T o s uc c e e d in his c la im, Hidalg o must show that his counsel’s repr es en t at i on fell below a n objective standa

rd of
rea sonablene ss a

nd that he wa s prejudice d by his counsel’s def

icient per formanc e. See Strick land v. W ashington , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 6 87 (1 98 4) ; He rn an de z v . S tate , 7 26 S.W. 2d 53 , 56-5 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p . 1 9 8 6 ) ( ad o p t i n g Strickland two-prong test). Unless both pr ong s are satisfied, Hidalg o cannot demonstrate that his c onviction r esulted from a brea kdown in the adve rsar ial proce ss. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687.

Under the first prong , a court revie ws the attorney ’s per formanc e with a hig h deg ree of def ere nce. Strickland , 46 6 U. S. at 69 0; An dr e ws v . S tate , 159 S.W .3d 98, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 05 ). Th e re is a str on g pr e sumpt ion that c ouns e l’ s c on du c t fa lls wi thi n a wi de ra ng e of re a so na ble profe ssional assistance, and the appellant must ove rcome the presumption by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 0; An dr e ws , 1 59 S.W. 3d a t 10 1; J ac k so n v . S tate , 877 S.W .2d 7 6 8 , 7 7 1 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 4 ). T h e r ea s o n ab l en es s o f c o u n s el ’s ch al l en gedco n d u ct is determined in the context in which it occurre d an d b y v i ew i n g t he conduc t at the time in which it occur red. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 0; An dr e ws , 159 S.W .3d at 101.

Th e c ourt of cri mi nal a

pp e a ls h a s st a te d th a t, i n c on du c tin g our r e vie w, we mus t assume a strateg ic motive if any can be imag ined, and we m u s t conclude that the counse l’s p erformanc e wa s deficie nt only if it was so outrag eous that no compe tent attorney would have10

eng ag ed in it. Bo nev . S

tate , 7 7 S
. W
. 3 d

8 2 8 , 8 3 3 n . 1 3 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Garcia v. Sta te , 57 S.W. 3d 43 6, 44 0 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 )) . T his le ve l of de fe re nc e is w arr ante d b e c a us e “[i] ntensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acc eptable a ssistance c ould dampen the
ard or and imp a ir the ind e pe nd e nc e of

de fe ns e c ouns e l, d isc oura g e the a c c e pta nc e of a ssi g ne d c a se s, and undermine the t rust betwee n attorney and client.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690. This defe rential standard ba lance s the protec tion o f t h es e important policy interests with the protec tion of eac h de fe nd ant’ s f

un dame nta l SixthAm e ndme nt r ig hts
. An a ppellant may

preva il on an ineffe ctive assistanc e cla im by providing a re cord that
a f f i r m a t i v e l y d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a th i s c o u n s e l ’ s p e r f o r m an c e w a s n o tb a s e d

o ns o u n d t r i a l s t r a t e g y. Ma lle tt v . S

tate , 65 S.W .3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Howeve r, in almost all case s, the rec ord
on dir e c t a pp e a l is ina de qu a te to sho w that couns e l’ s con du c t fe ll b e low an o bje c tiv e ly

re a so na ble standard of

perf ormanc e. See B one , 7 7 S. W.3 d a t 83 3; Tho mp so n v. Sta te , 9 S. W. 3 d 8 0 8 , 8 1 3 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1999). In rar e instance s, counsel’s pe rfor m an ce f alls below an obje ctive standa rd of
rea sonablene ss as a matter of law, r eg ardle ss of whethe r the re cord a dequate ly ref lects trial counse l’s
su bje c tiv e mot ivatio ns , if

no re a so na

ble tr ia l stra

te g y c ou ld j us tif

y tr ia l c ouns e l’ s c on du c t. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 0; An dr e ws , 159 S.W .3d at 102.

T o s a tisfy the sec ond prongof the Strickland test, the defe ndant must show that “there is a rea sonable proba

bility that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the re sult of the proce eding would have been differ ent. A rea sonable probability is a probability sufficie nt to undermine confide nce in the outc ome.” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 4; An dr e ws , 159 S.W .3d at 102. Hidalg o has
s at i s fi edn ei t h er

p ro n g.11 First, we note that the knife was prope rly admitted into evidence . Hidalg o claims that his trial counsel should have obje cted to the introduc tion of the knife a nd the awl on the ba sis of an insufficient foundation to demonstrate the re levanc e of the se items. However, the f oundation for
a dm i t t i n g t h e kn i f

e w a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g ht h e t e s t i m o n y o f R i c h m an an d O ’ B r i e n . S p e c i f i c a l l y, Ric hma n te sti fi e d th a t w hen he a pp ro a c he d H ida lg o, Hi da lg o s ho ve d h is h and int o h is p oc ke t. Rememberingthat Hidalg o was c harg ed with s tabbing O’B rien, and fea ring that Hidalg o might be g oing f or a knife , Richman drew his weapon a

nd order ed Hidalg o to place h i s h an d s on the ca r. Acc ording to Richman’s testimony , while doing a routine se ar ch , he found the knife in Hidalg o’s pocket. O’B rien had testified that Hidalg o rea ched into his pocke t for the sha rp instrument that he
c ut O’ B ri e n with
. Th is t e sti mony , c omb ine d w ithRic hma n’ s te sti mony , intr od

uc e d th e po ssi bil ity that the pocket knife was the weapon us ed by Hidalg o to stab O’B rien. Theref ore, the knife tende d to make more probable the fac t that H idalg o used a deadly wea pon in his attack on O’B rien, establishing its rele vance . Tex. R. Evid. 401. Although the argument for the r eleva nce of the awl is wea k er , R i ch m an testified that he se ized it after noticingit in plain si g ht in Hidalgo’ s truck be c a us e he fe lt that it

mig ht h ave be e n th e weap on us ed in the a ssa ult . Ri c hma

n s tate d th a t it s char acte ristics seemed ve ry close to the char acte ristics of the wea pon used in the crime a s descr ibed by O’B rien and the ot her w itnesses and that it could have cause d the wound to O’B rien’s a bdomen and the tea

r i n his shirt. By

proving that both items were in Hida lgo’ s possession and that either one could have been the wea

pon that appellant use d and took with him afte r the a g g ravated assault, the State demons trated r eleva nce. See id. The fa cts that neither item wa s found at the sc ene of the12

ag g ravated assault or that both were found in appe llant’s possess i o n ab o u t a mont h afte r the ag g ravated assault would have g one to the we ight, but not the admissibility , of the items.

Even if the knif

e and a wl wer e inadmissible, allowing them to be admit ted may have b e e np arto f

a s t r a t e g y b y H i d a l g o ’ s t r i a l c o u n s e l t o e s t a b l i s hr e a s o n a

b l e d o u b ta s t o t h e d e a d l ywe a po n e le me nt o f t

he c ri me c ha

rg e d. Th is p ote nti a l stra

te g y is r e fl e c te d b y

the c los ingargume nts of Hidalg o’s counse l, who passed a round the knife and awl to the jury and ar g ued that the we apons
we re no t c a

pa ble of ca us ing se ri ou s b od ily inj ur y or de a th g ive n th e ir

pa rt ic ula r c ha ra c te ri sti c s. Hidalg o’s trial counse l may have thoug ht that the folding knife with a thre e- to four -inch blade and the awl would seem relatively harmless compar ed to the “shar p instruments” the jury

may have be en imag ining. B eca

use allowingadmiss i o n of the knife and aw l may have c onceiva

bly been pa rt of Hidalg o’s counsel’s trial strateg y to establish that those wea pons wer e used in the cr ime but did not meet th e s tatuto r

y s ta n d ar d f o r a d e a d ly

- w e a

p o n f in d in g , w e c an n o t s ay u

p o n th is r e c ord that Hidalg o’s counse l was constitutionally defe ctive, or t h at h e fell below an objective standa rd of
rea sonablene ss as a matter of law. Even if in the inter est of jus tice we wer e to addre ss the s econd pr ong of the Strickland analy sis, Hidalgo ha s offe red nothing t o show that the admission of these items had a prejudicia l ef fe ct o n t h e ou t co m e. T o t h e co n t ra ry , al l t h e ev i d en ce p re s en t edi nt h e c as e i n d i ca t edt h at Hi d al go
a tta cked O’ B ri e n, that he a tta c ke d h im w itha we a po n, and that th e we a

po n h e us e d w a s a

de a dly
wea pon. No controverting evidenc e was prese nted on any of these points. Consequently , we c annot say that the fa ilure of Hida lgo’ s counsel to obje ct to the admission of the knife a nd awl into evidenc e undermines c onfidenc e in the jury ’s g uilty verdic t, a nd as a re sult, the level of pre judice re quired for13

a findingof ineff

ective assistance of

counsel wa s not reac hed by allowing those items into evidence. We overrule Hidalg o’s third point of err or.
CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

uled ea ch of H idalg o’s points of err or, we aff i rm the trial cour

t’s jud g me nt.

___________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Waldrop Affir med Filed: De cembe r 15, 2006 Do Not Publish