IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA14-127

Filed: 7 April 2015

Lincoln County, No. 08 CVS 1960

THE ESTATE OF NATHAN RICHARD COPPICK, by its ADMINISTRATOR 

RICHARD G. COPPICK, Plaintiff,

v.

HOBBS MARINA PROPERTIES, LLC; HOBBS WESTPORT MARINA, LLC; 

CHAMPIONSHIP CHARTERS, INC.; JOSEPH CLIFTON CHAMPION; AND 

PETROLEUM EQUIPMENT & SERVICE, INC., Defendants.

Appeal by defendant Petroleum Equipment and Service, Inc., from judgment

entered 11 April 2013 by Judge Forrest D. Bridges in Lincoln County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 August 2014.

Sigmon, Clark, Mackey, Hutton, Hanvey & Ferrell, PA, by Forrest A. Ferrell 

and Jason White, for plaintiff-appellee.

Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, P.A., by Kimberly Sullivan, for defendantappellant.

BRYANT, Judge.

Where the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict finding that the 

death of Nathan Coppick was caused by defendant’s negligence and properly based 

on the doctrine of negligence per se, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of 

defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial. We also 

find no error in the trial court’s assessment of interest on the compensatory damage 

award in accordance with North Carolina General Statutes, section 24-5.
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On 27 March 2013, a jury trial commenced in Lincoln County Superior Court, 

the Honorable Forrest Donald Bridges, Judge presiding. Plaintiff, The Estate of 

Nathan Richard Coppick, by its Administrator Richard G. Coppick, had filed suit 

alleging negligence against defendants Hobbs Marina Properties, LLC; Hobbs 

Westport Marina, LLC; Championship Charters, Inc.; Joseph Clifton Champion; and 

Petroleum Equipment & Service, Inc. Prior to trial, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed 

its claim against defendants Championship Charters, Inc., and Joseph Clifton 

Champion. The record is silent as to the outcome of the proceedings against Hobbs 

Marina Properties, LLC, and Hobbs Westport Marina, LLC. But, at trial, the only 

defendant plaintiff proceeded against was Petroleum Equipment & Service, Inc. 

(hereinafter “defendant”).

The evidence at trial tended to show that on 10 June 2008, Nathan Coppick 

was working at the Hobbs Westport Marina in Denver, North Carolina. Shortly 

before four o’clock that afternoon, the Championship II, an eighty-foot-long charter 

vessel with two fuel tanks (one twenty gallon tank, one ten gallon tank) was 

positioned at Hobbs Westport Marina for refueling. The gas pump was activated, and 

recorded video surveillance admitted as substantive evidence and played for the jury 

showed Nathan pulling a gasoline hose toward the gasoline receptacle located at the 

rear of the Championship II. Nathan then walked away from the gasoline receptacle 

and headed toward the front of the boat. According to the clock shown on the recorded 

video surveillance, after six minutes had elapsed, a vapor cloud was visible on the 
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port side of the vessel in “real close proximity” to the fueling area. Then there were 

two explosions. The first explosion occurred as Nathan was stepping off a ladder from 

the second deck onto the center of the stern (the back of the boat). When the second 

explosion occurred, fire engulfed the stern of the Championship II. Nathan was killed 

instantly.

Evidence showed that defendant provided the fuel dispensing system 

equipment, including nozzles, used at the marina. The nozzle on the hose Nathan 

used to refuel the Championship II was a non-pressure-activated nozzle with a holdopen latch. Richard Strickland, Chief Fire Code Consultant with the North Carolina 

Department of Insurance, Office of State Fire Marshal, and Rebecca Warr, Safety 

Compliance Officer with the North Carolina Department of Labor, testified that use 

of gasoline nozzles with a hold-open latch at a marina was a violation of the North 

Carolina Fire Code and OSHA regulations.

The jury found defendant negligent and liable for Nathan Coppick’s death. The 

jury awarded plaintiff $1,500,000.00, and the trial court entered judgment in 

accordance with the jury award. Defendant filed a motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. 

The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appeals.

___________________________________

In its appeal from the denial of its motion for JNOV and alternatively, new 

trial, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying the motion. Defendant also 
THE ESTATE OF NATHAN RICHARD COPPICK V. HOBBS MARINA PROPERTIES, LLC, ET AL

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challenges the trial court’s instructions on negligence and negligence per se, the trial 

court’s failure to instruct on insulating negligence, certain evidentiary rulings of the 

trial court, and the award of prejudgment interest. 

“A motion for JNOV is essentially a renewal of a motion for a directed verdict.

The standard to be employed by a trial judge in determining whether to grant a 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same standard employed in ruling on a 

motion for a directed verdict.” State Properties, LLC v. Ray, 155 N.C. App. 65, 72, 

574 S.E.2d 180, 185—86 (2002) (citations omitted).

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand 

a motion for a directed verdict, all of the evidence which 

supports the non-movant's claim must be taken as true and 

considered in the light most favorable to the non-movant. 

The non-movant is given the benefit of every reasonable 

inference which may legitimately be drawn from the 

evidence, resolving contradictions, conflicts, and 

inconsistencies in the non-movant's favor. A motion for 

directed verdict should be denied if more than a scintilla of 

evidence supports each element of the non-moving party's 

claim.

Trantham v. Michael L. Martin, Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 745 S.E.2d 327, 331 

(2013) (quotations and citations omitted).

Negligence / Negligence Per Se

Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to prove the elements of negligence and,

thus, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for JNOV. Defendant 

contends plaintiff failed to establish that defendant owed Nathan Coppick a duty of 
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care, and failed to put forth evidence that defendant installed the nozzle used by 

Nathan at the time of his death. We disagree.

In order to set out a prima facie claim of negligence 

against [the defendant], [the] plaintiff was required to 

present evidence tending to show that (1) [the defendant] 

owed a duty to [the] plaintiff; (2) [the defendant] breached 

that duty; (3) such breach constituted an actual and 

proximate cause of plaintiff's injury; and, (4) [the] plaintiff 

suffered damages in consequence of the breach.

Cucina v. City of Jacksonville, 138 N.C. App. 99, 102, 530 S.E.2d 353, 355 (2000)

(citation omitted). However, where there is a violation of a safety statute, the 

traditional role of the jury in determining whether plaintiff has set forth a prima facie 

case of negligence is superseded, and defendant-violator is considered to be negligent 

as a matter of law, or negligent per se. 

The statute prescribes the standard, and the standard 

fixed by the statute is absolute. The common law rule of 

ordinary care does not apply – proof of the breach of the 

statute is proof of negligence. The violator is liable if injury 

or damage results, irrespective of how careful or prudent 

he has been in other respects.

Cowan v. Transfer Co. & Carr v. Transfer Co., 262 N.C. 550, 554, 138 S.E.2d 228, 231

(1964).

The general rule in North Carolina is that the violation of 

a public safety statute constitutes negligence per se. A 

public safety statute is one imposing upon the defendant a 

specific duty for the protection of others. Significantly, 

even when a defendant violates a public safety statute, the 

plaintiff is not entitled to damages unless the plaintiff 

belongs to the class of persons intended to be protected by 

the statute, and the statutory violation is a proximate 
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cause of the plaintiff's injury.

Stein v. Asheville City Bd. Of Educ., 360 N.C. 321, 326, 626 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2006)

(citations and quotations omitted).

Defendant’s duty of care argument, which in effect challenges the duty imposed 

pursuant to the public safety statute in question—here, the N.C. Building Code—

must fail. See Stultz v. Thomas, 182 N.C. 470, 473, 109 S.E. 361, 362 (1921) (holding 

that “[a] failure to discharge an affirmative duty imposed by law has been held by us, 

in a number of cases, to constitute an act of negligence per se . . . . In fact, a breach 

of a legal duty, or a duty imposed by law, comes within the very definition of 

negligence[.]” (citations omitted)).

Pursuant to General Statutes, section 143-138, “[t]he [Building] Code may 

regulate activities and conditions in buildings, structures, and premises that pose 

dangers of fire, explosion, or related hazards. Such fire prevention code provisions 

shall be considered the minimum standards necessary to preserve and protect public 

health and safety . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-138(b1) (2013). “The N.C. Building 

Code has the force of law[,] . . . and a violation thereof is negligence per se.” Lindstrom 

v. Chesnutt, 15 N.C. App. 15, 22, 189 S.E.2d 749, 754 (1972) (citations omitted). 

“[T]he Code imposes liability on any person who constructs, supervises construction, 

or designs a [structure] or alteration thereto, and violates the Code such that the 

violation proximately causes injury or damage.” Olympic Products Co. v. Roof Sys., 

Inc., 88 N.C. App. 315, 329, 363 S.E.2d 367, 375 (1988) (citation omitted).
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In the instant case, the specific activity subject to regulation by the Code was 

the use of certain nozzles containing a hold-open latch. “Dispensing of Class I, II or 

IIIA liquids into the fuel tanks of marine craft shall be by means of an approved-type 

hose equipped with a listed automatic-closing nozzle without a latch-open device.” 

N.C. Fire Prevention Code § 2209.3.3 (2002) (emphasis added). As a producer, 

installer and maintainer of fuel dispensing systems which are placed on premises 

that pose a danger of fire or explosion, defendant is subject to the duty imposed under 

the code. 

Defendant argues that it could not be found liable based on negligence per se

absent a showing of a violation of the code and a showing that defendant knew or 

should have known of the violation. Plaintiff, however, points to evidence in the 

record that defendant admitted to being a general contractor licensed by the State of 

North Carolina and, as such, is required to have knowledge of the North Carolina 

Building Code before obtaining a general contractor license. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 87-

10(b) (2013) (“Application for license [for General Contractors]” “(b) The Board shall 

conduct an examination . . . of all applicants for license to ascertain . . . (ii) the 

qualifications of the applicant in reading plans and specifications, knowledge of 

relevant matters contained in the North Carolina State Building Code . . . ; (iii) the 

knowledge of the applicant as to the responsibilities of a contractor to the public and 

of the requirements of the laws of the State of North Carolina relating to contractors

[and] construction . . . .”).
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Despite defendant’s contention that the Code does not specify who is 

responsible for compliance with the section that regulates nozzles and hoses at 

marine fueling stations, plaintiff’s evidence showed that the responsibility for 

complying with the Code fell upon the marina owner and upon the person or entity 

who installed the nozzles. Plaintiff’s evidence, as presented by Chief Fire Code 

Consultant for the North Carolina Department of Insurance Office of State Fire 

Marshal Richard Strickland, showed that the Code placed on defendant a duty to 

provide to marinas the approved type of hose equipped with the proper nozzles, and 

that providing a prohibited nozzle constitutes negligence per se. 

Q. So the law of our state, then, would require as of 

2002 that you cannot place a nozzle on a fueldispensing system at a marina that contains a holdopen latch; is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. And to do so would be illegal in that it violates the 

North Carolina State Building Code, correct?

A. Yes, it would be in violation of [the] North Carolina 

State Building Code.

In support of its argument that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s 

motion for JNOV and, alternately, a new trial, defendant contends that plaintiff 

failed to establish defendant installed the gasoline nozzle Nathan used when refueling the charter boat, the Championship II. Plaintiff responds that the evidence 

presented at trial established defendant was the only company, contractor, or 
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supplier to provide and maintain the fuel dispensing equipment. Evidence in the 

record supports plaintiff’s response that defendant was the sole supplier and installer 

of fuel dispensing equipment to the marina, including the types of nozzles alleged to 

be in violation of the statute.

For example, Nick Harmon, who worked at the marina in the summer of 2005, 

2006, and 2007 as assistant dock manager, then as dock manager, testified that 

nozzles containing hold-open latches1 were used “very often” in fueling the boats. 

With six fueling points and multiple boats coming in, a person could start refueling 

one vessel, then move to a second boat and refuel it. Harmon testified that nozzles 

containing hold-open latches were used to refuel the Championship II, as well as 

other boats. Harmon recalled defendant installing and maintaining the nozzles 

containing hold-open latches: “I knew [defendant’s] mechanics and techs very well” 

but knew of no other company that provided maintenance for the fuel dispensers.

Further, defendant made the following pertinent factual admissions which 

were allowed as evidence before the jury: that on 27 July 2006, defendant installed 

five new gasoline nozzles on the fuel dispensers at the marina; that the dispensers 

were “automatic-closing nozzles which contained hold-open latches”; that defendant’s 

records showed that defendant had performed maintenance/service work on the fuel 

dispensing system at the marina every year since 1998; and, that the nozzle on the 

 

1 Nozzles containing hold-open latches allow gasoline to flow continuously without the 

necessity of an attendant applying pressure to the nozzle.
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fuel dispenser involved in the 10 June 2008 fire and explosion on the Championship 

II would dispense 10 gallons of fuel per minute if set on full speed with the hold-open 

latch engaged.

This evidence, presented by plaintiff at trial, tended to show that defendant 

installed and maintained fuel delivery equipment, including gasoline nozzles that 

contained hold-open latches, which was in violation of the Fire Code referenced above. 

Such a violation, plaintiff contends, constitutes negligence per se.

Defendant, at trial and now on appeal, urges our review of contradictory 

testimony regarding the type of nozzle used by Nathan and the installation of the 

nozzle. However, for purposes of ruling on a motion for JNOV, the trial court must 

resolve all conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies in the light most favorable to 

the non-movant, here, plaintiff. See Trantham, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 745 S.E.2d at

331. Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff and giving plaintiff the benefit of 

every reasonable inference, there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury for the 

jury to find that defendant installed and performed routine maintenance on the fuel 

dispensing system at Hobbs Westport Marina, including changing the fuel dispensing 

nozzles.

This evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s instruction on 

negligence per se which followed the pattern jury instructions and properly stated the 

law as to negligence and negligence per se. Therefore, this evidence was sufficient to 

prove that defendant was subject to the safety statute at issue in this litigation and 
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that defendant’s actions were in violation of the statute and, thus, sufficient to prove 

liability for negligence per se, provided there was proximate cause. See Stein, 360 N.C.

at 326, 626 S.E.2d at 266 (“The general rule in North Carolina is that the violation of 

a public safety statute constitutes negligence per se. . . . [The plaintiff may recover if 

he] belongs to the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute, and the 

statutory violation is a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.” (citations omitted)). 

Therefore, we review defendant’s arguments regarding proximate cause. 

Proximate Cause

Defendant contends plaintiff failed to establish that any conduct of defendant 

proximately caused the explosion on 10 June 2008. We disagree.

“The test of proximate cause is whether the risk of injury, not necessarily in 

the precise form in which it actually occurs, is within the reasonable foresight of the 

defendant.” Shelton v. Steelcase, Inc., 197 N.C. App. 404, 431—32, 677 S.E.2d 485, 

504 (2009) (citation omitted). “Actual causation may be proved by circumstantial 

evidence, and this principle is equally as true in fire cases as in any other tort liability 

case.” Collins v. Caldwell Furniture Co., 16 N.C. App. 690, 694, 193 S.E.2d 284, 286 

(1972) (citation omitted). “[W]hat is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a 

question for the jury.” Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equip. Co., 310 N.C. 227, 235, 

311 S.E.2d 559, 566 (1984) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Jenkins v. 

Helgren, 26 N.C. App. 653, 658, 217 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1975) (“Certainly it is both 

probable and foreseeable that fire will be the consequence of a serious fire hazard. 
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Beyond question the fumes which defendants here allowed to accumulate constituted 

a serious fire hazard as a direct consequence of which the damaging fire occurred. 

One whose negligence creates the hazard of fire cannot escape responsibility merely 

because the source of the triggering spark may not be shown.” (citations omitted)).

Defendant states that no expert testified as to the cause or origin of the 

explosion, and that plaintiff relied entirely upon circumstantial evidence. However, 

expert testimony was not required to establish the cause or origin of the explosions. 

See Associated Indus. Contr’rs, Inc. v. Fleming Eng'g, Inc., 162 N.C. App. 405, 411—

12, 590 S.E.2d 866, 871 (2004) (“It is well settled that the standard of care must be 

determined by expert testimony unless the conduct involved is within the common 

knowledge of laypersons. Where, as in the instant case, the service rendered does not 

involve esoteric knowledge or uncertainty that calls for the professional's judgment, 

it is not beyond the knowledge of the jury to determine the adequacy of the 

performance.” (citation omitted)). 

Here, plaintiff put forth sufficient evidence, both direct and circumstantial, as 

to the cause or origin of the explosion. For example, the nozzle and hose used to refuel 

the Championship II just prior to the explosion was plaintiff’s Exhibit 38D. Exhibit 

38D, along with the remaining nozzles taken from the marina, utilized a “hold-open 

latch.” When refueling a boat, marina dockhands could “engage the hold-open latch 

and then go about doing other business[,]” because the hold-open latch is supposed to 

disengage and stop the flow of fuel when the gasoline reaches the top of the tank 
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being filled. However, one marina customer described an overflow of fuel from the 

gasoline tank on his boat as he refueled on 7 June 2008—three days before the 

explosion. “I looked over the side and gas was coming back out of the boat -- or out of 

the spigot. So I jumped out of the boat, flipped the [dispenser] off, the gas, so it 

stopped.”

Q. How much gas do you think roughly spilled

out?

A. Well, I mean, I don't know. Usually I didn't fill up 

unless the tank was close to empty . . ., but I would 

say at least a couple gallons. Maybe not quite that 

much.

The nozzles used at the marina had three speeds; “the fastest was 10 gallons a 

minute, the middle one was about 5 gallons a minute, and the lowest one was 2 

gallons a minute.”

Q. . . . [F]rom the time that nozzle was put in and 

switched on until the explosion, how long [was that]?

A. It appeared to be about six minutes.

. . .

Q. So just using simple math, that would have meant 

that 60 gallons of gas was pumped during that time?

. . .

Q. . . . So if [the nozzle] worked, it might have shut off 

[when the tank was full], but if it didn't work, if it 

pumped that whole time, 6 times 10 is 60 gallons of 

gas would have been pumped into whatever tank 

that nozzle was in?
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A. It could have.

At least one defense witness testified that the fuel nozzle used to refuel the 

Championship II had not “clicked off” prior to the explosion. Also, evidence at trial 

showed that the manufacture date on the nozzle, Exhibit 38D, matched the month 

defendant invoiced the marina for a standard nozzle, indicating that defendant sold 

the nozzle that was used by Nathan Coppick to refuel the Championship II on 10 

June 2008.

In addition to the testimony and exhibits, the jury was able to view as 

substantive evidence the video recording of events leading up to the explosions, and 

to decide, along with other evidence, whether plaintiff had established proximate 

cause. This evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, was sufficient to 

enable the jury to find that the gas dispenser nozzle used in refueling the 

Championship II failed to shut-off after the tank reached maximum capacity, causing 

excess gasoline to spill out into the surrounding water. Further, from this evidence 

the jury could find that a vapor cloud appeared shortly before the excess gasoline 

spilled into the water and then ignited, resulting in two explosions and a fire which 

engulfed the stern of the Championship II and killed Nathan Coppick. On this record 

there was sufficient evidence of negligence per se, including evidence of proximate 

cause, to survive a motion for JNOV and, alternatively, a new trial. See Trantham, 
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Opinion of the Court

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___ N.C. App. at ___, 745 S.E.2d at 331 (citations and quotations omitted). 

Defendant’s arguments are overruled.

Jury Instructions

Based on our preceding analysis, we overrule defendant’s contentions that the 

trial court erred by instructing the jury on negligence and negligence per se. However, 

while we disagree with defendant, we nevertheless review defendant’s argument that 

the trial court erred in denying its request for an instruction on insulating negligence.

On appeal, this Court considers a jury charge 

contextually and in its entirety. The charge will be held to 

be sufficient if it presents the law of the case in such 

manner as to leave no reasonable cause to believe the jury 

was misled or misinformed. The party asserting error bears 

the burden of showing that the jury was misled or that the 

verdict was affected by an omitted instruction. Under such 

a standard of review, it is not enough for the appealing 

party to show that error occurred in the jury instructions; 

rather, it must be demonstrated that such error was likely, 

in light of the entire charge, to mislead the jury.

Boykin v. Kim, 174 N.C. App. 278, 286, 620 S.E.2d 707, 713 (2005) (citations and 

quotations omitted).

An efficient intervening cause is a new proximate cause 

which breaks the connection with the original cause and 

becomes itself solely responsible for the result in question. 

It must be an independent force, entirely superseding the 

original action and rendering its effect in the causation 

remote. It is immaterial how many new elements or forces 

have been introduced, if the original cause remains active, 

the liability for its result is not shifted.
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Hairston, 310 N.C. at 236, 311 S.E.2d at 566—67 (citation omitted). “Insulating 

negligence means something more than a concurrent and contributing cause. It is 

not to be invoked as determinative merely upon proof of negligent conduct on the part 

of each of two persons, acting independently, whose acts unite to cause a single 

injury.” Id. at 236, 311 S.E.2d at 566 (citations omitted).

Defendant contends it presented sufficient evidence as to the negligence of 

others to support giving the instruction on insulating negligence. Defendant argues 

that its evidence showed, for example: that the owner/operator of the Championship 

II allowed the vessel to be refueled with the boat systems on; that the marina officers 

instructed marina employees to use the fuel dispensing nozzles containing hold-open 

latches; that the marina cashier failed to oversee the fuel dispensing process; and 

that the marina changed fuel dispensing nozzles and failed to test them. 

While defendant points to conduct noted above which may have contributed to 

the cause of the 10 June 2008 explosion, defendant fails to direct our attention to 

conduct which reasonably may have been viewed as “a new proximate cause which 

breaks the connection with the original cause and becomes itself solely responsible 

for the result in question,” id. at 236, 311 S.E.2d at 566, that is, the explosion and fire 

that led to the death of Nathan Coppick. From our independent review of the record, 

we are unable to find any conduct that supersedes the original conduct of defendant

where such conduct constituted a violation of a safety statute and which proximately 

caused the death of Nathan Coppick. See id. at 236, 311 S.E.2d at 566—67. 
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Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly denied defendant’s request for an 

instruction on insulating negligence. Accordingly, defendant’s argument is 

overruled.

Evidentiary Rulings

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in evidentiary rulings and other 

rulings, resulting in a manifest abuse of discretion. Defendant contends the trial 

court erred in allowing witnesses to testify to damages he or she sustained as a result 

of Nathan Coppick’s death, allowing two witnesses to “vouch for other testimony that 

[had] been given,” admitting a photograph of Nathan Coppick’s body where it was 

found after the explosion, and overruling defendant’s objection to plaintiff’s crossexamination of defendant’s president. While defendant acknowledges that, standing 

alone, the contested admissions would likely not amount to reversible error, 

defendant nevertheless contends that the cumulative effect of these rulings was 

prejudicial. Defendant further argues that the admission of the contested evidence 

resulted in confusion of the jury and prejudice to defendant requiring a new trial.

However, other than defendant’s assertions, we see no evidence in the record 

that the trial court’s rulings resulted in confusion of the jury and/or undue prejudice 

to defendant such that a new trial is required. Accordingly, we overrule this 

argument.

Prejudgment Interest
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Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its award of prejudgment 

interest based on the full amount of compensatory damages awarded, $1,500,000.00. 

Defendant contends prejudgment interest should be calculated based only on the 

portion of compensatory damages for which defendant is responsible. We disagree. 

As defendant concedes, our Supreme Court previously addressed this issue in 

Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 507 S.E.2d 894 (1998). In Brown, the Court directly 

rejected the defendant’s argument that a trial court should subtract the amount of 

settlements received from joint tortfeasors from the total compensatory award before 

calculating the prejudgment interest. Id. at 526, 507 S.E.2d at 898. The Court 

reasoned that this proposed method was “prohibited by the plain language of 

N.C.G.S. § 24–5, which requires calculation of prejudgment interest on the entire 

compensatory-damages verdict.” Id.

To calculate prejudgment interest when judgment is rendered against one, but 

not all, tortfeasors, our Supreme Court outlined the following process: 

(1) adding prejudgment interest at the legal rate to the 

entire compensatory damages award as N.C.G.S. § 24–5(b) 

requires, (2) adding interest at the legal rate to the 

settlement sum from the date of settlement until the date 

of judgment, and (3) subtracting the second calculation 

from the first to determine the amount of compensatory 

damages [the] defendant owes to [the] plaintiff.

Id. at 527, 507 S.E.2d at 898; see also Boykin, 174 N.C. App. at 288, 620 S.E.2d at 714 

(holding that pre-judgment interest is to be awarded before a set-off is given for the 

settlement amount).
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Here, the trial court applied prejudgment interest at a rate of eight percent 

(8%) per annum to the total $1,500,000.00 compensatory award beginning 9 June 

2010, the date the claim was filed, through 11 April 2013, the date of entry of 

judgment, less any credits to which defendant may be entitled by law. In a post-trial 

hearing, the trial court explained that to calculate the share of the total award due 

from each party, the trial court would follow the following formula: “[First,] [a]dding 

prejudgment interest at the legal rate to the entire compensatory damages. . . . 

[Second], adding interest at the legal rate to the settlement sum from the date of 

settlement until the date of judgment and [third,] subtracting the second calculation 

from the first." This is in accordance with the formula espoused by our Supreme 

Court in Brown. Accordingly, we overrule defendant’s argument and find no error in 

the judgment and award of the trial court.

NO ERROR.

Chief Judge McGEE and Judge STROUD concur.