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[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 25 (Monday, February 7, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 6581-6584]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-2612]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2011-0037; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-273-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and 
F4-600R Series Airplanes, and Model C4-605R Variant F Airplanes 
(Collectively Called A300-600 Series Airplanes)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the 
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory 
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation 
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe 
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 
condition as:

    [T]he FAA has published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation 
Regulation 88).
    In their letters referenced 04/00/02/07/01-L296, dated March 
4th, 2002, and 04/00/02/07/03-L024, dated February 3rd, 2003, the 
JAA [Joint Aviation Authorities] recommended the application of a 
similar regulation to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA).
    Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for 
passenger transport aircraft * * * are required to conduct a design 
review against explosion risks.
    During improvement of the protection of fuel pump wiring against 
short-circuit by accomplishment of Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) 
A300-24-6094, a study led by the manufacturer concluded that the 
harness, installed through the wing panel needed to be protected to 
prevent possible damage in case of chafing which could potentially 
lead to short-circuit [and intermittent function or loss of the 
inner tank fuel pump. Loss of both inner tank fuel pumps could 
result in inability to use the remaining fuel supply in the inner 
tank. A short-circuit could also result in an ignition source in a 
flammable leakage zone].
* * * * *
    The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address 
the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by March 24, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact 
Airbus SAS--EAW (Airworthiness Office), 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 
31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 
93 44 51; e-mail: account.airworth-eas@airbus.com; Internet http://www.airbus.com. You

[[Page 6582]]

may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, 
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 
Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the 
FAA, call 425-227-1221.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory 
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street 
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is 
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket 
shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 
227-2125; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address 
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2011-0037; 
Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-273-AD'' at the beginning of your 
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, 
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
this proposed AD based on those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We 
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we 
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical 
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA 
Airworthiness Directive 2010-0225, dated November 5, 2010 (referred to 
after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition for the 
specified products. The MCAI states:

    [T]he FAA has published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation 
Regulation 88).
    In their letters referenced 04/00/02/07/01-L296, dated March 
4th, 2002, and 04/00/02/07/03-L024, dated February 3rd, 2003, the 
JAA [Joint Aviation Authorities] recommended the application of a 
similar regulation to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA).
    Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for 
passenger transport aircraft with either a passenger capacity of 30 
or more, or a payload capacity of 3,402 kg (7,500 lb) or more, which 
have received their certification since January 1st, 1958, are 
required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.
    During improvement of the protection of fuel pump wiring against 
short-circuit by accomplishment of Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) 
A300-24-6094, a study led by the manufacturer concluded that the 
harness, installed through the wing panel needed to be protected to 
prevent possible damage in case of chafing which could potentially 
lead to short-circuit [and intermittent function or loss of the 
inner tank fuel pump. Loss of both inner tank fuel pumps could 
result in inability to use the remaining fuel supply in the inner 
tank. A short-circuit could also result in an ignition source in a 
flammable leakage zone].
    For the reasons stated above, this [EASA] AD requires the 
replacement of bushes in the hydraulic reservoir panel.

    You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD 
docket.
    The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel 
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the 
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes 
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for 
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a 
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, 
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' 
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards 
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule 
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' 
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
    Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., 
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders 
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition 
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design 
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for 
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to 
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance 
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety 
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to 
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary 
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
    In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four 
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel 
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of 
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable 
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address 
the failure types under evaluation: single failures, single failures in 
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure 
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included 
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for 
further action.
    The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that 
is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European 
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation 
regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed 
to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory 
standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that 
all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport 
category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against 
explosion risks.
    We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are 
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel 
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result 
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

    Airbus has issued Mandatory Service Bulletin A300-24-6102, Revision 
01, dated September 24, 2010. The actions described in this service 
information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in 
the MCAI.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant 
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have 
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service 
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we 
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition 
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same 
type design.

[[Page 6583]]

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

    We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in 
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it 
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the 
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these 
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information 
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
    We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those 
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are 
highlighted in a Note within the proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

    Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD 
would affect about 120 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that 
it would take about 13 work-hours per product to comply with the basic 
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $85 per 
work-hour. Required parts would cost about $266 per product. Where the 
service information lists required parts costs that are covered under 
warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these costs. 
As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, some 
parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these 
figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to 
be $164,520, or $1,371 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation 
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's 
authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed 
regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Airbus: Docket No. FAA-2011-0037; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-
273-AD.

Comments Due Date

    (a) We must receive comments by March 24, 2011.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to all Airbus Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, B4-
620, B4-622, B4-605R, B4-622R, F4-605R, F4-622R, and C4-605R Variant 
F airplanes, certificated in any category, all certified models, all 
serial numbers, except airplanes on which Airbus Service Bulletin 
A300-24-6102 (Airbus Modification 13381) has been embodied.

Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 24: 
Electrical Power.

Reason

    (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 
states:
    [T]he FAA has published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation 
Regulation 88).
    In their letters referenced 04/00/02/07/01-L296, dated March 
4th, 2002, and 04/00/02/07/03-L024, dated February 3rd, 2003, the 
JAA [Joint Aviation Authorities] recommended the application of a 
similar regulation to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA).
    Under this regulation, all holders of type certificates for 
passenger transport aircraft * * * are required to conduct a design 
review against explosion risks.
    During improvement of the protection of fuel pump wiring against 
short-circuit by accomplishment of Airbus Service Bulletin (SB) 
A300-24-6094, a study led by the manufacturer concluded that the 
harness, installed through the wing panel needed to be protected to 
prevent possible damage in case of chafing which could potentially 
lead to short-circuit [and intermittent function or loss of the 
inner tank fuel pump. Loss of both inner tank fuel pumps could 
result in inability to use the remaining fuel supply in the inner 
tank. A short-circuit could also result in an ignition source in a 
flammable leakage zone].
* * * * *

Compliance

    (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Actions

    (g) Within 30 months after the effective date of this AD, 
install Teflon bushes in the hydraulic reservoir panel at the lower 
left-hand side in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of 
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A300-24-6102, Revision 01, dated 
September 24, 2010.

Credit for Actions Accomplished in Accordance With Previous Service 
Information

    (h) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in 
accordance with Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A300-24-6102, 
dated August 13, 2009, are acceptable for compliance with the 
corresponding requirements of this AD.

FAA AD Differences

    Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information 
as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

    (i) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using 
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Dan 
Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport 
Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,

[[Page 6584]]

Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2125; fax (425) 227-1149. 
Information may be e-mailed to: 9-ANM-116-AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov. 
Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal 
inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the 
local flight standards district office/certificate holding district 
office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this 
AD.
    (2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain 
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these 
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered 
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority 
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product 
is airworthy before it is returned to service.

Related Information

    (j) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness 
Directive 2010-0225, dated November 5, 2010; and Airbus Mandatory 
Service Bulletin A300-24-6102, Revision 01, dated September 24, 
2010; for related information.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 31, 2011.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2011-2612 Filed 2-4-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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