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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-14-00292-CV

____________________

ANDREW SAWYER WELLER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause Nos. 49280, 49361 

__________________________________________________________________ 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Andrew Sawyer Weller appeals a commitment order extending his inpatient 

mental health services. In two appellate issues, Weller contends the evidence is 

legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that services 

should be continued. We affirm the trial court’s commitment order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 11, 1988, Andrew Weller was found not guilty of murder by 

reason of insanity and commited to a mental health facility. See Weller v. State,
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184 S.W.3d 787, 788 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, no pet.); see also Act of May 

25, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 454, § 3, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2640, 2643-47 

(repealed 2005) (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46C.256 (West 

2006)).1 Weller has been continuously committed for inpatient treatment since 

1988. On May 30, 2014, the State filed an application for renewal of extended 

court-ordered mental health services. Attached to the State’s application were (1) 

certificates of examination for mental illness, signed by two physicians who had 

examined Weller and reviewed his mental health records during the thirty days 

prior to the date of the application, (2) a dangerousness risk assessment, and (3) a 

forensic psychiatry report to the court, dated May 7, 2014.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s application on June 2, 

2014, and on June 3, 2014, the trial court again entered an order of commitment 

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The Texas Legislature repealed article 46.03 in 2005 and amended the Code 

of Criminal Procedure to add “Chapter 46C. Insanity Defense.” Act of May 27, 

2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 831, §§ 1, 2, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 2841. The 2005 

amendment “applies only to an offense committed on or after the effective date of 

this Act. An offense committed before the effective date of this Act is covered by 

the law in effect when the offense was committed, and the former law is continued 

in effect for that purpose.” Act of May 27, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 831, § 5, 2005 

Tex. Gen. Laws 2841, 2853-54. The effective date of the Act was September 1, 

2005. Act of May 27, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 831, § 6, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 

2841, 2854.
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continuing Weller’s inpatient mental health services.2 In its order, the trial court 

concluded that (1) Weller is mentally ill, (2) likely to cause serious harm to himself 

or others as a result of his mental illness, (3) will, if not treated, continue to suffer 

severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, continue to 

experience deterioration of his ability to function independently, and will be unable 

to make a rational and informed decision regarding continuing treatment, and (4) 

will continue to suffer from mental illness for more than ninety days. The trial 

court also found “by clear and convincing evidence, that no sufficient settings for 

care on a less-restrictive, or out-patient, basis exist at the present time, or will 

become available in the foreseeable future.” 

THE EVIDENCE 

Weller appeared at the hearing of June 2, 2014, by telephone pursuant to his 

request to do so. The trial court noted that State’s proposed exhibit one consisted of 

twelve pages, including (1) a telefax submission form from Rusk State Hospital 

(“Rusk”); (2) a cover letter from Dr. George Howland, the unit psychiatrist at 

Rusk, and Brenda Slayton, the superintendent of Rusk; (3) a dangerousness risk 

assessment; (4) a forensic psychiatry report to the court, signed by Howland; (5) 

Howland’s certificate of medical examination for mental illness; and (6) a second 

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Weller waived his right to have a jury determine whether he continued to 

meet the criteria for involuntary inpatient commitment. 
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certificate of medical examination for mental illness, signed by Dr. Larry Hawkins, 

all of which were attached to the State’s application. State’s exhibit one was 

admitted into evidence without objection. 

The certificate of medical examination signed by Howland indicated that 

Howland examined and evaluated Weller at Rusk on May 7, 2014, and stated that 

Weller suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and is currently in the Hope 

Residential Unit at Rusk. In the certificate, Howland opined that Weller is (1) 

likely to cause serious harm to others and is suffering from severe and abnormal 

mental, emotional or physical distress; (2) experiencing substantial mental or 

physical ability to function independently, “which is exhibited by the proposed 

patient’s inability, except for reasons of indigence, to provide for his basic needs, 

including food, clothing, health, or safety”; and, (3) “unable to make a rational and 

informed decision as to whether or not to submit to treatment.” Howland further 

opined that Weller was refusing psychotropic medications, had been irritable, 

appeared to be paranoid about “court[,]” and had “no insight into his mental 

illness[,]” and he explained that Weller’s paranoia, lack of insight, and refusal to 

take psychotropic medications demonstrate that Weller’s condition will continue 

for more than ninety days. 
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The certificate of medical examination for mental illness signed by Hawkins 

indicated that Hawkins examined Weller at Rusk on May 12, 2014, and stated that 

Weller suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. Hawkins also determined that Weller 

is (1) suffering from severe and abnormal mental, emotional or physical distress; 

(2) experiencing substantial mental or physical inability to function independently, 

“which is exhibited by the proposed patient’s inability, except for reasons of 

indigence, to provide for his basic needs, including food, clothing, health, or 

safety”; and, (3) “is unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether 

or not to submit to treatment.” Hawkins noted on the certificate that Weller 

appeared to be irritable at times, argumentative over some issues, and “continues to 

refuse any psychiatric medications[.]” Hawkins stated that although Weller still has 

some paranoid views, he behaves “fairly well” without psychiatric medications and 

“functions fairly well” in the hospital environment. Hawkins opined that although 

Weller’s “[b]ehavior has responded to hospital structure[,]” Weller “would need 

med[ication]s in [the] community.” 

The dangerousness risk assessment completed by clinician Joe Colkin

indicated that Weller has not been aggressive or violent since his admission to 

Rusk’s residential program. Colkin noted that Weller killed both of his parents in

1986, and that “[r]ecords indicate that his family was considering civil 
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commitment for him prior to the murder[s].” According to Colkin, Weller “has 

also not had violent behaviors since he has been off of his medication.” Colkin 

noted on the assessment as follows: 

Mr. Weller does not accept that he has a psychotic condition. This 

prevents him from considering realist[ic] options proposed by the 

psychiatrist. Also, he says he will not consider a group home setting, 

that his own rented space is what he needs. He understands that this 

position is atypical and difficult for Social Workers and MHA[]s to 

promote. He reasons that it is a practical plan that a judge would 

support.

Colkin also indicated in the assessment that Weller “states he does not believe he 

has a mental illness and therefore does not need psychiatric medications[;]” Weller 

believes his treatment for a stroke in the 1990s may have cured his psychosis; and 

Weller “maintains that taking medication since that time for psychosis has not been 

of benefit.” Colkin identified as mitigating circumstances Weller’s ability to 

function well in Rusk’s residential program and Weller’s likely ability to function 

in a “transitional outpatient setting.” Colkin characterized Weller’s risk for 

aggression as low, but noted that Weller desires to live independently in a rural 

setting away from Jefferson County rather than in a transitional setting in Jefferson 

County. Colkin concluded that Weller has demonstrated the ability to manage 

living in a residential setting, and Colkin “anticipated that [Weller] can manage 

living in an outpatient transitional living setting.” 
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The forensic psychiatry report Howland provided to the court in a letter (as 

part of State’s exhibit one) stated that Weller was charged with killing his parents, 

and “[a]t the time of this incident[,] it was reported that he was concerned about 

‘pod people.’” Howland discussed Weller’s belief that he does not need 

psychotropic medications and noted that Weller has been off psychotropic 

medications for some time. Howland noted that Weller “has been more irritable 

lately than he usually is[,]” still feels that he does not need psychotropic 

medications, lacks insight into his mental illness, believes he has been cured, and 

“appears paranoid about the court.” Howland also indicated that Weller has a job 

on the hospital grounds and “gets along fairly well” with his peers. Howland 

stated, “It is the opinion of the Hope unit recovery team that Mr. Weller is still 

paranoid at times. He is irritable and has no insight into his mental illness.”

Howland recommended that Weller be recommitted to Rusk to reside in the Hope 

residential unit. 

Weller testified that he has been committed for approximately twenty-six 

years, and he has never harmed himself or anyone else during that time. Weller 

explained that he has been off his medication for at least four years, and he has 

been able to care for himself and make decisions. Weller acknowledged that he 

was mentally ill at one time, but stated that he is not currently mentally ill. Weller 
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testified that he has taken different medications for mental illness, but “there

ha[s]n’t been any real need for it. There hasn’t been any psychosis or mental illness 

for a very long time.” When asked whether he was aware that doctors are saying he 

is still suffering from severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, 

Weller responded, “Just because they are saying that doesn’t necessarily mean that 

it’s true[,]” and he denied feeling such distress. Weller testified that, with the 

exception of “the stress of being locked up[,]” he has not experienced a substantial 

mental or physical deterioration of his ability to function independently.

Weller testified that he wakes himself each day, dresses himself, takes care 

of his personal hygiene, and works. Weller testified that if he were permitted to 

live in a less restrictive environment, he could get his own apartment, buy 

groceries, cook food, wash his clothes, and do whatever he needed to do without 

assistance. Weller explained that he could support himself with any assets or social 

security payments to which he might be entitled. Weller acknowledged that he has 

refused to take psychiatric medication despite Howland’s recommendation that he 

do so. Weller explained that he believes the medication harms him and he does not 

need such medication because he has had “no signs [of] psychosis or mental illness 

for a very long time . . . .”
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When the trial judge asked Weller whether he believes the doctors who are 

prescribing psychotropic medications are wrong, Weller responded,

Sir, they are doing a lot of things at these facilities that the Court 

doesn’t necessarily know about. There [are] a lot of homeless people 

here. There are a lot of crack heads here. They give them psychotropic 

meds and call them mental patients. That’s what’s happening in the 

State of Texas right now. I’ve lived it. I’ve been around it. I’ve seen it 

in the jails. I’ve seen it in these places. That’s why there is 

overcrowding in these places. You as law officers and people that 

represent the law need to take a close look at what is actually 

happening. 

When the trial judge asked Weller whether he wanted to be released to live 

independently at a location of his own choosing and whether he has discounted 

other types of outpatient facilities, Weller responded as follows:

[W]hen a person gets their freedom, they can choose where they want 

to live. If the State is going to tell me that I have to live at another 

place, then they can pick up the tab; and that’s not really my freedom. 

If I am released on an outpatient basis, I feel that I am capable of 

getting my own housing and reporting to the local MHA as required 

by the Court and complying with what MHA requires on an outpatient 

basis. I can do that. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge stated that “the Court . . . will grant 

the State’s motion and find that this is in the best interest of justice at this time.” 

ISSUES ONE AND TWO

In issue one, Weller argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 

trial court’s commitment order continuing his inpatient mental services. In issue 
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two, Weller contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the order. We 

address issues one and two together.

Under a legal sufficiency review when the burden of proof is “clear and 

convincing evidence,” we “consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a 

firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” Harrison v. State, 179 S.W.3d 

629, 634 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied). We assume the factfinder 

resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could. Id. 

Under a factual sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence, both in support of 

and contrary to the trial court’s findings, and we give “due consideration to 

evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and 

convincing.” Id. at 634-35. We must determine whether the evidence is such that a 

factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the 

allegations. Id. at 635. “We consider whether disputed evidence is such that a 

reasonable trier of fact could not have reconciled that disputed evidence in favor of 

its finding.” Id.

As discussed above, before the trial court were two certificates of 

examination for mental illness, dangerousness risk assessment, and a forensic 

psychiatry report to the court. The certificates of examination both indicated that 
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Weller has paranoid schizophrenia, is suffering from severe and abnormal mental, 

emotional, or physical distress, is experiencing a substantial mental or physical 

deterioration of his ability to function independently, and is unable to make a 

rational and informed decision regarding whether or not to submit to treatment.

Howland’s certificate concluded that Weller is likely to cause serious harm to 

others. Both Howland and Hawkins noted that Weller was paranoid at times and 

refused to take psychotropic medications, and Howland stated that Weller lacked 

insight into his mental illness. Colkin’s dangerousness risk assessment noted that 

Weller refuses to accept that he has a psychotic condition, refuses to consider 

treatment options proposed by his psychiatrist, and refuses to consider a group 

home setting. The forensic psychiatry report submitted by Howland noted that 

Weller has suffered from increased irritability, refuses to take psychotropic 

medication, lacks insight into his mental illness, believes that he is cured, and 

exhibits paranoia about the trial court, and Howland recommended that Weller be 

recommitted to Rusk.

Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we 

conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or 

conviction that its finding was true. See id. at 634. Therefore, the evidence was 

legally sufficient to support the trial court’s order. In addition, considering all the 
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evidence, both in support of and contrary to the trial court’s findings, and giving 

due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be 

clear and convincing, we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could reasonably 

form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations. See id. at 

634-35. Weller’s testimony that he is not mentally ill, does not need medication,

and can function independently is not so compelling that a reasonable trier of fact 

could not have reconciled that evidence in favor of its finding. See id. Accordingly, 

we overrule issues one and two and affirm the trial court’s order of commitment.

AFFIRMED.

______________________________

 STEVE McKEITHEN

 Chief Justice

Submitted on March 16, 2015

Opinion Delivered April 9, 2015

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.