J-A13001-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ALLISON SOLLEY

v.

TYLER SOLLEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2480 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered November 24, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division at 

No(s): C-48-PF-2021-00523

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 12, 2022

Tyler Solley (“Father”), files this appeal from the Final Protection From 

Abuse (“PFA”) Order entered on November 24, 2021, in the Northampton

County Court of Common Pleas, granting Allison Solley (“Mother”) and their 

two children protection from Father for a period of three years. After review, 

we affirm the trial court’s order.

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history 

as follows:

On July 19, 2021, a temporary [PFA] order was granted for 

[Mother] and her two minor children against [Father]. [Mother]

averred that [Father] has physically and verbally abused her from 

2012 to the present, with the most recent incident occurring in 

the early hours of July 19, 2021. On that date, [Father], while 

intoxicated, [] raped [Mother] and subsequently threatened to kill

himself, [Mother], and their daughters. [Mother] was eventually 

able to call for help and [Father] was subsequently arrested. 

A final PFA hearing was conducted on November 24, 2021 

before the [trial court]. Both [Mother] and [Father] took the 
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stand. [1], [2] At the end of the hearing, and upon consideration of 

the evidence presented, the [trial court] found that [Mother and 

the children] had a reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm and 

entered a three-year PFA.[3]

____________________________________________

1 Father was dismissed shortly after taking the stand as it became apparent 

that his response to any question regarding the July 19, 2021 incident was to 

assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as there were 

outstanding criminal charges. N.T., 11/24/21, at 13-19.

[COUNSEL FOR MOTHER]: So[,] if [Father] isn’t going to answer 

any of the questions – I have a whole outline of questions, Judge, 

but I don’t want to burden the [c]ourt and the record with these 

continual interruptions. So[,] if counsel is making it pretty clear

that if I ask him any questions about July 19th, he’s not going to 

answer the questions?

[THE COURT]: Correct?

[COUNSEL FOR FATHER]: Yes, that is correct, You Honor. . . .

Id. at 18-19.

2 Aside from the testimonial evidence, Mother marked and admitted several 

exhibits during this hearing, including the criminal complaint, search warrant 

application, and a letter from Children and Youth Services. N.T., 11/24/21, 

at 5, 60, 67. These exhibits, however, are not included with the certified 

record. We remind counsel, “Appellant has the responsibility to make sure 

that the record forwarded to an appellate court contains those documents 

necessary to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the issues raised 

on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Wint, 730 A.2d 965 (Pa. Super. 1999); see 

also Pa.R.A.P. 1921 Note (stating, “Ultimate responsibility for a complete 

record rests with the party raising an issue that requires appellate court access 

to record materials.”) (citation omitted). While counsel for Mother included 

the criminal complaint as an appendix to Mother’s brief, this cannot be 

considered by this Court as it is not part of the certified record. See

Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc) 

(noting that an appellate court may only consider that which is in the certified 

record). The lack of exhibits, however, does not hamper our review given the 

nature of Father’s appeal.

3 The court memorialized its determination by order of November 24, 2021. 

The court’s order included a temporary custody provision vesting full custody 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Trial Court Opinion, 1/31/22, at 1-2.

Notably, during the November 24, 2021 hearing, Mother’s direct 

examination focused squarely on the incident of July 19, 2021, where, she 

testified, Father raped her, strangled her, and threatened to murder her and 

her two children. N.T., 11/24/21, at 25-46. As such, the trial court excluded 

cross-examination as to prior incidents of abuse. See id. at 47 (the trial court 

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of the children in Mother pending further order. Final PFA Order, 11/24/21, 

at ¶ 5. In contravention of Father’s request, the trial court noted that it was 

not excluding the children as protected parties. N.T., 11/24/21, at 61, 67, 

69. As to the custody of the parties’ children, the court made it clear that 

such a determination would ultimately be made in custody court. Id. at 

69-70. The court declared:

As I indicated previously, if a PFA is entered, that temporary 

custody is vested with [Mother] pending the custody court 

determination.

. . .

On the custody provision, temporary custody of minor children [] 

shall be as follows:

Legal and physical custody shall be vested with [] Mother, until 

further Order of Court.

Further custody proceedings shall occur in custody court, with a 

determination of the custody and visitation rights of Father to be 

determined.

Absent consideration of the facts alleged by [Mother] in paragraph 

13 of the temporary PFA issued in this matter on July 19, 2021, 

in which [Mother] testified to on November 24, 2021, the entry of 

this PFA shall not indicate an adverse interest as to [Father] in 

future custody proceedings, during which a separate factual 

record can be established.

Id.
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stated, “The testimony of this witness was what happened on July 19th, and 

that’s what we’re going to limit the cross-examination to”); see also id. at 

49. Further, Father then attempted to present the testimony of Mother’s and 

Father’s marriage counselor, Dr. Midas,

4 despite the concession of Father’s 

counsel that Dr. Midas “was not a witness to what occurred on July 19th.”5 Id.

at 67. After the trial court inquired into the relevancy of Dr. Midas’ testimony, 

Father rested and requested to release Dr. Midas.6 Id. at 69-70.

Thereafter, Father, through counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal on 

December 1, 2021.

7

 On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our 

review:

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4 Counsel for Mother represented that Dr. Midas was originally involved as 

Mother’s individual counselor and then “migrated” to the role of marriage 

counselor. Id. at 5. The record does not reveal Dr. Midas’ first name.

5 The issue of Dr. Midas’ testimony was additionally raised preliminarily at the 

outset of the hearing and the trial court deferred its determination as to Dr. 

Midas’ testimony and its relevance. Id. at 5-8.

6 Despite indication of numerous other witnesses present, N.T., 11/24/21, at 

5, the only witness mentioned by name and offered by Father was Dr. Midas, 

id. at 67, 69-70.

7

In light of the fact that the November 24, 2021 PFA order affected child 

custody, this Court entered an order on December 17, 2021, designating the 

appeal a Children’s Fast Track appeal and directing Father to file his Rule 

1925(b) statement, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), no later than December 

27, 2021. Per Curiam Order, 12/17/21, at 1. On December 23, 2021, Father 

filed his Rule 1925(b) statement with this Court. A certificate of service 

attached to the Rule 1925(b) statement revealed that Father mailed the 

1925(b) statement to the trial court and e-mailed the Rule 1925(b) statement 

to the trial court judge’s secretary. Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/23/21, at 1. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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1. Was it error to limit cross examination solely to matters testified 

to on direct examination when the larger scope of activity averred 

in already admitted documents required testing for credibility and 

such limitation violated [Father’s] due process rights?

2. Was it error to limit witnesses to exclude any witnesses to the 

larger scope of activity specified in already admitted documents 

that required testing for credibility, such that [Father’s] due 

process rights were violated?

Father’s Brief at 4.

We review the PFA order under the following standard:

In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal 

conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion. The purpose 

of the PFA Act is to protect victims of domestic violence from those 

who perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance 

prevention of physical and sexual abuse. 

K.B. v. Tinsley, 208 A.3d 123, 127 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted); see also C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272, 1276 (Pa. 

Super. 2019); Custer v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050, 1053-1054 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (en banc).

Although Father’s “statement of questions involved on appeal” lists two 

appellate claims, the argument section of Father’s brief is limited to a single 

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On January 3, 2022, this Court received correspondence from the trial court 

judge, with an attached December 28, 2021 order, stating that Father had not 

properly effectuated service by mail or in person as required pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(1) and Pa.R.A.P. 121(c). Letter, 1/3/22, at 1. A certificate 

of service and certified mail receipt attached to an amended notice of appeal 

and Rule 1925(b) statement filed with this Court on January 3, 2022 reveal

that Father served the trial court judge by mail on December 29, 2021. See

Amended Notice of Appeal, 1/3/22, at 1. As such, Father timely complied with 

this Court’s order and properly served the trial court judge within a week and 

the trial court ultimately addressed Father’s issues raised on appeal in its Rule 

1925(a) opinion.
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claim: that the trial court erred when it restricted his cross-examination of 

Mother. As Father has not developed any argument regarding the trial court’s 

exclusion of Dr. Midas, we conclude that Father’s second numbered claim on 

appeal is waived. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011)

quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[W]here an 

appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to 

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion 

capable of review, that claim is waived.”); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 

A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017).

8

 

Therefore, we proceed to address Father’s first issue, where he claims

that the trial court erred when it limited his cross-examination of Mother. He 

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8 Even if preserved for our review, we would find this claim to be without 

merit. As the trial court explained: “[e]ven if the [c]ourt had allowed 

[Father’s] witnesses to take the stand, nothing within their testimony would 

disavow the credible testimony of [Mother] outlining the incident that occurred 

on July 19th, which was sufficient evidence to grant a final PFA.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 1/31/22, at 6. We agree. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a) (providing, 

in part: “The occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family 

or household members, sexual or intimate partners or persons who share 

biological parenthood: (1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, involuntary 

deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, 

aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault or incest with or without a 

deadly weapon; (2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious 

bodily injury. . . .”; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 477 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted) (a sufficiency of the evidence claim as 

to a PFA order is reviewed for and requires the establishment of abuse by a 

preponderance of the evidence); see also D.H. v. B.O., 734 A.2d 409, 410 

(Pa. Super. 1999); see also Fonner v. Fonner, 731 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa.

Super. 1999). 
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maintains that Mother referenced past incidents in her PFA filings and, as such, 

the trial court erred in limiting his cross-examination of Mother to the July 19, 

2021 incident. Father’s Brief at 7. Father states,

Regarding the matter at hand, the underlying PFA documents 

specified a much larger scope of activity than just the instance of 

July 19, 2021. The larger scope of allegations in the underlying 

petition are relevant and[,] in fact, intertwined with[] the instance 

that allegedly occurred on July 19, 2021 as the allegations are all 

of the same nature, involve all the same parties, and inclusion of 

these allegations would tend to make certain facts more or less 

probable than without such inclusion.

Id. Father argues the importance of these other instances as it relates to

credibility. He “avers that cross examination into these other instances would 

have cast doubt on both these other instances as well as the instant 

allegations of July 19, 2021.” Id. Father then argues that the limited

cross-examination resulted in the denial of his due process rights. Id. at 8-9.

Critically, the trial court based its final determination on Mother’s 

testimony as to the events of July 19, 2021, which it found to be sufficient 

evidence of abuse. N.T., 11/24/21, at 70-71; see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102(a); 

see also Thompson, 963 A.2d at 477; see also D.H. 734 A.2d at 410; see 

also Fonner, 731 A.2d at 161. As such, “[a]ny cross-examination concerning 

prior abuse would not outweigh the credible testimony of [Mother] regarding 

the incidents that occurred on July 19th that put [Mother and the children] in 

reasonable fear of imminent bodily harm.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/31/22, at 5.

As to the admission of evidence, the discretion of the trial court is 

well-settled.
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The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the 

trial court, and we will not overturn its decisions in this regard 

absent an abuse of discretion or misapplication of law. We also 

do not reverse such a ruling unless the objecting party sustained 

prejudice. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment. It requires a showing of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, ill-will, or such lack of support as to be clearly 

erroneous. Under this standard, the party challenging the trial 

court's discretion on appeal bears a heavy burden.

Kimble v. Laser Spine Inst., LLC, 264 A.3d 782, 795 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

Similarly, the scope of cross-examination is also left to the discretion of 

the trial court. “It is well settled that the scope of cross-examination is a 

matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent 

an abuse of that discretion. When a trial court determines the scope of 

cross-examination, it may consider whether the matter is collateral, the 

cross-examination would be likely to confuse or mislead the jury, and the 

cross-examination would waste time.” Commonwealth v. Largaespada, 

184 A.3d 1002, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Further, Rule 611 provides as follows as to cross-examination:

Rule 611. Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and 

Presenting Evidence 

(a) Control by the Court; Purposes. The court should exercise 

reasonable control over the mode and order of examining 

witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those 

procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting 

time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue 

embarrassment. 

(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination of a 

witness other than a party in a civil case should be limited to the 

subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting 

credibility, however, the court may, in the exercise of discretion, 
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permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. 

A party witness in a civil case may be cross-examined by 

an adverse party on any matter relevant to any issue in the 

case, including credibility, unless the court, in the interests 

of justice, limits the cross-examination with respect to 

matters not testified to on direct examination.

Pa.R.E. 611 (emphasis added).

Moreover, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 401:

Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence

Evidence is relevant if:

(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 

than it would be without the evidence; and

(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.

Pa.R.E. 401.

In support of its limitation of Mother’s cross-examination, the trial court 

reasoned that Mother proceeded only with respect to the incident of July 19, 

2021, making other instances of past abuse irrelevant and ancillary. The court 

stated:

[Father] is correct[] in [stating] that the original complaint that 

supported the temporary PFA did include allegations of past 

abuse. However, the only matter before the [c]ourt on November 

24th was a hearing for the issuance of a final PFA. At that hearing, 

[Mother] made the tactical decision to proceed solely on the 

events of July 19th[] and did not proffer any evidence of prior 

abuse. Even with the broader scope of cross-examination 

allowable under Pa.R.E. 611(b), any cross-examination regarding 

this past abuse was irrelevant, and collateral, to the PFA 

proceedings that occurred on November 24th. Thus, it was within 

this [c]ourt’s discretion to deny cross-examination on these 

matters.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/31/22, at 5 (citations and footnote omitted).
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We agree with the trial court. The trial court acted within its discretion 

in finding that cross-examination of Mother on incidents beyond July 19, 2021 

was collateral and irrelevant given the focus of her direct examination on the 

events and circumstances of July 19, 2021. Further, the trial court’s 

restriction did not deny Father due process. See In re J.N.F., 887 A.2d 775, 

781 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“Due process requires nothing more than adequate 

notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself in an 

impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the matter.”); see also In re 

Adoption of Dale A., II, 683 A.2d 297, 300 (Pa. Super. 1996) citing

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (“Due process is flexible and calls 

for such procedural protections as the situation demands.”). Father had the 

opportunity to cross-examine Mother and to present evidence. The trial court 

merely restricted cross-examination to topics that were based on the events 

of July 19, 2021. For the reasons stated by the trial court, we discern no abuse 

of discretion and do not disturb the trial court’s determination.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/12/2022