J-A03010-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

PAUL MCKENZIE

Appellant No. 884 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 16, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0000409-2012

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 06, 2015

Appellant, Paul McKenzie, appeals from the December 16, 2013 

aggregate judgment of sentence of 261⁄2 to 53 years’ imprisonment after a 

jury found him guilty of aggravated assault, rape by forcible compulsion, 

aggravated indecent assault by forcible compulsion, and unlawful restraint.1 

After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the facts of the violent sexual assault as 

follows.

In this case, [K.N.] testified that [Appellant] 

strangled her multiple times to the point of losing 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 3121(a)(1), 3125(a)(2), and 2902(a)(1), 

respectively.
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consciousness. The first time he strangled her was 

with his hands, the second time was with his [t]-

[s]hirt that he had taken off and twisted into a 

straight line and then wrapped it around her neck, 

and the third time was with a shoelace he had 

removed from one of his sneakers. While 

[Appellant] was strangling [K.N] with the shoelace, 

she tried to get her fingertips underneath the 

shoelace so she could get some air. [K.N.] also 

testified that [Appellant] punched her in her head –

behind the ears, on top of the head, and around her 

forehead. [K.N.] tried to block the blows by putting 

her hands over her head. [Appellant] also punched 

her in her back to get her to release her hands so he 

could continue punching her in the head. [K.N.] also 

testified that [Appellant] shoved his fingers up inside 

her [vagina] so hard that it pushed her back against 

the wall. [K.N.] also testified that [Appellant] raped 

her twice during this ordeal.

When [K.N.] tried to get away, [Appellant] 

caught up with her[,] grabbed her by her hair and 

around the neck[,] and dragged her back to the 

room. The next thing [K.N.] remembered was 

[Appellant] standing over her and taking his shoelace 

out of his shoe, telling her that “now you really 

f[***]ed up.” Furthermore, throughout the entire 

ordeal, [Appellant] kept telling [K.N.] that “it was 

time to die,” that he was going to kill her, and that 

she was going to die.

[K.N.]’s account of what occurred on 

November 4, 2011 into November 5, 2011 was 

corroborated by the injuries that were documented 

by Geneva Keirn, the SAFE Nurse at York Hospital. 

Ms. Keirn prepared body maps of those injuries and 

also took photos of the injuries sustained by [K.N.]. 

The kinds of injuries found on [K.N.] were:

 Abrasions and scratches to her chest; []

 Her left eye had redness to the inner area of 

the white of her eye, redness and blood in 

the sclera and around the eye; []
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 Her back had swelling and redness; []

 Her buttocks had swelling and redness; []

 Her scalp had redness, pain and 

tenderness; []

 Her genital area had lacerations, redness, 

and tenderness; abrasions to the labia and 

bottom of the vagina; []

 Her left arm had redness; []

 Her right arm had abrasions and scratches; 

[]

 Her left leg had swelling and redness, and 

red marks on her left upper thigh area and 

left lower leg; []

 Her left knee had red marks and abrasions 

and bruising; []

 Her right leg had swelling and redness; []

 Her right knee had abrasions and red 

marks; []

 Her right hand had swelling and redness to 

top of hand and fingers; []

 Her left hand had redness to all fingers 

extending to the palm and down to the 

thumb. There was redness, swelling, and 

purplish marks to her left thumb and parts 

of her left index finger; []

 The top of her left hand had redness and 

swelling to all fingers and extends to the top 

of the hand; and

 Her neck had various kinds of bruising, 

redness, abrasions, lines, and marks.
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In addition, Dr. Wayne Ross, a forensic pathologist, 

examined the medical records of [K.N.], the SAFE 

[n]urse’s notes and documentation of injuries, the 

photos of the scene, photos of [K.N.] taken by the 

SAFE [n]urse and by her family members and police, 

reviewed the police report and preliminary 

statements by [K.N.], and performed an analysis. 

His conclusions were consistent with [K.N.]’s account 

of what happened. Dr. Ross concluded that her 

various injuries were consistent with: [h]air being 

pulled[,] [b]lunt force trauma[,] [r]epeated 

strangulation[,] and [d]efensive wounds. Dr. Ross 

also concluded that [K.N.]’s injuries were 

inconsistent with consensual intercourse as there 

were multiple tears, and the injuries indicate a 

severe amount of force was used and penetration 

was significant and severe. In addition, Dr. Ross 

also testified that his findings are inconsistent with 

rough sex, [for the following reasons.]

1. [K.N.] was repeatedly beaten; []

2. [K.N.] had bruises all over her body; []

3. [K.N.] had traumatic alopecia where her 

hair had been torn from her head; []

4. [K.N.] had bruises all over her chest; []

5. There were at least five (5) areas of 

strangulation to the neck; []

6. There were bruises all over her body; and

7. The tears down at the vaginal introitus are 

inconsistent with rough sex.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/14, at 2-5 (citations omitted).
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By criminal information filed on January 30, 2012, the Commonwealth 

charged Appellant2 with the aforementioned offenses as well as attempted 

murder, rape by threat of forcible compulsion, sexual assault, aggravated 

indecent assault without consent, aggravated indecent assault by threat of 

forcible compulsion, false imprisonment, and terroristic threats.3 On 

September 3, 2013, a three-day jury trial commenced. On September 5, 

2013, the jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault, rape by forcible 

compulsion, aggravated indecent assault by forcible compulsion, and 

unlawful restraint. The jury found Appellant not guilty of attempted murder. 

The remaining charges were nolle prossed. A court-ordered sexually violent 

predator assessment was completed and Appellant was not determined to be 

a sexually violent predator. N.T., 12/16/13, at 1. Thereafter, on December 

16, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 261⁄2 to 53 years’ 

imprisonment.4

____________________________________________

2 We note that although the criminal information is contained within the 

certified record and was file-stamped on January 30, 2012, it was not 

entered on the trial court’s docket until February 2, 2012. However, 

“[a]lthough the trial court docket is part of the official record, when it is at 

variance with the certified record it references, the certified record controls.” 

Shelly Enters., Inc. v. Guadagnini, 20 A.3d 491, 494 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

As a result, we conclude that Appellant was charged on January 30, 2012.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 3121(a)(2), 3124.1, 3125(a)(1), 3125(a)(3), 

2903(a), and 2706(a)(1), respectively.

4 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of imprisonment 

of eight and one-half to 17 years for aggravated assault. On the conviction 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On December 23, 2013, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion 

asserting the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and challenging 

the discretionary aspects of sentencing. On April 22, 2014, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal on May 21, 2014.5

On appeal, Appellant presents the following three issues for our 

review.

1. Was there insufficient evidence to conclude that [] 

Appellant used forcible compulsion based on prior 

consensual sexual encounters between the victim 

and the Appellant?

2. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s 

post[-]sentence motion because the jury’s verdict 

against [] Appellant was so against the weight of 

the evidence as presented at trial so as to shock 

one’s sense of justice?

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

for rape by forcible compulsion, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term 

of imprisonment of nine and one-half to 19 years. On the conviction for 

aggravated indecent assault by forcible compulsion, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to a term of imprisonment of five to ten years. On the conviction 

for unlawful restraint, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of 

imprisonment of three and one-half to seven years. All the sentences were 

imposed to run consecutively.

5

The trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b), and Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement. 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court discusses Appellant’s challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence and directs this Court to its April 29, 2014 

opinion for its discussion of its reasons for denying Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion on the remaining issues. Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/14.
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3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing 

an unduly harsh and unreasonable sentence when 

it imposed sentences in the upper end of the 

aggravated range and ordered all sentences to be 

served consecutively because the trial court failed 

to consider Appellant’s rehabilitative needs with 

the public’s safety?

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

In his first issue, Appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence the 

Commonwealth presented to convict him of the above-mentioned charges. 

Id. at 22. Specifically, Appellant contends “in the present case, there is 

insufficient evidence to conclude that the victim did not consent to this 

conduct.” Id. at 23. Appellant argues that he and K.N. had a sexually 

active relationship that ended four days prior to the incident. Id. He claims 

that on the night of the incident, he met K.N. for drinks after which he went 

to her apartment. Id. Appellant maintains that K.N. voluntarily followed 

him to the bedroom where they engaged in consensual sex twice. Id. at 24. 

Appellant suggests “K.N. fabricated the story because she wanted to get 

back at Appellant for not reciprocating her romantic advances.” Id. at 26. 

Our standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence 

is well settled. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider 

whether the evidence presented at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the 

verdict winner, support the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 66 (Pa. 2014) (citation 
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omitted), cert. denied, Patterson v. Pennsylvania, --- S.Ct. ---, 2015 WL 

731963 (2015). “The Commonwealth can meet its burden by wholly 

circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be 

resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive 

that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the 

combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 

appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate court, we must 

review “the entire record ... and all evidence actually received[.]” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he trier of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2014). “Because evidentiary 

sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 

126 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Diamond v. Pennsylvania, 

135 S. Ct. 145 (2014).

Instantly, Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, rape by 

forcible compulsion, aggravated indecent assault by forcible compulsion, and 

unlawful restraint. A person commits aggravated assault if he “attempts to 

cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, 
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knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 

indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). 

Further, a person is guilty of rape by forcible compulsion “when the person 

engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant [b]y forcible compulsion.” 

Id. § 3121(a)(1). Additionally, a person commits aggravated indecent 

assault by forcible compulsion when the person “engages in penetration, 

however slight, of the genitals or anus of a complainant with a part of the 

person’s body for any purpose other than good faith medical, hygienic or law 

enforcement procedures ... by forcible compulsion.” Id. § 3125(a)(2). 

Finally, a person is guilty of unlawful restraint if “he knowingly ... restrains 

another unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily 

injury.” Id. § 2902(a)(1). With regards to each of these crimes, Appellant’s 

sole argument is that K.N. consented to conduct. Appellant’s Brief at 23.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 

as the verdict-winner, the evidence belies Appellant’s contention that the 

Commonwealth did not demonstrate forcible compulsion. Regardless of the 

prior sexual relationship between Appellant and K.N., our review of the 

record clearly demonstrates that the sexual assault by Appellant on 

November 4-5, 2011 was not consensual. As detailed above, Appellant 

violently assaulted K.N. against her will, both physically and sexually. 

During the assault, K.N. testified that Appellant strangled her on at least 

three occasions, beat her, and told her he was going to kill her. N.T., 
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9/3/13, at 115-126. He also digitally penetrated her and raped her twice. 

Id. at 122-126. As a result of these attacks, K.N. sustained extensive 

injuries to her neck, chest, eye, back, buttocks, scalp, genital region, both 

arms, both legs, and both hands, which were consistent with her description 

of events. N.T., 9/4/13, at 260-285. A forensic pathologist testified that 

these injuries were not consistent with consensual sex or rough sex. Id. at 

301-302, 310, 314-315. Accordingly, the totality of the evidence presented 

at trial overwhelmingly establishes the forcible, nonconsensual nature of the 

assault and clearly supports the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See Patterson, supra. As a result, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his 

first issue. See Diamond, supra.

In his second issue, Appellant contends “[t]he jury’s verdict in this 

case was against the weight of the evidence presented at trial and shocks 

one’s sense of justice.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. We begin by acknowledging 

that “[a] true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient 

evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be 

believed.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 758 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has clarified that, “[a] motion 

for a new trial alleging that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth 

v. Weathers, 95 A.3d 908, 910-911 (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting

Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2008), appeal denied, 
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106 A.3d 726 (Pa. 2014). Therefore, on appeal, the reviewing court 

“reviews the exercise of discretion, not the underlying question whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Id. Indeed, it is well 

established that it is for the factfinder to determine the weight given to the 

evidence produced at trial. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206, 

212 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Because it is the role of the 

factfinder to weigh the evidence, an appellant seeking to challenge the 

weight of the evidence carries a heavy burden.

If the factfinder returns a guilty verdict, and if a 

criminal defendant then files a motion for a new trial 

on the basis that the verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence, a trial court is not to grant relief 

unless the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as 

to shock one’s sense of justice. 

Id. at 212-213. We also highlight that “[a] new trial is not warranted 

because of a mere conflict in the testimony and must have a stronger 

foundation than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses.” 

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, --- A.3d ---, 2015 WL 252446, at *8 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). “[O]nly where the facts and inferences disclose a palpable 

abuse of discretion will the denial of a motion for a new trial based on the 

weight of the evidence be upset on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Morales, 

91 A.3d 80, 91 (Pa. 2014) (emphasis in original, citation omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant claims that the evidence was inconsistent and “not 

indicative of a forcible sexual encounter.” Id. Instead, Appellant maintains 

the weight of the evidence shows a sexual encounter that “got out of hand 
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and [was] too rough, but ... did not rise to the level of a nonconsensual 

sexual experience.” Id. at 28. Specifically, Appellant claims there was no 

history of violence in the relationship, K.N. invited Appellant to her house 

after the two met for drinks that evening, and neither she nor her parents 

initially wanted the police involved. Id. at 28-31.

However, the jury heard the evidence of Appellant’s physical and 

sexual assault on K.N. as detailed above, and was free to find K.N.’s 

testimony credible and resolve any inconsistencies in the Commonwealth’s 

favor. The jury was free to find that the sexual encounter was not 

consensual. See Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 286 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (concluding weight of the evidence claim could not prevail as “the jury 

resolved the inconsistencies among the testimonies as it saw fit and reached 

a verdict[]”), appeal denied, 102 A.3d 984 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate 

court, we will not reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that 

of the factfinder. Commonwealth v. Serrano, 61 A.3d 279, 289 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citation omitted). The trial court thoroughly reviewed 

Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence and concluded, “it is 

clear that the verdict is not so contrary to the evidence as to shock the 

conscience, and a new trial is not warranted.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/14, 

at 10. Based on these considerations, we conclude the trial court did not 

commit a palpable abuse of discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a 
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new trial based on the weight of the evidence. See Morales, supra. 

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his second issue.

Appellant’s third issue raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects 

of sentencing. Appellant’s Brief at 31. We begin by noting our well-settled 

standard of review.

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion 

of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is 

not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the 

record, that the sentencing court ignored or 

misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for 

reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014).

It is well settled that, with regard to the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing, there is no 

automatic right to appeal. [Therefore, b]efore we 

reach the merits of this issue, we must engage in a 

four part analysis to determine: (1) whether the 

appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his 

issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a 

concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary 

aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise 

statement raises a substantial question that the 

sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code. 

The third and fourth of these requirements arise 

because Appellant’s attack on his sentence is not an 

appeal as of right. Rather, he must petition this 

Court, in his concise statement of reasons, to grant 

consideration of his appeal on the grounds that there 

is a substantial question. [I]f the appeal satisfies 
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each of these four requirements, we will then 

proceed to decide the substantive merits of the case.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 329-330 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013).

Instantly, Appellant has met the first two requirements by filing a 

timely notice of appeal and by raising his sentencing claim in his postsentence motion. However, Appellant’s brief does not include a Rule 2119(f) 

statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. Nevertheless, 

because the Commonwealth does not object to this procedural defect, we 

will not find waiver. See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 759 

(Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014). Consequently, 

we must determine whether Appellant has presented a substantial question 

that his sentence is inappropriate under the sentencing code. See 

Edwards, supra.

Appellant asserts that his sentence of 261⁄2 to 53 years’ imprisonment 

was “in the aggravated range at each count, with all sentences running 

consecutively[,]” which “was excessive[,] and the trial court’s refusal to 

downwardly modify the sentence was in error.” Id. at 34-35. Specifically, 

Appellant contends that the trial court failed to impose an individualized 

sentence when it departed from the probation office’s recommendation of 16 

to 36 years’ and instead punished Appellant based on the circumstances of 

the crime alone. Id. at 35-36, citing Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 

12, 13 (Pa. 1988). This Court has held that “a claim that the [trial] court 
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erred by imposing an aggravated range sentence without consideration of 

mitigating circumstances raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. 

Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (citation 

omitted). We therefore proceed to review the merits of Appellant’s claim.

Appellant asserts that “the trial court’s refusal to follow th[e] 

recommendation [of the probation office] was in error when balancing the 

protection of the public with his rehabilitative needs.” Appellant’s Brief at 

36. Specifically, Appellant cites his successful completion of his last period 

of state parole supervision as well as his incarceration while pending trial in 

this case for 736 days without any documented disciplinary problems. Id. at 

35. Appellant claims this “demonstrate[s] that he is amenable to 

rehabilitation and complies with probation and prison authorities.” Id.

After conducting our own review of Appellant’s claim, along with a 

review of the sentencing hearing, we conclude the trial court’s sentence was 

appropriate. The trial court noted that it “consider[ed] the protection of the 

public and [Appellant]’s rehabilitative needs, as well as various other 

factors,” including the following. Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/14, at 11.

 The [p]re-[s]entence [i]nvestigation report 

submitted by the York County Probation 

Department; []

 The statement by the victim, [K.N.] (both verbal 

and written); []

 Argument by [Appellant’s] [c]ounsel; []

 The statement by [Appellant]; []
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 Argument by the Commonwealth; []

 The fact that [Appellant] is not RRRI eligible and 

that the Commonwealth was not willing to waive 

that ineligibility; []

 The mitigated range sentence, standard range 

sentence, and aggravated range sentence for 

each crime [Appellant] was convicted of; []

 The Offense Gravity Score (OGS) for each 

offense; []

 The fact that the Prior Record Score (PRS) is a 5; 

and

 The manner, nature and circumstances 

surrounding the crimes committed by [Appellant] 

(the sentencing [j]udge is also the [j]udge who 

presided over the trial and heard all the 

evidence).

Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted). The trial court noted that it took into 

account Appellant’s and the Commonwealth’s arguments as well as the 

sentencing memoranda. Further, it took into account the York County 

Probation Department pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). It is 

axiomatic that where “the sentencing court had the benefit of a [PSI], we 

can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information 

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along 

with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 

912, 919 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 

appeal denied, 25 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, Rhoades v. 

Pennsylvania, 132 S.Ct. 1746 (2012). The trial court also noted 
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Appellant’s refusal to cooperate with the probation department in the 

preparation of the PSI. N.T., 12/16/13, at 9. The PSI noted “Paul McKenzie 

declined to make any statement on this matter and plans to appeal his 

conviction[.]” Id. Thus, to the extent that the PSI was incomplete, it was a 

result of Appellant’s unwillingness to participate in the PSI process. Further, 

the trial court delineated the following reasons for imposing an aggravated 

range sentence. 

We note that we have imposed aggravated 

range sentences on the [Appellant] in this case 

because of the vicious and prolonged nature of the 

attacks [Appellant] committed on someone who 

trusted him. We find that the aggravated range 

sentences are called for because the offender 

inflicted extreme mental cruelty on the victim during 

the course of the commission of his crimes; that he 

inflicted extreme physical cruelty on the victim 

during that same period of time; that he injured the 

victim; that the victim’s injuries substantially were in 

excess of the minimum necessary to prove the 

crimes committed; that the victim was in a position 

of trust and confidence of [Appellant]; that 

[Appellant] is a danger to society; that [Appellant] 

had just very recently completed a parole 

supervision or probation supervision on prior criminal 

charges; that [Appellant] has been subject to 

previous incarceration; that [Appellant], given the 

nature of his criminal record and his actions in 

regards to the crimes he committed in this case, is a 

poor candidate for rehabilitation; that the 

prosecution recommended the sentences imposed; 

and that any lesser sentence imposed upon 

[Appellant], given the nature and circumstances of 

the crimes he committed, would depreciate the 

seriousness of those crimes and the manner in which 

he committed them. I don’t think it’s inappropriate 

to liken what [Appellant] did to this victim as 

torture, threatened to kill, choked her, restrained 
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her, chased after her when she tried to escape, 

injured her, raped her, and did so over a long period 

of time.

N.T., 12/16/13, at 11. 

The foregoing clearly demonstrates that the trial court was fully aware 

of all of the mitigating circumstances. The trial court acknowledged it was 

going beyond the standard sentencing guideline recommendations and 

imposing a sentence in the aggravated range and noted its reasons for doing 

so on the record. Specifically, the trial court addressed Appellant’s prior 

completion of state parole supervision, which Appellant asserts as a reason 

for a mitigated sentence. It viewed that fact, among others, as showing 

Appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation. The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion simply because it drew the opposite inference from this fact as 

Appellant desired. See Raven, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant in this case. 

Id. Appellant is therefore not entitled to relief on his third issue. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s claims are meritless. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s December 16, 2014 judgment of 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2015