Filed 04/06/20 by Clerk of Supreme Court 

IN THE SUPREME COURT 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA 

2020 ND 77 

Wendy Michele Willprecht, Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee 

 v. 

Kevin John Willprecht, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant 

No. 20190201 

 Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, 

the Honorable John C. Irby, Judge. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice, in which Chief Justice Jensen and 

Justices VandeWalle and Crothers joined. Justice McEvers filed an opinion 

concurring specially. 

Jason W. McLean, Fargo, N.D., for plaintiff, appellant, and cross-appellee. 

Robert J. Schultz, Fargo, N.D., for defendant, appellee, and cross-appellant. 
1 

Willprecht v. Willprecht 

No. 20190201 

Tufte, Justice. 

[¶1] Wendy Willprecht appeals and Kevin Willprecht cross-appeals from a 

judgment granting the parties a divorce, distributing the marital estate, 

awarding primary residential responsibility for the parties’ children, and 

ordering child support. We conclude the district court’s property distribution 

is not clearly erroneous, but the court erred in calculating Kevin Willprecht’s 

child support obligation. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 

I 

[¶2] Wendy and Kevin Willprecht were married in 1999. They had four minor 

children together at the time of the divorce trial. Kevin Willprecht is a selfemployed farmer, and the parties acquired farmland throughout the marriage. 

In 2018, Wendy Willprecht sued for divorce. 

[¶3] The parties stipulated Wendy Willprecht will have primary residential 

responsibility for the children and Kevin Willprecht will have parenting time. 

The district court adopted the parties’ stipulation and incorporated it in the 

divorce judgment. 

[¶4] The district court held a bench trial on the remaining issues, including 

property division, spousal support, and child support. The court distributed 

the parties’ property and debts and awarded Wendy Willprecht a net property 

award of $2,076,302 and Kevin Willprecht a net property award of $3,562,998. 

The court calculated Kevin Willprecht’s child support obligation and ordered 

him to pay $3,092 per month in child support. The court concluded no spousal 

support was required and ordered each party would be responsible for their 

own attorney’s fees. 

II 

[¶5] Kevin Willprecht moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing Wendy 

Willprecht has accepted substantial benefits of the judgment. He argues that 

Wendy Willprecht accepted the real estate she was awarded, she sent letters 
2 

demanding he pay the credit card and bank debt, she threatened contempt if 

he did not pay the debt, and she demanded the rental income from farmland 

and half of the crop-price protection payment immediately even though no due 

date was set in the judgment. He contends Wendy Willprecht waived the right 

to appeal by accepting over $1 million in assets and taking affirmative steps to 

receive the benefits by drafting the deeds and requesting immediate payment. 

[¶6] Generally, one waives the right to appeal by unconditionally, voluntarily, 

and consciously accepting a substantial benefit from a divorce judgment. Tuhy 

v. Tuhy, 2018 ND 53, ¶ 7, 907 N.W.2d 351. A party moving to dismiss the 

appeal must clearly establish waiver of the right to appeal by the other party. 

Id. This Court has sharply limited the waiver rule in divorce cases. Id. We 

have said: 

The party objecting to the appeal has the burden of showing the 

benefit accepted by the appealing party is one which the party 

would not be entitled to without the decree. There must be unusual 

circumstances, demonstrating prejudice to the movant, or a very 

clear intent on the part of the appealing party to accept the 

judgment and waive the right to appeal, to keep this Court from 

reaching the merits of the appeal. 

Id.

[¶7] Kevin Willprecht does not allege he is prejudiced. Wendy Willprecht 

argues she should receive a greater share of the property as well as spousal 

support. Kevin Willprecht does not argue that the district court erred in 

distributing the marital estate or that Wendy Willprecht is entitled to less than 

she was awarded. Wendy Willprecht did not receive and accept any benefits 

that she would not be entitled to receive if the judgment were reversed. See 

Eberle v. Eberle, 2009 ND 107, ¶ 24, 766 N.W.2d 477; Sommers v. Sommers, 

2003 ND 77, ¶ 6, 660 N.W.2d 586. Kevin Willprecht has not established that 

Wendy Willprecht clearly waived the right to appeal. We deny his motion to 

dismiss the appeal. 
3 

III 

[¶8] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred in distributing the 

marital estate. 

A 

[¶9] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred in determining the 

value of the parties’ property. She contends the court misapplied N.D.C.C. 

§ 14-05-24, the parties agreed to the valuation for some of the property but did 

not reach an agreement on the valuation for other property, and the court used 

a different valuation date to determine the value of the other property. She 

claims the agreed-to valuation date must be used for all of the parties’ property 

and different dates cannot be used for different property. 

[¶10] A district court’s findings on the value of marital property will not be 

reversed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Lee v. Lee, 2019 ND 142, 

¶ 6, 927 N.W.2d 104. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an 

erroneous view of the law, there is no evidence to support it, or, on the entire 

record, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been 

made. Id. “A choice between two permissible views of the evidence is not 

clearly erroneous if the [district] court’s findings are based either on physical 

or documentary evidence, or inferences from other facts, or on credibility 

determinations.” Id. (quoting Hoverson v. Hoverson, 2001 ND 124, ¶ 13, 629 

N.W.2d 573). The court’s valuation depends on the evidence the parties 

present. Lee, at ¶ 6. 

[¶11] The district court found the parties agreed on the value of many assets, 

but they disagreed about the values of the business assets, particularly the 

harvested crops in storage. The court found there were three potential dates 

to use for valuation: “[t]he date of separation (December 2017), the date that 

the action was initiated (May 2018), and the date of trial (March 3, 2019).” The 

court decided to use the date of separation, finding Kevin’s valuation as of that 

date was the most “well-supported” by the evidence. 
4 

[¶12] Section 14-05-24(1), N.D.C.C., governs the district court’s distribution of 

the marital estate, including the valuation of marital property, stating: 

When a divorce is granted, the court shall make an equitable 

distribution of the property and debts of the parties. Except as may 

be required by federal law for specific property, and subject to the 

power of the court to determine a date that is just and equitable, 

the valuation date for marital property is the date mutually agreed 

upon between the parties. If the parties do not mutually agree 

upon a valuation date, the valuation date for marital property is 

the date of service of a summons in an action for divorce or 

separation or the date on which the parties last separated, 

whichever occurs first. 

[¶13] The primary purpose in interpreting a statute is to determine the 

legislature’s intent. Markegard v. Willoughby, 2019 ND 170, ¶ 9, 930 N.W.2d 

108. We interpret statutes as a whole and harmonize them to give meaning to 

related provisions. Baker v. Autos, Inc., 2019 ND 82, ¶ 10, 924 N.W.2d 441. 

We construe statutes to give effect to each provision, so no part is rendered 

inoperative or superfluous. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-38. We give meaning and effect to 

every word, phrase, and sentence. Baker, at ¶ 10. We give words in a statute 

their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless they are 

defined by statute or a contrary intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. 

“When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of 

it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” N.D.C.C. 

§ 1-02-05. 

[¶14] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1) states that the valuation 

date “is the date mutually agreed upon between the parties.” If the parties do 

not agree upon a valuation date, the valuation date “is the date of service of a 

summons . . . or the date on which the parties last separated, whichever occurs 

first.” The statute does not preclude an agreement to different valuation dates 

for different items of property. If the parties agree to a valuation date only for 

some property and not for other property, the statutory default will supply the 

date for valuing the other property. 
5 

[¶15] Here, the parties agreed to the same valuations for most of the assets in 

the marital estate. For the assets the parties were unable to agree on, the 

district court determined the value of the property as of the date of separation, 

which was the default under the statute. The court did not misapply N.D.C.C. 

§ 14-05-24. 

B 

[¶16] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred by failing to value and 

include the 2018 crop in the property distribution. She contends the court 

should have used the crop insurance to determine the value of the crop because 

the evidence established the crops were insured under revenue protection crop 

insurance and guaranteed Kevin Willprecht would receive at least a set 

amount for the crops. 

[¶17] The district court used the date of the parties’ separation to determine 

the value of property that the parties were unable to agree upon, including the 

crops. The court found the parties separated in December 2017. The 2018 crop 

did not exist at the time of the separation. The court did not err by failing to 

include the 2018 crops in the property distribution. 

C 

[¶18] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court’s distribution of the marital 

estate was inequitable and is not supported by the court’s findings. She claims 

Kevin Willprecht received a net award of $3,562,998 and she received a net 

award of $2,076,302, including a $750,000 equalization payment, which is a 

difference of $1,486,696. She contends the court’s explanation for the 

substantial disparity is inadequate because it did not address her contribution 

to the marriage, Kevin Willprecht’s behavior and noneconomic fault, or the 

400% gains in the value of the farmland. 

[¶19] A district court’s property distribution will not be reversed unless the 

court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Swanson v. Swanson, 2019 ND 25, 

¶ 5, 921 N.W.2d 666. The district court must make an equitable property 

distribution. N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). The court must include all of the parties’ 
6 

assets and debts in the marital estate and then consider the Ruff-Fischer

guidelines to determine an equitable distribution. Swanson, at ¶ 6. The RuffFischer guidelines include the following factors: 

[T]he respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the 

duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the 

marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of 

each, their health and physical condition, their financial 

circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its 

value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether 

accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters 

as may be material. 

Lee, 2019 ND 142, ¶ 12, 927 N.W.2d 104 (quoting Schultz v. Schultz, 2018 ND 

259, ¶ 27, 920 N.W.2d 483). The court is not required to make specific findings 

for each factor, but it must specify a rationale for its decision. Lee, at ¶ 12. 

The distribution does not need to be equal to be equitable, but a substantial 

disparity must be explained. Swanson, at ¶ 9. 

[¶20] The district court found Wendy Willprecht was 42 years old and Kevin 

Willprecht was 45 years old at the time of the trial, they were married in 1999, 

they own a parcel of real property containing the marital home, and they also 

own several hundred acres of farmland. The court found Kevin Willprecht is a 

self-employed farmer; he is the sole owner of a family farm corporation, which 

owns the farm equipment and conducts the farming operations; and he owns 

the farmland the corporation farms and he collects the rent on the land. The 

parties agreed they would include the assets and liabilities held by the 

corporation with their own assets and liabilities instead of trying to place a 

value on the shares of stock in the corporation. The court found: 

Kevin farmed for several years prior to the marriage. With 

the exception of a quarter section of property located in Cass 

County purchased by the parties after the marriage, the farmland 

came from Kevin’s family and was either purchased at a discount 

or was gifted, outright, to Kevin. In particular, the tracts described 

in the Rule 8.3 listing as Tracts 9 and 7 described as the South half 

of the Southwest quarter of Section 8 and the North half section of 

the Northwest quarter Section 17, Township 130 North, Range 53 
7 

West, had a valuation agreed upon by the parties of $864,273. 

These tracts were a gift from Kevin’s parents. 

The court awarded Kevin Willprecht most of the farmland, vehicles, crops, 

personal property in his possession, farm equipment, and all of the parties’ 

debts. The court awarded Wendy Willprecht the marital home, a quarter 

section of real property, her vehicle, an IRA, half of the crop protection 

payment, and the personal property in her possession. The court further 

ordered Kevin Willprecht to make an equalization payment of $750,000 to 

Wendy Willprecht. The court ordered the equalization payment be made in 

fifteen annual installments with three percent interest, for payment in the 

amount of $62,825 per installment, starting April 1, 2020. 

[¶21] The district court explained the disparity, stating: 

The ending result of the division of property is that the 

plaintiff will receive approximately 37 percent and the defendant 

will receive approximately 63 percent of the net marital estate. 

When considering the outright gifts of Tracts 7 and 9 from Kevin’s 

parents to Kevin for land valued in this divorce at $864,273, 

Kevin’s testimony that other gifts were given by his parents to him, 

and that other land purchased from his parents was purchased at 

a discounted price, any disparity has been accounted for. The 

Court also takes into account that crop assets are essentially 

“double counted.” While crops are an asset, crops are also next 

year’s income and have been used to calculate Kevin’s income for 

child support purposes. 

. . . . 

The Court finds that the division of property, while not 

equal, is equitable and is in line with the Ruff-Fischer Guidelines. 

Taking into account the outright gift of property from Kevin’s 

family to him valued now at $864,273, discounted land purchases, 

other gifts, and the “double counting” of crop assets, there is no 

real substantial disparity in the assets awarded to each party. 

[¶22] “[S]eparate property, whether inherited or otherwise, must initially be 

included in the marital estate, and [this Court has] never held that property 

brought into a marriage or acquired by gift or inheritance by one spouse, be 

irrevocably set aside to that spouse.” Swanson, 2019 ND 25, ¶ 9, 921 N.W.2d 
8 

666. But the property’s origin is one factor the court may consider. Id. This 

Court has recognized “‘the importance of preserving the viability of a business 

operation like a family farm,’ and ‘liquidation of an ongoing farming operation 

or business is ordinarily a last resort.’” Id. at ¶ 10 (quoting Rebel v. Rebel, 2016 

ND 144, ¶ 11, 882 N.W.2d 256). 

[¶23] The district court explained Kevin Willprecht’s parents gifted him some 

of the farmland and sold him other land at a discounted price. The farmland 

is used in the farming operation. The court considered the source of the 

property and the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. The court allocated most of the 

farmland and all of the parties’ debt to Kevin Willprecht, and also ordered him 

to pay $750,000 to Wendy Willprecht as an equalization payment. The court 

adequately explained the disparity in the distribution. The court’s distribution 

was not induced by an erroneous view of the law, and the evidence supports 

the court’s findings. 

[¶24] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred by making the 

equalization payment over time and delaying the payment for one year without 

explanation. When an equalization payment is ordered, the court may award 

interest at any appropriate rate and may order the beginning of the payments 

on any appropriate date. Schultz, 2018 ND 259, ¶ 29, 920 N.W.2d 483. A court 

has discretion in setting the rate of interest and the beginning date. Id. The 

district court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, 

or unconscionable manner, when it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or 

when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a 

reasoned determination. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

deciding the starting date of the equalization payments. 

[¶25] We affirm the district court’s property division, concluding it is not 

clearly erroneous. 

IV 

[¶26] Wendy and Kevin Willprecht argue the district court erred in calculating 

Kevin Willprecht’s child support obligation. 
9 

[¶27] Child support determinations involve questions of law, which are 

fully reviewable, findings of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard, 

and in some areas, matters of discretion subject to the abuse of discretion 

standard. Minyard v. Lindseth, 2019 ND 180, ¶ 6, 930 N.W.2d 626. The child 

support guidelines, N.D. Admin. Code ch. 75-02-04.1, govern child support 

determinations. Thompson v. Johnson, 2018 ND 142, ¶ 9, 912 N.W.2d 315. “A 

court errs as a matter of law if it does not comply with the requirements of the 

child support guidelines.” Wolt v. Wolt, 2019 ND 155, ¶ 5, 930 N.W.2d 589. 

A 

[¶28] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court failed to properly apply the 

child support guidelines to determine Kevin Willprecht’s child support 

obligation. She claims the court should have determined a five-year average 

of Kevin Willprecht’s income from self-employment, instead of the three-year 

average the court used. 

[¶29] A correct finding of net income is necessary to calculate the proper 

amount of support. Minyard, 2019 ND 180, ¶ 7, 930 N.W.2d 626. Section 75-

02-04.1-01(6), N.D. Admin. Code, defines net income and explains certain 

amounts are deducted from the obligor’s gross income to determine the net 

income. Gross income is defined as “income from any source, in any form,” 

except for certain specific exclusions. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-01(4). 

After the district court determines an obligor’s net income, the court applies 

that amount to the guidelines to calculate the child support obligation. 

Thompson, 2018 ND 142, ¶ 9, 912 N.W.2d 315. The amount of child support 

calculated under the guidelines is “rebuttably presumed to be the correct 

amount of child support[.]” N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-13. 

[¶30] Income must be documented through the use of tax returns, wage 

statements, and other information to fully apprise the court of all gross income. 

N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-02(7). “Where gross income is subject to 

fluctuation, regardless of whether the obligor is employed or self-employed, 

information reflecting and covering a period of time sufficient to reveal the 

likely extent of fluctuations must be provided.” Id. Recent past circumstances 

are generally a reliable indicator of future circumstances concerning income. 
10 

N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-02(8). “If circumstances that materially affect 

the child support obligation have changed in the recent past or are very likely 

to change in the near future, consideration may be given to the new or likely 

future circumstances.” Id. “A district court cannot arbitrarily ignore the 

guidelines simply because it feels the obligor’s tax returns do not reasonably 

reflect the obligor’s income without ordering the parties to present more 

information and making specific findings of fact.” Thompson, 2018 ND 142, 

¶ 10, 912 N.W.2d 315. 

[¶31] Section 75-02-04.1-05, N.D. Admin. Code, applies to determine net 

income from self-employment, stating: 

Self-employment activities may experience significant changes in 

production and income over time. To the extent that information 

is reasonably available, the average of the most recent five years 

of each self-employment activity, if undertaken on a substantially 

similar scale, must be used to determine self-employment income. 

When self-employment activity has not been operated on a 

substantially similar scale for five years, a shorter period may be 

used. 

N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-05(4). 

[¶32] The district court found: 

Taking into account the current agricultural conditions and the 

fact that no evidence was provided that would indicate that these 

conditions would change in the near future, Kevin’s three-year 

income average is appropriate under the law and guidelines to be 

used to base his child support calculation. 

After reducing Kevin Willprecht’s three-year average income by the amount of 

the rent for the property in Cass County that was awarded to Wendy 

Willprecht, the court found Kevin Willprecht’s income for child support 

purposes is $144,078. 

[¶33] Wendy Willprecht presented the parties’ joint tax returns for 2013 

through 2017 showing Kevin Willprecht’s income from the farming operation 

and land rentals. Kevin Willprecht presented the farm corporation’s tax 
11 

returns for 2012 through 2017 and his 2018 individual tax return. The parties 

presented sufficient evidence for the district court to calculate a five-year 

average of Kevin Willprecht’s self-employment income, but the court found a 

three-year average would be appropriate given current agricultural conditions. 

We have said, “The guidelines must be applied using common sense and in 

consideration of the circumstances.” Brew v. Brew, 2017 ND 242, ¶ 28, 903 

N.W.2d 72 (quoting Rathbun v. Rathbun, 2017 ND 24, ¶ 9, 889 N.W.2d 855). 

It is not clear what evidence in the record the court was referring to. The court 

did not make sufficient findings supporting its decision to calculate the child 

support obligation on a three-year average of Kevin Willprecht’s selfemployment income. 

[¶34] The district court erred by failing to make sufficient findings to support 

using a three-year average to determine Kevin Willprecht’s self-employment 

income to calculate his child support obligation. 

B 

[¶35] Wendy and Kevin Willprecht argue the district court erred by failing to 

include a child support step-down provision and ordering Kevin Willprecht’s 

child support obligation would not be reduced as each child reaches the age of 

majority. They argue the court’s decision does not comply with the child 

support guidelines and the court cannot refuse to order a step-down in the 

amount of support as each child reaches the age of majority to alleviate the 

need for spousal support. 

[¶36] The district court ordered: 

Kevin shall pay Three Thousand Ninety-Two Dollars 

($3,092) per month child support for the minor children 

commencing May 1, 2019, and continuing on or before the 1st day 

of each month thereafter until such time as each child reaches the 

age of 18, marries, dies, or is emancipated. The child support 

obligation is based upon the North Dakota Child Support 

Guidelines and Kevin’s net monthly income of $8,205. 

. . . . 
12 

Kevin will not be entitled to “step down” calculations of his child 

support obligation as each child become ineligible for child support. 

The Court makes this determination in conjunction with the 

decision not to award spousal support as set forth below. 

[¶37] The district court is limited in the ability to award post-minority child 

support to circumstances under which the parents have a statutory legal duty 

to support adult children. See N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08.2; Larson v. Larson, 2005 

ND 67, ¶¶ 12-15, 694 N.W.2d 13. The court erred by ordering the child support 

amount will not decrease as each child reaches the age of majority. 

C 

[¶38] The district court erred as a matter of law by failing to comply with the 

child support guidelines. We therefore reverse the court’s child support 

decision and remand for the court to recalculate Kevin Willprecht’s selfemployment income according to the most recent five years or make sufficient 

findings to support using a three-year average and to include a step-down 

calculation. 

V 

[¶39] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred by denying her request 

for spousal support. She contends that the court did not properly consider her 

need for support and Kevin Willprecht’s ability to pay and that the court 

improperly tied its decision on spousal support to its child support decision. 

[¶40] A decision about spousal support is subject to the clearly erroneous 

standard of review. Schmuck v. Schmuck, 2016 ND 87, ¶ 6, 882 N.W.2d 918. 

In deciding whether spousal support is appropriate, the court must consider 

the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, the needs of the spouse seeking support, and the 

ability of the other spouse to pay. Id. Property distribution and spousal 

support are interrelated and often must be considered together. Id.

[¶41] The district court denied Wendy Willprecht’s request for spousal 

support. The court considered the Ruff-Fischer factors. The court also made 
13 

findings about Wendy Willprecht’s need for support and Kevin Willprecht’s 

ability to pay, stating: 

Wendy works part-time for Sargent County at Emergency 

Management and occasionally substitute teaches. Her income is 

approximately $2,100 per month. She is also provided with a 

single health insurance coverage. She will also be netting 

approximately $19,333 in farm rent. Her annual earned income 

($2,100 x 12) and her farm rent, $19,333 is $44,533. Kevin’s 

annual projected income, before taxes is $144,078. From this 

amount he will be paying approximately $24,000 in health 

insurance premiums. Kevin’s annual child support obligation will 

exceed $36,000 per year. In addition, he will be making an 

equalization payment annually to Wendy in the amount of 

approximately $63,000. As a result, Wendy will have more 

spendable income available to her household than Kevin. Kevin is 

obligated to pay all of the debts of the parties. Wendy has a quality 

home with no mortgage obligation against it. Her vehicle is paid 

for. The Court did not include any “step-down” calculations for 

Kevin’s child support. This was done deliberately by the Court in 

light of the income disparity of the parties. 

The court concluded it would not award either party spousal support. 

[¶42] The district court explained that its decision not to include a step-down 

calculation for the child support and modify the obligation as the children each 

reach the age of majority was done deliberately to compensate for the disparity 

in the parties’ incomes. The court’s decision indicates the child support amount 

is to equitably balance the burdens of the divorce. This is improper. See Stock 

v. Stock, 2016 ND 1, ¶ 23, 873 N.W.2d 38. Child support is for the care and 

maintenance of the minor child, and spousal support is intended to equalize 

the burdens of the divorce. Id.; see also N.D.C.C. § 14-09-08 (stating parents 

have a duty to support their children). As we explained in Stock, if the court 

found Wendy Willprecht established a need for $3,092 per month but Kevin 

Willprecht currently lacks the ability to pay that amount, the court should 

have explicitly stated as much. See Stock, at ¶ 23. 
14 

[¶43] Because the district court tied its spousal support decision to its child 

support decision and we are reversing the child support decision and 

remanding for the court to include a step-down calculation for the child 

support, we are unable to properly review the spousal support decision. We 

reverse the court’s spousal support decision and remand for reconsideration. 

VI 

[¶44] Wendy Willprecht argues the district court erred by failing to award her 

attorney’s fees. She claims the court failed to adequately explain its decision 

denying her request for attorney’s fees. 

[¶45] The district court has discretion to award attorney’s fees in divorce 

proceedings under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23. See Heinle v. Heinle, 2010 ND 5, ¶ 32, 

777 N.W.2d 590. The district court’s decision will not be reversed on appeal 

unless the court abused its discretion. Id. We have explained the district court 

must balance the requesting party’s need for attorney’s fees against the other 

party’s ability to pay. Id. “The court should consider the property owned by 

each party, their relative incomes, whether property is liquid or fixed assets, 

and whether the action of either party unreasonably increased the time spent 

on the case.” Id. (quoting Reiser v. Reiser, 2001 ND 6, ¶ 15, 621 N.W.2d 348). 

[¶46] Wendy Willprecht requested attorney’s fees, arguing that Kevin 

Willprecht has the ability to pay and that she demonstrated her need for fees 

through her testimony and other evidence. The district court denied her 

request, stating, “Each party will be responsible for their own attorney’s fees.” 

The court did not provide any further explanation. 

[¶47] Because the district court did not adequately explain its decision denying 

Wendy Willprecht’s request for attorney’s fees, we are unable to determine 

whether the court properly considered the factors and whether it properly 

applied the law. Deyle v. Deyle, 2012 ND 248, ¶ 23, 825 N.W.2d 245. We 

remand for reconsideration and for the court to make adequate findings 

explaining its decision. 
15 

VII 

[¶48] We have considered the remaining issues and arguments and determine 

they are either unnecessary to our decision or are without merit. We affirm 

the judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

[¶49] Jerod E. Tufte 

Gerald W. VandeWalle 

Daniel J. Crothers 

Jon J. Jensen, C.J. 

McEvers, Justice, concurring specially. 

[¶50] I agree with and join the majority in sections I, II, IV, V, VI, and VII. I 

concur specially in section III. 

[¶51] Respectfully, I think the majority has oversimplified Wendy Willprecht’s 

argument by stating “[s]he claims the agreed-to valuation date must be used 

for all of the parties’ property and different dates cannot be used for different 

property.” Majority, at ¶ 9. Wendy Willprecht argued that N.D.C.C. § 14-05-

24 was ambiguous. In her argument regarding the interpretation following 

the amendment of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24, she states: 

However, it is unclear what happens when some valuation dates 

are agreed to and others are not. 

The plain language of the statute refers to a singular 

valuation date for the marital property. N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). It 

does not appear to account for situations where the parties may 

agree on values from one date and then attempt to apply different 

valuation dates to other properties that will benefit his or her 

claim. In interpreting a statute, this Court’s primary goal is to 

ascertain the intent of the legislature by first looking to the plain 

language of the statute and giving each word of the statute its 

ordinary meaning. Wilkens v. Westby, 2019 ND 186, ¶ 6, 931 

N.W.2d 229. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to meanings 

that are different, but rational. Id. Lastly, this Court presumes 

the legislature did not intend an absurd or ludicrous result or 

unjust consequences, and it construes statutes in a practical 
16 

manner, giving consideration to the context of the statutes and the 

purpose for which they were enacted. Id.

Moreover, the District Court also expressed a level of 

uncertainty with regard to this statute. At one point the District 

Court stated that it was afforded some level of flexibility and that 

it is not bound by the initiation of the action. Later, when 

discussing the admissibility of crop insurance information found in 

Exhibit 26, Kevin argued that the legislature provided a set 

timeframe for valuation. Wendy provided a counter-argument 

that in a situation where a party could manipulate values―such as 

the nature of farming―relying solely on the date of separation 

without discretion would produce a result that was not intended 

by the legislature. The District Court overruled Kevin’s objection 

as to the line of questioning. However, both Kevin and Wendy 

made claims that were rational within the meaning of the statute. 

There is ambiguity in N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24 (1). . . . To allow for the 

use of one date, agreed upon after the date of commencement of 

the action for some property, while allowing for a party to withhold 

agreement on the valuation of other property on that same date 

because it may not benefit him or her, would lead to a ludicrous 

and unjust result. 

In cases where there are issues as to valuation dates and

agreed upon valuations, the reasonable application of the statu[t]e 

is not to apply separate dates for each piece of property. Rather, 

the logical approach would be to use the date that was agreed to or 

the valuation closest to that date. In applying different valuation 

dates to different properties, when the majority of the property was 

valued post-commencement, the District Court committed an error 

as a matter of law. It committed that error because the statute 

itself is flawed and ambiguous. 

[¶52] I agree with Wendy Willprecht that the statute is ambiguous. I also 

agree that a party may withhold agreement on the valuation of certain 

property because it may not benefit him or her, which may lead to a ludicrous 

and unjust result. However, I disagree with her that reversal is required. 

[¶53] I maintain my previous position that the statute is ambiguous and that 

the legislature intended to give district court’s discretion in deciding the 

valuation date when parties do not agree under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). 

Messmer v. Messmer, 2020 ND 62, ¶¶ 24-29 (McEvers, Justice, concurring in 
17 

part and dissenting in part). If the court has discretion on the valuation date, 

the gamesmanship described by Wendy Willprecht can be dealt with to avoid 

a ludicrous or unjust result. 

[¶54] The district court appears to have applied its discretion rather than 

deciding it must use the earliest date provided in N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1). In 

its memorandum opinion, the court stated: 

The purpose of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24 is to give the Court a frame of 

reference in which to value an otherwise potentially moving target. 

Farms are somewhat unique in that a crop in the ground is valued 

is differently than crop in the bin. The Court sees three potential 

dates for valuation. The date of separation (December 2017), the 

date that the action was initiated (May 2018), and the date of trial 

(March 3, 2019). None of these three dates involve growing crop. 

It could be argued that some crop was in the ground in May of 

2018. Only speculative evidence was presented to the Court as to 

what was actually in the ground or its value at that time. Given 

the consistency of the farming operation and the fact that growing 

crop is not in consideration, the snapshot of crop values provided 

to the Court in December 2017 is likely very consistent to what 

would be snapshot of crop values at the date of trial. Again, there 

was no evidence as to the actual value of growing crop in the 

ground in May 2018. In May 2018, much of the farm’s crop assets 

may have been in the ground. While estate tax litigators may place 

some type of income in respect of a decedent value on growing 

crops, the reality is that this is the point of time at which most crop 

assets are at risk. The Court finds Kevin’s valuation to be the most 

useful and most well-supported valuation of harvested crop assets. 

 
18 

[¶55] The parties here agreed on multiple valuation dates in regard to the 

following property: 1) personal property with an appraisal date of July 17, 

2018; 2) farmland with an appraisal date of September 14, 2018; and 3) the 

marital home with an appraisal date of October 24, 2018. They did not agree 

on which date to value the crops. While I may not have chosen the date of 

separation to value the crops, I cannot say the district court abused its 

discretion in doing so. Therefore, I concur with the majority that the district 

court, on this issue, should be affirmed. 

[¶56] Lisa Fair McEvers