STATE OF MISSOURI, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) No. SD33492 

 ) 

COURTNEY K. THOMPSON, ) Filed: April 8, 2015 

 ) 

 Defendant-Respondent. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY 

Honorable Daniel W. Imhof, Associate Circuit Judge 

DISMISSED 

 In this case, the State appeals from a docket entry which the parties 

interpret as an order granting a motion to suppress evidence. However, the 

docket entry is so vague that it does not, in fact, have the substantive effect of 

suppressing evidence. Thus, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate 

jurisdiction. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

 On September 28, 2013, at about 2:30 in the morning, Courtney K. 

Thompson ("Defendant") was operating a passenger vehicle on Kansas 

Expressway in Springfield, Missouri. Officer Andrew Webb ("Officer Webb") 

stopped Defendant's vehicle, and ultimately Defendant was charged with driving 
2 

while intoxicated and failure to drive on the right half of the roadway. See 

§§ 304.015, 577.010, RSMo Cum. Supp. (2014). 

 Defendant filed a motion to suppress all the evidence obtained after the 

traffic stop, arguing "[t]he initial stop was made without probable cause, and 

without legal justification." At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the 

evidence consisted of Officer Webb's testimony and the video recording from the 

dash cam from Officer Webb's patrol car. Officer Webb testified that when he 

first observed Defendant's vehicle the tires of the car had crossed into the other 

lane of travel. The video did not show the tires crossing into the other lane of 

travel. The parties vigorously disputed whether the evidence supported the 

conclusion that Defendant's vehicle entered the other lane of travel so as to 

provide justification for the traffic stop. 

 The trial judge took the matter under advisement and later made a docket 

entry regarding the motion to suppress. That docket entry stated: 

After reviewing the video, the court is unable to tell if [Defendant's] 

tires cross over into the inside lane of traffic, but that if they did — 

and the court does find the deputy credible at least in his belief that 

this happened — the movement of the vehicle was minor enough 

that the court believes suppressing the evidence for inadequate 

probable cause is consistent [with] the cases supplied by defense 

counsel — in evaluating whether [Defendant's] driving was 

"erratic", [sic] the court also notes there was no other traffic close to 

[Defendant][.] 

The State appealed. 

Discussion 

 "Although the parties have not raised the issue of jurisdiction, this [C]ourt 

must address it sua sponte." State v. Lilly, 410 S.W.3d 699, 701 (Mo. App. 

W.D. 2013) (quoting Maskill v. Cummins, 397 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Mo. App. W.D. 
3 

2013)). Moreover, "[t]he right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute 

does not give a right to appeal, no right exists." Id. (quoting Buemi v. 

Kerckhoff, 359 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Mo. banc 2011)). Here, the State brings the 

appeal pursuant to Section 547.200 which provides, in relevant part, that "[a]n 

appeal may be taken by the state through the prosecuting or circuit attorney from 

any order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in . . . [s]uppressing 

evidence[.]" § 547.200.1(3), RSMo (2000). This statutory provision has been 

narrowly construed. See, e.g., State v. Eisenhouer, 40 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Mo. 

banc 2001) ("The mere exclusion of evidence based on a rule of evidence does not 

have the substantive effect of a motion to suppress."); Lilly, 410 S.W.3d at 702 

(dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction where the trial court's order had the 

effect of excluding rather than suppressing evidence). 

 In the present case, the docket entry from which the State appeals does not 

have the substantive effect of suppressing evidence because it is too vague. The 

trial court's docket entry discusses Officer Webb's testimony, but its conclusion 

with respect to that issue is unclear. The State suggests the trial court's entry is a 

general finding that Officer Webb was credible. However, the trial court's precise 

language—"the court does find the deputy credible at least in his belief that this 

happened" (emphasis added)—suggests another meaning. The italicized 

qualification can also suggest the trial court found Officer Webb was mistaken in 

Officer Webb's honest belief that Defendant's tires crossed the center line. The 

additional statements in the docket entry do not provide any further clarification. 

The trial court simply discusses the case citations provided by Defendant's 

attorney without making a definitive ruling regarding the motion to suppress. 
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Rather, the trial court merely says suppression of the evidence would be 

"consistent" with those cases. The trial court never makes a final determination 

of whether to suppress or not suppress the evidence. Thus the docket entry 

appears to be merely a record of the trial court's as yet incomplete thought 

process regarding the motion to suppress. To find that this docket entry had the 

substantive effect of suppressing or not suppressing evidence would require this 

Court to supply language that simply is not contained in the docket entry. 

 The trial court's docket entry does not meet the requirements for an 

interlocutory appeal pursuant to Section 547.200.1(3), RSMo (2000). Where 

there is no statutory authority for an appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider the appeal. See Lilly, 410 S.W.3d at 701. "If this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to entertain an appeal, the appeal must be dismissed." Id. (quoting 

Walker v. Brownel, 375 S.W.3d 259, 261 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012)).

Conclusion 

 The appeal is dismissed. 

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, P.J. – OPINION AUTHOR 

NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, J. – CONCURS 

DON E. BURRELL, J. – CONCURS