J-S12016-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

NATALIO J J. ALVAREZ,

Appellant No. 434 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 30, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011943-2007

BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2015

Appellant, Natalio J J. Alvarez, appeals nunc pro tunc from the order 

entered on September 30, 2013, that denied his petition filed pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 

We affirm.

The relevant facts of this matter, as gleaned from the record, reveal 

that on August 25, 2007, E.S., who was fourteen years old, was swimming 

in a creek with some friends. N.T., 4/7/09, at 46. While at the creek, E.S. 

was introduced to Appellant. Id. at 48. At the time, Appellant was twentytwo years old. Pretrial Investigation Service Report, 10/1/07. While E.S. 

was swimming in the creek, at approximately 7:15 p.m., Appellant 

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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approached E.S. from behind. N.T., 4/7/09, at 55. E.S. testified that 

Appellant put his fingers inside her vagina, and she told him to stop. Id. 

Appellant then asked E.S. if he could put his penis inside her, and E.S. said 

no. Id. Appellant then pushed E.S.’s pants to the side and penetrated her 

vagina with his penis. Id. Appellant restrained E.S. and continued to 

penetrate her vagina for approximately twenty seconds while E.S. told him 

to stop. Id. at 60-63. After the attack, E.S. sat near the creek and cried. 

Id. at 62. The next day, E.S. told a friend about the assault. Id. at 86-73. 

On September 11, 2007, Appellant called E.S.’s mother at approximately 

2:00 a.m., and he admitted that he had touched and fondled E.S. Id. at 12-

14. E.S. and her mother went to the police on the evening of September 11, 

2007. Id. at 78. 

Appellant was arrested and, following a jury trial, he was convicted of 

unlawful contact with a minor, sexual assault, corrupting the morals of a 

minor, and indecent assault. On July 28, 2009, Appellant was sentenced to 

a term of three to six years of incarceration followed by five years of 

probation. No direct appeal was filed. 

On April 8, 2010, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel, and on March 28, 2013, Appellant filed an amended 

PCRA petition. On June 27, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a motion to 

dismiss. The PCRA court provided Appellant with notice of its intent to 

dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 on 
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September 6, 2013, and on September 30, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed 

Appellant’s petition.1 No appeal was filed. However, on December 20, 

2013, Appellant sought the reinstatement of his appellate rights. In an 

order filed on January 27, 2014, the PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s 

appellate rights nunc pro tunc, and this timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for this Court’s 

consideration:

Whether the trial court erred in denying [Appellant’s] PCRA 

petition where trial counsel failed to present a critical alibi/fact 

witness, Jonathan Lopez, on behalf of [Appellant] at trial which 

would have change [sic] the outcome of the case.

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (italics and capitalization omitted).

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA 

court’s determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 

A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 

A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The PCRA court’s findings will not be 

disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. 

____________________________________________

1

 The record reflects that there was another Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of 

intent to dismiss without a hearing filed on August 16, 2013. Regardless of 

the reason for this duplication, Appellant’s PCRA petition was not dismissed 

until September 30, 2013, which is in compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 as it 

gave Appellant twenty days in which to respond prior to the order dismissing 

the petition. 
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Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 

2001)).

When we consider an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

counsel is presumed to have provided effective representation unless the 

PCRA petitioner pleads and proves that: (1) the underlying claim is of 

arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her conduct; 

and (3) Appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s action or omission. 

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975-976 (Pa. 1987). “In order 

to meet the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness standard, a defendant 

must show that there is a ‘reasonable probability that but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.’” Commonwealth v. Reed, 42 A.3d 314, 319 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will fail if the petitioner does not 

meet any of the three prongs. Commonwealth v. Williams, 863 A.2d 

505, 513 (Pa. 2004). “The burden of proving ineffectiveness rests with 

Appellant.” Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1018 (Pa. 2007). 

To establish counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness, 

Appellant must show:

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify 

for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, 

the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to 

testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of 

the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied appellant a fair 

trial.
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Commonwealth v. Thomas, 44 A.3d 12, 23 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). 

Here, the record reflects that a man named Jonathan Lopez, was willing and 

available to testify that he was with Appellant at the creek on the date in 

question. Amended PCRA Petition, 3/28/13, Attachment 1, Statement of 

Jonathan Lopez, at ¶¶ 1-5. Mr. Lopez claimed that he was with Appellant 

the entire time they were at the creek, and that he “never saw [Appellant] 

touch the complainant or heard her complain that [Appellant] touched her.” 

Id. Additionally, Appellant attached a statement to his amended PCRA 

petition in which he alleges that he informed counsel of Mr. Lopez’s 

existence, but that counsel opted not to contact Mr. Lopez. Amended PCRA 

Petition, 3/28/13, Attachment 2, Statement of Natalio J J. Alvarez, at ¶¶ 1-

3. However, while Appellant arguably established the first four prongs of the 

test set forth above, the PCRA court concluded that the absence of Jonathan 

Lopez’s testimony was not prejudicial.

The PCRA Court explained its conclusion as follows:

The omission of Mr. Lopez’[s] purported testimony that he 

was present for an indeterminate period of time and neither 

observed nor otherwise perceived Appellant physically contacting 

the complainant was not prejudicial. Appellant’s admission to 

initiating physical contact with the complainant plainly 

diminished the import of Mr. Lopez’[s] assertion that he didn’t 

observe any touching. N.T. 4/8/09 at 109, 117-125. 

Furthermore, Mr. Lopez’[s] statement does not clearly indicate 

whether he was even present at the time of the assault; he 

imprecisely described his presence and involvement as occurring 

“in the afternoon,” being with Appellant “the entire time,” while 

evidence at trial established the assault occurred later in the 

evening. See Lopez affidavit. Given Appellant’s admitted sexual 

advances, Mr. Lopez’[s] statement can therefore be fairly 
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characterized as relating to the afternoon only, or, if he was 

‘present’ during the assault, he was not carefully monitoring 

Appellant’s interaction with the complainant. Either way, the 

presentation of testimony mirroring Mr. Lopez’[s] vaguely 

worded affidavit was unlikely to meaningfully bolster Appellant’s 

defense.

In addition to the court’s determination that Mr. Lopez’[s] 

statement, viewed as potential alibi evidence, is considerably 

weak, the Commonwealth’s evidence clearly established the 

Appellant’s guilt. The complainant, whom the jury found to be a 

credible witness, provided detailed testimony of the assault. As 

thoroughly detailed in the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss, 

the corroborating testimony of various witnesses as well as 

Appellant’s repeated proclamations of wrongdoing further 

supported the court’s finding that Mr. Lopez’[s] statement was 

unlikely to have altered the verdict.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/15/14, at 3 (unnumbered page). 

We agree with the PCRA court’s rationale and determination. The 

record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that counsel’s decision not to 

call Jonathan Lopez as a witness was not prejudicial, and it did not deny 

Appellant a fair trial. 

For the reasons set forth above, we discern no error of law in the PCRA 

court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying Appellant’s PCRA 

petition.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/10/2015