IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-0792

Filed April 8, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EARL DEAN DAWSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Terry R. Rickers, 

Judge. 

A defendant appeals from his convictions for failure to comply with the sex 

offender registry. AFFIRMED.

James S. Nelsen of James S. Nelsen, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney 

General, and Edward W. Bull, County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
2

MULLINS, J.

Earl Dean Dawson appeals from his convictions on two counts of failure to 

comply with the sex offender registry. He was convicted of failing to timely 

register an email address and Facebook account name. On appeal, he contends 

he was denied the right of cross-examination and the right to present a defense 

when the Court made several evidentiary rulings. He also contends there was 

insufficient evidence to show he knew or reasonably should have known the sex 

offender registry requires reporting the email address and Facebook account. 

We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.

Dawson is a tier-one sex offender subject to the reporting requirements of 

the sex offender registry statute set out in Iowa Code chapter 692A (2011). He 

was convicted in 2006 of sex abuse in the third degree; the victim was his 

fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. Iowa Code section 692A.109 requires law 

enforcement officers or the court to inform a sex offender released from 

incarceration of his obligation to register. In January 2010, Dawson was 

released from prison and received a registration packet and a form in which he 

provided the registry a number of personal and contact details. The registration

packet also contained an explanation of his obligations as a sex offender under 

Iowa Code chapter 692A. The packet stated the offender is required to notify the 

sheriff of each county where the offender maintains a residence, employment, or 

is in attendance as a student, within five business days, of “all relevant 
3

information, as defined by section 692A.121.”1 On the registration form, Dawson 

was asked to provide “email addresses screen names any/all internet identifiers.” 

He provided none. The form included a notification that, “A sex offender shall, 

within five business days of any change of relevant information, appear in person 

to notify the sheriff of each county where a change has occurred.” The packet 

contained a disclaimer, which Dawson signed and dated, stating:

In signing below, I acknowledge that I have been notified of 

my duty to register with the Iowa sex offender registry and to 

comply with all of the requirements of Iowa Code chapter 692A, 

including those listed on this DCI-144 form. I also acknowledge 

that I have received a copy of Iowa Code sections 692A.101(2), 

692A.113, and 692A.114. 

In December 2010, Dawson created a Facebook account under a false 

name, “Bob Harley,” using the unregistered email address, 

“harleyboy01@live.com.” Dawson admitted at trial he used a false name to 

access Facebook because Facebook does not allow sex offenders to have 

accounts. Dawson did not notify law enforcement about this email address or 

Facebook account within the required five days. 

Dawson completed registration forms in 2011 and 2012. In 2011, the 

registration packet stated the offender is required to register with law 

enforcement by providing “all relevant information, as defined by section 

692A.101(1)(23).”2 This is a typographical error; the relevant code section is 

692A.101(23), providing “relevant information” includes “internet identifiers.” 

 

1

Iowa Code section 692A.121 controls public access to offenders’ personal information 

in the sex offender registry. 

2

Iowa Code section 692A.103 identifies offenders who are required to register. Iowa 

Code section 692A.104 describes the process for registration, including the requirement 

of “providing all relevant information to the sheriff.”
4

Iowa Code § 692A.101(23)(a)(9). “Internet identifier” is defined as “an electronic 

mail address, instant message address or identifier, or any other designation or 

moniker used for self-identification during internet communication or posting, 

including all designations used for the purpose of routing or self-identification in 

internet communications or postings.” Iowa Code § 692A.101(15).

The 2011 packet also provided partial texts of several important sections 

of the chapter, including section 692A.101(1) and (2) (definitions of an 

“aggravated offense” and an “aggravated offense against a minor”), .113 

(exclusion zones and prohibition of certain employment-related activities), .114 

(residency restrictions), and .115 (employment where dependent adults reside.) 

Dawson did not notify law enforcement of the email address or Facebook 

account in his 2011 registration. He signed another disclaimer acknowledging 

his receipt and understanding of the registration requirements. 

In 2012, the registration packet once again included the requirement that 

the offender provide “all relevant information, as defined by section 

692A.101(1)(23).” On February 7, 2012, Dawson provided an email address, 

“dawson1@iowatelecom.net”, but did not report the “bobharley01@live.com” 

email address or the Facebook account and false name of Bob Harley. He 

signed the waiver acknowledging his receipt and understanding of the 

registration requirements. 

In February 2012, Department of Criminal Investigations Special Agent 

Amy Kluender, who specializes in sex offender registry compliance, conducted a 

compliance check on Dawson and interviewed him in person. On February 29, 
5

2012, Kluender discovered Dawson was using “Bob Harley” as a false name 

online in several email addresses and on Facebook. Dawson admitted to 

Kluender he used these names to circumvent rules about sex offenders’ access 

to social media sites. Shortly thereafter, he registered the email address and 

Facebook account with the county sheriff.

Iowa Code section 692A.111 sets out a criminal penalty for a sex 

offender’s failure to comply with the registration requirements. The State 

charged Dawson with two aggravated misdemeanor counts of failure to comply 

with the sex offender registry: count one for failure to register the Facebook alias 

of “Bob Harley”; count two for failure to register the email address 

“harleyboy01@live.com.” The court held a bench trial. The State’s only witness 

was Kluender. The State also offered Dawson’s sex offender registry packets 

from 2010, 2011, and 2012. Dawson testified on his own behalf. The court ruled 

from the bench, finding Dawson guilty on both counts. Dawson appeals, arguing 

he was denied the right to present a defense and to cross-examine Kluender. He 

also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. 

II. ANALYSIS.

A. Evidentiary Rulings. 

Iowa Code section 692A.111(1) provides a criminal penalty for sex 

offenders who fail to comply with the Sex Offender Registry requirements:

A sex offender who violates any of the requirements of 

section 692A.104, 692A.105, 692A.108, 692A.112, 692A.113, 

692A.114, or 692A.115 commits an aggravated misdemeanor for a 

first offense and a class “D” felony for a second or subsequent 

offense . . . . For purposes of this subsection, a violation occurs 

when a sex offender knows or reasonably should know of the duty 
6

to fulfill a requirement specified in this chapter as referenced in the 

offense charged.

Thus, section 692A.111(1) requires proof that the defendant knew or reasonably 

should have known of the requirement. 

Dawson contends on appeal that the district court violated his 

constitutional rights. First, Dawson argues the district court violated his right to 

cross-examine the State’s witness and to present a defense in two ways: first, by

refusing to allow him to elicit testimony from Kluender to show there was not 

sufficient evidence that the State informed Dawson of what he was required to 

report, as required under 692A.109; and second, by refusing to allow Dawson to 

testify to his own subjective understanding of the requirements. Second, 

Dawson argues because he was unable to elicit the testimony on crossexamination, the court improperly placed the burden of proof on him to “disprove” 

the knowledge element of the offense. The State contends Dawson elicited 

testimony about Kluender’s personal knowledge of the registration requirements 

and Dawson’s subjective understanding in an attempt to raise an untimely 

constitutional vagueness challenge to the statute itself, arguing a reasonable 

person would not have understood the requirements of the registry. According to 

the State, the district court was correct to stop the questioning eliciting such 

testimony and Dawson’s own testimony invoking such an argument. 

During the trial, Dawson’s counsel engaged in the following crossexamination of Kluender:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now, you know the definitions of the 

term relevant information, correct?

KLUENDER: Yes. 
7

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And did you learn those definitions 

through your training at the academy and through your college 

education?

KLUENDER: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: How did you learn of those 

definitions?

KLUENDER: Reading the registration documents. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And is that reading the registration 

documents as—

KLUENDER: It’s also the Iowa Code Section 692A.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. So in 692A where does it talk 

about relevant—relevant information?

KLUENDER: I believe it’s 691A.101—I believed it’s 

contained—I believe it’s the definition section in 692A. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now [is a] sex offender ever told, 

you are to go look at 692A.101?

KLUENDER: I don’t know if Mr. Dawson was specifically 

told. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you learn anything about legal 

research through your training either in college or at the academy?

KLUENDER: What do you mean by did I learn anything 

about legal research, sir?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did you ever have any training on 

legal research?

KLUENDER: No.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: They just turned you loose—sorry—

THE COURT: The question is really vague, counsel. I’m not 

sure if I understand what you’re getting at.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Have you ever received any type of 

training that would—that specifically would go with legal search as 

in researching statutes?

PROSECUTOR: Objection, Your Honor, relevance.

THE COURT: How is it relevant, counsel?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, once again if he is—we’re 

trying to figure out how he should know to report this information. 

And if he needs to go do some legal research—We as attorneys go 

to law school and spend quite a—we get oriented to doing legal 

research and going through a statute. And plain reading of statute 

doesn’t necessarily give anybody the—the full requirements of what 

to register here.

THE COURT: So you’re essentially arguing that if—if a 

Defendant comes in and said, I didn’t bother to read the code, that 

that is a defense?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: It’s not that they didn’t bother to read 

the code; it’s that somebody would have to actually have some sort 
8

of help in order to understand the requirements of the Sex Offender 

Registry or be specifically told what they need to register. 

PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, may the State be heard?

THE COURT: You may.

PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, the State would object to this 

line of questioning based on the grounds that it’s a constitutional 

vagueness argument that’s being made inside the framework of 

trial. If the defendant wanted to object to the code as written as 

vague, that should have been done pretrial. Additionally, we’re 

basically hearing an argument of ignorance of the law as defense, 

which no affirmative defense of that nature is recognized under 

Iowa law nor does the defense have the right to take up now [sic]

affirmative defense—So the State would object, Your Honor, on 

relevance to the question, will be renewing its objection as we 

continue to go down this line of questioning.

THE COURT: Well, I’m going to sustain the objection 

because clearly ignorance of the law is not a recognized defense, 

and it appears through the questioning that the Defendant’s trying 

to mount a due process attack of some sort on the statute. But the 

trial isn’t the time to do that. If you were going to attack the 

constitutionality of the statute that process should have occurred 

pretrial. 

Later, Dawson testified as follows:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you know what internet 

identifiers are?

DAWSON: After listening to arguments today—I thought I 

did, but I’m not really sure. To me it’s a user name.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you think that email is included in 

internet identifiers?

PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, objection, relevance. 

Specifically—I’m sorry—May I be heard further?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, Iowa Code 701.6 deals [sic]

ignorance of the law is not a defense; therefore it’s not essential to 

any element of the case before us. 

THE COURT: I guess I’m failing to see how it’s relevant. 

Code defines what internet identifier is. The Court makes the 

determination of what is or isn’t an internet identifier or alias so—

I’m not quite sure what the Defendant’s opinion lends to it 

concerning the Court’s determination. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, specifically just has to do 

with—he knows of the duty to fulfill his requirement and if he has—

in order to know or should know he needs to know what this 

requirement is. 
9

The COURT: It—Again I—It sounds like you’re trying to 

mount a due—due process constitutionality that—that should have 

been raised by pretrial motion to dismiss. I guess, why are we 

discussing this at this stage of the proceedings?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I’m not actually—I mean I’m not 

trying to make an attempt to attack the statute at all, just 

questioning on—to whether or not he had the knowledge of his 

requirement to do this and therefore intentionally did not report this 

information.

THE COURT: So aren’t you in fact making an ignorance of 

the law argument then?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I suppose in a roundabout way, yes, 

I am. 

THE COURT: That’s what it appears to the Court as well. 

For that reason I’m going to sustain the objection. 

On appeal, the State responds to Dawson’s appeal arguments by 

asserting Dawson is again attempting to attack the statute for being

unconstitutionally vague.3 Dawson filed no reply brief, therefore, he does not 

assist us by confirming or denying the State’s reading of his arguments. 

Nonetheless, Dawson somewhat attempts to attack the complexity and 

vagueness of the statute on appeal, complaining, “The court’s sustaining of 

objections by the State as to questions regarding knowledge ultimately resulted 

in the defendant being forced to testify to attempt to disestablish the element of 

knowledge by attempting to establish the unreasonableness of the assumption 

that the defendant should easily grasp such a complex statute.” However, the 

 

3 See, e.g., State v. Reed, 618 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa 2000) (internal quotations 

omitted):

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

Federal Constitution, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a 

penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 

ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 

manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 

enforcement.
10

trial transcript shows Dawson’s counsel insisted he was not attempting to argue 

the statute was unconstitutionally vague. 

Through the court’s discussion with defense counsel, we are persuaded 

counsel did not intend to attack the statute as unconstitutionally vague, and we 

agree that such an attack would have been untimely at trial.

4

To the extent that 

Dawson attempts to argue this on appeal, it is not preserved for review.5 Further, 

we do not consider the court’s rulings to have the constitutional dimensions that 

Dawson alleges; they are evidentiary rulings on relevancy objections, and we 

assess them according to those standards. 

Generally, we review questions involving the admissibility of evidence for 

an abuse of discretion. State v. Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 675 (Iowa 2014). An 

abuse of discretion occurs “[w]hen the district court exercises its discretion on 

grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” 

Id. A ground or reason is untenable if it is “based on an erroneous application of 

the law or not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Even if there has been an 

abuse of discretion, we need not reverse if the inclusion or exclusion was 

harmless to the defendant. State v. Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d 283, 288 (Iowa 

 

4

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(2) provides: 

Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination 

without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion. 

The following must be raised prior to trial:

a. Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the 

prosecution.

b. Defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or 

information . . . .

5 State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1995) (“When a party fails to alert the 

district court to its contentions, that party cannot thereafter rely on those contentions to 

seek a reversal on appeal.”)
11

2009). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any 

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 

less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.401. 

Generally, relevant evidence is admissible, and evidence that is not relevant is 

inadmissible. Iowa R. Evid. 5.402. 

Defense counsel admitted he was attempting to argue that Dawson was 

subjectively unaware of the registration requirement. Thus, the testimony elicited 

from Kluender regarding her knowledge of the requirements could not have been 

probative of either Dawson’s subjective knowledge or whether he reasonably 

should have known. The court sustained the State’s relevance objection. This 

decision was neither untenable nor unreasonable; therefore, there was no abuse 

of discretion. 

In asking Dawson whether “email is included in internet identifiers,” 

defense counsel admitted he was attempting to make an argument that Dawson 

was ignorant of the law. As the court pointed out, the statute defines “internet 

identifier” as:

an electronic mail address, instant message address or identifier, or 

any other designation or moniker used for self-identification during 

internet communication or posting, including all designations used 

for the purpose of routing or self-identification in internet 

communications or postings. 

Iowa Code § 692A.101(15). Dawson’s opinion as to the definition was not 

relevant to whether the email address and Facebook account were internet 

identifiers; that is a legal question for the court, as determined by the code. The 

trial court concluded the purpose of the testimony was not to help determine what 
12

an internet identifier included but was to argue Dawson did not know of the 

requirement; it found, therefore, that the testimony was irrelevant and sustained 

the State’s objection. 

The testimony from Dawson about his understanding of whether “email is 

included in internet identifiers” could have been relevant in determining whether 

he subjectively knew of the registration requirements. Iowa Code section 

692A.111(1) requires that in order for a sex offender to be guilty of failure to 

comply with registration requirements, the sex offender either “knows or 

reasonably should know of the duty to fulfill” the requirements. The court abused 

its discretion when it denied Dawson the opportunity to testify as to his ignorance 

of the registration requirements.

Dawson was, however, allowed to testify without objection that he did not 

know he was required to report the email address and Facebook account name 

until Kluender interviewed him. But the evidence showed that Dawson had 

disclosed an email address in the 2012 registration, twenty-two days before 

Kluender discovered the Facebook account and false name. The evidence of 

Dawson’s 2012 registration is both undeniable and in contradiction to any 

testimony he might have given denying subjective knowledge of the requirement 

to disclose email addresses and identifiers. Consequently, to the extent Dawson 

should have been allowed to testify to his subjective knowledge of the 

registration requirements governing email addresses and identifiers, we 

determine such denial was harmless error. See Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d at 288. 
13

Dawson further contends the court improperly shifted the burden of proof 

on the knowledge element to him, thereby forcing him to testify on his own behalf 

as to his knowledge to counter Kluender’s testimony about the information he 

was provided in the registration packets. Dawson complains the court, in its 

verdict, relied heavily on Dawson’s own statements under cross-examination that 

he failed to register the email address and the Facebook account. The State, in 

its case in chief, presented evidence in an attempt to show Dawson subjectively 

knew of the requirement and that he reasonably should have known of it. 

Dawson then testified to rebut this evidence. Although the court found that 

Dawson admitted each element of the crime on the stand, the court, by not 

allowing the irrelevant testimony from Kluender, did not force Dawson to testify 

and did not shift the burden of proof to him. 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Dawson contends the court erred in finding there was sufficient evidence 

to find him guilty of the offense because he did not know and should not 

reasonably have known the code required him to register the email address and 

Facebook account. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges for 

correction of errors at law. State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 1996). 

We uphold a finding of guilt if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. 

State v. Henderson, 696 N.W.2d 5, 7 (Iowa 2005). Evidence is substantial if a 

rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. We consider all evidence in the case, including that which detracts from the 

verdict. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id.
14

Iowa Code section 692A.111(1) provides a criminal penalty for sex 

offenders who fail to comply with the Sex Offender Registry requirements. The 

offender’s knowledge may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence. State 

v. Ogle, 367 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985). During his own testimony 

and during his interview with Kluender, Dawson admitted every element of the 

offense, except for the knowledge element. 

Iowa Code section 692A.109 imposes a duty upon the sheriff or warden of 

the jail or prison from which the sex offender is released or the court to inform the 

sex offender of his or her obligations under chapter 692A. Section 692A.109 

does not prescribe a specific list of information a sex offender must receive. 

Among the obligations, the sheriff, warden, or court must “[i]nform the sex 

offender of the duty to register under this chapter . . . and ensure registration 

forms are completed and signed.” Iowa Code § 692A.109(1)(b). The sheriff, 

warden, or court must also “[i]nform the sex offender that, within five business 

days of a change in relevant information . . . the sex offender shall notify, in a 

manner prescribed by ruled, the sheriff of the county of principal residence of the 

change.” Iowa Code § 692A.109(1)(d) (emphasis added). The chapter also 

requires the offender be informed of certain sections based on the type of 

conviction:

(g) Inform the sex offender who was convicted of a sex 

offense against a minor of the prohibitions established under 

section 692A.113 by providing the offender with a written copy of 

section 692A.113 and relevant definitions of section 692A.101.

(h) Inform the sex offender who was convicted of an 

aggravated offense against a minor of the prohibitions established 

under section 692A.114 by providing the offender with a written 
15

copy of section 692A.114 and relevant definitions of section 

692A.101.

Iowa Code § 692A.109(1)(g)-(h) (emphasis added). The chapter does not 

specify what constitutes the “relevant definitions.” Dawson was convicted of an 

aggravated sex offense against a minor. The 2011 and 2012 packets provided 

the texts of sections 692A.113 and .114; they also provided the definitions of 

“aggravated offense” and “aggravated offense against a minor” by excerpting 

Iowa Code section 692A.101(1) and (2). They did not, however, provide the 

definition of “sex offense against a minor” provided under section 692A.101(28). 

This would seem to be a relevant definition under section 692A.101(g). 

Dawson complains the registration packets did not inform him of the 

relevant definitions in section 692A.101. According to Dawson, section 

692A.109(g) required the State to inform him of all the definitions under section 

692A.101, including the definition of “relevant information” under section 

692A.101(23) and “internet identifier” under section 692A.101(15). Dawson 

argues, because the entire text of section 692A.101 was not included in the 

registration packets, the State did not fulfill its obligation to inform him and 

consequently he could not reasonably have known of the requirements. 

Dawson conflates the State’s obligation to inform him of his registration 

requirements as a sex offender and his obligation to comply with the 

requirements. The State’s failure to comply with its obligation does not 

necessarily absolve Dawson of his. The omission of the section 692A.101

definitions from the informational registration packet does not automatically lead 

us to conclude Dawson did not know or could not reasonably have known about 
16

the necessity of reporting his internet identifiers. A failure to inform the sex 

offender may be evidence of the offender’s lack of subjective knowledge as to 

the requirements. It may also be evidence that the offender could not reasonably 

have known of the requirements. It does not mean, per se, that the offender did 

not know or could not reasonably be expected to know of the requirement. 

First, we are not persuaded that 692A.109(1)(g) requires the State to 

inform the sex offender of all the definitions under section 692A.101. It requires 

only the “relevant definitions.” The definitions of “relevant information” and 

“internet identifiers” are not relevant to (g) because they are not related to a “sex 

offender who was convicted of a sex offense against a minor.” Second, Dawson 

was informed in the informational registration packets in 2011 and 2012 (not, we 

note, in 2010) that he was required to report “all relevant information, as defined 

by section 692A.101(1)(23),” which includes “internet identifiers.” In 2011 and 

2012, Dawson signed the form indicating he understood his obligation under the 

registry. Even if he did not subjectively know email addresses and Facebook 

accounts were included in the registry requirements, he reasonably should have 

known from the informational packet, which instructed him to report “all relevant 

information” and directed him to section 692A.101(1)(23). Most telling of 

Dawson’s actual knowledge of an obligation to disclose internet identifiers is the 

fact that in 2012 he had reported one email address, but not another one. The 

fact he omitted to report the one he used to create the Facebook account would 

appear to have either been intentional or negligent, not a result of lack of 

knowledge. These omissions were the basis for the criminal prosecutions in this 
17

case. He also admitted he made up the email address and fake name to 

circumvent the rules against sex offenders using Facebook. The evidence is

sufficient to support a conclusion that Dawson reasonably should have known 

about the requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

III. CONCLUSION.

We affirm the district court’s evidentiary rulings and the convictions for 

failure to comply with the sex offender registry requirements. 

AFFIRMED.