D. Applicant objects to the Conclusion of Law at paragraph 11 where it alleged
Applicant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mislead
into pleading guilty in an admiralty court.

1. As stated throughout, the RFAA is the only valid evidence supporting the grounds
for relief. Where the court failed to hold.a hearing to inquire furthér into the ev-
idence in the interest of justice. the court is in error.

IV. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

1. By its tacit admission the state intended to agree with Applicant's RFAA,
otherwise it would have completed its duty to disclose the exculpatory evidence.

2. ‘The RFAA is valid evidence proving by a preponderance Applicant's grounds for
relief. ,

3. Where the state did not contest the RFAA in its RESPONSE, the court's action
of advocating on behalf of the state by contesting the RFAA was ‘error.

4. The court's refusal to accept the agreement of the parties is erroneous.

5. Where the court questions the validity of the agreement of the parties and it
is on notice the same is the sole evidence in support of a fundamental defect in
che court's jurisdiction -- it should have held a hearing to further disclose the
truth of the matter. The court erred in its failure to hold a hearing in the int-
erest of justice.

WHEREFORE premises considered, Applicant numbiy prays the honorable court will
consider all the above, hold a: hearing if necessary, and grant requested relief.

Date: April 7, 2015 2d CL .
EDDIE A. NUN , 7

#1186691 Clements

960i Spur 594

Amarillo Texas 79107
I, EDDIE A. NUNNELLEY.JR., Applicant herein deciares and affirms under penalty of
perjury, that on this 7th day of Aprii 2015, I sent a copy of this document to the
District Clerk of Grayson County, and one copy to the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals. Each copy j rect and complete.

Page 5


4. The state is the authority to determine whether the trial court's actions of
trying the underlying case in admiralty jurisdiction was unlawful, aND THE DA is
now estopped from raising any factual matters it failed to raise before the 11.07
Appligation was filed. {see INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORP. VS. UNITED
TELEPHONE CORP., 550 F2d 287].

5. | The Handbook Of Common Law Pleading by Benjamin J. Shipman at pg.14 suggests:
“The term implied contracts is also applied to premises impiied or created by @law,
without any agreement in fact between the parties... Tne premises in these cases is

merely a fiction of law... The obligation is not comtractual but quasi contractual.”
CLARK, CONT. 752-754; WOODS V. AYERS, 39 Mich. 345.

6. Although tiie comnor Law supports the RFAA as a quasi contract between Appli-
cant and the state, the evidence requested via the RFAA is exculpatory and MUST BE
DISCLOBED- BRADY V. MARYLAND,83 S.Ct. 1194(1963).

7. The intent of the Grayson DA was to AGREE by failure to respond because the
prosecution has a duty to disclose exculpatory rvidence. NIELSON V. STATE, 836.S-W.
2d 245(TX.APP.-Texarkana 1992).

8. Prior to trial Applicant was denied by omission of tne chance to discover the
exculpatory evidence held by the state. The RFAA activated the Doctrine of Inquiry
Notice that would put a reasonably prudent person on a DUTY OF INQUIRY. WOODWARD
V. ORTIZ, 237 S.W.2d 286,289(TEX.1951). And like a purchaser with knowledge of title
defects, the state is chargeable with knowledge of it's errors of unlawful jurisd-
iction in’ the underlying case. See: MATTER OF HAMILTON, 125 F3d 292 (5th Cir.).

9;  Conmercial iaw in Texas is the Business & Conmerce €ode. A COURSE OF DEALING
at 1.303(b) therein is: "A sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions’
bétween the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and
other conduct. Course of Dealing may enter the agreement by TACIT RECOGNITION.
Where the original transaction is the plea agreement the KFAA is the underlying
course of dealing.

10 The state’s acceptance (implied) of Applicant's points as stipulated, is its
agreement the RFAA is valid evidence the 59th District Court DID NOT have lawfui
jurisdiction to try the case as stated in the grounds for relief. Where the court
disagrees, it should haave heid a hearing so the Applicant could ask the judge,
prosecutor, and clerk to discover the NAME of the jurisdiction exercised by the

district court.

Page 4


(07, DO =!

EDDIE A. NUNNELLEY.JR , IN THE 59th DISTRICT COURT
Applicant §

vs. OF GRAYSON COUNTY, TEXAS

STATE OF TEXAS § Cause No 49592-A
Respondent ‘ £11.07 Application

OBJECTIONS TO COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Comes Now, EDDIE A. NUNNELLEY.JR.. Applicant in the action that is an APPLICATION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. The State has filed its answer/response. The trial court
has filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This is Applicant's OBJECTION
thereto.

I. The working premise for this Application is that Applicant has reason to believe
the District Court's Judiciai Power for this case arises from the ADMIRALTY JURISDI-
CTION. -

A. If the trial court heard the underlying case in Admiralty Jurisdiction and App-
licant has no notice thereof, and was: then unable to challenge the jurisdiction as

a defense before trial, then his Guilty Plea was involuntary.

B. If indeed the jurisdiction of the district court was admitalty, then there must
be a commercial contract, agreement, or hypothecation extant which binds Applicant to
that jurisdiction. If no binding agent exists then the admiralty jurisdiction DOES
NOT apply to the subiect matter or to the person. The judgement: would then be VOID.
C. Since Applicant finds no authority or existing evidence that supports his pre-
mise, he sent a single Discovery Document to the State (Grayson DA) in the form of
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION BY AGREEMENT [Hereafter RFAA]. .

D. ApplicaNT asserts the state's failure to respond to the RFAA is itself the
state's admission, agreement, and ratification to his points as stipulated and evi-
dence supporting grounds for relief.

* NOTE 1: Where the district court's jurisdiction is presumed to be admiralty and
admiralty sits within commercial law, then the commerciai Law (UCC/IX.
BUS &COM CD.) and procedure apply and have been used by Applicant.

* NOTE 2: Where no specific precedent addresses issues directly - the law quoted
applies by analogy.

II. Court Errors in its FINDINGS OF FACT.
A... Applicant OBJECTS to the court's Finding of Fact at number 7 because the court

mistated the most essential part within that fact.
1. It is true that Applicant did not allege facts that relate to the court he
was found guilty in was an ‘Admiralty Court". The NAME of the court was not at

. RECEIVED IN
Page 1 COURT OF CRIRINAL APPEALS
APR 09 2015.

Abel heosta, Clerk

issue.



2. Applicant never alleged the court of conviction was an "Admiralty Court" per
se. However, Appliannt implied the 59th District Court is hearing Penal Actions
under the judicial power of the Admiralty JURISDICTION. There is a difference.

3.  BARRON's DIGTIONARY OF LEGAL TERMS, 3rd Ed&tion states:

ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME JURISDICTION.. Jurisdiction over all actions related
to events occurring at sea, including transactions relaténg to commerce and
navigation..."

ADMIRALTY COURTS. "Tribunals that hear cases involving maritime law..."
4. The Federal District Courts are so-called whether they exercise civil or crim-

inal power in Common Law, equity, Admiralty or Maritime jurisdiction.

5. Could it be that the 59th District Court is a ‘court’ or 'tribunal’ inferior
to the federal courts that exercises admiralty jurisdiction in penal actions? Judge
Nall does not say, yet he DOES NOT DENY that the district court he presides over
exercises admiralty jurisdiction in penal actions.

III. Court errors in its CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

A. Applicant objects to the Conclusion of Law in paragraph 6, where the judge
admits the case wass tried in a state district court "which has jurisdiction over
felony criminal cases."

1. - Applicant never challenged the NAME of the court itself (district) but tne
NAME of the jurisdiction (admiralty) exercised by that court. :

2. The court does-not state the NAME of its jurisdiction, nor does it.deny. that
admiralty jurisdiction was exercised in the underlyiing case. :

3. A Penal Action IS NOT a ‘criminal action’ per se. BARRON'’s DICTIONARY OF LEGAL

TERMS 3rd Ed. says: PENAL ACTION. “Acivil suit brought for the. recovery of a
statutory penalty imposed as a punishment for an offense
against the puolic."

4. “Ihe only constitutional judicial power allowing civil suits to impose criminal
type penalties on a defendant is the admiralty. , °
5. Since the state district court may exercise any of the 4 jurisdictions named
in either constitution (state/ied) the court's failure to address the NAME of the
subject jurisdiction, but instead compelling attention to the name of the court
[While knowing the name of the district court is unimportant to this issue] is
the intentional and deceptive use of semantics employed in order to misdirect. the
higher courts from learning the true issues.
B. Applicant objects to the Conclusions of Law in paragraph. 12 where it stated
the RFAA "is not a valid doaument," and "has no legal effect upon the proceedings".
1. In the State's Response to i1.07 Application for Writ of HAbeas Corpus, it

\

Page 2


DID NOT CHALLENGE, Applicant's RFAA which furthér VALIDATES that document as. the
state's admission, agreement, and ratificatiori of the points which support the
grounds for reliet. ;

2. In the state's response, the Grayson County District Attorney DID NOT state the
NAME of the district court's jurisdiction, nor did she deny that the 59th District
Court exercised Admiralty Jurisdiction in the underlying case.

3. If the underiying cas& were strictly a ‘criminal' case, then Applicant asserts
that perhaps it could be said that the RFAA is not a valid document or has no legal
effect. However since Penai Actions are "civil" (see Sec.1II Para.3 above) and the
habeas corpus is a civil action, then Appiicant asserts the court has the descretion
to accept his RFAA in accord with TX.R.CV.PRC. RULE 198.

4. . Since the RFAA is Applicant's only evidence of the district court's wrongfully
applied jurisdiction of admiralty, the court could have accepted the RFAA and Appli-
cant's grounds as agreed by the parties per TX.R.CV.PRC. 263.

5. Where the trial court may doubt that the evidence proves the grounds by a pre-
ponderarice as stated, the judge erred by not holding a hearing to determine same
because Applicant's pleadings and the state's suspicious faiiure to respona to the
RFAA put the court on notice of a fundamental error that has not been examined.

C. Applicant objects to Conclusions of Law at paragraph i3 where it stated the
state "is. not bound in any manner by the filing" of Applicant's RFAA, "or by the
state's failure to. respond..."

1.  Appiicant never stated the state was bound by the 'filing' of the RFAA, but

by the circumstances surrounding the tacit acceptance by the state.

2. The state made the original plea agreement with Applicant which induced his
guilty plea. This was an unwritten or IMPLIED AGREEMENT that was valid until Appl-
icant began to suspect the errors stated in the grounds for relakF.

3. The RFAA was written as a Counter-Offer or CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE to the
original plea agreement, and stipilated essentiably that iB the state failed to’
prove its prospective claim that the District Court did not exercise Admiralfy Jur-
isdiction over the underlying case, then the failure was the state's ADMISSION by
operation of law. Conditional Acceptance is one which will subject the drawee or acc-
eptor to the payment of money on a contingency. @HIT.BILLS 234. If he do recieve it
he must observe its terms. 1 CAMPb 425. The form of acceptance may be express or iimp-
lied. 4 EAST 91. These authorities apply via the premise that admiralty is a juri-
sdiction of commerce, otherwise they apply by analogy.

Page 3