IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joan Lichtman, :

Appellant :

: No. 352 C.D. 2018

v. :

: Submitted: October 26, 2018

Larry Krasner :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

PER CURIAM FILED: April 18, 2019

Joan Lichtman (Lichtman) appeals from the February 9, 2018 order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) which dismissed 

Lichtman’s complaint without prejudice pursuant to Rule 240(j)(1) of the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Civil Procedure (Pa.R.C.P.).1

The present case represents the third appeal that Lichtman has filed with 

this Court. In two, prior unreported opinions, Lichtman v. Williams (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

1435 C.D. 2017, filed May 8, 2018) (Lichtman I) and Lichtman v. Hodge (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 1563 C.D. 2017, filed September 13, 2018) (Lichtman II), this Court affirmed 

separate trial court orders dismissing complaints filed by Lichtman without prejudice 

 

1 Pa.R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1) states as follows:

If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding or 

the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis, the court prior to acting upon the petition may 

dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is 

untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is 

frivolous.

Pa.R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1). 
2

pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1). The underlying premise in those cases, as well as 

the present case, revolves around Lichtman’s repeated allegations that certain members 

of the Pennsylvania Bar, both public officials and private attorneys, illegally seized her 

personal and real property, which was then sold at a sheriff’s sale. 

In Lichtman I, Lichtman filed an action in mandamus seeking to compel 

former District Attorney for the City of Philadelphia, R. Seth Williams, and former 

First Assistant District Attorney for the City of Philadelphia, Kathleen Martin, to bring 

criminal charges against these members of the Bar, as well as damages. In Lichtman 

II, Lichtman filed a second action in mandamus again naming Williams and Martin as 

defendants, but also adding former Interim District Attorney Kelley Hodge and former 

First Assistant District Attorney John Delaney as defendants. Nevertheless, Lichtman 

acknowledged that the thrust of her second complaint in Lichtman II remained the same 

as that of Lichtman I. In her present complaint, now filed against the current District 

Attorney for the City of Philadelphia, Larry Krasner, Lichtman similarly 

acknowledges,

The essence of this Mandamus Complaint and its 

predecessor Complaints are essentially identical. All three 

Complaints are intended to address the failures and/or 

refusals of Philadelphia’s District Attorneys to perform 

basic, mandatory, ministerial, non-discretionary obligations 

of their office. 

(Lichtman’s Complaint, ¶6.) Lichtman’s complaint contains 271 paragraphs spread 

across 59 pages, attached to which are 2 memoranda of law.2 Contemporaneous with 

the filing of her complaint, Lichtman petitioned to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).

 

2 We note that Rules 1019(a) and 1022 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure require 

that “[t]he material facts on which a cause of action . . . is based shall be stated in a concise and 

summary form” and “[e]ach paragraph [in a pleading] shall contain as far as practicable only one 

material allegation.” Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 1019(a), 1022, respectively.
3

By order dated February 9, 2018, the trial court essentially dismissed 

Lichtman’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

could be granted pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1).3 Lichtman filed a motion for 

reconsideration on February 20, 2018. However, while this motion was pending, 

Lichtman filed a notice of appeal to this Court.4 Following her appeal, the trial court 

issued an opinion in support of its order pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Appellate Procedure (Pa.R.A.P.) explaining that Lichtman’s complaint was 

frivolous because she did not set forth a clear legal right to the relief requested and did 

not establish a corresponding duty on the part of District Attorney Krasner to act on 

her behalf. The trial court noted that the complaint was duplicative of the complaint 

filed in Lichtman II, with the exception that the defendant is changed to District 

Attorney Krasner. 

Additionally, the trial court stated that the District Attorney’s Office had 

conducted a reasonable investigation into Lichtman’s claims and ensured that her

claims were remedied in the underlying legal action, presumably referring to the 

sheriff’s sale. The trial court characterized Lichtman as being “merely dissatisfied with 

the outcome of her case.” (Trial court op. at 3.) In that regard, the trial court noted that

a prosecutor has broad discretion in deciding whether to prosecute an alleged criminal 

offender and that there is “no legal right to compel the Attorney General or a District 

Attorney to prosecute . . . individuals named in [a] private criminal complaint.” Konya 

v. District Attorney, 669 A.2d 890, 893 (Pa. 1995).

 

3 The trial court’s order references Lichtman’s action as being denied rather than dismissed.

4 Nevertheless, the trial court appears to have entered an order dated March 23, 2018, denying 

Lichtman’s motion for reconsideration.
4

On appeal,5as best we can discern, Lichtman argues that her complaint

should not have been dismissed for numerous reasons, which mirror her arguments in 

Lichtman I and Lichtman II.

6 For example, Lichtman claims she alleged facts showing 

that she satisfied the three-prong test warranting the issuance of a writ of mandamus 

because she asserted a valid claim upon which relief could be granted (related to an 

improper judgment of possession premised on the willful perjury of an attorney); the 

District Attorney owes a duty to her;

7

and she has no other means to secure the return 

of her assets, including her home, monies, and property, except through the courts.

Lichtman further asserts that the trial court incorrectly interpreted and applied 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1) and the law governing mandamus and failed to read the

complaint and consider the evidence Lichtman submitted. Lichtman also appears to

argue that the trial court could not dismiss her complaint under Pa.R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1)

because she previously had been permitted in other lawsuits to proceed IFP. Further, 

Lichtman argues that the trial court should have applied relevant provisions of the 

Philadelphia Code8to this matter and reported the conduct alleged in the complaint to 

attorney disciplinary and prosecutorial authorities.9

 

5

In reviewing a trial court’s decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 

240(j)(1), this Court is limited to determining whether the appellant’s constitutional rights were 

violated, whether the trial court abused its discretion, and whether the trial court committed an error 

of law. Jones v. Doe, 126 A.3d 406, 408 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

6 By order dated October 19, 2018, District Attorney Krasner was precluded from filing a brief 

in this matter.

7 Lichtman also argues that the sheriff owes a duty to her but the sheriff was not a named 

defendant in the present action.

8 Lichtman cites to Chapter 9-1600 of the Philadelphia Code, which prohibits unlawful

eviction practices. Phila., Pa. Code §§9-1600 – 9-1608 (2016).
5

Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1),

[I]f, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or 

proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a 

petition for leave to proceed [IFP], the court prior to acting 

upon the petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or 

appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied 

that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.

“A frivolous action or proceeding has been defined as one that ‘lacks an arguable basis 

either in law or in fact,’” id., Note (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 

(1989)), or, stated differently, fails to “set forth a valid cause of action” on its face, 

McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997).

Rule 506 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure (Pa.R.Crim.P.) 

sets forth the procedure for approval of a private criminal complaint, stating as follows:

(A) When the affiant is not a law enforcement officer, the 

complaint shall be submitted to an attorney for the 

Commonwealth, who shall approve or disapprove it 

without unreasonable delay.

(B) If the attorney for the Commonwealth:

(1) approves the complaint, the attorney 

shall indicate this decision on the complaint 

form and transmit it to the issuing authority;

(2) disapproves the complaint, the attorney 

shall state the reasons on the complaint form 

and return it to the affiant. Thereafter, the 

affiant may petition the court of common pleas 

for review of the decision.

 

9 Additionally, Lichtman’s brief contains accusations that the various trial court judges, by 

dismissing her complaint, had become willing participants in the underlying crimes alleged in the 

complaint, thereby exposing themselves to potential prosecution and disciplinary action, all in an 

attempt to silence her. However, such accusations, and others like them in Lichtman’s brief, are 

“immaterial and inappropriate to the proof of the cause of action,” i.e., they are scandalous and 

impertinent and, therefore, we will not consider them. See Department of Environmental Resources 

v. Peggs Run Coal Co., 423 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980).
6

Pa.R.Crim.P. 506.

Our Supreme Court discussed private criminal complaints in 

Commonwealth v. Benz, 565 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1989) (Larsen, J., concurring; Papadakos, 

J., dissenting) (plurality decision). In Benz, the local district attorney disapproved a 

private criminal complaint filed by Laverda Hicks on the grounds that insufficient 

evidence existed to establish that a crime had been committed by Officer Joseph E. 

Benz of the Pittsburgh Police Department. Subsequently, Hicks sought judicial review 

of the matter. The common pleas court accepted the petition but denied approval after 

a review of the record, holding that the district attorney did not abuse his discretion by 

not prosecuting Officer Benz. Hicks appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed 

the common pleas court and determined that evidence was available to establish a 

prima facie case. On further appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.

The court, in its opinion announcing the judgment, explained that because 

the local district attorney declined to prosecute on the basis of a “lack of evidence 

sufficient to establish a prima facie case . . . a court is required to review the 

appropriateness of that determination.” Benz, 565 A.2d at 767. The opinion noted that 

it has always been the burden of the Commonwealth to establish a prima facie case 

and, “[t]raditionally the final determination of sufficiency of the evidence has been a 

judicial judgment.” Id. However, the opinion distinguished that situation “from the 

prosecutorial discretion not to bring prosecution even if a prima facie case may be 

established from the evidence available.” Id.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court noted that the evidence in the case 

established a homicide, that Officer Benz was the person responsible for the death of 

Hicks’ son, and that whether the homicide was justifiable or excusable was a matter of 

defense and not a basis to conclude that a prima facie case did not exist. The Supreme 

Court rejected an argument by the Commonwealth that judicial intervention 
7

“impermissibly trammeled upon the prosecutorial discretion,” noting that the local 

district attorney had “never purported to predicate his decision not to prosecute upon 

the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion to make policy” but instead had “expressly 

stated that the decision to decline prosecution resulted from his determination that the 

evidence would not sustain a prima facie case.” Id. at 768. The Supreme Court held 

that this type of decision was “within the purview of the judicial system to review.”10 

Id.

Furthermore, “[a] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that 

compels an official’s performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty.” Sturgis v. 

Doe, 26 A.3d 1221, 1223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). The issuance of a writ of mandamus is 

warranted “where there exists a clear legal right in the plaintiff and a corresponding 

duty in the defendant and a lack of another appropriate and adequate remedy.” Lutz v. 

Commonwealth, 505 A.2d 1356, 1357 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). Mandamus will not lie “to 

revise a public official’s decision that results from the exercise of discretion.” Seeton 

v. Adams, 50 A.3d 268, 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). However, “[M]andamus can be used 

to compel a public official to exercise discretion where the official has a mandatory 

duty to perform a discretionary act and has refused to exercise discretion.” Id. at 274. 

Additionally, “[M]andamus is appropriate whenever there is a mistaken 

view of the law,” even if there is no actual exercise of discretion. Seeton, 50 A.3d at 

280 (citing Tanenbaum v. D’Ascenzo, 51 A.2d 757, 758 (Pa. 1947) (holding that where 

a public official’s refusal to act is based upon a misinterpretation of the law, a 

mandamus action is appropriate and the refusal is subject to review by the courts)). 

 

10 In a concurring opinion, Justice Larsen noted that the rule providing for the filing of private 

criminal complaints “protects the interest of the private complainant by allowing for the submission 

of the disapproved complaint to a judge of a court of common pleas. The judge’s independent review 

of the complaint checks and balances the district attorney’s decision and further hedges against 

possibility of error.” Benz, 565 A.2d at 769 (emphasis in original).
8

The court in Tanenbaum explained that while mandamus generally lies “only where 

the duty is ministerial and does not involve the exercise of discretion or judgment,” it 

will also lie “where by a mistaken view of the law or by an arbitrary exercise of 

authority there has been in fact no actual exercise of discretion.” Id. 

Here, Lichtman has not alleged that District Attorney Krasner’s refusal to 

take action was premised on a mistaken view of the law or that said refusal was the 

result of an arbitrary exercise of his authority. The fact remains that Lichtman has still 

not cured the deficiencies that led to the dismissal of her prior complaints. Instead, she 

has simply filed a new complaint naming current District Attorney Krasner as a 

defendant. As the trial court noted, former District Attorney Williams “conducted a 

reasonable investigation and ensured that [Lichtman] was remedied in the underlining

[sic] legal action,” but Lichtman is “merely dissatisfied with the outcome of her case.” 

(Trial court op. at 2-3.) 

Moreover, Lichtman has not alleged that she even submitted a private 

criminal complaint to District Attorney Krasner,11 who refused to take further action, 

let alone that said refusal amounted to bad faith, fraud, or unconstitutionality, or that 

he made a decision that was patently discriminatory, arbitrary, or pretextual. Rather, 

Lichtman’s present complaint merely reiterated the purported failures of previous 

individuals serving as Philadelphia District Attorney or First Assistant District 

Attorney to bring criminal charges against various members of the Pennsylvania Bar 

and judiciary. As the issues of legal error or abuse of discretion have already been 

addressed by our prior decisions in Lichtman I and II, and for the above reasons, we 

agree that Lichtman’s complaint lacked “an arguable basis either in law or in fact” and, 

 

11 In her complaint, Lichtman merely alleged that she “provided information to, and notified” 

District Attorney Krasner of the various criminal actions perpetrated against her. (Lichtman’s 

Complaint, ¶30.)
9

therefore, was frivolous. Pa.R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1), Note (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 

325). 

Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.12

 

12 Lichtman’s remaining contentions do not warrant reversal. There is nothing in Pa.R.C.P. 

No. 240(j)(1) that prohibits a court from dismissing an action as frivolous merely because in a prior

action the same party was granted permission to proceed IFP. But see Grosso v. Love, 667 A.2d 43,

44 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (holding that it was improper to dismiss the complaint as frivolous under

Pa.R.C.P. No. 240(j)(1), based on affirmative defenses which were deemed improper since the 

Commonwealth had not filed an answer; in other words, Pa.R.C.P. No. 240 did not even apply). There 

is nothing here in the record to suggest that the trial court did not read the complaint, and the 

documents attached to it, before dismissing it. In fact, to the contrary, the trial court’s February 9, 

2018 order expressly stated that the trial court reviewed the same. Nor is there anything in the record 

to suggest that the trial court judge who dismissed the complaint was biased. Adverse rulings, without 

more, are insufficient to demonstrate bias. Dow v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Household 

Finance Co.), 768 A.2d 1221, 1225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Finally, we find Lichtman’s contentions 

relating to the trial court’s purported failure to apply certain provisions of the Philadelphia Code and 

to report the conduct alleged in the complaint to attorney disciplinary and prosecutorial authorities

are without merit for the same reasons we articulated in Lichtman I.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joan Lichtman, :

Appellant :

: No. 352 C.D. 2018

v. :

:

Larry Krasner :

PER CURIAM

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of April, 2019, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dated February 9, 2018, is hereby affirmed.