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JOINT HEARING

BEFORE TH E

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

AND TH E

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTE RNATION AL 

ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIV ES

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NIN ETY -SECOND CONGRESS

SE CO ND SE SS IO N

MAR CH 1, 1972

75-232

U.S . GO VE RN MEN T PR IN TI NG OF FIC E 

WA SH INGT ON : 1972
s.

*

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?. t ? ?. • i f

CO MM IT TE E ON FO RE IG N AF FA IR S

V • v I I

TH OM AS E. M ORG AN , Penn sylvania, Chairman

CLEM EN T J. ZA B LO CK I, Wisconsin 

W AYN E L. H A YS, Ohio 

L. H. FO U N TAIN , North Carolina 

D A N T E B. FA SC ELL, Florida 

C H A R LE S C. DIG G S, Jr., Michigan 

CO R N E LIU S E. G A L LA G H E R , New Jersey 

R O B E R T N. C. N IX , Pennsylvania 

JOHN S. M ON AG AN , Connecticut 

DO N ALD M. F R A SE R , Minnesota 

BE NJA M IN S. R O SE N TH AL, New Yo rk 

JOHN C. C U LV E R , Iowa 

LE E H. HAM IL TO N, Indiana 

A BR A H AM K AZEN, Jr., Texas 

L E S T E R L. WOL FF . New Yo rk 

JO N ATH AN B. BI NG HAM , New York 

GU S Y A T R O N , Penn sylvania 

R O Y A. T A Y L O R , North Carolina 

JOHN W. D AV IS, Georgia 

M ORGAN F. M U R PH Y, Illinois 

R O N A LD V . DELL U M S, California

WILLIAM S. M AIL L1 AR D, California 

P E T E R II. B. F R E L IN G H U Y S E N , New Jersey 

WI LL IAM S. BRO O M FIE LD , Michigan 

J. IR V IN G W H A LLEY, Pennsylvania 

H. R. GR OS S, Iowa

ED W AR D J. DERW IN SK I, Illinois 

F. B R A D F O R D M OR SE , Massachusetts 

VER N O N W. T HO MSO N, Wisconsin 

P A U L F IN D L E Y , Illinois

JOHN BU CH A N A N , Alabam a 

SH ER MAN P. LL O Y D , Utah 

J. H E R B E R T B U R K E , Florida 

SE YM O U R H A L P E R N , New York 

G U Y V A N D E R J A G T, Michigan 

R O B E R T II. STE E L E , Connecticut 

P IE R R E S. DU PO N T, Delaw are 

C H A R LE S W. W HAL EN , Jr., Ohio

Roy J. B ull ock, Staff Administrato r

Su bco m m it te e on Afr ic a

CH A R LES C. D IG G S, Jr., Michigan, Chairman

R O B E R T N. C. N IX , Pennsylvan ia J. IR VIN G W H A LLEY, Pennsylvania

JOHN C. C U LV E R , Iowa WI LLIAM S. BRO O M FIE LD , Michigan

GU S Y A T R O N , Pennsylvania ED W AR D J. DER W IN SK I, Illinois

R O N A LD V . DELL U M S, California G U Y V A N D E R JA G T , Michigan

Goler T . B utch er, Subcommittee Staff C onsultant

T he lm a H . Shir ke y, Sta ff Assistant

S ubc o m m it te e on I n te r n a t io n a l Or g an iz ati o n s an d M ove m en ts

DO N ALD M. F R A S E R , Minnesota, Chairman

D A N T E B. FA SC E L L, Flo rida H. R. GR OS S, Iowa

CO R N E LIU S E. G A L LA G H E R , New Jersey 

L. H. FO U N TAIN , North Carolina 

BE NJA M IN S. R O SEN TH AL, New Yo rk 

ABRAH AM KAZEN , Jr., Texas

JO NAT HAN B. BIN GHAM , New Yo rk 

R O N ALD V . DELL U M S, California

P E T E R H. B. F R E L IN G H U Y S E N , New Jersey 

ED W AR D J. DER W IN SK I, Illinois 

P A U L F IN D L E Y , Illinois 

SE YM OUR H A L P E R N , New York

R ob er t B . B oe ttch er, Subcommittee Staff Consultant

Jea n B ro wn, Sta ff Assistant

(II )
C O N T E N T S

LIST OF WITNESSES

Bush, Hon. George, Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations 2

Schaufele, Hon. William, Senior Adviser to the Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations___________________ _________ 3

(in,

UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICA

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 1, 1972

H o u se of R e pr e se n t a t iv e s,

C om m it tee on F oreig n Affa ir s,

Subcom m it te es on Afr ic a an d

I n tern a tio n a l O rganiz ati ons an d M o v em en ts,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittees met, pursu ant to call, at 10:30 a.m. in room 

2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser 

(chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and 

Movements) presiding.

Mr. Fraser. This joint meeting of the Subcommittees on Africa 

and International Organizations and Movements will come to order.

Chairman Diggs and I flipped a coin to see who would chair the 

meeting and it came up on the edge so I got the opportunity to chair. 

I want to welcome Ambassador George Bush and Ambassador William 

Schaufele to this meeting.

On January 28 through the 4th of February, the Security Council 

gathered for an historic meeting on African soil in Addis Ababa. We 

believe tha t it is important from the general standpoint of the United 

Nations for the Security Council to become somewhat more mobile. 

Moreover, the meeting on African soil was especially important from 

the standpoint of focusing attention on African issues which occupy 

a significant part of the United Nations agenda. Following the 

Security Council meeting at Addis, Ambassador Bush journeyed to 

eight African countries: The Sudan, Kenya, Zambia, Zaire, Gabon, 

Nigeria, Chad, and Botswana. Thus, including the earlier journey 

to Somalia, he visited in total 10 African countries on this trip. 

We are indeed delighted that he took time to make these visits. 

Familiarization of policy officials with the people and government of 

an area with which they are concerned through on-the-ground visits 

is invaluable.

The members of the Subcommittee on International Organizations 

and Movements and the Subcommittee on Africa, in this joint subcommittee session, are anxious to hear about the Security Council 

meeting at Africa Hall in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and about your 

subsequent visits to other African countries.

Mr. Ambassador, we are delighted to have you, and why don’t you 

proceed as you wish.
2

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE BUSH, PERMA NENT U.S. 

REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. B ush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, joint chairmen, and I 

appreciate the opportunity to be here this soon after this visit. 1 have 

no prepared statement, but I would like to make a few opening 

comments and then be happy to answer any of your questions.

We, the U.S. Government, proposed some time before the Organization of African Unity formally suggested it, tha t the Security Council 

should indeed meet from time to time or the General Assembly even 

meet from time to time in other places in the world. WTe felt, and I 

know this reflected President Nixon’s personal view, t ha t this could 

have an effect of revitalizing interest in the United Nations.

Thus, when this meeting was proposed, we favored it. We were 

concerned about the costs involved. They were originally announced 

at something like half a million dollars, or there was some editorial 

comment that this meeting would cost a half million dollars, and that 

seemed outrageously high given the financial condition of the United 

Nations.

However, negotiations tha t Ambassador Schaufele participated in 

reduced the estimated cost to something like $110,000, and the 

Government of Ethiopia contributed a substantial amount of money 

beyond this on a unilateral basis to defray the costs.

Thus, though $110,000 is certainly not a small amount of money, it 

seemed to be much more in proportion to the merits of the case, and 

thus our reservation tha t we had about costs was, we think, properly 

answered.

The problem tha t very franklv had to be faced and has to be faced 

in any future meetings on this basis is, it would be unwise to put the 

Security Council in kind of a pressure cooker to deliberate objectively 

on specific issues. I don’t think that anybody would propose tha t a 

meeting on the Middle E ast should be held in Cairo, for instance, or 

in Tel Aviv.

I would expect that nobody would propose tha t. Therefore, there 

was some concern tha t this meeting not be positioned geographically 

where undue pressures would be brought to bear on the committee, 

and I think the meeting being held in Addis again from that standpoint 

allied people’s concern, I think justifiable concern. Thus, the two main 

concerns we had were laid to rest before the meeting, and the meeting 

in our final assessment was a plus factor.

It didn’t serve to bring insta nt solutions to some of the problems in 

South Africa, b ut I think in the final analysis though, the expectations 

were high by some of the African countries, reasoning something like 

this, “Gee, if we just have a meeting in Africa, that is going to put 

pressure on and nobody will want to veto a resolution on African soil,” 

and there was a kind of a feeling about that in the beginning tha t was 

disspelled as the meeting went on.

So there could have been some disappointment, but in my subsequent visit to eight countries, most of the people, in fact, all of the 

people I talked to at the foreign minister or chief of state level, said 

they felt the meeting was a plus.

There was some critical story in the New York Times saying, how 

can you say you are in Africa when you are in the Addis Hilton commuting in a Mercedes Benz, proceeding down to the Africa Hall.
3

I don’t think any of us pretended we were instant African experts. 

But Africa was all around you there, many people came to the meeting 

that might not have had access to it in the United States, and generally speaking, the climate was one where objectivity could prevail.

The Ethiopian Government did an excellent job, and so we think on 

balance it was a plus.

As to the mechanics of the meeting, the United States supported 

two resolutions on Namibia, one on apartheid and abstained on the 

Portuguese and Rhodesian resolutions which I will be glad to discuss 

with you.

I think the most positive thing tha t came out was the first Namibia 

resolution. I say positive because it set up machinery under which the 

Secretary General will contact South Africa.

One delegation, the Chinese, expressed concern that this could prove 

to be a slap in the face for the United Nations, but subsequent to the 

meeting, the Secretary General has been invited to come there.

Again I have talked to him before he left, and I don’t think there is 

any naive expectation tha t this is going to instantly solve the problem. 

But before the problem is solved, there is going to have to be communication between the U.N. and the Government of South Africa. 

We think this resolution, which also has three members of the Security 

Council involved in the process, is a positive step.

Mr. Fraser. Who are the three?

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM SCHAUFELE, SENIOR ADVISOR TO 

THE PERMANENT U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.N.

Mr. Schaufele. Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Argentina.

Mr. Bush. And Argentina introduced the resolution to sta rt with. 

There was some talk about expanding tha t to five. The Soviets 

wanted to increase it, but I don’t know tha t they proposed any additional names to go on it. So in a capsule, tha t is our feeling about the 

meeting.

As to future meetings abroad, we would be very careful. I think my 

own judgment is we should be very cautious about it because of the 

two main things tha t I mentioned earlier, the finances and the whole 

idea of pressure points.

But we would have to assess the meeting as a plus factor. The only 

damage came, in my judgment, from some very bad publicity tha t 

the United Nations received for kind of junketing in the face of a 

financial problem.

These funds were budgeted but not specifically, and I think in the 

future it would be well for the United Nations to foresee a meeting 

and, if it is going to happen, to have it budgeted specifically like other 

conferences are budgeted so we can avoid the claim that we are acting 

irresponsibly financially.

We were damaged, frankly, in the United States by some editorials 

in some of the papers, and some of them did not take note of the fact 

tha t the financing was greatly reduced from the original estimates, 

and I think Ambassador Schaufele deserves great credit for looking 

after that financial end as well as he did.

If I could make, sir, just a couple of quick comments on the trip 

itself, then I would be happy to answer any questions.
4

You have mentioned the countries I went to. T was privileged to 

meet seven chiefs of state. Some of the meetings were very perfunctory: President Mobutu at the airport, His Imperial Majesty 

Haile Selaissie in a very formal setting, a bilateral meeting where I 

presented a letter from the President but a rather formal and reasonably short meeting, 30 minutes.

But most of them were rather extensive and very frank, and I found 

the leaders very willing to talk frankly about the problems that they 

have, the problems with our country and the problems that they face 

in the world itself.

I was impressed with their vigor, I was impressed with their style, 

I was impressed with their dedication to nationhood, and generally 

speaking, the visits with these chiefs of state has got to be, at least 

for me, a real highlight of the trip.

These are young men for the most part. They are people tha t are 

striving very strongly to build nationhood, you might say, and in 

most instances they appear to be succeeding.

I was impressed with the fact that, though each one in varying 

degrees mentioned the problems of South Africa, when we got into 

substantive discussions, these were just some of the things that conconcerned them.

In fact, I would have to characterize them as an im portant part but 

certainly, percentagewise, only a small part of the problems that they 

face and that they wanted to talk about with us. The main parts being 

nationhood itself and economic development and to some degree 

geopolitics. They, of course, like other chiefs of state and foreign ministers, are extremely interested in things like the President’s trip to 

Peking and what tha t meant for Africa.

1 had a long visit in Sudan where we talked at length about the 

Middle East. 1 mentioned that sometimes a t the United Nations we 

get so obsessed with the issues concerning the south tha t we sometimes lose our balance in recognizing tha t there are many, many other 

problems.

In the United Nations, and again this is a rather subjective criticism, 

before I went to Africa, 1 was wondering exactly what is the sentiment 

in Africa about the United States because somethimes we cannot take 

positions in the United Nations that are compatible with what a group 

acting often in unity wants us to take.

I have in mind our commitment to peaceful change, both change, of 

course, and peaceful. Sometimes we cannot fulfill their wishes in terms 

of resolution.

But I will say that I found, and I expect you hear this from all your 

visitors who come back from other countries, a tremendous reservoir 

of goodwill for the United States in Africa. It is not just a historical 

affection, it is not simply the identity they feel with many of our black 

American citizens, but it is also a political identity. Again, not the 

systems themselves because we are dealing mainly with systems tha t 

are different from our systems, but it is the fact they recognize in the 

United States tha t some of their freedom is involved in our being 

strong.

We are dealing in many instances with, of course, military leaders, 

but there was a total recognition from most of the ones I talked with. 

I would not go into the details with each one on a specific conversa-
5

tion . I received the gen eral imp ression th at it is to their interest th at 

the Un ite d State s be wh at it is, sta nd s for wha t it does, and this is 

som eth ing th at J do n’t always get at the U.N. where we are dealing 

with specific resolution s.

I discovered wh at eve ryb ody on thes e com mittee s ha s known for a 

long tim e and wh at 1 have kno wn to some degree, and th at is the 

divergence th at is Africa, the d ifference th at is Africa.

in the north , you have the interest in the Middle Ea st, you have 

con cerns as I ind ica ted in the Sud an. Th e Chief of St ate wa nte d to 

talk in detai l ab ou t wh at we are doing in the Middle Eas t, wh at our 

view is of the Ja rrin g Mission, wh at our view is of the sepa rate tra ck 

th at the St ate Dep ar tm en t has been work ing on in ter ms of possible 

peace neg otiations, on the se proximity talk s, and the sam e thing was 

tru e to some d egree in Chad, whi ch I wa nt to mentio n specifically.

As we m oved fu rth er so uth an d go t int o Lu saka where some of y ou 

very rec ently have been, th ere the emp hasis on politic al issues was more on 

those to the sou th. But in wh ate ver pa rt of Africa and h owever dive rse 

Afric a is, there was alw ays a large a mou nt of time devoted to dev elopme nt, economics, and , again, indepe ndenc e, natio nhood, this kin d of 

thing.

I have two specifics, if 1 might, on the c ountries. We took a visit to 

Bo tsw ana and this was a very inter estin g visit. One of their Ministers 

of Com merce, cam e up and met us at the qu ad rip oint, and the re we 

had a cha nce to be near, at least geograp hica lly, the point where some 

of ou r m ost d ifficult U.N. p rob lem s tak e place, and we also h ad a g rea t 

presen tatio n by the Mini ste r of B ots wa na, the Mini ste r of Com merce, 

who prese nte d to us their desire for access to the no rth . Th is was a 

mo st imp ress ive trip .

1 also wa nt to me ntion specifically Chad. I was impressed with all 

the cou ntries I visited and with all the chiefs of state, bu t I was 

pa rti cu larly impressed with Ch ad. I would hope impressed no t 

necessa rily with the progres s or lack of prog ress, bu t I felt th at 

Presiden t To mbalba ye is a ma n of conviction, a man who can make 

a difficult, tou gh decision, no t alw ays as the U nited States m igh t have 

it, bu t certa inly reflecting an independe nce th at is wo rth y of our 

tak ing a look at it.

I would hop e th at the Congress would tak e a look to see if Chad 

migh t no t be give n some consider ation in our bilate ral aid or 

otherw ise.

We are doing things for Ch ad throu gh the regional system, bu t 1 

was im pressed with this lan dlo cked countr y, the ir fierce independence. 

Th ey are in a pressure are a themselves vis-a -vis the no rth and to 

some degree other areas, and I think the y are str uggling fiercely for 

indepe ndenc e. I t is a tin y co un try , it is a sma ll co un try ; seeing the 

pro blems th at face the m, I think those of us who are c oncerned ab ou t 

our own cities and our own dom estic problem s would be app alle d at 

some of the problems th at this Chief of State faces.

It is som eth ing th at again we could go int o in more detail, bu t I 

would single it ou t because it has made a l astin g impression on me to 

see the m really beg inning in their infanc y as far as develop me nt goes, 

with the firm d ete rm ina tio n th at they are going to su rvive as a nati onal 

en tit y given some very difficult prob lems.

7 5 -2 3 2— 72 -
6

1 wanted to make a comment because it concerns your committee’s 

deliberations very much, and I know your committee, sir, came up 

to New York in taking a look at the multilateral aid channels.

At these various places we went, we tried to see projects and tried 

to meet with the UND P representatives, and in many instances 

they would get together all the agency people.

1 have some recommendations I want to make to the UND P people, 

that I want to make to the Secretary General, one or two of which 

I had a chance to mention to him before he left on his trip. But I 

feel there is a great and crying need for more coordination between 

the independent agencies if the multilateral approach to aid is going 

to work the way 1 think it should and the way I want to see it work 

and the way I think the members of this committee want to see it 

work.

I believe in the multilateral approach to aid; 1 think it is in the 

U.S. interest to have a lot of our aid go through multilateral channels. 

But I think for us to be complacent about the delivery systems or 

about the coordination as it exists now would be a tremendous disservice to the m ultilateral approach tha t T believe in.

Because there is much that has to be done. There is a lot of talk 

and there is a lot of studying things to death and there is not all t hat 

much in terms of delivery system. This is a broad and dangerous 

generalization because there are some projects tha t are tremendously 

impressive and we could go into some of those.

But, generally speaking, I feel tha t there is room for plenty more 

coordination and streamlining and efficiency. I worry in the overall 

context about these independent agencies acting as independent 

fiefdoms struggling each for its place in the sun without coordinating 

their activities with the other agencies.

I will cite one example. I was tremendously impressed, as were 

those of you, with Mr. Gardiner. But I am appalled. They get all this 

data together and then in my judgment tha t data is not utilized by the 

agencies.

Here sit these experts, and if they are no good they ought to get rid 

of them.

I cite this one because I was impressed with the people I met in 

ECA, particularly with Mr. Gardiner and his dedication, but I am 

concerned tha t the information they turn up is not fully utilized. I 

would ask subsequently “Do you know how ECA fits in?” as we 

traveled around.

There was an indication that they fit out with some of these people 

instead of fitting in. Some places would say they are excellent and we 

use their population figures as a basis for determining where this 

project will go and where it doesn’t. B ut all I am saying is we need to 

have more of that happen.

Secretary Rogers has said that we don’t believe that Africa should be 

the scene of major power conflicts, and we don’t propose to make it so.

In conclusion, I would simply say tha t I agree with this statement. 

I am convinced that the African leaders themselves agree with this, 

and yet I end by saying th at Africa wants not just friendship but wants 

cooperation with America, wants it desperately. They recognize tha t
i

we have no desire to impose a system on them, that we have no desire 

to impose our will territorially or any other way against them.

1 was very pleased in some countries that the climate for American 

investment or foreign investment was good and was improving.

Places like the Sudan, for example, with which we don’t have 

diplomatic relations, we visited with five of their ministers. All expressed the desire for capital investment, private investment, from 

America, realizing they have to have appropriate safeguards for 

Americans to invest in their country.

In the U.N. I get the feeling we are categorized as imperialists and 

neocolonialists, and I make clear this is not what America stands for, 

but nevertheless it is repeated over and over and over again. Yet when 

you visit Africa they don’t harbor these opinions and ideas, and if 

they do the are too darned polite to tell me because it didn’t come up.

In fact, it is just the opposite, and this is again a broad generalization, they welcome American investment and participation, and 

certainly they welcome the freedom that our very existence assures 

for them.

Mr. Fraser. Thank you very much for your comments.

My impression is tha t those of us on the subcommittees, and a 

number of us have been in Africa, come away with the same impression; th at is, one can’t help but be impressed by the quality of leadership a t the top and the determination evidenced in tha t leadership.

Our subcommittee spent some time during a recent visit to New 

York on this precise question of coordination and got the impression 

tha t the UN DP believes it is making progress in implementing the 

Jackson report, particularly in having the UN DP Resident Representative be the leader in bringing together the various donors.

But we did discover th at the regional economic commissions of the 

U.N. don’t necessarily coordinate with UNDP in the countries 

and there is no adequate system for coordination with the bureaus, 

which are located in New York. UNDP lias decentralized according 

to regions, but the regional bureaus are physically located in New 

York, which surprised me a little although I can understand why that 

is done. I think you have put your finger on one aspect of the coordination problem.

Mr. Bush. The decentralization where the resident representation 

in the country has some control over the financing is a tool and 

sometimes an effective tool if the individual uses it properly to 

guarantee coordination.

But it is not a total tool, it is not a foolproof tool, because programs 

can be instigated and studied and started by the agencies themselves 

without having to have the UNDP Resident Representative give his 

stamp of approval. So I think it is very fair to say, and I am glad 

to have this chance, I think it is fair to say there has been a little bit 

of progress ju st from my studying it. All I am saying is, there needs 

to be more progress if the American people are going to be able to 

identify with this concept of multilateral aid, they will have to see 

more things happening.

Population was one of the things I worked on when I was in the 

Congress with many people here in this room. It is something tha t 

the U.N. should do. It is something where we are better served to use 

a multilateral channel, but it has got to be done efficiently and
8

effectively. There has to be some delivery systems. It should not be 

studied to death if the American people are going to see th at we are 

bette r off to use a multilateral channel anti I am convinced we are.

We don’t want to be imposing American standards of rate of growth 

on some country, but we are saying that if an international community 

decides it is worth while to have these programs and education, we 

want to strongly support it.

Mr. Fraser. I got the impression tha t we in the United States 

could really stand to beef up what from your point of view would be a 

backup operation by a more systematic involvement in recruiting and 

by being interested in and working with the various agencies of the 

United Nations.

I think we would end up being more fully informed with a greater 

degree of involvement. Also, we would come closer to matching what I 

understand is a higher input by some of the Scandinavian countries 

which place greater reliance on the U.N. system in their total foreign 

policy.

Mr. Bush. Mr. Chairman, the United States has, I would say, 

more so than any country—there may be one or two others t hat would 

be as holy as we are on this question—we have respected the Intern ational Civil Service, the objectivity of it far beyond most countries.

We have not used it as an arm of our Foreign Service. We have bent 

over backward on this.

Now, I think your criticism is well taken and tha t there are things 

we can do. I would say in the U.S. Mission—Ambassador Schaufele 

and I have been discussing this—to upgrade some of the Americans 

tha t are working at the U.N., in terms of quality of people and making 

quality people available, upgrade as far as possible this whole category 

of Americans who go into the Secretariat, whether it be the headquarters in New York or in other U.N. agencies.

This is one of the things I come back from this trip with, a determination th at we should try not to put the arm on these fellows and have 

them report in to our mission, as some countries do, th at is not what the 

International Civil Service should be.

But on the other hand, I think we can do more in terms of upgrading 

this service and taking more of an interest, and I accept that criticism.

Mr. Fraser. 1 think it has ju st been a relationship tha t the United 

States has had with the agency th at has evolved over a period of time. 

We would look forward to any recommendations you would make in 

tha t regard, we would like the United States to participate as fully as 

possible in all of these agencies.

Let me comment on Chad. My impression would be tha t this problem of regionalization stemmed from the Corey report 5 or 6 years 

ago. I originally was impressed with the Corey report thesis th at because we were spread too thinly we ought to maybe deal with regional 

projects or projects tha t had implications for more than one country. 

But I discovered in Africa from the African point of view tha t they 

feel their need is right in their own country and t hat regional projects 

tend to be down the road somewhat from their most pressing problems 

of education and health and employment and so on.

I would be sympathetic to any influence you can exercise within our 

State Department and in the Congress in perhaps freeing our ability 

to respond to the needs of some of these countries, without their having
9

to go through a virtual facade of finding a regional rationale to do 

something that is really a national undertaking in a bilateral program.

Mr. Bush. Certainly I don’t mean to undermine the regional concept 

by anything I have said here. I do agree, however, in certain specific 

cases we should without reopening a tremendous can of worms, take 

individual looks at bilateral assistance. I think also tha t we should 

review carefully the regional concept to see th at it does not get bogged 

down in border problems tha t would keep the regional approach from 

moving forward.

I think this is a danger inherent in regionalism. Yet certainly I think 

we could probably show that some of it has been successful. But 

during the visit people were saying to the United States tha t regionalism is fine but we desperately need your help on this project and to 

the degree these requests are legitimate ones and to the degree we 

have the funds available, I do plan to try to see if from our end we 

can’t recommend flexibility on this.

Mr. Fraser. There is no reason we cannot be on both tracks, both 

helping within the country and through regional efforts.

Mr. Bush. Within the confines of the limitations tha t are imposed 

on us.

Mr. Fraser. Chairman Diggs.

Mr. Diggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly welcome this opportunity to greet the witness and his 

colleague this morning, having served with him very profitably during 

the last General Assembly.

I think these joint meetings are valuable, and I hope it suggests, 

Mr. Chairman, to the Ambassador a precedent tha t we might well 

consider following prior to the opening of each General Assembly, both 

as it relates to a joint meeting between the International Organization 

Subcommittee and the Africa Subcommittee, and to subcommittees 

with other geographic jurisdictions. I was impressed tremendously 

not only with the amount of foreign policy interest in which our 

country is involved at the U.N., but with the extent to which the 

congressional inputs are limited, despite the constitutional role of this 

branch of Government in those decisions.

I think tha t some kind of device must be found where our role can 

be respected. A beginning, as I see it, would be joint meetings between 

this subcommittee, the Africa Subcommittee, the Subcommittee on the 

Near East, to begin examining some of the questions that are anticipated 

to be discussed at the ensuing General Assembly, so that at least the 

Congress can be put on notice. At least we can have an opportunity to 

become acquainted with the direction in which the executive anticipates taking us, because once the General Assembly opens, I can assure 

you that you do not have that opportunity, and I think it is one of the 

prime defects in the whole complex of our international relations.

I am particularly interested, Ambassador Bush, in a resolution which 

is pending before the Security Council now, and tha t is tha t sanctions 

against Rhodesia should remain fully in force until the people in 

Rhodesia freely and equally exercise their right to self determ ination.

Now, the Los Angeles Times on February 26th—I was o ut in Los 

Angeles a t a speaking engagement over the weekend—carried a story 

to the effect tha t the sponsors of this resolution had to modify the 

resolution in order to avoid a veto by our Government. I would like 

to get your comment on that.
10

Mr. B ush. Our comments simply are tha t the Congress passed 

legislation commonly known as the Byrd amendment. This was signed 

into law by the President.

This amendment was but one provision of a mammoth bill, and 

under law, under our law, this supersedes the other law, and thus we 

were in the position of not wanting to appear to be hypocritical on this 

kind of a resolution. Nor did 1 want to take the responsibility, and 

certainly this was our input to the Department, and they agreed, for 

flouting the law of our country, which has, as I am told by our lawyers, 

superseded the commitment we had to the sanction procedure.

So our position was tha t first, the United States has been second 

to none in the observance of these sanctions.

I might add this was discussed very fully a t the different stops we 

made on this trip. Second, that the importation of chrome was but a 

small part of the overall exports from Rhodesia before the sanctions and 

third, that within the confines of our law, we would continue to abide 

by the sanctions as much as anybody.

So that the resolution which we ended up abstaining on did not put 

us, in our judgment, in the position of being a hypocrite. I don’t have 

the exact wording of the resolution as it was originally presented, but 

we would have been asked to be voting for something, or abstaining 

on something, or permitting something to be put into effect th at we 

knew we could not comply with, and tha t we are not going to do.

We have taken the rap on this thing. We have taken the heat on it. 

The Congress has acted, it has become the law, and we must not 

appear to be totally hypocritical in the world community.

We have taken a great deal of abuse from those who wanted to 

embarrass us in Africa, to emphasize the negative and not the positive 

in the United Nations.

1 think to the degree we are in possible violation of these sanctions, 

what we have done has been done in the open, it has been done in the 

deliberative process here in the halls of the U.S. Congress. I have 

taken the offense enough, not to justify this, because it puts us in a 

very difficult position up there, but to also suggest tha t those who 

sanctimoniously criticize us in the U.N. had bette r look at their own 

hole cards to see why the sanctions are not working, because I am told 

that the United States has been second to none in the observance of 

these sanctions.

So I think this is what tha t editorial referred to, and we simply 

cannot, given the restrictions placed on us by law, appear to be twofaced up there on these things.

Mr. F raser. I was deeply involved in the House argument on the 

floor, and we got no help from the White House in trying to defeat this 

amendment, none at all, a pro forma appearance by some State 

Department people, but even they were pu t under some constraints, 

and now the United States is in violation of international law, and I 

only make this comment because I think it needs to be made.

Mr. B ush. I would simply say the administration, as I understand 

it, and in fact I am positive this is correct, was in opposition to this 

legislation, bu t I was not here, so 1 don’t know about the extent of the 

arm twisting.

Mr. F raser. There was none.

Mr. Bush. They were firmly and openly in opposition to the action 

that was taken, but once it was taken it is the law. All I am saying is
11

what I want to do is minimize the problem as far as this country is 

concerned—what I want to do is represent our system with a high 

degree of advocacy.

What I also made clear to these African leaders, and it was an 

embarrassing thing, we were not then in violation of sanctions. 1 don’t 

even know now, to my knowledge, that any of this stuff has been 

landed in the United States-----

Mr. Fraser. There is a ship on the way.

Mr. Bush. We keep hearing it is the longest voyage in history.

I also made clear, Mr. Chairman, and I hope this represents the will 

of the Congress, to these chiefs of state, tha t Congress was not dealing 

with, in their judgment, and 1 expect 1 could get an argument on this, 

but I don’t think tha t the Congress, and 1 certainly don’t think the 

U.S. position should be tha t the Congress was trying to further colonialism and racism in this action it took. It was dealing with another 

problem, and tha t problem, in the judgment of Congress, was security 

and dependency on the Soviet Union for strategic material. I did try 

to make this point, because 1 frankly believe when one represents his 

country, he ought to present it as forcefully and as fairly as he can, 

not covering up for mistakes t hat a country makes, but putting things 

in a favorable light.

Many of the people I talked to understood, because many understand tha t there are exceptions being made, less open than the United 

States, but many exceptions have been made to the sanctions program.

Mr. Fraser. Mr. Ambassador, 1 think your role is an appropriate 

one; you ought to pu t the best face on whatever happens.

I think equally it ought to be said tha t other countries have been 

flagrantly violating the sanctions, many of our so-called allies, and in 

my judgment this matter needs to be fully aired. I think th at for other 

advanced nations to openly and flagrantly violate the sanctions is in 

many ways much worse than what we did, because at least our 

violation is open.

There is hypocrisy all around the world on this issue, but this is one 

of the subjects in which the U.N. could be effective. It is one of the 

few nonviolent issues open to the U.N. I don’t find sufficient interest 

in the international community to make this one nonviolent procedure 

really effective. I think your position is a fair one. I did not mean to 

be critical of you.

Mr. Bush. I did not interpret it tha t way, but I thought the committee should know how we have approached this issue, and how we 

have tried to handle it, and what we are trying to do is restrict any 

hypocrisy we are accused of.

We have debated in the open. We have faced up to it. We have 

taken the heat on it, but I am going to try to find ways to keep this 

thing in its proper perspective, and to make the American, to make 

the U.S. record clear to those who are just using this to really hammer 

us from a propaganda standpoint.

Mr. Whalen. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. Diggs. Of course.

There are six others here, Mr. Chairman, so I will wait. If there is 

any time left after the others have had their opportunity to interrogate the Ambassador, then 1 may have some other questions.

Mr. Fraser. Mr. Whalley is next in line.
12

Do you want to yield?

Mr. Whalley. I will yield.

Mr. Whalen. T did receive a call from Secretary Newsome urging 

tha t I vote against the conference report tha t included the Byrd 

amendment, so I presume it was administration policy to be against 

the amendment.

But have you been confronted with the question by your colleagues 

in the U.N. tha t the amendment does not require the purchase of 

chrome, tha t purchase of chrome is within the discretion of the 

administration?

Mr. Bush. No, the point has not been raised. The only point tha t 

has been raised is th at the point that has continually been raised from 

Addis has been that the United States was in violation of the sanctions.

Mr. Whalen. I make tha t point because there is an article in “ CQ” 

this week, for example, which indicates the administration has not 

spent $12.5 billion for various projects tha t have been funded by the 

Congress.

Mr. Fraser. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. Whalley. You talk about your visit to Addis Ababa and subsequent visits. How many visits have you made altogether to Africa 

since you are the Ambassador to the U.N?

Mr. Bush. This is the first visit since I have been Ambassador. I 

made one trip in a private capacity before.

Mr. Whalley. And what was th at period of time?

Mr. Bush. The first visit I made was in 1963 or 1964, just as an 

individual, and then just to the north, to Libya and to Cairo.

Mr. Whalley. How much time did you spend this time?

Mr. Bush. A little over 3 weeks.

Mr. Whalley. What progress have you observed in the 8 or 9 

years?

Mr. Bush. The problem is I went to different countries, so it is 

hard to judge. I could not say something has changed in that period 

of time, because I was viewing different countries, and I could not 

really give you my objective analysis of that.

I think there lias been, just from studying the situation, some 

major changes in the economics. You might point to Zaire and 

countries of this nature, for example.

But T did not go to the same countries this trip tha t I went to then.

Mr. Whalley. How often are U.N. Security Council meetings 

held in Africa?

Mr. B ush. This is the first U.N. Security Council meeting tha t has 

been held in Africa, or anywhere else outside of New York.

Mr. Whalley. Do they have others in mind?

Mr. Bush. There are no specifics pending. There have been some 

rumors of it.

We are going to be very cautious and very wary of future meetings, 

letting each request stand on its own feet, and doing it within the 

confines of being sure we keep the finances in order, and, as I mentioned to the chairman, I feel that these things should be budgeted 

and planned in advance, and should not be in response to a crisis 

situation.

I don’t think tha t we should let the Security Council become a 

vehicle for, let the travel of the Security Council become a vehicle 

for bringing outside pressures on the Council .
13

The theory tha t the U.S. Government had, or th at we put forward, 

is that you revitalize the U.N. by kind of taking it to the people. 

But in terms of the future, we have no plans for any future meeting, 

and we will be very cautious and very wary of holding these meetings, 

unless the finances are carefully thought out, and the agenda is 

carefully thought out, and the whole procedure is given proper 

planning.

Mr. Whalley. You learned a great deal on this trip about African 

countries. Is it your idea to repeat a personal visit back there to 

learn more, and visit as many countries as possible?

Mr. Bush. I would like to do that.

This visit was special in tha t it was a presidentially blessed mission, 

and we had an o pportunity to take messages to chiefs of state.

Certainly with my present knowledge of Africa and their aspirations in conducting the business in the United Nations, I would like 

to go back.

Mr. Whalley. To do the job well for you, you almost have to go 

there and see Africa first-hand?

Mr. Bush. I do. 1 have to be tha t fine line between being a 

junketeering ambassador and one who wants to go and present 

our country’s views to some of these people.

This is my second trip abroad since I have been Ambassador. Once 

last year I went to see Gunnar Jarring in Sweden, and then to Geneva, 

and then this visit.

I think I am the first U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. to visit Africa. 

There are 42 votes in the United Nations there, 42 votes out of 132, 

and it is terribly important to us from just a plain political standpoint 

as well as the identity tha t we feel for the continent and their problems.

Mr. Whalley. How many colleagues did you take on the U.S. 

mission?

Mr. Bush. This time we had four at the Security Council meeting, 

including myself, and on this trip thereafter I think our official party 

was 12, plus the crew of the plane tha t was provided for us by the 

White House.

Mr. Whalley. I hope you can get back again as soon as possible.

As you say, 42 member nations, approximately one-third of the 

membership of the U.N. are in Africa, so it is a very, very important 

continent.

Mr. Bush. I am handed a note saying in 1951 the Security Council 

met in Paris, and 1 also think the General Assembly met there, but 

other than that, there have been no other meetings away from headquarters.

Mr. Fraser. Thank you, Mr. Whalley.

Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. Derwinski. Mr. Ambassador, you made a number of references to the fact tha t there was a favorable attitude toward possible 

American investment as well as our Government’s bilateral aid program and some of the multilevel programs.

It is not my intention to put words in your mouth, but by implication, this would indicate that some of the programs of other countries 

might not be looked upon as favorably because of the possible strings 

attached or attempts to use them for political leverage.
14

Mr. Bush. I think tha t you are not putting words in my mouth 

with tha t interpretation. There is a determination in some countries 

tha t an American investment presence, or an American aid presence, 

or American participation in the multilateral channel presence safeguards the independence of some of these countries, as well as furthering their development with no strings attached.

These countries I visited are fiercely independent, they are proud 

of being part of Africa. Though their history is recent in terms of 

independence, they are proud of their nationhood, and they are 

struggling to build this and inculcate it into their people. They see 

in us, in my judgment, and this may sound too patriotic or too pro our 

country, but they see in us the best single safeguard to their own 

nationhood, because they know very well the United States does not 

want to take over their countries or superimpose our system on them.

Mr. Derwinski. When you speak of this fierce independence, this 

obviously means economic independence as well as political independence, and I would imagine tha t the fear of being controlled in 

the economic sense by a former colonial ruler is still a major problem 

in part of Africa.

Mr. Bush. I am not sure how much they are worried about control. 

There still is a very important economic presence in many of these 

countries by those who were formerly the colonial powers.

I did not go into this specifically, but I did not detect too much 

hostility to this kind of investment, say, on the part of the United 

Kingdom or France.

I do think even in countries where there is a dependence on these 

countries, you might say, t ha t there is a great welcome for Americans.

Now, some things have to change in some of these areas for Americans to want to invest in these countries. But in almost every one, 

there was a pitch for better relations in terms of capital investment, 

and I was surprised to find tha t the rhetoric I get exposed to at the 

United Nations was not repeated, or was never implied. There was 

no labeling us imperialists and colonialists, and it is very seldom tha t 

the African countries label us these things. Once in a while it is.

This is very much separated when it comes to economic investment. 

They don’t think of us as trying to exploit them when they talk about 

investment, whether it is minerals or agriculture or whatever it is.

Mr. Derwinski. You specifically mentioned the conversation in 

Sudan where, if I recall correctly, due to the after effects of the Middle 

East crisis, we do not have relations with them.

They would welcome our economic investment?

Mr. Bush. That is true, we don’t have diplomatic relations with 

the Sudan. It was broken off because of the Middle East.

Now the United States is seeking better relations with the Sudan, 

and yet, without formal diplomatic relations, they are in the process 

of changing their investment code and their regulations covering 

investments to make very clear that foreign investment will be 

welcome, and tha t it will be protected as much as the Government can 

do so.

So there is a climatic change there towards the United States tha t 

is very, very encouraging, I think, in the Sudan.

Now, of course, the Sudan has some mammoth economic and 

political problems, some of which may be on the road to solution. 

There are political problems with the southern part of the country.
15

But the Middle East is the major obstacle to improved relations 

with the Sudan. Yet I had a great opportunity to explain to their 

Foreign Minister exactly what our aspirations are in the Middle 

East, what we are trying to do about peace in the Middle East, and 

I hope they felt reassured on this.

Mr. Derwinski. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, just for the sake of the record, I mentioned having 

served under Ambassador Bush at the U.N. this past fall. 1 can 

attest to his effectiveness, including the effectiveness which is obviously necessary to explain the actions of our Congress.

Mr. Fraser. Mr. Vander Jagt.

Mr. Vander J agt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to than k the Ambassador for his appearance here this 

morning, and commend him for his trip to Africa and for the effective 

wav in which the American point of view was represented there.

I am glad you made the trip, and I, with Congressman Whalen, 

hope you can make more.

1 have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Fraser. Mr. Ambassador, perhaps you could say something 

about the resolutions on the Portuguese problem.

Mr. Bush. Again I regret to say I did not bring the actual resolution, but our major problem with the Portuguese resolution was the 

almost official legitimacy tha t these resolutions would have granted to 

liberation groups. There was not anything particularly selective 

about that, but I think this was the major procedural problem tha t 

we had that kept us from voting for the resolution. We did abstain.

What was the final vote on tha t? Do you remember?

Ambassador Schaufele. I think it was 10, five abstentions.

Mr. Bush. Was there any other point—I am embarrassed to say I 

did not bring the specific resolution.

Ambassador Schaufele. We did have the additional problem, as 

we have had in the past, tha t the resolution would be interpreted to 

give legitimacy to use of force.

Mr. Bush. There was some chapter 7 language tha t remained in it.

One of the problems, Mr. Chairman, that we encountered, and tha t 

I hope I laid to rest to some degree, is tha t there was a tendency in 

some places—and I remember particularly an off-the-record and very 

open, 1 would say not hostile, 1 would say friendly but very frank questioning by a bunch of the intellectuals in Nigeria about this case. 

They were inclined to equate our quest for peaceful change with the 

status quo, no change at all, and they would state, “Look, your own 

Revolution was a nonpeaceful change.”

And my answer to that was, one, we mean both peaceful and 

change, and two, the United Nations Charter was not in existence at 

the time of the U.S. Revolution. We are not going to give up on the 

United Nations, which commits itself to peaceful change.

But it did come up a lot, and there was the feeling, and it was not 

put in the context of any specific revolution, it was put in the context 

of an overall policy toward Africa.

I am not sure they left convinced, b ut at least I conveyed to them 

what I think and what I know is the firm conviction of our President 

which is the policy of this country, tha t we are committed to change, 

but we are not committed to force, we are simply stopping short of 

that.
16

Mr. Fraser. On t hat question, I think this raises a very profound 

question for U.S. policy: When a group of people in the country are 

outside the political system, as they are in South Africa, where the 

Africans are excluded from any opportunity to participate in the 

government in any effective way, or in the case of Rhodesia or Southwest Africa, what is the position of the United States, tha t people who 

resort to the use of force because there is no political alternative open 

to them are wrong?

Mr. Bush. I think the position of the United States is tha t the 

United States is not going to resort to force in order to solve these 

problems.

Mr. Fraser. Itself?

Mr. Bush. Yes. And the United States is going to respect the 

charter provisions in terms of internal intervention and in terms of 

peaceful change.

This is the United States position.

Mr. Fraser. I can understand tha t the United States does not 

want to get into the business of itself applying force to bring about 

change in the country, but are we also a t the same time indicating, in 

effect, a disapproval of those who do use force under circumstances 

where there appears to be no other remedy open to them?

Mr. Bush. I would not say that. I would phrase it that we are 

urging and supporting the concept of self-determination, but we also 

are not—well, I would simply come back to peaceful change—but we 

are not recognizing or fomenting avenues tha t would result in change 

other than peaceful change.

Tha t is the only way I know to answer th at question.

Ambassador Schaufele. I would maybe add something to this, 

Mr. Chairman. The question is not usually addressed in the U.N. in 

terms of the liberation groups. It is addressed as to whether the 

United Nations as a body should give aid, including the use of force. 

In other words, force under U.N. aegis is the question and not the 

question of force being used by the liberation groups.

Mr. Fraser. Does it come up in part, though, on the issue of 

whether the United Nations should give support to liberation forces?

Mr. Bush. In a resolution of this nature, it comes up in that 

connection.

I mean there are some governments who want to see the United 

Nations specifically endorse this concept, and the United States has 

not been willing to do this, and I don’t expect it will. This covers a 

wide range of types of activity, and I don’t think we are prepared to 

do that.

Mr. Fraser. I can understand it is a difficult question, but you 

have forces on both sides. You have forces on behalf of the existing 

system, the police forces, the armies, and they use force to maintain 

their brand of law and order, and the Africans in some cases find tha t 

counterforce is the only avenue open to them. Viewed from their 

perspective one has to understand how they come to this conclusion. 

And I am wondering where we stand on th at issue.

I can understand that we might hold off in saying th at we are going 

to be involved in one side or the other, but are we, by implication, 

saying tha t those who seek to bring about change by force are wrong? 

Is that where we end up?
17

Mr. Bush. We are, by implication and directly, saying tha t we 

favor, as opposed to change that is brought about by war, we favor 

change t hat is brought about by peace.

And the problem is transcendent of simply African issues, important 

as they are, because you have systems in Africa itself, and in other 

parts of the world, where self-determination is not effected by the 

degree of democracy tha t perhaps each of us would like to see. Yet we 

stop short of saying tha t should be accommodated.

The achievement of the expression of people, whether it is on a 

racial problem or political domination problem, as long as we have a 

U.N. Charter, should be achieved by no means other than by peaceful 

means. So you cannot isolate it to South Africa.

And I think our position is wholly correct and consistent.

I see the question you are getting at, but I don’t think we can answer 

beyond saying tha t we mean both change and peaceful, and we are 

not going to advocate a different kind of change.

Air. Fraser. I don’t want to push this too far, because I know it 

is a complex problem, bu t I often wonder if some a uthoritarian group 

seized this government, whether we would be found in the forces of 

those trying to retain the democracy.

Mr. Bush. This, in my judgment, takes it into questions t hat transcend the racial considerations in the south, because you can look at 

other countries where exactly tha t has happened.

Now, the question you might ask me is: Should the United States 

openly suggest in these systems, tha t where democracy has been 

aborted or thwarted, tha t we should be supporting change in those 

countries by advocating war to make the change?

And my judgment is that we should not be doing this.

Mr. Fraser. Let me move one step back from that.

I don’t quarrel with the idea tha t the United States itself ought to 

refrain from being involved, but in the case of Libya, this is totally 

an international issue. The World Court has ruled tha t South Africa 

has lost its authority under the General Assembly to exercise control 

over southwest Africa.

What are we doing to see tha t this United Nations position—which 

cannot be put off as an internal matter any longer—is made effective?

Mr. Bush. Bilaterally what we have done is to discourage investment.

Most recently, we have supported this one resolution, which I feel 

has the best chance of effecting change, and tha t is the resolution tha t 

encourages the contact between the Secretary General, these three 

members tha t he mentioned, and the Government of South Africa. 

I think this is a sound position.

There was a danger, because dialog, as I am sure you know and 

Chairman Diggs knows, is kind of a word tha t has peculiar connotations to some. So we avoided using the word “dialog” because it 

means something to some countries—to some it is good, and to some it 

is bad'—but we used the word “communication,” and if the problem is 

going to be solved with peaceful change, it cannot be solved without 

at some point having the United Nations in contact , in communication 

with South Africa, and so this resolution is one of the steps tha t we 

have taken tha t could indeed lead to something.
18

It might be frustrated and thwarted at the very outset, but at least 

it is a step toward implementing a change in the way we want to see 

it implemented.

Mr. Fraser. Mr. Diggs.

Mr. Diggs. I noted in your press statement upon your retu rn that 

you had a very enlightening interlude in Somalia, and I was particularly interested in your comments with respect to that stop because, as you know, section 620 (n) of the Foreign Assistance Act has 

resulted in the severance of aid of any type. This is of particular 

interest in light of our country’s new interest in the Indian Ocean.

I was interested in your comments about Somalia, and particularly 

whether or not you saw something there tha t might be the basis for 

recommending to the administration tha t they seek the repeal or 

amendment of section 620(n) so that we could get back to some kind 

of normalcy in this small but very sensitive country.

Mr. B ush. Somalia, Mr. Chairman, was one tha t I got less feel 

for the relationships between America and that country than any 

other country I visited.

The reason was that we went as a group at the invitation of the 

Somalia Government. We were there only 24 hours. We did not have 

any private visits with the Chief of State or the Foreign Minister, 

though I did have opportunities to discuss U.N. matters with the latter 

at Addis.

So I cannot comment on that. T did not come away with the feeling 

there—and I would hope it was because I did not have these opportunities to talk during the visit—of a great desire to have better 

relations with the United States. I did have tha t feeling in some other 

countries. I have specifically mentioned the Sudan.

So I am not really qualified from my own observations there to 

make even a subjective comment on this.

We got there in the afternoon. We were delivered to the guest house. 

We were taken to the dinner at the general’s barracks and at his house, 

a very pleasant dinner. He got up and gave a long toast saying we 

ought to eliminate the veto in the United Nations, and saying among 

other things tha t he was glad to have us there.

I thought the Soviets might be uncomfortable at tha t point, because 

it is they, not we, who have exercised the veto to a great extent.

And then we went to a show which was tremendously interesting 

because it was fundamental. Some of it was the native dancing and 

stuff, but some of the fundamental propaganda about their revolution, 

was very interesting. The next day we left about noon, and we just had 

a chance to look around.

So I am not ducking your question. But it is the one place where we 

did not get into any real substance. There was not any opportunity to 

do that.

Mr. Diggs. Could you take a moment or so to trace for us how 

instructions came down to you in connection with the Security Council 

meeting, the various steps this process went through, and where the 

inputs were made that produced an end product that, for example, 

supported the position th at you have outlined?

Mr. B ush. Do you want it in the context of Addis, or just any 

situation?
19

Mr. Diggs. I would like to take this particular one, because I 

would like to see how you ended up on this question of sanctions. 

Take Rhodesia, how did you arrive at tha t end product?

Mr. B ush. That is not Addis. That was over here. Or we could 

give you the Rhodesian in Addis. There is a little difference.

Mr. Diggs. I would like to see you trace it.

Mr. B ush. The Rhodesian vote in Addis, we abstained on. We 

did not want to see the Security Council prejudge the Pearce Commission, abort the mission of Lord Pearce. We feel, and I think appropriately so, tha t the Pearce Commission deliberations so far have 

done as much to highlight the problem in Rhodesia as anything that 

has gone before.

When we first got to Addis, for example, there was a movement 

amongst many African representatives to abort the mission of Lord 

Pearce. They said, “Look, it has already been demonstrated tha t the 

answer should be no. We should call on them not to have this go on.”

This was the background for this particular resolution.

Then the problem on it, Congressman Diggs, is th at we don’t know 

before we get to a meeting of tha t nature what the resolution itself 

is going to be.

There is, as you know, what they call a period of general debate, 

that is nothing but a series of speeches, some new, some old, but each 

person doing his thing, giving a speech, presenting his position.

The resolution star ts to form, this is an 8-day meeting, about 4 

days down the road. There began to be a formulation, and, in this 

instance, the African nations got together through the three African 

members of the Security Council. They presented a draft resolution.

The original dra ft resolution would be cabled back by Ambassador 

Schaufele to the State Department, some of it dealing with the U.S. 

position which has been fairly well known.

Then negotiations would be going on. There would be last-minute 

changes suggested in a resolution.

Mr. Diggs. Once it gets back, you send a draft back to the State 

Department?

Mr. Bush. It would land at IO, and then the International 

Organizations end of things, and then it would be coordinated between 

any part of the Departm ent who would have a say on it.

Mr. Diggs. It would go to the Africa Bureau and then the B ureau 

of European Affairs?

Mr. Bush. Probably the Economics people have a look at it.

Mr. Diggs. Where did it go, in fact?

Mr. Bush. I could n ot speak specifically because I was in Addis, 

but in some cases it would be with EUR , depending on the issue.

Mr. Diggs. Suppose there is a dispute? Suppose the African 

Bureau feels we should not abstain, and the European Bureau feels 

we should. Who wins that argument?

Mr. Bush. Whoever the Secretary says.

I cannot answer specifically on this one, whether the Under Secretary 

would be involved on this one or not. In some issues I deal with, the 

Under Secretary has a very important input, on some the Secretary. 

It depends on what the issue is.

Bu t on this one I am confident tha t the Secretary would sign off on 

it, and if there was a difference between IO and AF, the final
20

decision on this would be bis. If it was a matter involving the veto,

this would be something tha t the President would be-----

Mr. Diggs. That brings the White House in. Was there any 

National Security Council input into this matter?

Mr. B ush. I doubt it. Certainly the White House is aware of what 

is going on, and if they want to comment or make an input, they can, 

but I think in the case of this particular resolution there was no 

particular problem in the State Department.

Mr. Diggs. Can you pinpoint who made the decision on it?

Mr. B ush. Tha t is something you can never do in the State 

Department.

I would be happy to take the responsibility for it, if you are looking 

for somebody to do that, because T am the President’s representative 

to the United Nations, and the buck stops with some of these things 

with me.

But I don’t profess to be t ha t big a deal that I can say this is the 

way it is going to be, and tha t is the way it happens. But in terms of 

responsibility for this position, I would be happy to accept it. It is 

mine. And on each of these resolutions I am in accord with the decision. 

I feel that we have, and now I am getting a little general, an inpu t on 

policy. Things don’t always work out the way I want to see them 

work out, but I think we have a reasonable policy input.

Now, in terms of making fundamental changes, this, of course, is 

not a decision tha t any individual Ambassador, whether he is in the 

President’s Cabinet or not, is going to have.

But I sometimes must be sympathetic to what I think you are 

saying, and tha t is, sometimes you keep saying 1 get messages the 

White House says this, or the State Department says this, and it is 

something without a face, and I cannot exactly be sure who it is who 

says, “Don’t say that in the speech.”

But if it is something I feel strongly enough about, and it is not just 

inoffensive to my great authorship on a public statement, I have 

always felt tha t the Secretary was willing, available, accessible to me, 

and willing to consider changes tha t we might want to suggest.

When it is a matter of critical national importance, certainly I 

would say the same thing is true to the degree the White House has 

an in put on it.

I don’t feel that we are overly frustrated by my having an answer 

and nobody else listening to it.

I do think tha t there is room for some criticism about the kind of 

facelessness of the process, but I would say for these resolutions, or 

anything t hat we have done in terms of policy, whether it is subcontinent, or Middle East, or China, I have been in accord with these 

major decisions, and I take the responsibility for them as the presidentially appointed representative to the United Nations.

Yet, I sometimes am frustrated by the machinery, I must say.

Mr. Diggs. Finally, since this is your first trip over there, did you 

come back with any specific recommendations growing out of your 

experience at the Security Council in Addis, or through your experiences in any of these individual countries?

Now, you specifically mentioned a particularly impressive experience tha t you had in Chad. You said you think we ought to somehow 

find some way to work out some bilateral contribution arrangement 

there.
21

Mr. Bush. I don’t want to hide behind the very facelessness I have 

decried. I had some specific recommendations, hut I also recognize 

there are some very seasoned people in the Department who will 

have a judgment on them, and I will have some specific recommendations to make to UNDP, some specific recommendations to make to 

Mr. Hannah.

But I don’t want to divide our foreign policy. I will fight for certain 

of these changes, the ones t hat 1 have mentioned, but I think I would 

be doing our policy a disservice by saying this is what I favor, if 

there is some compelling reasons why my view should be moderated 

by the experience of others. After 2 days in Chad, I have learned one 

heck of a lot, but I am n ot the world’s foremost expert on Chad.

I happen to think we can do more there, and I have some specifics 

1 will recommend we do there. But I would prefer if you not press it, 

because I don’t want to answer those specifics until policy has been 

shaped. I cannot reserve unto myself the role of being the final determinant of policy. That is not the way the system works, nor should 

it work.

So I would prefer not to go into the specifics, except to say that out 

of this trip 1 have not only general policy suggestions to make, but 

specifics I plan to press for. But once the decision is made, and if they 

are not accepted just exactly the way I want, fine, we will go on to the 

next event.

But we will try to see tha t these observations are cranked into 

American policy.

Mr. Diggs. I guess it would be fair to say that these suggestions 

and recommendations tha t you have in mind reflect what you consider 

to be serious imperfections in our policy.

Mr. Bush. As I have state d here, I am in accord with our policy, 

but I would never say tha t things cannot be improved.

Generally speaking, I endorse the President’s principles in the 

foreign policy message about Africa, and I feel comfortable with the 

policy. I do think there are specific areas where we can improve 

things. To the degree I have less specific but more general feelings 

about areas in which I can recommend changes tha t may result in 

more fundamental policy changes, I plan to do it.

But I simply cannot permit myself, as the representative of the 

President at the U.N., to be divided off from our foreign policy.

There is a book written, called “The Other State Department,” 

describing the relationships of former U.N. ambassadors with the 

administrations, and it is a primer for people like me tha t become 

representatives to the U.N. I t is an excellent book. It has big print, and 

there are not many pages in it. But I learned from t hat book that I 

must not think because we have strong convictions about things in the 

U.N. tha t we know absolutely everything there is to know about 

shaping all kinds of these policy issues, and yet I also feel strongly tha t 

I have a policy input. I intend to continue to use it, and hopefully 

people will do many of the things my way.

But when they will not, and when they don’t, and when I don’t get 

just the emphasis I want, I am not going to comment on that and highlight the differences I might have with the administration. I am just 

simply not going to do th at.

Mr. Diggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
22

Mr. Fraser. Mr. Whalen.

Mr. Whalen. No questions.

Mr. Fraser. Mr. Vander Jagt.

Mr. Vander J agt. No questions.

Mr. Fraser. The Congress restored $86 million to UNDP. Will 

tha t be helpful to the United States.

Mr. Bush. Yes, it would have been detrimental to us had the members on the committee not done that, because it would have been 

grossly misunderstood.

I have had a chance to look at some of the summaries of some of the 

things you heard up there, and I am in accord with the fact tha t in 

UND P we have a vehicle tha t is the self interest of the taxpayers in 

the United States to support, ft is also in the national interests to 

support it.

I really believe this and, therefore, I think it was proper to restore 

what appeared at one point to be a total elimination of support.

Mr. Fraser. Now, in the legislation this past year, I think we included a provision recommending that the United States move toward 

a 25-percent contribution level. We have under consideration in our 

committee currently the budget for the Department of State, which 

includes the mandatory assessment.

What would the effect be if in that legislation a mandatory 25-percent ceiling were to be included?

Mr. Bush. I would much prefer to see this as a goal.

This was first formulated in a nonpartisan way by the Lodge Commission, a bipartisan, nongovernmental commission made up of nongovernment people for the most part, and it recommended this longrange goal or goal of moving towards—let me strike “long range”— 

just a goal of moving toward 25 percent.

I think this should be done through hard negotiation in the U.N., 

with the goal adopted, rather than a specific goal set by Congress, if 

the Congress would go along with that, because it would give us the 

timing flexibility to achieve this goal.

I happen to be fully in accord with tha t goal. I think I also am in 

accord with another pa rt of the Lodge resolution that reserved to us the 

right to continue to provide support for the independent agencies at 

various levels, which does not mean cutting them at all.

So I would simply say if it could be done, this is the policy, it is the 

right policy. If it can be done through negotiation, I would much prefer 

to see it done tha t wav, so we would not be placed in violation of a 

commitment that was imposed on us by the budgeting process at the 

U.N. itself.

Mr. Fraser. I hope tha t you and the State Departm ent will 

watch tha t problem, because you may find it useful to make sure that 

your views get known.

Mr. Bush. I would be happy to do it here before your committee or 

any place else, because I feel strongly about this.

I have a view, and I think it has escaped some in this country, tha t 

when you have a commitment, tha t we should fulfill the commitment. 

One of the few things we have got is our word, and we should fulfill 

the commitment.

This is one of the things that put us in a difficult position on the 

legislation on the imports from Rhodesia. Now we have faced up to
23

tha t. As I have tried to do, we have put it in a most favorable light. 

We ought to do the same things on budget matters.

That is not to say tha t we ought to roll over and let everybody 

sock it to us in terms of us paying the bills for things. We have a 

deficit problem we are trying to solve.

It is a very complicated problem. It takes an awful lot of my time, 

and 1 have had many great discussions and arguments with the Soviets 

and others, who 1 maintain, have caused the problem, and in my 

judgment we must forcefully negotiate.

But where we have a commitment, and I forget exactly when the 

next budgetary assessment thing is set, but I think it is a year or so 

away before the percentages arc reviewed, we would be in a difficult 

position to be placed in default, leaving a gap of $15 million in the 

budget by taking unilateral action, even if it became the law through 

the Congress.

So I would hope the Congress would accept the fact tha t I will 

work my heart out to achieve th at goal, but not impose legal restriction 

on it.

Mr. Fraser. What you are saying is that the appropriations for this 

year-----

Mr. Bush. If you put a 25-percent ceiling on us, the difference 

between our assessed pa rt, 31.4 percent, something like that, and the 

difference between tha t and 25 percent would be this figure of-----

Mr. Fraser. In other words, we would be getting into trouble with 

an existing agreement, if this involved this-----

Mr. Bush. At this point in time, if this was imposed on us.

And yet, I strongly support the goal of moving towards 25 percent.

Mr. Fraser. We have also learned in discussing the financial 

problem tha t the United States is one of those contributing to the 

problem by our late payment. The dues are payable on February 1, 

but in fact we pay partly in July and partly in the fall so this lag in 

responding to our legal obligation contributes to the cash flow problem 

which aggravates the other financial problems tha t 1 think you 

correctly identified as coming from the Soviet and French refusal to 

pay for peacekeeping.

Should we try to move to a current payment system?

Mr. Bush. To the degree th at could be achieved, it would be very 

helpful to us at the U.S. Mission, because there is no question th at due 

to our fiscal year problems and stuff, we do exacerbate the cash Rowwise by our scheduling.

Now, I will say this, in fairness to my predecessors, all of whom had 

understandings on this, tha t there was an understanding tha t due to 

the fiscal year, the United States would pay as we have been paying. 

It is not something we ju st went over and hit them with.

But when tha t understanding was first made, there was a contingency fund, I believe a $40 million fund, t hat was available, almost 

a working capital fund you might call it, and tha t has diminished, 

that has vanished, because the budget has a shortfall by these peacekeeping withholdings, just by definition, of several million dollars a 

year. I think it is $4 million.

So it would be a helpful thing if the United States could make its 

full payment on th at schedule.
24

I will sav this, not by way of rationalization, but so you have all 

the facts, which I think you probably got in New York; many countries 

do have this policy of fitting their payments to the U.N., adjusting 

them according to domestic needs or fiscal year problems, or when 

their congresses or legislatures make approvals. I know the Soviets 

have had the same problems we have had of paying when it is flue.

So there are many countries in the same position. I think if we could 

set an example, if there were no compelling financial reasons why we 

could not, then we would be in a stronger position, and a position to 

help.

Mr. Fraser. Are there any further questions?

Our thanks to you, Mr. Ambassador, for a very candid and informative session. We appreciate your coming down to Washington 

today.

And our thanks to you, Ambassador Schaufele, for accompanving 

Ambassador Bush.

The meeting of the subcommittees is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the joint meeting of the subcommittees 

adjourned.)

o