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SJC-11704

WALDEN BEHAVIORAL CARE vs. K.I.

Middlesex. December 2, 2014. - April 9, 2015.

Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 

& Hines, JJ.

Mental Health. Practice, Civil, Commitment of mentally ill 

person, Waiver. Psychotherapist. Witness, Psychiatric 

examination, Privilege. Evidence, Privileged 

communication. Privileged Communication. Waiver.

Petition for civil commitment filed in the Waltham Division 

of the District Court Department on August 13, 2012. 

The case was heard by Gregory C. Flynn, J. 

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 

transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Stan Goldman for the respondent.

Diane M. Geraghty Hall for the petitioner.

Jennifer Honig, Phillip Kassel, Robert Fleischner, & Stan 

Eichner, for Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others, 

amici curiae, submitted a brief.

DUFFLY, J. Walden Behavioral Care, a facility for the 

treatment of mentally ill patients, brought a petition in the 
2

District Court pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, seeking to 

commit K.I. involuntarily and retain him in its facility. K.I. 

filed a motion in limine to exclude from the commitment hearing 

testimony concerning statements he had made to his treating 

psychiatrist at Walden Behavioral Care. K.I. claimed that his 

statements were protected by the psychotherapist-patient 

privilege as defined in G. L. c. 233, § 20B, and that the 

psychiatrist was precluded from testifying to those statements 

or to his opinion of K.I.'s mental or emotional condition based 

on those statements. 

A District Court judge denied K.I.'s motion, concluding 

that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was overcome by an 

exception to the privilege set forth in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a). 

At the commitment hearing, the psychiatrist was permitted to 

testify to statements made to him by K.I., and to his opinion 

that K.I. was suicidal. Based on this testimony, K.I. was 

committed to Walden Behavioral Care for six months. K.I. 

appealed the commitment order to the Appellate Division of the 

District Court; in a divided opinion, the court affirmed the 

commitment. K.I. appealed, and we transferred the case from the 

Appeals Court on our own motion. 

We conclude that the exception to the psychotherapistpatient privilege established in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), 

applies in the circumstances presented. Notwithstanding the 
3

absence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of the privilege, 

there was no error in permitting the psychiatrist to testify at 

the involuntary commitment hearing concerning K.I.'s statements.1

Background. In August, 2012, a physician petitioned for

K.I.'s emergency admission to Walden Behavioral Care pursuant to 

G. L. c. 123, ' 12 (a).2 In a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 

§ 12 (a), a physician wrote that K.I. was experiencing auditory 

hallucinations and attempting to kill himself by running into 

traffic. Within two hours of his arrival, K.I. was examined by 

a physician who authorized K.I.'s commitment to the facility for 

three days "for care and treatment" pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 

§ 12 (b). See Reida v. Cape Cod Hosp., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 

555-556 (1994). During this three-day period, Dr. David 

Brendel, a psychiatrist, provided diagnosis of and treatment to 

K.I. In his capacity as superintendent of Walden Behavioral 

Care, Brendel thereafter filed a petition for K.I.'s continuing 

 

1 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Mental Health Legal 

Advisors Committee, the Center for Public Representation, and 

the Disability Law Center on behalf of the respondent.

2 General Laws c. 123, § 12 (a), authorizes "any" licensed 

physician to apply for a person's admission to a "facility 

authorized" to provide mental health treatment, whom the 

physician has reason to believe would pose "a likelihood of 

serious harm by reason of mental illness" if not hospitalized. 

See Reida v. Cape Cod Hosp., 36 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 556 (1994). 

Any "qualified psychologist, qualified psychiatric nurse mental 

health clinical specialist, or licensed independent clinical 

social worker" also may do so. G. L. c. 123, § 12 (a). 
4

commitment under G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8.3 At no time was K.I. 

warned that, in certain circumstances, his statements to his 

treating psychiatrist might be admissible in future legal 

proceedings. 

K.I. filed a motion in limine to exclude Brendel's 

testimony regarding K.I.'s statements. K.I. maintained that his 

statements were protected by the psychotherapist-patient 

privilege, and that the sole potentially applicable exception to 

the privilege was set forth in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), 

concerning statements made to a psychiatrist in the course of 

court-ordered examinations. K.I. argued that the statements 

therefore were tantamount to statements made in the course of a 

court-ordered examination, and, because he had not been informed 

that his communications to Brendel would not be privileged, as 

required by G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), this exception was 

unavailable and his privileged statements should not have been 

admitted. A District Court judge denied K.I.'s motion, 

concluding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was 

overcome by the imminent harm exception to the privilege set 

forth in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a); the judge determined that the 

 

3 Pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 12 (d), a person must be 

discharged after three days unless the superintendent of a 

facility applies for a commitment order under G. L. c. 123, 

§§ 7, 8, or the person chooses to remain voluntarily.
5

exception provided by G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), was inapplicable. 

Brendel testified at the commitment hearing that K.I. had 

made repeated statements that voices were telling him to kill 

himself by overdosing on Oxycodone, and that he had access to 

Oxycodone in his apartment and intended to overdose when he was 

released. Based on these statements, Brendel testified to his 

opinion that K.I. was suicidal, and, if released, would pose a 

likelihood of serious harm to himself by reason of his mental 

illness.4 On the basis of this testimony, a District Court judge 

ordered K.I. committed to Walden Behavioral Care for six months.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We review questions 

of statutory interpretation de novo. Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 

Mass. 734, 737 (2014). "[T]he statutory language itself is the 

principal source of insight into the legislative purpose." 

Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37 (1977). In 

conducting our review, "a statute must be interpreted according 

to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 

construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 

considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 

mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 

be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 

be effectuated." Worcester v. College Hill Properties, LLC, 465 

 

4 Dr. David Brendel testified also to his diagnosis of K.I. 

as having schizophrenia, paranoid type.
6

Mass. 134, 139 (2013), quoting Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. 

President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 

(2006). 

2. Psychotherapist-patient privilege. The 

psychotherapist-patient privilege set forth in G. L. c. 233, 

§ 20B, applies to exclude from court proceedings, and from 

legislative and administrative proceedings, statements made by a 

patient to a psychotherapist relative to the diagnosis or 

treatment of the patient's mental or emotional condition. 

General Laws c. 233, § 20B,5 provides, in relevant part:

"[I]n any court proceeding and in any proceeding 

preliminary thereto and in legislative and administrative 

proceedings, a patient shall have the privilege of refusing 

to disclose, and of preventing a witness from disclosing, 

any communication, wherever made, between said patient and 

a psychotherapist relative to the diagnosis or treatment of 

the patient=s mental or emotional condition." 

The privilege "continue[s] in effect after [a] patient" has been 

hospitalized in a mental health facility. G. L. c. 233, § 20B. 

The statute enumerates six exceptions where "[t]he privilege 

granted hereunder shall not apply." Id. Two of those 

exceptions, G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), (b), are at issue here.

 

5 G. L. c. 233, § 20B, defines "Communications" as 

including:

"[C]onversations, correspondence, actions and 

occurrences relating to diagnosis or treatment, before, 

during, or after institutionalization, regardless of the 

patient's awareness of such conversations, correspondence, 

actions and occurrences, and any records, memoranda or 

notes of the foregoing."
7

General Laws c. 233, § 20B (a) (imminent harm exception), 

permits disclosure by a psychotherapist of otherwise privileged 

communications made by a patient in the following circumstances: 

"If . . . in the course of his diagnosis or treatment 

of the patient, [a psychotherapist] determines that the 

patient is in need of treatment in a hospital for mental or 

emotional illness or that there is a threat of imminently 

dangerous activity by the patient against himself or 

another person, and on the basis of such determination 

discloses such communication either for the purpose of 

placing or retaining the patient in such hospital, provided 

however that the provisions of this section shall continue 

in effect after the patient is in said hospital, or placing 

the patient under arrest or under the supervision of law 

enforcement authorities." 

General Laws c. 233, § 20B (b) (court-ordered examination 

exception), allows disclosure of otherwise privileged 

communications by a patient to a psychotherapist:

"If a judge finds that the patient, after having been 

informed that the communications would not be privileged, 

has made communications to a psychotherapist in the course 

of a psychiatric examination ordered by the court, provided 

that such communications shall be admissible only on issues 

involving the patient's mental or emotional condition but 

not as a confession or admission of guilt." 

3. Analysis. As discussed below, the only exception to 

the psychotherapist-patient privilege that applies in the 

present circumstances is the imminent harm exception, G. L. 

c. 123, § 20B (a). We decline to extend our holding in 

Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 524-526 

(1986), to apply the court-ordered examination exception, G. L. 

c. 123, § 20B (b), to examinations, by a diagnosing or treating 
8

psychotherapist, of a patient involuntarily committed to a 

mental health facility pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b). 

a. Applicability of G. L. c. 123, § 20B (a), the imminent 

harm exception. "Testimonial privileges 'are exceptions to the 

general duty imposed on all people to testify' and therefore 

'must be strictly construed.'" Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 

Mass. 325, 330 (2002), quoting Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 

390 Mass. 357, 359 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. 

Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). See Matter of Roche, 381 

Mass. 624, 634 n. 12 (1980). 

As pertinent to the facts of this case, the plain language 

of G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), states that the imminent harm 

exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies where 

two conditions are met. First, a psychotherapist has determined 

in the course of diagnosis or treatment that a patient "is in 

need of treatment in a hospital for mental or emotional illness" 

or "there is a threat of imminently dangerous activity by the 

patient against himself or another person"; second, the 

psychotherapist's disclosure of the statement is "for the 

purpose of placing or retaining" the patient in a hospital for 

treatment of such mental illness. Based on Brendel's testimony, 

K.I.'s statements indicated that he posed a threat of imminently 

dangerous activity against himself. Brendel, a psychotherapist, 

disclosed the statements in order to place or retain K.I. in 
9

Walden Behavioral Care, a facility for the treatment of mentally 

ill patients. Thus, on its face, the imminent harm exception 

appears to apply in these circumstances. 

Nonetheless, the statutory language does not state 

explicitly that the imminent harm exception applies to 

statements made to a psychotherapist by a patient while the 

patient is involuntarily committed to a mental health facility. 

We consider the language of G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), together 

with the statutory scheme governing civil commitment 

proceedings, see G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, to ascertain whether the 

Legislature intended the imminent harm exception to be available 

in these circumstances.6 See Commonwealth v. Semegen 72 Mass. 

App. Ct. 478, 480 (2008) ("where possible, we must seek to 

harmonize the provisions of any statute with related provisions 

where they are part of a single statutory scheme"). 

Involuntary civil commitment proceedings are commenced to 

prevent the imminent "discharge of [a patient from a facility] 

[when it] would create a likelihood of serious harm." Acting 

 

6 General Laws c. 123, § 7 (a), authorizes a superintendent 

of a mental health facility to petition for the commitment and 

"retention of any patient" at that facility upon a determination 

by the superintendent that "the failure to hospitalize would 

create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental 

illness." A court "shall not order the commitment of a person 

at the facility . . . unless it finds after a hearing that (1) 

such person is mentally ill, and (2) the discharge of such 

person from a facility would create a likelihood of serious 

harm." G. L. c. 123, § 8 (a).
10

Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 Mass. 101, 105 (2000), 

quoting G. L. c. 123, §§ 7 (a), 8 (a), 11. An element of proof 

in involuntary commitment cases is "the imminency of discharge." 

Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, supra. In the 

context of involuntary commitment proceedings, a "likelihood of 

serious harm" is defined as including "a substantial risk of 

physical harm to the person himself as manifested by evidence 

of, threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily harm." 

G. L. c. 123, § 1. When a patient who has been involuntarily 

committed in a mental health facility communicates to his or her 

psychotherapist that he or she intends to commit suicide upon 

release, the communication manifests precisely that type of a 

"likelihood of serious harm" that falls within the meaning of G. 

L. c. 123, § 7 (a).

Brendel's testimony during K.I.'s involuntary commitment 

proceeding included statements K.I. had made during Brendel's 

diagnosis of K.I. to determine whether he was suicidal and what, 

if any, course of treatment should be pursued. Based on these 

communications, Brendel determined that there was a "threat of 

imminent dangerous activity by the patient against himself," and 

disclosed K.I.'s communications "for the purpose of . . . 

retaining [K.I.] in [Walden Behavioral Care]." See G. L. c. 

233, § 20B (a). The language supporting the imminent harm 

exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in G. L. c. 
11

233, § 20B (a), tracks that which supports a patient's 

involuntary commitment to or retention in a mental health 

facility. The statutes therefore may be understood as working 

in concert to provide hospitalization and treatment to a patient 

who is at imminent risk of serious bodily harm. No language in 

either statute suggests that the Legislature intended to 

preclude a psychotherapist from disclosing a patient's 

statements in these circumstances, unless the psychotherapist 

has first warned the patient that a disclosure might be made.7

Indeed, the plain language of G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), 

contemplates that statements might be made by a patient during 

the course of diagnosis and treatment that reveal that the 

patient would be a danger to himself or herself if released from 

a treatment facility, and permits disclosure of such statements 

for the purpose of retaining the patient in the facility for 

treatment. As we said in Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 

268 (1974) (Lamb), the exception in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), 

applies "to a situation in which the patient is not 

 

7 By contrast, the Legislature clearly expressed its intent 

that a victim's communications to a sexual assault counselor be 

kept "confidential." See G. L. c. 233, § 20J ("sexual assault 

counselor shall not disclose such confidential communication 

without the prior written consent of the victim"; such 

communications "shall be inadmissible in any criminal or civil 

proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim"). 

Likewise, sexual assault counselors are not included within the 

definition of psychotherapists in G. L. c. 233, § 20B, and 

communications made to them are not subject to the exceptions to 

the psychotherapist-patient privilege in that statute. 
12

institutionalized or is about to be discharged from an 

institution," and the patient makes disclosures during the 

course of treatment that reflect the patient's need for 

treatment of mental or emotional illness in a hospital setting.8 

This is consistent with the Legislature's intent in enacting G. 

L. c. 233, § 20B (a), which was to "dispense with the privilege 

when there is an imminent threat that a person who should be in 

custody will instead be at large."9 Lamb, supra. 

K.I. argues that, at some point during the course of 

 

8 K.I. contends that, because a commitment petition under 

G. L. c. 123, § 7, may be filed only to seek retention of a 

patient in a mental health facility, the patient will "already 

[be] in the custody of State officials," and 

"institutionalized," and, therefore, the patient will not be 

"about to be discharged." Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 

268 (1974) (Lamb). Patients who are temporarily civilly 

committed must be discharged after the statutory commitment 

period, unless a petition is filed pursuant to G. L. c. 123, 

§ 12 (d). See note 3, supra. Civil commitment proceedings 

determine whether an individual will be discharged from an 

institution. Only then would the "failure to hospitalize . . . 

create a likelihood of serious harm" under G. L. c. 123, 

§ 7 (a). See Acting Supt. of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 431 

Mass. 101, 105 (2000) ("An element of proof in such cases is the 

imminency of discharge of the patient from the facility").

9 We determined that the imminent harm exception was 

inapplicable in the circumstances in Lamb, supra at 268, 

because, there, the Commonwealth had filed a petition to commit 

the petitioner indefinitely to the treatment center as a 

sexually dangerous person, G. L. c. 123A, § 6, and a 

psychiatrist had been appointed "to examine [the petitioner] and 

report to the court" in connection with that petition. Lamb, 

supra at 266. Notwithstanding his claim that the circumstances 

are similar, K.I.'s situation is not analogous.
13

diagnosis and treatment of a patient who is temporarily 

committed on an involuntary basis, a psychotherapist's role will 

shift, and his or her examination of the patient will no longer 

be solely to treat, but also to determine whether an involuntary 

commitment petition should be filed. At that point, K.I. 

contends, the patient's statements would no longer be used 

solely for treatment purposes, and therefore we should read the 

exception in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (a), to permit a 

psychotherapist to disclose communications only if the 

psychotherapist's determination of imminent harm is made 

"solely" or "exclusively" for treatment purposes. We decline to 

do so, as this would in essence require that we "read into [the] 

statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put 

there, [and to] add words that the Legislature had an option to, 

but chose not to include." See Massachusetts Insurers 

Insolvency Fund v. Smith, 458 Mass. 561, 567 (2010), citing 

General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envt'l Protection, 429 Mass. 

798, 803 (1999). 

b. Applicability of G. L. c. 123, § 20B (b), the courtordered examination exception. The policy objective of G. L. 

c. 233, § 20B (b), is "to permit a court to utilize expert 

psychiatric evidence by ordering an examination." Lamb, supra

at 269. "[T]he statute recognizes that such court-initiated 

interviews entail certain risks for the person to be examined." 
14

Id. Requiring a Lamb warning before such an examination, which 

is conducted in anticipation of a future proceeding, strikes the 

Legislature's intended "balance between the need for fairness 

and disclosure to the patient and full information for the 

court." Id. at 270. 

K.I. argues that Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 

398 Mass. 516, 524-526 (1986), enlarged the scope of the 

exception in G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), to cover examinations not 

made pursuant to court order, where the patient's communications 

will be used at a future legal proceeding, such as one seeking a 

patient's involuntary commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 

8. This argument is unavailing. 

In Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, supra at 518, 

the Department of Youth Services sought to extend a juvenile's 

commitment to the department beyond his eighteenth birthday. To 

that end, it retained a clinician specifically to evaluate the 

juvenile on behalf of the department, and to testify at a 

hearing to extend his commitment. We concluded that the 

patient-psychotherapist privilege applied where the Commonwealth 

chose to have a psychiatrist interview a juvenile in custody and 

where the psychiatrist did not precede those conversations with 

the Lamb warnings. Id. at 525. See Commonwealth v. Callahan, 

440 Mass. 436, 441 (2003). Our holding that Lamb warnings were 

required in those circumstances was based on the Commonwealth's 
15

decision to retain the psychiatrist for the purpose of 

interviewing the juvenile in order to seek an extension of his 

commitment. We said there that "warnings are required by reason 

of G. L. c. 233, § 20B, . . . and do not depend on whether the 

Commonwealth chooses to interview . . . on its own 

initiative . . . or to seek court permission" (citation 

omitted). Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, supra at 

526. We did not consider the applicability of G. L. c. 233, 

§ 20B (a), nor did we conclude that G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), 

would apply to any examination, whether court ordered or not. 

Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 433 Mass. 439, 

450-451 (2001), we defined the limits of our holding in 

Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, supra. We considered 

the examination of a potentially suicidal defendant and the 

subsequent admission of his statements, as well as the examining 

psychotherapist's opinion thereof, at his criminal trial. 

Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, supra at 446-447. The defendant in 

that case was charged with murder and had been placed on a 

suicide watch at the jail where he was being held pending trial. 

Id. at 446. A psychotherapist examined him to determine whether 

the defendant was suicidal and needed to be hospitalized because 

he was "at acute current risk of hurting himself." Id. To 

rebut the testimony of defense experts that the defendant 

suffered from an acute stress disorder, the psychotherapist was 
16

allowed to testify, over the defendant's objection, that, based 

on the psychotherapist's suicide risk assessments, the defendant 

was not suffering from such a disorder. Id. at 447. We held 

that G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), was not applicable in those 

circumstances because the psychotherapist's "examinations were 

not ordered by the court or sought by the prosecution, and were 

not conducted in anticipation of a future proceeding in which 

the defendant's mental capacity would be at issue." Id. at 450-

451.

10

As with the circumstances of the examination conducted in 

Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, supra, G. L. c. 233, § 20B (b), does 

not apply here. K.I.'s examination was not ordered by a court, 

nor sought by the Commonwealth for the purpose of supporting a 

petition seeking K.I.'s involuntary commitment. As such, K.I.'s 

examination was "not conducted in anticipation of a future 

proceeding in which the [patient's] mental capacity would be at 

issue." Brendel examined K.I. to determine the "care and 

treatment" K.I. needed. See G. L. c. 123, § 12 (b). In these 

 

10 The psychotherapist "conducted the risk assessments to 

identify whether the defendant was at imminent risk of harming 

himself and to recommend any necessary precautions or 

treatment." Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, 433 Mass. 439, 450 

(2001). We held that the psychotherapist's testimony properly 

was admitted under G. L. c. 233, § 20B (c), because the 

defendant had "introduced his mental and emotional condition as 

an element of his" defense. Commonwealth v. Seabrooks, supra at 

448. 
17

circumstances, the exception provided by G. L. c. 233, 

§ 20B (b), is not applicable. There was no requirement that a 

Lamb warning be given before Brendel examined K.I., and no error 

in the admission of Brendel's testimony about K.I.'s statements 

at the commitment hearing. 

Judgment affirmed.