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2023 IL App (5th) 210092-U 

NO. 5-21-0092 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Clinton County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 20-CF-139 

 ) 

KENNY A. BALFOUR, ) Honorable 

 ) Mark W. Stedelin, 

 Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

________________________________________________________________________ 

 JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Cates and Moore concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER 

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty 

 plea is affirmed where the record indicates that the defendant was properly 

 admonished under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012), 

and his guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. 

¶ 2 The defendant, Kenny Balfour, appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea to aggravated battery by means of discharging a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-

3.05(e)(1) (West 2020)). He contends that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea 

because he felt threatened into accepting the guilty plea; his counsel misrepresented that 

the state’s attorney had agreed to a seven-day furlough as part of the terms of the plea; his 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 07/05/23. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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counsel filed a bond assignment of $1000, which showed that counsel was financially 

motivated to persuade him to accept the plea; his counsel did not investigate his selfdefense claim; and his counsel misrepresented that he would receive a sentence of 29 

years in prison when the attempted murder offense that the State declined to charge 

carried a minimum sentence of 26 years. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 On October 1, 2020, the State charged the defendant with one count of aggravated 

battery in that the defendant shot Cody Gates in the abdomen with a .40-caliber handgun. 

On January 6, 2021, the defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to aggravated 

battery, a Class X felony. In exchange for the plea, the State agreed not to file any 

additional charges resulting from the incident, including attempted murder, and to 

recommend a sentence of 11 years’ imprisonment to be followed by 3 years of mandatory 

supervised release (MSR). At the hearing, the trial court made sure the defendant 

understood the nature of the plea and the charge that he was pleading guilty to. The court 

admonished him that, if convicted of aggravated battery, he could be sentenced to 6 to 30 

years in prison to be followed by a 3-year MSR period and about the rights he was giving 

up by pleading guilty. The court then asked the defendant whether anyone had forced or 

threatened him into pleading guilty, and whether anyone had promised him anything 

other than the plea terms to get him to plead guilty. The defendant responded, “No, sir,” 

to both questions. The court also asked him whether pleading guilty was his free and 

voluntary act, and he responded, “Yes, sir.” The court then found that the guilty plea was 

knowingly and voluntarily made. 
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¶ 5 The State then read the following factual basis:

“If this case would proceed to trial, state would call Detective Todd 

Timmermann of the Clinton County Sheriff’s Department who would testify that 

he ran a trace summary on a Taurus .40 caliber handgun with serial number 

SAN02943. And that—that handgun was bought at Ron and Jo’s Firearms and 

Sporting Supply in O’Fallon, Illinois, on September 15, 2020, by Denaysha Tauria 

Crisp. 

The state would then call a representative from Ron and Jo’s Firearms who 

would testify that on September 10th of 2020, the defendant *** was seen exiting 

a blue colored Dodge Journey with Ms. Crisp at Ron and Jo’s in O’Fallon, Illinois. 

Ms. Crisp and the defendant shopped for firearms there in Ron and Jo’s and then 

bought two handguns, one of which was the Taurus 24/7 Pro, serial number 

SAN02943. 

Then on September 15th, 2020, the blue Dodge Journey returned to Ron 

and Jo’s where Ms. Crisp exited, went in to pick up *** the handgun and Mr. 

Balfour *** was in the vehicle and was sighted when she came back out *** with 

the handgun. 

The state would then call Officer Curt Weh of the Breese Police 

Department who would testify that on September 28th, 2020, he received a call 

from dispatch of multiple shots fired at Cherry Court Apartments in Breese, 

Clinton County, Illinois. When Officer Weh arrived at the scene, he found a 

victim leaning up against a car who was later identified as Cody Gates who *** 

had a gunshot [wound] in the abdomen. When Officer Weh went up to a group of 

people, Officer Weh then observed the defendant coming out from behind an

apartment complex and that person was then identified as the defendant Mr. 

Balfour. 

State would call Sergeant Mark Berndsen of the Breese Police Department 

who would testify that a search was conducted around the apartments for a gun 

and a gun was found at the northeast part of the building, building 409, by 

Sergeant Berndsen. The gun was located on the east side of the fenced in area of 

thick weeds and brush. That gun borne the serial number SAN02943 which is the 

same gun that was purchased in the presence of the defendant.

The state would then call Cody Gates. Cody Gates would testify that on 

September 28, 2020, that there were four subjects who were fighting at the Cherry 

Court Apartments in Breese, Clinton County, Illinois, one of which was the 

defendant. Mr. Gates went up to try to breakup the fight. The defendant then 

tackled Mr. Gates and [Mr. Gates] was able to get assistance in getting Mr. 

Balfour off of him. The defendant then ran away and Gates followed him but fell 

down. When Mr. Gates looked up, Mr. Balfour had a gun pointed at Gates. At 

that point, Gates rolled behind a tree. When Gates looked back out from behind 

the tree is when the defendant shot Mr. Gates. Mr. Balfour then ran northeast 

towards the corner of the property which was *** where the gun was later found.
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The state would also call additional various eyewitnesses that would ID the

defendant, Mr. Balfour, as the shooter on the property.” 

¶ 6 After finding that there was a factual basis for the plea, the trial court accepted the 

guilty plea. The court then sentenced the defendant according to the terms of the plea, 

i.e., to 11 years in prison to be followed by a 3-year period of MSR. The defendant’s 

counsel then requested that the mittimus be stayed for seven days, so he could spend that 

time with his siblings. However, the State indicated that it was not in agreement with the 

furlough, and the court denied the request. 

¶ 7 On February 2, 2021, the defendant retained new counsel, and his new counsel 

filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In the motion, the defendant alleged that he 

told his guilty plea counsel that he had evidence to support his self-defense claim, but his 

counsel failed to investigate the claim, indicating there was no time for an investigation 

because the plea offer was only good for a limited time. The defendant alleged that his 

counsel also told him that, if he did not accept the plea offer, he would be charged with 

attempted murder, lose the case at trial, and be sentenced to 29 years’ imprisonment 

because of the color of his skin. The defendant argued that he relied on his counsel’s 

statements because he was young, did not have any previous criminal history, and had no 

working knowledge of the criminal justice system. 

¶ 8 The defendant further alleged that, prior to entering the courthouse for the guilty 

plea hearing, his counsel told him and his family that the state’s attorney had agreed to a 

seven-day furlough if he took the plea deal. However, after entering the courthouse, his 

attorney told him that they would have to ask for the furlough after the agreed sentencing 
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was entered by the trial court because the state’s attorney had not agreed to it. At that 

time, he felt like he had no choice but to plead guilty because he thought he would be 

sentenced to 29 years’ imprisonment if he did not accept the offer. He believed that his 

attorney’s statement that he would receive 29 years’ imprisonment was a threat to get him 

to accept the plea, so the attorney could collect the bond assignment, and had his counsel 

not made this threat, he would not have pled guilty and would instead have hired new 

counsel to investigate his self-defense claim. The defendant further argued that the court 

erred by not further inquiring, at the guilty plea hearing, about whether his plea was 

voluntary. Attached to the motion to withdraw guilty plea was the defendant’s affidavit, 

which reiterated the allegations in the motion. 

¶ 9 At the March 17, 2021, hearing on the motion to withdraw guilty plea, the 

defendant’s counsel argued that the interactions that the defendant had with his guilty 

plea counsel prior to entering the guilty plea were based on threats. The defendant was 

told that he would be convicted of attempted murder charges because of the color of his 

skin. The defendant, who had no experience with the criminal justice system, entered the 

guilty plea after taking counsel’s advice. He was told to answer every question the judge 

asked him in the affirmative. However, when he was in the courtroom, everything that he 

had previously discussed with his counsel was different. He thought the furlough was 

part of the deal, which was not the case. He also had evidence that he acted in selfdefense, and he wanted his counsel to investigate it, but his counsel indicated that there 

was no time for an investigation because the plea deal was only available for a limited 
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time. Thus, his counsel argued that the defendant did not go into the plea hearing openly 

and voluntarily knowing the full terms of the deal. 

¶ 10 In response, the State argued that the terms of the plea agreement were recited 

three times during the guilty plea hearing, and each time, it was noted that the State was 

agreeing to forego the additional attempted murder charge. The State argued that the 

defendant could not now seek to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he thought he 

could be convicted of a higher offense, as that was part of the plea agreement. The State 

noted that, at the guilty plea hearing, the trial court questioned the defendant about 

whether the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, and the defendant responded in 

the affirmative. At that time, the defendant indicated that no threats had been made to get 

him to plead guilty. 

¶ 11 After hearing the arguments, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. In making this decision, the court noted that the defendant was 

asked whether he understood what was going on and whether he understood the terms of 

the negotiated plea. Although there were conversations about a furlough mentioned in 

the motion, that was not recited as part of the plea agreement in the courtroom, and the 

defendant knew that it was not going to happen. The court indicated that the defendant 

felt like he did not have an opportunity to completely speak with his attorney, but he 

came into the courtroom and indicated that he wanted to plead guilty and that his guilty 

plea was voluntary. Thus, the court denied the motion. The defendant appeals.
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¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 On appeal, the defendant contends that he should be allowed to withdraw his 

guilty plea where his plea was not voluntarily made. Generally, the decision to grant or 

deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests within the sound discretion of the circuit 

court and, as such, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 

135, 163 (2001). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is 

arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view 

adopted by the trial court. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991).

¶ 14 A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a plea of guilty. People v. Hughes, 

2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32. Instead, defendant must show a manifest injustice under the facts 

involved. People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 520 (2009). The withdrawal of a guilty 

plea is appropriate where the plea was entered through a misapprehension of the facts or 

of the law or where there is doubt as to the accused’s guilt and justice would be better 

served through a trial. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32. Defendant bears the burden of 

demonstrating sufficient grounds to support a motion to withdraw the plea. People v. 

Stevens, 324 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1090 (2001). 

¶ 15 A defendant’s guilty plea must be voluntarily and knowingly made. People v. 

Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 370 (1999). To knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, a 

defendant must be advised of the direct consequences of the plea. Id. at 371. Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012) outlines the process for a court to determine 

whether a plea of guilty is voluntarily and intelligently made. Specifically, Rule 402(b) 

provides as follows: 
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“The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea 

is voluntary. If the tendered plea is the result of a plea agreement, the agreement 

shall be stated in open court. The court, by questioning the defendant personally 

in open court, shall confirm the terms of the plea agreement, or that there is no 

agreement, and shall determine whether any force or threats or any promises, apart 

from a plea agreement, were used to obtain the plea.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(b) (eff. 

July 1, 2012).

¶ 16 Here, the record does not show that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant was fully 

admonished by the trial court in accordance with Rule 402 before he tendered his guilty 

plea. The record shows that he was advised of the terms of the plea, the consequences of 

pleading guilty, and the prescribed sentencing range for the offense that he was pleading 

guilty to (aggravated battery). The defendant acknowledged that he understood the terms 

of the plea, i.e., that if he pled guilty to aggravated battery, the State would not file any 

additional charges stemming from the incident, which included attempted murder, and 

the State would recommend a sentence of 11 years’ imprisonment followed by a 3-year 

period of MSR. The defendant also indicated that he understood the implications of his 

guilty plea, that no one forced or threatened him into entering the guilty plea, and that no 

one promised him anything other than what was previously stated to enter the plea. 

When asked whether entering a guilty plea was his free and voluntary act, he responded 

in the affirmative. 

¶ 17 Although the defendant now claims that he felt threatened into accepting the plea 

because he was told he would be convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to 29 

years, we note that there is nothing in the record to support this contention, except for the 

defendant’s self-serving affidavit. In People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 356, 362 (1993), our 
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supreme court found that there was nothing in the record to support defendant’s claim 

that he pled guilty because he was being harassed, as the only black inmate, by three 

white inmates in the county jail. The court noted that the only evidence presented to 

support the defendant’s claim of harassment was his self-serving testimony. Id. Like in 

Johnson, the only evidence to support the defendant’s claim of threats here was his own 

self-serving affidavit; the defendant has presented no direct evidence to substantiate his 

claims. Moreover, the promise not to file additional charges from the incident, including 

attempted murder, was part of the terms of the plea deal and cannot now be used to 

challenge the guilty plea as based on threats. Further, if the defendant’s counsel told him 

that he would receive a total of 29 years if convicted of attempted murder, we note that 

the State indicates that the attempted murder charge would have carried a minimum 

sentence of 26 years to be followed by a 3-year period of MSR. 

¶ 18 As for the defendant’s claim that his counsel was financially motivated to 

persuade him to accept the plea offer because counsel filed a bond assignment of $1000, 

there is no support in the record for that claim. The filing of the bond assignment merely 

showed that counsel sought to be paid for his services, which was entirely appropriate. 

Also, the defendant’s claim that he was told that the state’s attorney had agreed to a 

seven-day furlough was contradicted by the record. The terms of the plea deal were set 

out at the guilty plea hearing prior to the defendant accepting the plea, and the terms did 

not include any mention of a furlough. Although there was discussion of a furlough after 

the defendant entered his guilty plea, the state’s attorney indicated that the request was 

not agreed to and presented argument for why the request should be denied. After 
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hearing counsels’ arguments, the trial court denied the request. Thus, the defendant’s 

counsel raised the issue at the guilty plea hearing, but there was no indication that counsel 

had told the defendant that the furlough had already been agreed to by the State.

¶ 19 With regard to his argument that his counsel failed to properly investigate his selfdefense claim before advising him to accept the guilty plea, we again find that the 

defendant has failed to provide any supporting evidence for this argument, other than his 

affidavit, which merely stated that he had a self-defense claim. He provided absolutely 

no detail regarding the substance of that claim. Also, we note that the defendant has not 

framed this argument as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

¶ 20 Based on the above, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Before accepting the guilty 

plea, the trial court properly admonished the defendant about the terms of the plea deal as 

well as the consequences of pleading guilty. The court also questioned the defendant to 

determine whether his plea was intelligently and voluntarily made. Thus, the defendant 

was properly admonished under Rule 402, and there was no indication from the record 

that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Accordingly, we affirm the 

court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Clinton 

County. 

¶ 23 Affirmed.