J-S17044-15 

___________________________ 

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

ROBERT L. HOWARD 

 Appellant No. 1951 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order November 24, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008242-2006 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 08, 2015 

 Appellant, Robert L. Howard, appeals from the order entered in the 

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, denying his first petition brought 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).

1

 We affirm. 

 The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

Appellant was arrested in connection with two separate 

robberies which occurred in the North Hills suburbs of the 

city of Pittsburgh. At trial, the Commonwealth presented 

evidence through the testimony of both victims. The first 

victim to testify...could not be certain as to the identity of 

the perpetrator. Appellant made a motion for judgment of 

acquittal, and the trial court granted the motion. 

With regard to the remaining case, the Commonwealth

presented the testimony of Melisa Lynn Hankins [“Victim”]. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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[Victim] testified that on December 22, 2005, she arrived 

at the Parkvale Bank at approximately 8:20 p.m. [Victim] 

parked her orange 2006 Cobalt diagonally two spaces to 

the left of the ATM machine. In the space to her right, 

nearest to the ATM, was another car. At the time, an 

African American man wearing jeans and a zip up hoodie 

was at the ATM; this person was later identified as

[A]ppellant. Due to the cold weather, the victim remained 

in her vehicle and prepared to use the ATM. 

During the two minutes [Victim] observed [A]ppellant at 

the ATM, she noted that he appeared flustered. [Victim] 

testified that [A]ppellant did not seem to be able to 

withdraw money and he continued to look around and 

made direct eye contact with her before returning to his 

car. [Victim] got out of her car, approached the ATM, and 

noticed it said, “insufficient funds, please try another 

account.” She then waited approximately 30 seconds for 

the homepage of the machine to appear and successfully 

withdrew $200.00, consisting of $20.00 bills, from her 

account. [Victim] then put the money and her card in her 

back pocket and took her receipt. 

After unlocking the door to her vehicle, she removed the 

money from her pocket and put it into a cup holder. 

[Victim] explained that her left leg was hanging out of the 

vehicle, and as she was getting ready to close the door, 

[A]ppellant grabbed her left arm with his left hand. 

[Victim] stated that [A]ppellant was so close she could 

smell his breath when he told her that he had a gun, 

holding his hand in his right pocket. [Victim] replied, 

“[T]his doesn’t really need to be going on. We’ll let it go. 

Nothing will be done about it. We’ll just let it go. It’s the 

holidays.” Appellant continued to push at his pocket as if 

there was something inside. 

[Victim] looked at [A]ppellant’s face and noticed he was off 

balance. She tried pushing him to get back into the car. 

In response, [A]ppellant pushed [Victim] into the car. 

[Victim] then hit her head off the side of the door as 

[A]ppellant came into the car and tried to take the money 

out of her hand. As [Victim] resisted, [A]ppellant took the 

ATM card out of her hand, crunched and ripped up the 

card, and took all of her cash. Appellant then left in his 
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vehicle. [Victim] called her father who then called the 

police. [Victim] identified [A]ppellant in court as the 

robber. 

Commonwealth v. Howard, No. 1913 WDA 2010, unpublished 

memorandum at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed August 12, 2011) (“Howard I”) 

(internal footnote and citations to the record omitted). 

 On March 8, 2006, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint 

charging Appellant with the robberies. Law enforcement, however, could not 

immediately apprehend Appellant. In July 2007, the Commonwealth located 

Appellant at the United States Penitentiary―Canaan (“USP―Canaan”). In a 

letter dated July 23, 2007, USP―Canaan offered temporary custody of 

Appellant to the Commonwealth, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on 

Detainers (“IAD”).2 The Commonwealth received the letter from 

USP―Canaan on August 2, 2007. The Commonwealth accepted the offer of 

temporary custody and agreed to take Appellant to trial “within the time 

specified in Article III(a) of the [IAD].”3 (IAD Form VII, filed 8/16/07, at 1). 

____________________________________________ 

2

 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9101-9108. 

3

 This Court previously determined: 

[B]ecause the warden of USP―Canaan offered temporary

custody to Allegheny County on a request by Appellant, ... 

Article III of the IAD applied and required that trial 

commence within 180 days of the Commonwealth[’s] 

receipt of notice of Appellant’s request. The 

Commonwealth represented that it received notice of

Appellant’s request on August 2, 2007.... Therefore,

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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The Commonwealth took Appellant into custody in Allegheny County on 

September 15, 2007. 

 The court originally scheduled Appellant’s case for trial on January 7, 

2008. On that date, however, trial counsel requested a continuance on 

Appellant’s behalf. Counsel executed a continuance form, which included 

the handwritten notation “no discovery[.]” (N.T. PCRA Hearing, 6/16/14, at 

7). The court granted the continuance and rescheduled trial for April 17, 

2008. On January 25, 2008, Appellant filed a motion for a bill of particulars, 

seeking to compel additional discovery. Specifically, Appellant requested 

supplemental police reports, surveillance tapes, video and audio recordings 

of police interrogations, forensic reports, and the original photo array shown 

to the victims. 

Appellant proceeded to a bench trial on April 17, 2008. Following trial, 

the court found Appellant guilty of one count of robbery. On June 30, 2008, 

the court sentenced Appellant to five (5) to ten (10) years’ imprisonment. 

This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 12, 2011, and our 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

absent a continuance granted for “good cause shown in 

open court,” or a determination that Appellant was “unable 

to stand trial,” the Commonwealth had until January 29, 

2008, to commence trial. 

Commonwealth v. Howard, No. 1914 WDA 2012, unpublished 

memorandum at 12 (Pa.Super. filed July 10, 2013) (“Howard II”) (internal 

citations omitted). 
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Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on 

January 5, 2012. 

Appellant timely filed a counseled PCRA petition on February 24, 2012. 

In it, Appellant argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 

the timeliness of trial under the IAD and Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. On September 

19, 2012, the court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without 

a hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The court denied PCRA relief on 

November 15, 2012. Regarding the continuance of trial from January 7, 

2008 to April 17, 2008, the court attributed the entire delay to Appellant. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on December 3, 2012. On 

appeal, this Court affirmed the order denying PCRA relief in part, concluding 

the PCRA court properly denied Appellant’s claim regarding the filing of a 

Rule 600 motion. Nevertheless, this Court also vacated the order and 

remanded for an evidentiary hearing as follows: 

[W]e conclude that the record did not support the 

conclusion of the PCRA court that there existed no genuine 

issues of material fact on the question of a “good cause” 

continuance under the IAD. 

Consequently, we remand for further development of the 

present record for consideration of whether the January 7, 

2008 continuance was attributable to Appellant, the

Commonwealth, or both. The PCRA court shall develop a 

record to explain the notation “no discovery” as the cause 

of the defense’s request for a continuance, and whether 

the rescheduling of trial until April 17, 2008, was beyond 

the control of the Commonwealth. 

Howard II, supra at 16-17. 
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The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 16, 2014. 

At that time, trial counsel testified that Appellant asked her to request a 

continuance, because he believed trial counsel could obtain additional 

discovery. Appellant disputed trial counsel’s testimony, claiming trial 

counsel did not ask Appellant whether he wanted a continuance. Appellant 

maintained trial counsel did not inform him about the IAD mechanical run 

date, and Appellant would have not have consented to the continuance if he 

had known about the IAD mechanical run date. On November 24, 2014, the 

court again denied PCRA relief. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on 

December 1, 2014. That same day, Appellant filed a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

 Appellant raises one issue for our review: 

DID THE [PCRA] COURT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT’S 

PCRA PETITION SINCE TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 

FOR FAILING TO RAISE A VIOLATION OF THE [IAD] SINCE

APPELLANT’S 4/17/08 TRIAL WAS HELD IN VIOLATION OF 

THE IAD? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 3). 

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s 

determination and whether its decision is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 

612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795 (2011). This Court grants great deference to the 

findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those 
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findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). We give no such deference, 

however, to the court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 

A.3d 1190 (Pa.Super. 2012). “Traditionally, issues of credibility are within 

the sole domain of the trier of fact [because] it is the trier of fact who had 

the opportunity to personally observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” 

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 553 Pa. 485, 527, 720 A.2d 79, 99 (1998), 

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 810, 120 S.Ct. 41, 145 L.Ed.2d 38 (1999). “[A]s with 

any other credibility determination, where the record supports the PCRA 

court’s credibility determinations, those determinations are binding” on this 

Court. Id. 

On appeal, Appellant contends the court had to commence trial on or 

before January 29, 2008, pursuant to Article III of the IAD. Although the 

court originally scheduled trial before the IAD mechanical run date, Appellant 

complains the court postponed trial until April 17, 2008. Appellant argues 

he did not waive his rights under the IAD by agreeing to a trial date outside 

the statutory period, and “[t]rial [c]ounsel should not have taken any 

postponement.” (Appellant’s Brief at 24). Appellant further argues the 

court elected to continue trial without conducting a proper hearing to 

determine the existence of good cause for the delay. 

Appellant acknowledges trial counsel’s contrary testimony from the 

PCRA hearing, but Appellant insists that counsel unilaterally sought the 
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continuance without giving Appellant the opportunity to sign off on the 

continuance form. Moreover, Appellant insists the delay in trial stemmed 

from a failure to provide certain discovery; therefore, the delay was 

attributable to the Commonwealth. Appellant also maintains that trial 

counsel did not explain Appellant’s rights under the IAD, and Appellant 

would not have authorized a continuance if he had known about the IAD 

mechanical run date. Appellant concludes trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to challenge the timeliness of trial based upon the IAD. We disagree. 

The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 (2008). When 

asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner is 

required to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 

(2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and, 

(3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 

Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999). The 

failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the claim 

to fail. Williams, supra. 

 “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the 

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis 

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit....” Commonwealth 

v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994). “Counsel cannot 
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be found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” 

Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ 

test to determine whether counsel’s chosen course was 

designed to effectuate [her] client’s interests. If we 

conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had 

some reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel’s 

assistance is deemed effective. 

Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95 (internal citations omitted). 

Prejudice is established when [a defendant] demonstrates 

that counsel’s chosen course of action had an adverse 

effect on the outcome of the proceedings. The defendant 

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome. In [Kimball, supra], we held 

that a “criminal defendant alleging prejudice must show 

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 21-22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 

(2002) (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“The IAD is an agreement between forty-eight states, the District of 

Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the United States, that 

establishes procedures for the transfer of prisoners incarcerated in one 

jurisdiction to the temporary custody of another jurisdiction which has 

lodged a detainer against a prisoner.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 886 A.2d 

689, 695 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 686, 897 A.2d 452 

(2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. McNear, 852 A.2d 401, 405 n.3 

(Pa.Super. 2004)). 
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Unlike a request for extradition, which is a request that the 

state in which the prisoner is incarcerated transfer custody 

to the requesting state, a detainer is merely a means of 

informing the custodial jurisdiction that there are

outstanding charges pending in another jurisdiction and a 

request to hold the prisoner for the requesting state or 

notify the requesting state of the prisoner’s imminent 

release. 

Jones, supra (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 567 Pa. 135, 139, 786 

A.2d 173, 175 (2001)). 

Article III of the IAD sets forth the following transfer procedure: 

§ 9101. Agreement on detainers 

The Agreement on Detainers is hereby enacted into law 

and entered into by this Commonwealth with all other 

jurisdictions legally joining therein in the form substantially 

as follows: 

* * * 

Article III 

 (a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of 

imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a 

party state, and whenever during the continuance of the 

term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party 

state any untried indictment, information or complaint on 

the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the 

prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within 180 days after 

he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting 

officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting 

officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his 

imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be 

made of the indictment, information or complaint: 

Provided, That for good cause shown in open court, 

the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court 

having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any 

necessary or reasonable continuance. 

* * * 
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, Article III (emphasis added). 

Additionally, “[T]he IAD may be tolled by the defendant’s own 

actions.” Jones, supra at 696 (quoting Commonwealth v. Montione, 554 

Pa. 121, 126, 720 A.2d 738, 741 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1098, 119 

S.Ct. 1575, 143 L.Ed.2d 671 (1999)). 

Significantly, a defendant may waive his rights under the 

IAD by agreeing to a trial date outside the time periods 

mandated by the statute. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 

110, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). In Hill, both 

defense counsel and the prosecution agreed on a trial 

date, which fell outside of the 180-day period mandated by 

Article III of the IAD. Upon expiration of the 180-day 

period, and prior to trial, defense counsel moved to 

dismiss the charges on Article III grounds. The Supreme 

Court held that the prior agreement to set a trial date 

beyond the 180-day period waived any subsequent Article 

III objection. Id. at 115, 120 S.Ct. at 664, 145 L.Ed.2d at 

567. Compare Commonwealth v. Mayle, 780 A.2d 677, 

684 n.15 (Pa.Super. 2001) (stating appellant’s failure to 

object to trial date scheduled beyond IAD time limit did not 

waive subsequent Article III objection, where trial date 

was not “product of negotiation” between parties). 

Jones, supra at 696-97 (internal footnote omitted). 

 Instantly, the PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing about the 

scheduling of Appellant’s trial beyond the IAD mechanical run date. Trial 

counsel, a criminal defense attorney with over twenty years’ experience, 

testified that she was aware of the IAD and its timeliness requirements. 

Trial counsel also testified that she executed a continuance form on January 

7, 2008, which postponed trial until April 17, 2008, after the IAD mechanical 

run date. Trial counsel maintained that Appellant told her to request the 
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continuance, because Appellant believed counsel could obtain additional 

discovery. 

 Trial counsel acknowledged her handwritten notation of “no discovery” 

on the continuance form, but she explained that the Commonwealth had not 

completely failed to provide discovery. Rather, after reviewing the discovery 

with Appellant, Appellant did not believe trial counsel had all available items. 

Regarding the purportedly missing discovery, trial counsel elaborated: 

It was [Appellant’s] belief that there were assisting officers 

that may have additional reports, supplemental reports, 

interrogation videos that may not have been provided to 

the Commonwealth, ...and that I was searching to make

sure on his behalf, at his request, was there any additional 

information that [the prosecutor] had not provided to me 

because he did not have it from certain officials that were 

involved in the arrest regarding these robberies. 

(See PCRA Hearing at 12.) Consequently, trial counsel filed the motion for a 

bill of particulars on January 25, 2008. 

Upon further questioning from PCRA counsel, trial counsel reiterated 

that Appellant asked her to execute the continuance form and file the motion 

for bill of particulars. Further, trial counsel explained: 

The postponements on any criminal case are not in the 

sole discretion of the defense trial attorney. The

postponements are the client’s[,] and if a client requested 

that I put in a postponement because [he] believed I could 

find something additional, that may assist in...having the 

charges dismissed, or clients found not guilty, I will surely 

listen to my client. That’s what conferences are for. 

There is no reason for me to question a client 

who...requests that I put in a postponement and seek out 

any additional information. 
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(Id. at 16). 

Regarding the good cause requirement of Article III of the IAD, trial 

counsel stated that the trial court considered the continuance request in 

open court. Trial counsel believed Appellant had demonstrated good cause, 

“or else this postponement would have never been granted by [the trial 

court]. [The trial court] does not...just sign postponements.”4 (Id. at 20). 

Although the parties rescheduled trial beyond the IAD mechanical run date, 

trial counsel did not have control over the date: 

The dates are picked between the Assistant District

Attorney’s calendar, the defense attorney’s calendar, and 

most importantly, the Judge’s calendar. So there are three 

people with three calendars that have to find a date that 

works for everyone. Most important in my mind, and I will 

say this always, the Judge’s calendar is most important. 

The Commonwealth...and my calendar are secondary to the 

[c]ourt’s. 

(Id. at 24). Trial counsel also emphasized that Appellant was aware of the 

IAD mechanical run date, but he still wanted to pursue a continuance. 

Appellant also testified at the PCRA hearing and denied many of trial 

counsel’s averments. The PCRA court, however, was free to determine the 

credibility of both witnesses. See Abu-Jamal, supra. 

____________________________________________ 

4

 Trial counsel discussed her experience in litigating continuance requests 

with the trial judge, noting the judge “asks for a more detailed reason 

[other] than what’s written on the postponement form of why either side, 

Commonwealth or defense, needs a postponement.” (Id. at 21). 

Additionally, the same jurist presided over Appellant’s PCRA proceedings. 
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 Based upon the foregoing, the PCRA court found “there was no 

ineffectiveness on the part of [trial] counsel and there was [good] cause 

shown to move the trial beyond the [IAD] mechanical run date of January 

29, 2008.” (See PCRA Court Opinion, filed November 24, 2014, at 4.) 

Here, trial counsel’s testimony provided ample support for the PCRA court’s 

conclusions. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9101, Article III. Therefore, Appellant’s 

claim, that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the timeliness of 

trial based upon the IAD, lacks arguable merit. See Pierce, supra; 

Poplawski, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying PCRA relief. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/8/2015