[Cite as State v. Schleter, 2024-Ohio-514.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

SENECA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 13-23-25

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

MARTIN J. SCHLETER, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. 22-CR-0213

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: February 12, 2024

APPEARANCES:

John M. Kahler II for Appellant

Stephanie J. Kiser for Appellee
Case No. 13-23-25

-2-

WALDICK, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Martin Schleter (“Schleter”), appeals the August 

24, 2023 judgment of conviction and sentence entered against him in the Seneca 

County Court of Common Pleas, following his plea of no contest to Aggravated 

Possession of Drugs. On appeal, Schleter assigns error with the trial court’s denial 

of a motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Background

{¶2} This case stems from an incident occurring in Tiffin, Ohio on December 

4, 2021, which resulted in the discovery by law enforcement of a small quantity of 

methamphetamine in the home shared by Schleter and his girlfriend, Dawn 

Pena. The drugs at issue were observed in plain view by a police officer after he 

and several firefighters made a warrantless entry into the home in response to a 9-

1-1 call about heavy black smoke that was pouring out of the home’s 

chimney. After the methamphetamine was observed by the police officer in 

Schleter’s home following the warrantless entry into the house, the drugs were 

subsequently seized pursuant to a search warrant.

{¶3} On October 26, 2022, the Seneca County Grand Jury returned a singlecount indictment against Schleter, charging him with Aggravated Possession of 

Drugs, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(a). On 

March 3, 2023, an arraignment was held and Schleter entered a plea of not guilty.
Case No. 13-23-25

-3-

{¶4} On March 29, 2023, Schleter filed a motion to suppress the evidence 

seized by police following the warrantless entry of his residence on December 4, 

2021. On May 12, 2023, the prosecution filed a response in opposition to the motion 

to suppress. 

{¶5} A suppression hearing was held on May 12, 2023. On July 28, 2023, 

the trial court filed a judgment entry and decision overruling the motion to 

suppress. On August 4, 2023, the trial court filed a nunc pro tunc judgment entry to 

correct a typographical error in the July 28, 2023 decision.

{¶6} On August 23, 2023, Schleter withdrew his original plea of not guilty 

and entered a plea of no contest to the sole count of the indictment. A sentencing 

hearing was held that same date, and Schleter was sentenced to a five-year term of 

community control.

{¶7} On September 18, 2023, Schleter filed the instant appeal, in which he 

raises one assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The trial court committed reversible error in denying 

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence and applying the 

exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

{¶8} In the sole assignment of error, Schleter asserts that the trial court erred 

in overruling the motion to suppress filed by Schleter with regard to evidence 

discovered by law enforcement following the warrantless entry into his home. On 

appeal, Schleter challenges the constitutional propriety of the entry into his home, 
Case No. 13-23-25

-4-

but not the validity of the search warrant that was subsequently obtained to seize the 

evidence observed in plain view following the warrantless entry.

Standard of Review

{¶9} “Appellate review of a decision on a motion to suppress presents a 

mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio5372, ¶ 8. The trial court serves as the trier of fact and is the primary judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence presented. 

State v. Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 850 (12th Dist.2000). Therefore, when an 

appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, it must accept 

the trial court’s findings of fact so long as they are supported by competent, credible 

evidence. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006–Ohio–3665, ¶ 100. The 

appellate court must then review the application of the law to the facts de novo. 

Burnside at ¶ 8.

Analysis

{¶10} In the instant case, the trial court reviewed the evidence presented at 

the suppression hearing and made findings of fact in its judgment entry overruling 

the motion to suppress, as follows:

On December 4, 2021, Detective Justin Nowak was working as a road 

patrol officer for the City of Tiffin Police Department and responded 

to a 911 call regarding a fire at a residence located at 94 Coe St., 

Tiffin, Ohio 44883. Detective Nowak testified that upon arriving at 

that location, Tiffin Fire Department had responded. Detective 
Case No. 13-23-25

-5-

Nowak testified that upon arriving there was thick black smoke 

coming from the chimney, which appeared to be a chimney fire. 

Detective Nowak testified that he did not see any smoke from any 

windows or flames. Detective Nowak testified that he attempted to 

make contact with the residents of the home, by knocking on the door.

Due to not being able to make contact with the residents, the fire 

department made entry. At that time, they were able to make contact 

with Martin J. Schleter and notified him of the possible chimney fire, 

and the fire department needed to come into the residence and 

investigate and check the source. The Defendant, Martin J. Schleter 

moved back and attempted to close the door. Detective Nowak 

prevented the door from being shut. Then Detective Nowak made 

contact with Defendant Dawn L. Pena and notified her of the situation. 

At this time, Detective Nowak did not see Defendant, Martin J. 

Schleter, but heard noises coming from the basement. Detective 

Nowak observed that both Defendant Martin J. Schleter and 

Defendant Dawn L. Pena did not seem concerned as to the emergency. 

Detective Nowak entered the home with the fire department, due to 

safety concerns based on the Defendants’ actions, to make sure that 

all residents have [sic] left the residence due to being unsure of the 

status of the fire.

Upon entering the home, Detective Nowak and the fire department 

personnel went down to the basement and located the Defendant 

Martin J. Schleter in the basement. The basement was smoke filled. 

Detective Nowak instructed Defendant Martin J. Schleter to leave the 

basement. Detective Nowak then did a sweep of the basement to 

make sure no one else was in the basement, because there was a lot of 

clutter in the basement. When performing the sweep, Detective 

Nowak observed on a couch next to the wood burner, a tube with 

crystalline material, which the officer believed to be 

Methamphetamine. Detective Nowak had no intention to search the 

home for drugs. Both Defendants Dawn L. Pena and Martin J. 

Schleter were outside of the residence and denied having any illegal 

drugs. Detective Nowak then contacted Detective Eric England to let 

him know of his observation of suspected methamphetamines.

Detective Eric England testified. Detective England is employed by 

the Tiffin Police Department. Detective England was the on call 

Detective on December 4, 2021, and spoke with Detective Nowak as 
Case No. 13-23-25

-6-

to the tube found in plain sight containing a crystalline substance. 

Detective England responded to the scene, contacted BCI Agent Dave 

Horn and Detective Shawn Vallery to assist, due to concerns that 

methamphetamine was being made at the location. The home was 

taped off. Detective England requested and obtained a search warrant 

signed by the Honorable Judge Jay A. Meyer. Detective England 

testified that the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant was 

the direct observations of Detective Nowak. Detective England, 

during the execution of the search warrant, located the plastic tube on 

the couch in plain view. There were no other drugs located in the 

home. The tube was tested and contained methamphetamine. 

Detective England then requested a search warrant for the phone of 

Martin J. Schleter, based upon the probable cause for the issuance of 

the search warrant for Martin J. Schleter’s residence, locating the tube 

containing Methamphetamine, finding packaging material, and based 

on his training and experience, that cellular devices are used in 

furtherance of drug activity.

Defendant Martin J. Schleter testified that resides at 94 Coe St., Tiffin, 

Ohio, in Seneca County. The residence is owned by his mom, and 

Defendant Martin J. Schleter and Defendant Dawn L. Pena reside 

there together. Defendant Martin J. Schleter on December 4, 2021 

tried to build a fire in the wood burner using motor oil, wood, and 

paper. Defendant Martin J. Schleter did not think that the smoke was 

an issue. Defendant Martin J. Schleter wanted to stay in the basement 

to tend to the fire. Defendant Martin J. Schleter told the officer that 

the house was not on fire. Defendant Martin J. Schleter testified that 

shortly after being outside the residence he was handcuffed and 

searched, he had never given consent to enter the home. Defendant 

Martin J. Schleter felt his rights had been violated.

Defendant Dawn L. Pena did not provide any testimony.

(Judgment Entry and Decision, Docket No. 36).

{¶11} Our review of the trial court’s findings of fact, based on the evidentiary 

record of the suppression hearing, reflects that the trial court’s findings are 
Case No. 13-23-25

-7-

supported by competent, credible evidence and, therefore, we accept those factual 

findings. State v. Roberts, supra, at ¶ 100.

{¶12} We now turn to a de novo review of the application of the law to those 

facts. In this case, the trial court determined that the “exigent circumstances” 

exception to the search warrant requirement was applicable to the facts and justified 

the warrantless entry into the home and the brief search that occurred immediately 

thereafter. 

{¶13} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 

individuals against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. In Katz v. 

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the United States 

Supreme Court held that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 

prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 

exceptions.” Id., at 357.

{¶14} “Exigent circumstances” are one well-established exception to the 

Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 

582–83, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The exigent circumstances 

exception is based on the premise that certain situations demand urgent police 

action, which may excuse an officer from failure to secure a search warrant. Welsh 

v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). When the 

government claims a warrantless search is valid under the exigent circumstances 
Case No. 13-23-25

-8-

exception, the search was usually a result of an emergency or dangerous situation. 

Payton, 445 U.S. at 583.

{¶15} “‘Whether exigent circumstances are present is determined through an 

objective test that looks at the totality of the circumstances confronting the police 

officers at the time of the entry.’” State v. Reilly, 3d Dist. Seneca App. No. 13-19-

28, 2020-Ohio-850, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Enyart, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 08AP184 and 08AP-318, 2010-Ohio-5623, ¶ 21, citing United States v. MacDonald, 916 

F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir.1990). “‘The duration of the intrusion and the scope of the 

search are governed by the constitutional command of reasonableness, which will 

be evaluated in terms of the emergency. Once the emergency conditions have been 

alleviated, further intrusion must be sanctioned by a warrant.’” Id., quoting State v. 

Bethel, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 10-AP-35, 2011-Ohio-3020, ¶ 26. 

{¶16} There is no set list of exigent circumstances that justifies a warrantless 

search, but “exigent circumstances generally must include the necessity for 

immediate action that will ‘protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury,’ or ‘will 

protect a governmental interest that outweighs the individual’s constitutionally 

protected privacy interest.”’ State v. Crawford, 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-04-21, 8-04-

22, 8-04-23, 2005-Ohio-243, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Nazarian, 9th Dist. No. 

04CA0017–M, 2004–Ohio–5448 at ¶ 10, citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 

392–93, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). 
Case No. 13-23-25

-9-

{¶17} Government officials responding to an active fire, or promptly 

investigating the cause thereof afterwards, is an exigent circumstance that has been 

repeatedly recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Michigan v. 

Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), Michigan v. 

Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293, 104 S.Ct. 641, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984), Welsh v. 

Wisconsin, supra, at 750. 

{¶18} In Michigan v. Taylor, supra, applying the doctrines of exigent 

circumstances and plain view, the United States Supreme Court held that “[a] 

burning building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a 

warrantless entry ‘reasonable’” Id. at 509. Further, “officials need no warrant to 

remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of a blaze after it 

has been extinguished.” Tyler at 510. Also in Tyler, the United States Supreme 

Court explained that “the exigency justifying a warrantless entry to fight a fire” does 

not end – and “the need to get a warrant” does not begin – “with the dousing of the 

last flame”: “this view of the firefighting function is unrealistically narrow.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at 509-510.

{¶19} In this case, we find that the decision of the firefighters and the police 

officer to make a warrantless entry and perform a cursory search of Schleter’s 

residence was justified by exigent circumstances, specifically the need to potentially 

protect life and property at that residence. In light of the evidence presented at the 
Case No. 13-23-25

-10-

suppression hearing, we agree with the trial court that the actions of the firefighters 

and police in entering Schleter’s home were reasonable under the circumstances.

{¶20} Specifically, the firefighters and the patrol officer were dispatched to 

a “possible house fire” at 94 Coe Street following a 9-1-1 call from a third-party. 

(5/12/23 Tr., 6). Upon Officer Nowak arriving at that location along with personnel 

from the fire department, he observed heavy black smoke in the area, coming from 

the chimney. Nowak testified that the amount of smoke coming through the 

chimney and spreading throughout the neighborhood was “excessive” and 

indicative of a chimney fire. (Id., 17). Because of that, the immediate concern was 

to evacuate any occupants of the residence due to the potential risk of physical harm. 

After firefighters got no response upon attempting to make contact with anyone 

inside of the home, the fire department personnel decided to force entry into the 

house in order to locate and extinguish the fire. 

{¶21} The firefighters were able to get the front door open just slightly, but 

not wide enough to get through. At that point, firefighters realized that there was a 

person inside of the residence, subsequently identified as Schleter, who said he had 

a wood burning stove going for heat, and then retreated further into the home instead 

of opening the door for the firefighters. Firefighters then requested that Officer 

Nowak assist them in trying to get Schleter to evacuate. 

{¶22} Because entry could not be made through the front door, Nowak and 

the fire department personnel went to a patio door at the back of the residence, where 
Case No. 13-23-25

-11-

Dawn Pena came to the door. Pena was advised that the house or chimney was on 

fire, that the occupants needed to evacuate, and that the fire department needed to 

enter. In response, Pena attempted to shut the door. At that point, Nowak and some 

of the firefighters stepped inside and could hear noises coming from the basement, 

which was accessed through the kitchen where the officials had entered. The 

firefighters went down the stairs, followed by Officer Nowak, and Schleter was 

located in the basement. Schleter was made to leave the residence. 

{¶23} There was smoke in the basement and, while firefighters were 

attempting to locate the source of the fire, Officer Nowak made a cursory sweep of 

the basement to make sure no other persons were down there. In so doing, Nowak 

noticed what he suspected to be methamphetamine in plain view on the couch, next 

to the wood burning stove. At or near that time, the fire department officials 

ascertained that the fire was contained to the chimney area. Both Schleter and Pena 

were made to wait outside of the residence until the firefighters ensured the fire was 

extinguished. 

{¶24} On those facts, the actions taken by the firefighters and the police were 

objectively reasonable, particularly when viewed in light of what was known to the 

officials at the time the warrantless entry and sweep of the house occurred, as 

opposed to evaluating the actions at issue in light what was learned by the officers 

after the investigation of the fire took place. The intrusion into the home was 
Case No. 13-23-25

-12-

minimal and was properly limited to addressing the exigent circumstances that were 

present.

{¶25} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that the warrantless 

entry and search of Schleter’s home was justified on the basis of exigent 

circumstances, being the immediate need to take action in order to protect lives and 

property.

{¶26} The assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶27} Having found no error in the particulars assigned and argued by the 

defendant-appellant, Martin Schleter, the judgment of the Seneca County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed

ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur.

/hls