UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4734

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

REGINALD LASHAWN LOCKHART,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., District Judge. (3:12-cr-00359-RJC-1)

Submitted: March 31, 2015 Decided: April 7, 2015

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Aaron E. Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne 

M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Reginald Lashawn Lockhart pled guilty to unlawfully 

possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012). Based on his 2002 convictions for 

multiple armed robberies and assaults, the district court 

sentenced Lockhart under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) 

and imposed 180 months of imprisonment, the statutory minimum 

pursuant to § 924(e). On appeal, Lockhart challenges the 

constitutionality of the ACCA as applied to him. We affirm. 

“We generally review a defendant’s challenge to the 

constitutionality of a statute de novo.” United States v. 

Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 182 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 

Ct. 1936 (2014). “However, when the issue is not presented to 

the district court, . . . then we review for plain error.” Id.

We conclude that three of Lockhart’s arguments were not 

raised in the district court and, thus, are reviewable only for 

plain error. Id.; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 579 

n.4 (4th Cir. 2010). First, Lockhart argues that the ACCA’s 

objective — incapacitating offenders until the age at which 

their criminal careers normally end — could be achieved in his 

case without application of the ACCA’s 15-year mandatory 

minimum. Second, he contends that his ACCA sentence is 

disproportionate to his underlying crime because he was never 

afforded the intervening periods of incarceration between his 
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predicate convictions, which, he claims, are necessary to make 

imposition of a recidivist statute, like the ACCA, fair. Third, 

Lockhart claims that, pursuant to the Second Amendment and the 

affirmative defense of justification, he had a legitimate right 

to possess the firearm in certain circumstances and that the 

ACCA impeded that right.

To establish plain error, Lockhart must show that: (1) an 

error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error 

affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States, 

133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013); United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 

700, 711 (4th Cir. 2015). Even if Lockhart makes the required 

showing, correction of the error lies within our discretion, 

which we exercise only if “the error seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1126-27 (internal 

alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted). 

“To be plain, an error must be clear or obvious,” such as 

when “the settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit 

establishes that an error has occurred.” United States v. 

Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Because Lockhart has pointed to no 

decision from this court or the Supreme Court concluding that 

the ACCA is unconstitutional when applied to circumstances, or 

challenged by arguments, such as his, he has not demonstrated
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that the district court’s application of the ACCA was clear or 

obvious error. Thus, Lockhart has not met his burden to 

demonstrate plain error.

Only one of Lockhart’s claims was properly presented to the 

court below, and we review it de novo. Hager, 721 F.3d at 182. 

Lockhart argues that the ACCA, when applied to a defendant who, 

like him, served no intervening sentence between predicate 

convictions, is overinclusive because it incapacitates offenders 

who are not career criminals, as traditionally defined in other 

recidivist statutes. To the extent Lockhart believes the ACCA 

must withstand heightened or intermediate scrutiny, that belief 

is erroneous. United States v. Inglesi, 988 F.2d 500, 503 (4th 

Cir. 1993) (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464-

65 (1991)). When reviewing challenges of this nature to the 

ACCA’s classification scheme, we inquire whether the “statute 

makes an irrational classification, unrelated to a valid 

government purpose.” United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 68 

(4th Cir. 1995). We conclude that the ACCA’s inclusion of 

repeat offenders — such as Lockhart — whose predicate 

convictions are not separated by intervening periods of 

incarceration in its classification of armed career criminals is 

neither irrational nor unrelated to a valid government purpose. 

See id.; cf. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980). 
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We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED