J-S02027-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

BRUCE ALVARADO

Appellant No. 488 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 24, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000702-2013

BEFORE: MUNDY, OLSON and WECHT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 06, 2015

Appellant, Bruce Alvarado, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on January 24, 2014. We affirm.

The trial court has ably summarized the underlying facts of this case. 

As the trial court explained:

On January 1, 2013, Detective Perez and Officer Floyd set 

up a narcotics surveillance on the 2800 block of Lee Street 

in the City of Philadelphia. At approximately 5:20 p.m., 

Detective Perez observed [Appellant] standing on the 

northwest corner of Lee Street and Somerset Street along 

with another Hispanic male, later identified as Christopher 

Keylez.[1] A white male, later identified as Andrew Cook, 

____________________________________________

1 As the Commonwealth declares: “[t]he notes of testimony from trial 

identify the cohort as ‘Christopher Ke[y]lez,’ but the trial court’s docket 

identifies the co-defendant’s criminal matter as Commonwealth v. 

Cristopher Quiles, CP-51-CR-0004687-2013.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 2 

n.1. Nevertheless, with respect to the co-defendant’s last name, this 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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approached them, engaged in a brief conversation, and then 

handed Keylez [United States] currency. In response, 

Keylez crossed the street to a vacant lot for approximately 

one minute and returned to hand Cook a small item. Cook 

then departed from the area and Detective Perez radioed 

his description and direction of travel to backup officers. . . . 

Cook was stopped by Officer Ashburn, who recovered one 

yellow tinted packet of powder cocaine. 

. . .

At approximately 5:55 p.m., Detective Perez observed 

another white male, later identified as Francis Mandarin, 

approach [Appellant] and Keylez, engage in a brief 

conversation, and then hand Keylez [United States] 

currency. In response, Keylez crossed the street to a 

vacant lot for approximately one minute and returned to 

hand Mandarin a small item with a fist over hand motion. 

Mandarin then departed [] the area in a white Buick and 

Detective Perez radioed [Mandarin’s] description, the 

vehicle description, and the direction of travel to backup 

officers. . . . Mandarin was stopped by Officer Crawford, 

who recovered one peach packet of crack cocaine.

. . .

At approximately 6:25 p.m., Detective Perez observed a 

third white male, later identified as Charles Gorman, 

approach [Appellant] and Keylez, engage in a brief 

conversation, and then hand [Appellant] [United States] 

currency. In response, [Appellant] handed Gorman a small 

item with a fist over hand motion. Gorman then departed [] 

the area in a Toyota Rav4 [automobile] and Detective Perez 

radioed [Gorman’s] description, the vehicle description, and 

the direction of travel to backup officers. The detective also 

radioed a description of [Appellant] and [Keylez] to the 

backup officers. . . . Gorman was stopped by Officer 

Kenner, who recovered five clear packets of heroin with blue 

glassine inserts stamped “China White.” 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

memorandum will retain the spelling that is memorialized in the trial court’s 

opinion and in the notes of testimony. 
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. . .

[During Appellant’s trial, it was stipulated that “Officer 

Criselli . . . stopped and arrested [Appellant] as [Appellant] 

began to run into [Appellant’s house at] 2810 Lee Street.” 

N.T. Trial, 10/30/13, at 20.] Officer Criselli [] recovered 

[$150.00 in United States] currency from [Appellant’s] 

person. [However, the police did not recover any controlled 

substances from Appellant’s person]. Keylez was stopped 

and arrested by Officer Walsh[,] who recovered [$250.00 in 

United States] currency from [Keylez’s] person.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/13/14, at 2-4.

Following Appellant’s October 30, 2013 bench trial, the trial court 

found Appellant guilty of possession of a controlled substance with the intent 

to deliver (hereinafter “PWID”) and possession of a controlled substance.2 

On January 24, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of 

one-and-a-half to four years in prison for PWID.3 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and now raises the following 

claim to this Court:

Was not the evidence insufficient to convict [Appellant] of 

[PWID] and simple possession of a controlled substance 

where the officer’s observations and circumstantial evidence 

____________________________________________

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and (16), respectively.

3 Appellant was originally sentenced on October 30, 2013. However, 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion and, on January 24, 2014, the 

trial court vacated Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Trial Court Order, 

1/24/14, at 1. The trial court then re-sentenced Appellant to serve a term of 

one-and-a-half to four years in prison for PWID, with credit for 379 days of 

time served. Id.
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did not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt that 

[Appellant] committed the illegal acts?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

We review Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim under the 

following standard:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of 

law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden 

of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must 

be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the 

evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 559-560 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en 

banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his PWID

and simple possession convictions because “there was [not] enough [] 

circumstantial evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

drugs recovered from Mr. Gorman were sold to him by [Appellant]. . . . 
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[Therefore, Appellant’s convictions are based upon] conjecture and 

speculation.” Appellant’s Brief at 10 and 14. In other words, Appellant 

claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because 

“the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” 

Brown, 23 A.3d at 559-560 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Appellant’s claim fails.

An individual is guilty of possession of a controlled substance if he 

knowingly and intentionally possesses a controlled substance. 35 P.S. 

§ 780-113(a)(16). Further, “[i]n order to convict an accused of PWID under 

35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), the Commonwealth must prove that he both 

possessed the controlled substance and had an intent to deliver that 

substance.” Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 

2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Within Appellant’s brief to this Court, Appellant bases his argument 

upon our Supreme Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Banks, 658 A.2d 

752 (Pa. 1995). There, our Supreme Court held that the police did not have 

probable cause to conclude that the defendant had sold contraband, where 

the police observed: a single exchange on a street corner, where the 

defendant handed an unidentified object to an unidentified female in 

exchange for an undetermined amount of money, and the defendant fled 

upon seeing the police. Appellant’s Brief at 12; Banks, 658 A.2d at 752. 
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According to Appellant, since the Supreme Court concluded that the police 

did not possess probable cause in Banks, “by definition” the evidence is 

insufficient to support Appellant’s convictions in the case at bar. Appellant’s 

Brief at 12-13.

Appellant’s reliance upon Banks fails because, in Banks, the police 

merely observed a single street transaction and the police never stopped the 

unidentified female – thus, the police were never able to determine what the 

defendant sold to the female. Banks, 658 A.2d at 753. By contrast, in the 

case at bar, the quantity and quality of the Commonwealth’s evidence is far 

greater than was found in Banks. Specifically, in this case, the 

Commonwealth presented evidence that: Appellant was lingering on a 

street corner that was being used for drug distribution, with an individual 

who was distributing cocaine; during the course of one hour, the police 

observed Appellant and Keylez engage in three hand-to-hand street 

transactions with passing individuals; the three hand-to-hand transactions 

occurred in roughly the same manner (the individual approached Appellant 

and Keylez on the corner, the individual engaged in a brief conversation with 

Appellant and Keylez, the individual handed Appellant or Keylez money, 

following the monetary exchange, either Appellant or Keylez handed the 

individual “a small item” in a “fist over hand motion,” and, following the brief 

transaction, the individual departed); each of the individuals was later 

stopped by the police and the police recovered cocaine from the two who 
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transacted with Keylez and a different drug – heroin – from the one who 

transacted with Appellant; when police appeared on scene, Appellant 

attempted to flee; and, a search of Appellant’s person revealed that 

Appellant possessed $150.00. 

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that 

Appellant possessed the heroin that was later recovered from Charles 

Gorman and that, when Appellant possessed the heroin, Appellant possessed 

the heroin with the intent to deliver. Appellant’s claim on appeal fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2015