J. A01013/15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

BENEFICIAL CONSUMER DISCOUNT 

COMPANY D/B/A BENEFICIAL 

MORTGAGE COMPANY OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

PAMELA A. VUKMAN, : No. 355 WDA 2014

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at No. GD-06-024554

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE AND ALLEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 06, 2015

Appellant, Pamela A. Vukman (“Vukman”), appeals from the order 

granting appellee, Beneficial Consumer Discount Company’s (“Beneficial”), 

motion to confirm a sheriff’s sale. Finding no error in the issues raised on

appeal, we affirm.

On September 14, 2001, Beneficial extended a loan to Vukman to 

purchase a house at 104 Dorf Drive in Pittsburgh, and the loan was secured 

by a mortgage. In December of 2005, Vukman defaulted on the loan. 

Subsequently, Beneficial filed the requisite Act 6 and Act 91 pre-foreclosure 
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notices.1 The Act 91 notice was defective because it failed to inform Vukman 

of the option of a face-to-face meeting with Beneficial. See 35 P.S. 

§ 1680.403c(b)(1). After failed negotiations between the parties, Beneficial 

filed a complaint in foreclosure on October 17, 2006. After further 

negotiations, on May 6, 2009, the parties entered a consent judgment. The 

trial court memorialized the terms of that consent judgment in its opinion:

It is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that 

consent judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff, 

Beneficial Consumer Discount Company 

(“Beneficial”) in mortgage foreclosure and against 

Defendant, Pamela A. Vukman in the amount of 

$217,508.81 together with interest at the rate of 

$43.75 per diem for each day after May 6, 2009 and 

costs. It is further ORDERED and DECREED that 

Defendant Pamela A. Vukman’s (“Vukman”), New 

Matter and Counterclaim are hereby DISMISSED 

WITH PREJUDICE.

Beneficial agrees to NOT execute on the 

Judgment as long as Vukman mets [sic] the 

following requirements:

. . . .

If any of the requirements are not met by the 

[sic] Vukman, Beneficial may immediately execute 

on the Judgment and proceed to Sheriffs Sale.

If all of the above requirements are met by 

Vukman, Beneficial will vacate this judgment and 

bring Vukman’s loan current with a balance of 

$139,000.00 on July 19, 2010.

Vukman agrees to Release and hold harmless 

any and all persons and business entities, including 

 

1

Loan Interest and Protection Law, 41 P.S. § 403 (Act 6), and Housing 

Finance Agency Law, 35 P.S. §§ 1680.402c, 1680.403c (Act 91).
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but not limited to Beneficial, Beneficial’s employees, 

agents and representatives, . . . from any and all 

claims set forth in Vukman’s New Matter and 

Counterclaim and from any and all claims she 

may have had or may have in the future

resulting from the matters brought forth in the above 

referenced action.

This agreement has been on record in open 

court with all parties present on May 6, 2009 at the 

above-captioned docket [number].

Trial court opinion, 5/13/14 at 3 (emphasis added).

Vukman subsequently defaulted again. After pleadings were filed by 

both parties, a sheriff’s sale went forward on August 2, 2010. On August 31, 

2010, Vukman filed a motion to set aside the sheriff’s sale which argued that 

the defective Act 91 notice deprived the trial court of subject matter 

jurisdiction. On January 10, 2011, the trial court agreed with Vukman and 

entered an order setting aside the sheriff’s sale and dismissing the complaint 

in foreclosure.

Beneficial appealed the decision, and while this court affirmed the 

decision on January 30, 2012, our supreme court reversed on 

September 25, 2013. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. v. Vukman, 37 

A.3d 596 (Pa.Super. 2012), reversed, 77 A.3d 547 (Pa. 2013). The 

supreme court found that while the Act 91 notice was indeed defective, it did 

not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, and remanded the 

case.
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On February 14, 2014, Beneficial moved to confirm the sheriff’s sale. 

In response, Vukman argued that the trial court had to grant her relief under 

Act 70 because of Beneficial’s defective Act 91 notice.2 On February 19, 

2014, the court entered an order granting Beneficial’s motion to confirm the 

sheriff’s sale. The court found that Vukman had surrendered any Act 70 

remedy by the consent judgment. This timely appeal followed.

Although Vukman purports to frame three issues on appeal, she is 

effectively raising two issues:

1. Did Vukman waive her Act 70 rights by the 

consent judgment?

2. Is waiver of Act 70 rights barred by statute or 

public policy?

We will address these issues in the order presented.

Preliminarily, we note that the parties are in conflict as to what 

standard we should review the issues on appeal. Beneficial propounds an 

abuse of discretion standard as appropriate to a trial court’s decision on a 

motion to set aside a sheriff’s sale. See Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. 

Lark, 73 A.3d 1265, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2013). Vukman, on the other hand, 

asserts that because our review involves statutory interpretation, our 

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review plenary. See Egan 

 

2 Act 70 is the Homeowner Assistance Settlement Act, 35 P.S. §§ 1681.1 to 

1681.7. Section 1681.5 of Act 70 enables the court to remedy violations of 

the notice sections of Act 91.
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v. USI Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 92 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal 

granted, 108 A.3d 30 (Pa. 2015).

We agree with Vukman. Although this appeal is taken from an order 

confirming a sheriff’s sale, in the first issue we are called upon to interpret 

the terms of a consent judgment. A consent judgment is a contract and is 

construed like a contract. Laird v. Clearfield & Mahoning Railway Co., 

846 A.2d 118, 122 (Pa.Super. 2004), reversed on other grounds, 916 

A.2d 1091 (Pa. 2007); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Fisher v. Phillip 

Morris, Inc., 736 A.2d 693, 698 n.14 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1999), cert. denied, 

Sklaroff v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Fisher, 531 U.S. 917 (2000). It is well 

settled that where we are called upon to interpret a contract, our standard of 

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Newman 

Development Group of Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi’s Family Market, 

Inc., 98 A.3d 645, 653 (Pa.Super. 2014). As for the second issue, as noted 

by Vukman, an issue involving statutory interpretation carries the identical 

standard of review. We now turn to the issues.

We first find that Vukman’s issues are moot because the consent 

judgment effectively provided Vukman Act 70 relief. Act 70 provides as 

follows:

The following provisions shall apply relating to the 

Homeowner’s Emergency Mortgage Assistance 

Program: 

(1) If there has been a failure to comply with 

the notice requirements of sections 
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402-C and 403-C of [Act 91], known as 

the Housing Finance Agency Law, and 

such failure has been properly raised in a 

legal action, including an action in 

foreclosure, for money due under the 

mortgage obligation or to take 

possession of the mortgagor’s security, 

the court may dismiss the action without 

prejudice, order the service of a 

corrected notice during the action, 

impose a stay on any action or impose 

other appropriate remedies in the action 

to address the interests, if any, of the 

mortgagor who has been prejudiced 

thereby.

35 P.S. § 1681.5(1).

The clear purpose of this section is to provide the trial court with 

remedial options to forestall a foreclosure action until the mortgagor has 

been provided with accurate Act 91 notice. In this regard, the court may: 

1) dismiss the foreclosure action outright, but without prejudice to re-file 

and provide proper Act 91 notice; 2) order corrected Act 91 notice; 

3) impose a stay; or 4) impose any other appropriate remedy to address the 

interest of the mortgagor.

We find that the consent judgment effectively provided Act 70 relief. 

At the time the consent judgment was entered, Vukman not only was aware 

that she had the right to a face-to-face meeting with Beneficial, she had 

actually had that meeting because it resulted in the consent judgment. 

Furthermore, as a result of the consent judgment, not only was foreclosure 

forestalled, it was prevented altogether so long as Vukman complied with 
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the payment obligations provided in the consent judgment. Thus, although 

Act 70 had not been enacted at the time of the consent judgment, the 

consent judgment effectively provided the relief envisioned by Act 70.

Moreover, even if the consent judgment did not serve as Act 70 relief, 

Vukman is not entitled to such relief now. In her first issue, Vukman 

contends that in the consent judgment she waived only those claims set 

forth in her New Matter and Counterclaim, but not any of her defenses, such 

as Act 70. We disagree. The language of the consent decree clearly and 

unambiguously included a waiver of far more than just the claims Vukman 

set forth in her New Matter and Counterclaim: “Vukman agrees to Release 

and hold harmless any and all persons and business entities . . . from any 

and all claims set forth in Vukman’s New Matter and Counterclaim and from 

any and all claims she may have had or may have in the future.” If 

we interpreted this language as limiting the waiver to just the claims 

contained in the New Matter and Counterclaim, the highlighted language 

would be rendered mere surplusage.

When a written contract is clear and unequivocal, its 

meaning must be determined by its contents alone. 

In construing a contract, we must determine the 

intent of the parties and give effect to all of the 

provisions therein. An interpretation will not be 

given to one part of the contract which will annul 

another part of it.
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Gaffer Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Discover Reinsurance Co., 936 A.2d 1109, 

1113 (Pa.Super. 2007), quoting Capek v. Devito, 767 A.2d 1047, 1050 (Pa. 

2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Vukman’s proposed interpretation does not give effect to the 

highlighted language but instead annuls it. Clearly, Vukman intended to 

waive any and all claims both past and present. This would include any 

claims under Act 70. We also reject Vukman’s argument that she could not 

waive an Act 70 claim in the consent judgment because Act 70 had not been 

enacted at the time. The language of the consent judgment waives all 

claims Vukman may have in the future. Such a waiver clearly anticipates all 

future remedies whether known or unknown. There is no merit here.

In her second issue, Vukman asserts that Act 70 cannot be waived 

either as a matter of statute or public policy. Vukman’s statutory argument 

is predicated upon the no-waiver provision of Act 6:

Notwithstanding any other law, the provisions of this 

act may not be waived by any oral or written 

agreement executed by any person.

41 P.S. § 408. Vukman then states, “[t]herefore, statutory rights under 

Act 70 cannot be waived because Act 6 was incorporated into Act 91 and 

Act 91 was amended by Act 70.” (Vukman brief at 8.)

Neither Act 70 nor Act 91 has a no-waiver provision. Act 91 did 

incorporate the notice information required under Act 6. See 35 P.S. 

§ 1680.403c(b)(1). However, Act 91 did not incorporate the no-waiver 
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provision. Moreover, both Act 70 and the notice requirements of Act 91 

were enacted after the no-waiver provision of Act 6 was enacted. Obviously, 

the Legislature was aware that it had barred waiver under Act 6 and could 

also have done so under Act 70 and Act 91, but chose not to do so. 

Therefore, we find no statutory bar to waiver of Act 70.

As for public policy prohibiting waiver, Vukman merely quotes a nearly 

80-year-old case stating that the then existing usury statute was part of the 

public policy of the state and could not be waived by the debtor. While we 

agree that usury is against the public policy of this state, we are not 

prepared to rule that this public policy extends to the waiver of Act 70 under 

the circumstances of this case. We again note that the Legislature could 

have barred waiver of Act 70 provisions but chose not to do so. Thus, we 

find no public policy barring Vukman’s waiver of Act 70 in the context of this 

case.

Accordingly, having found no merit to the issues on appeal, we will 

affirm the order below.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2015