Inthe matter of BEFORETHE DEPARTMENT OFTRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

THEIMPOSITION OFUNJUSTUSERCHARGESAT ITALIANAIRPORTS ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) OST-2013-0038 under Section 41310(c) ofthe InternationalAirTransportation Fair Competitive Practices Act, as amended

OBJECTIONS OF ALIT ALIA- COMPAGNIAAEREAITALIANAS.p.A. TO ORDER2013-3-1 Communications withrespectto this document shouldbe sentto:

March 22, 2013 Richard D. Mathias Jonathon H. Foglia Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger, L.L.P. 888 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel: (202) 298-8660 Fax: (202) 342-0683 rdmathias@zsrlaw.com jhfoglia@zsrlaw.com Counsel for Alitalia

- CompagniaAerea Italiana S.p.A.BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

Inthe matter of THE IMPOSITION OF UNJUST USER CHARGES AT ITALIANAIRPORTS under Section41310(c) ofthe International AirTransportation FairCompetitive Practices Act, as amended

OBJECTIONS OF ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) OST-2013-0038

ALIT ALIA- COMPAGNIAAEREAITALIANA S.p.A. TO ORDER2013-3-1 Alitalia- Compagnia Aerea Italiana S.p.A. ("Alitalia") hereby submits these objections to Order 2013-3-1 (served Mar. 15, 2013) (the "Order" or "Tentative Decision"), in which the Department has proposed to take the unprecedented step ofbarring Alitalia from "participating in any or all services (on-line, interline or codeshare) between any point or points in Italy, via any intermediate point in the EU, and any point or points in the United States." Id. at 2. This proposed action is based on the Department's tentative finding that the "Italian differentiated system of airport landing and takeoffuser charges produces an unjust discriminatory effect on U.S. carriers, in violation of the U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement," resulting in "an unjustifiable discriminatory practice against U.S. air carriers" and "imposing an unjustifiable restriction onU.S. air carriers' access to the market." Id. Further to this finding, the Department summarily concludes that its proposal to effectively ban Alitalia's holding out of foreign air transportation to or from the United States via EU intermediate points in order to exert pressure

on Italy, home to the third largest economy in the eurozone and a crucial trade partner with whom the United States has enjoyed a long, fruitful and positive aviation relationship for -2-

### decades, would somehowbe consistentwith the "public interest andthe rules ofproportionality." Id. Alitalia strenuously objects to the findings and conclusions set forth in the Order, and urges, for the reasons set forth herein, that the Departmentnot finalize its Tentative Decision. 1



### I. Introduction and Summary ofPosition The Tentative Decision would impose extraordinarily harsh sanctions on Alitalia under the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41310, as amended ("IATFCPA"), in order to eliminate a system ofdifferential airport user charges, over which Alitalia has no control, and that has been-and continues to be-the subject of governmental consultations withinthe U.S.-EU Joint Committee, as provided for under the U.S.- EU Air Transport Agreement (the "Agreement"). Remarkably, the Tentative Decision fails to provide a reasoned analysis supporting the Department's conclusionthat the airport user charges

are either unjustifiably or unreasonably discriminatory under the IATFCPA and the Agreement, which, pursuant to Article 12, expressly allows such charges to reflect the cost to competent charging authorities providingthe airport facilities. Furthermore, and as the Department is well aware, the Government ofItaly has already, in government-to-government negotiations, indicated that the differential system will be eliminated. Nevertheless, ifthe Department were to determine that a violation ofthe Agreement

1 

### To the extent the Department intends to amend or modify the foreign air carrierpermit issued

to Alitalia under 49 U.S.C. § 41302 pursuant to Order 2010-1-15, Alitalia hereby notifies the Department ofits intention to request an administrative hearing, as required under 49 U.S.C. § 41304, in order to take testimony regarding the differential fee system and to rebut the Department's tentative finding that the systemproduces anunjust discriminatory effect onU.S. air carriers, placing such carriers at a competitive disadvantage. A hearing also will assist with the full development ofan agency record for purposes ofseekingjudicial review ofany such amendment or modification to Alitalia's foreign air carrier permit, as provided for under 49 U.S.C. § 46110 and Aerolineas Argentinas S.A. v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 415 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005). -3-

### exists, its proposed countermeasures represent a dangerous unilateral departure from the

. established mechanism provided for under the Agreement, specifically Article 19, which provides for arbitration procedures to resolve nearly any dispute arising under the Agreement, after consultations have proven to be ineffective in resolving the dispute. Even assuming the differential airport user charges were unjustifiably or unreasonably discriminatory (which the Department has failed to established), and even were the U.S. Government to unilaterally act to the exclusion ofthe arbitrationprovisions ofthe Agreement (which it cannot and shouldnot), the Department's proposed action departs from well-established principles ofproportionality under international law and Departmental precedent. In short, the Department has not provided any, much less a compelling, explanation of why such a draconian countermeasure would be warrantedunderthe circumstances orhowitsproposed action is inthe public interest.



### II. The Tentative Decision Lacks A Reasoned Explanation To Support The Conclusion That The User Charges AreEither Unjustifiably Or UnreasonablyDiscriminatory 

### The Tentative Decision, barely running over two pages, scarcely touches upon the reasoning underpinning the Department's conclusion that the airport user charges at issue constitute discrimination by a foreign government against U.S. air carriers properly within the scope ofthe IATFCPA. Rather, the Department concludes, ipso facto, that the mere existence of different user charges applicable to extra-EU and intra-EU flights at Italian airports is unjustifiably orunreasonablydiscriminatory. To be clear, the airport user charges at issue apply to flights of all airlines at Italian airports, regardless of nationality, when arriving directly from or departing directly to points outside the EU (extra-EU flights). Thus, the flights of U.S. air carriers and any foreign air carrier, including Alitalia, directly serving the United States, or any other point outside the EU, from an Italian airport are assessed the same tonnage-based user charges. U.S. air carriers do not -4-payhigher fees than Alitalia in this regard, nor could theyunder the Agreement, which requires that "user charges shall be assessed on the airlines ofthe other Party onterms not less favorable thanthe most favorable terms available to any other airline at the time the charges are assessed." Id. at Art. 12(1). Flights operating entirely within the EU (intra-EU flights), on the other hand,

are subject to a lesser tonnage-based charge, but that charge, once again, is the same regardless ofthe nationalityofthe airline.2 Alitalia understands that ithas previouslybeenthe position ofthe Government ofItalyin government-to-governmentnegotiations thatthis differential systemreflects the increasedcost of providing airport services to extra-EU flights, which generally utilize larger aircraft and carry significantly more passengers than flights within the EU. Moreover, extra-EU flights, by their verynature, require a greater degree ofcustoms, agricultural andimmigrationinspection services than intra-EU flights, given that a significantly larger percentage ofpassengers aboard extra-EU flights are non-EU residents. In this regard, many customs and immigration formalities have been eliminated with respect to EU residents traveling within the Schengan area,**~'** on intraEuropean flights, as provided for under Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Most importantly, and as here relevant, Article 12 of the Agreement allows eitherpartyto establish charges up to the "full cost to the competent charging authorities orbodiesproviding" the airport service. Additionally, the Convention onInternational Civil Aviation (the "Chicago Convention") expressly permits a contracting State to impose or permit to be imposed airport charges on

2 Ofcourse, cabotagerestrictions preclude a U.S. air carrierfrom providing air services wholly

withinthe EU,justas 49 U.S.C. §41703 prevents foreign air carriers from engaging inair services whollywithinthe United States absent the express authorization ofthe Department, but suchrestrictions are not at issue inthis proceeding.
-5-aircraft of any other contracting State engaged in scheduled international air transportation, provided such charges are no higher "than those that would be paid by its national aircraft provided in similar international air services." Id. at Art. 15(b) (emphasis added). The Departmenthas not even attempted to reconcile the Tentative Decision, which seeks to eliminate Italian airport user charges assessed on aircraft of all nationalities engaged in similar international air services (extra-EU flights), with Article 15 ofthe Chicago Convention, which allows for a differential system ofuser charges whenthe international air services are not similar. Ofcourse, the assessment ofspecial and unique user charges on the operation or sale of international air services to or from U.S. airports is a concept widely embraced by the United States, with a litany ofspecial fees and taxes hitting both airlines andpassengers, including, but not limited to, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") aircraft fee under 7 C.P.R. § 354.3(e), the APHIS passenger fee under 7 C.P.R. § 354.3(f), the customs user fee under 19 C.P.R. § 24.22(g), the immigration user fee under 8 C.P.R. § 286.2, and international arrival anddeparture taxes as requiredunder 26 U.S.C. §4261. At bottom, the Tentative Decision does not provide any indication that the Department

even considered the inherent differences between intra-EU and extra-EU flights with regard to the cost ofproviding services at Italian airports, orhow the application ofhigheruser charges to extra-EU flights is any less reasonable than the user charges applicable to international air services atU.S. airports. Indeed, the Department has notprovided any explanation to support its preliminary conclusion that the Italian user charges violate the Agreement and warrant remedial action under the IATPCPA. Nor has the Department provided any evidence of how the differential fee system produces an unjust discriminatory effect on U.S. air carriers, or how the systemplaces U.S. air carriers at a competitive disadvantage. Similarly, the Department has not

-6-described the additional costs incurred by U.S. air carriers and whether they constitute any meaningful component ofsuch carriers' costs ofprovidingtransatlantic service to and from Italy. Moreover, U.S. air carriers have the competitive option of serving Italian airports via intermediate EU points on a code-share or interline basis, in which case such flights are subject to the lower tonnage user charges underthe differential fee system. In short, the Tentative Decision fails to adhere to the well-settledprinciple that an agency "examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection betweenthe facts found andthe choice made." MotorVehicle Mfr. Ass'nv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Expressed another way, "the decision [must be] based on a consideration of the relevant factors." Id. Where an agency decision is not so articulated, the decision shall be deemedunlawful and set aside as "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse ofdiscretion orotherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Even assuming, arguendo, that an agency possesses the required statutory authority to take action in an area, such action must be held arbitrary and capricious when devoid of "reasoned decision-making." City of Kansas City v. Dep'tofHous. & UrbanDev., 923 F.2d 188, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Given that the Tentative Decision fails to articulate a reasoned basis for the findings and conclusion, it must not be finalized. Rather, the facts upon with the Department relied and the

reasons forming the basis offor its conclusions must be fully articulated before the Department proposes to take this or any other countermeasure, so that Alitalia and all interested parties are providednotice and ameaningful opportunityto prepare and submit comments.

-7-

### III. TheDifferential User ChargesArePresentlyThe SubjectOfExtensive Governmental Negotiations Unlike nearly all other pnor Departmental proceedings entailing proposed countermeasures under the IATFCPA, government-to-government negotiations regarding the Italian airportuser charges have notreached an impasse or otherwiseprovenineffective. Indeed, during the Tenth Meeting of the U.S.-EU Joint Committee held in December of 2011, representatives of the Government of Italy advised that Italy was in consultations with the European Commission regarding the system ofdifferential user charges. And, at the Eleventh Joint Committee Meeting held in May of 2012, representatives of the Government of Italy explained that the Rome airport user charges would be revised once the Government of Italy establishes an independent supervisory authority, as required under Directive 2009/12/EC ofthe European Parliament and of the Council (the "Directive"), mandating a common framework regulating the essential features ofairport charges andthe waythey are set. This independent supervisory authority will be responsible for ensuring the correct application of measures taken to comply with the Directive, including "the approval of the charging system and/or the level ofairport charge." Id. at Art. 11(1). The Directive's impact to the Italian airport user charges at issue cannot be overstated, particularly in light of the Directive'srequirementthat airport charges "notdiscriminate against airportusers, inaccordance with Communitylaw," id. atArt. 3, while simultaneously allowing for the "modulation ofairport charges for issues ofpublic and general interest," provided the criteria are "relevant, objective and transparent." Id. And, as provided elsewhere under the Directive, "the level of airport charges maybe differentiated according to the quality and scope of [airport] services and their costs oranyother objective andtransparentjustification." Id. at Art. 1 0(1).

-8-

### As indicatedin the Tentative Decision, further discussions were held regarding the Italian airport user charges during the Twelfth Joint Committee Meeting held in January ofthis year. Furthermore, and shortly before that meeting, the European Commission asked the Government ofItaly for an explanation ofthe differentiated system ofcharges; Alitalia understands that the Government ofItaly provided the European Commission with the requested information earlier this month. Based on the foregoing, Alitalia respectfully submits that government negotiations regarding the Italian airport user charges are extensive, ongoing and, thus far, have proven productive, with an objective ofreaching aresolution ofthe matter. The Department must pause at this critical moment and heed its own prior admonishment that the "IATFCPA legislative approach favors, underprescribedparameters, negotiatedresolution." Order 2003-10-18 at 2. Indeed, even where the Department, in the exercise its authorityunderthe IATFCPA, has found a violation of the underlying air services agreement, it has often declined to impose sanctions while government-to-government negotiations were either ongoing or expected to

resume in the near future. For example, as the Department explained in Order 94-1-23 when it granted an IATFCPA complaint of Northwest against Lufthansa and the Government of the Federal Republic ofGermany but deferred a decision on appropriate sanctions, "The issue

... has been the subject of numerous informal and formal consultations with the German Government over the past several months. We expect to have further discussions with Germany in the near future on this and other issues

. . . In these circumstances, we believe that the public interest is best served ifwe defer the issue ofsanctions while this process continues." Id. at 4. See also Order 93-10-36 (granting IATFCPA complaint of Federal Express against the Government ofJapan but deferring sanctions on the same grounds); Order 89-11-17 (granting

-9-

### IATFCPA complaint ofPan American against Varig, Transbrasil and Government ofBrazil but deferring sanctions inlight ofcontinuing government-to-government efforts towards resolution). In light ofthe ongoing nature of consultations both within the U.S.-EU Joint Committee and between the Government ofItaly and the European Commission, the public interest would best be servedbysimilarlydeferring a decision on sanctions at this time. Finally, given that the Italian airport user charges and European Community law are inextricably linked, and in light of the principle embodied in the Directive that a common approach to a system of airport charges is better achieved at the Community level, the Government ofthe United States shouldbe negotiating a resolution ofthe matter pursuant to the procedures and mechanisms provided for under the Agreement-not by taking an extreme countermeasure against Alitalia in the hopes of unilaterally forcing Italy to eliminate the differential system ofairportuser charges. Ifthe Departmentwere to conclude that a violation of the Agreement exists, as tentatively determined in the Order, the Agreement mandates a dispute resolutionprocedure involving formal consultations and, ifthat fails, referral to aneutral bodyor formal arbitration, as discussed in Section IV, infra. The United States is not free to disregard the Agreement by unilaterally imposing sanctions, nor is the U.S. required to do so under the IATFCPA. This is particularly true in light of 49 U.S.C. § 

### 40105(b), which requires the Secretary, when carrying out his authority under Subtitle VII, Part A (including his authority to take action under the IATFCPA) to "act consistently with [the] obligations ofthe United States Government under an international agreement." Cf. British Caledonian Airways v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

-10-

### IV. IfTheDepartmentBelieves A LegitimateDispute Under theAgreement Exists, The Agreement Compels Resolution ByFormal Consultation and Arbitration 

### The very agreement which the Department has tentatively determined is inbreachbythe Government of Italy specifically provides an agreed procedure for resolving that dispute. Pursuantto Article 19, Arbitration, the United States has expressly agreedthat: [a]ny dispute

. relating to the application or interpretation ofthis Agreement, other than issues arising under Article 20 orunder Annex 2, that is notresolvedby a meeting ofthe Joint Committee may be referred to a person or body for decision by agreement ofthe Parties. Ifthe Parties do not so agree, the dispute shall, at the request ofeither Party, be submittedto arbitrationinaccordance withtheprocedures [ofArticle 19]. Ifthe Department determines to take actions directly impacting Alitalia's U.S. traffic rights due to an alleged breach ofthe Agreement, the proper mechanism is for the United States or the European Union, onbehalfofits Member States, to invoke Article 19. To be certain, the United States should be the party invoking Article 19 of the Agreement, which is a particularly appropriate mechanism where, as here, the dispute involves essentially an interpretation ofthe reasonableness ofcharges imposed by airports ofone party under the Agreement, in particular the cost to competent charging authorities providing the airport facilities. Article 19 evidences the parties' strong intent to resolve disputes in a waythat maintains their positive aviation relationship, by formal consultations and, if necessary, by referring disputes to a neutral decision-maker, not byresorting to unilateral sanctions against an airline of the other party. Alitalia understands from Italian Authorities that the possibility to resolve the issue has been, and continues to be, exploredthrough formal consultations within the context ofthe Joint Committee process under Article 18 ofthe Agreement as well as ongoing consultations between the European Commission and the Government ofItaly, as discussed in Section III, supra.

-11-The excessively punitive nature ofthe proposed sanctions without resort to arbitration is particularlyremarkable in light ofthe U.S. Government's pastwillingness to submit, to a neutral arbitrator, disputes involving foreign airport charges assessed against U.S. air carriers, particularly where, as here, the U.S. Governmenthas taken the positionthat the charges are not a reflection of the cost incurred to provide the service. The U.S. Government has, on several occasions, agreed to submit disputes with its international aviation trade partners to arbitration.**See~** United States-United Kingdom Arbitration Concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges, 24 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 335 (1993); France-United States Air Transport Arbitration, 3 Int'l Legal Materials 668 (1964); Italy-United States AirTransport Arbitration, 4 Int'l Legal Materials 974 (1965). Against this backdrop, the Tentative Decision is wholly silent as to why arbitration underArticle 19 ofthe Agreement wouldnotbe warrantedhere. More fundamentally, however, the U.S. cannot and should not cavalierly disregard the provisions in its international agreements that, as in this case, mandate a specific process for resolving disputes arising under such agreements. To do so here would violate both the spirit andthe letter ofthe Agreement, bargained for betweenthe United States andthe EuropeanUnion

over the course of several years, damaging the positive aviation relationship that has always existedbetween Italy andthe United States. Indeed, the veryexistence ofthe consultation and arbitrationprovisions ofthe Agreement establishes a mutual preference, agreed to between the U.S. and EU, to resolve differences without resorting to retaliation and other self-help measures, which are viewed under international law as an extreme, last resort action to be taken only ifall possible remedies have been exhausted. It is axiomatic that self-help is unwarranted so long as meaningful governmentto-government consultations are possible. See Restatement (Third) ofForeign Relations Law §

-12-905 (1987), Comment£ (explaining, "[c]ountermeasures are to be avoided as long as genuine negotiation or third-party settlement is available and offers some promise of resolving the matter," and emphasizing that "[a] showing of necessity is particularly important before any drastic measures of self-help are taken"). Under this clearly established principle, Italy's willingness to consult, in good faith, on the matter ofthe differential system ofairport charges forms more than a sufficientbasis to not finalize the Tentative Decision. Finally, punishment directed against Alitalia in orderto compel its homeland government to eliminate the differential fee system constitutes a breach of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Italy (the "Treaty"), which provides that corporations and associations of each High Contracting Party shall be permitted, without interference, to engage in commercial activities within the territories ofother High Contracting Party in conformity with applicable laws and regulations, upon terms no less favorable than those accorded to corporations and associations ofthe such other High Contracting Party. Id. at Art. 11(3). Furthermore, "corporations and associations ofeither High Contracting Party shall not in any case . . . receive treatment less favorable than the treatment . . . accorded to corporations and associations of any third country." Id. at Art. II(4). The rights and privileges secured to Alitalia byvirtue ofthe commitments made by the Government ofthe United States under the Treaty, includingthe rightto engage incommercial activities onterms no less favorable that U.S. air carriers, subject to applicable laws and regulations, would be violated were the Tentative Decision finalized, causingirreparableharmto Alitalia and constituting abreach ofthe Treaty.

-13-

### V. The Proposed Sanctions WhollyLackProportionality If, notwithstanding the objections set forth above, the Department were to decide to impose sanctions, theymustbeboundbythe rule ofproportionality. As the Departmenthas long recognized in the context of disputes between the Government of the United States and its international aviation treaty partners involving proposed sanctions under the IATFCPA, "countermeasures must not be clearly disproportionate to the alleged breach in light of(1) the injuries suffered by the company or companies concerned, and (2) the importance of the questions ofprinciple arising from the allegedbreach." Order 81-12-91 at 14 (citing U.S.-France Change-of-Gauge Arbitration, 54 Int'l Law Reports 304, 338 (1978)). Expressed another way, countermeasures taken by one party must be proportionate to the injury suffered to the party invoking the countermeasures. And, as the Department also has explained, "sanctions should be used with moderation and should be aimed at restoring equality between the Parties and encouraging the parties to continue negotiation toward a solution." Order 81-12-91 at 15. See also Restatement, supra, at§ 905, Reporters' Note 5 ("Countermeasures must have some degree ofequivalence with the alleged breach and their aim should be to restore equality between the Parties andto encourage them to continue negotiations withmutual desire to reach an acceptable solution and to avoid escalationthat would leadto worsening ofthe conflict") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This very principle is, moreover, embodied in the IATFCPA, as discussed in Section III, supra. In contrast, the proposed penalties under the Tentative Decision are breathtakingly punitive in nature and extreme, departing from the rule ofproportionality. And, by effectively blocking Alitalia from engaging in any and all air services between Italy and the United States via EU intermediate points, the Tentative Decision, iffinalized, would severely disrupt shippers

-14-

### and air travelers, as there wouldbe few, ifany, re-accommodation opportunities on other airlines given declining capacity andrecord load factors inthe transatlantic air services market. Such an outcome clearlywouldbe contraryto the public interest. Even where the Department, applyingthe rule ofproportionality, hasproposedto take the extraordinary step of restricting a foreign air carrier's traffic rights, it has, almost without exception, only done so where a foreign government has refused to authorize the services ofa U.S. air carrier properly designated under an air services agreement, circumstances which are wholly absent from this case. See**~** 

### Order 94-6-4 (proposing to limit operations ofEL AL in the New York-Tel Aviv market in response to the Government of Israel's refusal to grant operating authority to World Airways); Order 93-11-22 (proposing to limit operations ofLanChile and LADECO in the Miami-Santiago market in response to a Government ofChile order blocking American from increasing nonstop service); Order 93-5-13 (proposing to limit operations ofQantas in response to fifth-freedom traffic restrictions placed by the Government of Australia on Northwest); and Order 81-12-91 (proposing to defer pending statement of authorizations for Japan Air Lines in response to refusal by the Government ofJapan to grant operating authority to United). In 

### each of these cases, the Department only took such an extraordinary step in recognition of the "established precedent that the denial of operating authority is the maximumpenaltythat abilateral aviationpartner can impose." Order 93-5-13 at 4. Ofcourse, no U.S. air carrierproperlydesignated bythe Government ofthe United States under the Agreement has been denied the exercise of traffic rights provided for under the Agreement. Indeed, in one of the Department's more recent IATFCPA cases involving the imposition of airport charges deemed to be impermissibly discriminatory under the IATFCPA

-15-and the underlying air services agreement, the Department expressly declined a request byU.S. air carriers to curtail or otherwise suspend the foreign air carrier's traffic rights. Order 2003-6- 33. Neither Alitalia, nor, for that matter, any other interested party, has beenprovided with any explanation in the Tentative Decision as to why the Department proposes to treat Alitalia differently in this case. The Tentative Decision, therefore, represents a serious and unfounded departure from the Department's longstanding precedent under the lA TFCPA and must not be finalized.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Alitalia

- Compagnia Aerea Italiana S.p.A. respectfully submits these objections and urges that the Department of Transportation not to finalize the tentative findings and conclusions set forth inOrder 2013-3-1.

March 22,2013

-16- Respectfully submitted,

Richard D. Mathias JonathonH. Foglia Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger, L.L.P. 888 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20006 Tel: (202) 298-8660 Fax: (202) 342-0683 rdmathias@zsrlaw.com jhfoglia@zsrlaw.com Counsel for Alitalia

- CompagniaAerea Italiana S.p.A.CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I herebycertifythat I causeda copyofthe foregoing objections ofAlitalia- Compagnia Aerea Italiana S.p.A. tobe served, this 22ndday ofMarch, 2013, viaemail transmission, onthe following individuals: paul.gretch@dot.gov mary.street@dot.gov esta.rosenberg@dot.gov lturpin@ustr.eop.gov urskr@state.gov eugene alford@ita.doc.gov agoerlich@ggh-airlaw.com andrew.harakas@clydeco.us anita.mosner@hklaw.com charles.hunnicutt@thompsonhine.com dmendersbee@zsrlaw.com david.heffeman@wilmerhale.com dhemandez@vedderprice.com dkirstein@yklaw.com dhainbach@ggh-airlaw.com eshar@eckertseamans.com ggarofalo@ggh-airlaw.com jyoung@yklaw.com john@mietuslaw.com joseph.stefano@allenovery.com romanow@pillsburylaw.com herscovici77@yahoo.com lbridgeman@ziemanspeegle.com lhalloway@crowell.com matwood@cozen.com mgoldman@sgbdc.com mroller@rollerbauer.com wkaras@steptoe.com sascha.vanderbellen@delta.com benjamin slocum@usairways.com bob.lmeisley@wnco.com brian.gillman@mesa-air.com cbethke@airlines.org charles.donley@ssd.com cefelts@fedex.com dan.weiss@united.com dshort@fedex.com efaberman@wileyrein.com eheffeman@naca.cc francis.heil@aa.com gbleopard@fedex.com gpwicks@wicks-group.com gmurphy@crowell.com hershel.kamen@united.com howard kass@usairways.com jamestello@earthlink.net jeffrey.manley@united.com jennifer.nowak@hklaw.com jrichardson@johnlrichardson.com john.palo@evergreenaviation.com john.fredericksen@suncountry.com jhill@dowlohnes.com jonathan.linde@united.com kenneth.guinn@pillsburylaw.com kevin.montgomery@polaraircargo.com ldwasko@erols.com leslie.abbott@wnco.com lharig@wicks-group.com mlbenge@zsrlaw.com mcmillin@woa.com msinick@ssd.com mfrancesconi@ups.com nssparks@fedex.com patricia.snyder@thompsonhine.com pdoell@naca.cc pmurphy@lopmurphy.com ranjit.seth@evergreenairlines.com robert.cohn@hoganlovells.com rsilverberg@sgbdc.com robert.wirick@aa.com rpommer@atlasair.com scott.mcclain@delta.com lachter@erols.com cargoair@aol.com steve.morrissey@united.com tgillies@southernair.com

Jonathon H. Foglia