J-S01031-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CARRINGTON KEYS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee No. 939 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order May 22, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Forest County

Civil Division at No(s): C.D. 59 OF 2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., JENKINS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED APRIL 10, 2015

Appellant, Carrington Keys, appeals from the order entered in the 

Forest County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, which denied his 

petition to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissed as frivolous the 

complaint he called a petition for writ of habeas corpus. For the following 

reasons, we transfer the matter to the Commonwealth Court. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

According to the record, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole 

issued a Notice of Board Decision as recorded February 27, 2013, which 

denied Appellant parole/probation. The notice listed various reasons for the 

Board’s decision, including: (a) Appellant’s need to participate in and 

complete additional institutional programs; (b) Appellant’s risk and needs 

assessment indicating Appellant’s level of risk to the community; (c) the 
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negative recommendation from the Department of Corrections (“DOC”); (d) 

reports, evaluations and assessments/level of risk indicating Appellant’s risk 

to the community; (e) other pertinent factors, such as Appellant’s need for a 

longer period of positive institution adjustment and completion of treatment. 

The notice also said Appellant was to be reviewed in or after October 2013. 

At the next interview, the Board would review Appellant’s file and consider 

whether: (a) Appellant had successfully participated in/successfully 

completed a treatment program for violence prevention; (b) Appellant had 

received/maintained a favorable recommendation for parole from the DOC; 

and (c) Appellant had maintained a clear conduct record. Finally, the notice 

stated Appellant may file an application for parole/reparole no sooner than 1 

year after the recording date of the last decision denying him 

parole/reparole, i.e., no sooner than February 27, 2014. In response to the 

notice, Appellant purports to have sent the Board a document Appellant 

called an “Acceptance of Contract” which, he claimed, formed a “binding 

contractual agreement” between Appellant and the Board. 

On May 16, 2014, Appellant filed a petition for leave to proceed IFP

and a companion complaint he called a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In 

his filing, Appellant essentially complained of actions and omissions of the 

Board, based on the Board’s failure to fulfill the “contract” between the 

Board and Appellant. Appellant complained he had satisfied the Board’s 

conditions, but the Board denied him a meaningful review, told Appellant to 
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satisfy those conditions again, and denied Appellant parole. Appellant 

concluded he was entitled to enforce the purported “contract” and have the 

court compel the Board to perform “its existing obligations.” As presented, 

Appellant did not directly challenge the legality of his sentence or detention. 

By order dated May 22, 2014, and filed May 23, 2014, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s IFP application and dismissed the complaint as frivolous, 

pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 240(j). A copy of the order was sent to Appellant on 

May 23, 2014. On June 6, 2014, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. By order 

filed and served on June 17, 2014, the trial court ordered Appellant to file 

and serve a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 

days, per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); any issue not raised in a properly filed and 

properly served statement would be deemed waived. As of July 23, 2014, 

Appellant had not filed and served his Rule 1925(b) statement or requested 

any enlargement of time to comply. So, the trial court deemed Appellant’s 

issues on appeal waived. 

Appellant raises two issues for review:

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING 

APPELLANT’S HABEAS CORPUS AS A CIVIL COMPLAINT

AND DENYING APPELLANT RELIEF BASED UPON CIVIL 

STANDARDS INSTEAD OF USING 42 PA.C.S.A. 6501-6505, 

et seq.

WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED IN FILING 

APPELLANT’S HABEAS CORPUS INTO THE WRONG VENUE

IN CONTRAST TO PA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 

RULE 108(B).

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 
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Preliminarily, we address this Court’s appellate jurisdiction: “Even 

when neither party has raised the issue of jurisdiction, this Court may, sua 

sponte, determine whether retention of jurisdiction is appropriate, or 

whether the matter should be transferred to the Commonwealth Court.” 

Commonwealth v. Reed, 696 A.2d 199, 200 (Pa.Super. 1997) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 639 A.2d 1213, 1214 

(Pa.Super. 1994)). 

Jurisdiction over parole matters generally lies in the Commonwealth 

Court. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 829 A.2d 783 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003). 

“[H]abeas corpus is not available to challenge the denial of parole because 

the inmate is serving a legal sentence and parole is a matter of discretion. A 

habeas corpus petition may be used only to challenge the legality of a 

sentence, that is, the state’s right to confine the inmate or the length of 

confinement, and not the denial of parole.” Id. at 785. See also Weaver 

v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 688 A.2d 766, 775 n.17 

(Pa.Cmwlth. 1997) (stating habeas corpus is not available to challenge 

denial of parole, “irrespective of the factual underpinnings of the prisoner’s 

contentions”). 

Nevertheless, “[t]he form by which a suit seeking review of an agency 

action is brought is not dispositive”; and the petition should be examined “to 

determine whether it can be construed as challenging final agency action in 

any form.” Kester v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 609 
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A.2d 622, 624 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1992). Instead of dismissing a petition outright, 

if a petition could be construed as a challenge to the Board’s actions in 

denying parole, the trial court should transfer “the petition to the 

Commonwealth Court for consideration of [its] original jurisdiction, per 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a), which mandates the transfer of a matter erroneously 

filed in the wrong court.” Snyder, supra at 785. 

Instantly, Appellant filed a petition for IFP status and a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus in the trial court. Specifically, Appellant alleged he had 

satisfied the Board’s requirements for parole eligibility, but the Board 

refused to review Appellant’s case or grant him parole. Although styled as a

petition for writ of habeas corpus, Appellant’s petition complains about the 

Board’s actions and omissions regarding his parole eligibility. Thus, we 

conclude the matter lies within the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth 

Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over Appellant’s complaint. Instead 

of dismissing the complaint outright, the trial court should have transferred 

it to the Commonwealth Court. See id. The best resolution of matter at 

this point is to transfer it to the Commonwealth Court for disposition.1 

Accordingly, we transfer this matter to the Commonwealth Court for 

appropriate disposition. 

Case transferred to Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction is relinquished. 

____________________________________________

1 Due to our disposition, we decline to deem any issues waived on the basis 

of Rule 1925(b). 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/10/2015