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SJC-11709

COMMONWEALTH vs. BRYANT WARE.

Hampden. December 4, 2014. - April 8, 2015.

Present: Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 

& Hines, JJ.

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 

Controlled Substances. Practice, Criminal, Plea, Conduct 

of government agents, Discovery, Disclosure of evidence. 

Evidence, Guilty plea, Certificate of drug analysis, 

Exculpatory, Disclosure of evidence. Constitutional Law, 

Plea, Conduct of government agents. Due Process of Law, 

Plea, Disclosure of evidence.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 

Department on August 29, 2007; November 25, 2009; and March 9, 

2010.

A motion for leave to conduct postconviction discovery and 

for funds, filed on February 14, 2014, was considered by 

C. Jeffrey Kinder, J. 

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 

direct appellate review. 

James P. McKenna for the defendant.

Katherine A. Robertson, Assistant District Attorney, for 

the Commonwealth.
2

SPINA, J. In this case, we consider whether a Superior 

Court judge abused his discretion in denying a motion for leave 

to conduct postconviction discovery and for funds, filed by the 

defendant, Bryant Ware. The defendant sought retesting of drug 

evidence maintained by the Springfield police department in 

countless cases brought by the Commonwealth between July, 2004, 

and January 18, 2013. During that time period, Sonja Farak was 

a chemist at the Department of Public Health's State Laboratory 

Institute in Amherst (Amherst drug lab). Also during that time 

period, the defendant was indicted on drug charges in three 

separate cases. His motion for postconviction discovery was 

predicated on the fact that Farak pleaded guilty on January 6, 

2014, to four counts of tampering with evidence, G. L. c. 268, 

§ 13E; four counts of theft of a controlled substance (cocaine) 

from a dispensary, G. L. c. 94C, § 37; and two counts of 

unlawful possession of a class B substance (cocaine), G. L. 

c. 94C, § 34. In denying the motion, the judge concluded that 

the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case for 

relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (4), as appearing in 435 

Mass. 1501 (2001). We conclude that the judge did not abuse his 

discretion, and affirm his order. At the same time, based on 

what we learn from the record in this case about Farak's 

misconduct at the Amherst drug lab and the Commonwealth's 

failure to investigate the scope and timing of such misconduct, 
3

we further conclude that the defendant is entitled to retest the 

controlled substance that gave rise to his 2009 indictment 

charging distribution of cocaine as a subsequent offense.

1. Background on the Amherst drug lab.

1 The Amherst drug 

lab began operation in 1987 with the primary function of 

analyzing suspected controlled substances for law enforcement 

agencies involved in the prosecution of criminal cases in 

western Massachusetts.2 As of January, 2013, there were four 

 

1 In the fall of 2013, the judge in the present case also 

conducted an evidentiary hearing on postconviction motions filed 

by fifteen defendants who claimed that alleged criminal conduct 

by Sonja Farak rendered their guilty pleas to various drug 

charges unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, and that this 

newly discovered evidence cast doubt on the justice of their 

convictions. The evidence presented at the hearing was limited 

to (1) the timing and scope of Farak's alleged criminal conduct; 

(2) the timing and scope of conduct underlying negative findings 

in an October, 2012, quality assurance audit of the Department 

of Public Health's State Laboratory Institute in Amherst 

(Amherst drug lab) by the State police; and (3) the extent to 

which Farak's alleged criminal conduct and the audit findings 

might relate to the testing of drug evidence in the fifteen 

defendants' cases. Although Bryant Ware was not one of these 

defendants, his record appendix in the present appeal includes 

the memoranda of decision and orders issued by the judge in six 

of those cases. The judge's description of events at the 

Amherst drug lab is fundamentally the same in each decision and 

forms the basis for our recitation of the background on that 

facility. The judge issued each memorandum of decision and 

order in the fall of 2013, several months before he issued his 

order in the present case on March 12, 2014. Neither the 

Commonwealth nor the defendant has challenged the essential 

facts regarding events that transpired at the Amherst drug lab 

concerning Farak.

2 On July 1, 2012, the responsibility for oversight of the 

Amherst drug lab was transferred from the Department of Public 

Health to the State police. 
4

employees at the facility, and each one could access the 

evidence safe by means of an electronic card or a key. On 

January 17, 2013, the evidence officer at the Amherst drug lab, 

Sharon Salem, was attempting to match certificates of drug 

analysis (drug certificates) with the corresponding samples when 

she realized that she was missing the samples in two cases. 

Records reflected that Farak had completed testing on those 

samples earlier in the month and had confirmed that the 

substances were cocaine. On January 18, Salem reported the 

missing evidence to her supervisor, James Hanchett, who searched 

Farak's work station and discovered, among other items, a manila 

envelope containing the packaging for the two missing samples, 

which had been cut open. Testing of the substances in the 

packaging was negative for cocaine, contrary to Farak's earlier 

analysis. 

Hanchett immediately contacted the State police, who shut 

down the Amherst drug lab and began an investigation. They 

discovered two additional case envelopes in a temporary storage 

locker used by Farak, a location where evidence was not allowed 

to be stored overnight. Although each envelope was supposed to 

contain suspected cocaine, neither did, and a search for those 

substances was unsuccessful. Investigators also interviewed 

Farak's colleagues who said that, beginning in September, 2012, 

they observed a change in Farak's behavior, including frequent 
5

unexplained absences from her work station and a decrease in 

productivity. 

On January 19, 2013, the State police forensic services 

conducted an inventory of all drug evidence at the Amherst drug 

lab. Only the four above-described samples were missing. A 

similar inventory conducted approximately four months earlier 

had not uncovered any missing samples. Also on January 19, the 

State police searched Farak's vehicle pursuant to a warrant and 

seized, among other items, manila envelopes bearing case 

numbers, paperwork relating to the Amherst drug lab, a plastic 

bag containing a white powdery substance and a brown tar-like 

substance, a plastic bag containing assorted pills, and 

photocopies of three newspaper articles about individuals who 

had been investigated, charged, or sentenced for the illegal 

possession or theft of controlled substances.3 Attached to one 

 

3 One of the newspaper articles, dated March 29, 2011, had 

been printed from a computer on September 20, 2011, and was a 

story about the illegal possession of steroids by law 

enforcement officers. A second newspaper article, dated October 

25, 2011, had been printed from a computer on October 28, 2011, 

and was a story about a Pittsfield pharmacist being sentenced to 

three years in prison for stealing OxyContin from her workplace. 

The article mentioned that the pharmacist had replaced the 

OxyContin with other medications. A third newspaper article, 

dated December 2, 2011, had been printed from a computer on 

December 6, 2011, and was a story about a former San Francisco 

police department drug laboratory technician who stole cocaine 

from her workplace. These articles have not been included in 

the record in the present case. See note 1, supra.
6

of the articles was a handwritten note stating, "Thank [G]od I'm 

not a law enforcement officer" (emphasis in original). 

Farak was arrested at her home that same day. She was 

charged by criminal complaint in the District Court with 

unlawful possession of a class A substance (heroin), unlawful 

possession of a class B substance (cocaine), and two counts of 

tampering with evidence. On January 25, 2013, the State police 

searched a tote bag that had been seized from Farak's work 

station pursuant to a warrant. The bag contained a variety of 

substances that could be used to dilute or replace cocaine 

(soap, baking soda, soy candle flakes, and oven-baked clay), 

other items commonly used in the drug trade (plastic laboratory 

dishes, waxed paper, and fragments of copper wire), and several 

evidence bags that had been cut open. The evidence bags bore 

diverse dates from December 16, 2012, to January 6, 2013. 

On April 1, 2013, a State grand jury indicted Farak on four 

counts of tampering with evidence at the Amherst drug lab, four 

counts of stealing cocaine from that facility, and two counts of 

unlawful possession of cocaine. While proceedings were ongoing 

in the Superior Court with respect to these charges, four 

additional cases surfaced in which it seemed, based on 

retesting, that Farak may have removed cocaine from samples that 

were submitted to the Amherst drug lab for analysis between June 

15, 2012, and October 10, 2012, and replaced at least some of 
7

the cocaine with a counterfeit substance. It is not clear from 

the record why this particular evidence was selected for 

retesting. Nonetheless, it does appear that no charges were 

brought against Farak with respect to these four additional 

cases. On January 6, 2014, Farak pleaded guilty to all ten

charges.4

2. Factual and procedural history. In the present case, 

on August 29, 2007, a Hampden County grand jury indicted the 

defendant for possession of a class B controlled substance 

(cocaine) with intent to distribute (count one), possession of a 

Class D controlled substance (count two), violation of the 

controlled substances laws in proximity to a school or park 

(count three), possession of a firearm without a firearm 

identification card (count four), and conspiracy to violate the 

 

4 With respect to the first count of tampering with evidence 

(Count I), Farak was sentenced to two and one-half years in a 

house of correction, with eighteen months to be served, and the 

balance suspended with probation for five years, with special 

conditions. Farak was given the same sentence on the second and 

third counts of tampering with evidence, as well as on three 

counts of theft of a controlled substance, each sentence to run 

concurrently with the sentence on Count I. With respect to each 

of the two counts of unlawful possession of a class B substance, 

Farak was sentenced to serve one year in a house of correction, 

each sentence to run concurrently with the sentence on Count I. 

With respect to the fourth count of tampering with evidence and 

the fourth count of theft of a controlled substance, Farak was 

sentenced to five years' probation, to run concurrently with her 

probation on the other charges. 
8

drug laws (count five) (collectively, 2007 charges).5 On May 21, 

2008, the defendant pleaded guilty to counts one, two, and four.6 

On November 25, 2009, a Hampden County grand jury indicted 

the defendant for distribution of a class B controlled substance 

(cocaine) as a subsequent offense (2009 charge). The indictment 

arose from an incident on July 31, 2009, when the defendant 

purportedly sold two pieces of an off-white rock-like substance, 

later determined to be "crack" cocaine, to an undercover State 

trooper for twenty dollars. The defendant also was charged with 

violating the terms of his probation, which had been imposed 

when he pleaded guilty to the 2007 charges. 

Then, on March 9, 2010, a Hampden County grand jury 

indicted the defendant for possession of a class A controlled 

substance (heroin) with intent to distribute as a subsequent 

offense (count one), violation of the controlled substances laws 

in proximity to a school or park (count two), five counts of 

assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (a vehicle) 

 

5 The defendant has not claimed that Farak was the analyst 

who tested the substances that served as the bases for his 

indictments on the 2007 charges.

6 The Superior Court docket states that the defendant 

pleaded not guilty to counts three and five of the indictments, 

but it does not indicate the ultimate disposition of those 

charges. With respect to count one, the defendant was sentenced 

to two and one-half years in a house of correction, with one 

year to serve, and the balance suspended with probation for two 

years. With respect to counts two and four, he was sentenced to 

six months in a house of correction, to be served concurrently 

with the committed sentence on count one. 
9

(counts three through seven), and resisting arrest (count eight) 

(collectively, 2010 charges). The indictments arose from an 

incident on December 22, 2009, when Springfield police officers 

attempted to stop the defendant's vehicle and execute an arrest 

warrant, the defendant rammed his vehicle into three police 

cruisers while fleeing the scene, the officers eventually 

stopped and searched the vehicle, they discovered therein eight 

bags of a substance that subsequently was determined to be 

heroin, and the defendant resisted efforts to place him under 

arrest.7 On February 4, 2011, the defendant pleaded guilty to 

count one and counts three through eight of the 2010 charges, he 

pleaded guilty to the 2009 charge,8 and he pleaded guilty to the 

probation violation.9

 

7 The defendant has not claimed that Farak was the analyst 

who tested the substances that were seized from his vehicle on 

December 22, 2009, and that served as the bases for the 2010 

charges.

8 According to an affidavit signed by the defendant on 

November 18, 2013, he understood that if this case had gone to 

trial, the Commonwealth would have offered a certificate of drug 

analysis signed by Farak, indicating that the substance sold to 

the undercover State trooper was cocaine. Consequently, the 

defendant tendered his guilty plea in material part because of 

his understanding of the likelihood of success of the 

Commonwealth's case. 

9 With respect to the 2009 charge, the defendant was 

sentenced to from five to seven years in the State prison. With 

respect to count one of the 2010 charges, he was sentenced to 

from five to seven years in the State prison, to run 

concurrently with his sentence on the 2009 charge. The 

Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi with respect to count two of 

the 2010 charges. With respect to count three of the 2010 
10

On August 12, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for a new 

trial with respect to the 2009 charge. Six months later, on 

February 14, 2014, he filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. 

P. 30 (c) (4) for leave to conduct postconviction discovery and 

for funds, with respect to all three cases that had been brought 

against him.10 The defendant sought retesting of drug evidence 

maintained by the Springfield police department that related to 

cases brought by the Commonwealth between July, 2004, and 

January 18, 2013.11 He claimed that, given the lack of 

 

charges, the defendant was sentenced to eighteen months' 

probation, to be served from and after his sentence on count 

one. With respect to counts four through eight of the 2010 

charges, he was sentenced to eighteen months' probation, to be 

served concurrently with his sentence of probation on count 

three. As to the probation violation, the defendant was 

committed to a house of correction to serve the eighteen-month 

suspended portion of his sentence on the 2007 charges, to run 

concurrently with his State prison sentence on the 2009 charge. 

10 Rule 30 (c) (4) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), provides:

"Discovery. Where affidavits filed by the moving 

party under subdivision (c)(3) establish a prima facie case 

for relief, the judge on motion of any party, after notice 

to the opposing party and an opportunity to be heard, may 

authorize such discovery as is deemed appropriate, subject 

to appropriate protective order."

11 In a memorandum of law in support of his motion to 

conduct postconviction discovery, the defendant proposed that 

all drug samples produced from July, 2004, through January 18, 

2013, be visually inspected to see whether it readily could be 

determined that they contained two distinct substances. The 

defendant also proposed that one hundred randomly selected 

samples from 2004, and two hundred randomly selected samples 

from each succeeding year, be retested to determine whether 

evidence of tampering could be identified. It was the 
11

investigation by the Commonwealth, there was no reason to 

believe that the full extent of Farak's criminal conduct had 

been identified. In the defendant's view, the eight cases in 

which Farak had compromised the integrity of the Commonwealth's 

evidence were the proverbial tip of the iceberg. In his motion, 

the defendant asserted that the requested postconviction 

discovery was "reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might 

warrant granting a new trial." The Commonwealth opposed the 

motion. 

On March 12, 2014, the defendant's motion for leave to 

conduct postconviction discovery was denied. The judge 

concluded that the defendant had failed to establish a prima 

facie case for relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (4). He 

stated that there was no evidence that the drug analyses in the 

defendant's cases were inaccurate, or that Farak had been 

involved in any misconduct at the time the defendant pleaded 

guilty on February 4, 2011. Moreover, the judge continued, 

separate and apart from the timing of Farak's misconduct, there 

were good reasons for the defendant to have accepted the plea 

agreement, including a more favorable sentencing disposition 

than would have been available after a trial. The judge 

 

defendant's understanding that in light of the Springfield 

police department's procedures for the disposal of drug 

evidence, the evidence that the defendant sought to have 

retested had not yet been destroyed. 
12

determined that, given the strength of the Commonwealth's cases, 

the significant benefit the defendant received from the plea 

agreement, and the absence of evidence that Farak's misconduct 

affected the drug analyses in the defendant's cases, her 

misconduct would not have been material to his decision to plead 

guilty. The defendant appealed from the order denying his 

motion for postconviction discovery, and we granted his 

application for direct appellate review. 

3. Discussion. The defendant contends that he has made a 

prima facie showing that his motion for postconviction discovery 

is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might warrant 

granting him a new trial. He emphasizes that the focus of his 

motion is to determine precisely when Farak began to engage in 

misconduct at the Amherst drug lab and, consequently, when she 

first compromised the Commonwealth's evidence in drug cases. 

The defendant asserts that, although common sense would suggest 

that Farak was tampering with evidence well before the summer of 

2012, the Commonwealth has failed to conduct more than a brief, 

cursory investigation into the matter. That being the case, the 

retesting of drug samples would, in the defendant's view, 

establish the time frame of Farak's wrongdoing, potentially 

furnishing the defendant with evidence to support his motion for 

a new trial. Given the likelihood of uncovering such important 

evidence, the defendant argues that the judge abused his 
13

discretion in denying the defendant's motion for postconviction 

discovery. We disagree.

As a preliminary matter, we point out that, generally 

speaking, "discovery orders are interlocutory and not 

appealable." Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525, 528 (1984). See 

Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 687 (1999) (in most cases, 

interlocutory rulings "are not appealable until the ultimate 

disposition of the case because they are not 'final orders'"); 

Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 597 (1988) (no right of 

appeal from interlocutory order unless authorized by statute or 

rule); Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 779 (1979). In the 

ordinary course, an established route for a defendant to "obtain 

appellate review of the denial of his motion for postconviction 

discovery would be in connection with an appeal from the denial 

of his motion for a new trial, if the new trial motion is in 

fact denied." Donald v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1007, 1007

(2002). See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 261 (1981) 

(reviewing postconviction discovery issue on appeal from denial 

of motion for new trial).

The circumstances in the present case, however, necessitate 

an exception to the established route for obtaining appellate 

review of an order denying postconviction discovery. General 

Laws c. 211, § 3, provides that "[t]he supreme judicial court 

shall have general superintendence of all courts of inferior 
14

jurisdiction to correct and prevent errors and abuses therein if 

no other remedy is expressly provided." This court's 

superintendence powers are discretionary, are exercised only in 

exceptional circumstances, and are not intended to circumvent 

the regular appellate process. See Planned Parenthood League of 

Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 706 (1990); 

Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 679 (1978). In the 

past, we have exercised our general superintendence powers to 

resolve, among other things, "important issues with implications 

for the effective administration of justice" and "matter[s] of 

public interest that may cause further uncertainty within the 

courts." First Justice of the Bristol Div. of the Juvenile 

Court Dep't v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Bristol Div. of the 

Juvenile Court Dep't, 438 Mass. 387, 391 (2003) (resolving 

internal dispute between members of judicial department). See 

Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 88-89 (2013) (allegations 

of misconduct by chemist at William A. Hinton State Laboratory 

Institute in Jamaica Plain, and implications of such misconduct

on defendants convicted of drug offenses, warranted court's 

exercise of superintendence powers to review certain procedures 

adopted by trial court to handle postconviction matters).

Here, it is undisputed that Farak pleaded guilty to 

numerous criminal charges that arose from her work as a chemist 

at the Amherst drug lab. Her misconduct has raised significant 
15

concerns about the administration of justice in criminal cases 

where a defendant was convicted of a drug offense and she was 

the analyst. Given the very limited nature of the State police 

investigation into Farak's activities at the drug lab, the 

precise time frame and scope of her misconduct are unknown.12 

Nonetheless, Farak's criminal behavior, and the potential 

implications of such behavior on defendants who have been 

convicted of drug offenses based on evidence that she analyzed, 

present exceptional circumstances warranting this court's 

immediate attention. In accordance with our general 

superintendence powers under G. L. c. 211, § 3, we proceed to 

review the judge's order denying the defendant's motion for 

leave to conduct postconviction discovery.

"The purpose of postconviction discovery is to allow a 

defendant to gather evidence to support 'an apparently 

meritorious claim . . . [where] the evidence that can be adduced 

to support the claim is unknown to the court.'" Commonwealth v. 

Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 406 (2005), quoting 4 ABA Standards for 

Criminal Justice, Postconviction Remedies Commentary to Standard 

22-4.5, at 22-48 (2d ed. 1986). When requesting such discovery, 

a defendant by affidavit "must make a sufficient showing that 

the discovery is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that 

 

12 As far as we can tell, Farak has not provided any details 

concerning the timing and scope of her misconduct, apart from 

pleading guilty to the ten indictments.
16

might warrant granting a new trial." Daniels, supra at 407. 

See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 453 Mass. 54, 61-62 (2009); 

Commonwealth v. Martinez, 437 Mass. 84, 97 (2002). See also 

Reporters' Notes to Rule 30, Mass. Ann. Laws, Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, at 1710 (LexisNexis 2014-2015) ("Discovery is 

appropriate where specific allegations before the court show 

reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are 

fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he or she is 

entitled to relief"). A defendant cannot use a motion for 

postconviction discovery to engage in a "fishing expedition." 

See generally E.B. Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure 

§ 42:30 (4th ed. 2014). A trial judge has broad discretion in 

deciding whether a defendant has established a prima facie case 

for relief such that a postconviction discovery motion should be 

allowed. See Commonwealth v. Lynch, 439 Mass. 532, 545, cert. 

denied, 540 U.S. 1059 (2003); Martinez, supra at 97-98.

In this case, given the breadth of the defendant's motion 

for leave to conduct postconviction discovery, we conclude that 

the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion. 

The defendant made no showing that his wide-ranging request for 

the visual inspection of thousands of drug samples analyzed by 

Farak between July, 2004, and January 18, 2013, as well as for 

the retesting of approximately 1,700 of those samples, would be 

reasonably likely to uncover tainted evidence. See note 11, 
17

supra. Nothing has been presented to suggest that Farak engaged 

in misconduct at the Amherst drug lab prior to perhaps the fall 

of 2011, at the earliest, when the newspaper articles seized 

from her vehicle were printed from a computer,

13 see note 3, 

supra, or that the drug analyses she performed before that time 

were inaccurate or subsequently altered.

That said, the precise timing and scope of Farak's 

wrongdoing are unclear. When personnel at the Amherst drug lab 

notified the State police in January, 2013, that Farak may have 

compromised the evidence in two drug cases, the Commonwealth had 

a duty to conduct a thorough investigation to determine the 

nature and extent of her misconduct, and its effect both on 

pending cases and on cases in which defendants already had been 

convicted of crimes involving controlled substances that Farak 

had analyzed. It is well established that the Commonwealth has 

a duty to learn of and disclose to a defendant any exculpatory 

evidence that is "held by agents of the prosecution team." 

 

13 In Commonwealth v. Cotto, post , n.13 (2015), we 

note that the motion judge in that case "was not persuaded that 

it was reasonable to infer from Farak's possession of the 

newspaper articles that were printed in the fall of 2011 . . . 

that she was stealing controlled substances at that time." We 

conclude there that "the judge did not abuse his discretion in 

making this determination." Id. Here, the motion judge did not 

make any findings regarding the significance of the newspaper 

articles, presumably because they were not part of the record in 

this case. See note 3, supra. Generally speaking, absent a 

specific finding to the contrary, the newspaper articles could 

serve as a basis for concluding that Farak engaged in misconduct 

at the Amherst drug lab earlier than the summer of 2012.
18

Commonwealth v. Beal, 429 Mass. 530, 532 (1999). See

Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 349 (2014); Commonwealth

v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 327 (2008). Such agents include not 

only prosecutors and police, but also chemists working in State 

drug laboratories who analyze purported drug samples and report 

their findings to the prosecutor's office. See Scott, supra. 

See also Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 823-824 (1998)

(prosecution had duty to inquire about existence of scientific 

tests conducted by Commonwealth's own police crime laboratory 

and to produce exculpatory evidence sought by defendant). In 

Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 402-403 (1992), a case 

where the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence 

that was in its possession but was never specifically requested 

by the defendant, we acknowledged that these disclosure 

requirements "are inconsistent with the traditional adversary 

role of litigants." Id. at 408. However, in concluding that 

the nondisclosure of the evidence required the ordering of a new 

trial, we stated that "the duties of a prosecutor to administer 

justice fairly, and particularly concerning requested or 

obviously exculpatory evidence, go beyond winning convictions." 

Id. See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), 426 Mass. 1397 (1998) ("The 

prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . make timely disclosure 

to the defense of all evidence or information known to the 
19

prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 

mitigates the offense . . .").

As far as can be gleaned from the record, the Commonwealth 

never conducted a thorough investigation of the Amherst drug 

lab. The State police spent a few days looking for missing 

evidence, searching Farak's vehicle, interviewing her 

colleagues, conducting an inventory of the facility, and 

searching a tote bag that had been seized from Farak's work 

station. The inquiry appeared to end there, until it came to 

light several months later that Farak might have tampered with 

evidence in four more cases. Drug samples were retested in 

those additional cases, and the results indicated that at least 

some of the cocaine had been replaced with a counterfeit 

substance. It is apparent that the Commonwealth clearly had 

information suggesting that Farak had engaged in misconduct at 

the Amherst drug lab, but the magnitude and implications of the

problem have not been ascertained.14

The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the 

defendant's motion as it was presented, given its wide-ranging 

sweep. Nonetheless, based on what is known about Farak's 

misconduct and on the failure of the Commonwealth to pursue a 

 

14 Given that the matter of Farak's misconduct at the 

Amherst drug lab involves defendants in multiple counties, the 

State police detective unit of the Attorney General's office 

might be best suited to lead an investigation.
20

thorough investigation into the matter, we conclude that the 

defendant should be afforded an opportunity to conduct 

postconviction discovery relating to the 2009 charge, the only 

one in which the Commonwealth would have offered a drug 

certificate signed by Farak, indicating that the substance 

allegedly sold to an undercover State trooper was cocaine. See 

notes 5, 7, & 8, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Cotto,

post , (2015) (describing procedure for retesting drug 

samples not yet destroyed). The defendant may file a new motion 

for postconviction discovery and for funds, pertaining 

specifically to that case. Such discovery may include, among 

other things, visual inspection and retesting of the controlled 

substance at issue, and funds may be allocated as appropriate.

4. Conclusion. The judge's denial of the defendant's 

motion for postconviction discovery and for funds is affirmed. 

This case is remanded to the Superior Court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.