IV 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 38 

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to make an invaluable contribution 

to United States and international security, and noting former Senator 

Richard G. Lugar’s indispensable contributions to international security 

and reducing nuclear weapons-related risks. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 14, 2019 

Mr. SHERMAN (for himself, Mr. BANKS, Mr. FOSTER, Mr. FORTENBERRY, 

Mr. LUJA ́N, and Mr. FLEISCHMANN) submitted the following concurrent 

resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the Treaty on 

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to make an invaluable contribution to United 

States and international security, and noting former Senator Richard G. Lugar’s indispensable contributions to 

international security and reducing nuclear weapons-related risks. 

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons (NPT) opened for signature 50 years ago on 

July 1, 1968; 

Whereas the United States and the former Soviet Union 

averted a catastrophic nuclear exchange during the OctoVerDate Sep 11 2014 02:13 May 15, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 \\ALPHA3\E\BILLS\HC38.IH HC38

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ber 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which led to a series of 

bilateral and multilateral agreements to lessen the chance 

of nuclear war, including the NPT; 

Whereas President John F. Kennedy predicted in 1963 that 

as many as 25 countries would acquire nuclear weapons 

by 1970 absent a treaty to control nuclear weapons; 

Whereas the United States Senate provided its advice and 

consent to the NPT on March 13, 1969, with a vote on 

ratification of 83 to 15; 

Whereas the NPT has grown to include 191 State Parties, 

making an irreplaceable contribution to international security by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; 

Whereas former Senator Richard G. Lugar made indispensable contributions to reducing nuclear weapon risks, 

most notably through his leadership in standing up the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nunn-Lugar Program’’), which eliminated 7,600 nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union; 

Whereas Senator Lugar successfully secured Senate Advice 

and Consent for the Treaty between the United States of 

America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 

Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 

Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly known as the ‘‘New START 

Treaty’’); 

Whereas Article III of the NPT obliges each non-nuclear 

weapon country that is a party to the NPT to conclude 

a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify treaty compliance, 174 

of which are Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements 


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crafted to detect the diversion of nuclear materials from 

peaceful to non-peaceful uses; 

Whereas the 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture 

Review affirms, ‘‘The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) is a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation 

regime. It plays a positive role in building consensus for 

non-proliferation and enhances international efforts to 

impose costs on those that would pursue nuclear weapons 

outside the Treaty.’’; 

Whereas the success of the NPT has and will continue to depend upon the full implementation by all parties of the 

Treaty’s three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament; 

Whereas over the past half century, the United States has exhibited leadership in strengthening each of the NPT’s 

three pillars for the global good, including— 

(1) reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile by more 

than 85 percent from its Cold War heights of 31,225 in 

parallel with equally massive reductions of the Russian 

Federation’s stockpile through bilateral coordination; 

(2) cooperating with Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and 

Belarus through the Nunn-Lugar Act to facilitate the 

surrender of nuclear weapons on their soil after the fall 

of the Soviet Union—leading to each country’s accession 

to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states; 

(3) providing voluntary contributions to the IAEA to 

promote peaceful nuclear activities exceeding 

$378,000,000 since 2010, including activities that help in 

the treatment of cancer and other life-saving applications; 

and 


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(4) extending deterrence to United States allies in 

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan, 

and the Republic of Korea—which is an unmistakable 

demonstration of the United States commitment to collective security; 

Whereas heightened geopolitical tensions in recent years have 

made cooperation on non-proliferation and arms control 

issues with the Russian Federation more challenging; 

Whereas a range of actions by the Government of the Russian Federation has led to a deterioration in bilateral relations with the United States, including— 

(1) Russia’s brazen interference in the 2016 United 

States presidential elections; 

(2) its violation of the Treaty between the United 

States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 

and Shorter-Range Missiles (commonly known as the 

‘‘INF Treaty’’), signed at Washington, DC, December 8, 

1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988; 

(3) its use of a chemical nerve agent in an assassination attempt against Sergei Skripal and his daughter 

Yulia in the United Kingdom in March 2018; 

(4) its illegal annexation of Crimea; 

(5) its invasion of Eastern Ukraine; and 

(6) its destabilizing actions in Syria; 

Whereas within a difficult environment, preserving agreements that continue to contribute to United States and 

global security, particularly the New START Treaty, is 

important, and the Department of State confirmed in 

February 2018 that Russia had met New START’s Central Treaty Limits and stated that ‘‘implementation of 


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the New START Treaty enhances the safety and security 

of the United States’’; 

Whereas United States efforts to reduce dangers associated 

with the nuclear arsenals of both the Russian Federation 

and the People’s Republic of China, through an ambitious arms control agreement, would advance United 

States and global security, adding to the benefits to stability and transparency provided by existing agreements; 

Whereas Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a March 2018 

speech, unveiled details of new kinds of strategic nuclear 

weapons under development that may be accountable 

under the provisions of the New START Treaty, including hypersonic nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered cruise 

missiles, and multi-megaton nuclear torpedoes shot from 

drone submarines; 

Whereas the Russian Federation erroneously claimed that the 

United States may have not reached New START Treaty 

Central Limits by February 5, 2018, as is mandated by 

the Treaty; 

Whereas the Bilateral Consultative Commission is the appropriate forum for the Parties to engage constructively on 

any New START Treaty implementation issues that 

arise; and 

Whereas the collapse of the INF Treaty and expiration of the 

New START Treaty would lead to the absence of any 

binding, bilateral treaty or agreement governing United 

States and Russian nuclear forces for the first time since 

1972: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 

2 concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that— 


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1 (1) the United States should continue to en2 courage all parties to the Treaty on the Non-Pro3 liferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to comply fully 

4 with the Treaty; 

5 (2) the United States should maintain support 

6 for the International Atomic Energy Agency through 

7 its assessed and voluntary contributions and pro8 mote the universal adoption of the IAEA Additional 

9 Protocol; 

10 (3) the United States should— 

11 (A) consider extending the Treaty between 

12 the United States of America and the Russian 

13 Federation on Measures for the Further Reduc14 tion and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 

15 Arms, signed at Prague April 8, 2010, and en16 tered into force February 5, 2011 (‘‘New 

17 START Treaty’’), within the context of wider 

18 enhancement of strategic stability between the 

19 United States and the Russian Federation, pro20 vided that the treaty continues to advance 

21 United States national security; 

22 (B) assess whether Russia’s recently-an23 nounced nuclear capabilities should be account24 able under the New START Treaty and raise 

25 the issue directly with Russia; 


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1 (C) conclude an interagency process to 

2 consider an extension of the New START Trea3 ty and to engage with Russia on the full range 

4 of strategic stability issues and other arms con5 trol and non-proliferation issues; 

6 (D) begin negotiations with Russia on an 

7 agreement to address the massive disparity be8 tween the non-strategic nuclear weapons stock9 piles of Russia and the United States and to se10 cure and reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons 

11 in a verifiable manner; and 

12 (E) consider the consequences of the New 

13 START Treaty’s expiration in 2021 in relation 

14 to the insights it provides into the location, 

15 movement, and disposition of current and fu16 ture Russian strategic systems; 

17 (4) the United States strongly condemns Rus18 sia’s violations of the Treaty Between the United 

19 States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 

20 Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate21 Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Wash22 ington December 8, 1987, and entered into force 

23 June 1, 1988, and urges it to come back into full 

24 compliance prior to August 2, 2019; 


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1 (5) in responding to Russia’s deployment of 

2 INF-range systems, the United States should advo3 cate for those defense and deterrence steps which 

4 preserve the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty 

5 Organization and are aimed at averting an arms 

6 race on the European continent; 

7 (6) pursuit of a verifiable and comprehensive 

8 arms control agreement with Russia and the Peo9 ple’s Republic of China, which may capture strategic 

10 and non-strategic nuclear weapons capabilities, 

11 would enhance United States and global security by 

12 building upon other treaties, agreements, and trans13 parency measures to reduce nuclear risk; and 

14 (7) the United States should continue to en15 courage opportunities for cooperation with other nu16 clear weapons-possessing countries to reduce the sa17 lience, number, and role of nuclear weapons in their 

18 national military strategies. 

Æ 


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