NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 14-1580

____________

CHARLES BRIDGES,

 Appellant

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY; JASPER J. BEDE; 

JANET LANDESBURG; REANA SWEENEY

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(E.D. Pa. No. 5-12-cv-02316)

District Judge: James Knoll Gardner

____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 20, 2015

Before: FISHER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, Jr., Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 6, 2015)

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OPINION*

____________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.
2

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

Charles Bridges, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) with the Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”), appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion for preliminary 

injunctive relief as well as the District Court’s dismissal of two supplemental pleadings. 

Bridges sought to enjoin his supervisors from temporarily removing him from hearing 

disability cases until he completed a ten-day training session on agency policies. Bridges

has since completed the training session and has returned to hearing disability cases. We 

will dismiss the appeal as moot.

I.

We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 

legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 

to our analysis.

Bridges is an ALJ with the SSA’s office in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In June 

2010, Bridges lost his position as the Hearing Office Chief ALJ for the SSA’s Harrisburg 

office but remained an ALJ in that office. Following his position change, Bridges filed 

this action against the Commissioner of the SSA and three individual ALJs for 

discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act1and 

for various due process and tort claims. 

 

1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
3

The instant appeal, however, is limited to the District Court’s denial of Bridges’s

motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction that he filed on 

February 21, 2014. On February 18, 2014, Bridges’s supervisors told him that he had 

been subjected to a “focused review of adjudicated SSA disability cases for fiscal year 

2013.”2 Based on this review—which SSA says showed that Bridges’s decisions in 

disability cases did not comply with SSA standards—Bridges was told he had to attend a 

ten-day training session. During this ten-day period, Bridges would not hear disability 

cases, and his cases would be reassigned to other ALJs. Through his motion for 

preliminary relief, Bridges sought to preserve the status quo, i.e., to enjoin his 

supervisors’ requirement that he attend the ten-day training session. 

The District Court scheduled a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion for 

February 24, 2014. On the day of the hearing, however, neither Bridges nor his counsel 

appeared at the scheduled time and neither could be located. Counsel for defendants

appeared at the hearing and also filed an opposition to the preliminary injunction motion, 

arguing that Bridges could not show a likelihood of irreparable harm. Based on the 

parties’ written submissions, the District Court denied Bridges’s motion because he could 

not satisfy any of the required elements for preliminary injunctive relief and because he 

failed to prosecute the motion. Bridges filed a motion for reconsideration, but he 

withdrew the motion before the District Court ruled on it.

 

2

(J.A. 34a (internal quotation marks omitted).)
4

In addition to the District Court’s denial of his preliminary injunction motion, 

Bridges’s notice of appeal stated that he was also appealing the District Court’s dismissal 

of his first supplemental pleading and its denial of his request to file a second 

supplemental pleading. The first supplemental pleading concerned two positions Bridges 

applied for but allegedly was denied a meaningful opportunity to be considered for due to 

retaliation and discrimination based on his race. The second supplemental pleading 

concerned a December 2013 change in the Hearing Office Chief ALJ position 

description. Bridges alleged that the change in position description conferred new 

authority on the Regional Chief ALJ to remove a Hearing Office Chief ALJ, thus 

showing that his June 2010 removal from the position of Hearing Office Chief ALJ was 

unlawful.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court generally 

has jurisdiction to review the denial of a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292(a)(1). But when something happens during the course of litigation that 

“prevent[s] a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be 

dismissed as moot.”3 Specifically, “when the event sought to be enjoined in a 

preliminary injunction has occurred, an appeal from the order denying the preliminary 

 

3 Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698–99 (3d Cir. 1996); see 

also Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that “mootness is a 

jurisdictional issue”). 
5

injunction is moot.”4 Here, Bridges sought to enjoin the action requiring him to attend 

training and temporarily reassigning his cases to other ALJs.

5

 He has since completed 

the training and has been reinstated to hear cases.6 His appeal is therefore moot.7

Additionally, we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s dismissal of 

Bridges’s supplemental pleadings because that dismissal was not a final decision 

appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.

 

4 Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1991). 

5

(J.A. 31a (requesting the District Court to stay the “February 18, 2014 

employment action . . . pending disposition of Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary 

injunction”).)

6

(Supplemental App. SA405–06.) 

7 Even if the appeal was not moot, we would affirm the denial of the preliminary 

injunction motion because Bridges has failed to make a clear showing of irreparable harm 

in the absence of preliminary relief. Both before the District Court and this Court, 

Bridges has offered no evidence of irreparable injury and has instead argued that such 

injury should be presumed. Bridges has not identified any authority for such a 

presumption, and this Court has expressly rejected such a presumption in employment 

discrimination cases. See Marxe v. Jackson, 833 F.2d 1121, 1127 (3d Cir. 1987).