United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-5015

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:12-cv-00836-ECH, Chief Judge Emily C. 

Hewitt.

______________________ 

Decided: April 7, 2015 

______________________ 

STEVEN J. BLOXHAM, Fredericks Peebles & Morgan 

LLP, Sacramento, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also 

represented by TIM HENNESSY, JOHN M. PEEBLES, DARCIE 

LYNN HOUCK. 

JENNIFER SCHELLER NEUMANN, Environment and 

Natural Resources Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. 

Also represented by SAM HIRSCH. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, MAYER, and CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges.
2 SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US

MAYER, Circuit Judge. 

The Shinnecock Indian Nation (the “Nation”) appeals 

a final judgment of the United States Court of Federal 

Claims dismissing its suit for lack of jurisdiction. See 

Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 

369 (2013) (“Court of Federal Claims Decision”). We 

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

BACKGROUND

In June 2005, the Nation filed suit in the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 

“seek[ing] to vindicate its rights to certain lands located 

in the Town of Southampton in Suffolk County, New 

York.” Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, No. 05-

CV-2887, 2006 WL 3501099, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 

2006) (“Land Reclamation Suit”). The Nation asserted 

that in 1859 the State of New York enacted legislation 

allowing thousands of acres of the Nation’s land to be 

wrongfully conveyed to the government of the Town of 

Southampton. Id. at *2. The Nation sought “broad relief,” including damages and possessory rights in the 

disputed lands. Id. at *1.

In November 2006, the district court dismissed the 

Nation’s suit. Id. at *6. Relying on City of Sherrill v. 

Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 217–21 (2005), and 

Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 273–78 (2d 

Cir. 2005), the court held that laches barred the Nation’s 

claims. See Land Reclamation Suit, 2006 WL 3501099, at 

*3–5. Although the court acknowledged that the “wrongs” 

alleged by the Nation were “grave,” it emphasized that 

the Nation had not occupied the disputed lands since 

1859. Id. at *6. In the court’s view, the “disruptive 

nature” of the Nation’s land claims was sufficient to “tip[] 

the equity scale in favor of dismissal.” Id. The Nation 

then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit (“Second Circuit”). That appeal remains pending.
SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US 3

On December 5, 2012, the Nation filed an action in 

the Court of Federal Claims, seeking $1,105,000,000 in 

money damages, as well as costs, attorney’s fees, and 

“[s]uch other and further relief” as the court “deem[ed] 

just and proper.” Court of Federal Claims Decision, 112 

Fed. Cl. at 375. The Nation alleged that the United 

States, “acting through the federal court system . . . 

denied any and all judicial means of effective redress for 

the unlawful taking of lands from [the Nation] and its 

members.” Id. at 372 (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). In its complaint, the Nation asserted 

that in failing to provide it with a remedy for the misappropriation of its tribal lands, the United States violated 

trust obligations arising under both the Non-Intercourse 

Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, and the “federal common law (informed by international law norms).” 112 Fed. Cl. at 378.

The government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing both that the Nation’s claims were not ripe 

for review and that they fell outside the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the Indian Tucker Act.1 Id. 

The Nation thereafter sought to amend its complaint to 

add a “judicial takings” claim alleging that the district 

court’s decision to dismiss its Land Reclamation Suit was 

a compensable taking of a vested property right. Id.

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the Nation’s 

complaint on two alternative grounds. First, the court 

held that the Nation’s claims were not ripe for adjudication because they were predicated upon the district court’s 

judgment in the Land Reclamation Suit and that judgment was on appeal. Id. at 378–79. Second, the court 

1 The Indian Tucker Act provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for Indian tribal claims that “otherwise 

would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the 

claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or group.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1505. 

 
4 SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US

held that even if the Nation’s claims were ripe for review, 

it had no jurisdiction to consider them because they did 

not fall within the Indian Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign 

immunity. Id. at 380–82. The court refused, moreover, to 

allow the Nation to amend its complaint to add a judicial 

takings claim, concluding that such an amendment would 

be “futile.” Id. at 387. According to the court, because the 

Nation had not yet “secured a final unreviewable judgment in its favor on its [Non-Intercourse] Act claim,” its 

interest in that claim had not vested and was therefore 

“not protected by the Takings Clause.” Id. at 384–85. 

The court further noted that the Nation had been unable 

to cite to any “case in which a property owner prevailed on 

a judicial takings claim . . . .” Id. at 386.

The Nation then filed a timely appeal with this court. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a determination that a claim is not 

ripe for adjudication. Morris v. United States, 392 F.3d 

1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Howard W. Heck & 

Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 134 F.3d 1468, 1471 (Fed. 

Cir. 1998). Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of 

law, which we likewise review de novo. Rick’s Mushroom 

Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 

2008); Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 

264 F.3d 1071, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We review the 

denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of 

discretion. Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States, 550 F.3d 

1135, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

B. Ripeness

Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine that “prevent[s] 

the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, 

from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements 

. . . .” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967),
SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US 5

abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 

U.S. 99 (1977). Determining whether a dispute is ripe for 

review requires evaluation of: (1) the “fitness” of the 

disputed issues for judicial resolution; and (2) “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” 

Id. at 149; see Sys. Application & Techs., Inc. v. United 

States, 691 F.3d 1374, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

As the Court of Federal Claims correctly determined, 

the Nation’s breach of trust claims are not ripe for adjudication. See 112 Fed. Cl. at 378–79. The Nation asserts 

that the United States breached trust obligations, arising 

under both the Non-Intercourse Act2 and the federal 

common law,3 to protect the Nation’s lands and to provide 

it with effective redress for the misappropriation of those 

lands by the State of New York.4 The Nation’s breach of 

trust claims, however, rest on the district court’s judgment dismissing its land claims against the State of New 

York and an appeal of that judgment is pending before 

2 In relevant part, the Non-Intercourse Act provides: “No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of 

lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian 

nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law 

or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.” 25 U.S.C. 

§ 177. 

3 The Nation asserts that the “federal common law, 

which has always recognized Indian tribal rights and 

which incorporates customary international human rights 

law” guarantees the “right to redress for the unlawful 

taking and forced dispossession of the Nation and its 

members from their lands.”

4 The defendants in the Land Reclamation Suit include the State of New York, the County of Suffolk, New 

York, and the Town of Southampton, New York. See 

Land Reclamation Suit, 2006 WL 3501099, at *2.

 
6 SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US

the Second Circuit. Until the Second Circuit—and possibly the Supreme Court—have had an opportunity to 

review, and possibly reverse or revise, the district court’s 

judgment, it would be premature to determine whether 

the United States breached any trust obligation to provide 

the Nation with effective redress for the loss of its lands. 

See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 

568, 580–81 (1985) (emphasizing that a claim is not ripe 

for adjudication if it rests upon “contingent future events 

that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not 

occur at all” (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 413 F.3d 1327, 

1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that “a case is not ripe if 

further factual development is required” (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)).

On appeal, the Nation argues that it will be irreparably harmed if adjudication of its breach of trust claims is 

postponed. It contends that if its claims are not heard 

now, it “will forever be barred” from asserting those 

claims by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to 

suits filed in the Court of Federal Claims. We disagree. 

“A claim under the Tucker Act . . . first accrues only when 

all the events which fix the government’s alleged liability 

have occurred . . . .” Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United 

States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). As the government 

acknowledges, “[b]ecause the Nation alleges that the 

United States harmed it through the federal court system, 

the Nation’s claims (if any) will not accrue and the six 

year statute of limitations prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2501 

will not begin to run until the federal court system, not 

merely the district court, has arrived at a final decision 

regarding the Nation’s claims against the State of New 

York.”

The Nation further contends that its breach of trust 

claims are now ripe for adjudication because “the potential for the Second Circuit to reverse the dismissal of the 
SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US 7

Nation’s [Non-Intercourse Act] land claim is more illusory 

than real.” In support, the Nation notes that the Second 

Circuit has “thrice affirmed” the applicability of the 

laches doctrine to bar Indian land claims. See Onondaga 

Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2012); 

Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 

135–37 (2d Cir. 2010); Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 274–77; see 

also Stockbridge-Munsee Cmty. v. New York, 756 F.3d 

163, 165 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is now well-established that 

Indian land claims asserted generations after an alleged 

dispossession are inherently disruptive of state and local 

governance and the settled expectations of current landowners, and are subject to dismissal on the basis of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility.”). Until the Nation 

completes the appellate process, however, there is no way 

of knowing whether its claims are distinguishable from 

those at issue in earlier cases. It is possible, moreover, 

that the Second Circuit will elect to reconsider its laches 

jurisprudence en banc. Likewise, the Supreme Court 

could grant certiorari and reverse or modify the Second 

Circuit’s approach to the laches bar, particularly if, as the 

Nation asserts, that approach is “contrary to longstanding 

principles of equity, as well as inconsistent with applicable Supreme Court precedent and [c]ongressional legislation and policy.” We reject, therefore, the Nation’s 

contention that its breach of trust claims are now ripe for 

review because its right to appeal the dismissal of its land 

claim is only “illusory.”

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

If a claim is not yet ripe for judicial review, it should 

generally be dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Casitas, 708 F.3d at 1343 (affirming the dismissal of a 

takings claim without prejudice after determining that it 

was unripe); Morris, 392 F.3d at 1378 (affirming the 

dismissal of a takings claim without prejudice because it 

was “not ripe as a matter of law”); see also Barlow & 

Haun, Inc. v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 597, 615 n.20 
8 SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US

(2014) (emphasizing that if a claim is moot or unripe it 

“should be dismissed as nonjusticiable and not for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction”); Bannum, Inc. v. United 

States, 56 Fed. Cl. 453, 462 (2003) (“If a claim is not ripe 

. . . it must be dismissed without prejudice.”). Here, 

however, the Court of Federal Claims held that the Nation’s claims were not ripe for review, but nonetheless 

proceeded to determine that even if those claims were 

ripe, they invoked no statute or other source of substantive law sufficient to bring them within the jurisdictional 

reach of the Indian Tucker Act.5 See Court of Federal 

Claims Decision, 112 Fed. Cl. at 379–87.

“[T]here is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy,” 

and no prohibition precluding a court from dismissing a 

claim on alternative grounds. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon 

Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999) (explaining that in 

appropriate cases a district court can dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction without first establishing that it has 

subject matter jurisdiction); see Sinochem Int’l Co. v. 

Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) 

(emphasizing “that a federal court has leeway to choose 

among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case 

on the merits” (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted)); McGuire v. United States, 707 F.3d 1351, 1362 

(Fed. Cir. 2013) (reversing a determination that a takings 

claim was ripe for review, but affirming the trial court’s 

5 “Although the Indian Tucker Act confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal Claims, it is not itself a 

source of substantive rights. To state a litigable claim, a 

tribal plaintiff must invoke a rights-creating source of 

substantive law that can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the 

damages sustained.” United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 

U.S. 488, 503 (2003) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

 
SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US 9

judgment in favor of the government because it was clear 

that the plaintiff lacked the requisite property interest to 

support a viable takings claim). The present case, however, involves the unusual situation in which the claims 

asserted against the United States rest upon the outcome 

of litigation still pending in another forum. At the current juncture, the Nation’s claims against the United 

States are merely hypothetical—contingent on the ultimate resolution of its land suit against the State of New 

York—and we think it is premature as to these claims to 

make any binding determination as to whether they 

invoke a money-mandating source of substantive law. See 

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) 

(explaining that “[a] justiciable controversy [must be] 

distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character”).

In assessing jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, “a single determination controls whether the plaintiff has 

identified a money-mandating source for purposes of 

Tucker Act jurisdiction and whether the statute on its 

merits provides a money-mandating remedy on which the 

plaintiff can base a cause of action . . . .” Adair v. United 

States, 497 F.3d 1244, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Thus, in a 

“single step,” the Court of Federal Claims “determines 

both the question of whether [a] statute provides the 

predicate for its jurisdiction, and lays to rest for purposes 

of the case before it the question of whether the statute on 

its merits provides a money-mandating remedy.” Fisher 

v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 

banc in relevant part). Accordingly, when the Court of 

Federal Claims addressed the question of whether the 

Nation’s breach of trust claims fell within the Indian 

Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity, it necessarily 

made a determination, on the merits, that the NonIntercourse Act failed to provide a money-mandating 
10 SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US

remedy upon which the Nation could base its cause of 

action.6

“The operation of [a] statute is better grasped when 

viewed in light of a particular application.” Texas v. 

United States, 523 U.S. 296, 301 (1998). Until the litigation now pending in the Second Circuit is finally resolved—and the metes and bounds of the Nation’s breach 

of trust claims against the United States are certain—we 

think it is premature in the circumstances of this case to 

make any determination as to whether the NonIntercourse Act can be construed to provide a predicate 

for the exercise of jurisdiction over those claims. The role 

of the federal courts is to provide redress for injuries that 

are “concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense.” 

Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). Because 

the precise contours of the Nation’s breach of trust claims 

against the United States are at present only conjectural, 

any ruling on the merits of those claims is “patently 

advisory” in the circumstances of this case. Babbitt v. 

United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 304 

(1979); see Elec. Bond & Share Co. v. Sec. & Exch. 

Comm’n, 303 U.S. 419, 443 (1938); Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States, 529 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008).

Adherence to ripeness standards prevents courts from 

making determinations on the merits of a case before all 

6 The Court of Federal Claims further determined 

that nothing in the federal common law provided a basis 

for the exercise of jurisdiction over the Nation’s claims. 

See Court of Federal Claims Decision, 112 Fed. Cl. at 382 

(“Common law causes of action . . . are not included in 

[the Tucker Act’s] jurisdictional grant.” (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)).

 
SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US 11

the essential facts are in.7 See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l 

Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191 

(1985). Here, multiple possible litigation outcomes and 

factual developments could impact the Court of Federal 

Claims’ adjudication of the Nation’s breach of trust 

claims. The Second Circuit could reverse the district 

court’s judgment and afford the Nation some, or all, of the 

relief it seeks for the alleged misappropriation of its land. 

Alternatively, the appeals court could affirm the decision 

to deny the Nation compensation, but do so on grounds 

materially different than those relied upon by the district 

court. It is also possible that the Nation and the State of 

New York will reach a settlement, potentially obviating 

any need for the Court of Federal Claims to adjudicate the 

Nation’s breach of trust claims. Because the Nation’s 

claims against the United States cannot be fully and 

accurately assessed until its Land Reclamation Suit 

against the State of New York is finally resolved, those 

claims must be dismissed without prejudice. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 340, 350 

(1986) (“[A] court cannot determine whether a municipality has failed to provide ‘just compensation’ until it knows 

what, if any, compensation the responsible administrative 

body intends to provide.”); Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 

191 (concluding that the plaintiff’s takings claim “simply 

7 Although the Court of Federal Claims is an Article I tribunal, it generally adheres to traditional justiciability standards applicable to courts established under 

Article III. See, e.g., Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 

575 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Anderson v. United 

States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1350 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also 

Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 252, 

257–58 (1990) (“Although established under Article I, the 

Claims Court traditionally has applied the case or controversy requirement unless jurisdiction conferred by Congress demands otherwise.”).

 
12 SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US

[could not] be evaluated until the administrative agency 

ha[d] arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how 

it [would] apply the regulations at issue to the particular 

land in question”).

D. Leave to Amend

Finally, we turn to the Nation’s argument that the 

Court of Federal Claims abused its discretion in refusing 

to allow it to amend its complaint to add a “judicial takings” claim alleging that the district court’s judgment 

effectuated a compensable taking of the Nation’s vested 

property rights.8 Binding precedent establishes that the 

Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review the 

merits of a decision rendered by a federal district court. 

See Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. 

Cir. 2001); Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. 

Cir. 1994); see also Innovair Aviation Ltd. v. United 

States, 632 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Vereda, 

Ltda. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 

2001). Adjudication of the Nation’s proposed judicial 

takings claim would require the Court of Federal Claims 

to scrutinize the merits of the district court’s judgment, a 

task it is without authority to undertake.

8 Our review of whether the Court of Federal 

Claims correctly declined to allow the Nation to amend its 

complaint to add a judicial takings claim need not be 

postponed until litigation on the Land Reclamation Suit

is finally resolved. Regardless of whether the district 

court’s judgment dismissing the Nation’s land claim is 

reversed or otherwise modified on appeal, “Article III 

forbids the Court of Federal Claims, an Article I tribunal, 

from reviewing the actions of an Article III court . . . .” 

Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1344 

(Fed. Cir. 2002). 

 
SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US 13

The situation presented here parallels that presented 

in Allustiarte, 256 F.3d at 1351–53. There the plaintiffs 

brought suit in the Court of Federal Claims alleging that 

bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit took their property 

without just compensation when they allowed the plaintiffs’ assets to be sold at less than fair value. Id. at 1350–

51. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the plaintiffs’ 

suit for lack of jurisdiction and this court affirmed. We 

explained that the Court of Federal Claims was without 

authority to scrutinize the decisions of the bankruptcy 

courts (which are subordinate to Article III courts) and “to 

determine whether [the plaintiffs] suffered a categorical 

taking of their property at the hands of the . . . courts.” 

Id. at 1352.

A similar analysis applies here. The Nation alleges 

that in applying the doctrine of laches to bar its land 

claim, the district court improperly “took away the Nation’s legal right to sue for compensation for its stolen 

land.” The Court of Federal Claims, however, is without 

authority to adjudicate the Nation’s claim that it suffered 

a compensable taking at the hands of the district court. 

See Allustiarte, 256 F.3d at 1352; Joshua, 17 F.3d at 380. 

The court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions “of 

district courts and cannot entertain a taking[s] claim that 

requires the court to scrutinize the actions of another 

tribunal.” Innovair, 632 F.3d at 1344 (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). As 

the government correctly notes, “[d]eciding whether the 

district court’s judgment resulted in an unconstitutional 

taking of the Nation’s property would require the Court of 

Federal Claims to review the judgment and pass on its 

correctness.” Just as the plaintiffs’ takings claim in 

Allustiarte was an improper collateral attack on the 

judgment of the bankruptcy courts, the Nation’s proposed 
14 SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US

judicial takings claim is an attempt to mount an improper 

collateral attack on the judgment of the district court.9

Permitting parties aggrieved by the decisions of Article III tribunals to challenge the merits of those decisions 

in the Court of Federal Claims would circumvent the 

statutorily defined appellate process and severely undercut the orderly resolution of claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

(“The court of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the 

United States.”); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 

211, 218–19 (1995) (explaining that Article III “gives the 

Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, 

but to decide them, subject to review only by superior 

courts in the Article III hierarchy”).

9 Boise, 296 F.3d at 1344–45, upon which the Nation relies, is inapposite. There the government obtained 

an injunction against Boise Cascade Corp. (“Boise”) which 

prevented it from logging on its property without a permit. Boise thereafter filed suit in the Court of Federal 

Claims, alleging that the government’s decision to seek 

and obtain the injunction effectuated a taking of a compensable property interest. We concluded that the Court 

of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to consider Boise’s

takings claim, as the issue of whether the government’s 

actions in “seeking and obtaining the injunction” effectuated a taking of Boise’s property rights “was not before 

the district court, nor could it have been.” Id. at 1344. 

We emphasized, moreover, that “the sole forum available 

to hear Boise’s claim” was the Court of Federal Claims. 

Id. Here, by contrast, the question of whether the Nation 

has the right to bring an action for the loss of its tribal 

lands was squarely before the district court, and the 

Nation’s pending appeal to the Second Circuit provides it 

with a forum to challenge any errors in the district court’s 

judgment.

 
SHINNECOCK INDIAN NATION v. US 15

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the United States Court of 

Federal Claims’ determination that the Nation’s breach of 

trust claims are not yet ripe for review, vacate its ruling 

that it lacked jurisdiction over those claims, and remand 

the case with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust 

claims without prejudice.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED