IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kevin Williams, :

Petitioner :

: No. 31 M.D. 2017

v. :

: Submitted: June 2, 2017

Pa. Dept. of Corr’s, et al., at :

SCI-Forest, Medical Depart., :

and Security Office, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: September 5, 2017

Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary 

objections filed by the Department of Corrections (Department) to the petition for 

review (Petition) filed by Kevin Williams, a/k/a Kirby Stewart (hereafter, Williams). 

We sustain the Department’s objections and dismiss Williams’ Petition.

Background

On January 26, 2017, Williams, an inmate at the State Correctional 

Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest), filed his Petition against the Department, asking 

this Court to compel the Department to order MRIs for his shoulder and knees, return 

confiscated personal items, and change his living arrangements. (Petition, ¶11-14.)
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Specifically, Williams averred that on October 8, 2014, he went to the 

medical unit in SCI-Forest complaining of problems with his knees, including a

“popping” sound when he climbed up to his top bunk. (Petition, ¶5.) The physician 

ordered an x-ray of Williams’ knees, and, upon review of the x-rays, determined that 

there were no significant findings. Id. Williams wrote several request slips 

challenging the medical unit’s examination of his knees. Id. The medical unit gave 

Williams ibuprofen for his knees. However, Williams was dissatisfied and filed an 

internal grievance seeking an examination by a specialist, an MRI, or a CAT scan, all 

of which were denied by the Department. Id.

On October 23, 2015, Williams returned to the medical unit and sought 

an examination of his left shoulder. (Petition, ¶8.) Williams told the medical staff 

that his left shoulder makes “clicking” noises when he moved it around. Id. The 

medical staff examined his shoulder, and, as Williams alleges, told him he “probably 

[has] arthritis.” Id. Williams maintains that the word “probably” tells him that the 

medical staff at SCI-Forest does not know what is wrong with his shoulder; therefore, 

he wants a second opinion. Id. Williams filed another internal grievance pertaining

to the medical treatment he received in relation to his left shoulder. The grievance 

was denied by the Department. Id.

Williams now asks this Court to compel the Department to order MRIs 

for his knees and shoulder, give him permanent bottom bunk status, and provide him 

with pain medication. (Petition, ¶¶11, 13.) 

Additionally, Williams asks this Court to compel the Department to 

return to him various personal items that were confiscated while he was in the 

Restricted Housing Unit (RHU). (Petition, ¶6.) Williams alleges that, on April 30, 

2015, he was taken to the RHU in response to an investigation with his cellmate. Id. 
3

During his time in the RHU, Williams filed two grievances—one grievance 

concerning his confinement in the RHU and another relating to items that were 

confiscated during a cell search. Id. Both grievances were denied by the 

Department. Id.

Further, Williams asks this Court to compel the Department to alter his 

housing arrangement. (Petition, ¶¶9-10.) Specifically, Williams is unhappy that his 

cellmate smokes cigarettes. Id. at ¶9. Williams is not a smoker and does not want to 

endure secondhand smoke. Id. Williams states that, since his incarceration in 2000, 

he has only had four cellmates that did not smoke cigarettes. Id. Williams avers that 

he has a right to be in a smoke-free environment. Id. at ¶10. He maintains that unless 

he is given a single cell, he will always be subjected to secondhand smoke. Id. 

Williams filed internal grievances about the smoke in his cell and asked for a single 

cell. Id. The Department denied his grievances and request for a single cell. Id. at 

¶9.

On January 26, 2017, Williams filed the present Petition against the 

Department. (Petition, ¶1.) On April 25, 2017, the Department filed preliminary 

objections in the nature of a demurrer.1 The Department noted that, while Williams 

does not expressly state whether his Petition is in the nature of a mandamus, based on 

the relief that Williams is requesting, the Department is responding as such.

(Preliminary Objections, at 4.) However, the Department avers that mandamus is not 

appropriate to address Williams’ claims against the Department. Id. at 6. Rather, the 

 

1

In ruling on preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, this Court must accept as 

true all well-pleaded material facts and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Barndt v. 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 902 A.2d 589, 592 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). However, this 

Court is not required to accept as true “conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from the facts, 

argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion.” Silo v. Ridge, 728 A.2d 394, 398 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1999) (citing Giffin v. Chronister, 616 A.2d 1070, 1072 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)).
4

Department argues that issues relating to medical challenges, confiscation of personal 

items, and housing arrangements are best left to the discretion of Department 

personnel with the professional expertise. Id. at 7. Accordingly, the Department 

maintains that Williams’ Petition should be dismissed. Id. at 8.

After the Department filed its preliminary objections, Williams filed a 

brief in opposition. In his brief, Williams maintains that, by not ordering MRIs and 

pain medication, the Department is acting deliberately indifferent to his medical 

needs. (Petitioner’s Brief at 5.) He further contends that the Department violated his 

due process rights by confiscating his personal items. Id. at 6. Finally, Williams 

avers that he has a “right to be in a smoke-free environment.” Id. at 8.

Discussion

First, we must determine the nature of Williams’ action. While Williams 

does not state whether this is a mandamus action, the Department is correct that it 

must be treated as such based on the relief requested. See Kretchmar v. Department 

of Corrections, 831 A.2d 793, 797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (where inmate sought to 

compel the Department to provide him with specific medication, his action was in the 

nature of mandamus). Williams asks this Court to compel the Department, a 

governmental agency, to take specific action by ordering MRIs, providing him with 

pain medication, returning certain personal items, and altering his housing situation. 

Accordingly, it is clear from Williams’ Petition that he is seeking a writ of 

mandamus; therefore, we will treat this action as such. 

Initially, we note that “[m]andamus is an extraordinary writ that compels 

performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there exists: (1) a clear

legal right in the petitioner; (2) a corresponding duty in the respondent; and (3) an 
5

absence of any other adequate and appropriate remedy.” Buehl v. Beard, 54 A.3d 

412, 416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Mandamus is only used to protect rights that are 

already established and cannot be used as the basis to establish rights. Id. Further, a 

court cannot “direct the manner in which an official performs a discretionary 

function.” Id. As the Supreme Court explained:

The writ cannot be used to control the exercise of discretion 

or judgment by a public official or administrative or judicial 

tribunal; to review or compel the undoing of an action taken 

by such an official or tribunal in good faith and in the 

exercise of legitimate jurisdiction, even though the decision 

was wrong; to influence or coerce a particular determination 

of the issue involved; or to perform the function of an 

appeal or writ of error.

Pennsylvania Dental Association v. Insurance Department, 516 A.2d 647, 652 (Pa. 

1986) (emphasis added).

Medical Treatment

Williams maintains that the Department has violated his right to medical 

treatment under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to his 

proscribed medical needs. The Department avers that Williams’ challenge to the 

adequacy of the medical treatment does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. 

(Preliminary Objections at 11.)

The Eighth Amendment, in relevant part, prohibits the infliction of 

“cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The United States 

Supreme Court has interpreted this Amendment to mean that inmates are required to 

receive adequate medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976) 

(citing U.S. CONST. amend. VIII). Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has 

held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 
6

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Id. at 104 (internal citations omitted).

In Estelle v. Gamble, an inmate instituted a civil action against prison 

officials, including the chief medical officer, alleging that the prison officials violated 

the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment by not providing 

proper medical treatment after the inmate injured his back while fulfilling a prison 

work assignment. 429 U.S. at 98. Within a three-month period, the inmate was 

treated by the medical staff on seventeen occasions. Id. at 107. The medical staff 

diagnosed the inmate’s injury as a lower back strain and ordered bed rest, muscle 

relaxants, and pain relievers. Id. However, the inmate maintained that more should 

have been done, including the taking of x-rays. Id. The United States Supreme Court 

determined that the medical professionals’ decision to not order “an x-ray, or like 

measures, does not represent cruel and unusual punishment.” Id.

The deliberate indifference standard of the Eighth Amendment contains 

an objective element and a subjective element. See Kretchmar, 831 A.2d at 798. The 

objective element is met when the deprivation suffered by the inmate is “objectively, 

‘sufficiently serious. . . .’” Id. (quoting Framer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 

(1994)). As the United States Supreme Court held, to be sufficiently serious, “a 

prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized 

measure of life’s necessities.” Framer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The subjective element of a deliberate indifference claim requires prison 

personnel to have acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). A prison official cannot be found liable for deliberate 

indifference unless “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference 
7

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw 

the inference.” Id. at 837.

However, courts will not find deliberate indifference when an inmate 

receives medical attention, but simply disagrees with the medical professionals’ 

course of treatment. See Baez v. Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 311 

M.D. 2013, slip op. at 4, filed March 18, 2014). In Baez, an inmate diagnosed with 

systemic lupus erythematosus filed a petition asking this Court to compel the 

Department of Corrections to send him to a gastroenterologist and a chronic pain 

specialist. Id., slip op. at 1. The inmate alleged that the Department’s refusal to send 

him to these specialists amounted to deliberate indifference. Id. This Court opined 

that the deliberate indifference test gives great deference to prison medical authorities 

and their professional course of treatment for the inmates. Id., slip op. at 3. While the 

inmate did receive extensive medical treatment, the inmate was “attempting to 

mandate a particular course of treatment.” Id., slip op. at 4. Accordingly, this Court 

held that the inmate’s challenge to the adequacy of the medical treatment that he 

received within the prison did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Id.

Here, Williams does not allege that he was not seen by medical staff. 

Instead, he maintains that the physicians who examined him did not prescribe an 

appropriate course of treatment. Williams was seen by physicians within SCI-Forest 

on multiple occasions for his knees and shoulders. During his first visit to the 

medical unit, the physician ordered an x-ray on Williams’ knees. After the physician 

examined the x-ray, he found that there were no abnormalities; however, Williams 

disagreed with the physician’s medical findings. Later, when Williams went to the 

medical unit again, the staff determined that no further x-rays were needed, and that 
8

Williams most likely had arthritis, a determination with which Williams was 

dissatisfied.

Williams has been treated for the pain in his shoulders and knees; 

however, he is attempting to dictate his own course of treatment. Courts will 

repudiate any attempts to undermine or question the adequacy of treatment conducted 

by medical professionals which “remains a question of sound professional judgment.” 

Kretchmar, 831 A.2d at 799 (internal quotation marks omitted) (opining that an 

inmate’s denial for specific allergy medication was best left in the sound professional 

judgment of medical professionals). Williams’ course of treatment involved 

examinations by physicians in SCI-Forest and diagnostic tests, including x-rays. 

Williams’ complaint goes to the adequacy of the treatment he received, which 

remains a question of sound professional judgment. 

As a matter of law, Williams cannot show that he has a clear right to the 

relief he requests. Accordingly, the fact that the Department did not follow the 

course of treatment that Williams advances as appropriate does not rise to the level of 

an issuance of a writ of mandamus. 

Right to Smoke-Free Environment

Next, Williams asks this Court to compel the Department to move him to 

a single cell because his current cellmate smokes between 35 and 40 cigarettes a day. 

Williams maintains that he has a right to be in a smoke-free environment, and that he 

will only have a smoke-free environment if he does not have a cellmate. (Petition, 

¶10.) 

The Department avers that the Eighth Amendment neither requires that

inmates live in a single cell nor provides an inmate with the right to choose his cell 
9

accommodations. (Preliminary Objections, at 14.) The Department states that courts 

should be hesitant to interfere with “the orderly administration of the state prison 

system and should give broad deference to prison officials in running prisons.” (Brief 

for Respondents, at 13) (citing to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995); Bell v. 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). Further, the Department notes that prison 

personnel have broad discretion in deciding the housing arrangements for inmates. 

Ultimately, the Department maintains that SCI-Forest personnel determined that 

Williams needs a cellmate, and this Court “should not substitute [its] judgment for 

that of the [Department’s].” (Preliminary Objections, at 14.)

Williams maintains that he has a right to be in a smoke-free 

environment. However, Williams does not cite, and our research has not discovered, 

any case law expressing an explicit right to be in a smoke-free environment. 

Notwithstanding, a cause of action does exist under the Eighth Amendment when an 

inmate alleges that “prison officials have exposed him with deliberate indifference to 

levels of [environmental tobacco smoke] that pose an unreasonable risk of harm to 

his future health.” Johnson v. Lightcap, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 467 C.D. 2008, filed July 

11, 2008) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34-35 (1993)).

In order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate 

indifference to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) exposure, an inmate must satisfy 

the two-part test set forth in Helling. First, the inmate must prove that he was

exposed to “unreasonably high levels of ETS.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 35. In 

determining whether the levels of ETS are unreasonably high, the court must inquire 

“into the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that such an injury to 

health will actually be caused by exposure to ETS.” Id. at 36. Additionally, a court 

will also consider whether society would consider the risk of harm due to ETS smoke 
10

so grave “that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone

unwillingly to such a risk.” Id. 

In his Petition, Williams failed to aver any facts regarding his level of 

exposure to the ETS, any current or long-term health problems related to this 

exposure, or how this exposure violates contemporary standards of decency. While 

this Court understands the generalized health risks of second-hand smoke, Williams

has not presented sufficient information to allow this Court to determine whether the 

Department is violating the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide Williams with a 

single cell. 

This Court finds that there is no clear right to issue a writ of mandamus 

here due to the lack of information provided by Williams, in conjunction with the 

Department’s broad discretion in housing arrangements.2

Due Process

Williams alleges that the Department personnel confiscated photographs, 

a Panasonic Walkman, Sony earbuds, a headphone extension wire, Ray Ban 

sunglasses, and food items from his cell. (Petition, ¶6.) After Williams’ items were 

confiscated, he filed grievances within SCI-Forest to have his items returned. The 

Security Office provided Williams with a list of confiscated items but determined that 

Williams could not repossess these items while he was incarcerated due to 

Department policy. Williams maintains that the Department deprived him of his 

personal property. Further, Williams avers that there is “no post deprivation remedy” 

 

2 Williams also alleges that the Department tampered with his mail as well as confiscated 

legal paperwork; however, he does not elaborate on either one of these accusations. Accordingly, 

this Court cannot properly evaluate the cause of action or the remedy due, if any.
11

in the prison “because every grievance is in favor of [the Department]. . . .” 

(Petitioner’s Brief at 6.) 

The Department avers that Williams does not have an absolute right to 

all of the confiscated items because prisons can limit the type and quantity of items 

an inmate can possess. (Preliminary Objections at 12.) 

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive 

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1. Nevertheless, courts have repeatedly held that the internal prison 

grievance system is an adequate post-deprivation remedy under the due process 

clause. See Tillman v. Lebanon County Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d 

Cir. 2000). An inmate’s dismay at the outcome of the grievance process does not 

render the process inadequate. Further, “[r]easonable prison regulations regarding the

quantity and type of property that inmates may possess do not violate due process 

guarantees.” Small v. Horn, 722 A.2d 664, 671 (Pa. 1998). See Bell, 441 U.S. at 

554 (noting that prisoners' due process rights with respect to possession of property 

are not absolute, but are “subject to reasonable limitation or retraction in light of the 

legitimate security concerns of the institution”).

After Williams was denied access to the items that were taken from his 

cell, Williams utilized the prison grievance system to contest the confiscation. The 

Department’s internal grievance system is an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 

Accordingly, Williams has not stated a clear right to possess the confiscated items; 

therefore, an issuance of a writ of mandamus is not proper.
12

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Department’s preliminary 

objections and dismiss Williams’ Petition.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kevin Williams, :

Petitioner :

: No. 31 M.D. 2017

v. :

:

Pa. Dept. of Corr’s, et al., at :

SCI-Forest, Medical Depart., :

and Security Office, :

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 5

th day of September, 2017, the preliminary 

objections filed by the Department of Corrections are hereby sustained and the 

petition for review filed by Kevin Williams, a/k/a Kirby Stewart, is dismissed. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge