UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

TROY W. MILLER,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

DA-1221-11-0401-W-3

DATE: April 8, 2015

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Dennis L. Friedman, Esquire, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

John T. LeMaster, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

denied his request for corrective action in his individual right of action (IRA) 

appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial 

decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based 

on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application 

 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

of the law to the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of 

the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or 

involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of 

the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite 

the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See

Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the 

following points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not 

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. 

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, 

which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). 

BACKGROUND

¶2 The appellant formerly held the position of Superintendent of Industries, 

GS-13, with the agency’s Federal Bureau of Prisons. Hearing Transcript (HT) at 

6-8. The appellant’s primary duty as Superintendent of Industries was to 

supervise the running of a UNICOR factory that produced helmets for the 

military. HT at 8-11. UNICOR is the trade name for Federal Prison Industries, a 

government-owned corporation that employs inmates incarcerated in correctional 

facilities under the Federal Bureau of Prisons. HT at 227. The appellant filed an 

appeal with the Board alleging that he was reassigned out of his position into a 

series of temporary assignments, and then finally to the position of Management 

Analyst, GS-13, in retaliation for whistleblowing activity, specifically, a verbal 

disclosure on October 7, 2009, and verbal and written disclosures on December 

16, 2009, of gross mismanagement and the gross waste of funds in the factory’s 

operations. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 1.

¶3 After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision 

finding that the appellant had established by a preponderance of the evidence that 

he had made protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) that were a 
3

contributing factor in the decision to reassign him, but the agency had established 

by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reassigned the appellant in 

the absence of his disclosures. IAF, Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 9, 18. 

¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision arguing 

that the administrative judge incorrectly found that the agency met its burden of 

proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reassigned him in 

the absence of his disclosures. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 6. The 

agency has filed a response in opposition to the appellant’s petition. PFR File, 

Tab 7. 

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶5 When reviewing the merits of an IRA appeal, if the appellant is able to 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he made a protected disclosure 

under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) that was a contributing factor in an agency’s 

personnel action, then the Board must order corrective action unless the agency 

can establish by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same 

personnel action in the absence of the disclosure. Chavez v. Department of 

Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 17 (2013). Clear and convincing evidence 

is that measure or degree of proof that produces in the mind of the trier of fact a 

firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established. Id. The administrative 

judge, having determined that the appellant proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence that his two disclosures were a contributing factor in the decision to 

reassign him, analyzed whether the agency had established by clear and 

convincing evidence that it would have reassigned the appellant in the absence of 

the disclosures. ID at 6-9, 11-18.

¶6 One of the appellant’s supervisors testified that the appellant was initially 

reassigned because the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) requested that he be 

removed from the operational aspects of the UNICOR factory during an

investigation. HT at 321-22. OIG raised concerns that the appellant’s presence 
4

might compromise the integrity of the investigation. HT at 361. The supervisor

also testified that OIG subsequently requested that he be removed from a set of 

temporary duties because of accusations that the appellant was hampering the 

investigation by having conversations with inmates who had worked at the 

factory. HT at 325-26, 353. The supervisor further testified that the appellant 

was removed from another set of temporary duties at OIG’s request after 

accusations that the appellant was monitoring the phone calls of inmates who had 

worked in the factory specifically to gain information about the investigation. HT 

at 326-29. The supervisor testified to the increasing difficulty in identifying 

duties that the appellant could perform during the investigation. HT at 291-94. 

The factory closure at the appellant’s facility was announced around September 

2011. HT at 339. On June 14, 2012, the appellant received a directed 

reassignment to the position of Management Analyst, GS-13. IAF, Tab 6 at 

11-17. 

¶7 In determining whether an agency has shown by clear and convincing 

evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the 

protected disclosure, the Board generally considers the strength of the agency’s 

evidence in support of its action, the existence and strength of any motive to 

retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision,

and any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who are 

not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated. Carr v. Social 

Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Board does 

not view the Carr factors as discrete elements, each of which the agency must 

prove by clear and convincing evidence, but will weigh the factors together to 

determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing as a whole. McCarthy v. 

International Boundary & Water Commission, 116 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 44 (2011),

aff’d, 497 F. App’x 4 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 386 (2013).

¶8 In applying the Carr factors, the administrative judge considered the 

evidence and testimony presented by both the agency and the appellant. ID at 
5

6-9, 11-18. The administrative judge found that the appellant’s supervisor had 

little motive to retaliate because he had no vested interest in the subject of the 

disclosures, i.e., alleged mismanagement and the waste of funds at UNICOR. 

E.g., ID at 7, 13, 18. The administrative judge also found that considerable 

unrebutted evidence supported the agency’s stated reason for reassigning the

appellant in the manner that it did. E.g., ID at 8-9, 14, 17-18. The administrative 

judge found that there were no similarly situated-employees, and, therefore, no 

basis for evaluating whether the agency took similar actions against 

non-whistleblowers under comparable circumstances. ID at 9, 18.

¶9 The appellant argues on review that his supervisor’s testimony concerning 

his reassignment was based “in its entirety” on hearsay and without corroborating 

evidence and thus lacks the persuasiveness necessary to meet the clear and 

convincing evidence standard. PFR File, Tab 6 at 12-14. The supervisor’s 

testimony about what he was told by OIG is not hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 

801(c) (defining “hearsay” as a statement, other than one made by the declarant 

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove the truth of 

the matter asserted). His testimony is direct evidence, i.e., his own personal 

knowledge gained by hearing directly from OIG.

2

 See, e.g., HT at 321. As noted 

in the initial decision, the record contains evidence that corroborates the 

supervisor testimony. The appellant sent an email on December 16, 2009, stating

that he had been removed from the factory on December 15, 2009, due to the OIG 

investigation. ID at 9. The appellant testified that his supervisor called him and 

told him he was being removed because OIG was coming to do an investigation 

with his staff. Id. The nature and scope of the investigation, including the 

involvement of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, also corroborates the supervisor’s 

testimony. ID at 17-18; HT at 104-10. 

 2 In any event, hearsay evidence is admissible in Board proceedings, but the assessment 

of the probative value of hearsay evidence necessarily depends on the circumstances of 

each case. Borninkhof v. Department of Justice, 5 M.S.P.R. 77, 83-87 (1981).
6

¶10 Next, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in failing to 

properly consider certain factors in assessing whether the supervisor’s testimony 

was credible. PFR File, Tab 6 at 13-15. Specifically, he argues that the 

supervisor’s testimony, that OIG directed his reassignment because OIG has no 

administrative authority over Federal Bureau of Prisons employees, is inherently 

improbable. Id. at 14-15. The appellant also argues that his supervisor’s 

testimony was inherently improbable because the agency never produced 

documentary evidence of OIG’s request, the appellant was never given written 

notice regarding the reasons for the reassignment, and many of his temporary 

duties were not commensurate with the grade level of his position. Id. We find 

these arguments unpersuasive. The appellant’s supervisor testified that OIG 

requested that the appellant be reassigned, the request was discussed amongst the 

appellant’s supervisor, his regional director, and UNICOR’s central office, and 

the agency decided to reassign the appellant. HT at 321-24. The appellant’s 

supervisors further explained that it was difficult to find duties for the appellant 

that were commensurate with his grade level during the protracted OIG 

investigation because OIG asked that he not have access to the inmates who had 

worked in the factory, and he could no longer access the UNICOR computer. See

HT at 292, 330-32. We find that it is not inherently improbable that OIG would 

ask that the appellant be reassigned during its investigation, or that the agency 

would comply with this request, given the apparent scope of the investigation and 

the possibility of criminal charges against the appellant. See HT at 104-10, 

287-91, 297, 321-22. 

¶11 The appellant argues, moreover, that his supervisor had a strong retaliatory 

motive because his disclosures were an impediment to the supervisor’s interest in 

maximizing inmate employment in the “highly profitable” helmet production 

business. PFR File, Tab 6 at 15. The record, however, does not support such a 

conclusion. We agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the supervisor 

had little to no motive to retaliate because he possessed little knowledge as to the 
7

products manufactured in the factory, exercised no responsibility or influence 

over the business decisions at the factory, and was not principally interested in 

whether the factory was profitable or not, as long as it continued to provide 

training and employment for inmates. ID at 7. We also agree with the 

administrative judge’s finding that the supervisor had little motive to retaliate 

based on the appellant’s disclosures because, when the appellant made his 

disclosures, OIG’s investigation into the factory’s operations was already 

underway. ID at 13.

¶12 In sum, we find that the appellant’s assertions on review reflect mere 

disagreements with the administrative judge’s well-reasoned and thoroughly 

explained findings. After considering the arguments raised by the appellant in his 

petition for review, we find no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s finding 

that the agency established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have 

reassigned the appellant in the absence of his disclosures. See Crosby v. U.S. 

Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997). 

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request review of this final decision by the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The court must receive your 

request for review no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this order. See 

5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose to file, be 

very careful to file on time. The court has held that normally it does not have the 

authority to waive this statutory deadline and that filings that do not comply with 

the deadline must be dismissed. See Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 

931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you want to request review of the Board’s decision concerning your 

claims of prohibited personnel practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), 

(b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B), (b)(9)(C), or (b)(9)(D), but you do not want to challenge 

the Board’s disposition of any other claims of prohibited personnel practices, you 
8

may request review of this final decision by the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. The 

court of appeals must receive your petition for review within 60 days after the 

date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27, 2012). If 

you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. You may choose to request 

review of the Board’s decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit or any other court of appeals of competent jurisdiction, but not 

both. Once you choose to seek review in one court of appeals, you may be 

precluded from seeking review in any other court.

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to 

court, you should refer to the federal law that gives you this right. It is found in 

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. 

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United 

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm. 

Additional information about the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11. 

Additional information about other courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website 

at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for a list of attorneys who have expressed 

interest in providing pro bono representation for Merit Systems Protection Board 

appellants before the Federal Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board
9

neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that any 

attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board