*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 12, 2008*

Decided March 13, 2008

Before

          WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

       DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

       MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 07‐2878

WILLIAM E. GOLLIHER, JR.

           Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JACKSON COUNTY, ILLINOIS

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 04 C 879

David R. Herndon,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Federal inmate William Golliher, Jr., brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

claiming that law enforcement officers in Jackson County, Illinois, damaged his house

during an unlawful search that turned up evidence used to convict him of a drug

conspiracy.  In his complaint Golliher demanded his release as well as compensation for the

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 07‐2878 Page 2

damaged property and his time spent in prison.  The district court screened the complaint,

see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and, relying on Heck v. Humphry, 512 U.S. 477, 486‐87 (1994),

dismissed without prejudice all but the claim for the damage to the property.

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on that claim on

September 29, 2006.  This order was a final decision because “it resolved all outstanding

claims and made clear that [the] suit was at an end.” Head v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 225

F.3d 794, 800 (7th Cir. 2000).  Thus, it was immediately appealable.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291;

Borrero v. City of Chi., 456 F.3d 698, 699‐700 (7th Cir. 2006); Otis v. City of Chi., 29 F.3d 1159,

1165 (7th Cir. 1994).  But the court did not set out its judgment on a separate document, see

FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a), so it was not deemed to be entered until February 26, 2007, 150 days

after the court’s order was entered on the docket.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 58(c)(2)(B); FED. R. APP.

P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii); Borrero, 456 F.3d at 701.

In the 150 days after the district court entered its final decision, Golliher filed two

motions to amend his complaint, a motion for reconsideration, and a “motion to clarify

judgment.”  Although these motions were made before judgment was entered, the latter

two tolled the period for filing a notice of appeal just as if they had been made within 10

days after entry of judgment under Rule 58.  See Borrero, 456 F.3d at 701.  On March 12, 2007,

the district court denied all of the motions except the “motion to clarify judgment,” which

the court granted to the extent of explaining that at summary judgment it had considered

only the evidence relating to Golliher’s property‐damage claim and not evidence relating to

the validity of the search.  With this order, the clock began to run on Gollliher’s deadline to

appeal the judgment.  See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). But Golliher let 30 days lapse

without filing a notice of appeal, so he lost the ability to appeal the judgment.  See FED. R.

APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).  Accordingly, we do not consider Golliher’s arguments that the district

court improperly dismissed his wrongful‐incarceration claim and erred in granting

summary judgment on the property‐damage claim.

Four months later, in July 2007, Golliher filed a “Motion for Relief from Judgment”

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  Golliher argued that the district court should

set aside its judgment because, he asserted, he had been transferred to a different prison

during discovery so he could not respond adequately to the defendants’ summary‐

judgment motion.  He also argued that the district court’s order failed to address one of his

claims.  The court denied the motion, reasoning that Golliher offered no special

circumstances that justified setting aside the judgment and that all of Golliher’s arguments

either could have been raised earlier or already had been raised and decided.  This time

Golliher timely filed a notice of appeal.
No. 07‐2878 Page 3

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Golliher’s Rule 60(b)

motion.  See Harrington v. City of Chi., 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006).  None of Golliher’s

arguments convinces us that he is entitled to the “extraordinary remedy” Rule 60(b)

provides.  See Provident Sav. Bank v. Popovich, 71 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 1995).

He primarily argues that the judgment should be set aside because, he insists, the court’s

rulings contained legal errors.  But as we already have said, it is too late for Golliher to

attack the basis for the court’s underlying judgment.  He cannot use a Rule 60(b) motion to

make an end run around his failure to raise these arguments in a timely appeal from the

judgment.  See Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000).  In any event, legal

error is not a valid reason to grant a Rule 60(b) motion.  See Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758,

761 (7th Cir. 2002).  

AFFIRMED.