alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 696 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 696

   Permitting the collection of clothing, toys, food, and housewares 
 during the holiday season for charitable purposes in Senate buildings.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           November 15, 2018

   Mr. Isakson (for himself and Mr. Tester) submitted the following 
             resolution; which was considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   Permitting the collection of clothing, toys, food, and housewares 
 during the holiday season for charitable purposes in Senate buildings.

Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved,

SECTION 1. COLLECTION OF CLOTHING, TOYS, FOOD, AND HOUSEWARES DURING 
              THE HOLIDAY SEASON FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES IN SENATE 
              BUILDINGS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of the rules 
or regulations of the Senate--
            (1) a Senator, officer of the Senate, or employee of the 
        Senate may collect from another Senator, officer of the Senate, 
        or employee of the Senate within a Senate building or other 
        office secured for a Senator nonmonetary donations of clothing, 
        toys, food, and housewares for charitable purposes related to 
        serving persons in need or members of the Armed Forces and the 
        families of those members during the holiday season, if the 
        charitable purposes do not otherwise violate any rule or 
        regulation of the Senate or of Federal law; and
            (2) a Senator, officer of the Senate, or employee of the 
        Senate may work with a nonprofit organization with respect to 
        the delivery of donations described under paragraph (1).
    (b) Expiration.--The authority provided by this resolution shall 
expire at the end of the second session of the 115th Congress.
                                 <all>
```
David Putney, Environmental Engineer July 15, 2011

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards Sector Policies and Programs

Division
109 T.W. Alexander Drive, RTP, NC 27711 Mail Drop D243

- 02



### Re: Sulfur in anodes used at the Ormet Primary Aluminum Corporation Reduction Division

In response to your questions in your communication dated July 1, 2011 the following are responses as related to Ormet’s operation. Please note that currently Ormet purchases anodes

from va rious suppliers our information is related to the sulfur in the anodes used at this facility. Ormet has no specific knowledge regarding the lowest sulfur content consistently available for use in anodes at its facility.

1

. The range of sulfur content in the c oke utilized to make anodes used in the reduction cells over the last year of operation.



### Ormet’s suppliers have indicated the sulfur content range in 2010 was from 0.90% to 2.47%. As of June 2011 the range was from 1.11% to 1.84%.

2

. The highest sulfur c ontent in the coke utilized to make anodes used in the reduction cells at any time during the last 10 years.



### Ormet’s data indicates the highest sulfur content was recorded in 2002 as 3.23%.

3

. The lowest sulfur content anode coke that you believe you cou ld consistently obtain in sufficient quantities to operate your facility at capacity, long term (e.g. over the next 10 years).



### As noted above Ormet has no specific knowledge of coke sulfur content available to the current suppliers of Ormet’s anodes.

John Reggi, Director Corporate Environmental Services
#### M & G ENGINES, a partnership, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dorothy MROCH, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 80CA0994.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

June 4, 1981.

Robert W. Caddes, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

Roath & Brega, P. C., David W. Stark, Denver, for defendant-appellee.

*1178KELLY, Judge.

The plaintiff, M & G Engines, appeals the judgment dismissing its claim, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that it was without jurisdiction. We affirm.

The plaintiff is a partnership, consisting of three partners, one of whom is the defendant's husband. The defendant and her husband are involved in a dissolution of marriage proceeding.

The plaintiff brought this action in the superior court to obtain possession of its property located at the home of the defendant. Under a temporary restraining order issued by the district court in the dissolution proceeding, the husband is restrained from removing any property from the family home, including those assets of the plaintiff kept there.

The superior court properly found that it was without jurisdiction. Once a court takes jurisdiction of an action, it thereafter has exclusive jurisdiction of the subject and matters ancillary thereto. Utilities Board v. Southeast Colorado Power Ass'n, 171 Colo. 456, 468 P.2d 36 (1970). This result is necessary to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits. See Public Service Co. v. Miller, 135 Colo. 575, 313 P.2d 998 (1957). All the parties who may have an interest in the same property should be before the court in one action. See, C.R. C.P. 22. Whether the plaintiff's property located in the defendant's home is properly subject to a temporary restraining order is an issue before the district court in the dissolution proceeding.

The plaintiff was not without a remedy. The plaintiff could have intervened in the district court proceeding and been heard on its claims to the property. C.R.C.P. 20(a); § 14-10-105, C.R.S.1978.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

PIERCE and VAN CISE, JJ., concur.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00421-CV

AZLE MANOR, INC. D/B/A AZLE 

MANOR HEALTH CARE AND 

REHABILITATION

APPELLANT

V.

SERRA HOLT APPELLEE 

------------

FROM THE 48TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

------------

We have considered appellant's “Agreed Motion To Dismiss.” It is the 

court’s opinion that the motion should be granted; therefore, we dismiss the 

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f).

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

Costs of the appeal shall be paid by appellant, for which let execution 

issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(d).

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DELIVERED: April 24, 2014
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Agricultural Marketing Service 

Fruit and Vegetable Division 

Processed Products Standardization and 

Inspection Branch 

: FOR USE OF USDA : A - 457 

:PROCESSED PRODUCTS INSPECTORS: April 1975 

TO: All Processed Products Inspectors 

FROM: E. C. Williams, Chief of the Branch 

SUBJECT: Determining Compliance with Requirements for Soluble 

Solids Content in Fruit Preserves (or Jams), Fruit 

Jelly, Orange Marmalade and Apple Butter. 

FILE UNDER: Applicable U.S. Standards 

I. Purpose -- to provide the criteria by which lots may be considered 

as meeting or failing a minimum soluble solids content. 

II. Definitions: 

A. Sample Unit -- may be the primary container, .Q.!:. a subsample from a primary containe~ or a subsample from a filling source. 

B. Sample -- the number of sample units which are used in the 

inspection of a lot. 

C. Percent Soluble Solids -- degrees Brix measured on a refractometer. 

III. Sampling Rate -- the minimum of the single sampling rate specified in the regulations. 

IV. Sample unit readings are determined on a well mixed smear .Q.!:. a 

filtrate passed through cheese cloth. 

V. Minimum Soluble Solid Requirements: 

Jelly 65% 

Jam (Preserves) 65% 

Marmalade 65% 

Apple Butter 43% 
2 

VI. Acceptance Criteria -- a lot will be considered as meeting the applicable solids requirements when: 

A. The average of all the sample units tested meet the 

minimum soluble solids requirement. 

B. No sample unit reading falls more than 1% below the 

applicable minimum requirement.
```

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 20 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 20

  Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to 
     limit the number of terms that a Member of Congress may serve.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 3, 2019

   Mr. Rooney of Florida (for himself, Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Marshall, Mr. 
   Duncan, Mr. Palmer, Mr. Massie, Mr. Mooney of West Virginia, Mr. 
 Davidson of Ohio, Mr. Zeldin, Mr. Ratcliffe, Mr. Norman, Mrs. Lesko, 
 Mr. Meadows, Mr. Buck, and Mr. Kevin Hern of Oklahoma) submitted the 
following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the 
                               Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
  Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to 
     limit the number of terms that a Member of Congress may serve.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled   (two-thirds of each House 
concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States 
within seven years after the date of its submission for ratification:

                              ``Article--

    ``Section 1. No person who has served 3 terms as a Representative 
shall be eligible for election to the House of Representatives. For 
purposes of this section, the election of a person to fill a vacancy in 
the House of Representatives shall be included as 1 term in determining 
the number of terms that such person has served as a Representative if 
the person fills the vacancy for more than 1 year.
    ``Section 2. No person who has served 2 terms as a Senator shall be 
eligible for election or appointment to the Senate. For purposes of 
this section, the election or appointment of a person to fill a vacancy 
in the Senate shall be included as 1 term in determining the number of 
terms that such person has served as a Senator if the person fills the 
vacancy for more than 3 years.
    ``Section 3. No term beginning before the date of the ratification 
of this article shall be taken into account in determining eligibility 
for election or appointment under this article.''.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2004094EN.01003605.xml

| 17.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 94/36 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 94/36

---

Removal from the register of Case C-130/03 (1)

1

(2004/C 94/101)

By order of 28 January 2004 the President of the Court of Justice of the European Communities ordered the removal from the register of Case C-130/03: Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic.

---

(1)  OJ C 146 of 21.06.2003.

1

---
Meeting Osram Sylvania with Chemical Control Division re: Proposed

Clarification on Activated Phosphors. March 5, 2008 Chair, Dave Schutz, CCD
OS suggest ed the following agenda items for this meeting, plus whatever additional topics EPA wished to addre ss: 1. Introductions 2. Description of Osram Sylvania's interest in EPA's Proposed Clarification. 3. Discusson/clarification of certain aspects of the Proposed Clarification

-- e.g., proper Inventory nomenclature for future Section 5 notices for phosphors; the submittal and EPA review of Section 5 notices during the one

- year period.
4. The submittal of written comments on or before March 17. Meeting took place March 5. Attendees from Osram Sylvania were: Duncan Turnbull, Carmen Vene zia, Joseph Delehant, Blake Biles. Attendees from EPA were: David Schutz, Donald Sadowsky, Doyoung Lee, Kent Anapolle, Roy Seidenstein.
Osram noted that it has been relying on EPA’s guidance that activated phosphors were solid mixtures for many years. The correction EPA has proposed will require a number of PMNs from Osram for what seem to be minor changes. Osram has submitted PMNs for the host part of the phosphors it manufactures. Osram would like guidance on when an activator is significant, and the extent to which variable compositions using the same materials will trigger separate identities. Also, Osram may have some situations in which it believes its phosphors can be considered to be solid solutions, that is they could be considered not to mee t the criteria EPA identified in its FR notice as requiring activated phosphors to have Inventory identities of their own. As a second issue, Osram stated that this EPA proposal amounts to a regulation of existing chemical substances. A number of materia ls which will be noticed under the EPA proposal are in manufacture now. If testing is required for these materials, and the testing time period will be longer than the end of the year contemplated for coming into compliance, a manufacturer can be required to stop production for that material until the testing is submitted. This is §6 regulation done under the color of §5. Osram thinks that this kind of regulation, if undertaken, should be done under §§ 4 and 6. Some of these materials will likely require 90

- day studies if they are in the category respirable/poorly soluble. Downstream customers can be required to change materials. There will probably not be a consortium for this testing.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Prestige Brands International, LLC90 North BroadwayIrvington, New York 10533**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofPrestige Brands International, LLC on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period endedDecember 31, 2004 (the “Report”), I, Peter J. Anderson, Chief Financial Officerof Prestige Brands International, LLC, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,that:

 

(1)          The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of Prestige BrandsInternational, LLC.

 
| January 24, 2005 |                               |
|------------------|------------------------------------|
|             | Prestige Brands International, LLC |
|             |                               |
|             | By:                                | /s/ Peter  J. Anderson |   |
|             | Peter J.  Anderson                 |   |
|             | Chief  Financial Officer           |   |
|                  |                                    |  |  |  |

 

1

----
CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of
FalconTarget, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the
fiscal quarter ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),
the undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that to the undersigned’s knowledge:

(a) the Report fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;

and

(b) the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

FalconTarget, Inc.

Date: June 23, 2009

By:   /s/   Serge Atlan

Serge Atlan

Chairman

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4057

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

BRIAN DAVID HILL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00435-WO-1)

Submitted: March 30, 2015 Decided: April 7, 2015

Before GREGORY and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, PA, Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Brian David Hill appeals the district court’s order denying 

his motion for an extension of time to appeal his conviction and 

sentence. Upon review, we conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Hill’s motion. Accordingly, 

we affirm this portion of the appeal for the reasons stated by 

the district court. United States v. Hill, No. 1:13-cr-00435-

WO-1 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 16, 2015). 

To the extent Hill also seeks to appeal the criminal 

judgment entered against him, the Government has moved to 

dismiss that portion of the appeal as untimely. In criminal 

cases, the defendant must file the notice of appeal within 14

days after the entry of judgment or the order being appealed. 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). Upon a showing of excusable neglect 

or good cause, the district court may grant an extension of no 

more than 30 additional days to file a notice of appeal. Fed.

R. App. P. 4(b)(4), 26(b).

The district court entered the criminal judgment on 

November 12, 2014. Hill filed a notice of appeal on January 29, 

2015, well beyond the expiration of the appeal and excusable 

neglect periods. We therefore grant the Government’s motion to 

dismiss this portion of the appeal as untimely because Hill 
3

failed to file a timely notice of appeal or obtain an extension 

of the appeal period.*

We deny Hill’s motions to strike and to proceed pro se and

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART

 * Even if we construe the January 12, 2015 motion for an 

extension of time as a notice of appeal from the criminal 

judgment, the appeal still is untimely as to the criminal 

judgment.
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

August 11, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00455

- CV

William FISHBACK
, Appellant

v.

James Patrick WALKER , Sr.

Appellee

From the 406th Judicial District Court
, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2022CVK000319D4 Honorab le Sid L. Harle , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R
On July 18, 2022, the trial court found that Appellant William Fishback had violated thirty

- three provisions of a protective order, and it held him in contempt for each count. The trial court ordered Appellant confined in the Webb County Jail for a period of 180 days.
On July 2 6 , 2022, Appellant filed a second amended notice of appeal which identifies five points Appellant seeks to appeal, numbered as 2.a through 2.e. In paragraph 2.b, Appellant seeks to appeal from “[t]he Order holding him in contempt and sentencing him to six months confinement.” “[T] he validity of a [criminal] contempt judgment can be attacked ‘ only by way of h abeas corpus. ’” Collins v. Kegans , 802 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ; accord Gonzalez v. State , 187 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2006, no pet.)

. W e ORDER Appellant to show cause i n writing within FIFTEEN DAYS of the date of this order why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Collins
, 802 S.W.2d at 705

. Appellant must s how how this court has appellate jurisdiction for the matters listed in each of the notice of appeal paragraphs numbered 2.a through 2.e.
We also note that the clerk’s record filed on August 8, 2022, does not contain some of the documents and orders referred to in paragraph s 2.a through 2.e. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 34.5 (a) (noting that in a civil case, “the record must include copies of .

. . all pleadings on which the trial was held [and] the court’s judgment or other order that is being appealed” (emphasis added) )

._________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto se t my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 11th day of August, 2022

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ
, Clerk of Court
### UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OFTRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, DC In 

### the Matter of: REGENT AEROSPACE CORPORATION FDMS No. FAA-2013-0851 Served: September 17, 2015



### EXTENSION OF TIME ComplainantFederal Aviation Administration filed its notice ofappeal 

### inthis matter from the written initial decision issued byAdministrative Law Judge Richard C. Goodwin on July 27, 2015. Under 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.233(c) and 13.2ll(e), parties must perfecttheir appeals by filing an appeal briefwithin 55 days ofthe date ofthe issuance ofthe initial decision. Complainant's appeal briefis due no later than September 21,2015. By letter dated September 14, 2015, the agency attorney requested a 14-day extension of time forthe FAA to file its appeal briefunder 14 C.F.R. § 13.233(c)(1). 1 The agency attorney represented inthis letter thatRespondent, through its counsel, had agreedto the 14-day extension. Complainant's request for an extension oftime in whichto file its appeal briefis granted under 14 C.P.R. 

### § 13.233(c)(l). Complainant's appeal briefis now due to be filed on orbefore October 5, 2015. 2 MICHAEL P. HUERTA ADMINISTRATOR Federal AviationAdministration

# '!~Jdi::~ Manager, Adjudication Branch

1 The agency attorney also asked for an extension oftime in another case involving Regent Aerospace Corporation, FAA-2013-0852. That extension oftime is granted in a separate order.

2 The "mailing rule" (14 C.F.R. § 13.211(e)), which provides additional time after service by mail, does not apply to this extension. Thus, it does not extend the appeal briefs due date beyond October 19, 2015.

3 Issued under authority delegated to the ChiefCounsel and the Assistant ChiefCounsel for Litigation by Memorandum dated October 27, 1992, under 49 U.S.C. § 322(b) and 14 C.P.R.§ 13.202 (see 57 Fed. Reg. 58,280 (1992)) and redelegated bythe Assistant ChiefCounsel for Litigation to the Manager, Adjudication Branch, by Memorandum dated August 6, 1993.