IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 82 / 05-0493 

Filed December 1, 2006 

WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES, INC. and SENTRY INSURANCE, 

Appellees, 

vs. 

MARK HAVERLY, 

Appellant. 

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A. 

Hutchison, Judge. 

Claimant in workers’ compensation case won a favorable ruling from 

the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner, but the ruling was reversed by 

the district court. The claimant appealed, the court of appeals affirmed, 

and we granted further review. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 

VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED; CASE 

REMANDED. 

Christopher D. Spaulding of Berg, Rouse, Spaulding & Schmidt, 

P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant. 

Lee P. Hook and Joseph M. Barron of Peddicord, Wharton, Spencer & 

Hook, LLP, Des Moines, for appellees. 
2 

LARSON, Justice.

 Mark Haverly, who was employed by Winnebago Industries, Inc., filed 

a workers’ compensation claim under Iowa Code chapter 85 (2001) and won 

a favorable ruling from the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner. On 

judicial review, however, the district court reversed the commissioner’s 

ruling, and the court of appeals affirmed. On further review, we vacate the 

decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, 

and remand. 

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings. 

 Mark Haverly began working for Winnebago in 1983. In 1992 he 

suffered a work-related back injury and, in 1997, entered into a settlement 

of his workers’ compensation claim. Winnebago provided ongoing medical 

care for this back injury. Haverly continued to have back pain and 

underwent various courses of treatment, including surgery. On 

November 7, 2000, Haverly went to a doctor complaining of increased back 

pain, and the doctor recommended conservative treatment. Dissatisfied 

with the subsequent care provided by Winnebago, Haverly sought medical 

care from Dr. David Beck in February 2002. Dr. Beck recommended 

surgery. This surgery, however, was not authorized by Winnebago. 

 In March 2002 Haverly filed a petition for workers’ compensation 

benefits, alleging that a work-related back injury occurred on November 7, 

2000.1 Winnebago responded that any injury sustained on November 7, 

2000, related to Haverly’s 1992 injury and, at most, caused a temporary 

aggravation of his preexisting back condition. 

 Because Winnebago did not authorize Haverly to proceed with the 

surgery recommended by Dr. Beck, Haverly filed an application for alternate 

 

1Haverly also filed a petition alleging that he suffered a work-related back injury on 

March 2, 2000. This alleged injury is not at issue on further review. 
3 

medical care on May 17, 2002. See Iowa Code § 85.27; Iowa Admin. Code r. 

876—4.48. This petition alleged a November 7, 2000 injury date and 

requested that the surgery be provided by Winnebago. Haverly supported 

his request with an opinion from Dr. Beck that Haverly’s work duties had 

aggravated his preexisting back condition and that surgery was necessary. 

Winnebago filed an answer to the request for alternate medical care but, in 

its answer, did not dispute liability for the November 7 work injury. (A box 

on the answer form stating “employer denies [the claimant’s allegation of 

liability]” was not checked by Winnebago’s attorney.) Moreover, at the 

hearing on the application for alternate care, Winnebago’s attorney 

confirmed that Winnebago was not disputing liability for the injury. A 

deputy commissioner granted Haverly’s application for alternate care and 

ordered Winnebago to provide the surgery. Agency rules provide no intraagency appeal from such orders, and Winnebago did not seek judicial 

review. 

 Haverly’s claim for benefits proceeded to a hearing in 2003. The 

deputy commissioner determined, in relevant part, that the issue of liability 

for the November 7 injury had been previously “litigated” in the alternatemedical-care proceeding and that this prior decision was, therefore, 

res judicata on the issue of liability. The deputy stated: 

[I]njury arising out of and in the course of employment has 

been established in a prior contested case proceeding entitled 

to the same preclusive effect as is this arbitration proceeding. 

Winnebago appealed the arbitration decision on this and several other 

grounds. On the intra-agency appeal, the Workers’ Compensation 

Commissioner affirmed the deputy’s conclusion that Winnebago’s admission 

of liability in the alternate-medical-care proceeding was res judicata on the 

issue of liability for benefits. The commissioner also ruled that, even if 
4 

issue preclusion did not prevent Winnebago from litigating the issue, the 

record “amply demonstrates” that Haverly suffered a new injury on 

November 7, 2000. 

 Winnebago sought judicial review, challenging the agency’s 

res judicata determination, as well as the existence of a new injury. The 

district court reversed, ruling that issue preclusion did not apply because 

the issue of liability had not been “raised and litigated” in the prior action. 

See United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Shelly Funeral Home, Inc., 642 N.W.2d 648, 

655 (Iowa 2002). The district court found that Winnebago’s admission of 

liability in the alternate-medical-care proceeding was an admission of 

liability for medical care only and not an admission of liability for a new 

injury. 

 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. The court noted, but 

rejected, Haverly’s complaint that the district court’s conclusion permitted 

Winnebago to admit liability for the purpose of controlling medical care, but 

then deny it for the purpose of determining compensability. The court 

concluded that the requirements for issue preclusion were not met and that 

neither law-of-the-case nor judicial-estoppel doctrines could be applied to 

bar litigation of the liability issue. 

 Haverly contends Winnebago should not be permitted to admit 

liability in the alternate-medical-care proceeding when that worked to its 

advantage (by allowing Winnebago to control Haverly’s medical care) and 

then reverse its position in the arbitration hearing on the issue of liability 

for benefits. The arbitration decision stated a similar view of the case and 

questioned Winnebago’s motives in admitting liability in the alternatemedical-care proceeding. That decision observed 

that, under 876 I.A.C. 4.48(7), the expedited procedure [for 

alternate medical care] is not available where liability is 

disputed. Indeed, [Winnebago] filed a formal answer admitting 
5 

liability on May 29, 2002. At the beginning of the hearing, 

[Winnebago’s] attorney was asked directly whether liability was 

admitted, and answered just as directly that it was. . . . 

 The decision in that case [on alternate medical care] 

constitutes final agency action and has not been appealed. 

[Winnebago], however, ha[s] experienced a change of heart and 

now seek[s] to dispute liability. In agency experience, it is not 

unheard of for certain employers and insurance carriers to 

“admit” liability when there is something to gain thereby (the 

right to control medical treatment), yet thereafter attempt to 

deny liability as to the case in chief. This litigation offers a 

classic example. 

 On Winnebago’s intra-agency appeal, the commissioner made a 

similar observation. While the commissioner did not identify the doctrine of 

judicial estoppel by name, he clearly stated the gist of it in this language: 

 It would be patently unfair to allow an employer to admit 

liability and control the medical care for a medical condition 

and then allow that employer, after the care is completed to 

deny liability and litigate the liability issue, unless there are 

good reasons for doing so. 

II. The Issues. 

 Haverly raises a single issue: whether Winnebago is foreclosed from 

denying its liability for the November 7, 2000 injury by admitting its liability 

in the earlier alternate-medical-care proceeding. He raises three arguments 

in support of his appeal: issue preclusion, law of the case, and judicial 

estoppel. 

III. Standard of Review. 

 Judicial review of a workers’ compensation decision by the 

commissioner is governed by Iowa Code chapter 17A, our Administrative 

Procedure Act. See Iowa Code § 86.26. A party challenging agency action 

bears the burden of proving both the invalidity of the agency’s action and 

resulting prejudice. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a); Hill v. Fleetguard, 705 

N.W.2d 665, 671 (Iowa 2005). 
6 

 When a district court exercises its authority on judicial review, it acts 

in an appellate capacity to correct any errors of law by the agency. Hill, 705 

N.W.2d at 669; Heartland Express, Inc. v. Terry, 631 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 

2001). The district court may reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate 

relief if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced. Hill, 705 

N.W.2d at 669; Heartland Express, Inc., 631 N.W.2d at 265. 

 On our review of the district court’s decision, we apply the standards 

of chapter 17A to determine if our conclusions are the same as those of the 

district court. If so, we affirm; otherwise, we reverse or otherwise modify. 

Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 669. 

IV. Issue Preclusion. 

 Haverly argues, and the commissioner ruled, that the issue of 

Winnebago’s liability for the November 7 claim had been decided in the 

proceeding on Haverly’s application for alternate medical care because 

Winnebago conceded the point in its answer. Based on the principle of 

issue preclusion, the agency refused to revisit the issue of liability. 

 The doctrine of res judicata includes both claim preclusion and issue 

preclusion. Colvin v. Story County Bd. of Review, 653 N.W.2d 345, 348 

(Iowa 2002). In this case, Haverly relies on issue preclusion, also known as 

collateral estoppel. See Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 

n.2 (Iowa 1981). Under issue preclusion, once a court has decided an issue 

of fact or law necessary to its judgment, the same issue cannot be 

relitigated in later proceedings. Id. at 123. Issue preclusion serves a dual 

purpose: to protect litigants from “the ‘vexation of relitigating identical 

issues with identical parties or those persons with a significant connected 

interest to the prior litigation,’ ” and to further “the interest of judicial 

economy and efficiency by preventing unnecessary litigation.” Am. Family 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 562 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Iowa 1997) 
7 

(quoting State ex rel. Casas v. Fellmer, 521 N.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Iowa 

1994)). Under our four-part test, the doctrine applies to prevent relitigation 

if: 

(1) the issue determined in the prior action is identical to the 

present issue; (2) the issue was raised and litigated in the prior 

action; (3) the issue was material and relevant to the 

disposition in the prior action; and (4) the determination made 

of the issue in the prior action was necessary and essential to 

that resulting judgment. 

United Fire & Cas. Co., 642 N.W.2d at 655. 

 The element of issue preclusion of concern in this case is whether the 

issue of Winnebago’s liability was “raised and litigated” in the alternate-care 

proceeding. Iowa law is clear that issue preclusion requires that the issue 

was “actually litigated” in the prior proceeding. Spiker v. Spiker, 708 

N.W.2d 347, 353 (Iowa 2006); Hoth v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 577 N.W.2d 390, 

391-92 (Iowa 1998); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 

(“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid 

and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the 

determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, 

whether on the same or a different claim.”). 

 An issue is not actually litigated if the defendant might 

have interposed it as an affirmative defense but failed to do so; 

nor is it actually litigated if it is raised by a material allegation 

of the party’s pleading but is admitted (explicitly or by virtue of 

a failure to deny) in a responsive pleading; nor is it actually 

litigated if it is raised in an allegation by one party and is 

admitted by the other before evidence on the issue is adduced 

at trial; nor is it actually litigated if it is the subject of a 

stipulation between the parties. A stipulation may, however, 

be binding in a subsequent action between the parties if the 

parties have manifested an intention to that effect. 

Furthermore, under the rules of evidence applicable in the 

jurisdiction, an admission by a party may be treated as 

conclusive or be admissible in evidence against that party in a 

subsequent action. 

 In the case of a judgment entered by confession, consent, 

or default, none of the issues is actually litigated. Therefore, 
8 

the rule of this Section does not apply with respect to any issue 

in a subsequent action. The judgment may be conclusive, 

however, with respect to one or more issues, if the parties have 

entered an agreement manifesting such an intention. 

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. e; see also United States v. 

Young, 804 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1986) (“A fact established in prior 

litigation not by judicial resolution but by stipulation has not been ‘actually 

litigated’ and thus is the proper subject of proof in subsequent 

proceedings.”); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 813, at 381 (1997) (“Facts determined 

by admissions and stipulations ordinarily are not entitled to collateral 

estoppel effect, because facts so determined are not actually litigated, 

unless the parties to the stipulation manifest an intent to be bound in a 

subsequent action.” (Footnotes omitted.)). 

 We agree with the court of appeals and the district court that 

Winnebago’s admission of liability in the alternate-care proceeding did not 

constitute actual litigation for the purpose of applying issue preclusion. 

V. Law of the Case. 

 Haverly also argues that the deputy commissioner’s order requiring 

Winnebago to furnish alternate medical care is binding in future 

proceedings on that claim. “The doctrine of the law of the case represents 

the practice of courts to refuse to reconsider what has once been decided.” 

State v. Grosvenor, 402 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 1987); accord State ex rel. 

Goettsch v. Diacide Distrib., Inc., 596 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 1999). 

Pursuant to this principle, 

legal principles announced and the views expressed by a 

reviewing court in an opinion, right or wrong, are binding 

throughout further progress of the case upon the litigants, the 

trial court and this court in later appeals. 

Grosvenor, 402 N.W.2d at 405; 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 605, at 

300-01 (1995). 
9 

 The answer to Haverly’s law-of-the-case argument is that the agency 

did not decide anything as to Winnebago’s liability for compensation 

benefits, but only his right to alternate care. In fact, for reasons we discuss 

later, the agency could not decide liability at that stage. See Iowa Admin. 

Code r. 876—4.48(7) (2001) (If liability is disputed, the application for 

alternate medical care would have to be dismissed.). Our resolution of the 

issue regarding Winnebago’s admission of liability in the alternate-care 

proceeding is not based on what the agency did or decided at that point, but 

what Winnebago did. As such, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not bar 

Winnebago’s denial of liability in this case. That brings us to the issue of 

judicial estoppel, Haverly’s third argument. 

VI. Judicial Estoppel. 

Haverly argues that Winnebago is judicially estopped from denying 

liability for the November 7, 2000 injury because it conceded that issue in 

the alternate-medical-care proceeding. In this case, Haverly did not raise 

the issue of judicial estoppel. In fact, it was only mentioned and rejected by 

the district court in its ruling on judicial review. However, because judicial 

estoppel is intended to protect the integrity of the fact-finding process by 

administrative agencies and courts, the issue may properly be raised by 

courts, even at the appellate stage, on their own motion. See In re Cassidy, 

892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990); State v. Duncan, 710 N.W.2d 34, 43-44 

(Iowa 2006). 

 Under our cases, 

[t]he doctrine [of judicial estoppel] “prohibits a party who has 

successfully and unequivocally asserted a position in one 

proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a 

subsequent proceeding.” It is a “common sense” rule, designed 

to protect the integrity of the judicial process by preventing 

deliberately inconsistent—and potentially misleading—

assertions from being successfully urged in succeeding 

tribunals. The doctrine is properly limited in its application to 
10 

cases involving privity with, or prejudice to, the party invoking 

the doctrine. Another fundamental feature of the doctrine is 

the requirement of proof that the inconsistent position has 

been successfully asserted in the prior tribunal. Without such 

proof, “application of the rule is unwarranted because no risk 

of inconsistent, misleading results exists.” 

Wilson v. Liberty Mut. Group, 666 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Iowa 2003) (quoting 

Vennerberg Farms, Inc. v. IGF Ins. Co., 405 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1987)) 

(other citations omitted). 

 The doctrine at issue, although called “judicial” estoppel, is applicable 

in administrative, as well as judicial, cases. See Rissetto v. Plumbers & 

Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 604 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Unsurprisingly given its name, judicial estoppel is often 

articulated as applying to “judicial” proceedings. However, 

many cases have applied the doctrine where the prior 

statement was made in an administrative proceeding, and we 

are not aware of any case refusing to apply the doctrine 

because the prior proceeding was administrative rather than 

judicial. 

Id.; see also Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1427 (7th Cir. 

1993) (“Though called judicial estoppel, the doctrine has been applied, 

rightly in our view, to proceedings in which a party to an administrative 

proceeding obtains a favorable order that he seeks to repudiate in a 

subsequent judicial proceeding.”); Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 4477, at 575 (2002) (judicial estoppel applicable to 

cases of inconsistent statement made to administrative agency). The 

rationale for this principle is that “[a]scertaining the truth is as important in 

an administrative inquiry as in judicial proceedings.” Simon v. Safelite 

Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1997). 

 Our Wilson case is closely analogous to this one. In Wilson a workers’ 

compensation claimant settled his case with his employer under the 

provisions of Iowa Code section 85.35. As required by that statute, Wilson 

admitted there was a bona fide dispute with his employer regarding the 
11 

cause of his injury. His employer’s insurance carrier paid benefits under 

the settlement agreement. Wilson then filed a lawsuit against the insurance 

carrier for alleged bad-faith failure to settle the claim. Wilson, 666 N.W.2d 

at 165. 

 We held that Wilson was precluded, in a civil action, to claim badfaith failure to settle because this was exactly the opposite of what he had 

stated in his workers’ compensation settlement agreement, i.e., that there 

was a bona fide dispute on liability. Id. at 166-67. We reached that 

conclusion on the basis of judicial estoppel because 

[p]lainly Wilson’s position in the bad faith action is inconsistent 

with the position he asserted in the workers’ compensation 

litigation. To prevail on his bad faith claim, Wilson would 

necessarily have to prove that Liberty Mutual had no 

reasonable basis to deny his claim. Yet in the section 85.35 

proceedings before the workers’ compensation commissioner, 

Wilson successfully asserted there was a bona fide dispute as 

to whether his injuries were work-related so as to entitle him to 

additional benefits. These positions are clearly inconsistent. 

Id. at 167 (citation omitted). 

 In Simon a worker told the Social Security Administration he was 

unable to work, and the court held he was judicially estopped from later 

claiming damages for age discrimination against his employer because his 

later claim required proof that he was qualified and able to perform the 

duties required for his position. 128 F.3d at 73-74. 

 In DeGuiseppe v. Village of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187 (7th Cir. 1995), a 

police officer won a disability pension by claiming inability to perform his 

duties. He later sued the village for retaliatory discharge. As part of his 

retaliatory-discharge suit, the plaintiff was required to show he was not

disabled. DeGuiseppe, 68 F.3d at 191. While the plaintiff contended he was 

not disabled, the court said: 
12 

Regardless of whether or not this contention is true, this Court 

is not disposed to consider it. Under the doctrine of judicial 

estoppel, which “prevents a party who has successfully taken a 

position in one litigation from taking the opposite position in a 

subsequent litigation,” courts are under no compulsion to heed 

the shifting theories of “chameleonic litigants.” Instead, we will 

accept a party's prevailing position in previous litigation (or, as 

here, quasi-judicial proceedings) as dispositive. 

Id. (quoting Czajkowski v. City of Chicago, 810 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (N.D. Ill. 

1992)) (other citation omitted). 

 In this case, it is understandable why Winnebago admitted liability in 

the alternate-care proceeding. If an employer admits liability, it ordinarily 

has the right to control the care provided to the employee. Iowa Code 

§ 85.27(4). The right to control treatment, however, is lost if the employer 

disputes liability. Trade Prof’ls, Inc. v. Shriver, 661 N.W.2d 119, 124 (Iowa 

2003). In Trade Professionals we based this conclusion on the Workers’ 

Compensation Commissioner’s interpretation of an administrative rule. 

Under the Iowa Administrative Code, 

[a]pplication cannot be filed under this rule [for applying for 

alternate care] if the liability of the employer is an issue. If an 

application is filed where the liability of the employer is at 

issue, the application will be dismissed without prejudice. 

Iowa Admin. Code r. 876—4.48(7) (2001). 

 As we noted in Trade Professionals, 

[t]he industrial commissioner has interpreted this section to 

mean that, 

in Iowa, an employer and its insurer have the right to 

control the medical care claimant receives, with two 

exceptions. The first is where the employer has denied 

liability for the injury. The second is where claimant has 

sought and received authorization from this agency for 

alternative medical care. 

Trade Prof’ls, 661 N.W.2d at 124 (quoting Freels v. Archer Daniels Midland 

Co., #1151214 (7/30/2000)). 
13 

 We can assume in this case that Winnebago decided to admit liability 

for the purpose of maintaining control over Haverly’s care, but rejected any 

broader application of that admission because it wanted to challenge its 

liability for payment of benefits. Under judicial estoppel, this ordinarily 

cannot be permitted. There might, in some cases, be a significant change in 

the facts after the admission of liability that could justify a change of 

position by the employer, but those facts are not present here. 

VII. Conclusion. 

 For the reasons discussed, we vacate the decision of the court of 

appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand to the 

commission for computation of benefits. 

 DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF 

DISTRICT COURT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED. 

 All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.