NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIFARAH C. McDANIEL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

JIM MATTIS, Secretary, Department of 

Defense, Agency (DFAS), 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-56560 

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01112-MWFPLA 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 15, 2017**

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

Tifarah C. McDaniel appeals pro se from the district court’s summary 

judgment in her action alleging federal claims in connection with her employment. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. 

County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 20 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 16-56560 

basis supported by the record, Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 

(9th Cir. 2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on McDaniel’s race 

discrimination claim because McDaniel failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether she was performing according to her employer’s 

expectations and that similarly situated employees outside her protected class were 

treated more favorably, or whether her employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 

640-41 (setting forth prima facie case of discrimination and burden shifting 

requirements under Title VII).

To the extent McDaniel alleged a hostile work environment claim, summary 

judgment was proper because McDaniel failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether she was subjected to conduct that was severe or 

pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment. See id. at 642 (to 

demonstrate a hostile work environment, plaintiff must establish that the conduct 

was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and 

create an abusive work environment).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on McDaniel’s 
3 16-56560 

disability discrimination claim because McDaniel failed to raise a genuine dispute 

of material fact as to whether she had a disability as defined by the Rehabilitation 

Act. See Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007) (a 

disability discrimination claim requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that she “is a 

person with a disability”; an individual who has “a physical or mental impairment 

that substantially limits one or more of the [individual’s] major life activities” 

qualifies as disabled).

We do not consider documents and facts not presented to the district court. 

See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts 

not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.