TENNESSEE DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 

Employee: John Beers ) Docket No. 2014-06-0079 

) 

Employer: Rajendra Bhakta, ) 

 d/b/a Ram Construction ) State File No. 93780-2014 

In accordance with Rule 0800-02-22-.02(6), please find attached the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeals Board’s Opinion Affirming and Remading Interlocutory Order of 

Court of Workers' Compensation Claims in the referenced case. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Opinion Affirming and Remading 

Interlocutory Order of Court of Workers' Compensation Claims was sent to the following 

recipients by the following methods of service on this the 8th day of April, 2015. 

Name Certified 

Mail 

First Class 

Mail 

Via 

Fax 

Fax 

Number 

Via 

Email 

Email Address 

John Beers X newlookjohnbeers@gmail.com 

Michael L. Haynie X mhaynie@manierherod.com 

Kenneth M. Switzer, 

Chief Judge

 X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, 

Court of Workers’ 

Compensation Claims

 X Penny.Patterson-Shrum@tn.gov

 

Jeanette Baird

Deputy Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B 

Nashville, TN 37243 

Telephone: 615-253-0064 

Electronic Mail: Jeanette.Baird@tn.gov 
TENNESSEE DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 

Employee: John Beers 

Employer: Rajendra Bhakta, d/b/a 

Ram Construction 

Appeal from the Court of Workers' 

Compensation Claims 

Kenneth M. Switzer, Judge 

) Docket No. 2014-06-0079 

) 

) State File No. 93780-2014 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Affirmed and Remanded- Filed April 8, 2015 

FILED 

.-\ pril 8, 2015 

TENNESSEE 

\YORKERS' COl\IPENSATION 

APPEALS BOARD 

Time: 9:00Al\I 

OPINION AFFIRMING AND REMANDING INTERLOCUTORY 

ORDER OF COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS 

This interlocutory appeal involves a construction worker who injured his head and low 

back when he fell from a ladder at a job site where he was making repairs to the roof of a 

hotel. He alleged that for approximately one and one-half years before the accident he 

worked "off and on" for the owner of the construction company that was the general 

contractor for the job. The construction company denied that the worker was an 

employee at the time of the alleged injury, denied that the company was the general 

contractor on the project, and denied that it paid the worker for any work performed on 

the project. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court found that the injured worker 

did not work for the construction company as a statutory employee on the date of the 

alleged injury. The worker has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, which 

did not include a transcript of the expedited hearing or a statement of the evidence, we 

affirm the decision of the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims. 

Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board, in which Judge 

Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge Timothy W. Conner, joined. 

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John Beers, Chapmansboro, Tennessee, employee-appellant, prose 

Michael Haynie, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, Rajendra Bhakta, d/b/a 

Ram Construction 

Factual and Procedural Background 

John Beers is a resident of Cheatham County. He was injured on November 28, 

2014, when he fell from a ladder while working on the roof at the Dickerson Road Motel, 

a/k/a the Trinity Inn ("Trinity Inn") in Nashville. 1 He testified in the expedited hearing 

that he worked "off and on" for Rajendra "Ray" Bhakta, owner of Ram Construction 

("Ram"), for approximately one and one-half years before the alleged incident, 

performing construction work at various hotels. Exhibits introduced during the expedited 

hearing include several checks that Mr. Beers testified were paid to him by Mr. Bhakta 

that were drawn on "Nashville Hotel at the Crossings," and a check that Mr. Beers 

testified was paid to him by Mr. Bhakta drawn on the "Best Western Inn in Winchester." 

Mr. Beers testified that on an unspecified date Mr. Bhakta offered him work at the 

Trinity Inn at the hourly rate of $17 .00 for ten to twelve hours per day, seven days per 

week. He introduced a check dated December 2, 2014, drawn upon Subway Store 

#22053, which he testified Mr. Bhakta gave him for work performed at the Trinity Inn. 

Mr. Beers testified that he reported to an individual known to him as "Pops" at the Trinity 

Inn. 

Mr. Beers testified that while making roof repairs at the Trinity Inn on November 

28, 2014, he fell from a ladder, injuring his head and low back. He went to the 

emergency department at Skyline Medical Center immediately afterward and was treated 

and discharged the same day. He admitted that he listed his employer/guarantor as "New 

Look Construction" on the records at Skyline Medical Center, but he testified "New Look 

Construction" was a former business name under which he operated and that at the time 

of the injury he worked for Mr. Bhakta. Mr. Beers acknowledged that he previously used 

invoices bearing the name "New Look" that he submitted to Mr. Bhakta for his work and 

for materials he purchased for jobs at another hotel. Mr. Beers acknowledged that Mr. 

Vijay Patel owned the Trinity Inn, and that Mr. Patel told him to come to work on the 

date of the alleged injury. He also acknowledged that Mr. Patel, rather than Mr. Bhakta, 

wrote the check for his work at the Trinity Inn. He testified that he did not know whether 

Pops worked for Mr. Patel or Mr. Bhakta. 

Mr. Bhakta testified that he is a general contractor, and that his company, Ram, 

1 No transcript of the expedited hearing or statement of the evidence has been filed. We have garnered the factual 

background from the pleadings, the exhibits introduced at the expedited hearing and the trial court's order entered 

following the expedited hearing. 

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reports to its workers' compensation carrier that it has no employees because it uses 

subcontractors. He testified that Ram provides supervision of work performed by its 

subcontractors and ensures the timely completion of projects. Mr. Bhakta admitted a 

previous working relationship with Mr. Beers, and he acknowledged that he hired Mr. 

Beers to perform work on a pool at the Holiday Inn Express in March or early April 

2014. He testified that he became dissatisfied with Mr. Beers' work and terminated his 

services in September or October 2014. 

Mr. Bhakta testified that he was "helping out" Mr. Patel with work at the Trinity 

Inn because it was Mr. Patel's first construction project. He testified his involvement 

ended prior to the date that Mr. Beers was injured. A construction permit, issued on 

November 6, 2014, was introduced that identifies Ram Construction as the Contractor for 

work "to make interior renovations and re-roof fire damaged hotel 'Trinity Inn."' Under 

the signature line, the permit reads "Rajendra Bhakta," but Mr. Patel signed the permit. 

According to Mr. Bhakta, the permit was for demolition only, and when he learned that 

other, unauthorized work took place on the site, he contacted the city to stop the work. 

An identical copy of the permit was introduced that bears the handwritten notation, 

"Cancell (sic) permits 12-5-15 Rajendra Bhakta." 

Mr. Bhakta testified that he did not know Pops and that he did not write any 

checks to Mr. Beers while Mr. Beers worked at the Trinity Inn. Mr. Bhakta testified that 

Ram was not the general contractor at Trinity Inn on November 28, 2014, and that Mr. 

Beers was neither his employee nor his subcontractor on that date. 

In rebuttal, Mr. Beers testified that "everything had to go through [Mr. Bhakta]," 

on the Trinity Inn project, and that Mr. Bhakta summoned him to his office several times 

to discuss the project. 

Standard of Review 

The standard of review to be applied by the Appeals Board in reviewing a trial 

court's decision is statutorily mandated and limited in scope. Specifically, "[t]here shall 

be a presumption that the findings and conclusions of the workers' compensation judge 

are correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." Tenn. Code Ann. § 

50-6-239(c)(7) (2014). The trial court's decision must be upheld unless "the rights of the 

party seeking review have been prejudiced because findings, inferences, conclusions, or 

decisions of a workers' compensation judge: 

(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions; 

(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers' compensation judge; 

(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure; 

(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or 

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clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or 

(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the 

light of the entire record. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(2) (2014). 

In applying the above standard, courts have construed substantial and material 

evidence to mean "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a 

rational conclusion and such as to furnish a reasonably sound basis for the action under 

consideration." Clay County Manor, Inc. v. State of Tennessee, 849 S.W.2d 755, 759 

(Tenn. 1993) (quoting Southern Railway Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 682 S.W.2d 

196, 199 (Tenn. 1984)). Like other courts applying the standard embodied in section 50-

6-217(a)(2), we will not disturb the decision of the trial court absent the limited 

circumstances identified in the statute. 

Analysis 

An appellant bears the burden of showing that the evidence presented in the trial 

court preponderates against the trial court's findings. Manufacturers Consol. Service v. 

Rodell, 42 S.W.3d 846, 865 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coakley v. Daniels, 840 

S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)). However, "an employee need not prove each 

and every element of his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence at an expedited 

hearing to be entitled to temporary disability or medical benefits, but must instead present 

evidence sufficient for the trial court to conclude that that the employee would likely 

prevail at a hearing on the merits in accordance with the express terms of [Tennessee 

Code Annotated] section 50-6-239(d)(l) (2014)." McCord v. Advantage Human 

Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, slip op. at 5 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. Mar. 

27, 2015). 

An appellant also has the burden to ensure that an adequate record is prepared on 

appeal. As the Supreme Court's Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel 

explained in Vulcan Materials Co. v. Watson, No. M2003-00975-WC-R3-CV, 2004 

Tenn. LEXIS 451, at *6-7 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel May 19, 2004): 

The appellant has the duty of preparing a record that conveys a fair, 

accurate and complete account of the proceedings in the trial court with 

respect to the issues on appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). We are provided 

with only the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law rendered 

from the bench and the exhibits introduced at the trial of this cause, which 

include three doctor's depositions. We do not have a record of the lay 

testimony presented to the trial court. In the absence of an adequate record 

on appeal, this Court must presume the trial court's rulings were supported 

by sufficient evidence. 

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We have noted in prior opinions addressing appeals of interlocutory orders that 

including a transcript or statement of the evidence as part of the record on appeal 

promotes meaningful appellate review and, in tum, public confidence in the integrity and 

fairness of the process. See, e.g., Higgins v. Big K Food Market & Liquors, Inc., No. 

2014-01-0007 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. Dec. 8, 2014). "Full appellate 

consideration of a trial court's determination ... is part of the process designed to 

achieve an accurate and just decision .... " In re Adoption of JD. W., No. M2000-00 l 5 l -

COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 546, at * 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2000). 

"Without a transcript or a statement of the evidence, the appellate court cannot know 

what evidence was presented to the trial court, and there is no means by which we can 

evaluate the appellant's assertion that the evidence did not support the trial court's 

decision." Britt v. Chambers, No. W2006-00061-COA-R3-CV, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 

38, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007). When the review of a trial court's decision is 

accompanied by a presumption that the findings are correct, "it is essential that the 

appellate court be provided with a transcript of the trial proceedings or a statement of the 

evidence .... " Id. at *7. See also Estate of Cockrill, No. M2010-00663-COA-R3-CV, 

2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 754, at *11-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2010) ("In cases where 

no transcript or statement of the evidence is filed, the appellate court is required to 

presume that the record, had it been properly preserved, would have supported the action 

of the trial court."); Leek for Estate of Lovelace v. Powell, 884 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1996) ("In the absence of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must 

conclusively presume that every fact admissible under the pleadings was found or should 

have been found favorably to the appellee."). In short, "[a]n incomplete appellate record 

is fatal to an appeal on the facts," Piper v. Piper, No. M2005-02541-COA-R3-CV, 2007 

Tenn. App. LEXIS 70, at* 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. I, 2007), and a reviewing court "must 

conclusively presume that the evidence presented supported the facts as found by the trial 

court." Whitesell v. Moore, No. M201 l-02745-COA-R3-CV, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 

894, at *IO Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2012). 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(ll)(A) defines "Employee" to 

include "every person ... whether lawfully or unlawfully employed ... under any 

contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-

102(ll)(A) (2014). "In order for one to be an employee of another for purposes of our 

Workers' Compensation Law, it is, therefore, required that there be an express or implied 

agreement for the alleged employer to remunerate the alleged employee for his services 

in behalf of the former." Blackv. Dance, 643 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tenn. 1982). 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-1 B(a) provides that "[a] principal 

contractor, intermediate contractor or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to 

any employee injured while in the employ of any of the subcontractors of the principal 

contractor, intermediate subcontractor or subcontractor and engaged upon the subject 

matter of the contract to the same extent as the immediate employer." Tenn. Code Ann.§ 

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50-6-113(a) (2014). 

In the present case, the trial court found that on the date of Mr. Beers' alleged 

injury he did not work for Ram as a statutory employee. Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 50-6-239(c)(7) mandates that we presume the trial court's findings and 

conclusions to be correct, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. We 

have been provided with no record of any testimony taken during the expedited hearing. 

No statement of the evidence was offered by the appellant and, under these 

circumstances, we must presume that the trial court's rulings were supported by sufficient 

evidence. See Manufacturers Consol. Service, 42 S.W.3d at 865. 

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against 

the trial court's finding that Mr. Beers did not work for Ram as a statutory employee. 

Accordingly, the trial court's decision is affirmed and the case is remanded for any 

further proceedings that may be necessary. 

David F. Hensley, Judge 

Workers' Compensation Appeals Board 

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