THIRD DIVISION

										June 28, 2002

No. 1-01-1034

In re D.F. and D.F., Minors,       	  )   Appeal from the

								  )   Circuit Court of

(The People of the State of Illinois,	  )   Cook County.	 								  )	

	Petitiononerlaintiff-Appellee,				  )	          	 								  )             

		v. 						  )

								  )	

L.F.,							  )   Honorable

								  )	 Mark J. Lopez,

	RespondentDefendant-Appellant.).			  )	 Judge Presiding.

	JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

	Deshawn F. and Danella F. were taken from their mother,

Lashawn F., and placed in foster care after their well-being came

to the attention of the Illinois Department of Children and

Family Services (DCFS).  

	At an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found the

children were abused and neglected and, at the dispositional

hearing, adjudged them wards of the court.  Then, after an

evidentiary hearing, the trial court found Lashawn was an unfit

parent on the following grounds: (1) she failed to make

reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis

for the removal of the children within nine months after the

adjudication of abuse and neglect, and (2) she failed to make

reasonable progress toward the return of the children within the

same time period.  

	Lashawn appeals the trial court's judgment, contending the

trial court applied the wrong time periods in evaluating both her

efforts and her progress.  According to Lashawn, when we consider

the proper time periods we should conclude the trial court's

findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.  We

affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS

	Deshawn was born on March 27, 1994, and Danella was born on

July 25, 1992.  Both children tested positive for cocaine shortly

after birth.  Deshawn was also treated for syphilis.  DCFS was

notified about the family after Deshawn was born.  

	On January 18, 1995, the State filed petitions to adjudicate

Danella and Deshawn wards of the court and moved to place the

children in the temporary custody of the DCFS guardianship

administrator.  The court found probable cause existed that the

children were abused and neglected, and placed them in temporary

custody.

	The trial court held the adjudicatory hearing on June 16,

1995.  At the hearing, Mark Kolp, a paramedic for the Chicago

Police Department, testified he responded to a 911 call on

September 15, 1994.  Lashawn made the call for an ambulance to

take Deshawn to the hospital.  When Kolp questioned Lashawn,

Lashawn responded she had just returned home after being away for

four hours during which time she "was drinking and smoking reefer."  Kolp was also able to learn from Lashawn that Deshawn

was "a cocaine baby."

	During the ride to the hospital, Kolp observed Lashawn

shaking and unable to maintain a thought.  He also noticed both

Lashawn and the child were unclean and unkempt.  Kolp said he

believed he told Lashawn he intended to contact DCFS out of

concern for Lashawn's ability to care for Deshawn.  

	DCFS Investigator Levelle Kimble testified he investigated

Lashawn's residence on September 15, 1994.  During the visit, he

observed roaches in the home and that the home was "very untidy."

	On January 12, 1995, Kimble again visited Lashawn, this time

at a new residence.  During this visit, Kimble observed the home

had roaches and was not adequately clean and the children were

dirty. 

	The State then introduced evidence that both Danella and

Deshawn tested positive for the presence of cocaine metabolites

in their system shortly after birth.  The State also introduced a

report indicating Lashawn was admitted to the hospital after

complaining of hearing voices.  Lashawn was diagnosed as having

"Access 1 major depression with psychotic features" and

discharged on November 19, 1994, with medication.  

	Lashawn then introduced a report prepared by a doctor at the

hospital where Deshawn was treated on September 15, 1994.  In the

report, the doctor disagreed with an assessment that Lashawn was unable to care for Deshawn.  According to the doctor's report,

Lashawn appeared well-bonded to Deshawn.   

	At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found "that the

minors are neglected as to controlled substance as well as

injurious environment and that they are abused in that they have

been subjected to substantial risk of harm."  

	At the dispositional hearing on February 14, 1996, the trial

court again heard how the case came to the attention of DCFS. 

Derrick Cargle, the DCFS case worker assigned to this case in

November 1994, also testified Lashawn had a service plan

available to her that included recommendations to follow up on

drug rehabilitation referrals and complete a psychological

evaluation and special clinical services requirements.  Lashawn

did not comply with the service plan.  She only completed one of

the "psychologicals" and two initial screenings (presumably for

drug treatment programs), but failed to follow up with those

services.  Lashawn's reason for not participating in services was

that she had no transportation.  But Cargle testified he agreed

to provide her with tokens.  

	Cargle also testified the children were currently placed

with Lorelle Boyce, their great-aunt, and that the children were

doing well there.  Lashawn visited them only sporadically. 

Cargle recommended the court take guardianship of Danella and

Deshawn.  He did not recommend any unsupervised contact between Lashawn and the children.  

	At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found it

in the best interests of the children to adjudge them wards of

the court.  The court found Lashawn unable to care for, protect,

train, or discipline the children.  The children were allowed to

remain with Boyce.

	On November 1, 1999, the State filed supplemental petitions

for the appointment of a guardian with right to consent to the

adoption of the minors.  The petitions contained numerous grounds

of parental unfitness, including:

	"[Lashawn] failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the

conditions which were the basis for the removal of the

child[ren] from [her] within 9 months after the adjudication

of neglect or abuse under the Juvenile Court Act *** which

conduct is in violation of 750 ILCS 50/1D(m) ***.

and/or

	[Lashawn] failed to make reasonable progress toward the

return of the child[ren] to [her] within 9 months after the

adjudication of neglect or abuse under the Juvenile Court

Act *** which conduct is in violation of 750 ILCS 50/1D(m)

***."

	On August 18, 2000, the hearing to determine whether Lashawn

was a fit parent began.  The trial court heard testimony from

several case workers and Lashawn.  The parties also introduced into evidence various documents, including service plans prepared

and evaluated by the case workers that documented, among other

things, Lashawn's cooperation with the case workers'

recommendations.  

	On December 1, 2000, the court found Lashawn was unfit

because 

	"she *** failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the

conditions which were the basis for the removal of the

child[ren from her] within nine months after the

adjudication [of] neglect or abuse under the Juvenile Court

Act and *** failed to make reasonable progress toward the

return of the child[ren to her] within nine months after the

adjudication of neglect or abuse under the Juvenile Court

Act. ***"

	The court also said the relevant time period to assess

Lashawn's efforts and progress was from June 15, 1995 -- the date

the children were adjudicated neglected and abused -- to March

15, 1996.  The record indicates the actual date the children were

adjudicated neglected was June 16, 1995. 

	On January 30, 2001, the court held a hearing on whether it

was in the best interests of the children to terminate Lashawn's

parental rights.  The court heard testimony from Carla Wages,

Lashawn's case worker at the time; Boyce; Lashawn; and Edwina

Hood, Lashawn's sister and a potential adoptive parent.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determined it was not in the best interests of the children to terminate Lashawn's parental

rights.   

	Lashawn now appeals the trial court's December 1, 2000,

finding of unfitness, contending: (1) under the current version

of section 1D(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1D(m) (West

Supp. 2002)), the trial court did not consider evidence from the

appropriate time periods in making its findings; and (2) evidence

presented from the proper time periods shows the trial court's

findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence.  In the

alternative, Lashawn says we should vacate the finding of

unfitness and direct the trial court on remand to evaluate the

evidence under the relevant time periods.  

DECISION	

The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 and the Adoption Act

	Under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the involuntary

termination of parental rights involves a two-step process: (1)

the State must prove the parent is unfit as defined in section 1D

of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1D (West Supp. 2002)); and (2)

the court considers whether it is in the best interests of the

minor to terminate parental rights.  705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West

1999); see also In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210, 766 N.E.2d 1105 (2002).  The Adoption Act lists various grounds under which a

parent may be found unfit.  750 ILCS 50/1D (West Supp. 2002).  

	Under the version of the Act in place at the time the State

filed its supplemental petitions for appointment of a guardian

with the right to consent to adoption, section 1D(m) contained

the following two grounds for unfitness:

	"Failure by a parent to make reasonable efforts to correct

the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the

child from the parent, or to make reasonable progress toward

the return of the child to the parent within 9 months after

an adjudication of neglected or abused minor *** or

dependent minor ***."  750 ILCS 50/1D(m) (West 1999). 

	Effective January 1, 2000, the legislature amended the

section to read:

	"Failure by a parent (i) to make reasonable efforts to

correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal

of the child from the parent, or (ii) to make reasonable

progress toward the return of the child to the parent within

9 months after an adjudication of neglected or abused minor

*** or dependent minor ***, or (iii) to make reasonable

progress toward the return of the child to the parent during

any 9-month period after the end of the initial 9-month

period following the adjudication of neglected or abused

minor *** or dependent minor ***."	 750 ILCS 50/1D(m) (West Supp. 2002).  

	The parties agree we should use the statute as amended to determine the appropriate time periods applicable in this case.

	Lashawn contends that under the current version of the

statute, the nine-month period to assess a parent's fitness is

limited to the reasonable progress ground and does not apply to

the reasonable efforts ground.  Lashawn also contends the proper

date to begin assessing whether the parent has made reasonable

efforts or reasonable progress is the date of the dispositional

order, not the date of the adjudication of neglect, abuse, or

dependency.  Lashawn finally contends, when viewing the evidence

from the appropriate time period, the trial court's findings are

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Applicability of the Nine-Month Period

to the "Reasonable Efforts" Analysis

	In support of her contention that the nine-month limitation

does not apply to the reasonable efforts analysis, Lashawn relies

on In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d 461, 740 N.E.2d 60 (2000).  In that case, the Fourth District said the 2000 amendment to section

1D(m) "strongly suggest[s] that the legislature did not intend

the nine-month limitation to apply to a reasonable effort

analysis.  The current version sets forth three separate

enumerated grounds, specifying a time period for the second and

third but not the first."  In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 464- 65.  The Fourth District also said the amendment placed in doubt

the supreme court's holding in In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 727 N.E.2d 990 (2000).  In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 464-65.

	In In re D.L., the supreme court concluded that under the pre-amended statute the then 12-month limitation in Section 1D(m)

(amended to nine months in 1997) applied to both the reasonable efforts and reasonable progress grounds listed in the section. 

In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 10.    

	Purely legal issues regarding the proper construction of a

statute are reviewed de novo.  In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 211.  The primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect

to the intention of the legislature.  In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 211.  Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a

court must give effect to the statute as written.  In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 211. 

	Where the legislature has amended a statute after it has

been interpreted in the courts, "we presume the legislature was

aware of the judicial construction and acted with that knowledge.

*** Thus, where the amendment did not change the substance of the

statute, prior judicial interpretations retain their validity." 

S.D. v. Kishwaukee Community Hospital, 288 Ill. App. 3d 472, 477- 78, 681 N.E.2d 140 (1997); see also Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill. 2d 445, 458-59, 687 N.E.2d 1014 (1997) (legislature did not intend to amend clause that was previously

interpreted by courts where amendment to the statute did not

substantively change the clause at issue). 

	Under the clear and unambiguous language of the amended

section 1D(m) and the holding in In re D.L., a court's review of a parent's efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis

for the removal of the minor is limited to the nine-month period

following the adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency.  The

supreme court held "the relevant period of time under this

provision, in which the parent's efforts or progress must be assessed and measured, is the 12-month period following the

adjudication."  (Emphasis added.)   In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 10.  The legislature's amendment that shortened the relevant time

period from 12 months to nine months did not affect the supreme

court's holding.  See In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 564, 736 N.E.2d 678 (2000) (subsection (m) limits the evidence that may be

considered for both reasonable progress and reasonable efforts to

the nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect).  

	We respectfully disagree with the Fourth District's

conclusion that the 2000 amendment "strongly suggest[s] that the legislature did not intend the nine-month limitation to apply to

a reasonable effort analysis" and that "the application of the

supreme court's decision [in In re D.L.] to [section 1D(m)] now appears to be in doubt regarding the 'reasonable efforts' prong."  (Emphasis added.)  In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 464-65.  Contrary to the Fourth District's position, the 2000 amendment did not substantively change the language interpreted by the supreme court in In re D.L.  The Fourth District reads too much into the legislature's addition of numbers and a third element.  

	In the 2000 amendment, the only change the legislature made to the language interpreted by the supreme court in In re D.L. was to add lowercase roman numerals.  The only other change the

legislature made to section 1D(m) in the 2000 amendment was to

add another ground under which a court may find a parent unfit. 

In light of the additional ground added to the section, the

legislature added the roman numerals to maintain clarity in the

statute.  Because the amendment did not change the wording of the

sections of the statute examined by the supreme court in In re D.L., the supreme court's interpretation retains its validity and applicability to the current section 1D(m).

	This interpretation of the amended statute is entirely

consistent with other provisions of the Adoption Act and with the

purpose of the Juvenile Court Act.  Section 20a of the Adoption

Act states: 

	"It is in the best interests of persons to be adopted that

this Act be construed and interpreted so as not to result in

extending time limits beyond those set forth herein."  750

ILCS 50/20a (West 1999).  

	As the supreme court said, reading section 1D(m) to allow

the court to consider evidence beyond the period specified in the

section "would be inconsistent with the preceding provision."  In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 11.  Section 20 of the Adoption Act requires "[p]roceedings under this Act *** receive priority over

other civil cases in being set for hearing."  750 ILCS 50/20

(West 1999).  Also, "[a]n appeal from a judgment order for

adoption or other appealable orders under this Act shall be

prosecuted and heard on an expedited basis ***."  750 ILCS 50/20

(West 1999).  Section 1-2 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

provides that when a child is removed from the custody of his

parent DCFS shall consider concurrent planning, "so that

permanency may occur at the earliest opportunity."  (Emphasis added.)  705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 1999). 

	All these provisions show a desire by the legislature to

expedite adoptions and provide a permanent environment for the

minor as soon as possible.  Reading section 1D(m) as allowing a

parent a potentially unlimited amount of time to exhibit

reasonable efforts towards the return of the child is

inconsistent with these provisions.  

	Under the current version of the statute, a trial court's

review of a parent's reasonable efforts and reasonable progress

for the purposes of determining fitness is limited to the nine-

month period following the adjudication of neglect, abuse, or

dependency.

The Starting Date of the Nine-Month Period

	Lashawn also contends the appropriate date to begin measuring the nine-month period is the date the court determined

the disposition of the minors, February 14, 1996, not the date

the trial court adjudicated the minors neglected and abused, June

16, 1995.  In support of her contention, Lashawn cites In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 730 N.E.2d 637 (2000), along with other cases that either rely on In re D.S. or contain no analysis on the issue.  

	In In re D.S., the Fourth District held the nine-month time period specified in section 1D(m) under which the court should

review the parent's progress begins on the filing of the

dispositional order.  In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1028.  In reaching its conclusion, the Fourth District said the supreme

court's use of the date of adjudication of neglect in calculating

the appropriate time period in In re D.L. was not binding.  In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1027-28.  According to the Fourth District, the issue before the court in In re D.L. was whether the trial court could look beyond the then 12-month period

dictated by section 1D(m), not whether the date of the

adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency was the proper

start date for the 12-month period.  In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1027-28.    

	The Fourth District held the filing of the dispositional

order was the appropriate starting date because "[t]he filing of

the dispositional order completes the adjudication, renders it final, and gives rise to the right to appeal the adjudication of

neglect, abuse, or dependency."  In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1028.  The court observed that had the legislature intended the

time period begin on the date of the adjudicatory finding of

neglect, abuse, or dependency, as opposed to the date of the

dispositional order, the legislature would have said so as it did

in section 1D(m-1).  In re D.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1028 (citing 750 ILCS 50/1D(m-1) (West 1998) ("the date of entering foster

care is the earlier of: (i) the date of a judicial finding at an

adjudicatory hearing that the child is an abused, neglected, or

dependent minor ***")).  

	Lashawn waived the issue of whether the trial court erred in

using the date of adjudication of neglect and abuse as the

appropriate start date for the nine-month period under section

1D(m).  At trial, Lashawn's counsel not only failed to object to

the time period used, but also invited the court to choose the

date of adjudication of neglect in his closing argument when he

said: "Reasonable efforts, your Honor, should then be considered

from the date of the adjudication, which as June of '95; or the

date of the disposition which was February 14th of '96."  See In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242, 760 N.E.2d 85 (2001) ("[w]here a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the

court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for

review and the issue is waived").  We, nonetheless, choose to address the matter.  See Kus v. Sherman Hospital, 268 Ill. App. 3d 771, 781, 644 N.E.2d 1214 (1995) ("[T]he waiver rule is a

limitation on the parties to an appeal, not on the reviewing

court").  Again, we respectfully disagree with the Fourth

District.

	We find Lashawn's contention that the date of the

dispositional order is the appropriate start date is incorrect. 

The supreme court has emphasized the importance of applying the

plain language of the Adoption Act.  In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 212-15.  The plain language of section 1D(m) says the relevant

time period during which to assess a parent's conduct begins

after the "adjudication of neglected or abused minor under

Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minor

under Section 2-4 of that Act."  750 ILCS 50/1D(m) (West Supp.

2002).  The statute does not say the relevant period begins on the date the children are adjudged wards of the court.  

	Any ambiguity Lashawn may read into the statute should be

dispelled by those sections of the Juvenile Court Act that

explain what occurs at the adjudicatory hearing and the

dispositional hearing.  

	Section 2.1 of the Adoption Act says that the act "shall be

construed in concert with the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 ***." 

750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 1999).  Under the Juvenile Court Act,

"adjudicatory hearing" is defined in relevant part as "a hearing to determine whether the allegations *** that a minor *** is

abused, neglected or dependent, *** are supported by a

preponderance of the evidence."  705 ILCS 405/1-3(1) (West Supp.

2002).  The Juvenile Court Act defines "dispositional hearing" as

"a hearing to determine whether a minor should be adjudged to be

a ward of the court, and to determine what order of disposition

should be made in respect to a minor adjudged to be a ward of the

court."  705 ILCS 405/1-3(6) (West Supp. 2002). 

	Sections 2-21 and 2-22 reemphasize the adjudication of

neglect, abuse, or dependency occurs before the dispositional

hearing and the trial court's role in the dispositional hearing

is not to determine whether the minor is neglected, abused, or

dependent.  Section 2-21(2) states in part:

	"If *** the court determines *** that the minor is either

abused or neglected or dependent [at the adjudicatory

hearing], the court shall then set a time *** for a

dispositional hearing *** to be conducted under Section 2-22

at which hearing the court shall determine whether it is

consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the

minor and the public that he be made a ward of the court." 

705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 1999). 

	Section 2-22(1) reiterates the purpose of the dispositional

hearing: to "determine whether it is in the best interests of the

minor and the public that he be made a ward of the court, and, [if so, to] determine the proper disposition best serving the

health, safety and interests of the minor and the public."  705

ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 1999).

	These sections of the Juvenile Court Act show the

dispositional hearing does not involve adjudicating whether the

minor is abused, neglected, or dependent.  That determination is

made at the adjudicatory hearing, which occurs before the

dispositional hearing.  Thus, "an adjudication of neglected or

abused minor" as used in section 1D(m) of the Adoption Act does

not refer to the trial court's findings at the dispositional hearing, but instead to the trial court's findings at the

adjudicatory hearing.  As the State said, had the legislature

intended the nine-month time period to begin on the date the

dispositional order is entered, it could have easily said the

period begins after "the adjudication of the minor as a ward of

the court."

	Lashawn's contention disregards our previous uses of the

date the trial court found the minor neglected, abused, or

dependent in determining the relevant period during which to

assess a parent's efforts or progress under section 1D(m).  See, e.g, In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 392, 757 N.E.2d 613 (2001); In re D.H., 323 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11, 751 N.E.2d 54 (2001); In re C.M., 319 Ill. App. 3d 344, 357, 744 N.E.2d 916 (2001); In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 650, 658, 661, 740 N.E.2d 404 (2000).  For example, in In re B.S., the trial court used the date the minor was adjudged a ward of the court as the beginning of the

relevant time period instead of the date the minor was adjudged

dependent.  We held the relevant time period to evaluate whether

the parent made reasonable efforts or progress began on the date

the minor was adjudicated dependent, not on the date of the

dispositional order.  In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 658, 661.

	The supreme court also used the date the trial court found

the minor neglected, abused, or dependent in determining the

relevant period under section 1D(m) in In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 13.  We disagree with Lashawn's characterization of the supreme

court's use of the adjudicatory finding as the appropriate start

date as dicta.  Unlike the Fourth District, we would interpret In re D.L. as establishing the relevant time period in which the trial court should assess the parent's efforts and progress.  

	In In re D.L., the trial court adjudged the minor neglected and a ward of the court.  The State filed a supplemental petition

for the termination of the mother's parental rights on several

grounds.  More than three years after the minor was adjudged a

ward of the court, the trial court found the mother was not unfit.  The trial court relied on the mother's conduct occurring

more than 12 months after the adjudication of neglect.  In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 8.  The appellate court reversed, finding she was unfit under three grounds, one of which was the mother's failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the

child within the 12 months following the adjudication of neglect. 

In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 7.  

	The mother appealed only from the finding she was unfit for

failure to make reasonable progress, contending the trial court

properly considered her recent attempts to improve her life and

regain custody of the minor.  The supreme court rejected her

argument, concluding, under section 1D(m) as it then existed, the

trial court could consider only the parent's efforts or progress

within the 12 months following the adjudication of neglect.  In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 10.  In determining the exact time period applicable to her case, the supreme court used the date the trial

court adjudged the minor neglected, not the date the trial court

adjudged the minor a ward of the court.  In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 13.  

	The issue in In re D.L. was the exact time period during which the trial court could assess the parent's efforts and

progress under section 1D(m).  Necessary to the supreme court's

analysis was a determination of the proper start date for the

relevant time period.  The supreme court's designation of the

date of adjudication of neglect as the appropriate start date was

not dicta.  It was necessary to the decision in the case.

	Use of the date the minor is adjudicated neglected, abused,

or dependent, as opposed to the date of the dispositional order, is consistent with the purposes underlying the Adoption Act and

the Juvenile Court Act discussed in the previous section: to

expedite issues relating to the custody of minors.

	We conclude the trial court did not err in using the date it

issued its findings of neglect as the start date for the nine-

month period during which Lashawn's efforts and progress were

considered.

The Trial Court's Findings

	Lashawn also contends that if we use the proper time

periods, the trial court's findings of lack of reasonable efforts

and lack of reasonable progress would be against the manifest

weight of the evidence.  

	The State must prove parental unfitness by clear and

convincing evidence.  In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d 262, 270, 760 N.E.2d 542 (2001).  Because the trial court's opportunity to view

and evaluate the parties and their testimony is superior to that

of the reviewing court's, a trial court's finding of unfitness is

entitled to great deference and will be disturbed on appeal only

if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.  In re Grant M., 307 Ill. App. 3d 865, 868, 719 N.E.2d 195 (1999).  The trial court's finding is against the manifest weight of the

evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.  In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 270.  

	The Adoption Act contains several grounds for unfitness; proof of any one of them is sufficient to support a finding of

unfitness.  In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d at 210.  Under section 1D(m), reasonable efforts and reasonable progress are two distinct

grounds of unfitness, each requiring separate analysis.  In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 564, 736 N.E.2d 678 (2000). 

	Reasonable progress is an objective standard that focuses on

the steps the parent has taken toward the goal of reunification. 

In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 658.  The standard by which progress is measured is the parent's compliance with the court's

directives, service plans, or both.  In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 564.  Reasonable progress requires, at a minimum, the parent

make measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of

reunification.  In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 658.  

	Reasonable efforts, on the other hand, is a subjective

review of the parent's achievements.  In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 658.  The court must determine whether the parent has made

"earnest and conscientious strides" toward correcting the

conditions which led to the removal of the children.  In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 658.  A parent's deficiencies that are collateral to

the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the

children are not relevant to the reasonable efforts analysis.  In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 658.  

	Restricting our review of the evidence to the nine-month

period following the adjudication of neglect, June 16, 1995, to March 16, 1996, we disagree with Lashawn's contention that the

trial court's findings are against the manifest weight of the

evidence.  During the fitness hearing, the State introduced a

DCFS service plan, prepared and evaluated by Cargle, Lashawn's

case worker, during the relevant time period.  The service plan

covered the period from August 1995 to February 1996.

	According to the service plan, the problems or conditions to

be addressed by the plan were Lashawn's drug usage and her

emotional health, including problems resulting from depression. 

Among the tasks Lashawn was supposed to complete according to the

service plan were: (1) enroll in a substance abuse program; (2)

complete a urine analysis and forward DCFS a copy of the results;

(3) enter a job training program; and (4) participate in a

parenting class.  Cargle rated Lashawn unsatisfactory on each of

these tasks.  The State provided no evidence concerning Lashawn's

efforts or progress during March 1996.  

	Lashawn testified she did not attend all the referrals made

by Cargle because she did not have transportation.  She also said

she was unable to reach Cargle to explain the situation.  Lashawn

admitted she attended several meetings of a substance abuse

program, but did not complete the program.  She said that during

the relevant time period she visited the children regularly.

Lashawn also introduced into evidence orders of the trial court

showing Cargle failed to submit to the trial court the next period's service plan when it was due.  

	Based on the evidence, the trial court concluded Lashawn

failed to make both reasonable efforts and reasonable progress

toward the return of her children.  We conclude the opposite

result is not clearly evident.  Lashawn's participation in substance abuse programs, parenting classes, drug screening, and

job training were essential to correcting the problems that led

to the removal of the children.  Yet, Lashawn did not

satisfactorily complete one of those tasks.  Lashawn's failure to

complete any of these tasks does not demonstrate any measurable

or demonstrable movement toward the return of the children.  

	The only evidence Lashawn presented in her favor was that

she visited the children regularly, about twice a week. 

Apparently the trial court concluded Lashawn's visits did not

outweigh her non-compliance with the service plan.  This

conclusion is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.  

	We understand "the involuntary termination of a parent's

rights is a drastic step that permanently severs the parent-child

relationship."  In re J.J., No. 90529, slip op. at 8 (Ill. June 20, 2002).  For that reason we have carefully reviewed the record

to ensure the existence of clear and convincing evidence of

unfitness during the statutorily-dictated relevant time periods.  

	Lashawn directs this court to the efforts she made in 2000

to comply with the then-current service plans.  The trial court was not permitted to consider any evidence outside of the nine-

month period dictated by section 1D(m).  Thus, Lashawn's progress

and efforts in 2000 are irrelevant to the fitness determination. 

As Lashawn admitted during the January 30, 2001, hearing, "I have

done everything that I was supposed to do; but I didn't do it,

you know, in the time span that I had to do it.  And, you know,

honestly, it's probably too little too late."  

CONCLUSION

	We agree with the State and the Public Guardian that the

trial court did not err in reviewing Lashawn's efforts and

progress during the nine-month period immediately following the

trial court's findings that Danella and Deshawn were neglected

and abused.  We also conclude the trial court's findings that

Lashawn was an unfit parent because she failed to make reasonable

efforts and reasonable progress toward the return of the children

are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.  

	Affirmed.

	CERDA, and SOUTH, JJ., concur.