No. 2--05--0484 Filed 3/12/07

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF I LLINO IS, ) of Du Pa ge Co un ty. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 04--CF--2514 ) v. ) ) DAV ID A. DOLL, ) Honorab le ) Robert J. Anderson, Defend ant-App ellant. ) Judge , Pres idin g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE BYRNE de livered

the opinion of the c ourt: Following a bench

trial, de fendant , David

A. Doll, was convicted

of unlawful restraint (720 IL CS 5/10--3(a) (West 2004)) and sentenced to six y ears' imprisonment. Because de fe ndant wa s convicted of unlaw ful restr

aint of a minor, de fendant

was req uired to r egiste r as a se x offen der pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) ( 730 IL CS 150/2(B)(1.5), 3(a) (West 2004)). He appeals, contendi ng that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of unlawful restraint bey ond a rea sonable d

oubt; and (2) the Reg

istrati on Act is u

nconstitu tional as a

pplied to him because his crime did not involve any sexual motivation or component. For the reasons stated,

we affirm h

is conviction and

uphold the

constituti onality

of the Reg

istration Act as it a pplies to h

im. Defendant

was charged by

indictment with child abduction (720 IL CS 5/10--5( b)(10) ( West 2004)), unlawful restraint (720 IL CS 5/10--3(a) (West 2004)), and sexual exploitation of a c hild (720 IL CS 5/11--9.1(a--5) (West 2004)). The charg es arose from an incident that occurred on June 29,No. 2--05--0484

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2004, at the apartment co mplex w here defendant was employ ed as a janitor. On the charge of unlawful restraint, the State alleged that defendant

knowingly a

nd without legal authority de tained six-y ear-ol d

Tyeria L ., in that he took her into a closed staircase (refe rred to at trial as the fire escape stairway), pic

ked up Tyer

ia, and held her upside down. At the bench trial, Tyeria was seven yea rs old. Tyeria te stified that on the day in question, she lived in a

n apartm ent with he

r mother a

nd brothe rs. Ty eria tes tified tha

t she and her frie

n ds, Jenique and Ojamei, were cheerlea ding for Ty

er ia's brother , who was playing football. After cheerleading , Tye

ria a nd her fr iend T.T. saw def

endant ou tside the a partmen t wateri ng plan ts. Ty eria identified defendant in court. T.T. asked defendant to spra y them with the hose. Defendant sprayed Tyeria and T.T. After she finished pl aying , Tyeria w ent back into the apartment building and sat on the hallway steps inside the front entrance. She saw defendant washing the front windows in the hallway entrance. Defendant asked Ty eria if she wanted to

do somers aults, but

she did not respond. Ty

eria stated that de fendant then "grabbed" her and "took" her to the fire e scape stairway . Tyeria state d that, once there, defendant "jumped me up, and then he g rabbed my pa

nts, and my pants fell down." U sing a doll, Ty

eria de monstrate d what ha

d occurr ed. Ty eria he ld the doll u

pside dow

n by its ankles, lifted the doll up, held it at the waist, and then slid he r hands up an d stated that defendant "grabbed" her pant s and her " pants ca me down" to her feet. Ty eria told defendant to put her down and he put her down. She did not cry . The prosecutor asked Ty eria to demonstrate how long defendant held her, telling her to say "start" to repre sent whe

n she was first held by the ankles a

nd to say "stop" to represent when defendant put her down. The record r eflects that

the demonstration took about 15 seconds. Tyer ia stated that she returned to the park after de fendant let her go.No. 2--05--0484

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Tye ria testified that she wore capri pants that day, which were loose because they were a little too big. Tyer

ia stated that she usually wor e a belt with th

ose pants but did not on that day. When Tye ria arrived at the park, she told her two brother s and her two cousin s what ha

d happened. Ty

eria di d n ot te ll he r m ot he r a bo ut th e i nc id en t u nt il th e f ol lo wi ng da y. Oncross-examination, Tyeria testified that defendant

pulled her into the fire escape stairway and she told defendant that she did not want to go there. When asked whether she told her mother th at she had a

greed to go with

defenda nt, Ty eria re sponded that she did not tell he

r that she ha d agree d to go. T

ye ria reit erated that her pants fe ll down be cause de fendant grabb ed them. Patrick Dempsey, a

police officer who investigated the incident, testified that whe n he asked def endant what had happened, defendant at first denie d knowing any thing. Later, def

endant tol d Dempsey that he r emember ed a little girl asking i f she cou

ld help him wash the windows. At first, defendant denied that the little girl actually washed the windows, but he later said that the little girl used a squeegee to wash the windows. When Dem ps ey asked de fendant

if he kne

w the gi rl, defendant denied having seen her befor e, but he later stated that he had seen her in the complex and talked to her a few times and that, possibly , he fixed her bike. When confronted about the accusation agains thim, defendant denied ever touching or picking up Tyeria or

taking her t o the fir e escape stairwa y. Dempsey testified that de fendant made a point of telling him that he liked kids an d protected them. Dempsey stated tha t he kept telling defendant about what Ty eria had stated; that defendant picked her up, flipped

her over, took her clothes off, and took her into the fire escape area. Dempsey told defendant

that Ty eria wa s a very

believa ble gir l. At that p oint, def

endant a dmitted to Dempsey that he pi cked up the little g irl at the waist so she could wash the windows, that she moved around, and that she did flip over. After initially denying that Tyeria' s top fell over her face whenNo. 2--05--0484

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she flipped over, and that her pants came down to her a nkles , d efendant told Dempsey that, when he picked the girl up, she flipped over and her head

was facing the floor and her top c ame down over her face, exposing her chest and ba ck area. Defendant explained to Dempsey that he was holding Tye ria and her p ants at he

r ankles so she wou

ld not hit the floor. Defendant stated that, after the little girl started sc reaming and tried to get down, he put he r down and then she ran out the door. Defendant

wrote the following statement about the events, which Dempsey read tothe cour

t: "On Mo nd ay, 6/28/04, a

little gi rl *** had

approac hed custo dian David Dollin the foyer requesting work to wash thewindows. I observe d her doin

g the low er windo ws. Then she asked m e to pick her up so she could wash the upper part of the window, whe n done I held a grasp of her coming dow n but she twirled upside down, by her we aring loose clothes [i llegi ble] come down exposing her chest/underwear[,] while I grabbed hold of her ankles to prevent her from fal ling and be ing injured -- I a m sorry if y

ou thought I were

[ sic ] (atte mpti ng) to victimize your daughter in any way [,] but I don't associ ate with cri minal activity and for 'god' nothing

as to what you may

think had happened here as y

oulistened t

o your daug hter[']s story." Dempsey admitted t

hat when he spoke to Ty eria, sh e did

notsay that defe

ndant had touched her in any sexual ar ea. Dem psey further stated tha t Ty eria never told him that she had told defendant that she did n ot wan t to go to the fire escape staircase. Ty eria did not tell Dempsey tha t defendant grabbed her pants or pulled them down. Onredire ct, Demps ey

stated tha

t, at the ti

me he inte

rviewed defenda nt, Ty eria ha d told Dempsey that a man came to her, grabbed her by the arm, and walked her into the fire escapeNo. 2--05--0484

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st ai rw ay. Dempsey testified that his interview with defendant lasted about an hour and during that time he changed

his story at least f our times. Crystalon Gardner, Ty

eria's mother, testified that Tye ria had t old her th at she ha

d agre ed to go into the fire escape staircase with defe ndant; that defendant did not force her or take her to the fire escape

stairca se aga

inst her w ill. Gardner explained that the fire escape stairc ase is used by the tenants to exit the apartment building and to access the laundry area. Following closing argument, the trial court found def endant not guilty of c

hild abduction and of sexual exploitation of a child, because the court did not believe tha t the State h ad proved "the sexual gratification part

by proof beyond a re asonable doubt." However, the court found de fendant guilty of unlawful restraint. As to the unlawful restraint charge, the c ourt noted that i t foun d Tyeria's testimony to be clear, credible, and convincing . The court further stated that it believed the testimony of the o fficer and concluded that defenda nt's shifting from one position to another was evidence of a gu

ilty conscience. The trial

court further observed that, because de fendant was found guilty of unlaw ful restr

aint, he w as requi

red to register

as a sex of

fender . See 730 I

LCS 150/2(B)(1.5), 3(a) (West 2004). Defendant

f iled a motion for a new trial and a motion to declare the Registration Act unconstit utional, which were denied. Defe ndant wa s sentenc ed to an extended te rm of six y

ears' imprisonme

nt. The tria

l court de nied his mo tion to r econside r his sente

nce. De fendant

timely appeals

. Defendant

first contends that the State failed to prove him guilty of unlawf

ul restraint beyond

a reasonable doubt. On review, a conviction will not be set aside on grounds of insufficient evidence unless the proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt as to theNo. 2--05--0484

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defendant's guilt. People v. Collins , 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). The releva nt inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime bey ond a reasonable do ubt. People v. Cunningham , 212 I ll. 2d 274, 2 78 (2004) ; Collins , 106 Ill. 2d at 261. Defendant

argue s that he w as not pro ved gui lty o f unlawf

ul restra int bey ond a rea sonable doubtbe ca us e T yer ia 's te st im on y wa s u nr el ia bl e a nd co nt ra di ct ed by G ar dn er an d D em ps ey. According

to defendant, Ty

eria's testimony

was unreliable based

on her young

age, the fact that she could not recall with certainty

her activities that

day, and the f

act that the State coached her answer s. Defendant

argues that since Ty

eria received coaching

for the uncomplicated task of iden tifying defenda nt, it is re asonable

to assume

that she a

lso rece ived coa

ching o n other imp ortant ma tters. Defendant

further points out that Tyer ia testified that defe ndant pulled her onto the fire escape staircase, but her mother testified that Ty eria tol d her tha

t she ag reed to go there w

ith defendant and that d

efenda nt did not f

orce he r or take her ag ain st h er will. D efenda nt also poi

nts to Dempsey

's testim ony that Ty eria did not tell

Dempsey that she ha

d told defendant that she did not want to go onto the fire escape staircase or that de fendant had "g rabbed" or "pull ed" dow

n her pan ts. Defendant

asserts t hat, if the incident had bee n an illeg al deten

tion aga inst T ye ria's w il l, Ty

eria would have attached considerable significanc e to the fact tha t her pan ts fell dow

n, but inste ad Ty

eria told Dempsey that

she was more upset

about not w earing

a belt that day than about he

r pants falling down. Ina bench trial, the circuit court determinesth e credibility of the w itnesses, evaluates the evidence, and resolves any inconsistencies therein. People v. Ortiz , 188 Ill. App. 3d 506, 514 (1989). The testimony

of a sing le ey

ewitness is sufficient to sustain a conviction. People v. Ramos , 339 I ll.No. 2--05--0484

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App. 3d 891, 901 (2003). A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on qu es ti on s i nv ol vi ng th e w ei gh t o f t he ev id en ce or th e c re di bi li ty of witn esses unless the evidence is so palpably

contrary to the judgment or so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the de fendant's guilt. Ramos , 339 Ill. App. 3d at 901. Inthis case , the tria

l court wa s aware

of Ty eria' s age, th e time th at had passed since the incident , Tyeria' s difficulty in articulating the meaning of a lie, and the appearance of coaching, as these poin ts wer e argu ed by thedefense at trial. These iss

ues, while

not insig

nifican t, relate primaril y to collateral matters. Moreover, we do not find that Tyeria impea

ched her testimony that defendant grabbed her a

nd took her through a door, "jumped" he r up, and grabbed her pants and pulled them down to her ankles just because sheattache d some sig nificance to the fact that she forgot to wear her belt. Additionally, the trial court also was aware of the contra dicting evidence between Tye ria and Gardner regar

ding whether d efendant gra bbed Tyer

ia's arm and pulled her to the fire escape stairwa

y or whether Tye ria was n ot force d to go. Althoug

h Gardne r's sta tement contradic ts Tye ria's, Tye ria told Gardner the da y after the incid ent an d ther e is no indi catio n regard ing Tyeria 's disposition or the ci

rcumstan ces surr ounding that conv ersation . Regar dless, Tyeria' s testimony that defendant to ok he r t o t he fi re es ca pe st ai rw ay a ga in st he r w il l w as re ma rk ab ly unyiel ding at t rial. Tye ria testifie d clear

ly and convincingly

regarding

her encounter with defendant, and the trial c ourt found Tyeria' s testimony

more credible. Furthermore, that the trial c ourt chose to give defendant the benefit of the doubt on the other charg es does no t, in our min ds, diminish

Tye ria's c redibilit y regar ding the offense of unlaw ful restr

aint.No. 2--05--0484

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Defendant

asserts t hat th e Stat e's failure to call Ty eria's brothers and cousins to testify concerning what Ty

eria told them after the incident gives rise to the inference that their testimony would have been unfavorable to the State' s case. We disagree. As a general rule, if a potential witness is ava ilable and appears to havespecial information relevant to the case, so th at his testi mony woul d not merel y be cumul ative , and t he wit ness's relation ship with the Sta

te is such that

he would ordinarily be

expected to favor it, the State's failure to call the witness may g ive rise to a permissible inference t hat, if the witness were called, the witn ess's testimony

would have been unfavorable to the State's case

. People v. Jimerson , 69 Ill. App. 3d 403, 412 (1 979); People v. Irby , 237 I ll. App. 3d 38, 68 (19 92). Such

a nega tive infe rence i s permissib le only under ce rtain circumstances: for example, where the State fa ils to call a witne ss who poss esses uniq ue kno wledge of a cru cial, disp uted issue of fact ( People v. Williamson , 78 I ll. App. 2d 90 (1966)) , or wher e the governmen

t has cau sed the a

bsence o f a mater

ial witne ss ( People

v. Williams , 40 I ll. 2d 367 (1968)). Howeve r, no neg ative inf

erence is raised when the witness is also known and available to the defense y et is not called by

it. Irby , 237 I ll App 3d a t 69; People v. Zenner , 84 Ill. App. 3d 566, 571-72 (1980). We observe that defendant argue d at trial that the State's failure to cal l any of Tyeria 's brothers or cousin s to te stify would give r ise to a negative inference. T he trial court disagreed, noting that the State's option to call a witne ss to testif y w as a matter

of trial s trateg

y. T he court , however, did

gran t defend

ant the time to call t

he witnes ses if he

felt that their tes timony

would impeach Tye ria's, but defe

ndant did n ot call any of them to testify

. Thus, defendant cannot assert that the w itnesses were not equally available to him, and he cannot raise a neg ative-inference argument .No. 2--05--0484

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Inany event, e ven if we were to a ssume tha

t the State 's fail

ure to ca ll the witne sses would give rise to such a negative inference , this would not warrant the reversal of defenda nt's conviction.

" '[ I] t i s f un da me nt al th at th e [ St at e] ma y accept the risk of negative inferences [arising ] from the unexplained

absence of a witne ss so long

as the of fense is otherwis e proved.' " People v. Scott , 38 Ill. 2d 302 , 306 ( 1967) , quot ing People v. McElroy , 30 Ill. 2d 286, 290 (1964). The testimony of the complainant

need not be corroborated and need not be unequivocal. Rather, the complai na nt's te st im on y, when vie

wed in the

light most

favora ble to th e p ro se cu ti on , m us t s up po rt a f in di ng by a rational trier of

fact that the essential elements of the crime were proved bey ond a rea sonable d

oubt. Peoplev. Soler , 228 Ill. App. 3d 183, 197 ( 1992). Her e, the State presented sufficient competent evidence through

Tye ria's t estimony to establish

defenda nt's com mission of t

he offe nse of unlawful restraint when defendant knowingly , withoutle ga l a ut ho ri ty, detained Tye ria. See 720 IL CS 5/10-- 3(a) (West 2004). Insum, the tr

ial cour t knew ab out the contradic tions and neverthe less found defenda nt guilty of u nlawful restraint based primarily on what it believed to be the clear, credible, and c onvincing testimony of Tyeria . After viewing the complainant's testimony in the light most favora

ble to the State, we conclude that a ra tional tri er of fa

ct could h ave foun

d the esse ntial ele ments of th e crime bey ond a rea sonable d

oubt. Defendant

next contends that the R egistr ati on Act is un constituti onal as a

pplied to h

im, because his crime did not involve any sexual motivation or sexualcomponen t and ther efore s hould notbe included as a sex offense. Becau se defendant's argument pr esents questions of law--statutory constructionand cons titutional validity --our sta ndard of review i s de novo . People v. Malchow , 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).No. 2--05--0484

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The Reg istration

Act provides in pa

rt: "(A) ** * '[S]ex off

ender' means an y pe rson who i s: (1) charg ed pursua

nt to Illinois law, or any substantially similar federal, *** sister state, or foreign country

law, with a sex offense set forth in subsection (B) of this Section or the attempt to commit an included sex offense, and: * * * (B) As u sed in this A

rticle, ' sex offen se' mea

ns: * * * (1.5) A violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when

the victim is a person under 18 years of age, the defe ndant is not a parent of the victim, and the offense was committed on or after January 1, 1996: 10--1 (kidnapping), 10--2 (aggrava

ted kidnapping), 10--3 (unlawful restraint), 10--3.1 (aggrava

ted unlawful restraint). Anattempt to

commit any

of these offense s." 730 I

LCS 150/2 (Wes t 2004). Inthis case, defendant was convicted of unlawf ul restra int and was required to "register [as a sex offender] in person and provide accurate information as required by the Department of State Police," pursuant to section 3(a) of the Registration Act (730 I LCS 150/3(a) (West 2004)). The Registration Act was enacted by the I llinois legislature to create an additional method of protecting children

from, inter alia , the increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexual abuse.No. 2--05--0484

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84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 23, 1986, at 208. The Reg istration Act was designed to aid law enforcement age ncies by making

the offender's address re adily available to law enforcement

agencies. People v. Adams , 144 I ll. 2d 381, 387 (1991) (a case involving a pare nt and

a charge of criminal sexual assault); see also Malchow , 193 Ill. 2d at 420 ( a case inv olving aggravated cr

iminal sexual abuse) . Defendant

appears to base his argument on substantive due process g rounds in that he seeks to bar the government from arbitrar ily exercising its power w ithout the reasonable justification of serving a legit

imate inte rest. See Daniels v . Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 331, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662, 668, 106 S. Ct. 662, 665 (1986). Since the challenged statut e does not affect a fundamental constitutional right, we must apply the ra tional-basis test to determine wheth er the sta tute viola tes due pr ocess. Russell v. Department of Natural Resources , 183 Ill. 2d 434, 446-47 (1998). The Registration Act must bear "a reasonable rela tionship to the public interest intended to be protected, and the means adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired obj ective." Russell , 183 Ill. 2d at 447. "In

apply ing this te st, we ide

ntify the public

interest that the st

atute is intended

to protect, examine whether

the statute bears a reasonable rela tionship to that interest, and determine whether the method used to protect or further that inter est is reaso nable." People v. Lindner , 127 Ill. 2d 174, 180 (1989). "Under the rational-basis test, a

statute is presumed to be valid, and the party c hallenging the statute has the bu

rden of proving t

h at the sta

tute is irrational. [Citations.] As long as there is a conceiv able basis for fi ndin g a rational rela tionshi p, the law wi ll be uphel d. [Cit ations.] " People

v. Kohrig , 113 Ill. 2d 384, 398 (1986); see also Lulay v. Lulay , 193 Ill. 2d 455, 469 (2000) (holding that a statute is presumed constitutional and that the challenger has the bur den o f rebuttin g thatNo. 2--05--0484

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presumption). We must consider " ' "the statute in its entirety, noting the subjec t it addresses and the legislat ure's apparent objective in e nacting it." ' [ Citatio ns]." Lindner , 127 Ill. 2d at 181. After reviewi ng all th e provisi ons of the Re gistration Act, we find it clear that every provision relates to the registration of convicted off enders of children's per so nal safety a s defined by the act. The manif

est purpose of

the Registration Act is to help law enforcement protect children fromchild abduction, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, sexual assault, and sexual abuse by making the offend er's current address "available to law e nforcement agencies, which ma y then question

and, if necessary, detain him under appropr iate circums tances." Adams , 144 Ill. 2d at 387. After find ing that the public interest is served by the Registration Act, we must then determine whether there is a rational relationship between the statute and the interest served. Lindner , 127 I ll. 2d at 17 9; Kohrig , 113 Ill. 2d at 398. The Registration Act serves no purpose other than governing the registration of sex offenders and the release of the ir identities and address es in the State of Illinois. It is evident that a rational relationship exists between the principle and the

means of actualizing that principle. Peoplev. Full er , 324 Ill. App. 3d 728, 732 (2001). The Registration

Act serves the universal principle of protecting children from harm. The legislature has decided to protect the child

ren of I llinois by enabling

law enforcemen

t officia ls to more e asily

locate prior offenders . The Registration Act is thus

reasona bly related to the publ ic interest of protecting childre n from ha rm. The findi ng of a reasonable relationship between the statute a nd the public interest allows

us to advanc e to the f

inal step: determin

ing whe ther the method use d by

the Reg istratio n Act i s reasonable. Russell , 183 Ill. 2d at 446-47. The Registration Act requires any convicted sex offender to register with t

h e chief of police of the municipality or county wher

e he or she resides for moreNo. 2--05--0484

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than10 days. 730 IL CS 150/3(a) et seq. (West 2004). The offe nder must provide h

is date of birth and update any c

hanges in his home address, work address, and e mployer for either 10 years or

the rest of his or her natural life. 730 I LCS 150/6 through 8--5 (West 2004). The supreme court has articulated on this final step of the r ational-basis analysis. " As the legislative debates indicate, the public interest to be served by the Registration

Act is the assistance to law enforc ement in

the pr otect ion o f chil dren. *** W e find noth ing un reason able i n the s tatut e's method of servi ng its pur

pose. *** There is

a dir e ct relationship between the disability, the registration

of child sex offenders, and the purpose served by the statute, the protection of children." Adams , 144 Ill. 2d at 390-91. Defendant

allege s the abse

nce of a rationa l connection betwe en the of fenseof unlaw ful restra int an d the purpose of the Registration Act. L ike a few defendants before him, he a lleges nothing more than

the unfairness of being branded a sex offender when his crime was not sexually motivated. See People v. Beard , 366 Ill. App. 3d 197 (2006); People v. Johnson , 363 Ill. App. 3d 356 (2006), appeal allowed , 218 I ll. 2d 550 ( 2006); Fuller , 324 Ill. App. 3d 728. For example, in Fuller , the def endant st ole a van while the owner went into a store, leaving his two children, a girl and a boy, ages 6 and 15, inside the van. Based on the children's pre sence inthe stolen van, the defendant was convicted of aggra vated kidnapping of the minors and, therefore , was req uired tocomply with the Registra tion Act. Fuller , 324 Ill. App. 3d at 731. The defendant challenged

the Reg istration

Act as ap plied to him , on due pr

ocess g rounds. Fuller , 324 Ill. App. 3d at 731. The c ourt obse

rved tha t every pr ovi sion of the Registration Act relates to registra tion of convicted sex offen ders and that t he act s erves the purpose of governing sex offender registration and the release of such information. Fuller , 324 Ill. App. 3d at 732. The court further noted that theNo. 2--05--0484

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legislature intended to protect thechildren of Illinois from sex crimes by creating the Registration Act, which all ows law e

nforce ment offi cials to more ea sily locate child sex offenders. Fuller , 324 Ill. A pp. 3d at 7 32-33. Th

us, the court concluded that the Registration Act was re asonably re lated to the public interest of protecting chi ldren fro m harm and rejected the defendant' s argument that aggravated

kidnapping has no relationship to the Registration Act's purpose of protecting children from sex offenders. Fuller , 324 Ill. App. 3d at 733. In Fuller , how ever , there wa s some evidence of a " sexu al compone nt" to the de fendan t's crime. The arresting officer testified tha t, when he asked the defendant what he intended to do with the children whom

he kidnapped, the defendant told the officer that " 'he was going

to find a hotel

room and ask

the girl if sh e had any friends.' " Fuller , 324 Ill. App. 3d at 733. In this case, defenda nt contends that there is absolutely no evide nce of a sexua

l compone

nt to his crime

and that t he law is arbitra rily applied to him without the justification of serving the purpose of the Reg is tration A ct. That argument was recently espoused in People v. Johnson , 363 Ill. App. 3d 356 (20 06), whic h defendant urges us to follow. In Johnson , the defendant pleaded guilty to aggrav ated kid

napping , which a

utomatica lly classified him as a sex offen der purs uant to the

Registr ation Act . See 730 I

LCS 150 /2(B)( 1.5) (Wes t 2000). John son, like d

efenda nt in this case, contended that the Registration Act was arbitrary and

unreasonablewhen no sexual motivation was involved. Johnson , 363 I ll. App. 3d at 363. Th e First District, Second Di

vision, Ap

pellate C ourt ag

reed. D istinguishing the

casefrom Fuller , and relying

on other jurisdictions that had reached similar decisions, the court found that there was no rational basis for requiring the defendant to re gister as a sex offender where he had no history of committingNo. 2--05--0484

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sex offenses and his offense of ag gravated kidnapping was not sexually motivated and had no sexual purpose. Johnson , 363 Ill. App. 3d at 363. The dissent in Johnson noted, howev er, thatit is the nature of the offense--ag gravated kidnapping--that

triggers the Registration Act, not the presenc e of a s exu al component. Johnson , 363 Ill. App. 3d at 364 (Wolfson, J., specially concurring

in part a nd dissent

ing in part). Moreover, the dissent fo

und it rati onal for

the leg islature

to reason that a person who kidnaps a child may commit a sexual crime against that child. Johnson , 363 Ill. App. 3d at 364-65 (Wolfson, J., specia lly concurring

in part and dissenting in part). The dissent further commented t hat the legislature had the power to

prote ct children from a person convicted of agg ravated kidnapping by

requiring that per son to re gister as a sex offender. Johnson , 363 I ll. App. 3d at 365 (Wol fson, J., spe cially concurring

in part and dissent ing in part ); see also In re Phillip C. , 364 Ill. App. 3d 822 (2006) (largely relying on Fuller but noting the majority opinion in Johnson ). Defendant acknowledges that Johnson was reje cted by the major

ity in Beard , 366 Ill. App. 3d 197. Ther

e, the de fendant

argue d that the

Registr ation Act was unconstitutiona

l as appli e d, because his crime of aggrava

ted kidnapping of two children did not have a sexual component. The First District, Fifth Division, Appellate Court held that the statute does not requ ire such bl atant evidence of a sexua

l compone

nt and tha t agg ravate d kidnapp ing was

included in the stat ute beca use the Genera

l Assembly

deemed that aggrava

ted kidnapping often is a precursor to more grievous sex offenses. Beard , 366 Ill. App. 3d at 202. The Beard

court followed

what it deemed

to be a va lid arg ument pre sented by

the disse nt in Johnson

. Beard , 366 Ill. App. 3d at 203. The court pointed out that the aggrava ted kidnapping statute lists eight differ ent meth ods of committing aggravating kidnapping, only one

of whichNo. 2--05--0484

-16-

spec ific ally

mentions children (see 720 ILCS 5/10--2(a)(2) (West 2002)). However, the Registration Act classifies aggravate d kidnapping as a sexoffense only if the victim of

the aggravated kidnapping is younge r than 18 yea

rs of age and the putative kidnappe r is n ot the vic tim's pa

rent (73 0 IL CS 150/2(B)(1.5) (West 2002)). Thus, the court conclud ed that t he sex offender registration and notification provi sion s are no t tri ggered in every agg ravated kidnapping case but only when the victim of the kidnapping is a y

outh who is takenby s omeone ot h er than a parent. Beard , 366 I ll. App. 3d at 203. These qualifying characteristics support

the conc lusion tha

t a sexual c omponent i s immaterial for purposes of protecting children fromtriggering offe

nses . The court further surmised that the Gene ral Asse mbly had a ra tional ba sis to apply

the reg istration

and notif ication r equirem ents based on its view that kidnappers of children, those convicted of the unlawf ul restraint of children,

or those who

attempt those offe

nses, may

have a propensit

y to commit sexual cr

im es aga inst children. Beard , 366 Ill. App. 3d at 203. We agree with the reasoning employed by

the majority in Beard

and the dissent in Johnson

. We find t hat the Ge

neral As sembly

had a ra tional ba sis to apply

the Reg istration

Act to thos e convicted of the unl awful restraint of children, because those de fendants may ha ve a greater propensi ty to harm a child. It is the nature of the offe nse of unlawful restraint as well as the age of the victim that trigger the Registration Act, and it is rational f or the legislature to reason that a person other than t he chi ld's par

ent who un

lawfully restrai ns a child is more likely to harm the child. As stated by the Beard

court: "It is not

the role of this court to override the General Assembly's r

ational basis for the stat ute." Beard , 366 Ill. App. 3d at 203. According ly, we conc lude that the application of the Reg istration

Act to defendant does not violate his due process rights. We believe the relevantNo. 2--05--0484

-17-

portions of the Regis trati on Act are pri maril y concerned with prote cting a child from beingtaken by

someone other tha

n his or her parent, regar

dless of the presence or absence of a sexual component . For the preceding reasons, the judg ment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed. Affirmed. McLAREN and KAPAL

A, JJ., concur.