In the Missouri Court of Appeals 

Eastern District

DIVISION TWO

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED101235

) 

Respondent, ) 

) Appeal from the City of St. Louis

vs. ) Circuit Court 

) 

LEONARD DAVIE, ) Honorable Jimmie M. Edwards 

)

Appellant. ) Filed: April 7, 2015

Introduction

Leonard Davie (Defendant) appeals the trial court’s judgment, entered after a bench trial, 

finding him guilty of one count of felony drug possession. On appeal, Defendant claims the trial 

court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and overruling his objections to the 

admission of certain evidence at trial. We affirm.

Factual Background

On August 13, 2013, St. Louis City police officers Carl Whittaker and his partner 

Hammad Ahmad received an anonymous tip regarding a suspicious vehicle parked in an alley. 

Upon arriving at the alley, the officers found a black SUV occupied by Defendant, who was 

sitting in the front seat with his feet facing outward. Suspecting that Defendant was violating a 

city ordinance prohibiting parking in alleyways for an extended period of time, the officers 
2

exited their vehicle and approached the SUV. Defendant exited the SUV and started to walk 

away. The officers ordered Defendant to stop and get back into his vehicle, informing Defendant 

that he was not free to leave. They asked Defendant for his identification and ran his name 

through the Regional Justice Information Service (REJIS) system, which revealed Defendant had 

a parole violation, fugitive warrants for failure to appear, and a wanted card. The officers placed 

Defendant under arrest and informed him of his Miranda rights. Officer Whittaker searched 

Defendant’s person and found a small bag containing what he believed to be narcotics in 

Defendant’s pocket. Officer Whittaker then informed Defendant of the additional reason for his 

arrest and read Defendant his Miranda rights again. Defendant told the officer that the substance 

found in his pocket was heroin. Officer Whittaker sent the substance to the City of St. Louis 

Laboratory Division, where an examiner performed several analytical tests and determined that 

the substance was in fact heroin.

Defendant was charged with the class C felony of one count of possession of a controlled 

substance. Prior to trial, Defendant’s counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that 

the State’s evidence was obtained in violation of Defendant’s Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench 

trial. At trial, defense counsel objected to the admission of the heroin, the lab report, 

Defendant’s statements to the police, and Officer Whittaker’s testimony regarding the seizure. 

At the close of the State’s case, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. Both Defendant’s 

motion to suppress and motion for judgment of acquittal were denied. The trial court found 

Defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance, and Defendant was sentenced to six 

years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
3

Standard of Review

Appellate review of the denial of a motion to suppress is limited to a determination of 

“whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, and it will be reversed only if clearly 

erroneous.” State v. Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d 187, 190 (Mo. banc 2014). The trial court’s ruling is 

clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm 

impression that a mistake was made. State v. Cook, 273 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). 

We defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations and findings of fact. State v. Goff, 129 

S.W.3d 857, 862 (Mo. banc 2004). Whether reasonable suspicion existed is a question of law 

which this Court reviews de novo. State v. Norfolk, 366 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Mo. banc 2012).

Discussion

In his sole point on appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress and in overruling his objections to the admission of the evidence at trial, 

because the evidence was the result of an unlawful search and seizure. Defendant argues that the 

officers did not have the necessary reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio1in order to seize 

Defendant and the evidence should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. We 

disagree.

The United States Constitution2and the Missouri Constitution protect citizens against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MO. CONST. art. I, § 15. Both 

constitutional provisions afford the same protections and therefore the analysis is the same under 

each. State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 143 n. 2 (Mo. banc 2011). Searches and seizures 

conducted without warrants are unreasonable and therefore presumptively invalid. State v. 

Waldrup, 331 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Mo. banc 2011). However, an exception to the warrant 

 

1

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution has been incorporated through the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause and applies to the states. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
4

requirement exists under Terry v. Ohio, which allows officers to briefly stop a citizen in order to 

investigate potential illegal activity. 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). A person is seized “whenever a 

police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away.” Id. at 16. In order 

to justify a Terry stop, the officer must “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at 21. 

Accordingly, a search and seizure under Terry is not justified by “inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Id. at 27. Further, the stop must be reasonable in its scope. Id. at 20. 

Therefore, the analysis under Terry requires this Court to ask two questions: 1) was the stop 

reasonable in its inception; and 2) was the stop reasonable in its scope? Id. at 27-28.

First, we must address whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant. 

It is undisputed that Defendant was seized at the time the officers told him to stay in his car and 

that he was not free to leave. Defendant argues that the officers did not have reasonable 

suspicion to stop him at that point because the officers were acting only under the information 

provided to them in the anonymous tip, specifically that there was a suspicious vehicle in the 

alleyway. Generally, an anonymous tip alone is insufficient to establish the required reasonable 

suspicion for a Terry stop. State v. Weddle, 18 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000). 

Nonetheless, an anonymous tip may be considered in the totality of the circumstances that 

amounts to reasonable suspicion. State v. Stevens, 845 S.W.3d 124, 129 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). 

In this case, Officer Whittaker testified that after receiving the anonymous tip, he and his partner 

went to investigate the vehicle because of the ordinance prohibiting parking in alleyways for an 

extended period of time. Officer Whittaker also testified that when he began approaching the 

SUV, Defendant exited the vehicle and being unsure of where Defendant was headed, he told 
5

Defendant to stop. These facts, including the anonymous tip, gave the officers reasonable 

suspicion to seize Defendant. 

Most importantly, the officers were aware of the city ordinance that prohibited parking in 

alleyways, and Defendant was in fact parked in an alleyway. Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, 

it was unnecessary for Officer Whittaker to know how long Defendant’s vehicle had been parked 

in the alley. This is because a Terry stop does not require that the officer know conclusively that 

the person committed or is committing a crime. To the contrary, the underlying purpose of a 

Terry stop is to investigate in order to determine if criminal conduct is occurring. Here, Officer 

Whittaker personally observed Defendant parked in the alley. This is a specific and articulable 

fact that warranted an investigation into whether Defendant was violating the city ordinance. 

Under Terry, Officer Whittaker was well within the confines of the Fourth Amendment when he 

stopped Defendant “for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior.” 392 U.S. at 22. 

The anonymous tip and Defendant’s furtive movements merely bolstered the reasonable 

suspicion. To find otherwise would require Officer Whittaker to have probable cause to detain 

Defendant, which is not required under Terry. 

We next address whether the scope of the seizure was reasonable. After stopping 

Defendant and asking for his identification, Officer Whittaker and his partner ran Defendant’s 

name through the computer system and found that he had outstanding warrants. Running a 

defendant’s name through the REJIS system is permissible and within the scope of a Terry stop. 

See Waldrup, 331 S.W.3d at 675 (citing Klaucke v. Daily, 595 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2010)); U.S. v. 

Long, 532 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that a Terry stop may be extended for the time it 

takes the officer to run a criminal background check). The scope of Officer Whittaker’s stop of 

Defendant was reasonable.
6

Moreover, upon discovering that Defendant had outstanding warrants, the officers were 

entitled to arrest Defendant and perform a search incident to arrest. Waldrup, 331 S.W.3d at 676 

(citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009)). A search incident to arrest permits officers 

to search the arrestee’s person as well as the area in the arrestee’s immediate control in order to 

find weapons or other “destructible evidence.” Id. Here, Officer Whittaker arrested Defendant 

pursuant to a warrant for his arrest and searched Defendant pursuant to the search incident to 

arrest exception to the warrant requirement. The officers’ actions were therefore permissible 

under the Fourth Amendment. Because the officers had reasonable suspicion to undertake an 

investigatory Terry stop, the evidence they found as a result of the stop was admissible at trial. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err by admitting the challenged evidence at trial.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to 

suppress the evidence or overruling his objections at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________________

Philip M. Hess, Judge

Sherri B. Sullivan, P.J. and 

Mary K. Hoff, J. concur.