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PIPELINE SAFETY IN THE MERRIMACK VALLEY: 

INCIDENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

NOVEMBER 26, 2018 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman 

ROGER WICKER, Mississippi 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

TED CRUZ, Texas 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

GARY PETERS, Michigan 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire 

CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada 

JON TESTER, Montana 

NICK ROSSI, Staff Director 

ADRIAN ARNAKIS, Deputy Staff Director 

JASON VAN BEEK, General Counsel 

KIM LIPSKY, Democratic Staff Director 

CHRIS DAY, Democratic Deputy Staff Director 

RENAE BLACK, Senior Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on November 26, 2018 ...................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Markey ................................................................................. 1 

Joint statement of Andrew W. Maylor, North Andover Town Manager 

and Andrew P. Flanagan, Andover Town Manager ................................... 73 

Letter from Lawrence Fire Chief Brian Moriarty .......................................... 87 

Letter from North Andover Fire Chief William McCarthy ........................... 89 

Prepared statements from community members ........................................... 110 

Statement of Senator Hassan ................................................................................. 4 

WITNESSES

Hon. Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator from Massachusetts ................................. 3 

Hon. Niki Tsongas, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts ............................. 5 

Hon. Seth Moulton, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts ............................ 6 

Hon. Lori Trahan, U.S. Representative-Elect from Massachusetts ..................... 7 

Lucyannie Rondon, Sister of Leonel Rondon ......................................................... 8 

Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt III, Chairman, National Transportation Safety 

Board ..................................................................................................................... 9 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Hon. Matthew A. Beaton, Secretary, Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs ......................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 

Steve Bryant, President, Columbia Gas of Massachusetts .................................. 19 

Joe Hamrock, President and Chief Executive Officer, NiSource ......................... 21 

Joint prepared statement ................................................................................. 22 

Richard B. Kuprewicz, President, Accufacts, Incorporated .................................. 27 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration ................................................................................................................. 31 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 32 

Hon. Dan Rivera, Mayor, City of Lawrence .......................................................... 78 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 81 

Tina Messina, Owner, Wine Connextion ............................................................... 83 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 85 

Michael B. Mansfield, Fire Chief, Andover Fire Rescue ...................................... 94 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 96 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to: 

Hon. Matthew A. Beaton ................................................................................. 159 

Paul Roberti ...................................................................................................... 160 

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PIPELINE SAFETY 

IN THE MERRIMACK VALLEY: 

INCIDENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 2018 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Lawrence, MA. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in South 

Lawrence East Middle School Gymnasium, 165 Crawford Street, 

Lawrence, Massachusetts 01843, Hon. Edward Markey, Chairman 

of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Markey [presiding], Warren, and Hassan. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you for joining us for today’s field hearing of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 

I would like to express my appreciation to Commerce Committee 

Chairman John Thune and Ranking Member Bill Nelson for their 

support in allowing me to chair this important hearing. 

And I’d like to welcome my U.S. Senate colleagues who have 

joined me here today, my great partner from the state of Massachusetts, Senator Elizabeth Warren, and from the state of New 

Hampshire and a member of the Senate Commerce Committee, 

Maggie Hassan. 

We also welcome two members of the U.S. House of Representatives, Congresswoman Niki Tsongas of the 3rd Congressional District; Congressman Seth Moulton of the 6th Congressional District; 

and a warm welcome to Congresswoman-elect Lori Trahan. We 

look forward to continuing to working with you and continuing to 

push for answers. 

It has been 74 days since Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover 

suffered a disaster that Andover Fire Chief Michael Mansfield said, 

‘‘Looked like Armageddon.’’ Explosions and fires ripped through 

quiet neighborhoods, destroying homes and businesses, a precious 

life was lost, dozens were injured. 

For these communities, the explosions were only the beginning of 

months of uncertainty and hardship. This was the coldest Thanksgiving in 80 years in Massachusetts, with the wind chill temperatures plunging into the single digits in the Merrimack Valley, and 

despite its original promise, Columbia Gas has missed its deadline 

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for restoring gas service, meaning that nearly 1,600 families spent 

the Thanksgiving holiday enduring the brutal cold without heat. 

The explosions happened on a single day but the crisis for families as they try to stay warm and get back to work has gone on 

for far too long. We have seen unprecedented disruption, doubt, 

and despair for the Merrimack Valley. Columbia Gas should be 

ashamed. 

Our investigation into this disaster has resulted in one crystal 

clear conclusion. What happened on September 13 was not inevitable. It was preventable. Columbia Gas never contemplated that 

a disaster of this magnitude could happen and therefore did not 

have adequate procedures in place to prevent it or to respond to it. 

Not only did this company not prioritize safety, it appears as if 

safety was simply an afterthought, but the responsibility for safety 

failures doesn’t stop with Columbia Gas and NiSource. 

Federal regulations set by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 

Safety Administration or PHMSA are alarmingly deficient. The 

safety gaps in Federal rules mean that families all across the country cannot be assured that the natural gas pipelines running under 

their streets and into their homes are safe. 

PHMSA’s regulations essentially allow the natural gas pipeline 

industry to regulate itself. When the fox is left to guard the henhouse, we are assured to have a system-wide failure and then an 

inevitable disaster. 

We found failing after failing in Columbia Gas culture and Federal regulatory oversight. 

First, the company allowed an unqualified engineer to approve 

the pipeline construction work plan that led to this disaster. 

Second, Columbia Gas officials who had an understanding of the 

full pipeline system never saw or signed off on the pipeline construction work plan that led to this disaster. 

Third, Columbia Gas still has not adopted best practices for safety 3 years after its own industry made these recommendations. 

And fourth, the woefully insufficient safety, operations, and response plans that Columbia Gas did institute never adequately 

contemplated a disaster of this magnitude. So when it occurred, 

they were not prepared to stop it or to respond to it. 

The list of failings at this company is as long as the line for the 

temporary showers at Pumps Pond and when it comes to Federal 

regulations, there are clearly key gaps that allow a company like 

Columbia Gas and NiSource to operate unsafely. 

We owe it to the American people to put in place requirements 

to ensure that no natural gas company is allowed to shortchange 

safety ever again. Columbia—— 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. Columbia Gas’ deficiencies are more than a litany of shortcomings. They are a roadmap to disaster and that’s exactly what we saw on September 13th. 

On that day, following scheduled work in Lawrence, gas pressure 

in the Merrimack Valley’s distribution system rose to dangerous 

levels. It forced harmful combustible gas out of people’s stoves, radiators, and hot water heaters. This over-pressurization led to explosions, fires, and the destruction of more than a hundred homes 

and businesses in this region. 

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Leo Rondon died. He had just gotten his driver’s license only to 

be killed while celebrating this achievement with his friends. Our 

community mourns his loss and I’m grateful that his family could 

be here today to share his story. 

More than two dozen others were injured, including nine firefighters as they ran toward the danger and worked to save lives 

in that chaos. 

The National Transportation Safety Board has recently recommended that Columbia Gas and its parent company, NiSource, 

make urgent changes to how they handle construction and operations. That is the bare minimum of what this company needs to 

do to improve safety. 

But thus far, NiSource has refused to immediately implement 

these changes and that is not acceptable, and I want to hear directly from the company why our communities are yet again having 

to wait. 

Gas distribution companies need to put safety above speed and 

the public above politics. If Columbia Gas and NiSource refuse to 

do that, then they should not be operating in our state or any other 

state. 

This hearing—— 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. This hearing is personal to me. My father grew 

up in Lawrence. He graduated from the Vocational Program at 

Lawrence High School. The day after the explosions, I went up and 

visited the house he grew up in on Phillips Street, a house where, 

as a little boy, I celebrated Christmases. I talked to a family member there and they talked about their loss of power and like tens 

of thousands of residents that day, their power and everyone in 

their neighborhood’s power was out. They had no information, no 

comfort, no sense of when their lives would return to normal. No 

family should have to experience that kind of trauma and disruption. 

It is time for Columbia Gas and NiSource to answer for this disaster. The people of the Commonwealth have had to wait too long. 

So we thank you all for coming here today for this hearing. It 

will set the table for changes nationally to make sure that no one 

in Massachusetts or any other state ever has to suffer from such 

an accident. 

Now let me turn to recognize my partner, my great partner in 

the U.S. Senate from the state of Massachusetts, Senator Elizabeth 

Warren. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH WARREN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator WARREN. Thank you. Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

Senator WARREN. And thank you, Senator Markey, for holding 

this hearing today. 

The Merrimack Valley is still reeling from the horrific series of 

explosions that occurred more than two months ago. The Rondon 

family lost their son, many people were injured, dozens of homes 

were destroyed, and businesses shuttered, and thousands of people 

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are still without heat and hot water, living in temporary housing 

and unable to return to their normal lives. 

The communities of Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover have 

suffered immensely. I saw firsthand the destruction that these gas 

explosions caused across these communities, and I want to start by 

thanking our local officials and our first responders who acted 

quickly on September 13 and in the days that followed. 

In particular, I want to thank Mayor Dan Rivera who has shown 

strong leadership throughout this very difficult time. 

[Applause.] 

Senator WARREN. We’re here to say to everyone in the 

Merrimack Valley we will keep fighting for you. We will not let up 

until every last home has heat and hot water and until every last 

person has been compensated for their injuries and the disruption 

to their lives. 

Columbia Gas and NiSource are responsible not only for fixing 

this mess but also for providing financial support to every resident 

and every business affected by the explosion. 

This disaster, which appears was wholly preventable, is on them. 

The preliminary and interim NTSB report confirms that a series of 

mistakes by, and I quote, ‘‘a Columbia Gas-contracted work crew, 

which included a Columbia Gas inspector, executing one of the Columbia Gas-designed and approved pipe replacement projects, 

caused these explosions.’’ 

Our constituents deserve answers from Columbia Gas and 

NiSource. Two of them, Francisco and Esther Brega, are here in 

the audience today. The explosions cost them their home. Esther, 

an early childhood educator, also lost her business. They are still 

waiting for answers from Columbia Gas 2 months after the explosions, and we expect honest and thorough answers from the company. Our constituents deserve nothing less. 

This hearing is only a first step toward accountability for this 

disaster. The Massachusetts Congressional Delegation has requested that the President issue an emergency declaration for the 

gas explosions. We’re going to make sure that every family and 

every business is made whole. Then we’re going to fight so that 

this never happens in another community again. 

This industry has proven that safety is not its top priority. So if 

they won’t do what is right, then we should make sure that the 

laws and regulations compel them to do what is right. 

So thank you all for being here—— 

[Applause.] 

Senator WARREN.—today. I yield. 

Senator MARKEY. Next, we’re going to hear from Senator Maggie 

Hassan from New Hampshire. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MAGGIE HASSAN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator HASSAN. Well, good morning, everybody, and thank you, 

Senator Markey, for convening this hearing. I also want to thank 

our Chair and Ranking Member on the Commerce Committee. 

I’ll just start by also extending my deepest sympathies to the 

Rondon family and to all of the families and individuals who have 

been impacted by this tragedy. We lost one precious life and we all 

5 

know that several others were hospitalized or injured, families 

were displaced over Thanksgiving, and while we are grateful that 

they are safe, going through Thanksgiving without heat or hot 

water or living somewhere else is not acceptable. 

Businesses were disrupted and continue to be disrupted. We all 

know that we have to not only get to the bottom of what happened 

but make sure that we take steps to ensure it never happens again 

in any other community. 

I also want to join my colleagues here in expressing our deepest 

gratitude to the men and women who worked tirelessly to respond 

to these explosions, to put out fires, to provide medical care to 

those who needed it. A number of those first responders were members of the New Hampshire first responder family and we are so 

grateful for the mutual aid system that allows all of us to come together as needed in this region and do the work to keep our citizens safe. So again my deep thanks to all of the first responders. 

We know that 131 structures were damaged, including several 

homes in Lawrence, and these explosions and this destruction was 

unlike anything any of our first responders or any of us had ever 

seen. Armageddon indeed, Senator Markey. 

I look forward to the discussion today and hope that we can be 

helpful in finding ways we can prevent this kind of disaster in the 

future. 

To put it briefly, in the year 2018, people should be able to be 

confident that they can live in a home where their gas lines don’t 

explode. In the year 2018, people should be confident that when 

there is a problem, that the response by industry will be swift and 

efficient and effective, and they can get their heat and their hot 

water back. 

What we saw in Lawrence and what we are continuing to see 

from the industry is unacceptable. I am grateful to all of the members of the community who came forward and who are working so 

hard to mitigate the damage and mitigate the disruption for families and businesses, but this should never have happened in the 

first place, and the slow response is unacceptable and that’s one of 

the reasons that I think all members of our Commerce Committee 

will continue to work together to determine how we can prevent 

this kind of disaster, this kind of disruption, this kind of heartbreak in the future. 

Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. Now we’re going to hear from Congresswoman Niki Tsongas. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, 

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Senator Markey, and thank you also 

for chairing this hearing today. It’s so important to have it in the 

communities that have been impacted so that you all can hear 

firsthand both from those who are responsible for the accident and 

the incidents in and of themselves but also for those responsible for 

oversight. So I thank you so much for that. 

6 

And I also want to thank the Senate Committee’s leadership, 

John Thune of South Dakota, Bill Nelson of Florida, for their bipartisan support for holding this field hearing today. 

Given the information that we have learned from the gas explosions that devastated the Merrimack Valley in September, it is now 

clear that this disaster was entirely preventable. 

Columbia Gas had a dangerously misguided and tragically incomplete process for pipeline replacement projects and deficient decisionmaking by a field engineer was exacerbated by the company’s 

appallingly weak internal review procedures. 

This series of incidents, which Senator Markey has described and 

appropriately so as roadmap to disaster, resulted in the death of 

an innocent teenager whose family today will courageously give 

voice to their terrible loss, dozens of injuries, significant property 

damage, widespread panic and fear in the hours after the accident 

and still ongoing, and not to mention the ongoing crisis for families 

still displaced by these explosions. 

We are so fortunate to have the extraordinary first responders, 

many of you here in the room today, the great leadership, political 

leadership of the communities impacted, but, nevertheless, that is 

no substitute for the company’s failings. 

I believe Columbia Gas has a responsibility to make this community whole and to restore the public trust, to guarantee the safety 

of their customers, and to prevent another tragic accident like this 

from ever happening again, and beyond that, we in Congress have 

a responsibility to look at, seriously examine, and reform the ways 

in which we oversee this industry. 

I look forward to the testimony of those appearing before us 

today. 

Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. Next, Congressman Seth Moulton. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, 

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Senator Markey, for the time and for 

putting this important hearing together. 

To the witnesses sitting before us, thank you for being here and 

to my colleagues, Senator Markey, Senator Warren, and Representative Tsongas, I am grateful for your partnership in all things but 

in particular through the last 3 months as our offices continue to 

seek answers to this tragedy and help our communities recover. 

Representative-elect Trahan, welcome. You have big shoes to fill. 

We are glad you’re here. 

Through all of the debates of appliance replacement and Thanksgiving dinners in recent weeks, it can become easy to forget how 

absurd, how fundamentally absurd this situation is in the first 

place. No American family should go home in the evening with the 

fear that their house might blow up. 

Okay. Terrorists in some places like Afghanistan should go home 

in the evening fearing that their house might blow up but not Massachusetts families. 

What this gas company allowed to happen through their negligence is preposterous. Too many local families spent the coldest 

7 

Thanksgiving in 80 years unable to cook dinner and we must never 

forget that one innocent promising young man lost his life. 

Columbia Gas and NiSource, we appreciate the work you’ve done 

in the weeks since this tragedy, though we will question you on the 

details, but let me be clear. This situation is absurd. Your leadership must be held accountable and it must never happen again. 

Thank God for the heroes of this story, the first responders, who 

responded when the company did not. We will never know how 

many lives they, you, saved. We’re proud to have you here. We’re 

lucky to have you in our community. Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. And while we’re losing the great Congresswoman Tsongas, we have the great replacement for her, who will 

start in one month. 

So we welcome you to this hearing and so I recognize Congresswoman-elect Lori Trahan. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORI TRAHAN, 

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE-ELECT FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Ms. TRAHAN. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Markey. 

I’d like to thank Senators Markey, Warren, and Hassan for convening this hearing today in the heart of the disaster zone to discuss the gas explosions that rocked Lawrence, North Andover, and 

Andover on September 13. 

I want to thank you for the opportunity to address this panel as 

the next Congresswoman representing Lawrence and Andover. 

I also want to thank Representatives Tsongas and Moulton for 

their tireless work on behalf of those affected by this accident. 

I, too, want to thank the valiant efforts of our first responders 

and the ongoing leadership of Mayor Rivera and so many others. 

I also want to extend my deepest condolences to the family of 

Leonel Rondon and I thank them for being here bravely to share 

their story with us today. 

It has been 74 days. Today, there are still over 5,000 people who 

cannot go home and while most of the 680+ businesses affected 

have been brought back online, too many owners have waited too 

long to be reimbursed for their lost income, lost wages. These people cannot wait any longer. We need these families, these businesses, these communities to be made whole, but we also need the 

people across this state to feel safe and secure. 

We can replace heat and appliances, but we need to get to the 

root cause of this disaster, to restore confidence and faith that our 

pipelines are safe and that this will never happen again. 

We need answers from Columbia Gas so that we can bring out 

every lesson from this disaster. I urge the representatives from Columbia Gas and NiSource to fully cooperate with the hearing, with 

the NTSB, and with all the investigations so that we can coproduce safety protocols and prescriptions for the future. 

I urge Columbia Gas and NiSource at a minimum to adopt APIrecommended Practice 1173, the gold standard of safety practices 

for pipelines. API–1173 was born out of another pipeline disaster 

where 840,000 gallons of crude oil were dumped into wetlands in 

the Kalamazoo River in Michigan in 2010. 

8 

These standards are strict but they are the equivalent to the 

same safety standards governing our airlines, our chemical plants, 

and our nuclear power. Adopting these standards will ensure continuous improvement to increasing safety in the pipeline industry. 

I would like to thank the panel for this important work. I look 

forward to working with you on this issue and helping the people 

of the Merrimack Valley as we continue to cope with the aftermath, 

ensure safety and comfort, and restore this community’s confidence. 

Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. Now I would like to begin the hearing by inviting up the Rondon family, Lucy, Miguel, and Rosalie, to join us to 

tell their story about September 13, and the terrible loss which 

their family experienced when their brother and son, Leonel, was 

killed. 

I know that everyone in this room expresses their condolences, 

shares their grief, and wants their family to know that we are here 

for them and we want to, as well, thank them for their strength, 

thank them for their willingness to speak here today, because their 

story is a story which must be heard in order to ensure that we 

do put the laws on the books that ensure that it never happens 

again. 

So let us then turn to the family and ask if you would begin to 

tell the story of what happened on that day. 

STATEMENT OF LUCYANNIE RONDON, 

SISTER OF LEONEL RONDON 

Ms. RONDON. So for all of you who don’t know me, my name is 

Lucyannie Rondon. I am the sister of Leonel Rondon. 

Words cannot describe the pain my family and I feel at the loss 

of my brother Leonel. Some days I can almost hear him call me 

looking for my mother, filling up the room with his smile. He had 

such a warm heart. This senseless tragedy was the beginning of 

many things that my family and I will never do with Leonel again. 

My mother will never make him his favorite meal of shrimp and 

totonacas again. My daughter Riannie will never dance to her 

Uncle Leonel’s music he created just for her. Our little brother 

Yunite will never go to the movies with Leonel again. 

We will never forget him. We will not let this loss be without 

meaning. The grief we feel is unbearable but we know Leonel want 

us to stay strong. We will stand with the community on his behalf. 

Even as a young boy, he was so kind to others. He shoveled the 

snow for our neighbors. He carried groceries for the older people in 

our neighborhood. We will not have the joy of seeing the wonderful 

man we know he would have become. 

I stand in front of you in his honor. I will never have my brother 

back. We hope there will be justice for him and the community. Nobody should ever go through what my family has gone through ever 

again. 

Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. So our thanks to the Rondon family. Your powerful statement is something that we’ll always remember and I 

think it is very important for us to hear your story because that 

9 

will now help everyone to understand the importance of the hearing which we are about to have and why we must heed your warning that this should never happen again to any other family. So 

thank you so much for being here. 

Now I would like to ask for the first panel to come up and to be 

seated in front of your cards and that would be the Honorable Robert Sumwalt, the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety 

Board; the Honorable Matthew Beaton, Secretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs; Mr. 

Steve Bryant, the President of Columbia Gas of Massachusetts; Mr. 

Joe Hamrock, President and Chief Executive Officer of NiSource 

from Columbus, Ohio; Mr. Richard Kuprewicz, President of 

Accufacts, Incorporated; and Mr. Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel of the 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration in Washington, D.C. 

So if you could all please stand, thank you, please raise your 

right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Senator MARKEY. Let the record reflect that each answered affirmatively. 

Chairman Sumwalt, if you could begin your testimony and outline what you have found about what happened here in Lawrence. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. SUMWALT III, CHAIRMAN, 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

Mr. SUMWALT. Thank you, Senator Markey. Good morning, Senator Markey and Distinguished Members of Congress, Senator 

Warren, Senator Hassan, Congresswoman Tsongas, Congressman 

Moulton. 

Thank you for inviting the NTSB to testify this morning about 

the NTSB’s investigation into the September fires and explosion 

here in the Merrimack Valley. 

I’d like to begin by offering our sincerest sympathies to all of 

those who’ve been affected by this tragedy. 

As you know, the NTSB is an independent Federal agency. We’re 

charged by Congress to investigate transportation accidents, to determine the probable cause, and issue safety recommendations to 

prevent the reoccurrence of those accidents. We are not in the business of assigning blame or pointing fingers. 

Like with you, our goals are to determine what happened, why 

it happened, and what can be done to keep it from happening in 

the future? 

So based on our investigation so far, we know that the over-pressurization of a low pressure natural gas distribution system is 

what initiated the accident sequence. Prior to the over-pressurization, crews were replacing the older cast iron distribution line with 

new plastic lines. 

However, the sensing lines that are necessary for detecting and 

controlling pressure were not relocated to the new pipe. So, of 

course, once the old pipe was capped off, gas flow and pressure became substantially reduced and because the sensing lines were connected to the old pipes, which now had low flow and low pressure, 

the pressure regulator commanded for a full flow of high-pressure 

10 

gas into the low-pressure distribution system. This led to explosions and fires which were ignited by gas-fueled appliances. 

Why did it happen? We know that the tasks required for this 

work were developed and approved by Columbia Gas and did not 

account for the location of the sensing lines. Therefore, they did not 

require their relocation to the new pipes. 

We know that not all of Columbia Gas’s internal departments 

were required to review the plans nor were they required to be approved by a professional engineer, also known as a PE. 

Further, we know that a practice had been discontinued several 

years ago by Columbia Gas that required personnel to be in place 

to monitor work on the gas mains and be available to immediately 

respond to any abnormalities. 

Our investigation will further look into why the placement of the 

regulator sensing line was not considered in the planning phase 

and why it was not caught by inspectors. 

As Chairman of the NTSB, I want you to know that I’ve placed 

a high priority on properly completing this investigation, but as 

you can imagine, an investigation such as this is very complex and 

it will take time, but my commitment is we will do a good job and 

we will come up with recommendations to keep it from happening 

again. 

And as Senator Markey mentioned, two weeks ago, we issued 

five interim safety recommendations as a result of this investigation, including four recommendations which we classified as urgent 

recommendations. 

Now we only issue urgent safety recommendations when we determine that the course of action requires immediate attention to 

avoid imminent loss due to a similar situation. 

One recommendation was issued to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts where we called for requiring the seal of a professional engineer on all public utility engineering drawings. We issued the 

four urgent safety recommendations to NiSource, which, of course, 

is the pipeline owner operating as Columbia Gas of Massachusetts. 

First, to NiSource, they should revise the engineering and 

constructability review process to include all internal documents 

and require plans to be sealed by a PE prior to construction. 

Second, they should ensure that all natural gas system records 

are complete and readily available. 

Third, NiSource should incorporate risk assessment into project 

development. 

And last, while any modifications are being made to gas mains, 

NiSource should actively monitor pressures and require personnel 

to be in place to immediately respond to any abnormal changes in 

the pipeline system. 

In the interest of public safety, the NTSB urges expeditious implementation of each of these five interim safety recommendations. 

We stand ready to work with you and the Committee to continue 

improving the safety of our Nation’s pipeline system. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared testimony of Mr. Sumwalt follows:] 

11 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. SUMWALT III, CHAIRMAN, 

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Good morning Senator Markey. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to testify today. 

The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with investigating major transportation disasters—including pipelines. We determine the 

probable cause of accidents and issue safety recommendations aimed at preventing 

future accidents. We do not assign fault nor place blame. 

On September 13, 2018, about 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, a series of explosions and fires occurred after high-pressure natural gas was released into a lowpressure gas distribution system in the northeast region of the Merrimack Valley, 

Massachusetts. The distribution system was owned and operated by Columbia Gas 

of Massachusetts (Columbia Gas), a subsidiary of NiSource, Inc. The system overpressure damaged 131 structures, including at least 5 homes that were destroyed 

in the City of Lawrence and the towns of Andover and North Andover. Most of the 

damage was a result of structure fires ignited by gas-fueled appliances. Several 

structures were destroyed by natural gas explosions. One person was killed and at 

least 21 individuals, including 2 firefighters, were transported to the hospital. Seven 

other firefighters received minor injuries. 

On behalf of the entire NTSB, I would like to begin by offering my sincerest sympathies, to all of those in the Merrimack Valley who have been impacted by this 

tragedy. Our investigation continues, and our commitment is to keep the Commerce 

Committee informed of any updates, along with all those affected by this tragic 

event. 

Including this tragedy, we are currently investigating seven natural gas pipeline 

explosions in which lives were lost, homes destroyed, and communities severely affected. Further, we have successfully completed over 120 pipeline investigations and 

issued more than 1,300 pipeline safety recommendations, with over 80 percent 

closed favorably, since 1967. 

We launched this investigation to answer the very questions that you have raised: 

What happened? 

Why did it happen? 

What can be done to make sure that it never happens again? 

What happened? 

Based on our investigation so far, we know that over-pressurization of a low-pressure natural gas distribution system initiated the accident sequence. 

The cast-iron, low-pressure distribution system was installed in the early 1900s 

and had been partially improved with both steel and plastic pipe upgrades since the 

1950s. The low-pressure distribution system in the affected area relied on 14 regulator stations to control gas at the required pressure into structures serviced by the 

system, unlike high-pressure gas distribution systems that place an individual regulator to reduce pressure at each customer service. Each of the regulator stations reduced the pressure from about 75-pounds per square inch gauge (psig) natural gas 

main pipeline to 12 inches of water column (about 0.5 psig) for delivery to customers. 

Prior to the accident, Columbia Gas had an overarching plan consisting of multiple projects to replace 7,595 feet of low-pressure, existing cast-iron and plastic natural gas main with 4,845 feet of low-pressure and high-pressure plastic gas main 

on South Union Street and neighboring streets. 

On September 13, prior to the overpressure event, a Columbia Gas-contracted 

work crew, which included a Columbia Gas inspector, executed one of the Columbia 

Gas-designed and—approved pipe-replacement projects at the intersection of South 

Union Street and Salem Street in South Lawrence. The project was to install a plastic distribution main and abandon in place a cast-iron distribution main. The distribution main that was abandoned still had the regulator-sensing lines that were 

used to detect pressure in the distribution system and provide input to the regulators to control the system pressure. Once the contractor crews disconnected the 

distribution main that was being abandoned, the section containing the regulatorsensing lines began losing pressure. 

As the pressure in the abandoned distribution main dropped to about 0.01 psig, 

the regulators responded by opening further, increasing pressure in the distribution 

system. The regulators opened completely when they no longer sensed system pressure, allowing the full flow of high-pressure gas to release into the distribution system supplying the neighborhood. As a result, natural gas was delivered to customers 

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at a pressure well above the maximum-allowable operating pressure which led to 

the ignition of fires and explosions in homes. 

Minutes before the fires and explosions occurred, the Columbia Gas monitoring 

center in Columbus, Ohio, received two high-pressure alarms for the South Lawrence gas pressure system: one at 4:04 p.m. and the other at 4:05 p.m. The monitoring center had no control capability to close or open valves; its only capability 

was to monitor pressures on the distribution system and advise field technicians accordingly. Following company protocol, at 4:06 p.m., the Columbia Gas controller reported the high-pressure event to the Meters and Regulations group in Lawrence. 

A local resident made the first 9–1–1 call to Lawrence Emergency Services at 4:11 

p.m. 

In response, three technicians were dispatched to perform field checks on 14 regulators. Columbia Gas shut down the regulator at issue by about 4:30 p.m. The critical valves of the natural gas distribution system were closed by 7:24 p.m. Beginning 

about midnight, crews consisting of two Columbia Gas technicians escorted by two 

emergency response personnel began shutting off the meters at each house to isolate 

the homes from the natural gas distribution system. All meters were shut off by the 

following morning. 

Why did this happen? 

We know that the tasks required for this work were developed and approved by 

the utility and did not account for the location of the sensing lines. Therefore, they 

did not require their relocation so that the actual system pressure was detected and 

controlled. We know that not all of the utility’s internal departments were required 

to review the plans nor were they required to be approved by a professional engineer, who then places his/her official seal on the documents (a process known as 

‘‘sealing’’). Further, we know that a practice had been discontinued several years 

ago that required personnel to be in place to monitor work on gas mains and be 

available to immediately respond to any abnormalities. 

Our investigation will further look into why the placement of the regulator sensing lines were not considered in the planning phase and why it was not caught by 

inspectors. We are also looking at the response by Columbia Gas of Massachusetts 

once the event started to determine if actions taken were timely and appropriate. 

Urgent Safety Recommendations: What can be done to make sure that it 

never happens again? 

Our investigations are thorough, and it will take some time for us to issue a final 

report regarding the probable cause and to make recommendations to improve safety. However, as in all of our investigations, if we identify safety issues requiring immediate action, we have the capability to issue interim safety recommendations. In 

fact, recently, we issued five interim safety recommendations as a result of this investigation, including four which are classified as ‘‘urgent.’’ We only issue urgent 

recommendations when we determine that the course of action requires immediate 

attention to avoid imminent loss due to a similar accident. 

One recommendation calls upon the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to eliminate 

the existing professional licensure exemptions and require the seal of a professional 

engineer (PE) on all public utility engineering drawings. The NTSB believes that 

it is critical that an engineer with appropriate qualifications and experience review 

engineering plans for a gas company, if not develop them. The Commonwealth of 

Massachusetts exemption for the requirement of PE licensure to perform ‘‘industrial’’ and public utility work forecloses an opportunity to detect this design oversight. The seal of a PE should be required on all public utility engineering plans 

to reduce the likelihood of accidents such as this occurring. 

We issued the four urgent safety recommendations to NiSource, the pipeline 

owner, operating as Columbia Gas of Massachusetts. 

First, revise the engineering and constructability review process to include all internal departments and require plans to be sealed by a professional engineer prior 

to construction. 

Second, ensure that all natural gas systems records are complete and readily 

available. Third, incorporate risk assessments into project development. Lastly, 

while any modifications are being made to gas mains, actively monitor pressures 

and require personnel to be in place to immediately respond to any abnormal 

changes in the pipeline system. 

Conclusion 

Over the last 51 years, our investigations have found that safe operation of pipelines is a shared responsibility among operators, government oversight agencies, 

and local communities. 

13 

Pipelines remain one of the safest and most efficient means of transporting vital 

commodities used to power homes and supply businesses. However, as many in this 

room know all too well, the consequences are tragic when there is insufficient safety 

planning and oversight. To that end, the NTSB urges expeditious implementation 

of all five interim safety recommendations. 

We recognize the progress that has been made; yet, there will always be room for 

improvement. The NTSB stands ready to work with you and this Committee to continue improving the safety of our Nation’s pipeline systems. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer your 

questions. 

Senator MARKEY. Secretary Beaton. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MATTHEW A. BEATON, SECRETARY, 

MASSACHUSETTS EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENERGY 

AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 

Mr. BEATON. Thank you, Senator. Senator Markey, Senator Warren, Senator Hassan, Congressman Moulton and Congresswoman 

Tsongas, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on behalf of the Baker-Polito Administration. 

As Massachusetts Secretary of Energy and Environment, I oversee the Commonwealth’s six environmental natural resource and 

energy regulatory agencies. One of those agencies, the Department 

of Public Utilities, is the Commonwealth agency with jurisdiction 

over natural gas infrastructure. 

An annual certification provided by PHMSA grants the Department of Public Utilities’ Division of Pipeline Safety the authority 

to oversee intrastate pipeline facilities and gives the division the 

responsibility of pipeline inspections and the enforcement of operator compliance with Federal and state rules and regulations. 

When the division conducts pipeline safety inspections, a company’s site work is checked against approved plans and programs 

for consistency. PHMSA annually evaluates the department’s effectiveness and PHMSA’s 2017 evaluation of the DPU gave the Commonwealth’s Pipeline Safety Program a perfect score for incident 

investigations, program inspection procedures, damage prevention, 

field inspections, and compliance activities. 

Massachusetts’ PHMSA evaluations have trended upward from a 

score of 89.3 in 2014 to a score of 97.4 percent in 2017. 

Turning to the events of September 13, immediately following 

the fires and explosions in Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover, 

the Commonwealth mobilized emergency response capabilities 

through MEMA and the State Police, establishing a mobile incident 

command center in Lawrence to assist the municipalities. 

Within hours of the incident, the Governor, Lt. Governor, myself, 

and a number of administration staff arrived onsite and immediately began assessing the emergency response capabilities of Columbia Gas, worked with National Grid to cut electric power 

throughout the impact area, and dispatched the Director of Pipeline Safety and three DPU inspectors. 

Given the magnitude of the emergency and the insufficient response from Columbia Gas within the first 24 hours, Governor 

Baker issued a Declaration of Emergency by 3 p.m. on Friday, September 14. This Declaration ultimately led to an unprecedented 

DPU order directing EverSource Energy to take management control over the effort to safely restore utility services. 

14 

Subsequently, EverSource, with the oversight and support of the 

Administration, led an effort with over 1,000 mutual aid resources, 

to clear and make safe every structure within the impact zone, restore gas service to thousands of unaffected customers, and restore 

electric power to 18,000 customers. 

Another DPU order on September 21 appointed Joe Albanese of 

Commodore Recovery, LLC, as the Chief Recovery Officer to manage and coordinate the restoration efforts, which included building 

a command and control organization charged with restoring service 

to over 8,400 gas meters impacting more than 10,000 dwellings and 

680 businesses. 

Since September 13, myself and EEA staff have maintained a 

daily presence to coordinate and oversee the standup, transition, 

and implementation of recovery operations. The Baker-Polito Administration continues to maintain a daily support function in 

these operations. 

Simultaneous with the mobilization of recovery efforts, the 

Baker-Polito Administration quickly turned to ensuring both the 

continued safety and integrity of natural gas infrastructure in the 

Commonwealth. 

After a September 26 announcement to hire an independent evaluator, the DPU selected Dynamic Risk Assessment Systems earlier 

this month to examine the operation and maintenance policies and 

practices of the Commonwealth’s gas distribution companies as 

well as the physical integrity of the Commonwealth’s gas distribution system. 

On October 8 and 12, respectively, the DPU issued moratoria on 

all work, except emergency and compliance work, in both National 

Grid and Columbia Gas’s service territories. 

Last week, in coordination with the Northeast Gas Association, 

the Baker-Polito Administration made a first in the Nation announcement that all natural gas distribution companies in Massachusetts will adopt a pipeline safety management system, referred 

to as API–1173 that we already heard about. 

Additionally, the Baker-Polito Administration filed legislation 

last week to ensure that all gas utility work that could pose a material risk to public safety is reviewed and approved by a certified 

professional engineer. 

It is our hope that the actions taken in Massachusetts will initiate a conversation on the national level regarding appropriate industry standards and protocols to prevent such disasters in the future. 

In closing, this was undoubtedly a devastating and unfortunate 

incident that resulted in a tremendous loss for many residents of 

the Merrimack Valley. 

While there were unacceptable oversights that led to the incident 

and a challenging initial response, I do want to make note of the 

genuine commitment to restoration that I have observed from 

NiSource, particularly from their hundreds of dedicated employees 

who have left their families and relocated themselves in an effort 

to restore the quality of life as best possible here in the Merrimack 

Valley. 

I would also like to thank the Mayor of Lawrence, the Town 

Managers of Andover and North Andover, and the countless local, 

15 

state, and Federal officials and first responders who have partnered with us throughout this effort. 

The leadership and service of these individuals to our communities is commendable and has been an essential element to this 

restoration effort. 

Additionally, I would like to thank PHMSA and NTSB for their 

support, the multiple companies and utilities, along with the 4,500 

plumbers, electricians, mutual aid workers, contractors, linguists, 

and staff who united under the common mission of restoration of 

the region. 

And, finally, EverSource Energy is also deserving of our gratitude for their willingness to rise to the challenge associated with 

securing homes and businesses in the immediate aftermath of 

events and restoring utility services to impacted residents and 

businesses. Their leadership and ability to quickly mobilize resources was invaluable to the Commonwealth. 

Thank you again to the Committee for the opportunity to provide 

testimony on this issue and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Beaton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MATTHEW A. BEATON, SECRETARY, MASSACHUSETTS

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

Senator Markey, Senator Warren and members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on behalf of the Baker-Polito Administration regarding pipeline safety in Massachusetts and the response to the Merrimack Valley overpressurization event that 

occurred the afternoon of September 13, 2018. 

In the wake of this incident, which was caused by the release of high-pressure 

natural gas into a low-pressure gas distribution system, the Baker-Polito Administration immediately began coordinating relief efforts for residents and businesses 

displaced by the disaster. In addition to these relief efforts we took the following 

measures to assess and restore the safety and integrity of our pipeline infrastructure: 

• declared a State of Emergency; 

• directed Eversource to lead gas restoration efforts in Columbia Gas’ service territory; 

• directed Columbia Gas to hire an independent Chief Recovery Officer; 

• issued moratoria on all natural gas work, excluding emergency and compliance 

work in two natural gas service territories; 

• issued an RFP and subsequently contracted with an independent evaluator to 

conduct a comprehensive safety evaluation of Massachusetts’ natural gas infrastructure; 

• coordinated efforts to secure a commitment from all local gas distribution companies in the Commonwealth to adhere to industry best practices; and 

• filed legislation to implement the November 14, 2018 recommendation of the 

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to help prevent over-pressurization events in the future. 

Before diving into further details regarding the Administration’s response in the 

immediate aftermath of the fires and explosions in Lawrence, Andover, and North 

Andover, I’d like to first provide a brief overview of the Secretariat of Energy and 

Environmental Affairs’ jurisdiction over intrastate natural gas pipeline safety in the 

Commonwealth. 

During the course of my testimony, I will be unable to discuss the content of the 

ongoing investigations by both the NTSB and the Massachusetts Department of 

Public Utilities (DPU) Division of Pipeline Safety (Division), as I do not want to 

prejudice those investigations. 

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Overview of EEA Organization and DPU Jurisdiction 

As the Massachusetts Secretary of Energy and Environment, I oversee the Commonwealth’s six environmental, natural resource and energy regulatory agencies, 

which include the Departments of Environmental Protection, Public Utilities, Energy Resources, Conservation & Recreation, Agricultural Resources, and Fish and 

Game. The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) is the Commonwealth agency with jurisdiction over investor-owned electric power, natural gas, and 

water companies, as well as bus companies, moving companies, and transportation 

network companies. 

Notably, the DPU is the state agency that has assumed the responsibility for 

intrastate pipeline facilities, pursuant to Federal delegation by the Pipeline and 

Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) (49 USC 60105) and State law 

(MGL Chapter 164 § 105A). Under the annual certification provided by PHMSA to 

delegate its authority, the Department of Public Utilities’ Division of Pipeline Safety 

is responsible for pipeline inspections, compliance and enforcement of Federal and 

state rules, regulations, orders, safety programs, accident investigations, record 

maintenance and reporting. 

The Division’s Public Utility Engineers (PUEs) are charged with performing random and scheduled on-site audits and inspections of intrastate natural gas pipeline 

distribution facilities and pipeline crews, including reviews of crew qualifications, 

methods of work, and drug and alcohol screening. These PUEs also perform pipeline 

corrosion inspections and inspections of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facilities, as 

well as assist with the investigation of accidents involving public utility organizations to determine the cause and origin of the incident. 

It should be noted that, except in instances involving the two ongoing moratoria, 

the Division does not approve routine pipeline work in the Commonwealth; however, 

companies are required (per 220 CMR 101.04) to notify the Division 48 hours in advance of the start of construction of pipeline installations projects of 5,000 feet or 

more. 

The Division is also responsible for reviewing, every 5 years per PHMSA guidelines, programs and plans of the natural gas distribution companies, to ensure consistency with Federal and state rules and regulations, such as: 

• Operations & Maintenance Plan; 

• Operator Qualification Program; 

• Public Awareness Program; 

• Distribution Integrity Management Program (DIMP); and 

• Transmission Integrity Management Program (TIMP). 

In addition to the Division’s review of these plans and programs, the Commission 

of the DPU annually reviews and approves Emergency Response Plans of natural 

gas distribution companies in the Commonwealth. 

When the Division conducts onsite pipeline safety inspections, a company’s site 

work is checked against these plans and programs for consistency. If the Division 

finds deficiencies in either these plans and programs or the site work conducted by 

a company, they initiate an investigation which may lead to the issuance of fines, 

penalties and corrective actions. In response to violations of Federal and State regulations, the Department of Public Utilities can issue a $200,000 fine for each violation and a maximum civil penalty of up to $2,000,000(49 USC 60122; 220 CMR 59). 

Since 2016, the DPU has undertaken a number of proactive actions to increase 

pipeline safety in the Commonwealth, which notably includes the Division annually 

developing a risk-based inspection plan to ensure the targeted deployment of inspection resources on the activities, plans, programs and infrastructure that pose the 

greatest safety risk. In 2016, the Division also initiated an investigation of all district pressure regulation stations to ensure compliance with Federal regulations (49 

CFR Part 192.619). When the Division discovered that some district regulator stations were set at the Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (‘‘MAOP’’), they advised all companies of the risks associated with this. Setting pressure at the MAOP 

is not a violation of Federal regulations; however, Columbia voluntarily agreed to 

lower the operating pressure. 

Timeline of the Immediate Response to Events of September 13, 2018 

On the afternoon of September 13, 2018, immediately following the fires and explosions in the cities of Lawrence, Andover and North Andover, the Commonwealth 

mobilized emergency response capabilities through the Massachusetts Emergency 

Management Agency (MEMA) and the State Police, establishing a mobile State Police Incident Command Center in Lawrence, MA. 

17 

Within hours of the incident, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, myself and a 

number of administration officials arrived on-site. Our primary goal was to stabilize 

the situation and ensure local officials had the resources and information necessary 

to extinguish fires, clear and secure buildings and set-up shelters for displaced residents. 

We simultaneously began assessing the emergency response capabilities of Columbia Gas, worked with National Grid to cut electric power throughout the impacted 

area and through the Department of Public Utilities, dispatched the Director of 

Pipeline Safety and three DPU inspectors to the Merrimack Valley region. Given the 

unprecedented emergency circumstances coupled with the insufficient response from 

Columbia Gas within the first 24 hours of emergency response, Governor Baker 

issued a Declaration of Emergency by 3PM on Friday September 14, 2018. 

This declaration authorized DPU Chairman Angela O’Connor, pursuant to section 

4B of MGL Chapter 25, to take any action ‘‘necessary to assure public safety and 

welfare through the priority restoration or continuing availability of gas, electric, 

and water utility services.’’ Under this authorization and in response to the need 

for experienced management capable of advanced resource coordination and effective 

communication, Chairman O’Connor promptly directed Eversource to take management control over the effort to safely restore utility services. Subsequently, 

Eversource, with the oversight and support of the Administration, led an effort with 

over 1,000 mutual aid resources, to shut off gas service, clear and make safe every 

structure within the impact zone, restore gas service to over 10,000 customers outside the impact zone and restore electric power to 18,000 customers. 

Shortly thereafter, on September 21, 2018, DPU Chairman O’Connor appointed, 

Joe Albanese, Commodore Recovery LLC, as the Chief Recovery Officer, to manage 

and coordinate the restoration efforts. Joe is the Founder, President and CEO of 

Commodore Builders. 

Joe leveraged his 28 years of military service, including 20 years with the Naval 

Construction Forces, to build a command and control organization, consisting of over 

14 divisions, supporting the mission to safely restore services to over 8,400 gas meters impacting more than 10,000 dwellings and 680 businesses. In coordination with 

Baker-Polito Administration and NiSource, the restoration effort has been effective 

in: 

• mobilizing over 4,500 plumbers, electricians, mutual aid workers, contractors, 

linguists and staff; 

• replacing 43.3 miles of main pipeline and 5,086 service lines; 

• sourcing and distributing 14,000 hot plates and thousands of space heaters; 

• arranging for alternative housing options (Hotels, RVs, Apartments) to accommodate over 6,000 families; 

• maintain a shelter & warming center to accommodate an additional 1,000 individuals; 

• installing over 25,000 smoke and carbon monoxide detectors; and 

• launching 3 claims and business centers in Andover, Lawrence and North Andover to provide in-person assistance. 

Since September 13, 2018, I maintained a constant presence, 7-days a week, with 

staff from my Secretariat and the Governor’s office to assist in the building and implementation of recovery operations. To date, the Baker-Polito Administration continues to maintain a daily support function in these operations. 

Notably, the Administration has been committed to deploying energy efficient 

products during all phases of the restoration. That effort will not end when the natural gas service is restored to the Merrimack Valley and we are pleased that Columbia Gas has announced the launch of a targeted weatherization and energy efficiency campaign in the three affected communities. We have been in discussions 

with the company regarding the components of the program, but will certainly focus 

on deployment of insulation, as well as air source heat pumps and anticipate 

launching the program with the new 3-year energy efficiency plan that will commence on January 1st. 

Ongoing Reviews of Natural Gas Safety 

Simultaneous with the mobilization of restoration and recovery efforts, the BakerPolito Administration quickly turned to ensuring both the continued safety and integrity of natural gas infrastructure in the Commonwealth. 

On September 26, 2018, after considering other states’ actions in the aftermath 

of significant gas incidents and in consultation with PHMSA, the DPU announced 

the intent to hire an independent evaluator to assess, out of an abundance of caution, the safety of pipeline infrastructure throughout the Commonwealth. The selecVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
18 

tion of Dynamic Risk Assessment Systems, Inc., a Texas based firm with industryleading technical expertise in pipeline risk and asset integrity management, was recently publicized on November 1, 2018. 

Dynamic Risk will examine the operation and maintenance policies and practices 

of the Commonwealth’s gas distribution companies, including municipal gas companies. The independent evaluator will also examine the physical integrity of the Commonwealth’s gas distribution system. A preliminary report, which will complement 

the NTSB’s ongoing review, is expected within 120 days. We anticipate that the 

independent evaluator’s report will provide concrete recommendations regarding improving the integrity and safe operation of the Commonwealth’s aged natural gas 

infrastructure. 

Following another natural gas overpressurization event in Woburn, on October 8, 

2018, Chairman O’Connor issued a moratorium on all work, except emergency and 

required compliance work, in National Grid’s service territory, citing a ‘‘persistent 

disregard for Federal and state pipeline safety regulations.’’ This moratorium came 

on the heels of a September 26, 2018 letter to National Grid, detailing 29 possible 

violations of pipeline safety regulations by the company and a September 28, 2018 

request to the company for additional information regarding pipeline activities in 

the company’s territory. National Grid has responded to these allegations and the 

Division has issued additional discovery to the company and is continuing to investigate these possible violations. 

On October 12, 2018, following the issuance of the National Transportation Safety 

Board’s preliminary report, the DPU also issued a moratorium on all non-emergency 

or compliance work in Columbia Gas’ service territory. 

Last week, in coordination with the Northeast Gas Association (NGA), the BakerPolito Administration announced that all natural gas distribution companies in 

Massachusetts committed to adopting industry best practices—a Pipeline Safety 

Management System: American Petroleum Institute’s (API) Recommended Practice 

1173. This marks the first time an entire state has committed to Recommend Practices 1173, which was developed in the aftermath of high-profile natural gas incidents like the 2010 San Bruno disaster. 

Finally, in response to the NTSB’s November 14 recommendations, the BakerPolito Administration also filed legislation last week to ensure that gas utility work 

that could pose a material risk to public safety is reviewed and approved by a certified professional engineer. Currently, Massachusetts is one of many states that exempt public utility companies’ work from needing the approval of certified professional engineers. 

Lessons Learned and Recommendations 

While I’ve provided an overview of Massachusetts’ response to the events of September 13, 2018, both the NTSB report and the recommendations of the Independent Evaluator hired by the DPU will provide further insight into additional 

changes in protocols, regulation, and statute to ensure gas pipeline safety in the 

Commonwealth. 

The Baker-Polito Administration looks forward to working with the Massachusetts Legislature to pass the legislation we filed last week to implement the first 

NTSB statutory recommendation and we are encouraged by the Commonwealth’s 

natural gas system operator’s national leading agreement to adhere to best practices. We hope both of these efforts will initiate a conversation at the national level 

regarding appropriate industry standards and protocols to prevent such disasters in 

the future. 

The issue of pipeline inspectors has also been an area of public scrutiny in the 

wake of the Merrimack Valley overpressurization event; however, based on the information made publicly available to date, we believe that no additional number of 

inspectors could have prevented this incident. PHMSA recommends a total of 10 

Public Utility Engineers (PUEs), which includes both the certified inspectors and 

those PUEs undergoing federally mandated pipeline inspector certification. 

Since 2014, the number of PUEs in the Division has annually averaged at between 10–12 positions. The Pipeline Safety Division currently employs 8 natural gas 

public utility engineers (PUEs)—which includes 6 certified inspectors and 2 PUEs 

undergoing the Federal certification process. In addition to these 8 PUEs, three (3) 

new PUEs are expected to begin employment in mid-December, and the Division is 

in the process of hiring two (2) additional PUEs and one (1) Assistant Director of 

Pipeline Safety. 

In 2017, the Division’s pipeline inspectors conducted 1,177 inspections, up from 

880 in 2016. Additionally, PHMSA annually evaluates the Commonwealth’s effectiveness and PHMSA’s 2017 Evaluation of the Department of Public Utilities gave 

the Commonwealth’s Pipeline Safety program a perfect score for incident investigaVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
19 

tions, program inspection procedures, damage prevention, field inspections, and 

compliance activities. Massachusetts PHMSA evaluations have trended upwards 

from a score of 89.3 percent in 2014 to a score of 97.4 percent in 2017. 

The focus on pipeline inspector numbers has, however, highlighted the issue of 

retaining qualified pipeline inspectors, which we understand is a challenge not 

unique to Massachusetts and is a topic worth further exploration. 

Conclusion 

The Baker-Polito Administration, the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs and the Department of Public Utilities look forward to a continued 

dialogue with the Committee regarding all of these issues to ensure the safety of 

Massachusetts’ natural gas infrastructure. 

We look forward to the results of the NTSBs full review of the causes of the overpressurization event that occurred on September 13, 2018 and stand ready to implement both the recommendations of the NTSB and the Commonwealth’s independent 

evaluator. 

In closing, I would like to note that this was a devastating and unfortunate incident that resulted in tremendous loss for many residents of the Merrimack Valley. 

While there were unacceptable oversights that led to the incident and a slow initial 

response, I do want to make note of the genuine commitment and dedication I have 

observed from NiSource, particularly from their hundreds of dedicated employees 

who have left their families and relocated themselves in an effort to restore the 

quality of life, as best possible, for the residents of Merrimack Valley. I would also 

like to thank the Mayor of Lawrence, the town managers of Andover and North Andover and the countless local, state, and Federal officials who have partnered with 

us throughout this effort to break down barriers and collaborate on solutions to a 

number of complex situations throughout the restoration. The leadership and service of these individuals to our communities is commendable and has been an essential element of this restoration. Additionally, I would like to thank the multiple companies and utilities, along with the 4,500 plumbers, electricians, mutual aid workers, contractors, linguists and staff who united under the common mission of restoration of the region. 

Finally, Eversource is also deserving of our gratitude for their willingness to rise 

to the immediate challenge associated with securing homes and businesses in the 

immediate aftermath of events and restoring utility services to impacted residents 

and businesses. Their leadership and ability to quickly mobilize resources was invaluable to the Commonwealth. 

Thank you again to the Committee for the opportunity to provide testimony on 

this important issue. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Next, we’re going to hear from Steve Bryant, the President of Columbia Gas of Massachusetts. 

STATEMENT OF STEVE BRYANT, PRESIDENT, 

COLUMBIA GAS OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. BRYANT. Good morning. Good morning, Senator Markey, 

other Members of Congress, Merrimack Valley leaders and residents. 

Thank you for holding this hearing. We appreciate the opportunity to answer your questions. 

We know the tragedy of September 13 will have a lasting impact 

on the communities of Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover. 

As we talk today about steps we are taking to respond, we are 

deeply aware of the suffering, disruption, and unrest this tragedy 

has caused. Our company’s committed to addressing and remediating the damage that has occurred and to helping the community 

heal. 

I want to take a moment to thank our partners in the effort to 

help residents who have been impacted by this tragedy, the first 

responders, Captain Joe Albanese and Rear Admiral Richard C. 

Long, Governor Baker, Lt. Governor Polito, and Attorney General 

20 

Healey, Merrimack Valley community leaders, and other public officials, EverSource, and more than 450 mutual aid workers from 

utilities across the country. I say thank you. 

What this group has done to protect, assist, and restore the 

Merrimack Valley has been remarkable and we are grateful. 

We have submitted a full statement for the record and I will 

focus here on some of the immediate steps we are taking to support 

our customers. I also want to speak about the claims process for 

making our customers whole. I want to be clear up front. We know 

we have more to do to improve the work that is already underway. 

We’ve worked since the tragedy to address residents’ immediate 

needs and to establish a process to reimburse losses. Within 6 

hours of the explosion, we established a dedicated customer service 

line and within 48 hours, we opened the first claims center in Lawrence. We have since opened two additional claims centers in Andover and North Andover. 

Families visiting the claims center can receive direct financial 

aid to help address immediate needs for food, supplies, and transportation while they begin the work with claims personnel. 

We bought temporary cooking equipment and worked with fire 

officials to make sure residents who received equipment have proper safety information. We inspected thousands of homes to see if 

they could utilize space heaters and added smoke and carbon monoxide detectors. 

We have installed or provided reimbursement for alternate fuel 

solutions so that residents could have heat and hot water before 

gas service is restored. We secured temporary housing for affected 

customers. We also brought in offshore housing for workers leading 

the effort to restore gas service so our customers could be placed 

closer to their homes and closer to work. 

As of November 24, we have had over 18,000 visits to our claims 

center. We have added more resources to the center to make sure 

we are processing claims quickly, accurately, and efficiently. Nearly 

400 adjustors support the claims process to date and we have processed over 23,000 claims. 

Affected customers who’ve not yet filed claims should call 1–800– 

590–5571 and we also have people in the room today, so if we have 

customers that are impacted, we have claims adjustors. I just ask 

you put your hands up and indicate where you are, so please. 

We’ve also added information to the Columbia Gas website explaining how customers can escalate concerns with an adjustor and 

we are listening to feedback from the community and from you to 

improve our claims process and to make it as easy as possible. 

We recognize that the impacted communities will have needs 

that go beyond this assistance. In the days following the event, we 

donated $10 million to the Greater Lawrence Disaster Relief Fund 

to support the short- and medium-term needs of affected residents. 

We recently doubled our commitment, donating another $10 million to support businesses in the Merrimack Valley. 

Joe Hamrock and I have been in the communities for many 

weeks and what I’ve seen reaffirmed my love for this region, a 

place I’ve long called home. 

Coming out of what was for many the scariest days of their lives, 

so many residents are optimistic and selfless. The responsibility for 

21 

restoration is ours, we know, but we are working with strong communities and people who are extraordinary in their ability to do everything in their power to keep moving forward. 

I know our work has been far from perfect. I apologize for the 

hardship and frustration that has certainly caused and give you my 

commitment that we will continue to work to rebuild and restore 

the Merrimack Valley. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. I’m ready to 

answer your questions about the tragic events and about the work 

we must continue to recover from, and as a last note, I wish to 

offer my condolences to the family of Leonel Rondon. I will carry 

that in the heart for the rest of my life. 

Thank you. 

Senator MARKEY. Next, we’re going to hear from Joe Hamrock, 

the President and Chief Executive Officer of NiSource of Columbus, 

Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF JOE HAMROCK, PRESIDENT 

AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NISOURCE 

Mr. HAMROCK. Thank you, Senator. 

If I may, to the Rondon family, you have my deepest sympathy. 

I’m deeply sorry for the loss of your beloved son and brother. Lucy, 

thank you for your testimony here today. 

Each day, you are in my prayers that our Lord might comfort 

you and bring you His peace and those prayers will continue. 

On behalf of Steve and all of the NiSource and Columbia Gas 

family, we extend our condolences and sympathies and know that 

we will be here to support you in any way that we can. 

Good morning, Senators Markey, Hassan, and Warren, Representatives Moulton and Tsongas, Representative-elect Trahan, 

and Members of the Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover communities. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today. As you 

noted, Senator, I am the CEO of NiSource, the company that owns 

Columbia Gas of Massachusetts. 

On the afternoon of September 13, 2018, a tragic event occurred 

here in the Merrimack Valley. Columbia Gas was conducting a 

planned gas pipeline modernization project when things went horribly wrong, leading to multiple fires and explosions, many injuries, 

and a tragic loss of life. 

I am here on behalf of Columbia Gas and NiSource to apologize. 

We are deeply sorry. I am deeply sorry. 

I also want to reaffirm our responsibility to repair the damage 

safely and as quickly as possible, and I want to express our resolve 

to improve our gas delivery system and processes so that a tragedy 

like this never happens again. 

To those who were injured or who were carrying for injured loved 

ones and to those whose homes and businesses were damaged or 

destroyed because of the fires and explosions, we recognize the distress and hardship this has caused in your lives. 

To those whose daily routines have been disrupted as a result of 

the restoration efforts, from elderly residents living alone in Andover with unfamiliar appliances to young families in Lawrence with 

longer commutes to work and school, to the businesses in North 

22 

Andover who were not open and fear their customers may simply 

move on, I’ve heard you and we recognize your challenges and 

struggles. We are working around the clock to make things better. 

I want to tell you all personally that I am sorry and that I also 

know that an apology is simply not enough. We’re going to get everyone back in their homes and businesses. We know it’s too early 

to ask any of you to trust us, but we are committed to restoring 

these communities. 

We have completed the replacement of nearly 45 miles of gas 

pipeline and over 5,000 service lines. That has allowed us as of November 24 to restore service for over 6,000 residential meters and 

over 600 business customers, and I’m pleased to report that we are 

on track to restore heat and hot water to remaining facilities in the 

early part of the December 2 to December 16 date range. 

The NTSB is investigating the cause of the September 13 tragedy 

and we are cooperating with that investigation. NTSB’s work continues, but I want to be clear with everyone here today. We are not 

waiting for the NTSB final report to take steps to make sure that 

something like this never happens again. 

On September 14, we suspended work on all low pressure systems across NiSource, except where necessary for compliance and 

safety, and as detailed in my written testimony, we have already 

identified new safety measures for the operation of our low pressure systems, including a $150 million program to install continuous monitoring and protection against over-pressure situations. 

We have also focused on additional training across our entire company. 

I am humbled by the spirit, optimism, and determination of our 

customers not to allow this tragedy to disrupt their lives any more 

than it has, but we know we have to do more and we have to do 

it faster. 

We are focused on that, and I appreciate the leadership of the 

Massachusetts delegation, and before I close, I also want to offer 

our deepest gratitude to the first responders who answered the 

emergency calls on the evening of September 13 and the gas workers who assisted them. What you did was heroic and remarkable 

and we appreciate your work. 

The Merrimack Valley has a long road to recovery ahead. Our 

companies are committed to working with you and everyone here 

today to advance that recovery. I know this work is and will be the 

most important duty of my entire professional career. 

We are going to make the Merrimack Valley gas system safer 

than ever and we’re going to be here working with you to meet 

these commitments. 

Thank you and I’m ready to answer your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Hamrock and Mr. Bryant 

follow:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOE HAMROCK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE

OFFICER, NISOURCE AND STEVE BRYANT, PRESIDENT, COLUMBIA GAS OF MASSA- CHUSETTS

I. Introduction 

Good morning Senators Markey, Hassan, and Warren, Representatives Moulton 

and Tsongas, Representative-Elect Trahan, and members of the Lawrence, Andover, 

and North Andover communities. We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on 

23 

behalf of Columbia Gas of Massachusetts (‘‘Columbia Gas’’) and NiSource. Because 

we were both called to testify about the events surrounding the September 13th 

tragedy in the Merrimack Valley, we are providing this joint written statement of 

Columbia Gas and NiSource for the record. 

We know that the tragic events of September 13th will have a lasting impact on 

the people, businesses, and communities of Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover. 

As we talk today about the steps we are taking to respond, we are deeply aware 

of the suffering, disruption, and unrest this tragedy has caused. We want to offer 

our deepest sympathies and condolences to the family of Leonel Rondon, the young 

man who died because of an explosion, and our deepest apologies to those who were 

injured and to all the residents and business owners of the Merrimack Valley who 

were impacted by the September 13th fires and explosions. In addition, we want to 

offer our thanks to the first responders who answered the emergency calls on the 

evening of September 13th and the gas workers who assisted them. We are grateful 

for your service and your heroism in protecting the residents of the Merrimack Valley. We also want to acknowledge the leadership of the Massachusetts congressional 

delegation in the recovery efforts. 

The entire Columbia Gas and NiSource team is dedicated to addressing and remediating the damage that has occurred and to helping the community heal. 

II. September 13, 2018 And Its Aftermath: Taking Responsibility 

On September 13, 2018, Columbia Gas of Massachusetts was conducting a 

planned gas pipeline modernization project when things went horribly wrong. At 

4:04 and 4:05 pm, the Columbia Gas monitoring center received two alarms indicating high pressure within the South Lawrence low-pressure gas system. At 4:06 

pm, a controller within the monitoring center alerted the appropriate Columbia Gas 

personnel to dispatch them to the field. At approximately 4:30 pm, the Columbia 

Gas team shut down the regulator at issue. 

Before services were cut off, gas traveled through the system, leading to over-pressurization with terrible consequences—multiple fires and explosions, many injuries, 

and, most tragically, a loss of life. 

We are here on behalf of Columbia Gas and NiSource to apologize for this tragedy 

and to acknowledge our responsibility to make things right. We are deeply sorry. 

To those who were injured, those who cared or are caring for injured loved ones, 

and those whose homes or businesses were damaged or destroyed because of the 

fires and explosions, we recognize the distress and hardship this has caused in your 

lives. 

We know that the daily routines of many have been disrupted as a result of the 

over-pressurization and subsequent restoration efforts—from the elderly resident 

living alone in Andover with unfamiliar appliances, to young families in Lawrence 

with longer commutes to work and school, to business owners in North Andover who 

are not open and fear their customers may simply move on. We have heard from 

you and recognize your challenges and struggles. And we are working around the 

clock to make things better. 

We also know an apology is not enough. We know it is too early to ask any of 

you to trust us, but we want to reaffirm our responsibility and commitment to repair the damage safely and as quickly as possible. In the days and months ahead, 

we hope to prove our commitment to you. 

III. Broader Safety Measures 

The National Transportation Safety Board (‘‘NTSB’’) is investigating the cause of 

the September 13th tragedy, and we are cooperating with that investigation. The 

NTSB’s work continues, but we want to be clear—we are not waiting for the NTSB 

to issue its final report or for new regulations. We are proactively identifying actions 

we can take now to make sure that something like this never happens again. 

After September 13, we suspended construction work on low-pressure systems, 

only performing work necessary for compliance and safety. Since then, we have 

identified additional ways to make our low-pressure systems safer and reduce the 

risk of over-pressurization. We are also taking steps to respond to and execute on 

the NTSB’s safety recommendations. 

As part of this effort, we continue to evaluate opportunities to engineer fail-safe 

measures in our gas delivery systems. We have already committed to invest approximately $150 million to achieve the following infrastructure improvements: 

• OVER–PRESSURE PROTECTION DEVICES: We will be installing automatic 

pressure control equipment, referred to as ‘‘slam-shut’’ devices, on low-pressure 

systems across our seven-state operating area. These devices provide an additional level of control and protection. They operate like circuit-breakers; when 

they sense operating pressure that is too high or too low, they shut down the 

24 

flow of gas to the system, regardless of the cause. These devices operate independently of other pressure control devices, so they will automatically shut 

down the system to prevent over-pressurization. 

• REMOTE MONITORING: As an additional layer of protection, we will install 

remote monitoring devices on low-pressure systems so that gas control centers 

have an ability to receive pressure alarms on a real time basis. In the event 

a system is shut down by the ‘‘slam-shut’’ devices described above, the remote 

monitors will enable us to respond more quickly to restore service to customers. 

This commitment is in addition to the series of steps we took across our sevenstate footprint following the September 13th event in the Merrimack Valley, including: 

• SUSPENDED WORK: We suspended work on low-pressure systems, only performing work necessary for compliance and safety. We are still operating under 

these strict work guidelines. 

• FIELD SURVEY: We initiated and completed a field survey of our low-pressure 

regulator systems to identify available options to enhance the safe, reliable operation of regulator station equipment. 

• ENGINEERING DESIGN: We initiated an engineering design review of regulator stations to determine how best to install additional over-pressure protection systems. 

• MAPPING: We used the information from the field survey we conducted to 

begin adding new details to our electronic mapping system. Additionally, we are 

providing maps at the regulator stations themselves. 

• DAMAGE PREVENTION: We have initiated a process so that when we are notified of work near a regulator station by any company performing excavation, 

NiSource personnel will be required to be present to observe any excavation. 

In addition, we will continue to modernize our system in Massachusetts and elsewhere, replacing cast-iron and bare-steel pipes with more modern materials. 

IV. Customer Assistance and Claims 

We have worked diligently since the tragedy to address residents’ immediate 

needs and to establish a process to reimburse them for their losses. Within six hours 

of the explosions, we established a dedicated customer service line. Within 48 hours, 

we opened our first claims center in Lawrence, followed by two additional claims 

centers in Andover and North Andover. As of November 21, we have had over 

18,000 customer visits to these centers and have nearly 400 adjusters supporting 

the claims process. These figures, and some of the other figures throughout this 

statement of our companies, are best estimates as we continue our work. 

Families visiting the claims centers can receive direct financial aid to help address immediate needs for food and supplies while they begin to work with claims 

personnel. But, we also recognize that many residents need more than monetary 

compensation. We bought temporary cooking equipment and worked with fire officials to make sure residents who received the equipment had proper safety information. We inspected thousands of homes to see if they could utilize space heaters. We 

installed space heaters in the homes that could support them and added smoke and 

carbon monoxide detectors in the homes we inspected. We have installed (or provided reimbursement for) alternative fuel solutions so that residents could have heat 

and hot water before the restoration of natural gas service in order to remain in 

their homes. 

We have secured temporary housing for displaced residents, including hotel 

rooms, apartments, travel trailers, a congregate shelter, and even a pet shelter. We 

brought in offshore housing for workers leading the effort to restore gas service, so 

that customers could be placed in temporary housing that is closer to their homes 

and places of work. We are providing transportation assistance, in the form of either 

mileage reimbursement or access to our corporate accounts with Uber or Lyft. We 

are also providing winterization assistance to homes that have not yet had heat restored. We recognize there is no substitute for living in your own home and in your 

own community, and we continue to seek to identify additional avenues to minimize 

the burden. 

We recognize that the impacted communities will have needs that go beyond this 

assistance. For that reason, we committed $10 million to the Greater Lawrence Disaster Relief Fund in the days following the event. This fund is managed by the leadership of Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover. The Fund has helped serve the 

short and medium term needs of impacted residents, including housing, sustenance 

and support services. And, as we recently announced, we are providing an addiVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
25 

tional $10 million to support business recovery efforts in the Merrimack Valley. In 

coordination with state and local officials and community organizations, this includes direct technical support, funds for municipal discretion for business support, 

and longer-term regional support for economic development. 

We know that our customers have been frustrated by the flow of information and 

by changes to our restoration and claims plans. We recognize we need to do better 

and are working to improve our communications. We now have a more robust customer communications program to keep affected customers informed and we are 

sending regular updates through several communication channels. The communications program includes, among other things, direct mail, a weekly customer newsletter, an interactive map of our work schedules on our website, a 24/7 helpline, 

paid ads, and social media posts. We also have participated in six town hall/openhouse sessions in the three affected communities, where we heard directly from customers and provided resources to help resolve their issues. 

In addition to the channels mentioned above, we are making personalized phone 

calls, leaving notices on doors, and have appointed a dedicated spokesperson whose 

sole role is to communicate with the public through the media. We are also making 

communications in both English and Spanish. 

We are also taking targeted steps, like reaching out proactively to customers in 

communities that may not receive communications regularly through the other 

channels discussed above. 

We have hosted special events for the affected communities on Halloween and 

Thanksgiving. On Halloween, we held Operation Trick or Treat, which provided 

bags and candy to children in Andover and North Andover, and made it possible 

for over 1,100 children to go trick or treating in their temporary housing locations. 

For Thanksgiving, we are planning to provide more than 16,000 holiday dinners to 

customers, their families, and friends. 

V. Restoration of Service 

Following September 13th, our first priority has been to assist the communities 

affected by this tragedy. These efforts were designed with the primary purpose of 

helping get the Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover communities back on their 

feet. We have not done this alone. NiSource and Columbia Gas are grateful for the 

work of retired Navy Captain Joe Albanese, who was appointed by Governor Baker 

to lead the recovery effort in partnership with Columbia Gas and NiSource. We are 

also grateful for the work of Rear Admiral Richard Cellon, who is assisting Captain 

Albanese. We would also like to express our gratitude to Governor Baker, Lieutenant Governor Polito, Attorney General Healey, Adjutant General of the Massachusetts National Guard Keefe, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Director Schwartz, Senators Markey and Warren, Representatives Moulton and Tsongas, 

Representative-Elect Trahan, Lawrence Mayor Rivera, Andover Town Manager 

Flanagan, North Andover Town Manager Maylor, Eversource, the more than 450 

mutual aid workers from utilities across the country, and as noted earlier, the first 

responders from the Merrimack Valley and surrounding areas. 

The over-pressurization created a significant risk of damage to Columbia Gas’s facilities as well as customer-owned house-lines and appliances that typically only receive gas at low pressure. As a result, Columbia Gas could not safely just turn the 

gas back on at low pressure. Potential damage to main lines, services lines, and inhome natural gas systems and appliances all needed to be assessed and addressed. 

This restoration work is complex, and we are undertaking it at what is an unprecedented scale. We recently announced the overall cost could exceed $800 million. 

That amount includes pipeline and gas service restoration, relief measures, and 

third-party damages. 

Two initial observations about the restoration process. First, we have prioritized 

restoring gas service to our most vulnerable customers—the elderly, individuals 

with disabilities or health concerns, and young children—even when that slowed the 

overall pace of restoration. Our efforts to meet the needs of those vulnerable populations have been valuable, but do not eclipse the fact that much work remains to 

be done to completely restore the communities of Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover. Second, due to the complexity and scale of this work, we have committed to 

evaluating and adapting our approach as the restoration program has progressed so 

that we implement lessons we have learned along the way. 

We refer to the first component of the restoration process as ‘‘Gas Ready’’: The 

complete replacement of approximately 45 miles of low-pressure bare steel and castiron pipeline with state-of-the-art plastic mains and distribution lines. Customers 

will have noticed the replacement of the gas mains, which run down their streets, 

as well as the service lines, which connect the gas mains to their homes. 

26 

This portion of the project was completed on October 30, 2018, ahead of schedule. 

Our thanks go out to the individuals who worked tirelessly to install this state-ofthe-art infrastructure safely and efficiently and who saw this step of our restoration 

efforts to completion. 

The second component of the project, which we refer to as ‘‘House Ready,’’ involves repairing and replacing appliances and other natural gas infrastructure and 

equipment in customers’ homes. This process begins with an assessment of each 

home to determine the condition of all gas appliances and infrastructure, along with 

issues such as lead paint or non-code configurations that could affect work on the 

structure. Once necessary repairs and replacements have been made, the house will 

be inspected for safety. 

As part of the ‘‘House Ready’’ process, Columbia Gas has committed to replace essential natural gas appliances and equipment for impacted residential customers. 

(Other gas appliances will be replaced through the claims process.) Where possible, 

we are installing energy efficient equipment and appliances. We initially planned 

to do these replacements as part of the process of restoring gas service to a home. 

However, in order to restore heat and hot water to customers as quickly as possible, 

we have recently begun repairing equipment where we can safely do so, and will 

return later, after winter, to replace it with new, modern equipment. 

Columbia Gas brought on a major contractor to complete the ‘‘House Ready’’ process on the original timeline, which aimed to restore gas service to all impacted customers by November 19, 2018. Unfortunately, the ‘‘House Ready’’ process has taken 

longer than expected. The contractor ran into significantly more issues within the 

homes than anyone anticipated. Each home is unique and requires a tailored solution, with different heat and hot water systems, hazards, code issues, and layouts. 

We have also run into a significant number of homes in the restoration area with 

environmental issues, such as mold or asbestos, which required remediation before 

any work could be done. 

To address the challenges we encountered in the ‘‘House Ready’’ process, we have 

brought on three additional contractors, one dedicated solely to business customers, 

the other two to residential homes. Additionally, as we described before, we shifted 

our focus to repair any heating or hot water equipment where it could be safely repaired. We have also been able to significantly increase the number of plumbers 

working to restore service. Information about the revised schedule, as well as the 

appliances we will provide, is available on our website. 

Our business contractor leads an effort we refer to as ‘‘Back to Business,’’ in which 

a project manager is assigned to each affected company. The project manager leads 

a team, including a claims adjuster who aims to expedite the claims approval process for businesses. 

Residential and business customers also have the option to self-mitigate and seek 

reimbursement through the claims process; advances to fund repairs can also be obtained. 

As of November 20, we have completed the replacement of approximately 45 miles 

of gas pipeline and over 5,000 service lines. That has allowed us to restore service 

for 5,592 residential meters and 602 business customers—76 percent and 87 percent 

of the total residential meters and business meters. We deeply regret that we have 

had to extend the anticipated timeline for gas restoration to between December 2 

and December 16. But we are pleased to report that we continue to beat our daily 

goals of making homes ‘‘House Ready,’’ and we are currently on track to restore heat 

and hot water in the early part of that date range. 

Our commitment to the Merrimack Valley will not end once gas service is fully 

restored. We will continue to assist customers in filing claims in the wake of this 

event to address the needs of homes and businesses in the affected communities, 

including by coming back after the winter season to replace appliances that were 

initially repaired and completing paving and other work necessitated by the restoration-related construction. 

VI. Conclusion 

We are humbled by the optimism and determination of our customers not to allow 

this tragedy to disrupt their lives any more than it has, but we know we have to 

do more, and we have to do it faster. The Merrimack Valley has a long road to recovery ahead. Our entire company is committed to working with you to advance that 

recovery. We know this work is, and will be, the most important duty of our professional careers. We are going to get you back in your homes and businesses. We are 

going to make the Merrimack Valley gas system safer than ever. And we are going 

to be here, working with you. Thank you. 

27 

VII. Witness and Columbia Gas of Massachusetts Background 

Joe Hamrock. Since 2015, Joe Hamrock has served as President and CEO of 

NiSource, Inc., which operates seven subsidiary natural gas and electric utilities, including Columbia Gas of Massachusetts. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Electrical 

Engineering at Youngstown State University and began his career as an electrical 

engineer. Hamrock later attended business school here in Massachusetts, at MIT, 

and transitioned into management, which led eventually to his role as President 

and Chief Operating Officer of American Electric Power of Ohio. From AEP, 

Hamrock joined NiSource in 2012 as an Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of the Gas Distribution Segment, before being appointed CEO of 

NiSource in 2015. 

Steve Bryant. Steve Bryant is the President of Columbia Gas of Massachusetts. 

He is a native of Massachusetts, having grown up in Somerville, and has worked 

in the utility field in the Northeast for his entire adult life. After high school, Steve 

joined Commonwealth Energy as a mail boy, and later attended UMass Boston, 

where he earned a bachelor’s degree in economics. After college, Steve held a variety 

of positions at Commonwealth in the rates, customer operations, and sales departments. During that time, he attended Boston University’s Graduate School of Management, where he earned a master’s degree in business administration. Eventually 

he became a vice president at Connecticut Natural Gas, and from there, joined Columbia Gas in 2001 and was promoted to his current position in 2003. 

Columbia Gas of Massachusetts and its predecessors have been serving the energy 

needs of New Englanders for more than 160 years. In 1847, the Springfield Gas 

Light Company was founded to light the city’s streets, and it has been supplying 

gas heating to buildings since 1878, later under the name Bay State Gas, and eventually as Columbia Gas of Massachusetts. The company is proud of its long history 

serving the people of Massachusetts. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Our next witness is Richard Kuprewicz, who is the President of 

Accufacts, Incorporated. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. KUPREWICZ, PRESIDENT, 

ACCUFACTS, INCORPORATED 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to 

comment today on another pipeline event that could have been prevented. 

My name is Richard B. Kuprewicz, and I am President of 

Accufacts, Incorporated, based in Redmond, Washington. I have 

over 45 years of experience in the field. 

After many years of effort, distribution integrity management 

program or DIMP regulation became effective in August 2011, 

though prudent gas distribution operators were implementing 

these critical safety process approaches well before this deadline. 

Since promulgation of important transmission and distribution 

integrity management performance-based regulatory steps and 

minimum pipeline safety regulations, I have investigated far too 

many pipeline disasters which speaks volumes for the need for further pipeline safety regulatory clarification and/or improvement. 

Given the time limitations, I have focused on two important recommendations for the minimum pipeline safety regulations. 

Recommendation 1, add prescriptive requirements for management of change in regulation. Prescriptive requirements define 

shall and clearly define what an operator must do. 

In the important area of management of change or MOC, the gas 

industry mainly relies on the American Society of Mechanical Engineers or ASME standard Management System Integrity of Gas 

Pipelines, ASME B31.8S, and that supplements ASME B31.8. Both 

are performance-based standards. 

28 

Parts of both of these industry practices are incorporated by reference in current Federal pipeline safety regulations. 

Given the importance of management of change in pipeline safety, I recommend this process shall be prescribed by clear wording 

in pipeline minimum safety regulation. 

Industry practices development does not necessarily undergo the 

more public review and scrutiny and possible challenge that pipe 

safety regulation undergoes when reaching the higher obligation of 

promulgation into law. 

Incorporation of the exact wording of MOC protocols into Federal 

pipeline safety regulation also makes such regulation accessible to 

the public that could be impacted in the event of a pipeline failure. 

Congress made an attempt in the Pipeline Safety Regulatory 

Certainty and Job Creation Act of 2011 to rectify this difficulty for 

public access to important reference pipeline safety documents, but 

this well-meaning effort was circumvented by subsequent lobbying 

efforts to restrict such easier public access. 

Given the complexity of changes within many gas distribution 

system operations, Congress should require that pipeline safety 

regulation prescriptively incorporate critical minimum steps required for all management to change procedures that will cover 

both equipment and procedures. 

My second recommendation, Recommendation 2, require the use 

of computer leak mapping in DIMP. A creative pipeline operator 

can tamper with the evaluation of important metrics required to be 

reported annually to PHMSA, the Pipeline and Hazardous Material 

and Safety Administration. 

This is especially true in the area of DIMP regulation calling for 

the operators to evaluate and rank risk. Risk ranking can generate 

a wide range of outcomes developed from the same data. 

During the evolution of DIMP regulation, considerable discussion 

occurred related to displaying hazardous leak data by graphic mapping using computers and advanced mapping software in the late 

2000s. The mapping approach did not make it into the final DIMP 

regulation because an argument was presented at the time that 

many operators, especially the smaller operators, did not have access to computers and simpler-to-use developing mapping software 

was still evolving. 

Many gas distribution operators now recognize the importance, 

the efficiency, and safety benefits of computer leak mapping by 

grade, by cause, and by pipe type, such as mains or service lines, 

in quickly assisting in the evaluation of leak risk on their gas distribution systems. 

Such graphic color-coded computer mapping greatly aids the 

rapid analysis of large volumes of data to assist in quickly recognizing and identifying systemic geographic hot spots that might 

warrant further attention and resources to prudently control risk 

on their systems. 

Such leak mapping also helps to identify areas of a gas distribution system where One Call may not be effective. 

Quite simply, in the important area of leak evaluation and risk 

ranking, if a gas distribution operation cannot incorporate such a 

technically advanced and relatively inexpensive computer tool into 

29 

helping to improve pipeline safety, they should not be in the gas 

distribution business. 

Congress—— 

[Applause.] 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. Congress should direct development of simple 

regulations to require the use of computer leak mapping and reporting technologies into gas distribution safety to assist in evaluating and ranking risk. 

And I thank you for your time and I’ll take any questions later. 

[Applause.] 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kuprewicz follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. KUPREWICZ, PRESIDENT, ACCUFACTS

INCORPORATED

Thank you for the opportunity to comment today on another pipeline event that 

could have been prevented. My name is Richard B. Kuprewicz and I am President 

of Accufacts Inc., a consulting firm based at 8151 164th Avenue, NE, Redmond, WA 

98052. I specialize in all aspects of hydrocarbon-based pipelines. I have over fortyfive years of investigative experience and trained as a chemical engineer with additional knowledge in process safety management, developed from many years of operational experience. I have consulted for various local, state, and Federal agencies, 

NGOs, the public, and pipeline industry members on pipeline regulation, operation, 

and design, with particular emphasis on operation in unusually sensitive areas of 

high population density or environmental sensitivity. 

I serve as a representative of the public advising the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or PHMSA, on such areas as liquid and gas transmission integrity management, or TIMP, regulation development in the early 2000s 

following terrible pipeline tragedies. As a representative of the public I was also involved in the many years of natural gas distribution regulatory advancement wisely 

driven by the Congressional Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, And Safety Act of 2006 (PIPES Act of 2006) that mandated the gas distribution integrity 

management program, or DIMP, effort in Federal rulemaking. After many years of 

effort, DIMP regulation became effective in August 2011, though prudent natural 

gas distribution operators were implementing these critical safety process approaches well before this deadline. At the end of 2017, reports to PHMSA indicated 

that there are over 1,300 gas distribution operators in the U.S. encompassing a wide 

range of complexity. I believe most, if not all, gas distribution systems are intrastate 

pipeline systems operating within a state. The U.S. gas distribution system utilizes 

over 2.2 million miles of pipeline consisting of networks of mains and service lines, 

and composed of a wide variety of pipe materials and connections. Much of these 

materials and connections are sensitive to threats that are age related, such as cast 

iron and older vintage plastics, and mechanical connections. It is my observation 

that many gas distribution operators understand the importance and intent of 

DIMP, while others, sadly, still don’t. 

Since promulgation of these important TIMP and DIMP regulatory steps in minimum pipeline safety regulation, I have investigated far too many pipeline disasters, 

which speaks volumes for the need for further pipeline safety regulatory ‘‘clarification’’ and/or improvement. Concerning the failures (and I refer to multiple failures 

based on my experience and recent observations) the situation affecting the 

Merrimack Valley in Massachusetts (Lawrence event) on September 13, 2018, while 

rare for gas distribution operations, raises many questions about the adequacy or 

clarity of minimum pipeline safety regulations and safety process approaches. My 

comments are not intended to impede or influence the NTSB investigation concerning the Merrimack Valley failures. In my more than forty-five years of observation, I have nothing but respect for the NTSB pipeline investigation process. To finalize an NTSB report on a specific pipeline incident can take some time, given the 

need to be thorough, but I have nothing but confidence in this government body. 

It is a government organization that, well, just works. 

I will focus my brief comments and recommendations this morning concerning 

natural gas distribution system regulations on two important areas that I believe 

warrant regulatory advancement via prescriptive and clear regulation. Prescriptive 

regulation can be more efficient and effective than performance based regulations, 

such as TIMP, which has experienced, at best, mixed success. Prescriptive based 

safety regulations set basic obligations and tend to be clearer and less prone to misVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
30 

interpretation by using ‘‘shall’’ requirements, for example, that should leave no 

doubt as to important minimum safety requirements. 

I see the need for regulatory improvement in the area of gas distribution: 1) Setting prescriptive minimum requirements in the area of Management of Change, or 

MOC protocols in this critically important area, and 2) Improving the way DIMP 

approaches the area of evaluating and risk ranking, mandating the use of computer 

leak mapping, taking advantage of recent computer/software mapping strides made 

in this technical area. 

Recommendation 1: Add prescriptive requirements for Management of 

Change in regulation 

In the important area of Management of Change, or MOC, the gas industry mainly relies on the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (‘‘ASME’’) standard, 

ASME B31.8S–2004, ‘‘Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines,’’ revised in 2004 

that supplements ASME B31.8. Parts of both of these industry practices are incorporated by reference in Federal pipeline safety regulation (49CFR§ 195.7). Given the 

importance of MOC in pipeline safety, I recommend this process should be prescribed by clear wording in pipeline minimum safety regulation. While I have great 

respect for many industry practices, their development does not necessarily undergo 

the more public review and scrutiny and possible challenge that pipe safety regulation undergoes when reaching the higher obligation of promulgation into law. 

Incorporation of the exact wording of MOC protocols into Federal pipeline safety 

regulation also makes such regulation accessible to not only the industry, but importantly, also to the public that could be impacted in the event of a pipeline failure. 

Many referenced industry documents in Federal pipeline safety regulations are still 

not readily available to the public, or can only be obtained at great expense or effort. 

Congress made an attempt in the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job 

Creation Act of 2011 to rectify this difficulty for the public in gaining access to important referenced pipeline safety documents, but this well-meaning effort was circumvented by subsequent lobbying efforts to restrict such easier public access. 

Given the complexity of changes within many gas distribution system operations, 

Congress should require that pipeline safety regulation prescriptively incorporate critical minimum steps required for all Management of Change procedures that will 

cover both equipment and procedure changes. 

Recommendation 2: Require the Use of Leak Mapping in DIMP 

While DIMP regulation is heavily and appropriately reliant on metrics that can 

be measured, reported, and tracked, there nevertheless can be weakness where a 

creative pipeline operator can tamper with the evaluation of important metrics required to be reported annually to PHMSA and to many state pipeline regulatory 

agencies. This is especially true in the area in DIMP regulation calling for operators 

to ‘‘Evaluate and rank risk.’’ Risk ranking can generate a wide range of outcomes 

developed from the same data. During the evolution of DIMP regulation, considerable discussion occurred related to displaying hazardous leak data by graphic mapping using computers and advancing mapping software in the late 2000s. The mapping approach did not make it into the final DIMP regulation because an argument 

was presented at that time that many operators, especially the smaller operators, 

did not have access to computers, and simpler to use developing mapping software 

was still evolving. 

I have seen many gas distribution operators who now recognize the importance, 

efficiency, and safety benefits of computer leak mapping by grade, by cause, and by 

pipe type (mains or service lines) in quickly assisting in the evaluation of leak risks 

on their gas distribution systems. Such graphic color coded computer mapping greatly aids the rapid analysis of large volumes of data to assist in quickly recognizing 

and identifying systemic geographic ‘‘hot spots’’ that might warrant further attention and resources to prudently control risk on their systems. On more than one occasion, I have recommended that such simple computer mapping be utilized to aid 

pipeline operators and state regulators in justifying additional funds for further pipe 

replacement to efficiently improve gas distribution system safety. Such leak mapping also helps to identify areas of a gas distribution system where one-call may 

not be effective. 

Such computer and software advances have, I believe, reached the proficiency 

where a gas pipeline operator, even a small operator, should be easily able to incorporate such leak mapping/tracking advances into their operation. Quite simply, in 

the important area of leak evaluation and risk ranking, if a gas distribution operation cannot incorporate such a technically advanced and relatively inexpensive 

computer tool into helping to improve pipeline safety, they should not be in the gas 

distribution business. Congress should direct development of simple regulations to reVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
31 

quire the use of computer leak mapping and reporting technologies into gas distribution pipeline safety to assist in evaluating and ranking risk. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Now we’re going to hear from Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel of the 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL ROBERTI, CHIEF COUNSEL, PIPELINE 

AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. ROBERTI. Good morning. Senator Markey, Senator Warren, 

Senator Hassan, Representative Tsongas, and Representative 

Moulton,—— 

Senator MARKEY. Please move the microphone in a little closer. 

Mr. ROBERTI.—thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

The Merrimack gas explosions on September 13 were indeed 

tragic and unacceptable. On behalf of Secretary Elaine Chao and 

Administrator Skip Elliott, I recognize and appreciate your efforts 

to advance pipeline safety. For our leadership and everyone working at the Department of Transportation, safety is our Number 1 

priority. 

PHMSA’s mission is to protect people and the environment by 

advancing the safe transportation of energy and hazardous materials that are so essential to our daily lives. 

PHMSA oversees the inspection and enforcement of the nation’s 

interstate pipeline system. We advance education, research and development projects, and we administer the State Pipeline Safety 

Programs in 48 states, including Massachusetts. 

The natural gas explosions and fires in the Merrimack Valley 

were indeed tragic and avoidable. The United States Department 

of Transportation deeply sympathizes with the Rondon family and 

all those who suffered injuries or had their homes and property 

damaged or destroyed. 

PHMSA acknowledges and supports all initiatives to replace 

aging cast iron pipelines to advance public safety. 

In my prior role as a public utilities commissioner in Rhode Island, just a few miles south of here, I worked steadfastly to advance programs to accelerate the replacement of aged cast iron and 

bare steel pipelines for many years, particularly in the aftermath 

of tragedies like Allentown, Pennsylvania. 

Those types of tragedies galvanized the effort to modernize pipeline systems across the nation, yet despite Columbia Gas’s effort to 

replace aging systems, we witnessed an extraordinary failure in the 

planning, design, and execution of a replacement project. 

This accident once again illustrates how critical it is for pipeline 

operators to thoroughly plan and safely execute all facets related 

to construction, operation, and maintenance of pipeline networks. 

Now the written testimony I submitted discusses PHMSA’s 

Grant Assistance Program to our state partners, the training we 

provide to Federal and state inspectors, the importance and role of 

safety management systems, and, lastly, PHMSA’s evaluations of 

the State Pipeline Safety Programs. 

On the afternoon of September 13, when the incident occurred, 

PHMSA made an immediate decision to deploy multiple inspectors 

to the scene to provide technical assistance to both the MassachuVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
32 

setts Department of Public Utilities and the National Transportation Safety Board. 

As some of you know, PHMSA’s leadership also reached out in 

the evening of the incident to keep members of the Massachusetts 

congressional delegation apprised of PHMSA’s efforts and role. 

Since the time the tragedy unfolded, PHMSA’s team of experts 

have provided hundreds of hours of technical assistance and we 

will continue to do so until the Massachusetts and the NTSB complete their investigations. 

I also want to share some information about the State Pipeline 

Safety Programs that PHMSA administers. 

The Federal-state partnership with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts spans over 35 years. Massachusetts is a certified state 

partner with inspection and enforcement responsibilities for intrastate natural gas distribution and transmission pipelines. 

As a matter of Federal law, the Commonwealth possesses jurisdiction to investigate and make determinations regarding an operator’s compliance with Federal and state regulations. 

We also recognize the NTSB’s jurisdiction and expertise for leading the investigation and determining the probable cause of this 

tragic accident. While the NTSB’s preliminary report identified circumstances that likely contributed to the over-pressurization during the pipeline replacement project, PHMSA eagerly awaits the 

completion of both investigations so that we will have all requisite 

information concerning the cause of the incident and the operator’s 

compliance with pertinent regulations. 

This terrible accident shows how critical it is for pipeline operators to comprehensively understand their systems, including the 

design, construction, and operation of all facilities. 

Operators and qualified contractors must exercise extreme care 

and diligence in every aspect of their work. Above all, they need 

to nurture and maintain a safety culture that promotes the highest 

level of safety so that the tragic pipeline accident that occurred in 

Merrimack Valley never happens again. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look forward 

to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roberti follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL ROBERTI, CHIEF COUNSEL, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS

MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

I. Introduction 

Senator Markey and Senator Warren, thank you for inviting me to testify today 

as part of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee’s field hearing to discuss the September 13, 2018 natural gas accident involving Columbia Gas 

of Massachusetts and the oversight and effectiveness of state pipeline safety programs. 

Safety is the number one priority for U.S. Secretary of Transportation Elaine L. 

Chao and PHMSA Administrator Howard ‘‘Skip’’ Elliott. The recent tragic events in 

your state can only intensify the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) commitment to its goal of zero pipeline incidents. 

The mission of the PHMSA is to protect people and the environment by advancing 

the safe transportation of energy and other hazardous materials that are essential 

to our daily lives. The natural gas explosions and fires in Lawrence, Andover, and 

North Andover, Massachusetts, were tragic and all of us at PHMSA sympathize 

with the family of Leonel Rondon, the young man who lost his life, and all those 

who suffered injuries, or have property that was adversely impacted. 

33 

In response to the accident, PHMSA quickly dispatched multiple inspectors to 

Massachusetts to provide technical assistance to the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) and to the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (MA DPU). 

To date, PHMSA staff have provided more than 600 work-hours of technical engineering expertise, emergency response, and support. PHMSA will continue to assist 

the NTSB and the MA DPU as long as needed. 

In addition, PHMSA Administrator Elliott has made it a priority to make himself 

available for discussions with the Congressional Delegation and the Governor of 

Massachusetts. PHMSA will also continue to prioritize answering your questions relating to this incident and working with all Massachusetts officials. 

II. Roles 

Under PHMSA’s oversight, pipelines have continued to remain one of the safest 

ways to transport hazardous energy products in the U.S. This safety record has 

been demonstrated with over 99.99 percent barrel equivalent of liquid hydrocarbons 

reaching their onshore destinations safely and through consistent declines in casualties and major injuries attributed to pipeline incidents. In fact, pipeline incidents 

resulting in death or major injury have declined 64 percent in the past 20 years, 

despite increases in risk exposure measures like population, pipeline mileage, aging 

infrastructure and volume of product delivered. 

Pipeline safety is a shared responsibility for all public and private sector stakeholders. Of the nearly 2.8 million miles of pipeline infrastructure in the U.S., more 

than 80 percent of the lines belong to local distribution companies that transport 

natural gas to American homes and businesses. PHMSA’s state certification program expands the Federal government’s capacity to oversee these lines. 

A. Role of States 

Since 1971, when a national, uniform standard of pipeline safety regulations was 

implemented, states have had the authority, through PHMSA, to regulate the safety 

of intrastate pipelines. Sections 60105 and 60106 of title 49 U.S. Code, continue to 

allow states to assume safety authority through PHMSA for the inspection and enforcement of intrastate pipelines. While states may act as interstate agents for 

interstate gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines, the vast majority of 

their responsibility is to oversee local distribution gas systems, including the system 

we are here to discuss today. 

PHMSA sets the minimum Federal standards for pipeline safety, which the participating states then adopt into their state code and enforce. States are allowed, 

under Section 60104(c) of title 49 U.S. Code, to adopt more stringent safety standards than the minimum standards PHMSA sets. This allows states to codify and enforce regulations that deal with specific, regional (or local) risks that might not be 

feasible or cost-beneficial to regulate on the National level. Many states have established safety regulations that are more stringent than the Federal regulations. 

The MA DPU is PHMSA’s certified state partner in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Under this certification, the MA DPU is responsible for the inspection and 

enforcement for all intrastate natural gas distribution and transmission pipelines. 

Across our country, PHMSA partners with pipeline safety programs in 48 states 

(in addition to the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico), which employs approximately 380 full-time inspectors, through certification and agreements for the inspection of the Nation’s intrastate gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. PHMSA also has 

interstate agent agreements with nine states to perform interstate pipeline inspections. State pipeline safety agencies are the first line of defense in protecting much 

of the American public from pipeline risks on lines that exist primarily where people 

live and work. State pipeline safety agencies have authority over approximately 80 

percent of the total pipeline infrastructure under PHMSA’s oversight and have always been a critical component of a sound pipeline oversight program. 

In addition to working with individual states, PHMSA works closely with the National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives (NAPSR), an organization representing state government pipeline safety programs, towards our joint safety mission. PHMSA supports annual and regional NAPSR meetings and members of 

NAPSR frequently serve on PHMSA’s Advisory Committees. 

PHMSA has worked with the MA DPU for over 35 years as they have overseen 

pipeline safety in Massachusetts. PHMSA will continue to provide technical support 

to the MA DPU through this investigation and with any other technical assistance 

they may need in the future. 

B. Role of PHMSA 

There is an inherent risk associated with transporting energy. PHMSA’s job is to 

lessen the risk of energy transportation by pipelines by setting and enforcing Federal minimum safety standards for pipeline companies. The agency also promotes 

34 

1The State Base Grant is a formula grant that authorizes awards to state pipeline safety programs under the authority of 49 U.S.C. § 60107—State Pipeline Safety Grants. 2 All states except Alaska and Hawaii participate in PHMSA’s pipeline safety program. 

safety through education, research, and our partnerships with 48 states, who inspect and enforce regulations for pipelines and underground natural gas storage facilities. 

PHMSA is committed to making sure these organizations have the resources and 

expertise they need to keep our Nation’s pipelines safe. Jointly with our partner 

states, PHMSA continuously strives to strengthen oversight, inspection, and enforcement of pipeline transportation through technical assistance programs, grants, 

training, and outreach. 

1. Grants 

The financial support that we provide to our state partners through grants is 

a vital part of our partnerships. 

Based on the appropriation level set by Congress, our State Base Grant program 1 reimburses a portion of each of our partner state’s program expenses. 

The grants partially cover the cost of any personnel, equipment, and activities 

reasonably required for the conduct of the pipeline safety program. Most importantly, PHMSA’s grants provide state programs a consistent source of funding 

to hire and maintain adequate pipeline safety inspectors. PHMSA reviews state 

performance and conducts grant monitoring to ensure that the funds are used 

efficiently and effectively. 

The statute allows PHMSA to reimburse states at a level set by statute and 

Congressional appropriation—PHMSA can pay no more than 80 percent of a 

state’s total cost during a given calendar year and we prorate the total appropriation when necessary. For FY 2018, PHMSA awarded $56 million to participating state programs,2 including over $1 million to Massachusetts, which will 

cover almost 60 percent of their estimated program costs this year. 

As the number of miles of pipeline infrastructure continues to grow and as the 

older pipes age, this grant program is critical to our oversight of our Nation’s 

pipeline systems. 

2. Training 

PHMSA also supports state programs by providing essential technical training. 

Our state-of-the-art Training and Qualifications (T&Q) program has full accreditation from the International Association for Continuing Education and Training (IACET). 

The T&Q trains an average of 890 state and Federal inspectors annually, ensuring that all are current on updated regulations, technology, and best practices. 

PHMSA offers 58 online computer-based training and on-site courses, including 

classroom training and hands-on labs, that teach Federal and state inspectors 

how to understand and apply Federal regulations and incorporated industry 

standards. In addition, the Training Center offers technical assistance and nationwide seminars for companies to educate them on the consistent application 

of the regulations, inspection techniques, and compliance and enforcement procedures. 

The core courses that inspectors must take cover topics including PHMSA regulations, overpressure protection, corrosion control, plastic pipe joining, and welding. Five of the seven inspectors in Massachusetts have completed their core 

training. The remaining two inspectors are new hires and will also take these 

core classes. In FY 2018, inspectors in Massachusetts completed 32 courses at 

the T&Q Center, and PHMSA looks forward to continuing to work with the 

state. 

Training is critical to state inspectors. A significant increase in the total number of state and Federal inspection personnel, along with the many new employees who replace retirees, have led to increased training needs. Our Training 

Center is working hard to increase capacity in order to handle these needs. 

PHMSA has begun to hold ‘‘boot camps’’ to train new inspectors with the basic 

skills that allow them to begin their work quickly. 

Looking ahead, PHMSA’s T&Q Center is committed to developing innovative 

ways to be more accessible and effective, including the exploration of long-distance proctored classes, curriculum improvements, and more efficient delivery 

to ensure relevancy. 

3. Program Evaluations 

35 

3Sections 60105(e) and 60106(d) of title 49 U.S. Code provide for the monitoring of state pipeline safety programs by PHMSA. 4http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/States.htm 

5https://ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PLD18MR003-preliminary-report 

.pdf 

Each year, PHMSA evaluates every partner’s compliance with our safety program requirements. Our representatives work with the state officials to review 

their inspection procedures, records, inspection activities, and enforcement actions.3 These reviews provide an opportunity for dialogue between PHMSA and 

the states during which we emphasize the imperative to continually improve 

pipeline safety, public safety, and the protection of the environment. 

This evaluation assesses whether the state is maintaining an effective pipeline 

safety program in line with Federal regulations and provides the basis for determining the state’s total point award for the PHMSA pipeline safety grant for 

the upcoming year. 

The assessments consist of two parts. PHMSA first reviews each state’s 

Progress Report to validate that their pipeline safety program is supported by 

the people, training and other resources necessary to ensure pipeline safety. 

The progress report also summarizes their annual inspection activities conducted on the regulated companies within each state for the previous year. 

Second, PHMSA reviews the annual Progress Report documents submitted by 

the state for accuracy, reviews the pipeline program inspection procedures and 

records, and observes an on-site inspection of a pipeline company conducted by 

state staff. 

As part of this annual program evaluation process, PHMSA discusses state 

metrics developed by PHMSA and the National Association of Pipeline Safety 

Representatives. These metrics track the state’s damage prevention program, 

inspection activity, inspector qualification, leak management, enforcement, and 

incident investigation. 

These evaluations and the review of metrics are an opportunity for discussion 

between PHMSA and state pipeline safety program managers about potential 

safety program improvements. PHMSA also publishes each state’s progress on 

these metrics online 4 so that the state programs can proactively review their 

metrics and act to ensure positive performance trends. 

The strength of state pipeline safety programs directly impacts the integrity of 

our Nation’s pipelines, especially the local distribution systems. 

At the recent 2018 NAPSR National Meeting, PHMSA senior leadership spoke 

to all state pipeline safety programs and challenged the states to strive for excellence. Specifically, PHMSA encouraged state leaders to be diligent in their 

oversight, especially in light of the Massachusetts accident. State pipeline safety 

authorities, just as we at PHMSA, must vigorously inspect and enforce against 

the pipeline safety regulations and take prompt action where needed. 

C. Role of Gas Companies 

While PHMSA and our state partners are dedicated to a goal of zero incidents, 

a safe pipeline system requires the active participation of all stakeholders. Thus, the 

onus of maintaining a safe pipeline system is on the companies that own and operate the systems. 

PHMSA expects companies to know their systems’ risks and needs, including the 

risks of the systems’ design, environment, and operations. Companies must address 

these risks promptly. Accidents like what occurred here in Massachusetts are unacceptable. 

I want to recognize and thank the NTSB for their outstanding professionalism 

and dedication while leading the tragic Columbia Gas of Massachusetts accident investigation. In its preliminary report, the NTSB 5 noted that the overpressurization 

that caused the explosions and fires occurred during a pipeline replacement project. 

While we applaud the company’s intent to replace aged and vulnerable cast iron 

lines, the project’s work plan did not account for sensing lines of gas regulators in 

that part of the system. 

This tragedy and its aftermath have demonstrated how critical it is for companies 

to thoroughly plan and safely execute all their work involving design, construction, 

operation and maintenance of any replacement activity. Pipeline operators must understand that they have a responsibility to demand excellence from the contractors 

and subcontractors they hire to work on their systems. 

36 

We will support the MA DPU and the citizens of Massachusetts as they work to 

recover from this tragedy. At this point, it also appears that this accident was not 

caused by a gap in either Federal or state pipeline safety regulations—this was an 

issue of company quality control. While we might wish it otherwise, regulations 

alone will not prevent pipeline incidents and accidents. To prevent future accidents 

like this one, companies must focus on continuous improvement and nurturing a 

good safety culture. Such aggressiveness is essential if we—all of us, together—hope 

to create a pervasive culture of safety—one that looks upon even near-misses as unacceptable failures, like air traffic controllers have done for a very long time. And 

I choose that occupation because they are one of few endeavors with a smaller incident rate than pipeline operations. 

III. Continuous Improvement/Safety Management and Culture 

Pipeline operators must continue to use risk-informed approaches, such as integrity management, to ensure they are adequately identifying and addressing the 

greatest risks to their systems. This includes efforts to conduct integrity assessments and apply lessons learned across an entire system. But regulations are not 

the only resource PHMSA can use to improve pipeline safety. 

The common thread that runs throughout every aspect of PHMSA’s safety mission 

is a Safety Management Systems (or SMS) approach. SMS looks to find gaps, address them promptly, and prevent pipeline accidents and incidents from ever occurring as opposed to reacting. To be effective, SMS requires PHMSA to move beyond 

the role of being just a regulator—to encourage operators to identify and target their 

system risks, address those risks, and encourage a company-wide culture that 

makes safety the number one priority, always. 

Pipeline operators are only as good as their worst contractor. For SMS to permeate through all levels and areas of the pipeline industry, we need ways to share 

and analyze data, allowing all of us to see emerging trends and addressing problems 

before they result in accidents. We all share the same goal of zero pipeline incidents, 

and I believe that the more we collaborate, the safer our Nation’s pipelines will be. 

PHMSA’s expectation of companies, and the industries that support them, is for 

them to know their systems’ risks and needs. Periodic inspections by PHMSA or its 

state partners will not yield the kind of intimate knowledge required to anticipate 

all of a system’s vulnerabilities. 

PHMSA challenges companies by encouraging them to not wait for inspections, 

or for new regulations, to make safety improvements. It is folly to think that further 

improvement will occur if companies are either passive or complacent. Companies 

work with these systems every day and they must be more aggressive than to wait 

for PHMSA or states to identify potential problems. 

Under a well-designed SMS, companies can address an issue or gap before it becomes a problem, because some problems become accidents, and some accidents become tragedies. 

An aggressive approach is essential if we collectively advance to create a pervasive culture of safety—one that looks upon even the smallest issue or near-miss as 

unacceptable. 

Our commitment to SMS goes beyond asking companies to make cultural changes; 

we are implementing SMS throughout PHMSA as well. PHMSA is incorporating a 

focus on safety into our everyday operations, refocusing on our communications 

across the agency, and reexamining how we can do business even better. 

An element of the PHMSA SMS is our work with our state partners to improve 

our training support. As I said before, PHMSA’s T&Q Center is working to provide 

an effective and efficient distance delivery system that does not sacrifice the high 

quality of our training curricula. PHMSA’s goal is to make it easier for state inspectors to access the courses they need quickly and at a lower cost. 

PHMSA has an active mentoring program for state inspectors, and we continue 

to encourage states to participate in the program to improve inspector skillsets and 

benefit from feedback from experienced inspectors. In addition, last year PHMSA 

employees spent well over 7,600 hours working directly with state pipeline safety 

programs supporting pipeline safety. 

IV. PHMSA Supports Modernization 

Our Nation is growing rapidly. Increases in domestic energy production are placing more demand on all of the Nation’s transportation modes and poising America 

to become the world’s largest energy producer. Technology advancements quickly 

change how the industry uses the transportation system. In addition, it is projected 

that another 70 million more people will live in America in 2050, placing even more 

demand on the transportation network. All of these changes present new safety 

37 

6 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, 

North Dakota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, 

Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming 7https://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline_replacement/cast_iron_inventory.asp 8Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2016, Public Law 

114–183 

challenges, as well as new opportunities to improve the safety and efficiency of our 

Nation’s hazmat transportation system for today and the future. 

PHMSA believes that many of the next steps in safety will come from encouraging 

new technologies and prioritizing innovative solutions to safety challenges. We support modernization in multiple ways, including funding research and looking at new 

ways to conduct business. 

If done correctly, upgrading our Nation’s pipeline infrastructure is one of the surest ways to foster even higher levels of pipeline safety. That is why DOT and 

PHMSA issued a Call to Action in 2011 to accelerate the repair, rehabilitation, and 

replacement of the aged and outmoded pipeline that pose the highest risk across the 

country. 

Thanks to increased state and Federal safety initiatives and pipeline companies’ 

replacement efforts, the miles of active cast or wrought iron pipelines has declined 

significantly in recent years. To date, 21 states and one territory have completely 

eliminated their inventory of cast or wrought iron natural gas distribution lines.6

In fact, cast or wrought iron gas distribution pipelines make up only 2 percent of 

distribution mains in our country today,7 and 41 states, including the District of Columbia, have specific rate mechanisms that foster accelerated replacement of pipelines no longer fit for service. 

PHMSA considers it our responsibility to provide technical support to state and 

Federal agencies that have siting or route designation authority, to prioritize inspections related to the engineering and construction of major new pipeline projects, and 

to the support of projects that are designed to repair, rebuild, and expand infrastructure. 

We’re also committed to undertake the research that will develop new technologies and new solutions to pipeline safety challenges. Our R&D program works 

to apply research, strengthen consensus standards, and inform regulatory activities. 

Our research is focused on solving discrete, current problems that have an immediate effect on overall safety. 

Since 2002, PHMSA has funded 270 projects designed to prevent excavation damage to pipelines, identify and minimize leaks, and detect defects in pipelines well 

before they fail. In September, PHMSA awarded more than $3.8 million to 11 universities via our Competitive Academic Agreement Program (CAAP). The 13 research projects funded by CAAP this year address a number of consensus standards, 

rulemakings, mandates, and recommendations. 

The PIPES Act of 2016 8 required the Secretary to establish a Voluntary Information-sharing System (VIS) Workgroup (WG) to study information-sharing systems 

for the pipeline industry. This group will provide recommendations to the Secretary 

regarding whether a sharing system is needed, ways to encourage the exchange of 

inspection information, and best practices for the protection of proprietary and security-sensitive information. The VIS WG’s membership includes representatives from 

PHMSA, industry stakeholders, safety advocacy groups, research institutions, state 

public utility commissions, state pipeline safety inspectors, labor representatives, 

and other entities. The Workgroup is on schedule to present their recommendations 

to Secretary Chao before the end of the year. 

V. Conclusion 

Safety is the highest priority for the U.S. Department of Transportation and for 

PHMSA and we look forward to continuing to work with Congress to prevent future 

natural gas distribution pipeline accidents like what recently occurred in Massachusetts. Pipeline companies must apply lessons learned from this accident to their own 

programs and future operations. PHMSA holds companies accountable for the safe 

operation of their pipelines, and will continue its efforts to ensure that all stakeholders uphold the highest possible safety standards. 

As the number of miles of new pipe being buried across the country continues to 

grow, the need for strong state pipeline safety programs is ever more critical to promote transportation system safety in every corner of our great nation. States’ input 

and experience is critical in this effort as PHMSA sets public policy, strategically 

allocates resources, and moves forward with effective new regulations. 

Thank you again for inviting me to today’s field hearing. I look forward to your 

questions. 

38 

Senator MARKEY. OK. Thank you. 

Now we’ll go to a round of questions from the members of Congress. 

Mr. Hamrock, will you commit under oath today that you will 

guarantee that every family, every business is made 100 percent financially whole for the disaster which occurred on the property of 

Columbia Gas? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, yes, we take responsibility for the incident and the consequences of the incident and from the very beginning, we’re committed to working with each of the affected individuals, families, and businesses to ensure that we fully understand 

the impact on them and that we work with them closely to fully 

compensate them for their losses. 

Senator MARKEY. So you will make them 100 percent financially 

whole? 

Mr. HAMROCK. We will work with them to fully understand not 

just financially—— 

Senator MARKEY. Will you make them 100 percent financially 

whole? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Yes, we will, and—— 

Senator MARKEY. OK. 

Mr. HAMROCK.—we’ll work with them for all other effects that 

they may have experienced. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. The families and businesses need to hear 

that. 

Mr. Hamrock, the National Transportation Safety Board, Chairman Sumwalt, he testified to this, issued an urgent set of recommendations two weeks ago in an interim report which I have 

here. It’s an urgent report and it said that the company should 

take all of these additional safety measures immediately. 

Do you commit to adopting every one of these urgent safety 

measures now? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, the NTSB’s recommendations are 

aligned with our objectives. We are already implementing some of 

those. We began—— 

Senator MARKEY. No. I asked you if you would implement all of 

the recommendations—— 

Mr. HAMROCK. We will work—— 

Senator MARKEY.—of the NTSB? 

Mr. HAMROCK.—with the NTSB to fully understand and implement the recommendations they’ve made. 

Senator MARKEY. It has been two weeks since they issued these 

urgent recommendations. Why can you not commit to implementing urgent recommendations from the NTSB right now, all of 

them? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, we are committing to implement those 

recommendations. 

Senator MARKEY. All of them? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Yes, all of them, and in fact we have already implemented a number of them in the weeks subsequent to the tragedy occurring, and in some cases, we’ve gone above and beyond 

those recommendations already. 

39 

Senator MARKEY. It’s critical that all of them be implemented 

now. In the immediate aftermath, you said that you would review 

them, but in reviewing, you said you will now implement. 

Next, the NTSB found that a single unqualified engineer was allowed to approve the construction job that caused the disaster with 

no oversight from experienced technicians that would have understood the implications for the entire pipeline system. It’s unacceptable and shows a culture of complacency that Columbia Gas would 

allow someone so unqualified to make unilateral decisions about 

pipeline construction projects. 

Mr. Hamrock, were you aware that this was a practice occurring 

at Columbia Gas? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, we are reviewing the NTSB’s findings in 

this regard, looking at all of the underlying factors that would have 

contributed to that situation, committed to getting to the bottom of 

it, and we’ll not stop until we—— 

Senator MARKEY. Were you aware that there was an unqualified 

engineer doing the review of the project? Were you aware? 

Mr. HAMROCK. I was not personally aware. 

Senator MARKEY. Mr. Bryant, were you aware? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, I am aware of the fact that engineers who 

work on our system are not always professional engineers. That’s 

somewhat standard in the industry. 

Senator MARKEY. It is a standard that is too low. To have a safety decision made by an unqualified engineer is unacceptable. 

Will you commit right now to having all future pipeline construction plans signed off on by a qualified engineer and that Columbia 

Gas officials who know the entire pipeline system as the NTSB has 

recommended? Will you commit to that? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, yes, we have already begun to implement that. Where we do not have professional engineers in place, 

we will work with outside firms to ensure that we do in fact bring 

professional engineers to oversee the work, and we’ll work with the 

NTSB to make sure that we fully understand and clarify the intent 

of that recommendation. 

Senator MARKEY. All right. Well, that was a catastrophic mistake. The entire company failed. The buck does stop with you. Your 

company gave too much power to a low-level engineer with too little information. 

Next, up until four years ago, Mr. Hamrock, it was company policy to have a trained technician present in the pressure monitoring 

station when construction work was being done. If a technician had 

been onsite here in Lawrence on September 13, they likely would 

have seen the pressure spike, immediately turned off the gas, and 

potentially avoided this whole disaster, but according again to the 

NTSB, your company abandoned that requirement four years ago 

for that common sense safety measure. 

It took 26 minutes after the Columbia Gas Control Room received the high pressure alarms for someone to shut down the gas 

at the regulator. Four years ago, you would have had someone 

there to shut down immediately during that critical 26-minute gap. 

That did not happen because you abandoned that policy and the result was disaster. 

40 

Saving money as a way of increasing profits but at the expense 

of safety leads to disaster, Mr. Hamrock. 

Do you commit to having someone there onsite from now on to 

make sure it never happens again? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, safety is a core value for us, the core 

driver of everything that we do. We’ve reviewed that recommendation and that finding. Further review is required to fully understand it. We do commit to putting automatic shutoff capabilities in 

all of our systems, not just with somebody stationed at the regulator during construction work but on a continuous basis—— 

Senator MARKEY. Again, will you commit to changing the policy? 

Mr. HAMROCK. We do commit to putting automatic shutoff capabilities across all of our low pressure regulator systems, which goes 

above and beyond the NTSB recommendation, because it will be 

continuous automatic shutoff, not just—— 

Senator MARKEY. Will that satisfy you, Chairman Sumwalt? 

Mr. SUMWALT. I cannot commit on behalf of the entire Board, I’m 

one of five members of the Board, but I like what I hear there. The 

automatic shutoff valve, we’ve called for that in other accidents. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. And down to you, Mr. Kuprewicz. The fine 

that can be levied is $2 million. This disaster could cost upwards 

of a billion dollars. Is that fine too low, Mr. Kuprewicz? What 

should the fine be? It seems to me for Columbia Gas, it’s like paying a parking ticket for something that created a catastrophic accident. Where should these fines be set? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. Well, you ask a valid question. I’ve investigated 

too many multibillion dollar disasters from pipelines and that’s 

multi-B, with a billion. The fines, you could argue, and there has 

been a lot of debate on this over the decades, what’s the purpose 

of the penalty? 

I can’t give you a dollar answer, but what I can tell you is it 

should be high enough to change the culture so that they don’t repeat the mistakes that are obviously going to be investigated and 

reported on and so penalties aren’t necessarily to be punitive. They 

should be trying to modify the culture. If they can’t do that, then 

they’re not high enough and I’m sorry to be giving you a glib answer, but I’m giving you an honest, truthful answer. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, it’s not a glib answer. You’re saying 

they’re not high enough. They have to be much higher. It has to 

discourage Columbia or any other company from ever turning a 

blind eye to the safety problems in their company because they 

know that the fine is the equivalent of a parking ticket. 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. It gets even worse because the actual penalty 

that is assessed is very seldom actually collected. It’s a very small 

percentage, even less than that. So we’re on the same wavelength 

here, Senator. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, again, boosterism leads to complacency 

and complacency leads to disaster. When you assume that there 

can be no accident and the fine is so low, if there is one, then it 

creates the condition of complacency that does result in disaster. 

So these Federal fines have to be dramatically increased if we’re 

going to discourage this activity from ever occurring again in the 

future, and I would say to you, Mr. Hamrock, that my question to 

you is given what’s happened, given this catastrophic event, do you 

41 

think that you should be any longer allowed to run this company, 

given the catastrophe which has occurred? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, the consequences alone of this tragedy 

motivate me to dedicate the remainder of my professional career to 

ensuring that nothing like this ever happens again. That becomes 

the sole driver. 

I take responsibility on behalf of NiSource and on behalf of Columbia Gas and as CEO, I’m accountable to be sure that this never 

happens again and that we restore these communities to where 

they were. We won’t stop. We’re here for the long run. We won’t 

stop until we’re committed to that and that’s what I pledge. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, Mr. Hamrock, I’m not sure that you 

should be allowed to continue to be the CEO of this company given 

what happened. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. I think that it is absolutely imperative that 

there be some price which is paid for what has happened. 

Let me turn now and recognize my colleague, Senator from Massachusetts, Elizabeth Warren. 

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Senator Markey. 

So what happened in the Merrimack Valley is horrible, plain and 

simple. It is even more infuriating that this is not the first time 

that Columbia Gas and NiSource have failed to provide safe gas 

service to its customers. 

In 2012, a Columbia Gas worker punctured a mislabeled steel 

service line in Springfield, Massachusetts, resulting in an explosion 

that injured 17 people and caused an estimated $1.3 million in 

property damage. 

Mr. Hamrock, following the Springfield explosions, was your 

company pressed to improve your pipeline safety processes? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, in that instance, as you noted, one of our 

employees was investigating the call on a leak and in the course 

of that investigation punctured the service line during a process 

called bar holding, looking for the gas under the pavement. 

After that, as we always do in any sort of incident, whether it 

occurs on our system or others, we take actions that are designed 

to prevent something like that from ever happening again, and we 

did in fact change procedures and change bar holding procedures. 

Senator WARREN. So that’s a yes? 

Mr. HAMROCK. It’s a yes. Yes, we did. 

Senator WARREN. OK. Columbia Gas leaks also occurred across 

the Commonwealth, in Walpole in 2004 and 2007, in Easton in 

2007 and West Barnstable in 2009, and West Springfield in 2011, 

and in Skaugen in 2012. 

Following those leaks, did you take action to improve safety? 

Mr. HAMROCK. In every case, when there’s an incident, whether 

it’s caused by damage from an outside party, weather-related, any 

sort of asset-related condition, we always look for an opportunity 

to learn and make changes and take actions as a result of what we 

learned from those, so yes. 

Senator WARREN. Well, here, we’re here not because—and I 

think this is what you’re saying—not because one individual engineer or one mislabeled engineering plan, but because of a series of 

problems, and I’m concerned that these events culminating in the 

42 

deadly explosion three months ago expose a corporate culture that 

isn’t adequately focused on safety. 

Mr. Bryant, Mr. Hamrock, corporate culture is on you. Corporate 

priorities are on you and that’s why I want to ask about personal 

responsibility here. 

On October 11, the National Transportation Safety Board, the 

Federal body charged with determining what caused this tragedy, 

released an interim report on the Merrimack Valley explosions 

which clearly identified a series of failures by Columbia Gas. 

So, Mr. Bryant, you’re the President of Columbia Gas. That 

means the buck stops with you. The NTSB reports reveal unambiguous failures by the company that you run that contributed to this 

tragedy. 

I just want to know. Do you take personal responsibility for the 

breakdowns that led to these explosions? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, I take responsibility for the actions in the 

company and I’m responsible at this point to make sure that we 

thoroughly understand what happened and why. 

Senator WARREN. So you take personal responsibility here? 

Can I ask you the same question, Mr. Hamrock? You’re the CEO 

of NiSource, the company that owns Columbia Gas. The NTSB reports also clearly identify failures by NiSource that contributed to 

this tragedy. 

Do you take personal responsibility for this tragedy? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, yes, I take responsibility for the culture 

as well as you noted and safety is our core value. It drives everything we do. 

Senator WARREN. So let me ask you what personal responsibility 

means to you. 

Mr. Hamrock, how much were you paid last year? 

Mr. HAMROCK. My compensation is a matter of public record and 

it’s in the range of $5 million. 

Senator WARREN. Five million. OK. And, Mr. Bryant, how much 

were you paid last year? 

Mr. BRYANT. My compensation was approximately $550,000. 

Senator WARREN. OK. Little over half a million. Mr. Hamrock, 

has your pay been reduced as a result of this disaster? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, again, I take full responsibility—— 

Senator WARREN. That’s a yes or no question. How your pay been 

reduced as a result of this disaster? 

Mr. HAMROCK. I fully expect to be held accountable with compensation being an important part of that and in fact have recommended to our Board that my bonus be withheld. 

Senator WARREN. So your bonus may be withheld in the future? 

And, Mr. Bryant, was your pay reduced as a result of this action? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, a significant portion of my compensation 

above $230,000 is incentive compensation. I have suggested to Mr. 

Hamrock that any payment of any incentive in this year would be 

inappropriate. 

Senator WARREN. So you’re going to reduce—so you will lose 

your—people died in this explosion and you’re going to lose your incentive bonus this year, is that right? 

43 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, first conversation I had with Joe Hamrock 

and that is the conversation that we had is that something on the 

order of $300,000 would be inappropriate. 

Senator WARREN. OK. So you may lose your incentive bonus or 

you may not? 

Mr. BRYANT. I’d like to clarify that. I think I was more specific 

with Mr. Hamrock. I said that I did not think that it should be 

paid and, if offered, I would not accept. 

Senator WARREN. OK. You hope you will lose your incentive 

bonus. Is that what you just said? 

Mr. BRYANT. No. I’m sorry, Senator. I said that I told Mr. 

Hamrock that I did not think that the payment of an incentive this 

year would be appropriate. 

Senator WARREN. OK. Who’s going to be responsible for determining whether or not you get your incentive bonus? Is it Mr. 

Hamrock? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator,—— 

Senator WARREN. I just want to figure out what personal responsibility means to you two? 

Mr. HAMROCK.—personal responsibility goes beyond compensation. It’s—— 

Senator WARREN. Well, let’s start with compensation. I’m fine 

with beyond compensation, but I just want to know. You kept your 

jobs and you’re still getting paid what sounds like a lot of money, 

and I want to know what personal responsibility means here. 

Let me ask you another question. You said, Mr. Bryant, right 

after the explosion, ‘‘I see no cause to fire anybody with what I 

know so far.’’ So who exactly at Columbia Gas has been held responsible for the shortcomings that were identified in the NTSB report? Have you fired anyone? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Senator, the review is underway. We will take all 

appropriate actions, based on the final findings, the ultimate understanding of what happened here, personal accountability, including organizational responsibilities, and compensation will all be 

a part of that. 

The most important thing is that we get to the core set of facts 

and understand what happened, who’s accountable, make sure we 

make a consistent—— 

Senator WARREN. No. 

Mr. HAMROCK.—and complete set of recommendations. 

Senator WARREN. Let me stop you there. The most important 

thing is not just that we find out what happens. The most important thing is that we make changes so that it doesn’t happen again. 

Mr. HAMROCK. I agree. 

Senator WARREN. And I started my line of questions with how 

many times you have stood up and said in effect publicly this will 

not happen again. Yes, there has been an accident, there has been 

a mistake, but we’re going to improve safety and this will not happen again, and we can go through the list a second time or third 

time and that’s just right here in Massachusetts and yet now that 

we’ve had a huge tragedy, now that someone has died, now that 

people have been injured, now that people have lost their homes, 

you’re saying exactly the same thing you said every time in the 

past and you sit here and say I apologize and I’m glad to hear that 

44 

and I hope that it’s sincere and you say I take personal responsibility but I’m just not seeing any impact from that. 

I’m not seeing a company that takes safety seriously and I’m not 

seeing people at the head of the company who take any personal 

accountability for the kind of tragedy that a culture that is not focused on safety causes to the public. 

The people in this room have been injured. You have not. You 

continue to keep your jobs, to collect your big paychecks, and to go 

on about your business. Personal responsibility means you step up 

in this, not simply that you back away and say you’ll figure out 

how other people can deal with this problem. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. The Chair recognizes Senator Hassan. 

Senator HASSAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the 

witnesses for being here. 

Let me just start by saying you can count me in with my colleagues, Senator Markey and Senator Warren, in questioning why 

it is that the people of Lawrence and Andover and North Andover 

or the people in New Hampshire or any American you all serve 

should have to rely on your culture because I will add my concern 

to that. You just heard from Senator Warren that there have been 

safety incident after safety incident after safety incident just here 

in Massachusetts and it does not seem to have changed your culture and that is a grave concern because this can’t happen again 

and I’m sitting here saying that and, of course, others have said 

that after other accidents with your companies and others. 

It’s 2018 in the United States of America and nobody should be 

worried when they come home at night that their house is going 

to explode, nobody. 

So let me now turn to you, Mr. Sumwalt, because I want to figure out what we now do so that we’re not just relying on the culture of private enterprise and we are, in fact, doing what we should 

do as Americans to require and implement standards that will keep 

us safe. 

I understand that one of the recommendations issued in the 

NTSB’s preliminary report is to require that a professional engineer issue a seal of approval for public utility engineering drawings. 

Now I have to say when I read that, I was astounded that we 

don’t require that. It’s my understanding that neither Massachusetts nor New Hampshire nor many other states require such a 

seal of approval, although I understand from the Secretary that 

that is changing in Massachusetts. 

It seems to me that if this change requiring such a seal of approval could have prevented death and injury in the Merrimack 

Valley explosions, it would be worth alerting state governments so 

that they can respond accordingly, and I think you touched on this 

in your testimony, but can you help me understand what the NTSB 

is going to do to issue guidance to states that make sure that they 

take the steps they need to require professional engineer seal on 

these types of drawings? 

Mr. SUMWALT. Thank you for your question, Senator Hassan, 

and, of course, our immediate focus is on this particular—— 

Senator HASSAN. Right. 

45 

Mr. SUMWALT.—tragedy here in the Merrimack Valley. 

I would envision that part of our total package, our total investigation, we would want to look and see what the requirements are 

from various states. As you pointed out, about 29 states do not require this professional engineer signoff. 

So I can envision that that would be something that we would 

ultimately recommend. 

Senator HASSAN. Is there any reason you shouldn’t be recommending it right now? So that state legislatures will come back 

next month to state houses across the country. Why shouldn’t the 

top of their agenda be, not to mention the top of Congress’s agenda 

be, to implement this requirement as a matter of state regulation 

or state law? Why shouldn’t the NTSB be out front saying this is 

something you could do right now, this legislative session, to make 

sure that gas pipelines are safer? 

Mr. SUMWALT. Well, I certainly hear what you’re saying and I 

appreciate what you’re saying. Again, our immediate focus is on 

this particular event, so we’ve scoped the recommendations to address this event, but, as I mentioned, I suspect this investigation 

will have many, many recommendations that are broad-reaching. 

Senator HASSAN. Well, I appreciate that. What I would urge you 

all to do is when a recommendation, even if you haven’t finished 

the complete review, seems like there’s an obvious recommendation 

out there, that state legislators could act on immediately, get that 

recommendation out there and there are lots of us who want to 

work with you to do that. 

Mr. Kuprewicz, I want to touch a little bit on your testimony. 

You say in your testimony that using computer leak mapping and 

reporting technologies could help guard against incidents like the 

one in Merrimack Valley. 

Can you please discuss the role of technology in providing a 

backstop against human error and whether or not you think state 

and Federal Governments have the resources to implement that 

kind of technology? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. Well, actually, there are a couple states, and I 

won’t name them because of nondisclosure agreements, who have 

required as a matter in their PUCs, in their settlements for pipe 

replacement that to have the company present annually their leak 

detection results in computer maps and then they can sort them 

and filter them and so when you see in some of these areas the numerous leaks, even hazardous leaks, the Grade 1s, and it fills up 

the page, well, that doesn’t really do you a lot of good. 

So you’ve got to use the computer to filter it and so I guess the 

example I’d use is I used Apple Maps to find Lawrence today when 

I drove from Connecticut this morning visiting my daughter and it 

works. It’s not a real complicated system. You can do the same 

thing with—not with the complications of leak map—with Google 

mapping or Apple mapping, but there are very easy tools out there. 

They’ve been around for, you know, 10 years. They’re getting more 

sophisticated and so a simple little portable computer can do exactly that. 

Senator HASSAN. OK. So what you’re telling us is that there are 

models out there that could be used that could help prevent this 

kind of incident from occurring? 

46 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. Well, it’ll help indicate, you know, are you doing 

pipe replacement where it really needs to be, first,—— 

Senator HASSAN. Right. 

Mr. KUPREWICZ.—and then if you’re doing pipe replacement and 

it didn’t really need to be the first one to be done and it exposed 

you to a catastrophic over-pressure event for other reasons,—— 

Senator HASSAN. Right. 

Mr. KUPREWICZ.—that could have been avoided. 

Senator HASSAN. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. Roberti, does PHMSA have the necessary cyber security 

framework to rely on new technologies for safety like the ones we 

just heard about? 

Mr. ROBERTI. Senator, did you say cyber? 

Senator HASSAN. Yes. So we’re talking about computer programs. 

We’re talking about new technology to help prevent this kind of incident and, of course, the new technology has to be protected by 

strong cybersecurity. So does PHMSA have that kind of capacity? 

Mr. ROBERTI. Certainly. We invest a lot in R&D research with 

universities on that front. Cybersecurity on the pipeline side is 

within the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation 

Safety Administration. We work with them very closely. In fact, 

we’re about to execute an Addendum to an existing Memorandum 

of Understanding on how to bolster that area. 

In terms of this area about leak mapping, the distribution integrity management protocols within the regulations envision that 

pipeline operators will know their systems, prioritize where the 

risks are, and then prioritize investments. 

This type of technology should be employed if it’s available and 

can be employed and I think that’s something we’ll continue to look 

at, as well, how we can harness technology. 

Senator HASSAN. Thank you. And just in the interest of time, I’ll 

end my line of questioning, but I do want to follow up with you because I think your agency has been slow in responding to GAO recommendations about ways to improve and obviously that needs to 

change. 

Thank you. 

Senator MARKEY. Congresswoman Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Senator Markey, and I think you can 

hear from all our questions up here the deep concern obviously 

about the impact on the residents of the Merrimack Valley, but 

also the culture and processes and procedures in place within the 

company that led to this. 

So a lot of work to be done, and I think we’re grateful for the 

NTSB, who’s bringing some clarity, some objective clarity to just 

why this happened and what steps should be taken to prevent it 

from happening again. 

So I want to go to you, Chairman Sumwalt, and ask you, can you 

talk about the additional steps that you will be taking to conduct 

the investigation? You’ve issued a detailed preliminary report, I 

think, which was very concerning to all of us up here, showing, I 

think, in fact that this could have been prevented. 

But what will be the focus of your investigation moving forward? 

47 

Mr. SUMWALT. Well, thank you. Of course, we did want to get out 

these interim safety recommendations because we felt that they 

were very important to get those out early. 

So, in addition, I believe we’ve certainly identified the proximate 

cause of the accident. Of course, that’s an over-pressurization. We 

understand why the system over-pressured and so you could say, 

well, we figured the accident out. 

Our investigations are very thorough. So, in addition to identifying really the proximate cause, we want to look at the organizational culture of NiSource and Columbia Gas. That’s not as easy as 

going out and finding a sensor that is attached to the wrong line. 

Ms. TSONGAS. How do you do that? How do you look at the organizational culture? 

Mr. SUMWALT. Well, and that’s very tricky and that’s why it 

takes time, but we do that by looking at prior practices. We’ve 

heard about prior events that they’ve had. We will look at their— 

by interviewing their senior management, by not only the senior 

leadership but we want to interview the people that are in the rank 

and file. 

Oftentimes we find there’s a difference between what the people 

at the top of the organization are saying and what people on the 

front line are actually perceiving. So we will continue to look at 

that. 

We will also look at the regulatory oversight not only from the 

Federal oversight but from the state oversight, as well. So that’s 

what our entire investigation will look at. 

Additionally, we will be looking at the emergency response. So 

that’s really the plan at this point. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Have you found everybody to be cooperative in providing the documents, the people that you feel you’ve needed to 

talk with at NiSource and Columbia Gas have been cooperative? 

Ms. TSONGAS. Yes, ma’am, we’ve found them to be very cooperative with the NTSB. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So you’ve had no incidents with them? 

Mr. SUMWALT. I’m sorry? 

Ms. TSONGAS. So you’ve had no incidents having to insist on 

being able to talk with someone, any people sort of trying to avoid 

their conversations with you? 

Mr. SUMWALT. The truth is I feel like we’ve had a very open dialogue with NiSource and Columbia Gas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And how long do you think it’s going to take to get 

to your final report? I know you said it’s complicated. 

Mr. SUMWALT. It is indeed a priority. Usually our investigations, 

our pipeline investigations are running between 12 and 24 months. 

As I mentioned in my testimony, I’ve placed a priority on this to 

make sure that it is done in a timely fashion. Meanwhile, if we do 

see the need for urgent recommendations or interim recommendations, we will certainly come out with those. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So whatever recommendations you make will be 

specific to the company or will it be—could they also include recommendations around the regulatory framework, either a state or 

Federal level? 

Mr. SUMWALT. Yes, ma’am. I’m sorry. I couldn’t clearly hear that, 

but our recommendations, if they’re interim recommendations, 

48 

could be broad-reaching. As you know in our last recommendation 

package that came out 11 days ago, they were not only to NiSource 

but they were to the State of Massachusetts, as well. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And in terms of all the accidents you’ve investigated, where does this fall along the trajectory of seriousness? 

Mr. SUMWALT. Well, all of the accidents the NTSB investigates 

are very tragic in their own right. This one, of course, is devastating to not only the families involved but to the entire community. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And so you’re hesitant to put it in somewhere in 

the—— 

Mr. SUMWALT. Well, that’s always tricky because even if one person loses their life, that in itself is tragic. So I think that they’re 

all tragic and our thoughts and prayers are with the people of this 

community. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Mr. Hamrock, do you dispute any of the NTSB’s 

findings to date? 

Mr. HAMROCK. No. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So you accept their findings? 

Mr. HAMROCK. We accept their findings and are working with 

them. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Whatever it may say about the company? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Yes. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Mr. Hamrock, I wanted to ask a couple of other 

questions. 

There have been significant costs that your company’s incurred, 

rightfully so, and those will, I’m sure, be ongoing and we won’t 

know the final number, but can you make a commitment that the 

costs that you have incurred will not be passed along to the ratepayers? 

Mr. HAMROCK. We have approached this with no regard for anything but taking care of our customers and understanding the 

need, their needs, and have not focused on recovery or any 

other—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, you may not be focused on it to date, but in 

the future, when you come to grips with the total impact on your 

bottom line, can you make the commitment that you will not pass 

the costs along to the ratepayers? 

Mr. HAMROCK. I’m not in a position today to make such a commitment. We’ve not spent any time focusing on that question. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, I think I take great exception to that statement. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Senator MARKEY. Congressman Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Bryant, my job description as a Marine infantry officer is 

very simple. You’re responsible for everything your platoon does or 

fails to do. One sentence. 

You said in your statement initially that you take responsibility 

for recovery. Why did you not include in your statement that you 

take responsibility for the disaster? 

Mr. BRYANT. Congressman, I apologize. That was not an intentional omission. I take responsibility for the actions that took place 

that led to that and that responsibility is now to understand how 

49 

that happened and my further responsibility is to work with the 

rest of the NiSource team to make sure that something like that 

never happens again and Columbia Gas or NiSource or any other 

gas distribution company in the United States. 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Bryant, Mr. Hamrock talked about his responsibility for the safety culture of your company. Mr. Hamrock 

said that safety is a core value. Now it’s one thing to have a value 

and quite another to actually live up to it. 

Do you think that your company, Columbia Gas, lives up to having safety as a core value? 

Mr. BRYANT. I absolutely believe that NiSource has safety as a 

core value. 

Mr. MOULTON. And we know they have it as a core value. 

They’ve stated that. I’m asking you if you live up to that value? 

Mr. BRYANT. Yes, we do. I’ll give you the best example that I 

have is that any Columbia Gas employee can stop any activity at 

any time if they believe that act is unsafe. 

Mr. MOULTON. So then let’s go to the afternoon this tragedy occurred. There were two alarms at 4:04 and 4:05 p.m. received at 

your monitoring station, I believe in Ohio. What action did your 

company employees take when those alarms went off? 

Mr. BRYANT. They notified resources in Massachusetts that there 

was an over-pressurization and dispatched resources to the regulated station. 

Mr. MOULTON. What resources, Mr. Bryant? What resources 

were dispatched? 

Mr. BRYANT. Management regulation resources, the on-theground resources. 

Mr. MOULTON. Mr. Bryant, are you aware that or were you 

aware in the past that over-pressurization of a gas pipeline can 

cause explosions that could lead to the loss of life? 

Mr. BRYANT. Yes, I’m aware of that. 

Mr. MOULTON. Were you aware of that before this tragedy occurred? 

Mr. BRYANT. Yes. 

Mr. MOULTON. So it seems to me that if you’re aware that overpressurization of a gas pipeline could cause loss of life among your 

customers and if you receive two alarms at your facilities that simply notifying some regulators that there’s an over-pressurization incident doesn’t do much to help your customers. That doesn’t seem 

much like a culture of safety. 

At what time did you notify customers of the problem so that 

they could take action to secure their homes and save their own 

lives? 

Mr. BRYANT. Congressman, public safety officials took those actions immediately. 

Mr. MOULTON. I’m well aware of that. We’re lucky they’re here 

because otherwise a lot more people would have died. 

But if you’re taking responsibility for this,—— 

[Applause.] 

Mr. MOULTON.—when did you notify your customers? 

Mr. BRYANT. Congressman, first and foremost, I have to acknowledge and thank the public safety officials. They were on the 

ground. This was a widespread event and they took the actions 

50 

necessary to keep the public safe and we will be forever grateful 

to them for that. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you very much. Now you can answer my 

question. 

At what time did you notify customers that their homes could 

start blowing up? 

Mr. BRYANT. Again, Congressman, we did not need to do that. 

Public safety officials would do that. 

Mr. MOULTON. Well, let me help a little bit, Mr. Bryant, because 

on your website, you posted a notice at about 9 o’clock that 

evening, five hours, five hours after the two alarms were received 

by your facility that there is ‘‘an incident in the area and that customers should make themselves safe.’’ Five hours. That does not 

strike me as a culture of safety among your employees or at your 

organization. 

Mr. BRYANT. Congressman, I will readily admit that one of the 

weakest areas we had in the earliest hours of this event was communication and we intend to take that experience and learn from 

that. 

Mr. MOULTON. And how are you going to learn from that, Mr. 

Bryant? 

Mr. BRYANT. We will review the actions and the circumstances 

that took place on that evening and determine what we can do to 

make sure, God forbid, anything like this ever happens again we 

have the—— 

Mr. MOULTON. OK. But here’s something that’s very simple. If 

your company culture cares about safety and if you and your employees care about the lives of the customers you serve, then you 

should let them know that their houses might explode and not wait 

5 hours to do so. Do you agree with that? 

Mr. BRYANT. I just might—I might suggest that I see this in a 

different way. In those hours immediately after the explosions and 

fires, all of our employees were focused on making the systems 

safe, getting to all of the regulator stations that fed into that distribution system, making sure that all 14 points of gas flow were 

shut off, and that customers were out of their—in that—— 

Mr. MOULTON. So, Mr. Bryant, several reports and constituents 

of mine have stated numerous instances where Columbia Gas reps 

simply ran away from residents who were bombarding them with 

questions they didn’t know the answers to. That’s not a culture of 

safety. 

We’re going to hear later from Mayor Rivera of Lawrence and in 

his testimony, he will say, ‘‘It appeared to many of us that Columbia Gas did not have an actual plan for dealing with the disaster 

of this magnitude as if it never crossed their minds that this could 

occur.’’ To me, Mr. Bryant, that’s not a culture of safety. 

Mr. Hamrock, what was the profit margin for NiSource last fiscal 

year? 

Mr. HAMROCK. In 2017? 

Mr. MOULTON. 2017. 

Mr. HAMROCK. $1.20 per share, earnings per share. 

Mr. MOULTON. And do the math. What’s the overall profit? How 

many shares out there? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Well, on the order of 300 some million. 

51 

Mr. MOULTON. 300 million? 300 million. What is the cost of this 

tragedy, the latest estimate? 

Mr. HAMROCK. We’ve disclosed this tragedy, full cost, looks like 

it’ll cost about $800 million. 

Mr. MOULTON. $800 million? So what do you expect the profit 

margin for NiSource to be in the next three years? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Well, without accounting for this tragedy, it’ll continue to—— 

Mr. MOULTON. My question is whether you will account for it 

and whether the cost of this tragedy, the estimated $800 million, 

which I suspect will rise even further, will actually come out of 

your profit margin for the company. 

Mr. HAMROCK. We have approached this tragedy by bringing 

every resource available in without regard for the profit margin. 

Our first duty is to take care of our customers and ensure—— 

Mr. MOULTON. So what can we expect in your next quarterly report? 

Mr. HAMROCK. I don’t know. It’s too early to know that. 

Mr. MOULTON. You’re the CEO of the company, sir. You should 

know what shareholders should expect in their next report. 

Mr. HAMROCK. In the fourth quarter,—— 

Mr. MOULTON. Do you expect to report a profit? 

Mr. HAMROCK. We’re still in the fourth quarter and I don’t have 

clarity on what that’ll look like at this point. 

Mr. MOULTON. Well, if you took responsibility for this, you would 

have clarity because you would say right now that you will cover 

the $800 million and you will not see a profit at your company because otherwise, as Representative Tsongas suggested, it seems 

like you’re going to take the money out of your customers to make 

the company whole, to make your shareholders whole. That’s not 

responsibility. 

Mr. Bryant, one last question for you. Do you plan to resign? 

Mr. BRYANT. At this point, Congressman, I do not. My job, my 

focus, my effort every day is the restoration of service to our customers. 

Mr. MOULTON. So do you think you’re the best-qualified person 

to do that? 

Mr. BRYANT. I think I am the best-qualified person to do that. 

Mr. MOULTON. Well, Mr. Bryant, I beg to differ. Based on your 

response that evening, when it took five hours to notify your customers that there was a problem, it’s hard for me to imagine that 

you’re the best person to take responsibility of this company, and 

I suggest you resign. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. So now we’re going to move to a second round 

of questions. Any of the members who have questions will be recognized for that purpose. 

I’m going to move down to PHMSA, which is our Federal pipeline 

safety agency, which has responsibility for issuing regulations to 

ensure that communities in Merrimack Valley and communities all 

across the United States are safe, but, unfortunately, our pipeline 

safety agency has failed to do its job when it comes to natural gas 

pipelines. 

52 

Federal rules contain critical safety gaps. This agency often takes 

many years to issue required regulations, dragging its feet while 

our communities remain in danger. The agency is the poster child 

for an agency which has been captured by the industry which it is 

supposed to regulate. Rather than being a watch dog, PHMSA has 

become a lap dog for this industry in discharging its responsibility 

to make sure that pipelines are safe in Merrimack Valley but that 

pipelines are safe in every community across the country. 

Mr. Roberti, you say in your testimony, ‘‘The onus of maintaining 

a safe pipeline system is on the companies that own and operate 

the system.’’ That is a shocking statement, Mr. Roberti. That is like 

saying it is the responsibility of the fox to make sure that the hen 

house is safe. 

The onus, Mr. Roberti, is on your agency to ensure that the pipeline companies are operating safely, but your agency has abdicated 

that responsibility to the industry which it regulates. You leave it 

to the individual companies to determine whether or not they are 

going to put safety measures in place. 

So here we have a situation where four years ago, Columbia Gas 

just decided that they wouldn’t have someone there on duty in 

Lawrence to be able to respond immediately and that then created 

a huge time gap which then allowed for this accident to occur 

where it perhaps could have been stopped right at the beginning. 

So let me turn to you, Mr. Kuprewicz. Talk about PHMSA, talk 

about their delegation of responsibility down to the company level, 

and what needs to happen in order to make sure that we in Congress take action, which is necessary, and that there is a uniform 

set of guidelines which are put in place that are mandatory to be 

abided by so it’s not left in the discretion of Columbia Gas or any 

other company to determine whether or not safety standards, 

which will cost money, are put in place. Mr. Kuprewicz. 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. I’d say, first of all, technically, PHMSA has excellent technical people. I don’t want to take that away from them. 

I interact with them all the time. 

The biggest problem I observed in the last 20 years is the movement away from prescriptive regulation that has certain things 

that they must do—— 

Senator MARKEY. Can you pull in the microphone, Mr. 

Kuprewicz? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. I’m sorry. I thought my voice would carry. 

The biggest problem I see is the shift away from prescriptive 

where there were certain things the operators must do that 

PHMSA could get in and say you’re doing this or you’re not doing 

this to what we call the more risk-based performance movements 

and the performance gives a lot of wiggle room and it’s tough for 

a regulator to enforce. That’s probably the biggest frustration. 

The second one I’d see, an example would be the integrity management regulations for gas transmission interstate pipelines as 

well as intrastate pipelines. 

We started with a performance. We agreed to go with performance-based. We’d rather have had a little more prescriptive. We 

said it’s the first time we’re going to do this. OK. You’ve talked us 

into performance-based and that has not been very successful. 

53 

Senator MARKEY. So you say that the standard which is applied 

right now is inadequate. There should be a more prescriptive, a 

more detailed set of regulations put on the books to make sure that 

no company, no natural gas company in the United States is in any 

way questioning what the standard should be, and that if they violate it, they’re going to pay a penalty, that the Federal agency’s 

going to come down on them for not abiding by what the national 

standard is for safety. Is that what you’re saying? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. Yes, and especially if you want a rank in terms 

of where you want to put your effort in getting back toward the 

prescriptive regulations, OK, you can have a discussion on it. 

Senator MARKEY. So, in other words, we don’t let nuclear power 

plant operators, we don’t let the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant or 

the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant determine what the level of safety 

is at a nuclear power plant. There are Federal regulations that the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission puts on the books and then implements, is that correct? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. That’s correct. 

Senator MARKEY. And you’re saying that the same thing should 

be true for PHMSA and it is not today? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. That’s correct. Shift them back. They’re capable 

of doing that. 

[Applause.] 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. But it’s a major shift. 

Senator MARKEY. Well, it’s a common sense shift. The people up 

here don’t want to live questioning whether or not there are safety 

standards for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant. They don’t want 

to wonder whether or not it’s just left up to a single unqualified 

engineer to determine what happens in a particular situation. They 

want to make sure that their families are safe. They want to make 

sure that there is a plan in place that has been put together by 

the top people in the United States to ensure that there is in fact 

protection which is put on the books. 

Chairman Sumwalt, do you agree with that? 

Mr. SUMWALT. Well, generally, I do believe that the idea of performance-based standards is acceptable. The trick is how do you 

enforce the performance-based standards. 

Senator MARKEY. And if I may, because we talked about the $2 

million fine on an $800 million accident, and I think that’s conservative because the $800 million is what the insurance covers. There 

could be a much higher number ultimately, which is in fact imposed upon the citizens of Merrimack Valley, and this $2 million 

fine just seems absolutely pathetic as a discouragement so that real 

safety standards are adopted. 

Secretary Beaton, what is the state looking at in terms of imposition of fines upon this company? 

Mr. BEATON. Sorry, Senator, there was a noise. Did you say relative to the fines? 

Primarily up to this moment in time, our sole focus has been on 

the restoration of and the stabilization of the situation and the restoration as close, as best we can to back to normal here in the 

Merrimack Valley. 

We have an ongoing investigation at the Department of Public 

Utilities that will ultimately take us to that answer. I wouldn’t 

54 

want to put the cart before the horse and predetermine the outcome of that. So I think that is yet to be determined but I’m sure 

we will most certainly be looking into that. It’s too early to say 

what that would look like at this point in time. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Senator Warren. 

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So after the disaster in the Merrimack Valley, you committed to 

replacing over 50 miles of pipeline, replacing all in-home gas appliances, and providing temporary appliance heating and housing 

sources for residents. You set the timeline yourself for this, Mr. 

Bryant. What was the date that all that was to be done by? 

Mr. BRYANT. The original date that we committed to was November 19. 

Senator WARREN. November 19, and did you make that date? 

Mr. BRYANT. We did not, Senator. 

Senator WARREN. So now you have another date that you have 

set. What’s that date? 

Mr. BRYANT. No later than December 16. 

Senator WARREN. December 16, and can you guarantee that no 

family will have to wait beyond December 16 in order to return to 

their home, that they’ll have full service by then? 

Mr. BRYANT. Everything that I see what we have accomplished 

to date, up to and including yesterday, indicates to me that we will 

beat that date. 

Senator WARREN. So is that a guarantee? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, for me to guarantee would suggest that 

we’re in control of everything in life. May I just—— 

Senator WARREN. Well, let me stop you right there. You are in 

control. You are the guys who have all of the information. You’re 

the ones who have the money. You’re the ones who have the resources. You’re the ones who determine how many people you hire 

and who you hire and how you go about this and you’re the ones 

who set the date. 

Mayor Rivera didn’t set the date. Senator Markey didn’t set the 

date. I didn’t set the date. You set it. You said we can meet this. 

Now you’ve already proven you’re not very good at this because 

you’ve already missed by a month. 

All I want to know is can you really tell the folks here who don’t 

get to live in their houses, who don’t have hot water, who can’t 

cook, who don’t have heat, can you tell them for sure that the date 

you’ve picked is a real date and on December 16, they can all plan 

to move back home? 

Mr. BRYANT. I apologize for the comment about not being in control. All I meant was that there are customers who are making 

their own arrangements and their own arrangements to put heat 

and hot water in their home may not be fulfilled perhaps by their 

own desire. 

Senator WARREN. OK. So let’s—— 

Mr. BRYANT. For those—— 

Senator WARREN. For anyone who’s trying to do it on their own, 

I get that, but for everyone that you’re picking up, which is everyone, if they want—if they trust you to do this, you’ll have everyone 

back in their homes on December 16? 

55 

Mr. BRYANT. Yes, Senator, we will have everybody back in their 

homes by December 16. 

Senator WARREN. By December 16, okay, and that’s guaranteed? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, that’s my best statement. We will have 

people back in their homes before December 16. 

Senator WARREN. That’s guaranteed. OK. So look. Let me ask 

you a question about how we got to this mess to begin with when 

people thought they’d be back in on October 17—November 17. 

People need heat and I understand this. We just had the coldest 

Thanksgiving in 80 years and you said what you’d do is you’d put 

space heaters in for everybody. That would get people back into 

their homes quickly and be able to get heat. You purchased 24,000 

space heaters to provide to residents. 

So Senator Markey and I asked for some more details about the 

risk assessments you conducted before distributing these appliances and whether you’d chosen the safest possible options. So I 

just want to unpack a little how we got to where we are now. 

In your response, you acknowledge that about ‘‘90 percent of 

homes do not meet the recommended electrical configuration for 

space heaters.’’ When you announced the plan to provide space 

heaters, did you know that almost none of the homes in the region 

could handle them? 

Mr. BRYANT. No, we did not. One of the most difficult things in 

this process was learning the assessment of what we were facing 

and our intent was to give every customer possible—— 

Senator WARREN. So—— 

Mr. BRYANT—a space heater. 

Senator WARREN.—did you not take any input from the local fire 

chiefs on this when you put together your plan to buy 24,000 space 

heaters and distribute them? The fire chiefs didn’t talk to you 

about it or you didn’t talk to the fire chiefs about this? 

Mr. BRYANT. What we relied on with the fire chiefs is the determination of what electrical requirements in the home would be appropriate to put in a space heater. 

Senator WARREN. So when did you realize that you had a problem doing this with space heaters and consider making alternative 

housing and heating options available? 

Mr. BRYANT. As we began to intensively do house-by-house assessments. 

Senator WARREN. So how deep were you into this before you realized—I mean, I can do the math here, that 90 percent of these 

homes you’re not going to be able to fix this problem with space 

heaters. 

So how far did you get in this before you started making alternative arrangements? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, we were working to make alternative housing arrangements immediately, at the same time that we were 

looking to put space heaters into homes. We came to the conclusion 

that some customers may have wanted alternative housing and 

some customers may have wanted to stay in their homes. So we 

worked on two paths. 

Senator WARREN. So I’m just having trouble putting this together. So your workers had trouble bringing housing up to code. 

You said you’d give everyone space heaters. Then you realized the 

56 

houses can’t handle them, so you’re going to bring in electricians 

and you’re going to bring the houses up to code. 

So why did it take 13 days from the day that you announced the 

November 19 deadline, you announced that on October 9 to October 

22 before you announced the delayed date for restoration? 

Mr. BRYANT. Generally, we made the announcement about the 

delayed date for restoration once we made the determination that 

it would take us longer than we originally expected in most houses 

to be able to mitigate to allow the house to become ready for natural gas. 

Senator WARREN. And so you’re saying that you didn’t realize 

that you were going to blow your deadline until October 22? That’s 

when you made the announcement? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, when we made the announcement is when 

we came to the firm conclusion that we were not going to make 

that date. 

Senator WARREN. And you didn’t make it before then? You didn’t 

make it back sometime around October 9th when you were in the 

houses, going house-by-house, and finding out that 90 percent don’t 

have the power structure to do this? 

Mr. BRYANT. I’m sorry, Senator. The electric space heater issue 

really didn’t play into the issue. It was really a case of our making 

a determination of what it would take to be able to turn natural 

gas service back on in a home. 

Senator WARREN. OK. And so now you’ve got the appliances 

issue, though, whether or not you can get the appliances in, right, 

new appliances because you’ve finished the main part of the pipeline? 

Mr. BRYANT. Certainly, Senator, we completed the natural gas 

distribution build-out earlier than expected but the—what we call 

house-ready, the work necessary to be able to turn gas back on 

turned out to be much more labor-intensive than we originally estimated. 

Senator WARREN. OK. So here’s the problem I’ve got and I’m just 

trying to work through this. It starts with where Congressman 

Moulton started and that is, why did it take 5 hours in order to 

tell customers that there was a problem? I mean, you could see 

much more information on the news than you could get from the 

company that was responsible both for the explosion and for the 

safety of every single resident in the region. 

Now I’m going to the next part and so you announced a deadline 

by which you’d have everyone back in their homes. You gathered 

more information as you went along. You waited until late in that 

process. Now you’ve announced a new deadline and I’m asking the 

question in effect, how much confidence can you have in the new 

deadline? 

Part of the question is, are you taking the information in as it 

comes, and I want to ask one more related to this. On my way in, 

I met outside with the National Grid Workers, trained workers who 

are ready to go, who are willing to help, who want to help, and 

most of them idle for the last two and a half months. 

You know, you have a mutual aid pact with National Grid. You 

could have put their workers to work if they had been back at work 

at National Grid. So let me ask you. Have you urged National Grid 

57 

to reach an agreement with its workers so that you could call on 

mutual aid and get those people to work here in Lawrence and Andover and North Andover? 

Mr. BRYANT. I have not had such a conversation with National 

Grid. 

Senator WARREN. Why not? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, because I believe that those employees 

could have worked for our contractors and helped in the house 

mitigation if they so choose. 

Senator WARREN. So you didn’t think it was important to do it 

through National Grid. You said you had another way to hire all 

those employees, is that right? So you didn’t ask National Grid to 

do this? So did you—have you hired those National Grid employees 

through contractors indirectly or directly? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, I don’t know how many National Grid 

workers worked for our contractors. I don’t have any way of knowing that specifically. 

Senator WARREN. So I guess here’s the problem. We talked about 

a culture of inattention to safety, putting profits ahead of safety 

that led to the explosion. 

Now the people here are trying to deal with the impact of that, 

with the aftermath. Some families will never be made whole. A 

family lost a son, people who’ve been injured, people who’ve been 

moved out of their houses, little children who can’t go to their 

neighborhood schools, elderly people whose lives have been disrupted. 

But at a minimum, what we’re asking for is some accountability 

in the recovery efforts and that means the one thing you ought to 

be able to do—you have all the information. You are a very wealthy 

company. You could bring resources to bear. You could put a 

timeline out and you could get these people back in their homes 

and what we’re hearing is that there’s more information. You don’t 

know who’s been hired. You don’t know if there are other people 

who would have been available. 

But somehow it all turned out to be a bigger project than you 

had in mind back when you blew up a bunch of people’s houses and 

that you’re still not on top of this and that people can’t count on 

getting back in their homes, and is there anything you can say 

that’s going to give people some confidence that they really are 

going to be there before Christmas? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, I will says that they will be there before 

Christmas. 

Senator WARREN. All of them? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, all of them that we can complete. Again, 

if a customer makes the determination that they don’t—— 

Senator WARREN. It’s not all of them that we can complete. What 

they want to hear is that they’re all going to be completed. 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, we’ll be effectively completed with all customers in their homes before Christmas. 

Senator WARREN. All right. We’re going to hold you to it. 

Senator MARKEY. Senator Hassan. 

Senator HASSAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and—— 

Senator MARKEY. May I just? 

Senator HASSAN. Yes. 

58 

Senator MARKEY. Just to follow up, I ask unanimous consent to 

submit into the record testimony from United Steelworker Local 

12003 President Joe Kirylo and testimony from United Steelworker 

Local 12012 President John Buonopane describing their concerns 

about Massachusetts pipeline safety. 

Without objection, their testimony will be included in the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 


1126KIRY1.eps
59 


1126KIRY2.eps
60 


1126KIRY3.eps
61 


1126BUON1.eps
62 


1126BUON2.eps
63 


1126BUON3.eps
64 


1126BUON4.eps
65 

Senator MARKEY. I apologize. Senator Hassan. 

Senator HASSAN. It’s all good. I want to go back to the NTSB report and the timeline of this tragedy. Maybe, Mr. Kuprewicz, I can 

start with you. 

The monitoring center for Columbia Gas received an alert at 4:04 

p.m. and 4:05 p.m. that there was over-pressurization according to 

the NTSB report. 

What technology exists, if any, that would have allowed the control center to shut down the regulator remotely? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. Well, they’d have to implement and go to the 

screen. Most gas distribution systems do not have automated or remote control shutoff valves across their gridded gas networks and 

so when I hear that’s kind of where they’re heading, well, that’s a 

good thing, but it’s kind of a different thing and so that’s good and 

that would have given them the ability to say I’m monitoring the 

pressure at this point. I’m seeing over-pressure. My control center 

now has the ability to close that. 

Now there’s risk in doing that, OK, but that would give the control center the option of doing that because most distribution systems do not have the ability—while they may have remote monitoring, they don’t have highly sophisticated remote controlling of 

gas distribution systems. It’s highly unusual. 

Senator HASSAN. So it’s unusual to have but the technology exists to do it? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. I’m sorry. I didn’t hear you. 

Senator HASSAN. Sorry. It’s unusual for a gas company to have 

but the technology exists to do it? 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. That’s correct. They could do it. It’s just money. 

Senator HASSAN. It took about, as I read the report, it took about 

26 minutes from the first alarm to the actual closure of the critical 

regulator and that’s a long time. 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. In the industry, yes, but it’s pretty typical for 

systems that have to be manually closed. 

Senator HASSAN. Well, and that’s really what I’m trying to get 

at here. If systems have to be manually closed and it takes somebody calling people in the field and then them going out and closing the regulators, during that 26 minutes, catastrophe can occur. 

Mr. KUPREWICZ. That’s right. 

Senator HASSAN. It did. It did. OK. 

Mr. Roberti, I want to go back to what I referenced earlier. Your 

agency, PHMSA, is responsible for developing and enforcing regulations for the safe operation of our country’s 2.6 million miles of 

pipelines. 

Your agency, though, doesn’t have a great track record. So it is 

very clear that there are going to be recommendations of new safety regulations that come out of this tragedy with the hope that we 

will never see another tragedy like this one. 

But it is hard, given your agency’s track record, to believe that 

you are really going to initiate the implementation of these regulations. It seems that you’ll have no regard for timeliness when it 

comes to implementing congressional mandates and recommendations from the NTSB, from the GAO, or the Inspector General’s Office. 

66 

According to a 2016 GAO report, PHMSA has not implemented 

one-third of its mandates. It has missed numerous deadlines and 

25 percent of its mandates remain completely unimplemented, including eight pipeline recommendations relating to safety. 

The numbers are from 2016. So the first question is, have you 

made progress since 2016? 

Mr. ROBERTI. Well, Senator, thank you for the question. We 

work—the current PHMSA leadership is working tirelessly to get 

these unfinished mandates out. We have made some success. The 

Administrative Procedures Act is a law that we have to adhere to. 

There are Executive Orders and OMB regulations and I can tell 

you that the PHMSA leadership, we walk the hallways and daily 

this is what we know we’re tasked with this. 

We have congressional mandates and we are doing everything we 

can to get them done as soon as possible. 

Senator HASSAN. You are not the only Federal agency to have to 

deal with the administrative rules and acts. I would urge you, you 

know, we have a gymnasium full of people and a much larger community full of people whose lives have been forever changed by this 

tragedy and they are looking now to make sure that we do more 

than rely on the private sector to regulate itself. 

They are looking to their state and Federal governments to step 

up and make sure that we implement the rules that we have and 

if we change some rules and implement some new ones to make 

sure that this never happens again, that PHMSA will be right out 

there and I would like your agency’s guarantee that you will be initiating and pushing in ways that you haven’t in the past, asking 

Congress, asking the Administration for more resources, if you 

need them, but this should not be an agency that is this woefully 

behind in implementing critical safety mandates that protect the 

lives and the economy of this country, is that fair? 

[Applause.] 

Mr. ROBERTI. That’s a fair statement, and we commit to meeting 

the congressional mandates and awaiting for the conclusion of 

these investigations so that we have a full and complete record on 

which to move, whether or not the minimum standards need to be 

changed. 

As you know, we set the minimum standards. States can go 

above and beyond. It’s actually not a pure delegation. Congress 

granted or the authority over interstate systems has been reserved 

to the states. So it’s a little bit more complex. 

Senator HASSAN. I do understand that, and as a former Governor, I am always appreciative of having that kind of partnership, 

right, but what states are also looking to the NTSB and to PHMSA 

for is leadership and coordination and, frankly, it would be helpful 

to the point I made earlier to the Chairman, given that state legislatures will be reconvening in most states in this country next 

month. I would really highly recommend that you take what you 

can share with state governments now from this investigation and 

you get to work on coordinating with them so that, to the degree 

there are state laws and regulations that need to be changed, our 

states have the opportunity to get on the ball and do that and 

they’re looking to you all for leadership and coordination to do that. 

67 

Will you commit to me and this panel and to the people here that 

you will initiate that kind of coordination and communication? 

Mr. ROBERTI. Yes, Senator. It’s underway and we commit to 

doing that. 

Senator HASSAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator MARKEY. Congresswoman Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

It seems to me much of the discussion is focusing—it begs the 

issue of the company’s anticipation that such a terrible disaster 

might happen. We are focused very much on what caused it, how 

to put in place measures that prevent it from happening ever 

again, but also being mindful that we have to plan in the event 

that they do happen, and it seems to me much of our experience 

here in the Merrimack Valley and much of the questioning is eliciting answers that show you really did not anticipate a disaster 

like this ever taking place. 

So my question, Mr. Hamrock, is, how does your company plan 

for worst case scenario disasters? Was there a plan in place that 

you could immediately turn to and implement? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Thank you, Congresswoman. We do in fact have 

extensive emergency response and crisis response plans in place 

that we train on, drill on, run tabletops. We run through scenarios 

on a very frequent basis. 

When this happened, I was notified within 18 minutes of the initial alarm, immediately knew something terrible had happened and 

activated our Corporate Crisis Response protocols which included 

and entailed bringing support to the Columbia Gas of Massachusetts team, dispatched senior lieutenants who were on the ground 

here within hours here that evening from other parts of our system. 

I was on the ground the very next day and have spent the vast 

majority of the time here. The local operating company, Columbia 

Gas of Massachusetts, also has emergency response planning for 

such a scenario. 

This clearly stretched—was an extreme scenario. A lot we can 

learn from this, a lot we are learning from this. We’re committed 

to working with the NTSB. 

One of the areas of their investigation looks at emergency response. We’re fully cooperating with that and will in fact take back 

all lessons and actions that we can from this terrible tragedy. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So as you’re looking at your response and it’s clear 

that there were many shortcomings in it, what would you identify 

at this point as some of the clear takeaways from it, things you 

really have to deal with? 

Mr. HAMROCK. As Mr. Bryant said earlier, communications is an 

area that we clearly have lessons that we learned and will continue 

to learn. It’s an area that requires additional focus for us but we 

are focused on that. 

And then I would commend the Administration, the Baker Administration for implementing SMS on a statewide basis because I 

believe that framework will help not only us here in Massachusetts, but ultimately the entire industry have a more effective overlay of risk analysis and the ability to do more assessment of risk 

68 

of these kinds of situations and be better prepared in the event 

they could happen. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So is your disaster plan a written plan? Is it something somebody could take a look at to be sure that it’s adequate? 

Where does it exist? 

Mr. HAMROCK. Our emergency plan is, in fact, a written plan. It’s 

drilled and it’s shared with all of our stakeholders. We actually we 

work with fire departments on emergency response drills. We work 

with emergency responders. We built a training center here in 

Massachusetts where we do that kind of training and drilling. Very 

committed to that and recognize there are things in this tragedy 

that we need to learn from that didn’t quite meet the standard. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So clearly need some work. 

Mr. Roberti, I have a question for you. As part of your regulatory 

oversight, do you require pipeline companies to have a disaster response plan in place that you can review and determine whether 

it’s adequate or not? 

Mr. ROBERTI. So under Federal regulations, for any incident, including a pressure alarm going off, a leak, a fire, or a call, an emergency call, companies have to respond promptly and effectively. 

That’s in the regulations. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And how do you describe promptly? How is that 

determined? 

Mr. ROBERTI. Well, I can tell you it’s not three hours and 20 minutes to shut off the regulator stations. It has to be—as Mr. 

Kuprewicz said, that each pipeline system is different. In order to 

physically go out and shut off valves, it will require different 

logistical actions. 

There is no set timeframe, but typically 30 minutes is a typical 

response time for an operator to respond to a call for a leak or to 

respond to a situation like this. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And that’s because there are people in place 

who’ve been designated to take those actions? 

Mr. ROBERTI. Personnel and resources have to be readily 

deployable to respond to an incident like this. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So given the fact that this took so much longer, 

what would you say about that? 

Mr. ROBERTI. Well, I don’t want to prejudge. This is—again, I 

said that the jurisdiction to review compliance is within—the compliance with Federal and state regulations is with the State of 

Massachusetts. That investigation has to complete. 

We fully expect the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, when it completes its investigation, to make determinations 

about the company’s compliance with existing Federal regulations 

and state regulations, to the extent Massachusetts has regulations 

that exceed the minimum. 

Ms. TSONGAS. All right. Well, thank you so much because I know 

we’ve dealt in Washington with other disasters in which it was 

clear there were no disaster response plans in place and we 

watched these disasters unfold, as we did here, in a way that 

caused much more damage than ever should have been the case 

and so as lawmakers, we need to look at whether or not we need 

to require by law something more particular that reassures the 

public that the company is being held to the highest of standards. 

69 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Congressman Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Yes, I’d like to talk to you, Secretary Beaton. 

How would you describe the current state of our gas pipeline infrastructure in Massachusetts, Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. BEATON. I think given the nature and the history of the 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the fact is we have one of the 

oldest networks of natural gas distribution in the nation. I think 

we see that in the Northeast in particular and our industrialized, 

our early industrialized parts of the country, but we do have a plan 

in place, called our GCEP Plan, that is a plan submitted by the 

public utilities, of the replacement of that older pipeline to be modernized by more modern infrastructure. 

Mr. MOULTON. And how long will that plan take to implement? 

Mr. BEATON. Well, when they were originally filed, the companies ranged between 20 and 25 years with one exception of 11, but 

for the most part, I think we’re in year five. They were 20-year 

plans. 

Mr. MOULTON. So 20-year plans. So in the interim, we need to 

make sure that another tragedy like this doesn’t occur, and it 

seems to me that part of the way we do that is through inspections 

and your office is responsible for inspections of our gas pipeline 

system, is that correct, Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. BEATON. Yes. 

Mr. MOULTON. And do you take responsibility for the safety of 

our pipeline systems since you are in charge of inspections? 

Mr. BEATON. Yes. 

Mr. MOULTON. Do you believe that the current inspection and 

regulatory system in the state is adequate? 

Mr. BEATON. I believe it serves the function. I believe it serves 

its intended function is what I meant to say. Are there improvements that we could make to it? Certainly, and I think that is the 

reason for us calling on an independent evaluator. 

Mr. MOULTON. OK. So, Mr. Secretary, could you just—I’m not 

sure what serves as function means exactly. 

Do you think the system is adequate, the current system, the 

current inspection system? 

Mr. BEATON. To accomplish what it is intended to accomplish, 

yes. Other opportunities—— 

Mr. MOULTON. And what is it—Mr. Secretary, what is it intended to accomplish? 

Mr. BEATON. To oversee compliance and enforcement of Federal 

and state standards. 

Mr. MOULTON. What about the safety of the citizens of the Commonwealth, isn’t that fundamentally what it’s supposed to accomplish? 

Mr. BEATON. If that is the sole tool that is going to solve all the 

answers to accomplish that, then yes, but I think by inspection 

alone, we are not going to eliminate all risk associated with natural 

gas. 

Mr. MOULTON. OK. I understand you can’t eliminate all risk, but 

you said you do take responsibility for the safety of the citizens of 

the Commonwealth? 

70 

Mr. BEATON. I believe I was asked a different question, but I 

think it is our role to put policies, procedures, and enforcement and 

compliance in place that protects the Commonwealth citizens, yes. 

Mr. MOULTON. OK. So there are 21,000 miles of pipeline currently in Massachusetts. Can you say with confidence that we are 

safe from another accident like this occurring in the future, at least 

before the 20-year timeline for the replacement of these pipelines? 

Mr. BEATON. Is the definition of safe a guarantee that something 

would never ever happen again? 

Mr. MOULTON. You can answer that as you like. I’m just asking, 

do you have confidence that an explosion like this will not occur 

again? 

Mr. BEATON. I think we’re going to do everything in our power 

to make sure and I think we’ve taken great action. I don’t think 

anyone sitting at this table could guarantee nothing could happen. 

There are too many scenarios that I think makes that guarantee 

an impossibility. 

Mr. MOULTON. OK. Well, let’s just talk about the inspectors for 

a second. According to the Boston Globe just prior to the explosions, 

Federal pipeline regulators audited the state’s utility commission 

and raised concerns about attrition among the agency’s inspectors. 

Data from the state comptroller show eight DPU inspectors have 

retired in the past 3 years, including four since March. Six engineers were certified to conduct pipeline inspections at the time of 

the most recent Federal audit but one was out on medical leave, 

another was working on desk-bound duties due to medical issues, 

and two were working as supervisors. 

So at the time the state had just two engineers doing field inspections of pipeline work. Do you think that is adequate? 

Mr. BEATON. No. 

Mr. MOULTON. Just to put this in perspective for folks, there are 

21,000 miles of pipeline in Massachusetts. That means that with 

two inspectors in the field, each is responsible for 10,500 miles of 

pipeline. 

If you had a pipeline going from here to San Francisco and from 

San Francisco to Houston and then from Houston back here, that 

wouldn’t be 10,500 miles. In fact, you could then go all the way to 

San Francisco again and that wouldn’t be 10,500 miles. That’s the 

responsibility of one inspector. That doesn’t seem even close to adequate. 

Mr. BEATON. Well, could I bring some clarification to that? 

Mr. MOULTON. Yes, Mr. Secretary, please. 

Mr. BEATON. Yes, thank you. So those numbers aren’t entirely 

accurate. Currently, we have six certified inspectors, two professional engineers on the pathway for inspection, three new hires, 

two additional postings, and a divisional inspector. 

You pointed out that there is high turnover. This is a national 

challenge that every state faces, especially in a good economy, 

when higher-paying private sector jobs, you can go in, get the 

training with the state and through the Federal Government and 

then be ripe for purchase in the private sector, and it is a challenge 

all of our states face. 

I will say in 2013, we had eight inspectors. It reached a peak of 

12.5. In 2017, we had 10. In 2013, 716 inspections were completed. 

71 

In 2017, 1,177 inspections were performed. There has been a trajectory of trending in the right direction of both the number of inspections. We did hit one of those cycles and one of those dips where 

we had a large transition out of inspectors at that moment in time 

when the incident occurred. 

We have since taken the action to post new positions and will be 

at an all-time high of 14 inspectors once all the hires are made. 

Mr. MOULTON. OK. Well, I hope we get the 14 but just to put 

it in perspective for folks again, through all the numbers you went 

through, it seems to me that in the past years, the highest you ever 

reached is 12. OK. Again, with 21,000 miles of pipeline in Massachusetts, that’s like saying that each one of those inspectors is responsible for a pipeline that goes from here to Dallas. That doesn’t 

strike me as adequate, Mr. Secretary. 

I have one more question. I’m over my time. At a time when the 

DPU had only two inspectors in the field, hundreds of locked-out 

National Grid workers offered to assist in the recovery effort. However, it wasn’t until a month later that these workers were actually 

deployed. Why did it take so long for this to happen? 

Mr. BEATON. There were a number of complexities there associated with it. We don’t have the unilateral jurisdiction and authority to mandate that that happen. The Governor convened multiple 

meetings between the parties to try to negotiate and come to terms 

on this. 

We also worked very closely with all parties to try to get the 

workers to be able to work as quickly as possible. There were many 

conversations and there was actually an effort by NiSource to put 

out a notice that any of the employees would be welcome. They 

would have to come through another contractor, given the nature 

of the contract dispute between the Union and National Grid. 

There was an open door. We were trying to—there were some 

workers that were able to work on the site but the expertise of 

those workers was the work that was in the ground, not the houseready work that has been the challenge that we have talked about 

and that work was way ahead of schedule, 43.3 miles and over 

5,000, I think it was 5,086 service lines were placed in 29 days. 

So there was a short window of time where the expertise of those 

workers would have been able to fit into the puzzle of this extremely complicated restoration, but we did make every effort and 

led by the Governor actually initiating conversations and mediation 

talks to try to get the parties to sit down and negotiate and try to 

accelerate the opportunity to get those workers working as quickly 

as possible. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. But the bottom line is 

it took a month for them to come online, and the bottom line right 

now is that we have enough inspectors for each one to be responsible for a pipeline from here to Dallas and your goal is to add just 

two more. I think we need to significantly increase that goal. 

Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

So this panel has made it very clear that there are huge deficiencies in the regulatory system in our country, that there is a 

huge regulatory black hole that has been created where everyone 

72 

can point a finger in another direction in order to avoid the responsibility of actually having put the real safety protections in place 

to guarantee that accidents like this don’t happen. 

That’s why we’re having this hearing, to make sure it does not 

happen again. 

Mr. Hamrock, Mr. Bryant, at every step of the process, there was 

a chance for NiSource and Columbia to avoid this disaster. You 

could have had the correct maps of your system but you did not. 

You could have made sure the Meters and Regulations Group, the 

brains of the pipeline system, reviewed all work plans but you did 

not. You could have had a professional engineer sign off on plans 

but you did not. You could have had automatic shutoff relief devices installed to prevent over-pressurization but you did not. You 

could have had someone onsite at the regulator station to monitor 

operations but you did not. 

Instead of choosing safety, you chose savings. Instead of choosing 

action, you chose to cut corners, and instead of choosing—— 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. Instead of choosing to do things the right way, 

you chose the easy way every time and the result was disaster, but 

because of the decisions that you made to cut corners, to never 

prioritize safety, you created a situation where there were ticking 

time bombs underneath every street and inside of every house and 

business. 

The deeper we dig into your company, the more frightening this 

has become. Your recklessness took a wrecking ball to the lives of 

residents in these communities. 

Columbia Gas has been making up its response to this disaster 

as it goes along. Its deadlines—— 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. Its deadlines in November are now deadlines 

for December, but as Christmas is arriving, there are families all 

over Merrimack Valley who still doubt that they will be back in 

their homes. There are businesses who are still doubting that they 

will be open and that’s a legacy of your negligent activities in the 

days and weeks and months and years leading up to that disaster 

and now you’re not even close to making it up to the people in 

Merrimack Valley, not even close. 

We’re not going away. We’re going to be here with the people of 

Merrimack Valley to make sure that your company is made accountable, to make sure that there is a reckoning which NiSource 

and Columbia Gas has to suffer as a consequence of your negligence, of your taking the lowest common denominator as your 

standard for safety. 

The people in this room, they paid the price for that lowest common denominator. Their families paid the price, and we’re going to 

make sure that this system is overhauled so that a real safety system is put in place, not just for Merrimack Valley but for the whole 

country. We owe it to the people of this country. 

As the natural gas industry says it wants to dramatically expand 

natural gas into every city, every town, every state in the United 

States, that’s their goal, but we’re going to make sure that safety 

is Issue Number 1, that this lesson is not lost, that all of the answers which we have been receiving, which basically have been 

73 

saying they don’t know all of the details, that they’re still learning, 

that they’re still responding to the NTSB, that’s all we really need 

to know about how little they had planned for this disaster. 

So you might be making it up as you’re going along, but for the 

people of Merrimack Valley, their lives have been affected by that 

lack of attention, lack of concern, lack of safety. 

So this is the first hearing but it’s not the last. This is the beginning of accountability, the beginning of a process to ensure that our 

promise to the American people and on behalf of the people in 

Merrimack Valley that this never happens again. 

So this completes the first panel and we will be submitting questions in writing to you and we would also expect prompt answers 

to those questions in detail to the Committee. 

So this hearing is concluded and we now invite the second panel 

up to begin their testimony. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. Now I would like to welcome our next panel 

made up of leaders from the communities who have been hurt by 

this disaster. 

First, we have Lawrence Mayor Dan Rivera. Mayor Rivera has 

in many ways been the face of this issue, speaking for his constituents. He’s been doing an outstanding job in ensuring that those 

voices are heard, and we thank him for his work. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. Also, he’s joined by North Andover Town Manager Andrew Maylor and Andover Town Manager Andrew Flanagan, who have been representing their communities to make sure 

that their concerns are heard on a daily basis, and I am submitting 

joint testimony on behalf of both of the Town Managers into the 

record and I thank them for providing their stories to the Committee. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

JOINT STATEMENT OF ANDREW W. MAYLOR, NORTH ANDOVER TOWN MANAGER

AND ANDREW P. FLANAGAN, ANDOVER TOWN MANAGER

Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished Members of the 

Committee: 

The Merrimack Valley Gas Disaster 

On Thursday, September 13, 2018, at approximately 4:00 p.m. the over-pressurization of the low pressure gas lines in a 5 square mile radius in the Merrimack 

Valley area of northeastern Massachusetts resulted in more than 130 fires, close to 

two dozen injuries and at least one fatality. More than 10,000 households and 685 

businesses lost gas service and as a result did not have access to heat and hot water 

and other gas appliances. For more than three hours after the over-pressurization 

residents in the impacted area could smell gas outside of their homes. It is estimated that this disaster impacted between 40,000 and 50,000 residents in the towns 

North Andover, Andover and the City of Lawrence making it the largest disaster 

of its type in U.S. history. By Friday, September 14, 2018, the Governor of Massachusetts had declared a state of emergency. 

Note: Columbia Gas of Massachusetts, a NiSource company, is the gas utility that 

provides gas service to the impacted area. 

The Four Phases of the Disaster 

1. Response 

Less than an hour after the first 911 call the executives in the three impacted 

communities made their first major decision when they recommended that all residents with gas service evacuate to emergency shelters or to the homes of friends 

or relatives outside of the impacted area. Within ninety minutes we needed to make 

74 

a second major decision-to authorize that electric service be shut off to a significant 

portion of each community placing already scared and confused residents into darkness. The public safety response, fire, police and emergency medical services (EMS), 

was extraordinary and no doubt saved lives, reduced injury and substantially mitigated the impact that this disaster could have had on the region. As stated in the 

NTSB Preliminary Report (PLD18MR003) their investigation is ongoing and one of 

the factors that will require additional inquiry is ‘‘the coordination between the 

emergency responders and Columbia Gas’’. Just after 6:00 p.m. on the night of the 

disaster and only moments following the Incident Command Center (ICC) going 

operational, there was agreement that each of the impacted gas meters needed to 

be shut off to reduce the risk of future explosions and fires. By 7:00 p.m. those working in the (ICC) including the Governor, chief executives of the impacted communities, fire chiefs, the fire marshal, and the director of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), requested from Columbia Gas officials the 

maps of the impacted area and a definitive list of the impacted households and businesses. Columbia Gas was unable to produce such information for hours and when 

they did, the information was not completely accurate. As a result, the process to 

shut off all impacted meters began at approximately 2:00 a.m. Friday morning. Ten 

hours after the first 9–1–1 call. This, combined with the delay to fully depressurize 

the low pressure gas mains, hindered the work of the public safety personnel to 

fully eliminate the risk to the region. These were the first of many milestones that 

Columbia Gas would not meet during the response phase. Columbia Gas struggled 

coordinating their resources to complete the shutoff process and it became evident 

by the early afternoon on Friday September 14. 2018, that they were not up to the 

task. As a result Governor Baker declared a state of emergency and handed the responsibility of shutting gas service off to the remaining residents to Eversource. It 

should be noted that weeks into the recovery phase of the disaster the communities 

still did not have an accurate list of the properties impacted. 

2. Recovery 

A disaster of this magnitude is all consuming. Dozens of decisions need to be 

made daily and the command structure nature of a disaster response reduces the 

time available to develop consensus between professional staff and elected officials 

and creates challenges in finding ways to delegate the responsibilities and still meet 

deadlines. An additional complication in the decision making process for a regional 

disaster is representing the interests of your community while trying to understand 

the specific issues facing the other communities and trying to strike a balance that 

improves success for the entire recovery effort. Recognizing these challenges and the 

shortcomings during the gas shutoff effort, on September 21, 2018 Columbia Gas, 

with the support and encouragement of Governor’s office, hired retired Navy Captain Joe Albanese as the Chief Recover Officer (CRO). Columbia Gas has done an 

effective job of understanding the different needs of those impacted and has worked 

well to avoid a one size fits all approach to the recovery effort. 

Gas Main and Gas Service Replacement 

In order to restore service all 45 miles of gas main in the impacted area had to 

be replaced as did the service mains and meters to all homes. Columbia Gas under 

the direction of the CRO was well positioned to complete this work. More than half 

a dozen large gas main replacement contractors supplied the crews, at times more 

than 200 such crews, and the gas main replacement was completed 3 weeks ahead 

of schedule on October 30, 2018. Interestingly, there were more than 1,000 contractors from at least 7 states at the peak of the construction phase. The impact on the 

roads, sidewalks and other infrastructure in the impacted neighborhoods as a result 

of this massive utility project will not fully be known for years. Miles of streets 

which have been repaved in the past 5 years now have been damaged and there 

has been a similar impact on hundreds of linear feet of sidewalks, countless street 

trees and thousands of lawns and driveways. The communities have requested that 

Columbia Gas replace, not just spot repair, all public assets that were damaged. We 

have not yet received confirmation from Columbia Gas if they will do so. As it relates to the private property impact we would expect that Columbia Gas would return all impacted properties to their pre-disaster condition. 

Gas Device Replacement/Repair 

In the early stages of the recovery phase all gas devices including stoves, dryers, 

water heaters, boilers and generators were determined to be unsafe and therefore 

needed to be replaced, not just repaired, prior to service restoration. One of the most 

important decisions that was made during the recovery phase was determining the 

time-frame for completing the work to safely restore gas service and allow people 

to return to their normal way of life. Based on all of the information available the 

75 

agreed upon ‘‘re-light’’ date was set at November 19, 2018. The restoration process 

turned out to be far more challenging than expected. Arguably the most difficult decision of the entire disaster was made on October 24, 2018, when, based on the information available, the town managers and mayor agreed to change course and 

allow, if possible, temporary repairs to heating systems previously determined to be 

unsafe and extend the deadline for completion from November 19th to December 16, 

2018. As of November 19, 2018, sixty-seven days after the event and the original 

date for having all impacted residents and businesses ‘‘re-lit’’, 67 percent of residents and 81 percent of businesses have been ‘‘re-lit’’. With the change in strategy 

from ‘‘repair when you can and replace later’’ it is expected that Columbia Gas will 

have to return in spring of 2019 and embark on a 5 month process to replace the 

equipment that has been temporarily repaired. 

With the average nighttime temperatures ranging from 20 to 45 degrees and 

dropping on a daily basis alternative housing and temporary heat have been significant priorities. There are currently more than 1,700 families in hotels, travel trailers, shelters and apartments all secured for the purpose of providing alternative 

housing. When the restoration process began decisions needed to be made regarding 

prioritizing certain properties to reduce the risk to health or safety. These decisions 

had the burden of knowing those that wouldn’t be restored quickly may remain impacted for weeks or months. It is difficult to get people to leave their homes even 

when faced with the prospect of no heat, cold showers, and the inability to cook a 

hot meal, and/or dry their clothes. The decision to add travel trailers (RVs) was 

made in response to that concern. Locating the travel trailers presented its own 

challenges and therefore, another set of decisions was required. Where should the 

trailers be located given there would be loud generators and bright lights? How 

many trailers on each site? Should laundry facilities be included? 

Decisions regarding the most effective way to communicate with residents and determining who the audience is can present real challenges. More than 1,500 contracted employees from around the country are working in the three communities. 

There are cultural, societal and language differences between the employees and 

residents. Social media has taken on a more prominent role than what the communities experienced pre-disaster. We had to decide early on to focus increased resources in this space and push the gas company to do the same to help manage the 

misinformation that was running rampart early on. It took Columbia Gas weeks to 

engage in the appropriate communication channels and this ultimately led to confusion and mistrust which still exists through today. 

A strength of the recovery process has been all three communities working cooperatively. This has driven decisions which included holding joint, rather than separate, press events, entering in joint contracts for engineering services, developing 

inter-municipal agreements to help fill hundreds of police and fire details on a daily 

basis, and having similar agreements for hiring plumbing inspectors from other 

communities. 

During the past seven weeks we have had to make hundreds of decisions each 

of which directly impact one or more residents or business owners. Many of these 

decisions needed to be revisited or revised. To say that the environment for making 

decisions in a disaster such as this is dynamic would be an understatement. The 

primary lesson learned has been that the residents, business owners, and other 

stakeholders in the communities are looking for someone to trust, not someone to 

always be right. This lesson has helped instill confidence in our ability to make decisions even when insufficient information or limited time have made the decision 

making process less than ideal. 

We have no doubt that for many of the residents and businesses that remain impacted the frustration must be mounting by the day. It is frustrating for me as well. 

In many ways the ‘‘Rapid Relight Plan’’ which was instituted on October 24, 2018, 

raises new questions that will need to be answered. When exactly will my heating 

unit be replaced, will I have the option to move my gas service, who do I call during 

the winter if my now repaired heating unit breaks, how does the repair effect the 

warranty on my boiler, when will my driveway or lawn be repaired? 

Claims 

The claims process has been challenging for most residents and business owners. 

Claims centers were opened in each of the three communities within a week of the 

disaster and those claims centers remain open today. Impacted residents can also 

file claims via telephone. Most claimants have had multiple claims representatives 

throughout the reimbursement process as the third party company managing the 

claims process ramped up the demand. To date more than 23,000 claims have been 

filed, 9,940 of those claims remain active and more than $61 million in claims have 

been paid. 

76 

All three towns have been advocating on behalf of the residents and businesses 

impacted since this disaster occurred and will continue to do so. To expedite meeting 

the date established in the original plan we made decisions based on verbal commitments from Columbia Gas. Given what has transpired to date and the ongoing nature of the recovery process, one which extends well into next year, verbal commitments will no longer be acceptable. The Town of North Andover expects at a minimum the following from Columbia Gas: 

1. That a written agreement be drafted which very specifically identifies what 

each resident/business can expect from Columbia Gas and when. That agreement (contract) should be provided to each customer impacted. 

2. That Columbia Gas continue to provide the necessary resources to respond to 

service questions and claims. These resources must remain local. 

3. That Columbia Gas commit to the curb-to-curb replacement of ALL roads impacted by the gas main replacement work associated with this disaster. Columbia should also commit to the repair or replacement of all other impacted public assets such as sidewalks and street trees. 

3. Mitigation 

As you know the NTSB issued its Preliminary Report on October 11, 2018 

(PLD18MR003). In that report they were clear about the cause of this disaster ‘‘Columbia Gas developed and approved the work package executed on the day of the 

accident. The work package did not account for the location of the sensing lines or 

require their relocation to ensure the regulators were sensing actual system pressure. The work was performed in accordance with steps laid out in the work package. 

In light of this accident, Columbia Gas implemented a safety stand-down for all employees who perform work related to low-pressure natural gas systems for NiSource 

subsidiaries.’’ (Emphasis added) 

In a conversation we had with one of the lead NTSB investigators around the 

time the report was issued, it was confirmed to me that Columbia Gas was responsible and the fact that the report was ‘‘Preliminary’’ would not change that but instead allow them to provide more details about what took place before and after the 

incident. This is supported by the last sentence in the report, ‘‘The NTSB’s investigation into this accident is ongoing. Future investigative issues include the coordination between the emergency responders and Columbia Gas; an analysis of the engineering work package preparation and execution, including the design documentation; and a review of construction packages for constructability and safety.’’ Since 

the time the preliminary NTSB report was issued the State DPU issued a moratorium to Columbia Gas for all non-emergency gas work. It should be noted that a 

current Department of Public Utilities order includes a penalty of up to $1,000,000 

per impacted property if Columbia Gas fails to meet their obligations to complete 

work required. 

The NTSB has just recently (11/14/2018) issued a Safety Recommendation Report 

(PSR1802) related to the disaster which provides guidance to mitigate the likelihood 

of a similar disasters in the future. That report recommends the following actions: 

To the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: 

Eliminate the professional engineer licensure exemption for public utility work 

and require a professional engineer’s seal on public utility engineering drawings. (P–18–005) 

To NiSource, Inc.: 

Revise the engineering plan and constructability review process across all of 

your subsidiaries to ensure that all applicable departments review construction 

documents for accuracy, completeness, and correctness, and that the documents 

or plans be sealed by a professional engineer prior to commencing work. (P–18– 

006) (Urgent) 

Review and ensure that all records and documentation of your natural gas systems are traceable, reliable, and complete. (P–18–007) (Urgent) 

Apply management of change process to all changes to adequately identify system threats that could result in a common mode failure. (P–18–008) (Urgent) 

Develop and implement control procedures during modifications to gas mains to 

mitigate the risks identified during management of change operations. Gas 

main pressures should be continually monitored during these modifications and 

assets should be placed at critical locations to immediately shut down the system if abnormal operations are detected. (P–18–009) (Urgent) 

77 

4. Preparedness 

Per the NTSB Preliminary Report Preliminary Report issued on October 11, 2018 

(PLD18MR003) ‘‘minutes before the fires and explosions occurred, the Columbia Gas 

monitoring center in Columbus, Ohio, received two high-pressure alarms for the 

South Lawrence gas pressure system: one at 4:04 p.m. and the other at 4:05 p.m. 

The monitoring center had no control capability to close or open valves; its only capability was to monitor pressures on the distribution system and advise field technicians accordingly. Following company protocol, at 4:06 p.m., the Columbia Gas controller reported the high-pressure event to the Meters and Regulations group in 

Lawrence. The company protocol does not appear to include contacting local or regional Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs or dispatch) when such an event occurs. The first resident called 9–1–1 at 4:11 p.m. Fire, police and emergency medical 

services (EMS) began to respond in all three communities within five minutes of the 

over-pressurization as a result of an overwhelming number of resident calls for service. However, there was no direct communication to each community by the company regarding the nature of the problem. Therefore, for the next one to two hours 

confusion and fear spread throughout the region. ‘‘Columbia Gas shut down the regulator at issue by about 4:30 p.m. The critical valves of the involved natural gas 

distribution system were closed by 7:24 p.m.’’. The municipal chief executives were 

told that the complete depressurization of the impacted gas mains was not completed until several hours after that. It is possible that more local control of the system and a more robust protocol in response to an event could result in less overall 

damage. Specific questions regarding the preparedness issues are: 

• Would more local control of the system have allowed the ‘‘regulator at issue’’ 

to shut down this regulator sooner? If yes, would this have reduced the extent 

of the damage? 

• Would more local control of the system have allowed ‘‘the critical valves of the 

involved natural gas distribution system’’ to be closed before 7:24 p.m.? If yes, 

would this have reduced the extent of the damage? 

Finally, the communication protocol must reflect the need to get public safety 

agencies involved as quickly as possible and that gas mains and therefore gas main 

failures do not recognize community borders. PSAPs in all impacted jurisdictions 

must be contacted immediately after an event occurs. 

Conclusion 

The actions of Columbia Gas which resulted in the gas explosions and fires in the 

Greater Lawrence area have had a profound and continuing impact on the region’s 

residents and business owners. The exact impact both personal and economic will 

not be known for months or years to come. What is most concerning is the unforeseen costs such as the long term impact on the economic viability of many of the 

small businesses in the region, the emotional impact on vulnerable populations from 

being without heat and hot water, and/or the effect the disaster has had on families 

displaced and remaining in hotels rooms or travel trailers. 

In a disaster such as this identifying areas of deficiency is not only acceptable, 

but quite frankly not difficult. That being said, the senior leadership of Columbia 

Gas has partnered with the three communities to find solutions to the most significant and impactful problems. Also, the work of the Chief Recovery Officer Joe 

Albanese and his team with the support of Governor Baker, the Lieutenant Governor and several members of their senior staff, to continue to find creative ways 

to solve problems and to challenge those on the project that have underperformed 

is important to recognize. Without this leadership we would not have made the 

progress we have made to date. 

Finally, the residents and the business owners of the impacted area woke up on 

September 13, 2018, never imagining how dramatically their lives would change as 

a result of this disaster. They have endured loss of life, property, income, and a degradation of their quality of life. However, they have demonstrated great resilience, 

strength and courage during this difficult time and they deserve our thanks and a 

commitment that we will take steps to ensure their lives return to normal and that 

a similar disaster does not occur anywhere in the United States again. 

Regards, 

ANDREW W. MAYLOR

Town Manager 

North Andover, Massachusetts 

ANDREW P. FLANAGAN

Town Manager 

Andover, Massachusetts 

78 

Senator MARKEY. We thank you all for being here and we will 

begin with you, Mr. Mayor, and then I will introduce the other witnesses as their testimony is called for. 

So, again, we welcome you, Mr. Mayor, and we thank you for everything that you’ve done for your community and whenever you 

are ready, please begin your testimony, and if you could move that 

microphone in just a little bit. 

Mayor RIVERA. How’s that? 

Senator MARKEY. If you maybe lift it up a little bit. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAN RIVERA, 

MAYOR, CITY OF LAWRENCE 

Mayor RIVERA. Good morning, Senators, invited guests, and fellow affected citizens. 

I want to begin by thanking Senator Markey for advocating on 

behalf of our communities to bring this hearing to Lawrence, an 

honorary Lawrence kid. It allows all those affected to be present 

and included throughout the investigation process. 

The gas fires and explosions of September 13 and the days that 

followed were both a human tragedy and a human disaster. That 

tragedy continues despite the best efforts of Columbia Gas for the 

recovery effort. 

I never thought that I would have to ask people in my community and those in surrounding communities to evacuate the city 

fearing for their lives, asking them to abandon their homes, their 

businesses, and their neighborhoods because no one knew if it was 

safe for them to be there. 

Residents everywhere in the area evacuated out of sheer panic. 

We had to cut the electrical power to every domicile and business 

in South Lawrence, Andover, North Andover in the middle of the 

night. 

What followed the devastation of the fires and explosions was 

loss of life, grave unbearable injury to people, priceless loss of property and the regional economy, but worst of all, we lost the underlying security that the very thing most of us relied on to keep ourselves and our families warm in the coldest of New England winters could destroy our homes, our neighborhoods, our towns, and 

our very peace. 

We expected that the gas services that we pay good money for 

every month, that many families sacrifice to make those monthly 

payments, and that business owners base the core of their businesses on, would not put us in grave danger. However, that is exactly what happened. 

And during the heart of the disaster, I said this before, Columbia 

Gas was the least informed and the last to act. It is important to 

know that while we were trying to save lives and make heads and 

tails of the tragedy and disaster of those days, Columbia Gas was 

failing to manage the disaster in the same way they had failed to 

maintain their gas lines. 

I beat most of the upper echelon leadership to the scene that 

night after driving in Thursday night traffic from Boston. Those 

who have done that understand what I’m talking about. 

It was clear that the Columbia Gas engineers and Columbia Gas 

of Massachusetts top leadership were afraid and lacked a clear 

79 

path to deal with the disaster. They owned the gas in the pipe, 

they owned the customer relationships, yet they failed to own this 

disaster. 

They failed so much so that Governor Baker had to call for a 

state of emergency and put a different utility company in charge 

and we lost critical hours that first weekend getting people back 

in their homes because Columbia Gas refused to call for mutual 

aid, motivated by what appeared to many of us to be an unwillingness to bear the costs of that mutual aid. 

One person was dead, many were injured, and the core of three 

communities had been shaken, and it appeared to many of us that 

Columbia Gas didn’t have an actual plan for dealing with the disaster of this magnitude, as if it had never crossed their mind that 

this could occur. 

And earlier today, they said they did have one. I would love to 

see that. I’d love for them to put that up, the plan that was in 

place prior to this event. 

These plans should be mandated across utilities, not just natural 

gas, for there to be a system failure and customer evacuation plan 

created and refreshed every two years. Ordinary people have plans 

to get out of their own homes in case of a fire. It’s the least the 

utility could do to have a basic plan in place if they set your city 

on fire. 

It’s cold outside today and there’s snow on the ground. People in 

our communities are still without heat and hot water. Some people 

are still in hotel rooms and RVs and some are still cooking on hot 

plates and most of the people in the affected areas, regardless if 

they were living before Thanksgiving or not, let’s just say they 

didn’t have the Thanksgiving they wanted to due to this disaster. 

The recovery’s a material effort, fixing things in the system so 

that life can happen. I mean, in that sense, the recovery’s an awful 

experience only made better every day for some who get their gas 

turned back on. 

I want to say thanks to Governor Baker because, because of him, 

we have Chief Recovery Officer Joe Albanese leading the recovery 

effort, a 28-year veteran and former captain in the United States 

Navy Civil Engineer Corps, the Seabees. We’re honored to have Joe 

leading our restoration efforts. He enjoys our full support and appreciation for walking away from his own business to work on this 

recovery. 

Every day, he has done all he can to assist us to get Columbia 

Gas to live up to the responsibilities and get the work done. 

As I have lived it, the recovery has really been about four things: 

fixing the pipe in the street and to the house to get gas to the 

house, fixing the pipe and appliances in the house so they can turn 

the gas on, making people whole as customers of Columbia Gas for 

their physical loss, for mental anguish, and terrifying experiences 

that they had to endure and that means financially, and, four, supporting those people throughout this time as they waited for the 

first three things to be completed. 

Columbia Gas did accomplish the work of fixing the pipe in the 

street ahead of schedule and without further disaster. For this, we 

are thankful. 

80 

However, the rest of the work has been miserable. Any time the 

recovery has had to deal with the plight and need of people, Columbia Gas has initially failed, only getting it right days and sometimes weeks after local and state officials have raised the pressure 

on them so much so that they had to relent. 

The plight of people and their suffering has been prolonged because of a broken claims process, a broken repair process, and the 

total lack of understanding on how to communicate with customers. 

Long before we had 250 houses late in the day with gas, we had 

weeks of only 40 homes a day lit. For this, not only does Columbia 

Gas but Gilbane Recovery Services bear responsibility and as such 

should be investigated. I want to repeat that. Gilbane Recovery 

Services also bears responsibilities for missing the initial date and 

should be investigated. 

Before we had a hundred appliances delivered to homes on a day, 

we had days with none, and for almost a week, securing temporary 

housing was not only daunting but nearly impossible. Customers 

were lied to about availability of hotels and RVs and consistently 

left in the dark on their claims process. All the while, all the while 

hotel rooms and RVs sat empty. Having to endure not one, not two, 

but as many as five assessments of their homes and appliances before one wrench was turned to fix their boilers or furnaces was a 

common experience of the affected communities. 

Many times people languished without answers to important 

questions about when they should stay home from work to accommodate the Columbia Gas and the Gilbane contractors and when 

they could expect answers regarding their claims. All the while, 

people were sleeping in cold beds and cooking on hot plates and 

taking cold showers. Other families huddled in RVs and far-away 

hotel rooms waiting for their homes to be fixed. 

I’m not sure what would have happened to our communities if 

not for the firefighters of Lawrence, Andover, North Andover Fire 

Departments, and the over a thousand firefighters that came in 

support of them, including the State Fire Marshal’s Office. 

The effect of this disaster was controlled only by the professional 

posture and response of the Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover Police Departments and the over 1,100 police officers from 

across the Commonwealth and the State Police, all the municipal 

employees that put down their city and town bureaucracies and became an army of first responders, aid and humanitarian workers. 

[Applause.] 

Mayor RIVERA. From the city councils and selectmen to the library directors, from the state representatives to the teachers and 

staff of our public schools, many of them affected themselves, the 

Governor and his staff and cabinet who seamlessly rolled up their 

sleeves and became an active informed part of these efforts, the 

state legislature and the Federal delegation, both of you have made 

us feel that our plight was the most important business before the 

Commonwealth. 

Town Managers Maylor and Flanagan and I, as well as the affected across communities, can never thank them all enough for 

their actions. 

81 

I must say that I have never been more proud to be associated 

with this group of people in my life. They all showed the spirit of 

government and its power to do good. 

I want to be sure to say the rank and file of Columbia Gas workers and zone captains and the workers who fixed the pipe in the 

street all were shining spots in this ordeal. Zone captains became 

a symbol of the good Columbia Gas could do if it got its stuff together. 

The recovery and the personal and communal sense for every 

person affected is going to take some time, not measured in days 

or weeks. I’m not sure when we will remove from our memories the 

darkness, the fire, the cold nights, the cold showers, the evacuations, and the loss of such a young life. 

So in the end, we will need help from state and Federal officials 

and government to pave our roads, to fix our infrastructure, to pay 

for economic development, basic help for us to get off the mat after 

being knocked down by Columbia Gas, but what we all expect from 

you, what we ask of you is to do what is at the core of why we have 

governments and that is to protect us and to ensure this can’t and 

won’t happen again. 

In this one instance, in this one incident, Columbia Gas has 

shown they could not provide safely the service they promised everyone. This failure alone should cause that you take that privilege 

of running a gas company away from them and break that company apart. 

[Applause.] 

Mayor RIVERA. I’m not sure how you do it, revoke their licenses, 

make them sell their business to someone else. It doesn’t matter 

how you do it, but after they have met their financial obligations 

not only to the individuals and the businesses and to the municipalities, Columbia Gas should cease to exist. No second chances. 

Leonel Rondon’s life was taken and multiple homes no longer 

exist and our livelihood and our peace has forever been altered, so 

should Columbia Gas no longer exist. 

A disbanded Columbia Gas that no longer exists will send a 

strong message and motivator to others to do better around safety. 

That is what justice for everyone affected by this disaster would 

look like. 

Thank you. 

[Applause.] 

[The prepared statement of Mayor Rivera follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL RIVERA, MAYOR, CITY OF LAWRENCE

Good morning senators and invited guests and fellow affected citizens. The gas 

fires and explosions of September 13, 2018 and the days that followed was both a 

human tragedy and a human disaster. That tragedy continues despite the best efforts of Columbia Gas and the recovery effort. I never thought that I would have 

to ask people in my community and those in surrounding communities to evacuate 

the city, fearing for their lives. Asking them to abandon their homes, their businesses and their neighborhoods because no one knew if it was safe for them to be 

there; others evacuated out of sheer panic. We had to cut the power to every domicile and business in South Lawrence, Andover and North Andover in the middle of 

the night. What followed the devastations of the fires and explosions was loss of life, 

grave, unbearable injury to people, priceless loss to property and the regional economy, loss of business and jobs. But worst of all we lost the underlying security that 

the very thing most of us relied on to keep ourselves and our families warm in the 

82 

coldest of New England winters could destroy our homes, our neighborhoods, our 

towns and city, our very peace. We expected that the gas services that we pay good 

money for every month, that many families sacrifice to make those monthly payments and that business owners based the core of their business and their livelihood 

on, would not put us in grave danger, but that is exactly what happened. 

During the heart of the disaster Columbia gas was the least informed and last 

to act. It is Important to know that while we were trying to save lives and make 

heads or tails of the tragedy and disaster of those days Columbia gas was failing 

to manage the disaster, in the same way that they had failed to maintain their gas 

lines. I beat most of the upper echelon leadership to the scene after driving in 

Thursday night traffic from Boston. It was clear that the Columbia Gas engineers 

and Columbia Gas Massachusetts top leadership were afraid and lacked a clear 

path to deal with the disaster. They owned the pipe, owned the gas in the pipe, they 

owned the customer relationships, yet they failed to own this disaster. So much so 

that Governor Baker had to call for a state of emergency and put a different utility 

company in charge. We lost critical hours that first weekend, getting people back 

in their homes because they refused to call for mutual aid motivated by what appeared to many to be an unwillingness to bear the cost of that mutual aid. One person is dead, many injured the core of three communities has been shaken. It appeared to many of us that Columbia Gas did not have an actual plan for dealing 

with a disaster of this magnitude; as if it never crossed their minds that this could 

occur. It should be mandated across utilities (not just natural gas) for there to be 

a system failure and customer evacuation plan created and refreshed every 2 years. 

People have plans to get out of their homes in case of a fire. Utilities to should have 

a basic plan if they set your city or town on fire. 

It is cold outside today and there is snow on the ground. People in our communities are still without heat and hot water. Some people are still in hotel rooms and 

RVs. Some are still cooking on hotplates. And most of the people in the affected 

area, regardless if they were lit before Thanksgiving or not, did not have the 

Thanksgiving they wanted to due to this disaster. The recovery is a material effort; 

fixing things and systems so that life can happen, in that sense the recovery is an 

awful experience only made better every day for some who get their gas turned back 

on. 

Thanks to Governor Baker we have Chief Recovery Officer, Joe Albanese, leading 

the recovery effort. A twenty-eight-year veteran and former Captain in the United 

States Navy Civil Engineer Corps. We are honored to have Joe leading our restoration efforts and he enjoys our full support and appreciation for walking away from 

his business to work on this recovery. Every day he has done all he could to get 

Columbia Gas to live up to their responsibility and get the work done. As I have 

lived it, the recovery has really been about 4 things: (1) Fixing the pipe in the Street 

and to the House to get gas to the house, (2) Fixing the pipe and appliances in the 

house to turn on the gas, (3) making people whole as customers of Columbia Gas 

for the physical loss but also for the mental anguish and terrifying experiences they 

had to endure and (4) Supporting people as they waited for 1, 2, and 3 to be complete. 

Columbia Gas did accomplish the work of fixing the pipe in the street ahead of 

schedule and without further disaster. For this we are thankful. However, the rest 

of the work has been miserable. Anytime the recovery has had to deal with the 

plight and need of people Columbia Gas has initially failed only getting it right days 

and sometimes weeks after local and state officials have raised the pressure so 

much that they had to relent. The plight of people and their suffering has been prolonged because of a broken claims process, a broken repair process and a total lack 

of understanding of how to communicate with customers. Long before we had 250 

houses a day lit with gas, we had weeks of only 40 homes lit per day. For this not 

only does Columbia Gas but Gilbane Recovery Services, bear responsibility and as 

such should be investigated. Before we had days of 100 appliances delivered we had 

days with none. For almost a week, securing temporary housing was not only 

daunting, but nearly impossible. Customers were lied to about availability of hotels 

and RVs and consistently left in the dark on their claims processes. All the while 

hotel rooms and RVs sat empty. Having to endure not 1, not 2 but as many as 5 

assessments of their homes and appliances before one wrench was turned to fix one 

boiler. Many times people languished without answers to important questions about 

when should they stay home from work to accommodate Columbia Gas and GRS 

contractors, and when can they expect answer regarding their claims. All the while, 

people were sleeping in cold beds and cooking on hot plates and taking cold showers. 

Families huddled in RV’s and far away hotel rooms waiting for their homes to be 

fixed. 

83 

I am not sure what would have happened to our communities if not for the firefighters of the Lawrence, Andover, North Andover fire departments and the over 

1,000 firefighters that came in support of them including the State Fire Marshal’s 

office. The effect of this disaster was controlled only by the professional posture and 

response of the Lawrence, Andover, North Andover police departments and the over 

1,000 police officers from across the commonwealth and the State Police. All the municipal employees that put down their city and town bureaucracies and became an 

army of first responders, aid and humanitarian workers, from the city councilors 

and selectmen to the library director, from state representative to the teachers and 

staff at our public schools (many affected themselves). The Governor and his staff 

and cabinet, who seamlessly rolled up their sleeves and became an active, important 

part of these efforts, the State legislature and the Federal delegation both made us 

feel as if our plight was the most important business before the commonwealth. I 

have never been more proud to be associated with a group of people in my life. They 

all showed the spirit of government and its power to do good. I must say that the 

rank and file Columbia Gas workers and zone captains and the workers who fixed 

the pipe in the street all were a shining spots in this ordeal. Zone captains became 

a symbol of the good Columbia Gas could do if it got it stuff together. 

The recovery in the personal and communal sense for every person affected is 

going to take some time not measured in days or weeks. I am not sure when we 

will remove from our memories the darkness, the fire, the cold nights, the cold 

showers or the evacuations. So, in the end we will need help from state and Federal 

officials and government to pave our roads, to fix our infrastructure, to pay for economic development, basic help to get off the mat after being knock down by Columbia Gas. 

But what we all except from you, what we ask of you, is to do what is at the core 

of why we have governments, and that is to protect us and to insure this can’t and 

won’t happen again. In this one incident, Columbia Gas showed they could not provide the service they promised everyone safely. This failure alone should cause that 

you should take their privilege to run a gas company away. Break it apart revoke 

their license make them sell their business to someone else, it doesn’t matter how, 

but like Leonel Rondon’s life was taken, and multiple homes no longer exist, and 

our lives and livelihood has forever been altered, Columbia Gas as a company 

should no longer exist. That is what justice for everyone affected would look like. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Mayor. Thank you for your 

great work. 

And next, we’re going to hear from Tina Messina. Tina is a leader in the small business community in North Andover. We thank 

you for coming here and representing all of those businesses who 

want to have answers as to what happened and how soon they can 

go back to work. 

So we thank you and whenever you’re ready, please begin. 

STATEMENT OF TINA MESSINA, OWNER, WINE CONNEXTION 

Ms. MESSINA. Sure. Thank you. 

Good afternoon. My name is Tina Messina, and I’d like to thank 

the Committee for this opportunity to discuss the impact on September 13 gas explosion has had on the business community. 

Senator MARKEY. Could you move that microphone just over in 

front of you just a little bit? 

Ms. MESSINA. Closer? 

Senator MARKEY. Yes. 

Ms. MESSINA. After the initial shock of the event, the community 

needed to understand the scope of the problem. Information on the 

details came slowly as we learned what happened and who was affected by this event. 

By the following Sunday, I found myself hitting the trifecta. I 

was impacted as a landlord with two retail properties, a three-unit 

strip mall, a 23-unit shopping center, a business owner of a retail 

wine store, and my home were all in the affected area. 

84 

We learned that there could be over 40 miles of gas line that 

needed to be replaced and our gas equipment had been compromised. Upon learning this information, we didn’t know if we 

were looking at months or years to get back our gas service. 

That Monday, I began receiving many phone calls from my tenants. While some tenants could operate without gas, others, such 

as the restaurants, were shut down. Our restaurant tenants found 

themselves with no revenue stream and they were facing loss of 

help. 

Sharma Grill, a 164-seat restaurant, began to receive cancellations of future events as he could not give these clients any assurances that he would have a functional facility. 

During that first week after the explosion, finding solution to our 

problems was difficult as we needed to wait on state and local officials to give us direction. Information was scarce and frustration 

set in. 

As property owners, we began to explore our options to provide 

alternatives to heat our buildings. It was September and we figured that we had three months before the cold weather was upon 

us and we knew that if we didn’t have heat, we could not provide 

a working sprinkler system and we would have to shut down the 

buildings. It was an unthinkable scenario. 

We immediately began to look into alternative fuel sources, such 

as LP tanks, but quickly found we weren’t the first to be making 

those phone calls. It became clear they were many of us. Businesses as well as homeowners fighting for the same limited resources. 

We were also encountering state regulations and large costs for 

these solutions, making it very difficult to determine what to do. 

We needed answers. 

It wasn’t until the following Friday that we learned that the recovery process was going to take approximately two months and 

businesses were going to be addressed first. While we were all relieved to hear the short timeline, understanding the execution of 

the recovery plan was unknown. 

During this planning stage, many of us were experiencing loss of 

revenue, whether you were able to open your business or not. People stayed away from the area and many people didn’t know that 

businesses were open. 

As the recovery plan unfolded, it became apparent we all needed 

to individually manage the process of getting our gas turned back 

on. This became a full-time job for some of us. Understanding what 

needed to be fixed versus replaced was not a simple yes or no answer. 

Managing that process with Columbia was challenging as parameters and information changed daily. You will be told what to do 

1 day and then the next day you would have a new crew telling 

you something different. It was important to stay on top of the situation to ensure that your business and/or building would get relit. 

Once the gas-ready plan was deployed, we were hit with another 

wave of disruption. While we all understood replacing 48 miles of 

gas line was a monumental task, we did not understand the impact 

it would have on the infrastructure surrounding our businesses. 

Roads were shut down and dug up while traffic was redirected 

85 

making it time-consuming and difficult for people to get to our 

businesses. 

For more than 5 days, the only way to get in and out of our 23- 

unit shopping center was through the CVS Drive-Through. 

As it became difficult to get to these affected areas, many people 

were told not to go to these areas via social media. People were 

posting ‘‘What a mess, took me 40 minutes to go a half mile, don’t 

go there if you don’t have to.’’ Frustrations amongst patrons began 

to set in and they stayed away. 

I experienced this with the Wine Connection as our year-overyear sales were down from the previous time last year and I expect 

other businesses experienced the same. 

Also during this time, it became evident that people were living 

out of the area, whether by choice or the need to relocate due to 

their living conditions. Our regular customers were not around to 

shop for our goods and services. As someone whose personal home 

was affected, I understood the difficulties of living without heat, 

hot water, and cooking capabilities. 

Now that we are entering our third month into the recovery, concerns turn to the holiday season. This is a critical time for retailers 

and hospitality businesses and we wonder how will we fare through 

this season. Do customers know we’re open? Will they return to our 

businesses or have they adopted new locations for shopping for 

goods and services? When will residents be able to return to their 

homes and patronize our business? In a booming economy, these 

are unsettling questions we’re about to face. 

In conclusion, I’d just like to say to the Committee that the people of Merrimack Valley are resilient and while we’re still dealing 

with these challenges to recover from this disaster, we look forward 

to the days when we can get back to normal. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Messina follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TINA MESSINA, OWNER, WINE CONNEXTION

Good Afternoon, My name is Tina Messina and I’d like to thank the committee 

for this opportunity to discuss the impact of the Sept 13th gas explosion has had 

on the business community. 

After the initial shock of the event the community needed to understand the scope 

of the problem. Information on the details came slowly as we learned what happened and who was affected by this event. 

By the following Sunday, I found myself hitting the trifecta. I was impacted as 

a landlord, with 2 retail properties; a 3 unit strip mall and a 23 unit shopping center, a business owner of a retail wine store and my home were all in the affected 

area. We learned that there could be over 40 miles of gas lines that needed to be replaced and our gas equipment had been compromised. Upon learning this information we didn’t know if we were looking at months, several months or years to get 

back our gas service. 

That Monday, I began receiving many phone calls from my tenants. While some 

tenants could operate without heat, others such as the restaurants were shut down. 

Our restaurant tenants found themselves with no revenue stream and they were 

facing loss of help. Chama Grill, a 164 seat restaurant, began to receive cancellations of future events as he could not give these clients any assurance he would 

have a functional facility. 

During that first week after the explosion, finding solutions to our problems was 

difficult as we needed to wait on state and local officials to give us direction. Information was scarce and frustration set in. As property owners, we began to explore 

our options to provide alternatives to heat to our buildings. It was September and 

we figured we had 3 months before the cold weather was upon us and we knew that 

86 

if we didn’t have heat we could not provide a working sprinkler system and we 

would have to shut the buildings down. It was an unthinkable scenario. 

We immediately began to look into alternative fuel sources such as LP tanks but 

quickly found that we weren’t the first to make those calls. It became clear there 

were many of us, businesses as well as home owners, fighting for the same limited 

resources. We were also encountering state regulations and large costs for these solutions making it very difficult to determine what to do. We needed answers. 

It wasn’t till the following Friday that we learned the recovery process was going 

to take approximately 2 months and businesses were going to be addressed first. 

While all were relieved to hear the short time line, understanding the execution of 

the recovery plan was unknown. 

During this planning stage many of us were experiencing loss of revenue whether 

you were able to open your business or not. People stayed away from the area and 

many didn’t know if businesses were open. 

As the recovery plan unfolded it became apparent we all needed to individually 

manage the process of getting our gas turned back on. This became a fulltime job 

for some of us. Understanding what equipment needed to be fixed vs replaced was 

not a simple yes or no answer. Managing that process with Columbia was challenging as parameters and information changed daily. You would be told what to 

do one day and then the next day you would have a new crew telling you something 

different. It was important to stay on top of the situation to ensure your business 

and/or your buildings would get ‘‘re-lit’’. 

Once the Gas-Ready plan was deployed we were hit with another wave of disruption. While we all understood replacing 48 miles of gas lines was a monumental 

task, we did not understand the impact it would have on the infrastructure surrounding our businesses. Roads were shut down and dug up while traffic was redirected making it time consuming and difficult for people to get to our businesses. 

For more than 5 days, the only way to get in and out of our 23 unit shopping center 

was through the CVS drive thru. 

As it became very difficult to get to the affected areas, many people were being 

told not to go to these areas via social media. People were posting ‘‘what a mess’’ 

took me 40 minutes to go a 1⁄2 mile, don’t go there if you don’t have to.’’ Frustration 

amongst patrons began to set in . . . and they stayed away. I experienced this with 

the Wine ConneXtion, as our year over year sal es were down from the previous 

time last year and I expect other businesses experienced the same. 

Also during this time it became evident that many people were living out of the 

area. Whether by choice or the need to relocate due to their living conditions, our 

regular customers were not around to shop for our goods and services. As someone 

whose personal home was affected, I understood the difficulties of living without 

heat, hot water and cooking capabilities. 

Now that we are entering our 3rd month into the recovery, concerns turn to the 

holiday season. This is a critical time for retailers and hospitality businesses, and 

we wonder how will we fare through this season? Do customers know we’re open? 

Will they return to our businesses or have they adopted new locations of shopping 

for goods and services? When will residents be able to return to their homes and 

patronize our businesses? 

In a booming economy, these are very unsettling questions we are about to face. 

In conclusion I’d like to let the committee know that the people of the Merrimack 

Valley are resilient and while we are still dealing with the challenges to recover 

from this disaster, we look forward to the days where we can get back to normal. 

Thank you. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, and thank you so much for your 

testimony. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. And next, we are going to hear from Andover 

Fire Chief Michael Mansfield and I am also going to submit to the 

record testimony on behalf of Lawrence Fire Chief Brian Moriarty 

and North Andover Fire Chief William McCarthy. 

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Senator MARKEY. Also with us are Andover Police Chief Patrick 

Keefe, Lawrence Police Chief Roy Vasque, and North Andover Police Chief Charles Gray. We thank each and every one of you and 

all of the people who work under you who responded so valiantly 

on that first day and on all of the ensuing days. We are in your 

debt. We are in your debt every day but that was an especially trying time. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. And we just want to—we are mindful that on 

that day and on every day, you run toward the flames as everyone 

else is running away from the flames and on a day like today, I 

think it’s appreciated more than ever. So thank you. 

And now Chief Mansfield speaking on behalf of all of the brave 

men and women who worked up in Merrimack Valley to respond 

to that crisis, we welcome your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MANSFIELD, FIRE CHIEF, 

ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. MANSFIELD. Senator Markey, thank you very much. Senator 

Warren, Representative Tsongas, Representative Moulton. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today representing those men and women of the Fire Service who responded 

to the catastrophic natural gas incident that occurred at approximately 4:18 on September 13, 2018. This event has been identified 

by some as the worst natural gas disaster to ever occur in the history of the United States, if not the world. 

I must state that the time afforded to me to speak today will not 

even scratch the surface with regards to the specifics of this event 

or the challenges we have been confronted with and are still confronted with as we navigate through the recovery phase of this operation. 

Senator MARKEY. Chief, could I ask you just to move the microphone in a little closer? OK. Beautiful. 

Mr. MANSFIELD. Certainly. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Mr. MANSFIELD. The events that led up to the disaster would 

have never occurred if there were technological stopgap measures 

on the pipeline in place by Columbia Gas. Those measures would 

have prevented what has been reported to be up to 74 pounds of 

pressure introduced into the gas line that took well over, well over 

1 hour by Columbia Gas employees and/or subcontractors to shut 

down and purge. 

To date, it remains incomprehensible that Columbia Gas, which 

is a subsidiary of a multibillion dollar conglomerate known as 

NiSource, is involved in an industry that is so dangerous to our 

communities, but had no ability to stop the flow of natural gas to 

its infrastructure that supplies the three communities of Lawrence, 

North Andover, and Andover. 

The Fire Service in all three communities usually rely heavily 

upon one another to assist in the mitigation of any type of emergency incident when they occur. In this incident, all three fire departments found themselves competing for the same resources to 

assist in the emergency response which included a total of 141 

fires, five building explosions, unfortunately one death, and I want 

95 

to express my sincere condolences to the Rondon family for your 

loss, three civilians seriously injured, and seven firefighter injuries. 

9-1-1 calls for assistance at the initial point of the incident were 

overwhelmed, all available fire-rescue resources in the three affected communities within minutes, all off-duty fire-rescue personnel were requested to report back in to work, 150 of those offduty firefighters answered the call from the three communities immediately. 

The 9-1-1 telecommunications in the communities’ Dispatch Centers were overwhelmed immediately by the deluge of calls from the 

affected residents. In the first eight hours after the initial natural 

gas line over-pressurization occurred, the Lawrence, North Andover, Andover and mutual aid assets responded to over 375 calls for 

assistance. 

Firefighter safety was drastically minimized during the height of 

this incident as a result of the immediate lack of available resources. There are many instances on record where only one piece 

of apparatus with only three firefighters onboard responded to a 

full-blown building fire. 

A normal initial response to these types of incidents would include up to three engines, an aerial ladder, command staff, and rescues, totaling upwards between 15 to 17, quite possibly 20 firefighters. 

There were many reports of fire personnel passing by structure 

fires as they responded to a structure fire at an address they had 

been originally dispatched to. There are also many reports of firefighters exiting homes after extinguishing a fire and being met by 

frantic neighbors telling them that their home was also on fire. 

Mutual aid was immediately requested response all affected communities, as well. That system was overwhelmed to a point that a 

request to the State of Massachusetts Emergency Management 

Agency was made to activate the statewide Fire Mobilization Plan 

which allowed for several task forces of personnel, engine and ladder companies and ambulances to respond to assist with the disaster. 

The Fire Mobilization Plan brought in the following additional 

personnel and equipment assets from as far away as York, Maine, 

Nashua, New Hampshire, and communities as far away as Weston, 

Massachusetts. We had a total of 18 additional engine companies, 

six additional ladder companies, nine additional chief officers, 56 

additional ambulances, and 80 additional fire suppression personnel per 12-hour operational period were involved. 

These additional assets were rotated every 12 hours to ensure 

firefighter safety was paramount and those asset numbers were 

maintained until Monday, September 17, 2018. 

Many Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Federal agencies assisted with the initial responses, investigations, mitigations, and 

are still operating as part of the recovery phase of the operation, 

such as the Massachusetts Department of Fire Services, the Fire 

Marshal’s Office, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, 

the National Transportation Safety Board with their investigation, 

Federal Bureau of Investigations, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as well. 

96 

There are many lessons to be learned by this event. We within 

the Fire Service are willing to work with those at the state and 

Federal level to assist in the writing of additional legislation to further regulate the natural gas industry so that we may prevent anything to this magnitude to ever occur again in our country. 

All the aforementioned agencies’ assistance has been immeasurable and we greatly appreciate the seamless methodology of their 

approach and response to all of our requests to ensure that the citizens we serve maintained a high level of safety. 

Their compassion and caring in an effort to meet all of the communities’ needs and our citizens has been nothing short of astounding. 

In closing, on behalf of Lawrence Fire Chief Brian Moriarty, 

North Andover Fire Chief William McCarthy, and myself, I would 

like to thank all of those who have assisted us throughout this ordeal to date and those who continue to assist us with the recovery 

process. 

Most importantly, we would like to thank those who reside in our 

communities for their patience throughout this event and the outpouring of support we have received. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mansfield follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL B. MANSFIELD, FIRE CHIEF, 

ANDOVER FIRE RESCUE

I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today representing those men 

and women of the fire service who responded to the catastrophic natural gas incident that occurred at approximately 4:18 pm on September 13, 2018. This event has 

been identified as the worst natural gas disaster to ever occur in the history of the 

United States. 

I must state that the time afforded for me to speak today will not even scratch 

the surface with regards to the specifics of this event or the challenges we have been 

confronted with and are still confronted with as we navigate through the recovery 

phase of the operation. 

The events that led up to the disaster would have never occurred if there were 

technological stop gap measures on the pipeline in place by Columbia Gas. Those 

measurers would have prevented what has been reported to be up to seventy four 

(74) pounds of pressure introduced into the gas line that took well over one (1) hour 

by Columbia Gas employees and/or subcontractors to shut down. 

To date, it remains incomprehensible that Columbia Gas which is a subsidiary of 

the multibillion dollar conglomerate known as NiSource is involved in an industry 

that is so dangerous to our communities, but had no ability to stop the flow of natural gas to its infrastructure that supplies the three communities of Lawrence, 

North Andover, and Andover. 

The fire service in all three communities rely heavily upon usually assist one another in the mitigation of any type of emergency incident when they occur. With 

this incident all three fire departments found themselves competing for the same 

resources to assist in the emergency responses which included: 

• 141 Fires 

• 5 Building Explosions 

• 1 Death 

• 3 Civilians Seriously Injured 

• 7 Firefighter injuries 

911 calls for assistance at the initial point of the incident overwhelmed all available fire/rescue resources in the three affected communities within minutes. All off 

duty fire/rescue personnel were requested to report back into work. One hundred 

and fifty (150) off-duty firefighters from the three communities immediately answered the call. 

97 

The 911 Telecommunicators in the communities dispatch centers were also overwhelmed immediately by the deluge of calls from the affected residents. In the first 

eight hours after the initial natural gas line over pressurization occurred, the Lawrence, North Andover, Andover and mutual aid assets responded to over three hundred and seventy five (375) calls for assistance. 

Firefighter safety was drastically minimized during the height of this incident as 

a result of the immediate lack of available resources. There are many instances on 

record where only one piece of apparatus with only three firefighters on board responded to a building fire. A normal initial response to these types of incidents 

would include three (3) engines, an aerial ladder and Command Staff totaling fifteen 

(15) to seventeen (17) firefighters. There were many reports of fire personnel passing by structure fires as they responded to a structure fire at an address they had 

been originally dispatched to. 

There are also many reports of firefighters exiting homes after extinguishing a 

fire and being met by frantic neighbors that their home is on fire also. 

Mutual aid was immediately requested to respond to all affected communities as 

well. That system was overwhelmed to a point that a request to the State of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency was made to activate the statewide fire 

mobilization plan, which allowed for several task forces of personnel, engine and 

ladder companies and ambulances to respond to assist with the disaster. The fire 

mobilization plan brought in the following additional personnel and equipment assets from as far away as York, ME., Nashua, NH and communities as far away as 

Western Massachusetts: 

• 18 Additional Engine Companies 

• 6 Additional Ladder Companies 

• 9 Additional Chief Officers 

• 56 Additional Ambulances 

• 80 Additional Fire Suppression Personnel per 12 hour Operational Period 

These additional assets were rotated every twelve hours to ensure firefighter safety was paramount and those asset numbers were maintained until Monday September 16, 2018. 

Many Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Federal agencies assisted with the 

initial responses, investigations, mitigation and still are operating as part of the recovery phase of the operation such as the Massachusetts Department of Fire Services, Fire Marshal’s Office, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, National Transportation Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

There are many lessons to be learned by this event. We within the fire service, 

are willing to work with those at the state and Federal level to assist in the writing 

of additional legislation to regulate the natural gas industry so that we may prevent 

anything to this magnitude to ever occur again within our country. 

All of the aforementioned agencies assistance has been immeasurable and we 

greatly appreciate the seamless methodology of their approach and response to all 

of our requests to ensure that the citizens we serve maintained a high level of safety. Their compassion and caring in an effort to meet all of the community’s needs 

and our citizens has been nothing short of astounding. 

In closing, on behalf of Fire Chief Brian Moriarty, Fire Chief William McCarthy 

and myself, I would like to thank all of those who have assisted us throughout this 

ordeal to date and those who continue to assist us with the recovery process. Most 

importantly we would like to thank those who reside in our communities for their 

patience throughout this event and the outpouring of support we have received. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Chief, and—— 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY.—again we’re in your debt today but every day 

for what you do. So we thank you so much. 

So let’s begin with an overarching question and I would ask each 

of the witnesses to answer it. 

Mayor Rivera, Ms. Messina, Chief Mansfield, what grade A 

through F would you give to Columbia Gas in their response on the 

night of the incident and why would you give them that grade? 

Mayor RIVERA. On the night of the incident, I think that those 

who were close to this would give them an F. You know, having 

98 

been in the military, there’s a term people talk about this, like 

somebody’s in the weeds, even just not really present in the magnitude of the situation. We were pretty present but then looking for 

guidance and action from Columbia Gas, we just saw that they 

were in the weeds. They had no sense of this magnitude. 

Senator MARKEY. Ms. Messina. 

Ms. MESSINA. That night, the first thing that happened with us 

was that we had an alarm in our big 23-unit plaza and went down 

and thought nothing of it. It was in one of the restaurants and 

didn’t think much of it until the fire truck passed us and was like 

what’s going on here. 

So I think, you know, it was a very difficult night. As far as the 

response from Columbia, I mean, it wasn’t there. I didn’t hear anything till the Governor came on late at night, but, you know, it was 

just a lot of panic. For me, it was a little bit reminiscent of I was 

in Boston on 9/11 and it felt a little bit like that where it was just 

what’s going on, what do you mean? It didn’t feel—like depending 

on where you were, it didn’t feel like you were either in dire straits 

or what’s going on? It was not a big deal until I walked into my 

house and smelled gas. That’s when I started getting very unnerved. 

Senator MARKEY. And what grade would you give them on the 

first day? 

Ms. MESSINA. It wasn’t there. So for me, it would be, you know, 

in the D range because we didn’t hear anything. We didn’t know 

what was going on, period. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. Chief Mansfield, where were you when you 

were made aware that there was a gas-related emergency on September 13? When did they notify you on that day, and what grade 

would you give to Columbia Gas for their response? 

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wasn’t in contact with anybody from Columbia 

Gas for several hours after the event occurred. Due to the lack of 

communications, due to the lack of organization, due to the lack of 

their emergency planning, I would give them an F. 

Senator MARKEY. Mayor Rivera, you said in your testimony that 

Columbia Gas engineers and top leadership were afraid themselves 

and lacked a clear path to deal with the disaster. Can you elaborate on that? 

Mayor RIVERA. Yes, I mean, I guess I think we all were afraid. 

I think the problem is that when you’re tasked, you make five 

times the amount of money a year I make or 50 times the amount 

of I make a year, you’re going to be called to action, and I just felt 

like we couldn’t even get maps from them and then every time 

somebody in the room would have a suggestion on how to mitigate 

or deal with the problem, every idea went on the map and went 

on the list, and I think in a situation like that, even though I’m 

the Mayor of the city, I’m not really sure that I’m fully equipped 

to understand the complexities of a gas line and how to mitigate 

that problem. 

So I really do think that they were at a loss and they did send 

one person. They sent national support but they only sent one person on the ground that night. 

Senator MARKEY. And when did they respond to you on that 

night, Columbia Gas? 

99 

Mayor RIVERA. I called them first. I got a call from my Chief and 

then I got a call and then we all got together and then we ended 

up at the site, but on my drive in, I had called the Columbia Gas 

Government Affairs person. I called their head engineer. I was 

breaking the news to them and so I was kind of surprised that I 

was doing that, considering that I already had made it all the way 

down the building that I was in in Boston and I had already been 

in traffic for a good time when I called them after getting a sense 

of what was going on and they still had not known that something 

was going on. 

Senator MARKEY. And that’s unbelievable that you’re calling 

them to notify them of what’s going on. 

Mayor RIVERA. Yes. 

Senator MARKEY. It’s absolutely incredible and unacceptable. 

Mayor RIVERA. I don’t know how that happens and, frankly, the 

first time I talked to—that I saw somebody live was when they 

came up to me and said you have to shut the electricity off. 

Senator MARKEY. OK. So I’ve already referenced this—— 

Mayor RIVERA. I’m sorry. Can I say, when they said you have to 

evacuate the city? 

Senator MARKEY. Yes. So, again, we should talk about evacuation 

because the Columbia Gas Emergency Response Plan was woefully 

inadequate. They failed to imagine that there was a disaster of this 

scale that could occur and by doing so, they guaranteed that they 

would fail to execute a swift and effective response when a systemwide catastrophe did occur. 

Mayor Rivera, in your testimony, you requested that there be a 

Customer Evacuation Plan created and revisited every year. What 

are some of the components that you would like to see in a Company Evacuation Plan? 

Mayor RIVERA. Well, first of all, they have to have a notification 

system to make sure that every customer who they get a bill from 

every month gets notified in a way that’s appropriate and in their 

language immediately that something’s happening. 

I think that their conversations with the 9-1-1 folks, with first 

responders has to be immediate, and I think that it has to delineate what you would do with those people once you get them out 

of their homes, how you plan to put them in a place that’s safe, 

how you plan to support them in the long term and the short term, 

and then immediately figure out how to get them whole. 

They stood up a claims process two or three days right after and 

I think everyone saw pictures of what that looked like in Lawrence. 

They just did it in Lawrence. They didn’t even think about doing 

it that weekend in North Andover and Andover. It was a huge 

shortcoming. But that it really looked like a refugee center. There 

was no control. If it wasn’t for the staff of the city, the towns, and 

the State Police to get people in an orderly fashion, to give them 

a sense of how to get their claims started, I’m pretty sure we would 

have had a riot down there. 

Senator MARKEY. Yes. And I understand how utilities think. 

They don’t like to anticipate an accident which can occur. So it’s 

actually my law which requires the distribution of potassium iodide 

that could protect against thyroid cancer to everyone within a 10- 

mile radius around the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant. You have 

100 

to anticipate that something wrong can go wrong and thyroid cancer is the single-most likely consequence if you’re exposed. 

So here, there was no plan and they just assumed nothing could 

go wrong. 

So, Chief Mansfield, Columbia Gas is required to notify fire departments in the event of a Grade 1 gas leak which are severe and 

potentially dangerous. How quickly are you notified of these leaks 

by Columbia Gas and do you feel like the response from the company is sufficient to keep this area safe? 

Mr. MANSFIELD. The short answer is no, we don’t like their response to how they inform us of Grade 1 natural gas leaks. Several 

of us in the Merrimack Valley have been trying to get the ears of 

legislators in Columbia Gas. We’ve had open discussions with Columbia Gas leadership with regards to how we get notified when 

Grade 1 natural gas leaks occur and typically the response is they 

find that a Grade 1 leak occurs, they go ahead, they mitigate it 

after they find it, and then they notify the fire department and the 

law enforcement official as required by Massachusetts state law. 

Senator MARKEY. So what you’re saying is that the company 

identifies a serious potentially dangerous gas leak, they don’t call 

the fire department, they don’t call the police department, they fix 

it as best they can, then they call you the next day or 2 days later 

and say, oh, we had a big problem, but we didn’t feel we had to 

call you, the fire department, the police department of the city, is 

that correct? 

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is correct. The Grade 1 leak is the worst 

case scenario of a natural gas leak you can possibly have and it’s 

in their infrastructure and what they do is they go out, they locate 

a leak through their surveying process. They’ll mitigate the leak, 

repair it, and then the following day, we don’t get a phone call, we 

get an e-mail from somebody in their Operations Center that states 

that they had a Grade 1 leak at a particular address and there’s 

no need for emergency response. 

Senator MARKEY. So the question of long-term relief is also important because these businesses, these families that are going to 

be impacted, and we’ve been pushing the Trump Administration, 

Small Business Administration, trying to make sure that there is 

emergency home heating assistance for everyone who needs it because we’re never going to forget that these communities need help 

and we’re going to be there every step of the way. 

Mr. Mayor, Ms. Messina, Chief Mansfield, what grade A through 

F would you give Columbia Gas’ work over the longer-term restoration process and why? 

Ms. MESSINA. This is a double-edged sword. You know, when we 

first started in that first week, it was pretty bad because we just 

didn’t have any information. As the plan started to get deployed, 

there were a lot of resources. I mean, as someone who’s lived 

through this, I don’t think any of us can really complain about the 

amount of people that have been put on the ground. 

The biggest complaint I think that we would have is again, and 

I think this is an underlying issue, has been communication. You 

know, they were there when I called. I would be able to speak to 

them. They always had people that were available to talk to but 

trying to find the right person was difficult and being able to get 

101 

some straight answers, especially for the higher-end equipment, 

like HVAC units and things like that, that, you know, what do we 

do, you know. Do we have to replace them? Do we have to fix them 

because it’s not like these HVAC units are sitting in a warehouse 

somewhere. They take months to have to order and take a lot 

longer to have put up. 

So, I mean, I’d give them—clearly, I’d go from a D that I rated 

them in the beginning to a B+ because I really felt that I could get 

to somebody and get answers done and things were getting done 

faster, so that’s the double-edged sword. 

Senator MARKEY. Does anyone else want to give a grade to the 

long-term restoration? 

Mayor RIVERA. I guess I’d say the idea of the different points in 

time, I think you’ve got to give them an A for fixing the pipe in 

the street. Everyone thought there was going to be mass disaster 

and there was going to be—you couldn’t do it. I seen many people 

talking on TV about how it was undoable. So you’ve got to give 

them an A for that. 

I think for the fixing the pipes and the appliances in the house, 

you know, I think that that’s got to be a D to a C. We knew we 

needed an army of plumbers on September 14 and 15 and we were 

having discussions about plumbers in the first week of November. 

I’m not sure why Columbia Gas and Gilbane let that most important resource go unattended for so long, and I think they’re still at 

a D with the customer support and making people whole. They still 

are failing to cut checks to people. They put big numbers on the 

checks that they’re cutting to people. There are still people with 

fundamental issues unresolved, mainly because they just refuse to 

cut the check, and I’m telling them they should just cut this check 

now and not spend money on attorneys because it will turn into 

litigation, but I think all that type of grading goes to underscore, 

I think, something that I forgot to say in my comments and that’s 

to mention the people that have been affected. 

These people have been the most patient and understanding people. Literally the pipe froze on an RV and they asked this lady who 

clearly couldn’t speak that much English anyway how you feel? She 

said, oh, it’s Mother Nature, like this too shall pass. 

It is a miracle that we don’t have a riot. People have been so 

thankful for the crap they’ve had to put up with this company 

every day. It’s a blessing on them. It’s another reason why they 

should double their forces on the claims, pay these folks. You’ve 

put them through too much. 

Senator MARKEY. So thank you. We’re going to give them an A+ 

to the people from Merrimack Valley—— 

Mayor RIVERA. Amen. 

Senator MARKEY.—for their response and to all of those—— 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY.—who helped them in their response. We thank 

you. 

Let me recognize Senator Warren. 

Senator WARREN. So thank you very much. 

I just want to ask, did Mr. Bryant stay? Is he in here? How about 

Mr. Hamrock? Did anybody stay from Columbia Gas? Good. OK. 

102 

You represent the employees. How about representing the company? For what? 

VOICE. Claims questions. 

Senator WARREN. Good. Well, I’m glad you’re here. I’ll ask about 

claims. 

So I wonder who is here to at least hear this and take this information back to Mr. Bryant and Mr. Hamrock. I want to ask actually about the process, about what’s happened to the small businesses. 

We’ve heard from the Mayor. We’ve heard from the Fire Chief. 

But I want to drill down just a little bit on small businesses. 

Ms. Messina, I appreciate your being here today. Prior to the explosion, you had several businesses, as you testified, several properties in Andover. You were one of the many people whose businesses as well as your home was affected by this disaster. 

Can I just start by asking you about some of the financial costs 

here? How much money did you lose for the weeks that you could 

not operate your businesses? 

Ms. MESSINA. We’re still in the process of trying to put that together. It didn’t happen just for the month of October. This is 

something ongoing. As I said in my testimony, one of the things 

that we didn’t recognize as we were looking at, hey, how come so 

and so hasn’t been in? Well, we find out that so and so’s been living 

in their home in Maine because it’s too uncomfortable to be living 

here and dealing with this issue. 

So, you know, we had planned a great month of October and I 

just barely broke last year’s numbers, if that. We put everything 

on to it and, you know, in booming economy where we were seeing 

increases, it just kind of like came to a stop. I mean, those first 2 

weeks, we lost about 30 percent of our business. 

Senator WARREN. So what you’re saying is one of the ways small 

businesses lost out obviously is if they were closed all together, but 

the second way is small businesses lost out because there were just 

a lot fewer people who came in to shop, even if your business was 

otherwise operational, is that right? 

Ms. MESSINA. Correct. I mean, and to add to that was the difficulty of getting to the actual stores once the gas-ready plan was 

put into place. I mean, I think we all understood, like I said in my 

testimony, that 48 miles was a lot. I don’t think we understood that 

there’d be areas that were just completely cutoff and you would 

have to be redirected and there were times you’d go around in circles and you’d just say that’s it, I’m done, I’m going home. 

Senator WARREN. OK. And this obviously was affecting your customers. So has Columbia Gas explained to you whether or not 

they’re going to pay for your diminished business during this period of time? 

Ms. MESSINA. Going through the claims process, we were given— 

we were asked to give information but most of this information was 

skewed toward mainly a restaurant or anybody that had a hospitality business because they’re asking me about my food loss and 

stuff like that and it’s like no, no, I’m hot goods. 

So in fairness to them right now, we’re in the process of still trying to make those parameters for that claim. So my claim is still 

open and I have yet to really even talk to somebody because once 

103 

I found out that I could self-mitigate my home, I dropped my business claim so I could get my house online. 

Senator WARREN. So they haven’t told you yet then if they’re 

going to—they’ve not committed to reimburse you for the time that 

your business was less than it otherwise would have been if this 

disaster hadn’t occurred? 

Ms. MESSINA. Correct. But at the same time, I haven’t given 

them the complete information that they’ve asked for. 

Senator WARREN. OK. So let me ask you just a little bit about 

the information because I had some people come up during the 

break who have a small business that they have just launched and 

they said that they were asked for 3 years worth of financial information which they don’t have because they’re a beginning business. 

So what happens to a business like that in the claims process? 

Ms. MESSINA. Well, I mean, I would tell the claims process that 

they’re going to have to, you know, sit down and talk to them on 

an individual case basis because you’re right, there’s plenty of—I 

mean, I have three years but what does that mean? 

The other side of that equation is you can’t compare the last 

three years to this year which is a very good economy year, you 

know. You’ve got consumers buying more. So it’s going to have to 

be done on a case-by-case basis. 

Senator WARREN. OK. And what I’m hearing you say is there’s 

no commitment on the part of Columbia Gas. They have described 

it. This was the question. This is why I wanted to know whether 

or not we still had Mr. Bryant here and Mr. Hamrock. They both 

said that everyone who’d been injured would receive full compensation, and I’m just trying to—— 

Ms. MESSINA. Well, I have not. 

Senator WARREN .—ask what that means? 

Ms. MESSINA. I have not. 

Senator WARREN. And are you confident that you will? 

Ms. MESSINA. I’m pretty confident. 

Senator WARREN. You’re pretty confident. 

Ms. MESSINA. And only because of the way things have been handled on the home end. 

Senator WARREN. OK. 

Ms. MESSINA. So I feel like I have some kind of idea as to how 

it will be. 

Senator WARREN. And are you confident for small businesses 

that have just started, say businesses that don’t have a long history? Are you confident they’re going to be fully compensated for 

their losses? 

Ms. MESSINA. I can’t speak for that. I mean, like I said, I don’t 

know how they’re going to be able to structure what is fair for a 

new business that just started, you know. That would be difficult 

to try to monetize but that’s going to be a task that they’re going 

to need to do. 

Senator WARREN. Mayor Rivera, did you want to weigh in on 

that? 

Mayor RIVERA. I mean, I think at least the sense is that 

they’re—because they’re having the insurance company deal with 

these claims and not themselves and the money they have in the 

bank, they’re making decisions based on what their attorney’s alVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
104 

lowing them to make and it is incredibly difficult if you’re an immigrant entrepreneur serving at least our city where it’s a lot of folks 

who don’t have the same resources that folks in Columbia Gas 

have to have 3 years of information. 

All those things are true even more so and then the idea that 

they’re going to have—the bodega owner’s going to have the wherewithal to stay on top of these people for two years so they can get 

reimbursed for lost income but that’s what they’re going to have to 

do in order to be made whole. 

So I think that they’re better that they’re going to get out of 

here, you know, with maybe 50 cents on the dollar what they really 

owe because the bureaucracy itself does not allow it. 

We have a lady who has a laundry mat and she has dryers that 

are gas and she doesn’t believe that they could fix her gas dryers 

but they fixed other laundry mats’ dryers and they’re all working. 

She doesn’t feel that that’s going to be effective for her. They’re refusing to pay her the cost of new dryers. They think that that mitigation should be the case for everybody and, you know, the sense 

I get back from them is that they’re trying to get over on Columbia 

Gas and I just keep telling them you’re going to have to pay somebody. They’re not. You’re just making this lady’s life more miserable. Just buy her the new dryers because, frankly, she doesn’t believe that you’re going to make it safe for her in her business. 

So I think that that’s happening a lot. So I have less sense of 

a hundred percent of what was loss will get put in place and like 

Town Manager said, and even if they do get back, some places have 

lost employees and clientele and that’s a double whammy. In 6 

months, I’m not sure they can recover and we may lose that business forever. 

Senator WARREN. It’s hard enough to run a small business but 

these folks are now being asked to take on two jobs, run a small 

business and run a claims prosecution against an insurance company that doesn’t want to pay. 

Mayor RIVERA. And they stop talking to the business owner if 

they mention an attorney. Then they’ll only go through the attorney. 

Senator WARREN. So, in other words, reaching out and getting 

help may not help under these circumstances. 

Mayor RIVERA. Correct. 

Senator WARREN. Can I ask you a couple more about this, and 

that is, cash flow for these small businesses? Has money been 

forthcoming? You know, it’s one thing to say some day there will 

be a check coming, 3 months from now or 6 months from now or 

10 months from now, but people have to meet payroll, people have 

to buy supplies, people have to buy food, thinking of the restaurant 

business. They need cash flow right now. 

If the customers don’t come in for the past month and a half because either the business was entirely shuttered or because they 

couldn’t get there because the streets were torn up because everything’s chaotic and no one comes, they’re going to have depleted 

cash-flow which really puts the business at risk of collapsing. 

Has money been made available for people under those circumstances? 

105 

Ms. MESSINA. My understanding is, is that, with some of the restaurant tenants, they have done things for. 

Senator WARREN. Some, mm-hmm. 

Ms. MESSINA. I have three restaurant tenants that were affected 

by this. One was able to get online within a week. The other two 

was anywhere between four and five to six weeks before they could 

get on and that’s what—in my testimony, when I talked about you 

had to manage it on your own, it really came down to that because 

their needs were different than somebody like myself, the Wine 

Connection, which I could operate. I was just feeling loss of sales. 

So they did receive some financial. As a landlord, there were 

some tenants that, you know, did not pay because they just didn’t 

have revenue coming in and, you know, we’re floating that and 

waiting to see what happens there. So, again, we’re looking for that 

to be made whole. 

Senator WARREN. Mayor Rivera, did you want to add to that? 

Mayor RIVERA. Yes. Just there’s a bit of a chicken-and-egg thing 

with that process, too. If they tell you that your claim check is imminent and that it’s going to cover all the things, including cash 

flow, it’s hard to go and find cash flow or maybe even apply to the 

Emergency Loan Program that we had. 

So there was always this dueling thing of what check is going to 

hit for them first and then will Columbia Gas pay the subsequent 

issue after. So I think it has been confusing for small businesses 

on which way to go, mitigating on which heat source to use, do you 

stay on natural gas, do you go to electric, do you go to propane, because you’re not sure which is going to hit first, the claim check 

or a loan check, and money that you got for lost, spoiled food and 

those things, that came pretty fast, but like you said, if you don’t 

have food, as well. 

Senator WARREN. Well, when you think about small businesses, 

I’ll wrap this up, when you think about small businesses that live 

so close to the margin, I worry that something like this just wipes 

them out or puts them on such a downward path that they can’t 

recover and it doesn’t sound like the claims process is oriented toward how to get them stabilized and climbing again and then I 

worry about what the long-term implications are for Lawrence, for 

Andover, and for North Andover if they lose some number of their 

small businesses that try to keep an economic activity in the city 

and real economic engine for those areas. 

So I thank you. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Senator Warren. 

Congresswoman Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all, and thank you all for being here, 

and for your leadership and resolve through these very—these 

times that are certainly sorely testing you, and I am so sorry. I regret that the leadership from Columbia Gas and NiSource is not 

here to hear from you all just the dramatic shortcomings of their 

processes, at least in the near term. 

I’m sure, Mayor Rivera, as you heard Mr. Hamrock say that the 

company had a well-oiled response plan in place in the event of a 

disaster that you heartily disagreed. Am I correct? 

Mayor RIVERA. I would just like to see it. I’m not sure that anybody could put their hands on it. I was talking to Manager Maylor 

106 

and he looked for it. So if they can make it public, it’d be great to 

see the pre-thirteenth plan—— 

Ms. TSONGAS. Yes. 

Mayor RIVERA.—because we haven’t seen it. It sure felt like 

there wasn’t one. 

Ms. TSONGAS. This is just an off-the-top of my head, but when 

you finally talked to somebody at Columbia Gas or NiSource, who 

was it? At what level was it? 

Mayor RIVERA. Well, I spoke to—I’m going to get the lady’s last 

name wrong—Dana Argo. I first spoke to Mike Kane, who was the 

Government Relations guy, and then I called Dana Argo, who’s the 

head engineer, but he didn’t know what was going on. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So when did Mr. Hamrock finally manage to get 

in touch with you? 

Mayor RIVERA. Oh, he wasn’t on the ground till like maybe after 

we had gotten people home and safe, right, week plus. Pablo Vegas 

who came, he was there the night of, came in from Ohio. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, you’re right when you say that the way in 

which the community responded is really quite a testament to the 

character of the City of Lawrence as well as Andover and North 

Andover. 

I know when we all visited and made our way to the senior center to see the way in which people were coming forward to be sure 

people had a place to stay, food to eat in the near term while we 

started to sort of sort things out, I think was just again yet another 

remarkable testament to the character of the city. So I commend 

you for your leadership and for the remarkable people who live in 

this city as well as the Town of Andover and North Andover. 

Obviously communication was one of the extraordinary shortcomings of their response plan and you really had to step in. The 

City of Lawrence had to step in and do that in ways just to be reassuring in such a frightening time. 

Can you talk about how you did that and how you coordinated 

that with your response plan, let them know what was happening, 

when it was happening, at least especially in the near term? 

Mayor RIVERA. You know, I think what became evident very fast 

was that people were looking for information. I know the town 

managers and I, we spent a lot of time communicating with people 

as it is through, you know, whether it be for a town meeting or for 

a city council event or for whatever we’re doing. So we started to 

use those processes. We set up websites to put every single piece 

of information we could get on to that and then we just started to 

get to people and also monitoring social media. 

I know a lot of people don’t think that people live on social media 

but there are a lot of really important conversations happening on 

social media, a tactic that Columbia Gas came to late in this process, and I think that once we got all those things squared away, 

we started to just use that information, as much as we could get, 

to get to people. 

It got to a point where we were getting more information on a 

daily basis than they were giving out, and I think MEMA, Kurt 

Schwartz from MEMA started to do a MEMA daily update. So I 

would just post that daily update. There’s a lot of information it 

was hard to make heads or tails of, but we were getting this pretty 

107 

daily PowerPoint presentation and almost simultaneously all three 

of us started to ask them to allow us to publish this and we went 

days—I think we went a week and a half, maybe 10 days before 

we just said we’re going to publish it regardless of whether they 

let us and so that started to go out and it has the key indicators 

about who’s getting lit, where’s the information going, and if you 

go to the websites now, all of our websites has every single daily 

update on there. 

And then, you know, I think the Governor’s staff pushed them 

through Joe Albanese to again be more transparent. They had not 

done one direct mail piece to their customers in the whole time 

that we were there. We were pushing them to do that and they finally did the newsletter. I think they’re into their fourth newsletter 

of this event, which has become a very important tool. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Have they done a direct mail piece yet? 

Mayor RIVERA. That was it. They’re doing a newsletter. I think 

we got four newsletters in the can. They’re supposed to do weekly 

ones going forward but that was a battle, too. They didn’t want— 

again, I think in this process of trying to cover, trying to mitigate 

their damages, they created a situation where everything gets, you 

know, attorney’d to death and meanwhile people, you know, who 

need real answers about claims, people who need real answers 

about their housing stagnate, takes 2 days to do something and 

that means 2 days more in an RV or two days more without your 

business being open, and they scrub anything of any real meaning 

so that they’re not really providing any information. 

Ms. TSONGAS. At this point, what are the costs that the City has 

absorbed in order to respond to this? 

Mayor RIVERA. Well, we have very smart public safety folks and 

they started charging the Columbia Gas directly for every dollar we 

spend on public safety. So we’ve been made whole on that front, 

but I think that that number’s still yet to be understood. We each 

have areas where we put RVs on that need to be made whole 

again. We each have staff that have taken time away from their 

normal processes, focused solely on this, and also people who are 

affected who’ve been only focused on doing this, and so the roads, 

you know, have to spend much time in the affected area to see the 

immense disaster and mess they have made of our roads. Thank 

God they did it because they got the gas to us fast but there are 

some roads that literally were paved three months ago with just a 

fresh coat of paving on it and people have been waiting 30 years 

for that road to get paved and so I think that the paving of the 

roads are going to be the first real example of their hundred percent making the municipalities whole but along with the staff time 

and effort and energy and again I think that the amount of confusion they’ve created in our world is another reason why they just 

can’t be allowed to keep doing business. 

They’ve just not earned that privilege and that to keep doing 

business in our country after the death of a young boy and after 

the immense chaos they created in this community. There are 

other people that can do that work. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, I encourage you, all of you, all the communities to keep close tabs on what your costs have been so that we 

108 

can make sure Columbia Gas and NiSource assume responsibility 

for those, as well. 

I yield back. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

Mayor RIVERA. I will say Manager Maylor’s keeping the spreadsheet and I scream loud. He’s the good-looking one. He’s the smart 

one. That’s a compliment. 

Senator MARKEY. Congressman Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Senator. 

Mayor Rivera, a major complaint we have heard during our office 

hours in the District is that Columbia Gas failed to provide native 

language speakers in dealing with customers’ concerns and issues. 

As one of our first community leaders to address our Spanishspeaking constituents, can you elaborate on that and explain to everybody some of the challenges that many of your residents have 

faced? 

Mayor RIVERA. I mean, I think it’s when you think about the impact to everyone that’s involved, the impact to folks who are new 

to our country, who are already facing tons of challenges, and even 

some people who are not new to our country who are facing challenges around poverty, I think this has shown the weaknesses 

around our infrastructure and the weaknesses and our inability for 

communities like ours to defend ourselves against such a big disaster. 

It goes without saying that if we weren’t talking in Spanish, they 

weren’t listening because they don’t speak English and so it was 

important for us to translate things. They stood up a process to 

hire a ton of translators. I think immediately, you know, the solution is can we hire enough full-time translators, and they were having a hard time doing that because people who could translate have 

full-time jobs and so they initially didn’t want to do part-time 

translators and they got themselves into a situation where they 

didn’t have enough translators. 

I think later on, they backed off of that and, you know, you could 

work nights and weekends with the translation process, but again 

in the sense of trying to make it easy for themselves, not really 

thinking about the impact to the customer. 

And I think that right away, they took our suggestions about 

making things bilingual, but I think they fell down on that with 

the robocalls and I think it wasn’t till a couple weeks ago that they 

put a Spanish TV commercial that talks to those issues. 

You know, they said they had 30 business-focused claims agents 

but only had really two people who speak Spanish but they would 

put a translator with them, even though half of the businesses affected were in the city of Lawrence and I would say a good half of 

those needed English and Spanish translation. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mayor. 

Ms. Messina, I just want to ask about your experience and your 

colleagues in the small business industry’s experience with the 

Small Business Administration. 

Did you seek a disaster relief loan from the SBA? 

Ms. MESSINA. I’m sorry. I didn’t hear the question again. With 

the SBA? 

109 

Mr. MOULTON. Did you seek a disaster relief loan from the Small 

Business Administration? 

Ms. MESSINA. I did not. 

Mr. MOULTON. Are you familiar with people who have sought 

that resource? 

Ms. MESSINA. I’m not familiar. The only one that I’m familiar 

with is that one of the tenants did. I think they’re still in the process of trying to get something. It’s my understanding there was 

some kind of—I don’t know if it was through the SBA, that there 

was some way to get some interest-free, up to $50,000 was available for funding like cash flow and things like that. 

So, again, the hard part for me was trying to deal with all these 

different types of tenants with all different issues. Some had more 

needs than others and we were trying to find out how to best keep 

them operating while they were either down or just even like earlier said that their businesses were just off. 

Mr. MOULTON. So is it fair to say that you’re basically unaware 

of what the SBA offers here? 

Ms. MESSINA. Yes, that would be a fair statement. 

Mr. MOULTON. OK. Clearly, we need to do a better job of making 

those resources available. 

Chief Mansfield, thank you again for your response to the effort. 

What are some lessons that you would like to just briefly share 

with us that you’ve learned that will affect your response and your 

advice to others going forward? 

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think the lack of communications that was not 

there between Columbia Gas and the emergency response personnel. I think they need to do a better job at getting the word out 

and getting communications to the first responders so that they 

know exactly what it is they’re dealing with. 

We shouldn’t have to wait four-five-six hours to talk to somebody 

from Columbia Gas to find out exactly what’s going on with their 

pipeline infrastructure. We had people going out immediately responding to these natural gas calls, fires, explosions, and had really 

no idea, hard factual data that was indicating to us exactly what 

was going on with that infrastructure. 

I think there just needs to be—there could certainly be some 

tightening up of legislation, as I stated earlier, at the local level. 

I think we could probably tighten up within the Commonwealth 

itself. Bill 4164, which basically outlines how fire departments and 

law enforcement officials are notified, when they’re notified about 

Grade 1 leaks, and I think there could be certainly from what 

we’ve all experienced here, could certainly be some legislation 

tightened up at the Federal level, too, to make these people accountable for what they’re doing so that we don’t have the tragedies that we experienced in the Merrimack Valley. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you. 

For the information of the members and the witnesses, I’m going 

to ask unanimous consent that the hearing record remain open two 

weeks. Without objection, so ordered. 

And I would also ask unanimous consent to submit into the 

record testimony that was shared with the Committee by commuVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
110 

nity members hurt by this disaster. I think it’s important for their 

voices to be in the congressional record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

STATEMENTS FROM COMMUNITY MEMBERS

Rosario Germinudy from Lawrence: I felt desperate, hopeless and depressed when 

couldn’t go back home coming back from work. Finding a place to stay with 5 kids 

and a dog was a challenge for me and my husband. Thanks to really good friends 

we kept the family together. But can’t take the scenario I saw and experienced 

when had to go back home for some clothes the next day, seeing that my town 

turned into a ghost town was terrible; once I made it back to the north side all I 

wanted to do was cry and had that feeling of deception and for some reason kept 

on asking God why and why us. I know this will be in our lives for ever and will 

be remembered as a disaster, feel sorry for the lost of the boy that died and for others injured. What most of us lost can be replaced but a life can never be. Then the 

struggles that we are still going through is never heard off, happening in the USA, 

but we will stand because what does not kill us just makes us STRONGERS and 

that is what we are and will always be, strong people rising back a strong city . . . 

Lawrence strong. Together we are more and together we can overcome anything. I 

want to thanks Columbia Gas for trying their best even when it was after something that big happened once it did nothing else but to rescue and respond was to 

be done and that they have, the support my family have received from them and 

the city and mayor Dan Rivera have been priceless for me and my family. Hope everyone gets their services back and continue with their lives. Happy holidays for everyone. 

Monica Morell from Andover: We need to deep talk. I am still displaced. Limited 

network access. Please contact me via e-mail to set up a time to talk, or call me 

directly. 

Monica Morell Andover 

Nathan Ray from North Andover: I was not directly affected by this event. Friends 

stayed at my house for a few nights as they were looking for assistance. I have volunteered and promoted effected businesses and Families as much as possible. Unfortunately, I have witnessed a high level of fraud, mismanagement, and lack of accountability. I will not use names in this brief note. There is a massive amount of 

mismanagement and fraud. I know of one group that invoices $80k per week, just 

to install a dozen ovens. That is not the cost of the ovens, just the installation and 

service. 12 OVENS!! There is no organization in any part of this effort. The winners 

are the divorced or single guys out of state that earn 10x what they would normally 

earn. Meanwhile elderly family’s still do not have a place to sleep and are suffering 

badly. The rest of the community is stuck sitting in traffic all day watching all of 

these people doing nothing. Contractors and family’s have confirmed all of this information. Please feel free to contact me to discuss in more details. 

Best regards, 

Nathan Ray 

617–863–0062 

nate.ray@gmail.com 

Leo Lafond from North Andover: While we are being compensated for money spent 

to replace alliances etc I have not heard anyone talk about compensation for all the 

time we have spent on working through the recovery process. The number o hours 

spent on the phone with Columbia Gas, the claims adjusters, the assessment teams, 

added travel time etc is enormous. I self mitigated and going out shopping for appliances and contacting and working with contractors was a part time job This is time 

take away from family and friends that we won’t get back. My rough estimate is 

that it is somewhere between 40 and 59 hours at this pint and I am still not done. 

Once heat is on for everyone I really hope that we will all be compensated for this. 

This does not take into account the emotional stress that has been placed on all of 

us. I was home when my house filled with gas. Thank god I wad luckier than many 

of my neighbors. They did to do more for us than just pay for appliances. etc. 

111 

Max Lopez from Lawrence: I live in 8 Halsey st Lawrence. I originally had a 99.9 

energy efficient boiler which meant CG had to replace this boiler with something 

comparable. They did so but did not provide me a receipt or information on who 

installed the boiler. It has been a pain for me to register the unity under warranty 

and it has also been a pain to received a rebate associated by this new unit. Ultimately I did not ask to have my boiler replaced, instead this happened because of 

the negligence of CG. 

Javier Caban from Andover: We purchased the house in April 15, 2017. We went 

thru the whole year thru reconstruction replacing Gas appliances. Right when the 

project finalize in early May 2018, where the kitchen and new gas Range, gas dryer 

and gas fire places were completely done to start enjoying the new house, the ’’ catastrophe’’ happens . . . right now I am living with nor gas dryer, and no gas stove, 

eating out most of the time . . . Impossible to find a plumber to fix the gas line 

Columbia Gas remove to provide gas to the stove, so we can stop eating out. I understand that this is nothing compared to what other people are going thru . . . but 

it is my story and it has an impact on us after spending 12 months going thru construction and living surrounded by the stress that reconstructions creates and the 

cost involved. 

Christopher McCarthy from Andover: On September 13th, around 4:50pm our CO2

detector and fire detectors started going off. My two children (age 2 and 8), my 

girlfriend and I were all home. We discovered smoke coming from our basement and 

quickly got our children and animals out of the house. We called 911 once we were 

safely outside—it took over 4 minutes to get someone on the phone, continuely got 

a busy signal. Once the fire department showed up they quickly put out the fire 

in our basement and told our surrounding neighbors to not go into their homes. 

They left shortly after without further instruction on what we should do (at this 

point it was around 5pm and you could hear sirens going off everywhere). 

Luckily we had family in Boston we could spend the night with so we decided to 

head there. We didn’t realize how bad this situation was or how lucky we were to 

escape our house without getting hurt till we heard on the radio what was going 

on. It was a very traumatizing experience for my 8 year old son who is still scared 

of loud noises. 

Since September 13th, my family and I have not been able to return to our home 

to live there. We have been bounced around from 9 different hotels which in itself 

has been very difficult with two small children, two dogs, and a cat. The hotels that 

they have put us up in are covered by them except for a deposit. This deposit has 

ranged from $30–$500. . . Now tell me how we can continue to afford this when 

we are constantly being moved from place to place? These deposits sometimes take 

up till 10 days to get back. It has definitely been a struggle. 

My son has had a hard time adjusting to school life again because of us constantly 

moving. Luckily our school has an amazing support system and he is getting the 

help he needs. 

Columbia Gas has done little to help us with every day expenses we had to deal 

with because of being displaced. They had made promises of a debit card to help 

with food but never followed through. We have gotten very little answers on what 

is next for us. Every time we talk with someone or go into one of the centers they 

had set up we are met with different answers. They seem to put on a good front 

to the public but those going through this ordeal know all too well it’s all a facade. 

We have spent so much money being displaced from this disaster with no relief in 

sight. We just want them to be held accountable for everything they have caused. 

Eric Simili from North Andover: This is a letter I previously sent to my Reps: 

Dear Representative, 

I am a North Andover resident. As you know, our town went through a major disaster recently, along with Lawrence and Andover. Due to an unexplained incident 

having to do with natural gas pressure running through our streets and homes, at 

least 7 homes that I know of in my town either exploded or caught fire. I witnessed 

three of the fires, two on Pleasant St. and one on Phillips Ct. 

I was at work at the local pizza shop down the street from my home, as a delivery 

driver, when suddenly the ovens stopped working. We realized there was no gas. 

As I was on hold with Columbia gas, trying to figure out what was going on, I realized there were firetrucks going back and forth everywhere. The owner of the store 

112 

next to us told me he heard there was an accident downtown. I turned on my scanner app to see if I could hear anything and heard them talking about two fires 

across the street from each other about two blocks from me. I looked over and saw 

the smoke. It didn’t make sense, how was it possible that two houses across the 

street from each other were on fire? Then I heard them calling in a fire from Phillips Ct, down the street. I had already hung up with Columbia by now, realizing 

this was something big. I knew this had something to do with gas and houses on 

fire. I decided to take a drive down the road to Phillips Ct, where a neighbor of the 

house on fire was asking others if they smelled gas. I asked her if she knew what 

was happening. She said the firemen were telling people to shut off their gas. I 

headed back to the restaurant. 

At this point, firetrucks and sirens were being heard all over. I saw three helicopters flying over town. I started to imagine the worst. Maybe this was an act of 

terrorism. 

Maybe somebody had sabotaged the gas lines? Or a foreign government hacked 

into the gas company’s computers? Who knows? I was pretty unnerved at this point. 

When I saw on tv that a house had blown up, I thought, wow, what if that was 

the restaurant? I felt my heart beating faster as I thought about it. I thought about 

my house, but we don’t have a gas hookup, so I wasn’t too concerned. 

We had to close the restaurant at this point. After cleaning up, I stayed around 

a while talking with a co-worker and watching the news on my phone. There was 

traffic backing up as far as I could see. Thankfully I only live about a mile from 

work, so I went home. I joined neighbors who were out talking about what’s going 

on for a while. The feeling I got reminded me a little of the days after 9/11. It was 

nowhere near that bad, but we still had the same uneasy feeling you get when 

something like this happens. 

The reason I am telling you all this is because I am not happy with the way this 

is being handled. Columbia Gas has not shown up to press briefings. They don’t 

seem like they are taking it seriously. A person has died and others are seriously 

injured. There were many people without electricity for days. Half of Lawrence was 

forced out of their homes. Highway exits are closed. And we still don’t know when 

the gas is going to be turned back on. I heard maybe 3–4 weeks. 

I have missed work and am losing money because of this. I don’t know how much 

longer I’ll be able to pay bills. I doubt my boss will pay me anything for missed 

work. Most of my income is from tips anyway. 

I want this to be investigated thoroughly to make sure it doesn’t happen again. 

If the pipes are old and rusty, we need to replace them. If we need more inspectors 

and enforcement, we need to make these utility companies pay for it. Massachusetts 

DPU needs to take this seriously. Joseph Hamrock, the CEO of NiSource, the parent 

company of Columbia Gas, earned $5.4 million last year, or 51 times as much as 

the $105,206 median salary of NiSource employees, according to the AFL–CIO. I’m 

lucky if I earn $35,000 a year! 

Respectfully, 

Eric Simili 

10 Walker Rd Unit 8 

North Andover, MA 01845 

Kerin Miller from Andover: Our family of four was home on September 13th when 

my husband received an alert on his cell phone that we needed to evacuate the 

house immediately. I was five months pregnant and about to head to the grocery 

store; my husband happened to be home sick that day with a cold. I told him it was 

a hoax; if there was an emergency why would we need to leave? Wouldn’t they tell 

us to stay inside? We called 911 to confirm. ‘‘Get out immediately,’’ she said. ‘‘What 

about pets?’’ I asked. ‘‘Take them if you can.’’ 

We put our seven year old daughter and five year old son into the car, and we 

put our cat in the back in a carrier. We had nothing else with us but our phones 

and our wallets. As we exited our neighborhood in the Shawsheen area of Andover, 

people were standing on their lawns, dumbfounded expressions on their faces. To 

me, this was the most terrifying and traumatizing part of the Merrimack Valley Gas 

Explosions: the fifteen minutes or so when we had no idea what was happening. 

This all happened two days after the anniversary of Sept 11th. Fresh on my mind 

were stories about 9/11, so when I was told to evacuate, and that it had something 

to do with gas, my first thought was that there was some kind of terror attack involving utilities. 

There we were, our entire family in the car, sirens sounding all around, with no 

idea what was happening or which direction was safe. Emergency vehicles seemed 

to be headed north, and my husband was getting some preliminary news on his 

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phone, so when I asked him what direction to drive in he said ‘‘away from Lawrence.’’ We started driving on route 133 with no plan other than getting out of the 

area, the cat meowing in the back our SVU, all the while keeping our voices unnaturally cheerful for our children. ‘‘What’s going to happen to our house?’’ my daughter 

asked. We explained that everything in our home could be replaced, but people and 

pets could not be, so the important thing was that we were all together and safe. 

I am grateful for a few lucky breaks we got on that day: my husband should have 

been at work, and as surreal and alarming as it was to get two kids and a pet into 

a car and drive off not knowing what was happening to our town and our home, 

it would have been much more difficult if I was alone. I am also grateful that I was 

feeling ill from morning sickness and put off running errands—I would have been 

closer to the fires, and away from our children. I am also grateful that our daughter 

had just arrived home from school, so we did not have the added worry of being 

apart from her. 

We drove to Tewksbury and pulled into a Holiday Inn. We were lucky that it was 

a pet-friendly hotel and that a suite was available—later that night, I sat in the 

lobby and watched family after family get turned away. 

That afternoon and evening we watched the footage on the news and learned 

about the death of the 18 year old man in Lawrence and about the Lawrence police 

officer whose home sat burning because there were so many homes on fire at once. 

We saw aerial views of our town completely in the dark, as electricity had been cut 

to the entire area to avoid more fires starting. I used the word ‘‘surreal’’ again and 

again. That morning I had thought about the families in North Carolina evacuating 

for the hurricane, never imagining I we would be evacuating that afternoon, or that 

the Merrimack Valley would be all over the news, locally, nationally, and even internationally. 

Our two days at the hotel were spent trying to entertain our children and checking when we could return back to our home. My husband was allowed to return 

briefly and gather a few of our belongings, and he went back again to let a crew 

of gas workers and police in to check the house at night by flashlights. As we waited 

for word that we could return for good, we got some unrelated news that we had 

been anxiously waiting for: we were finally ‘‘clear to close’’ on the home in Andover 

we had been working for months to purchase. We had been living in town for almost 

five years, renting the bottom floor of a duplex, and we had been thrilled to find 

a 4 bedroom fixer upper we could afford in the same school district our daughter 

had been attending since Kindergarten. We had spent months completing paperwork and weeks waiting, and now, finally, we got the news we thought we would 

never hear: we were going to be first-time homeowners, in the town we had grown 

to love but weren’t sure we could ever hope to afford. 

Instead of feeling joyful, however, we looked at the map of explosions. Our new 

home was even closer to many of the fires than our rental. Both were in the ‘‘affected zone’’ that would have no gas for weeks. 

Within minutes of hearing that we were going to be homeowners, we also heard 

that we could return to our rental home. We took the last hot showers we would 

have for awhile and headed back to the affected area. 

It was much, much worse for others: a life was lost. Homes burnt down. Pets disappeared. We had been inconvenienced, but we were okay. 

I also thought that it was basically over; however, after the immediate impact of 

the gas explosions, we entered a much longer phase. It’s one thing to not have hot 

water for a few days—but not having it for weeks presents some very real challenges. In our rental, we had an electric stove, so in that way we’re lucky—we could 

cook as usual. Bathing was another story. We boiled water on the stove and mixed 

it with cold water in the bathtub to wash our children. We tried to take cold showers—but ‘‘cold’’ isn’t really the right word: the water was freezing. My husband 

could have taken hot showers at his gym, but his gym was also affected, so we took 

the advice of other families on facebook and invested in a ‘‘camping shower’’ from 

Amazon, a popular choice for those of us without hot water. (If you have never experienced a camping shower: A battery operated pump with a shower head on the 

other end, stuck into the bucket of hot water, gives you about 3 minutes of showering time; I soon learned to dread the sound of the pump running out of water at 

the bottom of the bucket.) I have long hair that was never going to get clean in the 

time or water pressure a camping shower provided, but I could also shower at 

Merrimack College, where I teach. A couple evenings a week, I left my house at 11 

pm, drove to Merrimack, and obviously pregnant, surrounded by young people, went 

to the college gym to shower. It was a huge pain—something that took 20 minutes 

and relaxed me before bed now took an hour round-trip and involved flip flops, 

strange looks, walks back to my car with wet hair, and flashing my work ID (one 

night I forgot my wallet and the Merrimack students working the front desk, perVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
114 

haps not realizing the state I was living in—a divide those of us who were ‘‘affected’’ 

began to find ourselves looking at the ‘‘non affected’’ across from more and more— 

sent me back home to get it rather than break the rules of gym admittance). I was 

lucky, though: the showers were clean and private and the locker rooms were 

empty. My friends and neighbors were showering at the much more crowded YMCA 

or at the temporary showers set up at Pomps Pond. My husband made due with 

a camp shower for weeks. 

All during this time we were supposed to be packing, as we were closing on our 

new home, two miles away. Finally, everything I had wanted was falling into place: 

but now, I found myself not wanting to move. Our new house had far more gas appliances than our rental: on top of no hot water, we would have no way to dry 

clothes and no stove to cook or even boil water. Also, there was the question of 

whether the sale would even go through. Can you buy a house with no gas? Was 

the house still going to be assessed at the same value? What about the appliances? 

What if we still had no gas by winter? How would we pay to stay somewhere else? 

Thankfully our real estate lawyer was also my cousin’s husband, and he was extremely concerned for us; much to the annoyance of our seller, he made sure there 

were provisions before we closed so that funds would be available should Columbia 

Gas not pay for repairs to the home, or if the home became unlivable during the 

winter months. We could not immediately move as planned, however, because we 

had done so little packing while we were dealing with being evacuated and dealing 

with life post-evacuation. We also had to spend hours of our time at the empty new 

house waiting for teams of gas workers to arrive. My husband left his number on 

the doors, and they would call him at work, and if I was home, I would come by 

immediately, usually with our four year old in tow. In addition to the stresses of 

moving and new homeownership (getting floors redone, finding out the dishwasher 

didn’t work), we were dealing with our appliances at the new house being assessed 

and condemned. We had to buy new electric appliances—dryer and water heater— 

so we could at least wash ourselves and our clothes post-move, and then we had 

to get Columbia Gas to reimburse us for the cost of the appliances and installation. 

It would have been wonderful to get that reimbursement in the form of a check, 

but it came instead on a debit card, making it difficult to get money into our checking account to pay bills, and requiring my husband and I to pass a card with thousands of dollars back and forth for every errand (‘‘Do you have the card?’’ ‘‘No. Do 

you have the card?’’). We learned the hard way that there were some essentials we 

couldn’t buy with the debit card at all, including gas. And, again, we were the lucky 

ones, since we happened to have money on hand to pay up front—an unusual situation for us, and one that only happened because we were in the process of buying 

a home. 

We did a lot of leg work to get a functioning dryer and hot water heater for our 

new home, but we decided to go through Columbia Gas to replace the gas stove in 

our new house, and, eventually, the boiler, too (it took a few weeks to get word that 

all boilers had to replaced). In the meantime, a local charity gave us a hotplate to 

cook on. 

Our new home sits on the Andover/Lawrence town line. Both of these communities turned into a maze of road construction at all hours of the day and night. 

It took at least 20 minutes to drive a couple of miles in any direction. Crews from 

all over the country descended on the area; day after day, groups of 9 or 10 workers, 

mostly men but some women, came in and out of our home, and we met people from 

all over the country. My husband is from the South, and we lived together in Atlanta for many years, so we enjoyed connecting with Southerners and hearing the 

stories of others, too, from as far away as Seattle. 

We were optimistic at this time. The ball seemed to be rolling. The neighborhood 

was a mess of trenches and trucks; our own yard was dug up, the meter moved outside—but we were assured, almost daily, that our stove and boiler would be replaced soon, and our gas would be turned on after that. One Sunday afternoon, a 

crew from Chicago came by and said we were on the list for that week. Then, the 

next day, everything stopped. The roads were quiet. No crews showed up. A press 

conference was held later that week, and we learned that a new plan was being put 

in place, putting the priority on getting boilers fixed or replaced, and moving back 

the November 17th deadline to have all work completed. 

We started to hear the term ‘‘self mitigate,’’ and a few neighbors got their gas 

turned on after having bipassed Columbia Gas and getting appliances through a 

contractor. My husband ran this option by our adjuster who said that Columbia 

would now pay for self mitigation up-front, and that it would likely be faster than 

waiting. We contacted a contractor and began the process of waiting for assessments 

and funds (always on the debit card, complicating every transaction). 

115 

This past Saturday, as I left the house to bring my daughter to ballet class, a 

gas worker approached me in my driveway. ‘‘Are you leaving?’’ she asked. ‘‘We’re 

ready to get your boiler hooked up. We have a team on the way.’’ Thrilled, I explained my husband was home and left. He texted me a half hour later. We couldn’t 

get a boiler installed because we had started using an outside contractor—even 

though no work had been done yet. 

Within days, the temperature at night dropped into the teens. All four of us slept 

in one bed to stay warm. My husband was up and down most of the night, nervous 

about the pipes freezing and checking on the space heaters we didn’t want to run 

while we slept but didn’t want to turn off, either. Over and over he kept saying ‘‘I 

shouldn’t have let them leave. I should have made them put the boiler in. We could 

have had heat.’’ 

It snowed last night. As of today, November 16th, we are still without gas and 

still without heat. The contractor we were working with told us it would be after 

Thanksgiving before they could get to us, even after my husband explained that we 

have small children and I am now seven months pregnant. We canceled our contract 

with them, are now waiting for a refund of our deposit, and have hired a plumber 

to install a boiler and gas stove on Saturday. Even if this does work out, I do not 

know when Columbia Gas will actually turn our gas on. Our facebook page of affected Andover residents has more and more people posting pictures of blue stove 

flames accompanied by those amazing three words: WE’VE BEEN LIT! Temperatures are dropping again after this weekend, and we hope by next week we are able 

to say the same. We have been contacted about finding alternate housing, but where 

would that housing be? My husband commutes to Boston; our kids have to be at 

school; I work at Merrimack College and teach nights at Bunker Hill—all easily accessible from here. We would have to pack, figure out a plan for our cat if we 

couldn’t take her with us, and winterize our home. Then we would have to share 

one room with two small children, who would have to adjust to sleeping in a new 

environment. The inconvenience of staying in a hotel seems about equal to the inconvenience of being cold and cooking on a hot plate. 

What we want is normalcy. A friend who lives in Methuen said to me ‘‘I’m just 

so tired of hearing people who don’t have gas complain about it. There are so many 

worse things that can happen.’’ Yes—that’s true, and I can see why she feels that 

way. I’m tired of complaining, too. I’m tired of talking about all of this. I’m tired 

of people coming in and out of my home without warning. What no one seems to 

understand is that all the stresses of life have continued, and every stress is compounded by the additional stress of dealing with Columbia Gas—a process that easily feels like a part time job. My husband used up all his time off in the initial 

stages—the evacuation, and our move—so most of this stress has fallen on me in 

the late stages of my pregnancy. Imagine those families going through even more 

than we are: caring for the elderly or disabled, trying to find a job, going through 

chemotherapy, having a newborn to care for—all the myriad ways that life can be 

difficult and trying—never feeling like their home the safe haven it’s supposed to 

be. 

Maureen Elliot from Andover: My husband and myself have owned a home in 

Shawsheen, Andover, for over 30 years. We never had water issues in our basement 

other than damp corners in our fieldstone foundation during this time. After Columbia Gas dug up our front yard we have had major flooding issues in our basement. 

Columbia Gas claims it is ground water. Serve Pro came and said it was obvious 

that we never had water issues before this. Columbia Gas does not respond. It is 

going to cost us approximately $10,000 to get this resolved. My husband has heart 

disease and is up every several hours turning on a sump pump we purchased at 

Home Depot. We own an another home in North Andover and this is also in the 

affected area. Columbia Gas needs to step up and do the right thing. Please call 

me at 508 846 3301 

Susan Haltmaier from North Andover: I received my first assessment visit on 9/ 

29/18 because I spoke to a team I saw in the street behind my house on Friday, 

9/28/18. I had been scheduled for that Friday but no one called or came. The daily 

briefings initially suggested that Columbia Gas would repair any leaks that had 

been found during the assessments. One was found in my house on 9/29/18 but no 

one from Columbia Gas ever came to repair it, as promised. My yard was dug up 

for a new line from the street and my bushes were dug up to connect the new line 

to the house. The bushes were put back in a crooked manner, with roots showing, 

and using sand rather than soil. I had to track down a crew working down the 

116 

street to come back and correct the plantings. In mid-October, I arranged for third 

party deliveries and installation of a stove, dryer, water heater, and furnace. But 

Columbia Gas was still insisting on making repairs to any leaks, regardless of who 

was installing the new appliances. The rules changed several times between 10/10, 

when I arranged for my new appliances and received prompt reimbursement from 

Columbia Gas, and 11/1, when Columbia Gas changed the rules and stated that 

third parties installers would be responsible for repairing leaks. I had not received 

an estimate for repairing the leak from the third party installer of my furnace. A 

stand-off ensued where Columbia Gas refused to repair the leak and my installer 

said it was not in their estimate. One Columbia Gas representative threatened me 

with ‘‘You made a claim, you took our money, repairing the leak is no longer our 

problem. It is your problem.’’ After a series of phone calls that escalated up the ladder, a very competent man came on 11/5/18 to repair the leak. Several other connections were deemed to require replacement and a crew came in and completed them. 

Another man came on 11/8 to relight my existing furnace under the latest directive 

from Columbia Gas and he said I needed a ‘‘fan in a can’’ to provide more combustion air in my basement to meet the current code. He said that the installer would 

know to include a ‘‘fan in a can’’ when he came with the new furnace on 11/12. But 

my third party installer did not install such a fan. Now I am in the situation of 

trying to get the installer to come back or Columbia Gas to come and put in the 

fan. It is exhausting to be caught in the middle, to receive a variety of advice, suggestions, directives, and recriminations. It is not that the work did not get done 

eventually, but that each affected homeowner has to be vigilant, alert, and aware. 

The uncertainty is enervating. It affects trying to do one’s paid job and take care 

of the people around you. Fortunately, I had many friends and family members who 

could take me in and spend the day at my house waiting for assessments, deliveries, 

repairs, etc. But not everyone was so fortunate. 

Nora Pelt from Andover: Our story is no different than most affected by the Columbia Gas fires of September 13th, 2018. It is the story of a scary, chaotic night 

on September 13th followed by 60 days of being scared to leave the house because 

you have no word of when crews might show up at your door, of waking up early 

to turn on space heaters to try and warm the house before the rest of the family 

awakes, of watching Columbia Gas daily put a positive spin on their work while 

pulling my hair out because not once did their updates reflect the nightmare that 

everyone I knew was going through. It is the story of all my husband’s and my free 

time spent combing the Columbia Gas updates to see how they daily changes the 

rules, of (unsuccessfully) trying to find reputable plumbers and electricians that 

were available before mid-December, of boiling water in an electric kettle literally 

for hours to get everyone showered at the end of the day, of researching boiler types/ 

like-for-like appliances/venting systems because it was impossible to trust Columbia 

Gas was making decisions in our best interest. It is the story of Columbia Gas playing ‘‘yes, you can’’ and ‘‘no, you can’t’’ for over two months. We have our home and 

our lives but every single aspect of our days was changed. I was able to recognize 

people in the affected area by the sound of their voices. Their shaky, quiet voices 

unable to make simple decisions betrayed their smiles. I recognize it because mine 

is the same. 

I was about to pick up my son from soccer practice when I told my husband I 

smelled gas in the house. He took note and we went on with our day. Five minutes 

later, as I was pulling out of the driveway, I received the call to turn off the gas 

and evacuate. I spent the next three hours trying to get my three boys home from 

various after school activities—that were normally 10 minutes away—while my husband ran from house to house turning off neighbor’s gas and holding babies while 

moms ran inside for diapers. We were overwhelmed watching a staging area at the 

end of our street, the firetrucks from Chelsea, Burlington, Lynn, Methuen, Revere, 

Dracut and on and on flew off in every direction at screaming pace. Usually, they 

all go in the same direction. It was so strange to see them scatter. It was wonderful 

to know so many had come to help and horrifying to realize that while I may have 

been trying to convince myself otherwise, what ever this was, was indeed a very big 

deal. 

Once cleared to reoccupy our house, my husband and I began learning to navigate 

the claims process. We picked up our hot plate and began discussing temporary hot 

water solutions. The hot plate was the first of many disappointments. It couldn’t 

boil water in less than an hour and truly wasn’t an option for a working mom of 

three boys to get dinner on the table each night. As for showers, my husband and 

I agreed an electric water heater was an indulgence we could live without. For $100, 

my husband hooked a propane camp shower to the propane from our grill with a 

117 

garden hose through our bathroom window providing hot water and good water 

pressure. We settled in and waited for crews to arrive. 

Eleven days after the evacuation, we were told to call to make a space heater appointment. I waited on hold for 56 minutes and scheduled the appointment. A crew 

came four days later (on time and pleasant). They made it clear upon arrival that 

these appointments were no longer for space heaters but for ‘‘data collection so more 

effective decisions can be made’’ BUT I didn’t call for data collection! I called for 

a space heater. They also had never seen a heating/hot water system like ours. They 

were standing right next to it when they asked me where it was. They said they 

had looked around my basement for 15 minutes for it. After sticking red ‘‘condemned stickers’’ on a few things, they left. My nerves began to unravel. 

Fifteen days in and we finally saw crews on our street! Hopes soared but they 

came and went leaving some spray painted lines. This week friends began dropping 

off warm bread, coffee cakes, cookies . . . things we couldn’t make for ourselves. 

Trying any way to help but realizing that most of this recovery laid in Columbia 

Gas’s hands. People dropped off space heaters, heating blankets, and InstaPots. 

Heating blankets and space heaters allowed two of our children to stay in their bedrooms with some sense of normalcy while one of our boys began sleeping in our bedroom on the floor. The InstaPot allowed me to run the boys to their activities and 

still cook a healthy meal for dinner. 

For three weeks, my husband and I have switched off working from home, afraid 

to leave the house unattended but the kids were getting squirrely so with great anxiety, we crossed our fingers, put our cell number on the door, and left the house 

unattended to head to Topsfield Fair. The kids had a blast and our joy was that 

we didn’t miss a crew at our door. 

The month of October was one disappointment after another. At this point it was 

obvious to all affected, that the best source of accurate information was a Facebook 

page that those affected created. With 8,000 people affected, we found that we were 

having 8,000 different experiences. My adjuster told me to Columbia Gas decided 

not to haul away condemned appliances, so we needed to make arrangements for 

that. A friend was told she was not allowed to remove condemned appliances because Columbia Gas was taking inventory of them. Every aspect of the recovery had 

multiple variations of this. Our nerves frayed a little bit more. We would get calls 

that crews needed come to look at our appliances for the third, fourth, fifth time 

only to get notification later that Columbia Gas changed their minds. Our relight 

date was pushed to 11/19. The cruise ship for the workers arrived with word that 

it will stay for ‘‘several months’’ and our nerves frayed a little more. We had a constant debate over the forecast and what we will do about hot water and heat. Columbia Gas won’t give us a space heater and won’t approve a mini-split system. We 

ask our adjuster for alternative heat sources and he suggested a pellet stove. We 

debate the installation of a pellet stove with a hole cut into our dining room wall 

and wonder if our wood floors will be damaged. Then comes word that Columbia 

Gas will be taking back the pellet stoves after all this is over! An invasive installation and then a removal??? We decide to pass and try to make due with our own 

space heaters and donated heating blankets. Our relight date is pushed to 11/22. 

My office was also affected and I would sit in my winter coat next to a space heater. 

The Columbia Gas website listed had our office as ‘‘relit’’ but I can assure you it 

was not. 

Almost five weeks in and crews arrive on our street to start digging. It took crews 

a little over a week on our short dead-end street to get the main and service gas 

lines tested and fixed. 

I had my annual check up with my primary care physician. She was surprised 

to see my usually normal blood pressure was high. We chatted about the situation 

and she said she would leave it be as it was likely situational. I explained I had 

nightmares about fires and explosions, I jumped when I heard sirens. Then she said 

I could stay in their warm lobby for the day and use their vending machine as much 

as I liked. I held back the tears because there was no way to explain the biggest 

problem was not heat or hot water or cooking but the mental game Columbia Gas 

was playing with us. We were forced to put our trust in a company that proved over 

and over they weren’t trustworthy. We had no other choice and it felt devastating. 

It was too cold for our propane shower system, so we borrowed an indoor camp 

shower from a friend. After boiling water in an electric kettle literally for hours each 

night for two weeks, we were done. I had too many tears, the boys didn’t want to 

get out of bed for school, they fought all the time and we decided to finally install 

an electric water heater. We still felt it was wasteful for the environment, we didn’t 

want it taking up space in our basement but hot water would be one less thing for 

us to have to manage on a daily basis. 

118 

We had a long planned family party to attend out of state for just two days. At 

this point it had been weeks with no one in our house and we weren’t on the 72 

hour list. We again took a deep breath, left our number on the door, and headed 

to the airport. Within two hours of landing, my cell phone rang with a crew at our 

door. We felt terrible about not being at the house but we had no notice of any kind 

and our relit date was still weeks away. We scrambled from out of state to get a 

neighbor to let them in and try to understand over the phone about what was happening and what decisions were being made. As we landed back at Logan airport, 

I checked the Columbia Gas website to see our relit date was pushed out three more 

weeks to 12/9. 

As November began, 50 days in, we started the search for a reputable plumber 

that could beat our 12/9 relit date. Our plumber was booked until mid-December. 

Another plumber was going door to door giving estimates, so we let him in but online reviews showed they jacked up prices and work done wasn’t great. Eventually, 

a friend pulled some strings and got their plumber to commit to a date to come and 

take a look. A day later Columbia Gas showed up saying they are ready to work. 

We don’t trust them and we start to gamble. Do we trust that Columbia Gas will 

show up tomorrow? Do we trust that they will stay until we have heat? What do 

we do if we aren’t happy with the work? Who do we call in three months if we have 

a problem with the new boiler? Will our friend’s plumber be able to beat the 12/ 

9 date (we know this is unlikely)? We are sick about it, and Columbia Gas can provide no information, but decide to call our friend’s plumber and let him go knowing 

that we won’t be able to get him back if Columbia Gas decides not to show up. We 

see Columbia Gas is under criminal investigation. This is no surprise to any one 

affected but our nerves fray a little more. 

The crew come and stay. We are told we will get a like-for-like replacement for 

our boiler and the next day they deliver something completely different. Something 

that can’t vent out our chimney so they will have to drill holes out our walls and 

we may need asbestos abatement. No one can explain to us why this happened. 

They all say, ‘‘don’t worry . . . you are going to love it!’’ That is fine, but we want 

to understand the decisions that are being made on our behalf! Is it because Navien 

gave Columbia Gas a great deal on these boilers? Is it because Columbia Gas will 

get Mass Save rebates for installing them? Is it because Columbia Gas has a warehouse of them and needs to get rid of them? Why the hell is it? A week into working 

10.5 hours days, one of the plumber explains our chimney was likely not up to code 

and Columbia Gas would have had to pay for our chimney to be rebuilt in order 

to vent a like-for-like system. Okay, this makes sense . . . I just wish someone 

would communicate these things . . . or anything. It takes the plumbers (kind, 

amazing, and lovely) nine days to install one boiler. They just didn’t have enough 

parts. They would go scavenging for parts each day. They can’t find any within a 

two hour radius of the area. One day they drove up into New Hampshire in hopes 

of finding parts. How can they not have enough parts when 6,000 people are still 

waiting? 

On day 59, 99 percent of our heat/hot water was restored. We are happy crews 

moved on to those that have no heat, but hope they circle back someday and fix 

the small section of baseboard heat that is not working. This is a long process. 

There are still 5,000 waiting on heat and hot water. Even with using Columbia Gas 

crews instead of our own, we spent thousands out of pocket. We have been reimbursed for much of it but have been waiting weeks for a large check. On day 65, 

our stove was relit. 

We are grateful for the progress and my eyes have been opened to what a recovery process can look and feel like. We were not physically injured. Our home is 

standing. My thoughts are on the California fires and hurricane hit areas and the 

nightmare recovery process. I hope FEMA does a better job than Columbia Gas and 

I hope Columbia Gas is held responsible for the complete lack of a disaster/recovery 

plan. The affects at our house will linger for a long time. 

Janina Majeran from Andover: I didn’t lose my house to an explosion or fire, but 

my home without heat and hot water for so long did not feel like my home. My 

home was always my sanctuary, but once it’s 50 degrees in your apartment and no 

amount of space heaters can warm it up, it ceases to be a safe haven. 

The thing that boggles my mind was how some representatives of Columbia Gas 

could be so callous when dealing with us. When I asked about temporary housing 

because my apartment was too cold to stay in, I was told to get a space heater. A 

friend of mine was told to get an electric blanket. Neither of those things are in 

any way sufficient when it’s dropping below 50. And it’s not like you can run a space 

heater all night long because they are a fire hazard—and these people know this. 

119 

It took me over 3 weeks to get housing. I kept being put off, kept being told someone would be in touch with me and no one ever was. This was a lesson in how the 

squeaky wheel gets the oil. 

I spent a month relying on friends and family to let me stay with them when it 

was too cold to stay at my apartment. I had to shuttle my cat here and there and 

everywhere. I was stressed out every day wondering how cold my apartment was 

going to get and checking weather apps all day every day. 

I’m home now and it was hard for me to come back. I was worried it would be 

taken away and I wouldn’t be able to get housing again. My home still does not feel 

like my home. I feel like I just moved in all over again only this time I’m worried 

I’ll wake up one night or come home after work and find it all gone again. 

The past 2 months have been hell and I’ve gotten little sympathy from people 

staying in warm places at the end of the day. And I worry about the people who 

have been trying to stick it out as the temperature drops and drops. 

This never should have happened. And none of us should be made to feel like 

criminals for wanting compensation for the things we’ve had to buy extra just to 

survive. If I want an electric skillet or toaster oven over your crappy little hot 

plates, then don’t argue with me over it. You did this. You did this to all of us. It’s 

not our fault you screwed up. 

Yeison Pinales from Lawrence: This has hurt me so much that I’m missing out 

on my kids development I had to arrange for then to b more without me cuz of I 

can’t b at my house.. Because my house is not a home at the moment I can’t do 

my routine like I always did in the past. thanks giving is a no at my home this 

year 

Nicole Pelletier from North Andover: My two children, ages 5 and 3, were home 

with me on the afternoon of September 13. Without warning, one of our neighbors 

began practically banging the door down telling us that homes were exploding and 

that we needed to get out. Completely caught off guard and terrified, my children 

and I fled our home and tried to get out of North Andover. 

During this trip, we had to drive through a ‘‘ground zero’’ of sorts . . . many of 

the homes that had exploded were in our neighborhood. We witnessed homes smoking and on fire. The sound of sirens was constant. We were unsure about the status 

of our own home left behind. My 5 year old son was so terrified he cried for an hour 

straight and was physically sick, before he finally passed out from exhaustion. 

We were thankfully not one of the worst affected—although we were without gas 

for more than six weeks, our home is still standing and none of us were physically 

injured. 

My son’s mental and emotional health, on the other hand, has been a different 

story. He had just started kindergarten the week prior to the gas fires, so he already 

had so much going on when this struck. He is now petrified of any kind of siren, 

no matter how far away it may be, and the possibility of any type of fire drill at 

school had him so anxious that he doesn’t want to go to school on most days. We 

have had to be in constant touch with his school counselor and we have also found 

him his own therapist for when he is not at school. This event has scarred him, and 

we are still dealing with this aftermath months later. 

Having said all that I don’t think Columbia has done nearly enough to remediate 

this disaster. My son will never forget this and although I am encouraged by the 

progress he is making with his therapist, the memory of his first ‘‘big kid’’ school 

experience will forever be colored by the events of September 13. 

Joseph Beninato from North Andover: I was at work my wife called said pilot in 

the gas wood stove hissing torch like flame shooting out. I told her go outside I 

would call gas company. When I called the operator was very calm asked address 

wanted to know the cross street told me to have my wife go outside and a man from 

Columbia gas would come by and take care of it. She said the was a problem in 

the area and they would take care of it. When I called my wife back she was 

hysterical all the neighborhood were in the streets. so much for the man coming by. 

so many people and teams coming repeating the same thing and no record of what 

the other team had done no database. our town is behind in the gas ready timeline. 

no one here was injured but the anxiety and fear will be with us for a long time. 

hopefully lessons can be learned because there will be another event if not looked 

into. we never found out the real cause. any word on that? 

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Michael Silverman from Andover: The gas explosion occurred on Sept. 13, 2018. 

Late that afternoon, we evacuated our home as ordered. We are a family of 4 including an 81 year old mother/grandmother who is a dialysis patient, a husband and 

wife with a 5-year old girl. Gas and electricity were shut off by 4:30 p.m. or so on 

that date . . . By Sunday morning, Sept. 16 electricity was restored. Gas was not 

. . . and still till this date, November 19, 2018 there is no gas service. This means 

that we have no gas for hot water, drying or heating in the home. While at first 

this was workable, as the cold weather has arrived, conditions are worse. We paid 

for and installed an electric water heater in early October so that we could take 

‘‘hot’’ showers. We have an electric toaster oven, hotplate and microwave to heat 

foods. We also purchased several electric heaters. We have to be careful with which 

small heaters or cooking appliances are own. When the microwave is on with any 

one of the portable heaters, the circuit breakers switch off and have to be reset. This 

can be dangerous . . . especially at night for the 81-year old and the 5 year old. 

Approximately, November 4th, the Gas Company set up some diesel powered generator outside with additional sub-generators inside. The main goal of these generators is to heat the water pipes to prevent them from freezing. 

We have become to accommodate to the situation. Being able to ‘‘cook’’ food is a 

regular challenge due to not having a range to use. This has increased our normal 

food budget to approximately double it’s normal amount each week. With all the 

electric heaters in addition to the hot water heater, electricity costs are averaging 

$460/month compared to $65/month prior to the gas disruptions. 

Lauren Keating from Andover: When I tell people my house almost blew up, they 

laugh, until I add, ‘‘no, but really,’’ before explaining the Columbia Gas fiasco that 

has dominated the last two plus months of my life. I was coaching in Chelmsford, 

MA when my phone figuratively blew up as the Merrimack Valley literally blew up. 

Friends asking if I was safe, telling me not to go home, and a former colleague desperately warning me to NOT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES head to Andover. 

It got to the point that I had to have my team copy and paste messages to friends 

and family that I was towns away and really had no idea what was going on. As 

a neighbor called me, I could hear the alarms in the background from our whole 

neighborhood, in the heart of what would come to be the affected area. Throughout 

the night, the news became more and more unbelievable, explosions, evacuations 

and exits being closed down. Essentially the Valley was shut down. 

On Sunday, when I returned from evacuation and was greeted with a bill from 

Columbia Gas. Newsflash—that was never going to get paid as this was around the 

time they referred to the devastation as an ‘‘inconvenience’’ or an ‘‘unfortunate incident.’’ As the weeks went on, it appeared that efficiency was a trait only possessed 

by their billing department as the weeks stretched into October and we still had 

no utilities, although we did have a LOT of people making a lot of doing construction at all hours. I think for people living outside of this, this is the hardest part— 

the small things that were the biggest disruption. For 10 days, there were police 

escorts as our street was shut down with no notice. Workers were jackhammering 

though the night and after a long day at work, the only options for dinner were a 

reheated crockpot and a cold shower. I took to going to the gym before 4 am to work 

out and shower and by mid-October was a zombie. As much as the reimbursement 

process was a pain, the worst part were the things you can’t quantify—the extra 

time to do daily tasks of living. 

By November, I had been in three hotels, fought for reimbursement and spent 

multiple weeks in my own apartment with temperatures under 40° inside as the list 

to receive housing was so long. When we returned home, we had out electricity cut 

multiple days for multiple hours with 30 minute notice, which is super convenient 

when you need to use a crockpot or microwave to eat. We had to leave our doors 

unlocked for two weeks because the workers ‘‘might’’ be by to replace our appliances. 

Because we wanted the work done, we did it, risking that anyone could have walked 

in. It is now November 19, the original date of restoration and the ‘‘ongoing disruption’’ is still in full swing. Our ‘‘new’’ stoves were defective and the replacements 

are backordered and we weren’t given a date for their arrival. The new furnace 

upon installation is leaky and not functioning at full capacity so while we have heat, 

it is not efficient. 

Through it all though, the strength of this community has shown through. The 

five people in our house have worked together to make sure we are as close to functional as possible. In the initial days of the evacuation, watching the communities 

come together to make sure everyone had what they needed even when Columbia 

was so distant was inspiring as everyone was in a state of uncertainty. I may still 

be rolling my eyes from all the euphemisms used by Columbia Gas for how miserVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
121 

able of a situation this is, but there is truly a soft spot in my heart for the resilience 

of the Merrimack Valley in circumstances for which they have had zero control and 

very little progress. 

Constance Glore from West Boxford: It is past time to face the truth that the burning of fossil fuels is making the earth uninhabitable for life as we know it. The rise 

in global temperature, sea level and forest fires is directly caused by the use of these 

fuels. The warming of the Gulf of Maine has brought shrimp populations to the 

brink of extinction. Pollution caused by the burning of fossil fuels was dubbed ‘‘the 

new tobacco’’ last week by the head of the World Health Organization who also reported that ‘‘the simple act of breathing is killing 7 million people a year and harming billions more.’’ (The Guardian) 

I am one of those. I have COPD. 

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported in Fall 2018, ‘‘Governments should stop licensing new fossil fuel projects; and stopping new projects alone 

will not be enough-governments must also phase out a significant number of existing projects ahead of schedule, while investing in a just transition for workers and 

communities.’’ 

A UN panel of scientists said every bit of warming matters, and we’re almost out 

of time to keep it in check. We have the next 12 years to begin to drastically reduce 

CO2. 

The tragedy and ensuing future environmental damage caused by Columbia Gas/ 

NiSource and other gas utilities must never be repeated. We need renewable, green, 

clean energy infrastructure to be built now. 

Martin Boroian from North Andover: I live with my sister Mary. I am a former 

Ma. State Metropolitan District Comm. Police Officer. We have been with heat from 

Sept. 13, 2018 till Nov. 2018. I am a disabled person. I have had 5 operations in 

the last five years. It was very hard waking up in a house with no heat. It was 

also very hard not knowing if and when we would have our heat restored. I also 

suffer from PTSD. I feel that there should have been more Ma. State utility inspectors to make sure that the Gas lines were in better condition. It was also not reassuring when none of our local politicians, except. Our U.S. Senator Edward Markey 

seemed to care about what happened to the citizens in Lawrence, North Andover, 

and Andover. Thanking you for letting us tell what happened to us. Ma. State and 

U.S. Citizens.—Respectfully Submitted by Martin Boroian-Tel.No. (78–655–7656— 

home address 58 Union Street, Apt.# 2. North Andover, Ma. 01845.—e-mail 

address=mborian-@yahoo.com-tel.no.978–655–7656. 

Vladimir Saldana from Lawrence: September 13th 

I was sitting with a friend on the front porch of Lawrence CommunityWorks office 

building going over the treasurer report for a Rwanda Youth Development Project 

we are both involved with. Not long after the explosions broke out, a colleague from 

Lawrence CommunityWorks walks ups the stairs and says ‘‘Omg Vladi, Lawrence 

is on Fire’’ My immediate reaction was ‘‘of course Lawrence is on fire, lots of good 

things are happening in this city’’ Her face expression change significantly as she 

was walking closer to me with her cell phone out in her hands she turns the screen 

around to show me a video of the news coverage. We watched the news clip for 

about 3–5 minutes to get a sense for what was happening. After learning that the 

affected area in the city was South Lawrence and that folks were being asked to 

evacuate I got my phone and called a friend that lives in South Lawrence. As we 

were on the phone my friend was packing up her stuff to leave her home. I asked 

her where she was going and she said to a friend that lives in the North of the City. 

My thoughts and heart we’re raising 100 miles per hours trying to wrap my head 

around what I should be doing and what was most necessary at the time. Organizing my thoughts quickly, I concluded to a three-phase strategy: a) my organizations have affordable housing units in the south of the city so I felt it was our responsibility to ensure the safety and evacuation of those units safety b) ensure that 

all my friends that live in South we’re evacuated, safe and had a place to go c) assist 

the greater community with the emergency response. 

It had been announced that the Parthum School was one of the emergency shelters that was set up for evacuees. After completing the first two part of my personal 

efforts to assist with the gas explosion I left the office and drove to the emergency 

shelter. When I arrived at the Parthum School there was a ton of activities and 

many faces I recognized, from community leaders to politicians. After hanging out 

122 

in the front lobby for 10–15 minutes with nothing to do I decided it was time to 

depart. When I was walking towards my car, a longtime friend/brother Emmanuel 

asked me where I was going. The question struck my cord because it felt as if I 

was abandoning the city during a tough time—I went on to explain to Emmanuel 

that I was leaving because they had enough volunteers and assistance. Emmanuel 

felt we needed to do more so he suggested we check out the other shelter at the 

Arlington School. We arrived at the Arlington School around 7:00 or so. When we 

arrived at the Arlington we didn’t find the same situation as the Parthum School. 

It was a bit more chaotic it the sense that no one really knew what was happening 

and folks that were evacuated and looking for a place to sleep didn’t know who to 

talk to or what to do. There was way too many activities happening and just not 

enough coordination. We approached the Red Cross respondent and asked how can 

we help? They said that at the moment there was nothing to do because they are 

getting organized. But, what we saw was a lot of emotional and personal disconnect 

from the vulnerable residents sitting in the school cafeteria with the people that 

were ‘‘in charge’’. I want to avoid critiquing the Red Cross because they were doing 

the best they can do with the resources they had at the moment. But in addition 

to having a low number of ‘‘official’’ volunteers, their low number of volunteers did 

not speak Spanish. This is where we saw an opportunity to assist. So we decided 

to serve as translators for the Red Cross. As time went on we made observations 

and noticed other gaps in their process, such as very little emotional support to the 

victims arriving at the shelter. 

Emmanuel and I recognized other community leaders and friends such as Pavel 

Payano and many others who were also feeling the disconnection between the process and the people arriving at the shelter. From this point on, the atmospheres took 

a turn, it was a kinematic connection between the community leaders that were 

present at the time. We all started to assume leadership roles. By the end of the 

first night on Thursday, it was clear that local leaders we’re going to manage the 

relief efforts with the Red Cross assistance. That night, I and other leaders that 

took an active role. From registering victims, feeding them dinner, getting answers 

for what was happening, setting up sleeping cods to even calling out of work for one 

the victim who did not speak English. That night, most of the community volunteers 

left the school at 2:30 A.M. on Friday. A few hours later, we all returned energized 

to assists our community. The situation at the Arlington School improved tremendously all due to the help of many local community leaders and neighbors helping 

neighbors. Like others, I’ve spent a tremendous amount of time in the shelter From 

Friday to Sunday. I slept at the emergency shelter Friday night and Saturday night. 

One of the reasons why I decided to stay was because none of the Red Cross official 

volunteers spoke Spanish. The vast majority of residents sleeping at the shelter did 

not speak English. I’ve felt responsible for their wellbeing and being a traumatic 

situation without interpretation can add more anxiety to a difficult situation. 

During those 3 and half days, my heart grew every moment I witness people from 

all over the place come to the shelter asking, ‘‘what can I do to help’’ or bringing 

food, toiletries, necessities and all sort of donations for the folks at the emergency 

shelter. We had an abundance amount of food, clothes, and basic needs at the shelter from just regular people dropping stuff off. We also had educators set up activities for families with kids, therapist offering free services to families that needed 

to speak to someone. I’ve felt the love, compassion, and services from the wider community for the victim and the City of Lawrence. 

Despite all the commotion that was happening outside of the walls of the Arlington emergency shelter, inside felt like a community center addressing individual 

needs. Responding to the larger crisis at hand. Volunteers stepping up and dedicating countless hours to help out in any way they can. The spirit of the community 

was incredible and eye-opening. To give you a sense on the sort of activities that 

were common during the emergency period read the following two scenarios. One 

night, a truck branded with a logo from a paving company from Peabody pulled up 

with about 50 cases of 24 pack of waters, inside the shelter, we probably had triple 

that amount of waters, and space was limited so we asked them to take it to the 

other shelter or the Senior Center. The stranger’s faces looked disappointed. Ultimately, we ended up squeezing the waters inside the school. The second scenario 

happened on Sunday afternoon after the Mayor decided to lift the band and allow 

people to go back home. Firefighters from Lowell pulled up to the school with two 

full vans of donation items. Half of the shelter population had already gone home. 

The ones that didn’t did have a home to go to. 

Today marks two after the gas explosions and the relief efforts continue to be a 

challenge for various reasons. Many families are still in a dire situation and the 

City continues to do everything possible to restore a sense of normality. As we are 

approaching a holiday dedicated for to give Thanks, I want to give Thanks to the 

123 

community of Lawrence for showing me resiliency, to the wider community for having a blessed heart and giving their support during these hard few weeks. I am confident that we will come out stronger out of this situation. 

Heather Wilson from North Andover: On September 13 2018 at approximately 4:30 

PM I had just got home form work and my son stopped by and said he smelled 

something, and immediately the smoke detectors went off he ran down the cellar 

to find my boiler engulfed in flames. My brother who has plumbing experience 

grabbed a tool and immediately shut the gas off to my boiler and went outside to 

turn it off at the house and while all this was happening I called fire department 

they where there immediately and the fire was out by the time they got there, They 

stayed for about 5 minutes when they realized it was a community wide gas leak 

and left to deal with more serious issues they realized there were higher triages to 

deal with., The next two weeks met me with many claims workers form all over the 

country who will all giving me different answers there was no consistency to their 

answers. Also they never called me I had to call them a week later only to find out 

that they had the wrong number, and they did not believe there was a fire in my 

house until i sent the report to them. I spent the next 5 weeks in 4 different hotels, 

very inconvenient as I am a handicapped women away form my home. 

Todd Sacco from Withrop: I don’t live in the affected area, however, a co-worker 

of mine does. His brother in law has been shipped in from other areas to assist with 

changing out meters. LOOK TO THE IMPORTED WORKERS FOR THE TRUTH. 

The local union workers are NOT carrying their weight and the imports are protecting them by not calling them out. 

This is not only making it unsafe and extremely inconvenient for residents, it’s 

making YOU, the elected official, who receives campaign funds from unions, look 

very very bad. 

This is unconscionable and needs to stop. I nave no dog in the hunt other than 

my sincerest concern for the innocent victims of the explosions and the ongoing war 

between the gas company workers and their management. 

Astrid Nielsen from Andover: Story from a resident in a NON impacted area 

Thursday Sep. 13th I was on the road when my kids called from home to tell me, 

that their friends were texting if we had gotten a prank call too about leaving the 

house. On my way back home through town sirens were blasting left and right and 

just as a firetruck would pass one way, another would come in the other direction. 

Usually when there is a fire an army of firetrucks will be present as well as police 

and the street will be closed of. That day I passed several single firetrucks without 

backup running in and out of buildings. 

We left the house and got a chance to talk it through and check social medias 

and found, that since we are on a street, where gas was never put in, we could go 

home safely. Instead we invited friends to come and stay with us. 

A friends in Andover was driving around with her child and another 3 children. 

They had been at the library and had been evacuated and when the mom came to 

pick up her daughter, she took the other 3 as their parents were not close by. Two 

of the children’s parents were stuck in Lawrence, where they have a restaurant, and 

was not able to get out of town until late that evening. We made beds for 10 but 

eventually only 3 stayed. The next evening they were able to go home. 

That was suppose to be it for us, but 

—My daughter had to go to emergency counseling. She is better, but it has been 

so hard to witness. All the uncertainty and not feeling safe is hard to deal with 

as an adult and much more for an adolescent with anxiety. 

—I was in Andover a few days later and when a firetruck came blasting by and 

everyone absolutely froze including me. It took a minute or two before anyone 

were able to talk again. We all remembered 

—For the next two month I would have to add a minimum of 15 minutes to 

any trip trough town because of all the construction and detours. With two kids 

and their schedule it was very stressful to have to be places at specific times 

when you never knew what to expect. 

—I have lunch in town several times a week and for two month my favorite 

places were closed. (Bueno Malo, Yella, Casa Blanca). There are people I used 

to pass by every week I haven’t seen for month now. The dynamic in town has 

been so off since 9/13 

124 

The most popular costume this year for Halloween was a yellow vest and a hard 

hat!!! 

On paper my family will not be a part of history. But we were impacted. 

PS I don’t think you will ever know the whole scope. I talked to a home owner 

who told me, that there had been 6 fires on their street, but when I checked the 

map, only 1 had been recorded. 

Stacie Murphy from Lawrence: I am submitting this story on behalf of CLASS, 

Inc. Located at One Parker Street, Lawrence, MA. 

On Thursday, September 13, 2018 at approximately 4:20pm, several gas lines in 

the Merrimack Valley started to explode as staff was leaving for the day. A called 

was placed to the CEO Al Frugoli who was still inside the building in a meeting. 

He was told to evacuate the building and ask that the evening cleaning crew leave 

as well. Nancy Price, Facilities Manager was on her way home when she received 

the news of the emergency in Lawrence. She headed back to CLASS at One Parker 

St. but at that time, no one was allowed on or near the property. CLASS Management spent hours on the phones communicating with key staff regarding opening 

of the building on Friday, as we were not aware of the severity of the disaster. 

On the evening of September 13th all power was cut to 1 Parker Street and the 

surrounding areas. No power means we lost all connections to our phone system and 

servers. At approximately 11pm a decision was made to closed CLASS at One 

Parker Street for programs on Friday. Staff would have to use a snow day in order 

to be paid. Meeting had to be canceled and rescheduled. 

CLASS serves 265 individuals at One Parker Street on a daily basis, many of our 

clients live in group homes, many were also affected by the gas disaster in the 

Merrimack Valley. A majority of CLASS Staff lives in the affected areas and some 

could not even get to their homes. CLASS lost approximately $6,800.00 in Transportation, $15,786 in Employment Services and $10,591.00 in Medicaid. Total revenue lost on Friday, September 13 

was $33,177.00. 

On Saturday September 15, at around 8pm, all power was restored to CLASS at 

One Parker Street. 

On Sunday, September 16, Lawrence Fire Department along with Columbia Gas 

inspected One Parker Street and gave CLASS the green light to open. CLASS 

opened without heat operating in the building and re-opened programs at One 

Parker Street on Monday, September 17 

On Monday September 17, programs re-opened. Many issues were discovered due 

to the power being cut. We discovered both garage doors were not operating and had 

to be manually opened. Service was called to repair the garage doors that resulted 

in charges as parts needed to be replaced. The security system dropped from the 

server and had to be re-programmed by technicians. 

At approximately 10:25AM, an odor of gas was reported and our building was 

evacuated. After Friday’s incidents staff were nervous and it was unsettling to many 

individuals we serve as well. The Fire Department arrived on scene, did a walk 

through and cleared the building, followed by the gas company who checked the 

building and gave the final ok. 

On October 13, a temporary heating system was installed into the building. Due 

to the nature of our business, CLASS had to hire temporary staff for some individuals we serve. Gas was restored on Monday, November 12. During this disaster, 

CLASS paid overtime hours to our facilities manager who worked almost 24/7 to 

make sure things were done correctly and our building was handled with care. 

Shawn Logan from Andover: Although not directly impacted by the Gas explosions 

(with the exception of my brother staying at my home as his house was impacted), 

I am impacted peripherally—as were countless others in two ways: 

1. The Columbia Gas workers and their efforts have closed streets, re-routed traffic and resulted in extreme congestion throughout the towns of Andover, North Andover, and Lawrence. This has been time consuming and frustrating. Further it appears they have taken advantage of the explosions to unnecessarily upgrade all 

their gas lines and forced homeowners to have their gas appliances and homes reinspected and brought up to existing code. 

2. The street work to dig up, replace, and repair gas lines has reduced the quality 

of the roads and paved surfaces in Andover, North Andover, and Lawrence. In my 

view, Columbia Gas should pay to have the impacted roads re-paved. The patchwork 

of repairs results in excessive wear and tear on the suspensions of all our vehicles 

and makes for some very uncomfortable travel. 

125 

Dean and Mona Thornhill from North Andover: Our home was set on fire. We lost 

85 percent of all our possessions. We are estimated to be out of our home for a year 

to repair it. 

Alexander Katsev from North Andover: I own a property in North Andover that 

was affected by the disaster. I would like to get the property inspection results, but 

Columbia gas was unable to produce it. I called—10 times—no one knows anything. 

No written report, no certification that gas operated appliances are not damaged. 

Nothing. very poorly managed. . . . 

Jon Paul from Andover: I am the pastor of the Free Christian Church in Andover, 

a local church that is still not fully restored as of today (11/21/2018). We hope to 

have heat restored by next week but our kitchen could take weeks or months longer 

due to a number of complications. In the meantime, ministries that use the kitchen 

to provide meals for seniors and others in need are on hold. 

Even our normal worship services have been challenging as the building is very 

cold. A number of our parishioners have chosen to stay home due to the cold. 

I plan to do a wedding on Saturday morning 11/24. We have some temporary 

heat, but it is inadequate for our large church building. I feel bad (especially for 

the bride) that it will probably be cold indoors at her wedding. 

We are doing our best to provide spiritual and practical support residents and 

businesses impacted by this crisis while dealing with our own issues. We recently 

received an e-mail from one of our seniors, a widow. I think is a good example of 

the struggles many are facing. She writes: ‘‘I am not feeling well today and will stay 

home [from the church’s senior group] tomorrow. Exhausted trying to deal with everything. The gas situation is disorganized. I wake up and find people digging up 

my lawn and they have machinery blocking my driveway. Electricians came to hook 

up my furnace, but I don’t have a furnace yet. Had a small flood in my basement 

when they took out the hot water heater, and the pipe is still leaking into a large 

bucket. I am really exhausted. They told me that my appliances would be coming 

on a certain day, but they didn’t. Afraid to leave the house in case they do come, 

or people want to get into the house. I am just beat right now. . .’’ 

Lacey McManus from Andover: On September 13th after smelling gas in my home 

I went outside, thinking I was losing my mind. How could there be a gas odor in 

my home, no gas appliance was on! I found a neighbor, who myself and my children 

consider family, in the middle of the street frantic! My heart broke for her when 

she said she had a fire in her basement and was told the fire department would 

get to her as soon as they could. We proceeded to tell our neighbors to get out of 

their homes and ensuring all were safe. Since that horrific day, we have all spent 

countless hours trying to find ways to feed our families, keep our children and pets 

warm, all while making life continue as normal. Because outside of the affected 

areas nobody understood the struggle of feeding a family without a stove or ensuring the house was warm enough when your kids got home or where and when their 

next warm shower would be. As a mother it has been very hard to look my children 

in the eyes and tell them everything would be ok and there was nothing for them 

to worry about. A hotel was out of the question, because how would I get the kids 

to school, how would I get to work, and the kids to their afterschool sports practices. 

We live here because our entire lives are within a 5 mile radius of where we live. 

I had already been inconvenienced enough with driving 30 minutes for them to take 

warm showers, spending hours on end planning and making meals for us to eat and 

stressing over the winter months just around the corner. Then we got into a routine 

and we made it work. Then the contractors came a month early to get us relit . . . 

what a nightmare!!! People in and out of my home, with no respect for my belongings or my family. The water tank blew water everywhere and the entire crew left 

without cleaning it up, they forgot about my house for days, and when they finally 

did come back it was days before everything was properly installed. The inspector 

spent 2 minutes in basement to say we were good to go, and when we were relit 

I still had no hot water. A task that took self mitigated people 2 days tops took us 

2 and a half weeks! Once we were relit, I was happy but then fear set in. How am 

I supposed to feel safe in a home with gas again? Every noise, while probably normal, scares me to my core. Using a stove again, having the furnace on, and using 

my dryer, while normal and an everyday necessity that many don’t bat an eye to, 

makes me so nervous! This is going to take a LONG time to recover from. What 

makes matters worse, is how do we feel safe knowing we have the same gas proVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
126 

vider that caused this epic disaster? Monetary reimbursements for minimal expenses only get us so far, the responsibility of making us all feel safe and comfortable in our homes sits in the hands of our representatives, senators, our governor, mayors, town managers and everyone else who should have the residents 

well-being at the top of their agenda. 

Susan Roussilhes from Andover: The horror of September 13, 2018 has been recounted and retold many times so I’ll start with the days following the explosions. 

We are doubly affected—our home and our new business are both in the affected 

area. We received an alert that our home had been broken into. We called the police 

and after some confusion and vague explanations, we were informed that Columbia 

Gas, along with the police and a locksmith, broke into our home to shut off the gas. 

We were allowed to enter both places 4 days after the explosions-both with no heat. 

In addition to having no heat in our home, we had no hot water, no dryer for 

clothes, cold showers, and no cooking. There was also the constant anxiety that 

what would happen before might happen again. There were ‘‘gas purges’’ that 

caused worry and confusion. In the days following the incident there were workmen, 

police, officials from the state and town. I think everyone was still in shock. 

We attended meeting after meeting to receive whatever information we could— 

which was sparse and confusing. We filed our first claims at the new claim center 

in town. We waited in line with everyone else. We were given a hot plate and were 

told we would have to have our home inspected if we were to receive space heaters. 

No one came to inspect so we were then told to go out and buy space heaters and 

we would be reimbursed. We submitted receipts to an assigned adjuster who then 

issued a few checks to reimburse us. We continued to submit expense receipts with 

no response after 2 weeks. We called the claim number and spoke to our adjuster 

who told us she was no longer our adjuster and we were reassigned to another adjuster but she had no idea who that adjuster was. This changing of adjusters would 

occur 3 more times. She said that she submitted all of our documents to her supervisor who assigned our claim to another adjuster. We were finally told who are new 

adjuster was and it was a disaster from the beginning. We had to resubmit all of 

our receipts again and then we were accused of duplicating receipts. We spent hours 

in the claim center and on the phone with the claim center in Louisiana. We care 

for our grandson 3 days a week and it had started to get very cold. We talked to 

an adjuster for families who needed to be relocated and our only options would have 

been to go into an RV which would not have been acceptable with a young child 

and a dog and 3 adults or to be placed in a hotel 27 miles south. We explained to 

the adjuster in Louisiana that traffic in Boston is horrendous and that commute 

would be over an hour or more both ways (our business is located 3 blocks from our 

home). We were then lectured by this person located thousands of miles away that 

it would only be 35 minutes. We decided to stay in our home and remain cold. 

This was our day: on the phone with adjusters in Louisiana, in the claim center 

in town—for hours on end—gather documents, receipts, etc. We called newspapers, 

news channels, and congress people and senators and even the governor-but since 

it was in the middle of elections, we had little response. 

We became inundated with workmen and police. Our street was blocked off for 

several weeks. Work went on through the night with many sleepless nights. 

Our home has 2 sections-one is 160 years old and there was an addition added 

10 years ago so therefore we have 2 boilers and 2 hot water heaters. We were able 

to replace 1 hot water heat and convert it to electric so we had limited hot water 

and we were finally able to take a hot shower. after several weeks of. Old showers. 

We were also able to get reimbursed for that expense fairly quickly. We ordered replacements for all appliances but had to front the bill for a new oven, gas dryer, 

1 boiler, and a combination boiler and gas hot water heater all costing around 

$30,000. Getting reimbursed was agonizing-calling Louisiana and spending hours in 

the claim center. We got our gas back on November 9. We still have no stove in 

spite of the purchase of a brand new one. The town inspector would not approve 

the use of our stove because our cabinets above our stove are too low. These same 

cabinets were approved prior to these explosions. So now we have 2 options in order 

for us to use the stove-raise the cabinets 3 inches throughout our kitchen and extend the tile backsplash and paint the kitchen which would cost a few thousand dollars or have metal plates put under the cabinets which might be unsightly-we don’t 

know because we’ve never heard of this before. 

Now for our business-September was to have been the beginning of our busiest 

season. It has turned out to be disastrous. My daughter and I opened our store on 

November 9, 2017. We worked very hard to establish a women’s boutique and we 

put everything we have into our store. We previously had a successful store on 

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Newbury street in Boston but decided to open a new location in our community. We 

wanted to leave behind the high rent, the hectic commute, and the higher cost of 

doing business in Boston and concentrate on our community. We opened in November of last year to a very successful few months. The business previously occupying 

the space was a very successful and lucrative women’s boutique selling very similar 

styles to what we have so we anticipated doing a similar business. We started out 

that way and then September 13 happened. Our business came to a standstill. Because we don’t have numbers for our Andover location from last year, we used an 

average of what we did in our Boston store and the store previously in this space 

and took an average. Our sales for the month of September declined by 83 percent. 

For October we used a similar formula and again sales declined 77 percent. We can 

now use last year’s November numbers and as of this date-our November sales are 

down 57 percent. In the days since the explosions parking has been a nightmare 

because many of the available parking has been taken up by work trucks and such. 

Traffic has been snarled because of workers and construction trucks. The restaurants surrounding us have been closed. We get many customers from these restaurants and it is very much a co-dependent relationship. Business has decreased 

to such a point that we have been unable to pay rent. We don’t want to lose the 

3 employees we have so we have been scheduling them for half of the hours to 

which they are accustom. We have orders that we can’t take in so that those customers who do come in we can sell them merchandise that is current and not previous season inventory. Our business is suffering. Claim money that we have received has gone to paying rent and orders. We are paying pay roll out of personal 

funds which would not be so serious but we have had to put out $30,000 up front 

for our appliances and work for our home. 

We have received claim money and reimbursements for expenses but we are not 

sure if we will ever recover our customer base when there are other businesses in 

nearby towns that customers can frequent as well as online shopping. 

In short we are very aware that we may never recover and the business that my 

daughter and I started may have to be declared bankrupt. We don’t have the money 

from our savings to keep putting into our business. 

We wanted you to hear our story. Thank you. 

Janice Valverde from Lawrence: TESTIMONY of YWCA Northeastern Massachusetts to the Field Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 

Transportation—November 26, 2018—Lawrence, MA 

YWCA Northeastern Massachusetts is a multi-site, multi-service agency that has 

served vulnerable women, children and families in the Merrimack Valley for over 

125 years. One of its major program areas is Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault 

services. 

Four of the agency’s seven sites are located in Lawrence. One of those is the 

YWCA Domestic Violence Emergency Shelter, located at an undisclosed residential 

address in South Lawrence. It was directly affected by the gas explosions on September 13, 2018. 

At any given time, the Shelter is home to five women and their minor children 

who have fled domestic violence. It is always full to capacity. On September 13, 

there were five women and six children living at the Shelter. 

While the gas pipeline incident was extremely disruptive to all affected, and especially devastating to those who lost their homes, the YWCA Shelter residents were 

thrust into a situation that affected them in a way somewhat different from the way 

it affected others. 

For them to have to evacuate the Shelter and very quickly adapt to a different 

environment and different routines, even for three days, was far beyond an inconvenience; it as extremely stressful, disruptive and fear-inducing, especially to a few 

with fragile mental health. 

The YWCA wants to enter the unique story of these domestic violence survivors 

and their children into the record. We appreciate this opportunity to do so. 

The YWCA Emergency Shelter was evacuated on the evening of September 13 

after the gas explosions occurred. The Shelter’s gas furnace and hot water heater 

were no longer usable. It would be three days (and nights) until the Shelter’s five 

women and six children would be able to return to the Shelter. Columbia Gas offered accommodations in trailers or reimbursement to the YWCA for hotel stays. 

Neither of these was a viable or practical solution for the 11 Shelter Residents, however. 

For domestic violence victims whose lives had already been profoundly disrupted, 

each of whom was at a point on their own path of healing from trauma while living 

in the Emergency Shelter, this new disruption was quite traumatic. Some of the 

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residents were experiencing PTSD or other mental health issues. Typically, over a 

period of time, usually months, survivors slowly heal from trauma as some stability 

and certainty comes into their lives. But a major stressor can cause a setback in 

their recovery. 

Having to leave the Shelter in the midst of the gas explosion disaster was indeed 

a setback for all of the YWCA Emergency Shelter residents to some degree, but particularly for two women and one young teenage boy who are suffering with mental 

health issues. 

Along with the rest of the Shelter ‘‘family,’’ they were frightened to leave the Shelter itself and did not want to be separated from each other or the YWCA Shelter 

staff. YWCA staff, who are highly trained and experienced in dealing with trauma, 

were able to manage the situation, but that did not erase the trauma added to all 

these residents’ lives. 

Trailers offered by Columbia Gas as temporary quarters were at least a temporary solution for some people, but not a viable solution for the YWCA Shelter residents. Moving into a trailer in the city among others affected by the gas explosions, 

was not only an added stressor, but was potentially a threat to individual safety. 

The trailers provided no guarantee of privacy and physical safety and security, 

which are obviously paramount to someone whose abuser may be in the same community. Shelter residents typically bond into a family-like community within the 

house—bonding with each other and with YWCA Shelter staff who are present 24/ 

7. This would not have been sustainable if every family was in its own trailer, and 

support of the staff is key to maintaining stability and encouraging healing for the 

residents. 

Likewise, the option of a hotel stay was not a good one. There were not enough 

rooms in any one area hotel for all 11 residents. Again, this option brought up the 

issue of how to maintain the daily support system provided by YWCA Shelter staff 

and the common fear of being ‘‘out in the community.’’ 

The bottom line was that Shelter residents were re-traumatized to varying degrees, and all of them were frightened to leave the Shelter, but forced to do so by 

circumstances. 

After considering the options, the YWCA decided there was no choice but to use 

its own resources. For three days, Shelter residents were able to stay at the YWCA 

Fina House, a residential building that houses the YWCA Transitional Housing program for domestic violence survivors and the residential Teen Parenting Program, 

was available, too. It is a secure building, staffed 24/, as is the Shelter. Conditions 

over those three days were somewhat chaotic, overcrowded and far from ideal, but 

at least the residents were persuaded to go there since their safety and security 

could be guaranteed and YWCA staff could remain with them.. 

Once the Shelter was cleared by authorities after three days, the residents returned to a house, albeit without central heat or hot water. It was decided that the 

best course of action was to have the residents remain in the Shelter while YWCA 

senior staff ‘‘scrambled’’ as much as necessary to restore heat and hot water. For 

almost six weeks, residents were shuttled to other YWCA facilities in Lawrence to 

take showers—the Fina House and the YWCA Lawrence site which has a locker 

room with showers. 

The YWCA discovered that the electrical panel in the house (Emergency Shelter) 

could not even accommodate space heaters in every room, so the YWCA purchased 

electric blankets for residents. Fortunately the weather was not too cold for the next 

six weeks—the last two weeks of September and all of October. 

Over several weeks, with cold weather on the horizon, the challenge of restoring 

some normalcy to the Shelter residents’ lives was a big one. The YWCA made various requests for assistance, reaching out to the state and to private foundations, 

while negotiating with Columbia Gas regarding the YWCA’s claim for damages, and 

its need for a replacement water heater. 

Ultimately, the YWCA was able to find emergency funding to cover the costs of 

replacing the failed gas heating system with electric baseboard heat, and had a new 

electrical panel was installed to accommodate the baseboard heating and a new 

stove. Columbia Gas finally provided a new gas hot water heater after about five 

weeks, but not without repeated calls from YWCA directors. 

None of this happened without incurring many unexpected costs and a diversion 

from the regular work of the agency’s directors, and domestic violence program staff, 

but the emotional costs to the Shelter residents was perhaps the greatest cost. 

Thank you for considering this story of how the Columbia Gas pipeline explosions 

affected a unique population in Lawrence. 

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Jaime Sloan-McCarthy from North Andover: My name is Jaime Sloan-McCarthy 

and I am the owner of Dani Kaye Store LLC located at 85 Main Street in North 

Andover, MA. My husband and I own two businesses in North Andover and thankfully his company Muse Intermedia LLC was minimally affected by the Columbia 

Gas explosions that happened on September 13, 2018. I opened Dani Kaye on August 24th, 2017 and we had just completed our first year of business when the incident occurred. Opening and cultivating a new business in a new market is a significant undertaking by itself, and the challenge of the gas explosions has been crippling. As a new business, I only have one year of records and every piece of product 

is purchased outright. My vendors do not extend credit terms to new businesses and 

one year of records is not enough to present to a bank for business financing options. There isn’t enough documentation to show viability to any financial institution to receive a loan. My husband and I were in the process of building a home 

at the time of the incident and were weeks away from our closing date. We were 

displaced for a few days from the apartment we were staying in while waiting for 

the home to be completed as we were staying in North Andover. We are both self 

employed and did not have the luxury of using our personal credit or assets to ease 

the financial strain in my business, nor could we seek financing even to help our 

business with a pending mortgage. We knew our financials were being monitored 

up until we closed and we could not afford to jeopardize the home we had worked 

so hard to purchase. We applied for an emergency loan from MCCI after closing on 

our home to help us and we just received it yesterday morning; it took two weeks 

to receive because of the back and forth between the lender and Columbia Gas regarding my claim. Two weeks is significantly longer than the 24–48 hour approval 

we were promised. Two weeks is a long time after losing two months of my most 

lucrative season right before the Holidays which is supposed to be the icing on the 

cake for a retail business like mine and the necessary financial cushion we need to 

get us to the Spring season. Additionally, we still do not have gas in my shop and 

my HVAC unit has not been replaced for me to have a permanent heating solution. 

I currently have a Rheem heating unit that was supplied by my landlord who chose 

to self mitigate and until this unit was installed we had two weeks where it was 

too cold for me to operate my business out of the shop. I am grateful for the Columbia Gas workers who have tried to help get us hooked back up, but having them 

continually coming through my store is disruptive to my business and makes it an 

uncomfortable environment for my clientele to shop. 

I am proud of what I have been able to achieve in my first year of business in 

this market as the first upscale women’s boutique in North Andover. Growing a new 

business takes time and planning and this is something Columbia Gas is not willing 

to consider as we have been dealing with them for our business claim. After the gas 

explosions, I did not see many customers for four weeks due to traffic disruptions 

and the fact many of them were impacted and displaced as well. I did not expect 

to see them under the circumstances. After the four weeks it became too cold for 

me to operate in my store and we lost another two weeks of business over this. I 

was still trying to do business at this time because I had to sell product to pay for 

product that I ordered six months prior that was cut to order for our store. Some 

of my vendors cancelled a few orders for us but I could not cancel everything without jeopardizing my relationships and the exclusivity of some of our brands. I also 

needed the product for my regular customers who expect new items when they come 

to see me, and I didn’t want to risk having my pieces re-allocated by the vendors 

to other businesses. I struggled to sell inventory that was intended for early Fall 

and that would inevitable go on sale online and in department stores within a few 

months. I am still sitting on many pieces that have effectively ‘‘expired’’ and I have 

lost my window to sell them due to the shift in weather. My money is still tied up 

in this product which should have moved through my business by now. Columbia 

Gas has ignored this part of my claim which has made doing business incredibly 

difficult. They do not want to take responsibility for my product needs and obligations and the numbers they have presented to us have netted out and discounted 

all costs associated with product. Since we don’t have enough history as a business, 

the gas company is using our numbers from last year as a base line and we had 

barely been open. I don’t know how they can compare a business that only had 

under 50 customers to a business that currently has 600 and counting as people are 

still discovering us everyday. I have fought to build our business and reputation 

over the last year and I am only asking that I be treated fairly so I can continue 

to operate and get back on track to grow as I had planned. 

Despite the challenges and losses we have endured with our business, I have still 

made it a priority to give back to our community. I have hosted Sip and Shop events 

where we raised money for the Lawrence Emergency Fund and for the Soto family. 

I have also donated clothing to people who have needed it. I know I am fortunate 

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to be operational and that others have it worse than I do and I have felt obligated 

to help. I hope that we will be given that same support from our community as the 

situation is rectified. It is imperative that the Town of North Andover will push to 

bring business downtown now for the Holidays to help the businesses like mine that 

are up and running and are fighting to get back to business as usual. The road to 

recovery will be a long one; small businesses are necessary to the fabric of this community and we cannot be forgotten. I opened my store in North Andover a year ago 

because I believed in the future and potential of the area. I intend to not only survive this incident, but continue to thrive and service the community. 

Lisa Cascio from Lawrence: https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ma-natural-gas-explosions-highlight-tension-between-recovery-and-efficiency#gs.dSkRLuc 

Elizabeth Rocco from Arlington: I’m a family physician at the GLFHC clinic at 

Plaza 114 in South Lawrence. I was in the clinic during the explosions, and I heard 

of the impact on my staff and patients’ lives for the last 2 months. 3 of my patients 

residences burned down and lost everything. One patient moved out of state. The 

other two moved from hotel to hotel for 2 months looking for housing and only found 

housing last week. One had to drop out of graduate school because the cost of losing 

all her possessions and living in a hotel wiped out her savings. She also experienced 

trouble sleeping, panic attacks and depression which interfered with her ability to 

study and work. Most of my patients had anxiety and sleep disturbances related to 

the fires and explosions depending on how closely they were impacted. Many of my 

patients and staff have complained of exhaustion from the extra time needed to heat 

water on electric hot plates for bathing, the inconvenience and extra cost of not 

being able cook at home and the discomfort of not being able to heat their home 

during the cold fall nights. Patients also missed their appointments at the health 

center because they were displaced from their home. 

Erika Ody from North Andover: While I am one of the lucky ones that was able 

to safely retrieve my four year old son and dog the day of the explosions, our lives 

haven’t been the same since Sept 13th. I didn’t get the opportunity to retrieve any 

belongings that weekend and had to drive hundreds of miles picking up and dropping off my pet and child that weekend to find emergency care and housing. We 

stayed in the house from Sept 15th through Oct 8th without heat, hot water, a dryer 

or stove. Then, we were forced into emergency housing as my son has an eating disorder and doesn’t have enough body fat for sustained cold temperatures. We are attempting to self mediate and hope to be home soon but I cannot emphasize enough 

how little contact we had from Columbia Gas prior to this last week when they finally started to check on me. It’s too little and too late. 

Rafael Juliao from Lawrence: My name is Rafael Juliao; I live at 26–28 Farley 

St. in Lawrence, MA, and own a business two blocks from my home, First Class Car 

Shop, Inc. On the afternoon of September 13, 2018, I was at the shop when I got 

a call from my family at home-they were scared; all of the alarms were going off 

and they were saying there was fire and smoke in the house. I rushed home and 

saw all of the tenants-I have a multi-family home and rent apartments to two tenants-outside looking at the house. When I got to the driveway, I called 911 over and 

over again, but there was either no answer or the line was busy. Eventually, fearing 

that my house would burn down-and despite my wife’s objections-I went into our 

basement, where I found the furnace on fire and flames creeping up the wall. I also 

heard the sound of blowing air. What I now know is that it was a gas leak. I used 

wet laundry and buckets of water and clothing to put the fire out. I grabbed pliers 

and turned off the gas meter and opened the windows. 

When I went back outside, more people who live on the street were coming outside, and within minutes, all of my neighbors were outside, screaming and afraid 

their houses were going to burn down. I worked with a few of my neighbors to go 

into three other houses and put the fires out and turn off the gas meters. 

After that, we started hearing there had been pipeline explosions all over town. 

Because we have emergency supplies in our house, we decided to stay put instead 

of going to a hotel that Columbia Gas was offering. Even with no electricity, no gas, 

and no heat, with two kids, ages 11 and 18, we felt we would be better off staying 

at home. But it was frightening every day. It felt like a war zone in the days after 

the explosions. We saw people robbing the house across the street. My son was 

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stopped when he was riding his bike because police thought he was a looter. The 

emotional and psychological toll this has taken on our kids and our family has been 

immense. My kids both missed school; they’ve been cold; they’ve been frightened. 

I thought Columbia Gas would be sympathetic and helpful to those impacted by 

the disaster they caused, but interacting with them has been a nightmare. Because 

I am a business owner, a homeowner and have tenants, I have had to deal with 

them on multiple fronts. I have had to call them dozens of times. I have been passed 

around from one claim adjuster to another (at this point, I think the number is up 

to six), each one requiring me to submit a different set of documents and evidence 

and requiring me to start the process anew each time I am passed to someone new. 

One of the adjustors assigned to me for my home told me to get an estimate from 

an electrician and plumber for the repairs that needed to be made in the house to 

have temporary heat put in. The estimate was upwards of $13,000, and when I reported back to Columbia, the adjustor simply said there was no way Columbia 

would agree to pay that amount. Eventually, I spoke to the foreman overseeing a 

crew working on repairs to the pipelines in the street, and he felt bad for us and 

sent men in to put in a new furnace, new water heaters, and a new stove, but we 

still don’t have cooking gas. According to one of Columbia’s claim adjusters, I 

shouldn’t be making a fuss about not having cooking gas because we ‘‘can find other 

things to eat.’’ 

On top of all of this, my business is suffering. The shop was shut down for five 

days after the explosions; we had no electricity. Once we opened back up, there was 

construction in front of the shop to fix pipelines, and it was blocking the entrance 

for customers to come into the shop. Beyond that, there is no one left in town. How 

is my business supposed to survive when there are no customers? 

Columbia Gas was offering me a fraction of the profits I was losing-the income 

I need to feed my family-and when I tried to outline not only the lost profits, but 

also the costs of repair that were piling up, I was met with hostility and skepticism. 

I’ve had to use money from my pension to pay our bills. When I explain to the adjusters that my business will never be the same, they don’t care. When I call them 

to ask them when something is going to be done, their response is that we have 

to wait or it’s not happening. I have been stunned by how poorly they treat us. 

The callousness of these adjustors has been like a punch to gut. They caused this 

disaster. They put my family and our whole community through this nightmare. 

They missed their deadlines for restoring heat and making the necessary repairs. 

And yet, when we talk to them, they act as if we’ve done something wrong, like 

we’re inconveniencing THEM. There has been so little communication and transparency during the process, and my family and I are at our wit’s end. We don’t 

know when things will return to normal, if ever. 

Elsa Berroa from Lawrence: My husband and I are senior citizens with disabilities, and we suffer from multiple ailments. With no gas, heat or hot water in our 

home, we had no choice but to go to one of the temporary trailers after the explosions. But even the trailers were cold, and because I have poor circulation, the cold 

affects me tremendously. The trailers were such poor quality that they would move 

in the wind; it felt like we were on a boat. And the park where we were kept was 

so badly maintained that mud gathered in huge amounts and made it impossible 

to get around. I felt trapped in our tiny trailer. 

When our gas was finally reconnected, Columbia Gas gave us 24 hours to move 

out of the trailer. It felt like an eviction. We don’t move so well, and we don’t drive, 

so this was incredibly difficult for us. I needed assistance to pack and couldn’t get 

it. It was terrible. Further, when I tried to sign up for their Thanksgiving meal 

about two weeks before the holiday, I was told it was too late. 

I have been traumatized because now I fear my home. I blame Columbia Gas 

wholeheartedly for what they have put us through. Every representative I have spoken to has been unkind. It makes me feel like I’m begging for assistance and that 

Columbia Gas wants to seem like a hero, like they’re helping us, when really, they 

caused this disaster with their negligence. 

Cynthia Rwabuhinga from Lawrence: I’m Cynthia Rwabuhinga; I live in Lawrence, MA, and since the explosions on September 13, 2018, my life has been turned 

upside down. I’m a teacher’s assistant at a local public school, where I work with 

kindergartners. I’m an active member of my church and community. I rent space 

in a house in Lawrence, but after the explosions, it was not safe to return home. 

I was only just able to return home last week, but I still don’t have cooking gas. 

132 

On the day of the explosions, I was assisting with an afterschool activity at my 

school. We were outside when the chaos started. A child was crying and said she 

had heard there were fires—soon afterward, the school was evacuated. It felt like 

a terrorist attack. I thank God the kids were at school because it could have been 

worse, but it really felt like Armageddon. It felt like God was coming, and I wasn’t 

going with him. Everywhere I turned, it was chaos. 

A friend told me that explosions were happening everywhere, and police were saying don’t go into your houses. As I drove from the school, I saw a house on fire, 

smoke everywhere, everyone outside of their houses in panic. I was calling 911 but 

couldn’t get through. I started calling everyone I knew telling them not to go into 

their houses. I drove a town over to Methuen and stayed with a friend’s parents 

for almost two weeks before being able to get a hotel through Columbia Gas. We 

were all in a state of shock. 

When I reached out to Columbia Gas for a hotel, they told me there was nothing 

close and that the only thing they could give me is a place in Waltham; otherwise, 

I’d have to wait. And please understand, I had already waited. I didn’t get into a 

hotel until October 3. I took it, but my work and my church, where I go almost five 

days a week for various community programs I participate in, are back in Lawrence. 

Columbia Gas said they would pay for my gas because of all of the driving back 

and forth I was doing, but meanwhile, my car battery also ran out, my mileage went 

up, and one of my tires popped. In addition to the financial and physical toll driving 

back and forth had on me, it was stressful, and I was spending more than an hour 

and a half in the car every day. Columbia Gas didn’t care. I live paycheck to paycheck, and they refused to give me the gas money up front, which also made it near 

impossible for me to afford all of my living expenses. The gas card also didn’t arrive 

when they said it would, and they were dismissive when I tried to explain that I 

needed it. 

**The hotel that they put me up in was dilapidated. The stove and entire ‘‘kitchen’’ in the hotel room was run down; the stove was crusted with rust and unusable. 

When I tried to raise this with Colombia Gas, they were rude and dismissive. They 

also had someone from the hotel knocking on my door regularly to see if anyone 

was staying with me. No one was, but they invaded my privacy nonetheless. Eventually, they did move me to a better hotel because I’d found a threatening note on 

my windshield at the first place, but why did it take so long? Why did I have to 

suffer and feel unsafe for them to put me in a decent place when I couldn’t return 

home? 

I suffer from chronic arthritis, and this ordeal has exacerbated my pain. I’m under 

such stress that my hair has started to fall out; my blood pressure is dangerously 

high; I’ve started having panic attacks. I’m drowning in bills. I haven’t been able 

to cook and so have racked up so many expenses paying for food; I’ve gained weight 

from eating poorly. I had a good life. I loved my job; I loved my church and my community. And it’s crumbled because Columbia Gas created a disaster and then resented the residents of Lawrence for needing relief and support. They’ve destroyed 

our community, and they couldn’t care less. 

Brigdetann Tavares from Lawrence: I have MS and am a single mother of a toddler. I decided to weather it out and stayed in my home after the explosions. When 

the temperature started to drop, we went to a hotel that was very far from my 

child’s daycare and from Boston, where I need to go regularly for medical treatment. 

I am having trouble sleeping. I am under so much stress, and one of the worst triggers of MS is stress, so I have been greatly physically impacted, too. I feel powerless 

and don’t feel like Columbia Gas is listening to us to try to lessen the burden they 

created for me and everyone in Lawrence. 

Karen Martin from Boxford: The collapse of the gas system in the Merrimack Valley, the largest disruption in the history of the industry, has significantly impacted 

the residents of this area, devastating many. To be evacuated, to live in a trailer 

not fit for New England winter or in a hotel 20 miles from work and kids’ school 

and activities, or to remain in unheated homes for months is the largest disruption 

of most victims’ lives. 

This was a preventable tragedy. Twenty years ago when I worked for a telecommunications company, a much more inherently safe industry than gas distribution, there was a process of review by a team of experts before any product was delivered. It’s unimaginable that Columbia Gas did not have such a process in place. 

Even with the new rules for the gas companies that will be required by this and 

other hearings, who will monitor and enforce the implementation of these rules? 

133 

How long will it be before some belt-tightening measure buries these rules? The 

aging gas infrastructure, with its many known gas leaks, suggests another disaster 

is possible. 

In addition to the obvious safety issues with the gas system that were experienced 

in the Merrimack Valley, there is the larger issue of climate change. Burning ‘‘natural’’ gas for heat and power produces 36 percent of the carbon dioxide emissions 

in Massachusetts. Methane, the main component of natural gas, is a greenhouse gas 

that is 80 times more powerful than carbon dioxide. Unburned methane escapes into 

the atmosphere from the many gas leaks in the area as well as when pipes are vented (as they were in the repair process). 

Our Global Warming Solutions Act of 2008 requires us to reduce greenhouse gas 

emissions 25 percent from 1990 levels by 2020. We are a far cry from that. The recent IPCC report declares we have until 2030, just 12 years from now, to reduce 

emissions by 45 percent and develop into a net-zero planet by 2050. This would 

allow for the possibility of keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees Centigrade to 

avoid the most catastrophic impacts of climate change. 

With this in mind, why is Columbia Gas allowed to rebuild the Merrimack Valley 

with more dirty fossil fuel burning, greenhouse gas emitting equipment? Why are 

they allowed to install gas equipment that is not the most energy efficient equipment available? Shouldn’t they be required to rebuild with equipment that runs on 

clean energy, reducing our GHG emissions? Why is there not a state or Federal plan 

that would require a rebuild after any tragedy such as this to be one that would 

move us to a net zero state by 2050 or earlier? Why can’t we make the Merrimack 

Valley rebuild a model for reconstruction in the eventuality of future catastrophes? 

Lawrence is one of the poorest cities in Massachusetts. In our state, people whose 

income is below 50 percent of the Federal poverty level, spend 40 percent of their 

income on energy bills. With climate change making New England summers hotter, 

coupled with the ‘‘heat effect’’ in cities like Lawrence, this expense will only rise. 

High efficiency electric heat pumps provide both heating and cooling, satisfying 

heating needs for New England winters and fulfilling an approaching need for air 

conditioning. Heat pumps, coupled with weatherization of homes and a plan to ‘‘solarize’’ Lawrence would reduce energy bills for its residents while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 

A just solution to the gas system collapse requires a forward thinking solution 

that would move the Merrimack Valley toward a renewables energy future. It would 

enhance the safety of residents and put us on a path to meeting our climate goals, 

sustaining a livable planet for our children and grandchildren. 

Laura Roffer from North Andover: My story cannot even remotely compare to the 

family who lost a son, or those who lost homes, but I feel it is important for my 

story to be heard. 

I got a call from my daughter on the afternoon of the explosions. I was at North 

Station about to board the commuter rail home. I was under such stress, and so 

anxious, that I boarded the wrong train as I tried to understand what was happening. I made my way to the correct train while trying to juggle calls coming from 

my son, 300 miles away at school, but had heard from friends what was happening 

at home, and my daughter telling me she was trying to get out of the house with 

our dog, and other friends and family members calling and texting making sure we 

were OK. The early calls from my son were full of emotion as I tried to tell him 

that we were OK. 

I had to exit the train at North Wilmington because the train wasn’t going further 

north. It was mass confusion. My daughter & dog managed to get in the car to come 

get me in Wilmington. We drove back to North Andover to gather some belongings, 

and the scene was like nothing I had ever seen before. I entered the house with 

a flashlight so as not to spark anything. We all headed to Manchester NH to my 

fiancee. I had to use my son’s car and not mine because we were turned away from 

Merrimack Street where the commuter rail garage is and where my car was. The 

house was without power from Thursday at 6 until sometime on Saturday morning. 

I wasn’t able to get my car until Sunday when the street and the garage were 

opened. 

From that weekend and continuing to current day I, and would assume most, 

have experienced a total lack of coordinated statuses, communications and solutions. 

I remember going back to my house to put a note on the door with my cell # so 

that I could be contacted for a relight, clearly not knowing it would take 66 days 

for me to get to that point. 

I believe it was a full week after the explosions, that residents then knew the extent of the issue and had hopes of being made whole by November 19 as shared 

134 

by the recovery team. I showered for 3 weeks at the Y on the Andover/North Andover line before my commute to Boston. I bought substitute cooking appliances. I 

went to my fiancee’s every weekend with my laundry. I bought space heaters to 

warm the house a bit, which in the early days was OK, because it wasn’t that cold 

yet. 

I received 2 confirmations that an assessment team would be coming on October 

3. I stayed to work from home, put my dog in doggy daycare, and no one showed 

up. I went to work the following day to get a text from my neighbor that the crew 

was there. Thankfully my daughter was about 15 minutes away and they could get 

in and condemn all of my appliances: furnace, tankless hot water heater, dryer and 

stove. 

As the recovery options changed, I opted to have an electric hot water heater installed with my own contractor. I spent hours making calls to plumbers and electricians to come give estimates, and made arrangements to work from home so I 

could explain the situation and show them the space. About a week later, it started 

to get cold. Options were made available for alternative housing. I called my claims 

adjuster, he told me I didn’t qualify because Columbia Gas had made the investment in the hot water heater, so the assumption was that I could stay. I spent hours 

getting estimates for alternate heat options like mini-splits and pellet stoves, again, 

making arrangements to work from home to allow the workers in but couldn’t find 

a reasonable solution. 

Days later, I made the request again based on the upcoming colder forecast. It 

took 3 days for someone to get back to me with options. We were eventually provided with a trailer in Andover. We never stayed in it though, because of the inconvenience of the location. 

Then came the news conference with the announcement that they would not hit 

their deadline. My relight date went from November 9, to November 9–19, to December 7. I read the daily updates, I checked the 72-hour schedule and the interactive map almost daily. We made the decision to stay in the house as long as the 

temps at night were 40 or above. If the temps were going to be below that, I took 

the dog with me to my fiancee’s house, my daughter went to her boyfriend’s house 

in Bolton. I never really knew where I was going to be on any given day. 

Based on the December 7 date, I made the decision to self-mitigate. Again, took 

time to be home to have an HVAC contractor come, took the time to write e-mails, 

ask questions, submit estimates and eventually get something approved for a December 3 install which was the earliest my contractor could get there. I had hoped 

to have heat in my house for Thanksgiving so my son could come home & actually 

stay in his own bed. 

On November 10, my street was full of various crews. I was home because I was 

scheduled for an assessment. But there were other crews, installing emergency heat 

systems. I asked one of the workers if I was getting one and he told me I wasn’t 

on the list. I never received a call or door hanger offering that option. 

That day, the assessors determined that I was eligible for the rapid re-light. I assumed that was still my December 7 date, but a couple of days later, when I called 

to inquire about the emergency heat, Columbia Gas said my address was on the 72 

hour schedule. That was November 12. No one was home that day, nor did I get 

a call from a contractor, but Columbia Gas told me it was likely they’d be at my 

house. So I stayed home on November 13, worked in a cold house, no one came. I 

called to get additional information, and demanded to speak with a supervisor. He 

told me that I would receive a call from a contractor the night before someone would 

come. My address remained on the 72 hour schedule through November 14, and 

that was the date I finally received a call from a contractor. I let my neighbor know 

(as I live in a duplex), and made arrangements to work from home on November 

15. It was 47 degrees in my house. I’m not sure why given that it’s a duplex, my 

neighbor’s address was not on the 72-hour schedule or why he did not receive a contractor call. 

They did indeed come & work. The inspector arrived at 5. Again confusion. He 

was only provided with my neighbors address and not mine, but did the inspection. 

The Columbia contractor thought they could get the relight done that night, but 

that was not the case. So I drove back to Manchester. 

The relight happened on November 16, 66 days after the explosions. Had I known 

Columbia Gas was coming earlier, I’d have had my new appliances ready for installation. I’m thankful to have heat, but wasn’t able to do any special cooking for my 

son’s arrival home for Thanksgiving and am still doing laundry in Manchester. 

A few of my neighbors still have emergency heat. I have a generator outside of 

my front door the size of a dumpster with hoses running across the sidewalk and 

my lawn into my neighbor’s windows. It’s frightening to me to know that some peoVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00138 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
135 

ple don’t have heat and the temperature in the teens, the coldest Thanksgiving on 

record. 

My time is important. I spent far too much time and energy on this incident. Too 

much time e-mailing, calling, waiting at home. Too much time packing and unpacking my belongings and trying to plan my days. There was tremendous stress, anxiety and uncertainty. 

While I’m thankful to those on the street performing the work who work through 

the rain, snow and cold temps, I am not thankful for the miscommunications and 

disjointed efforts across subcontractors hired to answer questions. After my relight, 

I received 5 calls from various Columbia Gas centers asking if I had heat. I also 

had a knock at the door at 9:30 at night asking if I had heat. I appreciate the concern, but I think they just can’t keep up with the information as it changes, so they 

needed to be sure. I’m also thankful that my claims adjuster turned things around 

quickly, which from reading stories in the paper and hearing from neighbors at one 

of the open houses, this was not the case for many. 

I’m hopeful that this will be but a blip on the radar when I put my house in the 

market in the spring and that there are no long term impacts to the housing market 

due to fear of natural gas in the neighborhood. 

I appreciate your efforts on our behalf as well as the efforts from the offices of 

Senator Warren, Congressman Moulton, AG Maura Healey and Governor Baker, all 

of whom I’ve written. 

Please hold those responsible accountable for this. 

Kind regards, 

Laura Roffer 

978–302–0834 

John Matera from Andover: I live in Andover, MA, where the consequences of the 

Columbia Gas disaster continue to be felt. Fortunately, our home does not have natural gas service and was not directly damaged. Our community has been damaged 

greatly. 

Loss of life and destruction of dozens homes and commercial buildings is horrific. 

Friends are still without heat in their own residences. Traffic continues to severely 

restricted, making ordinary trips arduous while circumnavigating the destruction/ 

construction. Commerce is not back to normal—many retail and services business 

are still not operating normally. The loss of productivity is huge. Even if the tangible costs are remediated, the intangibles and difficult-to-quantify damages—that 

are nevertheless real—are unlikely to be addressed. 

NiSource and its subsidiary, Columbia Gas, have not evidenced any degree of 

competence in either preventing the disaster in the first place, but in making repairs or even estimating when they will be complete. No one has explained how this 

was allowed to be possible. Why weren’t redundant safeguards in place? What assurance do we have that the same level of negligence will not continue? 

My friends and neighbors live in fear or what is next. Will there be an audit of 

cybersecurity at all of the gas utilities in the country? If not, haven’t we just trained 

terrorists how to blow up cities? The likelihood of companies that allow such unsafe 

gas networks to be in place will have good computer network security is low. Are 

we one hacking incident away from another catastrophe? 

Mostly, we fear that nothing will happen at all. The utility executives and regulators will keep their jobs and get promotions and bonuses instead of being held accountable. We will continue to live with sub-standard utilities and infrastructure 

that should be an embarrassment to a nation that is supposed to lead. 

Sincerely, 

John Matera 

Isabelle Ceron from Lawrence: The worst part of the gas disaster for our family 

was that my son was alone at home in South Lawrence when the explosions happened. He is a teen, and he was terrified. He called me at work, telling me about 

the terrible gas smell, the sirens and helicopters, and I told him to get out. We met 

on the road between Lawrence and North Andover. 

Because of all the commotion we went to my sister’s house in North Andover. 

However, there too there were fires and everyone was evacuating. At first, we were 

just out in the front yard trying to understand what to do. Then we understood we 

had to evacuate—and in all the commotion we made a hotel reservation and drove 

what took about 2 hours to Manchester. Once we got there, we realized that this 

wasn’t the place where we made the reservation. We’d been so upset we didn’t write 

down the name correctly. The place we went to didn’t have space. So, we turned 

136 

around and went back to North Andover and stayed the night at home. We knew 

we weren’t supposed to, but the gas and the electricity were out, and we had nowhere else to go, so we stayed home. 

The next morning, we went to Lowell to eat, since there was nothing open around 

us, and we didn’t feel comfortable staying home. 

We were lucky that our gas was turned on after the first weekend, since we were 

on a high-pressure line. My sister stayed with us for 65 days until her gas was returned. 

Elsa Berroa from Lawrence: First, it’s important that the senate committee understand that we were all subjected to a terrifying event. I was certain that I was not 

going to survive on the evening of Sept. 13th. I heard sirens and helicopters and 

heard something rushing out of the basement of our triple decker. There was a terrible odor of gas, and I realized the rushing sound was the gas coming out. I ran 

for my life onto the street—and then I saw that a house down the block was already 

on fire, and the street was filling with smoke. We hopped in the car and evacuated 

with everyone else as quickly as possible. We went to stay at one of our children’s 

homes. 

A painful headache started that evening and has plagued me on and off frequently since then. When evening comes, I feel jumpy and afraid—as if again this 

awful fear and dread will overtake me. I feel so relieved that the over pressurization 

of gas didn’t happen at night—we all would have been asphyxiated in our beds. 

There are two kids upstairs, my granddaughter on my floor, and a child downstairs. 

I think of how we all could have been gone. 

We remained evacuated for 4 days, and when we returned at last our apartment 

had no gas appliances. 

We were told a space heater couldn’t be installed even though we requested it. 

It was a hardship for us to purchase our own space heaters, but we had to. Even 

though we could get reimbursed from Columbia Gas, it wasn’t an easy process. I 

don’t have Internet or a scanner at home, and I’m retired, so it was a lot of trouble 

to get reimbursed. Perhaps if this ever happens again the gas company should accept pictures of receipts to make reimbursement easier or provide cash before a purchase is made. 

To cook, we were supplied a hot plate. I cooked on the hot plate, an electric fry 

pan, and the microwave. No hot water, which was very uncomfortable. 

Then it began to get quite cold out, and it was very uncomfortable to be in the 

house. We requested a trailer close to our home for temporary shelter. We’re on a 

limited income, and it was too much for us to go far to a hotel, have meal and gas 

expenses, and be uncertain if we’d be reimbursed, since Columbia Gas said they’d 

provide me a refillable debit card—but the funds were never put on it. Therefore, 

I couldn’t trust leaving my cold apartment to go far away. SO I requested a trailer, 

and was told by the claims agent they would call me back. I called again, waited, 

was transferred, and was told again that they’d call back. There was so much negligence in setting up the temporary housing. After about literally a month, and after 

getting very cold, I finally had a friend of mine who works for the city call Columbia 

Gas. They did give us a trailer that night—but far from home. I went to the site 

and saw the mayor there, and he finally got us set up for a trailer close to our home. 

We moved there the next day. 

However, the thing about the trailers is that they turned off the heat when we 

left the site, and we had to request that they turn it back on, and then had to wait 

for the space to heat up. It was certainly a nuisance. I didn’t cook in the trailer 

because I don’t want to use gas. 

So, 63 days after the explosions I still get headaches in the afternoon. I still have 

trouble sleeping—I stay up watching boring TV with the hopes of sleeping, but really have a hard time getting to sleep at night. And I am still afraid of gas—and am 

so happy that my landlord got us an electric stove. All of this has made me wonder 

why I don’t just leave all this trouble and retire to my native Dominican Republic. 

Alice Fulton from Lawrence: While checking on my 92 year old mother in Haverhill on September 13, 2018, as I do every day, life as we know it changed for the 

foreseeable future. My wife, Lora, had received word from a friend that houses were 

exploding in Lawrence and surrounding towns, and nobody knew why. i agreed to 

go home, get the cats, and she’d meet me there so we could decide what to do. I 

was battling a heart condition at the time, so was moving very slowly. As I walked 

past one apartment at my mother’s residence, I heard a television news report stating that people just didn’t know if their houses would be next to explode, since noVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
137 

body knew why the first seventy homes were on fire. One of those homes is 1/4 mile 

from ours, and was completely lost because there were no more crews to fight new 

fires at the early point when it broke out. 

Approaching Lawrence on Route 495 it looked like a war zone, with smoke billowing from several house fires across the horizon of Lawrence, Andover, and North 

Andover. The confusion, lack of communication, and lack of disaster planning were 

on the horizon as well, though we were unaware of its effects at that point. The 

automatic response from other cities and towns was amazing. I saw emergency vehicles that were like no others I had ever seen before, and as the days ticked by thereafter, they were joined by fire apparatus, police, and gas company workers from farreaching cities and towns like Boston, Brookline, Holbrook, Randolph, and Atkinson, 

NH. 

Once home, it took me nearly an hour to gather the cats, place some low-sodium 

foods in a bag to eat wherever we were to land, and load all this with a few bags 

of clothing and personal items (including my new medications) into my car. As I 

made one more pass around our home to assure that I had not forgotten anything 

essential, a neighbor pounded on the front door, asking to be let into the area where 

our gas meter was located. He had an off-duty fireman with him, who was voluntarily shutting off the gas in any homes he could. After the gas was shut off, I sat 

to gather my thoughts and catch my breath on the bench outside our garage. Lora 

arrived shortly from work in Boston, reporting that traffic was already at a standstill on roads leading out of Lawrence. As we began to process what we knew of 

the situation, which was only the beginning of the uncertainty that became ‘‘the new 

normal’’ of the next few months, some neighbors joined us, one of whom had a scanner. We all sat in our yard, hearing that it was taking hours for traffic to leave the 

area, that there was already one break-in at a house on a street nearby, and discussing that our only options for the night were to go hours away where we would 

have no hope of monitoring the situation directly. We, and our other two closest 

neighbors, decided to stay put, as we were unwilling to leave our cats, nor to be 

stuck in traffic for hours to go . . . where. . .? Nothing seemed like a better alternative, since our gas had been shut off already. 

At approximately 8pm, electricity was shut off to the area. For the next three 

days until it was restored, we quickly opened the refrigerator to get what we could, 

heated things on the gas grill (including making packaged ramen noodles on the 

grill), and used rechargeable light bars to see at night (that I had thankfully kept 

charged for emergencies). We periodically sat in our vehicles, engines running, for 

hours to recharge devices so that we could get any news at all. Devices seem to 

charge faster if the vehicle is moving, but we didn’t dare drive farther than around 

the immediate block, because people were not being allowed into the area during 

the rumored evacuation. The rest of the world knew more about what had happened 

than we did, it seemed, since we had no access to television. 

The first night had been eerie, at best, with helicopters flying about all night, no 

light, and a plan we had devised in case someone came to the door in the darkness. 

At 2:30 a.m. we were awakened by pounding on our front door; a Boston Police Officer, and a gas company employee from Fall River came to check that our gas was, 

indeed, shut off. He determined that it was, and they moved on. At 2:00 p.m. the 

following day, another crew came to check the same thing. It’s great that three different people/crews came to assure that the gas was off, but as the months marched 

on, it would have been better if crews knew what other crews had already done. 

We were visited by no less than four different crews to do the same thing at most 

every step of the restoration process. We liken it to always expecting company, 

never sure when they will arrive, and never arriving when they have said they 

would, so we could never leave or stop looking out the windows. The interactive 

maps and 72-hour lists were never accurate; more on that to follow. 

Three days after the electricity was shut off to the area it was restored, and that 

made things easier, but there was still a lot of uncertainty and lack of information. 

We had no idea when or how gas service could be restored, so the wait began. We 

made sure there would always be someone home, as we knew nothing about when 

someone might stop by to do something toward that goal. After a week or two, we 

stopped waiting, as the information just was not coming (and what little that came 

was inaccurate), so we went about our business, returning to work and keeping appointments. Sure enough, when Lora was at work in Boston and I was at a medical 

appointment in Brookline, a neighbor called her to say that someone was there to 

begin some phase of work at our house. She rushed home in the middle of her work 

day, determining that she’d get there quicker than I would, and met them within 

an hour. The neighbor had detained them for us, otherwise, who knows how long 

it would have been before anyone came back (we received zero notes on the door 

to say that someone had missed us, no calls in advance of workers coming until the 

138 

very last stage of the work/relight, and people coming by unannounced in almost 

every case). 

Columbia Gas made the effort to publish information that they felt was accurate, 

but it never was. For some reason, our street was never on the lists stating what 

streets were to be worked on over certain days, so we were unsure if we were in 

the queue at all. The interactive map was a great idea, but was never accurate, 

changing our expected work dates four times over, sometimes stating that work was 

done that was not done (so we would not be on their radar to come do it), and taking 

four days to be updated. Every call we made or contact in person was with people 

who were referring to the same information, so they were telling us that phases of 

the work were completed at our house that were not. Adjustor #3 refused to approve 

an alternate heating source because their data stated that our gas would be restored 

within four days of that conversation, which was not close to what actually occurred. 

We attended forums, sought resources, and had to fight for everything we’ve been 

reimbursed for so far. It has taken three hours per day to do this job, including 

monitoring websites for information, speaking with workers in the streets and 

neighbors/reading local message boards for real time information, standing in lines, 

deciphering published information that isn’t necessarily accurate, learning new terminology, and fighting for what we were promised. We are on our fourth adjustor; 

I never even dealt with #3, #4 has changed the rules for things I was told by #2 

regarding reimbursement of lost wages, and #2 tried to refuse our claim for a replacement five-burner stove with convection oven by trying to talk me into whatever 

they would provide (no convection oven, four burners, ordinary stove). Is Columbia 

Gas prepared to reimburse us somehow for that time? **(UPDATE: I JUST missed 

a call while writing this from Adjustor #4 checking to see if I received his e-mail 

(I haven’t), leaving me a telephone number to call back that states that the voice 

mail box is not set up, so I can’t reach him to tell him any of this.)** 

We are fortunate that we were able to afford to install a temporary electric water 

heater for $1,900, and purchase a suitable stove, awaiting reimbursement for both. 

Not everyone is well enough to withstand indoor temperatures below fifty degrees, 

as worries began about the need to drain pipes and evacuate our home. We are fortunate to have had gas restoration completed immediately prior to the fifteen degree 

night before Thanksgiving. We are fortunate that we are able to self-advocate and 

persist to get our needs met. Others are not, and their stories are heartbreaking. 

I hope that our story helps in some way to tirelessly continue the fight to get the 

needs met for every last person affected by this incident. This is not over yet, even 

for those of us whose service has been restored. Pipeline work should have taken 

place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, not taking whole days off for rain, Sundays 

off, and many not working on Saturdays. The remaining work should not have run 

into freezing weather, with people displaced from their homes, now indefinitely, 

while four crews come to do the same work. We were fortunate that Lora could work 

from home for this time period, but there were days when she had meetings that 

she could not miss, so I had to lose a day’s pay to also be home for work to be done. 

I anticipate another fight to recover lost wages due to that uncertainty. Our furnace 

is installed and operational, but not adjusted properly, so we need to spend more 

time pursuing adjustments once triage is completed for people who have no heat. 

Thank you for pursuing resolution of these issues, for speaking for those who can’t 

or can’t as effectively, and for caring about what we’ve been through as well as what 

is still to come. 

Lynne Rudnicki from North Andover: I have a couple of questions. 1. Our street 

lines and meter equipment have been converted to allow high pressure gas. Is the 

pressure on street lines now or in the near future being increased to high pressure. 

2. Will residents receive prior notice of increasing the pressure of the gas on the 

street lines? Note: many residents have experienced gas leaks after installation of 

new service lines and equipment change. Prior notice should be required so we can 

know to be aware. 3. Only the lines which experienced over pressurization in our 

three communities have been replaced. How many miles of gas lines and meters are 

needed to bring the rest to current standards. 4. Since the impacted areas have very 

irregular boundaries, will there be prioritization to finish replacing aged leaky pipes 

and updating the gas meter equipment in our communities. Residents of the impacted areas will certainly be concerned for a long time about nearby lines which 

have not been repaired. 

139 

Thomas Schaefer from North Andover: Here is a quick summary of our two month 

nightmare . . . 

• When Columbia Gas relocated our gas meter from indoor to outdoor, they installed the pipe to connect the gas main to our existing gas line within the 

home. When our plumbers did a pressure test on this line, they noticed there 

was a leak 

• We witnessed endless amounts of misinformation. A Columbia Gas rep I called 

on the phone rudely informed me that if I were to have my stove and dryer installed by someone other than Columbia Gas that I would be liable for all damages. 

• We stayed in our house the entire time (some days the temperature was 47 degrees inside) and Columbia Gas was only willing to reimburse me $7 of my $160 

electric bill for October. 

• The three hour window for a Columbia Gas rep to come and install the gas 

meter and relight our home turned into 7 hours of waiting 

My wife and I began our journey through the Merrimack Valley Explosions by returning home from vacation exactly 24 hours after the initial event occurred. We 

had no direct experience with the way emergency services handled the evacuation 

but were told by our neighbors of the chaos and diligent efforts by both the police 

and firefighters in immediate response to a growing catastrophe. 

From the beginning of the experience we were not informed of the scale of damages done throughout our neighboring towns. We were reliant on the news for information almost immediately. As the first week progressed we didn’t receive a call 

until, at earliest, September 21st, 8 days after the event. 

I was forced to gain any real information from social media accounts held by Columbia Gas and neighbors. Columbia Gas did nothing to communicate the extensive 

amount of damage that occurred during the emergency. 

We attempted our first claim at a claims center set up by Columbia Gas located 

at First and Main in North Andover. After speaking with a representative who did 

not work directly for Columbia Gas he informed us that they would be offering us 

$100 gift card to help with initial expenses, we didn’t end up accepting it as the 

representative claimed that if we accepted it sometimes Homeowners insurance 

could be denied as we accepted benefits from a separate entity. 

Approximately one week after our first interaction we were informed that we 

would be receiving a call from Columbia Gas to set up and delivered space heaters. 

We never received that call. We were forced to find alternative ways to heat our 

home and deliver hot water. I made a purchase of a propane burner that would 

allow us to heat up large quantities of water for bathing and washing up. 

Desperate for information we continuously called the Merrimack Valley affected 

customer line provided by Columbia gas for answers to our mounting questions. No 

information was provided other than requests for our patience as they continued 

their work. After continually reaching out for information and not receiving it we 

began to get frustrated. Columbia gas then announced that they wouldn’t be making 

their deadline and if you wanted to have the problems solved it would be quicker 

to self-mediate their issues. I would rather have gone this route because I didn’t not 

trust Columbia Gas to attempt to repair my appliances. We contacted a company 

to quote us for the work they said was required for us to receive gas again. By then 

we had a claims adjuster that worked for Columbia Gas to work on our claim. After 

a lot of back and forth I received a commitment to pay for the work. I paid $6,000.00 

out of pocket to reserve a time for the work to be completed on November 19th and 

waited for Columbia Gas to pay for the new equipment. And still, there was little 

to no information being shared with people in the affected area. 

After purchasing a new dryer and stove we contacted a separate company to install our new equipment I called Columbia Gas to make sure that it was OK to do 

so. The women on the phone rudely informed me that if I were to have my stove 

and dryer installed by someone other than Columbia Gas that I would be liable for 

all damages. I asked her how she figured that as we had in no way affected the 

safety of our home to which she replied if anything happens we are liable. This was 

the final straw for me in contacting Columbia Gas as I knew that the people they 

put in charge of communications were severely unqualified and frankly disrespectful. 

At this point we noticed our deadline for restorations had been updated on Columbia Gas’s restoration map. The dates on the map changed each week and never really provided us any valid information. We were now on the 72 hour list for restoration with a relight date the day after the work I had requested from our plumber 

would be completed. 

140 

We were on the 72 hour list for 10 days without a single call or visit. I took time 

of work to make sure we wouldn’t miss our opportunity to have gas restored. They 

never showed. The last week however I received several calls. Sometimes 4 times 

a day to make sure I had been contacted. I repeated the same information several 

times to not bother me as I was self-mitigating the damages and had received 

money from claims to pay for the work. Three times we had Columbia Gas representatives showing up at my home asking to do the same inspection of my home. 

I informed them each time that they had already done this work. They told me that 

the organization of Columbia gas was abysmal and unorganized. On Sunday, November 18th Columbia Gas relocated our gas meter from indoor to outdoor, they installed the pipe to connect the gas main to our existing gas line within the home. 

When our plumbers did a pressure test on this line, they noticed there was a leak 

On November 21st the work in my home had been completed and I needed to call 

the relight team to turn on my gas. Everything had been inspected and approved. 

I was told the earliest the Columbia Gas employee could make it was three hours. 

I needed the meter installed and gas to be turned on by an official employee. The 

three-hour window I was given ran up and I called again. I was told an employee 

had me scheduled. After another hour I called again asking when I could expect the 

employee. I was told 9 pm, seven hours after I was initially told three hours. I sent 

the plumbers (who has been waiting in my basement for the past five hours) home 

as I can expect them to put in 14 hours in a day. When 9pm rolled around I called 

for the last time saying that I didn’t believe they were coming. And employee 

showed up at 9:45pm and the first thing he said to me was ‘‘please don’t tell me 

you have steam heat’’ of course we do! They called in a plumber who got my boiler 

lit and ready for heat. On November 22nd at 1:45am I had my appliances restored 

to previous condition and our nightmare was over. I have never seen a company 

more unorganized . . . you would think after two months of this they would have 

had established a better system instead of the complete chaos we witnessed. 

One of the worst parts for me, was how cheap Columbia Gas was being with the 

claims reimbursements. They refused to pay our October electric bill. We had to 

send them July–November 2017 electric bills and compared it July–October 2018 

and the currently bill. They only willing to reimburse us $7. Not sure why they 

would compare it to summer months when we run our ACs non-stop. That was comparing apples to oranges. The whole time we stayed at home, while only being able 

to run one space heater at a time. We obviously used more electricity than we normally would have. 

With each passing week it got harder and harder to live the way we were living. 

Some days our house averaged 49 degrees. 

After all the stress and anxiety we went through these past two months I don’t 

feel comfortable having Columbia Gas as our gas company in Massachusetts. We 

saw how they reacted in a disaster. I feel disgusted thinking back on how this whole 

process unfolded and the lack of Columbia Gas’s response. They made us feel like 

we were the burden when we had to alter our lives for the past 65 days. 

Maureen Elliot from Andover: We have owned our house in Andover fog over 30- 

years with virtually no water our basement flooded and Columbia Gas refused to 

pay for a French drain and other repairs. What people have gone through, is beyond 

disgusting. 

Carolyn Bonier from Lawrence: I was one of the lucky ones. I had my gas back 

on in 4 days. However, the night the disaster happened was the most upsetting 

night I have ever experienced. I am 79 years old and live alone with my dog. I was 

watching TV when the explosions started happening. In a few minutes I lost power. 

When I went out on my deck, I could smell smoke, hear sirens and three helicopters 

were circling over head. I later learned that the closest explosion was about 10 

houses away from mine. A neighbor came by with a wrench and turned off my gas. 

I decided to go to visit my husband who is in a nursing home, thinking he would 

be worried about me. When I got to the nursing home I learned that everyone in 

the disaster area had been told to evacuate and that there would be police barricades blocking off entry to South Lawrence. I began to get very upset because I had 

left my dog at home. I knew I had to get her but I was afraid I wouldn’t be allowed 

into the neighborhood. I decided to wait until about 9:30 to go to get her thinking 

there might be less police presence. I had decided I would walk in if I was blocked 

from driving in. Also I had nowhere to spend the night because my friends with cats 

would not allow me to come with my dog. I got to the barricade on the edge of my 

neighborhood around 10 PM and, after sitting in a line of cars for about 20 minutes, 

141 

I was told by the officer that I could get my dog but to ‘‘hurry back’’. I went to my 

house and fed the dog and went to bed. I felt that I couldn’t use a flashlight or even 

my cell phone because the light might alert the police and they might think I was 

an intruder. I had real difficulty getting any sleep. I felt strange hiding from the 

police. They drove by with their blue lights on frequently. The next morning, a 

friend with a dog offered me a place to stay and my nightmare was over. However 

for the next few weeks, I cried whenever I thought about that night. I jumped whenever I heard a siren and felt depressed in general. If I reacted so strongly from one 

night of trauma, I can only imagine how bad it must be for the thousands who have 

suffered for months because of this disaster. 

Alice Fulton from Lawrence: Still writing, please check back tonight, when I will 

submit. Need to go do parent care now, but will get it in tonight. Thank you! 

Dr. Angela and John Barnes from Andover: We have been displaced from our 

home, due to the Columbia Gas explosions since September 13th 2018. We were able 

to stay in our affected home until then solely because the weather cooperated and 

was above 55 degrees. 

As of today, November 25th 2018 we STILL do not have heat or hot water in our 

home and we are ALSO without electricity. Yes, there are NO working utilities in 

our home. 

We reside as tenants in our historic Shawsheen home which did not pass the electrical capacity test in order to run even temporary heating solutions in the current 

voltage setting. The homeowners (residence is in trust) are making decisions from 

other locations and are removed from the situation. You can understand the trickle 

effect this is having on us all. 

I am sure our story is similar to that of other families displaced and impacted. 

We are working professionals and also owners of businesses, missed time at work 

is not ‘‘simply’’ forgiven by ‘‘missed wages’’ paid by Columbia Gas. We have careers 

and cannot ‘‘just’’ miss work. There are other implications longstanding due to 

missed days due to this Columbia Gas disaster. 

Contractors, who don’t show up on time or show up out of the blue due to poorly 

coordinated efforts are upsetting, when we have changed our work schedule according to the online information link per Columbia Gas and this ridiculous contradictory information on the Columbia Gas website regarding relight dates. The IT efforts at the back end change our home address relight dates DAILY. We have 

learned that we cannot rely on any information listed. Why is this public information listed incorrectly and updated incorrectly daily? Who needs this incorrect information? It’s not provided for the residents. Is it to satisfy safety or government 

guidelines? 

We have also had the unfortunate circumstance of daily communication with adjusters who won’t work with us on approval for everyday and necessary expenses, 

even though, keep in mind, Columbia Gas is the one who created this mess. 

We don’t have all day to run back and forth to a laundry room at a hotel or laundry mat?? We have a system in our home to make laundry, food and work all happen, which we can no longer use. Our basic rights disrupted and at the mercy of 

adjusters to decide. 

In the immediacy after the disaster we scrambled from a hotel in Danvers to 

maintain our careers and commute while driving back and forth to take children 

safely to school in Andover, waking children up at 5am to feed them breakfast and 

paying additional childcare costs to drop them off early at school so we could have 

enough time to drive around in newly created traffic. 

When we were able to safely return to our home we had 25 days of residence 

WITHOUT the use of hot water where we microwave water to fill our bathtub and 

or take sponge baths. Do you know how long it takes to fill a bathtub of water on 

the second floor of a home to properly clean 3 children (never mind we parents)? 

I can tell you. It took 2.5 hours of continuously going up and down the stairs. Cooking on a hot plate and microwaving food for children and all the while trying to keep 

our own health. How can one spend that many hours a day bathing and cooking 

while trying to keep up with professional work obligations and also keep some semblance of a healthy home for children??? Pretending like all is well to mitigate any 

further stress on the children? 

We relocated permanently to a hotel on October 8th 2018, only with the assistance of Jim Lyons as on my own I was unable to find a Columbia Gas, Worley or 

Adjuster who would APPROVE a direct bill on our hotel room. 

142 

We were told countless times by Columbia Gas, Worley and Adjusters that they 

only would only approve one queen bedroom with a shower for five people before 

for 4 weeks of time, despite the fact that I had a private reservation for a two bdrm 

hotel in Tewksbury at a corporate rate! 

Since the move to our hotel room, we are grateful to have a roof over our heads 

however one needs to understand it doesn’t all end there. It’s no vacation, no fun, 

no break from it all. Now we must rise at 4:30am daily, pay for additional school 

drop/childcare to drop for 7am so we are able to continue our careers and operate 

our businesses just to make it on time. These are additional expenses above and 

beyond what is reimbursed by Columbia Gas, Worley or adjusters. I was told these 

expenses would be denied. 

Maybe this experience seems trivial to the executives and management of Columbia Gas. Multiply these types of situations—increased traffic, missed work, etc due 

this situation becomes stressful beyond comprehension, from an event that really 

should not have happened at all. 

Our story tends to diverge from others because we have 3 children under age 8 

yrs, one of whom has special needs. Try speaking to children about this situation. 

When our children ask when will we be back in our home, our answer is, truthfully, 

‘‘we don’t know’’. Who knows, truthfully, if we will be back to our home by Christmas. Columbia Gas is such a joke. Try answering questions about, ‘‘how Santa will 

find us mommy and daddy?’’ 

How are parents supposed to put on Christmas from a hotel room??? From the 

looks of our nonoperational home, we will be spending Christmas like Thanksgiving. 

Thanksgiving was not one we’d like to relive as we were not only not able to host 

our family, we were not able to experience our traditions, we weren’t able to teach 

our children about our family traditions or serve OUR abundant bountiful traditional meal—from our family. 

Sure, the dinner provided by Columbia Gas was a nice half-measure. Really, that 

is all it was. We waited in a car line for an hour to wait for food, thinking ‘‘this 

should have never happened to us’’. I would rather have spent that precious hour 

of time with my family. 

This is what Columbia Gas needs to hear. Our lives have BEEN TURNED UPSIDE DOWN, whether it is waiting in line, waiting on the phone to speak to someone, waiting for a contractor has been extremely disrupted by the negligence of Columbia Gas. Compound these situations by months and months of NO answers, no 

wonder why our community is unsettled and uneasy. 

John and Angela Barnes 

Denise Velez from Lawrence: This nightmare began for us Sept 13th at around 

4:30. We were lucky to not have started cooking our dinners yet. My parents own 

the home I live in. Its technically a 2 family but it is 1. I live upstairs with my 

2 girls and my elderly parents live downstairs. 

On the day this started their was nothing on the news on TV or radio, phones 

nothing. We evacuated across our street lawn and garden store in front of our 

homes. Only through word of mouth, facebook, and neighbors listening to scanners 

were we even slightly aware of what was happening. We sat at a loading dock surrounded by burning and exploding homes. Smoke in every direction. Watched smoke 

surround my home and worried that my home was not hit with fire. I was one of 

the ‘‘lucky’’ ones on my street. Out of 8 others the blasting furnaces stopped only 

2 doors down. The three homes before that had charred, melted furnaces, and burnt 

basements. Luckily a neighbor was a firefighters son. His knowledge helped us. 

That night we slept with our eyes open, listening to the news on the radio. My kids 

anxiety was greater then I’ve ever seen before and they’ve been through some awful 

trauma. They begged and pleaded for us to leave but we had nowhere to go till the 

morning. The only person saying there was any threat to our safety was Mayor Rivera. Columbia gas was a ghost!!! They did not communicate to first responders nor 

residents. 

Eversource was put into play and things started moving. I had to be placed in 

a hotel because I am handicapped. Need the hot water. I am in a wheelchair and 

I use a cpap and nebulizer. They got us back into our homes 4 days after the explosions. Then we realized Columbia had finally stepped up and was trying to cover 

their tracts. Since CG took over there has been a constant barrage of people in and 

out of our home doing the same thing the other has done. 

No one at CG would give me an answer to a simple problem. I had an old 

143 

William Sahlas from North Andover: My family’s daily routines were altered and 

disrupted by, and because of, the Columbia Gas disaster. My wife works for the City 

of Somerville as a teacher in 3rd grade. Someone in her situation would NOT have 

had the necessary free-time bandwidth nor cooperation from her employer to recover 

from the disaster without the help of a significant other. I was able to be the primary person in the family to be the contact and liaison to Columbia Gas restoration 

efforts because of my employers cooperation. If it were not for a very understanding 

employer, Brightcove Inc. HQ at 290 Congress St. Boston MA, I would not have 

been able to successfully undergo the steps needed to navigate the recovery efforts. 

These steps and efforts are still going on today. There’s bookkeeping and accounting to deal with keeping track of the costs for repairs and appliance replacements. 

There was significant time involved to be with those who were doing the appliance 

replacements and home repairs. The hours that I put into the recovery efforts were 

very significant. 

I cannot imagine how some others are dealing with this ordeal who have not the 

same understanding employers or the financial means to fund the repairs needed 

while waiting to be reimbursed. Not to mention the temporary heating sources that 

had to be put in place. 

Having lived through the ordeal I feel that we are owed more than just an apology 

from the NiSource/Columbia Gas. The cold showers and cold rooms and disrupted 

holiday season as a result of the disaster will not be soon forgotten. Thanks for the 

memories Columbia Gas. 

Regards, 

William G. Sahlas 

43 Woodbridge Rd 

North Andover MA 01845 

Rachel McEnroe from Andover: This fall, we have been part of the affected area 

of the Merrimack gas explosion. We were evacuated for 2–3 days, went two months 

without hot water, just got a portion of our heat back last week (November 20th) 

and still have not had our stove and oven inspected and turned on. While dealing 

with this for a short period was OK, over the fall it had a significant impact on our 

daily routine (who wants to exercise when it requires you to heat up water on a 

hot plate in your bathroom in order to shower) and has taken a lot of energy and 

time to ’self-mitigate’ by arranging for new equipment, plumbers, and inspectors to 

come by—and we are very lucky that we could handle the upfront costs ahead of 

reimbursement. While we have hot plates to cook at home and have been OK, the 

local restaurants have all been closed for two months and we typically rely on takeout or dining out 1–2x/week because of busy schedules and that too has been both 

an added drain on us and a tough thing for our local economy. I cannot imagine 

what this would have been like had we not had some heat or had a gas dryer or 

had to relocate because of those things. There needs to be better safety procedures 

put in place for this kind of work and better state or Federal oversight. 

Carolyne Popescu-Pretor from Andover: THIS IS A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEM! USA missed the wake-up call many years ago. 

On September 13th we had gas fumes in our condominium. Our family needed 

to leave immediately. We also had dirty water. Our water was so dirty, it clogged 

the furnace valves. While we have numerous workers troubleshooting the situation, 

we currently have no hot water. On a record cold Thanksgiving Day, we had no 

heat. I’m genuinely concerned there was error in determining the correct replacement gas-fired boiler for our unit. 

The initial install date for our boiler was October 8th. Today is Sunday, November 

25th, I have heat—but no hot water. We have not had consistent heat and hot water 

since the initial incident. Naturally, the current potential for cyber incidents affecting pipeline business systems is a national concern. Leaving this tremendous responsibility of public safety to private industry is reckless. The blame game, please 

lets not be niave. 

https://energypost.eu/vulnerability-electric-utility-system-cyber-attacks/ 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018–04–04/cyberattack-bleeds-into-utility-space-as-duke-sees-billing-delay 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2018/03/28/how-on-earth-did-russia-hackour-energy-systems/#73d7a21a6104 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-russia/russian-hackers-penetratednetworks-of-u-s-electric-utilities-wsj-idUSKBN1KE03F 

144 

https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/russian-hackingattacks-us-power-grid-sewage-explosions-a8462691.html 

https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-gain-switch-flipping-access-to-us-powersystems/ 

Carolyne Popescu-Pretor 

Jorma McSwiggan Hong from Lawrence: Dear Senator Markey, 

First, I’d like to thank you and the other representatives for coming to our community today, it is encouraging to find that many of my own concerns were those 

voiced by you and your colleagues. I left a handwritten testimony today, not realizing that there was an online platform available, and didn’t include any of my personal information. For ease of documentation, I thought it might be a good idea to 

submit my testimony electronically as well. My household was affected as well, but 

I focus here on the effects of the community as I witnessed while working in Lawrence. I’m currently a graduate student studying public health, but until very recently 

and including the months following the disaster, I was working as a nutrition educator in the Lawrence Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program. The office 

serves low income pregnant and breastfeeding mothers and their children. This is 

a community that cooks daily, typically from scratch. It took one mother three hours 

to cook the afternoon meal for her family on a hotplate. Another mother, pregnant, 

experienced increased nausea and vomiting while relying on convenience take-out 

foods that she would not typically have chosen to eat. Pregnancy and infancy are 

short windows in which to begin healthy development, and to an extent this was 

disrupted by the explosions and subsequent displacement of our communities. Mothers who had frozen breastmilk in anticipation of returning to work lost their supply 

as it thawed during the power outage in the days immediately following the explosions. Some mothers were unable to continue breastfeeding their infants, so great 

was the disruption of the evacuation and multiple relocations. This interruption potentially has life-long health risks to the infants affected. Breastfeeding in the first 

6 months of life, per WHO recommendations, is attributed to helping establish the 

immune system, reducing allergies, and protecting against type II diabetes and certain types of cancer. In the event of a disaster such as this, it is important to recognize that in addition to the immediate damages endured, the health of a future generation has been affected as well. 

Thank you again, Senator, for your time and representation of the Merrimack 

Valley community. 

Sincerely, 

Jorma McSwiggan-Hong 

Elizabeth Cunningham from Andover: Lack of clear plan and protocols to restore 

power. Teams of 8–10 would arrive together at homes numerous times, often dirty 

and disruptive. I am a 73 year old retiree who ended up flagging down a Columbia 

Gas VA truck driving down my street. He was kind enough to give me his phone 

number, which I called often to receive step-by-step directions. He sent the right 

person my way each step of the way. Without his assistance and my financial resources, I still would not have heat. I had numerous visits after I had heat, as CG 

was clueless as to the status of individual homes. 

It was clear that Columbia needed to assign a project leader to each street, and 

provide residents with their phone number. Recovery required leaders, as you can’t 

just throw people onto a disaster without a clear plan. 

Maureen Omara from Andover: On September 13th I went home to find an in tact 

house and there hadn’t been a fire, thankfully, but not being able to get into my 

house and not knowing whether it was safe to even be standing in my front yard 

was a very unsettling feeling, one that took a few days to resolve. Trying to get to 

where I was staying and then back to work the next day, wearing the same clothes 

as the day before, and then trying to figure out how to get the logistics for my weekend guest and myself to get someplace else was a task in it’s own right. Knowing 

the gas was turned off when I was able to go back home was better, however I still 

had to deal with the unknown. The days that followed were spent trying to figure 

out where to shower if I didn’t want to take an ice cold one in my home and/or what 

and where to eat—that was a bigger battle as I have an autoimmune disease and 

try to eat a specialized diet. People who were not affected were great in reaching 

out offering up a place to shower, do laundry and have a home cooked meal. The 

145 

YMCA was great in providing a space to shower but it was just one more thing to 

try to find time to do in an already tight schedule. There were mornings I just 

sucked it up and took a freezing cold shower—not a great way to start your day. 

Then there was coordinating when I had to be home for someone to come to assess 

my home—could we get a space heater? I live in a very old home so I knew that 

wouldn’t happen. I had to take off time from work to do so during one of the busiest 

times for me. The next day Columbia Gas announced there wouldn’t be any more 

appointments as they were going to use the approach that everyone would need new 

systems and appliances; that was incredibly aggravating. After that it was like radio 

silence—when would someone come back? Would I have to be home? How much notice would I really get so I could be sure I could miss work. Every day in limbo. 

When the opportunity arose to relocate to a hotel as I live in the affected area, 

I took the steps to do so; that was a process in its own right and was just one more 

thing that you didn’t know when you were going to be contacted. When I finally was 

a message was left saying there was a reservation for me at the Embassy Suites 

at Logan Airport however there was no information left as to when the reservation 

would start, what might I have to pay for. etc. It took five different phone calls to 

get the information and it turned out the reservation had started the day before. 

Yet one more thing to be aggravated about. I appreciated having a place to go but 

the fact that I work in Wilmington meant for an even longer day every day. I was 

at the hotel for almost five weeks. 

Trying to keep up with the tasks associated with this mess became and continues 

to be exhausting and almost as if I have an additional part-time job. Not knowing 

what to expect—more importantly what information to trust has truly been the 

greatest source of my frustrations around this event. When will someone be at my 

house to inspect it? Will someone actually show up when they are supposed to be 

on my street? What if someone comes and I am not home—will then come back and 

when? What could you get reimbursed for as far as expenses? Is the map posted 

online the actual work plan or will that change? What could you actually get reimbursed for? I heard different things from different claims adjusters, neighbors and 

others affected. That kept changing and continues to this day to change. Information about what you can still be reimbursed for changes too depending on what you 

read and hear from others. Having to keep pestering my claims adjuster about the 

weekly per diem and getting continued clarification about what was and wasn’t reimbursable—that became a regular task; he was just as frustrated at times as the 

information kept changing. Different people calling—about claims, the status of the 

work being done at my home, etc.—trying to return phone calls and having to play 

phone tag—more time sucked up and more frustrations. The daily updates—great 

that Columbia Gas tried to keep us informed—but most of it was information none 

of us really needed. We wanted to know if our street was listed as a work site to 

be gas ready/house ready was that really the case? Having an actual window of time 

someone needed to be home would have helped so we could try to plan to continue 

to go to work and take care of things we needed to/wanted to. There are things that 

are still unknown—when will my stove come off of backorder and then, realistically, 

how long will it take to get installed (and the old one removed from my house)? I 

understand this situation is one that hasn’t been experienced before and there are 

many moving parts and many people with a say in what happens or doesn’t happen 

however I still feel things could have been a little more streamlined; even there had 

been one phone number to call to have your questions answered about everything 

instead having to reach out to different people and/or physically go places—that 

would have been an improvement. 

I am fortunate that I am a renter with a proactive landlord as if that wasn’t the 

case, I more than likely would still be living at the Embassy Suites at Logan Airport. I am fortunate that I’m not afraid to be proactive, have stayed on top of things 

and have a responsive claims adjuster who continues to reach out and make sure 

I have what I need. Each day though I come home to take care of another ’Columbia 

Gas’ task. I’m tired and just want things to go back to normal. 

Richard Oneil from Andover: About 10 years ago we had a non ignited explosion 

in the front of our house in the middle of our street which was caused by a leaky 

gas main it did not catch fire but we were evacuated none the less there was never 

a cause or response or any such information given to us and this just solidified our 

feeling of unsafeness. It’s obvious that the infrastructure is failing all over the area, 

what are they going to do? Perhaps replace all lines? 

146 

Howard Garshman from Auburn: Senator Markey—I applaud you efforts re: Columbia Gas, unfortunately you are not seeing the larger picture. The DAILY dangers and risks the gas companies are exposing an unknowing public too, make what 

happened in Merrimack look like a firecracker. 

Frank Dushame from North Andover: Good Morning Mr. Markey: 

It was a very chaotic day and time for all affected, and the day and stories and 

memorable for many. Mine was not as tragic as some but very clear in my mind 

like many. I was home that late afternoon and could smell gas in my house. I had 

new appliances but an old gas line system. I first checked the stove and could smell 

the strong order from there so I proceeded to shut the gas valve off behind the stove 

and was going to address it later. I was headed out to dinner that night so I proceed 

to leave my house. While driving to the top of my street I remember seeing a lot 

of first responder activity and was wondering what was going on. As i headed up 

RT125 towards Haverhill I saw many fire engines headed toward North Andover 

from other communities. I called my cousin to see what the hell was going on because one is a firefighter and another a police officer. He told me the news and after 

picking up my girlfriend I told her we were returning to my house to get my dogs 

out of there. It took us over 55 minutes to get back and upon arrival I opened the 

door and a tremendous gas smell came from my house. The dogs came running out 

and jumped into my car and we left right away. It has been a long and sometimes 

difficult 2 months and I know for me and many that those thoughts, experiences 

and images will always remain in ones mind. Thank you to all the first responders 

and people who have been assisting with this difficult time and situation 

Frank Dushame 

Suzanne Vazquez from Andover: Good Morning, 

I have been impacted by the Columbia Gas Explosion. I live with my husband 

four children and my brother with special needs. One of my children has a medical 

condition that needs to be closely monitored. In the beginning we could stay in our 

home and learned to take 5 minute showers. The showers were cold but manageable. As the weeks went by and the temperature dropped, I began the search for 

housing. The process was tedious with many phone calls and me explaining my situation to numerous people. My family started by hotel jumping, finding what ever 

hotel was available relatively close. Then, the hotel became fewer and far between. 

My children’s after school activities make it difficult to live further away because 

I would not get home until 7/7:30 on a good night. The hotels were paid for by me 

and then reimbursed by my adjuster. My adjuster has been a life saver. He understood my situation and worked tirelessly on finding me permanent housing. After 

a few weeks, we were placed in the Rec Park trailer site in Andover. I was not originally placed there but my adjuster and the site manager had room for my family 

and accepted us there. This made my stress and anxiety levels subside for a while. 

My children and brother had a safe permanent place to call home. There was weak 

wifi at the site so my cell phone bill has been overcharged for three months due 

to my older children needing Internet access to do homework. Sometimes they would 

brave the cold and stay at the house to do homework and come to the trailer around 

11pm to sleep. This would make waking up in the morning a challenge for all of 

us. The site managers are awesome! They are so friendly and accommodating to all 

our needs. The school where my younger children attend rerouted a bus to pick up 

my children. I can not say enough good things about the staff at the site. 

The second week in November Columbia Gas came to my house to begin the restoration process. The fore told me they would be in and out in two days. The crews 

were at my house for eight days. I had to continuously call out of work because I 

could not get a straight answer as to when they were going to be done. When there 

crews had finished, my new unit did not work. I took a week and countless phone 

calls to have someone come back to my house. Finally, a CG worker came to my 

house, I took another day off from work, and he looked at the system and explained 

that ‘‘they’’ have not been trained on the new systems and he didn’t know how to 

fix the problem. He reset the unit again and told me call the emergency line again 

to have another crew come back to me house. While I was waiting at the bus stop 

with my younger children, there was a crew beginning their day down the street. 

I ran over to them and asked if they could get in touch with someone who could 

come back to my house. A young man told me that he would be at my house when 

he finished assessing the house that he was at. An hour later, he came to my house 

and reset the system again. He gave me his number and told me to text or call if 

the unit went off again. I text him two more times that day. The following day a 

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whole new crew was at my house trying to solve the problem. The problem turned 

out to be the pipping. The pipes were too small for my house. The standard pipes 

that were installed were too small and now I have 4 1/2 inch pipes. The pipes are 

on the side of my house leading to the driveway. Now anytime that the weather 

gets cold, my driveway freezes. I have missed a ten days of work, so far, and may 

have to miss more when they come back to take my appliances. I am aware that 

a person 18 years or older needs to be home but I am an instructional assistant 

and taking this many days off of work has affected my ability to teach my students. 

I am responsible for their learning and help improve their way of learning. This 

does not happen if I have missed out on a weeks worth of classroom material. I am 

currently back in my home with heat and hot water but no appliances. I understand 

that there is a lot of work to be done, I do wish that the communication was better 

between CG and residents. It would be a little easier if I could let my administration know when I will be out of work. I have a lot of out of pocket food expenses 

and cooking for a family of seven, now eight, on a hot plate is quite time consuming 

and difficult. Not to mention, there is only so much take out one can really have. 

I have exhausted all the local take out places and fronted a restaurant bill and waiting to be reimbursed is expensive. This is only just the physical toll that this explosion has taken on me and my family. 

There is an emotional side effect as well. My children’s school work has suffered 

greatly due to this incident. They have missed assignments and sometimes emotionally fragile during the school day. The unpredictability has taken it’s toll on the 

younger children and they have become sleep deprived and emotional. My older children have become sleep deprived and irritable, more so than teen angst. There is 

constant tension between my husband and I as to who will take off work. I have 

more sick time to do so but I am also missing important class time with my students. I too have become emotional at work due to the stress. 

I have no time line of when my appliances will be removed or replaced. There 

have two assessor at my house in regard to the appliances but no action. 

The lack of internal communication is infuriating. 

Thank You, 

Zana Vazquez 

Lee Bluemel from North Andover: As a clergy person in North Andover and a resident impacted by the gas disaster, I see the impact of this disaster from many angles: 

1. As a clergy person, my initial response was to ascertain the needs of my congregation members, to coordinate congregational support with food, appliances, 

living spaces and emotional support. We were incredibly lucky in that none of 

the members of my congregation had fires or explosions in their homes; other 

clergy did have members impacted, and I believe six churches were without 

heat for weeks. Immediate response also included networking with the churches in the state to direct them regarding where they could send special relief 

collections that Sunday to the ECCF. 

2. As a clergy person, next phase response included attending three community 

meetings in Lawrence to hear from residents who were impacted regarding 

their experiences and needs. These were coordinated by Merrimack Valley 

Project and interfaith clergy. We learned from these meetings the need for temporary heat in homes, the need for additional translators on the streets, and 

the need for greater funding for therapeutic support. We also learned of a desire to reduce gas usage and to switch as possible to electric appliances. These 

concerns were all shared with the presidents of Columbia Gas and NiSource, 

and with Gov. Baker in a letter signed by 17 clergy and other supporting organizations. They were then shared with Mr. Steve Bryant, President of Columbia Gas, in a meeting with 23 clergy from the area. He took notes at that meeting about our requests; however, we did not hear back if, when or how these 

concerns were addressed. 

3. Our interfaith team continued then to listen to residents, attend community 

meetings, contact the State Attorney General’s Office, the Office of Energy and 

others to try to continue to raise concerns, especially regarding an overlooked 

issue: the lack of energy efficient equipment being brought in by Columbia Gas 

to people’s homes, resulting in more gas usage and higher bills. We also led 

a community educational session on what to look for in equipment, since Columbia Gas was not offering that education and much of the equipment there 

were offering was standard efficiency or poorly sized (and thus inefficient) for 

homes. 

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4. As a resident, I looked into Air Source Heat Pumps when Columbia Gas initially said these would be covered and received a quote; CG then reversed its 

earlier stated policy. I then looked into solar hot water heater or heat pump 

water heater, since I have solar on my roof, and then requested the most energy efficient option for my home from the CG list, but was told again and 

again by my adjuster that I was only eligible for ‘‘like for like’’ replacement of 

old equipment. I was also told that I could not get a fireplace insert because 

I was too close to my re-light date, even though I knew from the meeting with 

Mr. Bryant that those relight dates were in question. 

The gas disaster has consumed my ministry for the past two months, and it is 

clear to me that Columbia Gas and NiSource must be required by law to shift to 

a safety culture and an energy efficient culture. They have not done these things 

on their own. They should also set aside funds for the non-profits in Lawrence who 

have been saddled with so much extra work, as well as for solarizing the valley and 

bringing in energy efficiency programs, which they have not done when they had 

the opportunity. 

Leslie Diaz from North Andover: Good morning, 

How do you even start to express the magnitude my life has changed since September 13, 2018 to sum up how emotionally stressed and without a voice I feel every 

single day is an equality to been rape and robbed. Every day is a new struggle and 

challenge and I’m going to quote a phrase I was told by one of Columbia Gas employee ‘‘I’m just a one man show’’ while I was trying to explained that my basement 

has been flooded ever since they worked outside. I was livid so I used his own 

phrase and told him how would you feel been a one woman show single mother 

dealing with all of these with no moral or physical support from no one?? He 

couldn’t say anything. Precisely I said. To put in a little box all the frustration, 

headache, hopeless, helpless I feel throughout all of these it wouldn’t fit here and 

I would have to spend days writing. My only hope is to get back to my home take 

back my regular life and put all these behind me. 

Janice Phillips from North Andover: Comparatively, my family doesn’t have a horrific story to share. We are safe and sound and returned to our home 62 days after 

Columbia Gas’s negligent error caused explosions in North Andover, Andover, and 

Lawrence. Those 62 days were full of worry, chaos, panic, and exhaustion. But, I 

am grateful. I am grateful we are safe and sound. I am grateful we have had a reasonable and responsive claims adjuster who does want us to feel whole again. The 

boots on the ground in our home were kind, patient, and respectful as they tried 

to understand our fear and frustration while working to fix our home. It’s simply 

that no one who isn’t part of ‘‘the affected’’ can truly understand the impact. 

From a purely logistical level, dealing with this disaster caused by Columbia Gas 

completely overtook our lives. Early on, it took hours of watching news outlets, 

digging around on Columbia’s website, stalking their twitter feed to looking for any 

shred of accurate helpful information. The problem? There was none. Personally, it 

took 2 weeks before I could finally track someone down, who wasn’t just placed on 

a street corner in a truck to hand out a phone number to call, who could actually 

physically come to my house to tell me whether I had low pressure lines and was 

in this for the long haul or we’d be back up and running soon because we had high 

pressure lines. Unfortunately for my family, we had low pressure lines and we realized we were in this for the long haul. 

I can’t even convey the number of hours of all of our lives this has eaten away 

at. Hours upon hours trying to get answers on the phone. Hours upon hours waiting 

and waiting some more because Columbia gas *should* show up at my house sometime in the next 3 days. The toll on my entire family, living in two places, never 

having what we needed in either place is not something I can put into numbers. 

Our base of operations had to continue to be our home in North Andover as it was 

early in the school year, peak sports season for my kids, and we were trying to continue with some semblance of normalcy. Each day the temp would drop in my house 

and eventually, it stopped rebounding. I’d drive in from Danvers, to drop my high 

schooler off, spend an hour at home with my 5th grader before his drop off where 

we would snuggle under blankets keeping warm because our home was not approved to use space heaters, then I would begin my ‘‘normal day’’. 

I was working about 10–12 hour days at my actual job, and spending any spare 

moment I had trying to get answers about what was happening in our home. My 

kids would head home to wait in a cold house for sports practice and we’d regroup 

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around 8–9 pm each night to get packed for the next day and trek to Danvers. This 

didn’t seem so bad at first, day 2, day 5, day 7, I mean, there was a warm breakfast 

after all, a novelty for my kids. Then it sunk in. This wasn’t ending anytime soon. 

This logistical nightmare was actually my new normal. Sitting in my freezing cold 

house while we tried to live our ‘‘normal’’ life day in and day out, with no end in 

sight. The logistics were completely overwhelming and depressing. 

The emotional toll is also not to be forgotten. The terror each and every time you 

hear sirens, to this day. The true mental suffering of each and every member of my 

family as our lives were completely torn upside down. The tears of exhaustion from 

myself and my kids as we trekked back and forth to a warm bed. The missed parties 

and social events because you can’t just ‘‘pop over’’ from Danvers. 

Most significant is the loss of trust and security in our own home. The loss of ability to feel safe in the one place that should never be taken away. Our fearful tears, 

because we are afraid that this will happen again, sad tears because we know that 

many of our community members had their lives far more uprooted than we did, 

these are the things that each of you who caused this disaster CANNOT understand. 

I DO consider my family fortunate but this is way more than an ‘‘inconvenience’’. 

This is a life changing, man made disaster that could have been prevented. At the 

upper levels, this project has been woefully mismanaged only increasing the levels 

of stress on the affected residents. Don’t worry though, we have come together and 

formed an unstoppable bond only understood by ‘‘the affected’’. We will fight for 

each other and support each other until each and every home is back up and running. However, the toll on our mental health will take much longer to heal. 

What’s done is done, we are forever changed. We NEED Columbia Gas to step 

up to the plate. You can’t take your mistake back, but you need to make it as right 

as it can be made. Again, we are not an extraordinary story. Just a story of a working class family, fighting hard each day to get through having our world turned upside down. 

Mark Ross from Peabody: I’d like to suggest that every home in the area has a 

high pressure gas senor installed that senses over pressure and prevents what recently happened in the Merrimack Valley. There no other way to make people feel 

safe regarding gas coming into their home. Personally I’m willing to pay privately 

for the installation but feel that gas companies should be more likely to pickup the 

expense. 

Mark Ross from Peabody 

Clara Ruiz Vargas from Lawrence: My family and I are one to be grateful on 

being blessed as one of the luck ones. My heart goes out to each everyone one individual that was affected by this senseless, selfish, irresponsible disaster that not 

only greed was a great factor but lack of humanity from CG. 

In this whole process I’ve endured sickness, depression, humiliation, fear and so 

much anger! 

Not only did CG is fully responsible for what we are going thru they have made 

me fell like if I’m the one responsible for their negligence with their lack of communication and heartless ways in handling this disaster. 

To be where I am in this horror movie I had to beg every single day for over five 

weeks! 

No call/e-mails from my adjuster when I requested a budget for more heating 

source, for housing, for my stove, for my HW & Furnace, reimb. for heaters, until 

I threaten her with all of our politicians in charge including TRUMP! Now tell me 

was that necessary! My family and bundled up in one BR to keep each other warm 

when temperature dripped just because they were trying to save every penny for 

CG. and not realizing CG was the cause of all this! 

Once again we are very lucky to be here today and have a place to call home but 

it doesn’t change the fact that we are all victims of CG’s negligence! 

James Allick from Andover: Dear Senator Markey, 

Under normal situations I would not take the time to comment, but in this case 

I feel the need to say something. 

I have been a long time resident of Andover but this mistake by Colombia Gas 

really proves they are among the worst business group I have ever seen. 

As of last week I finally got gas back at my house, this is after of 

miscommunicated facts by Colombia Gas And to note I had been living in my car 

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as it had been hovering around 40 Degrees in my home, I have a pet which precluded me from any hotels, and Colombia Gas did NOTHING to help me. I was told 

to find housing on my own, I did the charge for the month of November was 

$1400.00 I turned in a receipt as instructed by Colombia Gas. they are not doing 

ANYTHING to cover that expense. Now upon replacement of the stove they by accident unplugged my refrigerator and causing ALL the food in the fridge and freezer 

to SPOIL AGAIN. their reply was did I take pictures???????? No another $300.00 

out the window. 

In closing I would not wish this on anyone, And Colombia Gas has done NOTHING TO HELP ME much less the people of Lawrence, Andover and North Andover 

but they did offer a Thanksgiving dinner. . . . Thanks ALOT!!!!!!!!! 

Jim Allick 

Andover, Ma 01810 

Linda Battalagine from North Andover: On the day of the disaster my daughter 

was home. My landlord had come home and smelled gas, he called Columbia Gas 

and a tech came to the house and said we were fine. He told my landlord that the 

levels of gas in the house were in acceptable range. My landlord MADE him shut 

off the main. By the time they got out side my neighbors house was on fire then 

the house across the street, there were six fires within a block radius of my house. 

After they assessed the damage to our house, not only were the appliances condemned but also the gas lines in the house were damaged do to the high pressure 

and we had several leaks that had to be repaired. So much for being ‘‘safe’’. 

Also my daughter was traumatized she called me hysterical looking for the pets 

and trying to evacuate everyone by herself in what I can only describe what looked 

like a war zone. 

In the days, weeks and months following—dealing with the claims reps was frustrating and difficult to get reimbursed. First when I asked about housing (moving 

cost or hotel) I was told ‘‘we offered a replacement water heater, don’t pay your 

rent’’. Which I refused to do as my landlord was a victim. Three weeks in I caught 

pneumonia from the stress, and taking cold showers and sitting in a cold house. At 

least six men where in my kitchen tearing out the appliances that were built into 

the cabinets. I put in a claim for take out that week and it was denied. They stated 

‘‘we gave you a hot plate’’. . . . I was so upset they it was expected of me to work 

around all these men doing stuff in the house while in bed with pneumonia to whip 

up a healthy dinner for my family on a two burner hot plate! I should have been 

in a hotel!!!! That saved them thousands of dollars. 

The only reason I got into housing was because of the local officials that required 

CG to do so. It took them four or five days to put me in housing after that. When 

they did they put me in Manchester NH!!!! I was commuting to my job in Boston 

and commuting took 5–6 hours a day!!! They put me in a hotel room with one bed 

and a pull out couch! I had to share a bed with my teenage son. I ended up calling 

around myself and I found a local hotel that CG reserved that was empty!!!! And 

the trailers were empty as well, I suspect they put us in Manchester so we would 

refuse the housing and they would not have to pay that bill. I did get into the local 

hotel after about 9 days. 

They promised to give me a food syphon after that and never did. I am out 14K 

of which I have only been reimbursed for about 8K. I did finally hire my own attorney who will work with CG to get me reimbursed for all my expenses. 

I think the worst part is the attitude that we should somehow be ‘‘grateful’’ for 

everything CG has done. They hired a company that deals with natural disasters 

to handle the claims process. The difference is that this was not a ‘‘natural disaster’’ 

it was negligence and my experience with CG through this process has been for 

them to blame everyone else and NOT take responsibility. From making my landlord responsible for housing, to thinking that a hotplate and space heater should 

be sufficient in dealing with the aftermath. 

The worst part is in the end all of our bills will probably be increased to cover 

the expense of what their oversight and greed has caused. 

Their executives make millions annually in a salary while I am on single mom 

who gets by living pay check to pay check. I have everything back now . . . but this 

disaster will have long term implications for me. . . . I am still out 8K and we will 

not have many gifts this Xmas as a result. My car had to go into the shop as during 

this I had put over 3000 miles add’l onto my car. My kitchen is still damaged as 

the appliances where custom fitted and the new ones don’t fit so we will need a carpenter to fix. Workers broke things in my house while they were tromping in and 

out without knocking (one time my daughter was alone and changing in her room). 

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I lost time out of work, and when I was at work I couldn’t concentrate as I had 

to deal with the lack of communication and fighting to get reimbursed for certain 

items. 

CG did not care about what their negligence caused . . . they cared about the perception of the public. They rushed through to complete the pipeline and gloated to 

the press about how they completed what was said couldn’t be done. They forgot 

that 8000 people were still without heat or hot water the day of that press release, 

they did not care if people were getting ill, or making a crazy commute. They neglected the human element of the disaster they do not deserve to be in business and 

it is my hope that they are forbidden to work in Massachusetts after this. I would 

rather see that than get my 8K back. 

Lawrence Teachers’ Union Local 1019: December 4, 2018 

Dear Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

The Lawrence Teacher’s Union, Local 1019, AFT MA, AFL–CIO, would like to 

offer some brief written testimony regarding the Lawrence Gas Explosion of September 13, 1018 and its aftermath. We are attaching some news clippings, press releases, and internal memos to support our concern for our students, families, community, and our members. We are attaching a survey taken by members who lived 

in the affected area. 

The explosions directly affected the homes of approximately 270 unionized AFT 

MA members and their families. Most of the 140 teachers, 90 paraprofessionals, and 

20 clerks were without heat, hot water, and stoves for over two months. They were 

relocated to hotels and trailers and suffered the inconveniences of not being able to 

cook, take a shower, or sleep in a warm bed in their own homes. 

The gas crisis also exposed the weakened gas infrastructure in all school buildings 

throughout the city. Differed maintenance of school boilers and HVAC systems 

reached a crisis in the weeks following the explosions, as the school department 

struggled to turn on the heat in the schools before the cold temperatures could set 

in. 

Students and teachers were inconvenienced by multiple evacuations, fire drills, 

and delays. Young children were exposed to cold and rain as they were moved to 

other schools. 

The Parthum School, although deemed safely situated in another part of the city, 

was constantly being evacuated for nearly two weeks due to gas fumes of an unspecified origin. The quick thinking of a school custodian found a leaking roof top unit 

at the school. The gas fumes were circulated back into the building through the exhaust system. The problem was rectified but the parents and public were on edge. 

Mayor Rivera stationed off duty firemen in all the city schools to insure safety and 

peace of mind. 

The crisis also brought out the best in the Lawrence Public Schools. Union members and administrators worked with the Red Cross by assisting in the shelters and 

comforting families. Staff read and played with children as their parents made arrangements for alternate housing and assistance. I am proud of their efforts, particularly the staff of the Bruce and Rollins Schools who suffered from school fires 

in 2016 and 2017. We are lucky to have such dedicated and caring unionists. 

On November 1, AFT President Randi Weingarten came to Lawrence and toured 

the neighborhoods and the schools before visiting one of the trailer parks. At the 

Breen School she distributed hats and gloves to the 4 and 5 year olds to help ward 

off the winter’s chill. These littlest victims of the natural gas fires and explosions 

took to President Weingarten as she read and talked with them. President 

Weingarten knows the Breen staff has a big job ahead of them but knows well that 

they are up to the challenge. 

We thank Mayor Daniel Rivera for his exceptional leadership, transparency, and 

courage during this crisis. He is doing an exceptional job. 

We are deeply grateful to the Lawrence Fire and Police Departments as well as 

all state and regional public safety and public works departments. They keep us 

safe. 

We are grateful to the American Federation of Teachers and the AFL–CIO for 

their support. As a gesture of good will at Thanksgiving, the union distributed $300 

worth of Market Basket gift certificates to every affected member. This was a modest gesture of support to our brothers and sisters who were affected by the explosions and struggled through the recovery effort. 

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We hope for a safe and swift resolution of this prolonged crisis. May we all stay 

Lawrence strong! 

Respectfully, 

Francis J. McLaughlin Jr. 

President 

Lawrence Teachers’ Union 

Local 1019 

Chief Patrick E. Keefe, Chief Roy P. Vasque, Chief Charles P. Gray: On September 

13th, 2018 the City of Lawrence Massachusetts, along with the neighboring communities of Andover and North Andover, experienced a natural gas disaster, which is 

being described as the largest disaster of its kind in our Nation’s history. This incident was the result of the over pressurization of a low pressure gas main, resulting 

in explosions and structure fires in these three communities. The Dispatch Centers 

of Lawrence, North Andover, and Andover were immediately inundated with hundreds of frantic 911 calls from terrified residents, as the smell of gas and clouds of 

smoke filled the air. The City of Lawrence alone received five hundred and fiftysix (556) calls between 4:10 PM and 8:00 PM. The Town of North Andover received 

roughly 198 911 calls in the initial moments of the incident. The Town of Andover 

received over 300 calls for service during the initial hours of the event. The men 

and women of these three police departments immediately responded without hesitation to this unprecedented disaster, doing what was asked of them without concern for their own safety. As Chiefs, we were tasked with coordinating the immediate evacuation of all residents as the fires began and continued to spread with 

no end in sight. Entire neighborhoods were filled with terrified residents, leaving 

their homes with just the clothes on their backs, as the magnitude and danger of 

this disaster remained unknown for a period of time. The three Chiefs immediately 

called and spoke to each other to determine the scope and magnitude of the event. 

The Chiefs, after determining the proximate caused was gas related, had officers on 

the roads and in cruisers begin to use their public address systems to tell people 

to get out of their houses. Cruisers drove through the affected area warning residents to rally at local evacuation sites. During the initial hour of the event, local 

fire apparatus was tied up at fire after fire. Police officers were tasked with locating 

other structure fires and alerting central dispatch. It was at this time that a call 

was made to Rockingham County New Hampshire for assistance. This is something 

that has never happened before. 

As the situation was unfolding, an incident command location was established immediately adjacent to Interstate 495 and Route 114 at the borders of the three 

neighboring communities. As Chiefs, we immediately realized that an emergency of 

this size would require a significant amount of law enforcement personnel, far greater than that which was available in all three communities combined. As a result, 

we collectively established a safety plan utilizing the Massachusetts State Police 

and the Northeastern Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council (NEMLEC). The 

Council is made up of sixty (65) communities and Sheriff’s Departments from Northeastern Massachusetts. NEMLEC provided personnel as well as additional communications and command capabilities to aide in the implementation of a constantly 

evolving safety plan. The Massachusetts State Police provided similar assets as well 

as providing helicopters to oversee the entire operation. 

At the command post, the three Chiefs sat in a meeting with the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, the State Fire Marshall, Fire Chiefs and the two town managers 

and the Mayor of the City of Lawrence. Also present were members of MEMA, the 

Columbia Gas. The meeting focused on turning off residential and business gas meters, as well as shutting down the power. 

As it was deemed necessary for safety reasons to shut down the power grid, a 

mass evacuation of the disaster zone was implemented. This required closing all 

exits from the highways and blocking all secondary entrances to the zone, while still 

allowing people to safely evacuate the area. Following the evacuation, the next essential task was to provide safety and security in the disaster zone which, with the 

exception of strategically placed temporary lighting, was in total darkness. Officers 

also were teamed with firefighters and Columbia Gas personnel to begin the arduous task of shutting down every gas meter in the affected area, approximately 8500 

meters in total. This was done in all three communities well into the night and 

early morning. Massive amounts of police, fire, EMS, and gas company personnel 

were used to complete this task. As daylight broke, the plan required an avenue for 

law enforcement to assist residents in temporarily returning home to gather medication and other essential items. This effort was carried out with assistance of buses 

153 

provided by the Merrimack Valley Regional Transit Authority and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority. 

Throughout the first two nights where power was turned off, cruisers from all 

over Massachusetts arrived to patrol the affected areas. Cruisers maintained a visible presence to all those still in the area, both residents and potential criminal elements saw a cruiser on every block all through the nights. 

These efforts continued for two (2) days until the power was restored on day three 

(3) of the event. As the evacuation order was lifted, law enforcement personnel assisted residents with the safe return to their homes, and continue to maintain the 

visible presence giving people a sense of safety and peace of mind.. 

As each of the affected communities attempted to return to a sense normalcy, it 

became clear that there would be an unprecedented amount of road construction underway simultaneously in all three communities. Once again, this required another 

adaption of the safety plan that would allow for the utilization of law enforcement 

personnel from Massachusetts and southern New Hampshire, as needed on a dayto-day basis. The three Chiefs quickly contacted NiSource and established a work 

agreement for the use of police officers in the work zones related to this incident. 

This was required to ensure the safety of motorists and pedestrians as they tried 

to navigate through neighborhoods in which virtually every street was affected. As 

alternative housing locations were established throughout the three communities, a 

law enforcement presence was maintained. Both of these facets of the plan are continuing to this very day. 

The overwhelming cooperation, collaboration, and professionalism of all law enforcement personnel involved from the outset of this incident until this very day has 

been simply amazing. While no amount of training or preparation could have adequately prepared our three communities for this disaster, this is without question 

one of the finest hours for the Massachusetts law enforcement community. In closing, it is important to note that none of these highlighted law enforcement successes 

would have obtainable without the support and understanding of the residents who 

we are sworn to serve. 

Jennifer Vallone from Lawrence: Her is my story . . . On that day I got home 

from work approximately 3:45. I was on the phone with my husband, i heard a loud 

bang. I figured it was a car accident so I looked outside and saw nothing. I walked 

back to the kitchen and smelled gas, thought maybe the cat had turned the knob 

on the stove, looked and saw nothing. Then I heard the smoke alarm going off in 

the basement, I opened the door and the smoke just started filling up the entire 

house. I was still on the phone with my husband and said something is really wrong 

here. I walked down a couple stairs to the basement and all I saw was flames. I 

screamed into the phone the house is on fire and immediately hung up on him and 

called the fire department. They told me leave the premises and evacuate the area 

there’s been multiple gas explosions in the area. I grabbed me keys and two dogs 

and ran out of the house. The smell of gas was so strong and when i saw the flames 

I knew it was bad. As I pulled away from the house my husband pulled up like a 

bat out of hell and I saw him run into the house from my rear view mirror. I immediately knew he was going in to save the house. I parked my car and ran back to 

the house to make sure he was ok, the house was filled with smoke, he was running 

around looking for a wrench screaming he had to shut the gas off. He yelled at me 

to get far away as he was running down to the basement after he found a wrench. 

He shut the gas off and the flames went out. He saved our house from burning 

down. After he knew we were ok, he grabbed two wrenches, he gave one to our 

neighbor and they both ran around the neighborhood shutting gas meters off to save 

other peoples homes. There were no firefighters, police or any help for almost 2 

hours. It was like a movie, helicopters flying above, people running around, kids crying. It was horrible. 

We ended up being without gas for 57 days. That time was the most stressful 

time of my life. Carting kids around to hotel rooms to shower. Trying to figure out 

different ways to cook for our family. The worst thing is the worry. I am worried 

everyday that something like this will happen again. I lay in bed every night before 

I fall asleep wondering if the smoke alarms are all working, I have a suitcase 

packed in case we have an emergency again and we have to leave our home suddenly. My husband has nightmares at night to this day, talking in his sleep. My 

9 year old can’t even take a shower without calling me to make sure I’m still here 

or asking me if I’m ok. This incident changed our lives forever. 

154 

Margaret Stone from Londonderry: I am writing on behalf of my Mom, Rita 

Kimball. We were in the process of selling her home and signed a purchase & sales 

agreement on 9/14/18 the day after the disaster. Her house is on 53 Dana St. Lawrence & it was considered to be in the high impact area. At the time my mom was 

living in a nursing home (age 87) so I was the contact to get any information of 

what we needed to do regarding the disaster. I repeatedly called the Columbia Gas 

phone # to get info with no answers, their usual response was since we are in the 

high impact area we can’t tell you any information at this time. I actually gave 

them my cell phone # and still no call backs. We originally had a closing date of 

10/19/18 but due to the disaster & no Gas or appliances we had to extend it to 11/ 

19/18 and now it all set to close on 11/30/18. I’m just puzzled as to why no one called 

me not one time except on 11/17/18 to ask if we were all set & if our gas was on. 

We didn’t even have a stove at that time, they delivered the wrong furnace which 

had to be replaced which took an extra week, when someone came in with the water 

heater & noticed they delivered the wrong furnace. Finally everything fell into place 

the following week. The total lack of information that was given out during this trying time was exhausting. No one not even the workers could tell you anything when 

you saw them in the neighborhood. If they did tell you something it was usually 

the wrong information. It’s stressful enough trying to sell your family home but to 

have this on top of everything else was truly trying. I must say that every worker 

that we encountered during this process was very polite and caring. My family appreciated all their hard work they have endured. Our situation was not as bad as 

other people including my sister who was also impacted during this time. She actually purchased all her appliances and she got her gas quicker than expected. Fortunately no one was living in the house at 53 Dana Street or this would be an entirely 

different response. Just the total lack of communication. 

left me speechless. Thank you for listening and thank you for your hard work during this time. I no longer live in Lawrence but work in the area and still have family in this city. 

I hope that Columbia Gas realizes the major impact of this terrible disaster. 

Juliann Porter from Lawrence: On Sept 13th I received a call from my neighbor, 

a little before 5p, telling me that houses were exploding and I needed to get home 

to get my animals. I was at work in the Lexington area and begun the very long 

ride home, panicking the entire time that I would be to late to save my 2 dogs and 

2 cats. By the time I made it into N Andover the emergency was full on and it felt 

like a war zone as I inched closer to my house. Just about 2 blocks from my house, 

someone tried to stop me and he made a rude remark when I told him that I had 

to get my animals. I immediately lost my composure and drove up on the sidewalk 

to get around him, in a complete panic. I ran in my house and threw all my animals 

into my car. Right after this, a house, approximately 5 houses down, basement exploded and I jumped in my car. My husband was unable to get into the area and 

we agreed to meet in a parking lot in Methuen. It then took me another hour and 

a half to make it those few miles to get to him. We were lucky to have family that 

were able to take us in for the evacuation, but that weekend was supposed to be 

filled with joy, as my brother was getting married. We were now in shock and without anything except the clothes on our back and our animals and had to figure out 

a way to still celebrate. The ensuing months just brought more frustration as the 

communication between Columbia Gas and those of us affected was horrid, at best. 

I lost those first 2 weeks of work due to robo calls telling me to be home for the 

next 48 hrs only to have nobody show up. After that it was just luck of the draw 

if you were home when they came. They repeatedly, did the exact same inspections 

with no progress at all. At the end of October, they finally were installing our combi 

unit, but this took 5 days because nobody was familiar with them. The removal and 

installation process was a joke as nobody was even aware that our appliances either 

hadn’t been removed yet or that we hadn’t even picked out new appliances. The 

workers on the ground were all very nice and 3working hard, but appeared to be 

just as confused as we were, as they were not getting direction from Columbia Gas 

either. I am grateful to be up and running, but feel as if we will never quite be 

able to return to our normal, prior to that day of Sept 13th. 

Doug Porter from Lawrence: This whole experience was a lesson and a scary one 

at that about how bad the flow of information was kept and shared. None of the 

workers knew where to go or what to do. I had workers in and out of my house 

four times to assess appliances and heating system. They took pictures of them 

every time they were here. The removal of the condemned appliances was a nightVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00158 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
155 

mare, they skipped around. When it came time to install heat and hot water, only 

a few workers seemed to know about how to install and wire controls for the systems they installed. It took four to five days at each person’s house. I know plumbers that could have everything done in half the time. Then with the stoves and dryers, you’d call and they said one thing but we’re doing another. They told people 

they weren’t installing them, yet they were. The miscommunication in all this was 

horrendous, surely in this day and age of computers, there should of been an app 

from Google or Microsoft that could of kept all information and shared among the 

workers as to what each address needed. Many people had to use vacation or sick 

days to be home for the reconstruction process only for them not to show up. FRUSTRATING! Many people ended up getting sick too. Some with pneumonia or bad 

colds or flues. I myself got bronchitis because of a cold damp house. This could of 

gone quicker and easier if they actually had proper communication and worked in 

an efficient manner. 

Vicente De La Rosa from Lawrence: Vicente de la Rosa Consejo Terapeutico Familiar. Es imposible entender como ocurrio este desastre que a creado confusion, 

ansiedad, temor entre los Residentes que vivimos en esta ciudad, ami que como 

consejero terapeutico familiar y Miembro del Comite intergrado por Sacerdotes, pastores, Capellanes y consejeros, me a tocado escuchar a muchos personas miembros 

de nuestras congregaciones donde han expresado su agustia y temor haun cuando 

se escucha el sonido de Emergencia muchas personas estan aun en panico y asta 

han expresado el deceo de mudarse de esta Ciudad por el temor que esto pueda 

vover a ocurrir, ami en particular que me toco junto a mi esposa Rosina estar por 

mas de un mes viniendo en un Trailer a sido muy dificil, su conducciones de salud 

se empeoran y aun esta en recuperacion, mi nieta Marlin enferma pir mas de dos 

semanas y aun no se recupera del todo apor que teniamos que pasar por esto? Por 

la negligencia de Columbia Gass, y no nos sentimos seguro de que vuelva a ocurrir 

y tengamos que atravesar por situaciones peores en el futoro, aun no se puede estar 

seguro en toda la la Nacion porque estamos viendo en tiempo donde nadie esta 

seguro, con sistemas de distribucion muy obsoleto y vulnerable a cualquir persona 

mal intencionada en sus manos queda impulsar leyes que nos permitan vivir con 

mas confianza. 

Kate McHugh from Andover: November 26, 2018 

Initial Shock 

On September 13 I returned home from the hospital after having a total hip replacement. A casual friend drove me home. She had been to my home only once before. It was 10 minutes before the evacuation alert was sent. 

I truly believed that I had minutes to leave my house. I believed my life was endanger and that I would lose everything. But what could I do? What options did 

I have? How could I get the cats out? I could barely walk on crutches, I couldn’t 

go down stairs easily, nor could I drive. Neighbors went door to door to turning off 

gas valves as others huddled in the street in disbelief. My friend ran to CVS to get 

my crucial blood thinner and pain med prescriptions. When she got there, employees 

were fleeing. They said they could not help and told her go to any other CVS. By 

that point, my street was closed and there was gridlock on Elm Street and Rt. 28. 

I needed those meds as blood clots are the most serious risk of death post hip surgery. My friend, not knowing the area, admitted she wanted to get home. What was 

I to do? 

This 30 minute period brought back another awful trauma . . . 3 years ago my 

husband died suddenly as we were commuting to Boston. I was as helpless then, 

as I was on Sept. 13. 

I was scared and frightened throughout that long initial 4 day period; every night 

a different crew came to check the house for gas. But my gas was turned off. What 

are they looking for? What is the danger? Feeling afraid in your own home is something you never forget. 

Turning Challenge into Opportunity 

A community of ‘‘affected’’ folks shared info about getting resources and alternative heat. This is how I learned of a safer, more energy efficient way of heating 

my home. It appeared that the safest and alternative was a ductless system. In fact, 

it would be more energy efficient as my steam heat has only one zone. A mini split 

system would allow me to heat only the rooms that I am occupying. 

So, I was proactive and asked Worley if I could get approval to research other 

heat sources, namely a mini-split system. My adjuster replied that that shouldn’t 

156 

be a problem. After doing copious research, I obtained 3 estimates for mini-split 

from MassSave approved contractors. The estimate included ∼$1,700 rebates from 

MassSave. I called them immediately and sent the best estimate to my claim adjuster. 

To qualify, an energy audit/assessment must be scheduled, but not necessarily 

completed, before work is begun. Eager to use these rebates, I called MassSave to 

schedule an assessment. Initially they said they were booking into January in Andover but when I provided my address I was told they could not book a date because 

I am in the ‘‘affected’’ area! When I explained that that was precisely why I needed 

to install an alternative heat source, I was told that Columbia Gas was forbidding 

the scheduling of energy assessments and then she gave me the phone number of 

folks who could help me. . . . The Columbia Gas Claims adjuster. My adjuster 

knows absolutely nothing about energy assessments! The worst part of this? Even 

if folks in the ‘‘affected ’’ had the means to pay for a mini split, they would not qualify for ∼$1,700 in rebates! 

That same day, my adjuster responded that his supervisor advised him not able 

to approve any mini split systems. It was suggested that I have a contractor come 

to my home to see if a pellet stove is possible to be installed. 

I asked if Columbia Gas would offer even a partial reimbursement as the minisplit system is an energy efficient alternative to heating my entire house with gas. 

He told me he had been forbidden to authorize any payment toward a mini-split because the system is not solely used for heat. 

The idea that a pellet stove is a reasonable substitution is absolutely unfounded. 

The idea that I haul 40 lbs of wood pellets is simply not possible; I am physically 

unable to maintain a pellet stove. 

What You See is Not What You Get 

I stayed updated via Columbia Gas website and Andover.gov. Again, I was searching for energy efficiency so I was happy to read that CG was offering such as for 

replacement. When the Gilbane crew (my 4th assessment) took over on my street 

I spoke to them about this and pointed to the pdfs online. They were totally unaware these options existed . . . because they didn’t in their world. 

Communication within Columbia Gas was sorely lacking. Their subcontractors 

were not kept up-to-date nor did they have access to the models shown on the 

website! The crew chief said, I have access to 3 boilers today, Kate, that’s it. 

How do you measure the fear, anguish, and exhaustion that countless people have 

and are still going through? Not only did this affect the residents but also the subcontractors. Boots on the ground. They were under a tremendous amount of pressure (meetings every night after they had worked 12 hrs) to check off the houses. 

And all these folks were away from their homes and family. There was empathy 

on both sides. 

Columbia Gas kept track of houses that were ‘‘relit’’ but those numbers don’t show 

the truth behind them. My home was relit on October 23, only because my 83-yearold neighbor was elevated to ‘‘priority’’ status. My neighbor told all the workers they 

needed to put me on the priority list as well due to my recent surgery. However, 

as of December 9, 2018, I have no stove nor oven nor heat in my bedroom. I got 

approval to replace my gas fireplace for my bedroom last week. It took 5 weeks to 

get the approval. 

The CEO of NiSource said in the hearing that he couldn’t commit to NOT raising 

rates for those who lived through this disaster. Essentially, their victims would foot 

the bill for their complacency and utter neglect. Please tell the residents of the 

Merrimack Valley that this unconscionable action will not be allowed in the United 

States of America. 

Thank you. 

Kate McHugh 

Andover, MA 

Senator WARREN. Mr. Chairman, does that mean people can still 

submit stories? 

Senator MARKEY. For two weeks, yes, for two weeks, that will be 

included in the record, and we—— 

Senator WARREN. Small business owners, as well. 

Senator MARKEY. Everyone up in this community who was affected, we want to hear your stories and it will be included in the 

record and we welcome that, urge you to do so. 

157 

And, again, I want to thank Andrew Flanagan of Andover and 

Andrew Maylor of North Andover, the Town Managers of those two 

communities. Thank you so much for being here. Thank you for 

your incredible response to this disaster. It’s ongoing but I can 

see—I think we can all see the teamwork that exists amongst your 

three communities. 

And I know that you’re a unit because that’s why we’re here. 

You’re saying how often does it happen that a Senate committee 

goes to a local community. Not often. This is a special day—— 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY.—and the reason that I wanted to bring the 

Senate Commerce Committee, which has jurisdiction over the pipeline safety agency and has jurisdiction over the National Transportation Safety Board, so they would be here today, is that they 

should experience what the impact is of regulations that do not 

work. They should see the harm which is done. 

Again, my father grew up in 88 Phillips Street in South Lawrence. He went to the John Breen School and I would like to take 

this moment to thank the South Lawrence East Middle School for 

hosting us here today. We thank you for—— 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY —allowing us to use your beautiful facility. My 

father came from this community and many members of my family 

now live in Andover and North Andover. It’s one community 

united. 

After hearing today from Columbia Gas and NiSource, Federal 

and state regulators, safety experts, and our communities on the 

devastation and hardship they have had to endure, I am not satisfied. We are not satisfied. The company and regulators refuse to 

take responsibility and I will not rest until there is accountability. 

1,300 Merrimack Valley families are still waiting for their homes 

to be house-ready because Columbia Gas was not even close to 

being safety-ready. Temperatures in Massachusetts are dropping 

and so is my faith, our faith that Columbia Gas, NiSource, and 

Federal regulators can prevent another disaster like this from happening again. 

That is unacceptable. That must change and I will fight every 

day, along with Senator Warren, as I know that Seth Moulton and 

Lori Trahan will, in partnership with Congresswoman Tsongas, to 

ensure that things change and that there is justice for our communities. 

We are going to take the lessons of this disaster and then turn 

them into laws so that we can ensure that no community, no family 

anywhere in Massachusetts or the United States has to experience 

a tragedy like this ever again. 

We thank all of you for being here. We will not forget. 

[Applause.] 

Senator MARKEY. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(159) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. EDWARD MARKEY TO

HON. MATTHEW A. BEATON

Question 1. The Columbia Gas pipeline integrity management plan did not contemplate the risk of this sort of event—a very low-probability, high-consequence disaster. This integrity management plan was audited and approved by the Department of Public Utilities. 

Did the Department of Public Utilities offer any comments or technical assistance 

for improving the distribution integrity management plan? 

Answer. In accordance with Federal law, 42 CFR 192 Subparts M and O, gas distribution companies are required to develop, and the Department is required to review, integrity management programs. The programs must meet the requirements 

set forth in the Federal regulations. The purpose of the Department‘s review of the 

programs is to ensure compliance with the Federal standards. 

The Department reviews these programs for compliance with Federal and state 

laws and regulations and, beyond ensuring compliance, does not offer comments related to the programs. 

Question 1a. Does DPU plan to require any modifications of this plan following 

the September 13 disaster? 

Answer. The Department has hired an independent evaluator, Dynamic Risk, who 

will examine the operation and maintenance policies and practices of the Commonwealth’s gas distribution companies and will also examine the physical integrity of 

the Commonwealth’s gas distribution system. A preliminary report, which will complement the NTSB’s ongoing review, is expected within the coming weeks. The purpose of the independent evaluator’s report will be to provide concrete recommendations for improving the integrity and safe operation of the Commonwealth’s aged 

natural gas infrastructure. 

Question 2. The Columbia Gas emergency response plan was approved by the Department of Public Utilities. However, this plan simply does not seem to have contemplated responding to system-wide disaster of the magnitude that we saw on September 13. The most severe level of emergency your response plan contemplated 

was for an incident that would last ‘‘72 hours or longer.’’ 

Did the Department of Public Utilities offer any comments or technical assistance 

for improving the emergency response plan? 

Answer. Under the Department’s regulations, Emergency Response Plans (‘‘ERP’’) 

of the natural gas distribution companies are annually filed with the Department 

and developed in accordance with the requirements set out in G.L. c. 164, § 85B and 

220 C.M.R. 19.00. Each gas company is required to ensure that it is adequately and 

sufficiently prepared to restore service to its customers in a safe and reasonably 

prompt manner during an Emergency Event. This includes, at a minimum, preparing and following written procedures consistent with those required by 49 U.S.C. 

§§ 60101 through 60125; 49 C.F.R. Part 192; G.L. c. 164, §§ 85B and 105A; 220 CMR 

69.00 and 220 CMR 100.00 through 113.00. Each gas company shall include these 

written procedures in their respective manuals for conducting operations and maintenance activities and for emergency response, and, where appropriate, in their 

manuals of written procedures to minimize hazards resulting from gas pipeline 

emergencies, as required by 49 C.F.R. Part 192; 220 CMR 69.00 and 220 CMR 

100.00 through 113.00. 

The Department reviews these plans for compliance with Federal and state laws 

and regulations. 

Question 2a. Does DPU plan to require any modifications of this plan following 

the September 13 disaster? 

Answer. The Department has hired an independent evaluator, Dynamic Risk, who 

will examine the operation and maintenance policies and practices of the Commonwealth’s gas distribution companies and will also examine the physical integrity of 

the Commonwealth’s gas distribution system. A preliminary report, which will comVerDate Nov 24 2008 07:23 Jan 07, 2025 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00163 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\57909.TXT JACKIE
160 

plement the NTSB’s ongoing review, is expected within the coming weeks. We anticipate that the independent evaluator’s report will provide concrete recommendations for improving the integrity and safe operation of the Commonwealth’s aged 

natural gas infrastructure. 

Question 3. After reading the National Transportation Safety Board report about 

what happened with this disaster, is it your opinion that a state inspector would 

have been able to catch this error, if one were to have been looking at the September 13 job at Salem St. and South Union St.? If not, is DPU planning additional 

requirements to ensure that state inspectors have the information or tools necessary 

to detect these sorts of faulty plans? 

Answer. The Department is one of many parties working with the NTSB on its 

investigation. As such, the Department cannot comment on, nor offer opinions 

about, the NTSB report. Additionally, the Department is conducting its own investigation into the cause and origin of the events of September 13, 2018 and it would 

be improper to comment, speculate, or make any conclusions about the possible outcome of that investigation. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. EDWARD MARKEY TO

PAUL ROBERTI

Question 1. Columbia Gas used to have a policy in place that required a trained 

technician be on site at the pressure-regulating station when work was being done 

that could affect the pressure of the pipeline system. This policy was abandoned four 

years ago, but according to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), onsite personnel could have ‘‘immediately addressed the issue and mitigated the consequences.’’ 

Would a nationwide requirement that technicians are present at key pressure-regulating stations improve safety during construction? 

Answer. Pipeline regulations already require that all individuals who perform 

tasks that affect the operation and maintenance of a pipeline, including tie-in of a 

new pipeline to a previously existing (operating) pipeline, are qualified. Such qualified personnel are expected to perform or oversee activities that may represent a 

high risk to the safe operation of the gas system. 

Further, it is PHMSA’s expectation that the pipeline industry adopt the American 

Petroleum Institute’s (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 1173, which clearly indicates that risk management must be an integral part of the design, construction, 

operation, and maintenance of a pipeline system. PHMSA participated as part of the 

RP 1173 standards development committee. This standard defines operational controls that are essential to the safe design and construction of pipelines. For example, 

Section 5.6: Risk Reduction requires that processes are reviewed to continuously reduce risk in all activities, including construction practices. Section 8.2: System Integrity requires pipeline operators to maintain quality control procedures so that 

construction is performed in accordance with an approved design. Pursuant to these 

practices, a pipeline operator should assess risk associated with all aspects of its 

pipeline system to define operational controls, address those risks, and review 

progress. 

Question 1a. If so, is PHMSA working on any regulation or guidance that would 

require on-site technicians during construction? If not, why not? 

Answer. Pipeline regulations already require that all individuals who perform 

tasks that affect the operation and maintenance of a pipeline, including tie-in of a 

new pipeline to a previously existing (operating) pipeline, are qualified. Such qualified personnel are expected to perform or oversee activities that may represent a 

high risk to the safe operation of the gas system. Pipeline regulations also require 

that companies have adequate written procedures for pipeline design, construction, 

operation, maintenance, and emergencies; have the capability to shut down systems 

in a timely manner in the event of an incident; and establish and adhere to written 

emergency plans to minimize hazards to life and property. 

PHMSA awaits the official conclusion of the NTSB’s investigation of the incidents 

in Merrimack Valley Massachusetts and will fully evaluate and consider all of the 

NTSB’s conclusions and recommendations, including whether or not further regulatory clarifications are needed. 

Question 2. The NTSB found that a single field engineer was allowed to almost 

unilaterally approve the work order that led to the explosions on September 13, 

2018. The NTSB noted there was no oversight from experienced technicians who 

would have understood the implications for the entire pipeline system. According to 

161 

the NTSB, the engineer in question had only ‘‘limited knowledge’’ about the ‘‘consequences of losing the capability to sense the main pressure.’’ 

Mr. Roberti, would safety improve if Federal regulations required that the departments responsible for knowing the locations of pressure-control equipment have to 

sign off on work plans? 

Answer. PHMSA takes all NTSB recommendations seriously. PHMSA awaits the 

official conclusion of the NTSB’s investigation of the incidents in Merrimack Valley 

Massachusetts and will fully evaluate and consider all of the NTSB’s conclusions 

and recommendations. 

Preliminary NTSB findings indicate that this accident stemmed from a deficiency 

in the company’s quality control and a breakdown of internal procedures. Pipeline 

regulations already require that all individuals who perform tasks that affect the 

operation and maintenance of a pipeline, including tie-in of a new pipeline to a previously existing (operating) pipeline, are qualified. Such qualified personnel are expected to perform or oversee activities that may represent a high risk to the safe 

operation of the gas system. 

Companies must comply with existing safety regulations, including instituting 

quality control procedures, and should continuously improve and nurture a comprehensive safety culture. Implementing the elements of RP 1173 can help companies achieve a strong safety culture. 

Question 2a. If so, is PHMSA working on any regulation or guidance that would 

require the approval of the officials within companies that have a system-wide view 

of the gas system? If not, why not? 

Answer. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has passed laws to require this for 

pipelines in Massachusetts. PHMSA’s primary role is to establish minimum safety 

standards and to provide oversight to these standards. PHMSA also partners with 

most U.S. states to provide pipeline safety oversight of about 80 percent of the 2.8 

million miles of pipelines in the U.S. The states may establish safety standards that 

go above and beyond the Federal minimum standards. PHMSA expects the pipeline 

industry to understand and manage the risks or their respective pipeline systems 

and to ensure the safe operation regardless of compliance with the Federal minimum standards. 

Question 3. One of the NTSB recommendations was for Columbia Gas to have a 

professional engineer review and certify any construction plans before starting work, 

in order to provide another layer of defense against the odds that one engineer could 

make a decision that would bring down the pipeline system. 

Mr. Roberti, would safety improve if gas distribution companies everywhere had 

a professional engineer review and approve all construction plans for gas distribution companies? 

Answer. PHMSA takes all NTSB recommendations seriously. PHMSA awaits the 

official conclusion of the NTSB’s investigation of the incidents in Merrimack Valley 

Massachusetts and will fully evaluate and consider all of the NTSB’s conclusions 

and recommendations. 

Question 3a. If so, is PHMSA working on any regulation or guidance that would 

require that professional engineers review and approve all work plans? If not, why 

not? 

Answer. As noted above, PHMSA awaits the official conclusion of the NTSB’s investigation of the incidents in Merrimack Valley Massachusetts and will fully evaluate and consider all of the NTSB’s conclusions and recommendations. 

Question 4. Right now, Federal regulations do not require pipeline companies to 

have a Pipeline Safety Management System (SMS) in place, which would require 

the adoption of a safety culture throughout a company’s operations and decisions. 

Do you agree that it would improve safety if Federal regulations required that all 

pipeline companies adopt a safety culture through a Safety Management System? 

Answer. At this time, PHMSA’s focus is on emphasizing the continuous assessment and improvement of pipeline safety by strongly encouraging pipeline operators 

to implement SMS. 

The common thread that runs throughout every aspect of PHMSA’s safety mission 

is an SMS approach. SMS looks to prevent accidents and incidents from ever occurring. PHMSA is moving beyond the role of being just a regulator—to push operators 

to identify and target their own risks, and to encourage a company-wide culture 

that makes safety the number one priority, always. Further, PHMSA understands 

that there is no one-size-fits-all method for creating an SMS program; implementation varies from operator to operator. To be effective, SMS programs must be developed by operators to address their specific operator needs and risks. 

Further, for an SMS culture to permeate through all levels and areas of the pipeline industry, we need ways to share and analyze data, allowing all of us to see 

162 

emerging trends to inform best practices. In December 2016, PHMSA established a 

Voluntary Information-Sharing System Working Group (VIS WG). The VIS WG was 

charged with studying information-sharing systems for the pipeline industry and 

providing recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation on the necessity of 

a sharing system, ways to encourage the exchange of information, and best practices 

for the protection of proprietary and security-sensitive information. The VIS WG 

plans to submit its recommendation report to the Secretary in Spring 2019. 

Question 5. On September 13, the pressure-controlling equipment in Lawrence experienced what is known as a ‘‘common mode of failure.’’ One action, in this case 

the abandonment of a pipeline running under South Union Street, caused both the 

main pressure regulator and the backup regulator to fail at the same time and in 

the same fashion. PHMSA regulations require that equipment meant to protect from 

over-pressurization are ‘‘designed and installed to prevent any single incident [. . .] 

from affecting the operation of both the overpressure protective device and the district regulator.’’ Shut-off devices or relief valves both provide a separate layer of protection beyond just having two working regulators in series. Previously, PHMSA 

staff have said that the regulator setup employed by Columbia Gas at issue in the 

September 13 disaster satisfied Federal requirements and is in common usage 

throughout distribution systems—conceivably putting other communities at a similar risk. 

Would safety improve if Federal regulations required that pressure-control devices 

could not have a common mode of failure, as we saw in this disaster? 

Answer. Preliminary NTSB findings indicate that this accident stemmed from a 

deficiency in the company’s quality control and a breakdown of internal procedures. 

Several methods and devices could potentially provide additional protection. 

PHMSA awaits the conclusion of the NTSB’s investigation and will thoroughly consider whether to require additional measures to prevent over-pressurization of lowpressure systems. 

Question 6. The maximum fine that PHMSA can levy for an incident is only $2.09 

million. 

Do you think it would act as a greater deterrent if PHMSA were able to fine companies above $2 million for disasters like this, yes or no? 

Answer. Civil penalties for violations of the pipeline safety regulations, statutorily 

set by Congress under 49 U.S.C. § 60122 and 49 CFR § 190.223, may be assessed 

up to $213,268 for each violation for each day the violation continues, with a maximum administrative civil penalty not to exceed $2,132,679 for any related series 

of violations. This maximum represents an inflationary increase by DOT final rule 

effective November 27, 2018. 

Civil penalties are just one of the critical tools, such as corrective action orders, 

that PHMSA uses to hold operators accountable. When appropriate, our agency does 

not hesitate to issue fines to operators. PHMSA also uses Compliance Orders and 

Corrective Action Orders to mandate company action, sometimes beyond regulatory 

standards, in order to assure safety. PHMSA has found the cost of complying with 

these orders can dwarf the civil penalties that PHMSA can impose, serving as a significant additional deterrent to pipeline failures. 

Question 7. When setting the recommended level of inspectors per state, does 

PHMSA take into account how much of a state’s pipeline system is made up of old, 

leaky cast iron pipes, some of which are well over 100 years old? 

Answer. Yes, PHMSA’s state inspection formula considers a state’s pipeline system composition, as well as several other performance factors, to determine the minimum inspections required in accordance with state certification. The number of inspections is then used to determine the number of inspectors needed. 

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