Œ This Opinion was initially released in typescript form.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-1031

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JESUS VEGA,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 05 CR 978—Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

____________

SUBMITTED JANUARY 5, 2006—DECIDED FEBRUARY 23, 2006Œ

____________

Before COFFEY, KANNE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, we must decide

which district court is the proper one to review conditions imposed on an individual who is charged with a crime

in one district, but who is apprehended and arraigned in a

different district. Relying on the plain language of 18 U.S.C.

§ 3145(a), the district court concluded that the answer is the

place where the charges are pending—a conclusion that

required it to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. We

too read the statute that way, and we therefore affirm.
2 No. 06-1031

Jesus Vega was charged in the Eastern District of

Virginia with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine. After the

Virginia court issued a warrant for Vega’s arrest, the police

eventually caught up with him in Chicago. Upon his arrest,

they took him before a magistrate judge in the Northern

District of Illinois to answer charges contained in an

“Affidavit of Indictment in Removal Proceedings.” Magistrate Judge Keys of that court held a detention hearing,

determined that with proper conditions Vega would appear

in Virginia, and granted him release on bond.

At the government’s request, Judge Keys stayed the

release order while the government moved for review in the

Eastern District of Virginia. Judge Ellis of the Virginia

district court entered a temporary stay of the release order

and ordered that Vega be transported to the Eastern

District of Virginia for a detention hearing. Vega then filed

in the Northern District of Illinois an “Emergency Motion

for Immediate Release and Stay of Removal Order Pending

Release.” Judge St. Eve dismissed Vega’s motion for lack of

jurisdiction and Vega appeals.

The only question before this court is whether Magistrate

Judge Keys’s release order should be reviewed in the

Northern District of Illinois or in the Eastern District of

Virginia. The governing statute reads in relevant part:

(a) Review of a release order.—If a person is ordered

released by a magistrate judge, or by a person other

than a judge of a court having original jurisdiction over

the offense and other than a Federal appellate court—

(1) the attorney for the Government may file, with the

court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a

motion for revocation of the order or amendment of

the conditions of release; and

(2) the person may file, with the court having original

jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for amendment

of the conditions of release.
No. 06-1031 3

18 U.S.C. § 3145(a). The statute allows for review of the

order by either party, and it has this to say about where the

review must be sought: “the person may file, with the court

having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for

revocation or amendment of the order.” Id. The question

before us is whether the phrase “the court having original

jurisdiction” limits review only to the court where the

charges are actually pending, or if (as Vega argues) it

allows review in any federal court that has jurisdiction over

federal crimes.

The problem with Vega’s suggestion is that it effectively

reads the contested phrase out of the statute. All federal

district courts have jurisdiction over federal crimes, thanks

to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; Vega’s reading leaves the words “the

court having original jurisdiction” with no purpose at all

to serve. Reading the phrase as a limitation, as we must for

it to serve any useful function, it can only mean the court

where charges are pending. Perhaps it would have been

preferable as a drafting matter to have used statutory

language that mirrors the formula used in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., Rule 5(c)(3)(D)

(magistrate judge must transfer defendant to “district

where the offense was allegedly committed” after making

certain findings); Rule 5.1(b) (defendant may elect to

have preliminary hearing conducted in “district where

prosecution is pending”). Even without this congruence,

however, the phrase makes sense only as a limitation of

review to the court where charges are pending. See United

States v. Torres, 86 F.3d 1029, 1031 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The

plain language of section 3145 dictates that the district

court with original jurisdiction over the offense, i.e., the

prosecution district . . . is the only proper one to review the

order in question.”).

Even if we thought that the statutory language was

ambiguous, we would resolve any such ambiguity in favor

of requiring review in the district court where the pros-
4 No. 06-1031

ecution is pending, just as our sister circuits have done. See

United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 2003);

United States v. El-Edwy, 272 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2001);

United States v. Evans, 62 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1995), but

see United States v. Johnson, No. 96-4173, 1996 WL 711592

(6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1996) (unpublished order). Rules 5 and 40

guarantee that a defendant will not forcibly be brought to

a different state until the government produces a warrant

and a judge determines that the defendant is the same

person named in the warrant, information, or indictment.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c)(3)(D)(i), (ii); 40(b). But the rules

mandate only that the initial appearance be in the district

of arrest. After that appearance, and a preliminary hearing

if the charge is sufficiently serious, the defendant must be

transferred to the charging district. See Rule 5(c)(3)(D). At

that point, it is the court where the charges are pending

that is responsible for any rulings that may be necessary to

guarantee the defendant’s presence for proceedings.

Vega argues that because the district court’s review of a

release or detention order involves a weighing of the factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), it makes more sense to

conduct the review in the district where the defendant is

arrested. He suggests that the latter court will have better

access to witnesses from the defendant’s community who

can provide information about the defendant’s history and

characteristics. But it is just as likely that a defendant is

from or has ties to the community where an alleged crime

was committed. And there are other factors in section

3142(g), such as the nature and circumstances of the offense

charged and the weight of evidence against the defendant,

that are more easily weighed in the charging district.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3145, the government or a charged

party who moves for review of a release or detention order

must do so in the court where charges are pending, regardless of where the initial appearance and detention hearing

took place. The district court below correctly concluded that
No. 06-1031 5

it did not have jurisdiction over Vega’s motion for review

and enforcement, and accordingly ordered that the defendant be transferred to the court of competent jurisdiction,

the Eastern District of Virginia. Accordingly, the district

court’s order is summarily AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—3-2-06