*The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAY 25 2001

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

BRUCE M. BERGER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 00-5024

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Oklahoma

(D.C. No. 98-CR-85-BU)

 

John E. Dowdell, of Norman, Wohlgemuth, Chandler & Dowdell, Tulsa,

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant.

Kenneth P. Snoke, Assistant United States Attorney (Stephen C. Lewis, United

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

 

Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McKAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BROWN,

Senior District Judge.*

 
2

 

BROWN, Senior District Judge.

 

Appellant Bruce Berger pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit

mail fraud and one count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 & 1341. 

A few days before he was to be sentenced, he filed a motion to compel the

government to move for a "substantial assistance" departure in his favor under the

United States Sentencing Guidelines, Section 5K1.1. After hearing arguments

from the attorneys, the district court permitted an evidentiary hearing on the issue. 

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court rejected defendant's contention that

the government's refusal to file a 5K1.1 motion was based upon an

unconstitutional motive. Berger was then sentenced in accordance with the terms

of his plea agreement. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court

erred in denying defendant's motion to compel the government to file a 5K1.1

motion. 

I.

An understanding of appellant's claim requires a rather extensive summary

of the facts. In June of 1998, a 25-count indictment was filed in the Northern

District of Oklahoma charging four defendants with conspiracy, wire fraud, mail
3

fraud, and interstate transportation of money obtained by fraud. The conspiracy

involved a scheme to defraud a Tulsa, Oklahoma, facility operated by a company

known as Hilti, Inc. According to the indictment, three of the four defendants --

Bruce Berger, Ronald Korman, and Kevin Kelleher -- worked out of a Delray

Beach, Florida, office selling cleaning supplies under the name of Concord

Industries, Inc., and later, Verde Industries, Inc. They allegedly developed a

kickback scheme with a Hilti employee, Jerry Gullo (the fourth defendant), under

which Gullo would receive cash bribes or gifts from the three and in return would

cause Hilti to approve payment of Concorde and Verde invoices for vastly

overpriced merchandise or for merchandise that was never delivered to Hilti. 

Aplt. App. at 22-39. A second superseding indictment later added numerous

charges against the three Florida co-defendants for similar acts aimed at two other

Tulsa companies. Id. at 70. 

The Hilti employee charged in the scheme, Jerry Gullo, pled guilty in

August of 1998 to the Hilti conspiracy charge. In Gullo's plea agreement, which

noted that restitution was mandatory for the offense, the parties stipulated that the

amount of restitution owed to Hilti "jointly and severally by the defendants in this

case" was over $440,000, although it added that Gullo "received far less [than this]
1Section 3664(h) of Title 18 provides: "If the court finds that more than 1

defendant has contributed to the loss of a victim, the court may make each defendant

liable for payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among

the defendants to reflect the level of contribution to the victim's loss and economic

circumstances of each defendant."

4

as his share [of proceeds from the offense]."1

 Aplt. App. at 60. The agreement

also stated: "Based on the defendant's cooperation to date, the United States will,

at the time of sentencing, move for a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

5K1.1." Id. at 62. 

Counsel for co-defendant Kevin Kelleher contacted prosecutors and

expressed his client's willingness to cooperate with the government, and on

December 3, 1998, Kelleher was debriefed by FBI agents in the Southern District

of Florida. Shortly thereafter, Kelleher and Assistant United States Attorney

("AUSA") Ken Snoke came to a verbal understanding as to the terms of a plea

agreement, pursuant to which Kelleher would agree to plead guilty to a felony

count in the Second Superseding Indictment and would continue to cooperate, and

the government would agree to file a § 5K1.1 motion on his behalf for a

downward departure. No written agreement was prepared at that time. See Aplt.

App. at 416. 

In the latter part of December, 1998, and early January, 1999, prosecutors

had plea negotiations with attorneys for appellant Berger and co-defendant
5

Korman, and on January 6, 1999, they met to finalize plea agreements. During

these discussions, defense counsel informed prosecutors that Berger and Korman

were negotiating an agreement with Hilti for the payment of restitution to Hilti. 

See Aplt. App. at 618-19. They also indicated that their clients had information

they were willing to provide relating to other possible offenses. Id. at 592. They

inquired into the type of deal Kelleher was getting, and AUSA Snoke said that

although it was not yet in writing and he could not give them all the specifics,

Kelleher's deal was similar to the one Gullo received. Id. at 620. Snoke informed

them he would be filing a 5K1.1 motion for Kelleher. Id. 

 Berger and Korman entered guilty pleas at a hearing on January 7, 1998.

Berger pled guilty to the Hilti conspiracy count and a related count of mail fraud. 

His plea agreement was entered into pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C) of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure, and called for the following agreed-upon sentence:

"[T]he parties agree that a specific sentence of 18 months imprisonment plus a

three year term of supervised release, a $200 Special Monetary Assessment, and

restitution to Hilti, Inc. in the amount of $430,000 (jointly and severally with other

convicted co-defendants), is the appropriate disposition of this case." Based upon

the representations of defense counsel that their clients had information they were

willing to share about other offenses, the following provision was inserted into the
6

plea agreement: "There has been information provided to this United States

Attorney's Office this week, by counsel for defendant, which may, at some future

time, result in a post-conviction motion by the United States to reduce the

defendant's sentence." Korman's agreement was similar except that it called for a

fifteen-month imprisonment sentence. In the course of the plea hearing, the court

asked if the government could void the plea agreement if the defendants failed to

make the restitution payments. In responding to that question, John Dowdell, who

was Mr. Berger's attorney, mentioned his understanding that "there would be a

joint and [several] restitution obligation on behalf of Mr. Berger and the other

three gentlemen that have been involved in this," and also indicated there had been

significant discussions with Hilti and that "there will be an independent

agreement, a civil agreement with Hilti" concerning restitution. 

The following day, January 8, 1999, Kelleher appeared for his change of

plea hearing. Due to an ice storm in the Tulsa area that day, AUSA Snoke, who

had primary responsibility for the case, was unable to attend the hearing. As a

result, AUSA Doug Horn, who had also worked on the case, covered the plea

hearing. 

Kelleher's plea agreement provided that he would plead guilty to one mail

fraud count relating to the Gunnebo-Johnson Company, which was one of the
7

other Tulsa victims allegedly defrauded by Korman, Berger, and Kelleher. The

agreement also provided that "[b]ased on the defendant's cooperation to date, and

his continued cooperation in this case in the investigation of Verde Industries in

Florida, the United States will, at the time of sentencing, move for a downward

departure, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, to a net offense level of 8." As opposed

to Hilti, which had been defrauded out of more than $400,000, Gunnebo-Johnson

lost less than $10,000 as a result of the defendants' conduct. Insofar as restitution

was concerned, Kelleher's plea agreement contained no specific figure. It stated

simply that "[t]he Court can order the defendant to pay for the full loss caused by

his conduct set forth above. The defendant agrees that the Court's consideration of

the amount of restitution shall NOT be limited to the amounts alleged in the counts

to which the defendant is pleading guilty, and may include stipulated amounts as

set forth below pursuant to Title 18, U.S.C. § 3663. The defendant further agrees

that any amount ordered by the Court to be paid as restitution may not be

discharged, in whole or in part, in any bankruptcy proceeding." Apparently before

the plea hearing began, counsel for Kelleher approached AUSA Horn and

expressed concern over the restitution provision, saying it was his understanding

that Kelleher would only have to make restitution to Gunnebo-Johnson. At some

point, Mr. Horn called AUSA Snoke about the restitution question, and asked him
8

about the possibility of a stipulation that Kelleher would only be liable for the

Gunnebo-Johnson restitution. According to Mr. Snoke, he authorized such a

stipulation for several reasons, including the fact that he thought the issue was

immaterial because Berger and Korman had indicated they were going to repay

Hilti and because Kelleher had no ability to make restitution. Id. at 419. Mr. Horn

apparently viewed this as a "fall back" position, however, as he informed

Kelleher's counsel that his view was that the restitution requirement applied to the

entire scheme. See Id. at 131. 

In the course of the plea hearing on January 8th, counsel for Kelleher raised

the restitution problem with the court and asserted that Kelleher should only be

liable for the Gunnebo-Johnson restitution. He argued that Kelleher had nothing

to do with the Hilti scheme. The district court noted that the plea agreement said

the court could order the defendant to pay restitution for the full loss caused by his

conduct, and asked Mr. Horn what that meant. Horn said that although Mr. Snoke

had apparently believed restitution on Kelleher's part might be limited to the count

of conviction (i.e., Gunnebo-Johnson), Horn's understanding of the law was that

restitution was not necessarily that limited and could include any loss resulting
2

 The permissible scope of restitution has spawned some confusion and

considerable case law. In 1990, the Supreme Court held that the Victim and Witness

Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3364, authorized an award of restitution only for

the loss caused by "the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction."

Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990). A split of authority subsequently

developed as to how Hughey applied in mail fraud cases, where a specific mailing is

typically alleged to be part of a broader scheme to defraud. Some courts held that a

defendant could only be liable for the loss from the specific mailing in the count of

conviction. This dispute was subsequently settled by an amendment to the VWPA

effective November 29, 1990, which made clear that restitution could be ordered for

the broader scheme to defraud alleged in a mail fraud count. See e.g., United States

v. Hensley, 91 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1996); 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). 

9

from a common scheme or plan, including possibly the Hilti loss.2

 Aplt. App. at

135. He also noted that Kelleher's ability to pay any restitution would be very

limited as compared to Korman and Berger. Id. Horn argued that whether the

Hilti loss resulted from the same scheme or plan as Gunnebo-Johnson was an issue

that should be determined at sentencing. Id. at 136. After further discussion,

however, Horn indicated that although the government's evidence suggested

Kelleher had some involvement in the Hilti scheme, he would be willing to

stipulate that Kelleher would only be liable for the Gunnebo-Johnson loss and that

Hilti would be considered a separate scheme for purposes of restitution. Id. at

137. The district court accepted the stipulation. Later in the plea hearing, Horn

reviewed the provision in the plea agreement relating to the § 5K1.1 motion,

stating that Kelleher "would be entitled to a 5K departure downward for his
10

cooperation providing assistance to the government, not only in statements to the

investigating agencies but in making himself available to testify at any potential

trials against codefendants." Id. at 152. 

The following day a story on Kelleher's plea appeared in the Tulsa World

newspaper. Under the headline "'Minor participant' pleads guilty in mail fraud

scheme," the article reported that Kelleher had admitted defrauding GunneboJohnson and would be liable for only a small amount of restitution, whereas

Korman and Berger had pled guilty and had agreed to pay restitution to Hilti in the

amount of $430,000. The article quoted Kelleher's lawyer as saying that his client

had no role in the Hilti conspiracy, and quoted AUSA Horn as saying that Kelleher

was a minor participant who might get a sentence of probation. John Dowdell,

appellant's attorney, received a call from defendant Korman, who had seen the

article. According to Dowdell, Berger and Korman were shocked by the terms of

Kelleher's plea. Aplt. App. at 622. 

On January 27, 1999, co-defendant Jerry Gullo appeared for sentencing. 

Based on the government's motion pursuant to § 5K1.1, the court departed

downward from the guidelines and placed Mr. Gullo on five years' probation and

ordered him to pay $446,833.15 in restitution to Hilti "jointly and [severally] with

any other person ordered to pay restitution to the victim of this offense." 
11

After reading about Kelleher's plea in the newspaper, Mr. Dowdell wrote

AUSA Snoke on January 27, 1999, saying he would like to review Kelleher's

proffer to the government. Aplt. App. 368. A series of letters followed. Snoke

wrote back and declined, stating that Kelleher's lawyer said he had kept Dowdell

advised, and suggesting that Berger should "tell his story to probation without the

benefit of anyone else's." Id. at 369. Dowdell wrote back, saying he wanted to see

the proffer because he believed Kelleher's plea did "not comport with the facts as I

have developed them," a reference to his belief that Kelleher had understated his

role in the Hilti conspiracy, and "in light of the contrast, to put [it] politely,

between the representations made by you to me as to the substance of Kelleher's

deal and his actual deal, as well as the government's apparent breach of the explicit

terms of Bruce Berger's and Ron Korman's plea agreements." Id. at 370. In a

responsive letter, Snoke acknowledged that Dowdell had previously asserted that 

Kelleher was more involved in Hilti than he had admitted, but noted that Dowdell

had also prefaced such assertions by saying he "did not want to get Kelleher into

any additional trouble." Snoke suggested that Dowdell share any information he

had about Kelleher with the Probation Department, which was conducting a presentence investigation. Snoke also said he had no idea what Dowdell was

referring to when he said the government had breached Berger’s and Korman's
12

plea agreements and asked Dowdell to explain. Dowdell's response letter did not

discuss the alleged breach but suggested a meeting and renewed the request for

Kelleher's proffer. This request apparently led to a meeting between Dowdell and

Snoke on March 5, 1999, at which Dowdell explained his belief that the

government had breached Berger's plea agreement by not holding Kelleher liable

for the Hilti restitution. Snoke indicated that he wasn't sure what he could do

about it at that point, questioned whether the issue was really material to Berger's

plea, and said that Berger's only real option at that point was probably to undo the

plea agreement if he so desired. During the meeting, Dowdell described

information which he said showed that Kelleher was fully involved in the Hilti

scam with Berger and Korman. Snoke said that if the information was accurate it

was troubling, and that it might cause him to ask that Kelleher serve some time,

but he also said he would not back away from his § 5K1.1 agreement with

Kelleher and that he wanted to talk to AUSA Horn about it. 

Meanwhile, in February of 1999, defendants Korman and Berger met with

an FBI Special Agent and provided information regarding other possible

violations of U. S. laws. Berger provided additional information to the FBI in

March of 1999. 

On April 28, 1999, Kelleher appeared for sentencing. In the course of that
3

 According to the government, it had evidence showing that Berger was the

owner and manager of Verde Industries, that he received the highest compensation

of the any of the three Florida defendants, and that he decided who performed what

function in the operation of the business. See Aplt. App. at 415. 

13

hearing, his attorney objected to a portion of the Presentence Report treating the

Hilti loss as relevant conduct. Aplt. App. at 181. The Presentence Report said

that FBI agents had found evidence of Kelleher's involvement in the Hilti scheme. 

Kelleher's counsel argued that his client had not intended to defraud anyone. Id. 

In his response, AUSA Horn expressed concern that defense counsel was

minimizing his client's involvement, but said the government was nevertheless

moving for a § 5K1.1 downward departure because Kelleher was "very

cooperative and instrumental in coming forward early on in the investigation and

providing information about the scheme that Verde Industries was involved in in

defrauding Hilti and other companies," and "provided several interviews with the

FBI agents in Florida and has provided information not only in this case, but

potentially in other cases and that may affect the Florida FBI office and that may

go beyond that and he has made himself available for interviews and, if necessary,

testimony in this and other cases." Aplt. App. 191-92. Horn said Kelleher was a

lesser participant as compared to Berger and Korman3 and recommended a fivelevel reduction, which would make Kelleher eligible for probation, and he
14

recommended a sentence of probation. The district court granted the motion and

sentenced Kelleher to five years' probation. No restitution was imposed because

the victim on the count of conviction, Gunnebo-Johnson, declined to submit a

restitution request. The court found that Kelleher did not have the ability to pay a

fine. 

On April 30, 1999, Dowdell wrote Snoke saying he was surprised to read

the press accounts of Kelleher's sentence in light of Snoke's comments at the

March 5th meeting that "you were inclined to propose that Kelleher serve time."

Dowdell said that despite his offer, no one from the government had conferred

with Berger or Korman regarding Kelleher's involvement in the Hilti scheme,

although Kelleher was "directly and continually involved" in the Hilti scam. He

said that he had "advised you [Snoke] of the general substance of these issues and

offered to share more detailed information, but you have shown no interest." 

Dowdell stated that Berger’s and Korman's plea agreements indicated they would

be jointly and severally liable to Hilti along with Gullo and Kelleher, and "[t]his

was a material representation made by you to [co-counsel] and me, on which our

clients relied." Dowdell said that at the March 5th meeting, Snoke had represented

that Kelleher did not receive a § 5K1.1 motion based on his cooperation regarding

the allegations in the Second Superseding Indictment and, as Dowdell was
15

unaware of any other investigation initiated as a result of Kelleher's proffer,

Dowdell was "mystified as to the basis for the government's moving under §

5K1.1." Dowdell again requested a copy of Kelleher's proffer "so that I might take

appropriate remedial action before the court, if necessary." 

On June 1, 1999, AUSA Snoke wrote Dowdell a lengthy response. Among

other things, Snoke said that to the extent Kelleher's agreement was relevant to

Berger, it should be kept in mind that Kelleher came forward first and,

furthermore, to the best of Snoke's recollection the principal issue discussed

during plea negotiations with Dowdell had been the amount of jail time that

Berger and Korman would receive, rather than what sentence Kelleher would get.

Snoke noted that he had informed defense counsel during those negotiations that

Kelleher would get a § 5K1.1 motion reducing his sentence to a probation-eligible

level. As for Dowdell's assertion that he was unaware of any investigation

initiated as a result of Kelleher's proffer or cooperation, Snoke said that "is

immaterial, since you would not know." With respect to Dowdell's allegations that

Kelleher had been equally involved in the Hilti scheme, Snoke said he had passed

that information on to the Probation Department and pointed out that Kelleher's

Presentence Report included the Hilti matter as relevant conduct in determining

his sentencing guideline range. With respect to joint and several liability for the
16

Hilti restitution, Snoke wrote:

At the time of Kelleher's guilty plea, Judge Burrage

requested that Doug Horn and [Kelleher's counsel] come

to some sort of agreement on that issue, and adjourned

the plea proceedings while they did so. As I discussed

with you on March 5, since it was our understanding that

Kevin Kelleher had virtually no resources with which to

pay Hilti restitution in any case [a fact that was

apparently born out by the presentence report done by

Probation], it seemed to Doug and me at the time of

Kelleher's plea to be as "academic" to have him jointly

and severally liable with your client and Mr. Korman for

Hilti restitution, as it was to have Jerry Gullo (equally

unable to assist with much restitution) jointly and

severally liable for the debt to Hilti. Neither Mr. Horn

nor I had any idea at the time of Kelleher's plea that that

was a concern to your client -- particularly in light of the

fact that [Korman's counsel] had told us, all along, that

your clients had worked out or were working out with

Hilti, an agreement to pay the entire Hilti restitution, and

you expected to have that done before their sentencing, if

not before the entry of their guilty pleas in the case. We

agreed to continuances in the trial date in part to

accommodate these plans. It seems that Kelleher's

liability to Hilti only became an issue after Kelleher's

plea. 

Aplt. App. at 378-79. Snoke said there was conflicting evidence and fingerpointing by the co-conspirators as to how much Kelleher had actually benefitted

from the Hilti scheme; and, although he had not initially intended to omit Kelleher

from the joint and several liability on Hilti, he ultimately approved that change in

Kelleher's agreement under the circumstances. Snoke indicated, as he had before,
17

that to the extent Dowdell believed this was a breach of Berger's plea agreement,

he should take whatever steps he thought were appropriate. He also suggested, as

he had before, that Dowdell bring to the attention of the court his concerns that

"perjurious representations" were made to the court about Kelleher's involvement

on Hilti. Snoke again declined to provide a copy of Kelleher's proffer, saying he

thought the transcripts of the Kelleher proceedings would provide a sufficient

basis for Mr. Dowdell to determine if the representations made to the court did not

comport with evidence in Dowdell's possession, as Dowdell claimed. 

On July 29, 1999, Mr. Dowdell forwarded a letter to Mr. Snoke regarding

Berger and Korman's assistance to a private company that had been a victim of the

Verde scam. The company indicated that Berger and Korman's assistance was

beneficial and had allowed the company to remove the employees involved. 

Also on July 29, 1999, an FBI agent in Florida wrote AUSA Snoke, at

Snoke's request, to evaluate information that had been provided to the FBI by

Berger and Korman. The letter was not particularly favorable and indicated that

the information had not produced anything of substantial value to the FBI. Aplt.

App. at 429. On August 19, 1999, Mr. Dowdell wrote one of the Florida FBI

agents, stating that he had concerns about the accuracy and completeness of the

FBI report. Dowdell noted that the FBI letter indicated Berger and Korman had
18

failed to provide certain information but, according to Dowdell, the defendants

had in fact provided it. He also asserted that the FBI letter failed to address other

information that had been provided by the defendants. He stated it was

"inconceivable to me that the report which Mr. Snoke received could be so bland,

if not fundamentally misleading, as to the nature of my client's and his codefendant's assistance," and he asked the agent to consider supplementing the

report. 

On September 7 and September 20, 1999, Dowdell wrote Snoke regarding

additional efforts by the defendants to provide information to the FBI, and

recounting Dowdell's discussions with FBI agents about the matter. On September

22, 1999, Snoke wrote back, saying he would discuss these matters with the FBI

agents prior to Berger's sentencing hearing the following week. He added,

however, "in light of the tenor of previous written communications to [the FBI

agent] and me, pleadings filed in the case, and several meetings held with you and

[Korman's attorney] on this subject, I believe that further meetings between us, at

this late date, would be unproductive." 

On September 27, 1999, two days before the date set for Berger's sentencing

hearing, Mr. Dowdell filed a motion to compel the government to file a § 5K1

motion for downward departure on behalf of Berger. Co-defendant Korman made
19

a similar request. The motion stated that given Berger's assistance, "the

government's refusal to move for substantial assistance is arbitrary and capricious,

made in bad faith and not rationally related to any legitimate government purpose

and otherwise breaches the plea agreement." Aplt. App. at 307. It said the

government's bad faith was demonstrated by "the stark contrast between the

treatment of Kelleher as compared with that of Berger." Id. The motion said the

government acknowledged it had breached Berger's plea agreement but "has

shrugged its shoulders in the face of its misconduct," and "has taken great

umbrage with defense counsel's communications regarding the breach and the

accuracy of representations to the court concerning Kelleher's role in the Hilti

scheme." It alleged that the government was unable to overcome its hostility

toward Berger and his counsel, and that the propriety of a motion to reduce the

sentence was clear "especially when [Berger's] assistance is considered in the

context of that provided by Mr. Kelleher, who is now on probation." Id. at 308. 

Mr. Snoke filed a brief in response on September 29, 1999. He asserted that the

remedy for the government's alleged breach of the plea agreement, assuming it

was a breach, was to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea, but he pointed out

that Mr. Dowdell said Berger did not want to do so. As for the information

provided to the FBI by Berger and Korman, Snoke provided a lengthy affidavit
20

discussing those matters in detail, and set forth his reasons for concluding that the

information did not amount to substantial assistance to the government. 

At the sentencing hearing for Berger and Korman on September 29, 1999,

the district court took up Berger's motion to compel the government to file a § 5K1

motion. The court first heard arguments from Mr. Dowdell, who asserted that the

government acted in bad faith and that its refusal to file a § 5K1 was "motivated

by the concerns and disagreements between counsel for the government and

counsel for the defendants arising from the government's breach of the restitution

provision of the plea agreement." Aplt. App. at 445. Mr. Dowdell discussed his

prior conversations with AUSA Snoke about the alleged breach of the restitution

provision and the assistance provided by Kelleher and Berger. Dowdell said that

in one of his letters he "confirm[ed] that Mr. Snoke, at the March 5th meeting

between the two of us, acknowledged to me that Mr. Kelleher's 5K1.1 motion was

not made in consideration for his cooperation with the government with regard to

the allegations set forth in this case," Id. at 459, and he argued there was no

evidence that Kelleher had provided any assistance in any other case. By contrast,

he argued, Berger had provided information relating to several possible federal

offenses. 

In response, Mr. Snoke argued that the alleged breach of the restitution
21

provision was "totally separate" from the 5K1 issue. Snoke stated that at the time

of Kelleher's plea, he did not think Kelleher's liability for Hilti restitution was

important to Berger and Korman because they had already indicated they were

negotiating with Hilti and anticipated making a lump sum payment to reimburse

Hilti. Even if the government's action was a material breach of Berger and

Korman's "joint and several" restitution provision, Snoke argued, then the remedy

was to permit the defendants to withdraw their pleas of guilty, but he pointed out

they did not want to do so. As for Kelleher's assistance, Snoke reviewed the

history of the case, and noted that FBI agents had wanted early on to secure the

cooperation of Kelleher both as a witness in Oklahoma and elsewhere on potential

charges arising out of the defendants' Florida operations. He said he talked with

FBI agents about the information provided by Berger and Korman, and that the

agents indicated most of their information was of little value, with the possible

exception of one matter that had not been fully evaluated but which could possibly

result in a future investigation. He concluded that the information provided by

Berger and Korman did not warrant a 5K1.1 motion, and denied that animosity

played any role in his decision. He noted that he had agreed to continuances of the

sentencing date to allow Berger and Korman to attempt to provide assistance. He

said "the fact that we made agreements with defendant Kelleher and defendant
22

Gullo to cooperate, that it caused, we feel, these defendants [Berger and Korman]

to decide to enter pleas in this case. It was definitely a case, like most of them are

around here, where you do flip the first person in and you flip whoever else you

need to or you think you need to to make your case and make it in the Southern

District of Florida, if they want to, and that is why Mr. Gullo and Mr. Kelleher got

specific 5K1.1 recommendations in their plea agreements; whereas these

defendants did not." Aplt. App. at 488. He added that, "at the time Mr. Kelleher

flipped, if you will, and we made the agreement to have him debriefed and make

his agreement, it was entirely a different situation than it was later on with these

two after we already had Kelleher on our side." Id. at 488-89. 

Mr. Dowdell argued numerous points in response, including an assertion

that at the March 5th meeting "we specifically demanded that the joint and several

liability to Hilti flow to Mr. Kelleher as well." Aplt. App. at 489. He argued it

was unfair to let the government breach the plea agreement and then say that the

remedy was to simply have the defendants withdraw their pleas of guilty and

thereby subject themselves to a greater sentence. He took issue with Snoke's

assertion that Kelleher's cooperation induced Berger and Korman to change their

pleas, saying although Kelleher's cooperation "irritated them," it was not a

motivating factor in their decision. Id. at 496. In the course of his argument, Mr.
23

Dowdell asked that he be allowed to be sworn to give testimony.

Because of time constraints, the district court was forced to continue the

hearing until October 15, 1999. The day before that hearing, Mr. Dowdell

submitted two affidavits from former employees of Verde, Inc., who stated

Kelleher was aware of or was involved in all of the company's transactions with

Hilti. At the resumption of the hearing on October 15th, Assistant U.S. Attorney

Kevin Leitch represented the government because Snoke and Horn anticipated

being called as witnesses. Mr. Dowdell proceeded first and, with the approval of

the district court, called AUSA Snoke to the stand. Mr. Snoke testified in detail

about the plea negotiations, the plea agreements, and the reasons for his decisions

on behalf of the government. Among other things, Snoke testified that on January

7, 1999, when he negotiated the plea agreements for Berger and Korman, he had

not reached a specific agreement with Kelleher as to his responsibility for

restitution. He also said he did not recall the "joint and several" aspect of

restitution being specifically discussed at the meeting with counsel for Berger and

Korman. He said the provision in Berger’s and Korman's plea agreements for

"joint and several" liability was standard language that he put in for the benefit of

the victim and the government, not for the defendants' benefit, and that he

probably copied it from Gullo's plea agreement. He explained when AUSA Horn
24

called him during Kelleher's plea hearing and indicated the judge wanted the

restitution issue cleared up in Kelleher's agreement and Kelleher's counsel was

indicating that the restitution was a "deal breaker," he agreed to let Horn stipulate

that Kelleher would not be liable for the Hilti restitution because it was his

understanding Kelleher had no resources and could not make restitution anyway. 

Snoke testified it did not occur to him at the time that this might be a breach of

Berger’s and Korman's agreements. He said he still did not believe the

government had breached those agreements because the "joint and several"

provision was for the victim's benefit but added that, if it was a breach, it was

unintentional. Snoke conceded none of the charges in the Second Superseding

Indictment were brought based on information provided by Kelleher, and he did

not know whether the information provided by Kelleher led to the opening of an

investigation or prosecution against anyone. Snoke also conceded the first time he

had told Dowdell that Kelleher was going to get a 5K1 motion was at the meeting

on January 6, 1999, the day before Berger and Korman pled guilty. With regard to

information provided to the FBI by Berger, Snoke testified a recent check with the

FBI indicated they would not be opening an investigation into the one matter that

they previously indicated might be of some interest, and both he and the FBI agent

were of the opinion that Berger’s and Korman's information did not amount to
25

substantial assistance to the government. Aplt. App. at 569-70; 598. The FBI

agent was present at the evidentiary hearing but due to certain stipulations was not

called as a witness. Aplt. App. at 514; 613. Snoke denied his decision was based

on personal animosity and denied that he retaliated because of the defendants'

complaint that he had breached the plea agreement. Snoke denied he had told

Dowdell at the March 5th meeting Kelleher did not receive a 5K1 motion for his

cooperation on the instant case. Id. at 604-05. 

Mr. Dowdell next called his client, Bruce Berger, to testify at the hearing. 

Among other things, Berger said the "joint and several" restitution provision in his

plea agreement was important "because we were all equally involved," and at the

time of his plea he understood that Kelleher would be pleading guilty to the Hilti

conspiracy and would be liable for that restitution. 

Mr. Dowdell was called as the next witness. He was examined by Mr.

Stidham, the lawyer for co-defendant Korman. Among other things, Dowdell said 

the first time he learned Kelleher would be getting a 5K1 motion was at the

January 6, 1999, meeting with Snoke, and Snoke told him Kelleher would be

pleading to something similar to Gullo's plea. Dowdell understood this to mean

Kelleher would be pleading to the Hilti conspiracy count. Dowdell said "we 

explicitly discussed the joint and several liability issue as to Hilti and were told
26

[by Snoke] that that would not be -- that would be included in our plea agreement

and that was not a problem." Aplt. App. at 620. Dowdell then recounted the

subsequent correspondence between himself and Snoke in which he expressed

concern that representations were being made to the court that Kelleher was not

involved in the Hilti scheme, when in fact he was. Dowdell indicated his client

was adamant that Kelleher share in the Hilti restitution because, according to

Berger, Kelleher was equally involved in the scheme. Id. at 627. Dowdell said he

had never represented to the government Berger and Korman were willing to

shoulder the entire burden of the Hilti restitution. Id. 

After Mr. Dowdell's testimony, the government called AUSA Doug Horn to

testify as to his recollection of events, and the government then recalled Mr.

Snoke. Snoke said he did not give Kelleher's proffer to Mr. Dowdell because he

did not think it was relevant to the arguments being made by Dowdell. Snoke

recounted that at the March 5th meeting, when the government's alleged breach of

the plea agreement was discussed, Dowdell told him that what he really wanted

was a 5K1 motion for Berger. According to Snoke, he responded by saying the

alleged breach and the 5K1 motion were two separate issues and he would not do

anything different on the 5K1 because of the alleged breach. Aplt. App. at 645-46. 

Snoke went into more detail on his reasons for giving Kelleher a 5K1 motion, and
27

said Kelleher had been targeted early on for cooperation because the government

did not have strong evidence against him. Assuming he would be willing to

testify, they had planned to use his testimony against Berger and Korman in the

Oklahoma investigation and to use him to decipher some 30 boxes of records

relating to further possible charges in the Southern District of Florida. Snoke said

Kelleher's lawyer called him early on and indicated they wanted to work out a deal

and did not want to go to trial. They worked out a tentative agreement in

November of 1999, and Kelleher gave his proffer in early December. Snoke said

he did not think the government needed Kelleher to a great extent in the Oklahoma

case (already having Gullo's cooperation at that point); but, after reading his

proffer and securing Kelleher's promise to be a witness in the Oklahoma case and

in any prospective case in Florida, and in view of the fact that as far as he knew

Berger and Korman were planning on going to trial, he made the decision to give

Kelleher a 5K1.1 motion. 

At the conclusion of the October 15, 1999, hearing, the judge took the

matter under advisement. The parties filed additional briefs in November of 1999,

and the sentencing hearing was resumed on January 26, 2000. At that hearing, the

district court first discussed the alleged breach of Berger’s and Korman's plea

agreements. The court expressed doubt as to whether a plea agreement for one
28

defendant could dictate joint and several liability for other defendants. Aplt. App.

at 202. The judge nevertheless said the government "probably" breached this

provision of the plea agreements, although he said he did not think the breach was

intentional. Id. The remedy, the court said, was to allow the defendants to back

out of the agreements and to withdraw their pleas of guilty if they wanted to do so. 

Id. Both of the defendants, upon inquiry from the court, said they did not want to

do so. Id. at 205. The district court then discussed the case law dealing with §

5K1.1 challenges, including Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992) and

United States v. Lee, 989 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1993). It noted that in Lee, the Tenth

Circuit said the district court can review the government's refusal to file a 5K1.1

motion only if the refusal violates an agreement with the government, if the refusal

is based on an unconstitutional motive, or in an "egregious case." The district

court then concluded that none of these factors were present in the instant case and

denied the defendants' motion. Aplt. App. at 208-09. The district court proceeded

to sentence Berger and Korman in accordance with their plea agreements. 

II. 

On appeal, Berger argues that the district court erred in denying his motion

because the government's refusal to file a 5K1.1 request was based on an

unconstitutional motive. He contends the prosecutor's refusal violated his right to
29

due process because it "was not rationally related to any legitimate government

end" and was motivated by retaliation for his assertion that the government

breached its promise concerning restitution. Next, he argues the refusal to file the

motion violated his plea agreement because the government "failed to exercise its

discretion in good faith." Aplt. Br. at 43. Finally, he contends the prosecutor's

refusal to file a 5K1 motion is "egregious" when the assistance he rendered is

compared to that given by Kelleher. 

III. 

During oral arguments in this case, the panel asked counsel whether it was

appropriate for attorneys who had testified as witnesses in the district court to

argue the case on appeal. This concern was raised in light of standards such as

Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme

Court. See 5 O.S. 2000, Ch. 1, App. 3-A. That rule provides -- with certain

exceptions -- "a lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is

likely to be a necessary witness." Comments to the identical ABA rule indicate

the rule "is not by its terms applicable to service as appellate counsel." See, ABA

Model Rule 3.7, Comment (1999). Although the rule thus does not appear to bar

counsel's representation in the instant appeal, we note the dual roles of the

attorneys in this case have made the determination of the appeal more difficult. 
30

One of the reasons for Rule 3.7 is that "[a] witness is required to testify on the

basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and

comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by

an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof." See

5 O.S. 2000, Ch. 1, App. 3-A, Rule 3.7 (comment). We found this to be true with

respect to the oral arguments of counsel, which made us uncertain at times

whether the attorneys were offering an analysis of the record or were instead

supplementing the record by expounding on facts within their personal knowledge. 

In such circumstances, we think attorneys should consider whether it would be

wiser to have different counsel handle the appeal, so as to keep separate the roles

of attorney and witness, to preserve the ability of counsel to remain objective, and

to avoid any potential conflict of interest between the attorney and the client.

IV. 

Section 5K1.1 of the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines provides in part that

"[u]pon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided

substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who

has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines." USSG §

5K1.1 (Nov. 1998). In Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992), the Supreme

Court addressed a challenge to the government's refusal to file a 5K1.1 motion. 
4A defendant has no right to discovery or an evidentiary hearing unless he

makes "a substantial threshold showing." Wade, 504 U.S. at 186. No issue has been

raised here concerning the district court's decision to permit an evidentiary hearing.

Consequently, we express no opinion on whether that determination was appropriate.

31

After noting the government made no agreement in that case requiring it to file the

motion, the Court said § 5K1.1 gives the government the power, but not a duty, to

file such a motion when a defendant has substantially assisted. Like other

prosecutorial decisions, a federal district court may review a prosecutor's refusal to

file a 5K1.1 motion if the court finds the refusal "was based on an unconstitutional

motive" such as the defendant's race or religion, or if the "prosecutor's refusal to

move was not rationally related to any legitimate Government end...." Id. at 186-

87. A mere claim that a defendant provided substantial assistance, however, will

not entitle a defendant to a remedy or even to discovery or an evidentiary hearing,4

nor will generalized allegations of improper motive suffice. Id. See also United

States v. Courtois, 131 F.3d 937, 938-39 (10th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor's

discretionary refusal to move for downward departure is not reviewable absent

unconstitutional motive or lack of rational relationship to legitimate government

end). 

In cases both before and after Wade, the Tenth Circuit suggested in addition

to the foregoing reasons, a district court could also grant relief "in an egregious
32

case ... where the prosecutor stubbornly refuses to file a motion despite

overwhelming evidence that the accused's assistance has been so substantial as to

cry out for meaningful relief." See United States v. Lee, 989 F.2d 377, 379-80

(10th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655, 657 (10th Cir. 1990)). 

After oral arguments in the instant case, a panel of the Tenth Circuit determined

this "egregious case" exception was no longer good law in view of Wade. See

United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. , 2001). Accordingly, to the

extent appellant relies upon this exception in his case, we find it provides no

grounds for relief. Our discussion is consequently limited to the grounds for relief

suggested in Wade. 

V.

Appellant alleged the government's refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion on his

behalf was based on an unconstitutional motive, as shown by "the stark contrast

between the treatment of Kelleher as compared with that of Berger." Aplt. App. at

307. The district court's finding that the prosecutor's refusal was not based upon

an unconstitutional motive is a finding of fact we will reverse only if it is clearly

erroneous. See e.g., United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 686-87 (10th Cir. 1996)

(applying general rule that clearly erroneous standard governs findings of fact). 

We conclude the district court's finding is supported by substantial evidence in the
5

 Berger argues that Kelleher's cooperation had no impact on his decision to

plead guilty, and says he did not even learn of the government's intention to file a

5K1 motion for Kelleher until after Berger's plea agreement had been worked out.

Aplt. Br. at 24. Regardless of the specific factors that went through appellant's mind,

however, the salient point is that the government had a tangible and rational basis for

deeming Kelleher's cooperation to be of substantial assistance in the prosecution of

its case. The prosecutor could properly conclude that his assistance was valuable

because it would encourage Berger to plead guilty or, if Berger decided to go to trial,

because Kelleher would be available as a witness. 

33

record. In explaining why Kelleher was granted a § 5K1.1 motion while Berger

and Korman were not, Snoke said he believed the early cooperation of Gullo and

Kelleher caused Berger and Korman to decide to plead guilty. Aplt. App. at 488. 

He explained that insofar as the government knew when Kelleher offered to

cooperate, Berger and Korman were planning on going to trial. In such

circumstances, Kelleher's cooperation and his value as a potential witness were of

obvious benefit to the government. From the government's perspective, when

Berger and Korman were faced with the prospect of two cooperating witnesses

willing to testify against them, they were certain to encounter significant pressure

to admit their guilt and to obtain the benefit of a plea agreement. That is in fact

ultimately what they decided to do.5

 If they had maintained their plea of not

guilty, Kelleher would have been available as a witness against them. Under the

circumstances, Snoke had a rational basis for considering Kelleher's cooperation

to be a substantial benefit to the government in the prosecution of Berger and
34

Korman. Kelleher's situation was thus clearly distinguishable from Berger and

Korman, whose willingness to cooperate came too late to assist the government in

the instant case. See Aplt. App. at 488 ("[A]t the point we made these plea

agreements with [Berger and Korman], the case was basically over."). See also

United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791, 797 (4th Cir. 1995) (prosecutor's offer of a

5K1.1 motion was rationally related to government ends where it was designed to

reward the first defendant to come forward as opposed to the defendant who

offered the most or the best assistance). 

Appellant's attempts to undermine the prosecutor's explanation were

unavailing. Mr. Dowdell alleged Snoke said at their March 5, 1999, meeting that

Kelleher did not receive the 5K1 motion for his assistance in this case. As an

initial matter, this allegation overlooked the undisputed evidence that Kelleher had

also agreed to cooperate on potential charges against the defendants (and others),

if the need arose, in Florida. At any rate, Snoke denied having made this

statement, see Aplt. App. at 604-05, and explained to the district court Kelleher's

willingness to cooperate both in this case and in other potential cases was the

reason he gave Kelleher the motion. In guaranteeing Kelleher a 5K1 motion that

made him eligible for probation, Snoke gave Kelleher the same benefit he had

given Gullo, the first defendant to come forward. Snoke's explanation was
35

consistent with the prior representations of AUSA Horn, who had informed the

district court on the day of Kelleher's plea in January of 1999 that Kelleher was

receiving the 5K1 motion because of his willingness to provide information and to

be a witness in the instant case and other potential cases. Horn gave the same

explanation at Kelleher's sentencing in April of 1999. Under the circumstances,

the district court had ample basis to conclude that the government's decision to

give Kelleher a 5K1 motion was related to legitimate government interests in

rewarding assistance in the prosecution of others. Cf. Town of Newton v.

Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (broad discretion in charging decisions

appropriate because prosecutor, not courts, must evaluate the strength of a case,

the allocation of resources, and enforcement priorities). 

In contrast to the discernible value of Kelleher's cooperation, the record is

void of evidence that the information provided by Berger and Korman was of

substantial assistance to the government. In addition to Snoke's assessment to that

effect, the record indicates that the FBI agents involved in the investigation shared

his view. These assessments were bolstered by evidence that, notwithstanding

appellant's apparent good faith attempts to provide all of the information he had,

none of that information in fact assisted in the prosecution of other individuals. 

Without setting forth the specific details of this information and the reasons why it
6

 Like other aspects of restitution, "joint and several" liability has spawned

some confusion. See e.g., United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir.

1993). Although we assume for purposes of our ruling that the government breached

Berger's plea agreement, we cannot agree with appellant's suggestion that the

language of the agreement was entirely clear. If the agreement was intended to

guarantee Berger that the government would seek Hilti restitution from Kelleher and

that Kelleher would in fact be ordered to pay such restitution, it certainly did so in a

36

was insufficient, we simply note Snoke's affidavit, representations and testimony

provided a substantial -- if not uncontroverted -- basis upon which the district

court could properly conclude the proffered information did not qualify as

substantial assistance. See Aplt. App. at 420-21; 424-26. 

Appellant nevertheless claims the prosecutor's refusal to grant him a 5K1.1

motion was prompted by a retaliatory motive because Berger had previously

accused the government of breaching the plea agreement. The district court

obviously rejected this argument, and we cannot say its determination is clearly

erroneous. The claim that these two events were causally related appears to be

based primarily on the fact that one came after the other -- post hoc, ergo propter

hoc. Although we do not question defense counsel's sincerity in raising and

pursuing the alleged breach of the plea agreement, the attempt to cast it as the

cause of subsequent events is unsubstantiated. Even assuming that the

government's failure to hold Kelleher liable was a breach of Berger's plea

agreement,6

 the appropriate remedy under the circumstances was -- as the
roundabout way. Berger's agreement contained a section entitled "Defendant's

Obligations," which noted that restitution was mandatory and that the court could

order the defendant to pay the full amount. The next section, entitled "The

Government's Obligations," said nothing at all about restitution. The last section of

the agreement, entitled "Sentence," contained the agreed upon sentence pursuant to

Rule 11(e)(1)(C), which included "restitution to Hilti, Inc. in the amount of $430,000

(jointly and severally with other convicted co-defendants) ...." Aplt. App. at 105-110.

7

 The plea agreements specifically provided: "In the event either party believes

the other has failed to fulfill any obligations under this agreement, then the

complaining party shall, in its discretion, have the option of petitioning the Court to

be relieved of its obligations herein." Aplt. App. at 322. Specific performance of the

government's alleged promise was not an option in this case given that a plea

agreement had already been concluded with Kelleher which did not obligate him to

pay Hilti restitution. Any change in Kelleher's obligations at that point would have

been a breach of his agreement. 

37

prosecutor suggested and the district court found -- to give Berger an opportunity

to withdraw from the agreement.7 Berger and Korman both declined to do that. 

Although the prosecutor clearly did not handle this matter in ideal fashion and

failed to communicate properly with defense counsel about the matter, the district

court found that any breach on the government's part was unintentional. As the

court noted in assessing the significance of the issue, the "practical side" was the

fact that Kelleher had "a negative net worth of almost $100,000.00 and virtually

no assets." Aplt. App. at 202. It was apparently because of this, and perhaps due

to a misunderstanding of the law, that Snoke viewed the matter as immaterial and

agreed to let Kelleher off the hook for the Hilti restitution. Although that may
8

 Although it is true that any restitution payments made by Kelleher to Hilti

would have reduced appellant's outstanding restitution obligation, the fact is that

Kelleher had no assets and was deep in debt. Appellant nevertheless claims that the

government's action has prejudiced him in a civil action brought by Hilti, because

Hilti used the criminal restitution order to obtain a default judgment against him but

not against Kelleher. Aplt. Br. at 15, n. 3. The fact that Kelleher was not subject to

the criminal restitution order, however, does not bar Hilti from obtaining a civil

judgment against him. Moreover, it only stands to reason that because Berger has

substantial assets while Kelleher does not, Hilti will pursue recovery from Berger

instead of Kelleher. That would likely be true regardless of any judgment Hilti might

obtain against Kelleher. Such recovery would be in keeping with joint and several

liability, which - assuming it applies in the civil case - would permit Hilti to obtain

recovery from any or all of the joint tortfeasors for the entire injury. See 1 Dan B.

Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 170 (West 2001). 

38

have been contrary to appellant's legitimate expectations at the time he entered his

plea agreement, from a practical standpoint it is difficult to see how it caused

appellant real prejudice. In view of Kelleher's financial situation it is highly

unlikely that any obligation on his part to make Hilti restitution would have been

benefitted Berger and Korman.8

 At any rate, when Berger and Korman claimed 

the government's action was a breach of their plea agreements, the prosecutor

pointed out that he could not retroactively change Kelleher's deal and suggested

that the appropriate remedy, assuming it was a breach, was for Berger and Korman

to petition the court to withdraw their pleas of guilty if they wanted to do so. We

see nothing inappropriate in this response, and we reject appellant's suggestion

that it shows the prosecutor harbored an irrational hostility to the defendant or his
39

counsel. Likewise, the fact that the prosecutor informed the defendants that if they

withdrew from their plea agreements they would lose the benefit of the agreedupon prison terms does not give rise to an inference of vindictiveness or improper

motive. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (threat to re-indict

defendant on more serious charge if he did not plead guilty was not

impermissible). 

The correspondence and conduct of both attorneys in this case reflect an

advocacy of conflicting interests on behalf of their clients, as well as some of the

give-and-take inherent in plea negotiations. There obviously could have been

better communication on both sides. But after hearing extensive testimony from

the attorneys about the reasons for their actions, the district court found Snoke's

5K1 decision was not based on an unconstitutional motive. The record provides

ample support for that ruling. As we noted previously, the prosecutor's

explanation was supported by legitimate and rational bases appearing in the

record. We see nothing to link Snoke's decision on the 5K1 motion to Berger's

claim the government breached the plea agreement. We note, as the district court

undoubtedly did, even after the defendants claimed that the prosecutor had

breached their plea agreements, the prosecutor agreed to defense requests to

continue the sentencing date in order to give the defendants an opportunity to
40

provide substantial assistance. In sum, the record does not show the prosecutor

abandoned his duty to make a decision based on governmental interests rather than

personal ones. Cf. United States v. Murphy, 65 F.3d 758, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1995)

(defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate prosecutorial

vindictiveness). Appellant simply failed to persuade the district court the

prosecutor's determination was based on anything other than an assessment of

legitimate governmental interests. 

 Appellant's final contention is that the prosecutor's refusal to file a 5K1

motion breached the plea agreement -- specifically, the provision stating that

information supplied by his attorney "may, at some future time, result in a postconviction motion by the United States to reduce the defendant's sentence." 

Appellant concedes that this language made the filing of a motion discretionary

with the government. See Aplt. Rep. Br. at 20. He argues, however, the

government "failed to exercise its discretion in good faith." Given that the

agreement preserved the government's discretion as to whether or not to file a

5K1.1 motion, we think appellant's argument is simply a restatement of his earlier

claim that the prosecutor's refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive or was

not related to a legitimate government end. As such, it fails for the reasons

previously stated. Cf. United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 2001)
41

(where motion is discretionary with the government, the court's authority to review

the government's refusal is limited to the two bases set forth in Wade). 

VI. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.