No. 04-14-00746-CV

In the Court of Appeals

for the Fourth District of Texas

ALAMO HEIGHTS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Appellant,

v.

CATHERINE CLARK,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the 285th Judicial District Court

of Bexar County, Texas

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Robert A Schulman

State Bar No. 17834500

Leonard J. Schwartz

State Bar No. 17867000

Bryan P. Dahlberg

State Bar No. 24065113

SCHULMAN, LOPEZ & HOFFER, L.L.P.

517 Soledad Street

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Tel.: (210) 538-5385 

Fax: (210) 538-5384 

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

ACCEPTED

04-14-00746-CV

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

4/9/2015 9:30:00 PM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 04/9/2015 9:30:00 PM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................ ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... v

SUMMARY OF REPLY......................................................................................... 1

REPLY...................................................................................................................... 2 

I. Plaintiff’s “Statement of Facts” contains multiple significant

misstatements ............................................................................................. 2 

A. That plaintiff was considered by her employer, AHISD, to be a 

superlative employee with an unblemished employment record 

prior to her engagement in protected activity is a gross 

distortion of jurisdictional evidence.................................................... 2

B. That plaintiff’s supervisor, her principal, was informed of and 

had been ignoring her complaints against her coworker, 

Monterrubio, for months prior to her having complained to her 

principal in writing on May 15, 2008 is another gross distortion 

of jurisdictional evidence .................................................................... 7

C. Plaintiff has embellished and invented allegations over the 

course of this lawsuit and her Brief contradicts her initial May 

15, 2008 written report........................................................................ 9

D. At all times AHISD followed its own sexual harassment 

policies in responding to plaintiff’s allegations ................................ 12

E Contrary to her recent and unfounded assertions in her Brief, 

the record evidence demonstrates that plaintiff’s TINA (her 

growth plan) was not issued in retaliation for her having 

complained ........................................................................................ 14

F. The record evidence does not support plaintiff’s conclusion that 

AHISD violated its custom or policy in evaluating and 

recommending plaintiff’s termination in the Spring of 2009............ 18
iii

II. Argument and Authorities....................................................................... 22

A. Mission Consolidated and the making of a prima facie case 

sufficient to withstand a jurisdictional challenge.............................. 22

III. Plaintiff has failed to establish the third, fourth and fifth elements 

of her sexual harassment claim ............................................................... 23

A. Plaintiff has failed to show that the alleged harassment was 

“based on gender” ............................................................................. 23

B. Plaintiff has failed to show that the alleged harassment was 

severe or pervasive under standards established by the Fifth 

Circuit................................................................................................ 26

C. Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that 

AHISD was negligent in controlling the workplace, and the 

jurisdictional evidence conclusively establishes that AHISD 

responded appropriately to her complaints....................................... 28

IV. Plaintiff has failed to show that AHISD’s legitimate nonretaliatory 

reasons for termination were pretextual as required to defeat a 

jurisdictional challenge to her retaliation claim under Mission 

Consolidated............................................................................................ 29

A. Under Texas SOAH v. Birch pretext is to be considered in 

engaging in the Mission Consolidated jurisdictional analysis.......... 30

B. Even were pretext not part of a jurisdictional analysis, 

plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails because her proffered 

circumstantial evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to 

support an inference of causation...................................................... 32

1. Plaintiff cannot rely on a theory of temporal proximity 

because her performance deficiencies had been identified 

and addressed by AHISD before she ever engaged in 

protected activity.......................................................................... 33
iv

2. Plaintiff was not similarly situated to Monterrubio, as she 

alone suffered from an astounding and unprecedented 

variety of consistent and severe, and irremediable, 

performance deficiencies setting her apart and in a class 

separate from any other AHISD employee to come before of 

after her. ....................................................................................... 34

PRAYER................................................................................................................. 36 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.............................................................................. 37

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE...................................................................... 38

APPENDIX............................................................................................................. 39
v

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Arredondo v. Gulf Bend Center, 

No. H-06-1580, 2007 WL 1004051 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2007).................. 33

AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes,

272 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008) .................................................................. 29, 34

Cantu v. Peacher, 

53 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied)......................... 22

City of Laredo v. Negrete, 

2010 WL 454921 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied) ........... 26-27

Doe ex rel. v. Dallas Independent School District, 

220 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2000)....................................................................... 22

E.E.O.C. v. Boh Brothers Construction Co., L.L.C.,

731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013)........................................................................ 24

English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 

190 F. Supp. 2d 833 (E.D.Va. 2002)........................................................... 25

Faragher v. Boca Raton, 

524 U.S. 775 (1998) .................................................................................... 29

Gulf States Toyota, Inc. v. Morgan,

89 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2002, no pet.)..... 23, 26, 28

KIPP v. Rosenberg, 

2015 WL 410454 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. filed)... 29-30

KIPP v. Whitehead, 

466 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) ..... 29, 31

La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 

302 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2002)....................................................................... 24
vi

Lauderdale v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 

512 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2007)........................................................................ 15

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 

37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994)....................................................................... 32

Love v. Motiva Enterprises LLC, 

349 Fed. App’x 900 (5th Cir. 2009)............................................................. 25

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973) ............................................................................. passim

Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 

477 U.S. 57 (1986) ...................................................................................... 26

Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Garcia,

372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) ................................................................. passim

Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 

523 U.S. 75 (1998) ................................................................................. 23-27

Ptomey v. Texas Tech University, 

277 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) ............ 15, 30, 32

Quantum Chemical Corp. v. Toennies, 

47 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2001) ......................................................................... 30

Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings v. Birch, 

No. 04-12-00681-CV, 2013 WL 3874473 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio July 24, 2013, pet. denied)........................... 30-31

University of Texas, M.D. Anderson Cancer Center v. Valdizan-Garcia, 

No. 01-12-00386-CV, 2012 WL 5545783

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] November 15, 2012, no pet.).................. 31

Vance v. Ball State University,

133 S.Ct. 2434 (U.S. 2013) .......................................................................... 28
vii

Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center,

453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006)....................................................................... 24

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Itz,

21 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied)......................... 26-27

Ysleta Independent School District v. Monarrez, 

177 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. 2005) .................................................................. 34-35

STATUTES AND RULES

Tex. Lab. Code § 21.051, .055 ........................................................................ passim
1

SUMMARY OF REPLY

The significance of the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Mission 

Consolidated, which governs this Plea to the Jurisdiction, is that in order to 

overcome governmental immunity a plaintiff asserting a public school district’s 

violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), must 

“actually allege a violation of the TCHRA by pleading facts that state a claim 

thereunder.” Id. at 635-36 (emphasis added). Finding that an “inquiry” into the 

substance of a plaintiff’s claims was required, the Mission Court reasoned: “[...] if 

TCHRA plaintiffs were allowed to stand on talismanic allegations alone, the 

constraining power of pleas to the jurisdiction would practically be eliminated.” Id.

at 638. As such, the Supreme Court’s clear instruction to lower courts is a duty to 

examine whether a plaintiff’s claims truly support a cause of action under the 

TCHRA and to dismiss claims found lacking.

Here, the Alamo Heights Independent School District (AHISD or Appellant) 

appealed the trial court’s decision that ignored the Mission Consolidated holding. 

See Appellant’s Brief. The Appellee responded (see Appellee’s Brief) and AHISD 

now files this Reply. 

The thrust of Appellee’s Brief is argument that the trial court did not err in 

denying AHISD’s jurisdictional plea because the factual allegations in Appellee’s 

pleadings (to be construed always in favor of her claims) coupled with her 
2

arguments, made out a prima facie sexual harassment and retaliation case under the 

TCHRA, thus meeting her jurisdictional requirements under Mission Consolidated.

In this Reply, AHISD will show that significant “facts” relied upon by 

Appellee in support of this contention were contorted, misrepresented and/or 

mischaracterized to such an extent that Appellee has no prima facie case and that 

once stripped of these embellishments and misrepresentations, the jurisdictional 

evidence clearly demonstrates the material deficiency of her claims that must, 

under Mission Consolidated and its prodigy, be dismissed. 

Appellee will also demonstrate that the “issue” of whether the Mission 

decision requires a jurisdictional review under the McDonnell Douglas rubric 

beyond the existence of a prima facie case, into pretext (Appellant claims it does 

not and Appellee asserts the opposite), while relevant, is preceded by the fact that a 

plaintiffs’ prima facie burden to have pled facts sufficient to support an inference 

of causation, the third required element of her prima facie case. As will be further 

developed below, in support of an inference of causation, Appellee/Plaintiff 

offered the trial court, as she again offers here, mere unsupported subjective belief 

that is wholly insufficient to meet this burden.
3

REPLY

I. Plaintiff’s “Statement of Facts” contains multiple significant

misstatements.

To overcome AHISD’s jurisdiction challenge, plaintiff is entitled to and will 

surely present only facts favorable to her case. But, in doing so plaintiff is not 

entitled to hyperbolize, exaggerate, misrepresent and otherwise distort testimony 

and documentary evidence. As such, AHISD points this Court to the following 

egregious and significant errors contained in plaintiff’s “Statement of Facts.” 

A. That plaintiff was considered by her employer, AHISD, to be a 

superlative employee with an unblemished employment record prior 

to her engagement in protected activity is a gross distortion of 

jurisdictional evidence. 

In support of her claim to have met the prima facie burden of demonstrating 

a causal relationship between her protected activity and subsequent adverse 

employment actions, plaintiff would have this court accept as “fact” that she was 

considered by AHISD to be a “perfect” employee (see Appellee’s Brief, p. 1), that 

she had not before received a “negative evaluation”(id.), and that she was never 

instructed to not bring her children to her workplace prior to her having reported 

harassing conduct to her supervisor on May 15, 2008 (id. at p. 15). 

Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff’s having made this report was a 

protected activity, the evidence submitted to the trial court not only fails to support 

these “factual” contentions, it supports a polar opposite result. 
4

A Perfect Employee?

Plaintiff’s claim to perfection as an employee is with regard to a single 45 

minute AHISD assessment, an observation of plaintiff’s classroom that was 

conducted 90 days into her first semester of employment. (CR 391-96) But,

AHISD concedes that at the time of her hiring, plaintiff was considered qualified 

for her position and the evidence submitted to the trial court was that well prior to 

plaintiff’s complaint to her supervisor, Principal, Stephanie Kershner had been 

addressing and attempting to correct plaintiff’s performance deficiencies as they

related to her relationship with her peers. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 181-182)

The single, “perfect” 45-minute observation of plaintiff’s physical education 

class occurring on December 7, 2007 concerned only Plaintiff’s classroom 

interactions with her students1 and did not rate her performance and interactions 

with peers in any of the areas that ultimately formed the basis of her growth plan, 

Domains V-VII, “Professional Communication,” “Professional Development,” and 

“Compliance With Policies, Operating Procedures, and Requirements,” 

respectively. (CR 391-94) 

 1 The four performance areas in which plaintiff was rated during this initial observation 

were Domains I-IV, “Active, Successful Student Participation in the Learning Process,” 

“Learner-Centered Instruction,” “Evaluation and Feedback on Student Progress,” and 

“Management of Student Discipline, Instructional Strategies, Time, and Materials.” (CR 

391-96)

2 See www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chutzpah

noun chutz·pah \ˈhu̇ t-spə, ˈḵu̇ t spä\. : Yiddish: personal confidence or courage that allows 
5

A First and Only Negative Evaluation? 

Plaintiff would have this court accept as fact that it was not until 2009, and 

only after her complaint to her Principal, that she received her “first and only 

negative evaluation” (see Appellee’s Brief, p. 1), but this again misrepresents the 

uncontroverted evidence. Plaintiff’s complaint to her principal was on May 15, 

2008, but prior to conducting plaintiff’s March 3, 2008 summative annual 

appraisal, plaintiff’s principal had received student reports of her contentious 

relationship with her alleged harasser, coach Monterrubio, on which she counseled 

plaintiff at the March 3, 2008 summative appraisal conference. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 

181-182) Likewise, during the March 3, 2008 summative annual appraisal, while 

rating her as but “proficient” in two performance areas, including “Professional 

Communication” plaintiff was directed to “communicate with girls’ athletic 

coordinator and administrators,” indicating a concern with plaintiff’s performance 

at that time. (CR 399-400)

Don’t Bring Your Kids to School Ma’am!

Plaintiff contends as “fact” that it was not until after her complaint to her 

Principal that AHISD directed her to stop bringing her children to school during 

the workday. See Appellee’s Brief, p. 15. The trial court evidence is that Kershner 

had issued this same directive to plaintiff prior to plaintiff’s complaint about 
6

Monterubbio. In plaintiff’s own words her principal had “told [her] that [her] 

daughter coming to the school twice a week during the last hour [of the workday] 

was causing problems in the workplace” instructing her to cease this practice. (CR 

333, emphasis added). Kershner also testified that this reprimand and directive to 

plaintiff had occurred prior to plaintiff’s complaint, that she, Kershner, was only 

enforcing campus policy that plaintiff had repeatedly violated. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 

184, 227-231) 

The Principal’s 2009 recommendation as Plaintiff’s First and Only 

Negative Evaluation 

The uncontroverted evidence before the trail court was that in June of 2009, 

plaintiff’s principal prepared a letter to her Superintendent recommending that 

plaintiff be terminated for cause. The letter was accompanied by a profoundly 

deficient evaluation, that plaintiff would have this court accept as her “first and 

only negative evaluation.” See Appellee’s Brief, p. 1. In some circles the term of 

art for this sort of contention is “chutzpah.”2 The uncontested record evidence is 

that in August, September, and October of 2008, Kershner and AHISD 

administrators held numerous meetings with plaintiff in an attempt to remediate the 

significant performance issues, including her failure to follow previous directives 

 2 See www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chutzpah

noun chutz·pah \ˈhu̇ t-spə, ˈḵu̇ t spä\. : Yiddish: personal confidence or courage that allows 

someone to do or say things that may seem shocking to others.
7

to not leave her children unattended at work, a growing and obvious inability to 

perform duties and function cooperatively with others, and failures to comply with 

AHISD’s policies. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 227-231; see also Appellant’s Brief, pp. 13-

15) The record is also replete with significant efforts made by AHISD to have 

plaintiff remediate these severe performance deficiencies (id.) including placing 

her on a growth plan and issuing her a written reprimand. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 184-

185, 236-237) It is conceded that plaintiff filed an EEOC charge on October 7, 

2008, three weeks prior to the implementation of the growth plan, but it is also 

uncontested that her growth plan was based on plaintiff’s conduct identified by 

AHISD and addressed with her months prior. Id. 

Once rectified, plaintiff’s distorted statement of “facts” belies her contention 

that she was a perfect employee with no performance deficiencies prior to her 

engagement in protected activity, and as such she cannot successfully contend that 

she has proffered evidence supporting her having demonstrated a causal 

relationship between her protected activity and subsequent adverse employment 

action, which is the third prima facie element of her retaliation claim. 

B. That plaintiff’s supervisor, her principal, was informed of and had 

been ignoring her complaints against her coworker, Monterrubio, for 

months prior to her having complained to her principal in writing on 

May 15, 2008 is another gross distortion of jurisdictional evidence. 

In support of her claim to have met the prima facie burden of demonstrating 
8

AHISD’s negligence in controlling the workplace, plaintiff would have this court 

accept as “fact” that plaintiff’s supervisor, her principal, had been informed of and 

had been ignoring her complaints against her coworker, Monterrubio, for months 

prior to her having complained to her principal in writing on May 15, 2008 (see

Appellee’s Brief, p. 4) when in fact, the jurisdictional evidence demonstrated only 

that Plaintiff’s May 15, 2008 letter was the first time she reported sexually oriented 

conduct to her principal.

According to plaintiff’s “facts” her principal was informed of her allegations 

against Monterrubio on numerous occasions and for months during the Spring of 

2008 (see Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-5), a good trick in that plaintiff also states that 

she had not, previous to her May 15, 2008 allegations, brought these complaints to 

her supervisor’s attention.3 In fact, in her May 15, 2008 written report to her 

principal plaintiff explains that she “had major hesitation about writing this very 

complaint” (CR 341), and included a list of reasons to explain “why I am just now

reporting this to you.” (CR 340, emphasis added) These are not the words of 

someone who has previously reported the same behavior to Kershner, much less 

done so on numerous occasions. 

The closest plaintiff gets to alleging prior knowledge of her supervisor in her 

letter is her suggestion that because her principal addressed her relationship with 

 3 There is no evidence, nor is there allegation, that plaintiff’s alleged Fall 2007 report to a 

“friend,” Annette Kessler, ever reached Kershner.
9

Monterrubio at the March 3, 2008 summative conference, she “must have been 

aware of problems in the workplace.” (CR 340, emphasis added) Moreover her 

principal’s testimony was that the March 3, 2008 summative conference discussion 

with plaintiff about her relationship with Monterrubio was about, and only about, a 

disagreement between the two over an instructional approach, namely where to 

hold classes, and how to discipline students who refused to dress for physical 

education classes. (CR 239) 

Thus, plaintiff’s own words at the time of her report, bolstered by her 

supervisor’s consistent testimony, reject plaintiff’s unsupported “factual” assertion 

that her principal had long known of the alleged sexual harassment and thus 

undermines her contention that AHISD failed to control the workplace by taking 

earlier corrective action, the fifth required prima facie element of her sexual 

harassment claim.

C. Plaintiff has embellished and invented allegations over the course of 

this lawsuit and her Brief contradicts her initial May 15, 2008 written 

report. 

As just described and as will follow, plaintiff’s Statement of Facts falsely 

depicts a severe, pervasive and offensive work environment of sexual advances, 

which plaintiff offers in support of her argument that she met the third and fourth 

required prima facie elements of her sexual harassment claim: (3) that the 

harassment constituted discrimination based on her gender, and (4) that it altered 
10

the terms and conditions of her employment. See Appellee’s Brief, pp. 2-4.

Plaintiff’s current allegations are materially different from those she first reported 

to her principal in her May 15, 2008 letter. 

Plaintiff’s May 15, 2008 letter characterized Monterrubio’s behavior as 

“rude,” “abrasive,” “inappropriate,” “bullying,” “harassing,” “offensive,” 

“derogatory,” “threatening,” and “intimidating” (CR 328-341), but never alleged 

that Monterrubio’s conduct was discrimination based on plaintiff’s gender. (CR 

328-341) Instead, plaintiff described Monterrubio as “jealous” of her (CR 329), 

and that Monterrubio was snubbing her because plaintiff was one of the “Alamo 

Heights mothers” thought of as “smug, wealthy, and snotty,” and that Monterrubio 

had called her daughters “trust-fund babies.” (CR 333-334) These reasons have 

nothing whatsoever to do with plaintiff’s gender, but give every indication that 

Monterrubio simply did not like plaintiff and allegedly bullied her for reasons not 

protected by law.

Plaintiff also never alleged, as she now asserts in her Brief, that Monterrubio 

or Boyer were sexually attracted to her, nor that they made sexual advances 

towards her, nor that their subsequent bullying was a response to unreciprocated 

sexual interest (Appellee’s Brief, p. 2). Today, plaintiff claims that Monterrubio 

and Boyer grabbed her buttocks while posing for a picture during the faculty 

Christmas party in 2007 (see Appellee’s Brief, p. 3). This allegation is significantly 
11

embellished and materially different from plaintiff’s initial report, where she 

reported that unidentified “coaches” were “grabbing their private areas of their 

bodies for photographs next to a Christmas tree.” (CR 330, emphasis added) For 

“factual” support, plaintiff cites her deposition testimony taken on March 22, 

2013, several years after the alleged incident, and several years into this 

pending litigation, where she, for the first time, alleged that she had been 

grabbed sexually. (Sec. Supp. CR 190-91)

Plaintiff also cites this same deposition testimony for not just embellished, 

but entirely new allegations of Monterrubio’s conduct that she had never before 

reported (see Appellee’s Brief, pp. 16-17, citing Sec. Supp. CR 195-197). Plaintiff 

was a prolific complainant with over 100 separate and combined allegations of 

bullying and harassing behavior found in multiple reports in 2008-2009. While a 

few of these allegations could be considered complaints of inappropriate behavior, 

the vast majority involved matters such as her not being brought breakfast tacos, 

wadded up print jobs in the trash cans, and radios played at too loud a volume (see

Appellant’s Brief, p. 16, citing Supp. CR, Vol. I. 250-253). But now, through her 

Brief and only though her Brief, plaintiff goes to great lengths to make her 

allegations seem severe, pervasive, and discriminatory while the allegations she 

originally made during the course of her employment, and throughout the first 

three years of this lawsuit that compose the juridictional records in this appeal, 
12

were nothing of the sort. It is inconceivable that such bombshell allegations as two 

co-workers sexually grabbing her buttocks could have slipped this plaintiff’s mind 

when she otherwise complained if somebody played the radio too loud. 

Absent plaintiff’s embellished and recent allegations of sexual advances, she 

cannot demonstrate, as is her burden, that the alleged conduct was discrimination 

based on her gender. See infra, Part III.A, discussing the third prima facie element 

of plaintiff’s same-sex hostile work environment claim. Moreover, once stripped of 

these embellishments, it becomes clear that the totality of plaintiff’s allegations is 

insufficient to meet the severe or pervasive threshold required to prove the fourth 

prima facie element of her claim.

D. At all times AHISD followed its own sexual harassment policies in 

responding to plaintiff’s allegations. 

As demonstrated above, plaintiff’s argument that her principal violated 

AHISD’s policy by ignoring her complaints during the Spring of 2008 is baseless 

as plaintiff by her own admission had not reported these allegations to her principal 

until May 15, 2008. See supra, part I.B. Similarly, plaintiff mischaracterizes the 

testimony of Kershner, Bashara and Brown when she alleges in her Brief that 

Kershner violated AHISD’s policy by not “formally handling Clark’s protected 

report under the District’s policy” when Kershner conducted the initial 

investigation into plaintiff’s allegations herself. See Appellee’s Brief, pp. 11-12. 
13

Specifically, plaintiff asks this Court to conclude that the record contains no 

written documentation showing that Kershner had provided a copy of plaintiff’s 

letter to Brown, who was the Director of Human Resources at the time, and that 

this establishes a “fact” that Kershner failed to bring plaintiff’s report to his 

attention to conclude that Kershner lacked the administration’s authority necessary 

to conduct an investigation of plaintiffs complaints. (see Appellee’s Brief, p. 11,

and Sec. Supp. CR 269). The record evidence is that Principal Kershner had 

informed Brown of plaintiff’s charges (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 102) and (CR 243) and 

that AHISD policy expressly allowed for the investigation to be conducted by a 

campus principal. See Appellee’s Brief, p. 11 and (Sec. Supp. CR 269). 

Plaintiff then falsely claims that “Kershner admitted she [was] not qualified 

to conduct such an investigation as she had never done it before” Id. But, this an 

outright fabrication, as the record evidence is uncontested that principal Kershner 

had previously handled a similar investigation involving a complaint of sexually 

inappropriate conduct by a teacher towards students, nor had she, or anyone (other

then plaintiff in her Brief), stated that she was unqualified to do so. (CR 246) 

Plaintiff also falsely asserts that AHISD’s policy was violated because a 

written report of the investigation was not filed with the district official overseeing 

the investigation. See Appellee’s Brief, p. 13. But the record reveals that Kershner 

was the district official overseeing the investigation, and she had provided plaintiff 
14

with a written report of her investigation and findings on May 23, 2008, which she 

also discussed with plaintiff in person on May 27, 2008. (CR 183, 225-26) The 

uncontroverted record testimony is also that Kershner shared the results of her 

investigation with Brown, the Director of Human Resources. (CR 102) 

Plaintiff concludes that Kershner’s investigation of her complaints was 

somehow illegitimate (see Appellee’s Brief, p. 15), clearly attempting to create 

the impression with this Court that AHISD failed to follow its own policy in 

handling her complaint. While plaintiff may and obviously does disagree with 

the investigation results, AHISD’s jurisdictional evidence leads this court to 

the opposite conclusion: that the school district and its administration followed 

AHISD policy and properly investigated plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff cannot 

rely on these factual misrepresentations and thus, she cannot show that she has 

met the fifth required prima facie element of her claim, that AHISD was 

negligent in controlling the working conditions because it knew of her 

allegations and did not take appropriate action in response. 

E. Contrary to her recent and unfounded assertions in her Brief, the 

record evidence demonstrates that plaintiff’s TINA (her growth plan) 

was not issued in retaliation for her having complained. 

Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation, that by placing her on a TINA4, AHISD 

retaliated against her in the Fall of 2008, relies on mischaracterized record 

 4 TINA is the school district’s acronym for Teacher in Need of Assistance, a growth plan. 
15

evidence without which plaintiff is unable to demonstrate a causal relation, the 

third required prima facie element of her retaliation claim.5

Plaintiff first argues that she suffered harassment beyond that complained of 

in May of 2008 more or less silently because “any further reports of harassment 

would have been futile, and Kershner never followed up to prove her wrong” 

(Appellee’s Brief, pp. 15-16), when in fact the opposite is true. Kershner 

conducted a thorough investigation of her complaints. (CR 183, 225-26) Plaintiff 

even expressed satisfaction with the results, stating to Kershner that she was 

satisfied with the investigation and response to her May 15, 2008 complaint, 

thanking Kershner, and saying that she “trusted [Kershner’s] judgment with respect 

to the conclusions of [Kershner’s] investigation.” (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 183, 193-197) 

Plaintiff was obviously satisfied at the time with the investigation, but if she had 

not been satisfied AHISD’s anti-harassment policy offered her an appeal through 

the School District’s grievance procedures. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 193-197) But 

plaintiff did nothing of the sort.6 Instead, while she nebulously voiced a degree of 

 5 See Ptomey v. Texas Tech Univ., 277 S.W.3d 487, 495 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. 

denied), explaining that a retaliation claimant must raise a fact issue as to as to the 

existence of a causal relationship between having engaged in a protected activity and a 

subsequent adverse employment action. 

6 Plaintiff’s currently expressed dissatisfaction with the results of Kershner’s investigation 

contradicts her statements to Kershner at this time; moreover, she had opportunity to but 

failed to appeal that decision under clearly established AHISD policy. See Lauderdale v. 

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that 

when an employee believes that an initial complaint was ineffective, it is unreasonable to 

not utilize other avenues provided under the employer’s policy).
16

discontent outside of AHISD’s established reporting procedures, she made no new 

allegations of sexually inappropriate conduct, and she did not appeal the District’s 

response. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 183-184, 230) In fact, the record evidence reveals that 

in meetings with plaintiff during August, September, and October of 2008, her 

supervisor principal and another AHISD administrator, the School District Athletic 

Director, implored her to detail the vague and general complaints she was 

referencing. But, the record is also uncontested that plaintiff steadfastly refused to 

do so. Id.

Plaintiff also asserts in her Brief that “in response to the [EEOC] charge, 

Kershner warned [her] that her complaints would have consequences.” See

Appellee’s Brief, p. 17. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony describing conversations 

with her principal is otherwise:

Q: Your complaints. I’m asking about your charge of 

discrimination. Did she ever infer or say there would be 

consequences for your having filed a charge of discrimination?

MR. PEARSON: Object to the form. You can answer.

A: No.

(Supp. CR, Vol. II 72)

Plaintiff also describes her TINA itself as retaliatory and unjustified because 

it concerned her failure to follow AHISD policy relating to her allegations of 

sexually inappropriate conduct. See Appellee’s Brief, pp. 18-19. But the TINA’s 

directive to plaintiff to follow District complaint procedures involved plaintiff’s 
17

allegations outside of AHISD’s anti-harassment policy, vague allegations and 

references to incidents plaintiff described as “unprofessional behavior,” in a 

September 29, 2008 meeting with Kershner, so vague and general that Kershner, 

and later the Athletic Director, begged plaintiff to provide specifics and to identify 

the employees she claimed to have been involved so that the District could 

investigate her general charges. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 183-185, 230) The TINA was 

borne from plaintiff’s refusal to do so and from Kershner having to direct plaintiff 

to utilize AHISD’s grievance policy for future complaints and from such directives 

having gone unheeded. Id. 

The uncontroverted record reveals that when plaintiff filed her Charge of 

Discrimination with the EEOC on October 7, 2008, she referenced her May 15, 

2008 written report to Kershner, but made no new allegations of inappropriate 

behavior of any sort. (Supp. CR, Vol. I 232-33) The uncontested record also 

demonstrates that in January and February of 2009, when plaintiff made new 

allegations, she was not reporting incidents of sexual harassment but rather that she 

was being “bullied” and “ostracized” by her coworkers. (Supp. CR, Vol. I 185-87, 

250-58) Her “new” and voluminous allegations were workplace grievances against 

coworkers, exactly the type of complaints plaintiff had, on multiple occasions, 

been expressly instructed to bring under AHISD’s grievance policy. (Supp. CR, 

Vol. I 198-203). 
18

Finally, the TINA clearly stated: “Catherine has repeatedly made reference 

to problems that have occurred with her physical education team, but she has never 

followed through with policy to submit these issues in writing as directed by Board 

Policy (DGBA LOCAL).” (Supp. CR, Vol. I 236) Her TINA also directed plaintiff 

to “comply with all policies, operating procedures and legal requirements.” (Supp. 

CR, Vol. I 237) No reasonable interpretation of the record evidence of plaintiff’s 

TINA supports her conclusion and argument that the TINA’s directive was issued 

to her in retaliation.

F. The record evidence does not support plaintiff’s conclusion that 

AHISD violated its custom or policy in evaluating and recommending 

plaintiff’s termination in the Spring of 2009. 

In support of her claim to have met the prima facie burden of demonstrating 

a causal relationship between her protected activity and a subsequent adverse 

employment action, plaintiff suggests that she received an exceptional review with 

respect to the performance concerns covered in her TINA (professional 

communication and compliance with policies) (Supp. CR, Vol. I 236-37) and 

would have this court accept as “fact” her argument that AHISD violated its own 

custom and policy in evaluating and recommending her termination. See

Appellee’s Brief, pp. 19-21. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that AHISD violated its 

custom because Georgia Franks, an assistant principal, had previously conducted a 

classroom observation of plaintiff and her supervisor, campus principal Kershner, 
19

conducted plaintiff’s summative evaluation. Id. Plaintiff contends that Kershner 

replaced Franks and “conducted the biased annual evaluation in order to support 

Clark’s wrongful termination.” Id. Plaintiff further contends that Kershner altered 

the evaluation document by “remov[ing] Franks’ name from the document 

entirely.” Id. at p. 21. Finally, plaintiff, without further explanation, suggests that 

Superintendent Kevin Brown did not follow AHISD’s termination policy when 

recommending plaintiff’s termination for cause to the Board of Trustees. Id. at pp. 

22-23. As more fully explained below, none of these bare and false assertions are 

supported by the jurisdictional evidence. 

The record evidence is that Franks rated plaintiff’s classroom performance 

though an observation conducted January 8, 2009. Rating plaintiff as “exceeds” in 

some areas she offered no rating to plaintiff with respect to Domains V-VII, areas 

addressed by plaintiff’s ongoing TINA. (CR 405-411). Plaintiff’s assertion that 

AHISD violated its custom when Kershner conducted plaintiff’s summative annual 

appraisal, even though Franks had conducted the observation (see Appellee’s 

Brief, pp. 20-21) further mischaracterizes Kershner’s testimony, which is the only 

evidence offered by plaintiff to support the existence of such a custom. Id. 

Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion that “it was customary for the same administrator

to conduct the [mid-year] evaluation and the annual evaluation” (see Appellee’s 

Brief, pp. 20-21), Kershner testified that it was not unusual for her to conduct 
20

annual evaluations even though an assistant principal had conducted the mid-year 

observation (CR 234-35) and there is no documentary evidence anywhere in the 

record suggesting otherwise. The following testimony addressing plaintiff’s claim 

that her evaluation was a retaliatory “consequence” of her having filed an earlier 

complaint, her unsupported beliefs, is all plaintiff has to support her “factual” 

claims: 

Q: [...] How do you know, other than your belief, that this [being 

evaluated by Kershner after being observed by Franks] is one of 

the consequences? Someone tell you? Did someone tell you that 

this was one of the consequences?

A: No, sir.

Q: So all you have is your own belief, correct?

MR. PEARSON: Object to the form.

A: I just know it.

Q: You just know it in your heart, correct?

MR. PEARSON: Object to the form.

A: Yes.

(Supp. CR, Vol. II 79) Thus, Kershner’s testimony dispenses with plaintiff’s 

contention of “custom” basing her conclusions on nothing more than an 

unsubstantiated subjective belief.

Plaintiff’s assertion that Kershner “removed Franks’ name from the 

document entirely” (see Appellee’s Brief, p. 21) is a very serious but thankfully 

entirely unsubstantiated charge of criminal misconduct against Kershner. AHISD 

wishes to give plaintiff the benefit of an analysis that her baseless charge is the 
21

result of her confusing Franks’ observation summary (CR 405-12) with Kershner’s 

summative annual appraisal (CR 357-64). There is no record evidence that either 

of these entirely different and distinct documents were altered in any way by 

Kershner or anyone else on behalf of AHISD. 

There is similar absurdity with regard to plaintiff’s “factual’ claim that when 

Brown told her that she would be informed of the Board’s action “pretty much 

immediately” meant her proposed termination was a “done deal.” See Appellee’s 

Brief, pp. 22-23. The undisputed evidence in this matter is that the Notice of 

Proposed Termination to plaintiff informed her of her full due process opportunity 

and her right to contest her proposed termination, to require the District to prove its 

reasons for the proposal and to establish good cause for her termination in a full 

evidentiary due process hearing before an independent hearing examiner. (Supp. 

CR, Vol. I 105, 138-74) The record is also undisputed that Plaintiff entirely 

rejected this opportunity to contest the Board’s proposed termination. (CR 105) 

Except now, she would have this Court accept as fact that her resistance at that 

time would have been futile! See Appellee’s Brief, p. 22.

Plaintiff’s attempted demonstration of the third prima facie element of her 

retaliation claim, that AHISD violated its custom and policy in evaluating and 

recommending her termination in 2009, is not only not supported by the 

jurisdictional evidence, it contradicts her own testimony and allegations. 
22

II. Argument and Authorities

A. Mission Consolidated and the making of a prima facie case 

sufficient to withstand a jurisdictional challenge.

Although this appeal involves a plea to the jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme 

Court held in Mission Consolidated that the standard of review “mirrors that of a 

traditional summary judgment” and the plaintiff must raise a fact issue on each of 

the jurisdictional elements of her claims. See Mission Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 635. 

Here, Plaintiff asks this court to accept her Statement of Facts without

challenge or change so that she may support her jurisdictional defense and meet 

her initial burden of proving the elements of a prima facie TCHRA case. See 

Mission Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 638. In doing so, plaintiff is permitted to reach 

into her arsenal of allegations, expecting the court to accept all well-plead 

allegations and even disputed facts as supporting her claims. Id. But, in doing so, 

plaintiff may not, without explanation, manufacture a genuine issue of material 

fact as attempted here, through the offer of an affidavit that contradicts her 

prior testimony. See Doe ex rel. v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380, 386 

(5th Cir. 2000) (omitting citations); see also Cantu v. Peacher, 53 S.W.3d 5, 

10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). To allow otherwise “would 

greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for screening 

out sham issues of fact.” Id. In as much, the foregoing assertions made in 

plaintiff’s Brief, that contradict and misrepresent the jurisdictional evidence in this 
23

case, and uncontroverted sworn deposition testimony, are to be disregarded by this 

Court.

III. Plaintiff has failed to establish the third, fourth and fifth elements of her 

sexual harassment claim.

Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim is based on the alleged harassment of her 

same-sex coworkers, Ann Monterrubio and Michelle Boyer. See Plaintiff’s Second 

Amended Petition, p. 3. Her prima facie case requires proof of the following 

elements: (1) that she is a member of a protected category (i.e., female); (2) who 

was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that was based on gender; (4) and 

which affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment; and (5) that her 

employer, AHISD, knew, or should have known, of the harassment and did not 

take prompt remedial action. See Gulf States Toyota, Inc. v. Morgan, 89 S.W.3d 

766, 770 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Plaintiff has failed to 

raise a fact issue on the third, fourth, and fifth prima facie elements, which 

deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over her claim. See Mission 

Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 638. 

A. Plaintiff has failed to show that the alleged harassment was “based on 

gender.”

In a same-sex hostile work environment case such as this one, harassment 

that merely involves sexual content or has sexual connotations is not necessarily 

discriminatory. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 
24

(1998). A same-sex plaintiff must always show that the alleged harassment was 

based on gender. See La Day v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 

2002). While plaintiff argues that she can offer additional evidentiary routes for 

establishing this element exists outside of those generally required in Oncale, she 

does in fact proceed under Oncale’s first evidentiary example. See Appellee’s 

Brief, pp. 34-35.7 Under this route, plaintiff must establish the third “based on 

gender” element of her prima facie case of same-sex discrimination claim by 

showing (1) that her alleged harasser made explicit or implicit proposals of sexual 

activity, and (2) provide credible evidence that her alleged harasser was 

homosexual. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. 

Plaintiff’s bare assertions that Monterrubio and Boyer “were physically 

attracted to [her]” and harassed her because plaintiff “did not reciprocate that 

interest” (see Appellee’s Brief, p. 35) cannot withstand a minimal level of scrutiny. 

See supra, Part I.C. Plaintiff’s recent allegation that Monterrubio and Boyer had, 

on one occasion (the 2007 faculty Christmas party) grabbed her buttocks, 

contradicts her own report of this alleged incident made in May of 2008 where she 

alleged that unidentified coaches were grabbing themselves and not her. (CR 330) 

 7 Plaintiff cites EEOC v. Boh Bros., Constr. Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2013), in which 

the Fifth Circuit recognized a same-sex discrimination claim based on an individual’s failure to 

conform to gender stereotypes. However, this additional evidentiary route is inapplicable because 

plaintiff has made no argument that her appearance or mannerism on the job were perceived as 

gender non-conforming in some way, and that they provided the basis for the harassment she 

alleges. Id. at 456 n. 7 (citing Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
25

Plaintiff makes no other allegation that could even remotely be construed as an 

explicit or implicit proposal of sexual activity. Moreover, plaintiff’s argument is 

not supported by any credible evidence that Monterrubio and Boyer were or are 

homosexual. To the extent plaintiff has formed any subjective belief of this fact is, 

such belief is, as a matter of law, insufficient proof to avoid summary judgment on 

a same-sex sexual harassment claim. See English v. Pohanka of Chantilly, Inc., 190 

F. Supp. 2d 833, 846 (E.D. Va. 2002); see also Love v. Motiva Enterprises LLC, 

349 Fed. App’x 900, 902-03 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that allegations of 

inappropriate comments, gestures, and physical contact by same-sex co-worker 

were more indicative of humiliating or bullying behavior, and did not support an 

inference of sexual attraction and proposals for sex).

Plaintiff cannot concoct these claims for the sole purpose of avoiding a 

jurisdictional challenge. She offers nothing from the jurisdictional record to 

remotely support her required demonstrations that she was the recipient of 

proposals for sexual activity and that her alleged harassers are homosexuals and 

thus, in this attempt, plaintiff has failed. 

Plaintiff’s recently invented allegations of sexual touching and sexual 

advances, for which the only example given is contradicted by her previous 

allegations, cannot reasonably form the basis of plaintiff’s complaint that such 
26

harassment was “based on gender,” and her same-sex discrimination claim must be 

dismissed for this reason. See Oncale, 523 at 80.

B. Plaintiff has failed to show that the alleged harassment was severe or 

pervasive under the standards established by the Fifth Circuit.

The fourth required prima facie element of plaintiff’s sexual harassment 

case is that the alleged harassment must be demonstrated to have altered a 

term, condition, or privilege of her employment. See Gulf States Toyota, 89 

S.W.3d at 770. In this respect, the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have 

required plaintiffs to demonstrate conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to 

constitute an actionable hostile work environment. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, 

FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). Here, plaintiff has not even alleged facts 

sufficient to demonstrate that the purported conduct of Monterrubio and Boyer 

remotely approached that threshold. 

Plaintiff’ argues that she does not need such proof because her “factual” 

claims are analogous to two cases: City of Laredo v. Negrete, 2010 WL 454921 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied) and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Itz, 21 

S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). However, these are the facts 

that distinguish plaintiff’s claims from those holdings: 

In both Negrete and Itz, the alleged harassers called their victims at their 

homes multiple times, made numerous unquestionable sexual advances towards 

their victims, and repeatedly touched them in a sexual manner. See Negrete, 2010 
27

WL 454921 at *6; Itz, 21 S.W.3d at 463-65. The alleged behavior of Monterrubio 

and Boyer pales in comparison, and Fifth Circuit cases addressing the threshold for 

a same-sex hostile work environment have never before recognized an actionable 

claim under allegations as minimal and inconsequential as those alleged by 

plaintiff. See Appellant’s Brief discussion Part III.C, pp. 54-60.

In support of her claim to have met the prima facie burden of demonstrating 

that Monterrubio and Boyer’s alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or 

pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment, plaintiff invents new 

allegations never before reported, and embellishes old ones in materially 

significant ways, all of which are contradicted by the jurisdictional evidence. See

supra, Part I.C (discussing plaintiff’s recently fabricated allegations) Yet, even if 

plaintiff’s sham allegations are taken as true, which they should not be in light of 

the overwhelming jurisdictional evidence that contradicts them, courts have 

consistently rejected hostile work environment claims based on conduct far more 

severe than the allegations of teasing and offhand comments offered by plaintiff. 

See, e.g., Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.

For these reasons alone plaintiff’s attempt to meet the fourth prima facie 

element of her sexual harassment claim fails, as does her attempt to defend against 

the jurisdictional challenges of Mission Consolidated interpreting the TCHRA.
28

C. Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that AHISD 

was negligent in controlling the workplace, and the jurisdictional 

evidence conclusively establishes that AHISD responded appropriately 

to her complaints.

The fifth element of a prima facie sexual harassment claim is a 

demonstration that the employer was negligent in controlling the workplace 

because it knew of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. See 

Gulf States Toyota, 89 S.W.3d at 770. Plaintiff’s argument that Boyer was her 

supervisor who failed to appropriately respond to her complaints (see Appellee’s 

Brief, pp. 41-42) does not begin to engage the factors identified by the United 

States Supreme Court for making this determination. See Vance v. Ball State 

University, 133 S.Ct. 2434, 2439 (U.S. 2013) (holding that a “supervisor” is a 

person with authority to hire, fire, promote, reassign, and alter a plaintiff’s benefits 

of employment). Here, it is undisputed that Boyer had no authority to hire, fire, 

promote, reassign or in any way alter plaintiff’s employment benefits. (Supp. CR, 

Vol. I. 35-36, 181)

Contrary to the arguments in plaintiff’s Brief, and as demonstrated by the 

uncontroverted jurisdictional evidence, the first-line AHISD employee with 

supervisory responsibilities over plaintiff was her principal, Kershner, and 

Kershner was not aware of plaintiff’s allegations until May of 2008. And the 

record evidence is further undisputed that AHISD promptly investigated plaintiffs 

claims and took prompt remedial action to prevent future harassment. (CR 183, 
29

225-26) Plaintiff’s own negligence, in unreasonably failing to report her 

allegations sooner, prevented AHISD from taking any earlier action (Supp. CR, 

Vol. I. 183), and for such reasons plaintiff also fails to meet the fifth required 

prima facie element of a sexual harassment claim, leading to a dismissal of such 

claim under the relevant authorities. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 

806-08 (1998).

IV. Plaintiff has failed to show that AHISD’s legitimate nonretaliatory 

reasons for termination were pretextual as required to defeat a 

jurisdictional challenge to her retaliation claim under Mission 

Consolidated.

A plaintiff’s prima facie burden for a retaliation claim differs notably from 

that of a discrimination claimant, as the ordinary (non-retaliation) McDonnell 

Douglas burden-shifting framework does not require evidence that a plaintiff’s 

membership in a protected class factored into the adverse employment decision. 

See AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. 2008).8

As such, plaintiff’s retaliation claim is distinguishable from the 

discrimination claims brought in KIPP v. Whitehead, 466 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (holding that consideration of pretext was 

not part of the jurisdictional analysis under Mission Consolidated for plaintiff’s 

 8 The Supreme Court held that a prima facie case of discrimination under the TCHRA 

requires an employee to show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) was 

qualified for her position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced 

by someone outside of her protected class or was treated less favorably than other similarly 

situated employees who were outside of her protected class. AutoZone, 272 S.W.3d at 592.
30

gender and race discrimination claims), and KIPP v. Rosenberg, 2015 WL 410454 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. filed) (holding same as for age 

discrimination claim).

Conversely, under a retaliation TCHRA claim, such as plaintiff also asserts 

here, the third prima facie element of causation requires a plaintiff to raise a fact 

issue as to as to the existence of a causal relationship between having engaged in a 

protected activity and a subsequent adverse employment action. See Ptomey v. 

Texas Tech Univ., 277 S.W.3d 487, 495 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied). 

And a plaintiff cannot do this absent direct or circumstantial evidence of actual 

retaliation. Id. In this respect, beyond speculation and innuendo, plaintiff has 

offered no evidence, embellished or not, of retaliation. 

A. Under Texas SOAH v. Birch pretext is to be considered when engaging 

in the Mission Consolidated jurisdictional analysis. 

Where, as here, an employer offers legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for its 

adverse employment action (see Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6-20, discussing plaintiff’s 

numerous irremediable performance deficiencies), the rebuttable presumption of 

retaliation that plaintiff initially relied on to meet the third prima facie element 

under McDonnell Douglas vanishes. See Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 

S.W.3d 473, 477 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that the employer’s provision of a 

legitimate reason eliminates the presumption initially relied on by the plaintiff). 
31

Without this presumption, and unless a plaintiff offers at least some 

circumstantial evidence of causation, rather than relying on her mere subjective 

belief, the plaintiff has not raised a fact issue as to the third required retaliation 

prima facie element. This was the holding that this Court previously reached in 

dismissing a plaintiff’s retaliation claim in Texas SOAH v. Birch, No. 04-12-

00681-CV, 2013 WL 3874473 at *19 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 24, 2013, pet. 

denied). Furthermore, the First Court of Appeals, which decided KIPP v. 

Whitehead, implicitly recognized this distinction between discrimination and 

retaliation claims when it previously decided University of Texas M.D. Anderson 

Cancer Center v. Valdizan-Garcia, 2012 WL 5545783 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] November 15, 2012, no pet.). In Valdizan-Garcia, the court granted the 

employer’s plea to the jurisdiction under Mission Consolidated, holding that, 

where it had demonstrated legitimate nonretaliatory reasons for her termination, 

the plaintiff had failed to provide required evidence, beyond her subjective belief, 

demonstrating she would not have suffered the adverse employment act “but-for” 

her engagement in protected activity. Id. at *7-8. Thus, the court engaged in the 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework as part of its jurisdictional analysis 

under Mission Consolidated. Id.

Because the application of Birch and Valdizan-Garcia to this plaintiff’s 

retaliation claims merely required her to raise a fact issue through allegations 
32

legally sufficient to support a reasonable inference in her favor, her argument that 

considering pretext at this jurisdictional stage would create an excessive burden is 

not persuasive. See Mission Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 635-36. Here, to demonstrate 

pretext, plaintiff would have only been required to allege circumstantial evidence 

that, taken as true, would suggest a retaliatory motive on the part of AHISD, the 

same circumstantial evidence that might support her initial prima facie burden to 

show causation. See Ptomey, 277 S.W.3d at 495. But, as here, a plaintiff’s mere 

conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated subjective beliefs are insufficient to 

meet this burden. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 

1994). And, because plaintiff’s factual misrepresentations have been laid bare, and 

for the reasons discussed in Section IV.B and C below, her evidentiary theories, 

the ones she might have relied on to meet this burden to show causation, have been 

demonstrated to be insufficient as a matter of law.

B. Even were pretext not part of a jurisdictional analysis, plaintiff’s 

retaliation claim fails because her proffered circumstantial evidence is 

insufficient as a matter of law to support an inference of causation. 

Plaintiff has offered no competent evidence, direct or circumstantial, that she 

was the victim of retaliation, except to argue that an inference of retaliation is 

established by the temporal proximity between her protected activity and AHISD’s 

adverse employment action (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 51-53), and by her 

unsubstantiated belief that Monterrubio was a similarly situated employee but was 
33

treated differently (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 23-25). However, the jurisdictional 

evidence is to the contrary such that the facts of this case cannot support an 

inference of causation under either evidentiary theory.

1. Plaintiff cannot rely on a theory of temporal proximity because her 

performance deficiencies had been identified and addressed by 

AHISD before she ever engaged in protected activity.

Plaintiff’s argument that she owned a stellar performance record prior to 

engaging in protected activity disintegrates upon basic scrutiny of the jurisdictional 

record. See infra, pp. 3-7; see also Appellant’s Brief, pp. 43-45. As plaintiff 

admitted in her initial May 15, 2008 written complaint, she was already on notice 

from Kershner that her performance was deficient. Id. Likewise, the undisputed 

evidence conclusively establishes that plaintiff’s growth plan, which was 

considered prior but began three weeks after she filed a charge with the EEOC, 

concerned significant performance deficiencies that AHISD had identified and 

taken several steps to remediate in the months prior to her EEOC charge. Id. The 

fact that plaintiff engaged in protected activity in the midst of these remediation 

efforts does not render her immune from discipline, does not confer a privileged 

status upon her, and does tie the District’s hands in responding upon reasonable 

belief that plaintiff’s performance was deficient. See Arredondo v. Gulf Bend Ctr., 

No. H-06-1580, 2007 WL 1004051, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2007).
34

2. Plaintiff was not similarly situated to Monterrubio, as she alone 

suffered from an astounding and unprecedented variety of 

consistent and severe, and irremediable, performance deficiencies 

setting her apart and in a class separate from any other AHISD 

employee to come before of after her.

In order to support an inference of retaliation through disparate treatment, a 

plaintiff must show that her comparator employee was similarly situated “in all 

material respects, including [...] conduct” (see Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 

Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. 2005)), and that their work rule violations 

and disciplinary records were “nearly identical.” See AutoZone, 272 S.W.3d at 594. 

In only one respect can plaintiff’s situation be equated with Monterrubio’s, and 

that concerned the District’s efforts in August, September, and October of 2008 to 

foster cooperation and professional communication between coaches in the girls’ 

athletic department. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 184, 227-231) When these efforts failed, 

plaintiff was placed on a growth plan, but it is undisputed that Monterrubio, who 

had not engaged in any protected activity, was, on the same day, also placed on a 

growth plan. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 184-185, 236-237) 

Aside from this lone instance, plaintiff and Monterrubio’s work rule 

violations are not remotely comparable in quantity or degree. (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 

105-106, 191-192) Plaintiff was terminated for a multitude of significant reasons 

that were not shared by Monterrubio or any other employee. Id. Such reasons 

included AHISD’s determination that plaintiff lied in the course of its investigation 
35

into a breach of state testing protocols when plaintiff’s cell phone rang multiple 

times during a TAKS exam (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 188, 268-69); making false reports 

to Kershner concerning her and others’ behavior in meetings, which Kershner 

witnessed herself and knew to be false (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 189, 312-313); the 

allegations plaintiff made to another teacher that Monterrubio and Boyer were 

“lesbian dikes” who “get drunk and share men.” (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 189-190, 321-

322); plaintiff’s failure to prepare lesson plans and maintain student grades (Supp. 

CR, Vol. I. 96-97, 327-335); her complaints about her coworkers made to students 

and her repeated failure to comply with Kershner’s directives not to bring her 

daughter to school during work hours (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 189-190).

The evidence conclusively establishes that plaintiff was not “similarly 

situated” with Monterrubio or any other AHISD employees (Supp. CR, Vol. I. 

105-106, 191-192), and as such, her allegations are insufficient as a matter of law 

to show retaliation through disparate treatment. See Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d at 917.
36

PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, AHISD prays that this Court reverse the trial 

court’s order denying its Plea to the Jurisdiction, and dismiss plaintiff’s claims for 

want of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Respectfully submitted,

SCHULMAN, LOPEZ & HOFFER, LLP

/s/ Robert A. Schulman

Robert A. Schulman

State Bar Number 17834500

Email: rschulman@slh-law.com

Leonard J. Schwartz

State Bar Number 17867000

Email: lschwartz@slh-law.com

Bryan P. Dahlberg

State Bar Number 24065113

Email: bdahlberg@slh-law.com

517 Soledad Street

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Tel.: (210) 538-5385

Fax: (210) 538-5384

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

ALAMO HEIGHTS ISD
37

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on this 9th day of April 2015, a true and correct copy 

of the foregoing document has been delivered by electronic service to counsel of 

record for Appellee in this proceeding as follows: 

Mr. Matthew R. Pearson, Gravely & Pearson, L.L.P., 425 Soledad 

Street, Suite 600, San Antonio, Texas 78205, 

Email: mpearson@gplawfirm.com.

Mr. Brendan K. McBride, McBride Law Firm, 425 Soledad Street, 

Suite 600, San Antonio, Texas 78205, 

Email: brendan.mcbride@att.net. 

/s/ Robert A. Schulman

Robert A. Schulman, 

Attorney for Appellant
38

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that 

this Reply Brief contains 8,137 words (excluding the caption, table of contents, 

index of authorities, signature, certificate of service, and certificate of compliance).

I further certify that this is a computer-generated document created in Word 

for Mac, using 14-point typeface for all text, except for footnotes, which are in 12-

point typeface. In making this certificate of compliance I am relying on the word 

count provided by the software used to prepare this document.

I understand that a copy of this document may be posted on the Court’s 

website and that the electronically filed copy of the document becomes part of the 

Court’s record.

Copies have been sent to all parties associated with this case.

/s/ Robert A. Schulman

Robert A. Schulman, 

Attorney for Appellant
39

APPENDIX

Tab Document

1 AHISD’s Motion to Exceed Word Limits of TRAP 9.4(i)(2)(C)
40

No. 04-14-00746-CV

In the Court of Appeals

for the Fourth District of Texas

ALAMO HEIGHTS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Appellant,

v.

CATHERINE CLARK,

Appellee.

On Appeal from the 285th Judicial District Court

of Bexar County, Texas

APPELLANT’S MOTION TO EXCEED 

WORD LIMITS OF TRAP 9.4(i)(2)(C)

Appellant Alamo Heights Independent School District files this unopposed

motion, contemporaneously with its Reply, asking the Court to allow it to exceed 

the word limits set for its Reply by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3)(C), 

and would respectfully show the following:

1. This case is an accelerated appeal of the trial court’s interlocutory 

order denying Appellant’s Plea to the Jurisdiction.
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2. This Court has the authority under the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure 9.4(i)(4) to allow a party to exceed the word limits.

3. This Court should allow AHISD to exceed the 7,500 word limit for its 

Reply by 637 words because this case involves several complex and novel legal 

issues that required substantial briefing from both parties, as well as a Clerk’s 

Record that has been filed in three separate installments totaling over 1,000 pages 

of pleadings, documents and testimony that make up the jurisdictional record in 

this case

4. This is the first such request by AHISD, and if the Court grants this 

relief, AHISD’s combined briefing in this case will not exceed the 27,000 word 

limit established by Rule 9.4(i)(2)(B).

5. Accordingly, AHISD believes that the foregoing reasonably explains the 

need for the requested relief, and that good cause exists for granting this relief. 

Appellee’s counsel is unopposed to this Motion, as indicated below.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, AHISD asks the Court to 

grant this Motion and allow it to exceed the word limits for its Reply by 637 words as 

requested herein.
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Respectfully submitted,

SCHULMAN, LOPEZ, & HOFFER, LLP

/s/ Robert A. Schulman

Robert A. Schulman

Texas Bar No. 17834500

Email: rschulman@slh-law.com

Leonard J. Schwartz

Texas Bar No. 17867000

Email: lschwartz@slh-law.com

Bryan P. Dahlberg 

Texas Bar No. 24065113

Email: bdahlberg@slh-law.com

517 Soledad Street

San Antonio, Texas 78205-1508

Telephone: (210) 538-5385

Facsimile: (210) 538-5384

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

On April 9, 2015, Bryan Dahlberg corresponded with Appellee’s counsel, 

Matthew Pearson, regarding the relief sought in this Motion. Mr. Pearson notified 

Mr. Dahlberg that he does not oppose this Motion to Exceed the Word Limits of 

TRAP 9.4(i)(2)(C).

/s/ Robert A. Schulman

Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 9th day of April 2015, a true and correct copy of 

the foregoing document has been delivered by electronic service to counsel of 

record for Appellee in this proceeding as follows:

Mr. Matthew R. Pearson, Gravely & Pearson, L.L.P., 425 Soledad 

Street, Suite 600, San Antonio, Texas 78205, 

Email: mpearson@gplawfirm.com.

Mr. Brendan K. McBride, McBride Law Firm, 425 Soledad Street, 

Suite 600, San Antonio, Texas 78205, 

Email: brendan.mcbride@att.net.

/s/ Robert A. Schulman

Attorney for Appellant