UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4398

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

THOMAS PHELPS HAMILTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:12-cr-00002-RLV-DSC-1)

Submitted: March 31, 2015 Decided: April 7, 2015

Before KING and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

D. Baker McIntyre, III, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Anthony J. 

Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury found Thomas Phelps Hamilton guilty of manufacturing 

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012), and 

possessing firearms and ammunition after having been convicted

of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). On 

appeal, Hamilton challenges his convictions and 180-month 

sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

Hamilton first argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by admitting the testimony of Trooper Richardson 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). We review a district 

court’s “decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) for abuse 

of discretion.” United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197, 206 (4th 

Cir. 2011). Under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior bad acts may 

be admitted as proof of “motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 

lack of accident” but “not . . . to prove a person’s character 

in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted 

in accordance with [his] character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 

“Rule 404(b) is an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of 

other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only 

criminal disposition.” United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 

651 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To be 

admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence must be (1) relevant to 
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an issue other than character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable.” 

United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 317 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, potential 

Rule 404(b) evidence should be excluded if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice to the 

defendant. United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 296-97 (4th 

Cir. 2010). 

Trooper Richardson testified only that he saw Hamilton in 

possession of a handgun in 2005. We conclude that this 

testimony meets all the criteria for admissibility under Rule 

404(b), and that the district court’s careful ruling with regard 

to the scope of Trooper Richardson’s testimony, combined with

the limiting jury instructions, eliminated the risk of unfair 

prejudice. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the 

district court’s admission of Trooper Richardson’s testimony 

under Rule 404(b).

II.

Next, Hamilton contends that the district court erred by 

applying the four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2013) for possession of a 

firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense. 

When evaluating Sentencing Guidelines calculations, we review 

the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Cox, 744 F.3d 305, 
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308 (4th Cir. 2014). Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a 

four-level enhancement if a defendant “used or possessed any 

firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony 

offense.” The purpose of this enhancement is “to punish more 

severely a defendant who commits a separate felony offense that 

is rendered more dangerous by the presence of a firearm.” 

United States v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A firearm or ammunition is 

possessed “in connection with” another felony offense “if the 

firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of 

facilitating, another felony offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6), cmt. 

n.14(A). The Guidelines provide a presumption for drug 

trafficking offenses: the firearm is presumed to have the 

“potential of facilitating another felony offense” when the 

“firearm is found in close proximity to drugs, drugmanufacturing materials, or drug-paraphernalia.” USSG 

§ 2K2.1(b)(6), cmt. n.14(B); see United States v. Paneto, 661 

F.3d 709, 717 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[I]n a situation in which the 

additional felony is drug trafficking, the guideline means that 

the enhancement is appropriate whenever the firearm is in close 

proximity to the drugs.”). 

After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district 

court properly applied the four-level enhancement under 

§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). At least one of the firearms was found in 
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close proximity to the marijuana manufacturing operation and 

other drug paraphernalia. Moreover, the evidence suggests that 

Hamilton’s possession of firearms was not a “mere accident or 

coincidence.” Jenkins, 566 F.3d at 163. Rather, it is apparent 

that the firearms were “present for protection [and] to 

embolden” Hamilton. United States v. McKenzie-Gude, 671 F.3d 

452, 464 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, whether applying the proximity presumption for drug 

trafficking offenses or the generally applicable standard 

articulated in the commentary to the Guidelines, the district 

court did not err by applying the four-level enhancement.

III.

We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED