alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# EPA_OG_Liquids_Unloading_Process_Comments - MSC

Good afternoon, On behalf of Mr. Dave Spigelmyer, President of the Marcellus Shale Coalition, attached are our comment s on the EPA White Paper on Oil and Natural Gas Sector Liquids Unloading Proces ses Thank you, Loren Loren A. Anderson, CPESC Strategic Projects Manager 24 Summit Park Drive, 2nd Fl. Pittsburgh, PA 15275 Office: 412.706.5160, Ext. 105 Mobile: 412.335.1912
http://www.marcelluscoalition.org/ SHALE INSIGHTTM 2014 Conference September 24­25, 2014 | Pittsburgh, PA David L. Lawrence Convention Center www.shaleinsight.com 

### Anderson <landerson@marcelluscoalition.org> Loren Mon 6/16/2014 1:28 PM To: OilandGas.Whitepapers <OilandGas.Whitepapers@epa.go v>; 

###  1 attachment EPA_OG_Liquids_Unloading_Process_Comments_MSC.pdf; 

### Page **1 of**  **1 EPA_OG_Liquids_Unloading_Process_Comments**  **- MSC**  **- OilandGas.Whitepapers** 

**8/ 26/**  **2014 https://pod51045.outlook.com/owa/OilandGas.Whitepapers@epa.gov/**
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

747 

CA 11-01131 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, FAHEY, PERADOTTO, AND SCONIERS, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ALEX G. SCHMIDT, 

ALSO KNOWN AS ALEXANDER GEORGE SCHMIDT, 

DECEASED. 

----------------------------------------------- 

ANN L. MCLAUGHLIN, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT; 

 ORDER

THOMAS E. WEBB, JR., AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE 

OF ALEX G. SCHMIDT, ALSO KNOWN AS ALEXANDER 

GEORGE SCHMIDT, DECEASED, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT, 

ET AL., RESPONDENTS. 

(APPEAL NO. 1.) 

DAMON MOREY LLP, BUFFALO (GREGORY ZINI OF COUNSEL), FOR

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. 

JOSEPH G. MAKOWSKI, BUFFALO (MICHAEL J. FLAHERTY OF COUNSEL), FOR

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Erie County

(Barbara Howe, S.), entered March 15, 2011. The order, insofar as

appealed from, granted the motion of petitioner for a protective order

with respect to certain interrogatories. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is 

unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in the decision

by the Surrogate.

Entered: June 8, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
iSH'/V

ELECTRONIC RECORD

COA # 14-13-00416-CR

STYLE: Clair A. Wolf v The State of Texas

COA DISPOSITION: Affirmed

DATE: October 21. 2014 Publish: No

OFFENSE: Solicitation to Commit Capital Murder

COUNTY: Harris

TRIAL COURT: 248th District Court

TC CASE #:1354683

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

STYLE: Clair A. Wolf v The State of Texas

CCA#

APP£LL4M7~ £ Petition CCA Disposition: ifiiV^

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS:

DATE: ffl/PjlMtJ'

JUDGE: fjJA UAJU4^Z~

DATE:

JUDGE:.

SIGNED:

PUBLISH:

PC:

DNP:

FOR REHEARING IN CCA IS:

JUDGE:

MOTION FOR

ELECTRONIC RECORD
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.K.L.R., A MINOR

PETITION OF: P.L.R. :

:

:

:

: No. 357 WAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M.J.R., A MINOR

PETITION OF: P.L.R. :

:

:

:

: No. 358 WAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 16th day of February, 2021

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
#### STATE of Wyoming ex rel. Ricky Lee DOUGHERTY, Petitioner, v. Arthur MERRILL, M.D., as Designated Psychiatric Representative of the District Court, First Judicial District, Laramie County, Wyoming, Respondent.

No. 5204.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Nov. 9, 1979.

Donald J. Sullivan of Sullivan, Van Court & Ahlstrom, Cheyenne, for petitioner.

*378ORDER DENYING WRIT OF PROHIBITION

Per Curiam.

Relator, Ricky Lee Dougherty, was charged with felony murder and armed robbery and moved that he was incompetent to stand trial. Pursuant to § 7-11-303, W.S. 1977, the district court suspended further proceedings and ordered a psychiatric examination of the accused. Relator then moved the district court to order the examination limited to the issue of relator’s present competence to stand trial. The district court refused and ordered that the examination should include all areas of inquiry mentioned in the above statute. Relator has pursued the matter by filing a Petition for Writ of Prohibition in this court.

Subsection (c)(iv) of § 7-11-303, supra, requires “[a]n opinion as to whether at the time of the alleged criminal conduct the accused, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” Relator has not yet entered a plea and contends that the statute was not intended to — or could not constitutionally — authorize questioning at this time of relator by a psychiatrist concerning the acts with which relator is charged. In essence, relator alleges that he is being forced to defend against the charges in an unconstitutional manner.

It is unnecessary to consider the validity of the district court’s order since it is elementary that a writ of prohibition will issue only when the party seeking it is without other adequate means of redress for a wrong about to be inflicted by an inferior tribunal. *State ex rel. Owen v. District Court of Sheridan County, Wyo.,*393 P.2d 806 (1964), and the authorities cited therein. In *Owen,*we refused to issue a writ of prohibition to accept an interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether the relator could constitutionally be charged with violation of a challenged statute. We held that relator, if convicted, had an adequate remedy in an appeal.

Although the petition in the instant mat-' ter alleges that “[n]o appeal in the world could ever undue [sic] the harm which could be done if an interrogation in the suspect area is permitted . . .,” the claim is unsupported by authority or argument. A controlling distinction between this petition and the one in *Owen*has not been called to our attention.

IT IS ORDERED that relator’s petition be denied.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LYNNE KORFF, as Statutory Plaintiff and

surviving mother of Timothy O’Brien

deceased - on behalf of all Statutory

Plaintiffs,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

CITY OF PHOENIX, a municipality; et

al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16020

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02317-ESW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Eileen Willett, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Argued and Submitted October 18, 2017 

San Francisco, California

Before: HAWKINS, W. FLETCHER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

FILED

OCT 31 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except

as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge.
The purpose of summary judgment is to identify whether material fact questions

exist, not to resolve them. In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action,1the district

court granted summary judgment on claims arising out of a June 2012 confrontation

between two Phoenix police officers and the late Timothy O’Brien at a public park. 

According to the officers, O’Brien was wielding a baseball bat, advancing towards

them, and disregarding commands to stop and drop the bat when they fired their

weapons. O’Brien’s mother, Lynne Korff (“Korff”), contends that her son had

dropped the bat and was no longer advancing towards the officers when the fatal shots

were fired. Taking the evidence put forward on O’Brien’s behalf and, as we must,

making all inferences from the record evidence in O’Brien’s favor, we conclude that

a jury must resolve this critical factual dispute. See Bracken v. Okura, 869 F.3d 771,

778 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Zetwick v. Cty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2017)). 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand. 

This factual dispute is also central to the officers’ assertion that they are entitled

to qualified immunity and Korff’s state law negligence claim against the City of

Phoenix. 

Because nothing in the record suggests that themagistrate judge could not fairly

and correctly apply the law on remand, we decline the suggestion that the case be

1

 Korff also brings a related negligence claim under Arizona law. 

2
assigned to a different judge. Neither our determination that summary judgment was

erroneously granted nor the preservation of the appearance of justice warrants

reassignment on remand. See Wyler Summit P’ship v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 235

F.3d 1184, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Our conclusions necessitate the vacatur of the fee and cost award below.2

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

2 For that reason, Appellees’ Motion to Strike Korff’s Amended Notice of

Appeal is denied as moot. 

3
Document

FIRST AMENDMENT TO CONSULTING AGREEMENT


This FIRST AMENDMENT TO CONSULTING AGREEMENT (“First Amendment”) dated June 6, 2022 (“Amendment Date”), amends the CONSULTING AGREEMENT (the “Agreement”) entered into by and between Philip Horlock (“Consultant”), and Blue Bird Corporation (“Company”), dated June 21, 2021.


Whereas, the Parties wish to amend the terms of the Agreement to modify the dates that Consultant will provide Consultant’s services and the dates that the Company will provide Compensation for the Consultant’s services, and;


Whereas, the Parties desire all other provisions and terms of the Agreement remain unchanged;


Now, therefore, by mutual agreement of the Parties, Section 2 of the Agreement, Term of Agreement, shall be amended as follows:


2.    Term of Agreement. The term of this Agreement will begin on the Engagement date and will continue until June 30, 2022, at which time the Consultant’s Services and the Compensation paid by the Company shall be temporarily suspended until December 31, 2022. Between July 1, 2022 and December 31, 2022 (the “Suspension Period”), Consultant shall not be obligated to provide any of the services to the Company contemplated by the Agreement and the Company shall owe no compensation to the Consultant for any such services, whether or not provided. Following the conclusion of the Suspension Period, commencing on January 1, 2023, the Agreement shall re-commence and shall continue through and until June 30, 2023. The parties may agree in writing to terminate this Agreement earlier, or to extend or modify the term of the Agreement at any time. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the term of this Agreement may be terminated by Consultant at anytime upon fifteen (15) days’ prior written notice to the Company. The period as defined in this section shall be referred to as the “Term.”


All other terms and conditions of the Agreement remain unmodified and unchanged, except wherein a conflict exists with this First Amendment, in which case the terms of this First Amendment shall control.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this First Amendment to be duly executed as of the Amendment Date written above.











						
	CONSULTANT:
	/s/ Philip Horlock
	Philip Horlock
		
	COMPANY:
		/s/ Matthew Stevenson
	By:	Matthew Stevenson
	Title:	Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.3

Certificate:

CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORT

OF GRAY PEAKS, INC.

I, the undersigned, being the Chief Financial Officer, of
Gray Peaks, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), does hereby certify, to the best of his information, knowledge and belief, that (1) the Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2007 (the Report)
fully complies with the requirements of section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)) and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.

Date: August 17, 2007



|                                                       
|-------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Bernard Asher                                      
|Title: President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
# Exhibit 32

Section 1350
Certifications

---

# Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, the Chief Executive
Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of CommunitySouth Bancshares, Inc. (the
Company), each certify that, to his knowledge on the date of this
certification:

| | 1. | The quarterly report of the Company for the period ended March 31, 2006 as filed
               with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date (the
               Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
               15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
               respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|Date:  May 12, 2006 |  | By:   /s/  C. Allan Ducker, III
|------------------- |  | -------------------------------
|                    |  | C. Allan Ducker, III           
|                    |  | Chief Executive Officer        

|Date:  May 12, 2006 |  | By:   /s/  John W. Hobbs
|------------------- |  | ------------------------
|                    |  | John W. Hobbs           
|                    |  | Chief Financial Officer
**Exhibit 15.5**

 

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTINGFIRM**

 

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in this Shell CompanyReport on Form 20-F of Metals Acquisition Limited of our report dated March 24, 2023 relating to the financial statements ofMetals Acquisition Corporation, which appears in the Registration Statement on Form F-4 (File No. 333-269007) of Metals AcquisitionLimited. We also consent to the reference to us under the heading “Statement by Experts” in this Shell Company Report on Form 20-F.

 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP

Chartered Professional Accountants, Licensed Public Accountants Vancouver,Canada

June 22, 2023
# C_2004106EN.01008905.xml

| 30.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 106/89 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 106/89

---

Removal from the register of Case T-184/03 (1)

1

(2004/C 106/179)

(Language of the case: Spanish)

(Language of the case: Spanish)

By order of 2 March 2004, the President of the Fourth Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities has ordered the removal from the register of Case T-184/03: Metrovacesa, S.A. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

---

(1)  OJ C 184 of 2.8.2003.

1

---
ENSR IAECOM 

ENSR 

1220 Avenida Acaso, Camarillo, California 93012 

T 805.388.3775 F 805.388.3577 www.ensr.aecom.com 

October 7,2008 RE.CE\VED 

OCT7 2008 Ms. Deborah Jordan 

Director, Air Division 

Air Di'.ISlon, AIR - :; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 9 U.S.EPA.REG.ION 9 

75 Hawthorne Street 

San Francisco, CA 94105-3901 

Attn: Anita Lee 

Re:Withdrawal of Comments on Proposed PSD Permit 

for Victorville 2 Hybrid Power Project 

Dear Ms. Lee: 

On behalf of the City of Victorville, we hereby withdraw the comments on the proposed PSD permit 

for the Victorville 2 Hybrid Power Project, which we submitted on behalf of the City on July 7, 2008. 

Thank you for your attention to this matter. Please call me if you have any questions. 

Sincerely, 

Sara J. Head 

Vice President, Environmental Programs 

shead@ensr.aecom.com 

cc:Tom Barnett, Inland Energy 

Michael Carroll, Latham & Watkins LLP
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 658 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 658

   Designating the week of September 30 through October 6, 2018, as 
                 ``National Community Policing Week''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 27, 2018

 Mrs. Shaheen (for herself, Mr. Cornyn, and Ms. Hassan) submitted the 
        following resolution; which was considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   Designating the week of September 30 through October 6, 2018, as 
                 ``National Community Policing Week''.

Whereas police officers are indispensable members of the community who put their 
        lives on the line to protect others;
Whereas promoting strong relationships founded in trust and mutual respect 
        between law enforcement officers and the communities they serve helps 
        ensure the safe and effective execution of the law;
Whereas law enforcement officers and communities that work together to address 
        public safety concerns can create lasting solutions to difficult 
        challenges;
Whereas a long-term commitment to community policing is necessary to eliminate 
        the underlying causes of crime;
Whereas the advancement of community policing should be supported to ensure that 
        State and local law enforcement agencies have necessary resources; and
Whereas community policing has been recognized as an important tool for 
        improving the relationship between law enforcement officers and the 
        communities they serve: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate--
            (1) designates the week of September 30 through October 6, 
        2018, as ``National Community Policing Week''; and
            (2) supports community policing and encourages the people 
        of the United States, law enforcement agencies, and elected 
        officials to identify ways in which communities can improve 
        public safety, strengthen relationships, and build trust.
                                 <all>
```
20220501 - Summary of Outside Director Compensation Program


		
			Exhibit 10.3
		

		
			Summary of Outside Director Compensation Program 
		

		
			﻿
		

		
			Annual Retainers
		

			
					
						﻿

					
					
						 

					
					
						 

				
	
					
						Director

					
					
						$50,000

					
					
						Paid quarterly at beginning of quarter

				
	
					
						Chair of Audit Committee

					
					
						+$20,000

					
					
						Paid quarterly

				
	
					
						Chair of Compensation Committee

					
					
						+$15,000

					
					
						Paid quarterly

				
	
					
						Chair of Nominating and Governance Committee

					
					
						+$12,000

					
					
						Paid quarterly

				
	
					
						Non-chair Audit Committee member

					
					
						+$10,000

					
					
						Paid quarterly

				
	
					
						Non-chair Compensation Committee member

					
					
						+$7,000

					
					
						Paid quarterly

				
	
					
						Non-chair Nominating and Governance Committee member

					
					
						+$7,000

					
					
						Paid quarterly

				



		
			﻿
		

		
			Note:  All travel expenses paid based on voucher.
		

			
					
						﻿

					
					
						 

				
	
					
						STOCK COMPENSATION:

					
					
						$80,000/year; each grant subject to one year vesting; stock compensation granted in May of year.

				



		
			﻿
		

		
			Note:  For subsequent new Board members who join Board mid-year, cash and stock compensation is pro-rated.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 14

- 11996 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:13

- cr
- 20921

- JIC

- 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus IRA KEMOY GRANT, a.k.a. Shaun Grant, a.k.a. Ira Ilyasha Grant, a.k.a . Ira Remoy Grant, a.k.a. Shawn Tamar Grant, a.k.a. Shawn Green, a.k.a. Charley K. Trace, a.k.a. Franze Unton Young,

Defendant

- Appellant.

________________ ________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ ( October 16, 2014 ) Case: 14-11996 Date Filed: 10/16/2014 Page: 1 of 32 Before WILSON , WILLIAM PRYOR and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Ira Kemoy Grant appeals his sentence of 46 months of imprisonment for reentering the United States after being deported. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). Grant argues that his sentence is s ubstantively unreasonable and , for the first time, that
his sentence is unconstitutional because his maximum statutory sentence was
increa sed based on the fact of a prior conviction that was not admitted to by him or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Grant to 46 months of imprisonment . Grant, a native and cit izen of Jamaica, reentered the United States after being deported in 200 8 for being an aggravated felon, and by
then he had amassed convictions for reckless driving , possession of marijuana with
intent to sell , battery , possession of a firearm as a convicted felon , attempted trafficking in marijuana , threatening a public servant , attempted forgery, false
im personation, and grand theft. The district court acted within its discretion in weighing more heavily Grant’s “exten sive criminal history” than the extenuating circumstances underlying his offense. And the district court accounted f o r Grant’s acceptance of responsibility by imposing a sentence at the low end of his advisory guideline range of 46 to 57 months of imprison ment. Grant’s sentence, which is
well below his maximum statutory sent ence of 20 years , is reasonable.

Case: 14-11996 Date Filed: 10/16/2014 Page: 2 of 33 Grant conced es that his challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence is foreclosed by precedent. In Almendarez

– Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 2 24,
118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998) , the Supreme Court held that a prior conviction “relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime” do es not
have to be charged in an indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury , even i f it increases the defendant’s maximum statutory sentence

. Id. at 228

– 47, 118
S. Ct. at 1223

– 33. Almendarez

- Torres remains the law until overruled by the Supreme Court, and it expressly refused to do so in Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. ____ , 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)

. Id. at 1260 n.1.
W e AFFIRM Grant’s sentence

. Case: 14-11996 Date Filed: 10/16/2014 Page: 3 of 3