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FILED

APR 06 2015

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-14-1416-PaKiTa

)

ERICA ADAM, ) Bankr. No. 12-12968-PC

)

Debtor. ) Adv. Proc. No. 12-01295-DS 

___________________________________)

)

ERICA ADAM, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) M E M O R A N D U M1

)

GREGORY LEE DOBIN, )

)

Appellee. )

___________________________________)

 Argued and Submitted on March 19, 2015

at Pasadena, California

Filed - April 6, 2015

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Deborah J. Saltzman, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 

Appearances: Christopher Charles Gautschi argued for appellant

Erica Adams; Vaughn Michael Greenwalt of Lang,

Hanigan & Carvalho, LLP argued for appellee Gregory

Lee Dobin. 

Before: PAPPAS, KIRSCHER, and TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judges.

1 This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have

(see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th

Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

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Chapter 72 debtor Erica M. Adam (“Adam”) appeals the judgment

of the bankruptcy court declaring that her debt for attorney’s

fees owed to creditor Gregory Lee Dobin (“Dobin”) is excepted from

discharge under § 523(a)(15). We AFFIRM.

I. FACTS

In August 1998, Adam, her spouse at the time, Dobin, and 

Stefan Adam (“Stefan”),3 Adam’s brother, entered into a

partnership they called Equestrian Performance Center (the

“Center”) to own and operate a horse boarding facility. The

Center acquired the property for the horse breeding facility in

Moorpark, California (the “Property”). Hildegard Adam

(“Hildegard”), Adam’s mother and Stefan’s aunt, provided $167,000

to the Center in exchange for a 20 percent interest in partnership

profits. Title to the Property was held in the names of Hildegard

and Stefan.

The Three Pre-Divorce Bankruptcies

On October 12, 1999, Adam and Dobin filed a chapter 13

bankruptcy petition. Bk. Case No. 99-21852. On their Schedule B,

in response to question 13 that directs debtors to list any

“interests in partnerships or joint ventures,” Adam and Dobin

replied “none.” The bankruptcy case was converted to a chapter 7

case on November 18, 1999, Dobin and Adam received a discharge on

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, all

Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,

Rules 1001–9037, and all Civil Rule references are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 1–86.

3 We refer to some persons by first name for clarity; we

intend no disrespect.

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March 2, 2000, and the case was closed as a “no asset” case on

March 7, 2000. 

On August 17, 2000, Adam and Dobin filed another chapter 13

petition. Bk. Case No.00-17500-KT. On their Schedule B in this

case, Adam and Dobin again responded “none” to question 13

regarding any partnership interests they may hold. This case was

dismissed on October 23, 2000. 

On February 5, 2001, Adam and Dobin filed a third chapter 13

petition. Case No. 01-10909-KT. Once again, they responded

“none” to the partnership question on Schedule B. The case was

dismissed on May 24, 2001.4

The Family Law and Civil Actions

On October 24, 2003, Adam filed a petition in the Family Law

Division of the Superior Court of California for the County of

Ventura (the "Family Court") seeking dissolution of her marriage

to Dobin (the “Family Law Action”). 

On June 24, 2004, Dobin filed a separate action (the “Civil

Action”) in Family Court against Adam, Hildegard, Stefan, EPC,

LLC, and the Center (“the Civil Action Defendants”). In a first

amended complaint in the Civil Action, Dobin asserted claims for

dissolution of the Center, partition of the Property, and for

damages for Adam’s alleged breach of contract, fraud in the

inducement, and conversion. More particularly, Dobin alleged

that: (1) Dobin, Adam, Stefan, and Hildegard had entered into an

oral agreement in 2003, which modified the terms of the Center

4 The bankruptcy court would later find that "the interest

of Dobin and Adam in [the Center], the business operated by [the

Center], and the Property were not disclosed in the schedules and

statements" in the three pre-divorce bankruptcy cases.

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partnership agreement; (2) Stefan withdrew from the partnership in

2003; (3) it was orally agreed that Adam and Dobin thereafter

would hold equitable title to 80 percent of the Center business

and Property and that Hildegard would hold a 20 percent equitable

interest in the business and Property in satisfaction for the

loans she made to start up the business and acquire the Property;

(4) it was orally agreed to pay Stefan for his ownership interest

but no price was fixed; (5) Hildegard formed EPC, LLC, thereafter;

and (6) Hildegard and Adam transferred the assets of the Center

into EPC, LLC without Dobin’s knowledge and consent.

The Family Court consolidated the Family Law Action and Civil

Action for a bench trial, which was held on twenty-two days

between 2005 and 2009. On October 29, 2009, the Family Court

entered a judgment in the consolidated action (the “Original

Judgment”) consisting of two parts: one part expressly resolved

the Family Law Action; the other resolved the Civil Action.

The Original Judgment was amended on April 20, 2010, to

include several rulings not relevant in this appeal, but otherwise

incorporating the substance of the Original Judgment (the “Amended

Judgment”). The Amended Judgment also contained two components.5

In its first three pages, the Amended Judgment resolved the claims

raised in the Civil Action, wherein the Family Court ruled that:

(1) Dobin was awarded $76,200 against the Civil Action Defendants;

and (2) Dobin was awarded the entire interests of the Civil Action

Defendants in the Property and the business operated at the

5 The Amended Judgment explained that “[t]he two parts –

this Amended Judgment and the revised family law judgment – shall

be signed and filed together and will constitute the revised

judgment.”

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Property as punitive damages. 

The second part of the Amended Judgment resolved the claims

asserted in the Family Law Action. It did so through use of a

standard “check the box” form for a California dissolution

judgment, together with an “Attachment A” to the form setting

forth several specific rulings. The paragraphs of Attachment A

which are pertinent in this appeal included:

“1. Neither party has established the right to an award of

spousal support.” 

“2. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that

Erica Adams breached her fiduciary duties owing to

Gregory Dobin by denying the existence of the

partnership she knew to exist and that her conduct was

fraudulent as defined in Civil Code 3294.” 

“7. The Court awards to Gregory Dobin the entire community

interest in, or any claims to a community interest in,

[the Property] as well as any interest in the entities

known as EPC, LLC, Equestrian Performance Center, and

Equestrian Property, LLC.”

“10. The court finds that Mr. Dobin is entitled to recover

from Erica Adams the attorney’s fees he has incurred in

connection with these actions in the sum of $300,000.”6

The Amended Judgment was entered on April 10, 2010. It was

not appealed.

This Bankruptcy Case and Adversary Proceeding

On August 6, 2012, Adam filed a petition under chapter 7. 

Dobin commenced the adversary proceeding in this appeal on

November 2, 2012. In the complaint, Dobin alleged that his claims

6 In Attachment A, the Amended Judgment also allocated

various assets of the parties’ marital community (pensions,

charging the parties with assets in their possession, crediting

them with payments on tax obligations). The court concluded that,

after the allocation, Dobin recovered $12,484 more than Adam. 

Thus, the state court credited $6,242 against the $300,000 fee

award “to equalize the division of community property.”

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against Adam as evidenced in the Amended Judgment were excepted

from discharge under § 523(a) for several reasons. First, Dobin

alleged that his claims were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)

because Adam had fraudulently represented to him that, if he

contributed money and labor, cosigned partnership loans, and moved

onto the Property, he would have an ownership interest in the

Property and businesses. Under § 523(a)(4), Dobin alleged that

Adam had breached her fiduciary duty to him by denying the

existence of the partnership. And under § 523(a)(6), Dobin

alleged that Adam had wilfully and maliciously damaged him. 

Adam filed an answer on November 28, 2012, generally denying

the allegations. 

Adam filed a motion for summary judgment on May 15, 2013.

Adam argued that Dobin lacked standing to assert his damage claims

against her because those undisclosed claims were property of the

estate in the first bankruptcy case filed by Dobin and Adam in

1999.

On July 17, 2013, Dobin filed a proposed amended complaint to

assert an additional exception to discharge claim under

§ 523(a)(15). In addition to the monetary damages Dobin sought in

the original complaint, he asserted an additional claim for the

$300,000 in attorney's fees he had been awarded in the Amended

Judgment because it was, he argued, a debt owed by Adam to a

former spouse (i.e., Dobin) that was incurred in the course of the

parties’ dissolution action.7 

Then, on July 18, 2013, Dobin filed a cross-motion for

7 The bankruptcy court granted Dobin’s request to amend the

complaint on August 13, 2013.

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summary judgment. In it, Dobin asserted he was entitled to

summary judgment on the newly stated § 523(a)(15) claim, and

repeated his earlier allegations under §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4),

and (a)(6). 

The bankruptcy court heard the two summary judgment motions

on August 29, 2013, and took the issues under advisement. On

October 8, 2013, the court entered a Memorandum Decision (the

“Memorandum Decision”). The court denied summary judgment on

Dobin’s claim under § 523(a)(15) without prejudice because that

claim had not been asserted in his original adversary complaint,

which was still in effect when the motions were filed. The

bankruptcy court determined that disputed issues of fact remained

regarding Adam’s alleged fiduciary breach and Dobin’s other claims

under § 523(a)(4). As to the Dobin’s claims under § 523(a)(2)(A)

and (a)(6), the court dismissed both claims because Dobin lacked

standing to raise them:

It is undisputed that Dobin and Adam failed to disclose

their interest in EPC, the business operated by EPC, and

the Property in the 1999 bankruptcy. . . . Property of

the estate that is not scheduled or otherwise

administered by the time the case is closed remains

property of the estate forever.

Memorandum Decision at 10. The court entered orders granting in

part and denying in part Adam’s motion for summary judgment, and

denying Dobin’s summary judgment without prejudice.

Both Adam and Dobin filed second motions for summary judgment

on February 27, 2014. Dobin again sought an exception to

discharge under § 523(a)(15) for the $300,000 in attorney’s fees. 

Adam’s motion addressed both the § 523(a)(4) and (a)(15) claims.

Among Adam’s arguments, she stressed that Dobin could not be

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rewarded for wrongful pursuit of claims that he not only did not

own but had concealed in three bankruptcy cases.8

The bankruptcy court heard the second round of summary

judgment motions on April 10, 2014. The court expressed concern

about deeming civil claims, made in connection with a family law

action that had nothing to do with the marriage dissolution other

than the fact that there were two spouses involved, excepted from

discharge under § 523(a)(15). However, after taking the motions

under submission, on April 14, 2014, the court ruled:

The attorney fee award of $300,000 under the Amended

Judgment was incurred by Adam in the course of the

marriage dissolution between Adam and Dobin, and the sum

of $300,000, less the credit of $6,242 remained owing by

Adam to Dobin on the petition date. It is accordingly

ORDERED that [Dobin’s] motion for summary judgment is

granted, and the balance of the $293,758 owing on the

attorney fee award under the Amended Judgment is

nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).

Order, at 2, April 14, 2014. Adam’s summary judgment motion was

denied.

The bankruptcy court entered a judgment on August 13, 2014,

declaring Dobin’s $293,758 claim excepted from Adam’s discharge

under § 523(a)(15). Adam timely appealed.

II. JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334

and 157(b)(2)(I). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

III. ISSUE

Whether the bankruptcy court erred in granting summary

8

 Although the second round of summary judgment motions also

discussed Dobin’s claim under § 523(a)(4), the focus shifted to

the § 523(a)(15) claim. Ultimately, the bankruptcy court approved

the stipulation of the parties to dismiss Dobin’s § 523(a)(4)

claim.

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judgment in favor of Dobin that Adam’s debt for the attorneys fees

was excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(15).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 695

(9th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the

pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any

affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Civil Rule 56(a), incorporated by Rule 7056. 

Barboza v. New Form, Inc. (In re Barboza), 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th

Cir. 2008). 

V. DISCUSSION

The bankruptcy court did not err in granting summary 

judgment that Dobin’s claim against Adam for the $293,758 in

attorney’s fees was excepted from discharge under 

§ 523(a)(15).

In this appeal, the parties agree that there are no disputed

material facts. Instead, they spotlight a question of bankruptcy

law for the Panel’s consideration: whether Dobin’s claim against

Adam for the attorney’s fees awarded to him by the state court in

the Amended Judgment is excepted from discharge in Adam’s

bankruptcy case under § 523(a)(15). For the reasons that follow,

we agree with the bankruptcy court that the bankruptcy court’s

grant of summary judgment in Dobin’s favor on this issue was

appropriate.

A. Congress, the Courts, and § 523(a)(15)

Section 523(a)(15) excepts non-support debts arising in

connection with a divorce or dissolution proceeding from discharge

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in bankruptcy. The evolution of § 523(a)(15) demonstrates

Congress’s intent to spread as large a net, and to include as many

marriage dissolution-related claims as possible, within this

exception to discharge. The current version of the relevant Code

provision reads: 

§ 523. Exceptions to discharge 

(a) A discharge under section 727 . . .of this title

does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt –

. . . (15) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the

debtor and not of the kind described in paragraph (5)

that is incurred by the debtor in the course of a

divorce or separation or in connection with a separation

agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of

record, or a determination made in accordance with State

or territorial law by a governmental unit[.]

§ 523(a)(15)(2015).

This discharge exception has undergone changes over the

years. While the Bankruptcy Code, and its predecessors, have long

included a discharge exception for a debtor’s obligations for

state court awards to a former spouse for alimony, maintenance and

support, see e.g., § 523(a)(5)(establishing a discharge exception

for a “domestic support obligation” as defined in § 101(14A)),

Congress amended § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1994 to add 

§ 523(a)(15) as a new discharge exception. As one circuit court

explained, "[t]he fact that Congress saw a need to add this

provision to section 523 strongly suggests that the language in

section 523(a)(5) does not cover obligations incurred as part of a

property division incident to divorce. The existence of this new

provision suggests Congress envisioned that there would be other

types of payments authorized in divorce agreements that would not

qualify as alimony, maintenance, or support." In re Evert,

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342 F.3d 358, 367-68 (5th Cir. 2003). As noted by the court, it

is evident that § 523(a)(15) was intended by Congress to encompass

debts between former spouses that fall outside the scope of the

exception addressing domestic support obligations in 

§ 523(a)(5). As a bankruptcy court has observed, "Congress

balanc[ed] two public policies in sections 523(a)(5) and (a)(15):

the Bankruptcy Code's purpose of providing a fresh start to a

deserving debtor; and the importance of a debtor's obligations to

his family" and works to prevent the non-debtor spouse from being

"left out-of-pocket because of a debtor's bankruptcy filing." 

In re Brooks, 371 B.R. 761, 766-67 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (citations

omitted).

If the addition of § 523(a)(15) in 1994 operated to broaden

the scope of those marital debts excepted from bankruptcy

discharge, in 2005, BAPCPA went even further. Before BAPCPA, a

debt otherwise covered by § 523(a)(15) was nonetheless

dischargeable if the debtor was financially unable to repay the

debt or if the benefit to the debtor associated with discharge of

that debt outweighed the detriment resulting therefrom to the

spouse, former spouse or child of the debtor. See Ashton v.

Dollaga (In re Dollaga), 260 B.R. 493, 495 (9th Cir. BAP 2001). 

BAPCPA removed both the financial capacity criterion and the

balancing of debtor's benefit against the creditor's detriment

from the amended discharge exception. Bendetti v. Gunness

(In re Gunness), 505 B.R. 1, 5 (9th Cir. BAP 2014);

In re Dumontier, 389 B.R. 890, 896 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2008). 

Courts have acknowledged that BAPCPA’s changes to

§ 523(a)(15) significantly expanded the scope of the debts covered

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by that section. Because Congress enacted § 523(a)(15) to broaden

the types of marital debts that are nondischargeable, beyond those

described in § 523(a)(5), “by implication a § 523(a)(15) exception

from discharge would also be construed more liberally than other

§ 523 exceptions.” Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 478 B.R.

419, 428 (10th Cir. BAP 2012); Berse v. Langman (In re Langman),

465 B.R. 395, 405 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2012) ("This provision has been

read to encompass a range of matrimonial debts, including

obligations arising out of property settlement agreements and

equitable distribution judgments."). The exception applies to all

debts, separate and community. In re Kinkade, 707 F.3d 546,

549-50 (5th Cir. 2013); see also March, Ahart & Shapiro, CAL.

PRACT. GUIDE: BANKRUPTCY § 22:270-22:272.3 (Rutter Group 2013) (“In

effect, therefore, taken together with § 523(a)(5), virtually all

domestic relations obligations (whether for support, a property

division or otherwise), are excepted from discharge if incurred in

connection with marriage dissolution or rooted in a separation

agreement, dissolution judgment, other court order, or a

governmental agency determination.”).

As further evidence of Congressional intent to treat

exceptions to discharge under § 523(a)(15) broadly, we note that

BAPCPA also modified § 523(c)(1). After the amendment, debts

falling under section § 523(a)(15) are no longer included in the

category of debts that are discharged automatically if a party

does not request a determination from the bankruptcy court. 

Gilman v. Golio (In re Golio), 393 B.R. 56, 61 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.

2008) ("The enactment of subsection 523(a)(15) and the increase in

the scope of the discharge exception effected by the 2005

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amendments, expresses Congress's recognition that the economic

protection of [] spouses and children under state law is no longer

accomplished solely through the traditional mechanism of support

and alimony payments.").

In sum, the trend in recent case law is to construe

§ 523(a)(15) expansively to cover a broader array of claims

related to domestic relations within the discharge exception. 

See, e.g., In re Wise, 2012 WL 5399075, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.

Nov. 5, 2012) (§ 523(a)(15) "rendered as non-dischargeable

virtually all obligations arising between spouses as a result of a

divorce decree."); Quarterman v. Quarterman (In re Quarterman),

2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4924, at * 9-10 (Bankr. D. Ariz. October 17,

2012) (“The Section is not limited to simply divorce decree

judgments alone but excepts any debt incurred by the debtor in the

course of divorce or any debt in connection with a divorce

decree.”).9

9 But see In re Tracy, 2007 WL 420252, at *2 (Bankr. D.

Idaho Feb. 2, 2007) where the bankruptcy court cautioned against

adopting too broad an interpretation of § 523(a)(15). In Tracy, the debtor's former spouse sought a determination from the

bankruptcy court that the debt owed to him pursuant to a state

court judgment regarding personal property left in the parties'

marital home was nondischargeable. Id., at *1. The debtor argued

that § 523(a)(15) excluded from discharge any debt "arising under

any order of a court to a former spouse." Id. (emphasis added). 

The Tracy court rejected this approach as too broad, and held that

in order for the debt to be excepted from discharge under

§ 523(a)(15), the former spouse had to show that the debts in

question "were incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce

or separation or in connection with a separation agreement or

divorce decree or other order of a court of record." Id., at *3

(citing Gamble v. Gamble (In re Gamble), 143 F.3d 223, 225 (5th

Cir. 1998)). The Tracy court noted that although the debts owed

to the former spouse by the debtor arose out of a dispute

regarding the parties' property rights subsequent to their

divorce, the parties began a new relationship as landlord and

(continued...)

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B. Section 523(a)(15) Applied to This Case

1. Dobin’s Arguments 

Using this legislative and case law review for context, we

turn to the issues in the present appeal. To establish his case

for exception to discharge of the attorney’s fees under

§ 523(a)(15), Dobin was required to establish three elements:

(1) that the debt in question is owed to a former spouse of the

debtor; (2) that the debt is not a support obligation within the

meaning of § 523(a)(5); and (3) that the debt was incurred in the

course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a

separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of

record. In re Taylor, 478 B.R. at 428; McFadden v. Putnam

(In re Putnam), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 6117, at * 58 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.

August 30, 2012).

That two of these elements are satisfied is undisputed. 

Dobin is the former spouse of debtor Adam. In addition, the

parties do not dispute that the debt Adam owes Dobin under the

state court’s Amended Judgment for attorneys’ fees is not a

domestic support obligation as provided in §§ 523(a)(5) and

101(14A). The only remaining question is whether that debt for

fees was incurred in the course of a divorce, or in connection

9(...continued)

tenant when the former spouse rented the home to the debtor. Id.

In Tracy, the court concluded that because the debts actually

arose out of the parties' post-divorce dealings as landlord and

tenant, the debts were unrelated to the dissolution of their

marriage. Id.

As we will see below, in this case, Dobin’s claims were based

upon Adam’s actions and events occurring during her marriage to

Dobin, and were considered in connection with the overall

disposition of the issues in the dissolution action, with the

money obligation evidenced in the dissolution judgment.

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with a divorce decree. We conclude that it is. 

First, we note that while the procedure employed by the

Family Court here may seem somewhat unusual in other states,

resolution of the parties’ claims in the consolidated action

comported with California state law. California law generally

allows consolidation of related matters pending before a

California court. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1048(a) (“When actions

involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the

court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the

matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions

consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings

therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”). 

In particular, as relevant here, when a dissolution

proceeding is pending in the Family Court division while a civil

action involving a breach of spousal duty or otherwise raising

issues that may impact division of assets is pending in the civil

division of the same court, consolidation is appropriate. CAL.

FAM. CODE § 1101(f) (“Any action may10 be brought under this section

[claim for breach of fiduciary duty by a spouse] without filing an

action for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or nullity,

or may be brought in conjunction with the action or upon the death

of a spouse.”) (emphasis added). As the Family Court has the

primary right to decide these issues, the consolidation must occur

such that the Family Court decides the issues. Askew v. Askew,

10 Adam argues that the bankruptcy court erred by referring

to the phrase “may be brought” as “must be brought.” We consider

this a distinction without a difference. Whether the statute

provides that the court may do something, or must do something, it

is statutory authority to do something.

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22 Cal.App.4th 942, 961-62 (“After a family law court acquires

jurisdiction to divide community property in a dissolution action,

no other department of a superior court may make an order

adversely affecting that division.”); In re Marriage of Schenck 

228 Cal. App.3d 1474, 1483-1484 (1991) (civil law and motion

department had no authority to order the sale of the family home

based on husband's accrued support arrearages when the family law

court still had jurisdiction to divide the community interest in

that home). Here, the state court explicitly invoked the

authority granted under Cal. Fam. Code § 1101(f) in issuing the

Amended Judgment.

Even if it had the authority to entertain Dobin’s breach of

fiduciary claims against Adam, she argues that the state court

lacked authority to order a combined attorney’s fee award for both

the dissolution action and the civil action. As discussed below,

we conclude that the fee award was made in conjunction with the

family law action. That it was made in the same judgment as the

other awards resolving the Civil Action is immaterial.11 A

critical element of a divorce proceeding is the division of

community property. An obligation for a debt related to the

division of community property in a divorce may constitute a debt

excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(15) where, as in this

appeal, Adam’s obligation to pay the attorney’s fees was

11 Indeed, there is case law supporting a single award of

attorney’s fees in a consolidated, multiple action, family court

judgment. Guardianship of Paduano, 215 Cal. App. 3d 346, 352

(1989)(“Because of the consolidation order, the guardianship and

family law proceedings were one and the same, and thus, no

segregation of fees and costs was necessary.”). However, as

explained below, in this case, there were separate awards for both

the civil and family parts of the Amended Judgment.

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incorporated in the Amended Judgment. Short v. Short

(In re Short), 232 F.3d 1018, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding

that a property division claim comes within purview of

§ 523(a)(15).

On this record, we conclude that Dobin is entitled to a

judgment excepting his claim from discharge under § 523(a)(15). 

Adam is his former spouse, and the attorney’s fee award to Dobin

in the Amended Judgment is not a support obligation as that term

is understood in § 523(a)(5). Since that obligation was created

in the Amended Judgment, and in particular, in that portion of the

Amended Judgment resolving the Family Law Action claims using the

standard California form for dissolution judgments, we conclude

that Adam incurred the obligation to pay Dobin’s attorneys fees in

connection with a divorce proceeding.

2. Adam’s Defenses

Adam asserts that both the state court and the bankruptcy

court lacked jurisdiction over Dobin’s claim against her because

they were based on Dobin’s incorrect assumption that he owned the

Property and the business. Under bankruptcy law, Adam contends,

the Property and business interests of both Adam and Dobin became

property of the bankruptcy estate when they first filed their

chapter 7 petition in 1999, and remained so because they failed to

disclose their purported interests in those assets in their

schedules. See § 554(c); In re Chen, 308 B.R. 448, 461 (9th Cir.

BAP 2004). Consequently, Adam argues, the state court could not

award Dobin damages based on Adam’s alleged fiduciary breach

arising from her control of the Property and the businesses.

Because, in essence, she contests whether the state court

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reached a correct result, as we see it, Adam’s argument that the

state court erred amounts to a collateral attack on that court’s

final judgment. It has long been established that final judgments

are not subject to collateral attack. Chicot County Drainage

Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1940). Res

judicata bars all claims based on the same “transactional nucleus

of facts” which “could have been asserted, whether they were or

not, in a prior suit between the parties.” Costantini v. TWA,

681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982); Ross v. IBEW, 634 F.2d

453, 457 (9th Cir. 1980); see also In re Marriage of Jackson,

136 Cal.App.4th 980, 988–989 (2006) (collateral attack on final

judgments not allowed absent unusual circumstances or compelling

policy considerations); 2 Witkin, CAL. PROCEDURE § 338 Jurisdiction,

pp. 961–963 (5th ed. 2008).

In this setting, Adam’s suggestion that the state court did

not have subject matter jurisdiction over the fiduciary breach

claim is of no moment. Adam concedes that she did not challenge

the jurisdiction of the state court. “While it is often said that

jurisdiction can be raised at any point in the proceedings, this

does not mean that it can be raised after a decision has become

final. Where a party does not challenge jurisdiction until a

collateral proceeding, the issue is res judicata because it is

presumed to have been determined in the earlier proceeding.” 

Chicot County Drainage Dist, 308 U.S. at 377-78.

Adam’s other arguments also lack merit. The one exception is

Adam’s challenge to the amount of Dobin’s nondischargeable

attorney’s fees. Fairly summarized, Adam demands that the

attorneys fee award be apportioned between the Family Law Action

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and Civil Action. But we find that unnecessary. All of the fees

were awarded “in connection with” the divorce proceedings, and the

fees were exactly the amount determined by the state court in the

Amended Judgment. In re Sasson, 424 F.3d 864, 872-73 (9th Cir.

2005) (“The bankruptcy court should ordinarily decline to allow

the parties to relitigate the debt amount and should give the

state court judgment as to the amount of debt preclusive effect.”)

VI. CONCLUSION

In summary, the scope of § 523(a)(15) is broad. Dobin 

established that the award of attorneys fees against Adam is a

debt owed to her former spouse, is not a domestic support

obligation, and was entered in connection with the parties’

divorce proceeding. The elements for an exception to discharge

under § 523(a)(15) were therefore established, and the bankruptcy

court did not err in excepting the attorney’s fees from discharge. 

We AFFIRM the judgment of the bankruptcy court.

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