### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 9, 200 3

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. TR AV IS P AR SON
Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty Nos. 01-07733 – 01-07736 Ber nie Weinm an, Jud ge

No. W2002-02743-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled March 3, 2004

The defe ndant, Travis Parson, and co-de fenda nt Ma rcus J ohnson wer e initially indict ed fo r t wo counts of espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry , preme ditated murder , and fe lony mu rd er . The de fenda

nt
was c onvicted of two c ounts of espec ially ag g ravated robber y and one count of criminally neg lige nt homicide. The tria l court imposed conse cutive sente n ces of twenty y ear s for e ach of

the robbe ry convicti o n s an d

a c o n cu rr en ts en t en ce o f t wo y ea rs fo r t h e h o m i ci d e c o n v i ct i o n , an ef fe ct i v e s en tence of for ty y ear s. I n this appeal of r ight, the de fenda nt asserts that the sentence s are excessive and that the trial cour

t erre d by order ing c onsecutive se ntencing

. Be cause the def endant’ s dual convictions for e specia lly

ag g rava t ed ro b b ery

violate the princ iples of double jeopa rdy , only one of the convictions is affir

med. The other is modified to a g g ravated assault. Be cause the rec ord does not support consec utive sentenc ing, the sentenc es ar e orde red to be served concurre ntly

. The a g g ravated assault conviction is rema nded to the t rial court for sentencing

. The remainder of t he judg ments of the trial cour

t are aff irmed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt s o f the Tr ialCo ur t A ffirm e d in P ar t, Re ve r se d in P ar t, and Rem anded i n Par t

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., joined. J OE G. R I L EY , J., f

ile d a se pa rate op ini on , c on c ur

ri ngin p art

and dis se nti ngin p art

. Rob e rt Wils on , Sh e lby

County Pub lic De fe nd e r ( of

c ouns e l); Garl and

Er g ud e n, As sis tant P ub lic De fe nd e r ( on

a pp e a l) ; T e re sa

Jone s, As sis tant P ub lic De fe nd e r ( a t tr ia l) ; a n d Ann e Ti pto n, Me mph is, Tenne ssee ( at trial), f

or the a ppellant, Travis Parson. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Bra den H. B oucek, A ssistant Att o r n e y G e n e ral; and Scott Bea rup and Patience Br anham, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION-2-

On t he evening of Decembe r 28, 2000, the victim, Mahmoud Ghannam, who manag ed the Discount Shop, was on duty with a fellow employ ee, Y ehia Abu- Hamda. Shortly afte r 9:00 p.m., the victim hear d a nois e and saw two men t wo or three meters away “just in front of the door.” One was short a

nd one wa s tall. Both wore masks. The victim was struc k by two bullets, fell to the floor, and then he ard be tween se ven and te n more shots, but was unable to tell who was firing. When he sat up to call for

help, he r ealized that the tall m an was still in the store and so he r emained quie t until he left. The vict i m descr ibed the taller man as we aringa “ja cket with cr eam c olor and lig ht blue” with a San F ranc isco log o in white letters trimmed in red. The victim was unable to see the fa c e of e ith e r o f h is a ssa ila

nts bu t de te rm ine d th a t th e y we re bla c k b a se d u

po n th e col or of the ir hands. Ac cordingto the victim, the defe ndant Parson wa s a regular patron of the Discount Shop and had wor n the San Fr ancisc o jacke t on numerous occ asions.

After waiting to make sure that no one else was in the store , the victim went to the offic e be hin d th e c ounte r ar e a , whe re Ab u- Ha mda wa s ly ing on the fl oo r in a poo l of blo od . T he vic tim pushed the store secur ity

button to sum mon police

. He then used Abu-H amda’ s cellular te lephone t o ca l l 9 1 1 an d

re p o rt t h e s h o o t i n gs

. Ab u -H am d a di ed fr o m m u l t i p l e gu n s h o two u n d s fr o m a h i gh
v el o ci t y we ap o n

. A c i gar

b o x i nwh i ch s t o re em p l o y e e s h e l d l ar ge b i l l s wa s d i s co v er edm i s s i n g. A p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 1 , 4 0 0 t o $ 1 , 6 0 0 w a s d e t e r m i n e d t o h a v e b e e nt a k e ni nt h e r o b b e r y. Serg eant William Dway ne Mer ritt, a homicide investig ator with the Memphis Police Depa rtment, coordinated the in v es t i g ation. A tip from Crime Stoppers led to the ar rest of the codefe ndant J ohnson, who initially provided the police with a fictitious name for the c o-per petrator. Ev e ntu a lly , h e imp lic a te d th e de fe nd ant. Af te rw ard, S erg e ant M e rr itt int e rv ie we d th e de fe nd ant, who initially

denied a ny involvement in the robber y an d s h o o t i n g. After

being informed that J ohnson had alre ady

g iven an incr iminating stateme nt, the defe ndant ac knowledg ed that he had participated in the ro b bery . The de fenda nt claimed that the r obbery was Johnson’s idea and that J ohnson had provided him with a loaded double barr el shotgun. The defe ndant contende d that he fired a single war

n i n g s h o t upon enter ing a nd did not otherwise fire his weapon. H e cla imed that John so n h a d a

n a ssa ult ri fl e and too k a pp rox im ate ly

$2 80 fr om a

c ig ar b ox and

a lso sto le so me cig are ttes. The def

endant s t at ed that his share of the stolen money was a pproxi mately

$130. Acc ording to Serg eant Me rritt, J ohnson was “muc h shorter” than the def endant. While there was a se c ur ity c a me ra in t he sto re , it

wa s n ot r e c or din g a t th e tim e of the of fe ns e s. Keith Hull, the def

endant’ s brother, te stified as an a libi witness for the def ense. He c laimed that the def

endant tele phoned him at his residenc e at a pproxi mately

9:00 p.m. on the evening of the robber y . He c ontended that his ca ller identification indicated that the def enda n t was calling f

rom his mother’s re sidence , where he w as living at the time. Accor ding to Hull, they talked for
a pp ro xima te ly

fi ft e e n mi nu te s, dis c us sin g ba sk e tba ll a nd Ne w Y e ar’ s E ve pla

ns

. The de fenda

nt, who was twe nty -three y ear s of ag e at the time of t he trial, claimed that he was at hi s mother’s residence at t he ti me of the offenses, vis iting with his g irlfriend a nd her two c hildren. He c o n te n d e d th a t th e y d id n o t le a v e th e r e s id e n c e a t an y ti me th a t d ay an d in s is te d that he had telephoned his brothe r at a pproxi mately

9:00 p.m. to dis cuss a New Y ear ’s Eve pa rty . Acc ording-3-

to the defe ndant, he wa s initi ally contac ted by

the police on J anuar

y 3, about a we ek af

ter the
ro bb e ry . T hat e ve nin g , De te c tiv e She ri da n pic ke d him up a t hi s mo the r’ s r e sid e nc e and dr ov e him to the poli ce s t ation. The de fenda nt contended that he initially denied a ny involvement in the of fe ns e s, bu t tha t he ev e ntu a lly c on fe sse d af te r fo ur ho ur s had pa sse d be c a us e the de te c tiv e s to ld h im that if he “didn’t g ive a statement that wa s simil ar to [co-de fenda nt J ohnson’s] that they

wer e g oing to make sure that [he] fac ed the de ath pena l t y

. ” T h e def endant de nied havingparticipated in the of fe ns e s and ma int a ine d that he ob ta ine d the de ta ils he pr ov ide d o ff ic e rs fr om Johns on ’s state me nt. The de fendant also denied ha ving e ver ow ned a c rea

m and light blue San F ranc isco jacke t. He contende d that his then-g irlfriend w as not prese nt at his tri al t o offe r alibi testimony beca use of “[d] isag ree ments and thing s of that such.” The de fenda nt expl ained that his mother c ould not offer
su c h te sti mony

be c a us e sh e wa s awa

y fr om h e r r e sid e nc e on

the e ve nin g of

the of fe ns e s.

I Although not r aised by

the par ties, there is an issue as to whethe r the de fenda nt’s dual
c on vic tio ns fo r a g g ra

vated robb e ry

vio late the pr inc ipl e s o f d ou ble je op ard

y . Wh e the r p ro pe rl y assig ned or not, howe ver, this cour t may consider pla in error

upon the rec ord under Rule 52(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure. State v. O g le, 666 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1984).

B e fo re an e rr or may be so re c og nize d, it mus t be “ pla in” and mus t a ff e c t a “ su bs tanti a l r ig ht” of the a ccuse d. The wor d “plain” is sy nony mous with “clea

r” or equivalently

“obvious.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). Plain er ror is not mere ly

erro r t h at i s conspicuous, but
es p e c ia ll y e g r e g io u s e r

r o r th a t s tr ik e s a t th e f

a ir n e s s , in te g r it

y , o r p u b li c r e p u tati o n o f judicial proce eding s. See State v. Wooden, 658 S.W .2d 553, 55 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) . I n State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) , this court define d “substantial rig ht” as a rig ht of “funda

mental proportions in the indictment pr ocess, a rig ht to the proof of e very element of the off ense and

. . . constitutional in nature .” I n that case , this c ourt established five fac tors to be applied in deter

mining whe ther a

n err or is plain: (a ) T he re c or d mu st c le arl y e sta bli shwh at oc c ur

re d in the tr ia l c ourt ; (b) a clea r and une quivocal rule of law must have been br eac hed; (c) a substantial rig ht of the ac cused must have been a dverse ly aff ecte d; (d) the a ccuse d [m ust not have wa ived] the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e) considera

tion of the err or must be “ne cessa ry to do substantial just ice.”

I d. at 641-42

. O u r

s u p r e me c o u rt c h ar a c te r iz e d th e A dk is s o nte s t a s a

“ c le ar an d me an in g ful standard” and empha siz ed that ea ch of the five fac tors must be prese nt be fore an er ror qua lifies as plain err or. State v. Smith, 24 S .W.3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000). I n this case, a ll f

ive fa ctors ar e pr e se nt. The double je opardy

provisions of both the United S t at es and Te nnessee Constit utions pr ov ide that-4-

“ no pe rs on

sh a ll b e pu t in

je op ard y of lif e or lim b f or the same of

fe ns e . U .S. Con st. amend. 5; Tenn. Const. ar t. I , § 10. The c lause ha s been inter prete d to include the fo llo wi ngpr ote c tio ns : ‘ I t pr ote c ts a g a ins t a se c on d pr os e c uti on fo r t he same of

fe ns e afte r a c qu itta l. I t p r o te c ts a g a in s t a s e c o n d p r o s e c u ti o n f o r th e s a me o f

f e n s e af ter conviction. And it pr otects ag ainst multipl e punishments f or the s am e o ff

ense.’ North Carolina v. Pea

rce , 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct . 2072, 2076, 23 L . Ed. 2d 656 (1969)[;] State v. Phill ips, 924 S.W .2d 662, 664 (Tenn.1996) .”

State v. Price, 46 S.W .3d 785, 824 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting State v. Addison, 973 S.W .2d 260, 266-67 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1997)). On September

4, 2003, this court rele ased its opinion in the direct a p p ea l fi l ed by

codefe ndant Marc us J ohnson. See State v. Mar cus Johns on, No. W2002-00987-CCA-R3CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Sept. 4, 2003). I n that case , a p anel of

this court conclude d that J ohnson
cou l d not be convicte d of two sepa rate char g es of a g g ravated robbe ry and ther efor e modified the conviction for the ag g ravated robbery of t he victim Ghannam to ag g ravated assault. In doing so, the
c ourt ru le d a s f oll ow s:
Def endant wa s indicted for the espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry of ea ch victim. There
wa s n o e vid e nc e pr e se nte d at tria l tha t pro pe rt y be lon g ingind ivi du a lly

to e a c h v ic tim was take n. See Moore v. State, 563 S.W .2d 215 (Tenn. Cri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 7 7). Our revie w of the r ecor d reve als that the evide nce suppor ts o n l y one robbe ry , and dual
c on vic tio ns fo r e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

vio late the p ri nc ipl e s o f d ou ble j e o p ar dy.
Where a n err or in the cr iminal proce eding s is found to aff ect the substantial rig hts of the def

endant, the e rror

may be noticed at any

time, even thoug h not raised in th e mo ti o n f

o r n e w tr ia l o r a s s ig n e d a s e r r o r o n a p p e a l, in th e d is c r e ti o n of the appellate court whe re ne cessa ry to do substantial just ice. Te nn. R. Crim. P . 52(b). * * * Th is C ourt

re c e ntl y he ld, in a c a se wi th sim ila

r c ir c ums tanc e s, that a

sin g le inc ide nt of

ro bb e ry inv olv ingtw o v ic tim s c on sti tut e s th e same of fe ns e . St a te v. I rv in L ee F ranklin and Jerry

L orenze Sandridg e, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 568, No. W20 02 -0 09 45 -C CA -R 3- CD (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. a t Jac ks on , Jun e 27 , 2 00 3) , [pe rm

. to appea l denied (Te nn. Dec . 22, 2003)]. A pan el o f t h i s Court stated, “the pr oper un it o f p ro se c uti on

fo r a g g ra

vate d r ob be ry

in T e nn e sse e is t

he numbe r o f t

he ft s, rathe r than the numbe r of victims.” I d. This Court relied upon the Te nnessee Supreme Court’s holding in State v. L ewis, 958 S.W.2d 736 (Tenn. 1997), in which the Court held that a de fenda nt could not be convicte d of multiple counts of ag g ravated ar son where he set fir e to a single a partment building that contained
sever al individual a

partments. This Court reasone d that the statute def ines robber

y in t e rm s o f t

he ft . Se e Te nn . Co de Ann. § 3 9- 13 -4 01 (a ). I n th is c a se , th e re wa s o nly
on e the ft or takin g of

pr op e rt y . F ur the rm or e , th e dis tin g uis hin g c ha racteri sti c-5-

betwee n the offe nse of r obbery and t h e o ff

en se of thef

t is the manner in which proper ty is taken, which is by

violence or

fea r. See State v. O wens, 20 S.W.3d 634, 638 (Tenn. 2000) . A taking may be ac complished b y

the threat of fea

r or violenc e re g ard le ss of wh e the r the re is a sing le vic tim or mul tip le vic tim s invo lve d. B e c a us e the only taking in this case occ urre d when c o-def endant Par son took cash and cig are ttes from behind the s tore c ounter, De fenda nt can be convicted of

only one e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r y.
Def endant is neve rtheless guilty of a c rime ag ainst eac h victim. The evidenc e su pp or ts the fi nd ingthat bo th vic tim s we re ma de to re a so na bly fe ar imm ine nt b od ily inj u ry b y u s e or display of a de adly

wea pon, which constitutes the off ense of ag g ravated assault. Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 102(a) (1)( B) , -101(a )(2) (1997 & Supp. 200 2). Unde r the test esta blished in St ate v. B urns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), ag g rava

ted assault is a pa

rt (a) lesser- inc lu d e d

o f f e n s e o f e specia lly

ag g ravated robber y . See State v. Jason C. C arte r, 2000 Tenn. Crim. Ap p

. L E XI S 340, No. M1998-00798-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App., fil ed at Nashville, April 27, 2000), perm. to appe al denied ( Tenn. 2000). As alleg ed in the indictment, eac h element of
a g g r a v a t e d

a s s a u l ti s i n c l u d e d

i nt h e e l e m e n t s o f

e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r y.
The re cord r evea ls that Defe ndant enter ed the Discount Shop armed w ith an AK-47. Mr

. Ghanna

m te stified that he hear d sever al shots a nd fea red for his life. As to t he de c e a se d v ic tim , M r. Ab u- Ha mda , w e c onclu de that th e e vid e nc e c le arl y supports D e f

e n d a nt’ s c o nv ic ti o n

f o r e s p ecia lly

ag g ravated robbe ry . Mr. Abu-H amda, a store c lerk, wa s standing behind the counter wher e the money

and cig are ttes were located, a nd he was shot a

nd killed. The e specia lly

ag g ravated robbe ry

of Mr. AbuHamda is t h e “trig g eringoffe nse” w hich establishes the f elony murder c onviction. Wit hout depre ciating the seriousne ss of the attac k upon Mr. Ghannam, we c onclude that the e vid e nc e mor e a

pp ro pr iate ly

su pp or ts a c on vic tio n f

or a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult ag ainst Mr. Ghanna

m under the f

acts a nd circ umstances of

this case.

Acc ording ly , Def

en d an t ’s conviction for

the espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry of Mr. Abu-Hamda is aff

irmed. Defenda

nt's c onviction for the e specia lly ag g ravated robber y of Mr. Ghanna

m is modified to ag g ravated assault, and this ca se is rema nded to the trial court f

or re sentenc ing on that offense

.
I d., slip op. at 10-12.

For the same r easons state d by the panel in Johnson’s c ase, the conviction for the ag g ravated robber y of Gha n nam must be modified to ag g ravated assault and r emande d to the trial court f or s en t en ci n g.T he t r i al cour t an d t he part i es r ef er t o t he ori gi nal numb er i ng o f t hes e enh anc ement f

act ors f ound i n T enn es s ee 1
C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 . H o w e v e r, the se fac to rs w e re re n u m b e re d b y the G e n e ra l A sse m b ly effe c tive J u ly 1, 2002. Se e T en n

. Code Ann

. § 40- 35- 114 ( Su pp. 2002)

. B ec au s e t h e def en dan t wa s s en t en ce d on O ct ober 10, 2002, t he new num b eri ng s ho ul d have b een ap p l i ed and wi l l be us ed i n t hi s o p i ni o n.
-6- II
Next, the defe ndant arg ues t hat his sentence s are excessive. Specific ally , he asse rts that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y a pp lyinge nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s ( 4) , th a t th e of

fe ns e inv olv e s mo re tha

n o ne vic tim ; (7), that the pe rsonal injuries inflicted upon the victims were pa rticularly g reat; (10), that the defe ndant possessed or

employ ed a f

irea rm during the commi ssion of the off ense; a nd (11), that the defe ndant had no he sita t i o n about commi tting a c rime whe n the risk to human life wa s high. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-1 1 4 (4 ), (7 ), (10) , (11) ( Supp. 2002). The state c oncede s the 1 mis a pp lic a tio n o f c e rt a in o f the fa c tor s bu t c on te nd s that the se nte nc e s we re sti ll w arr ante d. B e c a us e the espe cially

ag g ravated robbery

conviction with reg ard to the vic tim Ghannam has be en modified to ag g ravated assault and r emande d for re-se ntencing , our concern on the i ssue pertains only to the sentenc es for

espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry

and cr iminally

neg lige nt homicide.

When there is a challeng e to the l eng th, rang e, or manner of service of a sentence, it i s the duty of this court to conduc t a de novo revie w with a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations made by the trial cour

t are corr ect. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). This presumption is “conditioned upon the a ff ir ma tiv e sh ow ingin t

he re c or d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ingpr inc ipl e s and a ll rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s.” S tate v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) ; see State v. J ones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tenn. 1 9 9 4 ). “I f the trial c ourt applies inappr opriate f actor s or otherwise f

ails to follow the 1989 SentencingAct, the pr esumption of cor re ct n ess falls.” State v. She lto n, 85 4 S.W. 2d 11 6, 12 3 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ). Th e Se nte nc ingCom mis sio n Co mme nts provide that the bur den is on t h e d ef en dant to show the impropriety of the sente nce. T enn. Code Ann. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 , Se nte nc ingCom mis sio n Co mme nts

. Our re view re quires an analy sis of (1) the evidence, if any , rec eived at the t rial and se ntencing hear ing; ( 2) the pre sentenc e rep o rt ; (3 ) t he princ iples of sentenc ing a nd the ar g uments of counse l relative to sentencingalternatives; (4) the nature and chara cter istics of the offe nse; (5) a ny mitigating or enha ncing fac tors; (6) any

statements made by

the def endant in his own beha lf; and (7) the defe ndant' s potential for re habilitation o r treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-102, -103, - 210; State v. Smit h, 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. At the sentenc ing he aring, the victim testified that as a r esult of the shooting , he had underg one three surg ical proce dures and four months of phy sical thera

py . He r elated that his doctor had limited lifting with his left hand to fifte en pounds and that further i m p ro v em en t was not
e xpe c te d. Th e vic timwa s o ut o f w or k f or a pp ro xima te ly

nin e mon ths , and be c a

us e he wa s una

ble to return to the Disc ount Shop, he had g one into the wholesa le business with his wife.-7-

Demita Parson, the de fenda nt’s older sister, testified that when the defe ndant was a child, he
wa s “ a dv e ntu

ro us ” bu t wa s n e ve rt

he le ss “ a g oo d b oy .” She of

te n p ro vid e d c are fo r t

he de fe nd ant, wh o m s h e d es cr i b edas o b ed i en t

. M s

. P ar s o n t es t i fi ed t h at t h e d ef en d an th addro p p edo u to f h i gh school but had obtained his GED in an ef fort to “g et straig ht.”

At the close of

the proof, the trial court found the following enhanc ement fa ctors to be
a pp lic a ble : ( 2) , th a t th e de fe nd ant ha s a pre vio us his tor y of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns in a dd iti on to t ho se nece ssary to establish the appropriate rang e; (4), that the offe nse involved more tha n one victim; and (7), that the pe rsonal injuries inflicted upon the victims we re p articularly g reat. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2), (4) , (7) ( Supp. 2003). I t is not clear f rom the re cord w hich of the enhanc ement fac to rs wer e applied to e ach c onviction. After f inding no mitigating f

actor s to be applica

ble,
s ee Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113, the trial c ourt set the sente nce f or ea ch ag g ravated robbe ry at twenty y ear s, the midpoint i n the ra ng e, and the sentenc e for criminally neg lige nt homicide at two y ear s, the maxi mum in the rang e.

I nit ia ll y , th e d e f

e n d an t c o n c e d e s th a t h is h is to r y o f c r im in a l c o n v ic ti o n s s u

p p o rts th e trial court’s a pplicat i o n o f enha

nceme nt fac tor (2), but a rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed by applying
e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor (4 ), that th e of

fe ns e s involv ed mor e tha n o ne vic tim . B e c a

us e the re wa s a separ ate c onviction for ea ch victim, the state c oncede s that this factor wa s inapplicable. In State v. McKnig ht, 900 S.W .2d 36 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) , this court ruled that the mult iple victim factor is not applicable whe n convictions are enter ed for eac h victim, as in this case. See a lso S t ate v. Willi a mso n, 91 9 S. W.2 d 6 9, 82 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ) ( ho ldi ngthat th e mul tip le vic tim
e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor c ann ot b e a

pp lie d wh e n the de fe nd ant is c on vic te d of se pa ra te of fe ns e s a g a ins t
eac h victim). Be cause the def endant rec eived separ ate convictions for e ach vic tim, the trial court’s
a pp lic a tio n o f t

his fa c tor wa s e rr on e ou s.
The de fenda

nt nextasser

ts that the trial court e rre d by apply ing e nhance ment fac tor (7), that the persona l injurie s inflicted upon the victims we re particula rly g reat, be cause that fac tor is inherent in t he c ri me s o f e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry and

c ri min a lly

ne g lig e nt h omi c ide . A g a in, the state h a s c o n c e d e d

e r r o r

. S e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y i s an e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-403(a )(2) . Our supre me cour t has held that proof

of ser ious bodily

injury wil l al wa y s constitute proof of pa rticularly g reat injury . See State v. Jones, 883 S.W .2d 597, 602 (T e nn . 1 99 4) ; se e a lso State v. Ni x, 92 2 S.W. 2d 89 4, 90 3 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ). “ Part ic ula rl y g reat injury

is also an essential element of criminally neg lige nt homicide beca

use no g reater injury than death can be inflicted upon a person.” State v. Wil liam J ason McMa han, No. No. 03C01-9707- C R

- 0 0 2 6 2 , s l i p o p

. a t2 9 ( T e n n

. C r i m

. A p p

. , a tK n o x v i l l e , M a r c h 3 1 , 1 9 9 9 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor (7 ) s ho uld

no t ha ve be e n a pp lie d b y the tr ia l c ourt

. Next, the defenda

nt contends t hat t he trial court err ed by applying e nhance ment fac tor (10), that the def

endant e mploy ed a f

irea rm or deadly wea

pon during the offe nse, bec ause it is an esse ntial
e le me nt o f e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob bery

. W hi le it i s unc le ar whe the r t he tr ia l c ourt

int e nd e d to apply this enhance ment fa ct o r, the state a g ree s that application of the f actor would have be en e rr on e ou s. On

a fo rm us e d b y the tr ia l c ourt

duri ngse nte nc ing , th e fa c tor is c ir c le d b ut t

he re is a-8-

no ta tio n th a t th e fa c tor

wa s “ pa rt of the of

fe ns e .” Th e tr ans c ri pt of the se nte nc inghe ari ngre fl e c ts that the trial cour

t understood that the fire arms we re a “par t of the off

ense.” I t is our interpretation that the trial court did not apply this fa ctor to a ny of the convictions. Espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry i s r o b b e r y a c c o mp l i s h e d

w i t h a d e a d l y w e a

p o nan d w h e r e t h e v i c t i m s u f

f e r s s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39 -1 3 -4 0 3 (a ). T he use of a fire arm in the c ommissi on of the c rime wa s, of
course , a basis for

that conviction. See State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Tenn. 1995).

The state c ontends that the trial cour t’s application of e nhance ment fac tor (10) to the conviction for c riminally

neg lige nt homicide was appropriate

. Be cause the factor is not an essential element of the offe nse, it was prope rly applied. See T enn. Code Ann. §§ 39- 11-302(d) , 39-13-212; State v. Roy ce L ee “Dino” L ane, N o. 02-C-01-9102- CR-00011 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, J an. 29, 1992). Finally , the def

endant a sserts that the trial c ourt misapplied enhanc ement fac tor (11), that the defe ndant had no he sitation about committing a c rime whe n the risk to human life wa s high. A g ain, it is unclear whe ther the trial court actua lly applied this factor. While the state a g ain conc edes that application of this fac tor would have been err or, the transcr ipt of the sentenc ing he aringcontains no indication that it was considered by the trial cour t. There is no sugg estion that the shots fired during the offe nses posed a

threat to any one other

than the named victims. See S tate v. I mfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 707 (Tenn. 2002); Nix , 922 S.W .2d at 903. Acc ording ly , this factor w ould not be applicable

.

I n summary , as to all of the c onvictions, the trial court e rroneo u s l y applied enha nceme nt fac tors (4), that the of

fense s involved more than one victim; (7), that the per sonal injuries inflicted upon the victims we re particula rly g reat; a

nd (11), that the defe ndant had no hesitat i o n about committing an of

fense when the r isk to human life was high. As to t he espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry convictions, it also e rre d by applying e nhance ment fac tor (10), that the defe ndant employ ed a f irea rm or dea dly wea pon during the offenses. The trial court properly applied enha

nceme nt fac tor (2), that the d e f e n d an t h a s a p r e v i o u s h i s t o r y o f c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n s i n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e n e c e ssa ry to establish the ra

ng e, to ea ch of the defe ndant’s convic tions. I t also proper ly applied enha

nceme nt fac tor (10) to the c onviction f or criminally neg lige nt homicide

. The trial c ourt found no mitiga ting fa c tor s to be a

pp lic a ble and the de fe nd ant d oe s n ot a dv anc e any su c h f a c tor s o n a

pp e a l.

I n calc ulating the sentenc e for a Class A fe lony conviction, the pre sumptive sentence is the midpoint wit hin the rang e if ther e ar e no enha nceme nt or mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(c ). I f there are enhanc ement fa ctors but no mitigatingfac tors, t h e t ri al court shall set the sentenc e at or above the midpoint. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( d). I f there are mitigating fac tors but no enhanc ement fa ctors, the tria l court shall set the sent en ce at o r b el o w the midpoint. I d. A sentenc e invol v ing both e nhance ment and mitigating f actor s require s an assig nment of re lative weig ht for the e nhance ment fac tors as a me ans of incr easingthe s entenc e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(e)

. T h e s en t en ce should then be reduc ed within the ra ng e by any weig ht assigne d to the mitigating fac tors prese nt. I d.-9-

Especia lly

ag g ravated robbe ry

is a Class A felony with a Rang e I sentenc e ra

ng e of f ifteen to twenty -five year s

. S ee T enn. C ode Ann. §§ 39- 13-403(b) , 40-35-112( a)( 1). The pr esente nce repor t refle cts that the twe n t y -f our-y ear -old defe ndant, who droppe d out of hig h school in the eleve nth gr ade but late r obtained h i s GE D, has the followingprior cr iminal recor d: patronizing prostitution (01/29/ 01), possession of mar ijuana (01/29/01), a nd driving on a suspended, r evoked,
or ca ncelled lice nse (0/10/01). The defe ndant’s juvenile r ecor d ref lects that he was place d on unsupervised pr obation in November of 1995 for

vehicle theft. I n October of 1994, the de fenda

nt
w a s p l a c e d

i nH an o v e r

H o u s e a f

t e r b e i n g f

o u n d i np o s s e s s i o no f

a p i s t o l o ns c h o o l p r o p e rt y. Howeve r, prior juvenile adjudications may only be conside red unde r enha nceme nt fac tor (21) if the y wo uld have be e n f

e lon ie s f or an a du lt. State v. Jac ks on , 6 0 S. W.3 d 7 38 , 7 42 (T e nn . 200 1) . T hu s, the trial cour

t could have a

pplied enhanc ement fa ct o r (2 1 ), but only based on the adjudication of
ve hic le the ft . A c c or din g ly , th e de fe nd ant' s pr ior c ri min a l hi sto ry sh ou ld b e a c c or de d s ome we ig ht. I n our view, the mid-rang e sente nce of twenty y ear s initi ally

fix ed by the trial co u rt for the defe ndant’s convic tion for the espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry

of the victim Abu-Ha

mda was appropr iate.

I n calc ulating t h e s entenc e for a Class B, C, D, or

E felony conviction, the pre sumptive sentenc e is the minimum in the rang e if ther e ar e no enha nceme nt or mitigatingfac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). I f there are enhanc ement but no mitigatingfac tors, the trial cour t may set the sentenc e above the minimum, but still within the rang e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35 -210(d). A sentenc e involving both e nhan cement and mitigatingfac tors require s an assig nment of re lative weig ht for the e nhance ment fac tors as a me ans of incr easingthe sentenc e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(e) . The sente nce should then be reduc ed within the ra ng e by any we i gh t as s igne d to the mitigating fac tors prese nt. I d.

Cr imi na lly

ne g lig e nt h omi c ide is a

Cla ss E fe lony wi th a Rang e Ise nte nc e ra ng e of on e to tw o y e ars . Se e Te nn . Co de Ann. §§ 39 -1 3- 21 2( b) , 4 0- 35 -1 12 (a )( 5). I n ou r vie w, the a pp lic a ble enhanc ement factors, wa rra nt a one- y ear

incre ase f

rom the one- y ear

minimum to the two-y ear ma ximum

.
III

Fi n al l y , t h e d ef

en d an tas s er t s t h at t h e t ri al co u rt erre d b y o rd er i n g co n s e c u t i v e s en t en ci n g. The state contends that consec utive sentenc ing is wa rra nted bec ause the defe ndant has a n extensive
rec ord of criminal activity and is a dange rous offender whose be havior indica tes littl e or no r eg ard for human life

. Prior to the enac tment of th e C ri m i n al SentencingReform Ac t of 1989, the limited classifications for the imposit ion of consec utive sentenc es wer e set out in Gra y v. State, 538 S.W .2d 39 1, 39 3 ( Te nn . 1 97 6) . In th a t c a se our s up re me c ourt ru le d that ag g ra

vatin g c ir c ums tanc e s mu st be pre sent befor e plac ement in any one of the classifications. L ater , in State v. Taylor, 739 S.W .2d 227 (Tenn. 1987) , the cour t established an additional cate g ory for those defe ndants convicted of twoT he f i rs t f o ur cr i t eri a are f

o und in G ray

. A fi f

t h c at ego ry in G ray , ba sed o n a s p eci f i c num b er of

pri o r f el o ny 2

con v i ct i on s , ma y e n h an ce t h e s en t en ce r an g e bu t i s n o l on g er a l i s t ed cr i t er i on

. Se e T en n

. Code An n

. § 40- 35

- 1 1 5, S en t en cing C o m m i ssi o n C o m m en t s.
-10- or more statutory

offe nses involving se x ual abuse of minors. There wer e, howe ver, a dditional words of c a uti on : [C]ons e c uti ve se nte nc e s sh ou ld n ot ro uti ne ly be imp os e d .

. . and

. . . th e a g g re g a te maxi mum of consec utive terms must be reas onably related to the seve rity

of the offe nses involved.
Taylor, 739 S.W .2d at 230. The Sente ncing Commi ssion Com ments adopted the c autio n ary lang uage. T en n. Code Ann. § 40-35- 115. The 1989 Ac t is, in essence, the codification of the holdings in Gra

y and Ta y lor; consec utive sentenc es may b e i m p o s ed in t he discre tion of the trial
c ourt on ly up on a de te rm inatio n th a t on e or mor e of the fo llo wi ngc ri te ri a e xist: 2
(1 ) T he de fe nd ant i s a

pr of e ssi on a l c ri min a l wh o ha s kn ow ing ly de vo te d h ims e lf to criminal ac ts as a major sour ce of livelihood; (2) The defe ndant is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal ac tivity

is ex tensive; ( 3 ) T h e d e f

e n d an ti s a

d an g e r o u s m e n t a l l y a

b n o r m a l p e r s o ns o d e c l ar e d

b y a c omp e te nt p sy c hiatr ist who c on c lud e s a s a re su lt o f a

n inve sti g a tio n p ri or

to sentenc ing that the defe ndant' s criminal conduc t has been char acte rized by a patter n of re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be havio r w ithhe e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s; (4) The defe ndant is a dang erous of fende r whose beha v i o r i n d icates little or no
re g ard fo r h uma n li fe , a nd no he sit a tio n a

bo ut c omm itt inga

c ri me in wh ic h th e ri sk to h uma n li fe is h ig h; (5) The defe ndant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory

offe nses involving se x ual abu se of a

minor with consideration of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from the re lationship between the defe ndant and victim or victims, t h e t i m e s pan of defe ndant' s undetec ted sexual activity , the nature and scope of t he sex ual acts and the
e xten t of the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l and

me nta l da

ma g e to t he vic timor

vic tim s; (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse committed while on probation; (7 ) T he de fe nd ant i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b)

.W ith re g a rd to the c o -d e fen d a n t Jo h n so n , w h o w a s c o n v ic te d o f fe lo n y m u rd e r a n d tw o c o u n ts o f esp e c ia lly 3

a g g ra v a te d ro b b e ry, the trial c o u rt a p p a re n tly d e te rm ine d him to b e a d a n g e ro u s o ff e n d e r, b u t f

a iled to m a k e the re q u isite f i nd i ngs i n s up p o rt t hereo f

. A l t ho ugh not rai sed b y t he p art i es, t hi s co urt revers ed t he o rder o f co nsecut i ve sent enci ng
a n d o rd e re d the trial c o u rt o n re m a n d to “re c o n sid e r th e a p p ro p ria te n e ss o f co n se c u tive s e n te n c in g a n d fo r sp e c ifi c f i n di n g s t o be ma de i f

c on s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g i s or der ed. ” M ar cu s Joh n s on , s l i p op. at 3. B ec au s e s en t en ci n g w as n ot rai sed as an i ss ue b y t he co

- d ef end ant Jo hnson, no in fo rm a ti o n regardi ng any ap p l i cab l e enhancem ent or m i t i gat i ng f act o rs i s i ncl ud ed i n t he o p i ni o n.
-11- The leng th of the sentenc e, whe n consec utive in nature, must be “ justly deser ved in re lation to the seriousness o f t h e offense,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-102(1) , and “no g reater than that deser ved” unde r the c ircumstance s, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 2); State v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456 (Tenn. 1999)

.
I n Gra y , our supre me cour

t ruled that bef

ore c onsecutive se ntencingcould be impos ed upon the da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r, c on sid e re d th e mos t su bje c tiv e of

the c la ssi fi c a tio ns and

the mos t di ff

ic ult to a pp ly , o the r c on dit ion s mu st b e pr e se nt: (a ) t hat th e c ri me s invo lve d a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums tanc e s; (b) that c onsecutive se ntence s are a nece ssary means to pr otect the public f rom the def

endant; and (c) that the t erm reasona

bly relates to the s ever ity of t he offenses. I n State v. Wil kerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995) , our hig h court re aff irmed th o s e p r in c ip le s , holding that c onsecutive se ntence s cannot be require d of the da ng erous of

fende r “unle ss the t erms reasonably relate[] to the sever ity of the offe nses committed a nd are nece ssary in or der to pr otect the public (society ) f ro m fu rther criminal acts by those persons who resor t to ag g ravated criminal conduct.” The Wil kerson de cision, wh ic h mo dif

ie d s ome wh a t the str ic t fa c tua l gu ide lin e s f or c on se c uti ve se nte nc inga do pte d in State
v. Woo ds , 8 14 S.W. 2d 37 8, 38 0 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ), de sc ri be d s e nte nc inga s a “ human p ro c e ss that neither c an nor should be r educe d to a set o f fi x ed and me chanic al rules.” Wil kerson, 905 S.W .2d at 938.

At the c los e of

the se nte nc inghe ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt ma de the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s r e lativ e to
co n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g: [B ]as e d o n tw o s e pa

rate inj ur ie s, tw o s e pa

rate wo un din g s –

un de rs tan din g it ha pp e ne d in – in a ve ry sh or t pe ri od of tim e – b ut I

thi nk [the re are ] two dis tin c t a c ts and that base d on the seriousne ss of the ac t, they should be run conse cutive. 3

The sente ncing form used by the trial co u rt co n fl i cts with the holding. The trial court ha s circ led “no” ne x t to each of the sec tion 40-35-115 cr iteria for consec utive sentenc ing. I n our view, the fo rm us e d b y the tr ia l court re fl e c ts a m or e a c c ur a te a sse ssm e nt. No ne of the fa c tor s th a t w ou ld
war rant c onsecutive se ntencingappea r to be pre sent in this case. The evidenc e did not establish that the def endant is a pr ofessional c riminal. Although the defe ndant has a pr ior criminal re cord, it is not extensive. None of his prior c riminal convictions involved violence. The def endant doe s not qualify
as a dang erous mentally abnorma l pe rson so dec lare d by a compe tent psy chiatrist and ha s not been convicted of

two or more of

fense s involving sexual abuse of a minor.-12-

The state a sks that this court affir m consec utive s en t encingon the g round that the circ umstances of

the robbery indicate that the defendant is a dange rous offender with no hesitation about commi tt in g a

c r im e in w h ic h th e r is k

to h u ma nli f e is h igh

. I t a s s e rts th a t t h e d e f endant “showe d a signific ant disreg ard for human life by shooting his gun in the store knowingothers we re in the store and r obbing the store af ter two e mploy ees w er e s hot multi ple times.” Althoug h the robber y and shooting involved in this case we re e x tremely serious, the e vidence does not show that the def endant wa s responsible for the ag g ravating c ircumstance s. L ikewise, the r ecor d does not
su pp or t a fi nd ing that con se c uti ve se nte nc e s ar e wa rr ante d to pr ote c t th e pu

bli c fr om t

he de fe nd ant. As indi cated, the def

endant’ s prior cr iminal convictions have be en for nonviolent misdemeanor offe nses. The pr oof indicate d that he fired hi s wea pon one ti me. Neither victim was inj ured by the shotgun. The rec ord re flec ts that the victim and Abu-Hamda were shot by the hig h velocity

wea pon c ar r i e d b y t h e c o
- d e f

e n d an t J o h n s o n

. T h e d e f

e n d an tw i l l b e r e qu i r e d

t o s e r v e 1 0 0 % o f

h i s t w e n t yy ear sentenc e for

espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry . See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501( I )(1) . Wit hout diminis hing the seriousness of the se cr imes, it is our vi ew t h at i n carce ration of the de fenda nt for twenty y ear s is sufficient to punish the defe ndant and pr otect the public.

Ac c or din g ly , th e de fe n d a

nt ’ s c o nv i c t i o n s f

o r t h e e s p e c i a l l y

a g gr a v a t e d r ob be ry and c ri min a lly neg lige nt homicide of Abu-H amda a re a ffirme d. The sente nces for t hose off enses of twenty y ear s and two y ear s, respe ctively , are also aff irmed. The c onviction for the e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry of the victim Ghanna

m is modi fied to one f

or ag g ravated assault. The c ause is re manded to the tria l court for sentenc ing on that offense . All sentence s are to be serve d concur rently

.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DI NG JUDGE