NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ERNESTO ALONZO MORAN, Petitioner,

v.

THE HONORABLE ROBERT MILES, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF 

THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of MARICOPA, 

Respondent Judge,

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY, Maricopa County Attorney,

Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA SA 15-0053

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-105894-001

The Honorable Robert E. Miles, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Shell & Nermyr, PLLC, Chandler

By Mark A. Nermyr

Counsel for Petitioner

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By David R. Cole

Counsel for Real Party in Interest
MORAN v. HON. MILES/MONTGOMERY

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge John C. Gemmill and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Through this special action, Ernesto Moran challenges the

trial court’s grant of the State’s motion to amend the indictment brought 

against him, in which the State sought to change the date of the charged 

offense of misconduct involving weapons from December 18, 2013, to 

February 4, 2014. Moran argues the amended indictment describes an 

offense separate and apart from that originally charged, and for which there 

has been no finding of probable cause by a grand jury, in violation of the 

Arizona Constitution and Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. For the 

following reasons, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On February 12, 2014, the State presented evidence to a grand 

jury regarding Moran’s alleged participation in a home invasion. In his 

presentation, the prosecutor told the grand jury the crimes “occurred in 

Phoenix and in Maricopa County all on the 18th day of December, 2013.” 

¶3 The victim reported to police that, on December 18, 2013, she 

was confronted by three subjects as she exited the shower in her home. One 

subject grabbed her by the hair, threw her to the ground, pointed a pistol at 

her face, and demanded she tell him the location of her safe. A second 

subject discovered a shotgun that belonged to the victim’s boyfriend and 

also pointed it at her face and demanded the location of the safe. The three 

subjects then searched the house, collected shotgun shells and other

accessories in a bag, and exited the home through the front door with the 

bag and shotgun.

¶4 The victim recognized one of the subjects, who was later

identified as Moran, as an acquaintance of her cousin. With this knowledge, 

she was then able to locate a photograph on Facebook of Moran holding the 

shotgun taken from her residence. On February 4, 2014, Moran was

detained outside his mother’s home while exiting a green SUV and 

transported to the police station for questioning regarding the home 
MORAN v. HON. MILES/MONTGOMERY

Decision of the Court

3

invasion. During the interview, Moran admitted having a prior felony 

conviction. In the green SUV, police officers found the shotgun, shotgun 

shells, and other ammunition believed to have been taken from the victim’s 

home. 

¶5 On February 12, 2014, a grand jury returned a True Bill, which 

indicted Moran on five offenses: burglary in the first degree (count 1); 

armed robbery (count 2); kidnapping (count 3); aggravated assault (count 

4); and misconduct involving weapons (count 5). Each crime in the 

indictment was specifically alleged to have occurred on December 18, 2013.

¶6 On November 14, 2014, the trial court granted the State’s 

motion to dismiss counts 1 through 4. Thereafter, on February 17, 2015, the 

State moved to amend count 5, the sole remaining count, in order to 

“chang[e] the date of offense indicated . . . from the ‘18th day of December 

2013’ to the ‘4th day of February 2014.’” The State argued (1) it simply 

sought “to correct a mistake in fact in the indictment as to the date that 

[Moran] possessed the shotgun,” (2) the change of date did not alter any of 

the elements of a charge, and (3) Moran would not be prejudiced by an 

amendment because the State’s discovery reflected the shotgun was 

recovered from Moran on February 4, 2014. Over Moran’s objection, the 

court granted the State’s motion on the ground that the incorrect date was 

a “mistake of fact.” This special action followed. 

JURISDICTION

¶7 This Court has discretion to accept special action jurisdiction, 

and will generally do so in cases that raise issues of statewide importance, 

issues of first impression, pure legal questions, or issues that are likely to 

arise again. Frimmel v. Sanders, 236 Ariz. 232, 238, ¶ 22, 338 P.3d 972, 978

(App. 2014) (citing Potter v. Vanderpool ex rel. Cnty. of Pinal, 225 Ariz. 495, 

498, ¶ 6, 240 P.3d 1257, 1260 (App. 2010), and Luis A. v. Bayham-Lesselyong 

ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 197 Ariz. 451, 452-53, ¶ 2, 4 P.3d 994, 995-96 (App. 

2000)). Special action review is also appropriate where there is no plain, 

adequate or speedy remedy by appeal, and justice cannot be obtained by 

other means. Id. (citing Luis A., 197 Ariz. at 452-53, ¶ 2, 4 P.3d at 995-96);

Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a).1

 

1 Absent material revisions from the relevant date, we cite the current 

version of statutes and procedural rules.
MORAN v. HON. MILES/MONTGOMERY

Decision of the Court

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¶8 Generally, a defendant cannot challenge a grand jury’s

finding of probable cause on direct appeal. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 

439-40, ¶ 31, 94 P.3d 1119, 1134-35 (2004) (citing State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 

32, 906 P.2d 542, 565 (1995)). Additionally, the interpretation and 

application of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure are questions of law

appropriate for review by special action. Chartone, Inc. v. Bernini, 207 Ariz. 

162, 165-66, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d 1103, 1106-07 (App. 2004). For these reasons, and 

because we conclude the trial court abused its discretion, we accept 

jurisdiction and grant relief. Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 3.

DISCUSSION

¶9 We review a decision on a motion to amend an indictment for 

an abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 198 Ariz. 245, 247, ¶ 4, 8 P.3d 1159, 

1161 (App. 2000) (citing State v. Sammons, 156 Ariz. 51, 54, 749 P.2d 1372, 

1375 (1988)). The trial court abuses its discretion where it commits an error 

of law in the process of reaching a discretionary conclusion. Twin City Fire 

Ins. Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251, 254, ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 282, 285 (2003) (citing Grant 

v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 456, 652 P.2d 507, 529 (1982)).

¶10 In Arizona, a felony action may be commenced by indictment 

or the filing of a complaint.2 Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 30; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 2.2. 

“An indictment is a written statement charging the commission of a public 

offense, presented to the court by a grand jury, endorsed a ‘true bill’ and 

signed by the foreman [of a grand jury].” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.1(a). It serves 

a dual purpose: to provide a defendant with notice of the charges against 

him, and also “to ensure that a neutral intermediary — a grand jury 

comprised of ordinary citizens — finds that probable cause exists before the 

State can bring charges.” McKaney v. Foreman ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 209 

Ariz. 268, 274-75, ¶ 31, 100 P.3d 18, 24-25 (2004) (Hurwitz, J., dissenting in 

part and concurring in part) (citing State v. Superior Court (Mauro), 139 Ariz. 

422, 424, 678 P.2d 1386, 1388 (1984), and State v. Baumann, 125 Ariz. 404, 408, 

610 P.2d 38, 42 (1980)); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 21-413 (requiring indictment 

be based upon probable cause); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.1(d)(4) (same). The 

indictment therefore “limits the trial to the specific charge or charges” 

stated therein. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 13.5(b). 

 

2 Because the State elected in the immediate case to proceed by 

indictment, we need not delve into the respective rights and obligations 

associated with the complaint process. 
MORAN v. HON. MILES/MONTGOMERY

Decision of the Court

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¶11 Absent consent from the defendant, an indictment may be 

amended “only to correct mistakes of fact or remedy formal or technical 

defects.” Id.; see also State v. Kelly, 123 Ariz. 24, 26, 597 P.2d 177, 179 (1979) 

(“[A]n indictment may not be amended by the court to charge new and 

different matters of substance without the concurrence of the grand jury.”) 

(citing State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz. App. 246, 250, 492 P.2d 742, 746 (1972)). Thus, 

by its terms, Rule 13.5(b) applies only where there is a “mistake or defect in 

the indictment.” See State v. Freeney, 223 Ariz. 110, 113, ¶ 18, 219 P.3d 1039, 

1042 (2009).

¶12 Amendment of the date of an offense has been found 

appropriate where the offense itself remains unchanged. For example, in 

State v. Bruce, amendment of the indictment, adjusting by one day the date

the defendant knowingly received the earnings of prostitution, was 

appropriate to conform to the evidence presented at trial. 125 Ariz. 421, 

423-24, 610 P.2d 55, 57-58 (1980); see also State v. Self, 135 Ariz. 374, 380, 661 

P.2d 224, 230 (App. 1983) (permitting amendment to perjury charge to 

conform to evidence that date of hearing at which defendant perjured 

himself was September 11, 1979, rather than August 11, 1979, as alleged in 

indictment). An amendment to the date of a charged offense is 

impermissible, however, where the evidence reflects two separate events

occurred. See State v. Mikels, 119 Ariz. 561, 563, 582 P.2d 651, 653 (App. 1978) 

(vacating defendant’s conviction based upon amendment to indictment 

changing location of sodomy offense from shower to bunk where evidence 

indicated they were two separate events occurring twelve or thirteen days 

apart).

¶13 Here, the State argues that the discrepancy between the dates 

was a technical defect, arising from the lack of a “clear transition” during 

the presentation to the grand jury between the events of December 18, 2013,

and those of February 4, 2014, and that “it can readily be inferred that Count 

5 was based on what law enforcement officers discovered the day [Moran] 

was arrested.” This argument is not supported by the record. The grand 

jurors were never told the date of Moran’s detention, or that any of the 

described events specifically occurred on February 4, 2014. Instead, the 

State asserted that all of the alleged crimes, including misconduct involving 

weapons, occurred “on the 18th day of December, 2013.” The evidence 

presented to the grand jury also supported a finding of probable cause that 

Moran possessed a weapon on December 18, 2013. Specifically, the grand 

jury heard that, on December 18, 2013, Moran, a prohibited possessor, was 

involved in a home invasion and robbery with two other persons, and was 

one of the assailants who pointed a firearm at the victim’s face.
MORAN v. HON. MILES/MONTGOMERY

Decision of the Court

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¶14 Although the statutory violation asserted in the amended 

indictment at count 5 is the same as that in the original indictment, it 

describes a wholly separate factual event, occurring almost two months 

after the one specified in the original indictment, upon facts never 

specifically provided to or considered by the grand jury in its probable 

cause determination, distinguishing this matter from State v. Bruce. “This 

is not a case where only one crime has been committed and there remains a 

question as to the date on which it occurred or where it occurred. In this 

case there were two separate and distinct acts of [misconduct involving

weapons],” Mikels, 119 Ariz. at 563, 582 P.2d at 653, one occurring on 

December 18, 2013, and a separate event occurring on February 4, 2014. 

Thus, the record reflects “the indictment was not defective at all,” and Rule 

13.5 does not apply. See Freeney, 223 Ariz. at 113, ¶¶ 19-20, 219 P.3d at 1042.

¶15 Rule 13.5(b) does not permit the State to avoid a defendant’s 

constitutional right that an indictment be based upon probable cause by 

amending an accurate indictment to pursue the same charge occurring on 

a different occasion. See State v. Sanders, 205 Ariz. 208, 212, 217, ¶¶ 9-10, 37, 

68 P.3d 434, 438 443 (App. 2003) (reversing mid-trial amendment to 

indictment “to conform to the evidence” that a crime different than that 

originally charged was committed and noting “[a] defendant does not 

suffer a constitutionally diminished entitlement to notice from the state 

simply because a trial is being conducted on one charge and evidence of 

another offense has been admitted.”), overruled in part on other grounds by 

Freeney, 223 Ariz. at 113-114, ¶¶ 21-26, 219 P.3d at 1042-43; State v. Singh, 4 

Ariz. App. 273, 278, 419 P.2d 403, 408 (1966) (disapproving amendment 

changing recipient of forged document on grounds that the substitution of 

a different recipient created a separate and distinct crime), superseded by 

statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Allen, 235 Ariz. 72, 75 n.2, ¶ 8, 326 

P.3d 339, 342 n.2 (App. 2014).

¶16 Nor is there any authority to support the State’s suggestion 

that Moran impliedly consented to the amendment. To the contrary, the 

right of the accused to be advised of the charges against him with an ample 

opportunity to prepare an adequate defense is a fundamental element of 

due process. State v. Branch, 108 Ariz. 351, 354-55, 498 P.2d 218, 221-22 

(1972). On this premise, this Court has, on at least one occasion, held that a 

defendant himself must give actual consent to the amendment of an 

indictment to ensure due process is satisfied. State v. Sanders, 115 Ariz. 289, 

293, 564 P.2d 1256, 1260 (App. 1977) (noting in light of fundamental due 

process concerns “[i]t is therefore not too much to ask that the defendant be 

apprised of what is occurring and that his consent be secured”). 

Additionally, the record does not support an implication of consent where
MORAN v. HON. MILES/MONTGOMERY

Decision of the Court

7

Moran objected to the amendment once the State eventually sought to try 

him on a set of facts different from the original indictment. 

¶17 The State nonetheless argues that Moran was not prejudiced 

by the amendment because he knew or should have known of the State’s 

intent to proceed on the charge of weapons misconduct in relation to the 

February 4, 2014 events, as discovery included reference to the seizure of 

the weapons that followed Moran’s arrest. See Freeney, 223 Ariz. at 115, 

¶ 28, 219 P.3d at 1044 (affirming conviction where violation of Rule 13.5 was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). This Court has previously rejected 

the notion that the State may elect to proceed against a defendant on a 

separate, subsequent act at trial and amend the indictment to conform to its

strategy without notice to that defendant. Mikels, 119 Ariz. at 563, 582 P.2d 

at 653. There is no evidence the State intended the information regarding 

the recovery of the shotgun and other weapons in the vehicle Moran exited 

prior to his detention to be anything more than additional evidence tending 

to tie Moran to the December 18, 2013 incident. See id. (rejecting suggestion 

that defendant consented to amendment based on presentation of evidence 

that may have supported the amended charge, but was clearly admitted for 

separate purpose). And, nothing within the record prior to the proposed 

amendment indicates the State intended to pursue a second count of 

misconduct involving weapons. The mere fact of the disclosure of the

seizure of the shotgun is not sufficient to put Moran on notice that he would 

be tried for a wholly different crime, occurring on a different day than any 

other event with which he was charged.

¶18 We are likewise unconvinced by the State’s contention that 

Moran “foreclosed any argument” that he has been prejudiced by the 

amendment because he stated he did not believe the State could prove the 

crime of misconduct involving weapons occurred as charged, on December 

18, 2013. While such an assertion by a defendant may prompt the State to

reassess its likelihood of success in prosecuting the charge specified in the 

original indictment, it does not provide license to assert, through an 

indictment amended by the trial court, that the grand jury found probable

cause the defendant committed a crime based upon a set of circumstances 

it was never asked to consider. No grand jury has decided Moran should 

stand trial for a weapons offense that allegedly occurred months after the 

home invasion. Moran is most certainly prejudiced where “the variation 

[sought by an amendment] destroyed the defendant’s substantial right to 

be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand 

jury.” Mikels, 119 Ariz. at 563, 582 P.2d at 653 (citing Stirone v. United States, 

361 U.S. 212, 215-19 (1960)).
MORAN v. HON. MILES/MONTGOMERY

Decision of the Court

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¶19 To permit the State to amend an indictment in the manner 

presented here would impermissibly compromise the imprimatur of the 

grand jury. Such a result would be contrary to the essential purpose of the 

grand jury, which is to stand as a neutral intermediary “between the accuser 

and the accused.” Maretick v. Jarrett, 204 Ariz. 194, 197, ¶ 8, 62 P.3d 120, 123 

(2003) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also Mikels, 119 Ariz. at 563, 582 P.2d 653 (describing 

“very purpose” of requiring indictment by a grand jury is “to eliminate [a 

defendant’s] jeopardy to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens 

acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge”) (citing 

Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218); State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 877 (N.J. 2005) 

(“‘[T]he grand jury remains a constitutional bulwark against hasty and illfounded prosecutions and continues to lend legitimacy to our system of 

justice by infusing it with a democratic ethos.’”) (quoting State v. Fortin, 843 

A.2d 974, 1030-31 (N.J. 2004)). Surrender of that neutrality to the State

would open the door to the very dangers of excessive and unreasonable 

official interference with personal liberty our Constitution protects against.

CONCLUSION

¶20 On this record, we are not persuaded that Moran’s basic due 

process rights to a finding of probable cause and notice as to the charges 

against him were satisfied through the wholesale amendment of count five 

of the original indictment to include events occurring on February 4, 2014, 

without the matter having been returned to the grand jury. The

amendment to the indictment was not authorized under Rule 13.5(b), and 

the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion. As a 

result, we accept jurisdiction, vacate the order amending the indictment,

vacate the stay entered pending resolution of this special action, and 

remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this 

decision.