[Cite as State v. Good, 2011-Ohio-5077.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF WAYNE ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

ADAM GOOD 

 Appellant 

C.A. Nos. 10CA0056 

 10CA0057 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT 

COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO 

CASE Nos. CRB-10-08-1172 

 CRB-10-09-1218 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: October 3, 2011 

 

 BELFANCE, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Adam Good appeals his convictions for domestic violence. For the reasons set 

forth below, we affirm. 

I. 

{¶2} On August 4, 2010, Mr. Good and his then girlfriend, Kally Braucher, were 

involved in an altercation in a WalMart parking lot. Three weeks later, Mr. Good and Ms. 

Braucher were involved in another altercation at Mr. Good’s home. In both instances, police 

officers responded to reports of domestic violence. 

{¶3} Mr. Good was charged with and, following separate bench trials, convicted of 

domestic violence in both instances. He has appealed his convictions, raising three assignments 

of error. The cases have been consolidated, and we rearrange his assignments of error for ease of 

discussion. 
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II. 

MANIFEST WEIGHT

{¶4} Mr. Good challenges both of his convictions as being against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. In reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the appellate court 

“must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the 

credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of 

fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340. 

{¶5} In reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

“the appellate court sits as the ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of 

the conflicting testimony.” State v. Thomas, 9th Dist. Nos. 22990, 22991, 2006–Ohio–4241, at 

¶8, citing State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 388. Accordingly, “this Court’s 

‘discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in 

which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thomas at ¶8, quoting State v. 

Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175. 

{¶6} Both of Mr. Good’s convictions were for violating R.C. 2919.25(A) by 

committing domestic violence. R.C. 2919.25(A) provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly 

cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or household member.” “A person acts 

knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a 

certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B). Mr. Good does not 

contest that Ms. Braucher, with whom he has a daughter and with whom he lives, is a family or 

household member under R.C. 2919.25(A). Instead, in both assignments of error, he alleges that 
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the trial court lost its way when it determined that he knowingly harmed or attempted to harm 

her. 

AUGUST 26, 2010, INCIDENT 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

“DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 

WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.” 

{¶7} In his sole assignment of error regarding his conviction stemming from the 

August 26, 2010, incident, Mr. Good alleges that his conviction is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. He argues that Ms. Braucher’s testimony that he struck her should not be believed 

because she did not remember details about the incident and because a third person, Justin 

Brannan, testified to a different set of events. Thus, he argues, the trial court’s determination that 

he knowingly harmed or attempted to harm Ms. Braucher is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶8} Mr. Good and Ms. Braucher started arguing because Mr. Good could not find the 

sugar for his cereal. Ms. Braucher had put it in the laundry room because it was too big for the 

kitchen cabinets. Mr. Good repeatedly degraded Ms. Braucher’s intelligence for putting the 

sugar where she did. 

{¶9} The argument continued as Mr. Good and Ms. Braucher moved into the living 

room where Mr. Brannan was sleeping on the couch. Ms. Braucher testified that, while they 

were in the living room, Mr. Good hit her in the head but that she could not remember whether it 

was with an open or closed fist. According to Ms. Braucher, after Mr. Good hit her, she hit him 

and then took her five-year-old daughter outside to wait for the bus. 

{¶10} Mr. Good followed her outside and continued arguing with her. Ms. Braucher 

went back in the house to get away from Mr. Good and locked the door, but Mr. Good kicked the 
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door open. Ms. Braucher testified that, at some point after Mr. Good kicked in the door, he 

shoved her against a wall. She then took her daughter back outside to wait for the bus and, after 

the bus came, Ms. Braucher called 9-1-1 and began walking down the street. 

{¶11} Mr. Brannan testified that he awoke to the sound of Mr. Good and Ms. Braucher 

fighting in the living room. He testified that he wanted to stay out of the argument, so he 

continued to lie on the couch, facing away from the fight. He said that he heard Ms. Braucher hit 

Mr. Good two times. However, he testified that he never heard Mr. Good kick in the door. 

{¶12} Lieutenant James Henry of the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office was the first 

responder to arrive on the scene. He testified that he found Ms. Braucher walking along the 

road. She told him that Mr. Good had hit her but that she was more concerned that he was 

planning to take the couple’s one-year-old daughter. He drove Ms. Braucher back to the house 

where they found Mr. Brannan but not Mr. Good. Deputy Teresa Saurer arrived on the scene, 

and Lieutenant Henry walked around the house to see if he could find Mr. Good. He discovered 

Mr. Good hiding in the exterior stairwell leading down to the basement of the house. 

{¶13} Ms. Braucher testified that Mr. Good hit her in the head and pushed her against a 

wall. Mr. Good argues that the fact that Ms. Braucher had difficulty remembering the sequence 

of events and specific details indicates that her testimony was not credible. He points to her 

testimony that she did not remember if Mr. Good struck her with a closed fist or open hand, nor 

whether she was seated on the couch or standing next to it when he struck her. He also points to 

the fact that she did not remember precisely when or how Mr. Good pushed her into a wall. 

{¶14} This Court recognizes that Ms. Braucher’s testimony was vague with regards to 

many of the details of the altercation. However, the law enforcement officers’ testimony 

corroborated the basic parts of Ms. Braucher’s account, and, furthermore, whether Mr. Good hit 
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Ms. Braucher with an open hand or a closed fist is less important than whether he hit her. While 

Mr. Brannan testified that he did not hear Mr. Good hit Ms. Braucher, instead testifying that he 

heard her hit Mr. Good, he also testified that he had been sleeping on the couch and that their 

fighting woke him up. It is unclear from his testimony how long Mr. Brannan was awake prior 

to hearing Ms. Braucher strike Mr. Good. Ms. Braucher testified that she had hit Mr. Good, but 

only after he had hit her. Given that it is unclear how long Mr. Brannan had listened to the fight 

prior to Ms. Braucher hitting Mr. Good, his testimony does not definitively contradict Ms. 

Braucher’s testimony that Mr. Good hit her. 

{¶15} Ms. Braucher testified that Mr. Good hit her on the head and pushed her into a 

wall. Lieutenant Henry testified that he observed a knot on Ms. Braucher’s head and injuries on 

her neck, and Deputy Saurer testified that she observed the same injuries as well as injuries on 

the small of Ms. Braucher’s back. Though Mr. Brannan testified that he never heard Mr. Good 

hit Ms. Braucher, he admitted that he was not awake for the entire incident, and, furthermore, his 

testimony did not expressly contradict Ms. Braucher’s. Accordingly, after reviewing the entire 

record, we cannot say that the trial court lost its way to the extent that it determined that Mr. 

Good knowingly harmed or attempted to harm Ms. Braucher. 

{¶16} Mr. Good’s conviction for domestic violence stemming from the August 26, 

2010, incident is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. His assignment of error is 

overruled. 

THE AUGUST 4, 2010, INCIDENT 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

“DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 

WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.” 
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{¶17} In his second assignment of error concerning the August 4, 2010, incident, Mr. 

Good alleges that his conviction for domestic violence was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶18} On August 4, 2010, Mr. Good and Ms. Braucher got into an argument in the 

parking lot of a WalMart. Ms. Braucher testified that Mr. Good hit her at least once and that, 

after he hit her, she hit him back. She also testified that she thought Mr. Good hit her with a 

closed fist. Melissa Meinanger, a customer who was putting her groceries in her car, saw the 

incident from two parking aisles over. John Rinner, a truck driver waiting for a mechanic, also 

saw the fight. Ms. Braucher began to drive out of the parking lot but stopped. Ms. Meinanger 

and Mr. Rinner both testified that they then saw Mr. Good hit Ms. Braucher with a closed fist 

while she tried to defend herself. When Officer Matthew Cruise of the Wooster City Police 

Department arrived at the WalMart, he observed that Ms. Braucher’s right wrist was swollen as 

was one side of her face. 

{¶19} Mr. Good disputed these facts, testifying that he only hit Ms. Braucher after she 

repeatedly hit him. He testified that “she needed to calm down and * * * she [was] hitting [him] 

in the side of [his] head and * * * [he] just kind of pulled her head down and gave her a little 

knuckle on the top of her head[.]” 

{¶20} Mr. Good argues that the trial court lost its way when it determined that Mr. Good 

had harmed Ms. Braucher. Mr. Good points outs that no evidence was presented to indicate that 

Ms. Braucher sought medical attention and that Ms. Braucher did not testify that she suffered 

any injuries. However, Officer Cruise testified that, when he arrived at the WalMart parking lot, 

he observed that the right side of Ms. Braucher’s face was swollen as well as her right wrist and 

that Ms. Braucher complained of pain in both areas. Ms. Meinanger testified that she spoke with 
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Ms. Braucher after Mr. Good drove away and noticed that her face was red. While Mr. Good 

argues that this could have been because Ms. Braucher was crying, the trial court was not 

required to draw that inference. Furthermore, Ms. Meinanger and Mr. Rinner both testified that 

they saw Ms. Braucher attempting to shield her face with her hands while Mr. Good attempted to 

hit her with a closed fist. Officer Cruise’s testimony concerning Ms. Braucher’s slightly swollen 

face and wrist matches possible injuries one would expect based on the testimony of Ms. 

Meinanger and Mr. Rinner. 

{¶21} Additionally, a person violates R.C. 2919.25(A) not only when knowingly 

harming a family or household member but also when knowingly attempting to harm them. Mr. 

Rinner and Ms. Meinanger both testified that they saw Mr. Good attempting to strike Ms. 

Braucher with a closed fist. Hitting someone with a closed fist is an action which is likely to 

cause harm. Accordingly, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Mr. Good was 

knowingly attempting to harm Ms. Braucher. 

{¶22} Mr. Good argues that the trial court should not have believed the testimony of Mr. 

Rinner and Ms. Meinanger over his own because they both admitted to not watching the 

altercation in its entirety and, therefore, they may have missed Ms. Braucher hitting him. To the 

extent that this argument is an attempt to justify his actions as self-defense, however, Mr. Good 

has not developed a self-defense argument, and, thus, that argument is not properly before us. 

See App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7). To the extent that this argument is made to undermine 

the credibility of Mr. Rinner and Ms. Meinanger, the fact that they testified that they did not 

watch every second of the incident does not indicate that their testimony concerning Mr. Good 

punching Ms. Braucher is not worthy of belief. Mr. Rinner, Ms. Meinanger, and Ms. Braucher 
8 

 

all testified that Mr. Good hit Ms. Braucher, which even Mr. Good admitted, and the trial court 

was entitled to believe their testimony. 

{¶23} Thus, though Ms. Braucher did not testify that Mr. Good injured her, we cannot 

say, based on the testimony of Officer Cruise, Ms. Meinanger, and Mr. Rinner, that the trial court 

lost its way when it determined that Mr. Good knowingly harmed or attempted to harm Ms. 

Braucher. Accordingly, his conviction for domestic violence stemming from the August 4, 2010, 

incident is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. His second assignment of error is 

overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

“DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 

OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE 

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE 

OHIO CONSTITUTION” 

{¶24} Mr. Good argues in his first assignment of error that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to move for a judgment of acquittal because this waived his right to 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. 

{¶25} In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant “must show (1) 

deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of 

reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s 

errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different.” State v. Mundt, 115 Ohio St.3d 22, 

2007–Ohio–4836, at ¶62, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U. S. 668, 687–688, 694. 

{¶26} While Mr. Good argues that a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal is necessary to 

preserve the issue of sufficiency for review, this is an incorrect statement of law, see State v. 

Johnson, 9th Dist. No. 23515, 2007-Ohio-4133, at ¶5, citing State v. Thornton, 9th Dist. No. 

23417, 2007-Ohio-3743, and we have previously rejected the argument that a trial counsel’s 
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decision not to pursue the motion is deficient on this basis. See State v. Brooks, 9th Dist. No. 

07CA0111-M, 2008-Ohio-3723, at ¶43. 

“‘In two apparently little-recognized cases [] the Ohio Supreme Court stated that a 

failure to timely file a Crim.R. 29(A) motion during a jury trial does not waive an 

argument on appeal concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. 

Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 346[]; State v. Carter (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 

218, 223[]. In both Jones and Carter, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the 

defendant’s ‘not guilty’ plea preserves his right to object to the alleged 

insufficiency of the evidence. Id. Moreover, because ‘a conviction based on 

legally insufficient evidence constitutes a denial of due process,’ [] Thompkins[], 

78 Ohio St.3d [at] 386-387, [] a conviction based upon insufficient evidence 

would almost always amount to plain error.’ State v. Barringer, 11th Dist. No. 

2004-P-0083, 2006-Ohio-2649, at ¶59; State v. Coe (2003), 153 Ohio App.3d 44, 

48-49, 2003-Ohio-2732, at ¶19.” State v. Brown, 5th Dist. No. 2006-CA-53, 

2007-Ohio-2005, at ¶35. 

Accord Thornton at ¶¶13-14 (accepting and following Brown’s reasoning). Thus, a Crim.R. 29 

motion is not necessary to preserve the issue of sufficiency for appeal. Johnson at ¶5; Thornton

at ¶¶13-14. Accordingly, Mr. Good is incorrect that his trial counsel’s decision not to move for 

acquittal under Crim.R. 29 waived the issue of sufficiency on appeal. 

{¶27} Furthermore, when evaluating a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the relevant 

inquiry is whether the prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient 

evidence to sustain a conviction. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). In 

reviewing the evidence, we do not evaluate credibility and we make all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the State. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273. The State’s evidence is 

sufficient if “any reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

{¶28} As discussed above, Ms. Meinanger and Mr. Rinner testified that they saw Mr. 

Good hit Ms. Braucher with a closed fist. Mr. Good admitted that he struck Ms. Braucher, and 

Officer Cruise testified that he observed swelling on Ms. Braucher’s face and wrist. Making all 
10 

 

reasonable inferences in favor of the State, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find 

that Mr. Good harmed or attempted to harm Ms. Braucher. Accordingly, even if a Crim.R. 29 

motion were necessary to argue sufficiency on appeal, Mr. Good would be unable to demonstrate 

prejudice and, thus, fail to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. See Mundt at ¶62, 

citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694. 

{¶29} His first assignment of error with regards to the August 4, 2010, incident is 

overruled. 

III. 

{¶30} Mr. Good’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgments of the Wayne 

County Municipal Court are affirmed. 

Judgments affirmed. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wayne County 

Municipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A 

certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 
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 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 EVE V. BELFANCE 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, J. 

DICKINSON, J. 

CONCUR

APPEARANCES:

BRIAN L. SUMMERS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DANIEL R. LUTZ, Prosecuting Attorney, and LATECIA E. WILES, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.