UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4794

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TIMOTHY JAMES DONAHUE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:12-cr-00013-MOC-DCK-3)

Submitted: March 23, 2015 Decided: April 8, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David G. Belser, BELSER & PARKE, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, William M.

Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Following a jury trial, Timothy James Donahue was convicted 

on one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012), and one count of Hobbs 

Act robbery, and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1951(a), (2) (2012). The district court sentenced Donahue to 

concurrent 188-month prison terms. Donahue timely appeals.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the 

evidence presented at trial “supports the following narrative.” 

United States v. Reed, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1037601, at *1 

(4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2015). Scott Beaver owned Beaver Honda and 

Salvage, a business that sold cars and used auto parts all over 

the United States and beyond. The Beaver family home and the 

business shared a single address. On one side of the road were

the house and the car lot, separated by a fence. Directly 

across the road were the salvage yard and garage. Beaver’s 

wife, who also worked for the business, sometimes prepared 

paperwork and conducted telephone sales and purchases from 

inside the house.

Instead of putting his money in a bank, Beaver chose to 

keep it in a safe in his laundry room. In the evening after 

work, Beaver would bring the proceeds from the business into the 

house for storage in the safe. He estimated that he had $1.5 

million in the safe. He kept the cash from his business in the 
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safe in part because he felt like it was safer there than stored 

in a bank or invested, and in part for convenience because he 

used it “for transactions.” Although the business had a 

checking account, occasionally Beaver would retrieve cash from 

inside the house to pay people who performed work for him. 

Donahue met Beaver when Donahue was employed by Eric Wilson 

in Wilson’s automobile glass business. Wilson and Donahue 

performed work for Beaver, exchanging glass windshields at 

Beaver’s car lot. Donahue knew that Beaver kept cash from the 

business inside his house. Wilson preferred being paid in cash, 

and often he and Donahue waited in the house or on the front 

porch as Beaver retrieved money to pay them for their windshield 

work. Sometimes, when the two men waited in the living room, 

Beaver headed towards the laundry room, returning with their 

cash. Donahue and Wilson occasionally discussed that Beaver was 

worth several million dollars, and Donahue remarked “quite a few 

times” about how much money Beaver kept in the safe. 

Donahue conspired with others to rob Beaver’s safe. The 

robbery was carried out on July 21, 2011, by two of the coconspirators. The robbers forced Beaver, his wife, their two 

young daughters, Beaver’s adult grandson, and Beaver’s 

preschool-age great grandson, into the Beavers’ home and 

demanded that Beaver show them the safe. After Beaver opened 

the safe, the robbers took the cash; it took several trips to 
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carry it all to their vehicle. They began counting the money 

after they left the scene, but they stopped counting after $1.5 

million. The funds were subsequently divided amongst the 

coconspirators.

Donahue first argues on appeal that the Government failed 

to establish a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to 

support his convictions. A defendant challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence faces “a heavy burden.” United 

States v. McLean, 715 F.3d 129, 137 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The jury verdict must be sustained 

if, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, there 

is substantial evidence in the record to support the 

convictions. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); 

United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93 (4th Cir. 2011). 

“Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of 

fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Jaensch, 665 F.3d at 93 (internal quotation marks and brackets 

omitted). “Reversal for insufficient evidence is reserved for 

the rare case where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United 

States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

To establish a Hobbs Act robbery, the Government must 

prove:
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(1) that the defendant coerced the victim to part with 

property; (2) that the coercion occurred through the 

wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence 

or fear or under color of official right; and (3) that 

the coercion occurred in such a way as to affect 

adversely interstate commerce. 

Reed, ___ F.3d at ___, 2015 WL 1037601, at *8 (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery 

requires the Government to prove that the defendant agreed with 

at least one other person to commit acts that would satisfy the 

above three elements. United States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402, 

1403 (4th Cir. 1990). Donahue argues that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove the interstate commerce element of his 

convictions, because the money seized during the robbery had 

become Beaver’s private funds for which there was no interstate 

nexus. 

The jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act requires the 

Government to prove merely a de minimis effect on interstate 

commerce. United States v. Taylor, 754 F.3d 217, 222 (4th 

Cir.), pet. for cert. docketed, (U.S. Sept. 9, 2014) (No. 14-

6166). The fact that a robbery occurred in a private residence 

does not necessarily defeat the interstate nexus where the 

Government shows that the robbery depleted or attempted to 

deplete the assets of a business that affects interstate 

commerce or by showing that the defendant deliberately targeted 

a business engaged in interstate commerce. Id. at 223-26.
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In United States v. Powell, 693 F.3d 398 (3d Cir. 2012), 

Powell and his accomplices robbed Asian business owners at their 

homes, deliberately targeting these victims based on the 

robbers’ belief that these individuals did not use banks. Id.

at 399. Powell challenged his Hobbs Act convictions, arguing 

that the robbery of a private residence, as opposed to a 

business establishment, was insufficient to establish that the 

robbery affected interstate commerce. Id. at 402. The Third 

Circuit rejected this argument, holding that where a defendant 

targets a home to steal proceeds from a business that engages in 

interstate commerce, “such targeting satisfies the Hobbs Act’s 

jurisdictional nexus.” Id. at 403; accord Taylor, 754 F.3d at 

225 (holding that “evidence of the defendant’s intent is not 

required to prove that his robberies had an impact on interstate 

commerce, . . . [but] . . . is still probative . . . of whether 

his actions would have had the ‘natural consequence[]’ of 

affecting such commerce” (last alteration in original)).

Here, Donahue does not dispute that Beaver Honda and 

Salvage was engaged in interstate commerce. The evidence 

presented at trial showed that Donahue deliberately targeted 

Beaver because he knew that Beaver kept the proceeds from his 

business in a safe in his home. Donahue contends, however, that 

the proceeds were no longer receipts of the business because 

they had become Beaver’s personal savings. He argues that the 
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money used to operate the business came from its checking 

account. However, Donahue overlooks the evidence presented at 

trial that Beaver occasionally paid those who performed work for 

his business with cash retrieved from the safe. We conclude 

that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional 

element of the Hobbs Act.

Donahue also argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by declining his request to instruct the jury that 

interstate commerce may not be involved where the robbery 

depletes the assets of an individual rather than a business. We 

review for abuse of discretion the district court’s refusal to 

give a particular jury instruction. United States v. Shrader, 

675 F.3d 300, 308 (4th Cir. 2012). 

The district court’s refusal to grant a requested jury 

instruction is reversible error only if the proffered 

instruction was “(1) correct; (2) not substantially covered by 

the court’s charge; and (3) dealing with some point in the trial 

so important, that failure to give the requested instruction 

seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct his 

defense.” Id. When jury instructions are challenged on appeal, 

the issue is whether “the instructions, taken as a whole, 

adequately state the controlling law.” United States v. Bolden, 

325 F.3d 471, 486 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 
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that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

declining to give Donahue’s proposed instruction.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED