UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ADRIANN BORUM, et al. , : : Plaintiffs, : Civil Action No.: 16-1723 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 3, 16 : BRENTWOOD VILLAGE, LLC, et al. , : : Defendants. : MEMORANDUM OPINION
D ENYING D EFENDANTS ’ M OTION TO D ISMISS ; D ENYING P LAINTIFFS ’ M OTION FOR A P RELIMINARY I NJUNCTION
I. INTRODUCTION At first glance, this case places the Court in the unenviable p osition of either standing in the way of residential redevelopm ent or jeopardizing the homes of families who depend on the status quo. Defendants are severa l companies planning to redev elop their existing apartment complex into a more modern development with many more one- and two-bedroom units. Plaintiffs are a nonprofit orga nization and two tenants, purporting to represent a class, who contend that Defendants’ elimi nation of many three-, four-, and five-bedroom apartments in the process will disproportionately impact families in violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act and a comparable District of Colum bia statute. Plaintiffs seek pre liminary injunctive relief on the grounds that they face imminent irr eparable harm if Defendants proceed with their redevelopment plan. Defendants counter that any of the alleged injuries would not occur until years down the road. They also m ove to dismiss on several proc edural grounds, and because Plaintiffs “cherry-pick” a narrow demographic—“large families”— from the entirety of the class protected under the FHA—families—and focus only on the destruct ion of certain apartments and2 not the construction of many more . Because Defendants’ procedural arguments are flawed and Plaintiffs do not cherry-pick data , the Court will deny the Mot ion to Dismiss. Because Plaintiffs do not adequately show that the threatened injuries are imminen t, the Court will deny the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Complaint 1 Defendants Brentwood Associates, L.P., 2 Mid-City Financial Corporation, and Edgewood Management Corporatio n are owners of an affordable hou sing development located in Northeast D.C. See Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 2. They are in the process of redeveloping their deteriorating 75-year-old build ings, in part by increasing the total number of units but decreasing the number of larger-sized apartments. See District of Columbia Z oning Commission, Order No. 14-18, Case No. 14-18 at 33 (Mid-C ity Fin. Corp.) (Sept. 10, 20 15), available at ECF No. 4-18 [hereinafter Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18]; 3 Compl. ¶¶ 4–5. Their r edevelopment plan

1 Because the Court considers di fferent information when analyzi ng a motion to dismiss than it does with a motion for a preliminary injunction, the re levant facts are divided into two sections. 2 Per stipulation, Plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed the cas e against Defendant Brentwood Village, LLC, because Brentwood Village does not have an ownership interest in the property subject to the suit. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, ECF No. 12. 3 With respect to Defendants’ Mo tion to Dismiss, the Court takes judicial notice of the facts in the District of Col umbia Zoning Commission proceeding involving Defendants and their proposed redevelopment only to “avoid unnecessary proceedings when an undisputed fact on the public record makes it clear that the plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp. , 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The Court takes into account only uncontested facts, and does not “review[] the entire record,” which would require conversion of the Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Marshall Cty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala , 988 F.2d 1221, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Mikv a, C.J., dissenting). Plaintiffs never dispute Defendants’ invocation of the Z oning Commission’s order as a ba sis for its factual claims. See generally Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mo t. to Dismiss, ECF No. 21 (Plain tiffs even specifically3 calls for the elimination of 113 f our-bedroom and 21 five-bedro om apartment units. See Compl. ¶¶ 32, 46. In light of social, ec onomic, and practical conside rations, the D.C. Zoning Commission agreed with Defendants that, like in other developme nts nationwide, it would not be economical to build four- and five-bedroom units. See Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18, at 52, 56. The plan also calls for the decrease of three-bedroom apartments from 75 to 64 units. Compl. ¶ 47. In all, the redevelopm ent would decrease the numb er of three-, four-, and fivebedroom apartments from 209 to 64. Id. ¶ 5. It would also displace at least 119 households—the majority of which are families— currently residing at Brookland Manor. Id. ¶¶ 50–53, 75. Even the remaining three-bedroom apartments might not be affordable, “further reducing the available housing for larger families.” Id. ¶ 52. Defendant Mid-City’s V ice President Michael Meers testified before the D.C. Zoning C ommission that “all residents in good standing shall have the opportunity to return to the redeveloped property . . . [a]nd w hen relocations do occur[,] ownership will pay for all pa cking and moving expenses.” Id. ¶ 54. Plaintiffs allege that the redev elopment plan would have a disp arate impact on families. See id. ¶¶ 69–79. Among the 486 occupie d units at Brookland Manor, 25 3 (52%) are occupied by “families” that Plaintiffs claim are within the relevant statutory definitions, which the Complaint defines as “those w ho have one or more minor childrenliving in the household.” See id. ¶ 72. Of the 303 one- and two- bedroom apartments, only 104 ( 34%) are occupied by families, as defined by Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 74. Of the 183 three-, four-, and five-bedroom units, 149 (81%) are occupied by families. Id. Taken together, 149 families—comprising 59% of families overall—are at risk of displacement because of the development, compared to only 34 non-

state that they “are not challe nging the Zoning Comission’s app roval of Mid-City’s stage-one PUD application”).4 families—15% overall. Id. ¶ 77. The new development would contain about 1,760 units, including 1,646 apartments. Id. ¶¶ 48. There are currentl y around 535 apartment units at Brookland. See Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18, at 7. Individual Plaintiffs—Ms. Adriann Borum and Ms. Loretta Holloma n—allege that redevelopment would force them out of their homes and subject t hem to multiple forms of injury.
See Compl. ¶¶ 80–107. Ms. Borum lives in a four-bedroom apartment unit wi th her five children, who range in age from 7 to 21. Id. ¶¶ 94–95. She and her children depend on the local community for academic, religi ous, and recreational support. Id. ¶¶ 97–101. If the family is involuntarily displaced, “Ms. Bor um will have an extremely diff icult time finding an adequately[-]sized apartment in D .C. for her family because of the scarcity of affordable housing of her unit type.” Id. ¶ 105. Ms. Holloman lives with her mother, brother, and three school-aged children in a four-bedroom B rookland Manor apartment. Id. ¶¶ 80–81. Her brother and one of her children are both autistic and attend a special-needs progr ams—one for children and one for adults—in the community. Id. ¶ 82–83. She too will have a diffi cult time finding a replacem ent apartment for her family, may have to move outside of D.C., and will lose the irreplaceable community on which she and her family depend. See id. ¶¶ 82–91. Individual Plaintiffs bring this case on behalf of themselves and “all others similarly situated” including “[a]ll house holds who reside or have reside d at Brookland Manor in a three-, four-, or five-bedroom unit with on e or more minor child,” and who have either been displaced or are at risk of being displaced by Defendants’ proposed redev elopment project. See id. ¶ 122. Plaintiffs allege that at leas t 149 families are in the Propose d Class, and that the redevelopment will have “the same impact on all class members.” Id. ¶¶ 125–27. According to Plaintiffs, all members of the Proposed Class ar e interested in the case becaus e the redevelopment project5 significantly decrease s the amount of avail able housing suitabl e for families, would have a disparate impact on families, a nd may have been motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See id. ¶ 127. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue , a single injunction would a fford the primary relief that members of the Proposed Class seek. Id. ¶ 137. The final Plaintiff, community organization ONE DC, is “compris ed of members who include tenants of affordable hous ing properties that are seeki ng to avoid displacement, preserve affordable housing, ensure fair housing, and further equitable development in D.C.” Id. ¶ 108. ONE DC seeks this injunction “ on its own behalf and as a repres entatives of its members, including members who are reside nts of Brookland Manor and have minor children.” Id. ¶ 109. It further asserts that Defendant s’ conduct has directly “damag ed ONE DC by frustrating its mission of creating and preservi ng racial and economic equity i n D.C. for all and by causing ONE DC to divert scarce organiza tional resources,” particularlygiven that the organization has only two fulltime staff members. See id. ¶¶ 111–12. As a result of Def endants’ actions, ONE DC diverted its resources from its mission to “crisis organizin g” through “identifying, investigating, and combating Defen dants’ discriminatory policie s and practices, and to counseling, organizing, and rea ssuring tenants who have been fo rcibly moved or have feared imminent displacement under Defendants’ proposed redevelopment plan.” Id. ¶ 113, 118. For example, after hearing about the p roposed redevelopment, ONE DC organized a series of “Outreach Days.” Id. ¶¶ 114–16. In all, ONE DC alle ges that, as of July 28, 2016, i t had spent 640 staff-hours on “combat[ing] Defe ndants’ discriminatory cond uct.” Id. ¶ 121. To implement their redevelopment, Defendants have petitioned th e D.C. Zoning Commission through the “ planned unit development (PUD) process. ” See id. ¶ 43; D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11-X, § 300. In October , 2014, Defendants submitted an application for a First-Stage6 PUD and Related Zoning Map Amend ment (“First-Stage PUD”) with t he D.C. Zoning Commission. Compl. ¶ 44; see generally D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11-X, § 302. The Zoning Commission approved the First-Sta ge PUD application in June, 20 15, and its order became final on November 6, 2015. Compl. ¶ 56. Now , Defendants have filed a Second-Stage PUD application, the appr oval of which would all ow Defendants to be gin redevelopment and destruction of Plaintiffs’ apartments. See Pl. Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot . for Prelim. Inj., at 17–18, ECF No. 20; Compl. ¶ 57. During the course of the redevelopm ent process, Defendants made comments that Plaintiffs allege are discriminatory. See Compl. ¶ 59. In a December 2014 letter to the Brookland Manor Residents Associ ation, DefendantMid-City state d that four- and five-bedroom apartments are “not an ideal housing type for larger families and there are adverse impacts on the remainder of the community.” Id. ¶ 61. The following month, Mid-C ity said that there would not be four- or five-bedroom units because they are “not consis tent with the creation of a vibrant new community.” Id. ¶ 62. Then, in an April 2015 heari ng in front of the Zoning Co mmission, Defendant Mid-City, representing B rentwood Village, said that “ [c]ommunities and organizations throughout the count ry are in agreement that hous ing very large families in apartment complexes is signi ficantly impactful upon the qualityof life of households as well as their surrounding neighbors. T herefore, [Defendants do] not pr opose to construct four or five bedroom units in the project.” Id. ¶ 60. Plaintiffs now allege that Defendants violated the Federal Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) by undertaking the redevelopment pr oject that will disproportionat ely reduce the amount of apartments available for families, which they allege constitute s discrimination on the basis of familial status. See id. ¶¶ 140–50. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants violated the District7 of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) on similar grounds. See id. ¶¶ 151–62. Plaintiffs make separate claims under both statutes alleging discriminator y statements, because of Defendants’ statements sugges ting that housing for large famili es is incompatible with the community they seek to create. See id. ¶¶ 163–78. Defendants do not aim the Motion to Dismiss at Plaintiffs’ claims about these alleged statements. Plaintiffs’ Complaint seeks certification of a class, a judgmen t declaring that the proposed plan’s decrease of the number of units available for c ertain families violates the FHA and DCHRA, “any and all injunctive relief that the Court may de em appropriate,” compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. See Prayer for Relief, Compl. at 35–36. B. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction In addition to the above allega tions, Plaintiffs and Defendant s each put forward evidence for consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injun ction. 1. Plaintiffs’ Evidence Plaintiffs put forth evidence th at they argue shows that Plaint iffs face threats of injury if the redevelopment project proceeds. They submit a statement fr om Defendants to the Zoning Commission confirming the numerical allegations in the Complaint. See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 12, ECF No. 4-13. To digest the red evelopment plan in numerical terms, they also submit the declaration of a social-statistician, Dr. Andrew Beveridge. See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim . Inj. Ex. 1 (“Beveridge Decl.” ), ¶ 9, ECF No. 4-2. Based on his analysis of the redevelopmen t plans, he states that “famili es would be more than four times as likely as non-families to be adversely affected by the planned redevelopment because 58.9[%] of the families at Brookland Manor live in three-, four-, or five- bedroom units . . . [and] [i]n contrast, only 14.6[%] of non-families live in such . . . units .” See id. ¶ 9. Dr. Beveridge further8 asserts that families will f ace difficulty finding new housing, or, for the few families that might be able to remain at Brookland, overcrowding. See id. ¶¶ 10–11. Individual Plaintiffs assert specific injuries that they will s uffer if Defendants carry out the redevelopment. Ms. Holloman claims in a declaration that s he and her family will “suffer displacement,” and leave her along with her “aging mother, brother with special needs, and three minor children with nowhere to go.” See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 5 (“Holloman Decl.”), ¶ 9(a), ECF No. 4-6. She predicates this a ssertion on her “strong[] belie[f] that [she] will be unable to find housing that will accommodate [her] family’s size and special needs” within the community and at an affordable price. See id. ¶ 9(a)(i). She specifically worries that her mother will be unable to continue her “essenti al” career trai ning classes, her brother will lose his “essential” special-needs program, her autistic son will lose his “crucial” special needs classes, her other children will lose their local schooling, and the whole family will lose its community connections. See id. ¶¶ 9(a)(i)–(vi). Ultimately, s he is “concerned that [her] family could be forcibly broke n up,” leaving her separated fromher children. See id. ¶ 9(b). In addition to the toll moving woul d take on her family, she claim s she will suffer her own emotional distress. See id. ¶ 9(e). Ms. Borum similarly assert s that without a four-bedroo m unit she and her family cannot reside at Brookland, putting her fami ly at risk of displacement or fragmentation. See Pl.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for P relim. Inj. Ex. 4, ¶ 9(a), ECF No. 4-5. She claims that she personally is “aw are of” other families who hav e “been asked to leave the property” or been “broken up.” See id. ¶ 8. Like Ms. Holloman, Ms. Borum believes the redevelopment would make it impos sible for her and her family t o remain in the community. See id. ¶ 9(a).9 To bolster their claims that Def endants’ redevelopment will dis place or break apart families, Plaintiffs submit second-hand declarations of people who claim they know of other families who have been forced to relocate. See id. ¶ 8; Pls.’ Mem. in Su pp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 9 (“McFadden Decl.”), ¶ 6, ECF No. 4-10 (declaration o f tenant Reginald McFadden, wherein he asserts that he is “aware of other families who have already had to transfer to another unit . . . , had their families broken up into smaller units, o r been asked to leave”); Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj . Ex. 10 (“Scott Decl.”), ¶ 6, ECF No. 4-11 (declaration of tenant Valarie Scott asserting the s ame); Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 8 (“Jenkins Decl.”), ¶ 6, ECF No. 4-9 (decl aration of tenant Javon Jenkins asserting the same). Although Plaintiffs acknowledge that Defendants will allow families the right to return to Brookland, see Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 15, at 3, ECF No. 4-16, they argue that families cannot do so without larger apartm ents, which are scarce in the District of Columbia, see Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Preli m. Inj. Ex. 2 (“Merrifield Decl. ”), ¶ 27, ECF No. 4-3. Plaintiffs assert that families who rely on Section 8 vouchers to subsidiz e their rent payments will be particularly affected by redevelopment, because units available to lower-earning households are even scarcer than they are for the general population. See Merrifield Decl., ¶¶ 18, 32–34. Plaintiffs also produce evidence that they argue shows that the threatened injuries against Plaintiffs are imminent , if not occurring already. See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 26, ECF No. 4. As noted ab ove, several tenants argue that they know of families who have been forcibly moved or separ ated by Defendants. More broa dly, Plaintiffs argue that “Defendants will soon receive f inal approval of their proposed redevelopment.” See id. at 13. The D.C. Zoning Commission gave first-stage PUD approval to Def endants’ redevelopment plan, and Defendants submitted an application for second-stage PUD approval weeks before it10 was due. See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 17, ECF No. 4- 18 (D.C. Zoning Commission approval); Pls.’ Repl y Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Pre lim. Inj. Ex. 2, ECF No. 20-2 (Defendants’ stage-two app lication, dated September 20, 2016); Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 9, ECF No. 16-1 (noting that Defendants were requir ed to submit a stage-two application by November 6, 2016). Pl aintiffs argue that Defend ants’ early submission of the stage-two application shows just how quickly they intend to imp lement the redevelopment. See Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of M ot. for Prelim. Inj., at 12. With Defendants’ submission of another application for stage-two approval, the Zoning Commissi on can immediately consider the proposal, and if the Commissi on gives approval, Defendants may begin redeveloping immediately thereafter. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11-Z, § 702. At that point, Plaintiffs ar gue, there will be no way to stop Defe ndants from inflicting irrepar able injuries upon Plaintiffs. See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 14. Plaintiff s further argue that a recent filing with the Zoning Commission shows th at the first phase of redeve lopment will affect a building that is made up almost entirely of three- and four-bedroom unit s. See Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 3, at 1, ECF No. 20-3. To show that Defendants do not want “large families to reside o n their property,” see Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 15, Plaintiffs put forth statements made by Defendants in connection with the redevelopment project. See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 12, at 6; Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prel im. Inj. Ex. 18, at 8, ECF No. 4-19. In a submission to the Zoning Com mission, Defendants stated tha t “housing very large families in apartment communities is sig nificantly impactful upon the qu ality of life of households as well as their surrounding neighbors.” See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 12, at 6. Then, in response to a question fro m tenants, Defendants stated that they would “not build any11 new [four-bedroom] or [five-bedroom] apartment flats as our pra ctical experience has demonstrated that it is not an i deal housing type for larger fa milies and there are adverse impacts on the remainder of the community.” See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 18, at 8. 2. Defendants’ Evidence Defendants produce evidence tell ing a different story. Accordi ng to Michael S. Meers, Executive Vice President of Defe ndant Mid-City Financial Corpor ation, the redevelopment is an innocuous response to two principal concerns. See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 1 (“Meers Aff.”), ¶ 1, ECF No. 18- 1. First, “[t]he existing bu ildings are now 75 years old and are functionally obsolete with all of the major systems requiri ng replacement,” with the property last having been re novated over 40 years ago. Id. ¶ 6. The District of Columbia Office of Planning concurred with Defendant s that “the buildings and the infrastructure [of Brookland] are not optimally functional.” See Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18, at 64. Second, “the urban design of the original commun ity and buildings . . . has result ed in the property not being as safe” as it could be because of crime. Meers Aff. ¶ 7. Mr. Meers attribut es the “ongoing crime problems” to the street configur ation’s lack of conduciveness t o “efficient pedestrian and vehicular access through the subject property,” resulting in a kind of isolation from the surrounding community. See id. In addition, Defendants plan t o provide many more homes for all—regardless of familial status—by expanding the existing 535 apartment units to 1,760 total units, including 1,646 apartments. See id. ¶ 8, 10. The Zoning Commission agreed with Defendants that including lar ger units would be impractical. See Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18, at 52, 56. As for the families who claim to require la rger units, Defendants indirectly invoke a study purportedly showing that several Brookland tenan ts currently resid e in apartments12 that are too big for their respe ctive occupants, based on “the HUD guidelines of two persons per bedroom,” so that only “13 exiti ng households would require four bedrooms and no household would require five bedrooms.” See Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18, at 38. The Zoning Commission favorably cited the D .C. Office of Planning as havin g considered this information prior to stage-one PUD approval, see id. at 35–38, but neither the HUD guidelines nor the study are themselves in the record. T he Office of Planning also foun d that Defendant planned to maintain “[t]he building with the larger units . . . until the later phases at which time they can be ‘right sized’ to accommodate larger families.” See id. at 38. Defendants emphasize that any displacement of tenants would not occur until years down the road, during later phases of the redevelopment project. See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 6, ECF No. 18. Defendants plan to implement t he redevelopment project in three phases. See id . During “Phase One” in late 2017, three of the current 19 bui ldings that constitute Brookland Manor wil l be replaced by 28 for-sale unit s and 200 senior-citizen units.
See Meers Aff. ¶ 17. These buildin gs are called “Block 7.” See Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18, at 50. All residents in those three buildings will be “ relocated at ownership expense to an appropriate apartment home on the property.” Id. Some tenants have been moved, but “[n]o tenant in [the three affected bui ldings] has been forced to mov e outside the development as a result of any failure to accommoda te that tenant elsewhere in t he development.” See Meers Aff. ¶ 17. Because Defendants would ne ed the units created by Phase One to relocate tenants, Phase Two and Phase Three will not begin until 2019. See Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18, at 50. Individual Plaintiffs woul d not need to vacate during Phas e One. Defendants do not anticipate forcing Ms. Borum to relocate until “at least 2020” or forcing Ms. Holloman to relocate “until 2023.” Meers Aff. ¶¶ 18–19 (also declaring that any communication concerning13 relocation “will not happen until the year 2020 at the earliest for Plaintiff Borum, and the year 2023 at the earliest for Plainti ff Holloman”). The record does not show that any of the affiants that Plaintiffs cite in their motion, see Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 10, will be required to move away from Brookl and as a result of the redevel opment until after Phase One. See generally Meers Aff.; Defs.’ Opp’n to P ls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 2 (“Sanquist Aff.”), ¶ 6, ECF No. 18-2. If a preliminary injunction wer e to be granted, Defendants argu e, they would be severely harmed. “Based on the Zoning Commission’s approval, Mid-City h as subsequently expended significant capital on architecture, landscaping, engineering, legal services[,] and financing opportunities in anticipat ion of . . . construction phasing out lined in the approved PUD.” Meers Aff. ¶ 23. Not only will this mean that Defendants “would suff er enormous financial harm,” but it might mean that they would be unable to build the additional units and “be forced to reevaluate the commitment to vol untarily retain the Section 8 con tract that assists 373 very-low income families in the D istrict of Columbia.” Id. ¶ 24. In fact, “[i]n the case of delay, Mid-City could be forced to leave the ag ing property ‘as is’ and convertthe existing units to true unrestricted market rate units.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS Plaintiffs move for a prelimin ary injunction. In the Motion fo r a Preliminary Injunction, Plaintiffs move for the Court t o enjoin Defendants from submitt ing a second-stage PUD application. See Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., E CF No. 3. In the Complaint, Plai ntiffs request “any and all injunctive relief that the Court may deem appropriate, including entering a preliminary . . . injunction ordering Defendants to . . . cease violating” Plai ntiffs’ rights under the Federal Fair Housing Act and District of C olumbia Human Rights Act. See Prayer for Relief, Compl. at 35–14 36. After Plaintiffs filed their C omplaint and Motion for a Pr eliminary Injunction, Defendants submitted a second-stage PUD application, see Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 2, making the specific re quest in Plaintiffs’ Motion f or a Preliminary Injunction moot. Nonetheless, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ request for an app ropriate preliminary injunction to remedy their injuries. 4 Using a theory of disparate impact , Plaintiffs argue that the r edevelopment plan “will effectively eliminate housing for the majority of large familie s at the Brookland Manor property,” and that without a pr eliminary injunction, “it is al most certain that the nearly 150 families now resident at Brookland Manor will lose their housin g during the pendency of this litigation.” See Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 1. Defendants oppose a prelimi nary injunction, arguing that the alleged injurie s are not imminent, Plaintiffs are unlikely to be successful on the merits, and that preliminarily e njoining the redevelopment woul d significantly harm Defendants and the public. 5 See generally Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ M ot. for Prelim. Inj. Defendants move to dismiss on a number of grounds. They advanc e four procedural arguments: first, that Plainti ffs did not exhaust their adminis trative remedies through the zoning

4 In their Reply Memorandum, Pla intiffs assert that they “now mo dify the requested form of relief and seek to enjoin Def endants from taking any action towards residents meant to effectuate their challenged red evelopment plan, including reloc ating tenants on or off the property, evicting, moving, or otherw ise bringing about the ces sation of tenancy in preparation for . . . redevelopment.” Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. fo r Prelim. Inj., at 18, ECF No. 20. Plaintiffs did not move to amend the ir request for a preliminary injunction. However, because these are possible “appropriate” forms of a preliminary injunct ion meant to preserve Plaintiffs’ rights, the Court will conside r them with respect to any prelim inary injunction it might issue. 5 Defendants previously argued that Plaintiffs’ proposed injunct ion preventing the filing of a second-stage PUD application would have violated the Unite d States Constitution because it would block access to the Zoning Commission and constitute a pr ior restraint. See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj ., at 11–13. As Plaintiffs acknow ledge, because Defendants already submitted their application, the Court is unable to impose suchan injunction, making the argument moot. See Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 17–18.15 process, so principles of “‘ res judicata ’ and/or collatera l estoppel” preclude relief; second, that the Court does not have j urisdiction under the Rooker

–Feldman doctrine, because review would constitute an appeal of a state-a dministrative proceeding; thir d, that the Court should dismiss on Younger abstention grounds, because the cas e involves important D.C. ma tters; and fourth, that ONE DC lacks standing. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot . to Dismiss, at 9–10. In the substantive realm, Defendant s move to dismiss on the grounds th at Plaintiffs impermissibly cherry-pick the scope of both the protected class and alleged d iscriminatory action. The Court will first address Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the n move to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ arguments concerning exhaustion, Younger abstention, and Plaintiffs’ data interpretation are non-jurisdicti onal in nature and ask the Cou rt to determine whether Plaintiffs’ complaint states a cognizable claim. See William Penn Apartments v. D.C. Court of Appeals , 39 F. Supp. 3d 11, 19 (D.D.C. 2014) (analyzing Younger abstention in the context of a 12(b)(6) motion instead of a 12(b)(1) motion); Johnson v. District of Columbia , 368 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d , 552 F.3d 806 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting that “in cases where st ate courts properly treat a state administrative exhaustion requirement as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction . . . similar jurisdictional status for that state -law exhaustion requirement in federal courts will not be theoretical ly justified”). To survive such a motion a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, would state a plausible claim to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare r ecitals of the elemen ts of a cause of action, supported by mere conclu sory statements, do not suffice .” Id. Instead, plaintiffs must “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plaus ible.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v.16 Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “In evaluat ing a Rule 12(b)(6) mot ion to dismiss, a court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents atta ched as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint , or documents upon which the plai ntiff’s complaint necessarily relies even if the document is produced not by the parties.” Busby v. Capital One, N.A. , 932 F. Supp. 2d 114, 133–34 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal citations and quot ations omitted). In contrast, Defendants’ Rooker

–Feldman and standing arguments concern whether the Court has subject-matter juri sdiction over th e case at all. See Bradley v. DeWine , 55 F. Supp. 3d 31, 41 (D.D.C. 2014) (Rooker–Feldman doctrine); Cheeks v. Fort Myer Const. Co. , 722 F. Supp. 2d 93, 108 (D.D.C. 2010) (standing). F ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdicti on.” Rasul v. Bush , 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA , 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and e nd, with an examination of our jur isdiction.”). Thus, it is the plaintiff’s burden to e stablish that the Court has subject-matt er jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). When consid ering whether it has ju risdiction, a court must accept “the allegations of the complaint as true.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham , 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). The Court will analyze Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss using thes e standards, beginning first with Defendants’ procedur al arguments before moving to th eir argument that Plaintiffs do not state a cognizable claim.17 1. Exhaustion Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs knew about the Zoning Commission proceedings but did not choose to challenge the proposed redevelopment, both their FHA and DCHRA claims are barred by the doctrines of exhaustion and preclusion. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 18–19. The Court will address Defendants’ argument starting with an analysis of the FHA before moving to the DCHRA. Fair Housing Act Although Defendants do not bifur cate their analysis of exhausti on, the Court will begin with federal law. In support of their exhaustion argument, Def endants invoke Auger v. D.C. Board of Appeals & Review , a District of Columbia Court of Appeals case, where the plaintiff sought review “of his administra tive appeal from the District o f Columbia’s imminent enforcement of an order revoking his permit for a neon sign ato p his hotel” and a preliminary injunction prohibiting authori ties from removing the sign. See 477 A.2d 196, 199 (D.C. 1984).
In Auger , the plaintiff did not administratively appeal his case, despi te notice and an opportunity to do so. See id. at 206. As a result of the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust, the District of Columbia courts did not have juri sdiction over the action. See id. at 207. Defendants further note that parties alleging injury from a Zoning Commission order can appe al their case to the D.C. Court of Appeals. See D.C. Library Renaissance Project/W. End Library Advisory Grp. v. D.C. Zoning
Comm’n , 73 A.3d 107, 119 (D.C. 2013); see also York Apartments Tenants Ass’n v. D.C. Zoning
Comm’n , 856 A.2d 1079, 1081 (D.C. 2004). Under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A), “[a]n aggrieved person may com mence a civil action in a[] . . . court . . . to obtain app ropriate relief with resp ect to . . . [a] discriminatory housing practice or breach.” Thus, a plaintiff filing under § 3613 “ma y proceed directly into federal18 court, deferring neither to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development nor to state administrative and judicial processes.” Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood , 441 U.S. 91, 125 (1979). Congress “carefully chos e[] language” allowing immedia te judicial recourse to individuals “direc tly victimized by a discriminatory housing pr actice.” Id. at 125–26. The fact that Plaintiffs had District of C olumbia administrative remedie s available is irrelevant. As Plaintiffs argue, to require ind ividuals seeking relief from animminent violation of their federal rights to proceed through state-level administrative or judicia l avenues would defeat the purpose—as evinced from the “caref ully chosen language” of the statute—of the remedy that Congress provided. See id. at 125. The FHA “would be serio usly undercut if Section 812 actions were conditioned upon prior exhaustion of state adminis trative remedies.” Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, N.Y. , 689 F.2d 391, 393 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982) (analyzing state-level administr ative zoning remedies). Defend ants cite cases analyzing the processes governing appeals of unf avorable District of Columbiazoning restrictions generally— but not in the context of the vi olation of federal rights. See Auger , 477 A.2d at 200 (appeal of the denial of a permit to place a neon sign atop the plaintiff’ s hotel); Capitol Hill Restoration Soc. v. Zoning Comm’n , 287 A.2d 101, 102 (D.C. 1972) (appeal of a zoning application to build an office building); C. Library Renaissance Project/W. End Library Advisory Grp. , 73 A.3d at 111 (appealing “certain zoning requirements”); York Apartments Tenants Ass’n , 856 A.2d at 1081 (appealing an application t o modify a PUD on procedural gr ounds). Because Plaintiffs seek relief from alleged discri mination, Defendants’ cases are inapposite and Plaintiffs’ FHA claims are not barred for failure to exhaust. Throughout their argument on exhaustion, Defendants invoke conc epts of claim preclusion and issue preclusion, so the Court will address themseparately. Defendants argue19 that “Plaintiffs’ [indirect] challenge . . . to the Zoning Orde r is barred by jurisprudence on the preclusive effect of state admin istrative agency orders on late r-filed [f]ederal claims involving matters decided in agency adjudicative proceedings.” See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 24. Defendants cite to Univ. of Tennessee v. Elliott , a case in which the Supreme Court reasoned that it saw “ no reason to suppose that Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, wished t o foreclose the adaptation of tr aditional principles of preclusion to such subsequent developments as the burgeoning use of administr ative adjudication in the 20th century.” See 478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986). Even putting aside the technical req uirements of claim and issue preclusion, Elliott is not controlling here. Unlike in that case, where there was “no reason to suppose that Congress” i ntended to foreclose preclusi on, as noted above, Congress “carefully chose[]” to allow plai ntiffs to “proceed directly in to federal court” to vindicate their federal rights. Gladstone Realtors , 441 U.S. at 125–26. This shows that “Congress did not intend for administrative dete rminations . . . whether issued b y [federal] or certified state agencies, to preclude aggrieve d parties from seeking vindicatio n of their rights through civil actions.” United States v. E. River Hous. Corp. , 90 F. Supp. 3d 118, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Thus, “it would make little sense to give res judicata effect t o a proceeding,” Miller v. Poretsky , 409 F. Supp. 837, 838 (D.D.C. 1976), whether federal or state, under the FHA. See id. ; E. River Hous. Corp. , 90 F. Supp. 3d at 146. Accordingly , the Zoning Commission’s findings do not have preclusive effect over Plaintiffs’ FHA claims. But even if Congress did intend f or state-level administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect, the Court could not give such an effect here . Both claim and issue preclusion require a ruling by “a court of competent jurisdiction.” See Smalls v. United States , 471 F.3d 186, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (claim preclusion); Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States , 961 F.2d20 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (issue precl usion). The D.C. Zoning Commission has power to “regulate the locati on, height, bulk, number of stories and siz e of buildings . . ., the percentage of lot which may be occupied, the sizes of yards . . . and other o pen spaces, the density of population, and the uses of buildi ngs, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public activities, or other purposes.” 6 D.C. Code § 6-641.01. Although the Commission does have the power to ensure that zoning regulation s are consistent with the District of Columbia’s “comprehensive plan,” see Tenley & Cleveland Park Emergency Comm. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment , 550 A.2d 331, 332 (D.C. 1988), which, according to Defendants, is “a broad framewor k intended to guide the future land use planning decisions for the District of Columbia,” see Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, at 15, ECF No. 24, the Zoning Commission has no power to implement the plan. Tenley & Cleveland Park Emergency Comm. , 550 A.2d at 341 n.22. Because DC’s “broad framework” is not comparable to the Federal FHA and Defe ndants do not identify any power to independently review private FHA violations, 7 there is no indication that the District of Columbia Zoning Co mmission could be considered a “competent” “co urt” for purposes of reviewing F HA claims.

6 Defendants contend that this is not the proper provision provi ding the Zoning Commission with its powers. See Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n t o Mot. to Dismiss, at 15, ECF No. 24. They cite part (a) of D .C. Code § 6-621.01 for the pro position that the Zoning Commission has general power “[t]o protect the public health, s ecure the public safety, and to protect property.” See id. However, after this clause follo ws: “there is cr eated a Zoning Commission.” See D.C. Code § 6-621.01(a). Then, part ( e), which grants the Comm ission its power, provides that “[t]he Zoni ng Commission shall exercise al l the powers . . . with respect to zoning . . . as provided by law .” See D.C. Code § 6-621.01(e) (emphasis added). So, although part (a) outlines broad purposes for creating a Zoning Commissi on, it does not by itself grant power. 7 In their reply memorandum, Defen dants assert that a footnote o f a D.C. District Court “not[ed] that the Zoning Commi ssion may find that regulations g overning community-based residential facilities are violative of the FHA.” See Defs.’ Reply to Pls.’ Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, at 15. In fact, this is no t the case, at least using any meaningful definition of the word “find.” That footnote quoted the Zoning Commission as simply s tating that a regulation “could21 D.C. Human Rights Act Defendants also seek dismissal of the DCHRA count on exhaustiongrounds. Similar to the FHA, the DCHRA provides that “[a]ny person claiming to be a ggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any cou rt of competent jurisdiction for damages and such other remedies as may be appropriate, unless s uch person has filed a[n administrative] complaint.” D.C. Code § 2-1403.16(a); see also Williams v. District of Columbia , 467 A.2d 140, 141 (D.C. 1983) (noting that the DCHRA provides “direct resort to the courts,” but holding that government employees must exhaust adm inistrative remedies in some cases). The plain language of th e DCHRA commands the same find ing as the language of the FHA. Because the Court is one of “competent jurisdiction” and Plaintiffs claim to be “aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice” under the DCHRA, Plaint iffs did not need to exhaust any District of Columbia administrative remedies. Given the ar guably stronger language in the D.C. statute (“[a]ny person . . . shall have a cause of action” ), this reasoning applies equally to issues of preclusion here. Moreover, there is no indication th at the District of Columbia Zoning Commission is a competent “court” to review such a claim. The Court will not give preclusive effects to any findings by the Zoning Commission. 2. The Rooker

–Feldman Doctrine The Court next considers Defendants’ argument that the Court la cks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider this matter under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Defendants argue that review of this case would functionally constitute an appeal of a state-level judgment. “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining

be subject to challenge under th e provisions of the Fair Housin g Amendments Act,” not ruling on it substantively. See Cmty. Hous. Tr. v. Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs , 257 F. Supp. 2d 208, 223 n.18 (D.D.C. 2003).22 of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district c ourt review and rejection of t hose judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrin e is rooted in the Supreme Court’s appellate juri sdiction over state-court judgmen ts granted by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. In D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , the Supreme Court “held that this grant of jurisdiction is exclusive.” Lance v. Dennis , 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006); see also D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The doctrine is named after Feldman and the only other case where the Supreme Court has “applied this rule to find that a Federal District Court lacked jurisdiction,” Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923). See Lance , 546 U.S. at 463. In Rooker , the plaintiff sought Supreme C ourt review of an Indiana Supre me Court decision. Id. When the Supreme Court declin ed review, the plaintiff filed an action in a federal district court. Id. The Supreme Court “viewed the action as tantamount to an appea l of the Indiana Supreme Court decision, over which only [the Supreme] C ourt had jurisdiction, and said that the ‘aggrieved litigant cannot be permitted to do indirect ly what he no longer can do directly.’” Id. (quoting Rooker , 263 U.S. at 416). Sixty years later in Feldman , the Court applied the same reasoning to a Dis trict of Columbia Court of A ppeals decision refusing admission to a bar applicant. Id. The Supreme Court emphasized the difference between a judicial decision and an administrative one, holding that “to the extentplaintiffs challenged the Court of Appeals decisions thems elves—as opposed to the bar adm ission rules promulgated nonjudicially by the Court of Appeal s—their sole avenue of revi ew was with this Court.” Id. “Neither Rooker nor Feldman elaborated a rationale for a w ide-reaching bar on the jurisdict ion23 of lower federal courts, and [ Supreme Court] cases since Feldman have tended to emphasize the narrowness of the Rooker–Feldman rule.” 8 Id. at 464. As Defendants candidly point out, see Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 25, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he doctrine has no applicat ion to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency.” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n , 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002). Defendant s attempt to distingu ish Verizon Maryland by arguing that “not all federal courts have confined the scope of that remark to the specific factual scenario addre ssed in that deci sion,” citing an unpublished Central District of California case, Reiner v. California Dep’t of Indus. Relations

. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 25. ( citing No. 12-8649, 2012 WL 7145706, ( C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2012), report and recommendation adopted , 2013 WL 571797 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2013), aff’d sub nom

. Reiner v. California , 612 F. App’x 473 (9th Cir. 2015)). In Reiner , the plaintiff sought review of determinations made in a state-l evel workers’ compensation appe al board and “state tribunals.”
See 2012 WL 7145706, at *2. In finding that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applied, the Magistrate Judge emphasized tha t the case was based primarily o n state law, not federal law as in Verizon Maryland , and that the party in Reiner had actually filed a state -level claim previously, unlike in Verizon Maryland

. See id. at *3. Given that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine is “narrow and focused,” Thana v. Board of
License Comm’rs , 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016), the Cou rt is not inclined to go against the black-letter of Verizon Maryland that “[t]he doctrine has no app lication to judicial review of

8 Courts and scholars alike emphasi ze that the Supreme Court has trended toward narrowing the doctrine since Feldman , particularly in Lance

. See, e.g. , Thana v. Board of License Comm’rs , 827 F.3d 314, 319–20 (4th Cir. 2016) (calling the doctrine “n arrow and focused”); Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923–2006) , 9 Green Bag 2d 317 (2006) (mock obituary of the doctrine).24 executive action, including determinations made by a state admi nistrative agency.” 535 U.S. at 644 n.3. But even if it were, this is not a case of “primarily . . . state law,” Reiner , 2012 WL 7145706, at *3, and, as noted above, the Zoning Commission could not have subst antively heard these types of discrimination cla ims. This is a case of primar ily federal law with the actions of a state administrative agenc y looming in the background; in no way is the current action an appeal of the Zoning Commission’s order. Accordingly, Rooker

–Feldman is inapplicable. 3. Younger Abstention Defendants invoke the r elated doctrine of Younger abstention in support of their Motion to Dismiss. “In Younger v. Harris and its progeny, the Supreme C ourt held that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a f ederal court should not enjoin a pending state proceeding (including an administrative proceeding) that is judicial in nature and involves important state interests.” JMM Corp. v. District of Columbia , 378 F.3d 1117, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The doctrine stems from the equita ble principle that “courts . . . should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a cri minal prosecution, when the mov ing party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitab le relief.” Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971). At its core, Younger abstention stems from concerns of comity and federalism and prevents federal courts from enjoining ongoing c riminal prosecutions. See id. ; see also Samuels v. Mackell , 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971). Moving beyond the core of the doctri ne, federal courts also abstai n in quasi-criminal contexts. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. , 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (abstaining in a civil c ontext because “ the proceedi ng is both in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes wh ich prohibit the dissemination o f obscene materials”). The periphery of the doctrine may enc ompass proceedings not in courts, but that are judicial in nature and concern important state interests. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., In c. v. Council of City of25 New Orleans , 491 U.S. 350, 364–73 (1989). The doctrine has even been appl ied to suits between two non-state parties wh ere the underlying dispute conc erned important state interests. See, e.g. , Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. , 481 U.S. 1, 17 (1987). In a case be tween private parties, federal courts must abstain whe n (1) the relief sought would en join an ongoing state proceeding, (2) the state proceeding is judicial in nature, (3) “the state proceedings implicate important state interests,” and (4) “the proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.” See William Penn Apartments , 39 F. Supp. at 19 (internal citations and quotations omitted)

. The Court need not address all f our requirements, because Defen dants’ argument fails to establish that the Zoning Commission proceedings “afford an ade quate opportunity to raise the federal claims.” Defendants arg ue that a D.C. Federal District Court has said that “[t]he Board of Zoning Adjustment ha[s] authority to consider reasonable acc ommodation request[s],” implying that the board could cons ider such requests under the FHA. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 29. In fact , that court suggested the o pposite—although acknowledging that the Board of Zoning Adjustment has the power to make a rea sonable accommodation sua sponte under the “functional equivalent ” of the FHA under D.C. regulat ions, the court explicitly stated that “the [DC Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affa irs] is the body to whom a request for reasonable accommoda tion is properly lodged in the first instance.” See United States v. District of Columbia , 538 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (D.D.C. 2008). The court cited 14 D.C.M.R. § 111, which is entitled “Procedures Regarding Request s for Reasonable Accommodation Under the Fair Hou sing Act.” That regulation pro vides that “[a]ll requests for reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act shall be su bmitted to the Director, Department of Consumer and Re gulatory Affairs . . . or such off ice as the District may assign or delegate.” 14 D.C.M.R. § 111.3. S imilarly, here, as noted abo ve in the Court’s discussion of26 issue and claim preclusion, the Zoning Commission is not a bodyempowered to hear FHA claims. Thus, the Court will not abstain from addressing the m erits of Plaintiffs’ federal claims. 4. ONE DC Standing The Court next addresses Defendants’ argument that ONE DC—the c ommunity organization with some members who are residents of Brookland M anor with minor children, see Compl. ¶¶ 108–09—lacks standing t o bring this matter. Defendan ts specifically argue that ONE DC lacks a sufficiently conc rete injury-in-fact. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 31–35. “The Supreme Court has he ld that standing to bring an F HA claim is coextensive with constitutional standing.” Nat’l Fair Hous. All., Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 52 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman , 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982). ONE DC “bears the burden of e stablishing” its standing. See Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561. “An organization can have standing on its own behalf . . . or on be half of its members.” Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach , 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). S tanding based on an organizatio n’s own injury—“organizational standing”—requires an organizatio n, “like an individual plainti ff, to show actual or threatened injury in fact that is fairly tra ceable to the alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Properties, Inc. , 633 F.3d 1136, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotations om itted). For an organization to sue on behalf of its members through “associational standing,” i t must show that (1) “its me mbers would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right,” (2) “the interests it seek s to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose,” and (3) “ neither the claim asserted no r the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union27 Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc. , 517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n , 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Plaintiffs assert that ONE DC ha s both organizational and assoc iational standing. Because the Court finds that ONE DC has organizational standing , it need not address the associational standing issue. A s noted above, organizational s tanding requires a concrete injury, not “a mere setback to [the organization’s] abstract social int erests.” See Equal Rights Ctr. , 633 F.3d at 1138 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “An organization’s expenditure of resources on a lawsuit does not c onstitute an in jury in fact su fficient to establish standing.” Id. However, it is “clear . . . that i f the defendant’s allegedly w rongful action prompts an organization to ‘increase[] the resources [it] must devote to p rograms independent of its suit’ . . . , the organization has sh own an injury in fact.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc. , 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). There is “an important li mitation” on this principle: if an injury is “sel f-inflicted as a result of the o rganization’s own budgetary choices,” the party cannot claim an injury- in-fact as a re sult of the def endant’s behavior. Id. at 1139 (internal quotations omitted). This “does not automatically mean that [a party diverting resources] cannot suffer an injury sufficient to confer standin g.” Id. at 1140. The crucial test for determining whether an injury i s self-inflicted is whether the party “undertook the expenditures in response to, and to counteract , the effects of the defendant s’ alleged discrimination rather than in anticipation of litigation.” Id. In the housing context, usin g resources for a program to counteract a defendant’s discrim inatory advertisement constitut es an adequate injury-in-fact, because it is used for the pr actical purpose of responding to a llegedly illegal activity, not to prepare for litigation. See id. (citing Spann , 899 F.2d at 27–29). In Spann v. Colonial Village,
Inc. , the plaintiff-organizations e stablished standing when they al leged that the defendants’28 “preferential advertising te nded to steer black home buyers and renters away from the advertised complexes,” requiring the plaintiffs to “devote more time, effo rt, and money to endeavors designed to educate not only home buyers and renters, but the D C area real estate industry.” 899 F.2d at 27. So, if Defendants’ alleged actions frustrated ONE DC’s mission and ONE DC used resources to counteract that harm , it has standing to maintain the action. See Equal Rights Ctr. , 633 F.3d at 1140. Based on the facts alleged in the C omplaint, ONE DC has standin g to maintain this action. ONE DC is “comprised of members who include tenants of affordable housing properties that are seeking to avoid displacement, preserve aff ordable housing, ensure fair housing, and further equitable d evelopment in D.C.” Compl. ¶ 108. The alleged discrimination plainly frustrates ONE DC’s mi ssion. Plaintiffs allege that ON E DC has had to divert its scarce resources away from its central mission to “crisis organizing” in the form of investigation, counseling, organizing, canvassi ng, and other Brookland-specifi c programming. See id. ¶¶ 113– 121. In all, Plaintiffs alleg e that, as of July 28, 2016, ONE DC has “diverted approximately 640 hours of its staff members’ time to identify and combat Defendants’ discriminatory conduct through outreach, organizing, advocacy, and tenant counseling e fforts.” Id. ¶ 121. This places ONE DC’s case squarely w ithin the holdings in Equal Rights Center and Spann . ONE DC did not spend 640 hours concocting an in jury in anticipation of lit igation, but instead did so for the practical purpose of combating alle ged discrimination in the co mmunity. Defendants’ alleged discrimination forced ONE DC to a ddress an exigency in the community at the expense of its broader social goals. Accordingl y, ONE DC has sufficiently all eged organizational standing to withstand Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.29 5. Failure to State Disparate Impact Claims Defendants move to dismiss for fa ilure to state a claim with re spect to Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims under the FHA and DCHRA. Defendants ar gue that Plaintiff erroneously assumes that “large families” are a protected group under the FHA, instead of the broader protected class of “families.” Defendants further argu e that without an FHA claim, Plaintiff cannot invoke supplementa l jurisdiction to maintain i ts DCHRA claim. The Court will address these arguments in turn. Fair Housing Act Defendants move to dismiss Plain tiffs’ FHA disparate impact cla im for failure to state a claim on the basis that Plaintiffs’ statistical analysis cherry -picks “large families” from the broader “familial status,” and in so doing fails to analyze the effect that the entire redevelopment plan would have on allfamilies that reside or will reside in the new community. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 11–12.
The Federal FHA prohibits “ma k[ing] unavailable . . . a dwellin g to any person because of . . . familial status.” See 42 U.S.C. 3604(a). “‘Familial status’ means one or more indivi duals (who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled with . . . a parent or another person having legal custody of such . . . individuals,” or the parent’ s designee. 42 U.S.C. 3602(k). It is important to note that the FHA is generally a repository of neg ative rights—it does not affirmatively provide special pri vileges to parents living withminor children, but rather protects them from discriminatory acts. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. , 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (“The FHA is not an instrument t o force housing authorities to reorder the ir priorities. Rather, the FH A aims to ensure that those priorities can be achieved without arbitrar ily creating discriminatory eff ects or perpetuating segregation.”).30 For example, the FHA does not entitle families to occupy units in excess of nondiscriminatory, reasonable occupancy requireme nts that apply to the population in general. Fair Hous. Advocates Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Richmond Heights, Ohio , 209 F.3d 626, 636 (6th Cir. 2000); see also City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. , 514 U.S. 725, 733 (1995) (contrasting impermissible policies that tar get families with permissible po licies that “apply uniformly to all residents of all dwelling units”). It is also im portant to emphasize that the F HA only protects minor children domiciled with parents (or other such persons ina guardian role, as provided by the statute). As Plaintiffs concede, see Pls.’ Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 8 n.4, ECF No. 21, the sub-class of “large families” is not a protected class unde r the FHA. Debolt v. Espy , 832 F. Supp. 209, 215 (S.D. Ohio 1993), aff’d , 47 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The Court notes that as opposed to families in general, ‘large families’ are not a specifically protected class under Title VIII.”); see also Fair Hous. Advocates Ass’n, Inc. , 209 F.3d at 638 (concluding that “families of four, as opposed to families of three, are not pro tected classes”).
“[D]isparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housi ng Act . . . .” Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. In clusive Communities Project, Inc. , 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518, 2525 (2015). “To prevail on a disparat e impact claim, a plaintiff m ust offer sufficient evidence to support a finding that the challenged policy actually disproportionately a ffected a protected class.” 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia , 444 F.3d 673, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Secretary of Housing and U rban Development has “[t] he authority and responsibility for administering” t he FHA. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a); see also Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of
Nassau , 819 F.3d 581, 618 (2d Cir. 2016). Part of that authority is the power to promulgate rules “to carry out” the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614a; see also Mhany Mgmt., Inc. , 819 F.3d at 618. Accordingly, in line with the Second Circuit in Mhany Management , the Court “must defer to31 [HUD]’s reasonable interpretati on” of the FHA with respect to i ts rules on disparate impact. See 819 F.3d at 618 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); accord Boykin v. Fenty , 650 F. App’x 42, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2016). HUD has adopted a burden-shifting framework for eva luating disparate impact claim s. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c). First, the plaintiff has “the burden of proving that a challeng ed practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory effect.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) . Once the plaintiff makes such a showing, the “defendant has the burden of proving that the chal lenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2 ). If the defendant is ab le to do so, the “plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the subs tantial, legitimate, nondiscr iminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be ser ved by another practice that ha s a less discriminatory effect.” 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3).
To make an initial showing of di sparate impact at “step one,” courts often rely on statistical analyses. See, e.g. , R.I. Comm’n for Human Rights v. Graul , 120 F. Supp. 3d 110, 124–25 (D.R.I. 2015); Gashi v. Grubb & Ellis Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. , 801 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16– 17 (D. Conn. 2011). Such an analysis requires a plaintiff to “ compar[e] those affected by the policy with those unaffected by the policy.” See Gashi , 801 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (citing Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’ t, 352 F.3d 565, 575–76 (2d Cir.2003)); accord Graul , 120 F. Supp. 3d at 124 (internal citation and quotations omitted). In the “context . . . [of] housing discrimination, a wide enough contrast between the way a policyburdens members of a protected group as opposed to non-members is cognizable as a di sparate impact.” Graul , 120 F. Supp. 3d at 125. In Gashi , the court found a 30.76% effect on households with children a nd a 9.88% effect on households without ch ildren sufficient to const itute a disparate impact. See 80132 F. Supp. 2d at 16–17. In Graul , the court found a threefold d ifference sufficient. See 120 F. Supp. 3d at 126.

Defendants move to dismiss on t he grounds that Plaintiffs have not made a showing at step one of HUD’s framework, becaus e, according to Defendants, Plaintiffs’ statistical analysis inappropriately focuses on a particular subset of the protectedclass—large families—and a particular aspect of the redevel opment—the elimination of large r-occupancy apartments. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 11–18. The Court w ill address these two contentions in turn.

i. “Familial Status” vs. “Large Families”
Defendants’ first qualm with Plaintiffs’ reasoning is that it r elies on discrimination against large families rather than families as a protected grou p. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 9. As noted above, the FHA protects all fa milies, as defined by statute, regardless of size. Courts have consistently assumed that “‘[f ]amilial status’ refers to the presence of minor children in the household.” See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp. , 108 F.3d 246, 247 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Graul , 120 F. Supp. 3d at 125–26 (favor ably citing methodology comparing “households with chi ldren” and “households with no ch ildren”); United States v. Branella , 972 F. Supp. 294, 298 (D.N.J. 1997) (“Specifically, the FHAA provides that it is unlawful to make a dwelling unava ilable to any prospective buye r or renter because of the presence of minor children in the prospective household.”). So , although there is no special treatment for “large families” under the FHA, they are still pr otected under the umbrella of “families” if minors are in the household.33 Although Plaintiffs do repeatedly refer to “large families” in their Complaint, their statistical analysis specifical ly concerns “those who have one or more minor children living in the household.” See Compl. ¶¶ 72, 37. Similarly, Plaintiffs define their proposed class as “[a]ll households who reside or have res ided at Brookland Manor in a three-, four- or five[-]bedroom unit with one or more minor child.” See id. ¶ 122. Plaintiffs’ statistic al analysis includes apartments of all sizes, comparing those with minor children to those without them. See id. ¶ 75. Using that metric, Plaintiffs arri ve at the conclusion that the proposed redevelopment would adversely affect 59% of families overall, compared to 15% of no nfamilies. See id. ¶ 77. It does not matter that many of the protec ted individuals are part of “ large families” for the purpose of the Complaint, so long as the unprotected group and protected g roup are correctly defined. Because the Complaint shows that Plaintiffs do correctly define these groups, Plaintiffs did not “cherry-pick” protected families from the larger protected clas s.

ii. The Elimination of Large Apartme nts vs. the Project as a Whole
Defendants also argue that Plain tiffs fail to take into account “ all families that reside or will reside in the revitalized c ommunity,” citing Boykin v. Gray

. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 11 (second emphasis added). In Boykin , a group of homeless men claimed that the District of Columbia’ s closure of a particular homeles s shelter violated the FHA, because a disproportionate amount of the D.C. homeless population is bl ack and Hispanic. See 986 F. Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.D.C. 2013). The closure of the homeless she lter was part of a “broader shift in the District’s policy toward its homeless citizens” that had a net-positive impact on the minority population in the District. Id. at 21. Applying a disparate-imp act standard, that court found that “[t]he fundamental def ect in the plaintiffs’ argumen t is that the adverse impact of which they complain was suffered not by the entire homeless pop ulation in the District of34 Columbia, nor even by a significant portion of its more than 6, 000 members.” See id. at 20. Closing the specific shelter a ffected 90 people, but the overal l number of beds available to homeless persons rose as a resul t of the District’s program. See id. at 20–21. By referring to “ its homeless citizens,” “the entir e homeless population in the District of Columbia,” and “ its 6,000 members,” the above excerpts showthat the court was interested in the District of Columbia’s overall universe of homeless persons.
In the context of a private land lord, courts are similarly conc erned with the private party’s universe of tenants. In Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates , the tenants of a particular building contended that a polic y would have a disparate racial impact on them as individuals. 736 F.2d 983, 985–87 (4th Cir. 1984). Because the plaintiffs d id not show a “continuing disproportionate impact,” a suffi cient racial impact of the ent ire complex, or any impact on the local community, the district court dismissed the claim. See id. at 986–87. Reversing, the Fourth Circuit held that “membe rs of a discrete minority[] are required to prove only that a given policy had a discriminatory impact on them as individuals .” Id. at 987. That court found “consideration of the rest of the local community, the rest of [the residential community], or even prospective applicants for space in [the building] irrelevant.” See id. (internal quotations omitted). “The correct inquiry is whether the policy in questi on had a disproportionate impact on the minorities in the total group t o which the policy was appli ed.” Id.
Here, it does not matter that the redevelopment might open up s pace for families in the local community to occupy smaller ap artments at the redeveloped project. Defendants’ universe of persons are the existing ten ants at Brookland Manor. If the current families of Brookland Manor are disparately impacted by the redevelopment, it is irre levant that some protected persons in the local community might end up filling their shoes in units that could not support35 them. Plaintiffs do analyze the effect that the entire project will have on all ex isting tenants of Brookland Manor. See Compl. ¶¶ 75–79. Given that Plaintiffs adequately allege that the proposed redevelopment project wil l affect Brookland Manor fami lies over three times as much as it will nonfamilies, they state a claim.
D.C. Human Rights Act Defendants’ only contention spec ific to the DCHRA is that “elim ination of [Plaintiffs’] federal claims would dictate dism issal of the rest of their cla ims as failing the test for supplemental jurisdiction.” See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 18 n.7. Even if true, the Court simply notes that, as set forth above, it is no t dismissing the federal-question claims under the federal FHA, so supplemental jurisdiction rema ins. B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction Plaintiffs move for a preliminar y injunction to prevent Defendants from proceeding with their redevelopment plan. 9 “To warrant preliminary injunc tive relief, the moving party must show (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that it would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted, (3) that an injuncti on would not substantially injure other interested parties, and (4 ) that the public interest woul d be furthered by the injunction.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). There must be a showing of likely irre parable harm for a preliminary injunction to issue. Id. ; see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (“Our fre quently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking prelim inary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”). The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for irreparable injury,”

9 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.36 requiring that the injury “be both certain and great,” and “act ual and not theoretical.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches , 454 F.3d at 297 (internal citati ons and quotations omitted). “The moving party must show ‘[t]h e injury complained of is of s uch imminence that there is a “clear and present” need for equ itable relief to prevent irrepa rable harm.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC , 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). To meet the standard, “the harm mus t be so imminent as to be irrep arable if a court waits until the end of trial to resolve the harm.” Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono , 175 F.3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 1999). The moving party mus t also show that the threa tened injury is “beyond remediation” with other forms of relief. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches , 454 F.3d at 297. Plaintiffs argue that the thre atened injuries are imminent, bec ause when Defendants receive Stage Two approval, they w ill be free to commence destr uction of Plaintiffs’ homes. See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 26. Specifica lly, they argue tha t “D.C. Municipal Regulations make clear that second -stage approval is the final step before a redeveloper may commence demolition.” See id. They further argue that Defe ndants have already required families who reside in large units to “relocate, break up, and downsize.” See id. In support of their assertion, Plaintiffs cite to several declarations of ten ants who claim to know others at Brookland Manor who have been forced to move. See id. at 27; McFadden Decl. ¶ 6; Jenkins Decl. ¶ 6; Scott Decl. ¶ 6. H owever, they do not cite to any f irst-hand account of a family who has been forced to relocate o ff the property, nor any family wh o has been told they will need to relocate but will be unabl e to do so on the property. 10

10 Plaintiffs’ argument that a recent submission to the Zoning Co mmission shows that the first block to be demolished cont ains almost all three- and four-bedroom apartments is unavailing. See Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. f or a Prelim. Inj., at 13, EC F No. 20. If, as37 Defendants argue that any displa cement would not occur until ye ars in the future. See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for P relim. Inj., at 6. Michael Mee rs, Vice President of Defendant Mid-City Financial Corporati on, has stated that demolition will not commence until late 2017, at the earliest, because of the le ngth of time it takes to receive Stage Two approval and then obtain the requisite permits t o begin the project. See Meers Aff. ¶ 17. Moreover, because the existing buildings are collateral on aHUD loan until August 1, 2017, itis “highly unlikely” that Defendants could begin demolition any earlier. 11 See id. ¶ 21. Even then, the project will be limited to “Phase One,” meaning that only three of the 19 build ings will be demolished. See id. ¶ 17. Later phases will not be gin until 2019, and neither indi vidual Plaintiff will need to vacate until 2020, at the earliest. See id. ¶¶ 17–19. When the buildings are demolished during Phase One, Michael Meers asserts that all residents in those building s will be “relocated at owner expense to an appropriate apartment home on the property .” See id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added). Mr. Meers further declares that, a lthough some tenants have been mo ved, none have been unable to relocate at Brookland Manor. See id. Citing to HUD guidelines and the D.C. Office of Planning’s finding that the D.C . Zoning Commission cited favora bly, Defendants’ own numbers

they argue, Defendants have alr eady relocated “the overwhelming majority of [that block’s] residents,” id. at 12 they should be even more cap able of providing the Court w ith something in the record to show that a fam ily has been relocated and unable to move into another apartment on the property. If anything, this su pports Defendants’ argume nt that all families who will be relocated from Block 7 will be able to relocate on the property . But even more t o the point, the submission that Plaintiffs refer ence refers specifically to Blo ck 7. See Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 3, a t 1, ECF No. 20-3. The D.C. Z oning Commission knew that Block 7 was going to be demolished during Phase One, yet still credited a report that the larger units would not be phased out until t he later stages of redevel opment. See Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18, at 38, 50. 11 For the same reasons noted in no te 10, Plaintiffs’ arguments about relocation occurring well in advance of demolition are unavailing. See Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for a Prelim. Inj., at 13. Although it is o bviously true that relocation must occur before demolition, this fact, if anything, shows that Defendants are capable of re locating tenants to other locations on the property.38 show that only 13 Brookland Manor households would currently re quire a four-bedroom apartment, and none would require a five-bedroom apartment. 12 See Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18, at 38. The same finding f rom the D.C. Office of Pl anning noted that “[t]he building with the larger units would rem ain on the site until the later phases at which time they can be ‘right sized’ to accommodate the larger families.” Id. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that any families—let alo ne a disproportionate number of them—are facing the i mminent threat of being forced t o relocate until well after the case can be fully adjudicated. P laintiffs do not, for example, point to a particular family that lives in the block of houses scheduled to be demolished during Phase One that would be unable to move into an apartment elsew here at Brookland Manor. Althou gh Plaintiffs cite to certain second-hand sources alluding t o the idea of relocation, see, e.g. , Jenkins Decl., Defendants cite to specific attributes of the red evelopment project showing otherw ise. The Vice President of MidCity has stated that it is “highl y unlikely” that Phase One cou ld begin until August, 2017, and that it would be much more l ikely to begin later in 2017. And, assuring the Court that the harm is not imminent even further int o the future, he states that no resident will be forced to move away from Brookland Manor during S tage One, leaving the Plainti ffs with no ground to stand on until Stage Two, which is at leas t three years away. This make s sense in the context of Defendants’ contention that many families are in apartments that are too large, that the building with larger units will remain unt il later phases of redevelopme nt, and that vacancies currently exist that can be used to house displaced households from Block 7. 13 The situations of individual

12 Plaintiffs are correct that D.C. occupancy law may make this number higher in certain cases. However, they do not tell th e Court how frequently this is the case, or otherwise carry their burden of showing the extent of the issues in light of De fendants’ evidence. 13 It is worth noting that al though Plaintiffs’ methodology is pl ausible for HUD’s “step one” showing of disparate impact a t the motion-to-dismiss stage , it comes up short in showing39 Plaintiffs give the Court furthe r assurance: there are no plans that would require Ms. Borum to relocate until 2020 at the earli est or Ms. Holloman until 2023. Even if the proposed class were certified here, vague stories and m isgivings from tenants are i nsufficient for Plaintiffs to shoulder their burden of showing that an irreparable injury will likely occur if the Court waits to adjudicate the dispute on the merits. Although it is certainly possible that Defendants’ plans could change by moving the proce ss up considerably, Plaintiffs have not met the “high standard” of showing that they imminently face their alleged injuries. T he chance that the timeline moves up, disparate impact will occur at Phase One, or Plaintiffs wil l otherwise suffer injury does not rise to the level of a “clear and present threat” necessary for a showing of irreparable injury. Because some showing of imminent irreparable injury is required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Court must deny Plaintiffs’ motion. If Plaintiffs do obtain evidence s howing that imminent injury i s likely to occur, the Motion can be renewed and will be reconsidered in light of suchnew evidence. And, because Defendants applied for Stage Tw o PUD approval ahead of schedule and stop short of guaranteeing that they will follow the timeline set forth in th eir declarations, the Court will impose on Defendants a requireme nt to report to the Court and P laintiffs any changes in schedule

that “families”—as defined by the FHA—will necessarily be force d to relocate away from the property at a disproportionate rat e during the later stages of redevelopment. As noted above and shown by a plain reading of the sta tutory text, the FHA protect s only minor children living with parents (or similar guardians). See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k). The definition of “family” does not, for example, “encompass groups of more than one family.” Doe v. City of Butler , 892 F.2d 315, 326 (3d Cir. 1989) (Roth, J., dissent ing). Thus, a group of people cannot talismanically receive protection under the FHA just because one of them happens to be a parent domiciled with a minor child. Although the Court ne ed not reach the issue giventhe lack of imminent irreparable injury, in light of the fact that all tenants will eventually h ave to relocate to different units on the property, see Mid-City Fin. Corp. , Z.C. Case 14-18, at 2 (noting that all the existing buildings will be replaced), the Court queries whether breaking up groups of people—including extended families—into separate apartments will necessarily disparately impact “families.”40 that might make displacement of tenants at Brookland Manor more imminent than it was when they made their declarations in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motio n for a Preliminary Injunction.

IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defe ndants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED and Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED . An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: November 21, 2016 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge