J-S13043-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: T.P., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: L.P., NATURAL MOTHER No. 1794 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree entered October 3, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Orphans’ 

Court, at No: TPR 100 of 2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 9, 2015

L.P. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered October 3, 2014, in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which involuntarily terminated 

Mother’s parental rights to her minor daughter, T.P. (Child), born in July of 

2009.1 We affirm.

In June of 2012, the Allegheny County Department of Human Services, 

Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) received reports that Mother 

was not caring for Child properly, and that she was not addressing Child’s 

medical needs. In addition, there were concerns with respect to Mother’s 

mental health. Child was adjudicated dependent on February 15, 2013, and 

placed in the care of her great-aunt, M.H., and great-uncle, D.H. 

(collectively, the Foster Parents). 

On June 5, 2014, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to Child. A termination hearing was held on October 

 

1 The parental rights of Child’s father, T.E. (Father), were terminated by a 

separate decree entered that same day. Father is not a party to the instant 

appeal. 
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1, 2014, during which the orphans’ court heard the testimony of CYF 

caseworker, David Reagan; Dr. Neil Rosenblum, a psychologist who 

conducted evaluations of Mother, Child, and the Foster Parents; and Mother. 

The court entered its decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental 

rights on October 3, 2014. On October 30, 2014, Mother timely filed a 

notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

Mother now raises the following issue for our review. “Did the 

[orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in 

concluding that termination of [Mother’s] parental rights would serve the 

needs and welfare of the Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[]2511(b)?” 

Mother’s brief at 5. 

We consider Mother’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often 

have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple 

hearings.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), which provide as follows.

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent. 
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***

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at least six months, 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or 

will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve 

the needs and welfare of the child. 

***

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed 

from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist and termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).
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Instantly, Mother concedes that CYF presented clear and convincing 

evidence that her parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Section 

2511(a). Mother’s Brief at 9 (“CYF, the petitioner, did clearly and convincing 

establish threshold grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§ 2511(a)(2).”). Thus, we need only consider whether the court abused its 

discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(b). See In re Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 679 n.4 (Pa. Super. 

2013), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 540 (Pa. 2013) (declining to address Section 

2511(b) where the appellant did not make an argument concerning that 

section). 

Section 2511(b) “focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). As this Court has explained, “Section 2511(b) does not 

explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the 

Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional 

bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered” as part 

of our analysis. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of 

the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the 
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best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citing K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 533-36). 

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and 

stability the child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider 

the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any 

existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

Id. (quoting In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010)); see also In 

re T.D., 949 A.2d 910, 920-23 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 970 A.2d 

1148 (Pa. 2009) (affirming the termination of parental rights where “obvious 

emotional ties exist between T.D. and Parents, but Parents are either 

unwilling or unable to satisfy the irreducible minimum requirements of 

parenthood,” and where preserving the Parents’ rights would prevent T.D. 

from being adopted and attaining permanency).

Here, the orphans’ court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights would be in the best interest of Child. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

11/26/14, at 4. The court reasoned that Child is bonded with her foster 

family, and that Child is doing well in their care. Id. The court also found 

that Mother’s failure to visit regularly with Child weakened Child’s bond with 

Mother, that terminating Mother’s parental rights would not adversely impact 

this bond, and that termination would not be a “tremendous detriment” to 

Child. Id. at 4-5. The court determined that Mother remains incapable of 
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parenting Child, and that it would not serve Child’s needs and welfare to 

continue waiting for Mother to improve. Id. at 5. Finally, the court noted 

that Child’s current foster placement with her great uncle and aunt will allow 

for Child to maintain contact with Mother. Id.

Mother argues that the court abused its discretion by focusing 

improperly on Mother’s failings as a parent rather than Child’s needs and 

welfare. Mother’s Brief at 12-13. Mother also contends that the court 

“completely failed to analyze the potential effect” that termination would 

have on Child, and that the court instead relied on conjecture that Child will 

be able to maintain a relationship with Mother in order to justify termination. 

Id. at 13. 

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to Child. During the October 1, 2014 termination 

hearing, CYF caseworker, David Reagan, testified that he has been working 

on Mother’s case since September of 2012. N.T., 10/1/14, at 29. Mr. 

Reagan indicated that Mother’s family service plan (FSP) goals included 

improving her mental health, improving her parenting ability, visiting with 

Child, attending all medical appointments, and maintaining and/or obtaining 

housing. Id. at 33-34. Mr. Reagan noted that Mother “had a long history of 

mental health issues,” and that this “was the major goal.” Id. at 34. Mr. 

Reagan explained that Mother initially was receiving mental health treatment 
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through, inter alia, her high school. Id. at 35. However, Mother graduated 

in June of 2013. Id. at 36. Mr. Reagan indicated that Mother’s high school 

mental health team referred her to several new service providers, but 

Mother failed to obtain additional treatment. Id. Mother then moved to 

Ohio in October of 2013. Id. at 36. Mr. Reagan stated that Mother did not 

receive any mental health treatment while living in Ohio. Id. at 37. Mother 

returned to Pennsylvania in March of 2014, and received mental health 

treatment at FamilyLinks. Id. at 36-37. However, Mother attended only 

three of her seven scheduled appointments. Id. at 37. Mr. Reagan noted 

that, to his knowledge, Mother did not receive any additional mental health 

treatment from April of 2014 until August of 2014. Id.

Concerning Mother’s other FSP goals, Mr. Reagan testified that Mother 

was given a parenting goal because she was not properly caring for Child’s 

heart condition and asthma, and because Mother was “never there to take 

care of the child.” Id. at 38-39. Mr. Reagan conceded that Mother 

completed a parenting course while she was living in Ohio, and that Mother 

provided him with a certificate. Id. at 42. However, Mr. Reagan expressed 

concern that the certificate “didn’t say what they did, how long [the course] 

was, what it involved or anything like that . . . .” Id. Mr. Reagan noted that 

Mother has not “shown any signs of attending any medical appointments, 

and that “there hasn’t been any sign whatsoever that, . . . she’s capable of 

taking care of the child.” Id. at 41-42. As a result, Mr. Reagan stated that 
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CFY referred Mother to a new parenting program after she returned to 

Pennsylvania. Id. at 49. Mr. Reagan stated that the program sent Mother 

letters and called her several times, but that Mother did not respond. Id.

Mr. Reagan further testified that Mother underwent “several 

evaluations,” all of which recommended that Mother move out of her 

mother’s home. Id. at 38. According to Mr. Reagan, this was because there 

was “a lot of conflict in the home.” Id. at 37-38. Mr. Reagan testified that 

CYF made two referrals to assist Mother with housing in October of 2012, 

and in “January or February of ’13,” but that no referrals were made after 

that point because Mother was uncooperative, kept changing residences, and 

did not ask for another referral. Id. at 44-45. Mr. Reagan stated that 

Mother’s high school mental health team also made referrals up until July of 

2013. Id. at 45-47.

With respect to visitation, Mr. Reagan stated that Mother initially was 

scheduled to visit with Child once per week, but that Mother only attended 

one of her first twenty visits. Id. at 39-40. Accordingly, Mother’s visits 

were reduced to once every two weeks. Id. at 40. Mother only attended 14 

of her 42 scheduled visits during Mr. Reagan’s time as the caseworker. Id.

at 39, 42. Concerning Child’s relationship with the Foster Parents, Mr. 

Reagan testified that “they are bonded,” and that Child calls the Foster 

Parents “mom and dad.” Id. at 51.
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Dr. Neil Rosenblum testified that he conducted evaluations of Mother, 

Child, and the Foster Parents. Id. at 54-55. Dr. Rosenblum explained that 

he evaluated Child and the Foster Parents on June 27, 2013. Id. Dr. 

Rosenblum stated that Child “interacted very comfortably” with the Foster 

Parents during the evaluation, and that she “seemed to be very well 

integrated into the home environment.” Id. at 55-56. Moreover, the Foster 

Parents were “very nurturing” to Child, and “provided her with excellent 

developmental support.” Id. at 56. Dr. Rosenblum further testified that he 

completed a second evaluation of Child and the Foster Parents on April 14, 

2014, that Child “seemed to be very secure with foster parents” and had 

“become a very involved member of their family.” Id. at 54, 68. Dr. 

Rosenblum noted that Child appeared to have a good relationship with the 

Foster Parents’ son, T. Id. Dr. Rosenblum explained that, during the first 

evaluation, Child went back and forth between calling the Foster Parents 

“aunt and uncle” and “mom and dad.” Id. at 69. However, during the 

second evaluation, Child called the Foster Parents “mom and dad” 

exclusively. Id. Dr. Rosenblum opined that there was “a very strong bond” 

between Child and the Foster Parents. 

Dr. Rosenblum also described his July 30, 2014 evaluation of Child and 

Mother. Id. at 57-58. Dr. Rosenblum testified that, while Mother did not 

“show, . . . a great deal of enthusiasm” with Child, Mother was very patient 

with Child, Child also was “very comfortable” with Mother. Id. at 57-58. 
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Concerning Mother’s mental health, Dr. Rosenblum explained that he 

diagnosed Mother with major depressive disorder, and that Mother’s mental 

health issues were “significant and very serious.” Id. at 59-60. Dr. 

Rosenblum opined that, while Mother did well with Child during her one-hour 

evaluation, Mother’s depression would be “a significant barrier to her being 

able to adequately meet her own needs let alone the needs of a young child” 

over the long term. Id. at 60-61. Dr. Rosenblum explained that his 

prognosis with respect to Mother was guarded, due to Mother’s lack of 

housing and employment, and “given the situation that she’s in and the 

resources that she had available to her,” but that “with intensive mental 

health treatment, it would be possible to make some progress.” Id. at 62-

64. 

Dr. Rosenblum testified that he completed a second evaluation of Child 

and Mother on April 21, 2014. Id. at 54, 64. Dr. Rosenblum stated that 

Mother “still presented as being depressed,” and that she made “really no 

significant forward movement” during the year between evaluations and 

“was pretty much back at square one.” Id. at 65, 67. Dr. Rosenblum 

further testified that Child “has a concept of two mothers and she refers to 

both of them as mom.” Id. at 58, 72. However, Dr. Rosenblum explained 

that Child “seemed to have somewhat less of a bond” with Mother than she 

did with the Foster Parents. Id. at 69. Dr. Rosenblum opined that Child 

would not suffer a severe detriment if Mother’s parental rights were 
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terminated, as Child has “moved on” from her relationship with Mother and 

that, while Child cares about Mother and enjoys seeing her, Child now views 

her foster parents as her primary caretakers. Id. at 70-71. On crossexamination, Dr. Rosenblum confirmed that it would serve Child’s best 

interests to maintain a relationship with Mother. Id. at 72-73. 

Mother testified that she began mental health treatment at FamilyLinks

approximately a month prior to the October 1, 2014 termination hearing. 

Id. at 77. Mother indicated that, prior to FamilyLinks, she last received 

treatment around the time she graduated from high school in July of 2013. 

Id. at 77-78. Mother explained that she initially failed to obtain mental 

health treatment after graduation because she lacked transportation, 

because her phone calls were not being returned, and because of “[a] lot of 

miscommunication” with Mr. Reagan. Id. at 77-78. Similarly, Mother 

testified that she did not pursue the parenting program recommended by Mr. 

Reagan because there were “a lot of communication problems.” Id. at 79. 

Specifically, Mother stated that she did not receive a letter from the 

program, and that she did not have a cell phone, which prevented anyone at 

the program from calling her back. Id. at 78-79. Mother stated that she 

continues to visit with Child, and that Child calls her “mommy” and wants to 

leave with her at the conclusion of visits. Id. at 79-80.

Thus, the testimony presented during Mother’s termination 

hearing confirms that it is in Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s 
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parental rights. Child is bonded with her foster parents, who provide 

her with appropriate care and support. In contrast, at the time of the 

termination hearing, Mother had not cared for Child for over a year 

and a half. Mother also had failed to make significant progress toward 

improving her mental health, and it did not appear that Mother would 

be able to provide appropriate care for Child any time soon. In 

addition, while Dr. Rosenblum opined that Child still is bonded with 

Mother, he explained Child has “moved on” and no longer views 

Mother as her primary caretaker. As a result, it is clear that the bond 

between Mother and Child in this case is outweighed by Mother’s 

inability to care for Child, and by the permanence and stability 

provided by the Foster Parents. See T.D., 949 A.2d at 920-23; J.M.,

991 A.2d at 325 (quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

513 (Pa. Super. 2006)) (“‘The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s 

claims of progress and hope for the future.’”).

Further, we note that Mother’s argument that the orphans’ court 

focused improperly on Mother’s failings as a parent, rather that Child’s best 

interest and welfare, does not entitle her to relief. Mother is correct that 

“[t]he focus in terminating parental rights under [S]ection 2511(a) is on the 

parent, but the focus turns to the children under [S]ection 2511(b).” In re 

M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1181 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citing In re 
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Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)). 

However, it is clear that a parent’s inability to care for his or her child is a 

relevant consideration in determining whether termination will serve a child’s 

needs and welfare. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1010 (affirming the termination 

of parental rights where “the trial court emphasized mother’s inability to 

meet the parental duties required for the well-being of the child” as part of 

its Section 2511(b) analysis); M.T., 101 A.3d at 1182 (quoting favorably 

from a trial court opinion addressing the parents’ “inability to consistently 

provide a safe and secure environment for their children” as part of its 

Section 2511(b) analysis).

We also reject Mother’s argument that the court failed to analyze the 

effect that termination of her parental rights would have on Child, and 

instead relied on conjecture concerning the possibility of a future relationship 

between Mother and Child in order to justify termination. This contention is 

contradicted by the court’s opinion, in which it accepted Dr. Rosenblum’s 

testimony that termination would not cause Child to suffer a “tremendous 

detriment.” See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/26/14, at 5. While the court’s 

comments indicating that Child will be able to maintain a relationship with 

Mother were somewhat speculative, it appears that this consideration played 

only a small role in the court’s decision. No relief is due.
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Accordingly, because we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to 

Child, we affirm the decree of the orphans’ court.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/9/2015