J-S17035-22

2022 PA Super 155

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDRE BOYER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1165 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered May 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No: MC-51-MD-0000039-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 08, 2022

Appellant, Andre Boyer, appeals from the May 10, 2021 order entered 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County finding him guilty of 

indirect criminal contempt. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114.1,2 Appellant argues that the 

trial court erred by denying his due process rights, that it lacked jurisdiction 

to enter the order, and that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding 

of indirect criminal contempt. Upon review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 “An indirect criminal contempt consists of the violation of an order or decree 

of a court which occurs outside the presence of the court[.]” Commonwealth 

v. Mayberry, 255 A.2d 548, 551 (Pa. 1969) (citations omitted).

2 Appellant “is a former Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) police officer 

and has reported on police corruption within the [PPD] for over six years as 

character personality, Serpico, on news social media, Serpico News.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (footnote omitted). 
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Appellant’s conviction stems from the service of a subpoena directing 

him to appear as a witness in a grand jury investigation. As the trial court 

explained:

During the period of July, 2019 through March, 2021, the trial 

court was the supervising judge of the Thirtieth Investigating 

Grand Jury for Philadelphia County. As part of its responsibilities, 

the trial court swore in all witnesses who were to be presented to 

the investigating grand jury and presided over any proceedings 

related to the investigating grand jury, including violations of the 

oath of secrecy. On September 5, 2019 a hearing regarding grand 

jury investigation C-22 was held. The purpose of this hearing was 

to give Appellant the witness oath and the grand jury oath of 

secrecy.[3] Initially, prior to Appellant being present and before 

the administration of the oaths to Appellant, the only parties 

present [were] the assigned Assistant District Attorney, Tracy 

Tripp, a court reporter, and the trial court.

During this initial portion of the hearing, the Commonwealth 

recounted that, prior to September 5, 2019, Sergeant Detective 

Gerry Rocks requested Andre Boyer [] to come to the District 

Attorney’s Office. Sergeant Rocks did not inform Appellant that 

this was so he could be served with a grand jury subpoena related 

to grand jury investigation C-22. Appellant did not appear, 

instead, Appellant sent Sergeant Rocks an email accusing the 

District Attorney’s Office of trying to trick him into coming in so 

that he could be arrested.

A few days later, Detective Frank Wallace served a grand jury 

subpoena on Appellant. He explained to Appellant it was a grand 

jury subpoena, told Appellant the date that he was requested to 

appear, and explained the sealing order and its impact on 

Appellant, i.e., Appellant is unable to discuss any of this 

information. Apparently, while Detective Wallace was serving the 

subpoena, Appellant was recording and live streaming all that was 

transpiring onto social media from his phone in his pocket. 

Appellant repeated what Detective Wallace explained to him to 

show his understanding of the subpoena and the sealing order and 

____________________________________________

3 We have taken the liberty of substituting “Appellant” for “the Defendant” in 

this and other excerpts quoted herein from the trial court’s opinion.
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recorded all of this on his phone in his pocket. Within 15 to 20 

minutes after serving the subpoena and getting in his car to leave, 

Detective Wallace received numerous notifications from police 

officers who recognized him from Appellant’s live stream. The 

Commonwealth was notified by a detective in Internal Affairs that 

the service of the subpoena had been live streamed, but by the 

time they had been notified, Appellant’s live streamed video was 

gone and could not be retrieved by the Commonwealth.

On September 5, 2019, Appellant appeared before [the] trial court 

related to grand jury investigation C-22 so that he could be sworn 

in as a witness, advised of his rights and duties as a witness, and 

so that he could receive the oath of secrecy related to grand jury 

witnesses. As is common in grand jury matters involving only the 

administration of oaths to witnesses, Appellant was not 

represented by an attorney. However, on this date during the 

administration of the witness oath, he was advised of his right to 

retain an attorney or have an attorney appointed to represent him 

during the time that he would be a witness testifying before the 

grand jury. 

On this date, Appellant was informed about what the grand jury 

investigation was related to; who the target of that investigation 

was, and what information he would be asked to supply to the 

grand jury. At the September 5, 2019 hearing, the trial court 

issued a verbal order directing Appellant:

Again, Mr. Boyer, nothing that is being said in this room, 

nothing that you told Ms. Tripp about the nature of the 

investigation, and nothing about your testimony itself[,] 

what you say or what you learn during the course of this 

investigation as it relates to you being a witness before the 

Grand Jury is something you can reveal. You already 

revealed certain things on your blog or news media website. 

Obviously, that is not covered because that happened way 

before this conversation, but if there is anything that you 

learn as a result of you being a witness that cannot make it 

to your website. . . . You have the obligation to give 

continuing information to Ms. Tripp. . . . What you have to 

do is give the information that you have in your possession 

at the time that you are being asked questions, you are to 

be truthful and accurate. 
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N.T. 09/05/2019 at 26-29. The trial court further instructed 

Appellant, “. . . if you get more information from your sources 

about this, it doesn’t come from your testimony, it comes from 

something else, are you allowed to publish that[?] And it pains 

me, but I suspect the answer is yes. In that publishing you 

certainly cannot say, oh, by the way this is a grand jury 

investigation.” Id. at 29-30.

Prior to the date that he was scheduled to testify before the 

investigating grand jury, Appellant was arrested. Appellant was 

arrested by Detective Frank Wallace for a Violation of the Uniform 

Firearms Act (VUFA 6108)[4]. Detective Wallace arrested 

Appellant prior to Appellant giving testimony because Appellant 

was informed of the warrant for his arrest and attempted to flee. 

Subsequently, on August 23, 2020, Appellant posted a video to 

his media website, Philly Serpico News, titled, “Corruption in Philly 

Serpico News.” The video and post stated that a Philadelphia 35th

District Detective arrested a grand jury witness moments before 

he was set to testify against a high-ranking Philly police boss, then 

put a contract hit out on his life. Appellant further alleges in his 

video that the subject of the grand jury matter is [that] a highranking staff inspector assaulted a Temple University student in 

his police car and that the grand jury is set to indict the highranking staff inspector. 

On October 29, 2020, a hearing regarding grand jury investigation 

C-22 was held. The trial court issued a Rule to Show Cause as to 

why Appellant should not be held in indirect criminal contempt of 

a Court Order because Appellant had violated the trial court’s 

order and the grand jury secrecy oath by posting the 

aforementioned video on August 23, 2020. At the time of the 

hearing, the post and video were still live on the website. 

Additional evidence and testimony was presented at a second 

hearing on this matter on April 20, 2021.

On May 6, 2021, a final hearing regarding grand jury investigation 

C-22 was held. The trial court had previously held its decision 

whether to find Appellant in indirect criminal contempt under 

advisement from the April 20, 2021 hearing. The trial court found 

____________________________________________

4 Section 6108 relates to carrying firearms on public streets or public property

in Philadelphia.
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Appellant to be in indirect criminal contempt of its verbal order 

issued on September 5, 2019. The trial court did not impose a 

fine or incarceration, but ordered that Appellant be precluded and 

ordered not to reference any additional grand jury material related 

to what he was told the investigation was about on his media 

website in written, oral, or audio format. 

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/31/21, at 3-6 (some citations to notes of 

testimony from the May 6, 2019, October 29, 2020, April 20, 2021, and May 

6, 2021 hearings omitted). 

The trial court’s May 10, 2021 order states:

Now, this 10th day of May, 2021, [Appellant] having been found 

guilty of indirect criminal contempt of this court’s order dated 

September 5, 2019, [Appellant] shall not post any grand jury 

materials or discuss any matters related to any grand jury 

investigation or targets on any news media website or social 

media websites.

[Appellant] is not to engage in any conversation or discussions 

related to grand jury materials, grand jury targets, or grand jury 

witnesses, related to their involvement with the grand jury, with 

anyone other than his attorney.

[Appellant] is not to utilize any video pertaining to grand jury 

materials, targets, witnesses, or individuals in any capacity.

If [Appellant] wishes to discuss these matters or utilize video for 

any purpose, he is to seek leave from the court to disclose these 

materials for these other purposes. Upon such motion a hearing 

will be scheduled. 

Order, 5/10/21, at 1 (some capitalization omitted).

Appellant filed a timely appeal from the May 10, 2021 order. Both he 

and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant asks us to consider the following issues on appeal:
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A. Due Process – Whether the trial court erred in denying 

Appellant’s due process rights in violation of Article 1, Section 

9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the 14th Amendment of 

the U.S. Constitution, where there was no notice of an indirect 

criminal contempt charge prior to the contempt hearing 

commencing.

B. September 5, 2019 Nondisclosure Order 

1. Verbal Order – Whether the trial court erred in finding 

indirect criminal contempt for violating an order, as the 

alleged violated verbal order given September 5, 2019, 

and not followed by a written order, is not enforceable to 

find Appellant in indirect contempt. 

2. 42 Pa.C.S. § 4549(d) Cause Hearing – Whether the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction to enter a September 5, 2019 

witness nondisclosure order where Appellant moved for 

the release of the unredacted transcript and there was 

no evidence that a cause hearing prior to the 

nondisclosure order was held pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 4549(d).

C. May 10, 2021 Nondisclosure Order

1. 42 Pa.C.S. § 4549(d) Cause Hearing – Whether the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction to enter the May 10, 2021 order 

prohibiting Appellant from posting any grand jury 

materials or discussing any matters related to “any” 

grand jury investigation, for which he has not been called 

as a witness and there is no evidence that a cause 

hearing prior to the nondisclosure order was held 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 4549(d).

2. Overbreadth – Whether the trial court’s May 10, 2021 

order is overly broad by making everything connected 

with grand jury investigations untouchable, and violates 

Appellant’s First Amendment right of freedom of speech 

and press. 

Whether the trial court erred when ordering Appellant to 

file a motion with investigating grand jury supervising 

judge, the Hon. Kai N. Scott[, the trial judge,] for leave 

or in limine requesting permission to present his defense 
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and admit evidence in another case pending in Municipal 

Court.

D. Sufficiency of Evidence

1. Definite, Clear and Specific Nondisclosure Order –

Whether the evidence was insufficient to support a 

finding of indirect criminal contempt, as the September 

5, 2019 verbal order was not definite, clear and specific, 

and left doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to 

whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited, 

particularly given that Appellant showed lack of 

understanding and had no attorney present.

2. Wrongful Intent – Whether the evidence was insufficient 

to support a finding of indirect criminal contempt, as the 

Commonwealth failed to show that Appellant acted with 

wrongful intent to disobey a court order. 

Appellant’s Brief at 2-4. 

In Commonwealth v. Lambert, 147 A.3d 1221 (Pa. Super 2016), 

this Court explained: 

To establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must 

prove: 1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to 

the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) 

the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the 

violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must 

have acted with wrongful intent. Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36

A.3d 613, 619 (Pa. Super. 2012).

When reviewing a contempt conviction, much reliance is 

given to the discretion of the trial judge. Accordingly, the 

appellate court is confined to a determination of whether the 

facts support the trial court decision. Williams v.

Williams, 681 A.2d 181, 183 (Pa. Super. 1996). We will 

reverse a trial court’s determination only when there has 

been a plain abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Kolansky, 800 A.2d 937, 939 (Pa. Super.

2002).
J-S17035-22

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Id. at 1226 (cleaned up). 

In his first issue, Appellant contends the trial court violated his due 

process rights because there was no notice of an indirect criminal contempt 

charge prior to the commencement of the contempt hearing. He complains 

the rule to show cause directing him to appear at the October 29, 2020 hearing 

“failed to provide notice of the specific accusations against Appellant, and if 

the Commonwealth is seeking fines and/or imprisonment. Appellant had no 

notice of whether he was being accused of civil or indirect criminal contempt.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 19.5

Appellant’s assertion that he was not given notice of specific accusations 

is belied by the statement of his counsel at the beginning of the October 29, 

2020 hearing. At that time, his counsel represented that

the defense is that my client did not intentionally try to violate the 

court order with respect to violating a secrecy oath. That what he 

was trying to do is present his own defense in his criminal case; 

and that defense is that he suffered witness intimidation. So what 

was being revealed was not that the particular target of this grand 

jury investigation was actually under a grand jury investigation, 

but that my client had been intimidated as a witness before the 

grand jury. 

. . .

____________________________________________

5 Appellant acknowledged that the court clarified during the October 29, 2020 

hearing that Appellant was being charged with indirect criminal contempt. 

Appellant’s Brief at 19, n.15 (citation to notes of testimony omitted). 
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And what you are going to see on this video is not him saying the 

target, this particular person is under grand jury investigation and 

trying to violate it in that way.

N.T., 10/29/20, at 3-4, 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

The trial court rejected Appellant’s contention regarding lack of notice, 

explaining that he was given 

more than adequate notice: the supervising investigation grand 

jury judge made sure to explain what Appellant could and could 

not do . . . [and] also answered any questions Appellant had about 

what was permissible to post on his website and what his 

obligations were to avoid violating his oath of secrecy; and the 

trial court issued a Rule to Show Cause as to why Appellant should 

not be held in contempt for violation of his grand jury secrecy 

oath. As such, Appellant’s due process rights were not violated 

and he received more than sufficient notice, therefore, the trial 

court had proper jurisdiction.

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/31/21, at 11-12 (citation to notes of 

testimony from October 29, 2020 hearing omitted). 

Based on our review of the record, we find that facts support the trial 

court’s findings and that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining 

that Appellant’s due process rights were not violated. Therefore, we conclude 

that Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first issue.

In the first part of his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court 

erred by finding him in contempt because the September 5, 2019 order was 

verbal, was not reduced to writing, and was therefore unenforceable. 

Appellant’s argument is meritless. 

Appellant cites In re Tumpson, 345 A.2d 774 (Pa. Super. 1975), for 

the proposition that an oral order has no force or effect. Appellant’s Brief at 
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21. In Tumpson, counsel for a juvenile was convicted of indirect criminal 

contempt for allegedly advising a client to disobey a court order. However, 

no order had been issued. Rather, the trial court orally advised a juvenile 

probation officer that a hearing would be held in the juvenile’s case. The 

probation officer told the judge he would notify the juvenile, and did so. 

When the juvenile did not appear for the hearing, a bench warrant for 

his arrest was executed and the hearing was rescheduled. At the rescheduled 

hearing, the juvenile explained that he did not appear at the first hearing 

based on advice of his counsel, Tumpson. In response, the court issued a 

contempt citation and ordered counsel to show cause why he should not be 

held in contempt.

At the hearing on the rule, counsel requested a continuance to obtain 

his own counsel but also requested a copy of the order that he purportedly 

advised the juvenile to disobey. The court did not provide a copy of the 

order, acknowledging it was oral. The court allowed a continuance but 

eventually found counsel in contempt and fined him $50. 

On appeal to this Court, we reversed, finding the oral “order” had no 

force or effect. As the Court observed: 

Decrees and orders of court of record cannot be carried in the 

breast of the judge who makes them. If any regard is to be had 

to the regular and orderly conduct of judicial proceedings in such 

courts, all their orders, rules, and degrees must be recorded. The 

verbal order referred to never was recorded, and its first and only 

appearance in the case is the reference made to it in the appellee’s 

answer to appellant’s rule to show cause.
J-S17035-22

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Tumpson, 345 A.2d at 776 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. 

Magaziner, 253 A.2d 263, 267 (Pa. 1969)). 

We find that Tumpson is inapposite. There, the judge conveyed 

information about a scheduled proceeding to a probation officer who agreed 

to convey it to the juvenile. In contrast, here the trial court issued an order 

from the bench that was transcribed, thus creating a record of the order. As 

the trial court observed, “[L]itigants must be able to rely on representations 

made by the court, and it would be inequitable and detrimental to the 

functioning of the judicial system if such on-the-record representations could 

not be trusted.” Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/31/21, at 12 (quoting 

Jackson v. Hendrick, 746 A.2d 574, 576 (Pa. 2000) (plurality)). 

As the Commonwealth notes:

[Appellant] was informed at the September 5, 2019 hearing that 

he was not permitted to reveal any information regarding the 

grand jury investigation. He repeatedly stated that he understood 

the court’s order and would follow it. Although the order was 

provided to him orally, it was stenographically recorded on the 

record, as were Appellant’s representations that he understood 

and would follow the order. Thus [his] assertion that the order 

“was not reduced to writing” and therefore was “not enforceable” 

against him—or, in other words, could be completely ignored by 

him without any consequences—is baseless.

Commonwealth Brief at 22. We agree. Despite his assertions to the contrary, 

Tumpson does not afford Appellant any relief in the instant action. 

In the second part of his second issue, Appellant cites 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 4549(d) in support of his contention that the trial court lacked jurisdiction 

to enter the September 5, 2019 witness nondisclosure order. Similarly, in the 
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first part of his third issue, he cites Section 4549(d) in support of his argument 

that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the May 10, 2021 nondisclosure 

order relating to grand jury materials. The cited provision (Investigating 

Grand Jury Proceedings – Disclosure of Proceedings by Witness) directs that 

“[n]o witness shall be prohibited from disclosing his testimony before the 

investigating grand jury except for cause shown in a hearing before the 

supervising judge. In no event may a witness be prevented from disclosing 

his testimony to his attorney.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4549(d) (emphasis added). 

The Commonwealth highlights the fact that Section 4549(d) precludes 

prohibition of a witness’s disclosure of “his testimony.” However, Appellant 

never testified before the grand jury. Therefore, he could not have been found 

in contempt based on disclosure of his own testimony. Instead, he was found 

in contempt “because, in violation of the judge’s order, [Appellant] revealed 

that there was a grand jury proceeding and the substance of the matter it was 

investigating.” Commonwealth Brief at 25. “Since a cause hearing need be 

held only when a judge is prohibiting a witness from disclosing his ‘testimony,’ 

and since [Appellant] ultimately had no testimony to disclose, the question of 

whether a proper cause hearing was held is moot and cannot serve as a basis 

for relief.” Id. Moreover, in any event, the Commonwealth contends, the 

court did hold a proper cause hearing before issuing its order. Id. at 26.

In addition to claiming lack of jurisdiction regarding the May 10, 2021

order, Appellant argues in the second part of his third issue that the May 2021 
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order is overly broad. In response, the Commonwealth not only recognized 

the important governmental interest in protecting the secrecy of grand jury 

proceedings, Commonwealth Brief at 32, but also noted that Appellant “had 

already directly violated the court’s earlier nondisclosure order.” Id. at 31. 

The Commonwealth highlighted Appellant’s claim that he was confused by the 

order and did not realize posting a video on the Internet that disclosed the 

existence and subject of the investigation was prohibited, a claim dispelled by 

a review of Appellant’s own testimony. The Commonwealth also correctly 

observed that the May 2021 order was necessary to ensure that Appellant “did 

not once again violate the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings, and [to 

avoid] confusion, real of feigned, on [Appellant’s] part regarding what 

information he was precluded from revealing.” Id. 

Addressing and rejecting Appellant’s assertions regarding both the 

September 2019 and May 2021 orders, the trial court explained:

On September 5, 2019, the supervising judge presiding over the 

investigating grand jury issued both a secrecy oath and a 

nondisclosure order to Appellant. The trial court had jurisdiction 

to enter both the September 5, 2019 witness nondisclosure order 

and the May 10, 2021 order prohibiting Appellant from posting 

any grand jury materials because Appellant had received, 

understood, and agreed to the secrecy oath and nondisclosure 

order. During the hearing held on September 5, 2019, one of the 

first questions Appellant was asked about was regarding the grand 

jury subpoena and the sealing order he received while 

livestreaming. The trial court had a long conversation with 

Appellant regarding the secrecy oath, answered any questions 

Appellant had, and the May 10, 2021 order essentially reduced 

the trial court’s verbal order to a written order and re-emphasized 

the secrecy aspect of his previous oath.
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The cause hearing for the nondisclosure order was held prior to 

the date that Appellant was sworn in on September 5, 2019, 

without the presence of Appellant. The Commonwealth was the 

party requesting the nondisclosure order and explained why there 

should be a nondisclosure order issued. As with all grand jury 

matters, a witness (in this case Appellant) is not entitled to hear 

relevant information about what other witnesses may say that 

may have gone to the supervising judge’s determination that the 

nondisclosure order was appropriate. In the instant matter, a 

nondisclosure order was deemed appropriate, in part, based on 

Appellant’s prior conduct of recording being served with the grand 

jury subpoena and his actions of holding himself out as the press.

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/31/21, at 10-11 (citations to notes of 

testimony omitted). 

We dismiss Appellant’s suggestion that the May 2021 order violated his 

freedom of speech and somehow impaired his ability to prepare a defense in 

his unrelated VUFA case. As the Commonwealth contends, the order “simply 

requires [Appellant] to obtain the supervising judge’s permission before 

disclosing grand jury information, and this requirement is necessary because 

[Appellant] has blamed his failure to follow the earlier nondisclosure order on 

his inability to understand what the order covered.” Commonwealth Brief at 

32. With regard to his defense of the VUFA charges, the court’s order “permits 

[Appellant] to seek leave of court if he has reason to use the grand jury 

information,” id. at 33, and can obtain relief, if he can demonstrate how that 

information can in anyway be relevant to his firearms charges. Therefore, we 

reject any assertion that the order imposes an improper restriction on his 

ability to defend himself. 
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Based on our review, we conclude that trial court had jurisdiction to 

enter both the September 5, 2019 and May 10, 2021 orders, and further 

conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the May 10, 2021 order 

is not overly broad and does not preclude Appellant from seeking leave of 

court to disclose materials. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the 

trial court, we shall not disturb its conclusions. Appellant’s second and third 

issues fail for lack of merit.

In his fourth issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting a finding of indirect criminal contempt. He argues that the order 

was not definite, clear, or specific, and further contends that the 

Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that Appellant acted with wrongful 

intent to disobey a court order. 

In Commonwealth v. Walsh, 36 A.3d 613 (Pa. Super. 2012), this 

Court reiterated:

Our standard of review in assessing whether sufficient evidence 

was presented to sustain [an a]ppellant’s conviction is wellsettled. The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, we may 

not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may 

be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 
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evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Id. at 618-19 (quoting Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 109-

10 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted)). Again, 

[t]o establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must 

prove: 1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to 

the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) 

the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the 

violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must 

have acted with wrongful intent. 

Id. (quoting Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d at 110) (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court concluded that its order was sufficiently definite, 

clear, and specific “as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited in 

[Appellant’s] mind. [He] was clearly told that he could not speak about 

anything that was being said in the room, including the nature of the 

investigation and that a grand jury investigation even existed.” Trial Court 

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 8/31/21, at 14. Further, Appellant “was permitted to 

ask questions [if] he was unclear about anything that was stated to him, which 

he made sure to ask, and there was nothing ambiguous about the trial court’s 

verbal order.” Id. The court found that Appellant’s statement during the 

September 5, 2019 hearing did not exhibit a lack of understanding on his part. 

Rather, his testimony “actually shows that he does, in fact, understand that 

he is not permitted to speak about the grand jury investigation as he states, 

‘I wouldn’t do that,’ in response to being explicitly told not to speak about the 
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grand jury investigation.” Id. We agree with the trial court that the order 

was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific, satisfying the first prong of the 

test. Further, it is unquestioned that Appellant had notice of the order, as 

reflected in his statement that he would not speak about the investigation, 

satisfying the second prong. 

With respect to the act being volitional and the contemnor’s wrongful 

intent, this Court has held that “[w]rongful intent will be found where the 

contemnor knows or reasonably should be aware that his conduct is 

wrongful.” Stewart v. Foxworth, 65 A.3d 468, 472 (Pa. Super.

2013) (quoting Himes v. Himes, 833 A.2d 1124, 1126 (Pa. Super.

2003)). “It is imperative that trial judges use common sense and consider 

the context and surrounding factors in making their determinations of 

whether a violation of a court order is truly intentional before imposing 

sanctions of criminal contempt.” Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 A.2d

1174, 1177 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 887 A.2d 1240 (Pa.

2005) (emphasis in original).

Here, the trial court recognized that “[w]rongful intent can be inferred 

if the [Appellant’s] act had substantial certainty of being in violation of the 

order.” Id. at 15 (citing Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d at 110). Further:

[Appellant] knew that by recording the video and mentioning the 

grand jury investigation that he was in direct violation of the 

September 5, 2019 order, yet he chose to release the video on his 

website anyway. [His] assertion that he recorded and released 

the video on his website as some sort of defense to his pending 
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case holds no persuasiveness as it was the wrong forum. [He] 

should have presented evidence during trial of his pending case, 

not posting a video publicly on his website, which instead 

appeared retaliatory towards the Commonwealth or the police 

department and indicated wrongful intent on [Appellant’s] part. 

Id. (citation to notes of testimony omitted). Not only does his conduct support 

the conclusion that he acted with wrongful intent, but also his suggestion that 

he released the video as part of his defense confirms that his conduct was 

volitional. 

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

we agree that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court, as factfinder, to 

conclude that every element of the crime of indirect criminal contempt was 

established beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant’s fourth issue fails.

Again, “when reviewing a contempt conviction, much reliance is given 

to the discretion of the trial judge” and “[w]e will reverse a trial court’s 

determination only when there has been a plain abuse of discretion.” 

Lambert, 137 A.3d at 1226 (citations omitted). Finding no “plain abuse of 

discretion” in the trial court’s determination, we shall not disturb it. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/8/2022