alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32

                            SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION






<PAGE>



                                   Exhibit 32

                     CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of  INTREorg  Systems,  Inc.  (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the period  ending March 31, 2009 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report") I, Russell
K. Boyd, Principal Executive Officer, Chief Executive Officer of the Company and
Principal  Accounting  Officer,  certify,  pursuant to 18 USC section  1350,  as
adopted pursuant to section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that to the
best of my knowledge and belief:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.


Dated: May 20, 2009

Name: Russell K. Boyd

/s/ Russell K. Boyd
---------------------------------------
Russell K. Boyd, (Principal Executive Officer,
Chief Executive Officer and Principal Accounting Officer)


This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed  filed by the  Company  for  purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
Exhibit 10.8


 


SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT


 


		TO:	The Directors of Qomolangma Acquisition Corp. (the “Company”).



 


The undersigned
hereby subscribes for 15,000 shares of common stock (the “Shares”)
of the Company. In consideration for the issue of the Shares, the undersigned hereby agrees and undertakes to pay $260.88 to the Company.


 


We agree to take the Shares subject to the Certificate of Incorporation
and By-laws of the Company and we authorize you to enter the following name and address in the stockholders
ledger of the Company:


 


	 	Name:	Jialuan Ma
	 	 	 
	 	Address:  	Apartment 1002, Building 3, No. 238

 Huo Xiang Road, Pudong, Shanghai


 


	/s/ Jialuan Ma	 
	Name:  	Jialuan Ma	 
	 	 	 
	Dated:	September 25, 2021	 


 


	Accepted:	 
	 	 
	QOMOLANGMA ACQUISITION CORP	 
	 	 	 
	Signed:  	/s/ Jonathan Myers	 
	Name:	Jonathan Myers	 
	Title:	President and Chief Executive Officer	 
	 	 	 
	Dated:	September 25, 2021
Dismissed and Opinion Filed March 19, 2020

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 20

- 00059

- CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A .E., A.E., AND A.E., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 417th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 417

- 50225

- 2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Molberg, and Carlyle Opinion by Justice Molberg The clerk’s record in this appeal has not been filed because appel lant has not paid or made arrangements to pay the clerk’s fee. By letter dated February 18, 2020,
we directed appellant to file, within ten days, written verification he had paid or
made arrangements to pay the fee or was entitled to proceed without payme nt of
costs. Although we cautioned appellant that failure to comply could result in
dismissal of the appeal, appellant has yet to comply. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 37.3(b).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See id. 37.3(b), 42.3(b),(c).

200059f.p05 /Ken Molberg// KEN MOLBERG JUSTICE– 2

– 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF A.E., A.E., AND A.E., CHILDREN

No. 05

- 20

- 00059

- CV On Appeal from the 417th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 417

- 50225

- 2018. Opinion delivered by Justice Molberg, Justices Bridges and Carlyle participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS the appeal.

We ORDER that appellee Audrey Evans recover her costs, if any, of this appeal from appellant Dustin Dwight Evans.

Judgment entered this 19 th day of March 2020.
## **Exhibit 31.2**

##  

**Section 302Certification**

 

I, David Sheridan, certifythat:

 

1.    Ihave reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Seneca GamingCorporation;

 

2.    Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3.    Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

 

4.    Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

 

(a)          Designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b)         Evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

 

(c)          Discussedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

 

5.    Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a)          Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

 

(b)         Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

 

 
| Date: August 14, 2008 | /s/ David Sheridan                             |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
|                       | David Sheridan   Chief Financial Officer       |
|                       |                                           |
|                       | (Principal Financial and   Accounting Officer) |

 

----
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 20-2717

___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v. Juan Juarez-Colmenero lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

____________ Submitted: May 10, 2021 Filed: June 25, 2021 [Unpublished]

____________ Before COLLOTON, WOLLMAN, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Juan Juarez-Colmenero pleaded guilty to being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5) and 924(a)(2), and was sentenced to 84 monthsin prison. He appeals, arguing the district court 1 imposed a substantively

unreasonable sentence. We affirm. Juarez-Colmenero was arrested after police discovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and two guns in his car. One of those guns had a defaced serial number and a magazine that could hold 16 rounds. He pleaded guilty to being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm, and the U.S. Probation Office assessed him a total offense level of 25, yielding an advisory Guidelines range of 84 to 105 months. The district court sentenced him to 84 months in prison. Juarez-Colmenero argues that the district court committed a clear error ofjudgment in weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and imposing a bottom-of-theGuidelines sentence. He says the district court should have varied downward because his offense was non-violent, he had not previously served time in prison, and his 16- round magazine put him just over the threshold for an enhancement under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(I). He also argues the advisory Guidelines range is better suited to those with histories of violent felonies, which he does not have. Finally, he says there is no need to protect the public because he promised not to illegally reenter the United States. We review sentences first for procedural error and, finding no error, for substantive unreasonableness under “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). Juarez-Colmenero does not argue procedural error, so we will only address substantive unreasonableness. We presume Juarez-Colmenero’s within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable. See United States v. Harris, 964 F.3d 718, 725 (8th Cir. 2020).

1 The Honorable Roseann Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. -2-We find no clear error of judgment in the district court’s weighing of the

§ 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc). The record reflects that the district court considered all of the factors and responded to each of Juarez-Colmenero’s arguments, even acknowledging that he persuaded the court to impose a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence. “The mere fact that the court could have weighed the sentencing factors differently does not amount to an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hall, 825 F.3d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 2016). The district court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

-3-
State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: April 9, 2015 518917 

________________________________

In the Matter of the Claim of

MARIA BELLANTONI,

Respondent,

v

CITY OF NEW YORK SCHOOL FOOD MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

AND NUTRITION SERVICES,

Appellant.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD,

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: February 18, 2015

Before: Peters, P.J., Lahtinen, Garry and Lynch, JJ.

__________

Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City

(Andrew Tran of counsel), for appellant.

Grey & Grey, LLP, Farmingdale (Kevin Plant of counsel), for

Maria Bellantoni, respondent.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City (Iris

A. Steel of counsel), for Workers' Compensation Board,

respondent.

__________

Lynch, J.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board,

filed July 22, 2013, which ruled that the employer waived the

right to raise the defense that claimant provided untimely notice

of her injury.
-2- 518917 

Claimant applied for workers' compensation benefits in

2011, alleging that she suffered a work-related injury to her

shoulder in 2009. The employer controverted the claim, but

neither filed a timely prehearing conference statement as

required by Workers' Compensation Law § 25 (2-a) (d) nor an

affidavit demonstrating due diligence and good cause for the

delay (see also 12 NYCRR 300.38 [f] [1]). As a result, the

Workers' Compensation Board ultimately determined that the

employer waived its defenses to the claim pursuant to 12 NYCRR

300.38 (f) (4) (see Matter of Quagliata v Starbucks Coffee, 82

AD3d 1321, 1322 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 703 [2011]; Matter of

Smith v Albany County Sheriff's Dept., 82 AD3d 1334, 1335 [2011],

lv denied 17 NY3d 770 [2011]). The employer now appeals.

"Inasmuch as the Board's decision was interlocutory and did

not dispose of all of the substantive issues or reach a

potentially dispositive threshold legal issue, it is not

appealable" (Matter of Lewis v Stewart's Mktg. Corp., 122 AD3d

1048, 1049 [2014] [internal quotation marks and citations

omitted]; see Matter of Zaldivar v SNS Org., 119 AD3d 1134, 1135

[2014]). We decline to review the Board's decision here, as it

continued the case for a determination by a Workers' Compensation

Law Judge as to whether claimant has presented sufficient

evidence to establish a claim, and the employer may appeal, if

necessary, from the Board's final decision on this issue (see

Matter of Ortiz v Martin Viette Nurseries, Inc., 82 AD3d 1480,

1480-1481 [2011]; Matter of Ogbuagu v Ngbadi, 61 AD3d 1198, 1199

[2009]). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Peters, P.J., Lahtinen and Garry, JJ., concur.
-3- 518917 

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-18-00398-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 323rd District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 323-105898-17

Before Kerr, Gabriel, and Pittman, JJ.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

IN THE INTEREST OF T.A., T.A., AND T.A., CHILDREN
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

We have considered “Appellant’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal.” We grant the 

motion and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f).

Per Curiam

Delivered: January 24, 2019
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

Appellate case name: Maxine Adams and Cecil Adams v. Rebecca Ross

Appellate case number: 01-11-00098-CV

Trial court case number: 980231

Trial court: County Civil Court at Law No. 1 of Harris County, Texas

Appellants’ motion for rehearing is DENIED. 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Harvey Brown

Acting for the Court

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Brown.

Date: May 15, 2013
#### PEOPLE of the State of Colorado in the Interest of R. L. N., Child. Upon the Petition of F. C. T., Petitioner-Appellant And Concerning J. D. C., Respondent-Appellee.

No. 79CA0657.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

Jan. 4, 1980.

*492Robert R. Gallagher, Jr., Dist. Atty., Ray L. Weaver, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., Little-ton, for petitioner-appellant.

No appearance for respondent-appellee.

COYTE, Judge.

From the dismissal of her petition in a paternity proceeding, petitioner appeals. We reverse.

On September 7, 1969, respondent, 171⁄2 years of age, signed the following affidavit:

> “COMES NOW [J.D.C.], who first being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: That he is the father of a minor child to be born of [F.C.N.] . . . on or about 12th day of September, 1967, and does hereby acknowledge paternity of the said minor child by [F.C.N.]

> FURTHER: He does acknowledge his liability for the support of the minor child and will pay according to his ability in the future, including an allotment from any military pay he may receive.”

When the amended petition seeking determination of respondent’s paternity was filed, the child referred to in the affidavit, R.L.N., was 10 years old. The trial court determined that the affidavit was invalid and that therefore the action was barred by § 19-6-101(2), C.R.S.1973 (ef. § 19-6-108, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8)), which statute limited the right to bring a paternity action after five years from the birth of the child, unless the provision was tolled by the conduct of the putative father, such as signing a valid acknowledgment of paternity. *See People in the Interest of L.L.R. II,*39 Colo. App. 180, 562 P.2d 1121 (1977).

The trial court ruled that unless a guardian, parent, or legal counsel is present at the signing of an acknowledgment of paternity by a minor, such acknowledgment is void. We agree with petitioner that the ruling is erroneous.

The record on appeal is very limited; however, it appears that the trial court relied on § 19-2-102(3)(c)(I), C.R.S.1973, in holding that the acknowledgment was void. The clear purpose of that statute is to afford a special protection to a juvenile who is in police custody because of alleged criminal acts. *See People v. Maes,*194 Colo. 235, 571 P.2d 305 (1977); *see also People v. Maynes,*193 Colo. 111, 562 P.2d 756 (1977). In contrast here, the admission of paternity did not pertain to any allegation of criminal conduct, and therefore, the statute is inap-posite.

Moreover, the mere infancy of respondent at the time of signing the affidavit would not render the affidavit void. As stated in *De Souza v. Barber,*263 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1959):

> “A statutory definition of minority, without more, does not in itself render inadmissible confessions or admissions of an infant. Whether the confession or admission is competent depends not alone upon the infant’s age, but also upon his intelligence, education, information, understanding, and ability to comprehend.”

Consequently, the dismissal of the petition by the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings in conformity with the foregoing.

PIERCE and RULAND, JJ., concur.
#### Alice Selph, Plaintiff in Error, v. L. C. Cobb, Defendant in Error.

APPELLATE PRACTICE — PRESENTING ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR TO JUDGE WITH BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

A failure to comply with the rule requiring an assignment of errors to be presented to the judge at the time of the settlement of a bill of exceptions to serve as a guide for making up such bill of exceptions, is ground for dismissal of the cause in .the appellate court, even though the bill of exceptions he signed by the judge in the absence of such assignment of errors. The proper practice in such cases is for the judge to refuse to sign such bill of exceptions until an assignment of errors is presented as the guide for t making it up.

This case was decided by the Court En Banc.

*229Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Columbia County.

The facts in the case are stated in the opinon of the Court.

*A. J. Henry*and *Roberson & Small,*for Plaintiff in Error.

• *Boozer & Gillen*and *T. B. Oliver, for*Defendant in Error.

Per Curiam.

This cause came' on to be heard before the court *en banc,*upon motion of the defendant, in error to dismiss the writ of-error. The second ground of this motion is, in substance, that no assignment of errors was presented to the judge at the time of the presentation or settlement of the bill of exceptions.

It appears from the certificate of the judge appended to the bill of exceptions that this ground of the motion is true. This omission is in direct violation of Special Rule One for the government of Circuit Courts in the preparation of bills of exceptions, which expressly provides that such assignment of errors so to be. presented to the judge shall be the guide for making up such bill of exceptions. The judge should have refused to sign such bill in the absence of such assignment of errors, and the violation of the rule in this respect is ground for dismissal of the cause. Florida, Central and Peninsular R. R. Co. v. Peacock, 44 Fla. 176, 33 South. Rep. 247; Southerland v. Sandlin, 44 Fla. 332, 32 South. Rep. 786.

Were there any assignments of error relied upon here based upon the record proper, we might visit the violation of the rule complained of upon the bill 'of excep*230tions alone by striking it from the record, but as there is no error assigned here except such as can be exhibited in and by a bill of exceptions, the writ of error must be dismissed, at the cost of the plaintiff in error, and it is hereby so ordered.

Whitfield, C. J., and Taylor, Hocker, Cockrell, Shackleford and Carter, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION





Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


(Section
1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code)





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Orsus Xelent Technologies, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the
Securities Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Hua Chen,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section
1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.





Date:
August 16, 2010


By:
              /s/ Hua ChenHua
      ChenChief
      Financial Officer





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
WILLIAM L. OWENS 

:3M> DnjniCT, New VOHK 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Ain AND LAND Foveas 

STBArecic POKES 

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURfTY 

EMIMIN O THHCATS, CvUnCCUP^TV, AMD 

SCIENCI AMD TECHMOLOOV 

EuemiNCY CoMMUracAn^f, 

PUPAREDMSI AND RESKN M 

Consrefisi of tf)e Winitth ^tatt% 

$oiu(e of JKepres(mratJbr£ 

Was^instott, Sl£ 20515 

September 24,2010 

S10-ll)()^.>29-().V> 

FIEASE HESrQND H) 

WASHINGTON OFFICe 

I—i 3340 RAYSURN HOUSE Ornct Bunoma 

WAEHir*aTON, DC 2M15-3233 

130}) 335^611 

OiSTHiCT OFFICE: 

D 120 WASHINOTOU STKEEI, Sum 300 

WATUTOMN, NY 13901-3370 

(315J7i3-3I60 

L-1 14 DunuE STKEET, SUTE 310 

PLArrsauHgH, NY 1ZM1-Z99S 

15181503-1400 

Secretary lUy LaHood 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

400 7th Street, SW 

Washington, DC 20590-0001 

Dear Secretary LaHood, 

'-:'^^-:^ 

I would like to express my support for the U.S. Department of Transportation Small Community Air 

Service Devdopmcnt Program Grant Application submitted by the City of Syracuse, NY and the 

CentexState Corporation for Economic Opportunity. This grant would be used to enhance the quality of 

air service ctmcntly available at the Syracuse Hancock International Airport, as well as to attract new, 

low cost air-lines to the facility. 

The Syracuse Airport serves Central and Northern New York, where a lack of affordable air fare has been 

a serious and consistent issue, negatively impacting the local business conummity. The airport has been 

working in conjunction with a strong coalition of local elected ofGcials, economic developers, and 

business leaders to improve the region's air service for some time now. Recently, the City of Syracuse, in 

collaboration with the CenterState Corporation for Economic Opportunity, applied for a $1,000,000 grant, 

to be combined with a $300,000 commitment &om local businesses. Tlus money will be used to attiact 

new, low-coat carriers to the Airport, not only improving the quality and affordability of the air services 

offered at Hancock Airport, but helping local business and benefitting the broader Central and Northern 

New York Region as well. 

I ask that you give this application your most thoughtful and serious considcratioa If you need any 

additional information, please contact Madeline Donovan in my Watcrtown ofHcc at (31S) 782-31 SO. 

Sincerely, 

0U/(^^x-^ 

Bill Owens 

Member of Congress 

WLO/md 

PRlWTtD ON RECYCLEO PAPEft