United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 22-2057

___________________________ 

Courtnay Bell

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Baptist Health, doing business as Baptist Health Medical Center-North Little Rock

 Defendant - Appellee

Dr. Kapil Yadav

 Defendant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

____________ 

Submitted: January 10, 2023

Filed: February 28, 2023

____________ 

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

____________
-2- 

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Courtnay Bell appeals the district court’s1 grant of summary judgment to the 

defendant, Baptist Health, on her sex-discrimination, retaliation, hostile work 

environment, constructive-discharge, and negligent-retention claims. We affirm.

I.

Bell was a staff radiologic technologist for Baptist Health at its North Little 

Rock location. She regularly worked in the catheterization laboratory with doctors 

from Arkansas Cardiology, P.A., who provided interventional-cardiology services 

for Baptist Health. She worked with Dr. Thomas Conley and Dr. Kapil Yadav, 

among others.

In March 2019, Bell began documenting incidents between herself and Dr. 

Yadav. She alleges the following incidents between March and November 2019: 

Dr. Yadav was angry with her when an x-ray tube froze up; ignored her statement to 

him that a patient’s family was not present and asked a male co-worker about the 

patient’s family instead; told her not to make fun of him after she made a comment 

to him; spoke to her in an accusatory tone when he asked her whether she had 

answered his phone during a procedure; became frustrated with her for taking too 

long to prepare a patient and made derogatory statements to her about her prepping 

of a patient; and, during a procedure, threw a used syringe past her onto a patient’s 

groin, screamed at her, and threatened to report her. Bell claims that during one of 

the incidents a male witness stated that he wished Dr. Yadav “would not treat the 

women here differently than he treats the men.” Bell admits that Dr. Yadav never 

made any sexual comments to her but believes that he treated her differently than 

the men with whom he worked.

1

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern 

District of Arkansas.
-3- 

In August 2019, Bell reported some of these incidents to Baptist Health 

through its hotline. Later that month, Bell filed a complaint with the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission alleging discrimination by Dr. Yadav. After 

reporting these incidents, she met with her supervisor and the Perioperative Services 

Director. They created a safety plan, under which Bell would call them if she felt 

unsafe working with Dr. Yadav and one of them would step in to cover for her. She 

did so once after an incident with Dr. Conley.

Bell had an incident with Dr. Conley on November 20, 2019. Bell was 

working with Dr. Conley and reported to Baptist Health that she thought he was 

intoxicated during a procedure. Dr. Conley was required to take a breathalyzer test 

to prove that the allegation was false. Furious, he then told Baptist Health that he 

would never work with her again. That day, Bell was placed on paid administrative 

leave until April 2020. 

In March 2020, Baptist Health offered Bell the option to return to work and 

transfer to either Baptist Health Little Rock or Baptist Health Conway or to remain 

at Baptist Health North Little Rock. Regardless of her choice, her duties, hours, and 

pay would remain the same. Bell refused the offer because she did not want to work 

with Dr. Yadav again, even though he mainly worked at the North Little Rock 

location. Bell never investigated how often Dr. Yadav worked at the other two 

Baptist Health locations. Bell also testified that Baptist Health offered to transfer

her to another department, but that she did not think she should have to change

departments to avoid working with Dr. Yadav. 

Bell ultimately sued Baptist Health and Dr. Yadav for sex discrimination and 

retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Arkansas Civil 

Rights Act (“ACRA”); constructive discharge and negligent retention under 

Arkansas state law; and conspiracy to deprive her of equal protection under 42 

U.S.C. § 1985. After Dr. Yadav was dismissed as a defendant, Baptist Health moved 

for summary judgment, and the district court granted its motion. Bell appeals.
-4- 

II.

We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Mobley v. St. Luke’s Health 

Sys., Inc., 53 F.4th 452, 455 (8th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate “if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Paul’s Indus. Garage, Inc. v. 

Goodhue Cnty., 35 F.4th 1097, 1099 (8th Cir. 2022). 

A.

First, we address Bell’s constructive discharge claim. “Title VII encompasses 

employer liability for a constructive discharge.” Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 

U.S. 129, 143 (2004). To establish a claim of constructive discharge, Bell must show 

that “(1) a reasonable person in her situation would find the working conditions 

intolerable, and (2) the employer intended to force her to quit. An employee must, 

however, grant her employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the intolerable 

condition before she terminates her employment.” Rester v. Stephens Media, LLC, 

739 F.3d 1127, 1132 (8th Cir. 2014). The bar to show constructive discharge is high. 

O’Brien v. Dep’t of Agric., 532 F.3d 805, 810-11 (8th Cir. 2008). Here, Bell 

presented no evidence that Baptist Health intended to force her to quit. Rather, the 

record indicates that Baptist Health tried to retain Bell by giving her paid 

administrative leave, offering to relocate her to a different location, and offering to 

transfer her to a new department. Thus, the district court did not err in granting 

summary judgment to Baptist Health on this claim.

B. 

Second, we address Bell’s sex-discrimination and retaliation claims. These 

claims both fail for the same reason: there is no genuine dispute of material fact 

about whether Bell suffered an adverse employment action.
-5- 

Bell alleges sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the ACRA, Ark. Code § 16-123-

101 et seq. The analysis is the same under both statutes. See Barber v. C1 Truck 

Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 792 (8th Cir. 2011) (addressing sex 

discrimination); Burkhart v. American Railcar Indus., Inc., 603 F.3d 472, 477 (8th 

Cir. 2010) (addressing retaliation). The McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting 

framework applies to both her sex-discrimination and retaliation claims because she 

does not offer direct evidence of either. See Bearden v. Int’l Paper Co., 529 F.3d 

828, 831 (8th Cir. 2008); Gibson v. Concrete Equip. Co., 960 F.3d 1057, 1064 (8th 

Cir. 2020) (noting that the McDonnell-Douglas framework applies to retaliation 

claims based on indirect evidence). To establish a prima facie case of sex 

discrimination, Bell “must show that (1) she was a member of the protected group; 

(2) she was qualified to perform the job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment 

action; and (4) circumstances permit an inference of discrimination.” See Bearden, 

529 F.3d at 831. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Bell must show “that 

(1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she suffered a materially adverse 

employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to the protected 

conduct.” See Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800,

804 (8th Cir. 2013).

A materially adverse employment action “is a tangible change in working 

conditions that produces a material employment disadvantage.” Rester, 739 F.3d at

1131. “Such action might include termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes 

that affect an employee’s future career prospects but minor changes are not 

enough.”2

 Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The focus is on 

“material adversity” so we can “separate significant from trivial harms.” Burlington 

N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (emphasis omitted). “In the 

retaliation context, a materially adverse action is one that might have dissuaded a 

2

Although a constructive discharge is also a materially adverse employment 

action, Fercello v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1083 (8th Cir. 2010), we already 

concluded that there is no genuine dispute of material fact about whether Bell was 

constructively discharged.
-6- 

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 

Jackman, 728 F.3d at 804-05 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Bell’s sex-discrimination and retaliation claims fail because she has not 

suffered an adverse employment action. Baptist Health offered for Bell to keep her 

same job at any one of three locations or to transfer departments. Even if it is 

possible that Bell would have to work periodically with Dr. Yadav if she worked at 

other locations, she could have transferred to another department where she would 

not have to work with Dr. Yadav. Bell has not shown that transferring to another 

department would produce a material employment disadvantage. See Rester, 739 

F.3d at 1131. Finally, for her retaliation claim, there is no evidence that the offer to 

keep her same job at either of the three locations or to transfer to another department 

would have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 

discrimination. See Jackman, 728 F.3d at 804-05. Thus, the district court did not 

err in granting summary judgment to Baptist Health on this claim.

C. 

Third, we address Bell’s claim of a hostile work environment. Sex 

discrimination that creates a hostile work environment or abusive work environment 

violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vajdl v. Mesabi Acad. of 

KidsPeace, Inc., 484 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 2007). “A hostile work environment 

arises when sexual conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 

with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or 

offensive working environment.” Id. at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Hostile work environment claims are limited in nature, requiring a high evidentiary 

showing that the plaintiff’s workplace is permeated with discriminatory 

intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “To establish a prima facie hostile work 

environment claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she was a member of a protected 

group; (2) the occurrence of unwelcome harassment; (3) a causal nexus between the 
-7- 

harassment and her membership in the protected group; (4) that the harassment 

affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) that the employer 

knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt and 

effective remedial action.” Id. 

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Baptist Health 

on this claim because there is no evidence that the alleged discrimination by Dr. 

Yadav was based on sex. We have previously held that there was no genuine dispute 

of material fact about whether alleged harassment was based on sex when the 

plaintiff failed to present evidence of the offender’s motivation. See Linville v. 

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 335 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“While 

Farnham’s striking Linville in the scrotum and laughing was probative of crude, 

gender-specific vulgarity, it was not, by itself, probative of gender discrimination.”). 

Here, Bell alleges six incidents with Dr. Yadav between March and November 2019, 

and she admits that Dr. Yadav made no sexual remarks. Nonetheless, Bell alleges 

that Dr. Yadav’s comments were motivated by sex because he treated women worse 

than men. But Bell provides no evidence besides her own allegations that Dr. Yadav 

treated women worse than men. For example, she did not provide testimony or

formal complaints from female coworkers alleging that they were similarly treated 

badly by Dr. Yadav. Though she claims that a male coworker once commented on 

how Dr. Yadav treats women worse than men, her allegation is inadmissible hearsay 

that we cannot consider at summary judgment, see Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 

377 F.3d 917, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2004), and her male coworker did not substantiate 

her claim in his deposition. Thus, no reasonable jury could conclude that Dr. 

Yadav’s actions towards Bell were based on her sex. 3

 See Palesch v. Mo. Comm’n 

3

Even if there were a genuine dispute of material fact about the causal nexus 

between the harassment and Bell’s sex, we would conclude that the harassment was 

not sufficiently severe and pervasive to affect a term, condition, or privilege of Bell’s 

employment. See Singletary v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrs., 423 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 

2005). The alleged harassment is not “so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it 

poisoned the work environment.” See LeGrand v. Area Res. for Cmty. & Hum. 

Servs., 394 F.3d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Bainbridge v. Loffredo 

Gardens, Inc., 378 F.3d 756, 759-60 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that racial slurs 
-8- 

on Hum. Rts., 233 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2000) (granting summary judgment to the 

defendant because the plaintiff presented no evidence besides her allegations that 

she was harassed because of her race or sex). 

D.

Lastly, we address Bell’s state-law negligent-retention claim. To prevail on

this claim, Bell must show that “the employer knew or, through the exercise of 

ordinary care, should have known that the employee’s conduct would subject third 

parties to an unreasonable risk of harm.” Med. Assurance Co. v. Castro, 302 S.W.3d 

592, 595 (Ark. 2009). “As with any other negligence claim, a plaintiff must show 

that the employer’s negligent supervision or negligent retention of the employee was 

a proximate cause of the injury and that the harm to third parties was foreseeable.” 

Id. 

Bell argues that Baptist Health knew of multiple written complaints by Bell 

of Dr. Yadav’s behavior yet did nothing. But the evidence does not suggest that 

Baptist Health subjected her to any unreasonable risk of harm. See id. at 595. Here, 

prior to Bell submitting her complaints, there is no evidence that Baptist Health knew 

that Dr. Yadav posed a risk of harm to Bell. Cf. Saine v. Comcast Cablevision of 

Ark., 126 S.W.3d 339, 498-500 (2003) (concluding that a factual question existed 

about whether an employer knew or should have known that an employee—with a 

known record of inappropriate behavior—would subject others to an unreasonable 

risk of harm). And soon after Bell reported her complaints to Baptist Health’s 

hotline (and only a few months after the incidents began), it offered her a safety plan

(which Bell utilized), placed her on paid administrative leave, and offered her 

positions limiting her interaction with Dr. Yadav. Thus, the district court did not err 

in granting summary judgment to Baptist Health on Bell’s negligent-retention claim.

occurring once a month for two years were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to 

create a hostile work environment); O’Brien, 532 F.3d at 809-10 (holding that verbal 

harassment and increased scrutiny were not severe or pervasive enough to give rise 

to a hostile work environment).
-9- 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Baptist Health.

______________________________