[Cite as Cleveland v. Clark, 2024-Ohio-4491.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF CLEVELAND, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 113546

v. :

LAMARCO CLARK, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 12, 2024 

Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court 

Case No. 2022TRC012227

Appearances:

Mark Griffin, City of Cleveland Director of Law, Aqueelah 

A. Jordan, Chief Prosecutor, and Margaret Scott, Assistant 

City Prosecutor, for appellee.

Law Office of Victor O. Chukwudelunzu, LLC and Victor 

Chukwudelunzu, for appellant.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant, Lamarco Clark (“Clark”), appeals from his 

convictions for driving while under the influence of alcohol and failure to stop at a 

stop sign, following a bench trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History

This case originated with a motor vehicle accident that occurred on

August 10, 2022 which involved Christina Crandell (“Crandell”) and Clark, at the 

intersection of East 99th Street and South Boulevard in Cleveland, Ohio. 

The City of Cleveland (“the City”) alleged that Crandell drove her 

automobile east on South Boulevard towards the East 99th Street intersection where 

she had a stop sign for her lane of travel. The City further alleged that Crandell came 

to a complete stop at the intersection, looked both directions for traffic, observed no 

oncoming vehicles and proceeded into the intersection. Clark, who was 

simultaneously proceeding south on East 99th Street towards the intersection of 

South Boulevard, allegedly driving while intoxicated, failed to stop at the stop sign 

and struck the front driver side of Crandell’s vehicle. 

Officer Kortez Johnson (“Johnson”) and Officer Matthew Woznicki 

(“Woznicki”), of the Cleveland Division of Police, were dispatched to the scene of the 

automobile accident. The officers spoke with Clark, Crandell and witnesses and

inspected the property damage, the accident scene and the position of the vehicles 

after the accident. Pursuant to the officers’ investigation, a complaint was filed 

against Clark on August 21, 2022, charging him with failure to stop at a stop sign in 

violation of Cleveland Cod. Ord. (“C.C.O.”) 431.19, a minor misdemeanor, and 

driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“OVI”) in violation of C.C.O. 

433.01(A)(1), a misdemeanor of the first degree. On September 7, 2022, Clark 

entered a not guilty plea to both charges.
The Cleveland Municipal Court conducted numerous pretrial

hearings and, on December 20, 2022, Clark waived his speedy trial rights. On 

April 12, 2023, Clark filed a motion to suppress evidence arguing the arresting 

officer lacked probable cause to arrest Clark for OVI. The City filed a brief in 

opposition and Clark filed a supplemental motion. On June 1, 2023, the trial court 

conducted a hearing on Clark’s motion to suppress and heard testimony from Officer 

Woznicki. 

Suppression Hearing

Woznicki testified that he has been a patrol officer for the Cleveland 

Division of Police for seven years during which time he had interacted with 

suspected OVI drivers on numerous occasions. Woznicki received annual 

mandatory training on traffic stops and was trained on the National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) manual.

Woznicki stated he was dispatched, on August 10, 2022, to the scene 

of an automobile accident at the intersection of East 99th Street and South 

Boulevard. Woznicki described the area as a four-way intersection, with South 

Boulevard being a one-way eastbound street with stop signs posted eastbound on 

South Boulevard and southbound on East 99th Street.

Upon Woznicki’s arrival at the scene of the accident, a fire truck and 

an EMS vehicle were present. Woznicki observed numerous neighbors on the streets 

who informed him that Clark had been speeding and failed to stop at the stop sign. 

They further were discussing that Clark hit Crandell’s vehicle, that Clark appeared
intoxicated and related that Clark tossed a beer can or alcoholic beverage from his 

car window. The EMS officer told Woznicki that Clark refused medical treatment 

and that he may have been intoxicated. 

Woznicki stated that the front end of Crandell’s vehicle was totaled, 

that Clark’s vehicle was positioned four to five houses south of the intersection and 

that both vehicles had sustained heavy damage.

According to Woznicki, Clark attempted to walk away from the scene 

of the accident but Woznicki prevented Clark’s departure so that he could question 

Clark about the accident. Woznicki stated he observed Clark “kind of swaying a little 

bit” and Clark provided incoherent answers. Woznicki further stated that when he 

asked Clark how the accident happened, Clark was unable to answer. Clark refused 

to engage in a field-sobriety test and, in response to that inquiry, Clark threatened 

to kill Woznicki stating, “If you try it, I will kill you.” Woznicki detained Clark and 

placed him in his patrol vehicle. While both men were inside the vehicle, Woznicki 

smelled an odor of alcohol that the officer could not describe as either weak or 

strong. Woznicki further stated he observed Clark as “kind of slumped over” with

slurred speech and glassy eyes. Woznicki concluded that Clark was intoxicated due 

to his demeanor, movements, glassy eyes and the smell of alcohol on his breath.

Woznicki neither observed Clark’s alleged erratic driving nor any 

traffic violation and that he learned how the accident occurred through oral 

statements from “other people involved” and “several witnesses on scene,” who said 

Clark drove at a high rate of speed and failed to stop at the stop sign. 
According to Woznicki, the NHTSA manual instructs an officer 

administering a field-sobriety test to first ask if the suspect has suffered a medical 

impairment because the behavior of a person involved in a serious accident may 

mimic the effects of impairment from drugs or alcohol such as unsteadiness, slurred 

speech or incoherence.

On June 1, 2023, the trial court issued a detailed judgment entry 

denying Clark’s motion to suppress.

On November 15, 2023, the trial court conducted a bench trial and 

heard testimony from Crandell, Johnson and Woznicki. Clark presented no 

evidence before resting.

Crandell

Crandell testified that, on August 10, 2022, as she drove eastbound 

on South Boulevard, she stopped for the stop sign at the intersection of East 99th

Street, looked both directions and saw no cars were coming and she then proceeded 

into the intersection. Crandell testified that the intersection was a four-way stop 

with stop signs positioned on each corner. Crandell stated then when her vehicle 

was in the middle of the intersection, she saw “something black coming out [sic] the

corner of [her] eye, and [she] heard a horn” and she was struck by another vehicle 

on the front driver side of her vehicle. Tr. 8. Crandell stated the other driver ran a 

stop sign, although she conceded that she did not see the other driver until 

“something black caught the corner of [her] eye and a horn blew.” Tr. 14.
Crandell was transported by ambulance to a hospital from the 

accident scene. Crandell sustained bruising and swelling from the accident and her 

automobile was declared a total loss due to the extensive property damage.

Officer Johnson 

On August 10, 2022, Johnson, a patrolman for the Cleveland Division 

of Police for two and one-half years, arrived at the intersection of South Boulevard 

and East 99th Street, which is a residential area, and he observed two vehicles with 

significant, disabling property damage. Johnson testified that it was a four-way 

intersection with stop signs on each roadway. Johnson stated he observed Clark 

exiting the driver’s side of his vehicle, an indication that Clark was the driver of that 

vehicle. Johnson testified that he interviewed Crandell, secured witness statements 

and inspected the vehicles to ascertain if the witness statements as to how the 

accident occurred correlated with the property damage. Johnson testified that

Clark’s vehicle was approximately 50 feet south of the intersection and Crandell’s 

vehicle was stopped in the intersection. 

Johnson stated he observed Clark exhibit loud and belligerent 

behavior and Clark was detained and placed in the back of the zone car. Johnson 

further testified that once Clark was placed in the rear of the zone car, he smelled a 

strong odor of alcohol emanating from Clark and he noticed Clark’s speech was not 

clear. According to Johnson, Clark refused to engage in a field-sobriety test at the 

accident scene or a breath-analysis test at the Bratenahl police station. 
Johnson testified about his training and experience as a police officer 

included detecting when an individual is under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 

Based upon Johnson’s observations of Clark, he determined Clark was intoxicated 

and wrote Clark a ticket charging him with OVI.

Johnson also testified that his training and experience as a police 

officer included processing an accident scene and determining the cause of an 

accident. Based upon the vehicles’ property damage, the positioning of the vehicles 

after the collision and witness statements, Johnson concluded that Clark caused the 

accident when he failed to stop at the stop sign and issued Clark a ticket for failure 

to stop at a stop sign.

Woznicki

Woznicki’s trial testimony largely mirrored his testimony at the 

suppression hearing. Woznicki described his interaction with Clark as follows:

As I was approaching [Clark], he appeared to be confused, or he was 

kind of swaying. He wasn’t listening to my commands. I was trying to 

figure out how this accident occurred, and he failed to tell me how it 

happened, and then, at that point, he tried to walk through me to leave 

the scene of the accident. At that time, we detained him. He was trying 

to leave the scene of the accident.

Woznicki stated he could not recall whether the odor of alcohol 

stemming from Clark was apparent outside the patrol car or later inside the police 

station. He further testified that he could not recall if Clark was unsteady on his feet

when they arrived at the police station. Woznicki stated that Clark’s belligerent 

behavior decreased once he refused the field-sobriety test.
Woznicki transported Clark to the Bratenahl police station where the 

officer attempted to administer a blood alcohol test but Clark refused to cooperate. 

Woznicki testified that he received training in order to detect when an 

individual is impaired and he had investigated hundreds of motor vehicle accidents 

prior to the accident involving Clark and Crandell. Woznicki stated that because 

Clark refused to submit to a field-sobriety test, he had to rely on his observations to 

determine if Clark was impaired.

Defense counsel questioned Woznicki about whether a field-sobriety 

test should be administered to an individual involved in a serious accident:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now, you did say — indicate that you were 

trained in NHTSA Manual, correct?

OFFICER WOZNICKI: That’s correct.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And part of that training indicates that if 

someone has been involved in a serious accident, you’re not necessarily 

supposed to give them Field Sobriety Tests.

OFFICER WOZNICKI: Yes, I — that’s part of it, but he — he was not 

injured to a point where he — he refused medical attention on scene. 

He wasn’t — he was able to walk.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And again, I respect you as police officer. 

However, you’re not a medical doctor.

OFFICER WOZNICKI: Right.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. And sometimes people experience injury 

and still could not make statements after being in a serious accident 

that might not be, you know, the best decision, like, you know, denying 

medical care.

OFFICER WOZNICKI: Yes, that’s correct, but —
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.

OFFICER WOZNICKI: — also that’s why we want to get a Breathalyzer 

done.

Tr. 54.

At the conclusion of the City’s case, Clark made a Crim.R. 29 motion 

for acquittal, which the trial court denied. On November 29, 2023, the trial court 

issued a detailed judgment entry finding Clark guilty of OVI and failure to stop at a 

stop sign. 

On December 13, 2023, the trial court sentenced Clark to 180 days in 

jail, suspended 160 days, and imposed a fine of $525. Further, the trial court stayed 

the sentence pending Clark’s appeal. 

On January 9, 2024, Clark filed a timely notice of appeal presenting 

these four assignments of error:

Assignment of Error I: The trial court erred to the prejudice of 

appellant, by denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.

Assignment of Error II: Appellant[’s] conviction for driving under the 

influence of alcohol, and operation of a vehicle at stop sign was not 

supported by sufficient evidence.

Assignment of Error III: Appellant[’s] conviction for driving under the 

influence of alcohol, and operation of a vehicle at stop sign was against 

the manifest weight of evidence.

Assignment of Error IV: The trial court erred and abused its discretion 

in denying appellant’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal.
Legal Analysis

Motion to Suppress

In his first assignment of error, Clark argues that the trial court erred 

when it denied his motion to suppress. Specifically, Clark contends there was no 

credible evidence that he caused the accident nor that his driving was impaired. 

Clark argues that his unsteadiness and slurred speech may have been caused by his 

involvement in a serious accident. Clark contends the totality of the circumstances 

did not show probable cause to arrest him for OVI and, therefore, his convictions 

should be reversed.1

This court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under 

a mixed standard of review.

“In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact 

and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate 

witness credibility.” State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96 (8th Dist.

1994). The reviewing court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact 

in ruling on a motion to suppress if the findings are supported by 

competent, credible evidence. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 

¶ 8 (2003). With respect to the trial court’s conclusion of law, the 

reviewing court applies a de novo standard of review and decides 

1 Officer Woznicki stated he utilized his body camera during the traffic stop and,

during the suppression hearing, the City played the audio associated with Officer 

Woznicki’s body camera for the court. At the suppression hearing, the City stated it would 

introduce as an exhibit a flash drive with the audio recording of Officer Woznicki’s body 

camera footage. The body camera audio recording is not part of the record in this appeal. 

The parties do not argue any disparity between the suppression hearing testimony and the 

body camera audio recording, and we presume regularity in the proceedings below. See

State v. Rice, 2011-Ohio-1929, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.) (“Absent a transcript or alternative record 

under App.R. 9(C) or 9(D), we must presume regularity in the proceedings below.”). The 

municipal court’s judgment entry denying Clark’s motion to suppress references Clark’s 

demeanor captured on video. We review Clark’s first assignment of error absent the body 

camera’s audio recording.
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State 

v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist. 1997).

State v. Miller, 2018-Ohio-4898, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).

Warrantless arrests in an OVI case are constitutional in Ohio when 

the officer had probable cause, at the time of the stop, to make an arrest. Cleveland 

v. Bruner, 2002-Ohio-6512, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St.2d 

14 (1966). Probable cause exists when, based upon the totality of the circumstances, 

the arresting officer had sufficient information at the time of the arrest, derived from 

a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and circumstances, to cause a reasonable 

and prudent person to believe that the suspect committed the offense. Bruner, 

citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); State v. Timson, 38 Ohio St.2d 122, 127 

(1974). “‘In an OVI case, a finding of probable cause may be supported by the totality 

of the circumstances even absent the administration of a field sobriety test.’” Bruner

at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421 (2000), paragraph one of the 

syllabus.

A police officer may not make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor 

offense unless the act occurred in the officer’s presence. Hamilton v. Jacobs, 100 

Ohio App.3d 724 (12th Dist. 1995). However, an exception to this general rule exists 

where a defendant caused an automobile accident. Under such circumstances,

police need not observe the impaired driving. Bruner at ¶ 14, citing Oregon v. 

Szakovits, 32 Ohio St.2d 271 (1972).
Here, the testimony presented at the hearing on the motion to 

suppress demonstrated that Woznicki, a seven-year veteran with the Cleveland 

Police Department, had prior experience interacting with impaired drivers. 

Woznicki did not observe the accident but, during his investigation, he heard several 

individuals discussing that Clark was speeding and failed to stop at the stop sign

and, ultimately, he concluded that Clark caused the accident. Witnesses, including 

EMS personnel, also reported to Woznicki that Clark appeared intoxicated and Clark

was seen tossing an alcoholic beverage container out of his automobile window. 

Woznicki observed the heavy damage to both vehicles as well as the final resting spot 

of Clark’s vehicle — four or five houses south of the intersection. Woznicki personally 

interacted with Clark and testified that Clark was unsteady on his feet, his eyes were 

glassy, he had slurred speech, he was incoherent and unable to describe how the 

accident occurred, he smelled of alcohol, and he was belligerent and attempted to 

leave the scene of the accident. While Clark did not admit to drinking alcohol, 

Woznicki’s testimony supported the conclusion that Clark was impaired. And while 

Woznicki conceded that being in a serious accident could cause unsteadiness and 

slurred speech, the testimony provided additional factors that supported the 

officer’s conclusion that Clark drove impaired.

We find Clark’s reliance on Bruner, 2002-Ohio-6512, at ¶ 10, in 

support of his suppression motion unpersuasive. The police in Bruner responded 

to a multiple-car accident on the highway. At the accident scene, Bruner admitted 

she had been drinking and the police officer noted an odor of alcohol on her breath. 
Bruner initially was unable to recite the alphabet but successfully did so after the 

administration of a field-sobriety test. At the suppression hearing in Bruner, the 

City failed to introduce evidence that Bruner caused the motor vehicle accident or 

that her driving was impaired. In viewing the totality of the circumstances, this 

court found competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s determination 

that no probable caused existed to arrest Bruner for driving under the influence. 

Conversely, in the instant case, the City did present evidence that Clark drove 

impaired and caused the accident with Crandell.

We find, in viewing the totality of the circumstances, that the City 

presented competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s determination 

that probable cause existed to arrest Clark for driving under the influence and for 

failure to stop at a stop sign. Thus, Clark’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence and Crim.R. 29 Motion for Acquittal

In his second assignment of error, Clark argues the evidence 

presented by the City did not meet the burden of production to support convictions 

for either OVI or failure to stop at a stop sign and, therefore, his convictions were 

not supported by sufficient evidence. In his fourth assignment of error, Clark argues 

the trial court erred and abused its discretion when it denied his Crim.R. 29 motion 

for acquittal.

A sufficiency of the evidence challenge requires a determination as to 

whether the State has met its burden of production at trial. State v. Hunter, 2006-

Ohio-20, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390 (1997). 
An appellate court reviewing sufficiency of the evidence must determine “‘whether, 

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks, 

61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. With a sufficiency inquiry, 

an appellate court does not review whether the State’s evidence is to be believed but 

whether, if believed, the evidence admitted at trial supported the conviction. State 

v. Starks, 2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins at 387. A sufficiencyof-the-evidence argument is not a factual determination, but a question of law. Id.

Similarly, Crim.R. 29(A) provides that a court “shall order the entry 

of the judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses . . . if the evidence is insufficient 

to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.” “Because a Crim.R. 29 motion 

questions the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[w]e apply the same standard of review to 

Crim.R. 29 motions as we use in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.’” 

Fairview Park v. Peah, 2021-Ohio-2685, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Tenace, 

2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37. Thus, we will address Clark’s second and fourth assignments 

of error collectively.

In a sufficiency inquiry — or Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal

inquiry — we assume the State’s and City’s witnesses testified truthfully and evaluate 

whether that testimony, along with any other evidence introduced at trial, satisfies 

each element of the offense. In re D.R.S., 2016-Ohio-3262, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). The 

elements of an offense may be proven by direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, 
or both. See, e.g., State v. Wells, 2021-Ohio-2585, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing State v. 

Durr, 58 Ohio St.3d 86 (1991). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence have 

“equal evidentiary value.” Wells at ¶ 26, citing State v. Santiago, 2011-Ohio-1691, ¶ 

12 (8th Dist.).

Relevant to our review of the trial court’s Crim.R. 29 ruling and 

Clark’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument are the offenses for which the court 

found Clark guilty: OVI and failure to stop at a stop sign. Following a bench trial, 

the court found Clark guilty of driving under the influence, in violation of C.C.O. 

433.01, that reads:

(a) Driving under the influence.

(1) No person shall operate any vehicle, . . . within this City, if, 

at the time of the operation, any of the following apply:

A. The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of 

abuse, or a combination of them.

Generally, any lay witness, including a police officer, may testify 

whether an individual appeared intoxicated. State v. Clark, 2007-Ohio-3777, ¶ 13

(8th Dist.), citing State v. Schmitt, 2004-Ohio-37, ¶ 12, citing Columbus v. Mullins, 

162 Ohio St. 419, 421 (1954). To establish one’s impaired driving ability, the State 

may rely on physiological factors including slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and the 

odor of alcohol. Solon v. Hrivnak, 2014-Ohio-3135, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing Clark at

¶ 13; State v. Simms, 2008-Ohio-4848, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.); State v. Holland, 1999 Ohio 

App. LEXIS 6143 (11th Dist. Dec. 17, 1999). “Other factors that the state may use to 

show intoxication include evidence that the defendant caused an accident, refused 

to submit to a field-sobriety or chemical test, or exhibited a belligerent or combative 
demeanor.” State v. Yared Fitsum Assefa, 2023-Ohio-385, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.). Fieldsobriety tests are not required to prove an OVI conviction. Hrivnak at ¶ 17, citing 

State v. Strebler, 2006-Ohio-5711, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.).

The court also found Clark guilty of operation of his vehicle at a stop 

sign, in violation of C.C.O. 431.19, that reads:

Except when directed to proceed by a law enforcement officer, every 

driver of a vehicle . . . approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly 

marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near 

side of the intersection, or, if none, then at the point nearest the 

intersecting roadway where the driver has a view of approaching traffic 

on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After having stopped, 

the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection 

or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an 

immediate hazard during the time the driver is moving across or within 

the intersection or junction of roadways.

In the instant case, Crandell testified that she entered the intersection 

after coming to a complete stop and was struck by Clark’s vehicle because Clark 

failed to stop at the stop sign for his lane of travel. The trial testimony demonstrated 

that Clark exhibited slurred speech, unsteadiness, and an odor of alcohol. Clark 

refused to submit to a field-sobriety test and chemical test. The testimony showed 

Clark was belligerent with the officers and attempted to leave the scene of the 

accident. Based upon these observations, the officers determined Clark drove under 

the influence of alcohol. While the officers conceded the NHTSA manual does not 

recommend a field-sobriety test after a serious accident because unsteadiness and 

slurred speech could be caused by the accident rather than intoxication, the 

testimony supported many factors that indicated Clark’s impairment due to 
intoxication. The officers also determined from the property damage, the location 

of the two vehicles, and the witness statements that Clark caused the accident by 

failing to stop at the stop sign and yield the right of way to Crandell’s vehicle. 

Overall, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark’s convictions were based upon sufficient evidence 

and, therefore, Clark’s second and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

In his third assignment of error, Clark contends that his convictions 

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

A manifest weight challenge questions the credibility of the evidence 

presented and examines whether the State met its burden of persuasion at trial. 

State v. Whitsett, 2014-Ohio-4933, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 

380 at 387; State v. Bowden, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins at 

390. A reviewing court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts 

in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage 

of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. 

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172 (1st Dist. 1983), paragraph three of the syllabus. When 

considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence, the court of appeals sits as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree with 

the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387, citing 
Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). A reversal on the basis that a verdict is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence is granted “only in the exceptional case 

in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Martin. Reversal of a 

trial court’s “judgment on manifest weight of the evidence requires the unanimous 

concurrence of all three appellate judges.” State v. Crumbley, 2010-Ohio-3866, 

¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins at paragraph four of the syllabus.

In challenging the weight of the evidence supporting his convictions, 

Clark argues the record does not include (1) a positive chemical test, (2) competent, 

credible evidence that he drove impaired and (3) competent, credible evidence that 

he failed to stop at a stop sign. 

No chemical test results were provided because Clark refused to 

submit to the breath-analysis test. However, to prove a driver was impaired, the 

State need not establish the driver tested at a particular level of alcohol 

concentration in his body but must “prove that [the driver] had consumed alcohol 

in a quantity that had ‘adversely and appreciably impaired [his] actions or mental 

processes and deprived [him] of that clearness of intellect and control of [him]self 

which he would otherwise have had.’” State v. Panzeca, 2020-Ohio-4448, ¶ 15 (1st 

Dist.), quoting State v. Hall, 2016-Ohio-783, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Bakst, 

30 Ohio App.3d 141, 145 (1st Dist. 1986).

Absent chemical testing, the City presented evidence of Clark’s 

physiological characteristics including slurred speech, unsteadiness, and odor of 

alcohol; Clark’s aggressive and belligerent demeanor; Clark’s inability to describe 
the events of the accident and Clark’s refusal to submit to a field-sobriety test or 

breath-analysis test.

At trial, Clark argued that officers are trained, pursuant to the NHTSA 

manual, not to administer a field-sobriety test following serious accidents because 

slurred speech and imbalance — signs of driver impairment due to drugs or alcohol 

— could also result from a serious accident. Based upon the facts of this case, we 

find the possibility that Clark’s symptoms were caused by the accident — rather than 

his intoxication — unpersuasive where Clark refused medical attention, suggesting 

he was not injured; Officers Johnson and Woznicki smelled the odor of alcohol on 

Clark; Clark refused the field-sobriety and breath-analysis tests and the presence of

multiple other indices described above that Clark was impaired.

After a thorough review of the record, and weighing all the evidence, 

we cannot say that this is one of the rare cases in which the trier of fact lost its way. 

Clark’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and, thus, 

we overrule his third assignment of error.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

Cleveland Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR