alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Certifications**

 

 

I, Paul Vanderslice, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K, and all reportson Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by thisreport on Form 10-K, of BMO 2022-C3 Mortgage Trust (the “Exchange Act PeriodicReports”);

 

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act Periodic Reports,taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in lightof the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicingand other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the periodcovered by this report is included in the Exchange Act Periodic Reports;

 

4. Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliancestatement(s) required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, andexcept as disclosed in the Exchange Act Periodic Reports, the servicers havefulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreement(s) in all materialrespects; and

 

5. All of the reports on assessment of compliance withservicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestationreports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backedsecurities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included asan exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have beendisclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

 

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably reliedon information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC Bank, National Association; K-StarAsset Management LLC; Park Bridge Lender Services LLC; Computershare TrustCompany, National Association; SCP Servicing LLC; KeyBank National Association;Pentalpha Surveillance LLC; Wilmington Trust, National Association; RialtoCapital Advisors, LLC; and 3650 REIT Loan Servicing LLC.

 

 

Date: March 29, 2024

 

/s/ PaulVanderslice                                                   

Paul Vanderslice

Chief Executive Officer, BMO Commercial Mortgage SecuritiesLLC

(senior officer in charge of securitization of thedepositor)
#### SWISS CREDIT BANK, Appellee, v. VIRGINIA NATIONAL BANK-FAIR-FAX, formerly Community Bank and Trust Company, Appellant.

No. 75-2154.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 5, 1976.

Decided June 3, 1976.

*588Richard J. Stahl, Alexandria, Va. (Taylor & Clemente, Alexandria, Va., on brief), for appellant.

John H. Ariail, Jr., Arlington, Va. (Henry St. John FitzGerald, Tolbert, Smith, FitzGerald & Ramsey, Arlington, Va., on brief), for appellee.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and CRAVEN and FIELD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: ■

This is an action by a foreign bank, which cashed a cashier’s check, against a Virginia Bank which issued the check and then refused to honor it. On cross motions for summary judgment, the court below granted judgment for Swiss Credit.

The question decided below was whether the bank’s notice of refusal to honor the check was timely under the Uniform Commercial Code and/or under the Rules for the Collection of Commercial Paper promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce.

We see no need to reach the question of timeliness of the notice of dishonor. A cashier’s check is a bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon itself. It is accepted in advance by the act of its issuance, and it cannot be dishonored by the issuing bank because of an indebtedness to it of one of its customers. 5B Michie on Banks and Banking, Ch. 9 § 253 (1973); 107 A.L.R. 1463 (1937).

We affirm the judgment although we do so for reasons other than those stated by the district court.

affirmed.
**Exhibit31.1**

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I,Russell C. Taylor, President and Chief Executive Officer of Cellu TissueHoldings, Inc., certify that:

1.            I havereviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Cellu Tissue Holdings, Inc.  for the period ended November 23, 2006;

2.              Based onmy knowledge, this report does notcontain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;

3.              Based onmy knowledge, the financial statements,and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.            Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)           Designed such disclosurecontrols and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures tobe designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relatingto the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisquarterly report is being prepared;

(b)          Evaluatedthe effectiveness****of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c)           Disclosedin this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has material affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and

5.               The registrant’sother certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors:

(a)          All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize, andreport financial information; and

----

(b)         Any fraud**,** whether ornot material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
| Date:  | January 8, 2007                         |   |   |
|--------|-----------------------------------------|--------|--------|
|   |                                    |
|   | /s/ Russell C.  Taylor                  |   |
|   | Russell C.  Taylor                      |
|   | President and  Chief Executive  Officer |

 

----
OFFICE OF APPELLATE COURTS 

### AUG 2 8 2014 STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT 

# FILED

A14-0435 In re Petition for Disciplinary Action against Bruce Anthony Kunz, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 225289. ORDER The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action alleging that respondent Bruce Anthony Kunz committed professional misconduct warranting public discipline, namely: (1) entering into business transactions with clients without the required written disclosures and without obtaining their written, informed consent to the essential terms of the transactions and respondent's role in them, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.8(a); (2) representing clients despite a conflict of interest that existed because of the business transactions respondent had entered into with these clients, including representing one such client in a bankruptcy proceeding, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(2) and 8.4(d); and (3) failing to disclose a client's interest in and income from one of respondent's business transactions with the client to a bankruptcy court and bankruptcy trustee, in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a), 4.1, and 8.4(c). Respondent unconditionally admits the allegations in the petition, withdraws his previously filed answer, and waives his rights under Rule 14, Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR). In a stipulation, respondent and the Director jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline is suspension from the practice of law for a

1minimum of 4 months, with the right to file a petition for reinstatement not more than 60

days before the expiration of the suspension period. This court has independently reviewed the file and approves the jointly recommended disposition. Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Respondent Bruce Anthony Kunz is suspended from the practice of law for a minimum of 4 months, effective 14 days from the date of the filing of this order, with leave to file a petition for reinstatement not more than 60 days before the expiration of the minimum suspension period; 2. Respondent may petition for reinstatement pursuant to Rule 18(a)-(d), RLPR. Reinstatement is conditioned on successful completion of the professional responsibility portion of the state bar examination, and satisfaction of continuing legal education requirements pursuant to Rule 18(e), RLPR; and 3. Respondent shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspension to clients, opposing counsel, and tribunals), and shall pay $900 in costs pursuant to Rule 24, RLPR. Dated: August 28, 2014 BY THE COURT:

kit , •i d ?— Alan C. Page Associate Justice

2
April 9, 2015

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Appellant

NO. 14-13-00456-CV V.

DELIA PAGAYON, MICHELLE FULTON, ALFREDO G. PAGAYON, 

MICHAEL G. PAGAYON, AND THE ESTATE OF ALFREDO M. PAGAYON, 

Appellees

________________________________

This cause, an appeal from the judgment signed February 26, 2013 in favor 

of appellees Delia Pagayon, Michelle Fulton, Alfredo G. Pagayon, Michael G. 

Pagayon, and the Estate of Alfredo M. Pagayon, was heard on the transcript of the 

record. We have inspected the record and find error in the judgment. We therefore 

order the judgment of the court below REVERSED and REMAND the cause for 

proceedings in accordance with the court’s opinion.

We further order that all costs incurred by reason of this appeal be paid by 

appellees Delia Pagayon, Michelle Fulton, Alfredo G. Pagayon, Michael G. 

Pagayon, and the Estate of Alfredo M. Pagayon.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
Fruit & Specialty Crops 1400 Independence Avenue, SW.

Vegetable Inspection Room 1536-S, STOP 0240

Program Division Washington, DC 20250-0240

March 3, 2015

 

AMENDMENT NO. 1

COMMODITY SPECIFICATION

FROZEN VEGETABLES DATED JUNE 2014

The purpose of this amendment is to insert “a cut size” requirement for Frozen, Cut or Chunks 

Sweet Potatoes.

I. Frozen, Cut or Chunks Sweet Potatoes

1. Grade – U.S. Grade A.

2. Color – Golden, Yellow, or Mixed.

3. Style – Cut or Chunks.

4. Cut Size – 1⁄2 to 1 inch.

5. Net Weight – 30 pounds (6/5 pound bags).

All other terms and conditions remain unchanged.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Justice

###### Antitrust Division

                    Notice is hereby given that, on March 16, 2012, pursuant to Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301*et seq.*                     (“the Act”), Connected Media Experience, Inc. (“CMX”) has filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing changes in its membership. The notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, Xertive, Tel Aviv, ISRAEL, has withdrawn as a party to this venture.                

No other changes have been made in either the membership or planned activity of the group research project. Membership in this group research project remains open, and CMX intends to file additional written notifications disclosing all changes in membership.

                    On March 12, 2010, CMX filed its original notification pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice in the                     **Federal Register**                     pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act on April 16, 2010 (75 FR 20003).                

                    The last notification was filed with the Department on December 21, 2011. A notice was published in the                     **Federal Register**                     pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act on January 11, 2012 (77 FR 1727).                

Patricia A. Brink,

Director of Civil Enforcement, Antitrust Division.

[FR Doc. 2012-8941 Filed 4-12-12; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE P
#### The OKLAHOMA PUBLISHING COMPANY, a corporation, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Floyd MARTIN, Judge of the District Court for the Seventh Judicial District, Canadian County, Oklahoma, Respondent.

No. 0-80-268.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

May 5, 1980.

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION AND/OR MANDAMUS

On April 24, 1980, the Petitioner filed in this Court its Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for alternative Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus and Brief in support thereof. The Petitioner seeks to prohibit the Respondent judge from closing any further sanity hearings to the public under the authority of 43A O.S. Supp.1979, § 54.1H, where criminal charges are pending against the subject of the hearing. Additionally, a Writ of Mandamus is sought mandating the Respondent to provide the public and the press with immediate access to a complete transcript of the closed sanity hearing held April 10,1980, in the District Court of Canadian County, Oklahoma, in a case styled *State of Oklahoma v. Steven Keith Hatch and Glen Burton Ake,*No. CRF-79-302, 303, 304, and 305. Petitioner further asks that we require the trial judge to open all court files in Canadian County Case No. PMH-80-8.

We do not attempt to pass on the question of whether the Respondent acted correctly or incorrectly in holding a closed sanity hearing. We would observe that neither of the parties to the litigation, the State of Oklahoma nor the defendant Ake, requested a closed sanity hearing or objected to the court’s closure order. Subsequently, the Petitioner was allowed to appear and object to the closed proceedings.

Pursuant to Rule 1.25, 22 O.S. Supp.1979, Ch. 18, App., Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, we will entertain ap*254plications only in aid of our appellate jurisdiction when the action arises out of criminal matters within the jurisdiction of this State. 20 O.S.1971, §§ 40, 41; *Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals,*Okl., 595 P.2d 416 (1978); *Johns v. Hess,*Okl.Cr., 546 P.2d 652 (1976); and *Jerry v. Pardon and Parole Board,*Okl.Cr., 546 P.2d 650 (1976). This matter not being in aid of our appellate jurisdiction, coupled with the fact that the Petitioner is not a party to the litigation in Case No. CRF-79-302 compels us to deny the relief requested.

NOW THEREFORE, after considering the pleadings and brief filed herein, and being fully advised in the premises, and recognizing that the Court of Criminal Appeals is a court of special and limited jurisdiction, and further recognizing that this Court has no general superintending control over inferior courts and can issue writs of prohibition and mandamus only in the exercise or aid of our appellate jurisdiction (See *Carder*v. *Court of Criminal Appeals,*supra) this Court finds that the Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus should not issue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

WITNESS OUR SIGNATURES, AND THE SEAL OF THIS COURT, this 5th day of May, 1980.

/s/ TOM R. CORNISH, Presiding Judge

/s/ TOM BRETT, Judge

/s/ HEZ J. BUSSEY, Judge
Exhibit 11.0

                     KEARNY FINANCIAL CORP. AND SUBSIDIARIES
                STATEMENTS RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                ------------------------------------------------
                (In Thousands, Except Per Share Data, Unaudited)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                        Three Months Ended             Six Months Ended
                                                         December 31, 2006             December 31, 2006
                                                        ------------------             -----------------


<S>                                                     <C>                              <C>
Income available to common stockholders                 $          547                   $     1,473

Weighted average shares outstanding                             69,258                        69,505

Basic earnings per share                                $         0.01                   $      0.02

Income for diluted earnings per share                   $          547                   $     1,473

Total weighted average common shares and equivalents
outstanding for diluted computation                             69,753                        69,901

Diluted earnings per share                              $         0.01                   $      0.02

</TABLE>
# C_2004106EN.01005903.xml

| 30.4.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 106/59 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 106/59

---

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

of 1 April 2004

in Case T-198/02: N v Commission of the European Communities (1)

1

(Officials - Disciplinary measures - Removal from post without loss of pension rights - Statement of reasons - Rights of the defence - Proportionality - Failure to comply with the time-limits fixed by Article 7 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations - Article 12, first paragraph, of the Staff Regulations)

(2004/C 106/117)

Language of the case: French

In Case T-198/02: N, a former official of the Commission of the European Communities, resident in Asse (Belgium), represented by N. Lhoëst and E. de Schietere de Lophem, lawyers, with an address for service in Luxembourg, against Commission of the European Communities (Agent: J. Currall) – application (1) for annulment of the decision of the appointing authority of the Commission of 25 February 2002 imposing on the applicant the disciplinary measure of removal from post without withdrawal or reduction of entitlement to retirement pension in accordance with Article 86(2)(f) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and (2) for damages – the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber), composed of J. Azizi, President, M. Jaeger and F. Dehousse, Judges; H. Jung, Registrar, gave a judgment on 1 April 2004 in which it:

| (1) | Orders the Commission to pay the applicant the sum of EUR 700 as compensation for the non-material damage suffered by him; |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Orders the Commission to pay the applicant the sum of EUR 700 as compensation for the non-material damage suffered by him;

| (2) | Dismisses the remainder of the action; |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Dismisses the remainder of the action;

| (3) | Orders the Commission to bear its own costs and to pay one-sixth of the applicant's costs of the present proceedings and the proceedings for interim relief; |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Orders the Commission to bear its own costs and to pay one-sixth of the applicant's costs of the present proceedings and the proceedings for interim relief;

| (4) | Orders the applicant to bear five-sixths of his costs of the present proceedings and the proceedings for interim relief. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Orders the applicant to bear five-sixths of his costs of the present proceedings and the proceedings for interim relief.

---

(1)  OJ No C 233 of 28.9.2002.

1

---
#### Ronald Lee HEUGA, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. 4366.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

April 11, 1980.

Robert L. Russell, Vandiver & Russell, Anchorage, for appellant.

David Mannheimer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CON-NOR, BOOCHEVER, BURKE and MATTHEWS, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

On our own motion we earlier dismissed this appeal, with an opinion to follow.

*548On June 6, 1978, Heuga entered a plea of no contest to the crime of robbery. At the same time he reserved his right to appeal the superior court’s determination that his confession was admissible. This proposed procedure was based on our opinion in *Cooksey v. State,*524 P.2d 1251, 1256-57 (Alaska 1974). However, in *Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage,*574 P.2d 801, 803 n.4 (Alaska 1978), we held that appeals from such conditional pleas will not be accepted unless the issue reserved for appeal is dispositive of the ease, and a stipulation of the parties to that effect, approved by the court, appears in the record. We made this holding applicable to all pleas entered after the date of *Oveson,*which was February 3, 1978.

In the case at bar a determination that Heuga’s confession is invalid would not be dispositive of the case, as there was eyewitness identification of Heuga as the perpetrator of the robbery. It follows that, under our holding in *Oveson,*Heuga cannot maintain this appeal.

The state argues that it has lost track of the eyewitness to the alleged robbery, and that this circumstance may mean that the validity of Heuga’s confession can be viewed as dispositive of this case, even though that was not true when the plea was entered. Under *Oveson,*however, the test of appealability is the situation as it existed at the time the plea was entered, not how it is altered by later events.

Heuga points out that the state agreed in open court that he could reserve the right to appeal, and that the superior court explained to him that he could appeal the denial of the motion to suppress his confession. From this he argues that the state has waived any jurisdictional question and that we should, therefore, entertain this appeal.

If we accepted Heuga’s argument it would mean that the requirements of *Ove-son*could be circumvented if the court and counsel merely wished not to observe the holding of that case. We will not retrench on *Oveson*in this manner.

Where it appears that the dictates of *Oveson*have been ignored, we will not hesitate to dismiss the appeal sua sponte, as we have done here. To do otherwise would mean that we could have thrust upon us the determination of hypothetical and abstract questions which are not dispositive of the case as to which appeal is sought. This we refuse to do.

APPEAL DISMISSED.