```

[Senate Hearing 115-888]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                        S. Hrg. 115-888

   PIPELINE SAFETY IN THE MERRIMACK VALLEY: INCIDENT PREVENTION AND 
                                RESPONSE

=======================================================================

                             FIELD HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                           NOVEMBER 26, 2018
                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation
                             
                             
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                             

                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
57-909 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2025                   

       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                   JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi            BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada                  TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma               GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  JON TESTER, Montana
                       Nick Rossi, Staff Director
                 Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
                    Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on November 26, 2018................................     1
Statement of Senator Markey......................................     1
    Joint statement of Andrew W. Maylor, North Andover Town 
      Manager and Andrew P. Flanagan, Andover Town Manager.......    73
    Letter from Lawrence Fire Chief Brian Moriarty...............    87
    Letter from North Andover Fire Chief William McCarthy........    89
    Prepared statements from community members...................   110
Statement of Senator Hassan......................................     4

                               Witnesses

Hon. Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator from Massachusetts...........     3
Hon. Niki Tsongas, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts........     5
Hon. Seth Moulton, U.S. Representative from Massachusetts........     6
Hon. Lori Trahan, U.S. Representative-Elect from Massachusetts...     7
Lucyannie Rondon, Sister of Leonel Rondon........................     8
Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt III, Chairman, National Transportation 
  Safety Board...................................................     9
    Prepared statement...........................................    11
Hon. Matthew A. Beaton, Secretary, Massachusetts Executive Office 
  of Energy and Environmental Affairs............................    12
    Prepared statement...........................................    15
Steve Bryant, President, Columbia Gas of Massachusetts...........    19
Joe Hamrock, President and Chief Executive Officer, NiSource.....    21
    Joint prepared statement.....................................    22
Richard B. Kuprewicz, President, Accufacts, Incorporated.........    27
    Prepared statement...........................................    29
Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
  Safety Administration..........................................    31
    Prepared statement...........................................    32
Hon. Dan Rivera, Mayor, City of Lawrence.........................    78
    Prepared statement...........................................    81
Tina Messina, Owner, Wine Connextion.............................    83
    Prepared statement...........................................    85
Michael B. Mansfield, Fire Chief, Andover Fire Rescue............    94
    Prepared statement...........................................    96

                                Appendix

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to:
    Hon. Matthew A. Beaton.......................................   159
    Paul Roberti.................................................   160

 
                            PIPELINE SAFETY
                        IN THE MERRIMACK VALLEY:
                    INCIDENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

                              ----------                              

                       MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 2018

                                       U.S. Senate,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                      Lawrence, MA.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m. in 
South Lawrence East Middle School Gymnasium, 165 Crawford 
Street, Lawrence, Massachusetts 01843, Hon. Edward Markey, 
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Markey [presiding], Warren, and Hassan.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you for joining us for today's field 
hearing of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation.
    I would like to express my appreciation to Commerce 
Committee Chairman John Thune and Ranking Member Bill Nelson 
for their support in allowing me to chair this important 
hearing.
    And I'd like to welcome my U.S. Senate colleagues who have 
joined me here today, my great partner from the state of 
Massachusetts, Senator Elizabeth Warren, and from the state of 
New Hampshire and a member of the Senate Commerce Committee, 
Maggie Hassan.
    We also welcome two members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Congresswoman Niki Tsongas of the 3rd 
Congressional District; Congressman Seth Moulton of the 6th 
Congressional District; and a warm welcome to Congresswoman-
elect Lori Trahan. We look forward to continuing to working 
with you and continuing to push for answers.
    It has been 74 days since Lawrence, Andover, and North 
Andover suffered a disaster that Andover Fire Chief Michael 
Mansfield said, ``Looked like Armageddon.'' Explosions and 
fires ripped through quiet neighborhoods, destroying homes and 
businesses, a precious life was lost, dozens were injured.
    For these communities, the explosions were only the 
beginning of months of uncertainty and hardship. This was the 
coldest Thanksgiving in 80 years in Massachusetts, with the 
wind chill temperatures plunging into the single digits in the 
Merrimack Valley, and despite its original promise, Columbia 
Gas has missed its deadline for restoring gas service, meaning 
that nearly 1,600 families spent the Thanksgiving holiday 
enduring the brutal cold without heat.
    The explosions happened on a single day but the crisis for 
families as they try to stay warm and get back to work has gone 
on for far too long. We have seen unprecedented disruption, 
doubt, and despair for the Merrimack Valley. Columbia Gas 
should be ashamed.
    Our investigation into this disaster has resulted in one 
crystal clear conclusion. What happened on September 13 was not 
inevitable. It was preventable. Columbia Gas never contemplated 
that a disaster of this magnitude could happen and therefore 
did not have adequate procedures in place to prevent it or to 
respond to it.
    Not only did this company not prioritize safety, it appears 
as if safety was simply an afterthought, but the responsibility 
for safety failures doesn't stop with Columbia Gas and 
NiSource.
    Federal regulations set by the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration or PHMSA are alarmingly 
deficient. The safety gaps in Federal rules mean that families 
all across the country cannot be assured that the natural gas 
pipelines running under their streets and into their homes are 
safe.
    PHMSA's regulations essentially allow the natural gas 
pipeline industry to regulate itself. When the fox is left to 
guard the henhouse, we are assured to have a system-wide 
failure and then an inevitable disaster.
    We found failing after failing in Columbia Gas culture and 
Federal regulatory oversight.
    First, the company allowed an unqualified engineer to 
approve the pipeline construction work plan that led to this 
disaster.
    Second, Columbia Gas officials who had an understanding of 
the full pipeline system never saw or signed off on the 
pipeline construction work plan that led to this disaster.
    Third, Columbia Gas still has not adopted best practices 
for safety 3 years after its own industry made these 
recommendations.
    And fourth, the woefully insufficient safety, operations, 
and response plans that Columbia Gas did institute never 
adequately contemplated a disaster of this magnitude. So when 
it occurred, they were not prepared to stop it or to respond to 
it.
    The list of failings at this company is as long as the line 
for the temporary showers at Pumps Pond and when it comes to 
Federal regulations, there are clearly key gaps that allow a 
company like Columbia Gas and NiSource to operate unsafely.
    We owe it to the American people to put in place 
requirements to ensure that no natural gas company is allowed 
to shortchange safety ever again. Columbia----
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. Columbia Gas' deficiencies are more than a 
litany of shortcomings. They are a roadmap to disaster and 
that's exactly what we saw on September 13th.
    On that day, following scheduled work in Lawrence, gas 
pressure in the Merrimack Valley's distribution system rose to 
dangerous levels. It forced harmful combustible gas out of 
people's stoves, radiators, and hot water heaters. This over-
pressurization led to explosions, fires, and the destruction of 
more than a hundred homes and businesses in this region.
    Leo Rondon died. He had just gotten his driver's license 
only to be killed while celebrating this achievement with his 
friends. Our community mourns his loss and I'm grateful that 
his family could be here today to share his story.
    More than two dozen others were injured, including nine 
firefighters as they ran toward the danger and worked to save 
lives in that chaos.
    The National Transportation Safety Board has recently 
recommended that Columbia Gas and its parent company, NiSource, 
make urgent changes to how they handle construction and 
operations. That is the bare minimum of what this company needs 
to do to improve safety.
    But thus far, NiSource has refused to immediately implement 
these changes and that is not acceptable, and I want to hear 
directly from the company why our communities are yet again 
having to wait.
    Gas distribution companies need to put safety above speed 
and the public above politics. If Columbia Gas and NiSource 
refuse to do that, then they should not be operating in our 
state or any other state.
    This hearing----
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. This hearing is personal to me. My father 
grew up in Lawrence. He graduated from the Vocational Program 
at Lawrence High School. The day after the explosions, I went 
up and visited the house he grew up in on Phillips Street, a 
house where, as a little boy, I celebrated Christmases. I 
talked to a family member there and they talked about their 
loss of power and like tens of thousands of residents that day, 
their power and everyone in their neighborhood's power was out. 
They had no information, no comfort, no sense of when their 
lives would return to normal. No family should have to 
experience that kind of trauma and disruption.
    It is time for Columbia Gas and NiSource to answer for this 
disaster. The people of the Commonwealth have had to wait too 
long.
    So we thank you all for coming here today for this hearing. 
It will set the table for changes nationally to make sure that 
no one in Massachusetts or any other state ever has to suffer 
from such an accident.
    Now let me turn to recognize my partner, my great partner 
in the U.S. Senate from the state of Massachusetts, Senator 
Elizabeth Warren.

              STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH WARREN, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Warren. Thank you. Thank you.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Warren. And thank you, Senator Markey, for holding 
this hearing today.
    The Merrimack Valley is still reeling from the horrific 
series of explosions that occurred more than two months ago. 
The Rondon family lost their son, many people were injured, 
dozens of homes were destroyed, and businesses shuttered, and 
thousands of people are still without heat and hot water, 
living in temporary housing and unable to return to their 
normal lives.
    The communities of Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover 
have suffered immensely. I saw firsthand the destruction that 
these gas explosions caused across these communities, and I 
want to start by thanking our local officials and our first 
responders who acted quickly on September 13 and in the days 
that followed.
    In particular, I want to thank Mayor Dan Rivera who has 
shown strong leadership throughout this very difficult time.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Warren. We're here to say to everyone in the 
Merrimack Valley we will keep fighting for you. We will not let 
up until every last home has heat and hot water and until every 
last person has been compensated for their injuries and the 
disruption to their lives.
    Columbia Gas and NiSource are responsible not only for 
fixing this mess but also for providing financial support to 
every resident and every business affected by the explosion.
    This disaster, which appears was wholly preventable, is on 
them. The preliminary and interim NTSB report confirms that a 
series of mistakes by, and I quote, ``a Columbia Gas-contracted 
work crew, which included a Columbia Gas inspector, executing 
one of the Columbia Gas-designed and approved pipe replacement 
projects, caused these explosions.''
    Our constituents deserve answers from Columbia Gas and 
NiSource. Two of them, Francisco and Esther Brega, are here in 
the audience today. The explosions cost them their home. 
Esther, an early childhood educator, also lost her business. 
They are still waiting for answers from Columbia Gas 2 months 
after the explosions, and we expect honest and thorough answers 
from the company. Our constituents deserve nothing less.
    This hearing is only a first step toward accountability for 
this disaster. The Massachusetts Congressional Delegation has 
requested that the President issue an emergency declaration for 
the gas explosions. We're going to make sure that every family 
and every business is made whole. Then we're going to fight so 
that this never happens in another community again.
    This industry has proven that safety is not its top 
priority. So if they won't do what is right, then we should 
make sure that the laws and regulations compel them to do what 
is right.
    So thank you all for being here----
    [Applause.]
    Senator Warren.--today. I yield.
    Senator Markey. Next, we're going to hear from Senator 
Maggie Hassan from New Hampshire.

               STATEMENT OF HON. MAGGIE HASSAN, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

    Senator Hassan. Well, good morning, everybody, and thank 
you, Senator Markey, for convening this hearing. I also want to 
thank our Chair and Ranking Member on the Commerce Committee.
    I'll just start by also extending my deepest sympathies to 
the Rondon family and to all of the families and individuals 
who have been impacted by this tragedy. We lost one precious 
life and we all know that several others were hospitalized or 
injured, families were displaced over Thanksgiving, and while 
we are grateful that they are safe, going through Thanksgiving 
without heat or hot water or living somewhere else is not 
acceptable.
    Businesses were disrupted and continue to be disrupted. We 
all know that we have to not only get to the bottom of what 
happened but make sure that we take steps to ensure it never 
happens again in any other community.
    I also want to join my colleagues here in expressing our 
deepest gratitude to the men and women who worked tirelessly to 
respond to these explosions, to put out fires, to provide 
medical care to those who needed it. A number of those first 
responders were members of the New Hampshire first responder 
family and we are so grateful for the mutual aid system that 
allows all of us to come together as needed in this region and 
do the work to keep our citizens safe. So again my deep thanks 
to all of the first responders.
    We know that 131 structures were damaged, including several 
homes in Lawrence, and these explosions and this destruction 
was unlike anything any of our first responders or any of us 
had ever seen. Armageddon indeed, Senator Markey.
    I look forward to the discussion today and hope that we can 
be helpful in finding ways we can prevent this kind of disaster 
in the future.
    To put it briefly, in the year 2018, people should be able 
to be confident that they can live in a home where their gas 
lines don't explode. In the year 2018, people should be 
confident that when there is a problem, that the response by 
industry will be swift and efficient and effective, and they 
can get their heat and their hot water back.
    What we saw in Lawrence and what we are continuing to see 
from the industry is unacceptable. I am grateful to all of the 
members of the community who came forward and who are working 
so hard to mitigate the damage and mitigate the disruption for 
families and businesses, but this should never have happened in 
the first place, and the slow response is unacceptable and 
that's one of the reasons that I think all members of our 
Commerce Committee will continue to work together to determine 
how we can prevent this kind of disaster, this kind of 
disruption, this kind of heartbreak in the future.
    Thank you.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Now we're going to hear from 
Congresswoman Niki Tsongas.

                STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, 
             U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Senator Markey, and thank you also 
for chairing this hearing today. It's so important to have it 
in the communities that have been impacted so that you all can 
hear firsthand both from those who are responsible for the 
accident and the incidents in and of themselves but also for 
those responsible for oversight. So I thank you so much for 
that.
    And I also want to thank the Senate Committee's leadership, 
John Thune of South Dakota, Bill Nelson of Florida, for their 
bipartisan support for holding this field hearing today.
    Given the information that we have learned from the gas 
explosions that devastated the Merrimack Valley in September, 
it is now clear that this disaster was entirely preventable.
    Columbia Gas had a dangerously misguided and tragically 
incomplete process for pipeline replacement projects and 
deficient decisionmaking by a field engineer was exacerbated by 
the company's appallingly weak internal review procedures.
    This series of incidents, which Senator Markey has 
described and appropriately so as roadmap to disaster, resulted 
in the death of an innocent teenager whose family today will 
courageously give voice to their terrible loss, dozens of 
injuries, significant property damage, widespread panic and 
fear in the hours after the accident and still ongoing, and not 
to mention the ongoing crisis for families still displaced by 
these explosions.
    We are so fortunate to have the extraordinary first 
responders, many of you here in the room today, the great 
leadership, political leadership of the communities impacted, 
but, nevertheless, that is no substitute for the company's 
failings.
    I believe Columbia Gas has a responsibility to make this 
community whole and to restore the public trust, to guarantee 
the safety of their customers, and to prevent another tragic 
accident like this from ever happening again, and beyond that, 
we in Congress have a responsibility to look at, seriously 
examine, and reform the ways in which we oversee this industry.
    I look forward to the testimony of those appearing before 
us today.
    Thank you.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. Next, Congressman Seth Moulton.

                STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, 
             U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Senator Markey, for the time and 
for putting this important hearing together.
    To the witnesses sitting before us, thank you for being 
here and to my colleagues, Senator Markey, Senator Warren, and 
Representative Tsongas, I am grateful for your partnership in 
all things but in particular through the last 3 months as our 
offices continue to seek answers to this tragedy and help our 
communities recover.
    Representative-elect Trahan, welcome. You have big shoes to 
fill. We are glad you're here.
    Through all of the debates of appliance replacement and 
Thanksgiving dinners in recent weeks, it can become easy to 
forget how absurd, how fundamentally absurd this situation is 
in the first place. No American family should go home in the 
evening with the fear that their house might blow up.
    Okay. Terrorists in some places like Afghanistan should go 
home in the evening fearing that their house might blow up but 
not Massachusetts families.
    What this gas company allowed to happen through their 
negligence is preposterous. Too many local families spent the 
coldest Thanksgiving in 80 years unable to cook dinner and we 
must never forget that one innocent promising young man lost 
his life.
    Columbia Gas and NiSource, we appreciate the work you've 
done in the weeks since this tragedy, though we will question 
you on the details, but let me be clear. This situation is 
absurd. Your leadership must be held accountable and it must 
never happen again.
    Thank God for the heroes of this story, the first 
responders, who responded when the company did not. We will 
never know how many lives they, you, saved. We're proud to have 
you here. We're lucky to have you in our community. Thank you.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. And while we're losing the great 
Congresswoman Tsongas, we have the great replacement for her, 
who will start in one month.
    So we welcome you to this hearing and so I recognize 
Congresswoman-elect Lori Trahan.

                STATEMENT OF HON. LORI TRAHAN, 
          U.S. REPRESENTATIVE-ELECT FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Ms. Trahan. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Markey.
    I'd like to thank Senators Markey, Warren, and Hassan for 
convening this hearing today in the heart of the disaster zone 
to discuss the gas explosions that rocked Lawrence, North 
Andover, and Andover on September 13.
    I want to thank you for the opportunity to address this 
panel as the next Congresswoman representing Lawrence and 
Andover.
    I also want to thank Representatives Tsongas and Moulton 
for their tireless work on behalf of those affected by this 
accident.
    I, too, want to thank the valiant efforts of our first 
responders and the ongoing leadership of Mayor Rivera and so 
many others.
    I also want to extend my deepest condolences to the family 
of Leonel Rondon and I thank them for being here bravely to 
share their story with us today.
    It has been 74 days. Today, there are still over 5,000 
people who cannot go home and while most of the 680+ businesses 
affected have been brought back online, too many owners have 
waited too long to be reimbursed for their lost income, lost 
wages. These people cannot wait any longer. We need these 
families, these businesses, these communities to be made whole, 
but we also need the people across this state to feel safe and 
secure.
    We can replace heat and appliances, but we need to get to 
the root cause of this disaster, to restore confidence and 
faith that our pipelines are safe and that this will never 
happen again.
    We need answers from Columbia Gas so that we can bring out 
every lesson from this disaster. I urge the representatives 
from Columbia Gas and NiSource to fully cooperate with the 
hearing, with the NTSB, and with all the investigations so that 
we can co-produce safety protocols and prescriptions for the 
future.
    I urge Columbia Gas and NiSource at a minimum to adopt API-
recommended Practice 1173, the gold standard of safety 
practices for pipelines. API-1173 was born out of another 
pipeline disaster where 840,000 gallons of crude oil were 
dumped into wetlands in the Kalamazoo River in Michigan in 
2010.
    These standards are strict but they are the equivalent to 
the same safety standards governing our airlines, our chemical 
plants, and our nuclear power. Adopting these standards will 
ensure continuous improvement to increasing safety in the 
pipeline industry.
    I would like to thank the panel for this important work. I 
look forward to working with you on this issue and helping the 
people of the Merrimack Valley as we continue to cope with the 
aftermath, ensure safety and comfort, and restore this 
community's confidence.
    Thank you.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. Now I would like to begin the hearing by 
inviting up the Rondon family, Lucy, Miguel, and Rosalie, to 
join us to tell their story about September 13, and the 
terrible loss which their family experienced when their brother 
and son, Leonel, was killed.
    I know that everyone in this room expresses their 
condolences, shares their grief, and wants their family to know 
that we are here for them and we want to, as well, thank them 
for their strength, thank them for their willingness to speak 
here today, because their story is a story which must be heard 
in order to ensure that we do put the laws on the books that 
ensure that it never happens again.
    So let us then turn to the family and ask if you would 
begin to tell the story of what happened on that day.

                STATEMENT OF LUCYANNIE RONDON, 
                    SISTER OF LEONEL RONDON

    Ms. Rondon. So for all of you who don't know me, my name is 
Lucyannie Rondon. I am the sister of Leonel Rondon.
    Words cannot describe the pain my family and I feel at the 
loss of my brother Leonel. Some days I can almost hear him call 
me looking for my mother, filling up the room with his smile. 
He had such a warm heart. This senseless tragedy was the 
beginning of many things that my family and I will never do 
with Leonel again.
    My mother will never make him his favorite meal of shrimp 
and totonacas again. My daughter Riannie will never dance to 
her Uncle Leonel's music he created just for her. Our little 
brother Yunite will never go to the movies with Leonel again.
    We will never forget him. We will not let this loss be 
without meaning. The grief we feel is unbearable but we know 
Leonel want us to stay strong. We will stand with the community 
on his behalf.
    Even as a young boy, he was so kind to others. He shoveled 
the snow for our neighbors. He carried groceries for the older 
people in our neighborhood. We will not have the joy of seeing 
the wonderful man we know he would have become.
    I stand in front of you in his honor. I will never have my 
brother back. We hope there will be justice for him and the 
community. Nobody should ever go through what my family has 
gone through ever again.
    Thank you.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. So our thanks to the Rondon family. Your 
powerful statement is something that we'll always remember and 
I think it is very important for us to hear your story because 
that will now help everyone to understand the importance of the 
hearing which we are about to have and why we must heed your 
warning that this should never happen again to any other 
family. So thank you so much for being here.
    Now I would like to ask for the first panel to come up and 
to be seated in front of your cards and that would be the 
Honorable Robert Sumwalt, the Chairman of the National 
Transportation Safety Board; the Honorable Matthew Beaton, 
Secretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs; Mr. Steve Bryant, the President of 
Columbia Gas of Massachusetts; Mr. Joe Hamrock, President and 
Chief Executive Officer of NiSource from Columbus, Ohio; Mr. 
Richard Kuprewicz, President of Accufacts, Incorporated; and 
Mr. Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel of the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration in Washington, D.C.
    So if you could all please stand, thank you, please raise 
your right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Senator Markey. Let the record reflect that each answered 
affirmatively.
    Chairman Sumwalt, if you could begin your testimony and 
outline what you have found about what happened here in 
Lawrence.

  STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT L. SUMWALT III, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL 
                  TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

    Mr. Sumwalt. Thank you, Senator Markey. Good morning, 
Senator Markey and Distinguished Members of Congress, Senator 
Warren, Senator Hassan, Congresswoman Tsongas, Congressman 
Moulton.
    Thank you for inviting the NTSB to testify this morning 
about the NTSB's investigation into the September fires and 
explosion here in the Merrimack Valley.
    I'd like to begin by offering our sincerest sympathies to 
all of those who've been affected by this tragedy.
    As you know, the NTSB is an independent Federal agency. 
We're charged by Congress to investigate transportation 
accidents, to determine the probable cause, and issue safety 
recommendations to prevent the reoccurrence of those accidents. 
We are not in the business of assigning blame or pointing 
fingers.
    Like with you, our goals are to determine what happened, 
why it happened, and what can be done to keep it from happening 
in the future?
    So based on our investigation so far, we know that the 
over-pressurization of a low pressure natural gas distribution 
system is what initiated the accident sequence. Prior to the 
over-pressurization, crews were replacing the older cast iron 
distribution line with new plastic lines.
    However, the sensing lines that are necessary for detecting 
and controlling pressure were not relocated to the new pipe. 
So, of course, once the old pipe was capped off, gas flow and 
pressure became substantially reduced and because the sensing 
lines were connected to the old pipes, which now had low flow 
and low pressure, the pressure regulator commanded for a full 
flow of high-pressure gas into the low-pressure distribution 
system. This led to explosions and fires which were ignited by 
gas-fueled appliances.
    Why did it happen? We know that the tasks required for this 
work were developed and approved by Columbia Gas and did not 
account for the location of the sensing lines. Therefore, they 
did not require their relocation to the new pipes.
    We know that not all of Columbia Gas's internal departments 
were required to review the plans nor were they required to be 
approved by a professional engineer, also known as a PE.
    Further, we know that a practice had been discontinued 
several years ago by Columbia Gas that required personnel to be 
in place to monitor work on the gas mains and be available to 
immediately respond to any abnormalities.
    Our investigation will further look into why the placement 
of the regulator sensing line was not considered in the 
planning phase and why it was not caught by inspectors.
    As Chairman of the NTSB, I want you to know that I've 
placed a high priority on properly completing this 
investigation, but as you can imagine, an investigation such as 
this is very complex and it will take time, but my commitment 
is we will do a good job and we will come up with 
recommendations to keep it from happening again.
    And as Senator Markey mentioned, two weeks ago, we issued 
five interim safety recommendations as a result of this 
investigation, including four recommendations which we 
classified as urgent recommendations.
    Now we only issue urgent safety recommendations when we 
determine that the course of action requires immediate 
attention to avoid imminent loss due to a similar situation.
    One recommendation was issued to the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts where we called for requiring the seal of a 
professional engineer on all public utility engineering 
drawings. We issued the four urgent safety recommendations to 
NiSource, which, of course, is the pipeline owner operating as 
Columbia Gas of Massachusetts.
    First, to NiSource, they should revise the engineering and 
constructability review process to include all internal 
documents and require plans to be sealed by a PE prior to 
construction.
    Second, they should ensure that all natural gas system 
records are complete and readily available.
    Third, NiSource should incorporate risk assessment into 
project development.
    And last, while any modifications are being made to gas 
mains, NiSource should actively monitor pressures and require 
personnel to be in place to immediately respond to any abnormal 
changes in the pipeline system.
    In the interest of public safety, the NTSB urges 
expeditious implementation of each of these five interim safety 
recommendations.
    We stand ready to work with you and the Committee to 
continue improving the safety of our Nation's pipeline system.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward 
to your questions.
    [The prepared testimony of Mr. Sumwalt follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert L. Sumwalt III, Chairman, 
                  National Transportation Safety Board
    Good morning Senator Markey. Thank you for inviting the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to testify today.
    The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged by Congress with 
investigating major transportation disasters--including pipelines. We 
determine the probable cause of accidents and issue safety 
recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. We do not assign 
fault nor place blame.
    On September 13, 2018, about 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, a 
series of explosions and fires occurred after high-pressure natural gas 
was released into a low-pressure gas distribution system in the 
northeast region of the Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts. The 
distribution system was owned and operated by Columbia Gas of 
Massachusetts (Columbia Gas), a subsidiary of NiSource, Inc. The system 
overpressure damaged 131 structures, including at least 5 homes that 
were destroyed in the City of Lawrence and the towns of Andover and 
North Andover. Most of the damage was a result of structure fires 
ignited by gas-fueled appliances. Several structures were destroyed by 
natural gas explosions. One person was killed and at least 21 
individuals, including 2 firefighters, were transported to the 
hospital. Seven other firefighters received minor injuries.
    On behalf of the entire NTSB, I would like to begin by offering my 
sincerest sympathies, to all of those in the Merrimack Valley who have 
been impacted by this tragedy. Our investigation continues, and our 
commitment is to keep the Commerce Committee informed of any updates, 
along with all those affected by this tragic event.
    Including this tragedy, we are currently investigating seven 
natural gas pipeline explosions in which lives were lost, homes 
destroyed, and communities severely affected. Further, we have 
successfully completed over 120 pipeline investigations and issued more 
than 1,300 pipeline safety recommendations, with over 80 percent closed 
favorably, since 1967.
    We launched this investigation to answer the very questions that 
you have raised:

        What happened?

        Why did it happen?

        What can be done to make sure that it never happens again?
What happened?
    Based on our investigation so far, we know that over-pressurization 
of a low-pressure natural gas distribution system initiated the 
accident sequence.
    The cast-iron, low-pressure distribution system was installed in 
the early 1900s and had been partially improved with both steel and 
plastic pipe upgrades since the 1950s. The low-pressure distribution 
system in the affected area relied on 14 regulator stations to control 
gas at the required pressure into structures serviced by the system, 
unlike high-pressure gas distribution systems that place an individual 
regulator to reduce pressure at each customer service. Each of the 
regulator stations reduced the pressure from about 75-pounds per square 
inch gauge (psig) natural gas main pipeline to 12 inches of water 
column (about 0.5 psig) for delivery to customers.
    Prior to the accident, Columbia Gas had an overarching plan 
consisting of multiple projects to replace 7,595 feet of low-pressure, 
existing cast-iron and plastic natural gas main with 4,845 feet of low-
pressure and high-pressure plastic gas main on South Union Street and 
neighboring streets.
    On September 13, prior to the overpressure event, a Columbia Gas-
contracted work crew, which included a Columbia Gas inspector, executed 
one of the Columbia Gas-designed and--approved pipe-replacement 
projects at the intersection of South Union Street and Salem Street in 
South Lawrence. The project was to install a plastic distribution main 
and abandon in place a cast-iron distribution main. The distribution 
main that was abandoned still had the regulator-sensing lines that were 
used to detect pressure in the distribution system and provide input to 
the regulators to control the system pressure. Once the contractor 
crews disconnected the distribution main that was being abandoned, the 
section containing the regulator-sensing lines began losing pressure.
    As the pressure in the abandoned distribution main dropped to about 
0.01 psig, the regulators responded by opening further, increasing 
pressure in the distribution system. The regulators opened completely 
when they no longer sensed system pressure, allowing the full flow of 
high-pressure gas to release into the distribution system supplying the 
neighborhood. As a result, natural gas was delivered to customers at a 
pressure well above the maximum-allowable operating pressure which led 
to the ignition of fires and explosions in homes.
    Minutes before the fires and explosions occurred, the Columbia Gas 
monitoring center in Columbus, Ohio, received two high-pressure alarms 
for the South Lawrence gas pressure system: one at 4:04 p.m. and the 
other at 4:05 p.m. The monitoring center had no control capability to 
close or open valves; its only capability was to monitor pressures on 
the distribution system and advise field technicians accordingly. 
Following company protocol, at 4:06 p.m., the Columbia Gas controller 
reported the high-pressure event to the Meters and Regulations group in 
Lawrence. A local resident made the first 9-1-1 call to Lawrence 
Emergency Services at 4:11 p.m.
    In response, three technicians were dispatched to perform field 
checks on 14 regulators. Columbia Gas shut down the regulator at issue 
by about 4:30 p.m. The critical valves of the natural gas distribution 
system were closed by 7:24 p.m. Beginning about midnight, crews 
consisting of two Columbia Gas technicians escorted by two emergency 
response personnel began shutting off the meters at each house to 
isolate the homes from the natural gas distribution system. All meters 
were shut off by the following morning.
Why did this happen?
    We know that the tasks required for this work were developed and 
approved by the utility and did not account for the location of the 
sensing lines. Therefore, they did not require their relocation so that 
the actual system pressure was detected and controlled. We know that 
not all of the utility's internal departments were required to review 
the plans nor were they required to be approved by a professional 
engineer, who then places his/her official seal on the documents (a 
process known as ``sealing''). Further, we know that a practice had 
been discontinued several years ago that required personnel to be in 
place to monitor work on gas mains and be available to immediately 
respond to any abnormalities.
    Our investigation will further look into why the placement of the 
regulator sensing lines were not considered in the planning phase and 
why it was not caught by inspectors. We are also looking at the 
response by Columbia Gas of Massachusetts once the event started to 
determine if actions taken were timely and appropriate.
Urgent Safety Recommendations: What can be done to make sure that it 
        never happens again?
    Our investigations are thorough, and it will take some time for us 
to issue a final report regarding the probable cause and to make 
recommendations to improve safety. However, as in all of our 
investigations, if we identify safety issues requiring immediate 
action, we have the capability to issue interim safety recommendations. 
In fact, recently, we issued five interim safety recommendations as a 
result of this investigation, including four which are classified as 
``urgent.'' We only issue urgent recommendations when we determine that 
the course of action requires immediate attention to avoid imminent 
loss due to a similar accident.
    One recommendation calls upon the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to 
eliminate the existing professional licensure exemptions and require 
the seal of a professional engineer (PE) on all public utility 
engineering drawings. The NTSB believes that it is critical that an 
engineer with appropriate qualifications and experience review 
engineering plans for a gas company, if not develop them. The 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts exemption for the requirement of PE 
licensure to perform ``industrial'' and public utility work forecloses 
an opportunity to detect this design oversight. The seal of a PE should 
be required on all public utility engineering plans to reduce the 
likelihood of accidents such as this occurring.
    We issued the four urgent safety recommendations to NiSource, the 
pipeline owner, operating as Columbia Gas of Massachusetts.
    First, revise the engineering and constructability review process 
to include all internal departments and require plans to be sealed by a 
professional engineer prior to construction.
    Second, ensure that all natural gas systems records are complete 
and readily available. Third, incorporate risk assessments into project 
development. Lastly, while any modifications are being made to gas 
mains, actively monitor pressures and require personnel to be in place 
to immediately respond to any abnormal changes in the pipeline system.
Conclusion
    Over the last 51 years, our investigations have found that safe 
operation of pipelines is a shared responsibility among operators, 
government oversight agencies, and local communities.
    Pipelines remain one of the safest and most efficient means of 
transporting vital commodities used to power homes and supply 
businesses. However, as many in this room know all too well, the 
consequences are tragic when there is insufficient safety planning and 
oversight. To that end, the NTSB urges expeditious implementation of 
all five interim safety recommendations.
    We recognize the progress that has been made; yet, there will 
always be room for improvement. The NTSB stands ready to work with you 
and this Committee to continue improving the safety of our Nation's 
pipeline systems.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy to 
answer your questions.

    Senator Markey. Secretary Beaton.

        STATEMENT OF HON. MATTHEW A. BEATON, SECRETARY,

            MASSACHUSETTS EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENERGY

                   AND ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

    Mr. Beaton. Thank you, Senator. Senator Markey, Senator 
Warren, Senator Hassan, Congressman Moulton and Congresswoman 
Tsongas, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on 
behalf of the Baker-Polito Administration.
    As Massachusetts Secretary of Energy and Environment, I 
oversee the Commonwealth's six environmental natural resource 
and energy regulatory agencies. One of those agencies, the 
Department of Public Utilities, is the Commonwealth agency with 
jurisdiction over natural gas infrastructure.
    An annual certification provided by PHMSA grants the 
Department of Public Utilities' Division of Pipeline Safety the 
authority to oversee intrastate pipeline facilities and gives 
the division the responsibility of pipeline inspections and the 
enforcement of operator compliance with Federal and state rules 
and regulations.
    When the division conducts pipeline safety inspections, a 
company's site work is checked against approved plans and 
programs for consistency. PHMSA annually evaluates the 
department's effectiveness and PHMSA's 2017 evaluation of the 
DPU gave the Commonwealth's Pipeline Safety Program a perfect 
score for incident investigations, program inspection 
procedures, damage prevention, field inspections, and 
compliance activities.
    Massachusetts' PHMSA evaluations have trended upward from a 
score of 89.3 in 2014 to a score of 97.4 percent in 2017.
    Turning to the events of September 13, immediately 
following the fires and explosions in Lawrence, Andover, and 
North Andover, the Commonwealth mobilized emergency response 
capabilities through MEMA and the State Police, establishing a 
mobile incident command center in Lawrence to assist the 
municipalities.
    Within hours of the incident, the Governor, Lt. Governor, 
myself, and a number of administration staff arrived onsite and 
immediately began assessing the emergency response capabilities 
of Columbia Gas, worked with National Grid to cut electric 
power throughout the impact area, and dispatched the Director 
of Pipeline Safety and three DPU inspectors.
    Given the magnitude of the emergency and the insufficient 
response from Columbia Gas within the first 24 hours, Governor 
Baker issued a Declaration of Emergency by 3 p.m. on Friday, 
September 14. This Declaration ultimately led to an 
unprecedented DPU order directing EverSource Energy to take 
management control over the effort to safely restore utility 
services.
    Subsequently, EverSource, with the oversight and support of 
the Administration, led an effort with over 1,000 mutual aid 
resources, to clear and make safe every structure within the 
impact zone, restore gas service to thousands of unaffected 
customers, and restore electric power to 18,000 customers.
    Another DPU order on September 21 appointed Joe Albanese of 
Commodore Recovery, LLC, as the Chief Recovery Officer to 
manage and coordinate the restoration efforts, which included 
building a command and control organization charged with 
restoring service to over 8,400 gas meters impacting more than 
10,000 dwellings and 680 businesses.
    Since September 13, myself and EEA staff have maintained a 
daily presence to coordinate and oversee the standup, 
transition, and implementation of recovery operations. The 
Baker-Polito Administration continues to maintain a daily 
support function in these operations.
    Simultaneous with the mobilization of recovery efforts, the 
Baker-Polito Administration quickly turned to ensuring both the 
continued safety and integrity of natural gas infrastructure in 
the Commonwealth.
    After a September 26 announcement to hire an independent 
evaluator, the DPU selected Dynamic Risk Assessment Systems 
earlier this month to examine the operation and maintenance 
policies and practices of the Commonwealth's gas distribution 
companies as well as the physical integrity of the 
Commonwealth's gas distribution system.
    On October 8 and 12, respectively, the DPU issued moratoria 
on all work, except emergency and compliance work, in both 
National Grid and Columbia Gas's service territories.
    Last week, in coordination with the Northeast Gas 
Association, the Baker-Polito Administration made a first in 
the Nation announcement that all natural gas distribution 
companies in Massachusetts will adopt a pipeline safety 
management system, referred to as API-1173 that we already 
heard about.
    Additionally, the Baker-Polito Administration filed 
legislation last week to ensure that all gas utility work that 
could pose a material risk to public safety is reviewed and 
approved by a certified professional engineer.
    It is our hope that the actions taken in Massachusetts will 
initiate a conversation on the national level regarding 
appropriate industry standards and protocols to prevent such 
disasters in the future.
    In closing, this was undoubtedly a devastating and 
unfortunate incident that resulted in a tremendous loss for 
many residents of the Merrimack Valley.
    While there were unacceptable oversights that led to the 
incident and a challenging initial response, I do want to make 
note of the genuine commitment to restoration that I have 
observed from NiSource, particularly from their hundreds of 
dedicated employees who have left their families and relocated 
themselves in an effort to restore the quality of life as best 
possible here in the Merrimack Valley.
    I would also like to thank the Mayor of Lawrence, the Town 
Managers of Andover and North Andover, and the countless local, 
state, and Federal officials and first responders who have 
partnered with us throughout this effort.
    The leadership and service of these individuals to our 
communities is commendable and has been an essential element to 
this restoration effort.
    Additionally, I would like to thank PHMSA and NTSB for 
their support, the multiple companies and utilities, along with 
the 4,500 plumbers, electricians, mutual aid workers, 
contractors, linguists, and staff who united under the common 
mission of restoration of the region.
    And, finally, EverSource Energy is also deserving of our 
gratitude for their willingness to rise to the challenge 
associated with securing homes and businesses in the immediate 
aftermath of events and restoring utility services to impacted 
residents and businesses. Their leadership and ability to 
quickly mobilize resources was invaluable to the Commonwealth.
    Thank you again to the Committee for the opportunity to 
provide testimony on this issue and I look forward to answering 
any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Beaton follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Matthew A. Beaton, Secretary, Massachusetts 
          Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs
    Senator Markey, Senator Warren and members of the Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, thank you for the opportunity 
to provide testimony on behalf of the Baker-Polito Administration 
regarding pipeline safety in Massachusetts and the response to the 
Merrimack Valley overpressurization event that occurred the afternoon 
of September 13, 2018.
    In the wake of this incident, which was caused by the release of 
high-pressure natural gas into a low-pressure gas distribution system, 
the Baker-Polito Administration immediately began coordinating relief 
efforts for residents and businesses displaced by the disaster. In 
addition to these relief efforts we took the following measures to 
assess and restore the safety and integrity of our pipeline 
infrastructure:

   declared a State of Emergency;

   directed Eversource to lead gas restoration efforts in 
        Columbia Gas' service territory;

   directed Columbia Gas to hire an independent Chief Recovery 
        Officer;

   issued moratoria on all natural gas work, excluding 
        emergency and compliance work in two natural gas service 
        territories;

   issued an RFP and subsequently contracted with an 
        independent evaluator to conduct a comprehensive safety 
        evaluation of Massachusetts' natural gas infrastructure;

   coordinated efforts to secure a commitment from all local 
        gas distribution companies in the Commonwealth to adhere to 
        industry best practices; and

   filed legislation to implement the November 14, 2018 
        recommendation of the National Transportation Safety Board 
        (NTSB) to help prevent over-pressurization events in the 
        future.

    Before diving into further details regarding the Administration's 
response in the immediate aftermath of the fires and explosions in 
Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover, I'd like to first provide a brief 
overview of the Secretariat of Energy and Environmental Affairs' 
jurisdiction over intrastate natural gas pipeline safety in the 
Commonwealth.
    During the course of my testimony, I will be unable to discuss the 
content of the ongoing investigations by both the NTSB and the 
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) Division of Pipeline 
Safety (Division), as I do not want to prejudice those investigations.
Overview of EEA Organization and DPU Jurisdiction
    As the Massachusetts Secretary of Energy and Environment, I oversee 
the Commonwealth's six environmental, natural resource and energy 
regulatory agencies, which include the Departments of Environmental 
Protection, Public Utilities, Energy Resources, Conservation & 
Recreation, Agricultural Resources, and Fish and Game. The 
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) is the Commonwealth 
agency with jurisdiction over investor-owned electric power, natural 
gas, and water companies, as well as bus companies, moving companies, 
and transportation network companies.
    Notably, the DPU is the state agency that has assumed the 
responsibility for intrastate pipeline facilities, pursuant to Federal 
delegation by the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration 
(PHMSA) (49 USC 60105) and State law (MGL Chapter 164 Sec. 105A). Under 
the annual certification provided by PHMSA to delegate its authority, 
the Department of Public Utilities' Division of Pipeline Safety is 
responsible for pipeline inspections, compliance and enforcement of 
Federal and state rules, regulations, orders, safety programs, accident 
investigations, record maintenance and reporting.
    The Division's Public Utility Engineers (PUEs) are charged with 
performing random and scheduled on-site audits and inspections of 
intrastate natural gas pipeline distribution facilities and pipeline 
crews, including reviews of crew qualifications, methods of work, and 
drug and alcohol screening. These PUEs also perform pipeline corrosion 
inspections and inspections of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facilities, 
as well as assist with the investigation of accidents involving public 
utility organizations to determine the cause and origin of the 
incident.
    It should be noted that, except in instances involving the two 
ongoing moratoria, the Division does not approve routine pipeline work 
in the Commonwealth; however, companies are required (per 220 CMR 
101.04) to notify the Division 48 hours in advance of the start of 
construction of pipeline installations projects of 5,000 feet or more.
    The Division is also responsible for reviewing, every 5 years per 
PHMSA guidelines, programs and plans of the natural gas distribution 
companies, to ensure consistency with Federal and state rules and 
regulations, such as:

   Operations & Maintenance Plan;

   Operator Qualification Program;

   Public Awareness Program;

   Distribution Integrity Management Program (DIMP); and

   Transmission Integrity Management Program (TIMP).

    In addition to the Division's review of these plans and programs, 
the Commission of the DPU annually reviews and approves Emergency 
Response Plans of natural gas distribution companies in the 
Commonwealth.
    When the Division conducts onsite pipeline safety inspections, a 
company's site work is checked against these plans and programs for 
consistency. If the Division finds deficiencies in either these plans 
and programs or the site work conducted by a company, they initiate an 
investigation which may lead to the issuance of fines, penalties and 
corrective actions. In response to violations of Federal and State 
regulations, the Department of Public Utilities can issue a $200,000 
fine for each violation and a maximum civil penalty of up to 
$2,000,000(49 USC 60122; 220 CMR 59).
    Since 2016, the DPU has undertaken a number of proactive actions to 
increase pipeline safety in the Commonwealth, which notably includes 
the Division annually developing a risk-based inspection plan to ensure 
the targeted deployment of inspection resources on the activities, 
plans, programs and infrastructure that pose the greatest safety risk. 
In 2016, the Division also initiated an investigation of all district 
pressure regulation stations to ensure compliance with Federal 
regulations (49 CFR Part 192.619). When the Division discovered that 
some district regulator stations were set at the Maximum Allowable 
Operating Pressure (``MAOP''), they advised all companies of the risks 
associated with this. Setting pressure at the MAOP is not a violation 
of Federal regulations; however, Columbia voluntarily agreed to lower 
the operating pressure.
Timeline of the Immediate Response to Events of September 13, 2018
    On the afternoon of September 13, 2018, immediately following the 
fires and explosions in the cities of Lawrence, Andover and North 
Andover, the Commonwealth mobilized emergency response capabilities 
through the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and the 
State Police, establishing a mobile State Police Incident Command 
Center in Lawrence, MA.
    Within hours of the incident, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
myself and a number of administration officials arrived on-site. Our 
primary goal was to stabilize the situation and ensure local officials 
had the resources and information necessary to extinguish fires, clear 
and secure buildings and set-up shelters for displaced residents.
    We simultaneously began assessing the emergency response 
capabilities of Columbia Gas, worked with National Grid to cut electric 
power throughout the impacted area and through the Department of Public 
Utilities, dispatched the Director of Pipeline Safety and three DPU 
inspectors to the Merrimack Valley region. Given the unprecedented 
emergency circumstances coupled with the insufficient response from 
Columbia Gas within the first 24 hours of emergency response, Governor 
Baker issued a Declaration of Emergency by 3PM on Friday September 14, 
2018.
    This declaration authorized DPU Chairman Angela O'Connor, pursuant 
to section 4B of MGL Chapter 25, to take any action ``necessary to 
assure public safety and welfare through the priority restoration or 
continuing availability of gas, electric, and water utility services.'' 
Under this authorization and in response to the need for experienced 
management capable of advanced resource coordination and effective 
communication, Chairman O'Connor promptly directed Eversource to take 
management control over the effort to safely restore utility services. 
Subsequently, Eversource, with the oversight and support of the 
Administration, led an effort with over 1,000 mutual aid resources, to 
shut off gas service, clear and make safe every structure within the 
impact zone, restore gas service to over 10,000 customers outside the 
impact zone and restore electric power to 18,000 customers.
    Shortly thereafter, on September 21, 2018, DPU Chairman O'Connor 
appointed, Joe Albanese, Commodore Recovery LLC, as the Chief Recovery 
Officer, to manage and coordinate the restoration efforts. Joe is the 
Founder, President and CEO of Commodore Builders.
    Joe leveraged his 28 years of military service, including 20 years 
with the Naval Construction Forces, to build a command and control 
organization, consisting of over 14 divisions, supporting the mission 
to safely restore services to over 8,400 gas meters impacting more than 
10,000 dwellings and 680 businesses. In coordination with Baker-Polito 
Administration and NiSource, the restoration effort has been effective 
in:

   mobilizing over 4,500 plumbers, electricians, mutual aid 
        workers, contractors, linguists and staff;

   replacing 43.3 miles of main pipeline and 5,086 service 
        lines;

   sourcing and distributing 14,000 hot plates and thousands of 
        space heaters;

   arranging for alternative housing options (Hotels, RVs, 
        Apartments) to accommodate over 6,000 families;

   maintain a shelter & warming center to accommodate an 
        additional 1,000 individuals;

   installing over 25,000 smoke and carbon monoxide detectors; 
        and

   launching 3 claims and business centers in Andover, Lawrence 
        and North Andover to provide in-person assistance.

    Since September 13, 2018, I maintained a constant presence, 7-days 
a week, with staff from my Secretariat and the Governor's office to 
assist in the building and implementation of recovery operations. To 
date, the Baker-Polito Administration continues to maintain a daily 
support function in these operations.
    Notably, the Administration has been committed to deploying energy 
efficient products during all phases of the restoration. That effort 
will not end when the natural gas service is restored to the Merrimack 
Valley and we are pleased that Columbia Gas has announced the launch of 
a targeted weatherization and energy efficiency campaign in the three 
affected communities. We have been in discussions with the company 
regarding the components of the program, but will certainly focus on 
deployment of insulation, as well as air source heat pumps and 
anticipate launching the program with the new 3-year energy efficiency 
plan that will commence on January 1st.
Ongoing Reviews of Natural Gas Safety
    Simultaneous with the mobilization of restoration and recovery 
efforts, the Baker-Polito Administration quickly turned to ensuring 
both the continued safety and integrity of natural gas infrastructure 
in the Commonwealth.
    On September 26, 2018, after considering other states' actions in 
the aftermath of significant gas incidents and in consultation with 
PHMSA, the DPU announced the intent to hire an independent evaluator to 
assess, out of an abundance of caution, the safety of pipeline 
infrastructure throughout the Commonwealth. The selection of Dynamic 
Risk Assessment Systems, Inc., a Texas based firm with industry-leading 
technical expertise in pipeline risk and asset integrity management, 
was recently publicized on November 1, 2018.
    Dynamic Risk will examine the operation and maintenance policies 
and practices of the Commonwealth's gas distribution companies, 
including municipal gas companies. The independent evaluator will also 
examine the physical integrity of the Commonwealth's gas distribution 
system. A preliminary report, which will complement the NTSB's ongoing 
review, is expected within 120 days. We anticipate that the independent 
evaluator's report will provide concrete recommendations regarding 
improving the integrity and safe operation of the Commonwealth's aged 
natural gas infrastructure.
    Following another natural gas overpressurization event in Woburn, 
on October 8, 2018, Chairman O'Connor issued a moratorium on all work, 
except emergency and required compliance work, in National Grid's 
service territory, citing a ``persistent disregard for Federal and 
state pipeline safety regulations.'' This moratorium came on the heels 
of a September 26, 2018 letter to National Grid, detailing 29 possible 
violations of pipeline safety regulations by the company and a 
September 28, 2018 request to the company for additional information 
regarding pipeline activities in the company's territory. National Grid 
has responded to these allegations and the Division has issued 
additional discovery to the company and is continuing to investigate 
these possible violations.
    On October 12, 2018, following the issuance of the National 
Transportation Safety Board's preliminary report, the DPU also issued a 
moratorium on all non-emergency or compliance work in Columbia Gas' 
service territory.
    Last week, in coordination with the Northeast Gas Association 
(NGA), the Baker-Polito Administration announced that all natural gas 
distribution companies in Massachusetts committed to adopting industry 
best practices--a Pipeline Safety Management System: American Petroleum 
Institute's (API) Recommended Practice 1173. This marks the first time 
an entire state has committed to Recommend Practices 1173, which was 
developed in the aftermath of high-profile natural gas incidents like 
the 2010 San Bruno disaster.
    Finally, in response to the NTSB's November 14 recommendations, the 
Baker-Polito Administration also filed legislation last week to ensure 
that gas utility work that could pose a material risk to public safety 
is reviewed and approved by a certified professional engineer. 
Currently, Massachusetts is one of many states that exempt public 
utility companies' work from needing the approval of certified 
professional engineers.
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
    While I've provided an overview of Massachusetts' response to the 
events of September 13, 2018, both the NTSB report and the 
recommendations of the Independent Evaluator hired by the DPU will 
provide further insight into additional changes in protocols, 
regulation, and statute to ensure gas pipeline safety in the 
Commonwealth.
    The Baker-Polito Administration looks forward to working with the 
Massachusetts Legislature to pass the legislation we filed last week to 
implement the first NTSB statutory recommendation and we are encouraged 
by the Commonwealth's natural gas system operator's national leading 
agreement to adhere to best practices. We hope both of these efforts 
will initiate a conversation at the national level regarding 
appropriate industry standards and protocols to prevent such disasters 
in the future.
    The issue of pipeline inspectors has also been an area of public 
scrutiny in the wake of the Merrimack Valley overpressurization event; 
however, based on the information made publicly available to date, we 
believe that no additional number of inspectors could have prevented 
this incident. PHMSA recommends a total of 10 Public Utility Engineers 
(PUEs), which includes both the certified inspectors and those PUEs 
undergoing federally mandated pipeline inspector certification.
    Since 2014, the number of PUEs in the Division has annually 
averaged at between 10-12 positions. The Pipeline Safety Division 
currently employs 8 natural gas public utility engineers (PUEs)--which 
includes 6 certified inspectors and 2 PUEs undergoing the Federal 
certification process. In addition to these 8 PUEs, three (3) new PUEs 
are expected to begin employment in mid-December, and the Division is 
in the process of hiring two (2) additional PUEs and one (1) Assistant 
Director of Pipeline Safety.
    In 2017, the Division's pipeline inspectors conducted 1,177 
inspections, up from 880 in 2016. Additionally, PHMSA annually 
evaluates the Commonwealth's effectiveness and PHMSA's 2017 Evaluation 
of the Department of Public Utilities gave the Commonwealth's Pipeline 
Safety program a perfect score for incident investigations, program 
inspection procedures, damage prevention, field inspections, and 
compliance activities. Massachusetts PHMSA evaluations have trended 
upwards from a score of 89.3 percent in 2014 to a score of 97.4 percent 
in 2017.
    The focus on pipeline inspector numbers has, however, highlighted 
the issue of retaining qualified pipeline inspectors, which we 
understand is a challenge not unique to Massachusetts and is a topic 
worth further exploration.
Conclusion
    The Baker-Polito Administration, the Executive Office of Energy and 
Environmental Affairs and the Department of Public Utilities look 
forward to a continued dialogue with the Committee regarding all of 
these issues to ensure the safety of Massachusetts' natural gas 
infrastructure.
    We look forward to the results of the NTSBs full review of the 
causes of the overpressurization event that occurred on September 13, 
2018 and stand ready to implement both the recommendations of the NTSB 
and the Commonwealth's independent evaluator.
    In closing, I would like to note that this was a devastating and 
unfortunate incident that resulted in tremendous loss for many 
residents of the Merrimack Valley. While there were unacceptable 
oversights that led to the incident and a slow initial response, I do 
want to make note of the genuine commitment and dedication I have 
observed from NiSource, particularly from their hundreds of dedicated 
employees who have left their families and relocated themselves in an 
effort to restore the quality of life, as best possible, for the 
residents of Merrimack Valley. I would also like to thank the Mayor of 
Lawrence, the town managers of Andover and North Andover and the 
countless local, state, and Federal officials who have partnered with 
us throughout this effort to break down barriers and collaborate on 
solutions to a number of complex situations throughout the restoration. 
The leadership and service of these individuals to our communities is 
commendable and has been an essential element of this restoration. 
Additionally, I would like to thank the multiple companies and 
utilities, along with the 4,500 plumbers, electricians, mutual aid 
workers, contractors, linguists and staff who united under the common 
mission of restoration of the region.
    Finally, Eversource is also deserving of our gratitude for their 
willingness to rise to the immediate challenge associated with securing 
homes and businesses in the immediate aftermath of events and restoring 
utility services to impacted residents and businesses. Their leadership 
and ability to quickly mobilize resources was invaluable to the 
Commonwealth.
    Thank you again to the Committee for the opportunity to provide 
testimony on this important issue.

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Next, we're going to hear from Steve Bryant, the President 
of Columbia Gas of Massachusetts.

             STATEMENT OF STEVE BRYANT, PRESIDENT, 
                 COLUMBIA GAS OF MASSACHUSETTS

    Mr. Bryant. Good morning. Good morning, Senator Markey, 
other Members of Congress, Merrimack Valley leaders and 
residents.
    Thank you for holding this hearing. We appreciate the 
opportunity to answer your questions.
    We know the tragedy of September 13 will have a lasting 
impact on the communities of Lawrence, Andover, and North 
Andover.
    As we talk today about steps we are taking to respond, we 
are deeply aware of the suffering, disruption, and unrest this 
tragedy has caused. Our company's committed to addressing and 
remediating the damage that has occurred and to helping the 
community heal.
    I want to take a moment to thank our partners in the effort 
to help residents who have been impacted by this tragedy, the 
first responders, Captain Joe Albanese and Rear Admiral Richard 
C. Long, Governor Baker, Lt. Governor Polito, and Attorney 
General Healey, Merrimack Valley community leaders, and other 
public officials, EverSource, and more than 450 mutual aid 
workers from utilities across the country. I say thank you.
    What this group has done to protect, assist, and restore 
the Merrimack Valley has been remarkable and we are grateful.
    We have submitted a full statement for the record and I 
will focus here on some of the immediate steps we are taking to 
support our customers. I also want to speak about the claims 
process for making our customers whole. I want to be clear up 
front. We know we have more to do to improve the work that is 
already underway.
    We've worked since the tragedy to address residents' 
immediate needs and to establish a process to reimburse losses. 
Within 6 hours of the explosion, we established a dedicated 
customer service line and within 48 hours, we opened the first 
claims center in Lawrence. We have since opened two additional 
claims centers in Andover and North Andover.
    Families visiting the claims center can receive direct 
financial aid to help address immediate needs for food, 
supplies, and transportation while they begin the work with 
claims personnel.
    We bought temporary cooking equipment and worked with fire 
officials to make sure residents who received equipment have 
proper safety information. We inspected thousands of homes to 
see if they could utilize space heaters and added smoke and 
carbon monoxide detectors.
    We have installed or provided reimbursement for alternate 
fuel solutions so that residents could have heat and hot water 
before gas service is restored. We secured temporary housing 
for affected customers. We also brought in offshore housing for 
workers leading the effort to restore gas service so our 
customers could be placed closer to their homes and closer to 
work.
    As of November 24, we have had over 18,000 visits to our 
claims center. We have added more resources to the center to 
make sure we are processing claims quickly, accurately, and 
efficiently. Nearly 400 adjustors support the claims process to 
date and we have processed over 23,000 claims.
    Affected customers who've not yet filed claims should call 
1-800-590-5571 and we also have people in the room today, so if 
we have customers that are impacted, we have claims adjustors. 
I just ask you put your hands up and indicate where you are, so 
please.
    We've also added information to the Columbia Gas website 
explaining how customers can escalate concerns with an adjustor 
and we are listening to feedback from the community and from 
you to improve our claims process and to make it as easy as 
possible.
    We recognize that the impacted communities will have needs 
that go beyond this assistance. In the days following the 
event, we donated $10 million to the Greater Lawrence Disaster 
Relief Fund to support the short- and medium-term needs of 
affected residents.
    We recently doubled our commitment, donating another $10 
million to support businesses in the Merrimack Valley.
    Joe Hamrock and I have been in the communities for many 
weeks and what I've seen reaffirmed my love for this region, a 
place I've long called home.
    Coming out of what was for many the scariest days of their 
lives, so many residents are optimistic and selfless. The 
responsibility for restoration is ours, we know, but we are 
working with strong communities and people who are 
extraordinary in their ability to do everything in their power 
to keep moving forward.
    I know our work has been far from perfect. I apologize for 
the hardship and frustration that has certainly caused and give 
you my commitment that we will continue to work to rebuild and 
restore the Merrimack Valley.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. I'm 
ready to answer your questions about the tragic events and 
about the work we must continue to recover from, and as a last 
note, I wish to offer my condolences to the family of Leonel 
Rondon. I will carry that in the heart for the rest of my life.
    Thank you.
    Senator Markey. Next, we're going to hear from Joe Hamrock, 
the President and Chief Executive Officer of NiSource of 
Columbus, Ohio.

              STATEMENT OF JOE HAMROCK, PRESIDENT 
             AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NiSOURCE

    Mr. Hamrock. Thank you, Senator.
    If I may, to the Rondon family, you have my deepest 
sympathy. I'm deeply sorry for the loss of your beloved son and 
brother. Lucy, thank you for your testimony here today.
    Each day, you are in my prayers that our Lord might comfort 
you and bring you His peace and those prayers will continue.
    On behalf of Steve and all of the NiSource and Columbia Gas 
family, we extend our condolences and sympathies and know that 
we will be here to support you in any way that we can.
    Good morning, Senators Markey, Hassan, and Warren, 
Representatives Moulton and Tsongas, Representative-elect 
Trahan, and Members of the Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover 
communities.
    Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today. As 
you noted, Senator, I am the CEO of NiSource, the company that 
owns Columbia Gas of Massachusetts.
    On the afternoon of September 13, 2018, a tragic event 
occurred here in the Merrimack Valley. Columbia Gas was 
conducting a planned gas pipeline modernization project when 
things went horribly wrong, leading to multiple fires and 
explosions, many injuries, and a tragic loss of life.
    I am here on behalf of Columbia Gas and NiSource to 
apologize. We are deeply sorry. I am deeply sorry.
    I also want to reaffirm our responsibility to repair the 
damage safely and as quickly as possible, and I want to express 
our resolve to improve our gas delivery system and processes so 
that a tragedy like this never happens again.
    To those who were injured or who were carrying for injured 
loved ones and to those whose homes and businesses were damaged 
or destroyed because of the fires and explosions, we recognize 
the distress and hardship this has caused in your lives.
    To those whose daily routines have been disrupted as a 
result of the restoration efforts, from elderly residents 
living alone in Andover with unfamiliar appliances to young 
families in Lawrence with longer commutes to work and school, 
to the businesses in North Andover who were not open and fear 
their customers may simply move on, I've heard you and we 
recognize your challenges and struggles. We are working around 
the clock to make things better.
    I want to tell you all personally that I am sorry and that 
I also know that an apology is simply not enough. We're going 
to get everyone back in their homes and businesses. We know 
it's too early to ask any of you to trust us, but we are 
committed to restoring these communities.
    We have completed the replacement of nearly 45 miles of gas 
pipeline and over 5,000 service lines. That has allowed us as 
of November 24 to restore service for over 6,000 residential 
meters and over 600 business customers, and I'm pleased to 
report that we are on track to restore heat and hot water to 
remaining facilities in the early part of the December 2 to 
December 16 date range.
    The NTSB is investigating the cause of the September 13 
tragedy and we are cooperating with that investigation. NTSB's 
work continues, but I want to be clear with everyone here 
today. We are not waiting for the NTSB final report to take 
steps to make sure that something like this never happens 
again.
    On September 14, we suspended work on all low pressure 
systems across NiSource, except where necessary for compliance 
and safety, and as detailed in my written testimony, we have 
already identified new safety measures for the operation of our 
low pressure systems, including a $150 million program to 
install continuous monitoring and protection against over-
pressure situations. We have also focused on additional 
training across our entire company.
    I am humbled by the spirit, optimism, and determination of 
our customers not to allow this tragedy to disrupt their lives 
any more than it has, but we know we have to do more and we 
have to do it faster.
    We are focused on that, and I appreciate the leadership of 
the Massachusetts delegation, and before I close, I also want 
to offer our deepest gratitude to the first responders who 
answered the emergency calls on the evening of September 13 and 
the gas workers who assisted them. What you did was heroic and 
remarkable and we appreciate your work.
    The Merrimack Valley has a long road to recovery ahead. Our 
companies are committed to working with you and everyone here 
today to advance that recovery. I know this work is and will be 
the most important duty of my entire professional career.
    We are going to make the Merrimack Valley gas system safer 
than ever and we're going to be here working with you to meet 
these commitments.
    Thank you and I'm ready to answer your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Hamrock and Mr. Bryant 
follow:]

Joint Prepared Statement of Joe Hamrock, President and Chief Executive 
    Officer, NiSource and Steve Bryant, President, Columbia Gas of 
                             Massachusetts
I. Introduction
    Good morning Senators Markey, Hassan, and Warren, Representatives 
Moulton and Tsongas, Representative-Elect Trahan, and members of the 
Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover communities. We appreciate the 
opportunity to testify today on behalf of Columbia Gas of Massachusetts 
(``Columbia Gas'') and NiSource. Because we were both called to testify 
about the events surrounding the September 13th tragedy in the 
Merrimack Valley, we are providing this joint written statement of 
Columbia Gas and NiSource for the record.
    We know that the tragic events of September 13th will have a 
lasting impact on the people, businesses, and communities of Lawrence, 
Andover, and North Andover. As we talk today about the steps we are 
taking to respond, we are deeply aware of the suffering, disruption, 
and unrest this tragedy has caused. We want to offer our deepest 
sympathies and condolences to the family of Leonel Rondon, the young 
man who died because of an explosion, and our deepest apologies to 
those who were injured and to all the residents and business owners of 
the Merrimack Valley who were impacted by the September 13th fires and 
explosions. In addition, we want to offer our thanks to the first 
responders who answered the emergency calls on the evening of September 
13th and the gas workers who assisted them. We are grateful for your 
service and your heroism in protecting the residents of the Merrimack 
Valley. We also want to acknowledge the leadership of the Massachusetts 
congressional delegation in the recovery efforts.
    The entire Columbia Gas and NiSource team is dedicated to 
addressing and remediating the damage that has occurred and to helping 
the community heal.
II. September 13, 2018 And Its Aftermath: Taking Responsibility
    On September 13, 2018, Columbia Gas of Massachusetts was conducting 
a planned gas pipeline modernization project when things went horribly 
wrong. At 4:04 and 4:05 pm, the Columbia Gas monitoring center received 
two alarms indicating high pressure within the South Lawrence low-
pressure gas system. At 4:06 pm, a controller within the monitoring 
center alerted the appropriate Columbia Gas personnel to dispatch them 
to the field. At approximately 4:30 pm, the Columbia Gas team shut down 
the regulator at issue.
    Before services were cut off, gas traveled through the system, 
leading to over-pressurization with terrible consequences--multiple 
fires and explosions, many injuries, and, most tragically, a loss of 
life.
    We are here on behalf of Columbia Gas and NiSource to apologize for 
this tragedy and to acknowledge our responsibility to make things 
right. We are deeply sorry.
    To those who were injured, those who cared or are caring for 
injured loved ones, and those whose homes or businesses were damaged or 
destroyed because of the fires and explosions, we recognize the 
distress and hardship this has caused in your lives.
    We know that the daily routines of many have been disrupted as a 
result of the over-pressurization and subsequent restoration efforts--
from the elderly resident living alone in Andover with unfamiliar 
appliances, to young families in Lawrence with longer commutes to work 
and school, to business owners in North Andover who are not open and 
fear their customers may simply move on. We have heard from you and 
recognize your challenges and struggles. And we are working around the 
clock to make things better.
    We also know an apology is not enough. We know it is too early to 
ask any of you to trust us, but we want to reaffirm our responsibility 
and commitment to repair the damage safely and as quickly as possible. 
In the days and months ahead, we hope to prove our commitment to you.
III. Broader Safety Measures
    The National Transportation Safety Board (``NTSB'') is 
investigating the cause of the September 13th tragedy, and we are 
cooperating with that investigation. The NTSB's work continues, but we 
want to be clear--we are not waiting for the NTSB to issue its final 
report or for new regulations. We are proactively identifying actions 
we can take now to make sure that something like this never happens 
again.
    After September 13, we suspended construction work on low-pressure 
systems, only performing work necessary for compliance and safety. 
Since then, we have identified additional ways to make our low-pressure 
systems safer and reduce the risk of over-pressurization. We are also 
taking steps to respond to and execute on the NTSB's safety 
recommendations.
    As part of this effort, we continue to evaluate opportunities to 
engineer fail-safe measures in our gas delivery systems. We have 
already committed to invest approximately $150 million to achieve the 
following infrastructure improvements:

   OVER-PRESSURE PROTECTION DEVICES: We will be installing 
        automatic pressure control equipment, referred to as ``slam-
        shut'' devices, on low-pressure systems across our seven-state 
        operating area. These devices provide an additional level of 
        control and protection. They operate like circuit-breakers; 
        when they sense operating pressure that is too high or too low, 
        they shut down the flow of gas to the system, regardless of the 
        cause. These devices operate independently of other pressure 
        control devices, so they will automatically shut down the 
        system to prevent over-pressurization.

   REMOTE MONITORING: As an additional layer of protection, we 
        will install remote monitoring devices on low-pressure systems 
        so that gas control centers have an ability to receive pressure 
        alarms on a real time basis. In the event a system is shut down 
        by the ``slam-shut'' devices described above, the remote 
        monitors will enable us to respond more quickly to restore 
        service to customers.

    This commitment is in addition to the series of steps we took 
across our seven-state footprint following the September 13th event in 
the Merrimack Valley, including:

   SUSPENDED WORK: We suspended work on low-pressure systems, 
        only performing work necessary for compliance and safety. We 
        are still operating under these strict work guidelines.

   FIELD SURVEY: We initiated and completed a field survey of 
        our low-pressure regulator systems to identify available 
        options to enhance the safe, reliable operation of regulator 
        station equipment.

   ENGINEERING DESIGN: We initiated an engineering design 
        review of regulator stations to determine how best to install 
        additional over-pressure protection systems.

   MAPPING: We used the information from the field survey we 
        conducted to begin adding new details to our electronic mapping 
        system. Additionally, we are providing maps at the regulator 
        stations themselves.

   DAMAGE PREVENTION: We have initiated a process so that when 
        we are notified of work near a regulator station by any company 
        performing excavation, NiSource personnel will be required to 
        be present to observe any excavation.

    In addition, we will continue to modernize our system in 
Massachusetts and elsewhere, replacing cast-iron and bare-steel pipes 
with more modern materials.
IV. Customer Assistance and Claims
    We have worked diligently since the tragedy to address residents' 
immediate needs and to establish a process to reimburse them for their 
losses. Within six hours of the explosions, we established a dedicated 
customer service line. Within 48 hours, we opened our first claims 
center in Lawrence, followed by two additional claims centers in 
Andover and North Andover. As of November 21, we have had over 18,000 
customer visits to these centers and have nearly 400 adjusters 
supporting the claims process. These figures, and some of the other 
figures throughout this statement of our companies, are best estimates 
as we continue our work.
    Families visiting the claims centers can receive direct financial 
aid to help address immediate needs for food and supplies while they 
begin to work with claims personnel. But, we also recognize that many 
residents need more than monetary compensation. We bought temporary 
cooking equipment and worked with fire officials to make sure residents 
who received the equipment had proper safety information. We inspected 
thousands of homes to see if they could utilize space heaters. We 
installed space heaters in the homes that could support them and added 
smoke and carbon monoxide detectors in the homes we inspected. We have 
installed (or provided reimbursement for) alternative fuel solutions so 
that residents could have heat and hot water before the restoration of 
natural gas service in order to remain in their homes.
    We have secured temporary housing for displaced residents, 
including hotel rooms, apartments, travel trailers, a congregate 
shelter, and even a pet shelter. We brought in offshore housing for 
workers leading the effort to restore gas service, so that customers 
could be placed in temporary housing that is closer to their homes and 
places of work. We are providing transportation assistance, in the form 
of either mileage reimbursement or access to our corporate accounts 
with Uber or Lyft. We are also providing winterization assistance to 
homes that have not yet had heat restored. We recognize there is no 
substitute for living in your own home and in your own community, and 
we continue to seek to identify additional avenues to minimize the 
burden.
    We recognize that the impacted communities will have needs that go 
beyond this assistance. For that reason, we committed $10 million to 
the Greater Lawrence Disaster Relief Fund in the days following the 
event. This fund is managed by the leadership of Lawrence, Andover, and 
North Andover. The Fund has helped serve the short and medium term 
needs of impacted residents, including housing, sustenance and support 
services. And, as we recently announced, we are providing an additional 
$10 million to support business recovery efforts in the Merrimack 
Valley. In coordination with state and local officials and community 
organizations, this includes direct technical support, funds for 
municipal discretion for business support, and longer-term regional 
support for economic development.
    We know that our customers have been frustrated by the flow of 
information and by changes to our restoration and claims plans. We 
recognize we need to do better and are working to improve our 
communications. We now have a more robust customer communications 
program to keep affected customers informed and we are sending regular 
updates through several communication channels. The communications 
program includes, among other things, direct mail, a weekly customer 
newsletter, an interactive map of our work schedules on our website, a 
24/7 helpline, paid ads, and social media posts. We also have 
participated in six town hall/open-house sessions in the three affected 
communities, where we heard directly from customers and provided 
resources to help resolve their issues.
    In addition to the channels mentioned above, we are making 
personalized phone calls, leaving notices on doors, and have appointed 
a dedicated spokesperson whose sole role is to communicate with the 
public through the media. We are also making communications in both 
English and Spanish.
    We are also taking targeted steps, like reaching out proactively to 
customers in communities that may not receive communications regularly 
through the other channels discussed above.
    We have hosted special events for the affected communities on 
Halloween and Thanksgiving. On Halloween, we held Operation Trick or 
Treat, which provided bags and candy to children in Andover and North 
Andover, and made it possible for over 1,100 children to go trick or 
treating in their temporary housing locations. For Thanksgiving, we are 
planning to provide more than 16,000 holiday dinners to customers, 
their families, and friends.
V. Restoration of Service
    Following September 13th, our first priority has been to assist the 
communities affected by this tragedy. These efforts were designed with 
the primary purpose of helping get the Lawrence, Andover, and North 
Andover communities back on their feet. We have not done this alone. 
NiSource and Columbia Gas are grateful for the work of retired Navy 
Captain Joe Albanese, who was appointed by Governor Baker to lead the 
recovery effort in partnership with Columbia Gas and NiSource. We are 
also grateful for the work of Rear Admiral Richard Cellon, who is 
assisting Captain Albanese. We would also like to express our gratitude 
to Governor Baker, Lieutenant Governor Polito, Attorney General Healey, 
Adjutant General of the Massachusetts National Guard Keefe, 
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Director Schwartz, Senators 
Markey and Warren, Representatives Moulton and Tsongas, Representative-
Elect Trahan, Lawrence Mayor Rivera, Andover Town Manager Flanagan, 
North Andover Town Manager Maylor, Eversource, the more than 450 mutual 
aid workers from utilities across the country, and as noted earlier, 
the first responders from the Merrimack Valley and surrounding areas.
    The over-pressurization created a significant risk of damage to 
Columbia Gas's facilities as well as customer-owned house-lines and 
appliances that typically only receive gas at low pressure. As a 
result, Columbia Gas could not safely just turn the gas back on at low 
pressure. Potential damage to main lines, services lines, and in-home 
natural gas systems and appliances all needed to be assessed and 
addressed.
    This restoration work is complex, and we are undertaking it at what 
is an unprecedented scale. We recently announced the overall cost could 
exceed $800 million. That amount includes pipeline and gas service 
restoration, relief measures, and third-party damages.
    Two initial observations about the restoration process. First, we 
have prioritized restoring gas service to our most vulnerable 
customers--the elderly, individuals with disabilities or health 
concerns, and young children--even when that slowed the overall pace of 
restoration. Our efforts to meet the needs of those vulnerable 
populations have been valuable, but do not eclipse the fact that much 
work remains to be done to completely restore the communities of 
Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover. Second, due to the complexity and 
scale of this work, we have committed to evaluating and adapting our 
approach as the restoration program has progressed so that we implement 
lessons we have learned along the way.
    We refer to the first component of the restoration process as ``Gas 
Ready'': The complete replacement of approximately 45 miles of low-
pressure bare steel and cast-iron pipeline with state-of-the-art 
plastic mains and distribution lines. Customers will have noticed the 
replacement of the gas mains, which run down their streets, as well as 
the service lines, which connect the gas mains to their homes.
    This portion of the project was completed on October 30, 2018, 
ahead of schedule. Our thanks go out to the individuals who worked 
tirelessly to install this state-of-the-art infrastructure safely and 
efficiently and who saw this step of our restoration efforts to 
completion.
    The second component of the project, which we refer to as ``House 
Ready,'' involves repairing and replacing appliances and other natural 
gas infrastructure and equipment in customers' homes. This process 
begins with an assessment of each home to determine the condition of 
all gas appliances and infrastructure, along with issues such as lead 
paint or non-code configurations that could affect work on the 
structure. Once necessary repairs and replacements have been made, the 
house will be inspected for safety.
    As part of the ``House Ready'' process, Columbia Gas has committed 
to replace essential natural gas appliances and equipment for impacted 
residential customers. (Other gas appliances will be replaced through 
the claims process.) Where possible, we are installing energy efficient 
equipment and appliances. We initially planned to do these replacements 
as part of the process of restoring gas service to a home. However, in 
order to restore heat and hot water to customers as quickly as 
possible, we have recently begun repairing equipment where we can 
safely do so, and will return later, after winter, to replace it with 
new, modern equipment.
    Columbia Gas brought on a major contractor to complete the ``House 
Ready'' process on the original timeline, which aimed to restore gas 
service to all impacted customers by November 19, 2018. Unfortunately, 
the ``House Ready'' process has taken longer than expected. The 
contractor ran into significantly more issues within the homes than 
anyone anticipated. Each home is unique and requires a tailored 
solution, with different heat and hot water systems, hazards, code 
issues, and layouts. We have also run into a significant number of 
homes in the restoration area with environmental issues, such as mold 
or asbestos, which required remediation before any work could be done.
    To address the challenges we encountered in the ``House Ready'' 
process, we have brought on three additional contractors, one dedicated 
solely to business customers, the other two to residential homes. 
Additionally, as we described before, we shifted our focus to repair 
any heating or hot water equipment where it could be safely repaired. 
We have also been able to significantly increase the number of plumbers 
working to restore service. Information about the revised schedule, as 
well as the appliances we will provide, is available on our website.
    Our business contractor leads an effort we refer to as ``Back to 
Business,'' in which a project manager is assigned to each affected 
company. The project manager leads a team, including a claims adjuster 
who aims to expedite the claims approval process for businesses.
    Residential and business customers also have the option to self-
mitigate and seek reimbursement through the claims process; advances to 
fund repairs can also be obtained.
    As of November 20, we have completed the replacement of 
approximately 45 miles of gas pipeline and over 5,000 service lines. 
That has allowed us to restore service for 5,592 residential meters and 
602 business customers--76 percent and 87 percent of the total 
residential meters and business meters. We deeply regret that we have 
had to extend the anticipated timeline for gas restoration to between 
December 2 and December 16. But we are pleased to report that we 
continue to beat our daily goals of making homes ``House Ready,'' and 
we are currently on track to restore heat and hot water in the early 
part of that date range.
    Our commitment to the Merrimack Valley will not end once gas 
service is fully restored. We will continue to assist customers in 
filing claims in the wake of this event to address the needs of homes 
and businesses in the affected communities, including by coming back 
after the winter season to replace appliances that were initially 
repaired and completing paving and other work necessitated by the 
restoration-related construction.
VI. Conclusion
    We are humbled by the optimism and determination of our customers 
not to allow this tragedy to disrupt their lives any more than it has, 
but we know we have to do more, and we have to do it faster. The 
Merrimack Valley has a long road to recovery ahead. Our entire company 
is committed to working with you to advance that recovery. We know this 
work is, and will be, the most important duty of our professional 
careers. We are going to get you back in your homes and businesses. We 
are going to make the Merrimack Valley gas system safer than ever. And 
we are going to be here, working with you. Thank you.
VII. Witness and Columbia Gas of Massachusetts Background
    Joe Hamrock. Since 2015, Joe Hamrock has served as President and 
CEO of NiSource, Inc., which operates seven subsidiary natural gas and 
electric utilities, including Columbia Gas of Massachusetts. He earned 
a bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering at Youngstown State 
University and began his career as an electrical engineer. Hamrock 
later attended business school here in Massachusetts, at MIT, and 
transitioned into management, which led eventually to his role as 
President and Chief Operating Officer of American Electric Power of 
Ohio. From AEP, Hamrock joined NiSource in 2012 as an Executive Vice 
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Gas Distribution Segment, 
before being appointed CEO of NiSource in 2015.
    Steve Bryant. Steve Bryant is the President of Columbia Gas of 
Massachusetts. He is a native of Massachusetts, having grown up in 
Somerville, and has worked in the utility field in the Northeast for 
his entire adult life. After high school, Steve joined Commonwealth 
Energy as a mail boy, and later attended UMass Boston, where he earned 
a bachelor's degree in economics. After college, Steve held a variety 
of positions at Commonwealth in the rates, customer operations, and 
sales departments. During that time, he attended Boston University's 
Graduate School of Management, where he earned a master's degree in 
business administration. Eventually he became a vice president at 
Connecticut Natural Gas, and from there, joined Columbia Gas in 2001 
and was promoted to his current position in 2003.
    Columbia Gas of Massachusetts and its predecessors have been 
serving the energy needs of New Englanders for more than 160 years. In 
1847, the Springfield Gas Light Company was founded to light the city's 
streets, and it has been supplying gas heating to buildings since 1878, 
later under the name Bay State Gas, and eventually as Columbia Gas of 
Massachusetts. The company is proud of its long history serving the 
people of Massachusetts.

    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    Our next witness is Richard Kuprewicz, who is the President 
of Accufacts, Incorporated. Welcome.

   STATEMENT OF RICHARD B. KUPREWICZ, PRESIDENT, ACCUFACTS, 
                          INCORPORATED

    Mr. Kuprewicz. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity to 
comment today on another pipeline event that could have been 
prevented.
    My name is Richard B. Kuprewicz, and I am President of 
Accufacts, Incorporated, based in Redmond, Washington. I have 
over 45 years of experience in the field.
    After many years of effort, distribution integrity 
management program or DIMP regulation became effective in 
August 2011, though prudent gas distribution operators were 
implementing these critical safety process approaches well 
before this deadline.
    Since promulgation of important transmission and 
distribution integrity management performance-based regulatory 
steps and minimum pipeline safety regulations, I have 
investigated far too many pipeline disasters which speaks 
volumes for the need for further pipeline safety regulatory 
clarification and/or improvement.
    Given the time limitations, I have focused on two important 
recommendations for the minimum pipeline safety regulations.
    Recommendation 1, add prescriptive requirements for 
management of change in regulation. Prescriptive requirements 
define shall and clearly define what an operator must do.
    In the important area of management of change or MOC, the 
gas industry mainly relies on the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers or ASME standard Management System 
Integrity of Gas Pipelines, ASME B31.8S, and that supplements 
ASME B31.8. Both are performance-based standards.
    Parts of both of these industry practices are incorporated 
by reference in current Federal pipeline safety regulations.
    Given the importance of management of change in pipeline 
safety, I recommend this process shall be prescribed by clear 
wording in pipeline minimum safety regulation.
    Industry practices development does not necessarily undergo 
the more public review and scrutiny and possible challenge that 
pipe safety regulation undergoes when reaching the higher 
obligation of promulgation into law.
    Incorporation of the exact wording of MOC protocols into 
Federal pipeline safety regulation also makes such regulation 
accessible to the public that could be impacted in the event of 
a pipeline failure.
    Congress made an attempt in the Pipeline Safety Regulatory 
Certainty and Job Creation Act of 2011 to rectify this 
difficulty for public access to important reference pipeline 
safety documents, but this well-meaning effort was circumvented 
by subsequent lobbying efforts to restrict such easier public 
access.
    Given the complexity of changes within many gas 
distribution system operations, Congress should require that 
pipeline safety regulation prescriptively incorporate critical 
minimum steps required for all management to change procedures 
that will cover both equipment and procedures.
    My second recommendation, Recommendation 2, require the use 
of computer leak mapping in DIMP. A creative pipeline operator 
can tamper with the evaluation of important metrics required to 
be reported annually to PHMSA, the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Material and Safety Administration.
    This is especially true in the area of DIMP regulation 
calling for the operators to evaluate and rank risk. Risk 
ranking can generate a wide range of outcomes developed from 
the same data.
    During the evolution of DIMP regulation, considerable 
discussion occurred related to displaying hazardous leak data 
by graphic mapping using computers and advanced mapping 
software in the late 2000s. The mapping approach did not make 
it into the final DIMP regulation because an argument was 
presented at the time that many operators, especially the 
smaller operators, did not have access to computers and 
simpler-to-use developing mapping software was still evolving.
    Many gas distribution operators now recognize the 
importance, the efficiency, and safety benefits of computer 
leak mapping by grade, by cause, and by pipe type, such as 
mains or service lines, in quickly assisting in the evaluation 
of leak risk on their gas distribution systems.
    Such graphic color-coded computer mapping greatly aids the 
rapid analysis of large volumes of data to assist in quickly 
recognizing and identifying systemic geographic hot spots that 
might warrant further attention and resources to prudently 
control risk on their systems.
    Such leak mapping also helps to identify areas of a gas 
distribution system where One Call may not be effective.
    Quite simply, in the important area of leak evaluation and 
risk ranking, if a gas distribution operation cannot 
incorporate such a technically advanced and relatively 
inexpensive computer tool into helping to improve pipeline 
safety, they should not be in the gas distribution business.
    Congress----
    [Applause.]
    Mr. Kuprewicz. Congress should direct development of simple 
regulations to require the use of computer leak mapping and 
reporting technologies into gas distribution safety to assist 
in evaluating and ranking risk.
    And I thank you for your time and I'll take any questions 
later.
    [Applause.]
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Kuprewicz follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Richard B. Kuprewicz, President, Accufacts 
                              Incorporated
    Thank you for the opportunity to comment today on another pipeline 
event that could have been prevented. My name is Richard B. Kuprewicz 
and I am President of Accufacts Inc., a consulting firm based at 8151 
164th Avenue, NE, Redmond, WA 98052. I specialize in all aspects of 
hydrocarbon-based pipelines. I have over forty-five years of 
investigative experience and trained as a chemical engineer with 
additional knowledge in process safety management, developed from many 
years of operational experience. I have consulted for various local, 
state, and Federal agencies, NGOs, the public, and pipeline industry 
members on pipeline regulation, operation, and design, with particular 
emphasis on operation in unusually sensitive areas of high population 
density or environmental sensitivity.
    I serve as a representative of the public advising the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or PHMSA, on such areas as 
liquid and gas transmission integrity management, or TIMP, regulation 
development in the early 2000s following terrible pipeline tragedies. 
As a representative of the public I was also involved in the many years 
of natural gas distribution regulatory advancement wisely driven by the 
Congressional Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, And Safety 
Act of 2006 (PIPES Act of 2006) that mandated the gas distribution 
integrity management program, or DIMP, effort in Federal rulemaking. 
After many years of effort, DIMP regulation became effective in August 
2011, though prudent natural gas distribution operators were 
implementing these critical safety process approaches well before this 
deadline. At the end of 2017, reports to PHMSA indicated that there are 
over 1,300 gas distribution operators in the U.S. encompassing a wide 
range of complexity. I believe most, if not all, gas distribution 
systems are intrastate pipeline systems operating within a state. The 
U.S. gas distribution system utilizes over 2.2 million miles of 
pipeline consisting of networks of mains and service lines, and 
composed of a wide variety of pipe materials and connections. Much of 
these materials and connections are sensitive to threats that are age 
related, such as cast iron and older vintage plastics, and mechanical 
connections. It is my observation that many gas distribution operators 
understand the importance and intent of DIMP, while others, sadly, 
still don't.
    Since promulgation of these important TIMP and DIMP regulatory 
steps in minimum pipeline safety regulation, I have investigated far 
too many pipeline disasters, which speaks volumes for the need for 
further pipeline safety regulatory ``clarification'' and/or 
improvement. Concerning the failures (and I refer to multiple failures 
based on my experience and recent observations) the situation affecting 
the Merrimack Valley in Massachusetts (Lawrence event) on September 13, 
2018, while rare for gas distribution operations, raises many questions 
about the adequacy or clarity of minimum pipeline safety regulations 
and safety process approaches. My comments are not intended to impede 
or influence the NTSB investigation concerning the Merrimack Valley 
failures. In my more than forty-five years of observation, I have 
nothing but respect for the NTSB pipeline investigation process. To 
finalize an NTSB report on a specific pipeline incident can take some 
time, given the need to be thorough, but I have nothing but confidence 
in this government body. It is a government organization that, well, 
just works.
    I will focus my brief comments and recommendations this morning 
concerning natural gas distribution system regulations on two important 
areas that I believe warrant regulatory advancement via prescriptive 
and clear regulation. Prescriptive regulation can be more efficient and 
effective than performance based regulations, such as TIMP, which has 
experienced, at best, mixed success. Prescriptive based safety 
regulations set basic obligations and tend to be clearer and less prone 
to misinterpretation by using ``shall'' requirements, for example, that 
should leave no doubt as to important minimum safety requirements.
    I see the need for regulatory improvement in the area of gas 
distribution: 1) Setting prescriptive minimum requirements in the area 
of Management of Change, or MOC protocols in this critically important 
area, and 2) Improving the way DIMP approaches the area of evaluating 
and risk ranking, mandating the use of computer leak mapping, taking 
advantage of recent computer/software mapping strides made in this 
technical area.
Recommendation 1: Add prescriptive requirements for Management of 
        Change in regulation
    In the important area of Management of Change, or MOC, the gas 
industry mainly relies on the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(``ASME'') standard, ASME B31.8S-2004, ``Managing System Integrity of 
Gas Pipelines,'' revised in 2004 that supplements ASME B31.8. Parts of 
both of these industry practices are incorporated by reference in 
Federal pipeline safety regulation (49CFRSec. 195.7). Given the 
importance of MOC in pipeline safety, I recommend this process should 
be prescribed by clear wording in pipeline minimum safety regulation. 
While I have great respect for many industry practices, their 
development does not necessarily undergo the more public review and 
scrutiny and possible challenge that pipe safety regulation undergoes 
when reaching the higher obligation of promulgation into law.
    Incorporation of the exact wording of MOC protocols into Federal 
pipeline safety regulation also makes such regulation accessible to not 
only the industry, but importantly, also to the public that could be 
impacted in the event of a pipeline failure. Many referenced industry 
documents in Federal pipeline safety regulations are still not readily 
available to the public, or can only be obtained at great expense or 
effort. Congress made an attempt in the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory 
Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 to rectify this difficulty for 
the public in gaining access to important referenced pipeline safety 
documents, but this well-meaning effort was circumvented by subsequent 
lobbying efforts to restrict such easier public access. Given the 
complexity of changes within many gas distribution system operations, 
Congress should require that pipeline safety regulation prescriptively 
incorporate critical minimum steps required for all Management of 
Change procedures that will cover both equipment and procedure changes.
Recommendation 2: Require the Use of Leak Mapping in DIMP
    While DIMP regulation is heavily and appropriately reliant on 
metrics that can be measured, reported, and tracked, there nevertheless 
can be weakness where a creative pipeline operator can tamper with the 
evaluation of important metrics required to be reported annually to 
PHMSA and to many state pipeline regulatory agencies. This is 
especially true in the area in DIMP regulation calling for operators to 
``Evaluate and rank risk.'' Risk ranking can generate a wide range of 
outcomes developed from the same data. During the evolution of DIMP 
regulation, considerable discussion occurred related to displaying 
hazardous leak data by graphic mapping using computers and advancing 
mapping software in the late 2000s. The mapping approach did not make 
it into the final DIMP regulation because an argument was presented at 
that time that many operators, especially the smaller operators, did 
not have access to computers, and simpler to use developing mapping 
software was still evolving.
    I have seen many gas distribution operators who now recognize the 
importance, efficiency, and safety benefits of computer leak mapping by 
grade, by cause, and by pipe type (mains or service lines) in quickly 
assisting in the evaluation of leak risks on their gas distribution 
systems. Such graphic color coded computer mapping greatly aids the 
rapid analysis of large volumes of data to assist in quickly 
recognizing and identifying systemic geographic ``hot spots'' that 
might warrant further attention and resources to prudently control risk 
on their systems. On more than one occasion, I have recommended that 
such simple computer mapping be utilized to aid pipeline operators and 
state regulators in justifying additional funds for further pipe 
replacement to efficiently improve gas distribution system safety. Such 
leak mapping also helps to identify areas of a gas distribution system 
where one-call may not be effective.
    Such computer and software advances have, I believe, reached the 
proficiency where a gas pipeline operator, even a small operator, 
should be easily able to incorporate such leak mapping/tracking 
advances into their operation. Quite simply, in the important area of 
leak evaluation and risk ranking, if a gas distribution operation 
cannot incorporate such a technically advanced and relatively 
inexpensive computer tool into helping to improve pipeline safety, they 
should not be in the gas distribution business. Congress should direct 
development of simple regulations to require the use of computer leak 
mapping and reporting technologies into gas distribution pipeline 
safety to assist in evaluating and ranking risk.

    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    Now we're going to hear from Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel of 
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.

    STATEMENT OF PAUL ROBERTI, CHIEF COUNSEL, PIPELINE AND 
           HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Roberti. Good morning. Senator Markey, Senator Warren, 
Senator Hassan, Representative Tsongas, and Representative 
Moulton,----
    Senator Markey. Please move the microphone in a little 
closer.
    Mr. Roberti.--thank you for the opportunity to testify 
today.
    The Merrimack gas explosions on September 13 were indeed 
tragic and unacceptable. On behalf of Secretary Elaine Chao and 
Administrator Skip Elliott, I recognize and appreciate your 
efforts to advance pipeline safety. For our leadership and 
everyone working at the Department of Transportation, safety is 
our Number 1 priority.
    PHMSA's mission is to protect people and the environment by 
advancing the safe transportation of energy and hazardous 
materials that are so essential to our daily lives.
    PHMSA oversees the inspection and enforcement of the 
nation's interstate pipeline system. We advance education, 
research and development projects, and we administer the State 
Pipeline Safety Programs in 48 states, including Massachusetts.
    The natural gas explosions and fires in the Merrimack 
Valley were indeed tragic and avoidable. The United States 
Department of Transportation deeply sympathizes with the Rondon 
family and all those who suffered injuries or had their homes 
and property damaged or destroyed.
    PHMSA acknowledges and supports all initiatives to replace 
aging cast iron pipelines to advance public safety.
    In my prior role as a public utilities commissioner in 
Rhode Island, just a few miles south of here, I worked 
steadfastly to advance programs to accelerate the replacement 
of aged cast iron and bare steel pipelines for many years, 
particularly in the aftermath of tragedies like Allentown, 
Pennsylvania.
    Those types of tragedies galvanized the effort to modernize 
pipeline systems across the nation, yet despite Columbia Gas's 
effort to replace aging systems, we witnessed an extraordinary 
failure in the planning, design, and execution of a replacement 
project.
    This accident once again illustrates how critical it is for 
pipeline operators to thoroughly plan and safely execute all 
facets related to construction, operation, and maintenance of 
pipeline networks.
    Now the written testimony I submitted discusses PHMSA's 
Grant Assistance Program to our state partners, the training we 
provide to Federal and state inspectors, the importance and 
role of safety management systems, and, lastly, PHMSA's 
evaluations of the State Pipeline Safety Programs.
    On the afternoon of September 13, when the incident 
occurred, PHMSA made an immediate decision to deploy multiple 
inspectors to the scene to provide technical assistance to both 
the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities and the 
National Transportation Safety Board.
    As some of you know, PHMSA's leadership also reached out in 
the evening of the incident to keep members of the 
Massachusetts congressional delegation apprised of PHMSA's 
efforts and role.
    Since the time the tragedy unfolded, PHMSA's team of 
experts have provided hundreds of hours of technical assistance 
and we will continue to do so until the Massachusetts and the 
NTSB complete their investigations.
    I also want to share some information about the State 
Pipeline Safety Programs that PHMSA administers.
    The Federal-state partnership with the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts spans over 35 years. Massachusetts is a certified 
state partner with inspection and enforcement responsibilities 
for intrastate natural gas distribution and transmission 
pipelines.
    As a matter of Federal law, the Commonwealth possesses 
jurisdiction to investigate and make determinations regarding 
an operator's compliance with Federal and state regulations.
    We also recognize the NTSB's jurisdiction and expertise for 
leading the investigation and determining the probable cause of 
this tragic accident. While the NTSB's preliminary report 
identified circumstances that likely contributed to the over-
pressurization during the pipeline replacement project, PHMSA 
eagerly awaits the completion of both investigations so that we 
will have all requisite information concerning the cause of the 
incident and the operator's compliance with pertinent 
regulations.
    This terrible accident shows how critical it is for 
pipeline operators to comprehensively understand their systems, 
including the design, construction, and operation of all 
facilities.
    Operators and qualified contractors must exercise extreme 
care and diligence in every aspect of their work. Above all, 
they need to nurture and maintain a safety culture that 
promotes the highest level of safety so that the tragic 
pipeline accident that occurred in Merrimack Valley never 
happens again.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Roberti follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Paul Roberti, Chief Counsel, Pipeline and 
               Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
I. Introduction
    Senator Markey and Senator Warren, thank you for inviting me to 
testify today as part of the Senate Commerce, Science and 
Transportation Committee's field hearing to discuss the September 13, 
2018 natural gas accident involving Columbia Gas of Massachusetts and 
the oversight and effectiveness of state pipeline safety programs.
    Safety is the number one priority for U.S. Secretary of 
Transportation Elaine L. Chao and PHMSA Administrator Howard ``Skip'' 
Elliott. The recent tragic events in your state can only intensify the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) 
commitment to its goal of zero pipeline incidents.
    The mission of the PHMSA is to protect people and the environment 
by advancing the safe transportation of energy and other hazardous 
materials that are essential to our daily lives. The natural gas 
explosions and fires in Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover, 
Massachusetts, were tragic and all of us at PHMSA sympathize with the 
family of Leonel Rondon, the young man who lost his life, and all those 
who suffered injuries, or have property that was adversely impacted.
    In response to the accident, PHMSA quickly dispatched multiple 
inspectors to Massachusetts to provide technical assistance to the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and to the Massachusetts 
Department of Public Utilities (MA DPU). To date, PHMSA staff have 
provided more than 600 work-hours of technical engineering expertise, 
emergency response, and support. PHMSA will continue to assist the NTSB 
and the MA DPU as long as needed.
    In addition, PHMSA Administrator Elliott has made it a priority to 
make himself available for discussions with the Congressional 
Delegation and the Governor of Massachusetts. PHMSA will also continue 
to prioritize answering your questions relating to this incident and 
working with all Massachusetts officials.
II. Roles
    Under PHMSA's oversight, pipelines have continued to remain one of 
the safest ways to transport hazardous energy products in the U.S. This 
safety record has been demonstrated with over 99.99 percent barrel 
equivalent of liquid hydrocarbons reaching their onshore destinations 
safely and through consistent declines in casualties and major injuries 
attributed to pipeline incidents. In fact, pipeline incidents resulting 
in death or major injury have declined 64 percent in the past 20 years, 
despite increases in risk exposure measures like population, pipeline 
mileage, aging infrastructure and volume of product delivered.
    Pipeline safety is a shared responsibility for all public and 
private sector stakeholders. Of the nearly 2.8 million miles of 
pipeline infrastructure in the U.S., more than 80 percent of the lines 
belong to local distribution companies that transport natural gas to 
American homes and businesses. PHMSA's state certification program 
expands the Federal government's capacity to oversee these lines.
A. Role of States
    Since 1971, when a national, uniform standard of pipeline safety 
regulations was implemented, states have had the authority, through 
PHMSA, to regulate the safety of intrastate pipelines. Sections 60105 
and 60106 of title 49 U.S. Code, continue to allow states to assume 
safety authority through PHMSA for the inspection and enforcement of 
intrastate pipelines. While states may act as interstate agents for 
interstate gas transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines, the vast 
majority of their responsibility is to oversee local distribution gas 
systems, including the system we are here to discuss today.
    PHMSA sets the minimum Federal standards for pipeline safety, which 
the participating states then adopt into their state code and enforce. 
States are allowed, under Section 60104(c) of title 49 U.S. Code, to 
adopt more stringent safety standards than the minimum standards PHMSA 
sets. This allows states to codify and enforce regulations that deal 
with specific, regional (or local) risks that might not be feasible or 
cost-beneficial to regulate on the National level. Many states have 
established safety regulations that are more stringent than the Federal 
regulations.
    The MA DPU is PHMSA's certified state partner in the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts. Under this certification, the MA DPU is responsible 
for the inspection and enforcement for all intrastate natural gas 
distribution and transmission pipelines.
    Across our country, PHMSA partners with pipeline safety programs in 
48 states (in addition to the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico), 
which employs approximately 380 full-time inspectors, through 
certification and agreements for the inspection of the Nation's 
intrastate gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. PHMSA also has 
interstate agent agreements with nine states to perform interstate 
pipeline inspections. State pipeline safety agencies are the first line 
of defense in protecting much of the American public from pipeline 
risks on lines that exist primarily where people live and work. State 
pipeline safety agencies have authority over approximately 80 percent 
of the total pipeline infrastructure under PHMSA's oversight and have 
always been a critical component of a sound pipeline oversight program.
    In addition to working with individual states, PHMSA works closely 
with the National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives 
(NAPSR), an organization representing state government pipeline safety 
programs, towards our joint safety mission. PHMSA supports annual and 
regional NAPSR meetings and members of NAPSR frequently serve on 
PHMSA's Advisory Committees.
    PHMSA has worked with the MA DPU for over 35 years as they have 
overseen pipeline safety in Massachusetts. PHMSA will continue to 
provide technical support to the MA DPU through this investigation and 
with any other technical assistance they may need in the future.
B. Role of PHMSA
    There is an inherent risk associated with transporting energy. 
PHMSA's job is to lessen the risk of energy transportation by pipelines 
by setting and enforcing Federal minimum safety standards for pipeline 
companies. The agency also promotes safety through education, research, 
and our partnerships with 48 states, who inspect and enforce 
regulations for pipelines and underground natural gas storage 
facilities.
    PHMSA is committed to making sure these organizations have the 
resources and expertise they need to keep our Nation's pipelines safe. 
Jointly with our partner states, PHMSA continuously strives to 
strengthen oversight, inspection, and enforcement of pipeline 
transportation through technical assistance programs, grants, training, 
and outreach.

        1. Grants
        The financial support that we provide to our state partners 
        through grants is a vital part of our partnerships.

        Based on the appropriation level set by Congress, our State 
        Base Grant program \1\ reimburses a portion of each of our 
        partner state's program expenses. The grants partially cover 
        the cost of any personnel, equipment, and activities reasonably 
        required for the conduct of the pipeline safety program. Most 
        importantly, PHMSA's grants provide state programs a consistent 
        source of funding to hire and maintain adequate pipeline safety 
        inspectors. PHMSA reviews state performance and conducts grant 
        monitoring to ensure that the funds are used efficiently and 
        effectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The State Base Grant is a formula grant that authorizes awards 
to state pipeline safety programs under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 
Sec. 60107--State Pipeline Safety Grants.

        The statute allows PHMSA to reimburse states at a level set by 
        statute and Congressional appropriation--PHMSA can pay no more 
        than 80 percent of a state's total cost during a given calendar 
        year and we prorate the total appropriation when necessary. For 
        FY 2018, PHMSA awarded $56 million to participating state 
        programs,\2\ including over $1 million to Massachusetts, which 
        will cover almost 60 percent of their estimated program costs 
        this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ All states except Alaska and Hawaii participate in PHMSA's 
pipeline safety program.

        As the number of miles of pipeline infrastructure continues to 
        grow and as the older pipes age, this grant program is critical 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        to our oversight of our Nation's pipeline systems.

        2. Training
        PHMSA also supports state programs by providing essential 
        technical training. Our state-of-the-art Training and 
        Qualifications (T&Q) program has full accreditation from the 
        International Association for Continuing Education and Training 
        (IACET).

        The T&Q trains an average of 890 state and Federal inspectors 
        annually, ensuring that all are current on updated regulations, 
        technology, and best practices. PHMSA offers 58 online 
        computer-based training and on-site courses, including 
        classroom training and hands-on labs, that teach Federal and 
        state inspectors how to understand and apply Federal 
        regulations and incorporated industry standards. In addition, 
        the Training Center offers technical assistance and nationwide 
        seminars for companies to educate them on the consistent 
        application of the regulations, inspection techniques, and 
        compliance and enforcement procedures.

        The core courses that inspectors must take cover topics 
        including PHMSA regulations, overpressure protection, corrosion 
        control, plastic pipe joining, and welding. Five of the seven 
        inspectors in Massachusetts have completed their core training. 
        The remaining two inspectors are new hires and will also take 
        these core classes. In FY 2018, inspectors in Massachusetts 
        completed 32 courses at the T&Q Center, and PHMSA looks forward 
        to continuing to work with the state.

        Training is critical to state inspectors. A significant 
        increase in the total number of state and Federal inspection 
        personnel, along with the many new employees who replace 
        retirees, have led to increased training needs. Our Training 
        Center is working hard to increase capacity in order to handle 
        these needs. PHMSA has begun to hold ``boot camps'' to train 
        new inspectors with the basic skills that allow them to begin 
        their work quickly.

        Looking ahead, PHMSA's T&Q Center is committed to developing 
        innovative ways to be more accessible and effective, including 
        the exploration of long-distance proctored classes, curriculum 
        improvements, and more efficient delivery to ensure relevancy.

        3. Program Evaluations
        Each year, PHMSA evaluates every partner's compliance with our 
        safety program requirements. Our representatives work with the 
        state officials to review their inspection procedures, records, 
        inspection activities, and enforcement actions.\3\ These 
        reviews provide an opportunity for dialogue between PHMSA and 
        the states during which we emphasize the imperative to 
        continually improve pipeline safety, public safety, and the 
        protection of the environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Sections 60105(e) and 60106(d) of title 49 U.S. Code provide 
for the monitoring of state pipeline safety programs by PHMSA.

        This evaluation assesses whether the state is maintaining an 
        effective pipeline safety program in line with Federal 
        regulations and provides the basis for determining the state's 
        total point award for the PHMSA pipeline safety grant for the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        upcoming year.

        The assessments consist of two parts. PHMSA first reviews each 
        state's Progress Report to validate that their pipeline safety 
        program is supported by the people, training and other 
        resources necessary to ensure pipeline safety. The progress 
        report also summarizes their annual inspection activities 
        conducted on the regulated companies within each state for the 
        previous year.

        Second, PHMSA reviews the annual Progress Report documents 
        submitted by the state for accuracy, reviews the pipeline 
        program inspection procedures and records, and observes an on-
        site inspection of a pipeline company conducted by state staff.

        As part of this annual program evaluation process, PHMSA 
        discusses state metrics developed by PHMSA and the National 
        Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives. These metrics 
        track the state's damage prevention program, inspection 
        activity, inspector qualification, leak management, 
        enforcement, and incident investigation.

        These evaluations and the review of metrics are an opportunity 
        for discussion between PHMSA and state pipeline safety program 
        managers about potential safety program improvements. PHMSA 
        also publishes each state's progress on these metrics online 
        \4\ so that the state programs can proactively review their 
        metrics and act to ensure positive performance trends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/States.htm

        The strength of state pipeline safety programs directly impacts 
        the integrity of our Nation's pipelines, especially the local 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        distribution systems.

        At the recent 2018 NAPSR National Meeting, PHMSA senior 
        leadership spoke to all state pipeline safety programs and 
        challenged the states to strive for excellence. Specifically, 
        PHMSA encouraged state leaders to be diligent in their 
        oversight, especially in light of the Massachusetts accident. 
        State pipeline safety authorities, just as we at PHMSA, must 
        vigorously inspect and enforce against the pipeline safety 
        regulations and take prompt action where needed.
C. Role of Gas Companies
    While PHMSA and our state partners are dedicated to a goal of zero 
incidents, a safe pipeline system requires the active participation of 
all stakeholders. Thus, the onus of maintaining a safe pipeline system 
is on the companies that own and operate the systems.
    PHMSA expects companies to know their systems' risks and needs, 
including the risks of the systems' design, environment, and 
operations. Companies must address these risks promptly. Accidents like 
what occurred here in Massachusetts are unacceptable.
    I want to recognize and thank the NTSB for their outstanding 
professionalism and dedication while leading the tragic Columbia Gas of 
Massachusetts accident investigation. In its preliminary report, the 
NTSB \5\ noted that the overpressurization that caused the explosions 
and fires occurred during a pipeline replacement project. While we 
applaud the company's intent to replace aged and vulnerable cast iron 
lines, the project's work plan did not account for sensing lines of gas 
regulators in that part of the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ https://ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/
PLD18MR003-preliminary-report
.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This tragedy and its aftermath have demonstrated how critical it is 
for companies to thoroughly plan and safely execute all their work 
involving design, construction, operation and maintenance of any 
replacement activity. Pipeline operators must understand that they have 
a responsibility to demand excellence from the contractors and 
subcontractors they hire to work on their systems.
    We will support the MA DPU and the citizens of Massachusetts as 
they work to recover from this tragedy. At this point, it also appears 
that this accident was not caused by a gap in either Federal or state 
pipeline safety regulations--this was an issue of company quality 
control. While we might wish it otherwise, regulations alone will not 
prevent pipeline incidents and accidents. To prevent future accidents 
like this one, companies must focus on continuous improvement and 
nurturing a good safety culture. Such aggressiveness is essential if 
we--all of us, together--hope to create a pervasive culture of safety--
one that looks upon even near-misses as unacceptable failures, like air 
traffic controllers have done for a very long time. And I choose that 
occupation because they are one of few endeavors with a smaller 
incident rate than pipeline operations.
III. Continuous Improvement/Safety Management and Culture
    Pipeline operators must continue to use risk-informed approaches, 
such as integrity management, to ensure they are adequately identifying 
and addressing the greatest risks to their systems. This includes 
efforts to conduct integrity assessments and apply lessons learned 
across an entire system. But regulations are not the only resource 
PHMSA can use to improve pipeline safety.
    The common thread that runs throughout every aspect of PHMSA's 
safety mission is a Safety Management Systems (or SMS) approach. SMS 
looks to find gaps, address them promptly, and prevent pipeline 
accidents and incidents from ever occurring as opposed to reacting. To 
be effective, SMS requires PHMSA to move beyond the role of being just 
a regulator--to encourage operators to identify and target their system 
risks, address those risks, and encourage a company-wide culture that 
makes safety the number one priority, always.
    Pipeline operators are only as good as their worst contractor. For 
SMS to permeate through all levels and areas of the pipeline industry, 
we need ways to share and analyze data, allowing all of us to see 
emerging trends and addressing problems before they result in 
accidents. We all share the same goal of zero pipeline incidents, and I 
believe that the more we collaborate, the safer our Nation's pipelines 
will be.
    PHMSA's expectation of companies, and the industries that support 
them, is for them to know their systems' risks and needs. Periodic 
inspections by PHMSA or its state partners will not yield the kind of 
intimate knowledge required to anticipate all of a system's 
vulnerabilities.
    PHMSA challenges companies by encouraging them to not wait for 
inspections, or for new regulations, to make safety improvements. It is 
folly to think that further improvement will occur if companies are 
either passive or complacent. Companies work with these systems every 
day and they must be more aggressive than to wait for PHMSA or states 
to identify potential problems.
    Under a well-designed SMS, companies can address an issue or gap 
before it becomes a problem, because some problems become accidents, 
and some accidents become tragedies.
    An aggressive approach is essential if we collectively advance to 
create a pervasive culture of safety--one that looks upon even the 
smallest issue or near-miss as unacceptable.
    Our commitment to SMS goes beyond asking companies to make cultural 
changes; we are implementing SMS throughout PHMSA as well. PHMSA is 
incorporating a focus on safety into our everyday operations, 
refocusing on our communications across the agency, and reexamining how 
we can do business even better.
    An element of the PHMSA SMS is our work with our state partners to 
improve our training support. As I said before, PHMSA's T&Q Center is 
working to provide an effective and efficient distance delivery system 
that does not sacrifice the high quality of our training curricula. 
PHMSA's goal is to make it easier for state inspectors to access the 
courses they need quickly and at a lower cost.
    PHMSA has an active mentoring program for state inspectors, and we 
continue to encourage states to participate in the program to improve 
inspector skillsets and benefit from feedback from experienced 
inspectors. In addition, last year PHMSA employees spent well over 
7,600 hours working directly with state pipeline safety programs 
supporting pipeline safety.
IV. PHMSA Supports Modernization
    Our Nation is growing rapidly. Increases in domestic energy 
production are placing more demand on all of the Nation's 
transportation modes and poising America to become the world's largest 
energy producer. Technology advancements quickly change how the 
industry uses the transportation system. In addition, it is projected 
that another 70 million more people will live in America in 2050, 
placing even more demand on the transportation network. All of these 
changes present new safety challenges, as well as new opportunities to 
improve the safety and efficiency of our Nation's hazmat transportation 
system for today and the future.
    PHMSA believes that many of the next steps in safety will come from 
encouraging new technologies and prioritizing innovative solutions to 
safety challenges. We support modernization in multiple ways, including 
funding research and looking at new ways to conduct business.
    If done correctly, upgrading our Nation's pipeline infrastructure 
is one of the surest ways to foster even higher levels of pipeline 
safety. That is why DOT and PHMSA issued a Call to Action in 2011 to 
accelerate the repair, rehabilitation, and replacement of the aged and 
outmoded pipeline that pose the highest risk across the country.
    Thanks to increased state and Federal safety initiatives and 
pipeline companies' replacement efforts, the miles of active cast or 
wrought iron pipelines has declined significantly in recent years. To 
date, 21 states and one territory have completely eliminated their 
inventory of cast or wrought iron natural gas distribution lines.\6\ In 
fact, cast or wrought iron gas distribution pipelines make up only 2 
percent of distribution mains in our country today,\7\ and 41 states, 
including the District of Columbia, have specific rate mechanisms that 
foster accelerated replacement of pipelines no longer fit for service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Montana, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto 
Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming
    \7\ https://opsweb.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline_replacement/
cast_iron_inventory.asp
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PHMSA considers it our responsibility to provide technical support 
to state and Federal agencies that have siting or route designation 
authority, to prioritize inspections related to the engineering and 
construction of major new pipeline projects, and to the support of 
projects that are designed to repair, rebuild, and expand 
infrastructure.
    We're also committed to undertake the research that will develop 
new technologies and new solutions to pipeline safety challenges. Our 
R&D program works to apply research, strengthen consensus standards, 
and inform regulatory activities. Our research is focused on solving 
discrete, current problems that have an immediate effect on overall 
safety.
    Since 2002, PHMSA has funded 270 projects designed to prevent 
excavation damage to pipelines, identify and minimize leaks, and detect 
defects in pipelines well before they fail. In September, PHMSA awarded 
more than $3.8 million to 11 universities via our Competitive Academic 
Agreement Program (CAAP). The 13 research projects funded by CAAP this 
year address a number of consensus standards, rulemakings, mandates, 
and recommendations.
    The PIPES Act of 2016 \8\ required the Secretary to establish a 
Voluntary Information-sharing System (VIS) Workgroup (WG) to study 
information-sharing systems for the pipeline industry. This group will 
provide recommendations to the Secretary regarding whether a sharing 
system is needed, ways to encourage the exchange of inspection 
information, and best practices for the protection of proprietary and 
security-sensitive information. The VIS WG's membership includes 
representatives from PHMSA, industry stakeholders, safety advocacy 
groups, research institutions, state public utility commissions, state 
pipeline safety inspectors, labor representatives, and other entities. 
The Workgroup is on schedule to present their recommendations to 
Secretary Chao before the end of the year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety 
Act of 2016, Public Law 114-183
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Conclusion
    Safety is the highest priority for the U.S. Department of 
Transportation and for PHMSA and we look forward to continuing to work 
with Congress to prevent future natural gas distribution pipeline 
accidents like what recently occurred in Massachusetts. Pipeline 
companies must apply lessons learned from this accident to their own 
programs and future operations. PHMSA holds companies accountable for 
the safe operation of their pipelines, and will continue its efforts to 
ensure that all stakeholders uphold the highest possible safety 
standards.
    As the number of miles of new pipe being buried across the country 
continues to grow, the need for strong state pipeline safety programs 
is ever more critical to promote transportation system safety in every 
corner of our great nation. States' input and experience is critical in 
this effort as PHMSA sets public policy, strategically allocates 
resources, and moves forward with effective new regulations.
    Thank you again for inviting me to today's field hearing. I look 
forward to your questions.

    Senator Markey. OK. Thank you.
    Now we'll go to a round of questions from the members of 
Congress.
    Mr. Hamrock, will you commit under oath today that you will 
guarantee that every family, every business is made 100 percent 
financially whole for the disaster which occurred on the 
property of Columbia Gas?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, yes, we take responsibility for the 
incident and the consequences of the incident and from the very 
beginning, we're committed to working with each of the affected 
individuals, families, and businesses to ensure that we fully 
understand the impact on them and that we work with them 
closely to fully compensate them for their losses.
    Senator Markey. So you will make them 100 percent 
financially whole?
    Mr. Hamrock. We will work with them to fully understand not 
just financially----
    Senator Markey. Will you make them 100 percent financially 
whole?
    Mr. Hamrock. Yes, we will, and----
    Senator Markey. OK.
    Mr. Hamrock.--we'll work with them for all other effects 
that they may have experienced.
    Senator Markey. OK. The families and businesses need to 
hear that.
    Mr. Hamrock, the National Transportation Safety Board, 
Chairman Sumwalt, he testified to this, issued an urgent set of 
recommendations two weeks ago in an interim report which I have 
here. It's an urgent report and it said that the company should 
take all of these additional safety measures immediately.
    Do you commit to adopting every one of these urgent safety 
measures now?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, the NTSB's recommendations are 
aligned with our objectives. We are already implementing some 
of those. We began----
    Senator Markey. No. I asked you if you would implement all 
of the recommendations----
    Mr. Hamrock. We will work----
    Senator Markey.--of the NTSB?
    Mr. Hamrock.--with the NTSB to fully understand and 
implement the recommendations they've made.
    Senator Markey. It has been two weeks since they issued 
these urgent recommendations. Why can you not commit to 
implementing urgent recommendations from the NTSB right now, 
all of them?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, we are committing to implement those 
recommendations.
    Senator Markey. All of them?
    Mr. Hamrock. Yes, all of them, and in fact we have already 
implemented a number of them in the weeks subsequent to the 
tragedy occurring, and in some cases, we've gone above and 
beyond those recommendations already.
    Senator Markey. It's critical that all of them be 
implemented now. In the immediate aftermath, you said that you 
would review them, but in reviewing, you said you will now 
implement.
    Next, the NTSB found that a single unqualified engineer was 
allowed to approve the construction job that caused the 
disaster with no oversight from experienced technicians that 
would have understood the implications for the entire pipeline 
system. It's unacceptable and shows a culture of complacency 
that Columbia Gas would allow someone so unqualified to make 
unilateral decisions about pipeline construction projects.
    Mr. Hamrock, were you aware that this was a practice 
occurring at Columbia Gas?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, we are reviewing the NTSB's findings 
in this regard, looking at all of the underlying factors that 
would have contributed to that situation, committed to getting 
to the bottom of it, and we'll not stop until we----
    Senator Markey. Were you aware that there was an 
unqualified engineer doing the review of the project? Were you 
aware?
    Mr. Hamrock. I was not personally aware.
    Senator Markey. Mr. Bryant, were you aware?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, I am aware of the fact that engineers 
who work on our system are not always professional engineers. 
That's somewhat standard in the industry.
    Senator Markey. It is a standard that is too low. To have a 
safety decision made by an unqualified engineer is 
unacceptable.
    Will you commit right now to having all future pipeline 
construction plans signed off on by a qualified engineer and 
that Columbia Gas officials who know the entire pipeline system 
as the NTSB has recommended? Will you commit to that?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, yes, we have already begun to 
implement that. Where we do not have professional engineers in 
place, we will work with outside firms to ensure that we do in 
fact bring professional engineers to oversee the work, and 
we'll work with the NTSB to make sure that we fully understand 
and clarify the intent of that recommendation.
    Senator Markey. All right. Well, that was a catastrophic 
mistake. The entire company failed. The buck does stop with 
you. Your company gave too much power to a low-level engineer 
with too little information.
    Next, up until four years ago, Mr. Hamrock, it was company 
policy to have a trained technician present in the pressure 
monitoring station when construction work was being done. If a 
technician had been onsite here in Lawrence on September 13, 
they likely would have seen the pressure spike, immediately 
turned off the gas, and potentially avoided this whole 
disaster, but according again to the NTSB, your company 
abandoned that requirement four years ago for that common sense 
safety measure.
    It took 26 minutes after the Columbia Gas Control Room 
received the high pressure alarms for someone to shut down the 
gas at the regulator. Four years ago, you would have had 
someone there to shut down immediately during that critical 26-
minute gap. That did not happen because you abandoned that 
policy and the result was disaster.
    Saving money as a way of increasing profits but at the 
expense of safety leads to disaster, Mr. Hamrock.
    Do you commit to having someone there onsite from now on to 
make sure it never happens again?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, safety is a core value for us, the 
core driver of everything that we do. We've reviewed that 
recommendation and that finding. Further review is required to 
fully understand it. We do commit to putting automatic shutoff 
capabilities in all of our systems, not just with somebody 
stationed at the regulator during construction work but on a 
continuous basis----
    Senator Markey. Again, will you commit to changing the 
policy?
    Mr. Hamrock. We do commit to putting automatic shutoff 
capabilities across all of our low pressure regulator systems, 
which goes above and beyond the NTSB recommendation, because it 
will be continuous automatic shutoff, not just----
    Senator Markey. Will that satisfy you, Chairman Sumwalt?
    Mr. Sumwalt. I cannot commit on behalf of the entire Board, 
I'm one of five members of the Board, but I like what I hear 
there. The automatic shutoff valve, we've called for that in 
other accidents.
    Senator Markey. OK. And down to you, Mr. Kuprewicz. The 
fine that can be levied is $2 million. This disaster could cost 
upwards of a billion dollars. Is that fine too low, Mr. 
Kuprewicz? What should the fine be? It seems to me for Columbia 
Gas, it's like paying a parking ticket for something that 
created a catastrophic accident. Where should these fines be 
set?
    Mr. Kuprewicz. Well, you ask a valid question. I've 
investigated too many multibillion dollar disasters from 
pipelines and that's multi-B, with a billion. The fines, you 
could argue, and there has been a lot of debate on this over 
the decades, what's the purpose of the penalty?
    I can't give you a dollar answer, but what I can tell you 
is it should be high enough to change the culture so that they 
don't repeat the mistakes that are obviously going to be 
investigated and reported on and so penalties aren't 
necessarily to be punitive. They should be trying to modify the 
culture. If they can't do that, then they're not high enough 
and I'm sorry to be giving you a glib answer, but I'm giving 
you an honest, truthful answer.
    Senator Markey. Well, it's not a glib answer. You're saying 
they're not high enough. They have to be much higher. It has to 
discourage Columbia or any other company from ever turning a 
blind eye to the safety problems in their company because they 
know that the fine is the equivalent of a parking ticket.
    Mr. Kuprewicz. It gets even worse because the actual 
penalty that is assessed is very seldom actually collected. 
It's a very small percentage, even less than that. So we're on 
the same wavelength here, Senator.
    Senator Markey. Well, again, boosterism leads to 
complacency and complacency leads to disaster. When you assume 
that there can be no accident and the fine is so low, if there 
is one, then it creates the condition of complacency that does 
result in disaster.
    So these Federal fines have to be dramatically increased if 
we're going to discourage this activity from ever occurring 
again in the future, and I would say to you, Mr. Hamrock, that 
my question to you is given what's happened, given this 
catastrophic event, do you think that you should be any longer 
allowed to run this company, given the catastrophe which has 
occurred?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, the consequences alone of this 
tragedy motivate me to dedicate the remainder of my 
professional career to ensuring that nothing like this ever 
happens again. That becomes the sole driver.
    I take responsibility on behalf of NiSource and on behalf 
of Columbia Gas and as CEO, I'm accountable to be sure that 
this never happens again and that we restore these communities 
to where they were. We won't stop. We're here for the long run. 
We won't stop until we're committed to that and that's what I 
pledge.
    Senator Markey. Well, Mr. Hamrock, I'm not sure that you 
should be allowed to continue to be the CEO of this company 
given what happened.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. I think that it is absolutely imperative 
that there be some price which is paid for what has happened.
    Let me turn now and recognize my colleague, Senator from 
Massachusetts, Elizabeth Warren.
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Senator Markey.
    So what happened in the Merrimack Valley is horrible, plain 
and simple. It is even more infuriating that this is not the 
first time that Columbia Gas and NiSource have failed to 
provide safe gas service to its customers.
    In 2012, a Columbia Gas worker punctured a mislabeled steel 
service line in Springfield, Massachusetts, resulting in an 
explosion that injured 17 people and caused an estimated $1.3 
million in property damage.
    Mr. Hamrock, following the Springfield explosions, was your 
company pressed to improve your pipeline safety processes?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, in that instance, as you noted, one 
of our employees was investigating the call on a leak and in 
the course of that investigation punctured the service line 
during a process called bar holding, looking for the gas under 
the pavement.
    After that, as we always do in any sort of incident, 
whether it occurs on our system or others, we take actions that 
are designed to prevent something like that from ever happening 
again, and we did in fact change procedures and change bar 
holding procedures.
    Senator Warren. So that's a yes?
    Mr. Hamrock. It's a yes. Yes, we did.
    Senator Warren. OK. Columbia Gas leaks also occurred across 
the Commonwealth, in Walpole in 2004 and 2007, in Easton in 
2007 and West Barnstable in 2009, and West Springfield in 2011, 
and in Skaugen in 2012.
    Following those leaks, did you take action to improve 
safety?
    Mr. Hamrock. In every case, when there's an incident, 
whether it's caused by damage from an outside party, weather-
related, any sort of asset-related condition, we always look 
for an opportunity to learn and make changes and take actions 
as a result of what we learned from those, so yes.
    Senator Warren. Well, here, we're here not because--and I 
think this is what you're saying--not because one individual 
engineer or one mislabeled engineering plan, but because of a 
series of problems, and I'm concerned that these events 
culminating in the deadly explosion three months ago expose a 
corporate culture that isn't adequately focused on safety.
    Mr. Bryant, Mr. Hamrock, corporate culture is on you. 
Corporate priorities are on you and that's why I want to ask 
about personal responsibility here.
    On October 11, the National Transportation Safety Board, 
the Federal body charged with determining what caused this 
tragedy, released an interim report on the Merrimack Valley 
explosions which clearly identified a series of failures by 
Columbia Gas.
    So, Mr. Bryant, you're the President of Columbia Gas. That 
means the buck stops with you. The NTSB reports reveal 
unambiguous failures by the company that you run that 
contributed to this tragedy.
    I just want to know. Do you take personal responsibility 
for the breakdowns that led to these explosions?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, I take responsibility for the actions 
in the company and I'm responsible at this point to make sure 
that we thoroughly understand what happened and why.
    Senator Warren. So you take personal responsibility here?
    Can I ask you the same question, Mr. Hamrock? You're the 
CEO of NiSource, the company that owns Columbia Gas. The NTSB 
reports also clearly identify failures by NiSource that 
contributed to this tragedy.
    Do you take personal responsibility for this tragedy?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, yes, I take responsibility for the 
culture as well as you noted and safety is our core value. It 
drives everything we do.
    Senator Warren. So let me ask you what personal 
responsibility means to you.
    Mr. Hamrock, how much were you paid last year?
    Mr. Hamrock. My compensation is a matter of public record 
and it's in the range of $5 million.
    Senator Warren. Five million. OK. And, Mr. Bryant, how much 
were you paid last year?
    Mr. Bryant. My compensation was approximately $550,000.
    Senator Warren. OK. Little over half a million. Mr. 
Hamrock, has your pay been reduced as a result of this 
disaster?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, again, I take full responsibility----
    Senator Warren. That's a yes or no question. How your pay 
been reduced as a result of this disaster?
    Mr. Hamrock. I fully expect to be held accountable with 
compensation being an important part of that and in fact have 
recommended to our Board that my bonus be withheld.
    Senator Warren. So your bonus may be withheld in the 
future?
    And, Mr. Bryant, was your pay reduced as a result of this 
action?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, a significant portion of my 
compensation above $230,000 is incentive compensation. I have 
suggested to Mr. Hamrock that any payment of any incentive in 
this year would be inappropriate.
    Senator Warren. So you're going to reduce--so you will lose 
your--people died in this explosion and you're going to lose 
your incentive bonus this year, is that right?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, first conversation I had with Joe 
Hamrock and that is the conversation that we had is that 
something on the order of $300,000 would be inappropriate.
    Senator Warren. OK. So you may lose your incentive bonus or 
you may not?
    Mr. Bryant. I'd like to clarify that. I think I was more 
specific with Mr. Hamrock. I said that I did not think that it 
should be paid and, if offered, I would not accept.
    Senator Warren. OK. You hope you will lose your incentive 
bonus. Is that what you just said?
    Mr. Bryant. No. I'm sorry, Senator. I said that I told Mr. 
Hamrock that I did not think that the payment of an incentive 
this year would be appropriate.
    Senator Warren. OK. Who's going to be responsible for 
determining whether or not you get your incentive bonus? Is it 
Mr. Hamrock?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator,----
    Senator Warren. I just want to figure out what personal 
responsibility means to you two?
    Mr. Hamrock.--personal responsibility goes beyond 
compensation. It's----
    Senator Warren. Well, let's start with compensation. I'm 
fine with beyond compensation, but I just want to know. You 
kept your jobs and you're still getting paid what sounds like a 
lot of money, and I want to know what personal responsibility 
means here.
    Let me ask you another question. You said, Mr. Bryant, 
right after the explosion, ``I see no cause to fire anybody 
with what I know so far.'' So who exactly at Columbia Gas has 
been held responsible for the shortcomings that were identified 
in the NTSB report? Have you fired anyone?
    Mr. Hamrock. Senator, the review is underway. We will take 
all appropriate actions, based on the final findings, the 
ultimate understanding of what happened here, personal 
accountability, including organizational responsibilities, and 
compensation will all be a part of that.
    The most important thing is that we get to the core set of 
facts and understand what happened, who's accountable, make 
sure we make a consistent----
    Senator Warren. No.
    Mr. Hamrock.--and complete set of recommendations.
    Senator Warren. Let me stop you there. The most important 
thing is not just that we find out what happens. The most 
important thing is that we make changes so that it doesn't 
happen again.
    Mr. Hamrock. I agree.
    Senator Warren. And I started my line of questions with how 
many times you have stood up and said in effect publicly this 
will not happen again. Yes, there has been an accident, there 
has been a mistake, but we're going to improve safety and this 
will not happen again, and we can go through the list a second 
time or third time and that's just right here in Massachusetts 
and yet now that we've had a huge tragedy, now that someone has 
died, now that people have been injured, now that people have 
lost their homes, you're saying exactly the same thing you said 
every time in the past and you sit here and say I apologize and 
I'm glad to hear that and I hope that it's sincere and you say 
I take personal responsibility but I'm just not seeing any 
impact from that.
    I'm not seeing a company that takes safety seriously and 
I'm not seeing people at the head of the company who take any 
personal accountability for the kind of tragedy that a culture 
that is not focused on safety causes to the public.
    The people in this room have been injured. You have not. 
You continue to keep your jobs, to collect your big paychecks, 
and to go on about your business. Personal responsibility means 
you step up in this, not simply that you back away and say 
you'll figure out how other people can deal with this problem.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. The Chair recognizes Senator Hassan.
    Senator Hassan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to 
the witnesses for being here.
    Let me just start by saying you can count me in with my 
colleagues, Senator Markey and Senator Warren, in questioning 
why it is that the people of Lawrence and Andover and North 
Andover or the people in New Hampshire or any American you all 
serve should have to rely on your culture because I will add my 
concern to that. You just heard from Senator Warren that there 
have been safety incident after safety incident after safety 
incident just here in Massachusetts and it does not seem to 
have changed your culture and that is a grave concern because 
this can't happen again and I'm sitting here saying that and, 
of course, others have said that after other accidents with 
your companies and others.
    It's 2018 in the United States of America and nobody should 
be worried when they come home at night that their house is 
going to explode, nobody.
    So let me now turn to you, Mr. Sumwalt, because I want to 
figure out what we now do so that we're not just relying on the 
culture of private enterprise and we are, in fact, doing what 
we should do as Americans to require and implement standards 
that will keep us safe.
    I understand that one of the recommendations issued in the 
NTSB's preliminary report is to require that a professional 
engineer issue a seal of approval for public utility 
engineering drawings.
    Now I have to say when I read that, I was astounded that we 
don't require that. It's my understanding that neither 
Massachusetts nor New Hampshire nor many other states require 
such a seal of approval, although I understand from the 
Secretary that that is changing in Massachusetts.
    It seems to me that if this change requiring such a seal of 
approval could have prevented death and injury in the Merrimack 
Valley explosions, it would be worth alerting state governments 
so that they can respond accordingly, and I think you touched 
on this in your testimony, but can you help me understand what 
the NTSB is going to do to issue guidance to states that make 
sure that they take the steps they need to require professional 
engineer seal on these types of drawings?
    Mr. Sumwalt. Thank you for your question, Senator Hassan, 
and, of course, our immediate focus is on this particular----
    Senator Hassan. Right.
    Mr. Sumwalt.--tragedy here in the Merrimack Valley.
    I would envision that part of our total package, our total 
investigation, we would want to look and see what the 
requirements are from various states. As you pointed out, about 
29 states do not require this professional engineer signoff.
    So I can envision that that would be something that we 
would ultimately recommend.
    Senator Hassan. Is there any reason you shouldn't be 
recommending it right now? So that state legislatures will come 
back next month to state houses across the country. Why 
shouldn't the top of their agenda be, not to mention the top of 
Congress's agenda be, to implement this requirement as a matter 
of state regulation or state law? Why shouldn't the NTSB be out 
front saying this is something you could do right now, this 
legislative session, to make sure that gas pipelines are safer?
    Mr. Sumwalt. Well, I certainly hear what you're saying and 
I appreciate what you're saying. Again, our immediate focus is 
on this particular event, so we've scoped the recommendations 
to address this event, but, as I mentioned, I suspect this 
investigation will have many, many recommendations that are 
broad-reaching.
    Senator Hassan. Well, I appreciate that. What I would urge 
you all to do is when a recommendation, even if you haven't 
finished the complete review, seems like there's an obvious 
recommendation out there, that state legislators could act on 
immediately, get that recommendation out there and there are 
lots of us who want to work with you to do that.
    Mr. Kuprewicz, I want to touch a little bit on your 
testimony. You say in your testimony that using computer leak 
mapping and reporting technologies could help guard against 
incidents like the one in Merrimack Valley.
    Can you please discuss the role of technology in providing 
a backstop against human error and whether or not you think 
state and Federal Governments have the resources to implement 
that kind of technology?
    Mr. Kuprewicz. Well, actually, there are a couple states, 
and I won't name them because of nondisclosure agreements, who 
have required as a matter in their PUCs, in their settlements 
for pipe replacement that to have the company present annually 
their leak detection results in computer maps and then they can 
sort them and filter them and so when you see in some of these 
areas the numerous leaks, even hazardous leaks, the Grade 1s, 
and it fills up the page, well, that doesn't really do you a 
lot of good.
    So you've got to use the computer to filter it and so I 
guess the example I'd use is I used Apple Maps to find Lawrence 
today when I drove from Connecticut this morning visiting my 
daughter and it works. It's not a real complicated system. You 
can do the same thing with--not with the complications of leak 
map--with Google mapping or Apple mapping, but there are very 
easy tools out there. They've been around for, you know, 10 
years. They're getting more sophisticated and so a simple 
little portable computer can do exactly that.
    Senator Hassan. OK. So what you're telling us is that there 
are models out there that could be used that could help prevent 
this kind of incident from occurring?
    Mr. Kuprewicz. Well, it'll help indicate, you know, are you 
doing pipe replacement where it really needs to be, first,----
    Senator Hassan. Right.
    Mr. Kuprewicz.--and then if you're doing pipe replacement 
and it didn't really need to be the first one to be done and it 
exposed you to a catastrophic over-pressure event for other 
reasons,----
    Senator Hassan. Right.
    Mr. Kuprewicz.--that could have been avoided.
    Senator Hassan. OK. Thank you.
    Mr. Roberti, does PHMSA have the necessary cyber security 
framework to rely on new technologies for safety like the ones 
we just heard about?
    Mr. Roberti. Senator, did you say cyber?
    Senator Hassan. Yes. So we're talking about computer 
programs. We're talking about new technology to help prevent 
this kind of incident and, of course, the new technology has to 
be protected by strong cybersecurity. So does PHMSA have that 
kind of capacity?
    Mr. Roberti. Certainly. We invest a lot in R&D research 
with universities on that front. Cybersecurity on the pipeline 
side is within the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Transportation Safety Administration. We work with them very 
closely. In fact, we're about to execute an Addendum to an 
existing Memorandum of Understanding on how to bolster that 
area.
    In terms of this area about leak mapping, the distribution 
integrity management protocols within the regulations envision 
that pipeline operators will know their systems, prioritize 
where the risks are, and then prioritize investments.
    This type of technology should be employed if it's 
available and can be employed and I think that's something 
we'll continue to look at, as well, how we can harness 
technology.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you. And just in the interest of 
time, I'll end my line of questioning, but I do want to follow 
up with you because I think your agency has been slow in 
responding to GAO recommendations about ways to improve and 
obviously that needs to change.
    Thank you.
    Senator Markey. Congresswoman Tsongas.
    Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Senator Markey, and I think you can 
hear from all our questions up here the deep concern obviously 
about the impact on the residents of the Merrimack Valley, but 
also the culture and processes and procedures in place within 
the company that led to this.
    So a lot of work to be done, and I think we're grateful for 
the NTSB, who's bringing some clarity, some objective clarity 
to just why this happened and what steps should be taken to 
prevent it from happening again.
    So I want to go to you, Chairman Sumwalt, and ask you, can 
you talk about the additional steps that you will be taking to 
conduct the investigation? You've issued a detailed preliminary 
report, I think, which was very concerning to all of us up 
here, showing, I think, in fact that this could have been 
prevented.
    But what will be the focus of your investigation moving 
forward?
    Mr. Sumwalt. Well, thank you. Of course, we did want to get 
out these interim safety recommendations because we felt that 
they were very important to get those out early.
    So, in addition, I believe we've certainly identified the 
proximate cause of the accident. Of course, that's an over-
pressurization. We understand why the system over-pressured and 
so you could say, well, we figured the accident out.
    Our investigations are very thorough. So, in addition to 
identifying really the proximate cause, we want to look at the 
organizational culture of NiSource and Columbia Gas. That's not 
as easy as going out and finding a sensor that is attached to 
the wrong line.
    Ms. Tsongas. How do you do that? How do you look at the 
organizational culture?
    Mr. Sumwalt. Well, and that's very tricky and that's why it 
takes time, but we do that by looking at prior practices. We've 
heard about prior events that they've had. We will look at 
their--by interviewing their senior management, by not only the 
senior leadership but we want to interview the people that are 
in the rank and file.
    Oftentimes we find there's a difference between what the 
people at the top of the organization are saying and what 
people on the front line are actually perceiving. So we will 
continue to look at that.
    We will also look at the regulatory oversight not only from 
the Federal oversight but from the state oversight, as well. So 
that's what our entire investigation will look at.
    Additionally, we will be looking at the emergency response. 
So that's really the plan at this point.
    Ms. Tsongas. Have you found everybody to be cooperative in 
providing the documents, the people that you feel you've needed 
to talk with at NiSource and Columbia Gas have been 
cooperative?
    Ms. Tsongas. Yes, ma'am, we've found them to be very 
cooperative with the NTSB.
    Ms. Tsongas. So you've had no incidents with them?
    Mr. Sumwalt. I'm sorry?
    Ms. Tsongas. So you've had no incidents having to insist on 
being able to talk with someone, any people sort of trying to 
avoid their conversations with you?
    Mr. Sumwalt. The truth is I feel like we've had a very open 
dialogue with NiSource and Columbia Gas.
    Ms. Tsongas. And how long do you think it's going to take 
to get to your final report? I know you said it's complicated.
    Mr. Sumwalt. It is indeed a priority. Usually our 
investigations, our pipeline investigations are running between 
12 and 24 months. As I mentioned in my testimony, I've placed a 
priority on this to make sure that it is done in a timely 
fashion. Meanwhile, if we do see the need for urgent 
recommendations or interim recommendations, we will certainly 
come out with those.
    Ms. Tsongas. So whatever recommendations you make will be 
specific to the company or will it be--could they also include 
recommendations around the regulatory framework, either a state 
or Federal level?
    Mr. Sumwalt. Yes, ma'am. I'm sorry. I couldn't clearly hear 
that, but our recommendations, if they're interim 
recommendations, could be broad-reaching. As you know in our 
last recommendation package that came out 11 days ago, they 
were not only to NiSource but they were to the State of 
Massachusetts, as well.
    Ms. Tsongas. And in terms of all the accidents you've 
investigated, where does this fall along the trajectory of 
seriousness?
    Mr. Sumwalt. Well, all of the accidents the NTSB 
investigates are very tragic in their own right. This one, of 
course, is devastating to not only the families involved but to 
the entire community.
    Ms. Tsongas. And so you're hesitant to put it in somewhere 
in the----
    Mr. Sumwalt. Well, that's always tricky because even if one 
person loses their life, that in itself is tragic. So I think 
that they're all tragic and our thoughts and prayers are with 
the people of this community.
    Ms. Tsongas. Mr. Hamrock, do you dispute any of the NTSB's 
findings to date?
    Mr. Hamrock. No.
    Ms. Tsongas. So you accept their findings?
    Mr. Hamrock. We accept their findings and are working with 
them.
    Ms. Tsongas. Whatever it may say about the company?
    Mr. Hamrock. Yes.
    Ms. Tsongas. Mr. Hamrock, I wanted to ask a couple of other 
questions.
    There have been significant costs that your company's 
incurred, rightfully so, and those will, I'm sure, be ongoing 
and we won't know the final number, but can you make a 
commitment that the costs that you have incurred will not be 
passed along to the ratepayers?
    Mr. Hamrock. We have approached this with no regard for 
anything but taking care of our customers and understanding the 
need, their needs, and have not focused on recovery or any 
other----
    Ms. Tsongas. Well, you may not be focused on it to date, 
but in the future, when you come to grips with the total impact 
on your bottom line, can you make the commitment that you will 
not pass the costs along to the ratepayers?
    Mr. Hamrock. I'm not in a position today to make such a 
commitment. We've not spent any time focusing on that question.
    Ms. Tsongas. Well, I think I take great exception to that 
statement.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    Senator Markey. Congressman Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Senator.
    Mr. Bryant, my job description as a Marine infantry officer 
is very simple. You're responsible for everything your platoon 
does or fails to do. One sentence.
    You said in your statement initially that you take 
responsibility for recovery. Why did you not include in your 
statement that you take responsibility for the disaster?
    Mr. Bryant. Congressman, I apologize. That was not an 
intentional omission. I take responsibility for the actions 
that took place that led to that and that responsibility is now 
to understand how that happened and my further responsibility 
is to work with the rest of the NiSource team to make sure that 
something like that never happens again and Columbia Gas or 
NiSource or any other gas distribution company in the United 
States.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Bryant, Mr. Hamrock talked about his 
responsibility for the safety culture of your company. Mr. 
Hamrock said that safety is a core value. Now it's one thing to 
have a value and quite another to actually live up to it.
    Do you think that your company, Columbia Gas, lives up to 
having safety as a core value?
    Mr. Bryant. I absolutely believe that NiSource has safety 
as a core value.
    Mr. Moulton. And we know they have it as a core value. 
They've stated that. I'm asking you if you live up to that 
value?
    Mr. Bryant. Yes, we do. I'll give you the best example that 
I have is that any Columbia Gas employee can stop any activity 
at any time if they believe that act is unsafe.
    Mr. Moulton. So then let's go to the afternoon this tragedy 
occurred. There were two alarms at 4:04 and 4:05 p.m. received 
at your monitoring station, I believe in Ohio. What action did 
your company employees take when those alarms went off?
    Mr. Bryant. They notified resources in Massachusetts that 
there was an over-pressurization and dispatched resources to 
the regulated station.
    Mr. Moulton. What resources, Mr. Bryant? What resources 
were dispatched?
    Mr. Bryant. Management regulation resources, the on-the-
ground resources.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Bryant, are you aware that or were you 
aware in the past that over-pressurization of a gas pipeline 
can cause explosions that could lead to the loss of life?
    Mr. Bryant. Yes, I'm aware of that.
    Mr. Moulton. Were you aware of that before this tragedy 
occurred?
    Mr. Bryant. Yes.
    Mr. Moulton. So it seems to me that if you're aware that 
over-pressurization of a gas pipeline could cause loss of life 
among your customers and if you receive two alarms at your 
facilities that simply notifying some regulators that there's 
an over-pressurization incident doesn't do much to help your 
customers. That doesn't seem much like a culture of safety.
    At what time did you notify customers of the problem so 
that they could take action to secure their homes and save 
their own lives?
    Mr. Bryant. Congressman, public safety officials took those 
actions immediately.
    Mr. Moulton. I'm well aware of that. We're lucky they're 
here because otherwise a lot more people would have died.
    But if you're taking responsibility for this,----
    [Applause.]
    Mr. Moulton.--when did you notify your customers?
    Mr. Bryant. Congressman, first and foremost, I have to 
acknowledge and thank the public safety officials. They were on 
the ground. This was a widespread event and they took the 
actions necessary to keep the public safe and we will be 
forever grateful to them for that.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much. Now you can answer my 
question.
    At what time did you notify customers that their homes 
could start blowing up?
    Mr. Bryant. Again, Congressman, we did not need to do that. 
Public safety officials would do that.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, let me help a little bit, Mr. Bryant, 
because on your website, you posted a notice at about 9 o'clock 
that evening, five hours, five hours after the two alarms were 
received by your facility that there is ``an incident in the 
area and that customers should make themselves safe.'' Five 
hours. That does not strike me as a culture of safety among 
your employees or at your organization.
    Mr. Bryant. Congressman, I will readily admit that one of 
the weakest areas we had in the earliest hours of this event 
was communication and we intend to take that experience and 
learn from that.
    Mr. Moulton. And how are you going to learn from that, Mr. 
Bryant?
    Mr. Bryant. We will review the actions and the 
circumstances that took place on that evening and determine 
what we can do to make sure, God forbid, anything like this 
ever happens again we have the----
    Mr. Moulton. OK. But here's something that's very simple. 
If your company culture cares about safety and if you and your 
employees care about the lives of the customers you serve, then 
you should let them know that their houses might explode and 
not wait 5 hours to do so. Do you agree with that?
    Mr. Bryant. I just might--I might suggest that I see this 
in a different way. In those hours immediately after the 
explosions and fires, all of our employees were focused on 
making the systems safe, getting to all of the regulator 
stations that fed into that distribution system, making sure 
that all 14 points of gas flow were shut off, and that 
customers were out of their--in that----
    Mr. Moulton. So, Mr. Bryant, several reports and 
constituents of mine have stated numerous instances where 
Columbia Gas reps simply ran away from residents who were 
bombarding them with questions they didn't know the answers to. 
That's not a culture of safety.
    We're going to hear later from Mayor Rivera of Lawrence and 
in his testimony, he will say, ``It appeared to many of us that 
Columbia Gas did not have an actual plan for dealing with the 
disaster of this magnitude as if it never crossed their minds 
that this could occur.'' To me, Mr. Bryant, that's not a 
culture of safety.
    Mr. Hamrock, what was the profit margin for NiSource last 
fiscal year?
    Mr. Hamrock. In 2017?
    Mr. Moulton. 2017.
    Mr. Hamrock. $1.20 per share, earnings per share.
    Mr. Moulton. And do the math. What's the overall profit? 
How many shares out there?
    Mr. Hamrock. Well, on the order of 300 some million.
    Mr. Moulton. 300 million? 300 million. What is the cost of 
this tragedy, the latest estimate?
    Mr. Hamrock. We've disclosed this tragedy, full cost, looks 
like it'll cost about $800 million.
    Mr. Moulton. $800 million? So what do you expect the profit 
margin for NiSource to be in the next three years?
    Mr. Hamrock. Well, without accounting for this tragedy, 
it'll continue to----
    Mr. Moulton. My question is whether you will account for it 
and whether the cost of this tragedy, the estimated $800 
million, which I suspect will rise even further, will actually 
come out of your profit margin for the company.
    Mr. Hamrock. We have approached this tragedy by bringing 
every resource available in without regard for the profit 
margin. Our first duty is to take care of our customers and 
ensure----
    Mr. Moulton. So what can we expect in your next quarterly 
report?
    Mr. Hamrock. I don't know. It's too early to know that.
    Mr. Moulton. You're the CEO of the company, sir. You should 
know what shareholders should expect in their next report.
    Mr. Hamrock. In the fourth quarter,----
    Mr. Moulton. Do you expect to report a profit?
    Mr. Hamrock. We're still in the fourth quarter and I don't 
have clarity on what that'll look like at this point.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, if you took responsibility for this, you 
would have clarity because you would say right now that you 
will cover the $800 million and you will not see a profit at 
your company because otherwise, as Representative Tsongas 
suggested, it seems like you're going to take the money out of 
your customers to make the company whole, to make your 
shareholders whole. That's not responsibility.
    Mr. Bryant, one last question for you. Do you plan to 
resign?
    Mr. Bryant. At this point, Congressman, I do not. My job, 
my focus, my effort every day is the restoration of service to 
our customers.
    Mr. Moulton. So do you think you're the best-qualified 
person to do that?
    Mr. Bryant. I think I am the best-qualified person to do 
that.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, Mr. Bryant, I beg to differ. Based on 
your response that evening, when it took five hours to notify 
your customers that there was a problem, it's hard for me to 
imagine that you're the best person to take responsibility of 
this company, and I suggest you resign.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. So now we're going to move to a second 
round of questions. Any of the members who have questions will 
be recognized for that purpose.
    I'm going to move down to PHMSA, which is our Federal 
pipeline safety agency, which has responsibility for issuing 
regulations to ensure that communities in Merrimack Valley and 
communities all across the United States are safe, but, 
unfortunately, our pipeline safety agency has failed to do its 
job when it comes to natural gas pipelines.
    Federal rules contain critical safety gaps. This agency 
often takes many years to issue required regulations, dragging 
its feet while our communities remain in danger. The agency is 
the poster child for an agency which has been captured by the 
industry which it is supposed to regulate. Rather than being a 
watch dog, PHMSA has become a lap dog for this industry in 
discharging its responsibility to make sure that pipelines are 
safe in Merrimack Valley but that pipelines are safe in every 
community across the country.
    Mr. Roberti, you say in your testimony, ``The onus of 
maintaining a safe pipeline system is on the companies that own 
and operate the system.'' That is a shocking statement, Mr. 
Roberti. That is like saying it is the responsibility of the 
fox to make sure that the hen house is safe.
    The onus, Mr. Roberti, is on your agency to ensure that the 
pipeline companies are operating safely, but your agency has 
abdicated that responsibility to the industry which it 
regulates. You leave it to the individual companies to 
determine whether or not they are going to put safety measures 
in place.
    So here we have a situation where four years ago, Columbia 
Gas just decided that they wouldn't have someone there on duty 
in Lawrence to be able to respond immediately and that then 
created a huge time gap which then allowed for this accident to 
occur where it perhaps could have been stopped right at the 
beginning.
    So let me turn to you, Mr. Kuprewicz. Talk about PHMSA, 
talk about their delegation of responsibility down to the 
company level, and what needs to happen in order to make sure 
that we in Congress take action, which is necessary, and that 
there is a uniform set of guidelines which are put in place 
that are mandatory to be abided by so it's not left in the 
discretion of Columbia Gas or any other company to determine 
whether or not safety standards, which will cost money, are put 
in place. Mr. Kuprewicz.
    Mr. Kuprewicz. I'd say, first of all, technically, PHMSA 
has excellent technical people. I don't want to take that away 
from them. I interact with them all the time.
    The biggest problem I observed in the last 20 years is the 
movement away from prescriptive regulation that has certain 
things that they must do----
    Senator Markey. Can you pull in the microphone, Mr. 
Kuprewicz?
    Mr. Kuprewicz. I'm sorry. I thought my voice would carry.
    The biggest problem I see is the shift away from 
prescriptive where there were certain things the operators must 
do that PHMSA could get in and say you're doing this or you're 
not doing this to what we call the more risk-based performance 
movements and the performance gives a lot of wiggle room and 
it's tough for a regulator to enforce. That's probably the 
biggest frustration.
    The second one I'd see, an example would be the integrity 
management regulations for gas transmission interstate 
pipelines as well as intrastate pipelines.
    We started with a performance. We agreed to go with 
performance-based. We'd rather have had a little more 
prescriptive. We said it's the first time we're going to do 
this. OK. You've talked us into performance-based and that has 
not been very successful.
    Senator Markey. So you say that the standard which is 
applied right now is inadequate. There should be a more 
prescriptive, a more detailed set of regulations put on the 
books to make sure that no company, no natural gas company in 
the United States is in any way questioning what the standard 
should be, and that if they violate it, they're going to pay a 
penalty, that the Federal agency's going to come down on them 
for not abiding by what the national standard is for safety. Is 
that what you're saying?
    Mr. Kuprewicz. Yes, and especially if you want a rank in 
terms of where you want to put your effort in getting back 
toward the prescriptive regulations, OK, you can have a 
discussion on it.
    Senator Markey. So, in other words, we don't let nuclear 
power plant operators, we don't let the Seabrook Nuclear Power 
Plant or the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant determine what the 
level of safety is at a nuclear power plant. There are Federal 
regulations that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission puts on the 
books and then implements, is that correct?
    Mr. Kuprewicz. That's correct.
    Senator Markey. And you're saying that the same thing 
should be true for PHMSA and it is not today?
    Mr. Kuprewicz. That's correct. Shift them back. They're 
capable of doing that.
    [Applause.]
    Mr. Kuprewicz. But it's a major shift.
    Senator Markey. Well, it's a common sense shift. The people 
up here don't want to live questioning whether or not there are 
safety standards for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant. They 
don't want to wonder whether or not it's just left up to a 
single unqualified engineer to determine what happens in a 
particular situation. They want to make sure that their 
families are safe. They want to make sure that there is a plan 
in place that has been put together by the top people in the 
United States to ensure that there is in fact protection which 
is put on the books.
    Chairman Sumwalt, do you agree with that?
    Mr. Sumwalt. Well, generally, I do believe that the idea of 
performance-based standards is acceptable. The trick is how do 
you enforce the performance-based standards.
    Senator Markey. And if I may, because we talked about the 
$2 million fine on an $800 million accident, and I think that's 
conservative because the $800 million is what the insurance 
covers. There could be a much higher number ultimately, which 
is in fact imposed upon the citizens of Merrimack Valley, and 
this $2 million fine just seems absolutely pathetic as a 
discouragement so that real safety standards are adopted.
    Secretary Beaton, what is the state looking at in terms of 
imposition of fines upon this company?
    Mr. Beaton. Sorry, Senator, there was a noise. Did you say 
relative to the fines?
    Primarily up to this moment in time, our sole focus has 
been on the restoration of and the stabilization of the 
situation and the restoration as close, as best we can to back 
to normal here in the Merrimack Valley.
    We have an ongoing investigation at the Department of 
Public Utilities that will ultimately take us to that answer. I 
wouldn't want to put the cart before the horse and predetermine 
the outcome of that. So I think that is yet to be determined 
but I'm sure we will most certainly be looking into that. It's 
too early to say what that would look like at this point in 
time.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Senator Warren.
    Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So after the disaster in the Merrimack Valley, you 
committed to replacing over 50 miles of pipeline, replacing all 
in-home gas appliances, and providing temporary appliance 
heating and housing sources for residents. You set the timeline 
yourself for this, Mr. Bryant. What was the date that all that 
was to be done by?
    Mr. Bryant. The original date that we committed to was 
November 19.
    Senator Warren. November 19, and did you make that date?
    Mr. Bryant. We did not, Senator.
    Senator Warren. So now you have another date that you have 
set. What's that date?
    Mr. Bryant. No later than December 16.
    Senator Warren. December 16, and can you guarantee that no 
family will have to wait beyond December 16 in order to return 
to their home, that they'll have full service by then?
    Mr. Bryant. Everything that I see what we have accomplished 
to date, up to and including yesterday, indicates to me that we 
will beat that date.
    Senator Warren. So is that a guarantee?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, for me to guarantee would suggest that 
we're in control of everything in life. May I just----
    Senator Warren. Well, let me stop you right there. You are 
in control. You are the guys who have all of the information. 
You're the ones who have the money. You're the ones who have 
the resources. You're the ones who determine how many people 
you hire and who you hire and how you go about this and you're 
the ones who set the date.
    Mayor Rivera didn't set the date. Senator Markey didn't set 
the date. I didn't set the date. You set it. You said we can 
meet this. Now you've already proven you're not very good at 
this because you've already missed by a month.
    All I want to know is can you really tell the folks here 
who don't get to live in their houses, who don't have hot 
water, who can't cook, who don't have heat, can you tell them 
for sure that the date you've picked is a real date and on 
December 16, they can all plan to move back home?
    Mr. Bryant. I apologize for the comment about not being in 
control. All I meant was that there are customers who are 
making their own arrangements and their own arrangements to put 
heat and hot water in their home may not be fulfilled perhaps 
by their own desire.
    Senator Warren. OK. So let's----
    Mr. Bryant. For those----
    Senator Warren. For anyone who's trying to do it on their 
own, I get that, but for everyone that you're picking up, which 
is everyone, if they want--if they trust you to do this, you'll 
have everyone back in their homes on December 16?
    Mr. Bryant. Yes, Senator, we will have everybody back in 
their homes by December 16.
    Senator Warren. By December 16, okay, and that's 
guaranteed?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, that's my best statement. We will have 
people back in their homes before December 16.
    Senator Warren. That's guaranteed. OK. So look. Let me ask 
you a question about how we got to this mess to begin with when 
people thought they'd be back in on October 17--November 17.
    People need heat and I understand this. We just had the 
coldest Thanksgiving in 80 years and you said what you'd do is 
you'd put space heaters in for everybody. That would get people 
back into their homes quickly and be able to get heat. You 
purchased 24,000 space heaters to provide to residents.
    So Senator Markey and I asked for some more details about 
the risk assessments you conducted before distributing these 
appliances and whether you'd chosen the safest possible 
options. So I just want to unpack a little how we got to where 
we are now.
    In your response, you acknowledge that about ``90 percent 
of homes do not meet the recommended electrical configuration 
for space heaters.'' When you announced the plan to provide 
space heaters, did you know that almost none of the homes in 
the region could handle them?
    Mr. Bryant. No, we did not. One of the most difficult 
things in this process was learning the assessment of what we 
were facing and our intent was to give every customer 
possible----
    Senator Warren. So----
    Mr. Bryant--a space heater.
    Senator Warren.--did you not take any input from the local 
fire chiefs on this when you put together your plan to buy 
24,000 space heaters and distribute them? The fire chiefs 
didn't talk to you about it or you didn't talk to the fire 
chiefs about this?
    Mr. Bryant. What we relied on with the fire chiefs is the 
determination of what electrical requirements in the home would 
be appropriate to put in a space heater.
    Senator Warren. So when did you realize that you had a 
problem doing this with space heaters and consider making 
alternative housing and heating options available?
    Mr. Bryant. As we began to intensively do house-by-house 
assessments.
    Senator Warren. So how deep were you into this before you 
realized--I mean, I can do the math here, that 90 percent of 
these homes you're not going to be able to fix this problem 
with space heaters.
    So how far did you get in this before you started making 
alternative arrangements?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, we were working to make alternative 
housing arrangements immediately, at the same time that we were 
looking to put space heaters into homes. We came to the 
conclusion that some customers may have wanted alternative 
housing and some customers may have wanted to stay in their 
homes. So we worked on two paths.
    Senator Warren. So I'm just having trouble putting this 
together. So your workers had trouble bringing housing up to 
code. You said you'd give everyone space heaters. Then you 
realized the houses can't handle them, so you're going to bring 
in electricians and you're going to bring the houses up to 
code.
    So why did it take 13 days from the day that you announced 
the November 19 deadline, you announced that on October 9 to 
October 22 before you announced the delayed date for 
restoration?
    Mr. Bryant. Generally, we made the announcement about the 
delayed date for restoration once we made the determination 
that it would take us longer than we originally expected in 
most houses to be able to mitigate to allow the house to become 
ready for natural gas.
    Senator Warren. And so you're saying that you didn't 
realize that you were going to blow your deadline until October 
22? That's when you made the announcement?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, when we made the announcement is when 
we came to the firm conclusion that we were not going to make 
that date.
    Senator Warren. And you didn't make it before then? You 
didn't make it back sometime around October 9th when you were 
in the houses, going house-by-house, and finding out that 90 
percent don't have the power structure to do this?
    Mr. Bryant. I'm sorry, Senator. The electric space heater 
issue really didn't play into the issue. It was really a case 
of our making a determination of what it would take to be able 
to turn natural gas service back on in a home.
    Senator Warren. OK. And so now you've got the appliances 
issue, though, whether or not you can get the appliances in, 
right, new appliances because you've finished the main part of 
the pipeline?
    Mr. Bryant. Certainly, Senator, we completed the natural 
gas distribution build-out earlier than expected but the--what 
we call house-ready, the work necessary to be able to turn gas 
back on turned out to be much more labor-intensive than we 
originally estimated.
    Senator Warren. OK. So here's the problem I've got and I'm 
just trying to work through this. It starts with where 
Congressman Moulton started and that is, why did it take 5 
hours in order to tell customers that there was a problem? I 
mean, you could see much more information on the news than you 
could get from the company that was responsible both for the 
explosion and for the safety of every single resident in the 
region.
    Now I'm going to the next part and so you announced a 
deadline by which you'd have everyone back in their homes. You 
gathered more information as you went along. You waited until 
late in that process. Now you've announced a new deadline and 
I'm asking the question in effect, how much confidence can you 
have in the new deadline?
    Part of the question is, are you taking the information in 
as it comes, and I want to ask one more related to this. On my 
way in, I met outside with the National Grid Workers, trained 
workers who are ready to go, who are willing to help, who want 
to help, and most of them idle for the last two and a half 
months.
    You know, you have a mutual aid pact with National Grid. 
You could have put their workers to work if they had been back 
at work at National Grid. So let me ask you. Have you urged 
National Grid to reach an agreement with its workers so that 
you could call on mutual aid and get those people to work here 
in Lawrence and Andover and North Andover?
    Mr. Bryant. I have not had such a conversation with 
National Grid.
    Senator Warren. Why not?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, because I believe that those employees 
could have worked for our contractors and helped in the house 
mitigation if they so choose.
    Senator Warren. So you didn't think it was important to do 
it through National Grid. You said you had another way to hire 
all those employees, is that right? So you didn't ask National 
Grid to do this? So did you--have you hired those National Grid 
employees through contractors indirectly or directly?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, I don't know how many National Grid 
workers worked for our contractors. I don't have any way of 
knowing that specifically.
    Senator Warren. So I guess here's the problem. We talked 
about a culture of inattention to safety, putting profits ahead 
of safety that led to the explosion.
    Now the people here are trying to deal with the impact of 
that, with the aftermath. Some families will never be made 
whole. A family lost a son, people who've been injured, people 
who've been moved out of their houses, little children who 
can't go to their neighborhood schools, elderly people whose 
lives have been disrupted.
    But at a minimum, what we're asking for is some 
accountability in the recovery efforts and that means the one 
thing you ought to be able to do--you have all the information. 
You are a very wealthy company. You could bring resources to 
bear. You could put a timeline out and you could get these 
people back in their homes and what we're hearing is that 
there's more information. You don't know who's been hired. You 
don't know if there are other people who would have been 
available.
    But somehow it all turned out to be a bigger project than 
you had in mind back when you blew up a bunch of people's 
houses and that you're still not on top of this and that people 
can't count on getting back in their homes, and is there 
anything you can say that's going to give people some 
confidence that they really are going to be there before 
Christmas?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, I will says that they will be there 
before Christmas.
    Senator Warren. All of them?
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, all of them that we can complete. 
Again, if a customer makes the determination that they don't--
--
    Senator Warren. It's not all of them that we can complete. 
What they want to hear is that they're all going to be 
completed.
    Mr. Bryant. Senator, we'll be effectively completed with 
all customers in their homes before Christmas.
    Senator Warren. All right. We're going to hold you to it.
    Senator Markey. Senator Hassan.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and----
    Senator Markey. May I just?
    Senator Hassan. Yes.
    Senator Markey. Just to follow up, I ask unanimous consent 
to submit into the record testimony from United Steelworker 
Local 12003 President Joe Kirylo and testimony from United 
Steelworker Local 12012 President John Buonopane describing 
their concerns about Massachusetts pipeline safety.
    Without objection, their testimony will be included in the 
record.
    [The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    Senator Markey. I apologize. Senator Hassan.
    Senator Hassan. It's all good. I want to go back to the 
NTSB report and the timeline of this tragedy. Maybe, Mr. 
Kuprewicz, I can start with you.
    The monitoring center for Columbia Gas received an alert at 
4:04 p.m. and 4:05 p.m. that there was over-pressurization 
according to the NTSB report.
    What technology exists, if any, that would have allowed the 
control center to shut down the regulator remotely?
    Mr. Kuprewicz. Well, they'd have to implement and go to the 
screen. Most gas distribution systems do not have automated or 
remote control shutoff valves across their gridded gas networks 
and so when I hear that's kind of where they're heading, well, 
that's a good thing, but it's kind of a different thing and so 
that's good and that would have given them the ability to say 
I'm monitoring the pressure at this point. I'm seeing over-
pressure. My control center now has the ability to close that.
    Now there's risk in doing that, OK, but that would give the 
control center the option of doing that because most 
distribution systems do not have the ability--while they may 
have remote monitoring, they don't have highly sophisticated 
remote controlling of gas distribution systems. It's highly 
unusual.
    Senator Hassan. So it's unusual to have but the technology 
exists to do it?
    Mr. Kuprewicz. I'm sorry. I didn't hear you.
    Senator Hassan. Sorry. It's unusual for a gas company to 
have but the technology exists to do it?
    Mr. Kuprewicz. That's correct. They could do it. It's just 
money.
    Senator Hassan. It took about, as I read the report, it 
took about 26 minutes from the first alarm to the actual 
closure of the critical regulator and that's a long time.
    Mr. Kuprewicz. In the industry, yes, but it's pretty 
typical for systems that have to be manually closed.
    Senator Hassan. Well, and that's really what I'm trying to 
get at here. If systems have to be manually closed and it takes 
somebody calling people in the field and then them going out 
and closing the regulators, during that 26 minutes, catastrophe 
can occur.
    Mr. Kuprewicz. That's right.
    Senator Hassan. It did. It did. OK.
    Mr. Roberti, I want to go back to what I referenced 
earlier. Your agency, PHMSA, is responsible for developing and 
enforcing regulations for the safe operation of our country's 
2.6 million miles of pipelines.
    Your agency, though, doesn't have a great track record. So 
it is very clear that there are going to be recommendations of 
new safety regulations that come out of this tragedy with the 
hope that we will never see another tragedy like this one.
    But it is hard, given your agency's track record, to 
believe that you are really going to initiate the 
implementation of these regulations. It seems that you'll have 
no regard for timeliness when it comes to implementing 
congressional mandates and recommendations from the NTSB, from 
the GAO, or the Inspector General's Office.
    According to a 2016 GAO report, PHMSA has not implemented 
one-third of its mandates. It has missed numerous deadlines and 
25 percent of its mandates remain completely unimplemented, 
including eight pipeline recommendations relating to safety.
    The numbers are from 2016. So the first question is, have 
you made progress since 2016?
    Mr. Roberti. Well, Senator, thank you for the question. We 
work--the current PHMSA leadership is working tirelessly to get 
these unfinished mandates out. We have made some success. The 
Administrative Procedures Act is a law that we have to adhere 
to. There are Executive Orders and OMB regulations and I can 
tell you that the PHMSA leadership, we walk the hallways and 
daily this is what we know we're tasked with this.
    We have congressional mandates and we are doing everything 
we can to get them done as soon as possible.
    Senator Hassan. You are not the only Federal agency to have 
to deal with the administrative rules and acts. I would urge 
you, you know, we have a gymnasium full of people and a much 
larger community full of people whose lives have been forever 
changed by this tragedy and they are looking now to make sure 
that we do more than rely on the private sector to regulate 
itself.
    They are looking to their state and Federal governments to 
step up and make sure that we implement the rules that we have 
and if we change some rules and implement some new ones to make 
sure that this never happens again, that PHMSA will be right 
out there and I would like your agency's guarantee that you 
will be initiating and pushing in ways that you haven't in the 
past, asking Congress, asking the Administration for more 
resources, if you need them, but this should not be an agency 
that is this woefully behind in implementing critical safety 
mandates that protect the lives and the economy of this 
country, is that fair?
    [Applause.]
    Mr. Roberti. That's a fair statement, and we commit to 
meeting the congressional mandates and awaiting for the 
conclusion of these investigations so that we have a full and 
complete record on which to move, whether or not the minimum 
standards need to be changed.
    As you know, we set the minimum standards. States can go 
above and beyond. It's actually not a pure delegation. Congress 
granted or the authority over interstate systems has been 
reserved to the states. So it's a little bit more complex.
    Senator Hassan. I do understand that, and as a former 
Governor, I am always appreciative of having that kind of 
partnership, right, but what states are also looking to the 
NTSB and to PHMSA for is leadership and coordination and, 
frankly, it would be helpful to the point I made earlier to the 
Chairman, given that state legislatures will be reconvening in 
most states in this country next month. I would really highly 
recommend that you take what you can share with state 
governments now from this investigation and you get to work on 
coordinating with them so that, to the degree there are state 
laws and regulations that need to be changed, our states have 
the opportunity to get on the ball and do that and they're 
looking to you all for leadership and coordination to do that.
    Will you commit to me and this panel and to the people here 
that you will initiate that kind of coordination and 
communication?
    Mr. Roberti. Yes, Senator. It's underway and we commit to 
doing that.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Markey. Congresswoman Tsongas.
    Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
    It seems to me much of the discussion is focusing--it begs 
the issue of the company's anticipation that such a terrible 
disaster might happen. We are focused very much on what caused 
it, how to put in place measures that prevent it from happening 
ever again, but also being mindful that we have to plan in the 
event that they do happen, and it seems to me much of our 
experience here in the Merrimack Valley and much of the 
questioning is eliciting answers that show you really did not 
anticipate a disaster like this ever taking place.
    So my question, Mr. Hamrock, is, how does your company plan 
for worst case scenario disasters? Was there a plan in place 
that you could immediately turn to and implement?
    Mr. Hamrock. Thank you, Congresswoman. We do in fact have 
extensive emergency response and crisis response plans in place 
that we train on, drill on, run tabletops. We run through 
scenarios on a very frequent basis.
    When this happened, I was notified within 18 minutes of the 
initial alarm, immediately knew something terrible had happened 
and activated our Corporate Crisis Response protocols which 
included and entailed bringing support to the Columbia Gas of 
Massachusetts team, dispatched senior lieutenants who were on 
the ground here within hours here that evening from other parts 
of our system.
    I was on the ground the very next day and have spent the 
vast majority of the time here. The local operating company, 
Columbia Gas of Massachusetts, also has emergency response 
planning for such a scenario.
    This clearly stretched--was an extreme scenario. A lot we 
can learn from this, a lot we are learning from this. We're 
committed to working with the NTSB.
    One of the areas of their investigation looks at emergency 
response. We're fully cooperating with that and will in fact 
take back all lessons and actions that we can from this 
terrible tragedy.
    Ms. Tsongas. So as you're looking at your response and it's 
clear that there were many shortcomings in it, what would you 
identify at this point as some of the clear takeaways from it, 
things you really have to deal with?
    Mr. Hamrock. As Mr. Bryant said earlier, communications is 
an area that we clearly have lessons that we learned and will 
continue to learn. It's an area that requires additional focus 
for us but we are focused on that.
    And then I would commend the Administration, the Baker 
Administration for implementing SMS on a statewide basis 
because I believe that framework will help not only us here in 
Massachusetts, but ultimately the entire industry have a more 
effective overlay of risk analysis and the ability to do more 
assessment of risk of these kinds of situations and be better 
prepared in the event they could happen.
    Ms. Tsongas. So is your disaster plan a written plan? Is it 
something somebody could take a look at to be sure that it's 
adequate? Where does it exist?
    Mr. Hamrock. Our emergency plan is, in fact, a written 
plan. It's drilled and it's shared with all of our 
stakeholders. We actually we work with fire departments on 
emergency response drills. We work with emergency responders. 
We built a training center here in Massachusetts where we do 
that kind of training and drilling. Very committed to that and 
recognize there are things in this tragedy that we need to 
learn from that didn't quite meet the standard.
    Ms. Tsongas. So clearly need some work.
    Mr. Roberti, I have a question for you. As part of your 
regulatory oversight, do you require pipeline companies to have 
a disaster response plan in place that you can review and 
determine whether it's adequate or not?
    Mr. Roberti. So under Federal regulations, for any 
incident, including a pressure alarm going off, a leak, a fire, 
or a call, an emergency call, companies have to respond 
promptly and effectively. That's in the regulations.
    Ms. Tsongas. And how do you describe promptly? How is that 
determined?
    Mr. Roberti. Well, I can tell you it's not three hours and 
20 minutes to shut off the regulator stations. It has to be--as 
Mr. Kuprewicz said, that each pipeline system is different. In 
order to physically go out and shut off valves, it will require 
different logistical actions.
    There is no set timeframe, but typically 30 minutes is a 
typical response time for an operator to respond to a call for 
a leak or to respond to a situation like this.
    Ms. Tsongas. And that's because there are people in place 
who've been designated to take those actions?
    Mr. Roberti. Personnel and resources have to be readily 
deployable to respond to an incident like this.
    Ms. Tsongas. So given the fact that this took so much 
longer, what would you say about that?
    Mr. Roberti. Well, I don't want to prejudge. This is--
again, I said that the jurisdiction to review compliance is 
within--the compliance with Federal and state regulations is 
with the State of Massachusetts. That investigation has to 
complete.
    We fully expect the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Utilities, when it completes its investigation, to make 
determinations about the company's compliance with existing 
Federal regulations and state regulations, to the extent 
Massachusetts has regulations that exceed the minimum.
    Ms. Tsongas. All right. Well, thank you so much because I 
know we've dealt in Washington with other disasters in which it 
was clear there were no disaster response plans in place and we 
watched these disasters unfold, as we did here, in a way that 
caused much more damage than ever should have been the case and 
so as lawmakers, we need to look at whether or not we need to 
require by law something more particular that reassures the 
public that the company is being held to the highest of 
standards.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    Congressman Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Yes, I'd like to talk to you, Secretary 
Beaton.
    How would you describe the current state of our gas 
pipeline infrastructure in Massachusetts, Mr. Secretary?
    Mr. Beaton. I think given the nature and the history of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the fact is we have one of the 
oldest networks of natural gas distribution in the nation. I 
think we see that in the Northeast in particular and our 
industrialized, our early industrialized parts of the country, 
but we do have a plan in place, called our GCEP Plan, that is a 
plan submitted by the public utilities, of the replacement of 
that older pipeline to be modernized by more modern 
infrastructure.
    Mr. Moulton. And how long will that plan take to implement?
    Mr. Beaton. Well, when they were originally filed, the 
companies ranged between 20 and 25 years with one exception of 
11, but for the most part, I think we're in year five. They 
were 20-year plans.
    Mr. Moulton. So 20-year plans. So in the interim, we need 
to make sure that another tragedy like this doesn't occur, and 
it seems to me that part of the way we do that is through 
inspections and your office is responsible for inspections of 
our gas pipeline system, is that correct, Mr. Secretary?
    Mr. Beaton. Yes.
    Mr. Moulton. And do you take responsibility for the safety 
of our pipeline systems since you are in charge of inspections?
    Mr. Beaton. Yes.
    Mr. Moulton. Do you believe that the current inspection and 
regulatory system in the state is adequate?
    Mr. Beaton. I believe it serves the function. I believe it 
serves its intended function is what I meant to say. Are there 
improvements that we could make to it? Certainly, and I think 
that is the reason for us calling on an independent evaluator.
    Mr. Moulton. OK. So, Mr. Secretary, could you just--I'm not 
sure what serves as function means exactly.
    Do you think the system is adequate, the current system, 
the current inspection system?
    Mr. Beaton. To accomplish what it is intended to 
accomplish, yes. Other opportunities----
    Mr. Moulton. And what is it--Mr. Secretary, what is it 
intended to accomplish?
    Mr. Beaton. To oversee compliance and enforcement of 
Federal and state standards.
    Mr. Moulton. What about the safety of the citizens of the 
Commonwealth, isn't that fundamentally what it's supposed to 
accomplish?
    Mr. Beaton. If that is the sole tool that is going to solve 
all the answers to accomplish that, then yes, but I think by 
inspection alone, we are not going to eliminate all risk 
associated with natural gas.
    Mr. Moulton. OK. I understand you can't eliminate all risk, 
but you said you do take responsibility for the safety of the 
citizens of the Commonwealth?
    Mr. Beaton. I believe I was asked a different question, but 
I think it is our role to put policies, procedures, and 
enforcement and compliance in place that protects the 
Commonwealth citizens, yes.
    Mr. Moulton. OK. So there are 21,000 miles of pipeline 
currently in Massachusetts. Can you say with confidence that we 
are safe from another accident like this occurring in the 
future, at least before the 20-year timeline for the 
replacement of these pipelines?
    Mr. Beaton. Is the definition of safe a guarantee that 
something would never ever happen again?
    Mr. Moulton. You can answer that as you like. I'm just 
asking, do you have confidence that an explosion like this will 
not occur again?
    Mr. Beaton. I think we're going to do everything in our 
power to make sure and I think we've taken great action. I 
don't think anyone sitting at this table could guarantee 
nothing could happen. There are too many scenarios that I think 
makes that guarantee an impossibility.
    Mr. Moulton. OK. Well, let's just talk about the inspectors 
for a second. According to the Boston Globe just prior to the 
explosions, Federal pipeline regulators audited the state's 
utility commission and raised concerns about attrition among 
the agency's inspectors. Data from the state comptroller show 
eight DPU inspectors have retired in the past 3 years, 
including four since March. Six engineers were certified to 
conduct pipeline inspections at the time of the most recent 
Federal audit but one was out on medical leave, another was 
working on desk-bound duties due to medical issues, and two 
were working as supervisors.
    So at the time the state had just two engineers doing field 
inspections of pipeline work. Do you think that is adequate?
    Mr. Beaton. No.
    Mr. Moulton. Just to put this in perspective for folks, 
there are 21,000 miles of pipeline in Massachusetts. That means 
that with two inspectors in the field, each is responsible for 
10,500 miles of pipeline.
    If you had a pipeline going from here to San Francisco and 
from San Francisco to Houston and then from Houston back here, 
that wouldn't be 10,500 miles. In fact, you could then go all 
the way to San Francisco again and that wouldn't be 10,500 
miles. That's the responsibility of one inspector. That doesn't 
seem even close to adequate.
    Mr. Beaton. Well, could I bring some clarification to that?
    Mr. Moulton. Yes, Mr. Secretary, please.
    Mr. Beaton. Yes, thank you. So those numbers aren't 
entirely accurate. Currently, we have six certified inspectors, 
two professional engineers on the pathway for inspection, three 
new hires, two additional postings, and a divisional inspector.
    You pointed out that there is high turnover. This is a 
national challenge that every state faces, especially in a good 
economy, when higher-paying private sector jobs, you can go in, 
get the training with the state and through the Federal 
Government and then be ripe for purchase in the private sector, 
and it is a challenge all of our states face.
    I will say in 2013, we had eight inspectors. It reached a 
peak of 12.5. In 2017, we had 10. In 2013, 716 inspections were 
completed. In 2017, 1,177 inspections were performed. There has 
been a trajectory of trending in the right direction of both 
the number of inspections. We did hit one of those cycles and 
one of those dips where we had a large transition out of 
inspectors at that moment in time when the incident occurred.
    We have since taken the action to post new positions and 
will be at an all-time high of 14 inspectors once all the hires 
are made.
    Mr. Moulton. OK. Well, I hope we get the 14 but just to put 
it in perspective for folks again, through all the numbers you 
went through, it seems to me that in the past years, the 
highest you ever reached is 12. OK. Again, with 21,000 miles of 
pipeline in Massachusetts, that's like saying that each one of 
those inspectors is responsible for a pipeline that goes from 
here to Dallas. That doesn't strike me as adequate, Mr. 
Secretary.
    I have one more question. I'm over my time. At a time when 
the DPU had only two inspectors in the field, hundreds of 
locked-out National Grid workers offered to assist in the 
recovery effort. However, it wasn't until a month later that 
these workers were actually deployed. Why did it take so long 
for this to happen?
    Mr. Beaton. There were a number of complexities there 
associated with it. We don't have the unilateral jurisdiction 
and authority to mandate that that happen. The Governor 
convened multiple meetings between the parties to try to 
negotiate and come to terms on this.
    We also worked very closely with all parties to try to get 
the workers to be able to work as quickly as possible. There 
were many conversations and there was actually an effort by 
NiSource to put out a notice that any of the employees would be 
welcome. They would have to come through another contractor, 
given the nature of the contract dispute between the Union and 
National Grid.
    There was an open door. We were trying to--there were some 
workers that were able to work on the site but the expertise of 
those workers was the work that was in the ground, not the 
house-ready work that has been the challenge that we have 
talked about and that work was way ahead of schedule, 43.3 
miles and over 5,000, I think it was 5,086 service lines were 
placed in 29 days.
    So there was a short window of time where the expertise of 
those workers would have been able to fit into the puzzle of 
this extremely complicated restoration, but we did make every 
effort and led by the Governor actually initiating 
conversations and mediation talks to try to get the parties to 
sit down and negotiate and try to accelerate the opportunity to 
get those workers working as quickly as possible.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. But the bottom line 
is it took a month for them to come online, and the bottom line 
right now is that we have enough inspectors for each one to be 
responsible for a pipeline from here to Dallas and your goal is 
to add just two more. I think we need to significantly increase 
that goal.
    Thank you.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    So this panel has made it very clear that there are huge 
deficiencies in the regulatory system in our country, that 
there is a huge regulatory black hole that has been created 
where everyone can point a finger in another direction in order 
to avoid the responsibility of actually having put the real 
safety protections in place to guarantee that accidents like 
this don't happen.
    That's why we're having this hearing, to make sure it does 
not happen again.
    Mr. Hamrock, Mr. Bryant, at every step of the process, 
there was a chance for NiSource and Columbia to avoid this 
disaster. You could have had the correct maps of your system 
but you did not. You could have made sure the Meters and 
Regulations Group, the brains of the pipeline system, reviewed 
all work plans but you did not. You could have had a 
professional engineer sign off on plans but you did not. You 
could have had automatic shutoff relief devices installed to 
prevent over-pressurization but you did not. You could have had 
someone onsite at the regulator station to monitor operations 
but you did not.
    Instead of choosing safety, you chose savings. Instead of 
choosing action, you chose to cut corners, and instead of 
choosing----
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. Instead of choosing to do things the right 
way, you chose the easy way every time and the result was 
disaster, but because of the decisions that you made to cut 
corners, to never prioritize safety, you created a situation 
where there were ticking time bombs underneath every street and 
inside of every house and business.
    The deeper we dig into your company, the more frightening 
this has become. Your recklessness took a wrecking ball to the 
lives of residents in these communities.
    Columbia Gas has been making up its response to this 
disaster as it goes along. Its deadlines----
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. Its deadlines in November are now deadlines 
for December, but as Christmas is arriving, there are families 
all over Merrimack Valley who still doubt that they will be 
back in their homes. There are businesses who are still 
doubting that they will be open and that's a legacy of your 
negligent activities in the days and weeks and months and years 
leading up to that disaster and now you're not even close to 
making it up to the people in Merrimack Valley, not even close.
    We're not going away. We're going to be here with the 
people of Merrimack Valley to make sure that your company is 
made accountable, to make sure that there is a reckoning which 
NiSource and Columbia Gas has to suffer as a consequence of 
your negligence, of your taking the lowest common denominator 
as your standard for safety.
    The people in this room, they paid the price for that 
lowest common denominator. Their families paid the price, and 
we're going to make sure that this system is overhauled so that 
a real safety system is put in place, not just for Merrimack 
Valley but for the whole country. We owe it to the people of 
this country.
    As the natural gas industry says it wants to dramatically 
expand natural gas into every city, every town, every state in 
the United States, that's their goal, but we're going to make 
sure that safety is Issue Number 1, that this lesson is not 
lost, that all of the answers which we have been receiving, 
which basically have been saying they don't know all of the 
details, that they're still learning, that they're still 
responding to the NTSB, that's all we really need to know about 
how little they had planned for this disaster.
    So you might be making it up as you're going along, but for 
the people of Merrimack Valley, their lives have been affected 
by that lack of attention, lack of concern, lack of safety.
    So this is the first hearing but it's not the last. This is 
the beginning of accountability, the beginning of a process to 
ensure that our promise to the American people and on behalf of 
the people in Merrimack Valley that this never happens again.
    So this completes the first panel and we will be submitting 
questions in writing to you and we would also expect prompt 
answers to those questions in detail to the Committee.
    So this hearing is concluded and we now invite the second 
panel up to begin their testimony.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. Now I would like to welcome our next panel 
made up of leaders from the communities who have been hurt by 
this disaster.
    First, we have Lawrence Mayor Dan Rivera. Mayor Rivera has 
in many ways been the face of this issue, speaking for his 
constituents. He's been doing an outstanding job in ensuring 
that those voices are heard, and we thank him for his work.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. Also, he's joined by North Andover Town 
Manager Andrew Maylor and Andover Town Manager Andrew Flanagan, 
who have been representing their communities to make sure that 
their concerns are heard on a daily basis, and I am submitting 
joint testimony on behalf of both of the Town Managers into the 
record and I thank them for providing their stories to the 
Committee.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    Joint Statement of Andrew W. Maylor, North Andover Town Manager 
              and Andrew P. Flanagan, Andover Town Manager
    Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished Members of 
the Committee:
The Merrimack Valley Gas Disaster
    On Thursday, September 13, 2018, at approximately 4:00 p.m. the 
over-pressurization of the low pressure gas lines in a 5 square mile 
radius in the Merrimack Valley area of northeastern Massachusetts 
resulted in more than 130 fires, close to two dozen injuries and at 
least one fatality. More than 10,000 households and 685 businesses lost 
gas service and as a result did not have access to heat and hot water 
and other gas appliances. For more than three hours after the over-
pressurization residents in the impacted area could smell gas outside 
of their homes. It is estimated that this disaster impacted between 
40,000 and 50,000 residents in the towns North Andover, Andover and the 
City of Lawrence making it the largest disaster of its type in U.S. 
history. By Friday, September 14, 2018, the Governor of Massachusetts 
had declared a state of emergency.
    Note: Columbia Gas of Massachusetts, a NiSource company, is the gas 
utility that provides gas service to the impacted area.
The Four Phases of the Disaster
1. Response
    Less than an hour after the first 911 call the executives in the 
three impacted communities made their first major decision when they 
recommended that all residents with gas service evacuate to emergency 
shelters or to the homes of friends or relatives outside of the 
impacted area. Within ninety minutes we needed to make a second major 
decision-to authorize that electric service be shut off to a 
significant portion of each community placing already scared and 
confused residents into darkness. The public safety response, fire, 
police and emergency medical services (EMS), was extraordinary and no 
doubt saved lives, reduced injury and substantially mitigated the 
impact that this disaster could have had on the region. As stated in 
the NTSB Preliminary Report (PLD18MR003) their investigation is ongoing 
and one of the factors that will require additional inquiry is ``the 
coordination between the emergency responders and Columbia Gas''. Just 
after 6:00 p.m. on the night of the disaster and only moments following 
the Incident Command Center (ICC) going operational, there was 
agreement that each of the impacted gas meters needed to be shut off to 
reduce the risk of future explosions and fires. By 7:00 p.m. those 
working in the (ICC) including the Governor, chief executives of the 
impacted communities, fire chiefs, the fire marshal, and the director 
of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), requested from 
Columbia Gas officials the maps of the impacted area and a definitive 
list of the impacted households and businesses. Columbia Gas was unable 
to produce such information for hours and when they did, the 
information was not completely accurate. As a result, the process to 
shut off all impacted meters began at approximately 2:00 a.m. Friday 
morning. Ten hours after the first 9-1-1 call. This, combined with the 
delay to fully depressurize the low pressure gas mains, hindered the 
work of the public safety personnel to fully eliminate the risk to the 
region. These were the first of many milestones that Columbia Gas would 
not meet during the response phase. Columbia Gas struggled coordinating 
their resources to complete the shutoff process and it became evident 
by the early afternoon on Friday September 14. 2018, that they were not 
up to the task. As a result Governor Baker declared a state of 
emergency and handed the responsibility of shutting gas service off to 
the remaining residents to Eversource. It should be noted that weeks 
into the recovery phase of the disaster the communities still did not 
have an accurate list of the properties impacted.
2. Recovery
    A disaster of this magnitude is all consuming. Dozens of decisions 
need to be made daily and the command structure nature of a disaster 
response reduces the time available to develop consensus between 
professional staff and elected officials and creates challenges in 
finding ways to delegate the responsibilities and still meet deadlines. 
An additional complication in the decision making process for a 
regional disaster is representing the interests of your community while 
trying to understand the specific issues facing the other communities 
and trying to strike a balance that improves success for the entire 
recovery effort. Recognizing these challenges and the shortcomings 
during the gas shutoff effort, on September 21, 2018 Columbia Gas, with 
the support and encouragement of Governor's office, hired retired Navy 
Captain Joe Albanese as the Chief Recover Officer (CRO). Columbia Gas 
has done an effective job of understanding the different needs of those 
impacted and has worked well to avoid a one size fits all approach to 
the recovery effort.
Gas Main and Gas Service Replacement
    In order to restore service all 45 miles of gas main in the 
impacted area had to be replaced as did the service mains and meters to 
all homes. Columbia Gas under the direction of the CRO was well 
positioned to complete this work. More than half a dozen large gas main 
replacement contractors supplied the crews, at times more than 200 such 
crews, and the gas main replacement was completed 3 weeks ahead of 
schedule on October 30, 2018. Interestingly, there were more than 1,000 
contractors from at least 7 states at the peak of the construction 
phase. The impact on the roads, sidewalks and other infrastructure in 
the impacted neighborhoods as a result of this massive utility project 
will not fully be known for years. Miles of streets which have been 
repaved in the past 5 years now have been damaged and there has been a 
similar impact on hundreds of linear feet of sidewalks, countless 
street trees and thousands of lawns and driveways. The communities have 
requested that Columbia Gas replace, not just spot repair, all public 
assets that were damaged. We have not yet received confirmation from 
Columbia Gas if they will do so. As it relates to the private property 
impact we would expect that Columbia Gas would return all impacted 
properties to their pre-disaster condition.
Gas Device Replacement/Repair
    In the early stages of the recovery phase all gas devices including 
stoves, dryers, water heaters, boilers and generators were determined 
to be unsafe and therefore needed to be replaced, not just repaired, 
prior to service restoration. One of the most important decisions that 
was made during the recovery phase was determining the time-frame for 
completing the work to safely restore gas service and allow people to 
return to their normal way of life. Based on all of the information 
available the agreed upon ``re-light'' date was set at November 19, 
2018. The restoration process turned out to be far more challenging 
than expected. Arguably the most difficult decision of the entire 
disaster was made on October 24, 2018, when, based on the information 
available, the town managers and mayor agreed to change course and 
allow, if possible, temporary repairs to heating systems previously 
determined to be unsafe and extend the deadline for completion from 
November 19th to December 16, 2018. As of November 19, 2018, sixty-
seven days after the event and the original date for having all 
impacted residents and businesses ``re-lit'', 67 percent of residents 
and 81 percent of businesses have been ``re-lit''. With the change in 
strategy from ``repair when you can and replace later'' it is expected 
that Columbia Gas will have to return in spring of 2019 and embark on a 
5 month process to replace the equipment that has been temporarily 
repaired.
    With the average nighttime temperatures ranging from 20 to 45 
degrees and dropping on a daily basis alternative housing and temporary 
heat have been significant priorities. There are currently more than 
1,700 families in hotels, travel trailers, shelters and apartments all 
secured for the purpose of providing alternative housing. When the 
restoration process began decisions needed to be made regarding 
prioritizing certain properties to reduce the risk to health or safety. 
These decisions had the burden of knowing those that wouldn't be 
restored quickly may remain impacted for weeks or months. It is 
difficult to get people to leave their homes even when faced with the 
prospect of no heat, cold showers, and the inability to cook a hot 
meal, and/or dry their clothes. The decision to add travel trailers 
(RVs) was made in response to that concern. Locating the travel 
trailers presented its own challenges and therefore, another set of 
decisions was required. Where should the trailers be located given 
there would be loud generators and bright lights? How many trailers on 
each site? Should laundry facilities be included?
    Decisions regarding the most effective way to communicate with 
residents and determining who the audience is can present real 
challenges. More than 1,500 contracted employees from around the 
country are working in the three communities. There are cultural, 
societal and language differences between the employees and residents. 
Social media has taken on a more prominent role than what the 
communities experienced pre-disaster. We had to decide early on to 
focus increased resources in this space and push the gas company to do 
the same to help manage the misinformation that was running rampart 
early on. It took Columbia Gas weeks to engage in the appropriate 
communication channels and this ultimately led to confusion and 
mistrust which still exists through today.
    A strength of the recovery process has been all three communities 
working cooperatively. This has driven decisions which included holding 
joint, rather than separate, press events, entering in joint contracts 
for engineering services, developing inter-municipal agreements to help 
fill hundreds of police and fire details on a daily basis, and having 
similar agreements for hiring plumbing inspectors from other 
communities.
    During the past seven weeks we have had to make hundreds of 
decisions each of which directly impact one or more residents or 
business owners. Many of these decisions needed to be revisited or 
revised. To say that the environment for making decisions in a disaster 
such as this is dynamic would be an understatement. The primary lesson 
learned has been that the residents, business owners, and other 
stakeholders in the communities are looking for someone to trust, not 
someone to always be right. This lesson has helped instill confidence 
in our ability to make decisions even when insufficient information or 
limited time have made the decision making process less than ideal.
    We have no doubt that for many of the residents and businesses that 
remain impacted the frustration must be mounting by the day. It is 
frustrating for me as well. In many ways the ``Rapid Relight Plan'' 
which was instituted on October 24, 2018, raises new questions that 
will need to be answered. When exactly will my heating unit be 
replaced, will I have the option to move my gas service, who do I call 
during the winter if my now repaired heating unit breaks, how does the 
repair effect the warranty on my boiler, when will my driveway or lawn 
be repaired?
Claims
    The claims process has been challenging for most residents and 
business owners. Claims centers were opened in each of the three 
communities within a week of the disaster and those claims centers 
remain open today. Impacted residents can also file claims via 
telephone. Most claimants have had multiple claims representatives 
throughout the reimbursement process as the third party company 
managing the claims process ramped up the demand. To date more than 
23,000 claims have been filed, 9,940 of those claims remain active and 
more than $61 million in claims have been paid.
    All three towns have been advocating on behalf of the residents and 
businesses impacted since this disaster occurred and will continue to 
do so. To expedite meeting the date established in the original plan we 
made decisions based on verbal commitments from Columbia Gas. Given 
what has transpired to date and the ongoing nature of the recovery 
process, one which extends well into next year, verbal commitments will 
no longer be acceptable. The Town of North Andover expects at a minimum 
the following from Columbia Gas:

  1.  That a written agreement be drafted which very specifically 
        identifies what each resident/business can expect from Columbia 
        Gas and when. That agreement (contract) should be provided to 
        each customer impacted.

  2.  That Columbia Gas continue to provide the necessary resources to 
        respond to service questions and claims. These resources must 
        remain local.

  3.  That Columbia Gas commit to the curb-to-curb replacement of ALL 
        roads impacted by the gas main replacement work associated with 
        this disaster. Columbia should also commit to the repair or 
        replacement of all other impacted public assets such as 
        sidewalks and street trees.
3. Mitigation
    As you know the NTSB issued its Preliminary Report on October 11, 
2018 (PLD18MR003). In that report they were clear about the cause of 
this disaster ``Columbia Gas developed and approved the work package 
executed on the day of the accident. The work package did not account 
for the location of the sensing lines or require their relocation to 
ensure the regulators were sensing actual system pressure. The work was 
performed in accordance with steps laid out in the work package. In 
light of this accident, Columbia Gas implemented a safety stand-down 
for all employees who perform work related to low-pressure natural gas 
systems for NiSource subsidiaries.'' (Emphasis added)
    In a conversation we had with one of the lead NTSB investigators 
around the time the report was issued, it was confirmed to me that 
Columbia Gas was responsible and the fact that the report was 
``Preliminary'' would not change that but instead allow them to provide 
more details about what took place before and after the incident. This 
is supported by the last sentence in the report, ``The NTSB's 
investigation into this accident is ongoing. Future investigative 
issues include the coordination between the emergency responders and 
Columbia Gas; an analysis of the engineering work package preparation 
and execution, including the design documentation; and a review of 
construction packages for constructability and safety.'' Since the time 
the preliminary NTSB report was issued the State DPU issued a 
moratorium to Columbia Gas for all non-emergency gas work. It should be 
noted that a current Department of Public Utilities order includes a 
penalty of up to $1,000,000 per impacted property if Columbia Gas fails 
to meet their obligations to complete work required.
    The NTSB has just recently (11/14/2018) issued a Safety 
Recommendation Report (PSR1802) related to the disaster which provides 
guidance to mitigate the likelihood of a similar disasters in the 
future. That report recommends the following actions:

        To the Commonwealth of Massachusetts:

        Eliminate the professional engineer licensure exemption for 
        public utility work and require a professional engineer's seal 
        on public utility engineering drawings. (P-18-005)

        To NiSource, Inc.:

        Revise the engineering plan and constructability review process 
        across all of your subsidiaries to ensure that all applicable 
        departments review construction documents for accuracy, 
        completeness, and correctness, and that the documents or plans 
        be sealed by a professional engineer prior to commencing work. 
        (P-18-006) (Urgent)

        Review and ensure that all records and documentation of your 
        natural gas systems are traceable, reliable, and complete. (P-
        18-007) (Urgent)

        Apply management of change process to all changes to adequately 
        identify system threats that could result in a common mode 
        failure. (P-18-008) (Urgent)

        Develop and implement control procedures during modifications 
        to gas mains to mitigate the risks identified during management 
        of change operations. Gas main pressures should be continually 
        monitored during these modifications and assets should be 
        placed at critical locations to immediately shut down the 
        system if abnormal operations are detected. (P-18-009) (Urgent)
4. Preparedness
    Per the NTSB Preliminary Report Preliminary Report issued on 
October 11, 2018 (PLD18MR003) ``minutes before the fires and explosions 
occurred, the Columbia Gas monitoring center in Columbus, Ohio, 
received two high-pressure alarms for the South Lawrence gas pressure 
system: one at 4:04 p.m. and the other at 4:05 p.m. The monitoring 
center had no control capability to close or open valves; its only 
capability was to monitor pressures on the distribution system and 
advise field technicians accordingly. Following company protocol, at 
4:06 p.m., the Columbia Gas controller reported the high-pressure event 
to the Meters and Regulations group in Lawrence. The company protocol 
does not appear to include contacting local or regional Public Safety 
Answering Points (PSAPs or dispatch) when such an event occurs. The 
first resident called 9-1-1 at 4:11 p.m. Fire, police and emergency 
medical services (EMS) began to respond in all three communities within 
five minutes of the over-pressurization as a result of an overwhelming 
number of resident calls for service. However, there was no direct 
communication to each community by the company regarding the nature of 
the problem. Therefore, for the next one to two hours confusion and 
fear spread throughout the region. ``Columbia Gas shut down the 
regulator at issue by about 4:30 p.m. The critical valves of the 
involved natural gas distribution system were closed by 7:24 p.m.''. 
The municipal chief executives were told that the complete 
depressurization of the impacted gas mains was not completed until 
several hours after that. It is possible that more local control of the 
system and a more robust protocol in response to an event could result 
in less overall damage. Specific questions regarding the preparedness 
issues are:

   Would more local control of the system have allowed the 
        ``regulator at issue'' to shut down this regulator sooner? If 
        yes, would this have reduced the extent of the damage?

   Would more local control of the system have allowed ``the 
        critical valves of the involved natural gas distribution 
        system'' to be closed before 7:24 p.m.? If yes, would this have 
        reduced the extent of the damage?

    Finally, the communication protocol must reflect the need to get 
public safety agencies involved as quickly as possible and that gas 
mains and therefore gas main failures do not recognize community 
borders. PSAPs in all impacted jurisdictions must be contacted 
immediately after an event occurs.
Conclusion
    The actions of Columbia Gas which resulted in the gas explosions 
and fires in the Greater Lawrence area have had a profound and 
continuing impact on the region's residents and business owners. The 
exact impact both personal and economic will not be known for months or 
years to come. What is most concerning is the unforeseen costs such as 
the long term impact on the economic viability of many of the small 
businesses in the region, the emotional impact on vulnerable 
populations from being without heat and hot water, and/or the effect 
the disaster has had on families displaced and remaining in hotels 
rooms or travel trailers.
    In a disaster such as this identifying areas of deficiency is not 
only acceptable, but quite frankly not difficult. That being said, the 
senior leadership of Columbia Gas has partnered with the three 
communities to find solutions to the most significant and impactful 
problems. Also, the work of the Chief Recovery Officer Joe Albanese and 
his team with the support of Governor Baker, the Lieutenant Governor 
and several members of their senior staff, to continue to find creative 
ways to solve problems and to challenge those on the project that have 
underperformed is important to recognize. Without this leadership we 
would not have made the progress we have made to date.
    Finally, the residents and the business owners of the impacted area 
woke up on September 13, 2018, never imagining how dramatically their 
lives would change as a result of this disaster. They have endured loss 
of life, property, income, and a degradation of their quality of life. 
However, they have demonstrated great resilience, strength and courage 
during this difficult time and they deserve our thanks and a commitment 
that we will take steps to ensure their lives return to normal and that 
a similar disaster does not occur anywhere in the United States again.
            Regards,

Andrew W. Maylor
Town Manager
North Andover, Massachusetts
Andrew P. Flanagan
Town Manager
Andover, Massachusetts

    Senator Markey. We thank you all for being here and we will 
begin with you, Mr. Mayor, and then I will introduce the other 
witnesses as their testimony is called for.
    So, again, we welcome you, Mr. Mayor, and we thank you for 
everything that you've done for your community and whenever you 
are ready, please begin your testimony, and if you could move 
that microphone in just a little bit.
    Mayor Rivera. How's that?
    Senator Markey. If you maybe lift it up a little bit.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. DAN RIVERA, 
                    MAYOR, CITY OF LAWRENCE

    Mayor Rivera. Good morning, Senators, invited guests, and 
fellow affected citizens.
    I want to begin by thanking Senator Markey for advocating 
on behalf of our communities to bring this hearing to Lawrence, 
an honorary Lawrence kid. It allows all those affected to be 
present and included throughout the investigation process.
    The gas fires and explosions of September 13 and the days 
that followed were both a human tragedy and a human disaster. 
That tragedy continues despite the best efforts of Columbia Gas 
for the recovery effort.
    I never thought that I would have to ask people in my 
community and those in surrounding communities to evacuate the 
city fearing for their lives, asking them to abandon their 
homes, their businesses, and their neighborhoods because no one 
knew if it was safe for them to be there.
    Residents everywhere in the area evacuated out of sheer 
panic. We had to cut the electrical power to every domicile and 
business in South Lawrence, Andover, North Andover in the 
middle of the night.
    What followed the devastation of the fires and explosions 
was loss of life, grave unbearable injury to people, priceless 
loss of property and the regional economy, but worst of all, we 
lost the underlying security that the very thing most of us 
relied on to keep ourselves and our families warm in the 
coldest of New England winters could destroy our homes, our 
neighborhoods, our towns, and our very peace.
    We expected that the gas services that we pay good money 
for every month, that many families sacrifice to make those 
monthly payments, and that business owners base the core of 
their businesses on, would not put us in grave danger. However, 
that is exactly what happened.
    And during the heart of the disaster, I said this before, 
Columbia Gas was the least informed and the last to act. It is 
important to know that while we were trying to save lives and 
make heads and tails of the tragedy and disaster of those days, 
Columbia Gas was failing to manage the disaster in the same way 
they had failed to maintain their gas lines.
    I beat most of the upper echelon leadership to the scene 
that night after driving in Thursday night traffic from Boston. 
Those who have done that understand what I'm talking about.
    It was clear that the Columbia Gas engineers and Columbia 
Gas of Massachusetts top leadership were afraid and lacked a 
clear path to deal with the disaster. They owned the gas in the 
pipe, they owned the customer relationships, yet they failed to 
own this disaster.
    They failed so much so that Governor Baker had to call for 
a state of emergency and put a different utility company in 
charge and we lost critical hours that first weekend getting 
people back in their homes because Columbia Gas refused to call 
for mutual aid, motivated by what appeared to many of us to be 
an unwillingness to bear the costs of that mutual aid.
    One person was dead, many were injured, and the core of 
three communities had been shaken, and it appeared to many of 
us that Columbia Gas didn't have an actual plan for dealing 
with the disaster of this magnitude, as if it had never crossed 
their mind that this could occur.
    And earlier today, they said they did have one. I would 
love to see that. I'd love for them to put that up, the plan 
that was in place prior to this event.
    These plans should be mandated across utilities, not just 
natural gas, for there to be a system failure and customer 
evacuation plan created and refreshed every two years. Ordinary 
people have plans to get out of their own homes in case of a 
fire. It's the least the utility could do to have a basic plan 
in place if they set your city on fire.
    It's cold outside today and there's snow on the ground. 
People in our communities are still without heat and hot water. 
Some people are still in hotel rooms and RVs and some are still 
cooking on hot plates and most of the people in the affected 
areas, regardless if they were living before Thanksgiving or 
not, let's just say they didn't have the Thanksgiving they 
wanted to due to this disaster.
    The recovery's a material effort, fixing things in the 
system so that life can happen. I mean, in that sense, the 
recovery's an awful experience only made better every day for 
some who get their gas turned back on.
    I want to say thanks to Governor Baker because, because of 
him, we have Chief Recovery Officer Joe Albanese leading the 
recovery effort, a 28-year veteran and former captain in the 
United States Navy Civil Engineer Corps, the Seabees. We're 
honored to have Joe leading our restoration efforts. He enjoys 
our full support and appreciation for walking away from his own 
business to work on this recovery.
    Every day, he has done all he can to assist us to get 
Columbia Gas to live up to the responsibilities and get the 
work done.
    As I have lived it, the recovery has really been about four 
things: fixing the pipe in the street and to the house to get 
gas to the house, fixing the pipe and appliances in the house 
so they can turn the gas on, making people whole as customers 
of Columbia Gas for their physical loss, for mental anguish, 
and terrifying experiences that they had to endure and that 
means financially, and, four, supporting those people 
throughout this time as they waited for the first three things 
to be completed.
    Columbia Gas did accomplish the work of fixing the pipe in 
the street ahead of schedule and without further disaster. For 
this, we are thankful.
    However, the rest of the work has been miserable. Any time 
the recovery has had to deal with the plight and need of 
people, Columbia Gas has initially failed, only getting it 
right days and sometimes weeks after local and state officials 
have raised the pressure on them so much so that they had to 
relent.
    The plight of people and their suffering has been prolonged 
because of a broken claims process, a broken repair process, 
and the total lack of understanding on how to communicate with 
customers.
    Long before we had 250 houses late in the day with gas, we 
had weeks of only 40 homes a day lit. For this, not only does 
Columbia Gas but Gilbane Recovery Services bear responsibility 
and as such should be investigated. I want to repeat that. 
Gilbane Recovery Services also bears responsibilities for 
missing the initial date and should be investigated.
    Before we had a hundred appliances delivered to homes on a 
day, we had days with none, and for almost a week, securing 
temporary housing was not only daunting but nearly impossible. 
Customers were lied to about availability of hotels and RVs and 
consistently left in the dark on their claims process. All the 
while, all the while hotel rooms and RVs sat empty. Having to 
endure not one, not two, but as many as five assessments of 
their homes and appliances before one wrench was turned to fix 
their boilers or furnaces was a common experience of the 
affected communities.
    Many times people languished without answers to important 
questions about when they should stay home from work to 
accommodate the Columbia Gas and the Gilbane contractors and 
when they could expect answers regarding their claims. All the 
while, people were sleeping in cold beds and cooking on hot 
plates and taking cold showers. Other families huddled in RVs 
and far-away hotel rooms waiting for their homes to be fixed.
    I'm not sure what would have happened to our communities if 
not for the firefighters of Lawrence, Andover, North Andover 
Fire Departments, and the over a thousand firefighters that 
came in support of them, including the State Fire Marshal's 
Office.
    The effect of this disaster was controlled only by the 
professional posture and response of the Lawrence, Andover, and 
North Andover Police Departments and the over 1,100 police 
officers from across the Commonwealth and the State Police, all 
the municipal employees that put down their city and town 
bureaucracies and became an army of first responders, aid and 
humanitarian workers.
    [Applause.]
    Mayor Rivera. From the city councils and selectmen to the 
library directors, from the state representatives to the 
teachers and staff of our public schools, many of them affected 
themselves, the Governor and his staff and cabinet who 
seamlessly rolled up their sleeves and became an active 
informed part of these efforts, the state legislature and the 
Federal delegation, both of you have made us feel that our 
plight was the most important business before the Commonwealth.
    Town Managers Maylor and Flanagan and I, as well as the 
affected across communities, can never thank them all enough 
for their actions.
    I must say that I have never been more proud to be 
associated with this group of people in my life. They all 
showed the spirit of government and its power to do good.
    I want to be sure to say the rank and file of Columbia Gas 
workers and zone captains and the workers who fixed the pipe in 
the street all were shining spots in this ordeal. Zone captains 
became a symbol of the good Columbia Gas could do if it got its 
stuff together.
    The recovery and the personal and communal sense for every 
person affected is going to take some time, not measured in 
days or weeks. I'm not sure when we will remove from our 
memories the darkness, the fire, the cold nights, the cold 
showers, the evacuations, and the loss of such a young life.
    So in the end, we will need help from state and Federal 
officials and government to pave our roads, to fix our 
infrastructure, to pay for economic development, basic help for 
us to get off the mat after being knocked down by Columbia Gas, 
but what we all expect from you, what we ask of you is to do 
what is at the core of why we have governments and that is to 
protect us and to ensure this can't and won't happen again.
    In this one instance, in this one incident, Columbia Gas 
has shown they could not provide safely the service they 
promised everyone. This failure alone should cause that you 
take that privilege of running a gas company away from them and 
break that company apart.
    [Applause.]
    Mayor Rivera. I'm not sure how you do it, revoke their 
licenses, make them sell their business to someone else. It 
doesn't matter how you do it, but after they have met their 
financial obligations not only to the individuals and the 
businesses and to the municipalities, Columbia Gas should cease 
to exist. No second chances.
    Leonel Rondon's life was taken and multiple homes no longer 
exist and our livelihood and our peace has forever been 
altered, so should Columbia Gas no longer exist.
    A disbanded Columbia Gas that no longer exists will send a 
strong message and motivator to others to do better around 
safety. That is what justice for everyone affected by this 
disaster would look like.
    Thank you.
    [Applause.]
    [The prepared statement of Mayor Rivera follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Rivera, Mayor, City of Lawrence
    Good morning senators and invited guests and fellow affected 
citizens. The gas fires and explosions of September 13, 2018 and the 
days that followed was both a human tragedy and a human disaster. That 
tragedy continues despite the best efforts of Columbia Gas and the 
recovery effort. I never thought that I would have to ask people in my 
community and those in surrounding communities to evacuate the city, 
fearing for their lives. Asking them to abandon their homes, their 
businesses and their neighborhoods because no one knew if it was safe 
for them to be there; others evacuated out of sheer panic. We had to 
cut the power to every domicile and business in South Lawrence, Andover 
and North Andover in the middle of the night. What followed the 
devastations of the fires and explosions was loss of life, grave, 
unbearable injury to people, priceless loss to property and the 
regional economy, loss of business and jobs. But worst of all we lost 
the underlying security that the very thing most of us relied on to 
keep ourselves and our families warm in the coldest of New England 
winters could destroy our homes, our neighborhoods, our towns and city, 
our very peace. We expected that the gas services that we pay good 
money for every month, that many families sacrifice to make those 
monthly payments and that business owners based the core of their 
business and their livelihood on, would not put us in grave danger, but 
that is exactly what happened.
    During the heart of the disaster Columbia gas was the least 
informed and last to act. It is Important to know that while we were 
trying to save lives and make heads or tails of the tragedy and 
disaster of those days Columbia gas was failing to manage the disaster, 
in the same way that they had failed to maintain their gas lines. I 
beat most of the upper echelon leadership to the scene after driving in 
Thursday night traffic from Boston. It was clear that the Columbia Gas 
engineers and Columbia Gas Massachusetts top leadership were afraid and 
lacked a clear path to deal with the disaster. They owned the pipe, 
owned the gas in the pipe, they owned the customer relationships, yet 
they failed to own this disaster. So much so that Governor Baker had to 
call for a state of emergency and put a different utility company in 
charge. We lost critical hours that first weekend, getting people back 
in their homes because they refused to call for mutual aid motivated by 
what appeared to many to be an unwillingness to bear the cost of that 
mutual aid. One person is dead, many injured the core of three 
communities has been shaken. It appeared to many of us that Columbia 
Gas did not have an actual plan for dealing with a disaster of this 
magnitude; as if it never crossed their minds that this could occur. It 
should be mandated across utilities (not just natural gas) for there to 
be a system failure and customer evacuation plan created and refreshed 
every 2 years. People have plans to get out of their homes in case of a 
fire. Utilities to should have a basic plan if they set your city or 
town on fire.
    It is cold outside today and there is snow on the ground. People in 
our communities are still without heat and hot water. Some people are 
still in hotel rooms and RVs. Some are still cooking on hotplates. And 
most of the people in the affected area, regardless if they were lit 
before Thanksgiving or not, did not have the Thanksgiving they wanted 
to due to this disaster. The recovery is a material effort; fixing 
things and systems so that life can happen, in that sense the recovery 
is an awful experience only made better every day for some who get 
their gas turned back on.
    Thanks to Governor Baker we have Chief Recovery Officer, Joe 
Albanese, leading the recovery effort. A twenty-eight-year veteran and 
former Captain in the United States Navy Civil Engineer Corps. We are 
honored to have Joe leading our restoration efforts and he enjoys our 
full support and appreciation for walking away from his business to 
work on this recovery. Every day he has done all he could to get 
Columbia Gas to live up to their responsibility and get the work done. 
As I have lived it, the recovery has really been about 4 things: (1) 
Fixing the pipe in the Street and to the House to get gas to the house, 
(2) Fixing the pipe and appliances in the house to turn on the gas, (3) 
making people whole as customers of Columbia Gas for the physical loss 
but also for the mental anguish and terrifying experiences they had to 
endure and (4) Supporting people as they waited for 1, 2, and 3 to be 
complete.
    Columbia Gas did accomplish the work of fixing the pipe in the 
street ahead of schedule and without further disaster. For this we are 
thankful. However, the rest of the work has been miserable. Anytime the 
recovery has had to deal with the plight and need of people Columbia 
Gas has initially failed only getting it right days and sometimes weeks 
after local and state officials have raised the pressure so much that 
they had to relent. The plight of people and their suffering has been 
prolonged because of a broken claims process, a broken repair process 
and a total lack of understanding of how to communicate with customers. 
Long before we had 250 houses a day lit with gas, we had weeks of only 
40 homes lit per day. For this not only does Columbia Gas but Gilbane 
Recovery Services, bear responsibility and as such should be 
investigated. Before we had days of 100 appliances delivered we had 
days with none. For almost a week, securing temporary housing was not 
only daunting, but nearly impossible. Customers were lied to about 
availability of hotels and RVs and consistently left in the dark on 
their claims processes. All the while hotel rooms and RVs sat empty. 
Having to endure not 1, not 2 but as many as 5 assessments of their 
homes and appliances before one wrench was turned to fix one boiler. 
Many times people languished without answers to important questions 
about when should they stay home from work to accommodate Columbia Gas 
and GRS contractors, and when can they expect answer regarding their 
claims. All the while, people were sleeping in cold beds and cooking on 
hot plates and taking cold showers. Families huddled in RV's and far 
away hotel rooms waiting for their homes to be fixed.
    I am not sure what would have happened to our communities if not 
for the firefighters of the Lawrence, Andover, North Andover fire 
departments and the over 1,000 firefighters that came in support of 
them including the State Fire Marshal's office. The effect of this 
disaster was controlled only by the professional posture and response 
of the Lawrence, Andover, North Andover police departments and the over 
1,000 police officers from across the commonwealth and the State 
Police. All the municipal employees that put down their city and town 
bureaucracies and became an army of first responders, aid and 
humanitarian workers, from the city councilors and selectmen to the 
library director, from state representative to the teachers and staff 
at our public schools (many affected themselves). The Governor and his 
staff and cabinet, who seamlessly rolled up their sleeves and became an 
active, important part of these efforts, the State legislature and the 
Federal delegation both made us feel as if our plight was the most 
important business before the commonwealth. I have never been more 
proud to be associated with a group of people in my life. They all 
showed the spirit of government and its power to do good. I must say 
that the rank and file Columbia Gas workers and zone captains and the 
workers who fixed the pipe in the street all were a shining spots in 
this ordeal. Zone captains became a symbol of the good Columbia Gas 
could do if it got it stuff together.
    The recovery in the personal and communal sense for every person 
affected is going to take some time not measured in days or weeks. I am 
not sure when we will remove from our memories the darkness, the fire, 
the cold nights, the cold showers or the evacuations. So, in the end we 
will need help from state and Federal officials and government to pave 
our roads, to fix our infrastructure, to pay for economic development, 
basic help to get off the mat after being knock down by Columbia Gas.
    But what we all except from you, what we ask of you, is to do what 
is at the core of why we have governments, and that is to protect us 
and to insure this can't and won't happen again. In this one incident, 
Columbia Gas showed they could not provide the service they promised 
everyone safely. This failure alone should cause that you should take 
their privilege to run a gas company away. Break it apart revoke their 
license make them sell their business to someone else, it doesn't 
matter how, but like Leonel Rondon's life was taken, and multiple homes 
no longer exist, and our lives and livelihood has forever been altered, 
Columbia Gas as a company should no longer exist. That is what justice 
for everyone affected would look like.

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Mayor. Thank you for your 
great work.
    And next, we're going to hear from Tina Messina. Tina is a 
leader in the small business community in North Andover. We 
thank you for coming here and representing all of those 
businesses who want to have answers as to what happened and how 
soon they can go back to work.
    So we thank you and whenever you're ready, please begin.

       STATEMENT OF TINA MESSINA, OWNER, WINE CONNEXTION

    Ms. Messina. Sure. Thank you.
    Good afternoon. My name is Tina Messina, and I'd like to 
thank the Committee for this opportunity to discuss the impact 
on September 13 gas explosion has had on the business 
community.
    Senator Markey. Could you move that microphone just over in 
front of you just a little bit?
    Ms. Messina. Closer?
    Senator Markey. Yes.
    Ms. Messina. After the initial shock of the event, the 
community needed to understand the scope of the problem. 
Information on the details came slowly as we learned what 
happened and who was affected by this event.
    By the following Sunday, I found myself hitting the 
trifecta. I was impacted as a landlord with two retail 
properties, a three-unit strip mall, a 23-unit shopping center, 
a business owner of a retail wine store, and my home were all 
in the affected area.
    We learned that there could be over 40 miles of gas line 
that needed to be replaced and our gas equipment had been 
compromised. Upon learning this information, we didn't know if 
we were looking at months or years to get back our gas service.
    That Monday, I began receiving many phone calls from my 
tenants. While some tenants could operate without gas, others, 
such as the restaurants, were shut down. Our restaurant tenants 
found themselves with no revenue stream and they were facing 
loss of help.
    Sharma Grill, a 164-seat restaurant, began to receive 
cancellations of future events as he could not give these 
clients any assurances that he would have a functional 
facility.
    During that first week after the explosion, finding 
solution to our problems was difficult as we needed to wait on 
state and local officials to give us direction. Information was 
scarce and frustration set in.
    As property owners, we began to explore our options to 
provide alternatives to heat our buildings. It was September 
and we figured that we had three months before the cold weather 
was upon us and we knew that if we didn't have heat, we could 
not provide a working sprinkler system and we would have to 
shut down the buildings. It was an unthinkable scenario.
    We immediately began to look into alternative fuel sources, 
such as LP tanks, but quickly found we weren't the first to be 
making those phone calls. It became clear they were many of us. 
Businesses as well as homeowners fighting for the same limited 
resources.
    We were also encountering state regulations and large costs 
for these solutions, making it very difficult to determine what 
to do. We needed answers.
    It wasn't until the following Friday that we learned that 
the recovery process was going to take approximately two months 
and businesses were going to be addressed first. While we were 
all relieved to hear the short timeline, understanding the 
execution of the recovery plan was unknown.
    During this planning stage, many of us were experiencing 
loss of revenue, whether you were able to open your business or 
not. People stayed away from the area and many people didn't 
know that businesses were open.
    As the recovery plan unfolded, it became apparent we all 
needed to individually manage the process of getting our gas 
turned back on. This became a full-time job for some of us. 
Understanding what needed to be fixed versus replaced was not a 
simple yes or no answer.
    Managing that process with Columbia was challenging as 
parameters and information changed daily. You will be told what 
to do 1 day and then the next day you would have a new crew 
telling you something different. It was important to stay on 
top of the situation to ensure that your business and/or 
building would get relit.
    Once the gas-ready plan was deployed, we were hit with 
another wave of disruption. While we all understood replacing 
48 miles of gas line was a monumental task, we did not 
understand the impact it would have on the infrastructure 
surrounding our businesses. Roads were shut down and dug up 
while traffic was redirected making it time-consuming and 
difficult for people to get to our businesses.
    For more than 5 days, the only way to get in and out of our 
23-unit shopping center was through the CVS Drive-Through.
    As it became difficult to get to these affected areas, many 
people were told not to go to these areas via social media. 
People were posting ``What a mess, took me 40 minutes to go a 
half mile, don't go there if you don't have to.'' Frustrations 
amongst patrons began to set in and they stayed away.
    I experienced this with the Wine Connection as our year-
over-year sales were down from the previous time last year and 
I expect other businesses experienced the same.
    Also during this time, it became evident that people were 
living out of the area, whether by choice or the need to 
relocate due to their living conditions. Our regular customers 
were not around to shop for our goods and services. As someone 
whose personal home was affected, I understood the difficulties 
of living without heat, hot water, and cooking capabilities.
    Now that we are entering our third month into the recovery, 
concerns turn to the holiday season. This is a critical time 
for retailers and hospitality businesses and we wonder how will 
we fare through this season. Do customers know we're open? Will 
they return to our businesses or have they adopted new 
locations for shopping for goods and services? When will 
residents be able to return to their homes and patronize our 
business? In a booming economy, these are unsettling questions 
we're about to face.
    In conclusion, I'd just like to say to the Committee that 
the people of Merrimack Valley are resilient and while we're 
still dealing with these challenges to recover from this 
disaster, we look forward to the days when we can get back to 
normal.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Messina follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Tina Messina, Owner, Wine Connextion
    Good Afternoon, My name is Tina Messina and I'd like to thank the 
committee for this opportunity to discuss the impact of the Sept 13th 
gas explosion has had on the business community.
    After the initial shock of the event the community needed to 
understand the scope of the problem. Information on the details came 
slowly as we learned what happened and who was affected by this event.
    By the following Sunday, I found myself hitting the trifecta. I was 
impacted as a landlord, with 2 retail properties; a 3 unit strip mall 
and a 23 unit shopping center, a business owner of a retail wine store 
and my home were all in the affected area.
    We learned that there could be over 40 miles of gas lines that 
needed to be replaced and our gas equipment had been compromised. Upon 
learning this information we didn't know if we were looking at months, 
several months or years to get back our gas service.
    That Monday, I began receiving many phone calls from my tenants. 
While some tenants could operate without heat, others such as the 
restaurants were shut down. Our restaurant tenants found themselves 
with no revenue stream and they were facing loss of help. Chama Grill, 
a 164 seat restaurant, began to receive cancellations of future events 
as he could not give these clients any assurance he would have a 
functional facility.
    During that first week after the explosion, finding solutions to 
our problems was difficult as we needed to wait on state and local 
officials to give us direction. Information was scarce and frustration 
set in. As property owners, we began to explore our options to provide 
alternatives to heat to our buildings. It was September and we figured 
we had 3 months before the cold weather was upon us and we knew that if 
we didn't have heat we could not provide a working sprinkler system and 
we would have to shut the buildings down. It was an unthinkable 
scenario.
    We immediately began to look into alternative fuel sources such as 
LP tanks but quickly found that we weren't the first to make those 
calls. It became clear there were many of us, businesses as well as 
home owners, fighting for the same limited resources. We were also 
encountering state regulations and large costs for these solutions 
making it very difficult to determine what to do. We needed answers.
    It wasn't till the following Friday that we learned the recovery 
process was going to take approximately 2 months and businesses were 
going to be addressed first. While all were relieved to hear the short 
time line, understanding the execution of the recovery plan was 
unknown.
    During this planning stage many of us were experiencing loss of 
revenue whether you were able to open your business or not. People 
stayed away from the area and many didn't know if businesses were open.
    As the recovery plan unfolded it became apparent we all needed to 
individually manage the process of getting our gas turned back on. This 
became a fulltime job for some of us. Understanding what equipment 
needed to be fixed vs replaced was not a simple yes or no answer. 
Managing that process with Columbia was challenging as parameters and 
information changed daily. You would be told what to do one day and 
then the next day you would have a new crew telling you something 
different. It was important to stay on top of the situation to ensure 
your business and/or your buildings would get ``re-lit''.
    Once the Gas-Ready plan was deployed we were hit with another wave 
of disruption. While we all understood replacing 48 miles of gas lines 
was a monumental task, we did not understand the impact it would have 
on the infrastructure surrounding our businesses. Roads were shut down 
and dug up while traffic was redirected making it time consuming and 
difficult for people to get to our businesses. For more than 5 days, 
the only way to get in and out of our 23 unit shopping center was 
through the CVS drive thru.
    As it became very difficult to get to the affected areas, many 
people were being told not to go to these areas via social media. 
People were posting ``what a mess'' took me 40 minutes to go a \1/2\ 
mile, don't go there if you don't have to.'' Frustration amongst 
patrons began to set in . . . and they stayed away. I experienced this 
with the Wine ConneXtion, as our year over year sal es were down from 
the previous time last year and I expect other businesses experienced 
the same.
    Also during this time it became evident that many people were 
living out of the area. Whether by choice or the need to relocate due 
to their living conditions, our regular customers were not around to 
shop for our goods and services. As someone whose personal home was 
affected, I understood the difficulties of living without heat, hot 
water and cooking capabilities.
    Now that we are entering our 3rd month into the recovery, concerns 
turn to the holiday season. This is a critical time for retailers and 
hospitality businesses, and we wonder how will we fare through this 
season? Do customers know we're open? Will they return to our 
businesses or have they adopted new locations of shopping for goods and 
services? When will residents be able to return to their homes and 
patronize our businesses?
    In a booming economy, these are very unsettling questions we are 
about to face. In conclusion I'd like to let the committee know that 
the people of the Merrimack Valley are resilient and while we are still 
dealing with the challenges to recover from this disaster, we look 
forward to the days where we can get back to normal.
    Thank you.

    Senator Markey. Thank you, and thank you so much for your 
testimony.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. And next, we are going to hear from Andover 
Fire Chief Michael Mansfield and I am also going to submit to 
the record testimony on behalf of Lawrence Fire Chief Brian 
Moriarty and North Andover Fire Chief William McCarthy.
    [The information referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    Senator Markey. Also with us are Andover Police Chief 
Patrick Keefe, Lawrence Police Chief Roy Vasque, and North 
Andover Police Chief Charles Gray. We thank each and every one 
of you and all of the people who work under you who responded 
so valiantly on that first day and on all of the ensuing days. 
We are in your debt. We are in your debt every day but that was 
an especially trying time.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. And we just want to--we are mindful that on 
that day and on every day, you run toward the flames as 
everyone else is running away from the flames and on a day like 
today, I think it's appreciated more than ever. So thank you.
    And now Chief Mansfield speaking on behalf of all of the 
brave men and women who worked up in Merrimack Valley to 
respond to that crisis, we welcome your testimony.

          STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MANSFIELD, FIRE CHIEF, 
                     ANDOVER, MASSACHUSETTS

    Mr. Mansfield. Senator Markey, thank you very much. Senator 
Warren, Representative Tsongas, Representative Moulton.
    I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today 
representing those men and women of the Fire Service who 
responded to the catastrophic natural gas incident that 
occurred at approximately 4:18 on September 13, 2018. This 
event has been identified by some as the worst natural gas 
disaster to ever occur in the history of the United States, if 
not the world.
    I must state that the time afforded to me to speak today 
will not even scratch the surface with regards to the specifics 
of this event or the challenges we have been confronted with 
and are still confronted with as we navigate through the 
recovery phase of this operation.
    Senator Markey. Chief, could I ask you just to move the 
microphone in a little closer? OK. Beautiful.
    Mr. Mansfield. Certainly.
    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    Mr. Mansfield. The events that led up to the disaster would 
have never occurred if there were technological stopgap 
measures on the pipeline in place by Columbia Gas. Those 
measures would have prevented what has been reported to be up 
to 74 pounds of pressure introduced into the gas line that took 
well over, well over 1 hour by Columbia Gas employees and/or 
subcontractors to shut down and purge.
    To date, it remains incomprehensible that Columbia Gas, 
which is a subsidiary of a multibillion dollar conglomerate 
known as NiSource, is involved in an industry that is so 
dangerous to our communities, but had no ability to stop the 
flow of natural gas to its infrastructure that supplies the 
three communities of Lawrence, North Andover, and Andover.
    The Fire Service in all three communities usually rely 
heavily upon one another to assist in the mitigation of any 
type of emergency incident when they occur. In this incident, 
all three fire departments found themselves competing for the 
same resources to assist in the emergency response which 
included a total of 141 fires, five building explosions, 
unfortunately one death, and I want to express my sincere 
condolences to the Rondon family for your loss, three civilians 
seriously injured, and seven firefighter injuries.
    9-1-1 calls for assistance at the initial point of the 
incident were overwhelmed, all available fire-rescue resources 
in the three affected communities within minutes, all off-duty 
fire-rescue personnel were requested to report back in to work, 
150 of those off-duty firefighters answered the call from the 
three communities immediately.
    The 9-1-1 telecommunications in the communities' Dispatch 
Centers were overwhelmed immediately by the deluge of calls 
from the affected residents. In the first eight hours after the 
initial natural gas line over-pressurization occurred, the 
Lawrence, North Andover, Andover and mutual aid assets 
responded to over 375 calls for assistance.
    Firefighter safety was drastically minimized during the 
height of this incident as a result of the immediate lack of 
available resources. There are many instances on record where 
only one piece of apparatus with only three firefighters 
onboard responded to a full-blown building fire.
    A normal initial response to these types of incidents would 
include up to three engines, an aerial ladder, command staff, 
and rescues, totaling upwards between 15 to 17, quite possibly 
20 firefighters.
    There were many reports of fire personnel passing by 
structure fires as they responded to a structure fire at an 
address they had been originally dispatched to. There are also 
many reports of firefighters exiting homes after extinguishing 
a fire and being met by frantic neighbors telling them that 
their home was also on fire.
    Mutual aid was immediately requested response all affected 
communities, as well. That system was overwhelmed to a point 
that a request to the State of Massachusetts Emergency 
Management Agency was made to activate the statewide Fire 
Mobilization Plan which allowed for several task forces of 
personnel, engine and ladder companies and ambulances to 
respond to assist with the disaster.
    The Fire Mobilization Plan brought in the following 
additional personnel and equipment assets from as far away as 
York, Maine, Nashua, New Hampshire, and communities as far away 
as Weston, Massachusetts. We had a total of 18 additional 
engine companies, six additional ladder companies, nine 
additional chief officers, 56 additional ambulances, and 80 
additional fire suppression personnel per 12-hour operational 
period were involved.
    These additional assets were rotated every 12 hours to 
ensure firefighter safety was paramount and those asset numbers 
were maintained until Monday, September 17, 2018.
    Many Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Federal agencies 
assisted with the initial responses, investigations, 
mitigations, and are still operating as part of the recovery 
phase of the operation, such as the Massachusetts Department of 
Fire Services, the Fire Marshal's Office, Massachusetts 
Emergency Management Agency, the National Transportation Safety 
Board with their investigation, Federal Bureau of 
Investigations, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as 
well.
    There are many lessons to be learned by this event. We 
within the Fire Service are willing to work with those at the 
state and Federal level to assist in the writing of additional 
legislation to further regulate the natural gas industry so 
that we may prevent anything to this magnitude to ever occur 
again in our country.
    All the aforementioned agencies' assistance has been 
immeasurable and we greatly appreciate the seamless methodology 
of their approach and response to all of our requests to ensure 
that the citizens we serve maintained a high level of safety.
    Their compassion and caring in an effort to meet all of the 
communities' needs and our citizens has been nothing short of 
astounding.
    In closing, on behalf of Lawrence Fire Chief Brian 
Moriarty, North Andover Fire Chief William McCarthy, and 
myself, I would like to thank all of those who have assisted us 
throughout this ordeal to date and those who continue to assist 
us with the recovery process.
    Most importantly, we would like to thank those who reside 
in our communities for their patience throughout this event and 
the outpouring of support we have received.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Mansfield follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Michael B. Mansfield, Fire Chief, 
                          Andover Fire Rescue
    I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today 
representing those men and women of the fire service who responded to 
the catastrophic natural gas incident that occurred at approximately 
4:18 pm on September 13, 2018. This event has been identified as the 
worst natural gas disaster to ever occur in the history of the United 
States.
    I must state that the time afforded for me to speak today will not 
even scratch the surface with regards to the specifics of this event or 
the challenges we have been confronted with and are still confronted 
with as we navigate through the recovery phase of the operation.
    The events that led up to the disaster would have never occurred if 
there were technological stop gap measures on the pipeline in place by 
Columbia Gas. Those measurers would have prevented what has been 
reported to be up to seventy four (74) pounds of pressure introduced 
into the gas line that took well over one (1) hour by Columbia Gas 
employees and/or subcontractors to shut down.
    To date, it remains incomprehensible that Columbia Gas which is a 
subsidiary of the multibillion dollar conglomerate known as NiSource is 
involved in an industry that is so dangerous to our communities, but 
had no ability to stop the flow of natural gas to its infrastructure 
that supplies the three communities of Lawrence, North Andover, and 
Andover.
    The fire service in all three communities rely heavily upon usually 
assist one another in the mitigation of any type of emergency incident 
when they occur. With this incident all three fire departments found 
themselves competing for the same resources to assist in the emergency 
responses which included:

   141 Fires

   5 Building Explosions

   1 Death

   3 Civilians Seriously Injured

   7 Firefighter injuries

    911 calls for assistance at the initial point of the incident 
overwhelmed all available fire/rescue resources in the three affected 
communities within minutes. All off duty fire/rescue personnel were 
requested to report back into work. One hundred and fifty (150) off-
duty firefighters from the three communities immediately answered the 
call.
    The 911 Telecommunicators in the communities dispatch centers were 
also overwhelmed immediately by the deluge of calls from the affected 
residents. In the first eight hours after the initial natural gas line 
over pressurization occurred, the Lawrence, North Andover, Andover and 
mutual aid assets responded to over three hundred and seventy five 
(375) calls for assistance.
    Firefighter safety was drastically minimized during the height of 
this incident as a result of the immediate lack of available resources. 
There are many instances on record where only one piece of apparatus 
with only three firefighters on board responded to a building fire. A 
normal initial response to these types of incidents would include three 
(3) engines, an aerial ladder and Command Staff totaling fifteen (15) 
to seventeen (17) firefighters. There were many reports of fire 
personnel passing by structure fires as they responded to a structure 
fire at an address they had been originally dispatched to.
    There are also many reports of firefighters exiting homes after 
extinguishing a fire and being met by frantic neighbors that their home 
is on fire also.
    Mutual aid was immediately requested to respond to all affected 
communities as well. That system was overwhelmed to a point that a 
request to the State of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency was 
made to activate the statewide fire mobilization plan, which allowed 
for several task forces of personnel, engine and ladder companies and 
ambulances to respond to assist with the disaster. The fire 
mobilization plan brought in the following additional personnel and 
equipment assets from as far away as York, ME., Nashua, NH and 
communities as far away as Western Massachusetts:

   18 Additional Engine Companies

   6 Additional Ladder Companies

   9 Additional Chief Officers

   56 Additional Ambulances

   80 Additional Fire Suppression Personnel per 12 hour 
        Operational Period

    These additional assets were rotated every twelve hours to ensure 
firefighter safety was paramount and those asset numbers were 
maintained until Monday September 16, 2018.
    Many Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Federal agencies assisted 
with the initial responses, investigations, mitigation and still are 
operating as part of the recovery phase of the operation such as the 
Massachusetts Department of Fire Services, Fire Marshal's Office, 
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, National Transportation 
Safety Board, Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency.
    There are many lessons to be learned by this event. We within the 
fire service, are willing to work with those at the state and Federal 
level to assist in the writing of additional legislation to regulate 
the natural gas industry so that we may prevent anything to this 
magnitude to ever occur again within our country.
    All of the aforementioned agencies assistance has been immeasurable 
and we greatly appreciate the seamless methodology of their approach 
and response to all of our requests to ensure that the citizens we 
serve maintained a high level of safety. Their compassion and caring in 
an effort to meet all of the community's needs and our citizens has 
been nothing short of astounding.
    In closing, on behalf of Fire Chief Brian Moriarty, Fire Chief 
William McCarthy and myself, I would like to thank all of those who 
have assisted us throughout this ordeal to date and those who continue 
to assist us with the recovery process. Most importantly we would like 
to thank those who reside in our communities for their patience 
throughout this event and the outpouring of support we have received.

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Chief, and----
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey.--again we're in your debt today but every 
day for what you do. So we thank you so much.
    So let's begin with an overarching question and I would ask 
each of the witnesses to answer it.
    Mayor Rivera, Ms. Messina, Chief Mansfield, what grade A 
through F would you give to Columbia Gas in their response on 
the night of the incident and why would you give them that 
grade?
    Mayor Rivera. On the night of the incident, I think that 
those who were close to this would give them an F. You know, 
having been in the military, there's a term people talk about 
this, like somebody's in the weeds, even just not really 
present in the magnitude of the situation. We were pretty 
present but then looking for guidance and action from Columbia 
Gas, we just saw that they were in the weeds. They had no sense 
of this magnitude.
    Senator Markey. Ms. Messina.
    Ms. Messina. That night, the first thing that happened with 
us was that we had an alarm in our big 23-unit plaza and went 
down and thought nothing of it. It was in one of the 
restaurants and didn't think much of it until the fire truck 
passed us and was like what's going on here.
    So I think, you know, it was a very difficult night. As far 
as the response from Columbia, I mean, it wasn't there. I 
didn't hear anything till the Governor came on late at night, 
but, you know, it was just a lot of panic. For me, it was a 
little bit reminiscent of I was in Boston on 9/11 and it felt a 
little bit like that where it was just what's going on, what do 
you mean? It didn't feel--like depending on where you were, it 
didn't feel like you were either in dire straits or what's 
going on? It was not a big deal until I walked into my house 
and smelled gas. That's when I started getting very unnerved.
    Senator Markey. And what grade would you give them on the 
first day?
    Ms. Messina. It wasn't there. So for me, it would be, you 
know, in the D range because we didn't hear anything. We didn't 
know what was going on, period.
    Senator Markey. OK. Chief Mansfield, where were you when 
you were made aware that there was a gas-related emergency on 
September 13? When did they notify you on that day, and what 
grade would you give to Columbia Gas for their response?
    Mr. Mansfield. I wasn't in contact with anybody from 
Columbia Gas for several hours after the event occurred. Due to 
the lack of communications, due to the lack of organization, 
due to the lack of their emergency planning, I would give them 
an F.
    Senator Markey. Mayor Rivera, you said in your testimony 
that Columbia Gas engineers and top leadership were afraid 
themselves and lacked a clear path to deal with the disaster. 
Can you elaborate on that?
    Mayor Rivera. Yes, I mean, I guess I think we all were 
afraid. I think the problem is that when you're tasked, you 
make five times the amount of money a year I make or 50 times 
the amount of I make a year, you're going to be called to 
action, and I just felt like we couldn't even get maps from 
them and then every time somebody in the room would have a 
suggestion on how to mitigate or deal with the problem, every 
idea went on the map and went on the list, and I think in a 
situation like that, even though I'm the Mayor of the city, I'm 
not really sure that I'm fully equipped to understand the 
complexities of a gas line and how to mitigate that problem.
    So I really do think that they were at a loss and they did 
send one person. They sent national support but they only sent 
one person on the ground that night.
    Senator Markey. And when did they respond to you on that 
night, Columbia Gas?
    Mayor Rivera. I called them first. I got a call from my 
Chief and then I got a call and then we all got together and 
then we ended up at the site, but on my drive in, I had called 
the Columbia Gas Government Affairs person. I called their head 
engineer. I was breaking the news to them and so I was kind of 
surprised that I was doing that, considering that I already had 
made it all the way down the building that I was in in Boston 
and I had already been in traffic for a good time when I called 
them after getting a sense of what was going on and they still 
had not known that something was going on.
    Senator Markey. And that's unbelievable that you're calling 
them to notify them of what's going on.
    Mayor Rivera. Yes.
    Senator Markey. It's absolutely incredible and 
unacceptable.
    Mayor Rivera. I don't know how that happens and, frankly, 
the first time I talked to--that I saw somebody live was when 
they came up to me and said you have to shut the electricity 
off.
    Senator Markey. OK. So I've already referenced this----
    Mayor Rivera. I'm sorry. Can I say, when they said you have 
to evacuate the city?
    Senator Markey. Yes. So, again, we should talk about 
evacuation because the Columbia Gas Emergency Response Plan was 
woefully inadequate. They failed to imagine that there was a 
disaster of this scale that could occur and by doing so, they 
guaranteed that they would fail to execute a swift and 
effective response when a system-wide catastrophe did occur.
    Mayor Rivera, in your testimony, you requested that there 
be a Customer Evacuation Plan created and revisited every year. 
What are some of the components that you would like to see in a 
Company Evacuation Plan?
    Mayor Rivera. Well, first of all, they have to have a 
notification system to make sure that every customer who they 
get a bill from every month gets notified in a way that's 
appropriate and in their language immediately that something's 
happening.
    I think that their conversations with the 9-1-1 folks, with 
first responders has to be immediate, and I think that it has 
to delineate what you would do with those people once you get 
them out of their homes, how you plan to put them in a place 
that's safe, how you plan to support them in the long term and 
the short term, and then immediately figure out how to get them 
whole.
    They stood up a claims process two or three days right 
after and I think everyone saw pictures of what that looked 
like in Lawrence. They just did it in Lawrence. They didn't 
even think about doing it that weekend in North Andover and 
Andover. It was a huge shortcoming. But that it really looked 
like a refugee center. There was no control. If it wasn't for 
the staff of the city, the towns, and the State Police to get 
people in an orderly fashion, to give them a sense of how to 
get their claims started, I'm pretty sure we would have had a 
riot down there.
    Senator Markey. Yes. And I understand how utilities think. 
They don't like to anticipate an accident which can occur. So 
it's actually my law which requires the distribution of 
potassium iodide that could protect against thyroid cancer to 
everyone within a 10-mile radius around the Seabrook Nuclear 
Power Plant. You have to anticipate that something wrong can go 
wrong and thyroid cancer is the single-most likely consequence 
if you're exposed.
    So here, there was no plan and they just assumed nothing 
could go wrong.
    So, Chief Mansfield, Columbia Gas is required to notify 
fire departments in the event of a Grade 1 gas leak which are 
severe and potentially dangerous. How quickly are you notified 
of these leaks by Columbia Gas and do you feel like the 
response from the company is sufficient to keep this area safe?
    Mr. Mansfield. The short answer is no, we don't like their 
response to how they inform us of Grade 1 natural gas leaks. 
Several of us in the Merrimack Valley have been trying to get 
the ears of legislators in Columbia Gas. We've had open 
discussions with Columbia Gas leadership with regards to how we 
get notified when Grade 1 natural gas leaks occur and typically 
the response is they find that a Grade 1 leak occurs, they go 
ahead, they mitigate it after they find it, and then they 
notify the fire department and the law enforcement official as 
required by Massachusetts state law.
    Senator Markey. So what you're saying is that the company 
identifies a serious potentially dangerous gas leak, they don't 
call the fire department, they don't call the police 
department, they fix it as best they can, then they call you 
the next day or 2 days later and say, oh, we had a big problem, 
but we didn't feel we had to call you, the fire department, the 
police department of the city, is that correct?
    Mr. Mansfield. That is correct. The Grade 1 leak is the 
worst case scenario of a natural gas leak you can possibly have 
and it's in their infrastructure and what they do is they go 
out, they locate a leak through their surveying process. 
They'll mitigate the leak, repair it, and then the following 
day, we don't get a phone call, we get an e-mail from somebody 
in their Operations Center that states that they had a Grade 1 
leak at a particular address and there's no need for emergency 
response.
    Senator Markey. So the question of long-term relief is also 
important because these businesses, these families that are 
going to be impacted, and we've been pushing the Trump 
Administration, Small Business Administration, trying to make 
sure that there is emergency home heating assistance for 
everyone who needs it because we're never going to forget that 
these communities need help and we're going to be there every 
step of the way.
    Mr. Mayor, Ms. Messina, Chief Mansfield, what grade A 
through F would you give Columbia Gas' work over the longer-
term restoration process and why?
    Ms. Messina. This is a double-edged sword. You know, when 
we first started in that first week, it was pretty bad because 
we just didn't have any information. As the plan started to get 
deployed, there were a lot of resources. I mean, as someone 
who's lived through this, I don't think any of us can really 
complain about the amount of people that have been put on the 
ground.
    The biggest complaint I think that we would have is again, 
and I think this is an underlying issue, has been 
communication. You know, they were there when I called. I would 
be able to speak to them. They always had people that were 
available to talk to but trying to find the right person was 
difficult and being able to get some straight answers, 
especially for the higher-end equipment, like HVAC units and 
things like that, that, you know, what do we do, you know. Do 
we have to replace them? Do we have to fix them because it's 
not like these HVAC units are sitting in a warehouse somewhere. 
They take months to have to order and take a lot longer to have 
put up.
    So, I mean, I'd give them--clearly, I'd go from a D that I 
rated them in the beginning to a B+ because I really felt that 
I could get to somebody and get answers done and things were 
getting done faster, so that's the double-edged sword.
    Senator Markey. Does anyone else want to give a grade to 
the long-term restoration?
    Mayor Rivera. I guess I'd say the idea of the different 
points in time, I think you've got to give them an A for fixing 
the pipe in the street. Everyone thought there was going to be 
mass disaster and there was going to be--you couldn't do it. I 
seen many people talking on TV about how it was undoable. So 
you've got to give them an A for that.
    I think for the fixing the pipes and the appliances in the 
house, you know, I think that that's got to be a D to a C. We 
knew we needed an army of plumbers on September 14 and 15 and 
we were having discussions about plumbers in the first week of 
November. I'm not sure why Columbia Gas and Gilbane let that 
most important resource go unattended for so long, and I think 
they're still at a D with the customer support and making 
people whole. They still are failing to cut checks to people. 
They put big numbers on the checks that they're cutting to 
people. There are still people with fundamental issues 
unresolved, mainly because they just refuse to cut the check, 
and I'm telling them they should just cut this check now and 
not spend money on attorneys because it will turn into 
litigation, but I think all that type of grading goes to 
underscore, I think, something that I forgot to say in my 
comments and that's to mention the people that have been 
affected.
    These people have been the most patient and understanding 
people. Literally the pipe froze on an RV and they asked this 
lady who clearly couldn't speak that much English anyway how 
you feel? She said, oh, it's Mother Nature, like this too shall 
pass.
    It is a miracle that we don't have a riot. People have been 
so thankful for the crap they've had to put up with this 
company every day. It's a blessing on them. It's another reason 
why they should double their forces on the claims, pay these 
folks. You've put them through too much.
    Senator Markey. So thank you. We're going to give them an 
A+ to the people from Merrimack Valley----
    Mayor Rivera. Amen.
    Senator Markey.--for their response and to all of those----
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey.--who helped them in their response. We 
thank you.
    Let me recognize Senator Warren.
    Senator Warren. So thank you very much.
    I just want to ask, did Mr. Bryant stay? Is he in here? How 
about Mr. Hamrock? Did anybody stay from Columbia Gas? Good. 
OK. You represent the employees. How about representing the 
company? For what?
    Voice. Claims questions.
    Senator Warren. Good. Well, I'm glad you're here. I'll ask 
about claims.
    So I wonder who is here to at least hear this and take this 
information back to Mr. Bryant and Mr. Hamrock. I want to ask 
actually about the process, about what's happened to the small 
businesses.
    We've heard from the Mayor. We've heard from the Fire 
Chief. But I want to drill down just a little bit on small 
businesses.
    Ms. Messina, I appreciate your being here today. Prior to 
the explosion, you had several businesses, as you testified, 
several properties in Andover. You were one of the many people 
whose businesses as well as your home was affected by this 
disaster.
    Can I just start by asking you about some of the financial 
costs here? How much money did you lose for the weeks that you 
could not operate your businesses?
    Ms. Messina. We're still in the process of trying to put 
that together. It didn't happen just for the month of October. 
This is something ongoing. As I said in my testimony, one of 
the things that we didn't recognize as we were looking at, hey, 
how come so and so hasn't been in? Well, we find out that so 
and so's been living in their home in Maine because it's too 
uncomfortable to be living here and dealing with this issue.
    So, you know, we had planned a great month of October and I 
just barely broke last year's numbers, if that. We put 
everything on to it and, you know, in booming economy where we 
were seeing increases, it just kind of like came to a stop. I 
mean, those first 2 weeks, we lost about 30 percent of our 
business.
    Senator Warren. So what you're saying is one of the ways 
small businesses lost out obviously is if they were closed all 
together, but the second way is small businesses lost out 
because there were just a lot fewer people who came in to shop, 
even if your business was otherwise operational, is that right?
    Ms. Messina. Correct. I mean, and to add to that was the 
difficulty of getting to the actual stores once the gas-ready 
plan was put into place. I mean, I think we all understood, 
like I said in my testimony, that 48 miles was a lot. I don't 
think we understood that there'd be areas that were just 
completely cutoff and you would have to be redirected and there 
were times you'd go around in circles and you'd just say that's 
it, I'm done, I'm going home.
    Senator Warren. OK. And this obviously was affecting your 
customers. So has Columbia Gas explained to you whether or not 
they're going to pay for your diminished business during this 
period of time?
    Ms. Messina. Going through the claims process, we were 
given--we were asked to give information but most of this 
information was skewed toward mainly a restaurant or anybody 
that had a hospitality business because they're asking me about 
my food loss and stuff like that and it's like no, no, I'm hot 
goods.
    So in fairness to them right now, we're in the process of 
still trying to make those parameters for that claim. So my 
claim is still open and I have yet to really even talk to 
somebody because once I found out that I could self-mitigate my 
home, I dropped my business claim so I could get my house 
online.
    Senator Warren. So they haven't told you yet then if 
they're going to--they've not committed to reimburse you for 
the time that your business was less than it otherwise would 
have been if this disaster hadn't occurred?
    Ms. Messina. Correct. But at the same time, I haven't given 
them the complete information that they've asked for.
    Senator Warren. OK. So let me ask you just a little bit 
about the information because I had some people come up during 
the break who have a small business that they have just 
launched and they said that they were asked for 3 years worth 
of financial information which they don't have because they're 
a beginning business.
    So what happens to a business like that in the claims 
process?
    Ms. Messina. Well, I mean, I would tell the claims process 
that they're going to have to, you know, sit down and talk to 
them on an individual case basis because you're right, there's 
plenty of--I mean, I have three years but what does that mean?
    The other side of that equation is you can't compare the 
last three years to this year which is a very good economy 
year, you know. You've got consumers buying more. So it's going 
to have to be done on a case-by-case basis.
    Senator Warren. OK. And what I'm hearing you say is there's 
no commitment on the part of Columbia Gas. They have described 
it. This was the question. This is why I wanted to know whether 
or not we still had Mr. Bryant here and Mr. Hamrock. They both 
said that everyone who'd been injured would receive full 
compensation, and I'm just trying to----
    Ms. Messina. Well, I have not.
    Senator Warren .--ask what that means?
    Ms. Messina. I have not.
    Senator Warren. And are you confident that you will?
    Ms. Messina. I'm pretty confident.
    Senator Warren. You're pretty confident.
    Ms. Messina. And only because of the way things have been 
handled on the home end.
    Senator Warren. OK.
    Ms. Messina. So I feel like I have some kind of idea as to 
how it will be.
    Senator Warren. And are you confident for small businesses 
that have just started, say businesses that don't have a long 
history? Are you confident they're going to be fully 
compensated for their losses?
    Ms. Messina. I can't speak for that. I mean, like I said, I 
don't know how they're going to be able to structure what is 
fair for a new business that just started, you know. That would 
be difficult to try to monetize but that's going to be a task 
that they're going to need to do.
    Senator Warren. Mayor Rivera, did you want to weigh in on 
that?
    Mayor Rivera. I mean, I think at least the sense is that 
they're--because they're having the insurance company deal with 
these claims and not themselves and the money they have in the 
bank, they're making decisions based on what their attorney's 
allowing them to make and it is incredibly difficult if you're 
an immigrant entrepreneur serving at least our city where it's 
a lot of folks who don't have the same resources that folks in 
Columbia Gas have to have 3 years of information.
    All those things are true even more so and then the idea 
that they're going to have--the bodega owner's going to have 
the wherewithal to stay on top of these people for two years so 
they can get reimbursed for lost income but that's what they're 
going to have to do in order to be made whole.
    So I think that they're better that they're going to get 
out of here, you know, with maybe 50 cents on the dollar what 
they really owe because the bureaucracy itself does not allow 
it.
    We have a lady who has a laundry mat and she has dryers 
that are gas and she doesn't believe that they could fix her 
gas dryers but they fixed other laundry mats' dryers and 
they're all working. She doesn't feel that that's going to be 
effective for her. They're refusing to pay her the cost of new 
dryers. They think that that mitigation should be the case for 
everybody and, you know, the sense I get back from them is that 
they're trying to get over on Columbia Gas and I just keep 
telling them you're going to have to pay somebody. They're not. 
You're just making this lady's life more miserable. Just buy 
her the new dryers because, frankly, she doesn't believe that 
you're going to make it safe for her in her business.
    So I think that that's happening a lot. So I have less 
sense of a hundred percent of what was loss will get put in 
place and like Town Manager said, and even if they do get back, 
some places have lost employees and clientele and that's a 
double whammy. In 6 months, I'm not sure they can recover and 
we may lose that business forever.
    Senator Warren. It's hard enough to run a small business 
but these folks are now being asked to take on two jobs, run a 
small business and run a claims prosecution against an 
insurance company that doesn't want to pay.
    Mayor Rivera. And they stop talking to the business owner 
if they mention an attorney. Then they'll only go through the 
attorney.
    Senator Warren. So, in other words, reaching out and 
getting help may not help under these circumstances.
    Mayor Rivera. Correct.
    Senator Warren. Can I ask you a couple more about this, and 
that is, cash flow for these small businesses? Has money been 
forthcoming? You know, it's one thing to say some day there 
will be a check coming, 3 months from now or 6 months from now 
or 10 months from now, but people have to meet payroll, people 
have to buy supplies, people have to buy food, thinking of the 
restaurant business. They need cash flow right now.
    If the customers don't come in for the past month and a 
half because either the business was entirely shuttered or 
because they couldn't get there because the streets were torn 
up because everything's chaotic and no one comes, they're going 
to have depleted cash-flow which really puts the business at 
risk of collapsing.
    Has money been made available for people under those 
circumstances?
    Ms. Messina. My understanding is, is that, with some of the 
restaurant tenants, they have done things for.
    Senator Warren. Some, mm-hmm.
    Ms. Messina. I have three restaurant tenants that were 
affected by this. One was able to get online within a week. The 
other two was anywhere between four and five to six weeks 
before they could get on and that's what--in my testimony, when 
I talked about you had to manage it on your own, it really came 
down to that because their needs were different than somebody 
like myself, the Wine Connection, which I could operate. I was 
just feeling loss of sales.
    So they did receive some financial. As a landlord, there 
were some tenants that, you know, did not pay because they just 
didn't have revenue coming in and, you know, we're floating 
that and waiting to see what happens there. So, again, we're 
looking for that to be made whole.
    Senator Warren. Mayor Rivera, did you want to add to that?
    Mayor Rivera. Yes. Just there's a bit of a chicken-and-egg 
thing with that process, too. If they tell you that your claim 
check is imminent and that it's going to cover all the things, 
including cash flow, it's hard to go and find cash flow or 
maybe even apply to the Emergency Loan Program that we had.
    So there was always this dueling thing of what check is 
going to hit for them first and then will Columbia Gas pay the 
subsequent issue after. So I think it has been confusing for 
small businesses on which way to go, mitigating on which heat 
source to use, do you stay on natural gas, do you go to 
electric, do you go to propane, because you're not sure which 
is going to hit first, the claim check or a loan check, and 
money that you got for lost, spoiled food and those things, 
that came pretty fast, but like you said, if you don't have 
food, as well.
    Senator Warren. Well, when you think about small 
businesses, I'll wrap this up, when you think about small 
businesses that live so close to the margin, I worry that 
something like this just wipes them out or puts them on such a 
downward path that they can't recover and it doesn't sound like 
the claims process is oriented toward how to get them 
stabilized and climbing again and then I worry about what the 
long-term implications are for Lawrence, for Andover, and for 
North Andover if they lose some number of their small 
businesses that try to keep an economic activity in the city 
and real economic engine for those areas.
    So I thank you.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Senator Warren.
    Congresswoman Tsongas.
    Ms. Tsongas. Thank you all, and thank you all for being 
here, and for your leadership and resolve through these very--
these times that are certainly sorely testing you, and I am so 
sorry. I regret that the leadership from Columbia Gas and 
NiSource is not here to hear from you all just the dramatic 
shortcomings of their processes, at least in the near term.
    I'm sure, Mayor Rivera, as you heard Mr. Hamrock say that 
the company had a well-oiled response plan in place in the 
event of a disaster that you heartily disagreed. Am I correct?
    Mayor Rivera. I would just like to see it. I'm not sure 
that anybody could put their hands on it. I was talking to 
Manager Maylor and he looked for it. So if they can make it 
public, it'd be great to see the pre-thirteenth plan----
    Ms. Tsongas. Yes.
    Mayor Rivera.--because we haven't seen it. It sure felt 
like there wasn't one.
    Ms. Tsongas. This is just an off-the-top of my head, but 
when you finally talked to somebody at Columbia Gas or 
NiSource, who was it? At what level was it?
    Mayor Rivera. Well, I spoke to--I'm going to get the lady's 
last name wrong--Dana Argo. I first spoke to Mike Kane, who was 
the Government Relations guy, and then I called Dana Argo, 
who's the head engineer, but he didn't know what was going on.
    Ms. Tsongas. So when did Mr. Hamrock finally manage to get 
in touch with you?
    Mayor Rivera. Oh, he wasn't on the ground till like maybe 
after we had gotten people home and safe, right, week plus. 
Pablo Vegas who came, he was there the night of, came in from 
Ohio.
    Ms. Tsongas. Well, you're right when you say that the way 
in which the community responded is really quite a testament to 
the character of the City of Lawrence as well as Andover and 
North Andover.
    I know when we all visited and made our way to the senior 
center to see the way in which people were coming forward to be 
sure people had a place to stay, food to eat in the near term 
while we started to sort of sort things out, I think was just 
again yet another remarkable testament to the character of the 
city. So I commend you for your leadership and for the 
remarkable people who live in this city as well as the Town of 
Andover and North Andover.
    Obviously communication was one of the extraordinary 
shortcomings of their response plan and you really had to step 
in. The City of Lawrence had to step in and do that in ways 
just to be reassuring in such a frightening time.
    Can you talk about how you did that and how you coordinated 
that with your response plan, let them know what was happening, 
when it was happening, at least especially in the near term?
    Mayor Rivera. You know, I think what became evident very 
fast was that people were looking for information. I know the 
town managers and I, we spent a lot of time communicating with 
people as it is through, you know, whether it be for a town 
meeting or for a city council event or for whatever we're 
doing. So we started to use those processes. We set up websites 
to put every single piece of information we could get on to 
that and then we just started to get to people and also 
monitoring social media.
    I know a lot of people don't think that people live on 
social media but there are a lot of really important 
conversations happening on social media, a tactic that Columbia 
Gas came to late in this process, and I think that once we got 
all those things squared away, we started to just use that 
information, as much as we could get, to get to people.
    It got to a point where we were getting more information on 
a daily basis than they were giving out, and I think MEMA, Kurt 
Schwartz from MEMA started to do a MEMA daily update. So I 
would just post that daily update. There's a lot of information 
it was hard to make heads or tails of, but we were getting this 
pretty daily PowerPoint presentation and almost simultaneously 
all three of us started to ask them to allow us to publish this 
and we went days--I think we went a week and a half, maybe 10 
days before we just said we're going to publish it regardless 
of whether they let us and so that started to go out and it has 
the key indicators about who's getting lit, where's the 
information going, and if you go to the websites now, all of 
our websites has every single daily update on there.
    And then, you know, I think the Governor's staff pushed 
them through Joe Albanese to again be more transparent. They 
had not done one direct mail piece to their customers in the 
whole time that we were there. We were pushing them to do that 
and they finally did the newsletter. I think they're into their 
fourth newsletter of this event, which has become a very 
important tool.
    Ms. Tsongas. Have they done a direct mail piece yet?
    Mayor Rivera. That was it. They're doing a newsletter. I 
think we got four newsletters in the can. They're supposed to 
do weekly ones going forward but that was a battle, too. They 
didn't want--again, I think in this process of trying to cover, 
trying to mitigate their damages, they created a situation 
where everything gets, you know, attorney'd to death and 
meanwhile people, you know, who need real answers about claims, 
people who need real answers about their housing stagnate, 
takes 2 days to do something and that means 2 days more in an 
RV or two days more without your business being open, and they 
scrub anything of any real meaning so that they're not really 
providing any information.
    Ms. Tsongas. At this point, what are the costs that the 
City has absorbed in order to respond to this?
    Mayor Rivera. Well, we have very smart public safety folks 
and they started charging the Columbia Gas directly for every 
dollar we spend on public safety. So we've been made whole on 
that front, but I think that that number's still yet to be 
understood. We each have areas where we put RVs on that need to 
be made whole again. We each have staff that have taken time 
away from their normal processes, focused solely on this, and 
also people who are affected who've been only focused on doing 
this, and so the roads, you know, have to spend much time in 
the affected area to see the immense disaster and mess they 
have made of our roads. Thank God they did it because they got 
the gas to us fast but there are some roads that literally were 
paved three months ago with just a fresh coat of paving on it 
and people have been waiting 30 years for that road to get 
paved and so I think that the paving of the roads are going to 
be the first real example of their hundred percent making the 
municipalities whole but along with the staff time and effort 
and energy and again I think that the amount of confusion 
they've created in our world is another reason why they just 
can't be allowed to keep doing business.
    They've just not earned that privilege and that to keep 
doing business in our country after the death of a young boy 
and after the immense chaos they created in this community. 
There are other people that can do that work.
    Ms. Tsongas. Well, I encourage you, all of you, all the 
communities to keep close tabs on what your costs have been so 
that we can make sure Columbia Gas and NiSource assume 
responsibility for those, as well.
    I yield back.
    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    Mayor Rivera. I will say Manager Maylor's keeping the 
spreadsheet and I scream loud. He's the good-looking one. He's 
the smart one. That's a compliment.
    Senator Markey. Congressman Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Senator.
    Mayor Rivera, a major complaint we have heard during our 
office hours in the District is that Columbia Gas failed to 
provide native language speakers in dealing with customers' 
concerns and issues.
    As one of our first community leaders to address our 
Spanish-speaking constituents, can you elaborate on that and 
explain to everybody some of the challenges that many of your 
residents have faced?
    Mayor Rivera. I mean, I think it's when you think about the 
impact to everyone that's involved, the impact to folks who are 
new to our country, who are already facing tons of challenges, 
and even some people who are not new to our country who are 
facing challenges around poverty, I think this has shown the 
weaknesses around our infrastructure and the weaknesses and our 
inability for communities like ours to defend ourselves against 
such a big disaster.
    It goes without saying that if we weren't talking in 
Spanish, they weren't listening because they don't speak 
English and so it was important for us to translate things. 
They stood up a process to hire a ton of translators. I think 
immediately, you know, the solution is can we hire enough full-
time translators, and they were having a hard time doing that 
because people who could translate have full-time jobs and so 
they initially didn't want to do part-time translators and they 
got themselves into a situation where they didn't have enough 
translators.
    I think later on, they backed off of that and, you know, 
you could work nights and weekends with the translation 
process, but again in the sense of trying to make it easy for 
themselves, not really thinking about the impact to the 
customer.
    And I think that right away, they took our suggestions 
about making things bilingual, but I think they fell down on 
that with the robocalls and I think it wasn't till a couple 
weeks ago that they put a Spanish TV commercial that talks to 
those issues.
    You know, they said they had 30 business-focused claims 
agents but only had really two people who speak Spanish but 
they would put a translator with them, even though half of the 
businesses affected were in the city of Lawrence and I would 
say a good half of those needed English and Spanish 
translation.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mayor.
    Ms. Messina, I just want to ask about your experience and 
your colleagues in the small business industry's experience 
with the Small Business Administration.
    Did you seek a disaster relief loan from the SBA?
    Ms. Messina. I'm sorry. I didn't hear the question again. 
With the SBA?
    Mr. Moulton. Did you seek a disaster relief loan from the 
Small Business Administration?
    Ms. Messina. I did not.
    Mr. Moulton. Are you familiar with people who have sought 
that resource?
    Ms. Messina. I'm not familiar. The only one that I'm 
familiar with is that one of the tenants did. I think they're 
still in the process of trying to get something. It's my 
understanding there was some kind of--I don't know if it was 
through the SBA, that there was some way to get some interest-
free, up to $50,000 was available for funding like cash flow 
and things like that.
    So, again, the hard part for me was trying to deal with all 
these different types of tenants with all different issues. 
Some had more needs than others and we were trying to find out 
how to best keep them operating while they were either down or 
just even like earlier said that their businesses were just 
off.
    Mr. Moulton. So is it fair to say that you're basically 
unaware of what the SBA offers here?
    Ms. Messina. Yes, that would be a fair statement.
    Mr. Moulton. OK. Clearly, we need to do a better job of 
making those resources available.
    Chief Mansfield, thank you again for your response to the 
effort.
    What are some lessons that you would like to just briefly 
share with us that you've learned that will affect your 
response and your advice to others going forward?
    Mr. Mansfield. I think the lack of communications that was 
not there between Columbia Gas and the emergency response 
personnel. I think they need to do a better job at getting the 
word out and getting communications to the first responders so 
that they know exactly what it is they're dealing with.
    We shouldn't have to wait four-five-six hours to talk to 
somebody from Columbia Gas to find out exactly what's going on 
with their pipeline infrastructure. We had people going out 
immediately responding to these natural gas calls, fires, 
explosions, and had really no idea, hard factual data that was 
indicating to us exactly what was going on with that 
infrastructure.
    I think there just needs to be--there could certainly be 
some tightening up of legislation, as I stated earlier, at the 
local level. I think we could probably tighten up within the 
Commonwealth itself. Bill 4164, which basically outlines how 
fire departments and law enforcement officials are notified, 
when they're notified about Grade 1 leaks, and I think there 
could be certainly from what we've all experienced here, could 
certainly be some legislation tightened up at the Federal 
level, too, to make these people accountable for what they're 
doing so that we don't have the tragedies that we experienced 
in the Merrimack Valley.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    For the information of the members and the witnesses, I'm 
going to ask unanimous consent that the hearing record remain 
open two weeks. Without objection, so ordered.
    And I would also ask unanimous consent to submit into the 
record testimony that was shared with the Committee by 
community members hurt by this disaster. I think it's important 
for their voices to be in the congressional record.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                   Statements from Community Members
    Rosario Germinudy from Lawrence: I felt desperate, hopeless and 
depressed when couldn't go back home coming back from work. Finding a 
place to stay with 5 kids and a dog was a challenge for me and my 
husband. Thanks to really good friends we kept the family together. But 
can't take the scenario I saw and experienced when had to go back home 
for some clothes the next day, seeing that my town turned into a ghost 
town was terrible; once I made it back to the north side all I wanted 
to do was cry and had that feeling of deception and for some reason 
kept on asking God why and why us. I know this will be in our lives for 
ever and will be remembered as a disaster, feel sorry for the lost of 
the boy that died and for others injured. What most of us lost can be 
replaced but a life can never be. Then the struggles that we are still 
going through is never heard off, happening in the USA, but we will 
stand because what does not kill us just makes us STRONGERS and that is 
what we are and will always be, strong people rising back a strong city 
. . . Lawrence strong. Together we are more and together we can 
overcome anything. I want to thanks Columbia Gas for trying their best 
even when it was after something that big happened once it did nothing 
else but to rescue and respond was to be done and that they have, the 
support my family have received from them and the city and mayor Dan 
Rivera have been priceless for me and my family. Hope everyone gets 
their services back and continue with their lives. Happy holidays for 
everyone.
                                 ______
                                 
    Monica Morell from Andover: We need to deep talk. I am still 
displaced. Limited network access. Please contact me via e-mail to set 
up a time to talk, or call me directly.
    Monica Morell Andover
                                 ______
                                 
    Nathan Ray from North Andover: I was not directly affected by this 
event. Friends stayed at my house for a few nights as they were looking 
for assistance. I have volunteered and promoted effected businesses and 
Families as much as possible. Unfortunately, I have witnessed a high 
level of fraud, mismanagement, and lack of accountability. I will not 
use names in this brief note. There is a massive amount of 
mismanagement and fraud. I know of one group that invoices $80k per 
week, just to install a dozen ovens. That is not the cost of the ovens, 
just the installation and service. 12 OVENS!! There is no organization 
in any part of this effort. The winners are the divorced or single guys 
out of state that earn 10x what they would normally earn. Meanwhile 
elderly family's still do not have a place to sleep and are suffering 
badly. The rest of the community is stuck sitting in traffic all day 
watching all of these people doing nothing. Contractors and family's 
have confirmed all of this information. Please feel free to contact me 
to discuss in more details.
    Best regards,
    Nathan Ray
    617-863-0062
    nate.ray@gmail.com
                                 ______
                                 
    Leo Lafond from North Andover: While we are being compensated for 
money spent to replace alliances etc I have not heard anyone talk about 
compensation for all the time we have spent on working through the 
recovery process. The number o hours spent on the phone with Columbia 
Gas, the claims adjusters, the assessment teams, added travel time etc 
is enormous. I self mitigated and going out shopping for appliances and 
contacting and working with contractors was a part time job This is 
time take away from family and friends that we won't get back. My rough 
estimate is that it is somewhere between 40 and 59 hours at this pint 
and I am still not done. Once heat is on for everyone I really hope 
that we will all be compensated for this. This does not take into 
account the emotional stress that has been placed on all of us. I was 
home when my house filled with gas. Thank god I wad luckier than many 
of my neighbors. They did to do more for us than just pay for 
appliances. etc.
                                 ______
                                 
    Max Lopez from Lawrence: I live in 8 Halsey st Lawrence. I 
originally had a 99.9 energy efficient boiler which meant CG had to 
replace this boiler with something comparable. They did so but did not 
provide me a receipt or information on who installed the boiler. It has 
been a pain for me to register the unity under warranty and it has also 
been a pain to received a rebate associated by this new unit. 
Ultimately I did not ask to have my boiler replaced, instead this 
happened because of the negligence of CG.
                                 ______
                                 
    Javier Caban from Andover: We purchased the house in April 15, 
2017. We went thru the whole year thru reconstruction replacing Gas 
appliances. Right when the project finalize in early May 2018, where 
the kitchen and new gas Range, gas dryer and gas fire places were 
completely done to start enjoying the new house, the '' catastrophe'' 
happens . . . right now I am living with nor gas dryer, and no gas 
stove, eating out most of the time . . . Impossible to find a plumber 
to fix the gas line Columbia Gas remove to provide gas to the stove, so 
we can stop eating out. I understand that this is nothing compared to 
what other people are going thru . . . but it is my story and it has an 
impact on us after spending 12 months going thru construction and 
living surrounded by the stress that reconstructions creates and the 
cost involved.
                                 ______
                                 
    Christopher McCarthy from Andover: On September 13th, around 4:50pm 
our CO2 detector and fire detectors started going off. My 
two children (age 2 and 8), my girlfriend and I were all home. We 
discovered smoke coming from our basement and quickly got our children 
and animals out of the house. We called 911 once we were safely 
outside--it took over 4 minutes to get someone on the phone, continuely 
got a busy signal. Once the fire department showed up they quickly put 
out the fire in our basement and told our surrounding neighbors to not 
go into their homes. They left shortly after without further 
instruction on what we should do (at this point it was around 5pm and 
you could hear sirens going off everywhere).
    Luckily we had family in Boston we could spend the night with so we 
decided to head there. We didn't realize how bad this situation was or 
how lucky we were to escape our house without getting hurt till we 
heard on the radio what was going on. It was a very traumatizing 
experience for my 8 year old son who is still scared of loud noises.
    Since September 13th, my family and I have not been able to return 
to our home to live there. We have been bounced around from 9 different 
hotels which in itself has been very difficult with two small children, 
two dogs, and a cat. The hotels that they have put us up in are covered 
by them except for a deposit. This deposit has ranged from $30-$500. . 
. Now tell me how we can continue to afford this when we are constantly 
being moved from place to place? These deposits sometimes take up till 
10 days to get back. It has definitely been a struggle.
    My son has had a hard time adjusting to school life again because 
of us constantly moving. Luckily our school has an amazing support 
system and he is getting the help he needs.
    Columbia Gas has done little to help us with every day expenses we 
had to deal with because of being displaced. They had made promises of 
a debit card to help with food but never followed through. We have 
gotten very little answers on what is next for us. Every time we talk 
with someone or go into one of the centers they had set up we are met 
with different answers. They seem to put on a good front to the public 
but those going through this ordeal know all too well it's all a 
facade. We have spent so much money being displaced from this disaster 
with no relief in sight. We just want them to be held accountable for 
everything they have caused.
                                 ______
                                 
    Eric Simili from North Andover: This is a letter I previously sent 
to my Reps:
    Dear Representative,

    I am a North Andover resident. As you know, our town went through a 
major disaster recently, along with Lawrence and Andover. Due to an 
unexplained incident having to do with natural gas pressure running 
through our streets and homes, at least 7 homes that I know of in my 
town either exploded or caught fire. I witnessed three of the fires, 
two on Pleasant St. and one on Phillips Ct.
    I was at work at the local pizza shop down the street from my home, 
as a delivery driver, when suddenly the ovens stopped working. We 
realized there was no gas. As I was on hold with Columbia gas, trying 
to figure out what was going on, I realized there were firetrucks going 
back and forth everywhere. The owner of the store next to us told me he 
heard there was an accident downtown. I turned on my scanner app to see 
if I could hear anything and heard them talking about two fires across 
the street from each other about two blocks from me. I looked over and 
saw the smoke. It didn't make sense, how was it possible that two 
houses across the street from each other were on fire? Then I heard 
them calling in a fire from Phillips Ct, down the street. I had already 
hung up with Columbia by now, realizing this was something big. I knew 
this had something to do with gas and houses on fire. I decided to take 
a drive down the road to Phillips Ct, where a neighbor of the house on 
fire was asking others if they smelled gas. I asked her if she knew 
what was happening. She said the firemen were telling people to shut 
off their gas. I headed back to the restaurant.
    At this point, firetrucks and sirens were being heard all over. I 
saw three helicopters flying over town. I started to imagine the worst. 
Maybe this was an act of terrorism.
    Maybe somebody had sabotaged the gas lines? Or a foreign government 
hacked into the gas company's computers? Who knows? I was pretty 
unnerved at this point. When I saw on tv that a house had blown up, I 
thought, wow, what if that was the restaurant? I felt my heart beating 
faster as I thought about it. I thought about my house, but we don't 
have a gas hookup, so I wasn't too concerned.
    We had to close the restaurant at this point. After cleaning up, I 
stayed around a while talking with a co-worker and watching the news on 
my phone. There was traffic backing up as far as I could see. 
Thankfully I only live about a mile from work, so I went home. I joined 
neighbors who were out talking about what's going on for a while. The 
feeling I got reminded me a little of the days after 9/11. It was 
nowhere near that bad, but we still had the same uneasy feeling you get 
when something like this happens.
    The reason I am telling you all this is because I am not happy with 
the way this is being handled. Columbia Gas has not shown up to press 
briefings. They don't seem like they are taking it seriously. A person 
has died and others are seriously injured. There were many people 
without electricity for days. Half of Lawrence was forced out of their 
homes. Highway exits are closed. And we still don't know when the gas 
is going to be turned back on. I heard maybe 3-4 weeks.
    I have missed work and am losing money because of this. I don't 
know how much longer I'll be able to pay bills. I doubt my boss will 
pay me anything for missed work. Most of my income is from tips anyway.
    I want this to be investigated thoroughly to make sure it doesn't 
happen again. If the pipes are old and rusty, we need to replace them. 
If we need more inspectors and enforcement, we need to make these 
utility companies pay for it. Massachusetts DPU needs to take this 
seriously. Joseph Hamrock, the CEO of NiSource, the parent company of 
Columbia Gas, earned $5.4 million last year, or 51 times as much as the 
$105,206 median salary of NiSource employees, according to the AFL-CIO. 
I'm lucky if I earn $35,000 a year!
    Respectfully,
    Eric Simili
    10 Walker Rd Unit 8
    North Andover, MA 01845
                                 ______
                                 
    Kerin Miller from Andover: Our family of four was home on September 
13th when my husband received an alert on his cell phone that we needed 
to evacuate the house immediately. I was five months pregnant and about 
to head to the grocery store; my husband happened to be home sick that 
day with a cold. I told him it was a hoax; if there was an emergency 
why would we need to leave? Wouldn't they tell us to stay inside? We 
called 911 to confirm. ``Get out immediately,'' she said. ``What about 
pets?'' I asked. ``Take them if you can.''
    We put our seven year old daughter and five year old son into the 
car, and we put our cat in the back in a carrier. We had nothing else 
with us but our phones and our wallets. As we exited our neighborhood 
in the Shawsheen area of Andover, people were standing on their lawns, 
dumbfounded expressions on their faces. To me, this was the most 
terrifying and traumatizing part of the Merrimack Valley Gas 
Explosions: the fifteen minutes or so when we had no idea what was 
happening. This all happened two days after the anniversary of Sept 
11th. Fresh on my mind were stories about 9/11, so when I was told to 
evacuate, and that it had something to do with gas, my first thought 
was that there was some kind of terror attack involving utilities.
    There we were, our entire family in the car, sirens sounding all 
around, with no idea what was happening or which direction was safe. 
Emergency vehicles seemed to be headed north, and my husband was 
getting some preliminary news on his phone, so when I asked him what 
direction to drive in he said ``away from Lawrence.'' We started 
driving on route 133 with no plan other than getting out of the area, 
the cat meowing in the back our SVU, all the while keeping our voices 
unnaturally cheerful for our children. ``What's going to happen to our 
house?'' my daughter asked. We explained that everything in our home 
could be replaced, but people and pets could not be, so the important 
thing was that we were all together and safe.
    I am grateful for a few lucky breaks we got on that day: my husband 
should have been at work, and as surreal and alarming as it was to get 
two kids and a pet into a car and drive off not knowing what was 
happening to our town and our home, it would have been much more 
difficult if I was alone. I am also grateful that I was feeling ill 
from morning sickness and put off running errands--I would have been 
closer to the fires, and away from our children. I am also grateful 
that our daughter had just arrived home from school, so we did not have 
the added worry of being apart from her.
    We drove to Tewksbury and pulled into a Holiday Inn. We were lucky 
that it was a pet-friendly hotel and that a suite was available--later 
that night, I sat in the lobby and watched family after family get 
turned away.
    That afternoon and evening we watched the footage on the news and 
learned about the death of the 18 year old man in Lawrence and about 
the Lawrence police officer whose home sat burning because there were 
so many homes on fire at once. We saw aerial views of our town 
completely in the dark, as electricity had been cut to the entire area 
to avoid more fires starting. I used the word ``surreal'' again and 
again. That morning I had thought about the families in North Carolina 
evacuating for the hurricane, never imagining I we would be evacuating 
that afternoon, or that the Merrimack Valley would be all over the 
news, locally, nationally, and even internationally.
    Our two days at the hotel were spent trying to entertain our 
children and checking when we could return back to our home. My husband 
was allowed to return briefly and gather a few of our belongings, and 
he went back again to let a crew of gas workers and police in to check 
the house at night by flashlights. As we waited for word that we could 
return for good, we got some unrelated news that we had been anxiously 
waiting for: we were finally ``clear to close'' on the home in Andover 
we had been working for months to purchase. We had been living in town 
for almost five years, renting the bottom floor of a duplex, and we had 
been thrilled to find a 4 bedroom fixer upper we could afford in the 
same school district our daughter had been attending since 
Kindergarten. We had spent months completing paperwork and weeks 
waiting, and now, finally, we got the news we thought we would never 
hear: we were going to be first-time homeowners, in the town we had 
grown to love but weren't sure we could ever hope to afford.
    Instead of feeling joyful, however, we looked at the map of 
explosions. Our new home was even closer to many of the fires than our 
rental. Both were in the ``affected zone'' that would have no gas for 
weeks.
    Within minutes of hearing that we were going to be homeowners, we 
also heard that we could return to our rental home. We took the last 
hot showers we would have for awhile and headed back to the affected 
area.
    It was much, much worse for others: a life was lost. Homes burnt 
down. Pets disappeared. We had been inconvenienced, but we were okay.
    I also thought that it was basically over; however, after the 
immediate impact of the gas explosions, we entered a much longer phase. 
It's one thing to not have hot water for a few days--but not having it 
for weeks presents some very real challenges. In our rental, we had an 
electric stove, so in that way we're lucky--we could cook as usual. 
Bathing was another story. We boiled water on the stove and mixed it 
with cold water in the bathtub to wash our children. We tried to take 
cold showers--but ``cold'' isn't really the right word: the water was 
freezing. My husband could have taken hot showers at his gym, but his 
gym was also affected, so we took the advice of other families on 
facebook and invested in a ``camping shower'' from Amazon, a popular 
choice for those of us without hot water. (If you have never 
experienced a camping shower: A battery operated pump with a shower 
head on the other end, stuck into the bucket of hot water, gives you 
about 3 minutes of showering time; I soon learned to dread the sound of 
the pump running out of water at the bottom of the bucket.) I have long 
hair that was never going to get clean in the time or water pressure a 
camping shower provided, but I could also shower at Merrimack College, 
where I teach. A couple evenings a week, I left my house at 11 pm, 
drove to Merrimack, and obviously pregnant, surrounded by young people, 
went to the college gym to shower. It was a huge pain--something that 
took 20 minutes and relaxed me before bed now took an hour round-trip 
and involved flip flops, strange looks, walks back to my car with wet 
hair, and flashing my work ID (one night I forgot my wallet and the 
Merrimack students working the front desk, perhaps not realizing the 
state I was living in--a divide those of us who were ``affected'' began 
to find ourselves looking at the ``non affected'' across from more and 
more--sent me back home to get it rather than break the rules of gym 
admittance). I was lucky, though: the showers were clean and private 
and the locker rooms were empty. My friends and neighbors were 
showering at the much more crowded YMCA or at the temporary showers set 
up at Pomps Pond. My husband made due with a camp shower for weeks.
    All during this time we were supposed to be packing, as we were 
closing on our new home, two miles away. Finally, everything I had 
wanted was falling into place: but now, I found myself not wanting to 
move. Our new house had far more gas appliances than our rental: on top 
of no hot water, we would have no way to dry clothes and no stove to 
cook or even boil water. Also, there was the question of whether the 
sale would even go through. Can you buy a house with no gas? Was the 
house still going to be assessed at the same value? What about the 
appliances? What if we still had no gas by winter? How would we pay to 
stay somewhere else?
    Thankfully our real estate lawyer was also my cousin's husband, and 
he was extremely concerned for us; much to the annoyance of our seller, 
he made sure there were provisions before we closed so that funds would 
be available should Columbia Gas not pay for repairs to the home, or if 
the home became unlivable during the winter months. We could not 
immediately move as planned, however, because we had done so little 
packing while we were dealing with being evacuated and dealing with 
life post-evacuation. We also had to spend hours of our time at the 
empty new house waiting for teams of gas workers to arrive. My husband 
left his number on the doors, and they would call him at work, and if I 
was home, I would come by immediately, usually with our four year old 
in tow. In addition to the stresses of moving and new homeownership 
(getting floors redone, finding out the dishwasher didn't work), we 
were dealing with our appliances at the new house being assessed and 
condemned. We had to buy new electric appliances--dryer and water 
heater--so we could at least wash ourselves and our clothes post-move, 
and then we had to get Columbia Gas to reimburse us for the cost of the 
appliances and installation. It would have been wonderful to get that 
reimbursement in the form of a check, but it came instead on a debit 
card, making it difficult to get money into our checking account to pay 
bills, and requiring my husband and I to pass a card with thousands of 
dollars back and forth for every errand (``Do you have the card?'' 
``No. Do you have the card?''). We learned the hard way that there were 
some essentials we couldn't buy with the debit card at all, including 
gas. And, again, we were the lucky ones, since we happened to have 
money on hand to pay up front--an unusual situation for us, and one 
that only happened because we were in the process of buying a home.
    We did a lot of leg work to get a functioning dryer and hot water 
heater for our new home, but we decided to go through Columbia Gas to 
replace the gas stove in our new house, and, eventually, the boiler, 
too (it took a few weeks to get word that all boilers had to replaced). 
In the meantime, a local charity gave us a hotplate to cook on.
    Our new home sits on the Andover/Lawrence town line. Both of these 
communities turned into a maze of road construction at all hours of the 
day and night. It took at least 20 minutes to drive a couple of miles 
in any direction. Crews from all over the country descended on the 
area; day after day, groups of 9 or 10 workers, mostly men but some 
women, came in and out of our home, and we met people from all over the 
country. My husband is from the South, and we lived together in Atlanta 
for many years, so we enjoyed connecting with Southerners and hearing 
the stories of others, too, from as far away as Seattle.
    We were optimistic at this time. The ball seemed to be rolling. The 
neighborhood was a mess of trenches and trucks; our own yard was dug 
up, the meter moved outside--but we were assured, almost daily, that 
our stove and boiler would be replaced soon, and our gas would be 
turned on after that. One Sunday afternoon, a crew from Chicago came by 
and said we were on the list for that week. Then, the next day, 
everything stopped. The roads were quiet. No crews showed up. A press 
conference was held later that week, and we learned that a new plan was 
being put in place, putting the priority on getting boilers fixed or 
replaced, and moving back the November 17th deadline to have all work 
completed.
    We started to hear the term ``self mitigate,'' and a few neighbors 
got their gas turned on after having bipassed Columbia Gas and getting 
appliances through a contractor. My husband ran this option by our 
adjuster who said that Columbia would now pay for self mitigation up-
front, and that it would likely be faster than waiting. We contacted a 
contractor and began the process of waiting for assessments and funds 
(always on the debit card, complicating every transaction).
    This past Saturday, as I left the house to bring my daughter to 
ballet class, a gas worker approached me in my driveway. ``Are you 
leaving?'' she asked. ``We're ready to get your boiler hooked up. We 
have a team on the way.'' Thrilled, I explained my husband was home and 
left. He texted me a half hour later. We couldn't get a boiler 
installed because we had started using an outside contractor--even 
though no work had been done yet.
    Within days, the temperature at night dropped into the teens. All 
four of us slept in one bed to stay warm. My husband was up and down 
most of the night, nervous about the pipes freezing and checking on the 
space heaters we didn't want to run while we slept but didn't want to 
turn off, either. Over and over he kept saying ``I shouldn't have let 
them leave. I should have made them put the boiler in. We could have 
had heat.''
    It snowed last night. As of today, November 16th, we are still 
without gas and still without heat. The contractor we were working with 
told us it would be after Thanksgiving before they could get to us, 
even after my husband explained that we have small children and I am 
now seven months pregnant. We canceled our contract with them, are now 
waiting for a refund of our deposit, and have hired a plumber to 
install a boiler and gas stove on Saturday. Even if this does work out, 
I do not know when Columbia Gas will actually turn our gas on. Our 
facebook page of affected Andover residents has more and more people 
posting pictures of blue stove flames accompanied by those amazing 
three words: WE'VE BEEN LIT! Temperatures are dropping again after this 
weekend, and we hope by next week we are able to say the same. We have 
been contacted about finding alternate housing, but where would that 
housing be? My husband commutes to Boston; our kids have to be at 
school; I work at Merrimack College and teach nights at Bunker Hill--
all easily accessible from here. We would have to pack, figure out a 
plan for our cat if we couldn't take her with us, and winterize our 
home. Then we would have to share one room with two small children, who 
would have to adjust to sleeping in a new environment. The 
inconvenience of staying in a hotel seems about equal to the 
inconvenience of being cold and cooking on a hot plate.
    What we want is normalcy. A friend who lives in Methuen said to me 
``I'm just so tired of hearing people who don't have gas complain about 
it. There are so many worse things that can happen.'' Yes--that's true, 
and I can see why she feels that way. I'm tired of complaining, too. 
I'm tired of talking about all of this. I'm tired of people coming in 
and out of my home without warning. What no one seems to understand is 
that all the stresses of life have continued, and every stress is 
compounded by the additional stress of dealing with Columbia Gas--a 
process that easily feels like a part time job. My husband used up all 
his time off in the initial stages--the evacuation, and our move--so 
most of this stress has fallen on me in the late stages of my 
pregnancy. Imagine those families going through even more than we are: 
caring for the elderly or disabled, trying to find a job, going through 
chemotherapy, having a newborn to care for--all the myriad ways that 
life can be difficult and trying--never feeling like their home the 
safe haven it's supposed to be.
                                 ______
                                 
    Maureen Elliot from Andover: My husband and myself have owned a 
home in Shawsheen, Andover, for over 30 years. We never had water 
issues in our basement other than damp corners in our fieldstone 
foundation during this time. After Columbia Gas dug up our front yard 
we have had major flooding issues in our basement. Columbia Gas claims 
it is ground water. Serve Pro came and said it was obvious that we 
never had water issues before this. Columbia Gas does not respond. It 
is going to cost us approximately $10,000 to get this resolved. My 
husband has heart disease and is up every several hours turning on a 
sump pump we purchased at Home Depot. We own an another home in North 
Andover and this is also in the affected area. Columbia Gas needs to 
step up and do the right thing. Please call me at 508 846 3301
                                 ______
                                 
    Susan Haltmaier from North Andover: I received my first assessment 
visit on 9/29/18 because I spoke to a team I saw in the street behind 
my house on Friday, 9/28/18. I had been scheduled for that Friday but 
no one called or came. The daily briefings initially suggested that 
Columbia Gas would repair any leaks that had been found during the 
assessments. One was found in my house on 9/29/18 but no one from 
Columbia Gas ever came to repair it, as promised. My yard was dug up 
for a new line from the street and my bushes were dug up to connect the 
new line to the house. The bushes were put back in a crooked manner, 
with roots showing, and using sand rather than soil. I had to track 
down a crew working down the street to come back and correct the 
plantings. In mid-October, I arranged for third party deliveries and 
installation of a stove, dryer, water heater, and furnace. But Columbia 
Gas was still insisting on making repairs to any leaks, regardless of 
who was installing the new appliances. The rules changed several times 
between 10/10, when I arranged for my new appliances and received 
prompt reimbursement from Columbia Gas, and 11/1, when Columbia Gas 
changed the rules and stated that third parties installers would be 
responsible for repairing leaks. I had not received an estimate for 
repairing the leak from the third party installer of my furnace. A 
stand-off ensued where Columbia Gas refused to repair the leak and my 
installer said it was not in their estimate. One Columbia Gas 
representative threatened me with ``You made a claim, you took our 
money, repairing the leak is no longer our problem. It is your 
problem.'' After a series of phone calls that escalated up the ladder, 
a very competent man came on 11/5/18 to repair the leak. Several other 
connections were deemed to require replacement and a crew came in and 
completed them. Another man came on 11/8 to relight my existing furnace 
under the latest directive from Columbia Gas and he said I needed a 
``fan in a can'' to provide more combustion air in my basement to meet 
the current code. He said that the installer would know to include a 
``fan in a can'' when he came with the new furnace on 11/12. But my 
third party installer did not install such a fan. Now I am in the 
situation of trying to get the installer to come back or Columbia Gas 
to come and put in the fan. It is exhausting to be caught in the 
middle, to receive a variety of advice, suggestions, directives, and 
recriminations. It is not that the work did not get done eventually, 
but that each affected homeowner has to be vigilant, alert, and aware. 
The uncertainty is enervating. It affects trying to do one's paid job 
and take care of the people around you. Fortunately, I had many friends 
and family members who could take me in and spend the day at my house 
waiting for assessments, deliveries, repairs, etc. But not everyone was 
so fortunate.
                                 ______
                                 
    Nora Pelt from Andover: Our story is no different than most 
affected by the Columbia Gas fires of September 13th, 2018. It is the 
story of a scary, chaotic night on September 13th followed by 60 days 
of being scared to leave the house because you have no word of when 
crews might show up at your door, of waking up early to turn on space 
heaters to try and warm the house before the rest of the family awakes, 
of watching Columbia Gas daily put a positive spin on their work while 
pulling my hair out because not once did their updates reflect the 
nightmare that everyone I knew was going through. It is the story of 
all my husband's and my free time spent combing the Columbia Gas 
updates to see how they daily changes the rules, of (unsuccessfully) 
trying to find reputable plumbers and electricians that were available 
before mid-December, of boiling water in an electric kettle literally 
for hours to get everyone showered at the end of the day, of 
researching boiler types/like-for-like appliances/venting systems 
because it was impossible to trust Columbia Gas was making decisions in 
our best interest. It is the story of Columbia Gas playing ``yes, you 
can'' and ``no, you can't'' for over two months. We have our home and 
our lives but every single aspect of our days was changed. I was able 
to recognize people in the affected area by the sound of their voices. 
Their shaky, quiet voices unable to make simple decisions betrayed 
their smiles. I recognize it because mine is the same.
    I was about to pick up my son from soccer practice when I told my 
husband I smelled gas in the house. He took note and we went on with 
our day. Five minutes later, as I was pulling out of the driveway, I 
received the call to turn off the gas and evacuate. I spent the next 
three hours trying to get my three boys home from various after school 
activities--that were normally 10 minutes away--while my husband ran 
from house to house turning off neighbor's gas and holding babies while 
moms ran inside for diapers. We were overwhelmed watching a staging 
area at the end of our street, the firetrucks from Chelsea, Burlington, 
Lynn, Methuen, Revere, Dracut and on and on flew off in every direction 
at screaming pace. Usually, they all go in the same direction. It was 
so strange to see them scatter. It was wonderful to know so many had 
come to help and horrifying to realize that while I may have been 
trying to convince myself otherwise, what ever this was, was indeed a 
very big deal.
    Once cleared to reoccupy our house, my husband and I began learning 
to navigate the claims process. We picked up our hot plate and began 
discussing temporary hot water solutions. The hot plate was the first 
of many disappointments. It couldn't boil water in less than an hour 
and truly wasn't an option for a working mom of three boys to get 
dinner on the table each night. As for showers, my husband and I agreed 
an electric water heater was an indulgence we could live without. For 
$100, my husband hooked a propane camp shower to the propane from our 
grill with a garden hose through our bathroom window providing hot 
water and good water pressure. We settled in and waited for crews to 
arrive.
    Eleven days after the evacuation, we were told to call to make a 
space heater appointment. I waited on hold for 56 minutes and scheduled 
the appointment. A crew came four days later (on time and pleasant). 
They made it clear upon arrival that these appointments were no longer 
for space heaters but for ``data collection so more effective decisions 
can be made'' BUT I didn't call for data collection! I called for a 
space heater. They also had never seen a heating/hot water system like 
ours. They were standing right next to it when they asked me where it 
was. They said they had looked around my basement for 15 minutes for 
it. After sticking red ``condemned stickers'' on a few things, they 
left. My nerves began to unravel.
    Fifteen days in and we finally saw crews on our street! Hopes 
soared but they came and went leaving some spray painted lines. This 
week friends began dropping off warm bread, coffee cakes, cookies . . . 
things we couldn't make for ourselves. Trying any way to help but 
realizing that most of this recovery laid in Columbia Gas's hands. 
People dropped off space heaters, heating blankets, and InstaPots. 
Heating blankets and space heaters allowed two of our children to stay 
in their bedrooms with some sense of normalcy while one of our boys 
began sleeping in our bedroom on the floor. The InstaPot allowed me to 
run the boys to their activities and still cook a healthy meal for 
dinner.
    For three weeks, my husband and I have switched off working from 
home, afraid to leave the house unattended but the kids were getting 
squirrely so with great anxiety, we crossed our fingers, put our cell 
number on the door, and left the house unattended to head to Topsfield 
Fair. The kids had a blast and our joy was that we didn't miss a crew 
at our door.
    The month of October was one disappointment after another. At this 
point it was obvious to all affected, that the best source of accurate 
information was a Facebook page that those affected created. With 8,000 
people affected, we found that we were having 8,000 different 
experiences. My adjuster told me to Columbia Gas decided not to haul 
away condemned appliances, so we needed to make arrangements for that. 
A friend was told she was not allowed to remove condemned appliances 
because Columbia Gas was taking inventory of them. Every aspect of the 
recovery had multiple variations of this. Our nerves frayed a little 
bit more. We would get calls that crews needed come to look at our 
appliances for the third, fourth, fifth time only to get notification 
later that Columbia Gas changed their minds. Our relight date was 
pushed to 11/19. The cruise ship for the workers arrived with word that 
it will stay for ``several months'' and our nerves frayed a little 
more. We had a constant debate over the forecast and what we will do 
about hot water and heat. Columbia Gas won't give us a space heater and 
won't approve a mini-split system. We ask our adjuster for alternative 
heat sources and he suggested a pellet stove. We debate the 
installation of a pellet stove with a hole cut into our dining room 
wall and wonder if our wood floors will be damaged. Then comes word 
that Columbia Gas will be taking back the pellet stoves after all this 
is over! An invasive installation and then a removal??? We decide to 
pass and try to make due with our own space heaters and donated heating 
blankets. Our relight date is pushed to 11/22. My office was also 
affected and I would sit in my winter coat next to a space heater. The 
Columbia Gas website listed had our office as ``relit'' but I can 
assure you it was not.
    Almost five weeks in and crews arrive on our street to start 
digging. It took crews a little over a week on our short dead-end 
street to get the main and service gas lines tested and fixed.
    I had my annual check up with my primary care physician. She was 
surprised to see my usually normal blood pressure was high. We chatted 
about the situation and she said she would leave it be as it was likely 
situational. I explained I had nightmares about fires and explosions, I 
jumped when I heard sirens. Then she said I could stay in their warm 
lobby for the day and use their vending machine as much as I liked. I 
held back the tears because there was no way to explain the biggest 
problem was not heat or hot water or cooking but the mental game 
Columbia Gas was playing with us. We were forced to put our trust in a 
company that proved over and over they weren't trustworthy. We had no 
other choice and it felt devastating.
    It was too cold for our propane shower system, so we borrowed an 
indoor camp shower from a friend. After boiling water in an electric 
kettle literally for hours each night for two weeks, we were done. I 
had too many tears, the boys didn't want to get out of bed for school, 
they fought all the time and we decided to finally install an electric 
water heater. We still felt it was wasteful for the environment, we 
didn't want it taking up space in our basement but hot water would be 
one less thing for us to have to manage on a daily basis.
    We had a long planned family party to attend out of state for just 
two days. At this point it had been weeks with no one in our house and 
we weren't on the 72 hour list. We again took a deep breath, left our 
number on the door, and headed to the airport. Within two hours of 
landing, my cell phone rang with a crew at our door. We felt terrible 
about not being at the house but we had no notice of any kind and our 
relit date was still weeks away. We scrambled from out of state to get 
a neighbor to let them in and try to understand over the phone about 
what was happening and what decisions were being made. As we landed 
back at Logan airport, I checked the Columbia Gas website to see our 
relit date was pushed out three more weeks to 12/9.
    As November began, 50 days in, we started the search for a 
reputable plumber that could beat our 12/9 relit date. Our plumber was 
booked until mid-December. Another plumber was going door to door 
giving estimates, so we let him in but online reviews showed they 
jacked up prices and work done wasn't great. Eventually, a friend 
pulled some strings and got their plumber to commit to a date to come 
and take a look. A day later Columbia Gas showed up saying they are 
ready to work. We don't trust them and we start to gamble. Do we trust 
that Columbia Gas will show up tomorrow? Do we trust that they will 
stay until we have heat? What do we do if we aren't happy with the 
work? Who do we call in three months if we have a problem with the new 
boiler? Will our friend's plumber be able to beat the 12/9 date (we 
know this is unlikely)? We are sick about it, and Columbia Gas can 
provide no information, but decide to call our friend's plumber and let 
him go knowing that we won't be able to get him back if Columbia Gas 
decides not to show up. We see Columbia Gas is under criminal 
investigation. This is no surprise to any one affected but our nerves 
fray a little more.
    The crew come and stay. We are told we will get a like-for-like 
replacement for our boiler and the next day they deliver something 
completely different. Something that can't vent out our chimney so they 
will have to drill holes out our walls and we may need asbestos 
abatement. No one can explain to us why this happened. They all say, 
``don't worry . . . you are going to love it!'' That is fine, but we 
want to understand the decisions that are being made on our behalf! Is 
it because Navien gave Columbia Gas a great deal on these boilers? Is 
it because Columbia Gas will get Mass Save rebates for installing them? 
Is it because Columbia Gas has a warehouse of them and needs to get rid 
of them? Why the hell is it? A week into working 10.5 hours days, one 
of the plumber explains our chimney was likely not up to code and 
Columbia Gas would have had to pay for our chimney to be rebuilt in 
order to vent a like-for-like system. Okay, this makes sense . . . I 
just wish someone would communicate these things . . . or anything. It 
takes the plumbers (kind, amazing, and lovely) nine days to install one 
boiler. They just didn't have enough parts. They would go scavenging 
for parts each day. They can't find any within a two hour radius of the 
area. One day they drove up into New Hampshire in hopes of finding 
parts. How can they not have enough parts when 6,000 people are still 
waiting?
    On day 59, 99 percent of our heat/hot water was restored. We are 
happy crews moved on to those that have no heat, but hope they circle 
back someday and fix the small section of baseboard heat that is not 
working. This is a long process. There are still 5,000 waiting on heat 
and hot water. Even with using Columbia Gas crews instead of our own, 
we spent thousands out of pocket. We have been reimbursed for much of 
it but have been waiting weeks for a large check. On day 65, our stove 
was relit.
    We are grateful for the progress and my eyes have been opened to 
what a recovery process can look and feel like. We were not physically 
injured. Our home is standing. My thoughts are on the California fires 
and hurricane hit areas and the nightmare recovery process. I hope FEMA 
does a better job than Columbia Gas and I hope Columbia Gas is held 
responsible for the complete lack of a disaster/recovery plan. The 
affects at our house will linger for a long time.
                                 ______
                                 
    Janina Majeran from Andover: I didn't lose my house to an explosion 
or fire, but my home without heat and hot water for so long did not 
feel like my home. My home was always my sanctuary, but once it's 50 
degrees in your apartment and no amount of space heaters can warm it 
up, it ceases to be a safe haven.
    The thing that boggles my mind was how some representatives of 
Columbia Gas could be so callous when dealing with us. When I asked 
about temporary housing because my apartment was too cold to stay in, I 
was told to get a space heater. A friend of mine was told to get an 
electric blanket. Neither of those things are in any way sufficient 
when it's dropping below 50. And it's not like you can run a space 
heater all night long because they are a fire hazard--and these people 
know this.
    It took me over 3 weeks to get housing. I kept being put off, kept 
being told someone would be in touch with me and no one ever was. This 
was a lesson in how the squeaky wheel gets the oil.
    I spent a month relying on friends and family to let me stay with 
them when it was too cold to stay at my apartment. I had to shuttle my 
cat here and there and everywhere. I was stressed out every day 
wondering how cold my apartment was going to get and checking weather 
apps all day every day.
    I'm home now and it was hard for me to come back. I was worried it 
would be taken away and I wouldn't be able to get housing again. My 
home still does not feel like my home. I feel like I just moved in all 
over again only this time I'm worried I'll wake up one night or come 
home after work and find it all gone again.
    The past 2 months have been hell and I've gotten little sympathy 
from people staying in warm places at the end of the day. And I worry 
about the people who have been trying to stick it out as the 
temperature drops and drops.
    This never should have happened. And none of us should be made to 
feel like criminals for wanting compensation for the things we've had 
to buy extra just to survive. If I want an electric skillet or toaster 
oven over your crappy little hot plates, then don't argue with me over 
it. You did this. You did this to all of us. It's not our fault you 
screwed up.
                                 ______
                                 
    Yeison Pinales from Lawrence: This has hurt me so much that I'm 
missing out on my kids development I had to arrange for then to b more 
without me cuz of I can't b at my house.. Because my house is not a 
home at the moment I can't do my routine like I always did in the past. 
thanks giving is a no at my home this year
                                 ______
                                 
    Nicole Pelletier from North Andover: My two children, ages 5 and 3, 
were home with me on the afternoon of September 13. Without warning, 
one of our neighbors began practically banging the door down telling us 
that homes were exploding and that we needed to get out. Completely 
caught off guard and terrified, my children and I fled our home and 
tried to get out of North Andover.
    During this trip, we had to drive through a ``ground zero'' of 
sorts . . . many of the homes that had exploded were in our 
neighborhood. We witnessed homes smoking and on fire. The sound of 
sirens was constant. We were unsure about the status of our own home 
left behind. My 5 year old son was so terrified he cried for an hour 
straight and was physically sick, before he finally passed out from 
exhaustion.
    We were thankfully not one of the worst affected--although we were 
without gas for more than six weeks, our home is still standing and 
none of us were physically injured.
    My son's mental and emotional health, on the other hand, has been a 
different story. He had just started kindergarten the week prior to the 
gas fires, so he already had so much going on when this struck. He is 
now petrified of any kind of siren, no matter how far away it may be, 
and the possibility of any type of fire drill at school had him so 
anxious that he doesn't want to go to school on most days. We have had 
to be in constant touch with his school counselor and we have also 
found him his own therapist for when he is not at school. This event 
has scarred him, and we are still dealing with this aftermath months 
later.
    Having said all that I don't think Columbia has done nearly enough 
to remediate this disaster. My son will never forget this and although 
I am encouraged by the progress he is making with his therapist, the 
memory of his first ``big kid'' school experience will forever be 
colored by the events of September 13.
                                 ______
                                 
    Joseph Beninato from North Andover: I was at work my wife called 
said pilot in the gas wood stove hissing torch like flame shooting out. 
I told her go outside I would call gas company. When I called the 
operator was very calm asked address wanted to know the cross street 
told me to have my wife go outside and a man from Columbia gas would 
come by and take care of it. She said the was a problem in the area and 
they would take care of it. When I called my wife back she was 
hysterical all the neighborhood were in the streets. so much for the 
man coming by. so many people and teams coming repeating the same thing 
and no record of what the other team had done no database. our town is 
behind in the gas ready timeline. no one here was injured but the 
anxiety and fear will be with us for a long time. hopefully lessons can 
be learned because there will be another event if not looked into. we 
never found out the real cause. any word on that?
                                 ______
                                 
    Michael Silverman from Andover: The gas explosion occurred on Sept. 
13, 2018. Late that afternoon, we evacuated our home as ordered. We are 
a family of 4 including an 81 year old mother/grandmother who is a 
dialysis patient, a husband and wife with a 5-year old girl. Gas and 
electricity were shut off by 4:30 p.m. or so on that date . . . By 
Sunday morning, Sept. 16 electricity was restored. Gas was not . . . 
and still till this date, November 19, 2018 there is no gas service. 
This means that we have no gas for hot water, drying or heating in the 
home. While at first this was workable, as the cold weather has 
arrived, conditions are worse. We paid for and installed an electric 
water heater in early October so that we could take ``hot'' showers. We 
have an electric toaster oven, hotplate and microwave to heat foods. We 
also purchased several electric heaters. We have to be careful with 
which small heaters or cooking appliances are own. When the microwave 
is on with any one of the portable heaters, the circuit breakers switch 
off and have to be reset. This can be dangerous . . . especially at 
night for the 81-year old and the 5 year old.
    Approximately, November 4th, the Gas Company set up some diesel 
powered generator outside with additional sub-generators inside. The 
main goal of these generators is to heat the water pipes to prevent 
them from freezing.
    We have become to accommodate to the situation. Being able to 
``cook'' food is a regular challenge due to not having a range to use. 
This has increased our normal food budget to approximately double it's 
normal amount each week. With all the electric heaters in addition to 
the hot water heater, electricity costs are averaging $460/month 
compared to $65/month prior to the gas disruptions.
                                 ______
                                 
    Lauren Keating from Andover: When I tell people my house almost 
blew up, they laugh, until I add, ``no, but really,'' before explaining 
the Columbia Gas fiasco that has dominated the last two plus months of 
my life. I was coaching in Chelmsford, MA when my phone figuratively 
blew up as the Merrimack Valley literally blew up. Friends asking if I 
was safe, telling me not to go home, and a former colleague desperately 
warning me to NOT, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES head to Andover. It got to 
the point that I had to have my team copy and paste messages to friends 
and family that I was towns away and really had no idea what was going 
on. As a neighbor called me, I could hear the alarms in the background 
from our whole neighborhood, in the heart of what would come to be the 
affected area. Throughout the night, the news became more and more 
unbelievable, explosions, evacuations and exits being closed down. 
Essentially the Valley was shut down.
    On Sunday, when I returned from evacuation and was greeted with a 
bill from Columbia Gas. Newsflash--that was never going to get paid as 
this was around the time they referred to the devastation as an 
``inconvenience'' or an ``unfortunate incident.'' As the weeks went on, 
it appeared that efficiency was a trait only possessed by their billing 
department as the weeks stretched into October and we still had no 
utilities, although we did have a LOT of people making a lot of doing 
construction at all hours. I think for people living outside of this, 
this is the hardest part--the small things that were the biggest 
disruption. For 10 days, there were police escorts as our street was 
shut down with no notice. Workers were jackhammering though the night 
and after a long day at work, the only options for dinner were a 
reheated crockpot and a cold shower. I took to going to the gym before 
4 am to work out and shower and by mid-October was a zombie. As much as 
the reimbursement process was a pain, the worst part were the things 
you can't quantify--the extra time to do daily tasks of living.
    By November, I had been in three hotels, fought for reimbursement 
and spent multiple weeks in my own apartment with temperatures under 
40+ inside as the list to receive housing was so long. When we returned 
home, we had out electricity cut multiple days for multiple hours with 
30 minute notice, which is super convenient when you need to use a 
crockpot or microwave to eat. We had to leave our doors unlocked for 
two weeks because the workers ``might'' be by to replace our 
appliances. Because we wanted the work done, we did it, risking that 
anyone could have walked in. It is now November 19, the original date 
of restoration and the ``ongoing disruption'' is still in full swing. 
Our ``new'' stoves were defective and the replacements are backordered 
and we weren't given a date for their arrival. The new furnace upon 
installation is leaky and not functioning at full capacity so while we 
have heat, it is not efficient.
    Through it all though, the strength of this community has shown 
through. The five people in our house have worked together to make sure 
we are as close to functional as possible. In the initial days of the 
evacuation, watching the communities come together to make sure 
everyone had what they needed even when Columbia was so distant was 
inspiring as everyone was in a state of uncertainty. I may still be 
rolling my eyes from all the euphemisms used by Columbia Gas for how 
miserable of a situation this is, but there is truly a soft spot in my 
heart for the resilience of the Merrimack Valley in circumstances for 
which they have had zero control and very little progress.
                                 ______
                                 
    Constance Glore from West Boxford: It is past time to face the 
truth that the burning of fossil fuels is making the earth 
uninhabitable for life as we know it. The rise in global temperature, 
sea level and forest fires is directly caused by the use of these 
fuels. The warming of the Gulf of Maine has brought shrimp populations 
to the brink of extinction. Pollution caused by the burning of fossil 
fuels was dubbed ``the new tobacco'' last week by the head of the World 
Health Organization who also reported that ``the simple act of 
breathing is killing 7 million people a year and harming billions 
more.'' (The Guardian)
    I am one of those. I have COPD.
    The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported in Fall 
2018, ``Governments should stop licensing new fossil fuel projects; and 
stopping new projects alone will not be enough-governments must also 
phase out a significant number of existing projects ahead of schedule, 
while investing in a just transition for workers and communities.''
    A UN panel of scientists said every bit of warming matters, and 
we're almost out of time to keep it in check. We have the next 12 years 
to begin to drastically reduce CO2.
    The tragedy and ensuing future environmental damage caused by 
Columbia Gas/NiSource and other gas utilities must never be repeated. 
We need renewable, green, clean energy infrastructure to be built now.
                                 ______
                                 
    Martin Boroian from North Andover: I live with my sister Mary. I am 
a former Ma. State Metropolitan District Comm. Police Officer. We have 
been with heat from Sept. 13, 2018 till Nov. 2018. I am a disabled 
person. I have had 5 operations in the last five years. It was very 
hard waking up in a house with no heat. It was also very hard not 
knowing if and when we would have our heat restored. I also suffer from 
PTSD. I feel that there should have been more Ma. State utility 
inspectors to make sure that the Gas lines were in better condition. It 
was also not reassuring when none of our local politicians, except. Our 
U.S. Senator Edward Markey seemed to care about what happened to the 
citizens in Lawrence, North Andover, and Andover. Thanking you for 
letting us tell what happened to us. Ma. State and U.S. Citizens.--
Respectfully Submitted by Martin Boroian-Tel.No. (78-655-7656--home 
address 58 Union Street, Apt.# 2. North Andover, Ma. 01845.--e-mail 
address=mborian-@yahoo.com-tel.no.978-655-7656.
                                 ______
                                 
    Vladimir Saldana from Lawrence: September 13th
    I was sitting with a friend on the front porch of Lawrence 
CommunityWorks office building going over the treasurer report for a 
Rwanda Youth Development Project we are both involved with. Not long 
after the explosions broke out, a colleague from Lawrence 
CommunityWorks walks ups the stairs and says ``Omg Vladi, Lawrence is 
on Fire'' My immediate reaction was ``of course Lawrence is on fire, 
lots of good things are happening in this city'' Her face expression 
change significantly as she was walking closer to me with her cell 
phone out in her hands she turns the screen around to show me a video 
of the news coverage. We watched the news clip for about 3-5 minutes to 
get a sense for what was happening. After learning that the affected 
area in the city was South Lawrence and that folks were being asked to 
evacuate I got my phone and called a friend that lives in South 
Lawrence. As we were on the phone my friend was packing up her stuff to 
leave her home. I asked her where she was going and she said to a 
friend that lives in the North of the City. My thoughts and heart we're 
raising 100 miles per hours trying to wrap my head around what I should 
be doing and what was most necessary at the time. Organizing my 
thoughts quickly, I concluded to a three-phase strategy: a) my 
organizations have affordable housing units in the south of the city so 
I felt it was our responsibility to ensure the safety and evacuation of 
those units safety b) ensure that all my friends that live in South 
we're evacuated, safe and had a place to go c) assist the greater 
community with the emergency response.
    It had been announced that the Parthum School was one of the 
emergency shelters that was set up for evacuees. After completing the 
first two part of my personal efforts to assist with the gas explosion 
I left the office and drove to the emergency shelter. When I arrived at 
the Parthum School there was a ton of activities and many faces I 
recognized, from community leaders to politicians. After hanging out in 
the front lobby for 10-15 minutes with nothing to do I decided it was 
time to depart. When I was walking towards my car, a longtime friend/
brother Emmanuel asked me where I was going. The question struck my 
cord because it felt as if I was abandoning the city during a tough 
time--I went on to explain to Emmanuel that I was leaving because they 
had enough volunteers and assistance. Emmanuel felt we needed to do 
more so he suggested we check out the other shelter at the Arlington 
School. We arrived at the Arlington School around 7:00 or so. When we 
arrived at the Arlington we didn't find the same situation as the 
Parthum School. It was a bit more chaotic it the sense that no one 
really knew what was happening and folks that were evacuated and 
looking for a place to sleep didn't know who to talk to or what to do. 
There was way too many activities happening and just not enough 
coordination. We approached the Red Cross respondent and asked how can 
we help? They said that at the moment there was nothing to do because 
they are getting organized. But, what we saw was a lot of emotional and 
personal disconnect from the vulnerable residents sitting in the school 
cafeteria with the people that were ``in charge''. I want to avoid 
critiquing the Red Cross because they were doing the best they can do 
with the resources they had at the moment. But in addition to having a 
low number of ``official'' volunteers, their low number of volunteers 
did not speak Spanish. This is where we saw an opportunity to assist. 
So we decided to serve as translators for the Red Cross. As time went 
on we made observations and noticed other gaps in their process, such 
as very little emotional support to the victims arriving at the 
shelter.
    Emmanuel and I recognized other community leaders and friends such 
as Pavel Payano and many others who were also feeling the disconnection 
between the process and the people arriving at the shelter. From this 
point on, the atmospheres took a turn, it was a kinematic connection 
between the community leaders that were present at the time. We all 
started to assume leadership roles. By the end of the first night on 
Thursday, it was clear that local leaders we're going to manage the 
relief efforts with the Red Cross assistance. That night, I and other 
leaders that took an active role. From registering victims, feeding 
them dinner, getting answers for what was happening, setting up 
sleeping cods to even calling out of work for one the victim who did 
not speak English. That night, most of the community volunteers left 
the school at 2:30 A.M. on Friday. A few hours later, we all returned 
energized to assists our community. The situation at the Arlington 
School improved tremendously all due to the help of many local 
community leaders and neighbors helping neighbors. Like others, I've 
spent a tremendous amount of time in the shelter From Friday to Sunday. 
I slept at the emergency shelter Friday night and Saturday night. One 
of the reasons why I decided to stay was because none of the Red Cross 
official volunteers spoke Spanish. The vast majority of residents 
sleeping at the shelter did not speak English. I've felt responsible 
for their wellbeing and being a traumatic situation without 
interpretation can add more anxiety to a difficult situation.
    During those 3 and half days, my heart grew every moment I witness 
people from all over the place come to the shelter asking, ``what can I 
do to help'' or bringing food, toiletries, necessities and all sort of 
donations for the folks at the emergency shelter. We had an abundance 
amount of food, clothes, and basic needs at the shelter from just 
regular people dropping stuff off. We also had educators set up 
activities for families with kids, therapist offering free services to 
families that needed to speak to someone. I've felt the love, 
compassion, and services from the wider community for the victim and 
the City of Lawrence.
    Despite all the commotion that was happening outside of the walls 
of the Arlington emergency shelter, inside felt like a community center 
addressing individual needs. Responding to the larger crisis at hand. 
Volunteers stepping up and dedicating countless hours to help out in 
any way they can. The spirit of the community was incredible and eye-
opening. To give you a sense on the sort of activities that were common 
during the emergency period read the following two scenarios. One 
night, a truck branded with a logo from a paving company from Peabody 
pulled up with about 50 cases of 24 pack of waters, inside the shelter, 
we probably had triple that amount of waters, and space was limited so 
we asked them to take it to the other shelter or the Senior Center. The 
stranger's faces looked disappointed. Ultimately, we ended up squeezing 
the waters inside the school. The second scenario happened on Sunday 
afternoon after the Mayor decided to lift the band and allow people to 
go back home. Firefighters from Lowell pulled up to the school with two 
full vans of donation items. Half of the shelter population had already 
gone home. The ones that didn't did have a home to go to.
    Today marks two after the gas explosions and the relief efforts 
continue to be a challenge for various reasons. Many families are still 
in a dire situation and the City continues to do everything possible to 
restore a sense of normality. As we are approaching a holiday dedicated 
for to give Thanks, I want to give Thanks to the community of Lawrence 
for showing me resiliency, to the wider community for having a blessed 
heart and giving their support during these hard few weeks. I am 
confident that we will come out stronger out of this situation.
                                 ______
                                 
    Heather Wilson from North Andover: On September 13 2018 at 
approximately 4:30 PM I had just got home form work and my son stopped 
by and said he smelled something, and immediately the smoke detectors 
went off he ran down the cellar to find my boiler engulfed in flames. 
My brother who has plumbing experience grabbed a tool and immediately 
shut the gas off to my boiler and went outside to turn it off at the 
house and while all this was happening I called fire department they 
where there immediately and the fire was out by the time they got 
there, They stayed for about 5 minutes when they realized it was a 
community wide gas leak and left to deal with more serious issues they 
realized there were higher triages to deal with., The next two weeks 
met me with many claims workers form all over the country who will all 
giving me different answers there was no consistency to their answers. 
Also they never called me I had to call them a week later only to find 
out that they had the wrong number, and they did not believe there was 
a fire in my house until i sent the report to them. I spent the next 5 
weeks in 4 different hotels, very inconvenient as I am a handicapped 
women away form my home.
                                 ______
                                 
    Todd Sacco from Withrop: I don't live in the affected area, 
however, a co-worker of mine does. His brother in law has been shipped 
in from other areas to assist with changing out meters. LOOK TO THE 
IMPORTED WORKERS FOR THE TRUTH. The local union workers are NOT 
carrying their weight and the imports are protecting them by not 
calling them out.
    This is not only making it unsafe and extremely inconvenient for 
residents, it's making YOU, the elected official, who receives campaign 
funds from unions, look very very bad.
    This is unconscionable and needs to stop. I nave no dog in the hunt 
other than my sincerest concern for the innocent victims of the 
explosions and the ongoing war between the gas company workers and 
their management.
                                 ______
                                 
    Astrid Nielsen from Andover: Story from a resident in a NON 
impacted area
    Thursday Sep. 13th I was on the road when my kids called from home 
to tell me, that their friends were texting if we had gotten a prank 
call too about leaving the house. On my way back home through town 
sirens were blasting left and right and just as a firetruck would pass 
one way, another would come in the other direction. Usually when there 
is a fire an army of firetrucks will be present as well as police and 
the street will be closed of. That day I passed several single 
firetrucks without backup running in and out of buildings.
    We left the house and got a chance to talk it through and check 
social medias and found, that since we are on a street, where gas was 
never put in, we could go home safely. Instead we invited friends to 
come and stay with us.
    A friends in Andover was driving around with her child and another 
3 children. They had been at the library and had been evacuated and 
when the mom came to pick up her daughter, she took the other 3 as 
their parents were not close by. Two of the children's parents were 
stuck in Lawrence, where they have a restaurant, and was not able to 
get out of town until late that evening. We made beds for 10 but 
eventually only 3 stayed. The next evening they were able to go home.
    That was suppose to be it for us, but
        --My daughter had to go to emergency counseling. She is better, 
        but it has been so hard to witness. All the uncertainty and not 
        feeling safe is hard to deal with as an adult and much more for 
        an adolescent with anxiety.
        --I was in Andover a few days later and when a firetruck came 
        blasting by and everyone absolutely froze including me. It took 
        a minute or two before anyone were able to talk again. We all 
        remembered
        --For the next two month I would have to add a minimum of 15 
        minutes to any trip trough town because of all the construction 
        and detours. With two kids and their schedule it was very 
        stressful to have to be places at specific times when you never 
        knew what to expect.
        --I have lunch in town several times a week and for two month 
        my favorite places were closed. (Bueno Malo, Yella, Casa 
        Blanca). There are people I used to pass by every week I 
        haven't seen for month now. The dynamic in town has been so off 
        since 9/13
    The most popular costume this year for Halloween was a yellow vest 
and a hard hat!!!
    On paper my family will not be a part of history. But we were 
impacted.
    PS I don't think you will ever know the whole scope. I talked to a 
home owner who told me, that there had been 6 fires on their street, 
but when I checked the map, only 1 had been recorded.
                                 ______
                                 
    Stacie Murphy from Lawrence: I am submitting this story on behalf 
of CLASS, Inc. Located at One Parker Street, Lawrence, MA.
    On Thursday, September 13, 2018 at approximately 4:20pm, several 
gas lines in the Merrimack Valley started to explode as staff was 
leaving for the day. A called was placed to the CEO Al Frugoli who was 
still inside the building in a meeting. He was told to evacuate the 
building and ask that the evening cleaning crew leave as well. Nancy 
Price, Facilities Manager was on her way home when she received the 
news of the emergency in Lawrence. She headed back to CLASS at One 
Parker St. but at that time, no one was allowed on or near the 
property. CLASS Management spent hours on the phones communicating with 
key staff regarding opening of the building on Friday, as we were not 
aware of the severity of the disaster.
    On the evening of September 13th all power was cut to 1 Parker 
Street and the surrounding areas. No power means we lost all 
connections to our phone system and servers. At approximately 11pm a 
decision was made to closed CLASS at One Parker Street for programs on 
Friday. Staff would have to use a snow day in order to be paid. Meeting 
had to be canceled and rescheduled.
    CLASS serves 265 individuals at One Parker Street on a daily basis, 
many of our clients live in group homes, many were also affected by the 
gas disaster in the Merrimack Valley. A majority of CLASS Staff lives 
in the affected areas and some could not even get to their homes.
    CLASS lost approximately $6,800.00 in Transportation, $15,786 in 
Employment Services and $10,591.00 in Medicaid. Total revenue lost on 
Friday, September 13 was $33,177.00.
    On Saturday September 15, at around 8pm, all power was restored to 
CLASS at One Parker Street.
    On Sunday, September 16, Lawrence Fire Department along with 
Columbia Gas inspected One Parker Street and gave CLASS the green light 
to open. CLASS opened without heat operating in the building and re-
opened programs at One Parker Street on Monday, September 17
    On Monday September 17, programs re-opened. Many issues were 
discovered due to the power being cut. We discovered both garage doors 
were not operating and had to be manually opened. Service was called to 
repair the garage doors that resulted in charges as parts needed to be 
replaced. The security system dropped from the server and had to be re-
programmed by technicians.
    At approximately 10:25AM, an odor of gas was reported and our 
building was evacuated. After Friday's incidents staff were nervous and 
it was unsettling to many individuals we serve as well. The Fire 
Department arrived on scene, did a walk through and cleared the 
building, followed by the gas company who checked the building and gave 
the final ok.
    On October 13, a temporary heating system was installed into the 
building. Due to the nature of our business, CLASS had to hire 
temporary staff for some individuals we serve. Gas was restored on 
Monday, November 12. During this disaster, CLASS paid overtime hours to 
our facilities manager who worked almost 24/7 to make sure things were 
done correctly and our building was handled with care.
                                 ______
                                 
    Shawn Logan from Andover: Although not directly impacted by the Gas 
explosions (with the exception of my brother staying at my home as his 
house was impacted), I am impacted peripherally--as were countless 
others in two ways:
    1. The Columbia Gas workers and their efforts have closed streets, 
re-routed traffic and resulted in extreme congestion throughout the 
towns of Andover, North Andover, and Lawrence. This has been time 
consuming and frustrating. Further it appears they have taken advantage 
of the explosions to unnecessarily upgrade all their gas lines and 
forced homeowners to have their gas appliances and homes re-inspected 
and brought up to existing code.
    2. The street work to dig up, replace, and repair gas lines has 
reduced the quality of the roads and paved surfaces in Andover, North 
Andover, and Lawrence. In my view, Columbia Gas should pay to have the 
impacted roads re-paved. The patchwork of repairs results in excessive 
wear and tear on the suspensions of all our vehicles and makes for some 
very uncomfortable travel.
                                 ______
                                 
    Dean and Mona Thornhill from North Andover: Our home was set on 
fire. We lost 85 percent of all our possessions. We are estimated to be 
out of our home for a year to repair it.
                                 ______
                                 
    Alexander Katsev from North Andover: I own a property in North 
Andover that was affected by the disaster. I would like to get the 
property inspection results, but Columbia gas was unable to produce it. 
I called--10 times--no one knows anything. No written report, no 
certification that gas operated appliances are not damaged. Nothing. 
very poorly managed. . . .
                                 ______
                                 
    Jon Paul from Andover: I am the pastor of the Free Christian Church 
in Andover, a local church that is still not fully restored as of today 
(11/21/2018). We hope to have heat restored by next week but our 
kitchen could take weeks or months longer due to a number of 
complications. In the meantime, ministries that use the kitchen to 
provide meals for seniors and others in need are on hold.
    Even our normal worship services have been challenging as the 
building is very cold. A number of our parishioners have chosen to stay 
home due to the cold.
    I plan to do a wedding on Saturday morning 11/24. We have some 
temporary heat, but it is inadequate for our large church building. I 
feel bad (especially for the bride) that it will probably be cold 
indoors at her wedding.
    We are doing our best to provide spiritual and practical support 
residents and businesses impacted by this crisis while dealing with our 
own issues. We recently received an e-mail from one of our seniors, a 
widow. I think is a good example of the struggles many are facing. She 
writes: ``I am not feeling well today and will stay home [from the 
church's senior group] tomorrow. Exhausted trying to deal with 
everything. The gas situation is disorganized. I wake up and find 
people digging up my lawn and they have machinery blocking my driveway. 
Electricians came to hook up my furnace, but I don't have a furnace 
yet. Had a small flood in my basement when they took out the hot water 
heater, and the pipe is still leaking into a large bucket. I am really 
exhausted. They told me that my appliances would be coming on a certain 
day, but they didn't. Afraid to leave the house in case they do come, 
or people want to get into the house. I am just beat right now. . .''
                                 ______
                                 
    Lacey McManus from Andover: On September 13th after smelling gas in 
my home I went outside, thinking I was losing my mind. How could there 
be a gas odor in my home, no gas appliance was on! I found a neighbor, 
who myself and my children consider family, in the middle of the street 
frantic! My heart broke for her when she said she had a fire in her 
basement and was told the fire department would get to her as soon as 
they could. We proceeded to tell our neighbors to get out of their 
homes and ensuring all were safe. Since that horrific day, we have all 
spent countless hours trying to find ways to feed our families, keep 
our children and pets warm, all while making life continue as normal. 
Because outside of the affected areas nobody understood the struggle of 
feeding a family without a stove or ensuring the house was warm enough 
when your kids got home or where and when their next warm shower would 
be. As a mother it has been very hard to look my children in the eyes 
and tell them everything would be ok and there was nothing for them to 
worry about. A hotel was out of the question, because how would I get 
the kids to school, how would I get to work, and the kids to their 
afterschool sports practices. We live here because our entire lives are 
within a 5 mile radius of where we live. I had already been 
inconvenienced enough with driving 30 minutes for them to take warm 
showers, spending hours on end planning and making meals for us to eat 
and stressing over the winter months just around the corner. Then we 
got into a routine and we made it work. Then the contractors came a 
month early to get us relit . . . what a nightmare!!! People in and out 
of my home, with no respect for my belongings or my family. The water 
tank blew water everywhere and the entire crew left without cleaning it 
up, they forgot about my house for days, and when they finally did come 
back it was days before everything was properly installed. The 
inspector spent 2 minutes in basement to say we were good to go, and 
when we were relit I still had no hot water. A task that took self 
mitigated people 2 days tops took us 2 and a half weeks! Once we were 
relit, I was happy but then fear set in. How am I supposed to feel safe 
in a home with gas again? Every noise, while probably normal, scares me 
to my core. Using a stove again, having the furnace on, and using my 
dryer, while normal and an everyday necessity that many don't bat an 
eye to, makes me so nervous! This is going to take a LONG time to 
recover from. What makes matters worse, is how do we feel safe knowing 
we have the same gas provider that caused this epic disaster? Monetary 
reimbursements for minimal expenses only get us so far, the 
responsibility of making us all feel safe and comfortable in our homes 
sits in the hands of our representatives, senators, our governor, 
mayors, town managers and everyone else who should have the residents 
well-being at the top of their agenda.
                                 ______
                                 
    Susan Roussilhes from Andover: The horror of September 13, 2018 has 
been recounted and retold many times so I'll start with the days 
following the explosions. We are doubly affected--our home and our new 
business are both in the affected area. We received an alert that our 
home had been broken into. We called the police and after some 
confusion and vague explanations, we were informed that Columbia Gas, 
along with the police and a locksmith, broke into our home to shut off 
the gas. We were allowed to enter both places 4 days after the 
explosions-both with no heat. In addition to having no heat in our 
home, we had no hot water, no dryer for clothes, cold showers, and no 
cooking. There was also the constant anxiety that what would happen 
before might happen again. There were ``gas purges'' that caused worry 
and confusion. In the days following the incident there were workmen, 
police, officials from the state and town. I think everyone was still 
in shock.
    We attended meeting after meeting to receive whatever information 
we could--which was sparse and confusing. We filed our first claims at 
the new claim center in town. We waited in line with everyone else. We 
were given a hot plate and were told we would have to have our home 
inspected if we were to receive space heaters. No one came to inspect 
so we were then told to go out and buy space heaters and we would be 
reimbursed. We submitted receipts to an assigned adjuster who then 
issued a few checks to reimburse us. We continued to submit expense 
receipts with no response after 2 weeks. We called the claim number and 
spoke to our adjuster who told us she was no longer our adjuster and we 
were reassigned to another adjuster but she had no idea who that 
adjuster was. This changing of adjusters would occur 3 more times. She 
said that she submitted all of our documents to her supervisor who 
assigned our claim to another adjuster. We were finally told who are 
new adjuster was and it was a disaster from the beginning. We had to 
resubmit all of our receipts again and then we were accused of 
duplicating receipts. We spent hours in the claim center and on the 
phone with the claim center in Louisiana. We care for our grandson 3 
days a week and it had started to get very cold. We talked to an 
adjuster for families who needed to be relocated and our only options 
would have been to go into an RV which would not have been acceptable 
with a young child and a dog and 3 adults or to be placed in a hotel 27 
miles south. We explained to the adjuster in Louisiana that traffic in 
Boston is horrendous and that commute would be over an hour or more 
both ways (our business is located 3 blocks from our home). We were 
then lectured by this person located thousands of miles away that it 
would only be 35 minutes. We decided to stay in our home and remain 
cold.
    This was our day: on the phone with adjusters in Louisiana, in the 
claim center in town--for hours on end--gather documents, receipts, 
etc. We called newspapers, news channels, and congress people and 
senators and even the governor-but since it was in the middle of 
elections, we had little response.
    We became inundated with workmen and police. Our street was blocked 
off for several weeks. Work went on through the night with many 
sleepless nights.
    Our home has 2 sections-one is 160 years old and there was an 
addition added 10 years ago so therefore we have 2 boilers and 2 hot 
water heaters. We were able to replace 1 hot water heat and convert it 
to electric so we had limited hot water and we were finally able to 
take a hot shower. after several weeks of. Old showers. We were also 
able to get reimbursed for that expense fairly quickly. We ordered 
replacements for all appliances but had to front the bill for a new 
oven, gas dryer, 1 boiler, and a combination boiler and gas hot water 
heater all costing around $30,000. Getting reimbursed was agonizing-
calling Louisiana and spending hours in the claim center. We got our 
gas back on November 9. We still have no stove in spite of the purchase 
of a brand new one. The town inspector would not approve the use of our 
stove because our cabinets above our stove are too low. These same 
cabinets were approved prior to these explosions. So now we have 2 
options in order for us to use the stove-raise the cabinets 3 inches 
throughout our kitchen and extend the tile backsplash and paint the 
kitchen which would cost a few thousand dollars or have metal plates 
put under the cabinets which might be unsightly-we don't know because 
we've never heard of this before.
    Now for our business-September was to have been the beginning of 
our busiest season. It has turned out to be disastrous. My daughter and 
I opened our store on November 9, 2017. We worked very hard to 
establish a women's boutique and we put everything we have into our 
store. We previously had a successful store on Newbury street in Boston 
but decided to open a new location in our community. We wanted to leave 
behind the high rent, the hectic commute, and the higher cost of doing 
business in Boston and concentrate on our community. We opened in 
November of last year to a very successful few months. The business 
previously occupying the space was a very successful and lucrative 
women's boutique selling very similar styles to what we have so we 
anticipated doing a similar business. We started out that way and then 
September 13 happened. Our business came to a standstill. Because we 
don't have numbers for our Andover location from last year, we used an 
average of what we did in our Boston store and the store previously in 
this space and took an average. Our sales for the month of September 
declined by 83 percent. For October we used a similar formula and again 
sales declined 77 percent. We can now use last year's November numbers 
and as of this date-our November sales are down 57 percent. In the days 
since the explosions parking has been a nightmare because many of the 
available parking has been taken up by work trucks and such. Traffic 
has been snarled because of workers and construction trucks. The 
restaurants surrounding us have been closed. We get many customers from 
these restaurants and it is very much a co-dependent relationship. 
Business has decreased to such a point that we have been unable to pay 
rent. We don't want to lose the 3 employees we have so we have been 
scheduling them for half of the hours to which they are accustom. We 
have orders that we can't take in so that those customers who do come 
in we can sell them merchandise that is current and not previous season 
inventory. Our business is suffering. Claim money that we have received 
has gone to paying rent and orders. We are paying pay roll out of 
personal funds which would not be so serious but we have had to put out 
$30,000 up front for our appliances and work for our home.
    We have received claim money and reimbursements for expenses but we 
are not sure if we will ever recover our customer base when there are 
other businesses in nearby towns that customers can frequent as well as 
online shopping.
    In short we are very aware that we may never recover and the 
business that my daughter and I started may have to be declared 
bankrupt. We don't have the money from our savings to keep putting into 
our business.
    We wanted you to hear our story. Thank you.
                                 ______
                                 
    Janice Valverde from Lawrence: TESTIMONY of YWCA Northeastern 
Massachusetts to the Field Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation--November 26, 2018--Lawrence, MA
    YWCA Northeastern Massachusetts is a multi-site, multi-service 
agency that has served vulnerable women, children and families in the 
Merrimack Valley for over 125 years. One of its major program areas is 
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault services.
    Four of the agency's seven sites are located in Lawrence. One of 
those is the YWCA Domestic Violence Emergency Shelter, located at an 
undisclosed residential address in South Lawrence. It was directly 
affected by the gas explosions on September 13, 2018.
    At any given time, the Shelter is home to five women and their 
minor children who have fled domestic violence. It is always full to 
capacity. On September 13, there were five women and six children 
living at the Shelter.
    While the gas pipeline incident was extremely disruptive to all 
affected, and especially devastating to those who lost their homes, the 
YWCA Shelter residents were thrust into a situation that affected them 
in a way somewhat different from the way it affected others.
    For them to have to evacuate the Shelter and very quickly adapt to 
a different environment and different routines, even for three days, 
was far beyond an inconvenience; it as extremely stressful, disruptive 
and fear-inducing, especially to a few with fragile mental health.
    The YWCA wants to enter the unique story of these domestic violence 
survivors and their children into the record. We appreciate this 
opportunity to do so.
    The YWCA Emergency Shelter was evacuated on the evening of 
September 13 after the gas explosions occurred. The Shelter's gas 
furnace and hot water heater were no longer usable. It would be three 
days (and nights) until the Shelter's five women and six children would 
be able to return to the Shelter. Columbia Gas offered accommodations 
in trailers or reimbursement to the YWCA for hotel stays. Neither of 
these was a viable or practical solution for the 11 Shelter Residents, 
however.
    For domestic violence victims whose lives had already been 
profoundly disrupted, each of whom was at a point on their own path of 
healing from trauma while living in the Emergency Shelter, this new 
disruption was quite traumatic. Some of the residents were experiencing 
PTSD or other mental health issues. Typically, over a period of time, 
usually months, survivors slowly heal from trauma as some stability and 
certainty comes into their lives. But a major stressor can cause a 
setback in their recovery.
    Having to leave the Shelter in the midst of the gas explosion 
disaster was indeed a setback for all of the YWCA Emergency Shelter 
residents to some degree, but particularly for two women and one young 
teenage boy who are suffering with mental health issues.
    Along with the rest of the Shelter ``family,'' they were frightened 
to leave the Shelter itself and did not want to be separated from each 
other or the YWCA Shelter staff. YWCA staff, who are highly trained and 
experienced in dealing with trauma, were able to manage the situation, 
but that did not erase the trauma added to all these residents' lives.
    Trailers offered by Columbia Gas as temporary quarters were at 
least a temporary solution for some people, but not a viable solution 
for the YWCA Shelter residents. Moving into a trailer in the city among 
others affected by the gas explosions, was not only an added stressor, 
but was potentially a threat to individual safety. The trailers 
provided no guarantee of privacy and physical safety and security, 
which are obviously paramount to someone whose abuser may be in the 
same community. Shelter residents typically bond into a family-like 
community within the house--bonding with each other and with YWCA 
Shelter staff who are present 24/7. This would not have been 
sustainable if every family was in its own trailer, and support of the 
staff is key to maintaining stability and encouraging healing for the 
residents.
    Likewise, the option of a hotel stay was not a good one. There were 
not enough rooms in any one area hotel for all 11 residents. Again, 
this option brought up the issue of how to maintain the daily support 
system provided by YWCA Shelter staff and the common fear of being 
``out in the community.''
    The bottom line was that Shelter residents were re-traumatized to 
varying degrees, and all of them were frightened to leave the Shelter, 
but forced to do so by circumstances.
    After considering the options, the YWCA decided there was no choice 
but to use its own resources. For three days, Shelter residents were 
able to stay at the YWCA Fina House, a residential building that houses 
the YWCA Transitional Housing program for domestic violence survivors 
and the residential Teen Parenting Program, was available, too. It is a 
secure building, staffed 24/, as is the Shelter. Conditions over those 
three days were somewhat chaotic, overcrowded and far from ideal, but 
at least the residents were persuaded to go there since their safety 
and security could be guaranteed and YWCA staff could remain with 
them..
    Once the Shelter was cleared by authorities after three days, the 
residents returned to a house, albeit without central heat or hot 
water. It was decided that the best course of action was to have the 
residents remain in the Shelter while YWCA senior staff ``scrambled'' 
as much as necessary to restore heat and hot water. For almost six 
weeks, residents were shuttled to other YWCA facilities in Lawrence to 
take showers--the Fina House and the YWCA Lawrence site which has a 
locker room with showers.
    The YWCA discovered that the electrical panel in the house 
(Emergency Shelter) could not even accommodate space heaters in every 
room, so the YWCA purchased electric blankets for residents. 
Fortunately the weather was not too cold for the next six weeks--the 
last two weeks of September and all of October.
    Over several weeks, with cold weather on the horizon, the challenge 
of restoring some normalcy to the Shelter residents' lives was a big 
one. The YWCA made various requests for assistance, reaching out to the 
state and to private foundations, while negotiating with Columbia Gas 
regarding the YWCA's claim for damages, and its need for a replacement 
water heater.
    Ultimately, the YWCA was able to find emergency funding to cover 
the costs of replacing the failed gas heating system with electric 
baseboard heat, and had a new electrical panel was installed to 
accommodate the baseboard heating and a new stove. Columbia Gas finally 
provided a new gas hot water heater after about five weeks, but not 
without repeated calls from YWCA directors.
    None of this happened without incurring many unexpected costs and a 
diversion from the regular work of the agency's directors, and domestic 
violence program staff, but the emotional costs to the Shelter 
residents was perhaps the greatest cost.
    Thank you for considering this story of how the Columbia Gas 
pipeline explosions affected a unique population in Lawrence.
                                 ______
                                 
    Jaime Sloan-McCarthy from North Andover: My name is Jaime Sloan-
McCarthy and I am the owner of Dani Kaye Store LLC located at 85 Main 
Street in North Andover, MA. My husband and I own two businesses in 
North Andover and thankfully his company Muse Intermedia LLC was 
minimally affected by the Columbia Gas explosions that happened on 
September 13, 2018. I opened Dani Kaye on August 24th, 2017 and we had 
just completed our first year of business when the incident occurred. 
Opening and cultivating a new business in a new market is a significant 
undertaking by itself, and the challenge of the gas explosions has been 
crippling. As a new business, I only have one year of records and every 
piece of product is purchased outright. My vendors do not extend credit 
terms to new businesses and one year of records is not enough to 
present to a bank for business financing options. There isn't enough 
documentation to show viability to any financial institution to receive 
a loan. My husband and I were in the process of building a home at the 
time of the incident and were weeks away from our closing date. We were 
displaced for a few days from the apartment we were staying in while 
waiting for the home to be completed as we were staying in North 
Andover. We are both self employed and did not have the luxury of using 
our personal credit or assets to ease the financial strain in my 
business, nor could we seek financing even to help our business with a 
pending mortgage. We knew our financials were being monitored up until 
we closed and we could not afford to jeopardize the home we had worked 
so hard to purchase. We applied for an emergency loan from MCCI after 
closing on our home to help us and we just received it yesterday 
morning; it took two weeks to receive because of the back and forth 
between the lender and Columbia Gas regarding my claim. Two weeks is 
significantly longer than the 24-48 hour approval we were promised. Two 
weeks is a long time after losing two months of my most lucrative 
season right before the Holidays which is supposed to be the icing on 
the cake for a retail business like mine and the necessary financial 
cushion we need to get us to the Spring season. Additionally, we still 
do not have gas in my shop and my HVAC unit has not been replaced for 
me to have a permanent heating solution. I currently have a Rheem 
heating unit that was supplied by my landlord who chose to self 
mitigate and until this unit was installed we had two weeks where it 
was too cold for me to operate my business out of the shop. I am 
grateful for the Columbia Gas workers who have tried to help get us 
hooked back up, but having them continually coming through my store is 
disruptive to my business and makes it an uncomfortable environment for 
my clientele to shop.
    I am proud of what I have been able to achieve in my first year of 
business in this market as the first upscale women's boutique in North 
Andover. Growing a new business takes time and planning and this is 
something Columbia Gas is not willing to consider as we have been 
dealing with them for our business claim. After the gas explosions, I 
did not see many customers for four weeks due to traffic disruptions 
and the fact many of them were impacted and displaced as well. I did 
not expect to see them under the circumstances. After the four weeks it 
became too cold for me to operate in my store and we lost another two 
weeks of business over this. I was still trying to do business at this 
time because I had to sell product to pay for product that I ordered 
six months prior that was cut to order for our store. Some of my 
vendors cancelled a few orders for us but I could not cancel everything 
without jeopardizing my relationships and the exclusivity of some of 
our brands. I also needed the product for my regular customers who 
expect new items when they come to see me, and I didn't want to risk 
having my pieces re-allocated by the vendors to other businesses. I 
struggled to sell inventory that was intended for early Fall and that 
would inevitable go on sale online and in department stores within a 
few months. I am still sitting on many pieces that have effectively 
``expired'' and I have lost my window to sell them due to the shift in 
weather. My money is still tied up in this product which should have 
moved through my business by now. Columbia Gas has ignored this part of 
my claim which has made doing business incredibly difficult. They do 
not want to take responsibility for my product needs and obligations 
and the numbers they have presented to us have netted out and 
discounted all costs associated with product. Since we don't have 
enough history as a business, the gas company is using our numbers from 
last year as a base line and we had barely been open. I don't know how 
they can compare a business that only had under 50 customers to a 
business that currently has 600 and counting as people are still 
discovering us everyday. I have fought to build our business and 
reputation over the last year and I am only asking that I be treated 
fairly so I can continue to operate and get back on track to grow as I 
had planned.
    Despite the challenges and losses we have endured with our 
business, I have still made it a priority to give back to our 
community. I have hosted Sip and Shop events where we raised money for 
the Lawrence Emergency Fund and for the Soto family. I have also 
donated clothing to people who have needed it. I know I am fortunate to 
be operational and that others have it worse than I do and I have felt 
obligated to help. I hope that we will be given that same support from 
our community as the situation is rectified. It is imperative that the 
Town of North Andover will push to bring business downtown now for the 
Holidays to help the businesses like mine that are up and running and 
are fighting to get back to business as usual. The road to recovery 
will be a long one; small businesses are necessary to the fabric of 
this community and we cannot be forgotten. I opened my store in North 
Andover a year ago because I believed in the future and potential of 
the area. I intend to not only survive this incident, but continue to 
thrive and service the community.
                                 ______
                                 
    Lisa Cascio from Lawrence: https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/
read/ma-natural-gas-explosions-highlight-tension-between-recovery-and-
efficiency#gs.dSkRLuc
                                 ______
                                 
    Elizabeth Rocco from Arlington: I'm a family physician at the GLFHC 
clinic at Plaza 114 in South Lawrence. I was in the clinic during the 
explosions, and I heard of the impact on my staff and patients' lives 
for the last 2 months. 3 of my patients residences burned down and lost 
everything. One patient moved out of state. The other two moved from 
hotel to hotel for 2 months looking for housing and only found housing 
last week. One had to drop out of graduate school because the cost of 
losing all her possessions and living in a hotel wiped out her savings. 
She also experienced trouble sleeping, panic attacks and depression 
which interfered with her ability to study and work. Most of my 
patients had anxiety and sleep disturbances related to the fires and 
explosions depending on how closely they were impacted. Many of my 
patients and staff have complained of exhaustion from the extra time 
needed to heat water on electric hot plates for bathing, the 
inconvenience and extra cost of not being able cook at home and the 
discomfort of not being able to heat their home during the cold fall 
nights. Patients also missed their appointments at the health center 
because they were displaced from their home.
                                 ______
                                 
    Erika Ody from North Andover: While I am one of the lucky ones that 
was able to safely retrieve my four year old son and dog the day of the 
explosions, our lives haven't been the same since Sept 13th. I didn't 
get the opportunity to retrieve any belongings that weekend and had to 
drive hundreds of miles picking up and dropping off my pet and child 
that weekend to find emergency care and housing. We stayed in the house 
from Sept 15th through Oct 8th without heat, hot water, a dryer or 
stove. Then, we were forced into emergency housing as my son has an 
eating disorder and doesn't have enough body fat for sustained cold 
temperatures. We are attempting to self mediate and hope to be home 
soon but I cannot emphasize enough how little contact we had from 
Columbia Gas prior to this last week when they finally started to check 
on me. It's too little and too late.
                                 ______
                                 
    Rafael Juliao from Lawrence: My name is Rafael Juliao; I live at 
26-28 Farley St. in Lawrence, MA, and own a business two blocks from my 
home, First Class Car Shop, Inc. On the afternoon of September 13, 
2018, I was at the shop when I got a call from my family at home-they 
were scared; all of the alarms were going off and they were saying 
there was fire and smoke in the house. I rushed home and saw all of the 
tenants-I have a multi-family home and rent apartments to two tenants-
outside looking at the house. When I got to the driveway, I called 911 
over and over again, but there was either no answer or the line was 
busy. Eventually, fearing that my house would burn down-and despite my 
wife's objections-I went into our basement, where I found the furnace 
on fire and flames creeping up the wall. I also heard the sound of 
blowing air. What I now know is that it was a gas leak. I used wet 
laundry and buckets of water and clothing to put the fire out. I 
grabbed pliers and turned off the gas meter and opened the windows.
    When I went back outside, more people who live on the street were 
coming outside, and within minutes, all of my neighbors were outside, 
screaming and afraid their houses were going to burn down. I worked 
with a few of my neighbors to go into three other houses and put the 
fires out and turn off the gas meters.
    After that, we started hearing there had been pipeline explosions 
all over town. Because we have emergency supplies in our house, we 
decided to stay put instead of going to a hotel that Columbia Gas was 
offering. Even with no electricity, no gas, and no heat, with two kids, 
ages 11 and 18, we felt we would be better off staying at home. But it 
was frightening every day. It felt like a war zone in the days after 
the explosions. We saw people robbing the house across the street. My 
son was stopped when he was riding his bike because police thought he 
was a looter. The emotional and psychological toll this has taken on 
our kids and our family has been immense. My kids both missed school; 
they've been cold; they've been frightened.
    I thought Columbia Gas would be sympathetic and helpful to those 
impacted by the disaster they caused, but interacting with them has 
been a nightmare. Because I am a business owner, a homeowner and have 
tenants, I have had to deal with them on multiple fronts. I have had to 
call them dozens of times. I have been passed around from one claim 
adjuster to another (at this point, I think the number is up to six), 
each one requiring me to submit a different set of documents and 
evidence and requiring me to start the process anew each time I am 
passed to someone new.
    One of the adjustors assigned to me for my home told me to get an 
estimate from an electrician and plumber for the repairs that needed to 
be made in the house to have temporary heat put in. The estimate was 
upwards of $13,000, and when I reported back to Columbia, the adjustor 
simply said there was no way Columbia would agree to pay that amount. 
Eventually, I spoke to the foreman overseeing a crew working on repairs 
to the pipelines in the street, and he felt bad for us and sent men in 
to put in a new furnace, new water heaters, and a new stove, but we 
still don't have cooking gas. According to one of Columbia's claim 
adjusters, I shouldn't be making a fuss about not having cooking gas 
because we ``can find other things to eat.''
    On top of all of this, my business is suffering. The shop was shut 
down for five days after the explosions; we had no electricity. Once we 
opened back up, there was construction in front of the shop to fix 
pipelines, and it was blocking the entrance for customers to come into 
the shop. Beyond that, there is no one left in town. How is my business 
supposed to survive when there are no customers?
    Columbia Gas was offering me a fraction of the profits I was 
losing-the income I need to feed my family-and when I tried to outline 
not only the lost profits, but also the costs of repair that were 
piling up, I was met with hostility and skepticism. I've had to use 
money from my pension to pay our bills. When I explain to the adjusters 
that my business will never be the same, they don't care. When I call 
them to ask them when something is going to be done, their response is 
that we have to wait or it's not happening. I have been stunned by how 
poorly they treat us.
    The callousness of these adjustors has been like a punch to gut. 
They caused this disaster. They put my family and our whole community 
through this nightmare. They missed their deadlines for restoring heat 
and making the necessary repairs. And yet, when we talk to them, they 
act as if we've done something wrong, like we're inconveniencing THEM. 
There has been so little communication and transparency during the 
process, and my family and I are at our wit's end. We don't know when 
things will return to normal, if ever.
                                 ______
                                 
    Elsa Berroa from Lawrence: My husband and I are senior citizens 
with disabilities, and we suffer from multiple ailments. With no gas, 
heat or hot water in our home, we had no choice but to go to one of the 
temporary trailers after the explosions. But even the trailers were 
cold, and because I have poor circulation, the cold affects me 
tremendously. The trailers were such poor quality that they would move 
in the wind; it felt like we were on a boat. And the park where we were 
kept was so badly maintained that mud gathered in huge amounts and made 
it impossible to get around. I felt trapped in our tiny trailer.
    When our gas was finally reconnected, Columbia Gas gave us 24 hours 
to move out of the trailer. It felt like an eviction. We don't move so 
well, and we don't drive, so this was incredibly difficult for us. I 
needed assistance to pack and couldn't get it. It was terrible. 
Further, when I tried to sign up for their Thanksgiving meal about two 
weeks before the holiday, I was told it was too late.
    I have been traumatized because now I fear my home. I blame 
Columbia Gas wholeheartedly for what they have put us through. Every 
representative I have spoken to has been unkind. It makes me feel like 
I'm begging for assistance and that Columbia Gas wants to seem like a 
hero, like they're helping us, when really, they caused this disaster 
with their negligence.
                                 ______
                                 
    Cynthia Rwabuhinga from Lawrence: I'm Cynthia Rwabuhinga; I live in 
Lawrence, MA, and since the explosions on September 13, 2018, my life 
has been turned upside down. I'm a teacher's assistant at a local 
public school, where I work with kindergartners. I'm an active member 
of my church and community. I rent space in a house in Lawrence, but 
after the explosions, it was not safe to return home. I was only just 
able to return home last week, but I still don't have cooking gas.
    On the day of the explosions, I was assisting with an afterschool 
activity at my school. We were outside when the chaos started. A child 
was crying and said she had heard there were fires--soon afterward, the 
school was evacuated. It felt like a terrorist attack. I thank God the 
kids were at school because it could have been worse, but it really 
felt like Armageddon. It felt like God was coming, and I wasn't going 
with him. Everywhere I turned, it was chaos.
    A friend told me that explosions were happening everywhere, and 
police were saying don't go into your houses. As I drove from the 
school, I saw a house on fire, smoke everywhere, everyone outside of 
their houses in panic. I was calling 911 but couldn't get through. I 
started calling everyone I knew telling them not to go into their 
houses. I drove a town over to Methuen and stayed with a friend's 
parents for almost two weeks before being able to get a hotel through 
Columbia Gas. We were all in a state of shock.
    When I reached out to Columbia Gas for a hotel, they told me there 
was nothing close and that the only thing they could give me is a place 
in Waltham; otherwise, I'd have to wait. And please understand, I had 
already waited. I didn't get into a hotel until October 3. I took it, 
but my work and my church, where I go almost five days a week for 
various community programs I participate in, are back in Lawrence. 
Columbia Gas said they would pay for my gas because of all of the 
driving back and forth I was doing, but meanwhile, my car battery also 
ran out, my mileage went up, and one of my tires popped. In addition to 
the financial and physical toll driving back and forth had on me, it 
was stressful, and I was spending more than an hour and a half in the 
car every day. Columbia Gas didn't care. I live paycheck to paycheck, 
and they refused to give me the gas money up front, which also made it 
near impossible for me to afford all of my living expenses. The gas 
card also didn't arrive when they said it would, and they were 
dismissive when I tried to explain that I needed it.
    **The hotel that they put me up in was dilapidated. The stove and 
entire ``kitchen'' in the hotel room was run down; the stove was 
crusted with rust and unusable. When I tried to raise this with 
Colombia Gas, they were rude and dismissive. They also had someone from 
the hotel knocking on my door regularly to see if anyone was staying 
with me. No one was, but they invaded my privacy nonetheless. 
Eventually, they did move me to a better hotel because I'd found a 
threatening note on my windshield at the first place, but why did it 
take so long? Why did I have to suffer and feel unsafe for them to put 
me in a decent place when I couldn't return home?
    I suffer from chronic arthritis, and this ordeal has exacerbated my 
pain. I'm under such stress that my hair has started to fall out; my 
blood pressure is dangerously high; I've started having panic attacks. 
I'm drowning in bills. I haven't been able to cook and so have racked 
up so many expenses paying for food; I've gained weight from eating 
poorly. I had a good life. I loved my job; I loved my church and my 
community. And it's crumbled because Columbia Gas created a disaster 
and then resented the residents of Lawrence for needing relief and 
support. They've destroyed our community, and they couldn't care less.
                                 ______
                                 
    Brigdetann Tavares from Lawrence: I have MS and am a single mother 
of a toddler. I decided to weather it out and stayed in my home after 
the explosions. When the temperature started to drop, we went to a 
hotel that was very far from my child's daycare and from Boston, where 
I need to go regularly for medical treatment. I am having trouble 
sleeping. I am under so much stress, and one of the worst triggers of 
MS is stress, so I have been greatly physically impacted, too. I feel 
powerless and don't feel like Columbia Gas is listening to us to try to 
lessen the burden they created for me and everyone in Lawrence.
                                 ______
                                 
    Karen Martin from Boxford: The collapse of the gas system in the 
Merrimack Valley, the largest disruption in the history of the 
industry, has significantly impacted the residents of this area, 
devastating many. To be evacuated, to live in a trailer not fit for New 
England winter or in a hotel 20 miles from work and kids' school and 
activities, or to remain in unheated homes for months is the largest 
disruption of most victims' lives.
    This was a preventable tragedy. Twenty years ago when I worked for 
a telecommunications company, a much more inherently safe industry than 
gas distribution, there was a process of review by a team of experts 
before any product was delivered. It's unimaginable that Columbia Gas 
did not have such a process in place. Even with the new rules for the 
gas companies that will be required by this and other hearings, who 
will monitor and enforce the implementation of these rules? How long 
will it be before some belt-tightening measure buries these rules? The 
aging gas infrastructure, with its many known gas leaks, suggests 
another disaster is possible.
    In addition to the obvious safety issues with the gas system that 
were experienced in the Merrimack Valley, there is the larger issue of 
climate change. Burning ``natural'' gas for heat and power produces 36 
percent of the carbon dioxide emissions in Massachusetts. Methane, the 
main component of natural gas, is a greenhouse gas that is 80 times 
more powerful than carbon dioxide. Unburned methane escapes into the 
atmosphere from the many gas leaks in the area as well as when pipes 
are vented (as they were in the repair process).
    Our Global Warming Solutions Act of 2008 requires us to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions 25 percent from 1990 levels by 2020. We are a 
far cry from that. The recent IPCC report declares we have until 2030, 
just 12 years from now, to reduce emissions by 45 percent and develop 
into a net-zero planet by 2050. This would allow for the possibility of 
keeping global warming to 1.5 degrees Centigrade to avoid the most 
catastrophic impacts of climate change.
    With this in mind, why is Columbia Gas allowed to rebuild the 
Merrimack Valley with more dirty fossil fuel burning, greenhouse gas 
emitting equipment? Why are they allowed to install gas equipment that 
is not the most energy efficient equipment available? Shouldn't they be 
required to rebuild with equipment that runs on clean energy, reducing 
our GHG emissions? Why is there not a state or Federal plan that would 
require a rebuild after any tragedy such as this to be one that would 
move us to a net zero state by 2050 or earlier? Why can't we make the 
Merrimack Valley rebuild a model for reconstruction in the eventuality 
of future catastrophes?
    Lawrence is one of the poorest cities in Massachusetts. In our 
state, people whose income is below 50 percent of the Federal poverty 
level, spend 40 percent of their income on energy bills. With climate 
change making New England summers hotter, coupled with the ``heat 
effect'' in cities like Lawrence, this expense will only rise. High 
efficiency electric heat pumps provide both heating and cooling, 
satisfying heating needs for New England winters and fulfilling an 
approaching need for air conditioning. Heat pumps, coupled with 
weatherization of homes and a plan to ``solarize'' Lawrence would 
reduce energy bills for its residents while reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.
    A just solution to the gas system collapse requires a forward 
thinking solution that would move the Merrimack Valley toward a 
renewables energy future. It would enhance the safety of residents and 
put us on a path to meeting our climate goals, sustaining a livable 
planet for our children and grandchildren.
                                 ______
                                 
    Laura Roffer from North Andover: My story cannot even remotely 
compare to the family who lost a son, or those who lost homes, but I 
feel it is important for my story to be heard.
    I got a call from my daughter on the afternoon of the explosions. I 
was at North Station about to board the commuter rail home. I was under 
such stress, and so anxious, that I boarded the wrong train as I tried 
to understand what was happening. I made my way to the correct train 
while trying to juggle calls coming from my son, 300 miles away at 
school, but had heard from friends what was happening at home, and my 
daughter telling me she was trying to get out of the house with our 
dog, and other friends and family members calling and texting making 
sure we were OK. The early calls from my son were full of emotion as I 
tried to tell him that we were OK.
    I had to exit the train at North Wilmington because the train 
wasn't going further north. It was mass confusion. My daughter & dog 
managed to get in the car to come get me in Wilmington. We drove back 
to North Andover to gather some belongings, and the scene was like 
nothing I had ever seen before. I entered the house with a flashlight 
so as not to spark anything. We all headed to Manchester NH to my 
fiancee. I had to use my son's car and not mine because we were turned 
away from Merrimack Street where the commuter rail garage is and where 
my car was. The house was without power from Thursday at 6 until 
sometime on Saturday morning. I wasn't able to get my car until Sunday 
when the street and the garage were opened.
    From that weekend and continuing to current day I, and would assume 
most, have experienced a total lack of coordinated statuses, 
communications and solutions. I remember going back to my house to put 
a note on the door with my cell # so that I could be contacted for a 
relight, clearly not knowing it would take 66 days for me to get to 
that point.
    I believe it was a full week after the explosions, that residents 
then knew the extent of the issue and had hopes of being made whole by 
November 19 as shared by the recovery team. I showered for 3 weeks at 
the Y on the Andover/North Andover line before my commute to Boston. I 
bought substitute cooking appliances. I went to my fiancee's every 
weekend with my laundry. I bought space heaters to warm the house a 
bit, which in the early days was OK, because it wasn't that cold yet.
    I received 2 confirmations that an assessment team would be coming 
on October 3. I stayed to work from home, put my dog in doggy daycare, 
and no one showed up. I went to work the following day to get a text 
from my neighbor that the crew was there. Thankfully my daughter was 
about 15 minutes away and they could get in and condemn all of my 
appliances: furnace, tankless hot water heater, dryer and stove.
    As the recovery options changed, I opted to have an electric hot 
water heater installed with my own contractor. I spent hours making 
calls to plumbers and electricians to come give estimates, and made 
arrangements to work from home so I could explain the situation and 
show them the space. About a week later, it started to get cold. 
Options were made available for alternative housing. I called my claims 
adjuster, he told me I didn't qualify because Columbia Gas had made the 
investment in the hot water heater, so the assumption was that I could 
stay. I spent hours getting estimates for alternate heat options like 
mini-splits and pellet stoves, again, making arrangements to work from 
home to allow the workers in but couldn't find a reasonable solution.
    Days later, I made the request again based on the upcoming colder 
forecast. It took 3 days for someone to get back to me with options. We 
were eventually provided with a trailer in Andover. We never stayed in 
it though, because of the inconvenience of the location.
    Then came the news conference with the announcement that they would 
not hit their deadline. My relight date went from November 9, to 
November 9-19, to December 7. I read the daily updates, I checked the 
72-hour schedule and the interactive map almost daily. We made the 
decision to stay in the house as long as the temps at night were 40 or 
above. If the temps were going to be below that, I took the dog with me 
to my fiancee's house, my daughter went to her boyfriend's house in 
Bolton. I never really knew where I was going to be on any given day.
    Based on the December 7 date, I made the decision to self-mitigate. 
Again, took time to be home to have an HVAC contractor come, took the 
time to write e-mails, ask questions, submit estimates and eventually 
get something approved for a December 3 install which was the earliest 
my contractor could get there. I had hoped to have heat in my house for 
Thanksgiving so my son could come home & actually stay in his own bed.
    On November 10, my street was full of various crews. I was home 
because I was scheduled for an assessment. But there were other crews, 
installing emergency heat systems. I asked one of the workers if I was 
getting one and he told me I wasn't on the list. I never received a 
call or door hanger offering that option.
    That day, the assessors determined that I was eligible for the 
rapid re-light. I assumed that was still my December 7 date, but a 
couple of days later, when I called to inquire about the emergency 
heat, Columbia Gas said my address was on the 72 hour schedule. That 
was November 12. No one was home that day, nor did I get a call from a 
contractor, but Columbia Gas told me it was likely they'd be at my 
house. So I stayed home on November 13, worked in a cold house, no one 
came. I called to get additional information, and demanded to speak 
with a supervisor. He told me that I would receive a call from a 
contractor the night before someone would come. My address remained on 
the 72 hour schedule through November 14, and that was the date I 
finally received a call from a contractor. I let my neighbor know (as I 
live in a duplex), and made arrangements to work from home on November 
15. It was 47 degrees in my house. I'm not sure why given that it's a 
duplex, my neighbor's address was not on the 72-hour schedule or why he 
did not receive a contractor call.
    They did indeed come & work. The inspector arrived at 5. Again 
confusion. He was only provided with my neighbors address and not mine, 
but did the inspection. The Columbia contractor thought they could get 
the relight done that night, but that was not the case. So I drove back 
to Manchester.
    The relight happened on November 16, 66 days after the explosions. 
Had I known Columbia Gas was coming earlier, I'd have had my new 
appliances ready for installation. I'm thankful to have heat, but 
wasn't able to do any special cooking for my son's arrival home for 
Thanksgiving and am still doing laundry in Manchester.
    A few of my neighbors still have emergency heat. I have a generator 
outside of my front door the size of a dumpster with hoses running 
across the sidewalk and my lawn into my neighbor's windows. It's 
frightening to me to know that some people don't have heat and the 
temperature in the teens, the coldest Thanksgiving on record.
    My time is important. I spent far too much time and energy on this 
incident. Too much time e-mailing, calling, waiting at home. Too much 
time packing and unpacking my belongings and trying to plan my days. 
There was tremendous stress, anxiety and uncertainty.
    While I'm thankful to those on the street performing the work who 
work through the rain, snow and cold temps, I am not thankful for the 
miscommunications and disjointed efforts across subcontractors hired to 
answer questions. After my relight, I received 5 calls from various 
Columbia Gas centers asking if I had heat. I also had a knock at the 
door at 9:30 at night asking if I had heat. I appreciate the concern, 
but I think they just can't keep up with the information as it changes, 
so they needed to be sure. I'm also thankful that my claims adjuster 
turned things around quickly, which from reading stories in the paper 
and hearing from neighbors at one of the open houses, this was not the 
case for many.
    I'm hopeful that this will be but a blip on the radar when I put my 
house in the market in the spring and that there are no long term 
impacts to the housing market due to fear of natural gas in the 
neighborhood.
    I appreciate your efforts on our behalf as well as the efforts from 
the offices of Senator Warren, Congressman Moulton, AG Maura Healey and 
Governor Baker, all of whom I've written.
    Please hold those responsible accountable for this.
    Kind regards,
    Laura Roffer
    978-302-0834
                                 ______
                                 
    John Matera from Andover: I live in Andover, MA, where the 
consequences of the Columbia Gas disaster continue to be felt. 
Fortunately, our home does not have natural gas service and was not 
directly damaged. Our community has been damaged greatly.
    Loss of life and destruction of dozens homes and commercial 
buildings is horrific. Friends are still without heat in their own 
residences. Traffic continues to severely restricted, making ordinary 
trips arduous while circumnavigating the destruction/construction. 
Commerce is not back to normal--many retail and services business are 
still not operating normally. The loss of productivity is huge. Even if 
the tangible costs are remediated, the intangibles and difficult-to-
quantify damages--that are nevertheless real--are unlikely to be 
addressed.
    NiSource and its subsidiary, Columbia Gas, have not evidenced any 
degree of competence in either preventing the disaster in the first 
place, but in making repairs or even estimating when they will be 
complete. No one has explained how this was allowed to be possible. Why 
weren't redundant safeguards in place? What assurance do we have that 
the same level of negligence will not continue?
    My friends and neighbors live in fear or what is next. Will there 
be an audit of cybersecurity at all of the gas utilities in the 
country? If not, haven't we just trained terrorists how to blow up 
cities? The likelihood of companies that allow such unsafe gas networks 
to be in place will have good computer network security is low. Are we 
one hacking incident away from another catastrophe?
    Mostly, we fear that nothing will happen at all. The utility 
executives and regulators will keep their jobs and get promotions and 
bonuses instead of being held accountable. We will continue to live 
with sub-standard utilities and infrastructure that should be an 
embarrassment to a nation that is supposed to lead.
    Sincerely,
    John Matera
                                 ______
                                 
    Isabelle Ceron from Lawrence: The worst part of the gas disaster 
for our family was that my son was alone at home in South Lawrence when 
the explosions happened. He is a teen, and he was terrified. He called 
me at work, telling me about the terrible gas smell, the sirens and 
helicopters, and I told him to get out. We met on the road between 
Lawrence and North Andover.
    Because of all the commotion we went to my sister's house in North 
Andover. However, there too there were fires and everyone was 
evacuating. At first, we were just out in the front yard trying to 
understand what to do. Then we understood we had to evacuate--and in 
all the commotion we made a hotel reservation and drove what took about 
2 hours to Manchester. Once we got there, we realized that this wasn't 
the place where we made the reservation. We'd been so upset we didn't 
write down the name correctly. The place we went to didn't have space. 
So, we turned around and went back to North Andover and stayed the 
night at home. We knew we weren't supposed to, but the gas and the 
electricity were out, and we had nowhere else to go, so we stayed home.
    The next morning, we went to Lowell to eat, since there was nothing 
open around us, and we didn't feel comfortable staying home.
    We were lucky that our gas was turned on after the first weekend, 
since we were on a high-pressure line. My sister stayed with us for 65 
days until her gas was returned.
                                 ______
                                 
    Elsa Berroa from Lawrence: First, it's important that the senate 
committee understand that we were all subjected to a terrifying event. 
I was certain that I was not going to survive on the evening of Sept. 
13th. I heard sirens and helicopters and heard something rushing out of 
the basement of our triple decker. There was a terrible odor of gas, 
and I realized the rushing sound was the gas coming out. I ran for my 
life onto the street--and then I saw that a house down the block was 
already on fire, and the street was filling with smoke. We hopped in 
the car and evacuated with everyone else as quickly as possible. We 
went to stay at one of our children's homes.
    A painful headache started that evening and has plagued me on and 
off frequently since then. When evening comes, I feel jumpy and 
afraid--as if again this awful fear and dread will overtake me. I feel 
so relieved that the over pressurization of gas didn't happen at 
night--we all would have been asphyxiated in our beds. There are two 
kids upstairs, my granddaughter on my floor, and a child downstairs. I 
think of how we all could have been gone.
    We remained evacuated for 4 days, and when we returned at last our 
apartment had no gas appliances.
    We were told a space heater couldn't be installed even though we 
requested it. It was a hardship for us to purchase our own space 
heaters, but we had to. Even though we could get reimbursed from 
Columbia Gas, it wasn't an easy process. I don't have Internet or a 
scanner at home, and I'm retired, so it was a lot of trouble to get 
reimbursed. Perhaps if this ever happens again the gas company should 
accept pictures of receipts to make reimbursement easier or provide 
cash before a purchase is made.
    To cook, we were supplied a hot plate. I cooked on the hot plate, 
an electric fry pan, and the microwave. No hot water, which was very 
uncomfortable.
    Then it began to get quite cold out, and it was very uncomfortable 
to be in the house. We requested a trailer close to our home for 
temporary shelter. We're on a limited income, and it was too much for 
us to go far to a hotel, have meal and gas expenses, and be uncertain 
if we'd be reimbursed, since Columbia Gas said they'd provide me a 
refillable debit card--but the funds were never put on it. Therefore, I 
couldn't trust leaving my cold apartment to go far away. SO I requested 
a trailer, and was told by the claims agent they would call me back. I 
called again, waited, was transferred, and was told again that they'd 
call back. There was so much negligence in setting up the temporary 
housing. After about literally a month, and after getting very cold, I 
finally had a friend of mine who works for the city call Columbia Gas. 
They did give us a trailer that night--but far from home. I went to the 
site and saw the mayor there, and he finally got us set up for a 
trailer close to our home. We moved there the next day.
    However, the thing about the trailers is that they turned off the 
heat when we left the site, and we had to request that they turn it 
back on, and then had to wait for the space to heat up. It was 
certainly a nuisance. I didn't cook in the trailer because I don't want 
to use gas.
    So, 63 days after the explosions I still get headaches in the 
afternoon. I still have trouble sleeping--I stay up watching boring TV 
with the hopes of sleeping, but really have a hard time getting to 
sleep at night. And I am still afraid of gas--and am so happy that my 
landlord got us an electric stove. All of this has made me wonder why I 
don't just leave all this trouble and retire to my native Dominican 
Republic.
                                 ______
                                 
    Alice Fulton from Lawrence: While checking on my 92 year old mother 
in Haverhill on September 13, 2018, as I do every day, life as we know 
it changed for the foreseeable future. My wife, Lora, had received word 
from a friend that houses were exploding in Lawrence and surrounding 
towns, and nobody knew why. i agreed to go home, get the cats, and 
she'd meet me there so we could decide what to do. I was battling a 
heart condition at the time, so was moving very slowly. As I walked 
past one apartment at my mother's residence, I heard a television news 
report stating that people just didn't know if their houses would be 
next to explode, since nobody knew why the first seventy homes were on 
fire. One of those homes is 1/4 mile from ours, and was completely lost 
because there were no more crews to fight new fires at the early point 
when it broke out.
    Approaching Lawrence on Route 495 it looked like a war zone, with 
smoke billowing from several house fires across the horizon of 
Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover. The confusion, lack of 
communication, and lack of disaster planning were on the horizon as 
well, though we were unaware of its effects at that point. The 
automatic response from other cities and towns was amazing. I saw 
emergency vehicles that were like no others I had ever seen before, and 
as the days ticked by thereafter, they were joined by fire apparatus, 
police, and gas company workers from far-reaching cities and towns like 
Boston, Brookline, Holbrook, Randolph, and Atkinson, NH.
    Once home, it took me nearly an hour to gather the cats, place some 
low-sodium foods in a bag to eat wherever we were to land, and load all 
this with a few bags of clothing and personal items (including my new 
medications) into my car. As I made one more pass around our home to 
assure that I had not forgotten anything essential, a neighbor pounded 
on the front door, asking to be let into the area where our gas meter 
was located. He had an off-duty fireman with him, who was voluntarily 
shutting off the gas in any homes he could. After the gas was shut off, 
I sat to gather my thoughts and catch my breath on the bench outside 
our garage. Lora arrived shortly from work in Boston, reporting that 
traffic was already at a standstill on roads leading out of Lawrence. 
As we began to process what we knew of the situation, which was only 
the beginning of the uncertainty that became ``the new normal'' of the 
next few months, some neighbors joined us, one of whom had a scanner. 
We all sat in our yard, hearing that it was taking hours for traffic to 
leave the area, that there was already one break-in at a house on a 
street nearby, and discussing that our only options for the night were 
to go hours away where we would have no hope of monitoring the 
situation directly. We, and our other two closest neighbors, decided to 
stay put, as we were unwilling to leave our cats, nor to be stuck in 
traffic for hours to go . . . where. . .? Nothing seemed like a better 
alternative, since our gas had been shut off already.
    At approximately 8pm, electricity was shut off to the area. For the 
next three days until it was restored, we quickly opened the 
refrigerator to get what we could, heated things on the gas grill 
(including making packaged ramen noodles on the grill), and used 
rechargeable light bars to see at night (that I had thankfully kept 
charged for emergencies). We periodically sat in our vehicles, engines 
running, for hours to recharge devices so that we could get any news at 
all. Devices seem to charge faster if the vehicle is moving, but we 
didn't dare drive farther than around the immediate block, because 
people were not being allowed into the area during the rumored 
evacuation. The rest of the world knew more about what had happened 
than we did, it seemed, since we had no access to television.
    The first night had been eerie, at best, with helicopters flying 
about all night, no light, and a plan we had devised in case someone 
came to the door in the darkness. At 2:30 a.m. we were awakened by 
pounding on our front door; a Boston Police Officer, and a gas company 
employee from Fall River came to check that our gas was, indeed, shut 
off. He determined that it was, and they moved on. At 2:00 p.m. the 
following day, another crew came to check the same thing. It's great 
that three different people/crews came to assure that the gas was off, 
but as the months marched on, it would have been better if crews knew 
what other crews had already done. We were visited by no less than four 
different crews to do the same thing at most every step of the 
restoration process. We liken it to always expecting company, never 
sure when they will arrive, and never arriving when they have said they 
would, so we could never leave or stop looking out the windows. The 
interactive maps and 72-hour lists were never accurate; more on that to 
follow.
    Three days after the electricity was shut off to the area it was 
restored, and that made things easier, but there was still a lot of 
uncertainty and lack of information. We had no idea when or how gas 
service could be restored, so the wait began. We made sure there would 
always be someone home, as we knew nothing about when someone might 
stop by to do something toward that goal. After a week or two, we 
stopped waiting, as the information just was not coming (and what 
little that came was inaccurate), so we went about our business, 
returning to work and keeping appointments. Sure enough, when Lora was 
at work in Boston and I was at a medical appointment in Brookline, a 
neighbor called her to say that someone was there to begin some phase 
of work at our house. She rushed home in the middle of her work day, 
determining that she'd get there quicker than I would, and met them 
within an hour. The neighbor had detained them for us, otherwise, who 
knows how long it would have been before anyone came back (we received 
zero notes on the door to say that someone had missed us, no calls in 
advance of workers coming until the very last stage of the work/
relight, and people coming by unannounced in almost every case).
    Columbia Gas made the effort to publish information that they felt 
was accurate, but it never was. For some reason, our street was never 
on the lists stating what streets were to be worked on over certain 
days, so we were unsure if we were in the queue at all. The interactive 
map was a great idea, but was never accurate, changing our expected 
work dates four times over, sometimes stating that work was done that 
was not done (so we would not be on their radar to come do it), and 
taking four days to be updated. Every call we made or contact in person 
was with people who were referring to the same information, so they 
were telling us that phases of the work were completed at our house 
that were not. Adjustor #3 refused to approve an alternate heating 
source because their data stated that our gas would be restored within 
four days of that conversation, which was not close to what actually 
occurred. We attended forums, sought resources, and had to fight for 
everything we've been reimbursed for so far. It has taken three hours 
per day to do this job, including monitoring websites for information, 
speaking with workers in the streets and neighbors/reading local 
message boards for real time information, standing in lines, 
deciphering published information that isn't necessarily accurate, 
learning new terminology, and fighting for what we were promised. We 
are on our fourth adjustor; I never even dealt with #3, #4 has changed 
the rules for things I was told by #2 regarding reimbursement of lost 
wages, and #2 tried to refuse our claim for a replacement five-burner 
stove with convection oven by trying to talk me into whatever they 
would provide (no convection oven, four burners, ordinary stove). Is 
Columbia Gas prepared to reimburse us somehow for that time? **(UPDATE: 
I JUST missed a call while writing this from Adjustor #4 checking to 
see if I received his e-mail (I haven't), leaving me a telephone number 
to call back that states that the voice mail box is not set up, so I 
can't reach him to tell him any of this.)**
    We are fortunate that we were able to afford to install a temporary 
electric water heater for $1,900, and purchase a suitable stove, 
awaiting reimbursement for both. Not everyone is well enough to 
withstand indoor temperatures below fifty degrees, as worries began 
about the need to drain pipes and evacuate our home. We are fortunate 
to have had gas restoration completed immediately prior to the fifteen 
degree night before Thanksgiving. We are fortunate that we are able to 
self-advocate and persist to get our needs met. Others are not, and 
their stories are heartbreaking. I hope that our story helps in some 
way to tirelessly continue the fight to get the needs met for every 
last person affected by this incident. This is not over yet, even for 
those of us whose service has been restored. Pipeline work should have 
taken place 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, not taking whole days off 
for rain, Sundays off, and many not working on Saturdays. The remaining 
work should not have run into freezing weather, with people displaced 
from their homes, now indefinitely, while four crews come to do the 
same work. We were fortunate that Lora could work from home for this 
time period, but there were days when she had meetings that she could 
not miss, so I had to lose a day's pay to also be home for work to be 
done. I anticipate another fight to recover lost wages due to that 
uncertainty. Our furnace is installed and operational, but not adjusted 
properly, so we need to spend more time pursuing adjustments once 
triage is completed for people who have no heat.
    Thank you for pursuing resolution of these issues, for speaking for 
those who can't or can't as effectively, and for caring about what 
we've been through as well as what is still to come.
                                 ______
                                 
    Lynne Rudnicki from North Andover: I have a couple of questions. 1. 
Our street lines and meter equipment have been converted to allow high 
pressure gas. Is the pressure on street lines now or in the near future 
being increased to high pressure. 2. Will residents receive prior 
notice of increasing the pressure of the gas on the street lines? Note: 
many residents have experienced gas leaks after installation of new 
service lines and equipment change. Prior notice should be required so 
we can know to be aware. 3. Only the lines which experienced over 
pressurization in our three communities have been replaced. How many 
miles of gas lines and meters are needed to bring the rest to current 
standards. 4. Since the impacted areas have very irregular boundaries, 
will there be prioritization to finish replacing aged leaky pipes and 
updating the gas meter equipment in our communities. Residents of the 
impacted areas will certainly be concerned for a long time about nearby 
lines which have not been repaired.
                                 ______
                                 
    Thomas Schaefer from North Andover: Here is a quick summary of our 
two month nightmare . . .

   When Columbia Gas relocated our gas meter from indoor to 
        outdoor, they installed the pipe to connect the gas main to our 
        existing gas line within the home. When our plumbers did a 
        pressure test on this line, they noticed there was a leak

   We witnessed endless amounts of misinformation. A Columbia 
        Gas rep I called on the phone rudely informed me that if I were 
        to have my stove and dryer installed by someone other than 
        Columbia Gas that I would be liable for all damages.

   We stayed in our house the entire time (some days the 
        temperature was 47 degrees inside) and Columbia Gas was only 
        willing to reimburse me $7 of my $160 electric bill for 
        October.

   The three hour window for a Columbia Gas rep to come and 
        install the gas meter and relight our home turned into 7 hours 
        of waiting

    My wife and I began our journey through the Merrimack Valley 
Explosions by returning home from vacation exactly 24 hours after the 
initial event occurred. We had no direct experience with the way 
emergency services handled the evacuation but were told by our 
neighbors of the chaos and diligent efforts by both the police and 
firefighters in immediate response to a growing catastrophe.
    From the beginning of the experience we were not informed of the 
scale of damages done throughout our neighboring towns. We were reliant 
on the news for information almost immediately. As the first week 
progressed we didn't receive a call until, at earliest, September 21st, 
8 days after the event.
    I was forced to gain any real information from social media 
accounts held by Columbia Gas and neighbors. Columbia Gas did nothing 
to communicate the extensive amount of damage that occurred during the 
emergency.
    We attempted our first claim at a claims center set up by Columbia 
Gas located at First and Main in North Andover. After speaking with a 
representative who did not work directly for Columbia Gas he informed 
us that they would be offering us $100 gift card to help with initial 
expenses, we didn't end up accepting it as the representative claimed 
that if we accepted it sometimes Homeowners insurance could be denied 
as we accepted benefits from a separate entity.
    Approximately one week after our first interaction we were informed 
that we would be receiving a call from Columbia Gas to set up and 
delivered space heaters. We never received that call. We were forced to 
find alternative ways to heat our home and deliver hot water. I made a 
purchase of a propane burner that would allow us to heat up large 
quantities of water for bathing and washing up.
    Desperate for information we continuously called the Merrimack 
Valley affected customer line provided by Columbia gas for answers to 
our mounting questions. No information was provided other than requests 
for our patience as they continued their work. After continually 
reaching out for information and not receiving it we began to get 
frustrated. Columbia gas then announced that they wouldn't be making 
their deadline and if you wanted to have the problems solved it would 
be quicker to self-mediate their issues. I would rather have gone this 
route because I didn't not trust Columbia Gas to attempt to repair my 
appliances. We contacted a company to quote us for the work they said 
was required for us to receive gas again. By then we had a claims 
adjuster that worked for Columbia Gas to work on our claim. After a lot 
of back and forth I received a commitment to pay for the work. I paid 
$6,000.00 out of pocket to reserve a time for the work to be completed 
on November 19th and waited for Columbia Gas to pay for the new 
equipment. And still, there was little to no information being shared 
with people in the affected area.
    After purchasing a new dryer and stove we contacted a separate 
company to install our new equipment I called Columbia Gas to make sure 
that it was OK to do so. The women on the phone rudely informed me that 
if I were to have my stove and dryer installed by someone other than 
Columbia Gas that I would be liable for all damages. I asked her how 
she figured that as we had in no way affected the safety of our home to 
which she replied if anything happens we are liable. This was the final 
straw for me in contacting Columbia Gas as I knew that the people they 
put in charge of communications were severely unqualified and frankly 
disrespectful.
    At this point we noticed our deadline for restorations had been 
updated on Columbia Gas's restoration map. The dates on the map changed 
each week and never really provided us any valid information. We were 
now on the 72 hour list for restoration with a relight date the day 
after the work I had requested from our plumber would be completed.
    We were on the 72 hour list for 10 days without a single call or 
visit. I took time of work to make sure we wouldn't miss our 
opportunity to have gas restored. They never showed. The last week 
however I received several calls. Sometimes 4 times a day to make sure 
I had been contacted. I repeated the same information several times to 
not bother me as I was self-mitigating the damages and had received 
money from claims to pay for the work. Three times we had Columbia Gas 
representatives showing up at my home asking to do the same inspection 
of my home. I informed them each time that they had already done this 
work. They told me that the organization of Columbia gas was abysmal 
and unorganized. On Sunday, November 18th Columbia Gas relocated our 
gas meter from indoor to outdoor, they installed the pipe to connect 
the gas main to our existing gas line within the home. When our 
plumbers did a pressure test on this line, they noticed there was a 
leak
    On November 21st the work in my home had been completed and I 
needed to call the relight team to turn on my gas. Everything had been 
inspected and approved. I was told the earliest the Columbia Gas 
employee could make it was three hours. I needed the meter installed 
and gas to be turned on by an official employee. The three-hour window 
I was given ran up and I called again. I was told an employee had me 
scheduled. After another hour I called again asking when I could expect 
the employee. I was told 9 pm, seven hours after I was initially told 
three hours. I sent the plumbers (who has been waiting in my basement 
for the past five hours) home as I can expect them to put in 14 hours 
in a day. When 9pm rolled around I called for the last time saying that 
I didn't believe they were coming. And employee showed up at 9:45pm and 
the first thing he said to me was ``please don't tell me you have steam 
heat'' of course we do! They called in a plumber who got my boiler lit 
and ready for heat. On November 22nd at 1:45am I had my appliances 
restored to previous condition and our nightmare was over. I have never 
seen a company more unorganized . . . you would think after two months 
of this they would have had established a better system instead of the 
complete chaos we witnessed.
    One of the worst parts for me, was how cheap Columbia Gas was being 
with the claims reimbursements. They refused to pay our October 
electric bill. We had to send them July-November 2017 electric bills 
and compared it July-October 2018 and the currently bill. They only 
willing to reimburse us $7. Not sure why they would compare it to 
summer months when we run our ACs non-stop. That was comparing apples 
to oranges. The whole time we stayed at home, while only being able to 
run one space heater at a time. We obviously used more electricity than 
we normally would have.
    With each passing week it got harder and harder to live the way we 
were living. Some days our house averaged 49 degrees.
    After all the stress and anxiety we went through these past two 
months I don't feel comfortable having Columbia Gas as our gas company 
in Massachusetts. We saw how they reacted in a disaster. I feel 
disgusted thinking back on how this whole process unfolded and the lack 
of Columbia Gas's response. They made us feel like we were the burden 
when we had to alter our lives for the past 65 days.
                                 ______
                                 
    Maureen Elliot from Andover: We have owned our house in Andover fog 
over 30-years with virtually no water our basement flooded and Columbia 
Gas refused to pay for a French drain and other repairs. What people 
have gone through, is beyond disgusting.
                                 ______
                                 
    Carolyn Bonier from Lawrence: I was one of the lucky ones. I had my 
gas back on in 4 days. However, the night the disaster happened was the 
most upsetting night I have ever experienced. I am 79 years old and 
live alone with my dog. I was watching TV when the explosions started 
happening. In a few minutes I lost power. When I went out on my deck, I 
could smell smoke, hear sirens and three helicopters were circling over 
head. I later learned that the closest explosion was about 10 houses 
away from mine. A neighbor came by with a wrench and turned off my gas. 
I decided to go to visit my husband who is in a nursing home, thinking 
he would be worried about me. When I got to the nursing home I learned 
that everyone in the disaster area had been told to evacuate and that 
there would be police barricades blocking off entry to South Lawrence. 
I began to get very upset because I had left my dog at home. I knew I 
had to get her but I was afraid I wouldn't be allowed into the 
neighborhood. I decided to wait until about 9:30 to go to get her 
thinking there might be less police presence. I had decided I would 
walk in if I was blocked from driving in. Also I had nowhere to spend 
the night because my friends with cats would not allow me to come with 
my dog. I got to the barricade on the edge of my neighborhood around 10 
PM and, after sitting in a line of cars for about 20 minutes, I was 
told by the officer that I could get my dog but to ``hurry back''. I 
went to my house and fed the dog and went to bed. I felt that I 
couldn't use a flashlight or even my cell phone because the light might 
alert the police and they might think I was an intruder. I had real 
difficulty getting any sleep. I felt strange hiding from the police. 
They drove by with their blue lights on frequently. The next morning, a 
friend with a dog offered me a place to stay and my nightmare was over. 
However for the next few weeks, I cried whenever I thought about that 
night. I jumped whenever I heard a siren and felt depressed in general. 
If I reacted so strongly from one night of trauma, I can only imagine 
how bad it must be for the thousands who have suffered for months 
because of this disaster.
                                 ______
                                 
    Alice Fulton from Lawrence: Still writing, please check back 
tonight, when I will submit. Need to go do parent care now, but will 
get it in tonight. Thank you!
                                 ______
                                 
    Dr. Angela and John Barnes from Andover: We have been displaced 
from our home, due to the Columbia Gas explosions since September 13th 
2018. We were able to stay in our affected home until then solely 
because the weather cooperated and was above 55 degrees.
    As of today, November 25th 2018 we STILL do not have heat or hot 
water in our home and we are ALSO without electricity. Yes, there are 
NO working utilities in our home.
    We reside as tenants in our historic Shawsheen home which did not 
pass the electrical capacity test in order to run even temporary 
heating solutions in the current voltage setting. The homeowners 
(residence is in trust) are making decisions from other locations and 
are removed from the situation. You can understand the trickle effect 
this is having on us all.
    I am sure our story is similar to that of other families displaced 
and impacted. We are working professionals and also owners of 
businesses, missed time at work is not ``simply'' forgiven by ``missed 
wages'' paid by Columbia Gas. We have careers and cannot ``just'' miss 
work. There are other implications longstanding due to missed days due 
to this Columbia Gas disaster.
    Contractors, who don't show up on time or show up out of the blue 
due to poorly coordinated efforts are upsetting, when we have changed 
our work schedule according to the online information link per Columbia 
Gas and this ridiculous contradictory information on the Columbia Gas 
website regarding relight dates. The IT efforts at the back end change 
our home address relight dates DAILY. We have learned that we cannot 
rely on any information listed. Why is this public information listed 
incorrectly and updated incorrectly daily? Who needs this incorrect 
information? It's not provided for the residents. Is it to satisfy 
safety or government guidelines?
    We have also had the unfortunate circumstance of daily 
communication with adjusters who won't work with us on approval for 
everyday and necessary expenses, even though, keep in mind, Columbia 
Gas is the one who created this mess.
    We don't have all day to run back and forth to a laundry room at a 
hotel or laundry mat?? We have a system in our home to make laundry, 
food and work all happen, which we can no longer use. Our basic rights 
disrupted and at the mercy of adjusters to decide.
    In the immediacy after the disaster we scrambled from a hotel in 
Danvers to maintain our careers and commute while driving back and 
forth to take children safely to school in Andover, waking children up 
at 5am to feed them breakfast and paying additional childcare costs to 
drop them off early at school so we could have enough time to drive 
around in newly created traffic.
    When we were able to safely return to our home we had 25 days of 
residence WITHOUT the use of hot water where we microwave water to fill 
our bathtub and or take sponge baths. Do you know how long it takes to 
fill a bathtub of water on the second floor of a home to properly clean 
3 children (never mind we parents)? I can tell you. It took 2.5 hours 
of continuously going up and down the stairs. Cooking on a hot plate 
and microwaving food for children and all the while trying to keep our 
own health. How can one spend that many hours a day bathing and cooking 
while trying to keep up with professional work obligations and also 
keep some semblance of a healthy home for children??? Pretending like 
all is well to mitigate any further stress on the children?
    We relocated permanently to a hotel on October 8th 2018, only with 
the assistance of Jim Lyons as on my own I was unable to find a 
Columbia Gas, Worley or Adjuster who would APPROVE a direct bill on our 
hotel room.
    We were told countless times by Columbia Gas, Worley and Adjusters 
that they only would only approve one queen bedroom with a shower for 
five people before for 4 weeks of time, despite the fact that I had a 
private reservation for a two bdrm hotel in Tewksbury at a corporate 
rate!
    Since the move to our hotel room, we are grateful to have a roof 
over our heads however one needs to understand it doesn't all end 
there. It's no vacation, no fun, no break from it all. Now we must rise 
at 4:30am daily, pay for additional school drop/childcare to drop for 
7am so we are able to continue our careers and operate our businesses 
just to make it on time. These are additional expenses above and beyond 
what is reimbursed by Columbia Gas, Worley or adjusters. I was told 
these expenses would be denied.
    Maybe this experience seems trivial to the executives and 
management of Columbia Gas. Multiply these types of situations--
increased traffic, missed work, etc due this situation becomes 
stressful beyond comprehension, from an event that really should not 
have happened at all.
    Our story tends to diverge from others because we have 3 children 
under age 8 yrs, one of whom has special needs. Try speaking to 
children about this situation. When our children ask when will we be 
back in our home, our answer is, truthfully, ``we don't know''. Who 
knows, truthfully, if we will be back to our home by Christmas. 
Columbia Gas is such a joke. Try answering questions about, ``how Santa 
will find us mommy and daddy?''
    How are parents supposed to put on Christmas from a hotel room??? 
From the looks of our nonoperational home, we will be spending 
Christmas like Thanksgiving. Thanksgiving was not one we'd like to 
relive as we were not only not able to host our family, we were not 
able to experience our traditions, we weren't able to teach our 
children about our family traditions or serve OUR abundant bountiful 
traditional meal--from our family.
    Sure, the dinner provided by Columbia Gas was a nice half-measure. 
Really, that is all it was. We waited in a car line for an hour to wait 
for food, thinking ``this should have never happened to us''. I would 
rather have spent that precious hour of time with my family.
    This is what Columbia Gas needs to hear. Our lives have BEEN TURNED 
UPSIDE DOWN, whether it is waiting in line, waiting on the phone to 
speak to someone, waiting for a contractor has been extremely disrupted 
by the negligence of Columbia Gas. Compound these situations by months 
and months of NO answers, no wonder why our community is unsettled and 
uneasy.
    John and Angela Barnes
                                 ______
                                 
    Denise Velez from Lawrence: This nightmare began for us Sept 13th 
at around 4:30. We were lucky to not have started cooking our dinners 
yet. My parents own the home I live in. Its technically a 2 family but 
it is 1. I live upstairs with my 2 girls and my elderly parents live 
downstairs.
    On the day this started their was nothing on the news on TV or 
radio, phones nothing. We evacuated across our street lawn and garden 
store in front of our homes. Only through word of mouth, facebook, and 
neighbors listening to scanners were we even slightly aware of what was 
happening. We sat at a loading dock surrounded by burning and exploding 
homes. Smoke in every direction. Watched smoke surround my home and 
worried that my home was not hit with fire. I was one of the ``lucky'' 
ones on my street. Out of 8 others the blasting furnaces stopped only 2 
doors down. The three homes before that had charred, melted furnaces, 
and burnt basements. Luckily a neighbor was a firefighters son. His 
knowledge helped us. That night we slept with our eyes open, listening 
to the news on the radio. My kids anxiety was greater then I've ever 
seen before and they've been through some awful trauma. They begged and 
pleaded for us to leave but we had nowhere to go till the morning. The 
only person saying there was any threat to our safety was Mayor Rivera. 
Columbia gas was a ghost!!! They did not communicate to first 
responders nor residents.
    Eversource was put into play and things started moving. I had to be 
placed in a hotel because I am handicapped. Need the hot water. I am in 
a wheelchair and I use a cpap and nebulizer. They got us back into our 
homes 4 days after the explosions. Then we realized Columbia had 
finally stepped up and was trying to cover their tracts. Since CG took 
over there has been a constant barrage of people in and out of our home 
doing the same thing the other has done.
    No one at CG would give me an answer to a simple problem. I had an 
old
                                 ______
                                 
    William Sahlas from North Andover: My family's daily routines were 
altered and disrupted by, and because of, the Columbia Gas disaster. My 
wife works for the City of Somerville as a teacher in 3rd grade. 
Someone in her situation would NOT have had the necessary free-time 
bandwidth nor cooperation from her employer to recover from the 
disaster without the help of a significant other. I was able to be the 
primary person in the family to be the contact and liaison to Columbia 
Gas restoration efforts because of my employers cooperation. If it were 
not for a very understanding employer, Brightcove Inc. HQ at 290 
Congress St. Boston MA, I would not have been able to successfully 
undergo the steps needed to navigate the recovery efforts.
    These steps and efforts are still going on today. There's 
bookkeeping and accounting to deal with keeping track of the costs for 
repairs and appliance replacements. There was significant time involved 
to be with those who were doing the appliance replacements and home 
repairs. The hours that I put into the recovery efforts were very 
significant.
    I cannot imagine how some others are dealing with this ordeal who 
have not the same understanding employers or the financial means to 
fund the repairs needed while waiting to be reimbursed. Not to mention 
the temporary heating sources that had to be put in place.
    Having lived through the ordeal I feel that we are owed more than 
just an apology from the NiSource/Columbia Gas. The cold showers and 
cold rooms and disrupted holiday season as a result of the disaster 
will not be soon forgotten. Thanks for the memories Columbia Gas.
    Regards,
    William G. Sahlas
    43 Woodbridge Rd
    North Andover MA 01845
                                 ______
                                 
    Rachel McEnroe from Andover: This fall, we have been part of the 
affected area of the Merrimack gas explosion. We were evacuated for 2-3 
days, went two months without hot water, just got a portion of our heat 
back last week (November 20th) and still have not had our stove and 
oven inspected and turned on. While dealing with this for a short 
period was OK, over the fall it had a significant impact on our daily 
routine (who wants to exercise when it requires you to heat up water on 
a hot plate in your bathroom in order to shower) and has taken a lot of 
energy and time to 'self-mitigate' by arranging for new equipment, 
plumbers, and inspectors to come by--and we are very lucky that we 
could handle the upfront costs ahead of reimbursement. While we have 
hot plates to cook at home and have been OK, the local restaurants have 
all been closed for two months and we typically rely on take-out or 
dining out 1-2x/week because of busy schedules and that too has been 
both an added drain on us and a tough thing for our local economy. I 
cannot imagine what this would have been like had we not had some heat 
or had a gas dryer or had to relocate because of those things. There 
needs to be better safety procedures put in place for this kind of work 
and better state or Federal oversight.
                                 ______
                                 
    Carolyne Popescu-Pretor from Andover: THIS IS A CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEM! USA missed the wake-up call many years ago.
    On September 13th we had gas fumes in our condominium. Our family 
needed to leave immediately. We also had dirty water. Our water was so 
dirty, it clogged the furnace valves. While we have numerous workers 
troubleshooting the situation, we currently have no hot water. On a 
record cold Thanksgiving Day, we had no heat. I'm genuinely concerned 
there was error in determining the correct replacement gas-fired boiler 
for our unit.
    The initial install date for our boiler was October 8th. Today is 
Sunday, November 25th, I have heat--but no hot water. We have not had 
consistent heat and hot water since the initial incident. Naturally, 
the current potential for cyber incidents affecting pipeline business 
systems is a national concern. Leaving this tremendous responsibility 
of public safety to private industry is reckless. The blame game, 
please lets not be niave.
    https://energypost.eu/vulnerability-electric-utility-system-cyber-
attacks/
    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-04/cyberattack-
bleeds-into-utility-space-as-duke-sees-billing-delay
    https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2018/03/28/how-on-earth-
did-russia-hack-our-energy-systems/#73d7a21a6104
    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-russia/russian-
hackers-penetrated-networks-of-u-s-electric-utilities-wsj-idUSKBN1KE03F
    https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/
russian-hacking-attacks-us-power-grid-sewage-explosions-a8462691.html
    https://www.wired.com/story/hackers-gain-switch-flipping-access-to-
us-power-systems/
    Carolyne Popescu-Pretor
                                 ______
                                 
    Jorma McSwiggan Hong from Lawrence: Dear Senator Markey,
    First, I'd like to thank you and the other representatives for 
coming to our community today, it is encouraging to find that many of 
my own concerns were those voiced by you and your colleagues. I left a 
handwritten testimony today, not realizing that there was an online 
platform available, and didn't include any of my personal information. 
For ease of documentation, I thought it might be a good idea to submit 
my testimony electronically as well. My household was affected as well, 
but I focus here on the effects of the community as I witnessed while 
working in Lawrence.
    I'm currently a graduate student studying public health, but until 
very recently and including the months following the disaster, I was 
working as a nutrition educator in the Lawrence Women, Infants, and 
Children (WIC) program. The office serves low income pregnant and 
breastfeeding mothers and their children. This is a community that 
cooks daily, typically from scratch. It took one mother three hours to 
cook the afternoon meal for her family on a hotplate. Another mother, 
pregnant, experienced increased nausea and vomiting while relying on 
convenience take-out foods that she would not typically have chosen to 
eat. Pregnancy and infancy are short windows in which to begin healthy 
development, and to an extent this was disrupted by the explosions and 
subsequent displacement of our communities. Mothers who had frozen 
breastmilk in anticipation of returning to work lost their supply as it 
thawed during the power outage in the days immediately following the 
explosions. Some mothers were unable to continue breastfeeding their 
infants, so great was the disruption of the evacuation and multiple 
relocations. This interruption potentially has life-long health risks 
to the infants affected. Breastfeeding in the first 6 months of life, 
per WHO recommendations, is attributed to helping establish the immune 
system, reducing allergies, and protecting against type II diabetes and 
certain types of cancer. In the event of a disaster such as this, it is 
important to recognize that in addition to the immediate damages 
endured, the health of a future generation has been affected as well.
    Thank you again, Senator, for your time and representation of the 
Merrimack Valley community.
    Sincerely,
    Jorma McSwiggan-Hong
                                 ______
                                 
    Elizabeth Cunningham from Andover: Lack of clear plan and protocols 
to restore power. Teams of 8-10 would arrive together at homes numerous 
times, often dirty and disruptive. I am a 73 year old retiree who ended 
up flagging down a Columbia Gas VA truck driving down my street. He was 
kind enough to give me his phone number, which I called often to 
receive step-by-step directions. He sent the right person my way each 
step of the way. Without his assistance and my financial resources, I 
still would not have heat. I had numerous visits after I had heat, as 
CG was clueless as to the status of individual homes.
    It was clear that Columbia needed to assign a project leader to 
each street, and provide residents with their phone number. Recovery 
required leaders, as you can't just throw people onto a disaster 
without a clear plan.
                                 ______
                                 
    Maureen Omara from Andover: On September 13th I went home to find 
an in tact house and there hadn't been a fire, thankfully, but not 
being able to get into my house and not knowing whether it was safe to 
even be standing in my front yard was a very unsettling feeling, one 
that took a few days to resolve. Trying to get to where I was staying 
and then back to work the next day, wearing the same clothes as the day 
before, and then trying to figure out how to get the logistics for my 
weekend guest and myself to get someplace else was a task in it's own 
right. Knowing the gas was turned off when I was able to go back home 
was better, however I still had to deal with the unknown. The days that 
followed were spent trying to figure out where to shower if I didn't 
want to take an ice cold one in my home and/or what and where to eat--
that was a bigger battle as I have an autoimmune disease and try to eat 
a specialized diet. People who were not affected were great in reaching 
out offering up a place to shower, do laundry and have a home cooked 
meal. The YMCA was great in providing a space to shower but it was just 
one more thing to try to find time to do in an already tight schedule. 
There were mornings I just sucked it up and took a freezing cold 
shower--not a great way to start your day.
    Then there was coordinating when I had to be home for someone to 
come to assess my home--could we get a space heater? I live in a very 
old home so I knew that wouldn't happen. I had to take off time from 
work to do so during one of the busiest times for me. The next day 
Columbia Gas announced there wouldn't be any more appointments as they 
were going to use the approach that everyone would need new systems and 
appliances; that was incredibly aggravating. After that it was like 
radio silence--when would someone come back? Would I have to be home? 
How much notice would I really get so I could be sure I could miss 
work. Every day in limbo.
    When the opportunity arose to relocate to a hotel as I live in the 
affected area, I took the steps to do so; that was a process in its own 
right and was just one more thing that you didn't know when you were 
going to be contacted. When I finally was a message was left saying 
there was a reservation for me at the Embassy Suites at Logan Airport 
however there was no information left as to when the reservation would 
start, what might I have to pay for. etc. It took five different phone 
calls to get the information and it turned out the reservation had 
started the day before. Yet one more thing to be aggravated about. I 
appreciated having a place to go but the fact that I work in Wilmington 
meant for an even longer day every day. I was at the hotel for almost 
five weeks.
    Trying to keep up with the tasks associated with this mess became 
and continues to be exhausting and almost as if I have an additional 
part-time job. Not knowing what to expect--more importantly what 
information to trust has truly been the greatest source of my 
frustrations around this event. When will someone be at my house to 
inspect it? Will someone actually show up when they are supposed to be 
on my street? What if someone comes and I am not home--will then come 
back and when? What could you get reimbursed for as far as expenses? Is 
the map posted online the actual work plan or will that change? What 
could you actually get reimbursed for? I heard different things from 
different claims adjusters, neighbors and others affected. That kept 
changing and continues to this day to change. Information about what 
you can still be reimbursed for changes too depending on what you read 
and hear from others. Having to keep pestering my claims adjuster about 
the weekly per diem and getting continued clarification about what was 
and wasn't reimbursable--that became a regular task; he was just as 
frustrated at times as the information kept changing. Different people 
calling--about claims, the status of the work being done at my home, 
etc.--trying to return phone calls and having to play phone tag--more 
time sucked up and more frustrations. The daily updates--great that 
Columbia Gas tried to keep us informed--but most of it was information 
none of us really needed. We wanted to know if our street was listed as 
a work site to be gas ready/house ready was that really the case? 
Having an actual window of time someone needed to be home would have 
helped so we could try to plan to continue to go to work and take care 
of things we needed to/wanted to. There are things that are still 
unknown--when will my stove come off of backorder and then, 
realistically, how long will it take to get installed (and the old one 
removed from my house)? I understand this situation is one that hasn't 
been experienced before and there are many moving parts and many people 
with a say in what happens or doesn't happen however I still feel 
things could have been a little more streamlined; even there had been 
one phone number to call to have your questions answered about 
everything instead having to reach out to different people and/or 
physically go places--that would have been an improvement.
    I am fortunate that I am a renter with a proactive landlord as if 
that wasn't the case, I more than likely would still be living at the 
Embassy Suites at Logan Airport. I am fortunate that I'm not afraid to 
be proactive, have stayed on top of things and have a responsive claims 
adjuster who continues to reach out and make sure I have what I need. 
Each day though I come home to take care of another 'Columbia Gas' 
task. I'm tired and just want things to go back to normal.
                                 ______
                                 
    Richard Oneil from Andover: About 10 years ago we had a non ignited 
explosion in the front of our house in the middle of our street which 
was caused by a leaky gas main it did not catch fire but we were 
evacuated none the less there was never a cause or response or any such 
information given to us and this just solidified our feeling of 
unsafeness. It's obvious that the infrastructure is failing all over 
the area, what are they going to do? Perhaps replace all lines?
                                 ______
                                 
    Howard Garshman from Auburn: Senator Markey--I applaud you efforts 
re: Columbia Gas, unfortunately you are not seeing the larger picture. 
The DAILY dangers and risks the gas companies are exposing an unknowing 
public too, make what happened in Merrimack look like a firecracker.
                                 ______
                                 
    Frank Dushame from North Andover: Good Morning Mr. Markey:
    It was a very chaotic day and time for all affected, and the day 
and stories and memorable for many. Mine was not as tragic as some but 
very clear in my mind like many. I was home that late afternoon and 
could smell gas in my house. I had new appliances but an old gas line 
system. I first checked the stove and could smell the strong order from 
there so I proceeded to shut the gas valve off behind the stove and was 
going to address it later. I was headed out to dinner that night so I 
proceed to leave my house. While driving to the top of my street I 
remember seeing a lot of first responder activity and was wondering 
what was going on. As i headed up RT125 towards Haverhill I saw many 
fire engines headed toward North Andover from other communities. I 
called my cousin to see what the hell was going on because one is a 
firefighter and another a police officer. He told me the news and after 
picking up my girlfriend I told her we were returning to my house to 
get my dogs out of there. It took us over 55 minutes to get back and 
upon arrival I opened the door and a tremendous gas smell came from my 
house. The dogs came running out and jumped into my car and we left 
right away. It has been a long and sometimes difficult 2 months and I 
know for me and many that those thoughts, experiences and images will 
always remain in ones mind. Thank you to all the first responders and 
people who have been assisting with this difficult time and situation
    Frank Dushame
                                 ______
                                 
    Suzanne Vazquez from Andover: Good Morning,
    I have been impacted by the Columbia Gas Explosion. I live with my 
husband four children and my brother with special needs. One of my 
children has a medical condition that needs to be closely monitored. In 
the beginning we could stay in our home and learned to take 5 minute 
showers. The showers were cold but manageable. As the weeks went by and 
the temperature dropped, I began the search for housing. The process 
was tedious with many phone calls and me explaining my situation to 
numerous people. My family started by hotel jumping, finding what ever 
hotel was available relatively close. Then, the hotel became fewer and 
far between. My children's after school activities make it difficult to 
live further away because I would not get home until 7/7:30 on a good 
night. The hotels were paid for by me and then reimbursed by my 
adjuster. My adjuster has been a life saver. He understood my situation 
and worked tirelessly on finding me permanent housing. After a few 
weeks, we were placed in the Rec Park trailer site in Andover. I was 
not originally placed there but my adjuster and the site manager had 
room for my family and accepted us there. This made my stress and 
anxiety levels subside for a while. My children and brother had a safe 
permanent place to call home. There was weak wifi at the site so my 
cell phone bill has been overcharged for three months due to my older 
children needing Internet access to do homework. Sometimes they would 
brave the cold and stay at the house to do homework and come to the 
trailer around 11pm to sleep. This would make waking up in the morning 
a challenge for all of us. The site managers are awesome! They are so 
friendly and accommodating to all our needs. The school where my 
younger children attend rerouted a bus to pick up my children. I can 
not say enough good things about the staff at the site.
    The second week in November Columbia Gas came to my house to begin 
the restoration process. The fore told me they would be in and out in 
two days. The crews were at my house for eight days. I had to 
continuously call out of work because I could not get a straight answer 
as to when they were going to be done. When there crews had finished, 
my new unit did not work. I took a week and countless phone calls to 
have someone come back to my house. Finally, a CG worker came to my 
house, I took another day off from work, and he looked at the system 
and explained that ``they'' have not been trained on the new systems 
and he didn't know how to fix the problem. He reset the unit again and 
told me call the emergency line again to have another crew come back to 
me house. While I was waiting at the bus stop with my younger children, 
there was a crew beginning their day down the street. I ran over to 
them and asked if they could get in touch with someone who could come 
back to my house. A young man told me that he would be at my house when 
he finished assessing the house that he was at. An hour later, he came 
to my house and reset the system again. He gave me his number and told 
me to text or call if the unit went off again. I text him two more 
times that day. The following day a whole new crew was at my house 
trying to solve the problem. The problem turned out to be the pipping. 
The pipes were too small for my house. The standard pipes that were 
installed were too small and now I have 4 1/2 inch pipes. The pipes are 
on the side of my house leading to the driveway. Now anytime that the 
weather gets cold, my driveway freezes. I have missed a ten days of 
work, so far, and may have to miss more when they come back to take my 
appliances. I am aware that a person 18 years or older needs to be home 
but I am an instructional assistant and taking this many days off of 
work has affected my ability to teach my students. I am responsible for 
their learning and help improve their way of learning. This does not 
happen if I have missed out on a weeks worth of classroom material. I 
am currently back in my home with heat and hot water but no appliances. 
I understand that there is a lot of work to be done, I do wish that the 
communication was better between CG and residents. It would be a little 
easier if I could let my administration know when I will be out of 
work. I have a lot of out of pocket food expenses and cooking for a 
family of seven, now eight, on a hot plate is quite time consuming and 
difficult. Not to mention, there is only so much take out one can 
really have. I have exhausted all the local take out places and fronted 
a restaurant bill and waiting to be reimbursed is expensive. This is 
only just the physical toll that this explosion has taken on me and my 
family.
    There is an emotional side effect as well. My children's school 
work has suffered greatly due to this incident. They have missed 
assignments and sometimes emotionally fragile during the school day. 
The unpredictability has taken it's toll on the younger children and 
they have become sleep deprived and emotional. My older children have 
become sleep deprived and irritable, more so than teen angst. There is 
constant tension between my husband and I as to who will take off work. 
I have more sick time to do so but I am also missing important class 
time with my students. I too have become emotional at work due to the 
stress.
    I have no time line of when my appliances will be removed or 
replaced. There have two assessor at my house in regard to the 
appliances but no action.
    The lack of internal communication is infuriating.
    Thank You,
    Zana Vazquez
                                 ______
                                 
    Lee Bluemel from North Andover: As a clergy person in North Andover 
and a resident impacted by the gas disaster, I see the impact of this 
disaster from many angles:

  1.  As a clergy person, my initial response was to ascertain the 
        needs of my congregation members, to coordinate congregational 
        support with food, appliances, living spaces and emotional 
        support. We were incredibly lucky in that none of the members 
        of my congregation had fires or explosions in their homes; 
        other clergy did have members impacted, and I believe six 
        churches were without heat for weeks. Immediate response also 
        included networking with the churches in the state to direct 
        them regarding where they could send special relief collections 
        that Sunday to the ECCF.

  2.  As a clergy person, next phase response included attending three 
        community meetings in Lawrence to hear from residents who were 
        impacted regarding their experiences and needs. These were 
        coordinated by Merrimack Valley Project and interfaith clergy. 
        We learned from these meetings the need for temporary heat in 
        homes, the need for additional translators on the streets, and 
        the need for greater funding for therapeutic support. We also 
        learned of a desire to reduce gas usage and to switch as 
        possible to electric appliances. These concerns were all shared 
        with the presidents of Columbia Gas and NiSource, and with Gov. 
        Baker in a letter signed by 17 clergy and other supporting 
        organizations. They were then shared with Mr. Steve Bryant, 
        President of Columbia Gas, in a meeting with 23 clergy from the 
        area. He took notes at that meeting about our requests; 
        however, we did not hear back if, when or how these concerns 
        were addressed.

  3.  Our interfaith team continued then to listen to residents, attend 
        community meetings, contact the State Attorney General's 
        Office, the Office of Energy and others to try to continue to 
        raise concerns, especially regarding an overlooked issue: the 
        lack of energy efficient equipment being brought in by Columbia 
        Gas to people's homes, resulting in more gas usage and higher 
        bills. We also led a community educational session on what to 
        look for in equipment, since Columbia Gas was not offering that 
        education and much of the equipment there were offering was 
        standard efficiency or poorly sized (and thus inefficient) for 
        homes.

  4.  As a resident, I looked into Air Source Heat Pumps when Columbia 
        Gas initially said these would be covered and received a quote; 
        CG then reversed its earlier stated policy. I then looked into 
        solar hot water heater or heat pump water heater, since I have 
        solar on my roof, and then requested the most energy efficient 
        option for my home from the CG list, but was told again and 
        again by my adjuster that I was only eligible for ``like for 
        like'' replacement of old equipment. I was also told that I 
        could not get a fireplace insert because I was too close to my 
        re-light date, even though I knew from the meeting with Mr. 
        Bryant that those relight dates were in question.

    The gas disaster has consumed my ministry for the past two months, 
and it is clear to me that Columbia Gas and NiSource must be required 
by law to shift to a safety culture and an energy efficient culture. 
They have not done these things on their own. They should also set 
aside funds for the non-profits in Lawrence who have been saddled with 
so much extra work, as well as for solarizing the valley and bringing 
in energy efficiency programs, which they have not done when they had 
the opportunity.
                                 ______
                                 
    Leslie Diaz from North Andover: Good morning,
    How do you even start to express the magnitude my life has changed 
since September 13, 2018 to sum up how emotionally stressed and without 
a voice I feel every single day is an equality to been rape and robbed. 
Every day is a new struggle and challenge and I'm going to quote a 
phrase I was told by one of Columbia Gas employee ``I'm just a one man 
show'' while I was trying to explained that my basement has been 
flooded ever since they worked outside. I was livid so I used his own 
phrase and told him how would you feel been a one woman show single 
mother dealing with all of these with no moral or physical support from 
no one?? He couldn't say anything. Precisely I said. To put in a little 
box all the frustration, headache, hopeless, helpless I feel throughout 
all of these it wouldn't fit here and I would have to spend days 
writing. My only hope is to get back to my home take back my regular 
life and put all these behind me.
                                 ______
                                 
    Janice Phillips from North Andover: Comparatively, my family 
doesn't have a horrific story to share. We are safe and sound and 
returned to our home 62 days after Columbia Gas's negligent error 
caused explosions in North Andover, Andover, and Lawrence. Those 62 
days were full of worry, chaos, panic, and exhaustion. But, I am 
grateful. I am grateful we are safe and sound. I am grateful we have 
had a reasonable and responsive claims adjuster who does want us to 
feel whole again. The boots on the ground in our home were kind, 
patient, and respectful as they tried to understand our fear and 
frustration while working to fix our home. It's simply that no one who 
isn't part of ``the affected'' can truly understand the impact.
    From a purely logistical level, dealing with this disaster caused 
by Columbia Gas completely overtook our lives. Early on, it took hours 
of watching news outlets, digging around on Columbia's website, 
stalking their twitter feed to looking for any shred of accurate 
helpful information. The problem? There was none. Personally, it took 2 
weeks before I could finally track someone down, who wasn't just placed 
on a street corner in a truck to hand out a phone number to call, who 
could actually physically come to my house to tell me whether I had low 
pressure lines and was in this for the long haul or we'd be back up and 
running soon because we had high pressure lines. Unfortunately for my 
family, we had low pressure lines and we realized we were in this for 
the long haul.
    I can't even convey the number of hours of all of our lives this 
has eaten away at. Hours upon hours trying to get answers on the phone. 
Hours upon hours waiting and waiting some more because Columbia gas 
*should* show up at my house sometime in the next 3 days. The toll on 
my entire family, living in two places, never having what we needed in 
either place is not something I can put into numbers. Our base of 
operations had to continue to be our home in North Andover as it was 
early in the school year, peak sports season for my kids, and we were 
trying to continue with some semblance of normalcy. Each day the temp 
would drop in my house and eventually, it stopped rebounding. I'd drive 
in from Danvers, to drop my high schooler off, spend an hour at home 
with my 5th grader before his drop off where we would snuggle under 
blankets keeping warm because our home was not approved to use space 
heaters, then I would begin my ``normal day''.
    I was working about 10-12 hour days at my actual job, and spending 
any spare moment I had trying to get answers about what was happening 
in our home. My kids would head home to wait in a cold house for sports 
practice and we'd regroup around 8-9 pm each night to get packed for 
the next day and trek to Danvers. This didn't seem so bad at first, day 
2, day 5, day 7, I mean, there was a warm breakfast after all, a 
novelty for my kids. Then it sunk in. This wasn't ending anytime soon. 
This logistical nightmare was actually my new normal. Sitting in my 
freezing cold house while we tried to live our ``normal'' life day in 
and day out, with no end in sight. The logistics were completely 
overwhelming and depressing.
    The emotional toll is also not to be forgotten. The terror each and 
every time you hear sirens, to this day. The true mental suffering of 
each and every member of my family as our lives were completely torn 
upside down. The tears of exhaustion from myself and my kids as we 
trekked back and forth to a warm bed. The missed parties and social 
events because you can't just ``pop over'' from Danvers.
    Most significant is the loss of trust and security in our own home. 
The loss of ability to feel safe in the one place that should never be 
taken away. Our fearful tears, because we are afraid that this will 
happen again, sad tears because we know that many of our community 
members had their lives far more uprooted than we did, these are the 
things that each of you who caused this disaster CANNOT understand.
    I DO consider my family fortunate but this is way more than an 
``inconvenience''. This is a life changing, man made disaster that 
could have been prevented. At the upper levels, this project has been 
woefully mismanaged only increasing the levels of stress on the 
affected residents. Don't worry though, we have come together and 
formed an unstoppable bond only understood by ``the affected''. We will 
fight for each other and support each other until each and every home 
is back up and running. However, the toll on our mental health will 
take much longer to heal.
    What's done is done, we are forever changed. We NEED Columbia Gas 
to step up to the plate. You can't take your mistake back, but you need 
to make it as right as it can be made. Again, we are not an 
extraordinary story. Just a story of a working class family, fighting 
hard each day to get through having our world turned upside down.
                                 ______
                                 
    Mark Ross from Peabody: I'd like to suggest that every home in the 
area has a high pressure gas senor installed that senses over pressure 
and prevents what recently happened in the Merrimack Valley. There no 
other way to make people feel safe regarding gas coming into their 
home. Personally I'm willing to pay privately for the installation but 
feel that gas companies should be more likely to pickup the expense.
    Mark Ross from Peabody
                                 ______
                                 
    Clara Ruiz Vargas from Lawrence: My family and I are one to be 
grateful on being blessed as one of the luck ones. My heart goes out to 
each everyone one individual that was affected by this senseless, 
selfish, irresponsible disaster that not only greed was a great factor 
but lack of humanity from CG.
    In this whole process I've endured sickness, depression, 
humiliation, fear and so much anger!
    Not only did CG is fully responsible for what we are going thru 
they have made me fell like if I'm the one responsible for their 
negligence with their lack of communication and heartless ways in 
handling this disaster.
    To be where I am in this horror movie I had to beg every single day 
for over five weeks!
    No call/e-mails from my adjuster when I requested a budget for more 
heating source, for housing, for my stove, for my HW & Furnace, reimb. 
for heaters, until I threaten her with all of our politicians in charge 
including TRUMP! Now tell me was that necessary! My family and bundled 
up in one BR to keep each other warm when temperature dripped just 
because they were trying to save every penny for CG. and not realizing 
CG was the cause of all this!
    Once again we are very lucky to be here today and have a place to 
call home but it doesn't change the fact that we are all victims of 
CG's negligence!
                                 ______
                                 
    James Allick from Andover: Dear Senator Markey,
    Under normal situations I would not take the time to comment, but 
in this case I feel the need to say something.
    I have been a long time resident of Andover but this mistake by 
Colombia Gas really proves they are among the worst business group I 
have ever seen.
    As of last week I finally got gas back at my house, this is after 
of miscommunicated facts by Colombia Gas And to note I had been living 
in my car as it had been hovering around 40 Degrees in my home, I have 
a pet which precluded me from any hotels, and Colombia Gas did NOTHING 
to help me. I was told to find housing on my own, I did the charge for 
the month of November was $1400.00 I turned in a receipt as instructed 
by Colombia Gas. they are not doing ANYTHING to cover that expense. Now 
upon replacement of the stove they by accident unplugged my 
refrigerator and causing ALL the food in the fridge and freezer to 
SPOIL AGAIN. their reply was did I take pictures???????? No another 
$300.00 out the window.
    In closing I would not wish this on anyone, And Colombia Gas has 
done NOTHING TO HELP ME much less the people of Lawrence, Andover and 
North Andover but they did offer a Thanksgiving dinner. . . . Thanks 
ALOT!!!!!!!!!
    Jim Allick
    Andover, Ma 01810
                                 ______
                                 
    Linda Battalagine from North Andover: On the day of the disaster my 
daughter was home. My landlord had come home and smelled gas, he called 
Columbia Gas and a tech came to the house and said we were fine. He 
told my landlord that the levels of gas in the house were in acceptable 
range. My landlord MADE him shut off the main. By the time they got out 
side my neighbors house was on fire then the house across the street, 
there were six fires within a block radius of my house. After they 
assessed the damage to our house, not only were the appliances 
condemned but also the gas lines in the house were damaged do to the 
high pressure and we had several leaks that had to be repaired. So much 
for being ``safe''.
    Also my daughter was traumatized she called me hysterical looking 
for the pets and trying to evacuate everyone by herself in what I can 
only describe what looked like a war zone.
    In the days, weeks and months following--dealing with the claims 
reps was frustrating and difficult to get reimbursed. First when I 
asked about housing (moving cost or hotel) I was told ``we offered a 
replacement water heater, don't pay your rent''. Which I refused to do 
as my landlord was a victim. Three weeks in I caught pneumonia from the 
stress, and taking cold showers and sitting in a cold house. At least 
six men where in my kitchen tearing out the appliances that were built 
into the cabinets. I put in a claim for take out that week and it was 
denied. They stated ``we gave you a hot plate''. . . . I was so upset 
they it was expected of me to work around all these men doing stuff in 
the house while in bed with pneumonia to whip up a healthy dinner for 
my family on a two burner hot plate! I should have been in a hotel!!!! 
That saved them thousands of dollars.
    The only reason I got into housing was because of the local 
officials that required CG to do so. It took them four or five days to 
put me in housing after that. When they did they put me in Manchester 
NH!!!! I was commuting to my job in Boston and commuting took 5-6 hours 
a day!!! They put me in a hotel room with one bed and a pull out couch! 
I had to share a bed with my teenage son. I ended up calling around 
myself and I found a local hotel that CG reserved that was empty!!!! 
And the trailers were empty as well, I suspect they put us in 
Manchester so we would refuse the housing and they would not have to 
pay that bill. I did get into the local hotel after about 9 days.
    They promised to give me a food syphon after that and never did. I 
am out 14K of which I have only been reimbursed for about 8K. I did 
finally hire my own attorney who will work with CG to get me reimbursed 
for all my expenses.
    I think the worst part is the attitude that we should somehow be 
``grateful'' for everything CG has done. They hired a company that 
deals with natural disasters to handle the claims process. The 
difference is that this was not a ``natural disaster'' it was 
negligence and my experience with CG through this process has been for 
them to blame everyone else and NOT take responsibility. From making my 
landlord responsible for housing, to thinking that a hotplate and space 
heater should be sufficient in dealing with the aftermath.
    The worst part is in the end all of our bills will probably be 
increased to cover the expense of what their oversight and greed has 
caused.
    Their executives make millions annually in a salary while I am on 
single mom who gets by living pay check to pay check. I have everything 
back now . . . but this disaster will have long term implications for 
me. . . . I am still out 8K and we will not have many gifts this Xmas 
as a result. My car had to go into the shop as during this I had put 
over 3000 miles add'l onto my car. My kitchen is still damaged as the 
appliances where custom fitted and the new ones don't fit so we will 
need a carpenter to fix. Workers broke things in my house while they 
were tromping in and out without knocking (one time my daughter was 
alone and changing in her room).
    I lost time out of work, and when I was at work I couldn't 
concentrate as I had to deal with the lack of communication and 
fighting to get reimbursed for certain items.
    CG did not care about what their negligence caused . . . they cared 
about the perception of the public. They rushed through to complete the 
pipeline and gloated to the press about how they completed what was 
said couldn't be done. They forgot that 8000 people were still without 
heat or hot water the day of that press release, they did not care if 
people were getting ill, or making a crazy commute. They neglected the 
human element of the disaster they do not deserve to be in business and 
it is my hope that they are forbidden to work in Massachusetts after 
this. I would rather see that than get my 8K back.
                                 ______
                                 
    Lawrence Teachers' Union Local 1019: December 4, 2018
    Dear Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation,
    The Lawrence Teacher's Union, Local 1019, AFT MA, AFL-CIO, would 
like to offer some brief written testimony regarding the Lawrence Gas 
Explosion of September 13, 1018 and its aftermath. We are attaching 
some news clippings, press releases, and internal memos to support our 
concern for our students, families, community, and our members. We are 
attaching a survey taken by members who lived in the affected area.
    The explosions directly affected the homes of approximately 270 
unionized AFT MA members and their families. Most of the 140 teachers, 
90 paraprofessionals, and 20 clerks were without heat, hot water, and 
stoves for over two months. They were relocated to hotels and trailers 
and suffered the inconveniences of not being able to cook, take a 
shower, or sleep in a warm bed in their own homes.
    The gas crisis also exposed the weakened gas infrastructure in all 
school buildings throughout the city. Differed maintenance of school 
boilers and HVAC systems reached a crisis in the weeks following the 
explosions, as the school department struggled to turn on the heat in 
the schools before the cold temperatures could set in.
    Students and teachers were inconvenienced by multiple evacuations, 
fire drills, and delays. Young children were exposed to cold and rain 
as they were moved to other schools.
    The Parthum School, although deemed safely situated in another part 
of the city, was constantly being evacuated for nearly two weeks due to 
gas fumes of an unspecified origin. The quick thinking of a school 
custodian found a leaking roof top unit at the school. The gas fumes 
were circulated back into the building through the exhaust system. The 
problem was rectified but the parents and public were on edge. Mayor 
Rivera stationed off duty firemen in all the city schools to insure 
safety and peace of mind.
    The crisis also brought out the best in the Lawrence Public 
Schools. Union members and administrators worked with the Red Cross by 
assisting in the shelters and comforting families. Staff read and 
played with children as their parents made arrangements for alternate 
housing and assistance. I am proud of their efforts, particularly the 
staff of the Bruce and Rollins Schools who suffered from school fires 
in 2016 and 2017. We are lucky to have such dedicated and caring 
unionists.
    On November 1, AFT President Randi Weingarten came to Lawrence and 
toured the neighborhoods and the schools before visiting one of the 
trailer parks. At the Breen School she distributed hats and gloves to 
the 4 and 5 year olds to help ward off the winter's chill. These 
littlest victims of the natural gas fires and explosions took to 
President Weingarten as she read and talked with them. President 
Weingarten knows the Breen staff has a big job ahead of them but knows 
well that they are up to the challenge.
    We thank Mayor Daniel Rivera for his exceptional leadership, 
transparency, and courage during this crisis. He is doing an 
exceptional job.
    We are deeply grateful to the Lawrence Fire and Police Departments 
as well as all state and regional public safety and public works 
departments. They keep us safe.
    We are grateful to the American Federation of Teachers and the AFL-
CIO for their support. As a gesture of good will at Thanksgiving, the 
union distributed $300 worth of Market Basket gift certificates to 
every affected member. This was a modest gesture of support to our 
brothers and sisters who were affected by the explosions and struggled 
through the recovery effort.
    We hope for a safe and swift resolution of this prolonged crisis. 
May we all stay Lawrence strong!
    Respectfully,
    Francis J. McLaughlin Jr.
    President
    Lawrence Teachers' Union
    Local 1019
                                 ______
                                 
    Chief Patrick E. Keefe, Chief Roy P. Vasque, Chief Charles P. Gray: 
On September 13th, 2018 the City of Lawrence Massachusetts, along with 
the neighboring communities of Andover and North Andover, experienced a 
natural gas disaster, which is being described as the largest disaster 
of its kind in our Nation's history. This incident was the result of 
the over pressurization of a low pressure gas main, resulting in 
explosions and structure fires in these three communities. The Dispatch 
Centers of Lawrence, North Andover, and Andover were immediately 
inundated with hundreds of frantic 911 calls from terrified residents, 
as the smell of gas and clouds of smoke filled the air. The City of 
Lawrence alone received five hundred and fifty-six (556) calls between 
4:10 PM and 8:00 PM. The Town of North Andover received roughly 198 911 
calls in the initial moments of the incident. The Town of Andover 
received over 300 calls for service during the initial hours of the 
event. The men and women of these three police departments immediately 
responded without hesitation to this unprecedented disaster, doing what 
was asked of them without concern for their own safety. As Chiefs, we 
were tasked with coordinating the immediate evacuation of all residents 
as the fires began and continued to spread with no end in sight. Entire 
neighborhoods were filled with terrified residents, leaving their homes 
with just the clothes on their backs, as the magnitude and danger of 
this disaster remained unknown for a period of time. The three Chiefs 
immediately called and spoke to each other to determine the scope and 
magnitude of the event. The Chiefs, after determining the proximate 
caused was gas related, had officers on the roads and in cruisers begin 
to use their public address systems to tell people to get out of their 
houses. Cruisers drove through the affected area warning residents to 
rally at local evacuation sites. During the initial hour of the event, 
local fire apparatus was tied up at fire after fire. Police officers 
were tasked with locating other structure fires and alerting central 
dispatch. It was at this time that a call was made to Rockingham County 
New Hampshire for assistance. This is something that has never happened 
before.
    As the situation was unfolding, an incident command location was 
established immediately adjacent to Interstate 495 and Route 114 at the 
borders of the three neighboring communities. As Chiefs, we immediately 
realized that an emergency of this size would require a significant 
amount of law enforcement personnel, far greater than that which was 
available in all three communities combined. As a result, we 
collectively established a safety plan utilizing the Massachusetts 
State Police and the Northeastern Massachusetts Law Enforcement Council 
(NEMLEC). The Council is made up of sixty (65) communities and 
Sheriff's Departments from Northeastern Massachusetts. NEMLEC provided 
personnel as well as additional communications and command capabilities 
to aide in the implementation of a constantly evolving safety plan. The 
Massachusetts State Police provided similar assets as well as providing 
helicopters to oversee the entire operation.
    At the command post, the three Chiefs sat in a meeting with the 
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, the State Fire Marshall, Fire Chiefs and 
the two town managers and the Mayor of the City of Lawrence. Also 
present were members of MEMA, the Columbia Gas. The meeting focused on 
turning off residential and business gas meters, as well as shutting 
down the power.
    As it was deemed necessary for safety reasons to shut down the 
power grid, a mass evacuation of the disaster zone was implemented. 
This required closing all exits from the highways and blocking all 
secondary entrances to the zone, while still allowing people to safely 
evacuate the area. Following the evacuation, the next essential task 
was to provide safety and security in the disaster zone which, with the 
exception of strategically placed temporary lighting, was in total 
darkness. Officers also were teamed with firefighters and Columbia Gas 
personnel to begin the arduous task of shutting down every gas meter in 
the affected area, approximately 8500 meters in total. This was done in 
all three communities well into the night and early morning. Massive 
amounts of police, fire, EMS, and gas company personnel were used to 
complete this task. As daylight broke, the plan required an avenue for 
law enforcement to assist residents in temporarily returning home to 
gather medication and other essential items. This effort was carried 
out with assistance of buses provided by the Merrimack Valley Regional 
Transit Authority and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.
    Throughout the first two nights where power was turned off, 
cruisers from all over Massachusetts arrived to patrol the affected 
areas. Cruisers maintained a visible presence to all those still in the 
area, both residents and potential criminal elements saw a cruiser on 
every block all through the nights.
    These efforts continued for two (2) days until the power was 
restored on day three (3) of the event. As the evacuation order was 
lifted, law enforcement personnel assisted residents with the safe 
return to their homes, and continue to maintain the visible presence 
giving people a sense of safety and peace of mind..
    As each of the affected communities attempted to return to a sense 
normalcy, it became clear that there would be an unprecedented amount 
of road construction underway simultaneously in all three communities. 
Once again, this required another adaption of the safety plan that 
would allow for the utilization of law enforcement personnel from 
Massachusetts and southern New Hampshire, as needed on a day-to-day 
basis. The three Chiefs quickly contacted NiSource and established a 
work agreement for the use of police officers in the work zones related 
to this incident. This was required to ensure the safety of motorists 
and pedestrians as they tried to navigate through neighborhoods in 
which virtually every street was affected. As alternative housing 
locations were established throughout the three communities, a law 
enforcement presence was maintained. Both of these facets of the plan 
are continuing to this very day.
    The overwhelming cooperation, collaboration, and professionalism of 
all law enforcement personnel involved from the outset of this incident 
until this very day has been simply amazing. While no amount of 
training or preparation could have adequately prepared our three 
communities for this disaster, this is without question one of the 
finest hours for the Massachusetts law enforcement community. In 
closing, it is important to note that none of these highlighted law 
enforcement successes would have obtainable without the support and 
understanding of the residents who we are sworn to serve.
                                 ______
                                 
    Jennifer Vallone from Lawrence: Her is my story . . . On that day I 
got home from work approximately 3:45. I was on the phone with my 
husband, i heard a loud bang. I figured it was a car accident so I 
looked outside and saw nothing. I walked back to the kitchen and 
smelled gas, thought maybe the cat had turned the knob on the stove, 
looked and saw nothing. Then I heard the smoke alarm going off in the 
basement, I opened the door and the smoke just started filling up the 
entire house. I was still on the phone with my husband and said 
something is really wrong here. I walked down a couple stairs to the 
basement and all I saw was flames. I screamed into the phone the house 
is on fire and immediately hung up on him and called the fire 
department. They told me leave the premises and evacuate the area 
there's been multiple gas explosions in the area. I grabbed me keys and 
two dogs and ran out of the house. The smell of gas was so strong and 
when i saw the flames I knew it was bad. As I pulled away from the 
house my husband pulled up like a bat out of hell and I saw him run 
into the house from my rear view mirror. I immediately knew he was 
going in to save the house. I parked my car and ran back to the house 
to make sure he was ok, the house was filled with smoke, he was running 
around looking for a wrench screaming he had to shut the gas off. He 
yelled at me to get far away as he was running down to the basement 
after he found a wrench. He shut the gas off and the flames went out. 
He saved our house from burning down. After he knew we were ok, he 
grabbed two wrenches, he gave one to our neighbor and they both ran 
around the neighborhood shutting gas meters off to save other peoples 
homes. There were no firefighters, police or any help for almost 2 
hours. It was like a movie, helicopters flying above, people running 
around, kids crying. It was horrible.
    We ended up being without gas for 57 days. That time was the most 
stressful time of my life. Carting kids around to hotel rooms to 
shower. Trying to figure out different ways to cook for our family. The 
worst thing is the worry. I am worried everyday that something like 
this will happen again. I lay in bed every night before I fall asleep 
wondering if the smoke alarms are all working, I have a suitcase packed 
in case we have an emergency again and we have to leave our home 
suddenly. My husband has nightmares at night to this day, talking in 
his sleep. My 9 year old can't even take a shower without calling me to 
make sure I'm still here or asking me if I'm ok. This incident changed 
our lives forever.
                                 ______
                                 
    Margaret Stone from Londonderry: I am writing on behalf of my Mom, 
Rita Kimball. We were in the process of selling her home and signed a 
purchase & sales agreement on 9/14/18 the day after the disaster. Her 
house is on 53 Dana St. Lawrence & it was considered to be in the high 
impact area. At the time my mom was living in a nursing home (age 87) 
so I was the contact to get any information of what we needed to do 
regarding the disaster. I repeatedly called the Columbia Gas phone # to 
get info with no answers, their usual response was since we are in the 
high impact area we can't tell you any information at this time. I 
actually gave them my cell phone # and still no call backs. We 
originally had a closing date of 10/19/18 but due to the disaster & no 
Gas or appliances we had to extend it to 11/19/18 and now it all set to 
close on 11/30/18. I'm just puzzled as to why no one called me not one 
time except on 11/17/18 to ask if we were all set & if our gas was on. 
We didn't even have a stove at that time, they delivered the wrong 
furnace which had to be replaced which took an extra week, when someone 
came in with the water heater & noticed they delivered the wrong 
furnace. Finally everything fell into place the following week. The 
total lack of information that was given out during this trying time 
was exhausting. No one not even the workers could tell you anything 
when you saw them in the neighborhood. If they did tell you something 
it was usually the wrong information. It's stressful enough trying to 
sell your family home but to have this on top of everything else was 
truly trying. I must say that every worker that we encountered during 
this process was very polite and caring. My family appreciated all 
their hard work they have endured. Our situation was not as bad as 
other people including my sister who was also impacted during this 
time. She actually purchased all her appliances and she got her gas 
quicker than expected. Fortunately no one was living in the house at 53 
Dana Street or this would be an entirely different response. Just the 
total lack of communication.
    left me speechless. Thank you for listening and thank you for your 
hard work during this time. I no longer live in Lawrence but work in 
the area and still have family in this city.
    I hope that Columbia Gas realizes the major impact of this terrible 
disaster.
                                 ______
                                 
    Juliann Porter from Lawrence: On Sept 13th I received a call from 
my neighbor, a little before 5p, telling me that houses were exploding 
and I needed to get home to get my animals. I was at work in the 
Lexington area and begun the very long ride home, panicking the entire 
time that I would be to late to save my 2 dogs and 2 cats. By the time 
I made it into N Andover the emergency was full on and it felt like a 
war zone as I inched closer to my house. Just about 2 blocks from my 
house, someone tried to stop me and he made a rude remark when I told 
him that I had to get my animals. I immediately lost my composure and 
drove up on the sidewalk to get around him, in a complete panic. I ran 
in my house and threw all my animals into my car. Right after this, a 
house, approximately 5 houses down, basement exploded and I jumped in 
my car. My husband was unable to get into the area and we agreed to 
meet in a parking lot in Methuen. It then took me another hour and a 
half to make it those few miles to get to him. We were lucky to have 
family that were able to take us in for the evacuation, but that 
weekend was supposed to be filled with joy, as my brother was getting 
married. We were now in shock and without anything except the clothes 
on our back and our animals and had to figure out a way to still 
celebrate. The ensuing months just brought more frustration as the 
communication between Columbia Gas and those of us affected was horrid, 
at best. I lost those first 2 weeks of work due to robo calls telling 
me to be home for the next 48 hrs only to have nobody show up. After 
that it was just luck of the draw if you were home when they came. They 
repeatedly, did the exact same inspections with no progress at all. At 
the end of October, they finally were installing our combi unit, but 
this took 5 days because nobody was familiar with them. The removal and 
installation process was a joke as nobody was even aware that our 
appliances either hadn't been removed yet or that we hadn't even picked 
out new appliances. The workers on the ground were all very nice and 
3working hard, but appeared to be just as confused as we were, as they 
were not getting direction from Columbia Gas either. I am grateful to 
be up and running, but feel as if we will never quite be able to return 
to our normal, prior to that day of Sept 13th.
                                 ______
                                 
    Doug Porter from Lawrence: This whole experience was a lesson and a 
scary one at that about how bad the flow of information was kept and 
shared. None of the workers knew where to go or what to do. I had 
workers in and out of my house four times to assess appliances and 
heating system. They took pictures of them every time they were here. 
The removal of the condemned appliances was a nightmare, they skipped 
around. When it came time to install heat and hot water, only a few 
workers seemed to know about how to install and wire controls for the 
systems they installed. It took four to five days at each person's 
house. I know plumbers that could have everything done in half the 
time. Then with the stoves and dryers, you'd call and they said one 
thing but we're doing another. They told people they weren't installing 
them, yet they were. The miscommunication in all this was horrendous, 
surely in this day and age of computers, there should of been an app 
from Google or Microsoft that could of kept all information and shared 
among the workers as to what each address needed. Many people had to 
use vacation or sick days to be home for the reconstruction process 
only for them not to show up. FRUSTRATING! Many people ended up getting 
sick too. Some with pneumonia or bad colds or flues. I myself got 
bronchitis because of a cold damp house. This could of gone quicker and 
easier if they actually had proper communication and worked in an 
efficient manner.
                                 ______
                                 
    Vicente De La Rosa from Lawrence: Vicente de la Rosa Consejo 
Terapeutico Familiar. Es imposible entender como ocurrio este desastre 
que a creado confusion, ansiedad, temor entre los Residentes que 
vivimos en esta ciudad, ami que como consejero terapeutico familiar y 
Miembro del Comite intergrado por Sacerdotes, pastores, Capellanes y 
consejeros, me a tocado escuchar a muchos personas miembros de nuestras 
congregaciones donde han expresado su agustia y temor haun cuando se 
escucha el sonido de Emergencia muchas personas estan aun en panico y 
asta han expresado el deceo de mudarse de esta Ciudad por el temor que 
esto pueda vover a ocurrir, ami en particular que me toco junto a mi 
esposa Rosina estar por mas de un mes viniendo en un Trailer a sido muy 
dificil, su conducciones de salud se empeoran y aun esta en 
recuperacion, mi nieta Marlin enferma pir mas de dos semanas y aun no 
se recupera del todo apor que teniamos que pasar por esto? Por la 
negligencia de Columbia Gass, y no nos sentimos seguro de que vuelva a 
ocurrir y tengamos que atravesar por situaciones peores en el futoro, 
aun no se puede estar seguro en toda la la Nacion porque estamos viendo 
en tiempo donde nadie esta seguro, con sistemas de distribucion muy 
obsoleto y vulnerable a cualquir persona mal intencionada en sus manos 
queda impulsar leyes que nos permitan vivir con mas confianza.
                                 ______
                                 
    Kate McHugh from Andover: November 26, 2018
    Initial Shock
    On September 13 I returned home from the hospital after having a 
total hip replacement. A casual friend drove me home. She had been to 
my home only once before. It was 10 minutes before the evacuation alert 
was sent.
    I truly believed that I had minutes to leave my house. I believed 
my life was endanger and that I would lose everything. But what could I 
do? What options did I have? How could I get the cats out? I could 
barely walk on crutches, I couldn't go down stairs easily, nor could I 
drive. Neighbors went door to door to turning off gas valves as others 
huddled in the street in disbelief. My friend ran to CVS to get my 
crucial blood thinner and pain med prescriptions. When she got there, 
employees were fleeing. They said they could not help and told her go 
to any other CVS. By that point, my street was closed and there was 
gridlock on Elm Street and Rt. 28. I needed those meds as blood clots 
are the most serious risk of death post hip surgery. My friend, not 
knowing the area, admitted she wanted to get home. What was I to do?
    This 30 minute period brought back another awful trauma . . . 3 
years ago my husband died suddenly as we were commuting to Boston. I 
was as helpless then, as I was on Sept. 13.
    I was scared and frightened throughout that long initial 4 day 
period; every night a different crew came to check the house for gas. 
But my gas was turned off. What are they looking for? What is the 
danger? Feeling afraid in your own home is something you never forget.

    Turning Challenge into Opportunity
    A community of ``affected'' folks shared info about getting 
resources and alternative heat. This is how I learned of a safer, more 
energy efficient way of heating my home. It appeared that the safest 
and alternative was a ductless system. In fact, it would be more energy 
efficient as my steam heat has only one zone. A mini split system would 
allow me to heat only the rooms that I am occupying.
    So, I was proactive and asked Worley if I could get approval to 
research other heat sources, namely a mini-split system. My adjuster 
replied that that shouldn't be a problem. After doing copious research, 
I obtained 3 estimates for mini-split from MassSave approved 
contractors. The estimate included $1,700 rebates from MassSave. I 
called them immediately and sent the best estimate to my claim 
adjuster.
    To qualify, an energy audit/assessment must be scheduled, but not 
necessarily completed, before work is begun. Eager to use these 
rebates, I called MassSave to schedule an assessment. Initially they 
said they were booking into January in Andover but when I provided my 
address I was told they could not book a date because I am in the 
``affected'' area! When I explained that that was precisely why I 
needed to install an alternative heat source, I was told that Columbia 
Gas was forbidding the scheduling of energy assessments and then she 
gave me the phone number of folks who could help me. . . . The Columbia 
Gas Claims adjuster. My adjuster knows absolutely nothing about energy 
assessments! The worst part of this? Even if folks in the ``affected '' 
had the means to pay for a mini split, they would not qualify for 
$1,700 in rebates!
    That same day, my adjuster responded that his supervisor advised 
him not able to approve any mini split systems. It was suggested that I 
have a contractor come to my home to see if a pellet stove is possible 
to be installed.
    I asked if Columbia Gas would offer even a partial reimbursement as 
the mini-split system is an energy efficient alternative to heating my 
entire house with gas. He told me he had been forbidden to authorize 
any payment toward a mini-split because the system is not solely used 
for heat.
    The idea that a pellet stove is a reasonable substitution is 
absolutely unfounded. The idea that I haul 40 lbs of wood pellets is 
simply not possible; I am physically unable to maintain a pellet stove.

    What You See is Not What You Get
    I stayed updated via Columbia Gas website and Andover.gov. Again, I 
was searching for energy efficiency so I was happy to read that CG was 
offering such as for replacement. When the Gilbane crew (my 4th 
assessment) took over on my street I spoke to them about this and 
pointed to the pdfs online. They were totally unaware these options 
existed . . . because they didn't in their world.
    Communication within Columbia Gas was sorely lacking. Their 
subcontractors were not kept up-to-date nor did they have access to the 
models shown on the website! The crew chief said, I have access to 3 
boilers today, Kate, that's it.
    How do you measure the fear, anguish, and exhaustion that countless 
people have and are still going through? Not only did this affect the 
residents but also the subcontractors. Boots on the ground. They were 
under a tremendous amount of pressure (meetings every night after they 
had worked 12 hrs) to check off the houses. And all these folks were 
away from their homes and family. There was empathy on both sides.
    Columbia Gas kept track of houses that were ``relit'' but those 
numbers don't show the truth behind them. My home was relit on October 
23, only because my 83-year-old neighbor was elevated to ``priority'' 
status. My neighbor told all the workers they needed to put me on the 
priority list as well due to my recent surgery. However, as of December 
9, 2018, I have no stove nor oven nor heat in my bedroom. I got 
approval to replace my gas fireplace for my bedroom last week. It took 
5 weeks to get the approval.
    The CEO of NiSource said in the hearing that he couldn't commit to 
NOT raising rates for those who lived through this disaster. 
Essentially, their victims would foot the bill for their complacency 
and utter neglect. Please tell the residents of the Merrimack Valley 
that this unconscionable action will not be allowed in the United 
States of America.
    Thank you.
    Kate McHugh
    Andover, MA

    Senator Warren. Mr. Chairman, does that mean people can 
still submit stories?
    Senator Markey. For two weeks, yes, for two weeks, that 
will be included in the record, and we----
    Senator Warren. Small business owners, as well.
    Senator Markey. Everyone up in this community who was 
affected, we want to hear your stories and it will be included 
in the record and we welcome that, urge you to do so.
    And, again, I want to thank Andrew Flanagan of Andover and 
Andrew Maylor of North Andover, the Town Managers of those two 
communities. Thank you so much for being here. Thank you for 
your incredible response to this disaster. It's ongoing but I 
can see--I think we can all see the teamwork that exists 
amongst your three communities.
    And I know that you're a unit because that's why we're 
here. You're saying how often does it happen that a Senate 
committee goes to a local community. Not often. This is a 
special day----
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey.--and the reason that I wanted to bring the 
Senate Commerce Committee, which has jurisdiction over the 
pipeline safety agency and has jurisdiction over the National 
Transportation Safety Board, so they would be here today, is 
that they should experience what the impact is of regulations 
that do not work. They should see the harm which is done.
    Again, my father grew up in 88 Phillips Street in South 
Lawrence. He went to the John Breen School and I would like to 
take this moment to thank the South Lawrence East Middle School 
for hosting us here today. We thank you for----
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey --allowing us to use your beautiful 
facility. My father came from this community and many members 
of my family now live in Andover and North Andover. It's one 
community united.
    After hearing today from Columbia Gas and NiSource, Federal 
and state regulators, safety experts, and our communities on 
the devastation and hardship they have had to endure, I am not 
satisfied. We are not satisfied. The company and regulators 
refuse to take responsibility and I will not rest until there 
is accountability.
    1,300 Merrimack Valley families are still waiting for their 
homes to be house-ready because Columbia Gas was not even close 
to being safety-ready. Temperatures in Massachusetts are 
dropping and so is my faith, our faith that Columbia Gas, 
NiSource, and Federal regulators can prevent another disaster 
like this from happening again.
    That is unacceptable. That must change and I will fight 
every day, along with Senator Warren, as I know that Seth 
Moulton and Lori Trahan will, in partnership with Congresswoman 
Tsongas, to ensure that things change and that there is justice 
for our communities.
    We are going to take the lessons of this disaster and then 
turn them into laws so that we can ensure that no community, no 
family anywhere in Massachusetts or the United States has to 
experience a tragedy like this ever again.
    We thank all of you for being here. We will not forget.
    [Applause.]
    Senator Markey. This hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to 
                         Hon. Matthew A. Beaton
    Question 1. The Columbia Gas pipeline integrity management plan did 
not contemplate the risk of this sort of event--a very low-probability, 
high-consequence disaster. This integrity management plan was audited 
and approved by the Department of Public Utilities.
    Did the Department of Public Utilities offer any comments or 
technical assistance for improving the distribution integrity 
management plan?
    Answer. In accordance with Federal law, 42 CFR 192 Subparts M and 
O, gas distribution companies are required to develop, and the 
Department is required to review, integrity management programs. The 
programs must meet the requirements set forth in the Federal 
regulations. The purpose of the Department`s review of the programs is 
to ensure compliance with the Federal standards.
    The Department reviews these programs for compliance with Federal 
and state laws and regulations and, beyond ensuring compliance, does 
not offer comments related to the programs.

    Question 1a. Does DPU plan to require any modifications of this 
plan following the September 13 disaster?
    Answer. The Department has hired an independent evaluator, Dynamic 
Risk, who will examine the operation and maintenance policies and 
practices of the Commonwealth's gas distribution companies and will 
also examine the physical integrity of the Commonwealth's gas 
distribution system. A preliminary report, which will complement the 
NTSB's ongoing review, is expected within the coming weeks. The purpose 
of the independent evaluator's report will be to provide concrete 
recommendations for improving the integrity and safe operation of the 
Commonwealth's aged natural gas infrastructure.

    Question 2. The Columbia Gas emergency response plan was approved 
by the Department of Public Utilities. However, this plan simply does 
not seem to have contemplated responding to system-wide disaster of the 
magnitude that we saw on September 13. The most severe level of 
emergency your response plan contemplated was for an incident that 
would last ``72 hours or longer.''
    Did the Department of Public Utilities offer any comments or 
technical assistance for improving the emergency response plan?
    Answer. Under the Department's regulations, Emergency Response 
Plans (``ERP'') of the natural gas distribution companies are annually 
filed with the Department and developed in accordance with the 
requirements set out in G.L. c. 164, Sec. 85B and 220 C.M.R. 19.00. 
Each gas company is required to ensure that it is adequately and 
sufficiently prepared to restore service to its customers in a safe and 
reasonably prompt manner during an Emergency Event. This includes, at a 
minimum, preparing and following written procedures consistent with 
those required by 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 60101 through 60125; 49 C.F.R. 
Part 192; G.L. c. 164, Sec. Sec. 85B and 105A; 220 CMR 69.00 and 220 
CMR 100.00 through 113.00. Each gas company shall include these written 
procedures in their respective manuals for conducting operations and 
maintenance activities and for emergency response, and, where 
appropriate, in their manuals of written procedures to minimize hazards 
resulting from gas pipeline emergencies, as required by 49 C.F.R. Part 
192; 220 CMR 69.00 and 220 CMR 100.00 through 113.00.
    The Department reviews these plans for compliance with Federal and 
state laws and regulations.

    Question 2a. Does DPU plan to require any modifications of this 
plan following the September 13 disaster?
    Answer. The Department has hired an independent evaluator, Dynamic 
Risk, who will examine the operation and maintenance policies and 
practices of the Commonwealth's gas distribution companies and will 
also examine the physical integrity of the Commonwealth's gas 
distribution system. A preliminary report, which will complement the 
NTSB's ongoing review, is expected within the coming weeks. We 
anticipate that the independent evaluator's report will provide 
concrete recommendations for improving the integrity and safe operation 
of the Commonwealth's aged natural gas infrastructure.

    Question 3. After reading the National Transportation Safety Board 
report about what happened with this disaster, is it your opinion that 
a state inspector would have been able to catch this error, if one were 
to have been looking at the September 13 job at Salem St. and South 
Union St.? If not, is DPU planning additional requirements to ensure 
that state inspectors have the information or tools necessary to detect 
these sorts of faulty plans?
    Answer. The Department is one of many parties working with the NTSB 
on its investigation. As such, the Department cannot comment on, nor 
offer opinions about, the NTSB report. Additionally, the Department is 
conducting its own investigation into the cause and origin of the 
events of September 13, 2018 and it would be improper to comment, 
speculate, or make any conclusions about the possible outcome of that 
investigation.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to 
                              Paul Roberti
    Question 1. Columbia Gas used to have a policy in place that 
required a trained technician be on site at the pressure-regulating 
station when work was being done that could affect the pressure of the 
pipeline system. This policy was abandoned four years ago, but 
according to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), on-site 
personnel could have ``immediately addressed the issue and mitigated 
the consequences.''
    Would a nationwide requirement that technicians are present at key 
pressure-regulating stations improve safety during construction?
    Answer. Pipeline regulations already require that all individuals 
who perform tasks that affect the operation and maintenance of a 
pipeline, including tie-in of a new pipeline to a previously existing 
(operating) pipeline, are qualified. Such qualified personnel are 
expected to perform or oversee activities that may represent a high 
risk to the safe operation of the gas system.
    Further, it is PHMSA's expectation that the pipeline industry adopt 
the American Petroleum Institute's (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 
1173, which clearly indicates that risk management must be an integral 
part of the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of a 
pipeline system. PHMSA participated as part of the RP 1173 standards 
development committee. This standard defines operational controls that 
are essential to the safe design and construction of pipelines. For 
example, Section 5.6: Risk Reduction requires that processes are 
reviewed to continuously reduce risk in all activities, including 
construction practices. Section 8.2: System Integrity requires pipeline 
operators to maintain quality control procedures so that construction 
is performed in accordance with an approved design. Pursuant to these 
practices, a pipeline operator should assess risk associated with all 
aspects of its pipeline system to define operational controls, address 
those risks, and review progress.

    Question 1a. If so, is PHMSA working on any regulation or guidance 
that would require on-site technicians during construction? If not, why 
not?
    Answer. Pipeline regulations already require that all individuals 
who perform tasks that affect the operation and maintenance of a 
pipeline, including tie-in of a new pipeline to a previously existing 
(operating) pipeline, are qualified. Such qualified personnel are 
expected to perform or oversee activities that may represent a high 
risk to the safe operation of the gas system. Pipeline regulations also 
require that companies have adequate written procedures for pipeline 
design, construction, operation, maintenance, and emergencies; have the 
capability to shut down systems in a timely manner in the event of an 
incident; and establish and adhere to written emergency plans to 
minimize hazards to life and property.
    PHMSA awaits the official conclusion of the NTSB's investigation of 
the incidents in Merrimack Valley Massachusetts and will fully evaluate 
and consider all of the NTSB's conclusions and recommendations, 
including whether or not further regulatory clarifications are needed.

    Question 2. The NTSB found that a single field engineer was allowed 
to almost unilaterally approve the work order that led to the 
explosions on September 13, 2018. The NTSB noted there was no oversight 
from experienced technicians who would have understood the implications 
for the entire pipeline system. According to the NTSB, the engineer in 
question had only ``limited knowledge'' about the ``consequences of 
losing the capability to sense the main pressure.''
    Mr. Roberti, would safety improve if Federal regulations required 
that the departments responsible for knowing the locations of pressure-
control equipment have to sign off on work plans?
    Answer. PHMSA takes all NTSB recommendations seriously. PHMSA 
awaits the official conclusion of the NTSB's investigation of the 
incidents in Merrimack Valley Massachusetts and will fully evaluate and 
consider all of the NTSB's conclusions and recommendations.
    Preliminary NTSB findings indicate that this accident stemmed from 
a deficiency in the company's quality control and a breakdown of 
internal procedures. Pipeline regulations already require that all 
individuals who perform tasks that affect the operation and maintenance 
of a pipeline, including tie-in of a new pipeline to a previously 
existing (operating) pipeline, are qualified. Such qualified personnel 
are expected to perform or oversee activities that may represent a high 
risk to the safe operation of the gas system.
    Companies must comply with existing safety regulations, including 
instituting quality control procedures, and should continuously improve 
and nurture a comprehensive safety culture. Implementing the elements 
of RP 1173 can help companies achieve a strong safety culture.

    Question 2a. If so, is PHMSA working on any regulation or guidance 
that would require the approval of the officials within companies that 
have a system-wide view of the gas system? If not, why not?
    Answer. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has passed laws to 
require this for pipelines in Massachusetts. PHMSA's primary role is to 
establish minimum safety standards and to provide oversight to these 
standards. PHMSA also partners with most U.S. states to provide 
pipeline safety oversight of about 80 percent of the 2.8 million miles 
of pipelines in the U.S. The states may establish safety standards that 
go above and beyond the Federal minimum standards. PHMSA expects the 
pipeline industry to understand and manage the risks or their 
respective pipeline systems and to ensure the safe operation regardless 
of compliance with the Federal minimum standards.

    Question 3. One of the NTSB recommendations was for Columbia Gas to 
have a professional engineer review and certify any construction plans 
before starting work, in order to provide another layer of defense 
against the odds that one engineer could make a decision that would 
bring down the pipeline system.
    Mr. Roberti, would safety improve if gas distribution companies 
everywhere had a professional engineer review and approve all 
construction plans for gas distribution companies?
    Answer. PHMSA takes all NTSB recommendations seriously. PHMSA 
awaits the official conclusion of the NTSB's investigation of the 
incidents in Merrimack Valley Massachusetts and will fully evaluate and 
consider all of the NTSB's conclusions and recommendations.

    Question 3a. If so, is PHMSA working on any regulation or guidance 
that would require that professional engineers review and approve all 
work plans? If not, why not?
    Answer. As noted above, PHMSA awaits the official conclusion of the 
NTSB's investigation of the incidents in Merrimack Valley Massachusetts 
and will fully evaluate and consider all of the NTSB's conclusions and 
recommendations.

    Question 4. Right now, Federal regulations do not require pipeline 
companies to have a Pipeline Safety Management System (SMS) in place, 
which would require the adoption of a safety culture throughout a 
company's operations and decisions.
    Do you agree that it would improve safety if Federal regulations 
required that all pipeline companies adopt a safety culture through a 
Safety Management System?
    Answer. At this time, PHMSA's focus is on emphasizing the 
continuous assessment and improvement of pipeline safety by strongly 
encouraging pipeline operators to implement SMS.
    The common thread that runs throughout every aspect of PHMSA's 
safety mission is an SMS approach. SMS looks to prevent accidents and 
incidents from ever occurring. PHMSA is moving beyond the role of being 
just a regulator--to push operators to identify and target their own 
risks, and to encourage a company-wide culture that makes safety the 
number one priority, always. Further, PHMSA understands that there is 
no one-size-fits-all method for creating an SMS program; implementation 
varies from operator to operator. To be effective, SMS programs must be 
developed by operators to address their specific operator needs and 
risks.
    Further, for an SMS culture to permeate through all levels and 
areas of the pipeline industry, we need ways to share and analyze data, 
allowing all of us to see emerging trends to inform best practices. In 
December 2016, PHMSA established a Voluntary Information-Sharing System 
Working Group (VIS WG). The VIS WG was charged with studying 
information-sharing systems for the pipeline industry and providing 
recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation on the necessity of 
a sharing system, ways to encourage the exchange of information, and 
best practices for the protection of proprietary and security-sensitive 
information. The VIS WG plans to submit its recommendation report to 
the Secretary in Spring 2019.

    Question 5. On September 13, the pressure-controlling equipment in 
Lawrence experienced what is known as a ``common mode of failure.'' One 
action, in this case the abandonment of a pipeline running under South 
Union Street, caused both the main pressure regulator and the backup 
regulator to fail at the same time and in the same fashion. PHMSA 
regulations require that equipment meant to protect from over-
pressurization are ``designed and installed to prevent any single 
incident [. . .] from affecting the operation of both the overpressure 
protective device and the district regulator.'' Shut-off devices or 
relief valves both provide a separate layer of protection beyond just 
having two working regulators in series. Previously, PHMSA staff have 
said that the regulator setup employed by Columbia Gas at issue in the 
September 13 disaster satisfied Federal requirements and is in common 
usage throughout distribution systems--conceivably putting other 
communities at a similar risk.
    Would safety improve if Federal regulations required that pressure-
control devices could not have a common mode of failure, as we saw in 
this disaster?
    Answer. Preliminary NTSB findings indicate that this accident 
stemmed from a deficiency in the company's quality control and a 
breakdown of internal procedures. Several methods and devices could 
potentially provide additional protection. PHMSA awaits the conclusion 
of the NTSB's investigation and will thoroughly consider whether to 
require additional measures to prevent over-pressurization of low-
pressure systems.

    Question 6. The maximum fine that PHMSA can levy for an incident is 
only $2.09 million.
    Do you think it would act as a greater deterrent if PHMSA were able 
to fine companies above $2 million for disasters like this, yes or no?
    Answer. Civil penalties for violations of the pipeline safety 
regulations, statutorily set by Congress under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 60122 and 
49 CFR Sec. 190.223, may be assessed up to $213,268 for each violation 
for each day the violation continues, with a maximum administrative 
civil penalty not to exceed $2,132,679 for any related series of 
violations. This maximum represents an inflationary increase by DOT 
final rule effective November 27, 2018.
    Civil penalties are just one of the critical tools, such as 
corrective action orders, that PHMSA uses to hold operators 
accountable. When appropriate, our agency does not hesitate to issue 
fines to operators. PHMSA also uses Compliance Orders and Corrective 
Action Orders to mandate company action, sometimes beyond regulatory 
standards, in order to assure safety. PHMSA has found the cost of 
complying with these orders can dwarf the civil penalties that PHMSA 
can impose, serving as a significant additional deterrent to pipeline 
failures.

    Question 7. When setting the recommended level of inspectors per 
state, does PHMSA take into account how much of a state's pipeline 
system is made up of old, leaky cast iron pipes, some of which are well 
over 100 years old?
    Answer. Yes, PHMSA's state inspection formula considers a state's 
pipeline system composition, as well as several other performance 
factors, to determine the minimum inspections required in accordance 
with state certification. The number of inspections is then used to 
determine the number of inspectors needed.

                                  [all]
```