October 29, 2014 

OSWER Docket 

EPA Docket Center, Mail Code 2822–1T 

Environmental Protection Agency 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20460 

Attention Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328 

Re: Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air 

Act, Section 112(r)(7); Proposed Rule 

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328 

Dear Sir or Madam: 

The Compressed Gas Association (CGA), founded in 1913, is dedicated to the development and 

promotion of safety standards and safe practices in the industrial, medical, and food gases industry. CGA 

represents over 125 member companies in all facets of the industry – manufacturers, distributors, 

suppliers, and transporters of gases, cryogenic liquids, and related products and services. Through a 

committee system, CGA develops technical specifications, safety standards, and training and educational 

materials, and works with government agencies to formulate responsible regulations and standards and 

to promote compliance with these regulations and standards. 

CGA member companies hold the safety of their employees and the communities in which they operate in 

the very highest regard. Industry experience shows long-term and continuing improvements in personnel 

safety performance. With the onset of Risk Management Program (RMP) standard, our member 

companies have strived to meet or exceed its requirements, and our industry's safety record reflects that 

effort. 

CGA appreciates the opportunity to submit our comments regarding possible revisions to EPA’s RMP 

regulations. CGA supports EPA's review of the RMP regulations and is also in favor of enforcement of the 

existing regulations. New regulations should not be driven by incidents caused by lack of compliance with 

the existing regulation. Rather, any new requirements should be justified through a demonstrated, costeffective reduction in risk and improvement in worker safety. 

CGA represents many companies that operate a multitude of facilities throughout the United States. As 

such, any information provided below does not represent the activities or actions undertaken by any 

specific company or at any specific location. These answers represent a broad industry response. CGA 

cannot respond to those questions posed in the RFI seeking specific company or facility-level information. 

Many industrial gas facilities are presently covered by the RMP standard due to the types or quantities of 

materials handled and stored. These facilities range in scope from very large production plants to much 

smaller locations merely storing quantities of covered chemicals barely above the threshold quantities. 

Containers of covered chemicals range from large pressurized bulk containers (tanks) holding several 

thousand pounds of a covered chemical to multiple small containers (cylinders) each containing less than 

one pound of a covered chemical. 
OSHA RFI on PSM

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328

October 29, 2014 

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1. Update the List of Regulated Substances 

CGA believes it is appropriate for EPA to periodically review the list of RMP regulated substances; 

however, EPA should only consider adding new chemicals after clearly identifying the hazards associated 

with these chemicals and the basis for establishing specific threshold quantities using a scientifically 

sound and risk-based approach. New chemicals should be added based on hazard and risk. Likewise, 

existing chemicals should be removed from the list of regulated substances if their risks and hazards are 

shown to be minimal. Government agencies should consider adopting similar lists of regulated chemicals, 

their thresholds, and approaches to addressing mixture concentrations. Such similar lists could reduce 

the burden of compliance for covered facilities. 

CGA members are guided by NFPA 400 for reactive hazards and support the adoption by EPA of NFPA 

400 for reactive hazards. In addition, rather than developing new regulations to address reactive hazards, 

CGA suggests EPA incorporate by reference existing standards, such as NFPA 704, which is already 

referenced in NFPA 400. Such an approach is in accordance with OMB Circular A-119, Federal 

Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity 

Assessment Activities, from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). National consensus codes 

integrate a broad cross section of opinions from a variety of stakeholder groups. 

3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized and Generally Accepted 

Good Engineering Practices 

CGA recommends that EPA consider adopting the recently updated CCPS definition of RAGAGEP that 

reads: 

“Recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice, a term originally used by OSHA, 

stems from the selection and application of appropriate engineering, operating, and maintenance 

knowledge when designing, operating and maintaining chemical facilities with the purpose of 

ensuring safety and preventing process safety incidents. 

It involves the application of engineering, operating or maintenance activities derived from 

engineering knowledge and industry experience based upon the evaluation and analyses of 

appropriate internal and external standards, applicable codes, technical reports, guidance, or 

recommended practices or documents of a similar nature. RAGAGEP can be derived from 

singular or multiple sources and will vary based upon individual facility processes, materials, 

service, and other engineering considerations." 

RAGAGEP is specific to a process and is best identified as part of the initial design and through 

mechanical integrity program development. Defining specific RAGAGEP requirements in regulation would 

likely result in inapplicable standards and codes being required and more applicable codes possibly being 

overlooked. RAGAGEP can include appropriate and approved internal standards as well as external 

consensus standards. RAGAGEP must recognize that there may be multiple approaches to designing 

and operating processes safely. 

CGA member companies utilize a number of sources for RAGAGEP, including standards developed by 

CGA, NFPA, ASME, and ASTM, among others. The standards selected for RAGAGEP also are specific 

to a process and should be identified and defined as part of the initial design and through mechanical 

integrity program development. Rather than defining an arbitrary time frame, updates to identified 

RAGAGEP should be considered when the process is modified under management of change and as 

part of the periodic PHA review required by RMP. Evaluating updates to RAGAGEP outside of these 

defined and tested approaches would impose an additional burden with no demonstrated improvement in 

worker safety. Such an approach would likely prove impractical considering the frequency with which 

codes and standards change. 
OSHA RFI on PSM

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328

October 29, 2014 

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Through a committee system, CGA develops technical specifications, safety standards, and training and 

educational materials, and works with government agencies to formulate responsible regulations and 

standards and to promote compliance with these regulations and standards. CGA member companies 

use the specification standards and other materials established by the CGA as a basis for their own 

internal standards, knowing that it meets the necessary criteria. Companies may impose additional 

requirements specific to their own unique operations. 

4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements To Cover Any Safety-Critical Equipment 

CGA believes the mechanical integrity requirements currently in regulation adequately address safetycritical systems. Although EPA has identified other equipment which, in its opinion, should be included in 

a mechanical integrity program, it provides no evidence that including such equipment will increase 

safety. The identification of safety-critical equipment should be site-specific and risk-based. The Process 

Hazard Analysis (PHA) is the vehicle used to identify process hazards, the equipment, systems, and 

procedures necessary to address the identified hazards and the maintenance and mechanical integrity 

programs needed to maintain these systems. Expanding mechanical integrity requirements would result 

in equipment and systems greatly removed from a covered process being included in the RMP standard 

without justification. 

As EPA notes in the RFI, the Program 2 maintenance requirements, which were intended as a 

streamlined version of the mechanical integrity program, includes process equipment not mandated in the 

more rigorous Program 3 requirements. EPA should modify the Program 2 requirements to align with 

those in Program 3. 

5. Require Owners and Operators To Manage Organizational Changes 

CGA believes that requiring management of organizational changes is an important and evolving concept 

that is worthy of further consideration. However, CGA also believes that approaches to management of 

organizational change are still under development and it would be premature at this time to require a 

particular approach. As an industry, we believe that management of organizational change could be 

addressed as a performance-based requirement rather than as a prescriptive requirement, allowing 

companies to adopt methodologies that are best suited to their specific circumstances. 

6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits 

Compliance audits do yield improved results by identifying deficiencies unseen by local operators. 

Requiring third-party compliance audits, however, will not necessarily yield improved results. Such an 

expansion will likely result in inadequately prepared auditors reviewing processes with which they are 

unfamiliar, imposing significant burdens on companies to provide training to the auditor and supervision 

during the audit. Companies should be allowed to determine and utilize the combination of internal and 

third-party audits that best fits their organizational structure, size, and need. 

CGA believes that compliance auditors, whether internal or third-party, should possess certain minimum 

qualifications. CGA believes companies should be required to document these required qualifications in 

their management system and the actual qualifications as part of their compliance reports. 

Finally, CGA believes that specific timeframes in which to address identified deficiencies found in 

compliance audits should not be defined by regulation. Some deficiencies require a simple resolution that 

can be accomplished in a short timeframe. Others may require significant work and capital expenditure. 

Rather than establishing predetermined timeframes for response, EPA should consider adopting the 

approach already set forth in regulation for addressing PHA findings. Resolution of identified deficiencies 

should be accomplished within a time period commensurate with the risk. 
OSHA RFI on PSM

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328

October 29, 2014 

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D. Additional Items for Which EPA Requests Information

1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis 

Considering alternative approaches to hazardous processes is not an issue; CGA agrees that 

consideration of alternate technologies and chemicals should be included in initial process design 

considerations. CGA does not, however, agree that specific alternate technologies or their consideration 

should be required by regulation. As EPA itself notes in the RFI, “...ISTs are relative and can only be 

described as inherently safer when compared to a different technology, including a description of the 

hazard or set of hazards being considered, their location, and the potentially affected population. Because 

an option may be inherently safer with regard to some hazards and inherently less safe with regard to 

others, the decision process must consider the entire life cycle, the full spectrum of hazards and risks, 

and the potential for transfer of risk from one impacted population to another." 

The impression given is that there are fewer hazards associated with the “safer technology” whereas it 

might just be a tradeoff of hazards. A “safer technology” might utilize a different chemical with perceived 

lower chemical hazards but requires the process to operate at higher pressures or temperatures or 

requires significantly higher quantities to be delivered and used. 

Rather than EPA and OSHA developing and publishing guidance for alternate technologies and 

chemicals, they should consider referencing one or more of the consensus publications already available. 

Organizations such as CCPS provide guidance on considering alternate technologies and chemicals 

during process design. Many of these readily available publications provide checklists and other tools for 

considering alternate technologies and chemicals. EPA should not include a requirement to consider 

alternate technologies specifically listed in the RMP, Lessons Learned Information System database, as 

there are a myriad of other factors to be considered when assessing the use of alternate technologies 

and chemicals. 

2. Emergency Drills To Test a Source’s Emergency Response Program or Plan 

CGA concurs with EPA that there is great value in conducting emergency response exercises with local 

emergency responders. Many CGA members’ facilities rely on volunteer emergency response 

organizations for response services. In some cases the volunteer emergency response organizations 

cannot commit to participating in training or the drills/exercises. CGA believes that regulations should 

encourage such exercises but not require them. Requiring facilities to conduct these exercises without a 

concomitant requirement for local emergency responders to also participate will unreasonably penalize 

these facilities. 

Emergency response exercises help ensure that all response personnel, whether they are company 

employees or local emergency responders, understand their roles and are useful in identifying gaps in 

training or procedures which need to be addressed to improve plan performance. The best way to learn 

from these exercises is to document the exercise results and post exercise reviews. Such documentation 

provides a record of lessons learned and actions taken to address identified gaps. These exercise 

records should be shared with local emergency responders. 

CGA does not agree that these records should be made available to the general public. CGA also does 

not agree that such records should be provided to EPA with the facilities’ RMP. This imposes an 

additional administrative burden on both the facility and EPA and serves little useful purpose. Such 

records should be available for EPA to inspect during any facility RMP audit. 

Emergency response during an actual release is a true test of the effectiveness of any plan. Like 

exercises, the results from the response to an actual release should also be documented and lessons 

learned developed. 
OSHA RFI on PSM

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328

October 29, 2014 

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3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated Substances 

CGA does not believe that automated detection and monitoring for releases provides sufficient reliability 

to warrant including it in regulation. Monitoring is not a guarantee that a release will be detected. Even a 

well-designed system might not detect a release due the material's properties and to other influences 

such as wind speed or direction, humidity, temperature, and other environmental factors. Although 

detectors for some families of chemicals may be available, some are specific to an individual chemical. 

When a facility has multiple regulated chemicals, multiple detection systems would be needed. Further, 

many covered chemicals do not have detectors capable of being automated. 

Using such systems to provide automatic notification to emergency responders and the general public 

poses significant risks. Currently, alarm points on detector systems are set low enough to provide the 

facility with time to address the leak before it worsens to a point where emergency responders need to be 

involved or the public notified. Historically, such systems have been prone to false positives due to their 

sensitivity. CGA believes requiring automatic notification could impose a significant burden on local 

emergency responders by initiating unnecessary responses. This is especially true for locations that rely 

on volunteer local emergency responders that may not have the capability to receive automatic 

notifications. The use and effectiveness of such systems should be considered as the facility develops its 

PHA and emergency response plan and not be required by regulation. 

4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements 

EPA's RMP regulations deal with off-site consequences and should not include on-site consequences 

that are addressed in OSHA's PSM standard. 

As noted in the RFI, several publications provide guidance for the location of occupied building and 

trailers in facilities. In addition to the ones noted in the RFI, CGA recently published a globally harmonized 

publication on location of occupied buildings specifically to address air separation and hydrogen/carbon 

monoxide plants (CGA P-64, Guideline for the Location of Occupied Buildings in Industrial Gas Plants). 

There is little need for EPA to develop its own requirements. RMP already has requirement to review 

occupancy of surrounding buildings, but no guidance/requirement to use this information; EPA should 

advocate that companies use their information for PHA and emergency response plans. 

NFPA and ICC codes presently address setback distances for a variety of chemicals and processes. 

Rather than developing new guidance, EPA should consider the guidance already provided. 

 

EPA RMP regulations were specifically promulgated to address episodic releases of covered chemicals. 

Their use to address long-term, chronic exposure is well beyond the scope and intent of the regulations. 

EPA should not comingle the requirements of OSHA’s right to know regulations and its own EPCRA 

regulations with those dealing with emergency response. Such an effort could result in duplicative, or 

worse yet conflicting requirements. 

5. Compliance With Emergency Response Program Requirements in Coordination With Local 

Responders 

As EPA states in the RFI, current regulations presently cover the issue. By regulation, facilities have the 

option to have employees respond to emergencies or depend on local emergency response authorities. 

The response choice made must be apparent in the facilities emergency response plan and that choice 

will drive the elements of the plan. If, during inspections facilities are found to be non-compliant with the 

regulations EPA should cite the facility and require any gaps be addressed in a timely manner. The 

answer to non-compliance is not more regulation, just enforcement of the existing regulations such as 

those outlined in EPCRA. 
OSHA RFI on PSM

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328

October 29, 2014 

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6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements 

CGA agrees with EPA that incident investigation and accident history reporting is an important element in 

determining how to prevent future incidents and accidents. CGA further agrees that incidents usually 

occur as a result of a series of other problems. Root cause analysis is an important part of any incident 

investigation. By determining the root cause, the facility can identify changes needed to prevent future 

occurrences. Thorough investigations do help facilities identify and address root causes. 

EPA regulations require incident and accident history be reviewed as part of the initial development of 

PHAs and also be considered during PHA revalidation. While incidents leading to the release of a 

covered chemical are simple to define, defining a “near miss” or “process upset” is extremely difficult and 

will likely vary by industry, process, locations and the like. CGA supports modifying current regulation to 

include a requirement that root cause analyses be conducted for incidents. CGA believes, however, that a 

requirement to investigate “near misses” or “process upsets” is inappropriate. A better approach might be 

to have facilities themselves define “near misses” and “process upsets” that should be considered in PHA 

revalidations. In this manner, any unique characteristics of a facility's processes and locations can be 

addressed. 

7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Requirements for Processes Involving Numerous 

Small Vessels Stored Together 

CGA believes the worst case release scenario is an unrealistic approach to determining incident 

endpoints and provides little value in determining hazards mitigation strategies and emergency response 

plans. Including multiple, small vessels as a source when determining a worst case release does nothing 

to change this conclusion. 

The incidents cited by EPA as the basis for including multiple small vessels in worst case release 

quantities were not examples of worst case scenarios. For flammable chemicals a worst case scenario 

release, by definition, assumes the instantaneous release of the contents of a single vessel followed by a 

vapor cloud explosion. While this type release might occur if the vessel fails catastrophically, a highly 

unlikely event, it is extremely improbable that multiple vessels would fail at the exact same moment. As 

noted in the examples, rather than instantaneous releases these incidents escalated over time. Following 

the initial release and ignition, the subsequent releases occur from direct flame impingement or radiant 

heating. And since there is an ignition source the likelihood of a vapor cloud explosion has been removed. 

CGA suggests modifying the regulations to require facilities consider the knock on effect of having 

multiple small containers stored in proximity with no mitigation provided to reduce the knock on effect 

when developing alternate case releases. This is a more realistic solution to the concern raised by the 

incident examples cited by EPA in the RFI. 

In response to these incidents, CGA proactively modified its publication CGA P-1, Safe Handling of 

Compressed Gases in Containers, to limit the quantity of flammable gases stored in one area and to 

identify adequate separation distances between storage areas to minimize the possibility of knock on. 

Although there is merit to considering the quantity of flammable chemicals contained in multiple small 

vessels stored in close proximity for developing an alternate case scenario, CGA believes there is little 

merit in taking such an approach for non-flammable chemicals. Even with the instantaneous release of, 

for instance, a toxic gas from a cylinder there is little likelihood of any knock on effect to surrounding 

cylinders. Without such knock on effect there is no compelling reason to consider anything more than a 

single vessel. 
OSHA RFI on PSM

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328

October 29, 2014 

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8. Public Disclosure of Information To Promote Regulatory Compliance and Improve Community 

Understanding of Chemical Risks 

CGA does not believe that providing RMP information to the general public will increase public safety or 

drive better regulatory compliance. CGA does believe that facility information should be provided to 

organizations such as emergency response authorities, LEPCs, and SEPCs so they can fulfill their public 

safety roles. Providing RMP information to the general public raises facility security concerns. When the 

RMP regulations were first promulgated, they contained elements that required sharing certain 

information with the general public. Following the events on September 11, 2001, this requirement was 

rescinded due to well-founded security concerns. Providing information such as chemical stored on site, 

quantities, and hazard mitigation elements merely provides a roadmap for those who wish to do harm. In 

addition, providing such information may be prohibited by DHS regulations, such as CFATS. 

The real answer to better compliance is better enforcement of existing requirements. Requiring facilities 

to publically post their RMP information will only result in additional work for those who currently comply 

and further ignoring of the regulations by those who do not comply. Depending on the public to identify 

facilities that do not comply with the RMP regulations will merely add administrative burdens to both the 

facilities and to EPA. Every such inquiry will have to be researched and answered. 

9. Threshold Quantities and Off-Site Consequence Analysis Endpoints for Regulated Substances 

Based on Acute Exposure Guideline Level Toxicity Values 

As noted above, CGA supports the periodic review of listed chemicals and their associated threshold 

quantities (TQs). Any changes to either the listed chemicals or their associated TQs should be based on 

a scientifically sound and risk-based approach and be done in a clear and transparent manner. Although 

there may be merit to the approaches suggested by EPA, these changes will likely result in a significant 

increase in the regulated community and should only be undertaken after clear and thorough benefits and 

costs analyses. 

Further, any change in approach to establishing TQ needs significant time for adoption. Facilities have 

changed operations to limit quantities below TQ; lower TQs will bring them under coverage. 

10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data 

CGA believes a facility's program level should solely be determined by the chemicals on-site, their TQs, 

and off-site consequences. Including a facility under Program 3 based exclusively on its NAICS code 

further complicates whether the facility is covered and adds little to no value. CGA also recommends that 

EPA periodically review RMP accident history data as part of their sound scientific approach when 

reviewing the list of covered chemicals and their TQs. 

11. The ‘‘Safety Case’’ Regulatory Model 

CGA opposes EPA and OSHA adopting a safety case approach to replace the RMP regulation and PSM 

standard. CGA believes that such a change will shift the responsibility to approve safety decisions from 

employers, who have the knowledge and expertise specific to a process and its hazards, to government 

inspectors with lesser knowledge and expertise. EPA provides no evidence to support its contention that 

such a drastic change will improve worker safety. 

In its RFI, EPA cites the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as an example of the effective 

utilization of a safety case approach. EPA notes the NRC oversees 100 commercial nuclear facilities and 

3,000 nuclear material facilities with a staff of nearly 4,000. CGA understands there are nearly 14,000 

RMP sites using hundreds of different process approaches to produce and store covered chemicals. 

From a size and breadth of different technologies encountered, there is no comparison between the 

scope of NRC and that of the RMP program. According to a 2009 report from the EPA Office of Inspector 
OSHA RFI on PSM

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328

October 29, 2014 

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General, 50 percent of high-risk RMP sites have never received an on-site inspection and over 65 percent 

of all RMP sites have never received an on-site inspection since the RMP began in 1999. It would take an 

enormous increase in personnel, possessing a wide array of detailed technical knowledge and 

experience, to provide coverage approximating that provided by the NRC staff. 

A main component of a safety case approach is for the duty holder to produce a “safety case report” that 

identifies a process’s hazards and risks and describe how they will be reduced to as low as reasonably 

practicable (ALARP). CCPS defines ALARP as “a risk reduction goal, where the risk reduction efforts are 

continued until the incremental effort to further reduce risk becomes grossly disproportionate to the level 

of risk reduction.” A regulator then “accepts” or “rejects” the safety case report before the owner can 

begin operation. The safety case approach provides no criteria for acceptance or rejection of the safety 

case report other than the regulator’s judgment that ALARP has been achieved. A regulator could require 

adopting different technologies or approaches based on his or her judgment alone. In addition to the 

significant time that this would require, such regulatory uncertainty would stifle innovation. 

12. Streamlining RMP Requirements 

CGA suggests EPA consider allowing more than one person to be identified as a certified preparer to 

submit RMP information through EPA's website. Limiting authorizing submittals to a single person 

imposes an undue burden on companies, especially those with multiple facilities. 

In conclusion, CGA appreciates the opportunity to submit our comments. We support EPA's review of the 

RMP regulations; however, we believe that new regulations should not be driven by incidents caused by 

lack of compliance with the existing regulations but rather justified through a demonstrated additional 

reduction in risk. The some of the incidents cited in this RFI as a rationale for more regulation occurred 

because companies disregarded significant requirements of the current regulations. As has been 

demonstrated by the millions of safe operating hours accumulated by companies, compliance with the 

current regulations significantly reduces the risk of process safety incidents. A focus on awareness and 

enforcement of existing regulation would better serve EPA, the regulated community, their employees 

and the communities in which they operate. 

Sincerely, 

COMPRESSED GAS ASSOCIATION 

Richard Craig 

Technical Director 

14501 George Carter Way, Suite 103 

Chantilly, VA 20151 

Telephone: 1-703-788-2730 

Email: rcraig@cganet.com