MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2018 ME 41 Docket: Pen

- 17

- 35 Argued: November	15,	2017 Decided: March	22,	2018
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER, MEAD , GORMAN ,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. KEITH COLEMAN

MEAD ,	J. [¶1] Keith	Coleman	 appeals	 f rom	a	judgment of	conviction	 for three counts	 of	murder,	17

- A	M.R.S.	 § 201(1)(A)	 ( 2017 ) ,	and	 one	 of	gross	 sexual assault	(Class	A),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 253(1)(C)	( 2017 ) , entered by	the	trial	court ( Penobscot County, A. Murray , J. )	 following a	 jury trial ;	 he	 also	 appeals	 his
sentences	of life imprisonment	on each	of the	murder	counts

. S ee 15	M.R.S. §§	2151 , 2152	(2017) ; M.R. App. P. 20 (Tower	2016)

. 1 Coleman	argues	that
the	court (1) abused	its	discretion	by limiting	his	cross

- examination	 of	 the
State’s	Chief	Medical	Examiner , (2) clearly	erred by finding	that	the State	had sufficiently	 established	 the	 chain	 of	 custody	 of	 the sexual	 assault	 kit used

1 This	 appeal	 was	 filed	 before	 September	 1, 2017; therefore, the	 restyled	 Maine	 Rules	 of Appellate	Procedure	do not	apply. See M.R.	App.	P.	1.2 during the	autopsy	of	one of	the victim s , and (3) applied an incorrect standard of	 proof and abused	 its	 discretion in determining the	 facts considered at sentencing. Coleman	 also asserts that there	 was insufficient	 evidence	 to support	the	jury’s	guilty	verdict	on	the	gross	sexual	assault	charge	and that
the	 State committed	 prosecutorial	 misconduct	 in	 its	 opening	 statement

. Although we	 conclude	 that the	 court	 abused	 its	 discretion by	 foreclosing
Coleman’s	cross

- examination of	 the Chief	Medical	Examiner concerning his termination	 from	 his	 position	 as	 Chief	Medical	 E xaminer	in	Massachusetts,
th e error	was	harmless	in	the	face	of	the	overwhelming	evidence	of	Coleman’s guilt. W e are	unpersuaded	by	the	remainder	of	his	arguments	and affirm	the judgment	and	sentence s . I. FACTS [¶2 ] “When	viewed	in	the	light	most	favor able	to	the	jury's	verdict,	the record	 supports	 the	 following	 facts.” State	 v.	 Diana ,	 2014	 ME	 45,	 ¶	 2,
89 A. 3d 132 (alteration	omitted) (quotation	marks	omitted)

. The bodies of an eight

- year - old girl , her ten
- year - old brother,	and	the	children’s	mother were found	in	their	home	in	Gar land	on	the	evening	of	December 20,	2014. Keith Coleman,	 the mother ’s on - and

- off	boyfriend	 of	a	 few	 years, had	been	living3 with	the victim s in t he i r	home	for	about	a	year prior	to	their	deaths but was absent	from	the	home when	the ir bodies	were	discovered

. [¶3 ] By	 all	 reports , Coleman’s	 and	 the	 mother’s	 relationship	 was	 a tumultuous	 one,	 plagued	 by	 incidents	 of	 Coleman’s	 physical	 abuse	 of	 the
mother. Shortly before	the deaths ,	the	mother told	Coleman	that	he	needed
to	de al	with	his	drinking	or	move	out; she was	also	considering	reconciling with	her	daughter’s	father. Coleman	was	very	upset	by	this	situation	and told

a	co worker,	on	 three	different	occasions,	 that	he	“wouldn’t	have	a	p roblem with	killing	them	all.” [¶4 ] The	children	were	last	seen on	December	19,	2014,	as	 they	left
school	on	the final day of	classes before	Christmas	vacation. On	the	same	day,
the	mother	made	her last known communication in	a text	message	to	her	aunt concerning a	 fight she and	 Coleman had that day. On	 the	 morning	 of
Decem ber 20,	 shortly	after	 7:00	a.m. , Coleman	drove	 away	 from	 the	ho me, then	returned	about	five to ten	minutes	later , and	left	by	10:00	or	11:00	a.m.
i n	 the	 famil y’s	 tan	mini van . Coleman	 stopped	 at	 a	local	 store	 for	 beer	 and cigarette	rolling	papers	before	driving	to	Bangor	to	return	a	remote

- control

car	at a	store ,	a	gift	he	had	intended	to	give	to	the	son. Coleman later arranged,
via direct messaging	 from	 one	 of	 his	 Facebook	 accounts,	 to	 meet	 up	 with4 friends	in	Bucksport

. While	messaging	with	his	friends	in	Bucksport,	he	sent another	set	of	Facebook	messages , telling another	friend that	he	was	“[o]n	the
run	fo r	capital	murder”	and	asking “[c] ould	you	send	me	an ything	to	get	me
to	the	hood.” [¶5 ] During	 the	 afternoon	 of	 D ecember	 20, after	 repeated	 failed attempts	 to	 reach	 the	 mother, the	 aunt whom the	 mother had texted	 the previous	day asked another niece	to go	to the home and check	on	the	mother
and	the children

. At	around	9:00	p.m.,	the	niece	and	a	number	of	other family members	 arrived	 at	 the	 home,	 broke	 through	 the	 locked	 front	 door,	 and discovered	 the	 mother’s	 body	 in	 one	 bedroom	 and	 the	 daughter’s	 body	 in another;	the	daughter	was	found gagged	and on	her	back, each	leg dangling
off	the	end	of	the	bed	on	either	s ide	of	one	of	its	corners. The	family	members
cal led	9

- 1

- 1	and	awaited	the	first responders’	arrival	outside	of	the	home. The
first	 to	arrive	was	a deputy	 from the	Penobscot	County	Sher iff’s	Office	who located	the	son’s	body	in	the	third	bedroom, underne ath	a	pile	of	bedding. [¶6 ] The	 next	 morning i n	 Bucksport , law	 enforcement officers responded	to an apartment where	Coleman	reportedly	had	spent	the previous night	and took	Coleman,	who	was	co operative ,	into	custody

. At	the	time	of	his arrest,	Coleman w as in	possession	of	the	family’s	tan	minivan,	the	mother’s5 EBT	 card , and her purse . Coleman	 was	 interrogated that	 evening for	 five hours	 by	 two	 detectives;	 slightly	 over	 four	 hours	 into	 questioning,	 he admitted	to	“killing [the	mother] and	the	kids.” [¶7 ] On	 December	 21	 and	 22,	 2014,	 the	 M edical	 Examiner’s Office performed	the	victims’	autopsies	and	concluded	that	the	cause	of	death	for	all three	 was	 asphyxiation	 by	 ligature	 strangulation. D uring	 the	 daughter’s autopsy,	the	Chief	Medical	Examiner, Docto r	Mark	Flomenbaum, detected	no trauma	to	her	genitals	and	found	that	her	hymen	was	intact,	but	he	observed
blunt	force	trauma	to	her	face ; two	superficial	abrasions	on	her	buttocks,	each slightly	less	than	an	inch	long ; and	what	he	suspected	was	dried	bloo d	in	her vaginal	 area	 and	 on	 the	 crotch	 of	 the	 pink	 shorts	 she	 was	 wearing

. The daughter	also	had	a	plastic	shopping	bag	stuffed	tightly	into her	mouth	and throat,	which , Dr.	 Flomenbaum opined , occluded	 the	 passage	 of	 all	 air	 and
sound. These	observation s	prompted either Dr.	Flomenbaum or the assisting

nurse , acting	under	his	supervision , to	collect four s wabs from	the	daughter’s vaginal	area using	a	sexual	assault	kit. During	th e afternoon	of	December	22, the	four	swabs	were	dried	and	placed	together	in	an	envelope	inside	the	kit , which was	 sealed and	left in	 the	M ed ic al E xaminer ’s	Office. Th e	 sealed	 kit
remained	there until December	24 at	10:00 a.m.,	when the	same s tate p olice6 d etective who	had	been	present	at	the	autopsy retrieved the	kit and brought
it	to a temporary	evidence	locker and ,	later, to	the Maine	State	Police Crime
Lab oratory for	testing

. [¶8 ] On	December	31,	2014,	a	c rime l ab oratory technician confirmed
that	 the item s	 of	 evidence	 delivered	 by	 the	 state	 p olice d etective	 from	 the autopsy	 were	 contained	 in	 sealed	 bags,	 with	 the	 seals	 unbroken,	 and processed	the	individual	items. Two	of	the	four	swabs in the	envelope	labeled “vaginal	swabs” as	well as	the	stained	cut ting	from	the shorts tested positive for, and were verified	as containing, blood	and	semen. S amples	of	the	vaginal swab	with	 the	highest	concentration	of forensic material	and	of	 the	stained
shor ts	were	sent	for	DNA	analysis. [¶9 ] M ixtures	of	DNA were fo und	on the ligature s associated	with the
victims. The	mixture	on	the	ligature found	on the	mother w as consistent	with the	DNA	profiles	of Coleman, the mother , and at	least	one	unknown	donor; a ligature found	 on the	daughter revealed	DNA consistent	with Coleman , the daughter ,	and	at	least	one	other unknown donor ; on another	ligature found

on the	 daughter ,	 there	 was	 DNA match ing her and at	 least	 one unknown donor; a ligature found	on the son	contained DNA	 that	was	consistent	with
the	 son ,	 the	 daughter,	 an d	 at	 least	 one	 unknown donor

. A forensic	 DNA7 analyst	found	that a sample	from	the	daughter’s	stained	shorts	had	too	little
material	for DNA analysis	of	the	sperm	or	blood. The	vaginal	swabs contained two	DNA	profiles

— one obtained from	skin	cells,	which was consistent	with the	 daughter , and	 the	 other	 from	 sperm	 cells,	 which was consistent	 with
Coleman. The	DNA	analyst calculated that	there	was	a	statistical	possibility of	less	than	1	in	300	billion	that	the	sperm	fraction	profile	came	fr om	someone other than	Coleman.
II. PROCEDURAL	HISTORY [¶1 0 ] Coleman	was initially charged	by	complaint	with	three	counts	of
murder	and later	with one	count	of	gross	sexual	assault	and was subsequently indicted	by	the	Penobscot	County	Grand	Jury for	those	charges .		17

- A M.R.S. §§ 201(1)(A); 253(1)(c)

. At his	arraignment,	Coleman	entered	pleas	of	not guilty

. [¶1 1 ] On	September	13,	2015,	the	State	moved in	limine to	bar	Coleman
from	 cross

- examining the	 medical	 examiner, Dr. Mark Flomenbaum , concerning a	Connecticut	judge ’s	finding	that Dr.	Flomenbaum ’s testimony as an	expert	witness for	a	defendant	in	a	child	death	case was	not	credible ; and , Dr. Flomenbaum ’s removal	from	his	previous	position	as	the	Massachusetts
Chief	 Medical	 Examiner

. The	 court reserved	 ruling	 on	 the	 motion	 until8 hearing Dr. Flomenbaum ’s testimony	 and later granted	 the	 State’s	 motion over	 Coleman’s	 repeated	 objection

. 2 The	 court f ound	 that the	 Connecticut court’s	 credibility	 determination	 was	 not	 a	 specific	 instance	 of	 conduct
p robative	 of a character	 for	 truthfulness. See M .R.	Evid.	608(b). The	court additionally	 found that Dr.	 Flomenbaum ’s removal	 from	 an	 administrative position	in	Massachusetts	was not	only irrelevant	to	his	medical	findings	in an	individual	autopsy but	also was likely to confuse,	and	needlessly	add	 to, the	issues	more	properly	before	the	jury ;	the	court	therefore	foreclosed	any

cross - examination on	this	issue	pursuant	to	M.R. Evid.	403

. [¶1 2 ] On	November	10,	2016, after	an	eleven

- day	trial, the	jury	found Coleman	 guilty	 on all charges and the	 court continued	 the	 matter	 for sentencing

. On	January	19, 2017,	the	court	imposed concurrent sentence s of
life imprisonment	on	each	of	the	murder	counts	and	a	concurrent	twenty

- year term	of	imprisonment	for	the	gross	sexual	assault. Coleman appealed	directly
from	his	conviction ,	pursuant	to M. R.	App.	P.	20 and 15	M.R.S.	§ 2151. U pon his	application, t he	Sentence Review	Panel	granted him leave	to	appeal from

2 The	 court	 referenced	with	 approval	 two trial	 court decisions	in	 unrelated	 cases	 that	 had similarly	limited	impeachment	of	Dr.	Flomenbaum. State	v.	Davis ,	No.	AROCD

- CR

- 2013

- 137	Unified Criminal	 Docket	 (Aroostook	 Cty .,	 August	 29,	 2016)	 (order	 granting	 motion	 in	 limine); State	 v. Haji

- Hassan ,	CUMCD

- CR

- 2014

- 7716	Unified	Criminal	Docket	(Cumberland	Cty.,	August	10,	2016) (order	on	motion	for	in	camera	review), appeal	docketed , No.	Cum

- 17

- 149	(Apr.	7,	2017).9 his	 sentence

. State	 v.	 Coleman ,	 No.	 SRP

- 17

- 60	 (Mar.	 13,	 2017). We
consolidated our review of	 his	 sentence with	 his	 direct	 appeal.
M.R. App. P. 20(h).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Limitation	on	Coleman’s Impeachment	of Dr.	Flomenbaum [¶1 3 ] Prior	 to	 trial	 and	 again	 at trial ,	 Coleman sought , pursuant	 to
M.R. Evid.	608(b) , to	impeach Dr.	Flomenbaum ’s character	for	truthfulness	by inquiring on	cross - examination	into ( 1) his	expert testimony in	a	May	2016
ch ild	death	case that	a	Connecticut	judge	found	was	not	credible and ( 2 ) his
termination	 as	 Massachusetts’s Chief	 Medical	 Examiner due	 to	 his administrative	shortcomings	and lack	of	candor	with	his	superiors

. Coleman made	 an	 offer	 of	 proof consisting	 of a	 l etter	 from	 a	 Connecticut	 State’s Attorney	 regarding a judge’s	 finding	 that Dr.	 Flomenbaum ’s	 testimony	was
not	 credible ; the	 transcript	 of	 that	 testimony ; a newspaper story	 about
Dr. Flomenbaum ’s	 termination	 in	 Massachusetts ; and	 the	 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ’s opinion a ffirming Dr.	 Flomenbaum ’s for

- cause termination. See Flomenbaum	 v.	 Commonwealth ,	 889	 N.E. 2d	 423 (Mass. 2008). On	appeal,	Coleman	asserts	that	the court	committed	an	abuse
of	discretion and	violated	his constitutional right	to	e ffectively	cross

- examine10 a	 witness	 when	 it	 denied	 him	 the	 opportunity	 to	 further	 impeach
Dr. Flomenbaum with evidence	 of these	 circumstances

. See U.S.	 Const.
amend s .	VI ,	XIV; Me.	Const.	art. I ,	§	6 ; M.R. Evid. 608(b)

. [¶1 4 ] We	afford a	trial	court	wide	discretion	in	its	evidentiary	rulings pursuant	to	M.R.	Evid.	403 and	608(b) and	review	such	rulings	for	an	abuse
of	discretion. State	v.	Made r i os ,	2016	ME	155,	¶¶	10

- 11,	149	A.3d	1145; State
v.	Williams ,	 2012	 ME	 63,	 ¶	 42,	 52	 A.3d	 911

. Rule	 608(b)	 prohibits	 use	 of extrinsic	evidence	 of	 specific	instances	 of	a	witness’s	conduct,	 other	 than	 a criminal	 conviction	 pursuant	 to	 M.R.	 Evid.	 609,	 to	 attack	 or	 support	 that
witness’s	character	for	truthfulness but	allows	a	court	to	permit “ a	witne ss ’ s credibility	[to]	be	attacked through	cross

- examination on	specific	instances	of
the	 witness ’ s	 prior	 conduct	 that	 are	 probative	 of	 truthfulness	 or
untruthfulness .” Williams ,	2012	ME	63,	¶	42,	52	A.3d	911 (emphasis add ed) (citation	omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted). [¶1 5 ] In	determining	whether	specific	instances	of	a	witness’s	conduct are	 sufficiently	 probative	 o f	 the	 witness's character	 for	 truthfulness	 or untruthfulness, a court	may	consider (1) “ the	import ance	of	th e	witness	to	the

case ” ; (2) “ how	probative	of	truthfulness	or untruthfulness	the	bad	acts	are ” ; and (3) “ [ t ] he	 reliability	 of	 the	 information	 that	 the	 bad	 acts	 in	 fact11 occurred

. . . .” State	v.	Almurshidy , 1999	ME	97,	¶	30, 732 A.2d	280 ; see Field
& Murray, Maine	 Evidence §	 608.2 at 299	 ( 6th	 ed.	 2007). The	 limited opportunity	to	inquire,	on	cross

- examination,	into	specific acts by	the	witness relating	 to the	 witness's character	 for truthfulness	 or untruthfulness , however, does	 not	 open	 the	 door	 to th e admission	 of extrinsic	 evidence relating	 to	 those	 acts. 3 Almurshidy , 1999	 ME 97,	 ¶	 25	 n.4,	 732	 A.2d	 280 (“[P]ursuant	to	Rule	608(b)(1),	extrinsic	evidence	.	.	.	is	not	admissible.”). Nor
does the	 limited	 opportunity	 to inquire	 into	 specific	 acts on

cross - examination override	our	well

- established	rule	that	opinion	testimony on	a	particular	witness’s	credibility	is	inadmissible. See State	v.	Woodburn , 559 A.2d	343,	346	(Me.	1989) ; State	v.	Caulk , 543 A.2d 1366,	1372	(Me.	1988).
W e now analyze each of the	proffered specific	instance s of Dr.	Flomenbaum ’s
conduct in	turn. 1) Connecticut	Testimony	and	Judge’s	Credibility	Determination [¶1 6 ] We ha ve not	dealt	with	the	admissibility	pursuant	to	Rule	608(b) of	past	judicial	credibility	determinations concerning an	expert	witness. We
ha ve , however,	done	so	in	the	context	of	expert	opinions regarding another

3 If	a	cross

- examiner	asks	a	question	regarding	a	specific	act,	after	satisfying	the	court	that	he has	a	good	faith	basis	to	ask	the	question,	and	the	witness	denies	the	act,	the	questioner	is	left	with the	answer	and	cannot	offer	extrinsic	evidence	to	rebut	the	witne ss’s	answer. See Field	&	Murray , Maine	Evidence §	608.2	at	299	(6th	ed.	2007).12 witness’s	credibility. See	Woodburn ,	559	A.2d at 346	(affirming	the	exclusion
of a psychologist’s	 expert	 testimony	 that	 the	 child	 victim	 was	 unable	 to distinguish	 truth	 from	 falsehood) (citing M.R.	 Evid.	 608(a) ,	 (b) )

. Coleman
contends that evidence	 of Dr.	 Flomenbaum ’s	 responses	 to a Connecticut prosecutor’s	 questions	 about	 his	 terminat ion	 from	 Massachusetts	 and a Connecticut	 judge’s	 finding	 that Dr.	 Flomenbaum ’s	 “testimony	 [was]	 not
credible”	are proper	subjects	for impeach ing Dr. Flomenbaum ’s	credibility	as
a	witness pursuant	to	Rule	608(b). [¶1 7 ] In	May	2016, Dr.	Flomenbaum appeared in	his	personal	capacity as	a	forensic	expert	at	a	trial	in the Connecticut Superior	Court on	behalf	of
the	defend ant	in	a	criminal	case

. Coleman asserts	that if	the	court	had	allowed him,	he	would	have	asked Dr.	Flomenbaum about	 this exchange	during	 the State’s	Attorney’s cross - examination in	that	case : [State’s	 Attorney]:	 And	 you	 were	 [working	 for	 Massachusetts] for

— I	can’t	recall	from	your	direct

— how	many	years? [ Dr.	Flomenbaum ]:	Two	year s .

.	.	.	. [State’s	Attorney]:	Two	years	before	they	fired you? [ Dr.	Flomenbaum ]:	No.	Two	years	before	I	left.13 [State’s	 Attorney]:	 Well,	 didn’t	 the [S] tate	 of	 Massachusetts terminate	you,	Doctor? [ Dr.	Flomenbaum ]:	The	governor	did.	Yes,	he	did. State	 v.	 Bumgarner

- Ramos , No.	 WMM

- CR13

- 0151026

- T	 (Conn.	 Super.	 Ct. May 11,	2016). [¶1 8 ] Although	we	have	said	that “ falsifying	testimony	is

.	.	. probative
of	 whether	 someone	 has	 a	 truthful	 or	 untruthful	 character ,”	 t h e	 above exchange cannot	 be	 construed	 in	 any	 sense	 as	 falsification	 of	 testimony.
See Almurshidy , 1999	ME	97,	¶	30	n.6,	73 2 A.2d	280

. Dr.	Flomenbaum appears to	have simply disagreed	with	the	characterization	that	he was	fired	but,	more importantly, he also acknowledged

— in	 his	 very	 next	 answer

— that his employment was indeed terminated. Bumgarner

- Ramos ,	 No.
WMM

- CR13

- 0151026

- T. Even	considering Dr.	Flomenbaum ’s	importance	to
the	State’s	case , this	instance	of	his	conduct	completely	lacks	any	relevance	or probative	value	regarding	his	character	for	truthfulness. See State	v.	Ericson , 2011	 ME	 28,	 ¶	 20,	 1 3	 A.3d 777; Almurshidy , 1999	 ME	 97,	 ¶	 30	 n.6,
733 A.2d 280

. [¶1 9 ] Coleman next points	 to	 the judge’s	 finding , in	 the same Connecticut	case , that Dr.	Flomenbaum ’s	“testimony [was] not	credible	and [ that the	court] rejects Dr.	Flomenbaum ’s conclusions	[concerning	the	cause14 of	death].” Bumgarner

- Ramos ,	No. WMM

- CR13

- 0151026

- T (Conn.	Super.	Ct. May	 17,	 2016)

. Coleman contends	 that th is	 instance of Dr.	 Flomenbaum ’s
conduct is admissible	impeachment	evidence on	the	authority	of United	States

v

. Cedeño , where	 the Court	 of	 Appeals	 for	 the Second	 Circuit held	 that the
defendant should	have	been	allowed	to	cross

- examine a government	witness
about a judge’s	finding	in	a	prior	case that the witness had	lied	while	testifying
under	 oath , but	 ultimately concluded	 that	 this error	 was	 harmless

. 6 44 F.3d 79, 81, 82

- 83 (2d	Cir.	2011) ; see Fed. R.	Evid.	608(b)

. [¶20 ] It	 is	 not	 clear	 that the Connecticut	 court’s	 finding	 regarding
Dr. Flomenbaum ’s	 testimony	would	 be	 admissible in	 this	 case according	 to
Cedeño , 4 which	is	distinguish ed from	these	facts by the judicial finding	at	issue there,	i.e.,	a determination that	the witness	had lied under	oath in	a	previous

case . 544	F.3d	at 81,	83. Furthermore,	several	of	the cases	cited	in Cedeño specifically	different iate	between a finding	that a witness	had	lied	o r	was	not credible	and a court finding	 the “ defense	witnesses	more	credible	 than	 the

4 The	Second	Circuit’s	approach	contrasts	with	others	that	allow	impeachment	by	inquiry	into the	underlying	facts	of	a	past	judicial	or	executive	branch	proceeding	but	disallo w	questions	about the	 proceeding’s	 conclusions	 or	 consequences,	 which	 are	 extrinsic	 evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b),	 Advisory	 Committee ’s	 Note to 2003	 amend. ; United	 States	 v.	 Whitmore , 384 F.3d	 836,	 836

- 37	 (D.C.	 Cir.	 2004); United	 States	 v.	 Davis ,	 183	 F.3d	 231,	 256,	 257	 n.12 (3d Cir. 1999); Deary	v.	City	of	Gloucester ,	9	F.3d	191,	196

- 97	(1st	Cir.	1993); United	States	v.	Lopez , 944	 F.2d	33,	 37

- 38	 (1 st Cir. 1991); Waymire	 v.	Miami	 Cty.	 Sheriff’s	Office ,	 2017	U.S.	Dist.	 LEXIS 160918,	at	*6

- 7	(S.D.	O hio	Sept.	29,	2017)

.15 government’s	 witness.” United	 States	 v.	 Whitmore ,	 359 F.3d	 609,	 620 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quotation	marks	omitted) ; s e e also United States	v.	Dawson , 434	 F.3d	956,	959	 (7 th Cir. 2006) ( approving	 of the	exclusion	 of questions about	 past	 judicial	 credibility	 findings	 “when	 the	 wi t n ess .	 .	 . had	 been disbelieved	in	 only	 one	case	 or where	it	was	unclear	whether	 and	why	 the
witness’s testimony	had	been	 rejected .”)

. W e	need	not	decide	w hether the Second	Circuit’s	approach should	be appl ie d in Maine	in case s where	the	court is	 left	 with	 an	 inescapable	 conclusion	 that	 the	 witness	 has previously lied
under	oath because in Dr. Flomenbaum ’s	case	no	such	conclusion	is	possible on	 the	 facts	 presented	 here

. See	 Cede ñ o ,	 644	 F.3d	 at	 81

- 83

. The	 obvious conclusion	to	be	drawn	from	reading	the	transcript	of	the	Connecticut	trial	is that	the	judge	was	presented	with	conflicting	expert	opinions	an d	elected,	as typically	 happens,	 to	 find	 one	 credible	 and	 the	 other	 not

— a	 far	 cry	 fro m finding	that	a	witness	lied. [¶ 2 1] We	 note	 also	 that	 the overarching, bright

- line	 rule	 of
M.R. Evid. 608(a) prevents	 the	 admission	 of personal	 opinions regarding a wit ness’s	 credibility	 or	 truthfulness. See Woodburn ,	 559	 A.2d at 346

. The Connecticut	j udge’s opinion of Dr.	Flomenbaum ’s testimony is	just	the	sort	of opinion	evidence	prohibited	by	Rule	608(a). T he court acted well	within	its16 discretion	 to preclude Coleman’s	 inquiry	 on	 cross

- examination	 into
Dr. Flomenbaum ’s testimony and the j udge's	finding	on	the credibility issue
in	the	Connecticut	case

. See id. ; Caulk , 543	A.2d at 1372

. 2) Dr.	Flomenbaum ’ s	Prior	Employment	Termination [¶22 ] Coleman next	 argues that the	 reasons	 for Dr.	 Flomenbaum ’s
removal as Massachusetts Chief	 Medical Examiner

— that according	 to	 the Massachusetts	 Supreme	 Judicial	 Court d ecision includ ed his administrative shortcomings	 and	 lack	 of	 candor	 with	 his	 superiors 5

— are	 also	 specific
ins tances	of Dr. Flomenbaum ’s	conduct	that	are	probative	of	his	character	for
truthfulness. Coleman postulates	 that Dr.	 Flomenbaum ’s termination from his	prior	employment	may	provide a motive	or bias on Dr. Flomenbaum ’s	part to	 please the	 Attorney	 General’s Office and	 thereby	 secure	 his	 continued employment in Maine’s Office	 of	 the Chief	 Medical	 Examiner ,	 which	 is	 a division	within	 the	Office	 of	 the	 Attorney	 General

. Coleman contends	 that , “[g]iven	 the	 import ance	 of	 Dr. Flomenbaum,	 his	 testimony,	 and	 his

cre dibility,” this	bias was	another	proper	avenue	for	cross

- examination and

5 The	Massachusetts	decision	cited	actions	by	Dr.	Flomenbaum	including	his	delayed	reporting of	a	missing	body	and	underestimation	of	the	backlog	of	bodies	awaiting	autopsies. Flomenbaum v.	Commonwealth ,	889	N.E.2d	423,	430

- 31	(Mass. 2008).17 that	the court abused	its	discretion by excluding this	impeachment evidence
pur suant	to	M.R.	Evid.	401	and	403. [¶23 ] If Dr.	Flomenbaum ’s administrative	capabilities	are	relevant	to
his	collecti on and	supervision of	the	sexual	assault	kit	evidence,	then	it	was
error	for	the	court	to exclude this impeachment evidence unless	its	probative value	 was	 substantially	 outweighed	 by	 the	 risks	 of	 unf air	 prejudice	 or confusion	of	the	jury	and	the	issues before	it .		M.R.	Evid.	401,	403

. T he	State sought	 to	 qualify Dr.	 Flomenbaum as	 an	 expert when	it inquired about	 his education,	 experience , and the number	 of	 autopsies	 he	 had	 performed. In
response, Dr .	Flomenbaum provided	a	summary	of	his	medical	training	and employment	 history,	 including	 his	 time	 as	 Massachusetts Chief	 Medical
Examiner ,	and	an	estimate	 that	he	had	conducted	3,000	 to	4,000	autopsies.
At	 the	 time Dr.	 Flomenbaum conducted	 the	 daughter’s autop sy,	 he	 was
Maine’s	C hief M edical E xaminer and he	supervised or	personally	undertook
the	 collection	 of	 the sexual	 assault	 kit	 and the other	 evidence	 from	 the daughter’s	autopsy

. [¶24 ] E vidence	of Dr. Flomenbaum ’s administrative	shortcomings	and
lack of	candor	with his superiors	when	he	was	the Chief	Medical	Examiner in
another	state are relevan t	to	his	performance of	his	administrative	duties as18 the	 State	 of	 Maine’s	 Chief	 Medical	 Examiner , contrary	 to	 the trial court ’s
f

indings. See United States v. York ,	933	F.2d	1343,	1365

- 66	 (7 th	Cir.	1991) ( affirming	expert	medical	doctor’s	impeachment	with	questionin g about his allegedly	 unprofessional	 conduct	 at	 his	 previous	 position	 as Chief	 Medical
E xaminer ) , overruled	 on	 other	 grounds	 by Wilson	 v.	Williams , 182	 F.3d	 562 (7th	 Cir.	 1999)

. Additionally, t he circumstances	 of Dr. Flomenbaum ’ s
termination are	directly	relevant	to	an	aspect	of	his	professional	credentials
that	the	State used	to qualify Dr.	Flomenbaum as	an	expert in	this	case

. See id. ; Maderios , 2 016	ME	155,	¶¶	10

- 11,	149	A.3d 1145 ; State	v.	Filler ,	2010	ME 90, ¶¶	17

- 20,	3	A.3d	365	 ( “ [E] vidence	 tending	 to	impeach	 [the	State’s	primary witness’s]	 credibility	 has	 greatly	 enhanced	 probative	 value. ” ( quotation marks	 omitted))

. In	 establishing	Dr. Flomenbaum's	 expert	 credentials,	 the
State	included the	fact	that	he had previously	held	a	prestigious	position

— a fact	 that may	 be	 properly	 tempered	 by	 the	 fact	 of	 his	involunt ary	 removal from	that	position. [¶25 ] We must next d ecide	 whether	 the court’s error in limit ing

cross - e xamination	 of	 a	 state’s	 witness was harmless based	 upon “ ‘ the importance	of	the	witness ’[s] testimony	in	the	prosecution ’ s	case,	whether	the testimony	was	cumulative,	the	presence	or	absence	of	evidence	corroborating19 or	contradict ing the	testimony	of	the	witness	on material	points,	the	extent	of

cross - examination	otherwise	permitted,	and,	of	course,	 the	overall	strength of	the	prosecution ’ s	case. ’ ” State	v.	Johnson ,	2009	ME	103,	¶	18,	982	A.2d	320 ( quoting Delaware	 v.	 Van	 Arsdall , 475	 U.S.	 673,	 684	 (1986) ). In	 this	 case,
Dr. Flomenbaum ’s	 testimony	 was just one	 of many pieces	 of	 evidence presented	 at	 trial .	 	 In addition	 to that	 evidence , the	 court	 heard	 testimony
from the	detectives	who recounted Coleman’s	confession	to	the murders; the
famil y	 members	 and	 first	 responder s who established that,	 of the three victims,	only	the daughter was	found gagged	and	straddling	the	end	corner	of

a bed ,	thus	supporting in	part a	finding	that	she	was	sexually	assaulted ; and
two	 forensic anal ysts	 from	 the c rime	 lab oratory who corroborated
Dr. Flomenbaum ’s testimony by	positively	identifying blood	and	semen on	the sexual	assault	kit	samples,	as	well	as	matching	Coleman’s	DNA	with	that	in	the sperm	found	on	the	daughter	and with the	DNA	found	on one	of the	ligature s . We conclude that	 the	 court’s	 error	 was harmless ,	 in	 part, because	 despite
Dr. Flomenbaum ’s	importance	to	the	State’s	case on	the	gross	sexual	assault charge, the	State presented significant circumstantial	evidence	to corroborat e that the	 blood	 and	 semen	 evidence Dr. Flomenbaum collected	 was	 as	 he characterized	 it	 in	 his	 testimony. In	 addition, Coleman was able	 to20

cross - examin e Dr. Flomenbaum generally as	to	his credibility	and alleged bias
in	favor	of	the	State ,	which decreased any	prejudice resulting from	the	lack	of

cross - examination	 regarding	 the	 Massachusetts	 termination. 6 The	 above factors	 along	 with the	 o ther circumstantial	 evidence and	 “the record	 as	 a whole	demonstrate[ ]	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	the	error	did	not affect the	substantial	rights	of	the	defendant	or	contribute	to	the	verdict	obtained.”
State	v.	Norwood ,	2014	ME	97,	¶ 14,	97 A.3d 613; Johnson ,	2009	ME 103,	¶	18 , 982	A.2d	320

. [¶26 ] In	 sum,	 w e conclude that	 the	 circumstances	 surrounding
Dr. Flomenbaum ’s termination	from	his	employment	in	Massachusetts	due	to his	administrative	shortcomings	and	lack	of	candor	are	arguably probative	of his	ability	to	supervise	and	process the	taking	of	forensic	samples and could
have temper ed the jury’s	 view of his admin istrative	 skill	and	candor in	 his
work	in	Maine

. S ee York ,	933 F.2d at 1365

- 66; Filler ,	2010	ME 90, ¶¶	17

- 20,
3 A.3d 365

. Although	 the	 court	 erred by finding	 that	 this	 impeachment
evidence	was not at	all relevant in	 this	 case and by precluding	 any related

6 Coleman’s	 cross

- examination	 of	 Dr.	 Flomenbaum,	 while	 not	 as	 extensive	 as	 he	 wished, satisfied	 his	 right	 to	 confront	 an	 adverse	 witness.	 	 The	 Confrontation	 Clause	 guarantees	 an adequate	and	effective,	but	not	unlimited,	cross

- examination,	and	the court’s	error	in	limiting	this questioning	did	not	 rise	 to	a	deprivation	 of	Coleman’s	constitutional	 right. See State	v.	Johnson , 2009	ME	103,	¶	15,	982	A.2d	320; State	v.	Brown ,	321	A.2d	478,	485	(Me.	1974).21 questioning , th o se error s w ere harmless	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 overwhelming evidence	of	Coleman’s	guilt. 7
B. Prosecutorial	Misconduct [¶27 ] We review	 preserved	 claims	 of	 prosecutorial	 misconduct	 for
harmless	error. State	v.	Pillsbury , 2017	ME	92,	¶	18,	161	A.3d	690; State	v. Dolloff ,	2012	ME	130,	¶¶ 31

- 34,	58	A.3d	1032. According to	this	standard, we disregard “ [ a ] ny	 error,	 defect,	 irregularity , or	 variance	 that	 does	 not	 affect substantial	 rights.” M.R.U.	 Crim.	 P.	 52(a)

. Coleman	 comp lains	 abou t	 the State’s	 opening	 statement that	 evidence	 from	 “vaginal	 swabs”	would	 show “sperm found	 on	 a	 young	 girl’s	 vagina ” because	 he	 claims that the	 swabs
should	have	been referred	 to as	“external	genitalia” swabs, in	keeping	with
the	sexual	assault	k it’s	protocol. Several	witnesses for	the	State testified	that
sexual	 assault	 kits indeed have	 separate	 envelopes	 and	 instructions	 for “vaginal	swabs,”	used	for	internal	vaginal	collections,	and for collections	from “external	 genitalia.” Dr. Flomenbaum testified	 that	 he	 labeled	 the	 sexual

7 Coleman	correctly	notes	that	he	did	not confess	to	the	sexual	assault	charge,	on	which	it	was the	State’s	burden	to	prove	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	that	genital

- to
- genital	contact	occurred

. See infra ¶¶ 29

- 30. Dr.	Flomenbaum ’s testimony provided support for such	a	 finding. Specifically, Dr. F lomenbaum	 testified that	 the	daughter	was	gagged; that she	had	blunt	 force	 trauma	 to	her face;	that	the	abrasions	on	her	buttocks and blood	around	her	vagina	and	in	the	crotch	of	her	shorts suggested	that	she	was	alive	when	the	abrasions	occurred;	and	he	c oncluded	that	her	intact	hymen ruled	 out	 penetrative	 sex	 but	 not	 necessarily	 direct genital contact. Neither	 Coleman	 nor	 the Massachusetts	 termination	 proceedings	 challenged	 Dr.	 Flomenbaum’s forensic	 abilities	 in performing	autopsies	and	reporting	his	findings.22 assault	kit	swabs,	taken	from	the	daughter’s	“vagina l	area ” between	the	labia majora	and	minora, as	vaginal	swabs. [¶28 ] The	State used	these	terms in	its	opening	statement , as	the Chief
M edical E xaminer	did,	to	accu rately	describe	where	the	evidence	of	a	sexual
act	was	found

— inside	the	lab ia	majora	and	external	to	the	hymen , not from deeper	 within the	 victim’s	 vagina,	 as	 Coleman	 claims	 the	 prosecutor	 said. 8 The	 State’s	 opening	 statement , which	 was preceded and follo wed by	 the
court’s	admonition s that	the	opening	statements	were	not	evidence , was free of	 any	 misconduct	 and	 was “fairly	 based	 on	 the	 facts	 [anticipated] in
evidence

. ” State	v. Cote , 2017 ME	73, ¶	27,	159	A.3d 831	(quotation	marks omitted); State	v. Lockhart ,	2003	ME	108,	¶ ¶ 47

- 49,	830	A.2d	433

. C. Sufficiency	of	the	Evidence	of	Gross	Sexual	Assault [¶29 ] Next,	 Coleman	 contends	 that	 there was insufficient	 evidence supporting	his	conviction	for	gross	sexual	assault,	namely	that	there	was	not proof	be yond	a	reasonable	doubt	of	direct	genital

- to
- genital	contact or	proof
that	 the	 victim	 was	 alive	 at	 the	 time that	 such	 contact	 occurred

. See 17

- A M.R.S.	§§ 251(1)(C) , 253(1)( C ) , 508 (201 7 ). We	review a	challenge that	there	is	insufficient	evidence	to	support	the	jury’s	verdict by viewing	all

8 The	 forensic	 evidence	indicated	 that	 the	 semen	was	 found	 between	 the	labia	 majora	 and minora, external	to	the	intact	hymen.23 the	 evidence	 and	 reasonable	inferences	 drawn	 therefrom	in	 the	light	most
favorable	to	the	State. See State	v. Diana ,	2014	ME	45,	¶	2,	89	A.3d	132 ; State
v.	Skarb inski ,	2011	ME	65,	¶	6,	21	A.3d	86

. [¶30 ] Section	253(1)(C)	requires,	in	this	case,	proof	of	a	sexual	act,	in the	 form	 of	 direct	 genital

- to
- genital	 contact,	 with	 a	 pers on	 who	 was	 not Coleman’s	 spouse and	who	 had	 no t	 reached	 twelve	 years	 of	 age. Coleman concedes	that	the	daughter	was un married	and	under	twelve	years	old. We
ha ve repeatedly said that	 “[a]	 criminal	 conviction	 may	 be	 based	 solely	 on circumstantial	evidence	.	.	.	as	long	as	the	evidence	supports	a	finding	that	each element	of	the	crime	is	pr oved	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.” State	v.	Moores , 2009	ME 102,	¶	10,	9 8 2 A.2d	318 ; see also State	v.	Cheney ,	2012	ME	119, ¶	42,
55	A.3d	473

. Despite	the lack	of	direct	evidence of how	Coleman’s	semen	was deposited	 on	 the	 victim ’s genital ia ,	 the	 jury	 could	 have	 rationally	 inferred, beyond	a	reasonable	doubt,	that	a	sexual	act (i.e.,	genital

- to
- genital	contact)
had	occurred	while	the	victim	was	alive	based	on	the	circumstantial	evidence24 presented	at	trial

. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 251(1)(C) ; State v.	Poblete ,	2010	ME	37, ¶	30,	993	A.2d	1104; State	v. Chad B. ,	1998	ME 150,	¶¶	7

- 8,	715	A.2d	144.
D. Chain	of	Custody	of the Sexual	Assault	Kit [¶ 3 1] Coleman next asserts that	 the	 court erred by finding	 that	 the State	had	established	a	proper	chain	of	custody of the sexual	assault kit ,	which

was stored	unde r	unknown	conditions	at	the	Medical	Examiner’s Office	from the	afternoon	of	December	22	until	10:00	a.m.	on	December	24,	2014. We
review for	clear	error	a	 find ing	 that	an	item	 of	physical	evidence	 has	been authenticated	by	a	sufficient	chain	of	custody. Diana ,	2014	ME	45,	¶¶	26

- 27, 89	 A.3d	 132; see M.R.	 Evid.	 901(a).	 	 A chain	 of	 custody “ need	 [not]	 be ironclad,”	and	“a	minor	break	goes	to	the	weight	of	the	evid ence	rather	than its	 admissibility.” Diana, 2014	 ME	 45,	 ¶ 26 , 89	 A.3d	 132 (alteration	 in original) (quotation	marks	omitted) (quoting	Field	&	Murray, Maine	Evidence §	901.3	at	543). The sexual	assault	kit	samples were sealed	and consistently
in	 the	custo dy	of	 the Maine	State	Police,	 the Medical	Examiner’s Office, and
then the	crime	lab oratory , before finally returning	to the	Maine	State	Police ’s
evidence	 locker

. The	 court	 did	 not	 clearly	 err	 or	 otherwise	 abuse	 its discretion	in	admitting	 the	 sexual assault	 kit	in	evidence because	 the	State25 accounted	for	the	kit’s	location	and	sealed	condition	at	all	relevant	times

. See
id

. E. Sentencing [¶32 ] Coleman finally argues	for	the	first	time	on	appeal that	we	should adopt a	 clear	 and	 convincing	 standard	 o f	 proof	 for aggravating	 factors

cons id ered	at	sentencing

. He	contends that	the	sentencing	court	abused	its discretion	in	considering as	aggravating	 factors,	upon	a	less	 than	clear	and convincing quantum	of	proof, his	prior	domestic	violence	against	the	mother and	the	victims’	conscious	fear	and	suffering. Where	a	challenge	to	the	court’s application	of	a	standard	of	proof	at	sentencing	is	unpreserved,	we review the
court’s	actions	for obvious	error. See State	v. Butsitsi ,	2015 ME	74,	¶¶	19,	22, 118	A.3d	222; State v.	Schofield ,	2005	ME	82,	¶	28,	895 A.2d	927. As	Coleman acknowledged	in	his	brief,	we	have instructed	sentencing	courts	to	consider any	 “reliable	 and	 relevant”	 evidence	 of	 mitigating	 or	 aggravating	 fa ctors

. State	v.	Waterman ,	2010	ME	45,	¶	48,	995 A.2d 243 .		T his	is	precisely	what	the
court	did	in	Co leman’s	case,	and	we	decline	to announce a	new	standard. [¶33 ] Considering	the	sentence	that	the	court	imposed,	w e	review the court’s	 application	 of	 the first	 step	 of the sentencing	 analysis

— the
determination	of	a	basic	sentence

— de	novo and we	review the court’s second26 step of	the	analysis

— the	determination	of	the final sentence

— for	an	abuse	of
discretion.	 	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §§ 1201(1) (A) , 1252

- C ( 2017 ); Waterman , 2010 ME 45,	 ¶	 42,	 99 5	 A.2d	 243 ; State	 v.	 Cookson ,	 2003 ME	 136,	 ¶ 38,
837 A.2d	 101 .	 	 Here	 the	 court	 found	 the	 existence	 of	 several aggravating
factors justifying a	life	sentence : ( 1)	multiple	deaths, ( 2) a	murder	committed in	the	presence	of a	child , ( 3) a murder	accompanied	by	sexual	assault, and ( 4 )	the	domestic	violence	nature	of	the	murders. 9 See Waterman ,	2010 ME 45, ¶ 45,	9 9 5 A.2d	243 ; State	v. Shortsleeves ,	580 A.2d 145,	149

- 50 (Me. 1990)

. On balance,	 the	 court	 dete rmine d that	 the	 mitigating	 circumstances 10 were greatly	 outweighed	 by those	 and additional	 aggravating	 factors , including Coleman’s	clear	mind,	free	from the	influence	of	any	substances, at	the	time	of the	crimes; the	impact	of	the	victims’	death s	on	their family	and	community; Coleman’s	 prior	 acts	 of	 domes tic	 violence; the	 victim s’	 conscious	 suffering and	 fear; and Coleman’s	 lack	 of	 remorse and consciousness	 of	 guilt	 in his
confession. See State	 v.	 Hamel ,	 2013	 ME	 16,	 ¶ 6,	 60 A.3d 783 ; Schofield ,

9 The	court	also	found that the	cause	of	the	deaths	by	s trangulation w as	an	aggravating	factor for	 sentencing	 purposes.	 	 Although	 not	 specifically	 listed	 among	 the Shortsleeves factors, strangulation	has	been	cited	in	other	life	sentence	cases. See State	v.	Dwyer ,	2009	ME	127,	¶	38, 985	A.2d	469; State	v.	Wils on ,	669	A.2d	766,	767

- 69 (Me.	1996).

10 The	sentencing	court	found	the	following	mitigating	factors:	Coleman’s	age	at	the	time	of	the crime,	his	history	of	substance	abuse	and	mental	health	issues,	his	lack	of	a	significant	criminal record,	the	absence	of premeditation,	the	evidence	that	he	has	family	and	friends	that	love	him,	and the	terrible	circumstances	of	his	childhood.27 2006 ME	 10 1,	 ¶ 14,	 904	 A.2d	 409; Cookson ,	 2003 ME 136,	 ¶¶ 39

- 41,
837 A.2d 101; Shortsleeves, 580	A.2d at 150

- 51. Coleman’s	challenge to	his
final	 sentence ,	 attacking just two	 of	 the several aggravating	 factors , is unpersuasive, and	 the court	acted	well	within	its	discretion	in arriving at a maximum	sentence	of	life	imprisonment on the	murder	c ounts

. The	entry	is: Judgment and	sentence s affirmed.

Jeremy	Pratt,	Esq. (orally), and	Ellen	Simmons,	Esq.,	Camden,	 and	 Logan	 E. Perkins, Esq.,	Perkins	Law	Office,	Belfast,	for	appellant	Keith	Coleman Janet	 T.	Mills,	 Attorney	 General , and	Donal d	W.	Macomber,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen. (orally), Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for appellee State	of	Maine

Penobscot	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket docket	number	CR

- 2014

- 4662 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY