An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling 

legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions 

of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-661

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 7 April 2015

DANIEL VAN ANTWERP,

Plaintiff

v. Pitt County

No. 12 CVD 596

EMILY BILOBRAN,

Defendant

Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 4 September 2013 by 

Judge Joseph A. Blick, Jr. in Pitt County District Court. Heard 

in the Court of Appeals 4 November 2014.

W. Gregory Duke, for plaintiff-appellant.

Teresa DeLoatch Bryant, for defendant-appellee.

CALABRIA, Judge.

Plaintiff Daniel Van Antwerp (“plaintiff”) appeals from an 

amended order entered 4 September 2013 that supersedes and replaces 

the order entered on 12 August 2013 granting Emily Bilobran 

(“defendant”) (collectively with plaintiff, “the parties”) primary 

physical custody of the parties’ minor child. Although defendant 

resides in North Carolina and plaintiff resides in Maryland, the 
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parties share joint legal custody. Plaintiff was awarded secondary 

physical custody and visitation. We affirm.

I. Background

The parties have known each other since they were teenagers. 

After the parties discovered defendant was pregnant with the minor 

child (“Jason”)1, they planned to get married, but never did. The 

parties are the biological parents of Jason, born in April 2009. 

Plaintiff was present for Jason’s birth, and although the parties 

previously separated, they resided together until October 2011, 

when they finally separated. Arguments between the parties 

resulted in physical altercations, cross-warrants, and a domestic 

violence protective order (“DVPO”)2. The DVPO and both crosswarrants were eventually dismissed. 

On 5 March 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint and later an 

amendment to his complaint in Pitt County District Court, 

requesting that the court grant the parties joint legal and 

physical custody of Jason. After defendant filed an answer and 

counterclaim on 11 October 2012, the trial court entered an order 

granting the parties temporary joint legal custody, with defendant 

having primary physical custody and plaintiff having secondary 

 

1 A pseudonym used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for 

ease of reading.

2 Neither the DVPO nor the cross-warrants are included in the 

record on appeal.
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physical custody, and delineated the terms of visitation. 

After a hearing, the trial court entered an order on 13 August 

2013 regarding permanent child custody that was amended on 4 

September 2013. The amended order superseded and replaced the 13 

August 2013 order. The trial court made several findings regarding 

the parties’ contentious relationship as well as their differing 

parenting techniques and lack of co-parenting. The trial court 

also found that both parties had medical issues and past legal 

issues: plaintiff had felony weapons violations while he was a 

student at Calvin College in Michigan, while defendant was 

previously charged with possession of marijuana and shoplifting. 

The trial court concluded that both parties were fit and proper 

persons to have the general care, custody, and control of Jason, 

and that Jason’s best interests would be served if the parties 

were granted joint legal custody. The trial court granted the 

parties permanent joint legal custody of Jason, with defendant 

having primary physical custody and plaintiff exercising secondary 

physical custody. The trial court also ordered a detailed 

visitation schedule, since defendant resides in Greenville, North 

Carolina, and plaintiff resides in Severna Park, Maryland. 

Plaintiff appeals.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that several of the trial court’s 

findings of fact are unsupported by competent evidence, and that 
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the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant primary 

physical custody. We disagree.

II. Standard of Review

“In a child custody case, the trial court’s findings of fact 

are conclusive on appeal if supported by substantial evidence, 

even if there is sufficient evidence to support contrary findings. 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Carpenter 

v. Carpenter, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 737 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2013) 

(citation omitted). “Whether those findings of fact support the 

trial court’s conclusions of law is reviewable de novo.” Id. 

“Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s decision in 

matters of child custody should not be upset on appeal.” Everette 

v. Collins, 176 N.C. App. 168, 171, 625 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2006).

III. Challenged Findings of Fact

As an initial matter, the trial court’s recording equipment 

malfunctioned at the hearing during defendant’s testimony. Both 

parties submitted their proposed narration of the evidence that 

was lost. The trial court reviewed the narrations and settled the 

record in accordance with its own narration pursuant to Rule 11. 

See N.C.R. App. P. 11(c) (“The functions of the judge in the 

settlement of the record on appeal are to . . . settle narrations 

of proceedings[.]”). Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s 
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narration of defendant’s testimony contains many inaccuracies. 

Specifically, plaintiff contends that the trial court “accepted 

much of what Defendant testified to notwithstanding her multiple 

misrepresentations of fact[.]” However, plaintiff’s argument 

apparently challenges the truthfulness of defendant’s testimony 

rather than the accuracy of the trial court’s narration. 

Additionally, plaintiff provides no authority to this Court to 

support his argument. Therefore, any argument plaintiff presents 

regarding the narration of defendant’s testimony is deemed 

abandoned. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (“Issues not presented in 

a party’s brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is 

stated, will be taken as abandoned.”).

Plaintiff argues that the trial court made several findings 

of fact that are unsupported by competent evidence in the record. 

Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in finding of 

fact number 8, finding that he quit high school halfway through 

his junior year and completed his high school education through 

the University of Nebraska Independent High School Studies 

program. However, plaintiff testified on cross-examination that 

he was enrolled in a high school in Maryland until halfway through 

his junior year, when he left that school to participate in several 

“mission trips,” including one in which he served on medical health 

teams in Lima, Peru. The trial court also found that plaintiff 
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completed his high school education through the University of 

Nebraska Independent High School Studies program, which is 

undisputed. Therefore, this finding is supported by competent 

evidence.

Another finding that plaintiff contends is unsupported by the 

evidence is finding of fact 15B, that “Plaintiff’s exact 

whereabouts [were] kept hidden from the Defendant for 

approximately a month” when he travelled to California is 

unsupported by the evidence. Defendant testified at the hearing 

that plaintiff called her during a layover while travelling to 

California. However, plaintiff concedes that friend Hilary Rose 

Keil testified at the hearing that defendant made several 

unsuccessful attempts to contact plaintiff after he left, and did 

not know plaintiff was in California until one month later. 

Therefore, this finding is supported by the evidence.

Plaintiff also challenges finding of fact number 15K, which 

states that his “patent and utter disregard for what appears to be 

well-grounded fears and concerns of the Defendant border on 

irresponsibility inconsistent with co-parenting” and that 

plaintiff left live rounds of ammunition within Jason’s reach. 

Defendant testified to her concerns regarding plaintiff’s use and 

carrying of loaded firearms around Jason. Specifically, defendant 

testified that she was concerned when plaintiff carried Jason 
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directly above the holstered firearm on plaintiff’s hip, and that 

there had been instances when she witnessed Jason playing with 

partially disassembled firearms. According to defendant, when she 

addressed her concerns with plaintiff, plaintiff responded that 

his child had a right to play with guns. Plaintiff also concedes 

that defendant presented evidence that she returned home on one 

occasion to find Jason chewing on a bullet. The trial court 

recognized plaintiff’s “right to bear arms as guaranteed by both 

the Constitutions of the United States and the State of North 

Carolina,” but ultimately found that plaintiff’s disregard for 

defendant’s concerns and lack of compromise was inconsistent with 

co-parenting. While this particular finding focuses on the point 

of contention between the parties regarding plaintiff’s firearms, 

other uncontested findings also indicate that the parties face 

serious issues with co-parenting, including findings that 

plaintiff was not supportive when defendant was breastfeeding

Jason, and that the parties disagreed regarding Jason’s care and 

maintenance and proper disciplinary techniques. Therefore, this 

finding is supported by competent evidence.

Plaintiff finally contends that the trial court’s finding of 

fact number 16 regarding the lack of communication between the 

parties is not only unsupported by the evidence, but erroneous 

because communication was prohibited while there was a DVPO in 
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place. Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he did not respond 

to defendant’s numerous telephone calls and messages while the 

DVPO was in effect. However, plaintiff fails to consider that the 

trial court heard evidence regarding the parties’ communication 

both before and after the October 2011 incident that resulted in 

the DVPO, including defendant’s testimony that she had great 

difficulty communicating with plaintiff regarding Jason’s medical 

expenses. Plaintiff also concedes that he failed to return

defendant’s attempts to contact him on at least two separate 

occasions when he was either working or travelling outside the 

United States. Therefore, this finding is also supported by the 

evidence. 

Although plaintiff contends otherwise, the extensive 

testimony presented by both parties at the hearing provides 

substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings. 

Plaintiff does not contest any other findings of fact; therefore 

the remaining findings are conclusive on appeal. Carpenter, ___ 

N.C. App. at ___, 737 S.E.2d at 785 (citation omitted).

IV. Abuse of Discretion

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in granting plaintiff primary physical custody. We 

disagree. 
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In child custody actions, the trial court “shall award the 

custody of such child to such person . . . as will best promote 

the interest and welfare of the child.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2

(a) (2013). “When the trial court finds that both parties are fit 

and proper to have custody, but determines that it is in the best 

interest of the child for one parent to have primary physical 

custody . . . such determination will be upheld if it is supported 

by competent evidence.” Hall v. Hall, 188 N.C. App. 527, 530, 655 

S.E.2d 901, 904 (2008).

In the instant case, Jason has lived in North Carolina with 

defendant for his entire life. After making extensive findings 

based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, many of which 

are undisputed on appeal, the trial court concluded that “[b]oth 

parties are fit and proper persons to have the general care, 

custody and control of the minor child.” The trial court further 

concluded that Jason’s best interests “will be served if the 

parties are granted joint legal custody of the minor child, with 

the Defendant exercising[] primary physical custody and the 

Plaintiff exercising secondary custody and visitation[.]” 

Plaintiff’s argument appears to be a “request that we reweigh 

the evidence and reach a different conclusion on the facts than 

that deemed appropriate by the trial court.” Dixon v. Gordon, ___ 

N.C. App. ___, ___, 734 S.E.2d 299, 304 (2012) (citation omitted). 
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“Accordingly, we are simply not permitted to act in accordance 

with [plaintiff’s] request under the applicable standard of 

review.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, 

we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding the parties joint legal custody and granting defendant 

primary physical custody of Jason.

V. Conclusion

The trial court’s findings were supported by competent 

evidence. We decline to reweigh the evidence, and find that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the parties 

joint legal custody, granting defendant primary physical custody, 

and granting plaintiff secondary custody and visitation of the 

parties’ minor child. Therefore, we affirm the order of the trial 

court.

Affirmed.

Judges STROUD and McCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).