Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A05-1407-CR-349 | April 6, 2015 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark Small

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Chandra K. Hein

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeffery W. Moore,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 6, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

60A05-1407-CR-349

Appeal from the Owen Circuit 

Court; The Honorable Lori Thatcher 

Quillen, Judge

60C01-1208-FA-520

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A05-1407-CR-349 | April 6, 2015 Page 2 of 8

[1] Jeffery Moore appeals his twenty-year sentence for Class B felony sexual 

misconduct with a minor.

1

 Moore asserts the court abused its discretion when 

it imposed that sentence. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2001 and 2002, Moore, who was in his mid-thirties, repeatedly engaged in 

sexual activity with T.B., who was the daughter of the woman Moore was 

dating. Moore began having sexual intercourse with T.B. when she was eleven, 

and he would obtain access to T.B. by sending her mother to the store so that 

he and T.B. were alone. T.B. became pregnant before her fourteenth birthday

and had the baby “three months before [she] turned fifteen.” (Tr. at 32.) Police 

learned T.B. had become pregnant by Moore, but they could not locate him.

[4] In 2012, police found Moore, and his DNA indicated the probability that he 

was the father of T.B.’s child was “99.9999%.” (App. at 30.) On August 29, 

2012, the State charged Moore with one count of Class A felony sexual 

misconduct with a minor2for sexual intercourse with T.B. when she was 

thirteen years old and one count of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a 

minor for sexual intercourse with T.B. when she was fourteen years old. 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a)(1) (1998). 

2

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (1998). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A05-1407-CR-349 | April 6, 2015 Page 3 of 8

[5] Moore reached a plea agreement with the State pursuant to which Moore 

would plead guilty to the Class B felony, the State would dismiss the Class A 

felony, and sentencing would be left to the discretion of the trial court. 

Following a sentencing hearing, the court found aggravators in Moore’s 

criminal history, his position of trust with T.B., and his commission of multiple 

acts of misconduct with her and found mitigators in Moore’s plea of guilty and 

his willingness to provide medical history for the benefit of the child. It

imposed a twenty-year sentence, with two years suspended.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Sentencing is principally a discretionary function, and the trial court’s judgment 

should receive considerable deference. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 

(Ind. 2008). Thus, we reverse only for an abuse of discretion, which occurs 

when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual 

deductions to be drawn from those facts and circumstances. Anglemyer v. State, 

868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g by Anglemyer v. State, 875 

N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We may find an abuse of discretion if the trial court 

does not provide a sentencing statement, if the sentencing statement is not 

supported by the record, if the sentencing statement omits reasons clearly 

supported by the record and advanced by the defendant, or if the trial court’s 

reasons for sentencing are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. In a 

felony case such as this, a trial court must give a “reasonably detailed 

recitation” of the reasons for the sentence imposed. Id. at 490. As we review 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A05-1407-CR-349 | April 6, 2015 Page 4 of 8

the court’s decision, we may consider both the written and oral sentencing 

statements. Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 631 (Ind. 2002) (“we are not 

limited to the written sentencing statement but may consider the trial court’s 

comments in the transcript of the sentencing proceedings”). 

[7] Moore’s arguments all arise from the court’s statement at the sentencing 

hearing: 

Mr. Moore . . . you were an adult male and you took a position of 

trust and you took that child, and it wasn’t one time of stupidity, it was 

over and over again, to the point that a child resulted in that. So, you 

screwed up two lives essentially at that moment. And, you also 

destroyed a relationship between a child and her parent. And, you 

took the stand and you told me how important your children were to 

you and so you have to know that by the choices that you made on 

that day, even though it was several years ago, it was one that [was]

designed for evil. And, you were wise enough then and wise enough 

now to know that what you were doing was wrong. And, so I have 

some real concerns when you say I didn’t know about the baby. The 

fact of the matter the baby resulted doesn’t mean you didn’t know 

what you did on a regular basis that put her in the position where she 

was placed in foster care. If you were so big on I’m going to take 

responsibility, the reality is that had the baby not been produced, you 

probably couldn’t have been found guilty because there wouldn’t have 

been enough evidence on a twelve-year-old little girl ten years later and 

it would have been you saying it didn’t happen and her saying that it 

did. . . . The fact is the evidence was overwhelming. After that it was 

just doing math and it was pretty easy to determine that [sic] what you 

did [and] when you did it. So, you got a pretty decent deal when I 

look at the charge because if I get rid of the A Felony, which by the 

plea agreement I have to do, the minimum you would have got [sic] 

under that sentence would have been twenty years. So, I’m glad that 

you did show up today, but the reality had you not showed [sic] up 

today then the plea never would have been accepted and you’d be still 

looking at potentially doing fifty years for what happened back then. 

Now, would you be deserving of fifty years, I don’t know. Because I 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A05-1407-CR-349 | April 6, 2015 Page 5 of 8

do think there’s [sic] some special circumstances that [defense counsel]

has brought out. But, on the same hand I think the minimum in that 

case of twenty years is appropriate [in] this case because you did 

violate a position of trust, you did have a prior criminal history, it 

wasn’t one incident, it was multiple and several incidents. I do find 

that you pled guilty and I’m glad that you were a trustee ‘cause it tells 

me it’s somebody that the department can work with. But, because 

you were a trustee you got benefits and, more importantly, you got 

entitled to your good time credit because you did what you were 

supposed to do. And, since you get good time credit, that’s what you 

deserve and I’m glad they did give that to you. But, I don’t think 

that’s something that screams volumes that says that you deserve to 

have no further punishment for this because you do. You destroyed 

that woman’s life and she just had the strength and integrity to go 

forward with it and be a survivor instead of a victim for the rest of her 

life. But, it’s time for you to have to suffer the consequences of it and I 

think you do deserve punishment for the same. So, here’s what your 

sentence is going to be. . . . I am going to sentence you to twenty years. 

I think that’s the minimum amount that was on the one sentence that’s 

appropriate. I agree with [State’s counsel]. That’s the notes that I 

made throughout the whole process. I think suspending two years is 

appropriate in this particular case. I will show that you have credit for 

606 days. With good time credit you have 1,216 days toward your 

sentence. I will sentence you to the Department of Correction, 

therefore, for eighteen years, give you credit for the time that we just 

discussed. I’m going to order there be a no-contact order with the 

victim in this case. The reason why I did suspend the two years is that 

I don’t think you’re the worst of the worst and you voluntarily have 

agreed to provide the medical is- -- history for the benefit of the child 

herein . . . . I do find, though, that the aggravators outweigh the 

mitigators. I find that you got a significant break by having the Count 

I – child molesting charge dismissed and I will follow through with 

that and dismiss that charge. I will show at this point in time you’re 

remanded to the Department of Corrections [sic] to start serving your 

sentence. 

(Tr. at 64-67.) 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A05-1407-CR-349 | April 6, 2015 Page 6 of 8

[8] Moore asserts “the trial court did not identify any factor as an ‘aggravator’ or 

any as a ‘mitigator.’” (Appellant’s Br. at 7.) It is true the court does not 

explicitly label any factor as an aggravator or mitigator in that statement, but 

the trial court’s written sentencing order explicitly lists three aggravators --

Moore’s criminal history, his position of trust with T.B., and his commission of 

multiple acts of misconduct with T.B. -- and two mitigators -- Moore’s plea of 

guilty and his willingness to provide medical history for the benefit of the child. 

(See App. at 7.) Thus, the court adequately identified aggravators and 

mitigators. See Corbett, 764 N.E.2d at 631 (we may consider both the written 

order and the statement at sentencing). 

[9] Moore also argues the court should have found as a mitigator that he was “a

model inmate during nearly two years of incarceration” before sentencing. 

(Appellant’s Br. at 9.)3 A court “need not regard . . . a possible mitigating 

circumstance the same as urged by the defendant.” Corbett, 764 N.E.2d at 630. 

The court abuses its discretion only when it does not “find mitigating 

circumstances clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration.” 

Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. As Moore notes, the court explicitly declined to 

find a mitigator in Moore’s status as a trustee at the county jail because he “got 

benefits and, more importantly, [he] got entitled to [his] good time credit.” (Tr. 

at 65.) As the court’s discussion indicated it considered this proposed mitigator, 

 

3 Moore also claims the court should have found a mitigator in his guilty plea because his “plea was not 

simply a pragmatic calculation.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) As the trial court listed Moore’s plea as a mitigator, 

(see App. at 7), we need not address this argument. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A05-1407-CR-349 | April 6, 2015 Page 7 of 8

we cannot find the court overlooked it. See Corbett, 764 N.E.2d at 631 

(declining to hold trial court overlooked mitigators where trial court discussed 

each proposed mitigator during sentencing). 

[10] Moore next asserts the court focused too heavily on the harm to the victim but 

“did not focus on matters as aggravating circumstances,” (Appellant’s Br. at 

11), which suggests the court was imposing “vindictive justice.” (Id.) To the 

extent Moore’s argument suggests the court did not find aggravating factors, the 

record does not support that argument. (See App. at 7.) Furthermore, our 

Legislature has permitted a trial court to consider the “harm, injury, loss, or 

damage suffered by the victim of an offense” when that harm was significant 

and greater than necessary to prove the offense. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1). 

As the trial court noted, the harm to T.B. was greater than that required to 

prove Class B felony sexual misconduct because T.B. was only thirteen years

old when she was impregnated by Moore. Compare Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1)

(defining Class A felony as act involving child “under fourteen”) with Ind. Code 

§ 35-42-4-9(a)(1) (defining Class B felony as act involving child “at least 

fourteen”). There was no abuse of discretion in the court’s discussion of the 

harm to T.B.4 See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492 (“Concerning the seriousness 

 

4 Moore also asserts error based on “what appears to have been the weight the trial court gave to the offense 

Moore committed.” (Appellant’s Br. at 12.) As we are no longer permitted to review the weight a court 

assigns to aggravating and mitigating factors, this assertion raises no error to review. See Anglemyer, 868 

N.E.2d at 491 (“Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’ aggravating and mitigating 

factors against each other when imposing a sentence, unlike the pre-Blakely statutory regime, a trial court can 

not now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.”). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 60A05-1407-CR-349 | April 6, 2015 Page 8 of 8

of the offense, this aggravator, which implicitly includes the nature and 

circumstances of the crime as well as the manner in which the crime is 

committed, has long been held a valid aggravating factor.”). 

[11] Finally, Moore asserts the court abused its discretion by discussing the 

sentencing range for the Class A felony charge that was dismissed without 

mentioning the sentencing range for the Class B felony sentence that was being 

imposed. Moore has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. The controlling 

statute permitted a twenty-year sentence for a Class B felony, see Ind. Code § 

35-50-2-5 (setting sentencing range at six to twenty years), and “we presume the

trial court knows and follows the applicable law.” Tharpe v. State, 955 N.E.2d 

836, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Moore has not overcome that 

presumption. 

Conclusion

[12] Finding no abuse of discretion in the imposition of a twenty-year sentence for 

Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, we affirm.

[13] Affirmed. 

Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.