In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-23-00035-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 158th District Court

Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. F19-3271-158

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

MICHAEL HENRY III, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In a single issue, Appellant Michael Henry III, who was a juvenile at the time of 

the events giving rise to this case, argues that the criminal district court lacked 

jurisdiction to place him on deferred-adjudication probation—and to subsequently 

sentence him to twenty years in prison—for the second-degree felony offense of 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because the juvenile court never made a 

probable cause finding that Henry had committed that particular offense, thereby 

rendering its waiver of exclusive jurisdiction invalid. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 54.02(a)(3); see also Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 667–68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) 

(stating that void-judgment exception applies in the deferred-adjudication context). 

Because a juvenile court waives jurisdiction with respect to conduct, not a particular 

charge, we affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

In April 2019, Henry and a group of his friends had a verbal and physical 

altercation with another group of boys outside one of the boys’ homes. After the 

fight initially broke up, Henry’s group left, but they returned about ten minutes later. 

Once the fight resumed, Henry pulled out a gun and fired it in the direction of 

multiple people, including H.C.

1

1Because H.C. was a juvenile at the time Henry’s offense was committed, we 

use an alias to refer to him. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. 
3

The State filed a petition against Henry in juvenile court alleging that he had 

engaged in deadly conduct, a third-degree felony, by firing a gun “at or in the 

direction of” H.C. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.05. Because Henry’s alleged 

deadly-conduct offense was a felony and he was at least fifteen years old at the time

that it was committed, the State requested the discretionary transfer of Henry’s case to 

criminal district court. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a).

In July 2019, the juvenile court held a transfer hearing to determine whether

there was probable cause to believe that Henry had committed the alleged deadlyconduct offense and whether, given the offense’s seriousness and Henry’s 

background, criminal proceedings were required. See id. § 54.02(a)(3). The juvenile 

court found that there was probable cause, waived jurisdiction, and transferred 

Henry’s case to criminal district court. 

After Henry’s case was transferred to the district court, a grand jury issued a

true bill of indictment charging Henry with the second-degree felony offense of 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on his firing of the gun at H.C. during 

the April 2019 fight.

2 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(b).

2The indictment alternatively alleged that Henry had “intentionally or 

knowingly threatened [H.C.] with imminent bodily injury by pointing or discharging a 

firearm” at him or in his direction or that Henry had “intentionally, knowingly, or 

recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to [H.C.] by striking [H.C.] with [his] hand or 

slamming [H.C.]” and that he had used or exhibited a deadly weapon—a firearm—

during the commission of the assault. 
4

In June 2020, Henry, pursuant to a plea bargain, pleaded guilty to the 

aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon charge. Under the terms of his plea 

agreement, Henry received deferred adjudication and was placed on five years’

probation.3

In March 2022, the State, alleging multiple probation violations, filed a motion 

to proceed with adjudication of guilt.

4

In February 2023, the district court held a 

hearing on the State’s petition. The district court found a number of the State’s 

allegations to be true; adjudicated Henry guilty; and after a punishment hearing,

sentenced Henry to twenty years in prison. This appeal followed. 

III. DISCUSSION

In a single issue, Henry contends that because the juvenile court never made a 

probable cause finding that he had committed the second-degree felony offense of 

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, its waiver of exclusive jurisdiction was 

invalid, and as a result, the district court lacked jurisdiction to place him on deferredadjudication probation—and ultimately to sentence him to twenty years in prison—

for that offense. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3). Henry’s argument lacks 

merit. 

3Henry was also required to pay a $500 fine. 

4The State amended its motion twice before it was heard by the district court. 
5

The Texas Family Code provides that the designated juvenile court of each 

county has exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings involving juvenile 

defendants. See id. §§ 51.04(a), 54.02(a). Therefore, any person accused of engaging in 

“delinquent conduct,” including violating a Texas penal law punishable by 

imprisonment or confinement in jail, between his tenth and seventeenth birthdays is 

subject to the exclusive original jurisdiction of a juvenile court. See id. §§ 51.03(a)(1)–

(2), 51.04(a); Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, 

pet. ref’d). 

“But the right of a juvenile offender to remain outside the jurisdiction of the 

criminal district court is not absolute.” Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 885 (citing Ex parte Arango, 

518 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d)). If—as in the 

present case—certain conditions are met, a juvenile court may, after an evidentiary 

hearing, waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile defendant to an 

appropriate criminal district court for criminal proceedings. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 54.02; Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 885–86.

It is well-settled that a juvenile court waives jurisdiction with respect to 

conduct, not with respect to a particular charge. Livar v. State, 929 S.W.2d 573, 574–

75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d); accord Eguade v. State, No. 08-15-00268-

CR, 2017 WL 3224863, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 31, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication); Herndon v. State, No. 05-11-00248-CR, 2012 WL 

2362528, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 22, 2012, no pet.) (not designated for 
6

publication); see also Cornealius v. State, 870 S.W.2d 169, 176 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1994), aff’d, 900 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“When the juvenile 

court waives jurisdiction and transfers a juvenile to the criminal district courts, the 

juvenile court is transferring the underlying conduct of the offense or offenses.” 

(citing Dixon v. State, 639 S.W.2d 9, 10 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, no pet.))). 

“[B]ecause a juvenile court waives jurisdiction with respect to conduct, a juvenile 

court’s transfer order is not required to apprise the defendant of the specific crimes 

for which he might be charged.” Herndon, 2012 WL 2362528, at *1 (citing Tatum v. 

State, 534 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)). Thus, once a juvenile court 

waives jurisdiction, the district court to which the case is transferred has jurisdiction

to adjudicate any offense arising from the same conduct for which the juvenile court 

waived jurisdiction. Livar, 929 S.W.2d at 575 (citing Brosky v. State, 915 S.W.2d 120, 

126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d)); see also Eguade, 2017 WL 3224863, at 

*3. 

Here, the conduct for which the juvenile court waived jurisdiction was Henry’s 

shooting “at or in the direction of” H.C. during the April 2019 fight. Because Henry’s

aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon charge was based on this conduct, the 

district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate this offense. See Livar, 929 S.W.2d at 575. 

That Henry was ultimately charged in the district court with a different offense—

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—than the one that the juvenile court found 

probable cause to believe Henry had committed—deadly conduct—is of no moment 
7

because both offenses arose from the same conduct. See id.; cf. Safian v. State, 

543 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“Deadly conduct, . . . as a matter of law, 

is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault by the use of a deadly weapon.”). 

Indeed, the State’s petition for discretionary transfer anticipated that Henry may 

ultimately be charged with additional or different offenses in the district court by

specifically requesting that the juvenile court transfer Henry’s case to the district court 

“for criminal proceedings concerning” the alleged deadly conduct offense and “all 

criminal conduct occurring in said criminal episode(s).” Thus, Henry’s argument that 

the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his aggravated-assault-with-a-deadlyweapon offense is meritless. 

We overrule Henry’s sole issue. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Henry’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: October 12, 2023