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### PB83-917004 

# NATIONAL

...------. TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594
- 

# SAFETY REPORT
GENERAL AVIATION CRASHWORTHINESS PROJECT, PHASE ONE NTSB/SR-83/01



# UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

### ,. '\

## ~():.. 1"' ' ' 

### . ' 

### TECHNICAL REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 1. Report No. 

### NTSB/SR-83/_01 

# I2.Government Accession No. 

### PB83-917004 4. Title and Subtitle Safety Report: General Aviation CrashworthinessProject, Phase One. ]. Author{s} 

### 9. Performing Organization Name**~nd** Address NationalTransportation SafetyBoard Bureau ofTechnology r Washington, D.C. 20594 12.Sponsorlng Agency Name and Address 

### NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Washington, D. C. 20594 15.Supplementary Notes

16.Abstract**3~Recipient's** Catalog No. 5.Report Date June 27, 1983 &.Performing Organization Code ij.Performing Organization Report No. IO.Work Unit No. 3741 J.J.Contract or Grant No. 13.Type of Report and Period Covered Safety Report

1972 -1981 14.Sponsoring Agency Code

Between 1972 and 1981, more than 21,000, or 25 percent, of the occupants of generalaviation aircraftinvolved in accidents were killed or seriously injured. The standards for occupant protection in general aviation aircraft have remained essentially unchanged for about the last 30 years. During this period, however, there have been major advances in crashworthiness technology. With the application of existing crashworthiness technology, it is notunreasonable to expecta substantialreduction in theover21,000 deathsand serious injuries. The general aviation industry recently has expressed a desire to more fully apply crashworthiness technology to aircraft. However, reS;l-world data on the reaction of the airplane, its components, and the occupants to a crash, are needed to develop design criteria. As part of its ongoing work in the area of general aviation crashworthiness, the Safety Board has undertaken a specialprogram of investigation that will provide the real-world data necessary to establish an envelope of typical general aviation accident impact deceleration loads and to describe crash scenarios for a range ofgeneral aviation accidents for which design for passenger survivability is feasible. This report, the first of a projected series, explains the Safety Board's crashworthiness program, its objective, and its goals. It presents a description of

. the crashworthiness analysis methodology used, demonstrates its validity, and provides an example demonstrating itsapplication. ·



### 17. Key Words Generalaviation accidents; crashworthiness; crash loads; accident investigation; accident investigation methodology; crash pulse; kinematics.

19.Security Classification (of this report) 

### UNCLASSIFIED NTSB Form 1765.2 (Rev. 9/74) 20.Security Classification (of this page) 

### UNCLASSIFIED HLOistribution Statement This document is available to the public through the NationalTechnical InformationService Springfield, Virginia 22161 21.No. of Pages 22.Price 

### 94INTRODUCTION • • • • • • • • • CRASHWORTHINESSPROGRAM • Program Objective and Goals

. CONTENTS

Data Requirements.

. • • • ANALY81S METHOD • • • • • ImpactSeverity • • . • • Visualization

. • • . • • PulseShape Development

. METHODVERIFICATION • Pitch Attitude. • • • Crash Pulse • • • . • Analysis Summaries 

### 1 3 3 4 5 5 6 11 

### 18 18 24 

### 25 APPLICATION OFANALY81S OF NTSB ACCIDENTINVESTIGATION DATA • • 37 CONCLUDING REMARKS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • 45 GLOSSARY OFTERMS USEDIN THE CRASHWORTHINHSS PROGRAM**APPEND~** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix A--NTSB General Aviation Crashworthiness Recommendations and FAA Responses • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Appendix B--NTSB Expanded Accident/Incident Report (NTSB Form 6120.4) • • • • • . . • • • • • . • • • • • . • • • • Appendix C--ComputerProgram for Crashworthiness Analysis • Appendix D--CrashworthinessProgram Investigationsto Date •

ii 

### 48 

### 57 57 65 

### 84 92

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# ~.;.j I' FNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594 SAFETY REPORT: GENERAL AVIATION CRASHWORTHINESS PROJECT, PHASE ONE Adopted: June 27, 1983 INTRODUCTION Between 1972 and 1981, 41,319 general aviation accidents of all types !/occurred. Of the over 83,000 occupants of these aircraft, more than 21,000, or 25 percent, were killed or seriously injured. About 34 percent, or more than 14,000 of the accidents were classified as relatively nonsevere !/ and resulted in fatal or serious injuries to 1,073
·occupants. The accidents which were classified as relatively severe comprised about

59 percent, or over 24,000, and resulted in fatal injuries to over 11,000 occupants and serious injuries to almost6,000 occupants. Since its inception, the Safety Board has been concerned about the limited emphasis which hasbeen placed on improving the quality of occupantprotection in general aviation aircraft. Since 1970, the Safety Board has issued 23 safety recommendations (see appendix A) and has conducted two special studies

## .Y which addressed general aviation crashworthiness 3/and occupant protection. The standards for occupant protection in general aviation aircraft have remained essentially unchanged for about the last 30 years. During this period, there have been major advances in crashworthiness technology, many of which resulted from government/industry research and investigative projects conducted in the late 1950's and the early 1960's. The projects, which included full scale crash testing of a variety of aircraft, were performed in all areas of crashworthiness, including postcrash fire, seats/restraints, cockpit/cabin environment, and the crash acceleration environment. Much of the information obtained from the projects, as well as information from earlier studies, was incorporated into the first and subsequent editions of the Aircraft Crash Survival Design**Guide~/** and first released to the public by the Army in 1967. 

### !/ To facilitate further analysis, the accident types were divided into two accident categories- relatively severe and relatively nonsevere accidents. The severe accidents included collisions with the ground or other objects, stall/spin accidents, and some · accidents following engine failure or malfunction. Typical of the nonsevere accidents were ground loops, hard landings, gear-up landings, nose-overs, or under/overshoots. Not included were accidents such as propeller strikes, inflight structural separations, and midair collisions. 

### !I Special Study, 11General Aviation Accidents: Postcrash Fires and How To Prevent Or ControlThem" (NTSB-AAS-80-2); Safety Report, "TheStatus of General Aviation Aircraft Crashworthiness" (NTSB-8R-80-2).**~I** Crashworthiness refers to the capability of a vehicle to protect its occupants during a crash. 

## !/ Aircraft Crash Survival Design Guide, USARTL-TR-79-22, Applied Technology Laboratory, U.S. Army Research and Technology Laboratories (AVRADCOM), Fort Eustis, Virginia, 1980.-2-


### Since that time the document has been revised periodically to reflect the changing technology in crash survivability. However, in spite ofthe availability of the information, only the Army has chosen to apply it fully to their helicopter design standards. The Safety Board believes that had the existing crashworthiness technology been applied, most of the 1,073 deaths and serious injuries which occurred in the nonsevere accidents would have been avoided. Although the percent reduction in the number of deaths and serious injuries in .the more severe accidents would not be as great as in the nonsevere accidents, it is still not unreasonable to expect that there would have been substantially fewer than the 17,000 deaths and serious injuries which did occur in these accidents. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has not upgraded existing occupant protection standards or incorporated new standards into the existing regulations for civil airplanes in a timely manner. This inaction has influenced the general aviation industry, which has not taken full advantage of existing crashworthiness technology to upgrade occupant protection in newly manufactured airplanes ofcurrent design or in the design of new airplanes. In the last several years, interest regarding general aviation crashworthiness has gained exposure from sources other than the FAA and NTSB. In February 1983, a Government/industry group, including representatives of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), met at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Langley, Virginia, facility to study small airplane stall speed. The findings of the group regarding crashworthiness included: (1) the mandatory availability and use ofupper torso restraints in small aircraft could provide an immediate 

# • ' '



### improvement in crashworthiness; (2) there currently is an adequate body ofknowledge for ., , the issuance of initial rules pertaining to structural crashworthiness for small airplanes; and (3) additional research is needed to define a crash scenario representative of survivable accidents on which crashworthiness performance standardscanbebased. Also in February 1983, the General Aviation Safety Panel (GASP), an industry task force which was convened at·the invitation of the FAA, issued a position paper containing several recommendations dealing with crashworthiness. Like the Government/industry group, the task force recommended mandatory installation and use of should,er harnesses as soon aspracticable. It

### also recommended that the development of new crashworthiness design standards be expedited. One of the immediate goals for this recommendation was to "provide a means for collecting meaningful accident data on the effectiveness of seat restraints and harnesses. Such "real-world" data would be compared with experimental results in order to provide a broaderbasis for creatingdesign criteria." The Safety Board is in a unique position to collect and analyze "real-world" data on crash forces and the effectivenessofseats/restraints, as well as tohelp to define realistic general aviation crash scenarios. To assist the manufacturers and FAA in defining reasonable design crashworthiness objectives, the Safety Board has undertaken a special program of investigation that will provide the 11

### real-world" data necessary to establish an envelope of typical general aviation accident impact deceleration loads and to describe crash scenarios for a range of general aviation accidents in which design for passenger survivability is feasible. If specific safety problems are observed in the course of these investigations which warrant immediate attention, they will be addressed immediately in separate safety recommendations. The data regarding occupant protection/crashworthiness also will assist the Safety Board in assessing the continuing validity ofitspastsafety 

# •

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### recommendations and in developing new recommendations. This initialreport explains the crashworthiness program, its objective, and its goals. It presents a .description of the crashworthiness analysis methodology used, demonstrates its validity, and provides an example demonstrating its application. It should be noted that the scope of this report is limited to the presentation of the investigative and analytical methodology, and does not include any detailed analyses ofdata obtained from theBoard's accident investigations. CRASHWORTHINBSS PROGRAM 

### The SafetyBoard's GeneralAviation CrashworthinessProgram is a multiyear project initiated in October 1981. The field phase of the program was begun on January 1, 1982, concurrent with the introduction of an expanded Safety Board accident/incident report form (NTSB Form 6120.4). (See appendix B.) The program provides for a systematic investigation ofgeneralaviation airplane accidents with emphasis on crashworthiness. Crashworthiness investigations gather data that are useful in determining the adequacy of current airplane design practices which affect occupant survivability. The parameters determined from these investigations include the nature of the impact conditions of the airplane, the amount of structural deformation, the approximate forces imposed on the structure and occupants, occupant injuries; and injury-producing mechanisms-- both mechanicaland accelerative. Program Obieetiveand Goals 

### The objective of the crashworthiness program is 

### to develop and disseminate to the FAA and the general aviation industry an envelope of likely peak decelerative forces occurring in survivable'§_/ general aviation airplane accidents, and their effects on the occupants and airplane structure for the purpose ofupgrading occupant protection design

. standards. The program will describe and categorize, by severity, crash scenarios for a range of survivable airplane accidents. Also, the program will attempt to correlate the scenario categories with the savings in lives and the reduction in serious injuries which might be achieved by upgrading the design standards of general aviation airplanes to levelscompatible with these scenariocategories. The following goalshave been set to accomplish the program objective:
o Establish investigative techniques which will facilitate the collection and analysis ofcrashworthiness data for general aviation accidents.
o Collect and evaluate, through detailed analysis, crashworthiness data on a select sample ofsurvivable generalaviation accidents.
o Validate analysis techniques which can be applied to the future analysis of the substantial amount of crashworthiness data which will be collected routinely in general aviation accident investigations. '§_/ 

### A survivable accident is one in which the forces transmitted to the occupant through the seat and restraint system do not exceed the limits of human tolerance to abrupt accelerations and in which the structure in the occupant's immediate environment remains · substantially intact to the extent that a livable volume is provided throughout the crash sequence.0

0 -4-


### Define crash pulSes that describe the impact severity of survivable accidents in generalaviation airplanes currently in use. Identify injury-producing mechanisms related not only to the fuselage structure, but to control/display designs, crew /passenger seats, and possible deficiencies in the availability and use of seat belts/shoulderharnesses, and correlate these with the crash loads.
o Describe and categorize crash scenario severity based on changes in velocity and impact angle.
o Use the crashworthiness data to validate past findings and to support future recommendations.

·Data Requirements 

### The crashworthiness evaluation of general aviation airplane accidents requires the collection of data addressing three areas: occupant injuries, impact severity, and the airplane's occupant protection capabilities. The causes of injury can be related to both the severity of the impact and the ability of the structure (including seats and restraints) to protect the occupant from the impact. These three areas are focused on by engineers in all vehicle crashworthiness design efforts. Occupant Injuries.-The occupant injuries of concern in the crashworthiness study · are those. resulting from either accelerative or mechanical sources. Abrupt acceleration.§/ (+ 

### or-) of the body or parts of the body may result in injuries, such as hyperextension of the cervical spine (whiplash) from longitudinal acceleration, or transection of the aorta from acceleration in the verticaldirection. Mechanical injuries, also referred to asblunt trauma or impact injuries, result from the body's striking or being struck by another object. A typical mechanical injury is a fractured skull or facial laceration which results from head contact with the instrument panel, seat back, or window jamb during a crash sequence. The detailed data concerning occupant injuries are collected from autopsy records, hospital records, and interviews with victims and medical/rescue personnel who responded to the accident. Identification of the injury mechanisms or the direct causes of the injuries, an important part of the investigation process, will provide information on the occupant protection capabilities of the airplane. Although injuries caused by accelerative forces may be identified as such, the magnitude of the forces causing the injuries must be identified through kinematic']../ analysis ofthe airplane crash. Impact injuries, in general, can be traced by physical evidence to occupant contact with particular structures in the cockpit or cabin ofthe airplane. Airplane ImpactSeverity.-The severity of a crash is stated in terms of a crash pulse which relates acceleration ("G11)**~/** 

### acting at the airplane's center of mass to time. The pulse is**determi~ed** 

### by the analysis of the airplane's kinematics which is established §./Acceleration is the change in velocity wit.h respect to time. In general, the term "acceleration"refers to an increase in velocity with respect to time, and is 

### expressed as a positive (+) 

### number

.. A decrease in velocity with respect to time is a negative (-) acceleration, or a deceleration. · ']_/ Kinematics is a branch of dynamics that deals with aspects of motion apart from consideration ofmass and force. 8/ Acceleration vs. time where acceleration in G's is the ratio of a particular acceleration to the acceleration ofgravity. (See Glossary ofTerms.) 

### .f 

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# 0 -5- through the reconstruction of the crash sequence. The kinematic analysis requires knowledge of the velocity change of the airplane, the distance over which the velocity change took place during the principal**impact,~/** the airspeed, the flightpath angle, the terrain angle, the airplane's attitude at the principalimpact, and the sliding distance after the impact. These values are determined from physicalevidence, including damage to the airplane structure, damage to objects in the crashpath, and ground scars. Additionaldata that are useful in establishing the required parameters can be obtained from radar data, aerodynamic analyses, and flight data recorders when they are available. OccupantProtection Capabilities.-The determination of how well an airplane can protect its occupants in a crash depends on more than documentation of injuries and analysis of the airplane's kinematics. Information is required on how much energy of the crash was absorbed by the structure and components through plastic or permanent deformation. Also, information is needed on whether or not the occupants were restrained sufficiently to allow them to have participated in the airplane structure's deceleration, or whether or not they experienced an abrupt, and perhaps nonsurvivable deceleration, because the tiedown chain 10/ failed to restrain them. Such information is gathered during a detailed examinationof the airplane wreckage. Also, fuselage deformation must be measured to determine whether a livable volume is maintained in the occupied area. Impact damage must be documented, and matched to the evironmental evidence, i.e., ground scars, tree strikes, and other collisions with obstacles, and evidence must be collected on seats and on the availability and use of restraints, and failures or deformation of these components and the components comprising the rest of the tie-down chain. ANALYSIS METHOD 

### ImpactSeverity Impact severity can be determined through either an energy management analysis or a kinematic analysis. The energy management analysis uses detailed mathematical modeling**o~** the main airplane structure, using finite element or lumped mass modeling techniques and requires indepth knowledge of the physical properties of major structural members and their responses under dynamic conditions. Similar techniques have' been employed to model the human occupant. Sophisticated computer programs, such as KRASH and SOM-LA (Seat/Occupant Model-Light Aircraft), which were developed as design aids and research tools, provide detailed analytical results of the dynamic response of the airplane and the occupant. However, because of the considerable time and technical expertise that are required to model different airplanes in order to utilize such programs, their use is precluded in day-to-day field investigations. The kinematic analysis adopted by the SafetyBoard simply requires data that can be collected at the crash scene using standard investigative techniques. The analytical process is straightforward and relatively simple to accomplish. The beginning and end of the principal impact are defined, and the peak decelerative force is derived from the estimated velocity change and the distance traveled by the airplane's center of mass**~/** Principal impact occurs when the major decelerative forces are experienced ·and the most damage is sustained by the fuselage. The principal impact may not necessarily be the initialimpact. 10/ The seat, restraints, seat tracks, bulkhead/floor, subfloor structure, and attachment hardware which act as a system to restrain and to protect the occupant.

### -6-

·. during the impact. Because precise engineering information about the reaction of the

structure between the starting and. the stopping points of the principal impact of a particular crash is not used, the kinematic analysis will not yield a unique crash pulse shape which describes the precise decelerative forces acting on the airplane throughout the crash. However, the analysis will provide a set of peak decelerative force values which should bracket the·unique or actual peak force for that crash by determining the minimum possible peak decelerative force and the peak decelerative force for a triangular shaped·pulse. In bracketing the actual peak decelerative force, the assumption is made that the decelerative forces are proportional to the mass of structure crushed, which in turn, influences the shape and magnitude of the crash pulse. This analysis methodology worked well when the NTSB applied it to crash tests of general aviation airplanes that were performed by NASA. To establish an envelope of representative crash forces from the bracketed solutions, it is necessary to use all known facts from field and test data to narrow the bracket for each crash pulse to approach its precise solution. However, as will be discussed further in the Method Verification section, the data available from the crash scene may be so limited that the kinematic reconstruction can be performed only for one direction, i.e., thephysical evidence may be sufficient to allow an analysis of the vertical crash loads but may be insufficient to allow an analysis of horizontal crash loads. Also, evefl ifin one accident alldata could be measured precisely and loads calculated exactly, that accident would not necessarily be representative of all survivable.general aviation accidents. Therefore, a substantialnumber of crash analyses is required to establish the pulse(s) that are representative of current general aviation airplanes. While it is recognized that there are limits to the accuracy of these individual crash analyses, the overall program is expected to yield an envelope ofpeak crash pulse values of sufficient accuracy· and consistency to be usable in the formulation of requirements for crashworthiness airplane design and testing. Certain data needed to establish the crash pulses by kinematic analysis are obtained from two procedures. The first procedure is the visualization of the crash sequence, the results of which provide impact attitude and crushing distance. The second procedure is the development of a crash pulse that, when integrated, will generate the documented velocity change and stopping distance. Visualization 

### Orthographic Drawing.-The most effective method of visualizing the impact attitude, flightpath angle, and the amount of crush that occurs is to create an orthographic drawing incorporating the impact data gathered in the field. Damage to the airframe, ground scars, and tree strikes can be

.documented through the use of measurements, photographs, sketches, and drawings and notes made on airplane three-view drawings. When all available impact information is documented, reconstruction of the airplane'simpact attitude is possible, and more confidence can be placed in the attitude reconstruction when several ground scars are present. The technique requires that the ground scars be aligned with the airplane components which caused them. Typically, distinctive gouge marks are left by components, such as landing gears, propellers, engine nacelles, and wing tips. Changes in the airplane's attitude may result from these components striking the ground during the crash sequence. Crush Line.-Another technique for establishing the impact attitude of the airplane is 

### through the use of the crush line. The crush line is formed as a result of the airframe being crushed against a surface and leaving a distinctive flat or "stamped" area on the

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### airframe. In g·eneral, the crush line can be identified by small, tight wrinkles in the skin, or by deformation of the airframe surfaces around longerons or stringers. This type of damage is caused by direct contact between the airplane and the ground. Points representing the edges of the damaged areas are plotted on an airplane three-view drawing and straight lines are drawn between these points. (See figure 1.) 

### Several lines intersect to create an imaginary plane or fiat surface, i.e., crush line. The impact attitude can be determined graphically by relating the crush line to the impact surface •

. The rotation required to place the crush line on the impact surface·defines the airplane's

pitch, roll, and yaw attitudes at impact relative to that surface. Correcting for surface slope will yield these attitudesrelative to the horizon. Once the crush line and impact attitude are established, a drawing is made with the airplane in that attitude. Lines can be added to the drawing parallel to the impact surface which will act as.distance marks and will help to display the progressive crushing ofthe structureup to the crush line or stopping point. (See figure 2.) The pitch attitude of the airplane at impact also can be calculated by a1gebraically adding the values for the fiightpath angle and the angle ofattack. The fiightpath angle is determined by aligning sequentially tree or object strikes and the ground impact point. The angle of attack can be estimated based on the airplane's speed and maneuvers just before impact. Although not as precise as using severalground scars, the value for pitch attitude derived by this method is sufficiently accurate for purposes of analysis when no other information is available. (See Glossary ofTerms.) Change in Velocity.-Once the stopping distance has been established, the change in velocity 11/ ·during the principal impact must be determined. The initial velocity is. estimated based on knowledge of the airplane's maneuvers just before impact, the airplane's performance parameters, the pilot's statement, or a witness statement. For example, an airplane may have been seen flying level in a nose high attitude and pitching over just before hitting the ground. From this information, it can be assumed that the airplane was at or near stall speed when the impact occprred. Another example is a twin-engine airplane that crashes out of control after power is lost in one engine. In this case, it 

### iS reasonable to estimate that the initial velocity was near the airplane's singleengine minimum control speed (V ). Witness statements, radar data, and airspeed readouts from flight data recorderN;1f available, also are helpful in estimating the initial velocity. The total velocity component of the principal impact actsalong the fiightpath. The flightpath angle is used to break down the total velocity component into its vertical and horizontal components, relative to the horizon. (See figure 3.) In the verticaldirection, the final velocity is used to determine the velocity change. The final velocity usually is zero because the maximum vertical crush is achieved when the downward movement is stopped by the ground during the principal impact. As vertical velocity becomes zero the maximum vertical crush is achieved. In the horizontal direction, most airplanes tend to slide along the ground for some distance after the principal impact, and the difference between the initial velocity and the final velocity (a value greater than zero) must be established for theprincipaliii_lpact.
11/ The change in velocity is the difference between the initialvelocity (the velocityjust prior to the principal impact) and the final velocity (the velocity just after principal impact).:1 -8-

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In crashworthiness analysist the velocity change is the most critical item and is the most difficult parameter to estimate. In the formulas for the calculation of the G-loads, the velocity appears as a squared factor, thus magnifying small errors in the estimate. ·Last second maneuvers of the airplane (controlled or uncontrolled) also can change the velocity by a small but important amount. Accounting for these changes is a difficult task and care must be taken toutilize allavailable information. After establishing values for distance and velocity changes during the principal impact, the final step is to estimate the horizontal and vertical crash pulsest or a combined pulse, which represents the change in velocity over the measured stopping distance. Pulse Shape Development Quick Look Analysis.--Because NASA general aviation crash test data shows that a triangular crash pulse shape accurately describes the principal impact in the test crashes, a triangular pulse shape (T) will be used to calculate the most reasonable peak decelerative force in the SafetyBoard crash analyses. The following formula will be used for calculating the triangular crash pulse shape: GT = V 2/gS where V = impact velocity (ft/sec) g

## =earth gravitationalconstant (32.2 ft/sec2) S =stopping distance (ft)
The minimum peak decelerative force, based on the samechange in velocity and distance, is calculated using the formula for the constant (rectangular shaped) pulse (C). The constant crash pulse shape is calculated using the following equation: G 

## =V2 /2gS where C V = impact velocity (ft/sec) · 2 g =earth gravitational constant (32.2 ft/sec ) S =stopping distance (ft) The total time of the pulse is calculated as: t 

## =V/gGC For example, figure 4 depicts an airplane that crashed in a 30°nose down attitude. The 4.6-foot line represents the total depth of crush. Impact velocity was 90 miles per hour, or 131.94 ft/sec. For the vertical crash pulse, the impact velocity would be V = 131.94 Sin 30° 66 ft/sec. The minimum peak pulse in the vertical direction is ttYen calculated as: 

### o c =

### v 2;2gs

## =662 /2(3z.2> 4.6

# =t.4. 1 °vc The triangular

### (ma~Imumfpeak GvT

## =V v /gS

## =66 /32.2 (4.6) or 29.4 G's, which, for this shape, is twice the minimum peak value. This results in a rarige (bracket) of 14.7 to 29.4 G's. Both pulses require a time of:

t 

## =V v/gGvc = 66/32.2 (14.7) =0.139 second-12-


### This method results in a fast and reasonably accurate "quick look" evaluation of an accidentand only requires that the values for velocity change and total stopping distance be known. However, a more detailed approach willyield a more accurate crash pulse and, with the use of shaping techniques, the range of accelerations between the calculated minimum and maximum peak G-loads canbebetterdefined, as shown below.

CRUSH

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### Figure4.--Crash visualization. Detailed Analysis Based on Shaping Technigues.-The following example illustrates how a detailed verticalpulse shape is developed. First, as in the "quick look" method, a visualization of the crash is developed, including the parallel lines showing the increasing amount of structure involved as the airplane crushes. Figure 4 shows that the nose area, which is comprised of lightweight**materia~** 

### is involved in the first 1 foot ofcrush (a). At the 1-foot mark, the components involved· include some lightweight skin, the nose gear structure, and small frame structure(b). Starting at the 3.6-footline, the structurebeing crushed includes the cockpitbulkhead, engine, engine mounts, cockpit floor, and side walls (c). 

### As the crush progresses to the areas of. increasingly massive structure, higher decelerations, or G-loads, are expected to occur. Allowances are made in the analysis for

.the differences .in the type and mass of the crushed structure. The least massive structure, referred to as nonproductive structure, is unable to support major loads and, thus, collapses easily. This structure has a crushing distance, but it does not produce a significant deceleration. In 

### this example, the distance from 0 to 1 foot is comprised of lightweight material and imparts no crash loads to the occupants while it is crushing; hence, it is nonproductive. · 

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# 0 -13- Nonproductive crushing is not considered when estimating acceleration levels in a pulse. However, an increase in the mass of structure involved will cause the crash pulse to be modified (shaped), based on the assumption that the magnitude of the crash pulse generally is proportional to the mass of structure being crushed. Correcting for nonproductive crushing and the increase in the mass of the structure involved is not precise, but these corrections make the results more accurate by eliminating large errors and by skewing the curves in a logical manner. Also, as in the "quick look" procedure, the minimum and triangular peak G's are calculated for the purpose of establishing a reasonable range of values. Since the first foot ofcrushing involves nonproductive structure, the stopping distance of 4.6

- 1.0 or 3.6 feet is used in calculations. The minimum peak G then, is 

## v2/2gS 

## =66 2/2 (32.2) 3.6, or 18.79 G's, and the triangular peak load is 

## v2/gS = 66 2/32.2 (3.6), or 37.58 G's. These values become the minimum (19 G's) and maximum (38 G's) limits for the force values in the crash analysis. (See figure 5.) It should be noted that this step is quite easy and can be included in many quick look analysis. The next step in the detailed analysis is the modification or shaping of the constant (rectangular) pulse. This modification is performed to create a pulse magnitude and shape between the calculated minimum and triangular peak G-loads, which is more ·representative of the actual impact. (See figure 5). The shaping technique requires that the area under the modified constant deceleration versus time cu.rve remains equalto the area under the unmodified curves, so that the velocity change remains the same. Target values for changes in distance (crush) and velocity, determined from the visualization and the physical evidence, are used to facilitate shaping of the crash pulse. Although the distance targets are fixed in magnitude, they can be moved along the abscissa, or time axis. Velocity targets also are fixed in·magnitude at the end points. The distance targets, which will be labeled (a) through (e) for this example, are set at**~'** 1, 2, 3, and 4.6 feet, respectively. (See figure 6.) The velocity.targets, labeled (f) and (g), are set at 66 ft/sec**(~feet** crush**and~** time)**and~** ft/sec (maximum crush and totaltime). Once the deceleration versus time curve has been established, it is integrated, generating the curve for velocity change. This curve, in turn, is integrated to generate the curve for distance change. (See figure 7.) A computer program has been written to perform the iterative process necessary for the integrations. (See appendix C.) The results are presented as graphs. A four-tiered pulse is assumed, based on the previously set distance targets. Each tier of the pulse represents the average G-load over a given distance. For this case, an initial estimated value of 27 G's was assumed as the highest value for the modified constantpulse. Any of the values between the established maximum and minimum values may be chosen for the estimate. However, analytical experience has shown that the midpoint, 27G's in this case, is a reasonable value for the initial estimate. This value can be revised and the analytical procedure can be repeated for the number of iterations needed to satisfy the distance and velocity target criteria. The 27G value and the distance targets are used to establish values for the relative magnitudes of the deceleration tiers. Judgment again is used in estimating how much of the total deceleration has occurred during each interval of crush. The results of these estimates arepresented in tabletG's (-) -14-

------MAXIMUM G triangular

(modified constant)**~----l'-----------+----t--,-MINIMUM** Gconstant



### TIME

Figure 5.-- Minimum and maximum force limits.

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### Figure 7.--Relationship ofacceleration, velocity, and distance in time.

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TableI.-- Estimating target magnitudes for deceleration tiers. Crush Level(feet) Percent ofTotal Deceleration G's 0-1 0% of27 G's 

# = 0 (G1) 1-2 33 %of27 G's 

# = 9 (G2) 2-3 66 %·of27 G's 

## = 18 (G3) 3-4.6 100 % of27 G's 

## = 27 (G4) Although many methods canbe used to establish target times, it is advantageous to make the estimates as accurate 

### as possible. This reduces the number of iterations necessary to meet the fixed target values when shaping the pulse. A method for calculating the target time is presented below. After an average velocity is calculated for each segment, the average time for each segment is calculated, and thedistance targets are set at these times. For segment 1 

### (0

- 1 ft), it is assumed that there is no change in velocity; therefore, the average velocity is 66 ft/sec. The average time for this segment iscalculated as: tave1

## =S/Vave1

## =1/66 or 0.015 second. Since there was no appreciable change in 

### velocity in the first segment, the starting velocity for the second segment (1-2 ft) also is 66 ft/sec•.For

## s2

# =1 ft, t2

# =1/66 or0.015 ft/sec. The change in velocity for this segment is: ll.

### V 2= 

### gGs2

### t, where Gs2 

### =the average Gestimate for the segment, from table 1. ll.

### V 2

## =32.2(9)(0.015) 

### =4.35 ft/sec, giving an ending velocity of 66

- 4.35 or 61.65 ft/sec for this segment. The average velocity for the second segment isV 2 = 

### 66 -2.18 or63:82 ft/sec. The average time for ave the segment is tave2 = 

### 1/63.82, or 0.016 second, for a cumulative time of0.031 seconp. Segment3 (2-3 

### ft) is treated similarly, resulting in a velocity change of9.27 ft/sec, an ending velocity of 52.38 ft/sec, and an average velocity of 57.01 ft/sec. The average time for the segment is 0.018 second, for a cumulative time of0.049 second. The velocity change in segment 4 (3-4.6 ft.) is from 52.38 ft/sec to 

### 0 ft/sec, the final velocity. The average velocity is 26.19 ft/sec. The average time for this segment is tave4

# =1.6/26.19, or 0.061 second, for a totalpulse time of0.110 second. The distance targets (a) through (e) and velocity targets (f) 

### and (g), are set at the following times: Distance Target (ft) 

### 0 (a) 1 (b) 2 (c) 3 (d) 

### 4.6 (e) Velocity Target (ft/sec) 66 (f)
(g) 

### Time (sec) 

### 0 0.015. 0.031 0.049 0.110 The estimatedcrash pulse magnitude and the velocity and distance targetsare entered into the computer program, the integrationsareperformed, and the curves areprinted

### -18-

asgraphs. For this case, the distance andvelocity plots matched their respective targets, which indicates that·thepulse estimates were reasonable. (See figure 6.) If 

### the targets had not been met, they could have been moved along the time axis, which would have required a corresponding movement of the deceleration tiers so that they remained aligned with the distance targets. The magnitude of the crash pulse estimate {G level) also can be modified, keeping in mind the limits imposed by the assumptions of nonproductive crushing and the proportionality of decelerations to the mass ofstructure involved in the crushing. It 

### is possible to generate a number of crash pulse shapes that would be compatible with the estimated velocity change and stopping ·distance. However, factors which influenced the choice ofthe triangular deceleration pulse shape included:
o NASA crash research tests which indicated that a representative tri8.ngular pulse exists for crashesofgeneralaviation airplanes.
o Deceleration increases as more structurebecomes involved in thecrush. Figure 8 shows the tiered pulse of figure 6 with a triangular peak. As stated previously, the tiered pulse in figure 6 represents the minimum limit of the range ofpeak forces for the crash. The peak value for the triangular pulse in figure 8 represents the new maximum limit for the pea):<: crash forces. As shown in the figure, all of the target values have been met, and the total pulse time has increased slightly so that the area under this curve remains equalto the areaunder the tiered curve. The corrections for areas of nonproductive crushing and the differences in the amount of structure involved in crushing developed during the analysis, have resulted in a narrowing of the range of likely forces from 19 G's (18.79 to 37.58 G's) to 9 G's (27 to 36G's). METHOD VERIFICATION 

### Verification ofthe accuracy ofthe techniques used todetermine the crash pulse was accomplished through the analysis of four NASA crash tests, using NASA's published data. 12/ This effort included comparison of Safety Board analyses based on physical evidence from NASA crash tests ofgeneral aviation airplanes with the actualparameters and results from those tests. Crash loads based on rectangular and triangular shaped crashpulses were calculated for each crash test. PitchAttitude 

### Several crash tested airframes, which were stored at the NASA Langley Research Center, were inspected and documented by Safety Board investigators, using the Board's normal accident investigation procedures. The goal of the exercise was to establish the airplane's impact attitude based only on the crush line and other fuselage deformation. Once the damage was documented and an impact attitude was established, a comparison was made with the NASA data, i.e., actual decelerations measured by instrumentation during the crash tests.
12/Vaughan, V.L., Jr., and R.J. Hayduk, "Crash Tests of FourIdenticalHigh-Wing SingleEngine Airplanes," NASA Technical Paper 1699, August 1980; and, "Determination of Crash Test Pulses andTheirApplication to AircraftSeatAnalysis," Society ofAutomotive Engineers, Inc., TechnicalPaper810611, Apri11981.

. ·

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### -20-
The measurements taken from the crush lines of the test airplanes were found to approximate closely the airplanes' attitudes at full development of the crushing. The comparison measurements were taken from NASA's crash test films. The film analyses showed that when crashed on concrete, the airplanes tended to rotate or bend during the principal impact, causing a change in pitch attitude between 3°and 9°. An example ofthis pitcl) rotation was identified in the film of a 45° nose down drop test. The airplane initially contacted the ground at 45°, but at the fully crushed position, the fuselage had rotated to a pitch angle of36°. In 

### the analyses of other drop test films, it was found that severalof the 30°nose down tests resulted in pitch attitudesof26°, and for 15°nose down tests, the pitch attitudes at full crush development were 12°. The crush line on test vehicle No. 14 is 

### identified as the flat portion on the nose. (See figUre 9.) When measured, the crush line shows a pitch attitude of 10° nose down. (See figure 10.) The actual test resulted in a 12° nose down pitch angle at full development. Test vehicle No. 18 (see figure 11) 

### illustrates how the use of only the crush line to establish attitude at impact can be misleading. The crush line is 

### measured at 22°, but at full development during the crash, pitch was near 27°. The error in measurement is 

### attributed to buckling of the fuselage·top which caused the crush line on the fuselage .bottom to stop development. Figure 12 

### shows the buckled area with a split rivet line. The rivet line is 

### split4°, so thepitch at full development could be measured as 22°plus 4°, or 26°.

. Other techniques for estimating pitch attitude also were verified. One technique was the use of.distinct bend lines found in the floor boards of the test vehicles. The 

# a floorboards of test vehicles Nos. 7 and 8 (see figures 13 and 14) retained their set after**.~** 

### the crash. In 

### vehicle No. 7, the floorboards were set at 40° after a 45° nose down drop test, and the floorboards in vehicle No. 8 were set at 28° after a 31° impact. Parallel wrinkles in the fuselage skin were reasonable indicators of pitch attitude at full development of the crush. In general, the parallel wrinkles were found to be'valid indicators if they did not emanate from an area of major structure. Test vehicle No. 17 has three parallel wrinkles on each side which end in an open area forward of the spar. (See figures 15 and 16.) These types of wrinkles were found to be usable with reasonable confidence to estimate pitch attitude.

Figure 9.-NASA test vehicle No. 14. (Note flat area under nose in foreground.)-21-



# • Figure 10.-Crushline on NASA test vehicle No. 14•

Figure 11.-NASAtest vehicle No. 18.-22-

Figure 12.-NASA testvehicle No. 18 showing buckle and split rivet line.

Figure 13.-NASA test vehicle No. 7. ,i J**··~** J-23-

Figure 14.-NASAtestvehicle No. 8.

Figure 15.-Parallelwrinkles on right side ofnose on vehicle No. 17.-24-



### Figure 16.-Parallelwrinkles on left side ofnose on vehicle No. 17. Each of the techniques described is a useful tool for estimating pitch attitude at impact. However, an investigator must exercise sound judgment in 

### basing conclusions on this evidence because each piece, taken by itself, can be misleading. Conclusions with the highest level of, confidence result from the use of a number of techniques to confirm an impactattitude. Crash Pulse.-A visualization of each test was made to establish the target values for distance. The NASA values for velocity and flightpath angle were used in calculating the crash pulse. The impact data could not begenerated for the NASA testsas they would be in 

### an NTSB field investigation. Velocity, impact attitude, angle of attack, and flightpath were artificially set for test purposes for the NASA tests and their values could not be estimatedby using techniques that would be applied in the field. Crash pulses first were calculated relative to earth axes, 13/ then·converted to airplane axes 14/ to allow comparison with accelerometer data from the NASA tests. Initial evaluations indicated that when the airplane crashed on an unyielding surface, such asconcrete, the predominant loading (reaction) occurred in the verticaldirection relative ·to the earth. Howeve.r, when the crash occurred on a yielding surface, such as dirt, the

loads were predominantly longitudinal, relative to the airplane axis as it dug into the ground. 13/ An axis system where the vertical and horizontal axes are normal and parallel respectively to the earth surface. 14/ An axis system where the vertical and horizontal axes are normal and parallel respectively to the airplane's fuselage.

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### ACTION



## ) 

# t REACTION

# ~REACTION
(a) Unyielding.Surface (b) Yielding Surface Figure 17.-Directionofreactions. Stated in another manner, in both cases, the reaction to the force ofthe impact was normal, or at right angles to the impact surface. This reaction follows Newton's third law of motion which states that, for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. In figure 17, the principal impact surface in (b) is redefined as the airplane ploughs into the ground, resulting in a predominant loading along the airplane's longitudinal axis, while in (a), the predominant loading occursin the directionnormal to theunyielding surface. If the airplane crashes on a yielding surface but does not dig in and stop, the physical evidence must be carefully evaluated to determine in 

### which axis the predominant loading occurs. Identification of the predominant axis is important because analysis of the crash loads along this axis is more accurate and more easily accomplished rather than attempting the analysis in a nonpredominant axis, and.then translating the results to the predominant axis. Some disagreement will arise in the comparison of the published test data with the calculated crash pulse data during verification because the time histories of the vertical and·horizontal pulses cannot becompared. If

### the verticaland horizontalcrash pulse peaks do not occur at the same time, the vector analysis, using the vector sums, is not entirely accurate. However, the calculations for the predominant pulse and the total vector sum · willbe reasonably accurate.

Analysis Summaries 

### The following summaries of the comparative analyses of two NASA crash tests illustrate the application of techniques developed for use in the field. NASA Test No. 8 (Unyielding surface) Test Data Flightpath**angl~** 

### Pitch angle Velocity Verticalvelocity change
· Horizontalvelocity change -30°(down) -25°(nose down) at full development

88.6 ft/sec 44.3 ft/sec 20ft/sec

### -26-
The test data were taken from NASA publications and crash test films. The flightpath and pitch angles were 30° down at initial contact. By the time the fuselage crush had reached full development, the pitch angle had decreased to 25 o 

### nose down, which was in agreement with the measurement of the crush line. The velocity at impact was measured at 88.6 ft/sec. The initial vertical velocity was 44.3 ft/sec {V = 

### 88.6 Sin 30°

## =44.3 ft/sec) for a vertical velocity change of44.3 

### -0 or 44.3 ft/sec. Thlhorizontal velocity change given in the data was 20 ft/sec, which resulted in an ending velocity of 56.7 ft/sec (Vh

## =88.6 Cos 30

## °= 

### 76.7 ft/sec, and 76.7 -20

## =56.7 ft/sec). Visualization.--The visualization in figure 18 was derived from field notes and still photographs of the wreckage taken by Safety Board investigators. The initial velocity vectors and flightpath angle are presented on the visualization. ·Progressive crushing is shown by parallellines at 1-footincrements, which represent the depth of the crush up to the maximum crush or full development at 3.6 feet. The crush line, which started just under the leading edge of the wing, the floorboards, and the wrinkles in the fuselage skin show that at the 3.6-foot crush mark, the pitch angle was 25° nose down; this was confirmedby the film data. The structure involved in the various levels of crushing is shown in table

## n. The crush from 

### 0·to 1 foot involves nonproductive structure. At 1 foot, the nose gear structure becomes involved, and deceleration begins to increase in proportion to the mass of the nose gear structure. As the crush progresses toward the cockpit floor, more substantial structure becomes involved and higher loads are transmitted to the cockpit area. Table H.-Structure involved invarious levels ofcrushing in NASA Test No. 8. 

### Crushing Distance (ft) 

### 0-1 1 -: 2 

### 2-3 3 - 

### 3.6 Vertical Deceleration (Gv' earth axis) Assume netcrush Velocity**~ange** 

### · Gvc =

### v /2gS
=

### 44.32/2 (32.2) 2.6


### = 11.72 G's GvT = 

### 2 (11.72)

= 

### 23.44 G's



### =Y/g Gvc
= 

### 44.3/(32.2) 11.72

= 

### 0.117 sec Structure Involved Nose structure(nonproductive) Nose gear Engines;**c9~kpit** 

### Engines, cockpit (fulldevelopment)

3.6 

### -1.0 = 

### 2.6 ft 44.3 ft/sec•••. i· •.

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### Since the impact was on a flat, unyielding surface, the predominant loading was in the vertical direction in earth axis. Since the first foot of crush (8-1 

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### feet. The constant decelerationpulsepeak value.(G 

# c> was 11.72 

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### peakvai8e of23.44 

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### ft/sec t = 8.117 

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# =20/(32.2) 8.117

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= 10.62 

### G's Airplane Axis--The first portion of the analysis yielded a verticalpeak pulse of'23.44 

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### from earthaxiS to ail'plane axis. (See figure 19.)

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### \ AIRPLANE

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### EARTH AXIS 

### Figure 19.-Translationofforces into airplane axis. Angle A = Cos-\10.62/25.73) 

### Angle A= 65.62° 

### Angle B

# =65;62-25 

### =40.62° 

### Solving for the vector components in airplane axis: Gv

## =25.73 

### Sin 40.62

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### G's Gh = 25.73 

### Cos 40.62 

### = 19.53 

### G's The totalvector sum remained at 25.73 

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# ··'W -29- Shaping oftheVerticalPulse.--The shaping technique is completed as in the example for pulse shape development. Distance and velocity targets will be set at 0, 1, 2, 3, and 3.6 feet, and 44.0 and 0 ft/sec, respectively. The highest value for the modified constant pulse is at 18 G's or halfway between the calculated constant and triangular peak G's (G

### c 

## =11.72 and Gt

## =23.44).

. Table lll.-Target magnitudes for deceleration tiers for NASA Test No. 8.
Crush Level(feet) 0 -1 1 - 2 2 - 3 3 - 3.6 Percent ofTotalDeceleration 0% of 18 33% of 18 66% of 18 100% of 18 G's 0 6 12 18 The calculated velocities and times for each segment are presented in Table IV with their corresponding distance targets.
Table IV.-Shaped crash pulse generation for NASA Test No. 8.
Distance**Velocit~** IncrementalTime TotalTime 0 44 0 1 44 .0227 .0227 2 39.6 .0239 .0446 3 30.4 .0286 .0752 3.6 0 .0752 .1146 The results of the first iteration of the computer run are shown in figure 20. The velocity and distance targets were not met. The time.increments and tne reliltive magnitudes of the acceleration plateaus were adjusted in subsequent iterations until the fixed target values were met. Figure 21 shows the final iteration of the modified constant pulse. A shaped triangular pulse was generated using the data from the final iteration of the modified constant pulse. (See figure 22.) The total velocity and distance changes remained the same, while the peak vertical load increased to 24.5 G's and total time increased slightly. Insufficient detailed data exist for shaping the horizontal pulse. However, since a value for the horizontal pulse must be used in translating the deceleration levels from earth axis to airplane axis, the calculated ho.rizontal value of 10.62 G's was used. Converting to airplane axis, the total pulse is 26.7 G's, the horizontalpulse is 20 G's, and the verticalpulse is 17.7 G's. · The loads from the published test data compared closely with the calculated and shaped analyticalresults shown in table V.0 0 0 0 0 

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### Total Vertical Horizontal NASA Test No. FAA 4 Test Data Flightpath angle Pitch angle Velocity -33-
Table V.--ActualNASA resultsversus NTSB analytic results in NASA Test No.8

Actual 24 18 16 G-Loads Calculated Analytical 26 17 20 (Yielding surface)
-32°(down) -34.5°(nose down) at impact Verticalvelocity change Horizontalvelocity change 83 ft/sec 42ft/sec 49 ft/sec Shaped Analytical 27 18 20

Since the nose of the airplane ploughed into the soil at impact, it was assumed that the predominant loading was along the airplane's longitudinal axis. Test data showed an impact velocity of 83 ft/sec, and a flightpath angle of 32° down. Vertical velocity at impact was 43.98 ft/sec (Vv 

### = 83 Sin 32 

### =43.98 ft/sec), for a verticalvelocity change of 43.98 -0 or 43.98 ft/sec. The horizontal velocity component at impact was 70.39 ft/sec (Vh

## =83 Cos 32 

## =70.39 ft/sec). The horizontalexitvelocity(startofslide) was measured at 20 ft/sec from the test film. This value also was calculated, using a sliding coefficient of friction of0.5, and a sliding distance of12 feeL The calculation [

## v2 = 

### 2(32.2) 0.5 (12)] resulted in a velocity of 19.66 ft/sec. An initial velocity of 70.39 ft/sec and an exit velocity of20 ft/sec, resulted in a horizontalvelocity change during the principal im'pact of50.39 ft/sec.
Visualization.--The visualization in figure 23 was derived from notes, photographs, and film data. This accident would have been difficult to reconstruct accurately in the field because the forward rotation of the airplane at impact caused crushing that gave the appearance ofa 70°to80°nose down pitch attitude. Reliance only on the crush line would have been inaccurate; reference toground scarsor tree strikes would have been necessary to establisha more accurate impact attitude. The crush line was identified as starting just aft of the wing struL As shown in tableVI, the structure involved in the first 1.5 feet of crush involved the nose gear only and would have a negligible effect on the deceleration. The next 0.5 foot of crush involved some of the engine cowl structure and also was nonproductive. The crush from 2.J) to 3.6 feet included the engine, firewall, and floor structure. Thus, the totaleffective crushing distance on the airplane was 1.6 feet, and with surface gouging estimated at 6 inches or 0.5 foot, the totalstopping distance was 2.1 feet.-34-



### c! 0


### ..... 

# ... Cd

# ~ 

# .i > I I 

# .. < <**~** 0 

## z tl Q) 

# ... .r

# ~:.\~. 

# '!_·, /}

·' I il l 

### ! 

# f

# ~

# ••• :I -' .\

. "· -35-

TableVI.-8tructure involved in variouslevels ofcrushing in NASA Test No. FAA 4. Crushing Distance (ft)**~** - 1.5 1.5

- 2.0 2.0

- 3.6 Structure Involved Nose gear (nonproductive) Engine cowl(nonproductive) Engine, firewall, floor structure
Vertical Deceleration (Gv' earth axis) Assume net crush 2.1 ft Velocity change 43.98 ft/sec G 

# = V2/2gS vC

## =43.982/2 (32.2) 2.1 

## =14.30 G's GvT

## =2 (14.30) 

## =28.60 G's tv 

## =V/g Gvc 

## =43.98/(32.2) 14.30

=**0.~6** sec
Horizontal Deceleration (Gh' earth axis)

Airplane Axis Velocity change 50.39 ft/sec t 

## =0.096 sec (same as for verticalpulse) GhC 

### =Vh /gt
=50.39/32.2 

### (0.096)

= 16.30 G's GhT = 2(16.30)
= 32.60 G's

The**force~** in earth axis are translated into airplane axis as follows: Angle A = 41.26° Angle B

## =41.26 -34.5

## =6.76°/ / / 

### .;.36-

/ / / 

## / AIRPLANE AXIS 

# \7

,

/ / 43.07 G's 28.60 G's

32.60 G's EARTH AXIS



### Figure 24.-Translation offorces into airplane axis. Solving for the vectorcomponents in airplane axis: G 

## =43.37 Sin 6.76

## =5.11 G's

v 

### Gh =

### 43.37 Cos 6.76 =

### 43.07 G's
The totalvector sum remained at43.37 G's.

( 

### The comparison ofactualand analyticalresults shown in 

### table Vll, indicates that in 

### thepredominant axis and for the totalpulse, the analyticalvalues again compared closely with actualtest data.

Total Vertical HorizontalTable Vll.-ActualNASA resultsversus NTSB analyticalresults in

### NASA test No. FAA 4.
Actual 40-45 

### 15 40-45 G-Loads Analytical 43

7 

### 43 

### In thecomparisons of the resultsof the actual and analytical loads from NASA tests No. 8 and No. FAA 4, in**genera~** 

### the analyses performed by the Safety Board appeared to have a high degree of accuracy and would indicate that the investigative methods and analyticalassumptionsused in

### the crashworthiness investigations were valid. 

# •.\

.

### ·~~~ ,I

### ~

# .•. ·.. 1 ,:**~** '

. ' -37-



### In many cases, insufficient data exist to allow an accurate estimate of exit velocities, especially relative to the horizontal In these cases, an analysis can·be performed which will establish only a relative crash magnitude. The analysis is performed only in 

### thepredominant axis. · For NASA test No. FAA 4, the predominant axis is the longitudinal axis of the airplane. The measurement from the visualization shows that the longitudinal stopping distance is 3.6 

### feet, and with the 0.5 

### foot of gouging, the total longitudinal stopping distance is 4.1 

### feet. The velocity can be estimated as changing from 83 to 20 

### ft/sec at the start of the slide, for a velocity change of 63 

### ft/sec. The minimum peak loading can thenbe calculated as:

= (V12 -V/)!2gS

= 

### (832 -202)/2(32.2)4.1

= 

### 24.58 G's The peak of the triangular shaped·pulse would be 49.15 G's total longitudinal deceleration. This method does not allow a calculation for the vertical pulse to be performed in airplane axis. Additionally, the velocity change from 83 to 20 

### ft/sec is not precisely correct because the directions of the velocity vectors were not taken into account; the 83 ft/sec acts at 32, 0 

### but the 20 ft/sec actsparallel to the earth. However, the corrections for these errors would be small, and the results would be within acceptable limits for use in 

### this type ofanalysis. APPLICATION OFANALYSIS OF NTSB ACCIDENTINVESTIGATION DATA 

### The following example is representative of a· typical application of analysis from an NTSB accident investigaion: · A Beechcraft 899 

### airplane was on an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to an airport in fog and light turbulence. The copilot stated that while on final approach, the ''bottom dropped out." The airplane crashed on an ice covered bay, and slid about 350feet beforecoming torest on the shore. (See figure 25.) Two crewmembers and five passengers were injured. The most extensive injuries, which were received·by the captain, included compression fractures of vertebrae, fractured lower legs, and head and internal injuries. The copilot received minor injuries. The passengers received flail-type injuries, including a fractured arm, fractured knee, head and facial injuries, and various contusions and lacerations. The investigation included interviews of passengers and. crew and an onsite documentation of the crash path, fuselage, ·seats, and restraints. Photographstaken at the accident site showed the crush line and general fuselage damage. (See figures 26 through 29.) The crush line was documented further on a three-view drawing ofthe airplane. {See figure 30.) The crush line in the photographs and the three-view drawing were consolidated into ·a separate drawing in which the crush plane was rotated to the horizontal position. {See fjgure 31.) Parallel lines, labeled 1 through 5, were drawn to r¢present the crush levels at which different parts of.the structure became involv¢d during the

. crash. The airplane attitude, measured directly from the drawing,tshowed a roll angle of21°left wing down and a nose down pitch attitude of 9°. ·-38-



### .,**F~ure** 25.--Airplane position and direction of slide. i ;

Figure 26.-Left side crush line.-39- 

# •

' 

### i i ' \

:.:

Figure 27.-Right side crush line.

Figure 28.-Interiorcabin damage.-40-



### Figure 29.-Damagedseat. The airplane was assumed to be near stall speed, based on the copilot's statement that the ''bottom dropped out." Since the wind was near zero, it was assumed that the ground speed and airspeed were. the same, near stall speed. Stall speed for the airpiane with the power offand 30 percent flaps, was 86 KTAS (knots true airspeed). A stall angle of attack near 12° with an estimated pitch rotation of 2° and a pitch angle measured at 9° yielded a possible flightpath angle of 23°, based on the following equation: Flightpath angle Flightpath angle = 

## = = 

### Pitch angle+ angle ofattack +pitch rotation go+ 120+2o 23° Since there was no supporting data, such as ground scars or tree strikes, the estimate of angle of attack and pitch rotation were not used with the same degree of confidence as was the crush line measurement, which was the most accurate datum available for this analysis. The velocity was calculated by first converting the total velocity of 86 KTAS to feet persecond. V

## =86 (1.69)

## =145 ft/sec Verticalvelocity was thencalculated as:

= 

### VSin (flightpath) = 

### 145 ft/sec Sin 23° =57 ft/sec

# - ..J 

### J: tl) :::J 

## a: (J

# ~ -41-


## w 

## z ::::iCRASH INVOLVEMENT 1. WING TIP
- 0 FT 2. ENGINE___, 2.28 FT 3. FUSELAGE- 3.30 FT 4. COCKPIT
- 4.00 FT 5. FULL STROKE- 6.12 FT

-- \**~--...,.,......',:..** 3**Y\~** 2 SCALE= 144 in/in PITCH= -9° FLIGHT P.ATH =-2° -9° -12°=-23° STALL SPEED- POWER OFF, 30% FLAPS= 82 KCAS =86 KIAS =86 KTAS ROLL=21

### ° LEFT Vv = 145 FT/SEC sin 23°

## = 57 FT/SEC

CRUSH LINE

1

Figure 31.-B99 visualization.

### ~

, ..., ..

# ~... .,. »··, 

### -·w-_..,.... 'M' I lll---1 'on _,.,..,.,-..

# ..,~~._,...;o•·'

### I~ ..**~~~-"'~'}')** 

### J..**~·** I

# (0 -43-
The first distance target was set at 3.3 feet, the distance from the wing tip to the beginnings of fuselage involvement. Using an entering velocity of 57 ft/sec, time for the first segment of the pulse was calculated as: tl = 

### 81/V1
= 

### 3.3 ft/57 ft/sec t1 = 

### 0.058 sec This time corresponds to target A 

### (3.3 feet, 0.058 second) in figure 32. The deceleration which began to increase more rapidly as the fuselage was crushed, is shown by a correspond.ing increase in the magnitude ofthe crash pulse. The second distance, target B, 

### was set at**4~0** 

### feet total distance where the cockpit became involved. The time for this segment was calculated as: t2 

## =S2/V2 

## =(4.0 ft

- 3.3 ft)/56 ft/sec t2 = 

### 0.013 sec, or about0.071 second cumulative time. Target B 

### was then plotted at4.0 feet and .071 second. (The velocity component for each timecalculation was estimated, based on the mass ofstructure involved.) · 

### In the last segment, the velocity was estimated to have dropped to 52 ft/sec; the corresponding distance value was 2.12 feet, (6.12-4). This distance value is used in the calculation of a constant crash pulse because it represents the involvement in the crash of those portions of the structure having the most significant effects on thechange in deceleration. The constant pulse was calculated as:
ave 

## =v2/2gS 

# =

522/2(32.2) 2.12 

## =19.8 G's
The time for thispulse was calculated as:

t 

## =V/gGvc

= 

### 52/32.2 (19.8) t = 

### 0.082 sec. The duration ofthe totalpulse was 0.153 second (0.071 + 

### 0.082). The calculated data points were entered into the computer, and the program was run. Distance targets, which are fixed in magnitude, were adjusted.on the time scale until the final distance target of 6.12 feet and the final vertical velocity target ofzero were met simultaneously. This resulted in the calculation ofa 19.50 constantverticalcrash pulse for a totaltime of0.157 second.

.(See figure 32.)0 0 0 0 <V ,;,

......

0 0 0 N

.... 

### .... 

## "'

0 0 0 

### • .D 

### "' "'

0 0 0 <0 ,;, If) ....

0 0 0 (l) 0 

## • •

·o**~0** 8<: 0 N 

## ... _,I"') w (f) > 0

0 0 "'l

.... 

## .., N

0 0 0

.... .D N**~**

0 0 <0 0 (X)

0 0 Q) 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 (X) I <- 0 0 N I

0 0 (X)



# - I 

# t**~**

El u u < 0

0

.... 

# - I

0 0 <V



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0 0 0


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0 0 (X) 1

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### ""\



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# {

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## --

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## I 

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# ,._**I~**,..... 

# \

# / I

I 

# 1/ \

I 

# B.J

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# I

# rye; I -- 

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I 

# !A?J ! 

# :\ I I 

# r \ !1!. 

# /I l 

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- 

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... 

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### - 

# / I 

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---· 

# ,l
0-02 0-04 0.06 

### o.os 0.10 0-12 0.14 0-16 T!ME



### Figure 32.-Crashpulse with targets. 

# ( ; I I,r , .: 

# (D
\\I



### ....

-



# l -45-

. . 

### Figure 33 shows the results of substituting the plateau type pulse shape with the triangular pulse shape. Adjustments were made so that the distance and velocity targets still were met. The triangular pulse shape, which is more consistent with pulse shapes resulting from crash tests, showed a short duration peak load of 30 G's acting on the airplane near the point ofimpact. This example analysis shows the importance of the visualization technique not only for reconstruction of the impact attitude and the overall crash pulse development. It also explained the differences in the injury patterns of the occupants. In 

### this case, the pilot received serious injuries, while the copilot who received minor injuries, was able to be present at the crash scene the day after the accident. Examination of the cockpit showed that the floor area under the pilot's seat was totally disrupted and that the front edge of the seat had broken in an upward direction. The copilot's seat showed evidence ofdownward loading. Figure 31 shows that the crush line on the left side of the airplane was high enough to be above the seatpan ofthe pilot's seat. However, because of the roll attitude of the airplane at impact, the crush line remained below the seat pan of the copilot's seat. The crushline is equivalent to ground level; therefore, the pilot and his seat physically tried topenetrate the ground --arigid surface

-- thus, bending the front of the seat up and transmitting loads greater than 30 G's to the pilot. On the other hand, the copilot's seat stayed above ground level, allowing it to act as a buffer or cushion between the copilot and the ground (crush line), and reducing the loads transmitted tohim tobelow the 30 Gpeak. CONCLUDING REMARKS 

### This report, which is a result of the first phase of the crashworthiness program, presents a methodology for the crashworthiness investigation and analysis of general aviation airplane accidents. Results of Safety Board documentation and analysis of two NASA general aviation crash tests using the methodology presented, compared well with NASA's published test data. This indicates that the methodology and assumptions developed for use in this program are valid. As of November 30, 1982, the Safety Board had conducted 31 full crashworthiness investigations. Ofthese investigations, 74 percent, or 23, of the airplanes involved in the accidents were Pipers or Cessnas, with Beech representing an additional16 percent or 5 airplanes. Single engine airplanes represent 87 percent, or27 airplanes. (See appendix D.) The current phase of the crashworthiness program, which includes the investigation and full analysis of a select sample of general aviation accidents, is not yet complete. However, preliminary findings tend to confirm the problems defined in past recommendations. Also, some preliminary findings indicate that problems. may exist concerning the adequacy of seat and restraint certification and testing, and the ability to maintain these items in a condition in which they will continue to meet at least the minimum standardsunder which they were certificated. The second phase of the program will include the presentation of the results of the analyses and correlation of the results. Recommendations ·addressing safety issues discovered as a result of the investigative process also will be included with the presentation ofthe second phase results.0 0 II)

0 

### • <D

0 c.c If'

0 II) 

## • 0 0 0 II)

0 0 N

.....

0 0

0 0 II) ..,. -46-

0 0 U)**7~~--~-r-~-r--.--.-,-.1--,-~--,--,--,--,--,-~ ol----l-~~-+-----+--+--+--+--+--+--+---+-~--t-~~~-t-­**  o N j**7+--+--+-~--~-l---1----+-~---+-~~-+-~--+--+-r--+--;**

i 

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. I 

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### 1----l---1----r------+--+-___J_--+**,6(1-~~ L:::ll\xdr--:JL-.t--+--~-t---t-1~-t---t--**  --
0**+--+-+-~-~~--r4~~-~~---+--+--+-~~+--+--;** en•

## ~or**~'** 

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### ,.,

0 0

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# 1/V**'~** 

# \**~-----t-D-+-ISTAN----tCE -~-F--+-at!l!!f** **!ll.fiL-----+---+---+-----i~\-+-1**-t--+-. •.

### ++'--t------ 0 0**~·~~~J~~~~~~** 

### fJ VELOCITY \ I
0 0



### o.o2 o.o4 0-06 • 

### o.os 0.10 TIME 0.12

Figure 33.-B-99 shaped triangular crash pulse. 0.14 o. 16 

# f

# 0 ' i 

### i '
'



# l -47-

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATIONSAFETY BOARD

June 27, 1983 /s/ JIM BURNETT Chairman 

### Is/ PATRICIA A. GOLDMAN Vice Chairman /s/ FRANCIS H. McADAMS Member 

### Is/ G. H. PATRICK BURSLEY Member /S/ DONALD D. ENGEN Member

### (1) Airspeed

(2) Flightpath

(3) PitchAttitude

(4) Angle ofAttack

(5) TerrainAngle -48-

GLOSSARY OF TERMS USEDIN THE CRASHWORTBINESS PROGRAM 15/



### The airplane's velocity along the flightpath, expressed in knots. True airspeed (airspeed corrected to standard· atmospheric conditions) is preferred. However, since it is 

### anticipated that the accuracy of the velpcity estimates will be coarse, indicated airspeed (airspeed.read directly from the airspeed indicator). can be used. Exceptions to this 

### would include accidents occurring at high elevations, or accidents resulting from spins, where the indicated airspeed may be near zero, but vertical velocity :is 

### high. The airspeed in knots is converted to feet per second for use in the kinematics equations. The path the airplane makes through the air. When measured relative to the horizon, the value for flightpath angle is derived. The flightpath angle is expressedas a negative number when the airplane is descending and as a positive number when the airplane is 

### climbing. (See figure Al.) 

### The direction in which the airplane is 

### pointed., When measured from a longitudinal reference line on the airplane (usually the waterline, rivet line, or window sill line) to the horizon, the pitch angle of the airplane is derived. The pitch angle is expressed as a negative number when**th~** 

### airplane is pointed down and as a positive number when the airplane is pointed up. (See figure A2.) The difference between pitch angle and flightpath angle. For purposes of kinematic analyses, effects of nonhorizontal winds typically are not taken into account(See figure A3.) The difference between the slope of the terrain and the horizon. An upslope relative to the airplane's flightpath is 

### expressed as a positive number, and a downslope relative to the flightpath is 

### expressed as a negative number. (See figure A4.)
15/ The glossary terms are not presented in alphabetical order. Instead, they are presented in order of development; one term combining with a subsequent term to define yetanother term. 

### i 

# r·,
•:

## i~**(~~···· ~/** 

### ~ 

# ..,..**\?~I ~** 



### f\..\Gl'\1

## p~1l'\

'---FLIGHT PATH ANGLE

Figure Al.-Flightpath and flightpath angle.**~ ··':~'~:i":>)<i'i'** **-~~'!'~~~**

HORIZON**~** <0 I..Jw**<(~** Z..J 

# aw :::;,U t-Z 

### -w C!Ja:: 

## zw 

## ou.. ..Jw 

### a: J: (.) 1- 

# a:



# - z 0**~** 

### a: 0 J: 

## -so

## z 0 N a: 0 J:--=-

### ~**~**



### LONGITUDINAL REFERENCE LINE

ANGLE OF ATTACK(+)

### ~ 

# .,

PITCH ANGLE(+)

Figure A3.-Angle ofattack. HORIZON 

### =--**~~­** 

# -**"r~** .,...---.,..



### J.



## .... IJ:

# ~tJ: (!) ::::i LL 0tw 

## > 

# 5
w 

### a: -52-

### (6) Impact Angle
(7) ImpactSpeed

(8) 

### Crush Line

(9) 

### Further Relationships of Definitions

(10) 

### Acceleration

(11) G -53-


### The algebraic sum of the flightpath angle and the terrainangle. (See figure AS.) Figure AS shows the relationship ofthe above definitions. The velocity of the airplane at the principalimpact, expressed in ft/sec. Airspeed can be corrected for wind to obtain impact speed. The line denoting the extent of damage caused by
· the airplane structure crushing against the ground.

The crush line, which represents the ground plane, is used to show the depth of crush (stopping distance) and the airplane's attitude at impact. (See figure A7.)
Pitch Angle-Flightpath Angle= Angle ofAttack Flightpath Angle-Terrain Angle =ImpactAngle Pitch Angle-TerrainAngle = Crush Line Crush Line-Impact Angle =Angle ofAttack The rate ofchange ofvelocity.
a= dV/dt where a =Acceleration V =Velocity t =Time · The ratio ofan acceleration(a) to the acceleration due to gravity (g

## =32.2 

### ft/sec2). G

## =a/g**~ ~J**  FLIGHT PATH ANGLE

TERRAIN ANGLE



### Figure A5.-Impactangle. ',1,,

HORIZON

# ~**~** ol:ao. I**~ '~** **~** 

# ...,**,~-** 

# u

HORIZON



### f\.\G\-\1

## p~1\-\

Figure A6.-Relationship ofdefinitions.**~-----------~~** ··.:.- :./**~­** 

# ..

HORIZON



### ch (.11 I-56--57
APPENDIX A NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETYBOARD GENERAL AVIATION CRASHWORTHINESS RECOMMENDATIONS AND FEDERALAVIATION ADMINISTRATION RESPONSES
Synopsis: On January 11, 1973, a Piper PA-28-180, N8964J, crashed landed in an orange grove after the engine failed in flight. Three occupants were seriously injured and one was fatally injured. As a result of its investigation of the accident, which disclosed failures in the rear passenger seatbelt cables, the Safety Board recommended on July 31, 1973 that theFAA:

. IsSue an Airworthiness Directive for all Piper PA-28-140/180 aircraft, which have the rear bench seat installation, to require replacement of the present 1/8-inch diameter seatbelt attachment cable with a stronger cable, or, alternatively, to reroute the present 1/8-inch cable to eliminate the stress concentration which may result from the cable contact with the seat frame. (A-73-56) On August 10, 1973, the FAA responded that the static. test of the seatbelt installation demonstrated a strength of 12g in the forward direction. The test conditions exceeded requirements, since the test loads included combined loading with forward, upward and sideward components, which resulted in more severe conditions than straight loadings in each design direction applied separately. An FAA review of the seatbelt installation showed that the attachment cable does not come into contact with the seat frame within the design envelope. The seat frame and structure would have to fail and deform before contactcanbe made. Since the rear seat frame in the area of the cable is a round tubing material, it would not result in an unusually high stress concentration on contact. The strength of the 1/8-inch diameter cable is 2,000 pounds in tension. This is higher than the minimum required seatbelt strength and the strength ofthe seat. Review of the PA-28 service records showed no previous case of this type of failure since type certification in 1960. The accident report indicated that high impact loads were transmitted to the structure as a result of hitting trees and the ground. The right wing was completely broken off, the left wing was almost severed, and major structural damage was inflicted. The FAA concluded that the installation met strength requirements but that loads in excess of design requirements were imposed. They therefore found no basis for issuance ofan Airworthiness Directive. Status: Although the FAA response indicated that no further action would be taken, its research continued and resulted 

### in fulfulling the intent of the recommendation by the issuance of AD-74-o9-o4. Therefore, the Safety Board classified safety recommendation A-73-56 as "Closed--Acceptable Action." Synopsis: On February 17, 1974, a Piper Seneca (PA-34-200) crashed near Taos, New Mexico. The SafetyBoard's investigation disclosed that the four standard passenger seats and one smaller passenger seat (7th seat) which were installed behindthepilot and copilot seatshad separated from their attachments during the crash sequence and were found in a pile in the forward part of the cabin. The seats were attached to the floor by means of "quick disconnect" fittings so that the seats could be removed. Although the seatbelts were attached to the aircraft floor, none had been fastened around the empty seats. As a result ofits investigation, the Safety Board made the following recommendations on June 2, 1975, tothe FAA:APPENDIX A -58-
Issue an Airworthiness Directive to require that an improved latching device be installed on all Piper aircraft designed with "quick disconnect" seat installations. (A-75-50)

. On September 26, 1975, the FAA responded that it had undertaken a "study of the condition described in the recommendation. We have now come to the conclusion, after further investigation, that an unsafe condition may exist. Verification of this possibility and a determination of whether this is a maintenance or design problem will require a survey of actual installations of seats and attachments, evaluation of alternate designs, and operatiqnalpractices. Aplan of action will be completed by November 15,**197~.** We will advise youof the action which willbe taken." On December 5, 1975, the FAA stated that "an Airworthiness Directive, AD-75-24-22, Amendment 39-2422, was issued with an effective date of November 21, 1975."

. . Status: The Safety Board has classified the recommendation 

### as "Closed--Acceptable Action." The Safety Board also recommended that the FAA: Amend 14 CPR 23.785(f) to require dynamic testing of seats to insure more realistic protection of occupants from serious injury in a minor crash. (A-75-51) · On September 26, 1975, the FAA responded that it "is unable to amend 14 CPR 23.785(f) to require dynamic testing unless realistic criteria are established. Necessary data are now being obtained by full scale controlled crash tests being conducted at Langley Research Center. In addition, we are conducting seat/occupant tests at NAFEC and are establishing computer capability through mathematic modeling at our Civil Aeromedical Institute at Oklahoma City. When realistic criteria are established, regulatoryaction will be taken." On November 9, 1978, the FAA stated that "in addition to the various research and development contracts in support ofthe generalaviation crashworthiness program, we are ' in the process of developing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend TSO-C39a for seats. We expect to complete this projectby the end of 1979." · On May 11, 1981, the FAA stated that '' Simula, Inc., is currently under contract to the FAA ·to complete and validate the single occupant, seat-restraint mathematical model. A draft report from Simula is due in September 1981. Following our review and incorporation of any changes, the final report will be available for .printing during December 1981. The model's ability to predict seat-occupant-restraint system**r~action** to a crash pulse will be validated by comparison with test results obtained by·the Civil AeromedicalInstitute." Status: The Safety Board has clasSified safety recommendation A-75-51 as "Open--Unacceptable Action. 11

. Synopsis: On December 2, 1976, a Beech Debonair crashed near Glenville, New York. The airplane ·cabin remained structurally intact, providing 

### a. survivable environment. However, the pilot was killed when he struck the control yoke; a broken rib punctured the pilot's heart. The Safety Board's investigation disclosed that seats did not fail and that, had the pilot been wearing a shoulder harness, upper torso rotation would have been(:t : .i..:; I \j 

### -59 APPENDIX A
reduced and the thoracic injury would have been prevented. Safety Board investigations of**~hree** 

### other general aviation aircraft accidents provided evidence which supported the effectiveness of shoulder harnesses in preventing occupant injury in small airplane accidents. On June 16, 1977, the FAA amended 14 CFR 23 and 91 to require the installation and use of shoulder harnesses on small general aviation aircraft. The amended airworthiness standards of 14 CFR 23 now require that front**s~ats** 

### of general aviation aircraft be equipped with approved safety belts and shoulder harnesses and the amended operating and flight rules of 14 CFR 91 require that shoulder harnesses be installed at each front seat location and be worn during takeoff and landing. These regulations, which became mandatory for flight crewmembers on all aircraft manufactured after July 18, 1978, represented a notable improvement to occupant safety. However, because the Safety Board believed that occupants of.the then existing fleet of fixed-wing general aviation aircraft--over 164,000 active airplanes--would be denied the level of protection affored the occupants of aircraft manufactured after July 18, 1978, it recommended on December8, 1977, that the FAA: Amend 14 CFR 23.785 to require installation of approved shoulder harnesses at all seat locations as outlined in NPRM 73-1. (A-77-70) Amend 14 CFR 91.33 and .39 torequire installation ofapproved shoulder harnesses on all general aviation aircraft manufactured before July 18, 1978, after a reasonable.lead time, and at all seat locations as outlined in NPRM 73-1. (A-77-71)

.

### ~.· On February 8, 1978, the FAA responded that it had considered the proposal in 

# t"W NPRM 73-1 and that "it was not considered supportable in the rulemaking process and the Board has provided no new information to justify further rulemaking action." In a February 15, 1979 letter, the FAA stated that ''based on the information available to the FAA at the time of their decisions on those amendments, the agency determined that a shoulder harness retrofit requirement was not appropriate. Further it was also believed that delethalization of light aircraft cabins would be preferable to a requirement that all 

### seats be equipped with shoulder harnesses." The FAA stated, however, that it would reconsider its earlier decisions regarding the issues and would advise the Safety Board on itsdecision. On March 28, 1980, the FAA advised the Safety Board that it had completed a survey of shoulder harnesses in small airplanes, that it was proceeding with regulatory analysis, and that upon completing of the analysis, it would provide the SafetyBoard with a detailed response. Status: The Safety Board has classified safety recommendations A-77-70 and -71 as "Open--Unacceptable Action." Synopsis: On September 2, 1978, an Antilles Air Boats, Inc,., Grumman 21A, struck the · water while on a passenger flight from St. Croix to St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands. The aircraft broke apart and the captain and 3 of the 10 passengers drowned. As a result of its investigation, the SafetyBoard recommended on August 24, 1979, that the FAA: Amend 14 CFR 135 to require all aircraft conducting passenger service under Part 135 in any overwater operations be equipped with approved flotation-type seat cushions, and to require aircraftconducting extended overwater operations to alsobe equipped with an approved life·preserver equipped with an approved survivor locatorlight. (A-79-67)APPENDIX A -=60-
On June 15, 1981, the FAA Administrator responded that he had directed his staffto**()·~~.** assemble operational statistics regarding survival aids in waters landings, analyze the j) statistics, and present him with a summary of alternative means to mitigate those risks. The Administrator also stated that his staff would also provide a detailed estimate of the costs of each .alternative action, considering all relevant data and recommenda-tions from the Board. Status: The Safety ·Board has classifed safety recommendation A-79-67 as "Open--Acceptable Action." Synopsis: The Safety Board's investigation of the Rocky Mountain Airlines DeHavilland DHC aircraft accident near Steamboat Springs, Colorado, on December 4, 1978, illustrated the need for survival training for crewmembers and for the installation of shoulder harnesses on crew seats. As a result of its investigation of this accident, the SafetyBoard recommended on September 6, 1979, that the FAA: Strictly enforce the compliance date for the istallation of shoulder harnesses as required by 14 CFR 135.171. (A-79-70) On December 5, 1979, the FAA responded that "this agency's action of granting certain operators extensions to the shoulder harness requirment under Part 135 is a logical solution to a supply problem. We are not aware ofany abuses by operators in delaying the installation ofshoulder harnesses in their aircraft." In an April 29, 1981 letter, the FAA stated that "all requests for extension of the compliance date were necessitated because of nonavailability of shoulder harness kits by· vendors of manufacturers prior to June 1, 1979. The letter further stated that the FAA had conducted a spot check with several regional venQ.ors and had found that air taxi operators granted extensions were in compliance with 14 CFR 135.10. Status: The Safety Board has classified safety recommendation A-79-70 as "Closed--Acceptable Action.n Synopsis: A special study conducted by the Safety Board on "GeneralAviation Accidents: Post Crash Fires and How to Prevent or Control Them" showed that postcrash fires occurred in approximately 8 percent of the 22,002 general·aviation accidents which occurred between 1974 and 1978. About 59 percent of those accidents involving postcrash fire resulted in fatailities. However, fatalities were involved in only 13.3 percentofthose accidents without fire. As a result ofits special study, the Safety Board recommended on September,9, 1980, that the FAA: Amend the airworthiness regulationsto incorporate the latest technology for flexible, crash-resistant fuel lines, and self-sealing frangible fuel line couplings at least equivalent in performance to those used in recent FAA tests and described in report No. FAA-RD-78-28 for all newly certificated generalaviation aircraft. (A-80-90) Amend the airworthiness regulationsto incorporate the latest technology for light weight, flexible, crash-resistant fuel cells at least equivalent in performance to those used in recent FAA tests and described in report No. FAA-RD-78-28 for newly certificated general aviation aircraft having nonintegral fuel tankdesigns. (A-80-91) 

## € 

# '

# ~~(· •' -61- 

### APPENDIX A Require after a specified date that all newly manufactured general aviation aircraft comply with the amended airworthiness ·regulations regarding fuel system crashworthiness. (A-80-92) Fund research and development to develop the technology and promulgate standards for crash-resistant fuel systems for general aviation aircraft having integral fuel tank designs equivalent to the standards for those aircraft having nonintegral fuel tank designs. (A-80-93) Assess the feasibility of reqUirmg the installation of selected crash resistant fuel system components, made available in kit form from manufacturers, in existing general aviation aircraft on a retrofit basis and promulgate appropriate regulations. (A-80-94) Continue to fund research and development to advance the state-of-the-art with the view toward developing other means to reduce the incidence ofpostcrash fire in generalaviation aircraft. (A-80-95) On December 8, 1980, theFAA responded that itbelieved that the recommendations ·"merit consideration, but will require indepth investigation with regard to effectivity and feasibility. A project has been established ·to consider the substance of these recommendations." Regarding recommendations A-80-90 through -92, the FAA responded on October 15, 1981, that it.concurred with the intent of the recommendations and that it had initiated a preliminary effort to study the impact of actions associated with implementation of these recommendations. The FAA stated that if its 

### studies and evaluations "indicate the potential benefits to society outweigh the potential costs of implementation, the FAA will further consider these recommendations and or appropriate alternatives for accomplishing the intent ofthe recommendations." Status: The Safety Board has classified safety recommendations A-80-90 through -92 as "Open--AcceptableAction. 11 • 

### Regarding safety recommendation A-80-93 and -95, the FAA responded that 11

### a crashworthiness investigation team specializing in the collection ofprecise accident and injury information is being formed. Research and development efforts will beundertaken depending on the results of the teams's findings. Any such programs will include a . cost/benefit analysis to assure that the cost of installing crash-resistant tanks and fittings are commensurate with expected safety improvements." On October 15, 1981, the FAA stated that it concurred in the intent of safety recommendation A-80-93 and -95. "Research and development efforts will be dependent upon the results ofa review ofgeneralaviation accident data currentlyunderway. We are placing a high priority on this review and will continue to keep the Board informed of our efforts in this regard!' Status: The Safety Board has classified safety recommendations A-80-93 and -95 as "Open.,--Acceptable Action."

### APPENDIX A -62- 

### Regarding safety recommendation A-80-94, the FAA responded on October 15, 1981, that it had completed an evaluation of this recommendation. "We have concluded that it is not feasible to require the retrofit of existing general aviation airplanes with selected crash resistant fuel system components, such as crash resistant fuel cells. We find that the total economic impact associated with the costs for engineering, recertification, parts, and installation would be prohibitive for the large number of general aviation airplanes presently in. operation. In consideration of the necessary supply of parts for these airplanes, coupled with the massive and complex logistics that would be required, we estimate that it would require decades to accomplish a retrofitprogram." Status: The Safety Board has classified safety recommendation A-80-94 as "Open--Acceptable Action." Synopsis: On December 17, 1980, the Safety Board completed an assessment of the adequacy of occupant protection in general aviation aircraft during a crash. The study was conducted because of the Safety Board's longstanding concern that a majority of serious and fatal injuries which occur annually in 

### these aircraft should be preventable. The Safety Board's report reviewed accident investigation findings, crashworthiness research and studies, and the regulatory requirements to assess the adequacy of occupant protectionduring generalaviation conditions which should be survivable.



# .. As a result of the specialstudy, theSafetyBoard recommended that the FAA: Require that those general aviation aircraft manufactured to include attachment points for shoulder harnesses at occupant seats be fitted with shoulder harnesses no later than December 31, 1985, and, in the interim, require this modification as a requisite for change in FAA registration. (A-80-125) Develop, in coordination with airframe manufacturers, detailed, approved installation instructions for installing shoulder harnesses at each seat location in current models and types of general aviation aircraft in which shoulder harness attachment points were not provided as standard equipment. Publish and provide these instructions to owners ofthese aircraftby December 31, 1982. (A-80-126) Require that those general aviation aircraft for which FAA-approved harness installiltion instructions have been developed be fitted with shoulder harnesses at each seat location no later than December 31, 1985, and, in 

### the interim, require this modification as a requisite for change in the FAA registration. (A-80-127) Extend the application of all newly established occupant protection provisions of 14 CFR 23 to all newly manufactured general aviation aircraft. (A-80-128) Revise 14 CFR 23.785(j) to incorporate performance standards and test criteria to insure that an acceptable level of occupant safety is 

### achieved through cabin "delethalization." (A-80-129) Revise current standards for seat and restraint systems to incorporate needed crashworthiness improvements identified in 

### FAA research project reports. (A-80-130) Establish standards for the dynamic testing of occupant protection devices required in generalaviation aircraft. {A-80-131)

# I \ 

# I \**~**

### ~;: j.? w ..**;~** \**~** 

### l t 

### f !**I/~** 

# r 

# ·w -63- 

### APPENDIX A
On April3, 1981, theFAA acknowledged receipt of.the recommendations. Status: The Safety Board has classified safety recommendations A-8.0-125 through A-80-131 as "Open--Response Received." Synopsis: On February 26, 1980, a Cessna Model 172K (XP) crashed during normal takeoff from theEagle Creek Airport near Indianapolis, Indiana. The pilot, a commercial flight instructor and the only occupant of the aircraft, was killed. According to witnesses, the aircraft pitched up to a steep nose high attitude, about 60° or 70°, and the sound of the engine power reduced abruptly from takeoffpower to idle. The aircraft then pitched down and rotated about 160°to the left before crashing on the edge of the asphalt runway. As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board recommended on February 24, 1981, that theFAA: Issue an · Airworthiness Directive for Cessna aircraft in which interference between seats in the full forward position and door jambs currently exists requiring that the seat rail stops bepositioned to permit proper seatlocking in all seatpositions. (A-81-15) Require the Cessna Aircraft Company to include an adjustment and locking check of front seats, belts, and shoulder harnesses on the "before takeoff" checklists applicable to all Cessna aircraft. This item should be included on new checklistsas soon aspossible. (A-81-16) Regarding safety recommendation A-81-15, the FAA responded on May 26, 1981, that an "analysis of the accident data on the Eagle Creek Airport crash has raised questions concerning the probable sequence of events that caused the actualcrash. This hasplaced in question the part that seat slipping may have had in causing the crash. In order to complete our analysis of whether some Cessna seats may not lock in place properly because of interference with the door jamb, we are analyzing our service difficulty reports, inspections of Cessna production aircraft, and some additional.data supplied by theBoard on other accidents where slippage ofthe pilot's seat was determined tobe a causalelement.11 

### Status: The Safety Board has classifed safety recommendation A-81-15 as "open--AcceptableAction." Regarding safety recommendation A-81-16, the FAA responded on May 26, 1981, that "in view of our comments on safety recommendation A-81-15, we believe it prudent to withhold any decision or action on this safetyrecommendation until we have completed our analysis on the issues surrounding any seatproblem that may exist." Status: The Safety Board has classified safety recommendation A-81-16 as "Open--AcceptableAction." · Synopsis: On August 28, 1970, the Safety Board forwarded a letter to the FAA suggesting that "it is 

### time to take a new look at minimum standards as they are applied in the general aviation crash safety field." In the letter, the SafetyBoard drew attention to the difference in crash safety philosophy employed by the FAA and the safety philosophy adopted by its sister agency responsible for automotive safety. The Safety Board recommended that the FAA reevaluate its position on m1mmum general aviation crashworthiness standards, considering at least the five specific recommendations included in the letter.APPENDIX A -64-
The Safety Board recommended that: (Part 1) Shoulder harnesses should be required on all general aviation· aircraft at the earliest practicaldate. (Part 2) Delethalization of aircraft interiors

- Suitable energy-absorbing padding should be required on all interior structures to protect occupants. (Part 3) Dynamic testing ofaircraft seats should be required. (Part 4) Emergency landing conditions

- Regulatory action be initiated to raise the "minor crash landing" inertia forces of FAR 23.561 to a level comparable to those produced by a moderate-to-severe crash landing. (Part 5) Crash fire protection

- Fuel tanks and fuel systems should be designed to minimize the spillage of fuel in moderate to severe crashes. (CY-70-42)

,On September 3, 1970, the FAA responded that they were "preparing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the subject of this recommendation and that its staff will be in touch with the Board's technical personnel." The FAA enclosed a copy of its Disposition of Petition re. Ralph Nader's Crashworthiness Petition. On November 7, 1972, the FAA indicated that an NPRM coveringparts Nos. 1 and 2 of the recommendation would be released before the end of the year. Regarding parts Nos. 3, 4, and 5, the FAA indicated that there may be need for improvements in those areas, but the information presently available was not sufficient to support rulemaking action. It took the FAA 7 years to implement the recommendation. Safety Board followup action included responses to NPRM 73-2 and FAA's Notice No. 7 4-3, Airworthiness Review Program. Evaluation of implemented action on Part 23 and Part 91 are now amended to require the installation of shoulder harnesses for the front seats of all small airplanes manufactured after July 18, 1978. Crewmembers occupying seats with required shoulder harnesses must have them fastened during takeoff and landing. The requirement is not retroactive to previously manufactured smallplanes. Part 23 was amended with the following paragraph: The cabin area surrounding each seat, including the structure, interior walls, instrument panel, control wheel, pedals, and seats, within striking distance of the occupants's head or torso (with the safety belt fastened), must be free of potentially injurious objects, sharp edges, proturberances, and hard surfaces. If energy absorbing designs or devices are used to meet this requirement, they must protect the occupant from serious injury when the occupant experiences the ultimate inertia forces prescribed in Section 23.56l(b) (2). Status: The Safety Board has classified safety recommendation CY-70-42 as 11Closed--Acceptable Action. 11 Part 4 of CY-70-42 was reiterated with the issuance of safety recommendations A-80-125 through -131.

# \ -65-
APPENDIXB NTSB EXPANDEDACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT (NTSB FORM6120.4)

National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION

1 D ACCIDENT 3 AircraftRegistration Number 4 Flight NUITiber 2 D INCIDENT Forcollision betw&en aircraft, enterreg. no. andfit. no. forotheraircraft 2 NTSB Accident/IncidentNumber

2 0 FAA DELEGATED

5 Aln:raftRegiatnltlonNumber I Flight Number

7 Clly/Piace 9 ZipCode (Firs/Snumbers only) 10 AccidentSllltElevation FeetMSL 11 Date ofAccident

(Nos. forM, D. Y) I, I I I. I

Attach additionalpages ifnecessary I II " I 14 TlmeZoM

16 Addlllo.nal Persons Participating In !hisAccidentllncldentlnveatlgatlon (Name, address. affilialion, attach additiOnalpages ifnecessary)

17 Date

(Nos. forM. D. YJAPPENDIX B -66-

NationalTransportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
ACCIDENT!INCIDENT Airport/ Approach/Landing Information 25 Alrpo<l Name 26 Airport 27 Accident Location 28 Distance FromAirport Center 29 Dlrec:tlon From Airport ldentlflef 10 OffairporVairstrip (Nearest SMJ L!....J' Magnetic AOtherW 2 0 On airport Uj SM A Other 

### W 3 0 On airstnp A Other W A Other 

### W

30 VFR Approach/Landing (Multiple entry) 31 Type InstrumentApproach Flown 1 Multiple entry) 32 Runway Usad ldendfier 10 None 10 None l..L...LJ 2t:J Traffic pattern 2 0 AOF!ND8 11 0 LOA A Other 

# w 3 0 Straight-in 3 0 VOR/TVOR 120 ASR 4 0 Valley/terrain lollowing 4 0 VOR/DME 13 0 PAR 33 Runway Length 50 Touch and go 50 TACAN 14 0 Sidestep I I l I I IFeet 6 0 Full slop 6 0 !LS-complete 15 0 Visual A Other W 70 Stop and go 7 0 tLS-Iocalizer 160 Contact 34 Runway Width 80 S1mulated forced landing 80**ILS-bac~course** 17 0 Circling**~Feet** 9 0 Forced landing 9 0 RNAV 18 0 Practice A Other L.J 100 Precautionary land1ng 100 MLS A Other 

## w A Other W 35 Airport Elevation I I I I I IFt. MSL A Other 

## w 36 Runway/Landing Sur1ace 37 Runwayfl..anding Surface Status 10 Macadam t 0 Dry 11 0 Water-glassy 2 0 Asphalt 20 Wet 120 Rubberdeposits 3 0 Concrete 30 Icecovered 13 0 Soft 4 0 Gravel 4 0 Snow-dry 14 0 Rough 50 Dirt 50 Snow-wet 15 0 Slush covered 60 Grass/turf 6 0 Snow-crusted 16 0 Holes 7.0 Snow 70 Snow-compacted A Other 

# w 80 Ice 8 0 Vegetation 90 Water 9 0 Water-calm A Other 

## w 10 0 Water-choppy
38 Ifaccident/incidentoccurredduring taxitakeoff, approach. landingorappropriatemaneuveringphaseofoperations. check

here Oandcomplete airportsupplement. Aircraft lrifonnation .. 

### . ,, ":**~-.** " - " 

### - -

.. 39 Aircraft Manufacturer 40 AircraftModel/Series 41 Serial No. 42 Certltlealad Maximum GrouWelght

A Other 

## w A OtherW 43 Type ofAircraft 44 Type Airworthiness Certificate 4S HomeBulll 10 Airplane 5 0 Blimp.tdirigible Standard Special 10 Yes 60 Restricted 20 Helicopter 6'0 Ultralight 10 Normal 7 0 Limited 20 No 3 0 Glider 70 Gyroplane 2 0 Utility 80 Provisional A Other 

## w 40 Balloon A Specify 30 AcrobatiC 9 0 Special flight 40**Tran~port** 100 Experimental 50 Unknown A OtnerW NTSB Form 6120.4 !Rev 1.'831 Page 2-67- APPENDIX B

National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
ACCIDENT /INCIDENT Aircraftlnform.llfon (continued):; ;•**~** :

.. .. 4S Landing Gear f Multiple entry) 1 0 Tricycle-fixed 4 0 Tailwheel-all retractable 7 0 Hull 10 0 Ski 13 0 High Skid A otherw 2 0 Tncycle-retractable 5 0 Tailwheel-retractable mains a0 Float 11 0 Ski/wheel 14 0 Body gear 30 Tailwheel-alllixed 6 0 Amphibian 9 0 Emerg. float 12 0 Skid 15 0 Wing gear
47 Ain:raft Damage 48 No. of Seats 49 Stall Warning System SO IFR Equipped 51 Icing Certification 1 0 None l....J....tJ Installed 10 Yes 10 Yes 20 M1nor A Other 

### w 1 0 Yes 20 No 20 No 30 Substantial 2 0 No A OtherW A Other LJ 4 0 Destroyed A Other w

52 Engine Manufacturer 53 Engine ModelandSeries 54 Engine Rated HorMpoW91' 56 Engine Type A Otherw 10 Reciprocating-carburetor 55 Engine RatedThrust 20 Reciprocating-fuel injected

_Lbs A.. OtherL..J 3 0 Turbo prop 57 Number of En!Jines 58 Type Maintenance Program 59 Typeof Last Inspection 4 0 Turbojet 

### w 1 0 Annual 10 Annual 50 Turbofan A Other LJ 2 0 100 hour 2 0 100hour 6 0 Turboshalt 3 0 AAIP/progressive 3 0 AAIP/progressive A OtherW 4 0 Continuous a1rworthiness 4 0 Continuousairworthiness A Otherl..._j A Other L...J 60 Dale Last Inspection Performed 61 Time Since Inspection 62 AirframeTot•t Time 63 Source of Maintenance Information 1Nos. for M. :J. Y 1**~Hours** I I I I I IHrs. 10 Tach 4 0 Logbooks Records \ I 

### I I 

### I, I A Other w A Otherw 2 0 Flight 50 Estimate A Other W 3 0 Hobbs A OtherW Engme Time !

/Hours) A Total Time B Time Since lnspec1ion c Time Since MajorOverhaul D Other 64 Engine No 1 I 65 Engine No2 I 66 Hazardous Materials onAircraft 67 Hazardous Material Spill/Factor Emergency Locator 1 2 A 10 No 1. 0 Yes Transmitter (ELT) Yes No ! Other A 2 0 No 68 Installed B othe;w A Other 

## w 69 Required
70 Operated OperatorInformation ; - 71 Registered Alrcr•ll Owner 72 Address

Name

73 OperatorolAircraft 1 0 Same as register!.d owner 74 Address 10 Same as registered owner 75 Operator Certificate No.

A Name: A B dba A Other W c OtherL.J B Other 

### w NTSB Form 6120.4 rRcv 1 831 Page3APPENDIX B -68-

NationalTransportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT

: ""**~Operator** lnfOI'I'IIIdlon (continued) ,_**,~:** .**-~:···.**

,**;·~.: -~L** ... .. 76 Operator StatusolThisAircraft 77 Pilot Status of This Aircraft 10 Owner 4 0 Borrower 10 Owner 4 0 Borrower 20 Lessee 5 0 Unauthorized 2 0 Lessee 5 0 Unautnorized 3 0 Renter A Other W 30 Renter 6 0 Employee A Other W Typeof Certificate(s) Held 78 None0 (Go to block82)
79 AirCarrierOperating Cel11ficatl! 80 Operating Cl!l111icate 81 Operator Cl!rtlficale

10 Flag carrier/domestic {121) 4 0 Large helicopter (127) 10 Aor travel club 10 RotorcraM-externalload operator (133) 2 0 Supplemental 50 Commuter aor earner 20 Otheroperator of 2 0 Agricultural aircraft (137) 3 0 All cargo (418) 60 On-demand au taxi large atrcraft Regulation Flight Conducted Under 82 Regulation FUghl Conducted Under 10 14 CFR 91 {only) 40 14 CFR 125 7 0 14 CFR 135 A Spec•ty 2 0 14CFR91D 50 14CFR127 sO 14 CFR 137 30 14 CFR 121 60 14 CFR 133 90 14 CFR 129 (Fore;gn /lag) Type of Flight Operation Conducted (Complete 83, 84, and85 ONLYifflight was a revenue operation conducted under 121. 125, 127, 129, 135) 83 84 85

10 Scheduled 10 Domestic 10 Passenger 3 0 Passenger/cargo 2 0 Non-scheduled 2 0 International 20 Cargo 4 0 Mail contract ONLY (Complete 86 ONLYifflight was NOTa revenue flight conducted under 121. 125. 127, 129, 135) 86 10 Personal 4 0 Executwe/corporate 7 0 Other work use 100 Positioning 2 0 Busmess 50 Aerial apphcat•on 8 0 Public use 30 Instructional (Including airearner training) 6 0 Aenal observation 9 0 Ferry A Specify**t~·nformatlon** 

## .. · :·:.. ,:;:,;t::;**"·'""r'-.:~**

### ,:s?{f&i~~Q~:2,ij;~.;~i::::·;~';:~~;;?~(:;},:1;;,.~:,.:.·." ;'**~'** ..·· · ..**,;~_}.** "·**>r~; ~** **~~-;.,;** 87 Na1114!1 (Last. Firs/, lmllal) sa Pilot Certllicale No. 89 Street Address
A Other 

## w A Otherl_,J A Other 

## w 90 City 91 State 192 Date of Bil1h 1 Nos. lor 93 Age 

### 194 Sex I I I I I I I MD. Y) L,J Yrs 10 Male A Other 

### l 

### J 

## w A Other L,_j A Otherl.J 2 0 Female 95 SealOccupied 96 Pl1nelpal Profession 97 Cerlificale(s) rMultrple entry) 10 Lefl . 10 Pilot-civilian 7 0 Doctor/dentist 13 0 Farmer/rancher 10 Student 60 Flight Engineer 20 Right 20 Pilot-military 80 Police 14 0**Ret~red** 20 Pnvate 7 0 Military 30 Center 3 0 Other-military 90 Student A OlherW 30 Commerc1al 8 0 None 40 Front 4 0 Aircraft mechanic 10 0 Clergy 4 0 Alfhne Transport 9 0 Foreign 50 Rear 50 Business 11 G Teacher 50 Flight Instructor A Other LJ A Otherl,J 6 0 Lawyer 12 0 Engineer (Complete block 101) NTSB Form 6120.4 IRev 118.lJ Page4

# ~}···;'**lY~** 

### ..

r. 

### l· l ,, H r ,.**t~** ,.

# 0

. ' -69- APPENDIX B

NationalTransportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT

## !!e:=~.::,~·~:~!~~~~:~~;?r~:r~~:~:~;~~:r ..

.. 98 Ratings-Airplane 99 RotorcraiVGIIder/LTA 100 lnatrumenl Rating 101 Instructor Rating(s)

1 0 Single engine land 1 0 Helicopter 10 None 10 Airplane SE sO Instrument airplane 2 0 Multiengine land 2 0 Gyroplane 20 Airplane 20 Airplane ME 70 Instrument helicopter 3 0 Single engine sea 3 0 Airship 30 Helicopter 30 Helicopter 4 0 Multiengine sea 40 Free balloon 40 Gyroplane S 0 Ghder sO Glider
102 Ground Instructor 103 Rating/EndorsementThis Aircraft 104 Months Since Check/Endorsement 105 Biennial Flight Review 10 Basic 1 0 Yes 

## w Months (Or equivalent) 20 Advanced 20 No (Go to block 70S) A Other 

## w 10 Yes 30 Instrument A Other 

## w 20 No 40 None A Other L.J
106 Months Since Last BFR 107 BFR (Or equivalent) Aircraft Make/Model 108 Medical Certificate 109 Medical Certificate Validity 

## w Months A Make tO Class 1 10 Valid medical-no waivers/llmitat•ons A Other LJ B Model 20 Class 2 20 Valid medical-with waivers/limitations COiherW 30 Class 3 30 Non valid medical lor lhis flight A Other L..J 40 Expired sO ·No medical certificate 110 Date of Las! Medical (Nos. lor M.D. Y) 111 Medical limitation for 112 Medical waiver tor A Other L.....J I I I I I I I 1 0 Vision 10 Vis•on A Otherl.J A Specify 20 Heanng A Specify 8 tither 

### L..J 8 Other L..J 113 Statement of Demonstrated Ability 114 Correcting Lenses (Multiple entry1 115 Source ot Pilot Flight Time 1 0 Yes 1 0 Required to be 1n possession 10 Pilot log sO Estimate 2 0 No 2 0 Required 10 be worn 2 0 Company sO Relative A otherw 30 Worn at time ofaccident 3 0 FAA A Other w A Other LJ 4 0 Operator
c A 

### • c D E F lnsuument G H I J K FlightTime AUA C lhrs Mall(- Ar'Piane Arrprane Nrght Aclua! Srmulateo Rotorcrah G110er LrgnTe• Other & Mooe• Srng1e Engrnp Mullrengrne**Tl'\8~"·** Art 135 Total Time 136 Pilot in Command (PIC) 137 Instructor 138 This Make/Model 139 Last 90 Days I I 140 Last30 Days I I I 141 Last 24 Hours I I I 142 Landings-Last 90 Days All AlrcraH 144 Landings-Last90 Days 146 Person at Controls 147 Degree of Injury -This Make/Model**~** 1 0 Pilei in command sO No one 1 0 None**~Day** A Other 

### W l...t__._j Day A Other 2 0 Second p1lot A Otherl........ 2 0 M.no• 143 Landings-Last 90 Days All Aircraft 145 Landings Las190 Days 3 0 Both pilots 3 0 Senous -This Make/Model W**~Night** A Other 

## w L..__,_j Night A Other 4 0 Non-pilot 4 0 Fatal 148 SeatbeltaAvailable 149 Seatbelts Used 150 Shoulder Harness Available 151 Shoulder Hamess Used 152 Autopsy Pertormed (Thrs piloli 1 0 Yes 1 0 Yes 10 Yes 1 0 Yes 10 Yes 20 No 20 No 20 No 2 0 No 20 No A OtherW A Otherw A Other

### L...J A othe•w A Other

### L...J NTSB Form 6120.4 tRev 18J1 - Page o



## ___________..... ..........----------

### J • 

# I

I [ 

### I APPENDIX B -70-

NationalTransportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT Pilot Information (continued) 153 Toxicology Performed (Thrs pilot) 154 Second Pilot 1 0 Yes A Other 

## w 10 Yes rComp/ete ;econdpilotsupplement) 20 No 2 0 No FlightItineraryInformation 155 Last Departure Point (Multiple entry1 157 DesUnallon (Mullipte entry) 158 Flight Plan Filed 1 0 Same as accidentJincident location or 10 Same as**acc~dentiinclden~** location or 10 Vrsual Fhght Rules (VFRJ A Airporl identifier 2 0 Local flight 20 Instrument Flight Rules (IFRJ B Cuy;Ptace A Arrport loentrher 30 VFR!IFR C StateW D Other 

## w B Cily/Piace --·· 40 Company iVFR) 156 Time of Departure estate W sO Military (VFR) A**Time~** C Other L.J 0 Other 

## w sO None B Time**zone~** A OtherL.J 159 type of Clearance 160 Air11pace tO None 1 0 Uncontrollecl 8 0 Stage II TRSA 15 0 Warnmg area 2 0 Spec•al VFR 20 Controlled 9 0 Stage Ill TRSA 16 0 FAR 93 (Spec•al air traffic areas) 3 0 IFR 3 0 Airport trallic area 10 0 Prohrblted area A Other 

## w 4 0 Special IFR 40 Control zone t1 0 Restricted area sO VFR on top 5 0 Airport advisory area 12 0 M!lrtary Operating Area ;MOA) 60 Cruise 6 0 Positive controt area 13 0 Student Jet Trainrng Area A Other 

### LJ 7 0 Termrnal control area 14 0 Demo Area
161 Control Area 162 Route 163Two Way Communications Established 1 0 Vrctor arrway 10 Standard instrument departure 6 0 IR route (military) 10 No 2 0 Jet airway 20 Standard te(m1na1 arnval 70 SR route (military)' 20 Yes 30 Control airway 30 Area navigatron sO Refuelrng route (military) A Facility identifier 40 Colored arrway 40 Drrect A OtherL..J 

### ---- A Other 

### LJ 5 0 VR route (military) B Other 

# w Aln::ndtLoading lnfonndon 164 Fuel on Board at Takeoff IMultiple entry) 165 Fuel Types 1 0 Estrmated 1 0 80!87 50 Kerosene 90 Mixture 2 0 Verified 20 100 low lead 6 0 JP3.4.5.6 100 Automotive A Gallons or 30 100<130 7 0 Je-t A 11 0 Anti iceadditive added (Ifknown) B Pounds 40 115!145 8 0Jet6 A Other 

## w C Other [..J.

### J 166 AireraflWeight atTakeoff 1 Multiple entry1 167 Aircraft CG at Takeoff 1 Multrple entry1 1 0 At or below max cert. gross takeolt werght 40 Verified 1 0 Wrthrn limits 4 0 Exceeded lateral limit 20 Above ma.x certificated gross takeoff we1ght A Other 

## w 2 0 Exceeded fwd limrt 5 0 Estrmated 3 0 Estimated 3 0 Exceeded aft limit 6 0 Veritred A Other 

## w 168 Aircraft Weight at Accident (Multiple entry1 16!1 Alrcralt CG atAccident (Multiple entryI 1 0 Same as takeolf sO Verif1ed 1 0 Sameas takeoff sO Exceeded lateral lrmit 2 0 At or belowmax cert. gross takeoff weight A Other L.J 2 0 Within lrmrts eO Eshmated 3 0 Above max certifrcated gross takeolf werght 30 Exceeded fwd limit 70 Verified 4 0 Estimated 4 0 Exceeded aft limit A Other 

# w

NTSB Form6120.4 rRt" t e.<J Page 6 

# • 

# ,,-71- APPENDIX B

NationalTransportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
ACCIDENT /INCIDENT _.Aircraft Loading lnf(lf'ln8tlon(continued) 170 Load Description 174 Simulated Instrument Flight 175 VIsion Restricting Device Used 1 0 None i 0 Parachutists t 0 Yes 1 0 Yes 2 0 Passengers 8 0 Water 2 0 No 2 D No 3 0 Cargo 9•0 Chemical A Otherl J A Other l J 4 0 Towing glider 100 Livestock 176 Parachute Required 177 Parachute Used 5 0 Towing banner 11 D mega! cargo t DYes 1 0 Yes 6 0 Other external A OtherLJ 20 No 2 D No A Otner L J A Other

### l.1.J

.Meterologlcallntormatlon 180 Source of Weather Briefing (Multiple entryI 181 Methodol Briefing (Multiple entry/ t 0 No record of briefrng 6 0 Company t 0 In person 2 0 NationalWeather Service (NWS) 70 Commercial weather service 2 0 Teletype 3 0 Flignt Service Station sO TV!radiowea1her 3 0 Telepnone 4 0 PATWAS (Pilot Automated TeL WX Answenng SVCI 90 Military 4 0 Aorcraft radro 5 0 VRS (Voice Response System) A Other 

# w 5 D TV1radio A Other 

## w
182 Completeness of Weather briefing 183 Investigator's Source ol Weather 184 Weather Obeervallon Facility !Direct entry) 1 0 Wealher not penment Information A Identifier

___ 2 0 Full 1D Pitot!Go to block 185) B Time of observalion zone __ 3 0 Partial-limited by pilot 2 D Witness rGo to bloch t85) C Elevation teet MSL 4 0 Partial-limited by brieler/lorecaster 3 0 Weather observation facility D Distance !romaccident site

__ NM A Other 

## w E Directionfrom accidenl site 'magnetic
185 Basic Weather Conditions 186 Conditionsof Light 187 Lowest Sky/Cloud Condition .188 Lowest Ceiling 1 0 Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) 1 D Dawn 1 D Clear 1 0 None (Clear) 20 Instrument Meteorological Condrtions (IMC) 2 D Daylight 2 D Scattered 2 0**Bro~en** A OtherW 3 D Nrghl (Dark) 3D Thin broken 3 0 Overcast 4 D Night (Bright) 4 D Thin overcast 4 0 Obscured 189 VIsibility 190 Temperature 50 Dusk 5 0 Partial obscuralion A
--- Feet AGL

__SM • F A OtherL.J A Feet AGL BOther 

## w A**~er** l 

### J B Olher 

## w 191 Dew Point 192 Wind (From) 193 Wind Velocity 194 Gusts 195 Altimeter Selling 196 Density Altitude --'F t 0 Variable 10 Calm t D None W.w..J··Hg Feel A Otherl.J A c. Magnetic A

__ Kts A

__ Kts. A Other 

## w A Other 

## w B OtherW B OtherW B OtherLJ 197 Restrictions to VIsibility 198 Typeof Precipitation t D None 7 0 Ground log (GF) 1 0 None 7 0 Snow shower (SW) 13 0 Ice crystals (IC) 2 0 Haze (H) 8 D Stowing spray IBY) 2 0 Rain (R) 8 D Drizzle (L) 14 0 tee pellet shower (IPW) 3 0 Dust (D) 9 0 Blowing dust !BD) 3 0 Snow (5) 9 D Ice pellets (IP) A Other 

## w 4 D Smoke (K) 10 D Blowing snow iBS) 4 D Hail (A) 10 0 Snow pellets (SP) 5 D Fog (FJ 11 0 Blowing sand (BNI 5 D Rarn showers (RW) 1t 0 Snow grarns (SG) 6 D Icetog (IF! A Other W 6 0 Freezing rain (ZRl 12 0 Freezing dnzzle tZL) 200 Intensity ol Preeipllallon 201 Aircrafl Fire 202 Explosion 203 Damage lo Proparty 1 D Light 1 0 None I 0 None 1 D None 5 0 Vehrcle(s) 2 0 Moderate 2 D In-flight 2 D ln-lhgnt 20 Residence 6 0 Arrport facll•ty 3 0 Heavy 3 0 On ground 3 0 On ground 3 0 Residential area 7 D Trees 9 D Wires!potes A Otr>erW A OtherW A OtherW 4 0 Commercial bldg 8 D Crops 10 0 Otner properly NTSB Form 6120.4 •R•·v 1Ur Page 7APPENDIX B -72-

National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
ACCIDENT /INCIDENT ::,..**~~.P-'··** .··**~.~?''·"·~:** 

### · ··...**rt~~.L:i:.2.:~.· ~;~{$ll~~·** 

## ..**~~·;d** 

## ..

# ·<,.. ·.·.:,·. ······· < :.... ,,.,, '.'';/:/, ;;::;, ·,;,;.'**·'';·~~;·',**(i.<:::**•.'·;j,·l~~~:--;;~;,;;,~~~·** ·.:..;...·**~;;;..;·~··...;..;;.**_____ -t 204 Pari Failure/Malfunction (Mullrp/e entry) 205 Incorrect Part (Multiple entry} 10 None 30 Part/component#2 A OtherW 10 None 30 Part/compdnent#2 A Other W 2 0 Part/component#1 4 D Part/component #3 2 0 Part/componenl #1 4 0 Part/component •3**I-:=-:-::-:-P::-a-r1~N_a_m_e** _____ +-
__**A_P_a_rll_c_om_po_n_e_n_t_•'---·t--•zc~mponen1#2** 205 ATACode 206 Manufacturer 207 Mfg. Pari • 208 Mig. Model • 209 Serlalt 210 Pari Condition 211 TotalTime 212 TSO 213 TSI 214 Cycles Totsl 215 Cycles Since Overhaul 216 Cycles Since lnapectlon 217 S..rYice Difficulty Repo.; or Mallunctlon/Defecl Repori Submllled

I\ITSB Form 6120.4 1Rnv 1'1\:l; , 10 Yes I 2D No I 0 Yes 2 0 No C Part/Component #3



## --------------------

10 Yes 2 0 No

PageS-73- APPENDIX B

National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION NTSB Accident/Incident Number

Supplement !-Crash Kinematics ' '' · ·. · 1 Accident SlleGeographic Coordinates -Latitude

10 North A W W
20 South B Other L..J
3 ImpactSequen.,.._lNumber .n sequence. Multrple entry.1

1

### D None 7

### D Ground 2

### D Rock face 8

### D Dirt bank 3 Ci Rigid structure 9 c::::J Scrub tree 4=:J Rocks to 1' diam. 10CJTrees/hmbs to 6" dram. 50 Rocks 1'-2'diam. 11 c::::JTrees!limbs 6"-9" diam. 6D Rocks > 2' diam. 12CJTrees/limbs 9"·12"diam. 4 Terrain At Principal Impact Point

1 0 Wet cultivated soil 2 0 Drycultivated soil 30 Dry packed clay 4 0 Soggyswampy 5 0 Packed snow 60 Loose snow 7 0 Concrete 8 0 Asphalt 9 0 Loose rock 10 0 Dry sod

5 Airspeed AI Impact (Enter**d~rect** ormark estimated range)

10 0·15 6 0 75·90 11 0 210 plus knots 2 Accident Site Geographic Coordinates-Longitude 1 0 East 20 West

Trees/limbs 12" diam. and up Frangtble approach aid Non-frangible approach aid Submerged obstacle Vehicle Aircral!
16 0 Ice 17 0 Mud 18 0 Sand 19 D None A A L..J' L.J
B Other LJ

19

### 0 Runway light 200 Water 21c::::JWire 220 Pole 23

### D Snow bank A Other 

### W

2 0 15-30 7 0 90-120 A Knots 3 0 30-45 8 0 120-150 6 Other 

### W A 8 __ Degrees Other 

### W 4 0 45-60 9 0 150-180 50 60-75 10 0 180-210 7 Pitch AttitudeAI Impact (Enterdirect ormark est•matedrange. 1
Pitch Attitude Nose Down Angle With Honzon Nose UpAngle With Horizon
1 0 Down 

# I I**~** ¢

### ~**~ ~** **~- ~**  '\\ 

# 'l

2 0 Up D 75 0 60 0 45 0 30D 15 D o 0 t5 0 Jo 0 45 D 80 0 1s0
A

__ Qeg.

### ~\\\\~~~~.PP.fif~ 90 0 75 0 600 45 0 300 t5 0 0 0 15 0 300 45 0 60 0 75 0 .90

v Roll Attitude At Impact !Enterdirectormark estimatedrange. 1 Atrcraf1 Rolled Left Alfcraf1 Rolled Righi Roll
1 0· Left

# ~'"~~--- 

# .....,....?'11
20 R1ght 0105 0 120 D 135 0 1so 0 165 0 180 0 1ss 0 1so 0135 0 120 0 10s 0

A ---Deg.

## ~ 

# /t !

.**,~-·** ..¥

## ~ ...-

## ~**~** \..

## ~ '

## ~ 90 0 75 0 60 0 45 0 30D IS 0 0 0 15 0 300 45 0 600 75 0 90 NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement I i1t83) B orOther L....J

B orOther L..J

Page 1APPENDIXB -74-

National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
Supplement !-Crash Kinematics (continued) 9Yaw A!Illudeallmpacl (Enterdirectormark estimatedrange.)

10 Nose left 2 0 Nose nght A**--~De9** Alfcrafl Yawed Left Aircraft Yawed Right 900 75 0 600 45 0 30 0 15 0 00 15 0 300 45 0 60 0 75 0 90 or B Other 

### a.;)).·). 1)}' I

## WI ()

I; l 6 

## L 'I

NTS8 Form612G.4 SupplementI (1183) -75-

NationalTransportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION

Elevation View APPENDIX B

'' ''

31.¥13 lidliifMiliNii?M

APPENDIX B

NationalTransportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION -76-

NTSB Accidentllnciden1 Number

Supplement K-Occupant. Survival and Injury Information
1 Seat No.

A L.J B If Seat Unknown Enter

Persons Name
C Other l J 2 Potlllon 10 Pilot in command 20 Second p•lot 30 Othercrewmember 4 0 Passenger A Other W 3 Age A L.Jvrs B Under 24 mos
.. enter

mon1hs 

### W C OtherW 4 Height 5 Weight

--- Inches A Other W A Other Los 

## w

6 Injury

### tncte•

1 0 None 7 Condition Priorto ACCident 1 0 Smoker 8 Phyolcany Handicapped 10 No 9 Seal BeltAdjustment 1 0 Not fastened 10 Shoulder Harness Adjustment 10 Not**faste~ed** 20 Minor 3 0 Serious 4 0 Fatal A Other L.J 20 Language difficulty 30 Pre-extsting d<sease 40 Prothesis A Other W 20 Blind 30 Mobility impaired 4 0 Deal A Other W 20 Loose 20 Loose 3 0 Snug 30 Snug 4 0 T•ght • 0 r.gnt 5 0 Seat not equipped A Other -l j 50 Not seated A Other W 11 Knew lmpacVAccidenlComing 10 Yes 12 Braced lor Impact 10 Yes 13 Directionof MovementatlmpacllMultiple en1ryJ
2 0 No A Other W

E•itDiagram
CL Cockp•t
1L
2L 3L 

# !

16 Bt!efedonEmeogency Proc:edutes

10 No 2 0 Behlfetakeofl 3 0 Before impacVaccident A Other W 10 Forward 3 0 Upward 5 0 Left 20 No 2 0 Rearward 40 Downward 60 Righi A OtherW A Other 

### W

Use following co<ies lorovernead 14 Exll Used tUse d•agram; hatches CR A Other L.J Cockpit 99 1R Cat>m88 2R Tailcone77 3R 

# J
17 Olllk:ully In Using E•ll 18 Escape Hampered 10 Yes 10 Yes 20No 20No A Other L.J A Olher W 19 Evacuation Aided by 10 Passenger 2 0 Crew 3 0 Bystander 4 0 CFR personnel A Other L.J 15 Escape Hampered by 1 0 Not hampered 20 Smoke 30 Heat 4 0 ln1unes 50 Trapped 6 0 Darkness 70 Oebns 8 0 DiSonentatiOn A Specify**---~** B, Other 

### U

20 Injured During Evacuation 10 Yes 20 No A Other W

Complete this section ifoxygen was used, 21 Type ofEqulpfi.ent

10 Supplemental 20 Portable A Other 

## w

NTSB Form 6120.4 SUpplement K (1183) 22 Dlfflc:ully InUse 10 Yes 20 No A Other W 23 Type of O•ygen SySiem 1D Solid state 20 Gaseous A Spectty


### --------- B Otner L.J

Page 1 I 

# I

)

# ""I**~** li

. I

.

. \
..'

. '"'··."' -77- APPENDIX B

National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
Supplement K-Occupant, Survival and Injury Information (continued) Complete thissection foraccidents involving fire. 24 0 Nofire involved (Go to block29) 25 Are First Sighted 1 Location) 26 Smol<e Mask orGogglefl Used 27 Material ofClolh1!11 Wom 26 Exposu111 to HeaVFrlll 1 0 Inside aircraft 10 No 10 Synthetic 10 Head/face 2 0 Outside aircraft 2 0 Yes 20 Nonsynthetic 20 Arm(s) 3 0 Both 30 Both 30 Fire resistant 30 Hand(s) A Other 

## w 4 0 Difficulty in use 40 Mix-synthetic and nonsynthetic 4 0 Leg(s) A Other 

## w A Other 

## w 50 Torso 60Feet A Other L..J Complete this section foraccidents involving ditching/waterimpact. 29 0 No watenmpact (Go to block36)
A Available c Used E Familiar With Use G Problems In Use 1 Malfunctione<l WilhUse K Eqwpment Damaged FlotatiOn Dev1ces 1Yes 2 B No Other 1 Yes 2 No 0Other 1Yes 2 No FOther 1 ves 2 H '1 s\2 No\J No Otheri Yes Other 1Yes 2 No LOther i 

## !wi 30 Lilerall 

## iw 

## w w Wi L.J
31 Vest-Inflatable 

## w w 

## w w! 

## w L.J
32 Vest-Non-Inflatable 

## w 

## w w L.J 

## w w

33 Cushion L..J 

## iw 

## w w LJ 

## w
34 TIITHI inWater 35 Rescued by

A

__Hrs. 10 Boat 3 0 Helicopter 50 Swimmer B Mins. c Other L.J 2 0 Airplane 4 0 None A Other Occupantlnjuries-Comp/ele applicableparts forsurvivors and nonsurvivors. Items 36 thru 43apply ONLYto flightcrewmembers. Fornon crewmembers, go to block44.
36 Medication Prescribed 37 Medication Being Taken 38 HoursSinceTaken 39 Medication Dosage 40 TimeSince Last Meal

1 0 No 1 0 No Hrs. ___ Hrs. A Yes !S{)IJCify:

__1 A Yes(Specily:

__) A Other 

## w A Other 

## w A Other 

## w B Other 

## w B Olher 

## w

41 Medication/Drugs Found 42 Location Medication/DrugsFound 43 Pre-exlaUngDiseaseFoundatAutopsy 10 No 10 On body 10 No autopsyperformed A Yes !Specify: --1 20 In personal effect 2 0 None reported B Other 

### LJ 3 0 In aircraft A Yes S{)IJCily: 4 0 Outside aircraft A Other 

## w 8 OtherW

NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement K{1183) Page2APPENDIX B -78-

National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
Supplement K-Occupant, Survival and Injury Information (continued)
Results ofToxicological Analyses-Completeas applicable forsurvivors andnonsurvivors. 44 Toxicology 1 0 Not ordered 3 0 Ordered-perlormed 50 Embalmed Other 

### W 2 0 Notordered-perlormed 4 0 Ordered-not perlormed 6 0 Specimen not available/unsuitable foranalysis A A Test Results Substances 1 Positive 2 Negative 8 Other c Level of Substances Found

45 Ethanol (Alcohol)
46 CO (Carbon Monoxide)
47 hb (Hemoglobin)
46 HCN (Hydrogen Cyanide) Listanyadditionaltox1cotogtcalsubstances discovered below.

A Substance Code 49 L...__._j
50 L.........J
51 L.......LJ
52 Lw.J
53 L......J

54 L.......J

55 Lw.J
56 L........J
57 l........J.J
58 L...__._j
59 L.........J
60 L........J
61 Lw.J
62 Lw.J B Level of Substances Found

NTSB Fonn612o.4 Supplemenl K (1/83) 

## w Mg% 

## w %Saluration 

## w gm% Microgramrml
Toxicological Substances/Codes
Acetamenophen

. . . 001 Acetaldehyde

. . . . . . . 002 Acetone

. . . . . 003 Amoxapine

. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 004 Amitriptyline

................ 005 Amobarbital .'

................ 006 Amphetamine

............... 007 Benzoyiecgonine

. 008 Brompheniramine ........•... 009 Butalbital

................... 010 Butabarbital

.. .. . . 011 Caffene

. .. . . ............... 012 Cannabin01ds

............... 013 Chlorazepate

.. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . 014 Chlordiazepoxide ...........• 015 Chlorphentermine

............ 016 Clonazepam

................. 017 Cocaine

.................... 018 Codeine

.................... 019 Desipramine

.. . . . . .. . . . ... . . . 020 Diazepam

................... 021 Dihydrocodeinone

........... 022 Diphenhydramine .......•.... 023 Diphenylhydantoin

. . . . . . . . . . 024 Doxepin

. .. .. . .. ..•. . . .. .. . . 025 Desall<ylflurazepam •......... 026 Demoxapam

................ 027 Ethcnlorvynol

......., . . . . .. 026 Flunitrazepam

............... 029 Flurazepam

. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. 030 Fluphenazine

.. . . ... . . ... . . . . 031 Glutethimide

................ 032 Haloperidol

................. 033 Hexobarbital

................ 034 Imipramine

.................. 035 Isopropanol

. . . . 036 Ketamine

... 037 Li<locaine
. .. . . . . .. 036 Mecloqualone

. . . . 039 Meperidine 040 Mephentermine

. . . . . . . . . . . . 041 Meprobamate

............... 042 Methanol

.................... 043 Methadone

. . . 044 Methamphetamine

. . . . . . . . . 045 Methaqualone

. . . . . . 046 Loxaplne

. . . . . . . . .... 047 Methylenedioxyam

.... 045 Phetamine

.. . . .. .. . .. . ... .. 049 Methylphenidate

.... 050 Methypryton

. . .• . . . ... . . . . . .. 051 Menthol

. . . . ... .•. . . . . . .. . ... 052 Morphine

. . ................ 053 Medazepam

. . .. . . .. . .• .•.. .. 054 Nicotine

.................... 055 Nortripl)lline

. .. . . . . . .. .. ..• . . 056 Oxazepam •. .. .. .. . . . . ..•... 057 Pentazocine

................. 058 Phenobarbital

.: .., .......... 059 Procaine

.................... 060 Propoxyphene

............... 061 Secobarbital

................. 062 Thioridazine

. . . . ... . . . . ..... 063 Temazepam
. . . . .. . . . . . . . ... . 064 Nordiazepam

................ 065 Pentobarbital

. .. .. . . ........ 066 Phencyclidine

.. .. .. .. . ... .. . 067 Phendimetrazine

............. 068 Prazepam ..........•. : .. 068
Page3 .. ' 

# • •• •; ,.



# •

.,. '.\!1\ ' •I '., '

## ..



# .J

I r il

... -79-

NationalTransportationSafety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION APPENDIX B

Supplement K-Occupanl, Survival·**~nd** Injury Information (continued) 0 '
63 0 Formultiple extreme traumatic injuries, check box, andgo to nextapplicable supplement. Occupant InjuryCoding Chart (Complete forsurvivors andnon survivors as applicable.)
A Body Reg•on B Aspect C Lesron D A.I.S. §everity F G System/Organ 6 InjurySource 7 Source of Data 64

65 

### I

66
67
68
69 I I 70
11
72 I I I 73 I Body Region
- A 88 Injured aspect unknown 05 Uver Sourceol Data
- G 99 Other 06 Nervous System 01 Head (Skull, scalp. ears) 07 Brain Ollicial 02 Face (Forehead. nose. eyes. mouth) Lesion- C 06 Spinal cord 01 Autopsy records with or without 03 Neck (Cervical spone. C1-C7) 01 Lacera1ion 09 Ears hospital/medical records 04 Shoulder (Clavicle. scapula. joint) 10 Arteriesveins 02 Hospital/medical records 05 Upper limb (Whole arm) 02 Contusion 11 Heart 03 Emergency room records 06 Arm (Upper) 03 Abrasion 12 Spleen 04 Private or treating physicians 07 Elbow 04 Fracture 13 Urogenital 06 Forearm 05 Concussion 14 Kidneys Unollicial 09 Wrist 06 Avulsion 15 Respiratory 10 Hand-lingers 07 Rupture 16 Eye 05 Lay coroner 11 Chest (Anterior and posterior ribs) 06 Sprain 17 Pulmonary/lungs 06 E.M.S personnel 09 Dislocation 07 Interviewee 12 Abdomen (Diaphragm and below) 10 Crush 18 Airway 06 Police 13 Back (Thoracsic spine T1·T12) 11 Amputation 19 Muscles 09 Other source 14 Back (Lumbar L1-LS) 20 Integumentary 15 Pelvis-hip 12 Burn 21 Thyroid (Thyroid orotherendocrine gland) 16 Lower limb (Whole leg) 13 Fracture and dislocation 88 Injured. unknown system or organ 17 Thigh (Femur) 14 Severence (Transection) 99 Other 18 Knee 15 Strain 19 Leg (Balow knee) 16 Detachment (Separation) Abbrevtaled InjuryScate· E 20 Ankle 17 Perforation (Puncture) 21 Foot-toes 88 Injured unknown lesion 00 Not injured 22 Whole bOdy 99 Other 01 Minor injury 88 Injured. unknown region 02 MOderate injury 99 Other Syalem/Organ
- 0 03 Serious injury (Not life-threatening) 04 Severe injury (Lite-threatening survival probable) Aapecl Of Injury
- B 01 Skeletal 05 Critical inJury (Survival uncertain) 02 Vertebrae 06 Maximum (untreatable) 01 Right 03 Joints 07 Injured (Unknown severity) 02 Lett 04 Digestive 88 Unknown if injured NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement K (1/63) Page4i , APPENDIX B -80-

National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
Supplement K-Occupant, Survival and Injury Information (continued) Injury Soun:e List - F 01 Windshiel<l 02 Windshield frame 03 Window 04 Wondow frame 05 lnstrumenl panel 06 Side console 07 Center console 06 Conlrol s!ickicycl'c stick 09 Collective 10 Control yoke column 1t Throttle ouadranVIevers 12 Rudder pedals , 13 Ceiling 14 Sidewall 15 Floor 16 fuselage framing;structure 17 Table 18 Seal 19 Seatback tray 20 Restraonts-seatbeiV!Iedown 21 Restraints-shoulder harness 22 Unsecured item(s) in cockpit 23 Unsecured item(sl in cabin 24 Other occupants

NTSB Form 6120.4 SUpplement K 11/83) 25 Ground/runway 26 Unsecured seat(s) 27 Outside Ob!ectls) entenng aircralt 28 Galley item(s) 29 Food/beverage item(s) 30 Other interiorObJeCts 31 Other extenorobjects 32 Evacuation shdetslide raft 33 Escape rope/tape 34 Escape inertia dev1ce 35 Ejecled from aircraft 36 Propeller/rotor blades 37 Exterior**a~rcraft** surface 38 Engone 39 Wheel!lores 40 Ground vehicle 41 Toxic/noxiouS/Irritant fumes 42 Fore/radiant heat 43 Flying glass 44 Door/hatches 45 Acceleratoon torces 46 Exposure 88 Unknown 99 Other

PageS

### -81- APPENDIX B

National Transportation Safety Board NTSB Accident!lncidenl Number FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION

A Other 

### L.J 10 Typecertificate ( Al(/rame manufacturer1 2 0 Non-TSO

5 Seat Type (Multiple entry1

10 Cockprt crew A B TSO (Specify! Other

4 0 Fotdrng stowable A

2D Flight attenelant srngte jumpseat 3 D Flight atlenaant double iumpseat S0 Single passenger seat 6 0 2 passenger seat unit 7 0 3 passenger seat unit 8 0 Sofa/Bench A Other 

### L..J

7 Total Seat Destruction iMultrple entry)

1 D impact /Go to blocl< 30) 2 D Fire (Go ro block30; A Other 

### W

A Other W

NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement L (1/83! A 8 Seat Anchored 1 0 Bulkhead,wall 2 0 Floor A Other 

### L.J

Other 

### L..J 9 Seal Primary Structure 1D Tube 2 0 Sheet metal 3 0 Composite 4 0 Wood

33 Restraint SystemDesign 10 2-point 2 D 3-pomt 3D 4-poont 4 0 5-pomt A Other 

### L.J 10 Insideaircraft-attached 2 0 Inside aircraft-separated 3 0 Outsrde aircrall A Other 11 Evidence of Fire/Heat Damage

1 0 None 2 0 Cushtonstcovers 3 D Structure 4 0 Restraims A

34 Type Release/Buckle 1 0 Metal to metal 2 0 Fabriciputl thru A Specofy ,B Ott.er 

### W FAPPENDIX B -82-

NationalTransportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
Supplement L-Seat, Restraint System and Fuselage Deformation (continued)

Aestraini System Desogn



### { 

## I I**~** 

## -l Two Pomt
Component Yes 35 Lapbell 36 Shoulder Harness 37 Inertia Reel 38 Tiedown Strap A

# ~:4 ] 

### .(

# ~ Three Poont Four Poont A Installed

2 B No Other L J 

### w L J L J B Fire**D~mage** 

### I EvidencEe of Use 1 2 0 1 2 F Yes No Other 1Yes No Other l Jl L j Li..J L....J L Jl Ld L Jl 

### w c 1 Seat

### ~

2 Wall 

### t L

### J**~** Ia.) Five Point G Location of Anchor Points 3 

## I 4 Floor Ceoling

0 5 8ulkhea<J H Other 

## w l J L J l J WebbongJStotchong Aestraont Attach Fottmgs SeattStruc1ure Attach Fitttngs
Component "' Ol "' E Cl 0 z 39 Lapbell I 40 Shoulder Harness I 41 Other Damage Release Buckle 10 Yes 20 No A Other

46 Fuselage CollapseAroundThis Seal 1 0 None 2 0 Collapse 3 0 Dosmtegrationllnconerated 1 

### l 0**~** "' Cl

47 Interior Surface Damage To This Seat 1 0 Yes 2 0 No A Other W I I 2 3 1 

# I 2 

### I 3 

# I 4 " ,Ji "0 

### "' "0 

### "' "' i "' i :a; 

## '" E ,.. ,_- =" "" e "'"' "'

# - <ii .,

# - -., Cl ;;;**~** ·-= 8- -;::a. a. i**8:~** "' 0 I**~** "'"' 

### "' z 01 O..Cil I I I I 42 Other Damage Tie Down Strap 1 0 Yes 2 0 No A Other 

# W 5 1 2 3 "'**~** "' !**~ ~**  "0 "'**~** "' e Cl**~** c 0 

### "' z Cl co

43 Other Damage Inertia Reel 10 Yes 4 ,._ji =" "'-**=~** "'"' O..<n

2 0 No A Other

48 Fuselage Collapse MeasurementsAround This Seal tEnter inches on drawing; Nose of AiC A Other**c...~.J** 

# ' A r--;.;Fo:;;r.;.;w.;:;ar;.:d;_,._,**·~**
A 01recuon of Detormat10n Fr---.,.....-, Th1s Seat 5

"0 "' j§ "' a. "' 

### "'

Cabtn.- !ntenor Deformat10n Around Th1s Seat !Selectcooes /rom list below) 1 

## I 2 

### I 3 Forward j Rearward ; Left 4 Righi 5 6 8 Up I Down Other on

# Iso Code 

# w 

# i**o.---....~-......,.......,** 

## w on. 

# cl linl 51 Code
52 Code Roof (Downwaracollapse1 53 Code Lt._! Nole: Arrow 1 1shows dlfeCiton ofdisplacement NTSB Form 6120.4 Supplement L (L83) Page2 

# • ';l

• '1 ' yF 

## r [' t.

# II'~ 

# I

r 

# [ i I ' 

### i
r i 

### l

I I;



# I 

# i
r r -83-

National Transportation Safety Board FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION
Supplement L-Seal, Restraint System and Fuselage Deformation (continued) (COdes to be usedin 50·53 above) 01 Wlndsh•eld 02 WindshieiCJ frame 03 Window 04 Window frame 05 Instrument panel 06 Side console 07 Center console 08 Control sucklcychc st1ck 09 Collective 10 Control yoke/column 11 Throttle quadranVIevers 12 Rudder pedals 13 Ceiling 14 Sidewall 15 Floor

NTSB Form 61211.4 Supplement L !1183) 16 Fuselage framing/structure 17 Table 18 Seat 19 Seatback tray 20 Restra>nts-seatbeltitiedown 2, Restraints-shoulder harness 22 Unsecured item(s) 1n cockp<t 23 Unsecured 1tem(s) in cab1n 24 Otheroccupants 25 Ground/runway 26 Unsecured sea1(S) 28 Galley <temls) 30 Other interiorobjects 44 Door'hatches APPENDIX B

Page 3-84-

APPENDIXC COMPUTERPROGRAM FOR CRASHWORTHINESS 

### ANALYSJS 

### ComputerProgram Summary Data defining the curve for an estimated crash pulse is entered into the computer, and the program is run. The acceleration curve is generated from the data, and the area under the curve is integrated, yielding a curve for velocity. The area under the velocity curve is 

### integrated yielding a curve for distance. This is accomplished by dividing the acceleration curve into 100 equal time increments. The change·in velocity and distance for each increment is 

### calculated using an average acceleration and average velocity for that increment. Additional documentation of the program is included below. Refer to the following lines in the program listing: Line 56: DV =(y 

### + Yold) *CONST 

## * DT DV (ft/sec) =velocity change for a given increment Y, Y 01

### d (G's) =The acceleration in G's at the end (Y) and at the beginning (Yold) ofeach increment CONST (constant) 

## =16.1 

## =32.2/2, where 32.2 is the gravitational constant, to translate G's to feet per second2• Division by 2 results in a value for an average G (Y & 

### Y 01

### d) for the increment. DT(sec) =The time increment, equalto the totaltime ofthe crashpulse divided by 100. Line 57: V(I} =

### V(I

- 1) + 

### DV V(I-1) (ft/sec) =

### velocity at the startofthe increment V(I) (ft/sec)

## = velocity at the end ofthe increment Line 58: DIS (I)= ((V(I) + 

### V(I-1)) *.5) *DT DIS (I) (ft) = 

### Distance change for a given increment. Multiplicationby 0.5, results in a value for the average velocity for V(I} +

### V(I-1). Line 59: DIS

## <n = DIS (I) + 

### DIS (1-1} DIS (I) (ft)

# = Cumulative distance ofcrush, asopposed to the incrementaldistance change calculated on line 58. L



# '-·..\.

,·

# ,{()

ir f**~**

# ! r

' 

# L. -85- APPENDIX C

--.,-------:-.::---------

### --···------------ ·-·--·------**~ORTMAN** IV V02.2•1 TUE 28•JUN•83**1~:51:19 PAG~**  001. ,LP:=DL1:(1,77]HUMAN

_ 0011.1.------

..._. ...PRO.GR.4ld- !:ill!tEAc....__

..________------- <.: C CREATED**8~** MONTY**MONTGUM~MY.** OF NTS6 fE-6U C JuLY, 198:l

. 

### ···--···-··· c----------- ------------ ··---------------·-----·-··----..--------·-"

l)\.)02 0003. 0004**000~** \1006 0007 1)008 ll\)09. 0010 0011

0012 0013 0014

0015. •.)0 16 0 !} 1., 01.118 L)019. C THIS**PROGRA~** READS ACCELERATION DATA AND fARGET C VALUES fOH VELOCitY AND DIStANCE fROM A USER C**CREAT~D** FILE.**TH~** PNOGRAM**I~TEGRATES** 1HE ACCELERATION

. C AND. THE THE. VELOCITY

....**:rO....G~:.1:.0ISTAt.lC!!:**..

C THE INTEGRATiONS ARE PLUltEO ON THE d04HD 1S OI**IT~L** C .i:JLOTTI::N TO ALLOW THF: USER TO St:E If HIS ACCt::l

..t:RATlON C EStiMATES ARE APPROPRIATE. 

### c. ·-·------ ..._.,_--- ...___---------------------------·-·------·------ 

### c THE**~UANO'S** COMPUTER IS A DIGITAL**EOUIPME~T** CORPORATION C POP•ll/40**RUNNl~G** RSX•ll/M SOFTWARE. C THIS**PRUG~A~** IS WRITTEN IN ANSI•66 FORTMAN. 

### c'
-.... ··--- ----------·------------ ---------··-------- ---·------ 

### c**OI~ENSIU~** D VARIABLES ANO lN!TIALIZAf!UN 

### c

C-

. 

### c

2 

## c C. 

## c

## :la

__ c c c32

3 \ 

### c c c c. 

### c REAL•4**NA{100),fA(100),K(10UJ,fHAC~(l0)** REA.I..*4---

. .V.(.5.0.0 ) .t01S-(!>-0-U+rl',S0-0.) ? X!:tA-C**~!.--** (. 4.0..}--

...**OlME~SIUN** VHALK(20),VTIM(20)**Dl/'ll~NSION** A(500) LUGICAL*l**~UF(80) PNO~PT**  USER fOR DATA**~IL~** AND OPEN IT Til-l!:: 1**t'UI-V~AT(** I**E~TEi-1** INPUT fiLENAMt:: 'S) ACCE..PT

... 2•.1C..JiUE.

.....-- ----- ......... CALL ASSIGN(3,BUf,IC) r0RMAT(Q,80All READ

.. TA.RGET..

..VELOCl.TY.._\lA.LUES.**At~u.** T1/Yl.t::S.- -·**~EAD(.),J;l)NVHACK** 00 2 ):! 1

## = l**,-,~** VHACK Hf.AU.(.3 ,_.33.) V.T!M"U.l#-.W'HA.CK.( I 1.**R~AD** TARGET DISTANCE VALU£S AND**1l~~S** READ(. 3.12) !HACK------
------------- fflR,.,AT(lRl DtJ .;} 1=1,IliACK REAU(J,jj)TnACK(!),XHACKll) 

### c u**~·**s.r.;; l.b.,..l-

......\..... 1--"G-. 12-

...-.... ----- .**~----** ---·-- READ**ACCEL~RATION** VALUES AND**TIM~S** AND CONStRUCT A**LihEA~ PIEC~-~ISI::** **fUNCTIO~** ARRA¥ . ! E•· SL0flt::S

..**A~..U** . LNtE.HC.E.£1S...EO.JL.A.L.L.

.. D EF.IN ElL l.N.T**t::R~A.L.S-.**___ _ 0020**~PARf:O** 0021 READ(J,JJJTA(l),Al

.0U22

......- LOO

....J-<J::AO C3.,.1J.,.L"i0;.9..ll..W:

..**2.~,** A....,.2"----:-·-·--------------·---- 0023 33**f0R~AT(2rt0.0)**APPENDIX C -86-



### ·--------------- 

## ----------**FU~TNAN** IV V02.2•1 TUE 2ij•JUN•8J 12:51:19 _PAGE 002 ,LP:=DL1:(1,77JHUMAN 0024-

. - -- -- ..**i~**PART:.nPA1<-1'_.-t-

----- 0025 IA(Nt:>ART+ll=!'2 0026**~A(~PARTJ:((A2•AlJ/(T2•TA(hPAMT)))** 0027**b(NPAR£):A~·MA(N~ARTl•T2** 0028------ -AJ..:A-2--------- -----· 0029 GU TO \00 

### c C INTEGRATION AHEA ••• VELOCIT¥ 

# = VELOCITY + AVG**ACCEL~RATIUN** 

# * TIM£ C- --·- .LliST.At.lCE: =--01-'HAN-Cg_-+--AVE:;RAt;E--**VE:~OCIT**i-'*-- :f.J-Me;.--------. 

### c C**1~~** TOTAL**Gl~EN** lNTEMVAL IS**OlVIO~D** INTO 100 SUBINTERVALS C FOR A**PIEC~·wlSE** INTEGkAflON•

.-·.--C-------

----------··-··· ----·--··--·- -----

!l030 0031 0032- 0033 (1034 0(}35 

### c**T[~ER** IS A SUBROUTINE**~HICH** METURNS AN ACCELERATION C· VALUE**FO~ TH~**  SPECifiED SUBINTEHVAL, USING TrlE

. C PIECE-wiSE LINEAR ARRAY CONSTRUCTED**FHO~** THE ACCELERATION C--- PO-I**NTS----I~-.--:f.t!(!;-.If>i.i<>-U-'t--to~** 1-b-l!;...--- ---·------· ------- ------- C":133 CON'[' { NU£ TfHN=fA(l) T;,tAX:TA.(.N.PAl<f-+--1.+--------·----·-·--·····---------

-----**DT:(T~AX•TMIN)/100. fA(l)~TAll)•.OOOOl**  TACNPARTtl):TA(NPARTtl)t.OOOOl ()0 l 0----·

-- .. 0 I)37 Tu:.fMI!ll---

- -- -- ---·-·-----· . -- --- .......... CALL**Tl~£R(TO,Y,TA,MA,B,NPART,!FLG)** lHifLG.NE.Ol GO TO 9000 .____, ___ ,

# __________ () i) 3i:3 0040 0041 0042 0043 0044 004!:i Ot)46 0t)47 0048**u04~:L** .. 0051 0052 !J I)5 3 9800 Oil54. 9900**uo~5** oo!>o iJIJ57**~)** lJ5 !:s 0059 0()60 

### 0vo1 10 

### c- - c 

### c c**A(lJ~i** YUL.U::f T<ll=lO V(l):VHACK·(t) D!S(l >=XHACI\.(1) 

### uu 10 l=2.10t.. ro=rO+uT T(l):TO CALL**flMEH(10,¥,fA,~A,~,~PAR1,IfL~J** IF( 1L' LG .li.U•.

### u). C.U-'l:U.

..**9~00-.-** .. TYPE -..;800**~·!JRMAT( 1**  TlMli'lG E:RROk IN fORCING i'UhCTION TIME')**~u** l'O 

### 9ooo Ci.JN T**u~ut.:**.. A(l):y JV:(Y+YOLOJ*CUNS!*DT V( 1 ):V(l-1 )t-Ui/ DiS( L.J:( (.\1..( 1 ).-t.\l. ( l.'!"

..J,•.}..). '-·**~-}.**

### *·U.t -· 01S(1J=UIS(l)+DIS(1•1) 'iULD=Y CONTINUE ..... ----------------·--·-------

... ... ··-··**~·······~·---·-~-·--·--·--·--·----··-··--·** ··-···-· .. -"**-~~--------~------·--·-** rrlE**l~TEGRATt:O** VALIJES Ar1D 11--11:: ACCI::LERAflflN**F'UNCTiOi~ A~£**  PLOT11::D**HF~I-<E.** 0062

.... ·--. - 0063 CALL.

..ASSt.c;.t.L{-l._,_!.aL,.:.,.L)

____---------·----------------··---------------- CALL CLUSE(3)

....

## ____,

# _____ 

# •

### -87- APPENDIX C

fORTRAN IV V02.2•1 PAGE 003**~LP::or.,t:** L1,77lHUMAN 01)64----
-- ----CA.L..L.-.**ASS-IGN...(.~'"'""""..._,_·+------------------------------·--------~--'** 0065**CA~L** PLOTS(O,Oil 0066 CALL fACTOR(l.O) 0067 CALL NEwPEN(l)

.**Ou6i:I--------CA.L.L--R£CT.(.0...-.-.0.....rl-l--..--.-~O-r-W--~--··----~-----**

0069 CALL**PLUT(l.S,.~,-3)** 0070 CALL GR1DCO.,O.,.S,.5,20,20) 0071 CALL SCALE(T,10.,101,1)

. 0072.. .CALL.. .SCALE(A,.10...,...;-l-.O.l

..,_!!L1+--.----------·-·--- U07) CALL**~~~PEN(2)** 0074 CALL AXIS(0.,0.,4HTINE,•4,10.,0.,T(l02),T(103ll 0075 CALL AXISCO.,O.,bHACC ,6,10.,90.,A(102),A(103)J 007&___ CALL--SYMtH.li..-C-'!!!....!125, 5.25-,....,..U

...r0-

.. 9..U.<>--#-.!"'1.)..-----**-----------~** 0077 CALL L1NECT,A,101,1,1,0) 0078 CALL**NE~PEN(3)** 0079 J=101 0080..------

-- D0-4.0.- I=-1-,-N**V-"!AC~---------------------,-------------------------** U081 J=J+l 00ij2 40 V(J):VHACK<ll OU8J CALL SCALE(V,lO.,J,l) u084--------

... - .. V (.10-2-J-=-l/..C...J-+ 1-J.----------·-----·--------

--------------------- 0085 V{l03}=VCJ+2) 0086 DO 41 J=l,NVHACK 0087 XP=(vTIMlJl•T(102))/TC103) 0088...... Y1?:...(

### v1-i.ACK (**J.).~-~(.1.0 2.}.)../.V-.(..l...Q.J.J..~--------·**  - -- --·--- -- U089 CALL**PLOTCX~·.25,YP,3)** 0U90 CALL PLOT(XP+.25,YP,2J 0091 CAt.L PLUf(XP,tP-.25,J) 0092. CALL**PLO'I.(.tP,¥e.t.25.~<2..l--** .....___ --·-··-·-·· 0093 41 CALL CIRCLCXP+.25,¥P,0.,360.,.25,.25,0.) 0094 CALL AXIS(•.S,O.,bHVEL**,b,10.,9U.~VllU2),V(103))** 0095 CALL**SV~BOL(·.~l25,5.25r.14,1,90.,•ll** 0096 CALL.**LHa:cr..il~.l.O.l.,..l,l,.J.J-_** ··- - .... 0097 CALL**NEw~EN(4)** 009H J=lOl Ou99 DO 42 l=l,IHACK 

# g

f

# g**~-** 4

### 2**~-~~-t-3**

### y;

### x**-~fAc KT!T---~--~-~---~·-··~** **··--·~---··~~·** 

### . -··**~~-----** 

### ...**·---~-----** oto2 CALL SCALf(OIS,lO.,J,l) 0103 DlS(l02l=OIS(J+1J IJl04.... D1S.Ll 03 );;OJS (J:t:Ll

.. Vl05 UU 43 J=l,IHACK 0106**XP=(THAC~(J)-f(102))/~(10JJ** 0 107 'iP

## = (XHACK (J l -DIS ( 102l ) I 0IS( 11)3) 0 10li CALL. t-lLUT (**X..t'-~--•** 2.S.,..X.E

..,..3...)..

__________-----------. -·--·. ·-- ..---··- ---·· 0109 CALL PLOTlXP+.25,YP,2J 0110 CALL PLOT(XP,YP•.25,3) 0111 CALL PLOT(XP,YP+.25,2) 0112 43

. CALL.

..**Cll~C.L.(.X.B:t.25.#-¥E..,..O.,..,..J.6.0.**...... -25.,..2!>.,.0

. 0113 CALL AXlS(-l.,O.,bHS ,6,10.,90.,01**~~~~ CAL~** **SVMAOL(•l.Jl25,5.2~,.14,2,YU.,-1J**

0115 CALL**Ll~~(T,DIS,101** 1,1,2)

. 0116

___ CALL. PLO'L.(.l.A

...**,.~**.. s..,_'!'j J -------·----- 0117 CALL PLOT(0.,0.,999)



# LAPPENDIX C 

### -88-

FORTHAN**I~** V02.2-1 ,LP:=DLt:£1,77JHUMAN TU£ 2H-JUN-bl 12:51:19 PAGE 004 0 1UL--900-0- CA!..l.--CWSg.-(..4..)__

___ _ 0119 CALL EXIT 0120 ENU-89- APPENDIX C

··-- 

### ··--------------- fORTRAN IV STORAGE MAP fOR PROGRAM UNIT HUMfAC l,OCAL NAME Al 

### OT lC J TMAX T2 'tOL.D

..- VARIABLES, .PSECT SDATA, S!ZE 

# =023042 ( 4881. NQRDS)

·----·····--·--·----·----·------·---··----··-------·------··- 

### --- -----------'--

TYPE**UF~S~T NAM~**  TYPE OFfSEt**NAM~** TYPE OffSET R*4 022656 A2 R*4 022666 CONST R*4 022b50 R*4 022702 OV H*4 022724 I 1*2 022644 Lf 2

_____Q22.£i..4..Q_

___.!EI.£____

....U 2 022-1J..b-------

.**l~CL-** I 

## * 2 ..CU2b4

### o 1*2 022730**~PART** 1*2 022654 NVHACK I*2 022642 R*4 022676 TMlN R*4 022672 TO R*4 022706 k*4 0226b2 XP R*4 022732 Y R*4 022712 tH( 4--- 022720..-.

--- .'tP------·--I:L*4---

.. 022-7 ).6....

.**·---·----··-~** LUCAL AND CUMMON**AHRA~S: ,~AME-------**  TYPE...•.**S£.CT.lU.N-.-OEE'SE~."!~~-~~SI.z.r.;.."!'!.~."!--'"!**.. '!!!..**O..t..~<S-I.Olll.~-------'** A ·R*4 SOATA 016540 003720 ( 1000.) (500) B k*4 SDATA 001440 000620 ( 200.) (100) BUF' L*l SDATA Ol2460 000120 ( 40.) (SO) t.> IS

......... Rf4- -···-··- S**DA.T-A-.-.-O.Ob-J.l.o__O.O..l~z.o_c..**.. 1.0.0.0..•..}....(

. .50

. 0.+--------**~A** W*4 SOATA 000000 000620 ( 200.) (100) r H*4 SUATA 012240 003720 ( 1000.) (500) fA R*4. SOATA OU0620 000620 ( 200.) (100) rHACK.. 

# '"'* 4

... ----- . SllA.U •.-- u.O.:l2**o.(J.___U.OV.l-2-0.-(-~** -..40-

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....( 20.>--·-------· 

### v R*4 SUATA 002400 003720 ( 1000.)**(50~)** VHACK R*4 $DATA 0lb300 000120 ( 40.) (20) vrlM H*4 SDATA 016420 000120 ( 40.) (20) XHACK

.. 1H4.... SOA..T.A_

___ 0.1.616.Q..

___Q..O.O.l20..-C-- 4.0•• )

.....(..2.0l------·-· Sdr:HWU

### r I I'll**~S,** F'lJ NClIONS, S'fATr:I·H:**i~**T Ar•D PR0CESS£H<-DEflNED FUNCTI UNS:**NAi~l:.** 1\SSIGN f4CTUR PLOTS T¥PE.:. R*4 R*4 IH4

,_1APPENDIX C -90-

FORTRAN IV V02.2•1 TUE 28•JUN•83 12!52:11 PAGE: 001

, LP:=DLl: [ 1,11JHUMAN 000.-1- ----·--···**S.USFHJU.'f..I-N-E-.t:.IME~,-'t-r-r-A-,.-~A-,**8-,.-N-,1 P:b-G-)-----------·- C C THIS kUUTINf**US~S** ThE PCECE•WISE LINEAR**RE~R~SENTATION** C fUR**TH~ FORCI~G** **~UNCTION** AND AN lNPUf**TIM~** VALUE --·-C.-

--- TO

.. f<KTUH#--- A-1\f-·AC{;&kb-RA.;t;**l-G-N-~J.A-I:AJ.E-.r:0!+-1'ifA4-l'-I** Ml!i-r--------- C 0002 0003 0004---···· 1}005 IJOOb OOUt! t)()0,9.-.. -1--

. •JO 10 0011 0012 2 I)0 1**~--** -- 3.. i)•J14 i)015

\ 

# \**R~AL•4 rA(l),~A(l),B(l)**  II'LG=O IllS:l----·. ·-···· ---··--**---~----·---·** ·------ ·--····· DO 1 [:2,N+1 lF(T.GT.TA(I•l).ANU.T.LE.TAll)) GO TO 2**.~s=N::>**+1 CO.ti'l' I**i'll~---------····------·.** ---·----·-·-------------- IfLG=-1 GO TO 3 i':f'lA(NS)*T+B(NS) CUN'f.I fll.lJ.Ii;..------- ·-···----- ----·-··----· ....._ ..___..---·--·-·· ... -----·- --- -····----- HFTURN**~NO** 

# ·;·-91- APPENDIX C

fURTRAN IV STORAGE MAP FOR**PHOGRA~** UNIT TIMER LOCAL VARIABLES, .PSECT SOATA, SIZE : 000032 ( 13.**~OROSJ -.~.--.4-·--···**  ·--- -·· ----**--·-·-··-~·-----·-·--·----··--··-·----- ·-~--~·-------·-·---**  TYP£**UFFS~T** NAME**T~PE** UffSET NAME TYPE**UFFS~T** It2 000024 IFLG 1*2 @ 000014 N 1*2 @ 000012 lf2 000022 T H*4 @ 000000 i H*4**~** UOU002 LOCAL AND COMMON AHRAYS:**~4ME** TYPE SECTION**OffS~T** ----·-SIZE•••••**DIM~NSIONS** B-

....... - .. !H<i**-~** $DATA---

..0000.1-0-.-

..00.00.Il-4-(.._.__ 2-..-)-- ( 1.->-·-------·- -··-·- MA R•4**~** SDAfA OOUOOb 000004 ( 2.) (1) fA H*4**~** $DATA 000004 000004 ( 2.) (1)

---···------ ------·----·· --·--·---------92,-

APPENDIX D 

# e
CRASHWORTIDNESS PROGRAMINVESTIGATIONS TO DATE

SIIINT 01 tMSIIIII'!liiiQS**~~ID'I'S** Ali!J>l.AIIE TOTAL DATE MU AJID P[R$0115 IIIJURI PHASE or TYI'E or 1982 MODEL OP£AATIOII TUAA!M ACC!O[N'T TYPE t-10 I(Qt(T LNIOIIIG TREES, SHRUBS, COll!SIO!t WITH GROIJliO II20G Cl1T TREE STOOS 2·1 BEECH APPROACH AIRPOI!'T COLl!S!Oit WITH GROIJliC 8£-99 2·15 PIP£R l.AIIDIHG AIRPORT COll!SIO" WITH**OBST~Cl·** PA·28R-180 2-27 CESSIIA APPROACH AIRPORT COlliSION WITH GROIJliO C·150 3-8 PIPER CRUISE FARI'I.A/40 COlllSION WITH OSSTACI PA·28-180 3·28 PIPER 

## • 4 T'-UOFF HILlS COLLISION WITH**GRO~NC** PA-28-140 5·6 PIP£R L'-NO!IIG MOU!lTAlNS COLLISION WITH GROUND PA-28R-180 5·9 BEECH l.AIIOIHG GOLF COURSE COLLISION WITH GROCND 8£-833 6-4 CESSIIA IWIEUYERIHG FAAIUHO COlliSIO!t WITH WIRE/ C-152-11 GROUND 6-13 PIPER CRUISE !IAASHLANO COlliSION WITH TREES/ PA-28-181 GROUND 6·17 CESSIIA CRUISE CNI'SITE COlliSION WlTH GROIJliO C·152 7-9 PIPER LNIOIIIG AIRPORT COLLISION WITH GR0\110 PA-24-250 1·9 PIPER APPROACH DIRT GAM MIOAIR COUUION/

# ·~) PA-28-160 COLLISION WITH GROIJliC 7-21 PIPER l.AIIDIHG FARMLAND COLLISION WITH GROUND PA-34-ZOOP 8·1**BEEC~** GO·AROUHD AIRPORT COLLISION WITH GROl'IIC BE-23 8-18 BELl.AIICA CRUISE BEACH 'COLLISION WIT!; GROIJliO 7ECA 8-18 PIPER I.AADIIIG AIRPORT COLLISION WITH GROIJliD PA-28-235 8-27 CESSIIA TAKEOFF FARIUHO COLLISIOn WITH TELEPHl t-207 POLE 9·5 PIPER CRUISE RIVER BED COLLI_SION WITH GROUNC PA-32·300 9-20 CESSIIA T'-KEOFF DESERT COLLIS!()!( WITH GROIJliC C·I82P 10-4 BEEOi 2 I.AAOI"G DITCH COLLISIIJI WITH GROUND BE-56TC 10·5 CESSIIA LAHOIHG DITCH COLLIS!ON W!Tf' GROUNC C-T210L 10·18 CESSIIA l.AIIOIHG !YIRSHl.AIID COlLISIOH WITH TREES/ t-17Z GROUND 10-21 PIP£R 4 l.AIIDIIIG PASTURE COLLISION WITH TREtSi PA-28-181 GROUND 10-23 CESSIIA 4 I'AIIEUYERII!G I«JUUITA!N SLOPE COLLISION WITH GROUNC C-172 10-24 PIPER 4 TAKEOff fAR!UHO COLLISION WITH GROUNC PA-32-300 11-8 BEEOi CRUISE fARI'LAHO COLLISION WITli GROUNG BE-23 11-8 CESSIIA APPROACH ROAOS!O[ COLLISION WITH GROu•t t-172 11·18 PIPER GO·AROU!IO AIRPORT COLL!SIO!t WITH GROIJliC 601P ll-21**GR~** lAKOIHG AIRPORT COLLISION WITH TREES 

# ,, M-5 ll-30 C£SSIIA LAJIOING AIRPORT COLL!SII)!j**~!TH** TREES C·PZlO