I N T H E SUPR EM E C O UR T O F M I SS I SS I PPI NO. 2 0 0 7 - CT - 0 2 0 4 7 - S CT AR T HUR D . CA RL I

S L E, AD M

I NI S T RA TOR OF T H E ES T A T E O F C H A R L ESE . A L L EN

, III , DECEAS

ED
v. J ANET ELL EN DAVI

SALL EN ON W RI T OF CE RT I ORARI D A T E O F JU D G M E N T : 10/ 19/ 2007 TRI AL J UDG E: HON . J AM ES H. C. THOM AS, J R. COURT F ROM W HI CH APP EAL ED: P EARL RI VER COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTO RN EY FO R A PP ELLAN T: M I CH AEL J . VA LLETTE ATTO RN EYS FOR A PP ELLEE: J OSEPH ED GA R FI LLI NG AN E C A R O L A N N E S T E S B U S T IN NAT UR E OF T HE CA S E : CI VI L - DOMES T I C R E L AT I ONS DI S P OS I T I ON: T HE J UDGMENT OF T HE CO UR T OF A P P E A L S IS R E V E R S E D A N D R E N D E R E D . THE J UDG M ENT OF T HE CHANCERY C O U R T O F P E A R L R IV E R C O U N T Y IS R E I N ST A T E D A N D A FFIRM E D - 07/ 29/ 2010 M OT I ON F OR RE HE AR I NG F I L E D: M ANDAT E I S S UE D:
EN BA NC. PI ERCE, J UST I CE, FOR TH E COU RT: ¶ 1 . A d iv o rc e d c o u p le , C h a rl e s A lle n a n d Ja n e t A llen , fil e d a p e tit io n to re v o k e th e ir di vor ce. W hi l e the pet i t i on w as pendi ng, C har l es di ed. T he chanc el l ori ni t i al l y quashe d the
m ot i on. O n r ehea r i ng, t he cha ncel l orf ound t hatJ anethad pr oduced s uf f i ci entevi dence of
r econc i l i at i on and ent er ed an or derre voki ng t he di vor ce. A r t hurC ar l i s l e, the admi ni s tr at or

### 2

of C har l es ’ s es t at e, appea l ed on hi s behal f
. T he C our tof

A ppeal s – f

i ndi ng c as es i n w hi ch a part y t o a pendi ng di vor ce di ed pr i ort o a f i nal entr y of

di vor ce t o be ana l ogous – hel d t hat t he chanc ery cour tdi d nothave j ur i s di ct i on t o hol d an evi dent i ary hear i ng, and r ever s ed and
re n d e re d th e m a tte r. J a n e t f ile d a p e titio n fo r w ri t o f c e rt io ra ri , w h ic h th is C o u rt g ra n te d
.

FACTS ¶2. C har l es and Jane tA l l en w ere m arr i ed on N ov em ber 24, 1996, and di vor ced on Sept ember23, 2002, i n t he C hance r y C our tof Pear l R i verC ou nty. T he coupl e had no chi l dr en dur i ng thei rmar r i age. O n M ay 17, 2006, J anetand C har l es f i l ed a J oi ntA ppl i cat i on to R ev o k e Ju d g m en t of D ivo rce , w h ich w as p rop erly sign ed b y b o th p arti es, i n the c h an ce ry cl erk’ s of

f i ce of Pe arl R i verC ount y. T hi s appl i cat i on w as pr epar ed by A r t hurD . C ar l i s l e. T he part i es t ook no f

ur t heract i on on the pet i t i on, and C har l es di ed on J une 16, 2006, pr i or to a n y e v id e n c e o f re c o n c ili a tio n b e in g p re se n ted to th e trial c o u rt. ¶3. T he tr i al cour tquas hed the appl i cat i on t o s etas i de the di vor ce ne ar l y one yea raf t er C h a rle s’s d e a th . T h e trial c o u rt’ s o rd e r sta ted th a t itw o u ld a llo w Ja n e t to file a tim e ly
r eques tf orr econs i der at i on, i f

s he coul d s how s uf

f i ci entf act s of a s at i s f act ory r econc i l i at i on. C arli sle rep rese n ted C h arles’s estate a s it s ad m inistrator. ¶4 . J anetf

i l ed f orr eco ns i de r a t i on a nd t e s t i f i e d t o t he f

ol l owi ng f

act s r egar di ng her
r econc i l i at i on w i t h C harl es : t he tw o had mai nt ai ned thei rr el at i ons hi p af t erthe di vor ce; C har l es and J anetha d c ont i nued t o t al k a nd go outt ogether ; Char l es ha d a pr i vat e t el ephone l i ne puti n J anet ’ s hous e s o he coul d c al l he r ; the t w o ha d s pentevery w eeke nd t ogetherf r om M ar ch 2006 unt i l Char l es ’ s de ath i n J une 2006; Char l es ha d cal l ed herm ul t i pl e t i m es a day
w hi l e s he w as r ecove r i ng f r om a hi p i nj ury s he i ncurr ed f ol l ow i ng H urr i cane K atr i na;

### 3

C h a rle s h a d p lan s to se ll h is h o u se a n d m o v e b a c k in to th e fo rm e r m a rital h o m e w ith Ja n e t;
a n d th e c o u p le h a d o p e n e d a jo in t b a n k in g a c c o u n t. ¶5. J anetal s o t es t i f

i ed thatt he r eas on t he coupl e i ni t i al l y had di vor ced w as t hatJ anet had become s i ck dur i ng t he mar r i age a nd J anet ’ s mot her , M ary D avi s , ha d encour aged he rt o get d ivo rce d
. Jan et t es tified that C h arles d id n o t com e into the c o u rtroo m the d ay they w ere di vor ced. R egar di ng t hei rr el at i ons hi p af t ert he di vor ce, J anets t at ed, “w e w er e al w ays cl os e. I tw as l i ke w e w er e neve rr eal l y di vor ced. ” O nce t hey fi l ed the pet i t i on t o r evoke the divorce, t he co up l e bo t h b egan w eari ng theirw edd i ng ri ng s. ¶6. O n cr os s - exami nat i on, J anet t es t i f i ed t hat C har l es had pai d t he bi l l s at hi s hous e, and

– o th e r th a n th e b ill fo r th e p h o n e lin e C h a rle s h a d p lac e d in Ja n e t’s h o m e – D a v is h a d p a id th e b ill s a t h e r h o u se . A fte r C h a rle s’s d e a th , h is b o d y w a s f o u n d a t h is h o m e b y h is hous ekee per , B ever l y Sl aydon. J anetw as atherhom e and w as i nf or m ed of hi s death by S la y d o n . ¶7. D avi s t es t i f

i ed t hatthe cor oners entChar l es ’ s pe r s onal e f f ect s t o D avi s . She s ai d s he
s u p p o s e d th e c o ro n e r d id th is b e c a u s e o f h e r d a u g h te r’ s re la tio n s h ip w ith C h a rl e s . ¶8. Sl aydon t es t i f

i ed that she had m et Janet w hil e w or ki ng f orC har l es i n hi s hom e. Sl aydon t es t i f

i ed thats he of

t en had t al ked t o J aneton t he phone, butC har l es w oul d notgi ve herJ anet ’ s phone numberbeca us e i tw as “ j us tf orhi m and [ J anet ] . ” She t es t i f i ed thatC har l es
w as o n the p h o n e w ith Jan et co n stan tl y , that Jan et reg u larl y h ad sp en t w ee k en d s at C h arles’s hous e, and C har l es and J anetw oul d hol d ha nds , t al k, a nd l augh. I n he ropi ni on, Char l es and J anetl oved ea ch othervery m uch. Fi nal l y, S l aydon t es t i f i ed t hatt he onl y ot herw om an s he
evers aw atC har l es ’ s hom e w as J anet ’ s per s onal car e pr ovi der , Patr i ci a B ear d.

### 4

¶9. B ear d car ed f

or J anet as s he r ecove r ed f r om a hi p i nj ury and, dur i ng t hat t i m e, dr ove C har l es a nd J anett o Popl arvi l l e t o f i l e the pet i t i on t o r evoke thei rdi vor ce. She s aw C har l es s i gn t he j oi ntappl i cat i on and t ake i tt o the cour t hous e. She t es t i f i ed t o s eei ng C har l es t hr ee t o four t i m es per w eek, and said t hat C harl es w ou l d bri ng Janet l un ch, fl ow ers , or pres ents . She s t at ed thatC har l es and Jane tw oul d s pend hour s t ogetheron the phone. I n heropi ni on, C har l es and J anetha d a ve r y l ovi ng a nd a f f ect i onat e r el at i ons hi p. I tw as herunder s t andi ng th a t th e c o u p le h a d w a n ted to h a v e th e ir d iv o rc e re v o k e d a n d th a t C h a rle s h a d p lan n e d to
r e tu r n t o t h e ma r i t a l h o me . S h e s t a t e d , “ [ Ch a r l e s ] n e v e rf e l tt h a tt h e y we r e d i v o r c e d
. He
w ant ed t o be w i t h her
. H e t ol d me thats he w as hi s l i f e par t ner . ” Fi nal l y, B ear d t es t i f i ed that C h a rle s h a d a sk e d h e r to fin d h is w e d d in g b a n d , an d sh e h a d se e n h im w e a rin g it. ¶10. C ar l i s l e t es t i f

i ed t hat he w as a cl os e f r i end of C har l es ’ s , and he had know n hi m s i nce 1969. H e s t at ed thathe had prepared the appl i cat i on t o r evoke the di vor ce, butthati tw as h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a tCh a r l e s “ n e v e ri n t e n d e d t o ma r r y [ J a n e t ] o rs e ta s i d e th e d i v o r c e . ” He f ur t hert es t i f

i ed thathe pr evi ous l y had pr epar ed f our orf i ve appl i cat i ons t o r evoke the di vor ce f

orC har l es , butC har l es had thr ow n t hos e appl i cat i ons aw ay. C ar l i s l e thought C har l es f el tchea t ed outof

the m ar i t al home i n the di vor ce, and w as us i ng t he r evoca t i on of di vor ce t o “r ecove rw hathe thoughtw as r i ght f ul l y hi s . ” ¶11. C ar l i s l e f

ur t her t es t i f

i ed t hat he r egul ar l y had vi s i t ed C har l es and t hat he neverhad not i ced s i gns of

anyone s t ayi ng w i t h hi m . W hen he vi s i t ed J anetaf t er C harl es’ s death, C ar l i s l e s ai d t he f

i r s tt hi ng J anett ol d hi m w as thats he w as notgoi ng t o pay f orthe f uner al
arr angement s . A s a r es ul t , he made a numberof t he f uner al arr angement s per s onal l y. H ow ever , J anett es t i f

i ed thatC ar l i s l e vol unt eer ed t o m ake the f uner al arr angement s and

### 5

r ef us ed t o al l ow hert o pay f ort he s ervi ce. Fi nal l y, C ar l i s l e t es t i f i ed thatC har l es had a per s onal r el at i ons hi p w i t h a f emal e att orney bef

or e and a f

t erH urr i cane K atr i na. W hi l e he d id n o t k n o w th e w o m a n ’s n a m e , itw a s s o m e o n e o th e r th a n Ja n e t.

RUL I NG I N T HE CHAN CE RY COURT ¶1 2 . C arli sle fi led a m o ti o n to q u ash the ap p li ca ti o n to rev o k e the d ivo rce . T h e c h an ce ry cour ts ubs equent l y ent er ed an or derquas hi ng t he appl i cat i on on J une 11, 2007. T he tr i al
cour tr eas oned that“ no he ar i ng orothere vi dence of the r econc i l i at i on w as pr es ent ed pr i or t o t he dea t h of

C har l es E . A l l en, I I I , ” and f ound thatt he mot i on ther ef or e s houl d be quas hed. H ow ever , t he or ders peci f i ed thatt he chanc ery c our tw oul d “ ent ert ai n a m ot i on t o r econs i der th is f in d in g s h o u ld th e c o -a p p lica n t ti m e ly file s u c h a re q u e st a n d sh o w su ffic ien t fa c ts
e v id e n c in g a s a tis fa c to ry re c o n c ilia tio n o f t h e p a rt ie s .” ¶ 1 3 . Ja n e t filed a m o tio n fo r re c o n sid e ra tio n e lev e n d a y s late r, o n Ju n e 2 2 , 2 0 0 7 . C a rlisle
s ubs equent l y f

i l ed a m ot i on t o str i ke Ja net ’ s m ot i on forre cons i der at i on, ar gui ng t hati tw as unt i m el y and thatJanet had fa i l ed i n the mot i on t o s how s uf f i ci entf act s evi denci ng a
r econc i l i at i on. T he chance r y cour thel d a hea r i ng on t he mat t er , i n w hi ch both J anetand C har l es ’ s es t at e pre s ent ed t es t i m ony r egar di ng t he coupl e’ s r econc i l i at i on, as des cr i bed above. T he cha ncel l orent er ed hi s orde ron O ct ober24, 2007, fi ndi ng j ur i s di ct i on pr operand gr ant i ng t he r evoca t i on of di vor ce. ¶14. T he cha ncery cour tal s o f ound evi dence of

i nt entt o r evi ve t he m arr i age i n t hat C har l es a n d Ja n e t h a d jo in tly filed th e p e tit io n . F u rth e r e v id e n c e w h ich su p p o rte d a n in ten tio n to
re v iv e th e m a rria g e n o ted b y the ch a n c e llo r in c lu d e d : C h a rle s a n d Ja n e t o fte n h a d sta y e d w ith
o n e a n o th e r, w e n t o u t to g e th e r, talk e d fre q u e n tly , an d h a d o p e n e d a jo in t b a n k a c c o u n t in

### 6

t hei rnames. T he cha ncel l ordi s m i s s ed the cl ai m t hatt he pet i t i on t o r evoke the di vor ce w as a n a tte m p t b y C h a rl e s to a c q u ir e title to th e m a ri ta l h o m e . ¶15 . C arl i sl e t i m el y appealed on beh al f of C harl es’ s est at e, rai si ng several i ssues. T ho se i ssues can be fai rl y sum m ari zed as fol l ow s: I. W hethert he ch ancery co urthad j uri sdi ct i on aft er the d eat h o f C harl es. I I . W hethert he cha ncel l orerr ed i n f i ndi ng t hatJ anethad pr oduced s uf f i ci entevi dence t o r evoke the di vor ce. III. W h e th e r th e c h a n c e llo r e rre d in fa ili n g to strik e Ja n e t’s m o tio n to r econs i deras unt i m el y a nd f orf ai l ur e t o s etf

or t h s i gni f

i cantf act s , and su b seq u en tl y h o lding a h ea ri n g o n the m att er. I V . W hether t he chance l l or err ed i n not di s m i s s i ng t he act i on t o s etas i de t he di vor ce be caus e J anetdi d notf i l e a r evi voraf

t erC har l es ’ s death. HO LDI NG OF THE CO URT O F AP PEALS ¶16. T he C our t of A ppeal s hel d t hat t he chanc el l or s houl d not have conduct ed a hear i ng on t he m at t er, becau se i tl acke d jurisdicti on . T his C ou rtprevi ou sl y h as heard a case i nvol vi ng a pet i t i on t o r evoke di vor ce w hi ch w as f i l ed by onl y one s pous e af t erthe dea th of th e o th e r s p o u s e . 

### Wel

lsv. Rober

son , 209 So. 2d 919 (Mi ss . 1968)
. H o w ev er, t he C our tof A ppeal s corr ect l y f

ound t hatt hos e f

act s w er e di s t i ngui s habl e f r om the pr es entm at t er . T he
c o u rt fu rt h e r n o te d th a t n o c a s e s d ir e c tly o n p o in t c o u ld b e fo u n d
. Carlis le v. A l len , 2009 W L 17 58 86 4, *4 , ¶15 (M i ss. C t. A pp . June 2 3, 20 09 ). T heref ore, t his i s an i ssue of f i rs t im p re ss io n in M iss iss ip p i. ¶1 7. T he C our tof

A ppeal s f

ound t ha tthe mos ta na l og ou s c a s e s a r e tho s e i n w hi ch a
m a rrie d c o u p le f

iles fo r d iv o rc e an d o n e o f th e p a rties d ies b e fo re a v a lid d iv o rc e d e c re e is
e n ter e d . In su c h c a se s, th is C o u rt h a s h e ld , “ u p o n th e d e a th o f o n e o f th e p a rties to a p u re ly

### 7

di vor ce a ct i on, bef

or e t he entr y of

a f i nal de cr ee . . . the ac t i on m ay notbe cont i nued and no f i nal decr ee of

di vor ce may be ent er ed ther eaf t er , s i nce . . . ther e i s then no s t atus of m arr i age upon w hi ch t he f

i nal decr ee of

di vor ce m ay oper at e. ” P itt m an v. P itt

m an , 375 So. 2d 415, 4 1 6 (M iss. 19 7 9 ) (qu o ti n g 1 0 4 A . L . R . 6 5 4 ). T h e C o u rto f A p p ea ls al so n o ted th at th is C o u rt
r ece nt l y has s ai d, “The l aw r egar di ng t he dea t h of one of t he par t i es i n a di vor ce a ct i on, as s etouti n P itt

m an , i s s t i l l val i d. ” B ar ton v. B ar ton , 7 9 0 S o . 2 d 1 6 9 , 1 7 3 (M iss. 2 0 0 1 ). ¶ 1 8 . R e ly in g o n w h a t w e re c o n s id e re d to b e a n a lo g o u s c a se s, th e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls h e ld t hat“s ubs t i tut i on of

anotherpar t y i n C har l es ’ s pl ace i s notpr oper . ” Ca rlisle , 2 0 0 9 WL 1 7 5 8 8 6 4 , * 4 , ¶ 1 7 . Re a s o n i n g t h a tt h e p u rp o s e o f r e v o k i n g a d i v o r c e i s t o “ r e u n i t e two form erl y m arr ied p art i es as a m arr i ed co up l e, ” t he C ou rtof A pp eal s hel d thatno pu rpose
w oul d be s erved i n r evoki ng t he di vor ce be caus e t her e i s “no s t atus of m arr i age upon w hi ch

. . . [ t o] oper at e. ” I

d. ¶19. T he C our t of A ppeal s agr eed w i t h t he chanc ery cour t t hat J anet had put on s uf f i ci ent
e v id e n c e o f h e r r e c o n c ilia tio n w ith C h a rl e s p ri o r t o h is u n tim e ly d e a th
. I d . a t * 4 , ¶ 18. H ow ever, t he co urtf

ou nd the t ri al courtl acked the “p ow er” t o rei nst at e t he m arr i age b ecause o f C h a rl e s ’s d e a th
. I

d. a t * 4 , ¶ 1 8 . T h e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls h e ld th a t th e c h a n c e llo r e rre d in conduct i ng an evi dent i ary hear i ng on t he m at t erand re i ns t at ed t he f i nal j udgm entof

di vor ce. T he j udgm entof

t he cha ncery cour tw as r ever s ed and r ender ed. J anetthen f i l ed a pe t i t i on f orw r i tof

cert i or ar i , w hi ch thi s C our tgr ant ed. A N A L Y S IS ¶ 2 0 . T h e f

i n d i n g s o f

a c h a n c e l l o ra r e s u b

j e c tt o a n a b u s e - o f

- d i s c r e t i o n s t a n d a r d o n r e v i e w. B ar ton v. B ar ton , 790 So. 2d 169, 175 ( M i s s . 2001) ( quot i ng Cu m m ings v. B enderm an , 681

### 8

So. 2d 97, 100 ( M i s s . 1996) ) ( T hi s C our t“w i l l notdi s turb the f actual f i ndi ngs of

a cha ncel l or
w h e n su p p o rte d b y su b sta n tial e v id e n c e u n les s th e C o u rt c a n sa y w ith re a so n a b le c e rta in ty t hatt he cha ncel l orabus ed hi s di s cr et i on, w as m ani f es t l y w r ong, cl ear l y err oneous orappl i ed
an err oneous l egal s t andar d. ”) H ow ever , ques t i ons of l aw w i l l be r evi ew ed de novo
. K eener P r ops . , L L C

v. W il s on , 912 So. 2d 954, 956 ( M i s s . 2005) ( ci t i ng W eis s ingerv. Sim

ps on , 861 S o . 2 d 9 8 4 , 9 8 7 (M iss. 2 0 0 3 )). ¶21 . T he st atute r egu l at i ng revocati on of di vo rce r eads as fol l ow s: T he j udgm entof

di vor ce f

r om the bonds of

mat r i m ony may be r evoked a tany t i m e by the courtw hi ch gr ant ed i t , unde rs uch r egul at i ons and r es t r i ct i ons as i tm ay deem pr opert o i m pos e, upon the j oi ntappl i cat i on of t he part i es , and upon t he pr oduct i on of

s at i s f act ory evi dence of

thei rr econc i l i at i on. M iss . C o d e A n n . § 9 3 -5 -3 1 (R e v . 2 0 0 4 ). E a c h o f th e sta tu te’ s re q u ire m e n ts h a v e b e e n m e t, and ther ef

or e, t he cha ncel l ordi d noterri n hol di ng a hea r i ng on t he mat t erand r evoki ng t he ju d g m e n t o f d iv o rc e . ¶22. T he C our t of A ppeal s err oneous l y rul ed t hat pet i t i ons t o r evoke a di vor ce s houl d be governed by the rul es w hi ch govern pet i t i ons t o di s s ol ve a m arr i age. W e have s ai d, “D i vor ce i n M i s s i s s i ppi
. . . i s pur el y and s i m pl y a c r eatur e of s t atut e. T he r evoca t i on ors et t i ng as i de of di vor ce de cr ees i s al s o governed ent i r el y by s tat ut e. ” W

e lls v. R o b e rs o n , 209 So. 2d 919, 9 2 3 (M iss . 1 9 6 8 ) (e m p h a sis a d d e d ). It is w e ll-es tab lish e d th a t “w h e n a rig h t is g iv e n so lely by s t atut e i ti s s ubj ectt o the t erm s named i n t he s t atut e. ” P r i ce v. P r i ce , 202 M i s s . 268, 32 So. 2d 124, 126 ( M i s s . 1947)
. Fur t her , thi s C our thas s ai d, “w hen a s peci al and part i cul ar s t atut e deal s w i t h a s peci al and part i cul ars ubj ect , i t s part i cul art erm s as t o the s peci al s ubj ect contr ol overgener al s t atut es deal i ng w i t h the s ubj ecti n gener al
. ” I d . ( ci t i ng G ull

y v.

### 9

L u m b e r m e n ’s Mu t. Ca s . Co ., 176 M i s s . 388, 397, 166 So. 541 ( 1936) )
. T he Legi s l atur e has cl ear l y l ai d outthe s t andar ds w hich m ustbe m eti n or dert o have a di vor ce r evoked, and t hos e ar e s epar at e r equi r ement s f r om thos e governi ng the gr antof a di vor ce de cr ee. I . Juri s di ct i on ¶23. C ar l i s l e al l eges t hatt he appl i cat i on t o r e vo ke the di vor ce a bat ed upon C har l es ’ s death. I n s uppor tof

t hi s ar gum ent , C ar l i s l e poi nt s t o t hi s C our t ’ s hol di ng i n the nea r l y- t w o- centur yo ld c a s e , G er ault

v. A nders on , 1 Mi s s . 3 0 , 1 8 1 8 W L 4 5 6 ( J u n e T e r m 1 8 1 8 ) , wh e r e i n we s ai d, “on the dea t h of [ a] part y hi s i nt er es tcea s es , and the j ur i s di ct i on of t he courtcea s es al s o. ” I d. at*2. C ar l i s l e f

ur t herpoi nt s t o t hi s C our t ’ s opi ni on i n W e lls , the o n ly c a se in
w hi ch thi s C our thas deal tw i t h a s i m i l arf acts cena r i o. T he W

ell s C our tacknow l edged the G e ra u lt h o ld in g a n d o th e r s im ila r p re c e d e n ts . See W e lls , 2 0 9 S o . 2 d a t 9 2 2 . ¶24. H ow ever , t he hol di ng i n W e lls w as not pr emi s ed on t he t r i al cour t ’ s j ur i s di ct i on, but
ra th e r o n t h e f

a il u r e o f t h e p e titio n e r t o m e e t e a c h o f t h e s ta tu to ry re q u ir e m e n ts . I d. T he W ell s C o u rt re lied o n th e p rin c ip le d isc u ss e d a b o v e , “ w h e n a rig h t is g iv e n so lely b y sta tu te i ti s subj ectt o t he t erm s nam ed i n t he s t atut e. ” P r i ce , 32 So. 2d at126. I n W e lls , w e f ound t hatt he pet i t i onerdi d notm eett he t erm s of Sect i on 2747 of

t he 1942 M i s s i s s i ppi C ode (w h ich to d a y is M iss iss ip p i C o d e S e c tio n 9 3 -5 -3 1 ) b e c a u se the p e tit io n w a s n o t filed jo in tly
– r atheri tw as an ex p a rte pet i t i on f i l ed af t ert he hus band’ s death. B eca us e the “s t atut e f i xes t he co nd i t i on s upon w hi ch the r i ght[ t o have a di vor ce r evoked] m ay be a s s ert ed, t he condi t i ons ar e an i nt egr al par tof t he r i ghtt hus gr ant ed – ar e s ubs t ant i ve condit i ons , the obs ervance of

w hi ch i s es s ent i al t o the ass ert i on of the r i ght
. ” W

e lls , 209 So. 2d at923.

### Deb orahH. B ell, Be ll on Mi ss i ss i pp iFa mi l

yLaw 43 6 (20 05) (“ Adjudi cati on of 1 

### mari ta l s tatus and c ust ody ar e c onsi der ed t o be in re m a ctions . A court wi th s ubje ct matt er juris dic ti on m ay ent er

a f ault- bas ed divorceor

c ust ody de cr eewithout pe rs onaljuris dic ti on over thedef endant. ”) ; “ An ac ti on for divorceis regard ed as a for m of in rem ac ti on, per mi tting a djudi cati on of right s ba se d on thedomi ci leof oneof the partie s — and the re for e thema rria ge — in a partic ular s tate . Ac cording t o theUni te d State s Suprem e Cour t, ‘Ea ch st at e a s a sove re ign ha s a

ri ghtf ul and le gitimate concer

n in t he m arit alst at

us of per sons domi ci led wi thin it s border s and . . . c an a lt er within i t own border s the m ar ri agest at us of thespous e dom ic il ed ther e. ’” Id. at 437 (quoting Wil

li ams v . North Caroli

na , 317 U. S. 287, 299, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 ( 1942))
. In No ble , west at ed: 2 

### notwi ths tanding thi s Court ' s holding that the [c hanc el lor] properly held that it coul d not rende r a pe rs onalmone tary j udgme nt a gainst thenon-r es ide nt def endant on [ a s umm on s by public ation] , i t wa s not tot al ly wi thout juris dic ti on. The[c hanc el lor] did have j uri sdi ction ove r the s ubje ct matt er of thedivorceac ti on and pe rs onaljuris dic ti on over one of theparti es to t

he marriage who didmeet residen cy require me nts fo r a div orce actio n. M iss. Code Ann. § 93-5- 5 (Supp. 1986). This statut ory authori ty and thepubli cati on noti cegives the chance ry court i ts authorit y to grant a divorce on cons tr uctive noti ceby publi cati on. No ble , 502 So. 2d at

320 (e mpha si s a dded)
. 10 T her ef or e, t hi s C our tdeci ded W e lls b a se d o n w h e th e r ea c h o f th e req u ire m e n ts o f th e sta tu te had bee n m et , as w e do t oday. ¶ 2 5 . F u rth e r, w h ile C a rlisle ci t es m any hi s t ori cal preceden t s f or t he pr opos i t i on t hatt he
cour t ’ s j ur i s di ct i on ceas es upon t he dea t h of one of t he part i es , he over l ooks a ce ntr al el ement req u ir ed for a juri sd ict ion al arg u m en t. W h ile a li m o n y , ch il d su p p o rt , an d v isi tat ion are p erso n al m att ers, acti o n s tou ch ing on th e m arriage relati o n sh ip it self, inclu d ing d ivo rce , are notper s onal — t hey ar e i n r em act i ons , and ar e s ubj ectt o s t atut ory con t rol
. I ndeed, one 1 sp o u se m a y o b tain a d iv o rc e w ith o u t pers onals e rv ic e o f p ro c e s s o n th e o th e r. 

### See, e.g., No ble v. N

ob le , 502 So. 2d 317, 320 ( Mis s. 1987). 2

### The di ss ent urges this Court to ana lyz e thepres ent matt er bas ed upon the m ar

ri age 3 

### anddiv orce statutes andour precedents regardin g suchstatutes. Ho wev er, the d issent fails to rec ogniz e that , upon the de ath of oneof the partie s seeking a div orce, ther e i s no s tatus of m ar ri agere maining for

thecourt t o dis solve – the relief the partie s s ought ha s be en ac com pli she d through thedeath of one of theparti es . Furthe r, the marria ge st at ute s a ls o ar e dis tinguis habl e, in t

hat e ntr y into a marria ge re quires s ole mni zati on of themarria ge be twe en the “p erson s” – requirin g th at bo th perso ns be present fo r th e marriag e to b e solemn ized. See Mis s. Code Ann. §§ 93-1- 17, 93- 1-19 ( Rev. 2004). Int e r e s t i ng ly, thedi s s e nt c or r e c t ly s t at e s , “ Th e p ri vi l e get o am e nd a s t at ut e , not 4 

### cons ti tutiona lly inf

ir m, does n ot re st

with thi s Cour

t”(quoting Missi

ss ippi Ethics Commission v. Gri

sham , 957 So. 2d 997, 1003 ( Mis s. 2007) ). Howe ver , that is exa ctly what thediss ent

propose s thi s Court

do – ame nd the s tatut e t o me an “ at any tim e du ring

the life of bot h parties .” It is the L egislature, an d no t th is C ourt, th at sh ou ld mak e sucha chan ge to thestat ute ’s me aning. As thest at uteis wri tt en, the reis no me nti on of thedeath of theparti es – and wewi llnot

now “e ngra ft ” s uch a

me aning onto t

he c le ar and unambi guous l angua ge of the s tatut e. 11 ¶26. T he C our tof

A ppeal s r el i ed on thi s C ourt ’ s hol di ng that“upon the death of one of the par t i es t o a pur el

y di vor ce ac t i on b e fo re th e e n tr y o f a d e c re e th e re in , th e a c tio n a b a te s .” P i tt m an , 3 7 5 S o . 2 d a t 4 1 6 (e m p h a sis a d d e d ). A s c lea rly sta ted b y th is C o u rt, th a t ru le appl i es onl y t o a pur el y di vor ce a ct i on. T hi s i s beca us e “the dis sol ut i on of the mar r i age re la tio n [w h ic h is th e re lie f t h e p a rt ie s s e e k fr o m th e c o u rt ] is alr eady ac com pl is hed by t he pr i ordeath of one of

t he par t i es . ” I

d . ( emphasi s added)
. T hus , ther e i s no s t atus of m arr i age f ort he courtt o di s s ol ve. 3 ¶2 7 . H ere , th e L eg isl ature drafted an d pa ssed l eg isla tio n w h ich a llo w s c h a n c e llo rs to
r evoke di vor ces upon f

ul f i l l m entof

a l l the s t atut ory r equi r ement s , even a f t ert he dea t h of

one of t he part i es . In t he prese ntm att er , the cha ncel l orf ound t hatal l the r equi r ement s of 4 M i s s i s s i ppi C ode Sect i on 93- 5- 31 had bee n m et . T her ef or e, beca us e the m at t eri s one t ouchi ng upon t he mar i t al s t atus of t he part i es and i s an i n r em ac ti o n , the tri al co u rt

### The di ss ent as ks the que stion, “doe s the Ma jorit y take the unt ena

bleposi ti on that 5 

### becau se a childcusto dyactionis in rem , a court h as autho rity to awardthe cu stody o f a child to a dea d per son? ” Of

c ours e not. Thedi ss ent

c le arly forget s that t

he pol es tar c onsi deration in a ch ild cu stody actio n is th e best interest of th e child– an daw ar d in g c usto dyof a ch ild to a d eceased partyclearlyw ou ld no t b e inth e ch ild’s best interest. Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Mi ss . 1983) . Thedis se nt’ s e xam pleis abs urd. 12 m ai nt ai ned j ur i s di ct i on i n or dert o m ake thatdet erm i nat i on. T he G e ra u lt c a s e c i t ed by 5 C ar l i s l e ul t i m at el y ha s no appl i cat i on w hat s oever . A ccor di ng t o s peci f i c l anguage f

r om t he
cas e, “[ i ] tw as an ac t i on i n per s onam . . . . ” G e ra u lt , 1818 W L 456 at*2. A ccor di ngl y, the chanc ery cour tm ai nt ai ned jur i sdi ct i on overthe mar i t al s t atus of J anetatal l r el evantt i m es in the p rese n t m att er. II. Sta tu tor y R eq u irem en ts ¶28. M i s s i s s i ppi C ode Sect i on 93- 5- 31 m akes i tcl earthata di vor ce may be r evoked w hen th e fo llo w in g req u ire m e n ts h a v e b e e n m e t: (1 ) a t any t i m e ( w i t h no r ef er ence t o t he dea th of one of t he part i es) , ( 2) by t he courtw hi ch gr ant ed i t , ( 3) unders uch r egul at i ons and
r es t r i ct i ons as [the courtw hi ch gr ant ed the di vor ce] m ay dee m pr opert o i m pos e, ( 4) upon t he j oi nta p p li ca ti o n o f th e p arti es, an d (5) u p o n the p rod u cti o n o f s at is f actor y ev i dence of th e irre c o n c ilia tio n . See M is s . C o d e A n n . 9 3 -5 -3 1 (R e v . 2 0 0 4 ). ¶ 2 9 . S in c e th e L e g isla tu re , in w ritin g S e c tio n 9 3 -5 -3 1 , d id n o t li m it th e tim e fra m e in wh i c h a c o u p l e ma y p u r s u e a r e v o c a t i o n o f d i v o r c e , J a n e ti s wi t h i n t h e a p p l i c a b l e t i me f r a me t o ha ve h e rd i vo r c e r e vo ke d. Furt he r mor e , the p e t i t i on was f i l e d i n a nd gr ant ed by t he C hance r y C our tof

Pear l R i verCount y, the cour tw hi ch gr ant ed C har l es and J anet ’ s di vor ce. T he cha ncery cour ti m po sed n o re gul at i ons and r es t r i ct i ons on t he r evoca t i on, and the

### This facto r distin gu ishes th e matter at han d fro m Wel lsv. Rober

son , 209 So. 2d 919 6 

### (Mi ss . 1968) , whe re in t

his Court re ver se d a c hanc el lor ’s re vocati on of divorceupon an ex parte app licationandhearin g after th e deathof o ne o f the sp ou ses. T he di s s entar gues t hatthe survi vi ng par t y, i n thi s cas e J anet , w as abl e t o pr es ent 7 unr ef ut abl e evi dence beca us e the dec eas ed coul d nots peak f orhi m s el f

attr i al , norcoul d he c h a n g e h is m in d p rio r to trial. H o w e v e r, o u r c h a n c e llo rs a re v e ste d w ith d isc re tio n to determ i ne if

t he ev i den ce of t he co up l e’s reconcil i at i on i s sat i sf act ory – an d thi s C ou rtm ust r evi ew onl y w hethers ubs t ant i al evi dence s uppor t s the cha ncel l or ’ s deci s i on. 

### 13 appl i cat i on t o r evoke t he di vor ce and t es t i m ony pr es ent ed atthe hea r i ng cl ear l y s how ed that t he appl i cat i on f

orr evoca t i on of

di vor ce w as a j oi ntappl i cat i on. 6 ¶30 . Fi nal l y, the cha ncel l or , i n hi s di s cr et i on, m us tdet erm i ne w hethers at i s f act ory evidence of r econc i l i at i on w as pr oduced a tt r i al
. A s s t at ed above , thi s C our tha s hel d t hati tw i l l not di s turb a cha ncel l or ’s factual f i ndi ngs w hen s uppor t ed by s ubs t ant i al evi dence , unl es s t he C o u rt c a n sa y w ith re a so n a b le c e rta in ty th a t t h e c h a n c e llo r w a s m a n ife stly w ro n g , cle a rly
e rr o n e o u s o r a p p lie d a n e rr o n e o u s le g a l s ta n d a rd
. B a r to n , 790 So. 2d at175. T he cha ncel l or
w as notm ani f

es t l y w r ong i n fi ndi ng t hatt her e w as suf f i ci entevi dence of

r econc i l i at i on and
r evoki ng t he di vor ce of

C har l es and J anetA l l en. The Courtof A ppeal s al s o agr eed thatJ anet h a d in tr o d u c e d su ff

ic ie n t e v id e n c e o f h e r r e c o n c ilia tio n w ith C h a rl e s . Ca rlisle , 2 0 0 9 WL 1 7 5 8 8 6 4 , * 4 , ¶ 18. 7 ¶31. T he r equi r ement s of M i s s i s s i ppi C ode Sect i on 93- 5- 31 have be en meti n the i r e nt i r e ty. T he cha ncel l ordi d noterri n s o f i ndi ng and gr ant i ng the appl i cat i on t o r evoke the di vor ce.
I I I . Suff i ci ency of

Janet ’ s M ot i on t o R econs i der

### Ru le 59 . New T rials. A men dm ent o f Ju dg men ts. 8 

### (a) Gro un ds. . . . On a m oti on for a ne w tria l in an a ction wi thout a j ury, the court m ay ope n thejudgm ent if on e h as been ent er ed, take a dditiona l te stim ony, ame nd findings and c onclusi ons, and dire ct the entry of a ne w jud gment. (b) TimeforMoti on. A motion for a new tri alshal l be fi le d not l at er than ten d ays after th e entryof ju dg ment. Mis s. R. Civ. P. 59. Rule60. Re li ef

fr om Judgmentor Or der . 9 

### (b) Mis takes ; Inadver te nce ; Ne wly Dis cove re d Evide nce ; Fr aud, et c. Onmotio n an d up onsuch terms as are just, th e court may reliev e a party or hi s l ega l repr es ent ativefrom a finaljudgm ent , order , or proc ee ding f

or the follo win g reaso ns: . . . (6) any o ther reaso n ju stifyin g relief fro m the ju dg ment. The m oti on sha llbe m adewithin a re as onabl e tim e. Mis s. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (6)
. 14 ¶ 3 2 . C a rlisle a rg u e s th a t Ja n e t’s m o tio n fo r re c o n sid e ra tio n in th e trial c o u rt w a s u n tim e ly f i l ed underM i s s i s s i ppi R ul e of C i vi l P r ocedur e 59 becaus e i tw as fi l ed el even days af t ert he 8 ent r y of t he j ud gmen t , r a t he rt ha n t e n. H oweve r , J a ne ta r gu e s t ha the rmot i on f or rec o n side rati o n w as n o t a m o ti o n fo r a n ew tri al, a s c o n tem p lat ed b y R u le 5 9 , b ec au se th ere had notbeen a t r i al pr i ort o herm oti on forr econs i der at i on bei ng f i l ed. R ather , J anet cont ends t he mot i on i s a mot i on f orr el i ef f r om j udgm entunderR ul e 60, w hi ch musthave 9 been made onl y w i t hi n a r eas onabl e t i m e. J anetas s ert s t hatel even da ys af t ert he entr y of

t he ju d g m e n t is a re a s o n a b le tim e . ¶33. T hi s C our t , i n Cannon v. Cannon , 5 7 1 S o . 2 d 9 7 6 , 9 7 8 (M iss . 1 9 9 0 ), s a id th a t it is “r eas onabl e t o c ons i der[ a par t y’ s m ot i on f orr econs i der at i on] as one underR ul e 60( b) ” w hen t he mot i on does nots t at e thati tw as br oughtunderR ul e 59 and w as f i l ed more than t en days af t ert he entr y of

f i nal j udgm enti n t he ca s e. W e f ur t hers t at ed, “H ow a courttr eat s a mot i on

### 15

f orr econs i der at i on tur ns on t he t i m e atw hi ch t he m ot i on i s s erved. I f the mot i on i s s erved
w i t hi n t en days of

t he r endi t i on of

j udgm ent , t he m ot i on f al l s unde rRul e 59( e)
. I f i ti s af t er t hatt i m e, i tf

al l s underR ul e 60( b)
. ” Id . a t 97 8 n .2 . H e re , th e m o tio n d id n o t sp e c ify th a t it
w as br oughtpur s uant t o R ul e 59, and i tw as f i l ed more than t en days af t erthe entr y of

t he
o rd e r t o q u a s h . T h e re fo r e , it s h o u ld b e c o n s id e re d a m o tio n fo r r e lie f u n d e r R u le 6 0 . W e h a v e sa id th a t a tria l co u rt h a s “ c o n sid e ra b le d isc re tio n , th o u g h n o t u n fe ttere d d isc re tio n ” in
re v ie w in g c la im s u n d e r R u le 6 0 (b ). I d. ( quot i ng H

& W Trans f er& Car tage Ser vice, I nc.
v. G riffin , 511 So. 2d 895, 898-99 ( M i s s . 1987)
. I n t he pr es entm att er , t he cha ncel l ordi d not ab u se h is discreti o n u n d er R u le 60 (b)(6 ). ¶34. C ar l i s l e f

ur t heras s er t s t hatJane t ’ s m ot i on di d nots etf or t h s i gni f

i cantf act s r egar di ng
r econc i l i at i on as r equi r ed by the tr i al court ’ s or derquas hi ng t he appl i cat i on t o r evoke. J anet ’ s m ot i on forr econs i der at i on r eads , “[ J anet ] w oul d f urt hers how thats he i s r eady a tt he C o u rt ’s co n v en ienc e to p rov e to th e C o u rtth rou g h t esti m o n y an d o ther e v iden ce that there
w as a compl et e r econc i l i at i on. ” T he cha ncel l orgr ant ed a he ar i ng on t he mat t eri n or derf or hert o do s o. C arl i sl e ci t es no author i t y f ort he pr opos i t i on thatJ anet ’ s m ot i on di d not
s uf f i ci ent l y addr es s t he evi dence s he w oul d pr es entr egar di ng the r econc i l i at i on. T her ef or e, th is iss u e is w ith o u t m e rit. I V . R evi vor ¶35. Fi nal l y, C ar l i s l e compl ai ns t hat J anet di d not compl y w i t h M i s s i s s i ppi C ode Sect i on 15 -1- 69 , w hich r eads: I f i n any ac t i on, dul y comm ence d w i t hi n the t i m e al l ow ed, the w r i ts hal l be a b a ted , o r th e a c tio n o th e rw ise a v o id e d o r d e fe a ted , b y th e d e a th o f a n y p a rty t her et o . . . t he pl ai nt i f

f m ay com m ence a new act i on fort he sa m e caus e, atany t i m e w i t hi n one yea raf

t ert he abat ementorotherde t erm i nat i on of the or i gi nal

### 16

s ui t. . . and hi s execut oror a dm i ni s t r at orm ay, i n cas e of t he pl ai nt i f

f ' s death, co m m en ce su ch n ew ac ti o n , w ith in the said o n e y ea r. M i s s . C ode A nn. § 15- 1- 69 ( R ev. 2003)
. H ow ever , a s di s cus s ed i n Sec t i on I of thi s opi ni on, th e a c tio n w a s n o t ab a ted u p o n th e d e a th o f C h a rle s. T h e re fo re , S e c tio n 1 5 -1 -6 9 is in a p p lica b le a n d th is iss u e is w ith o u t m e rit. CO NC L US I ON ¶36. B eca us e J anet m et every r equi r ement i n M i s s i s s i ppi C ode Sect i on 93- 5- 31 t o have a di vor ce r evoked, t he C our tof A ppeal s e r r ed i n r ever s i ng t he cha ncery cour t ’ s r evoca t i on of th e A lle n s’ d iv o rc e . T h e c h a n c e ry c o u rt m a in tain e d p ro p e r ju risd ictio n , the m o tio n to
r econs i derw as notunt i m el y underR ul e 60, and no r evi vorw as neces s ary undert he f act s of t hi s c a s e . The r e f

or e , the j ud gmen to f

the Courto f

Appe a l s i s r e ve r s e d a nd r e nd e r ed. T he j udgm entof

t he C hance r y C our tof

Pear l R i verC ount y i s r ei ns t at ed and a f f i r m ed. ¶ 3 7 . THE J UDGM ENT OF THE CO URT O F AP PEALS I S REVERSED AND RENDERED . THE J UDG M ENT OF THE CH ANC ERY CO URT O F P EARL RI VER COUNT Y I S RE I NS TA TE D AND A F F I RM ED . CARL S ON, P. J . , DI CK I NSON, KI TCHEN S AND CH AND LER, J J . , CO NCUR. RAN DO LPH, J . , DI S S ENTS W I TH S EPARATE W RI TTEN OPI NI ON J OI NED BY W ALLER, C. J . , AND LAM AR, J . LAM AR, J . , D I SS ENTS W I TH SEP ARA TE W RI TT EN OPI NI ON J OI NE D B Y W AL LE R, C. J . , GRAVE S , P . J . , AND R A N D O L P H , J . RA ND OL P H, J US T I CE , DI S S E NT I NG : ¶3 8 . Ju stic e L am ar h as a stutely h o n ed in u p o n the c o n tr o ll ing , n ea rly tw o -c e n tu ry -o ld hol di ng of

t hi s C our ti n G er ault

v. A nders on , 1 M iss. 3 0 , 1 8 1 8 W L 4 5 6 (Jun e T erm 1 8 1 8 ), t hat“on the dea t h of [ a] par t y hi s i nt er es tcea s es , and the j ur i s di ct i on of the courtcea s es al s o. ” Id . a t * 2 . See al s o O w en v. A br aham , 23 3 M i s s . 55 8, 56 1, 10 2 So . 2d 37 2, 373

### But accord in g t o Jan et, addressing sub stitutio n und er Mississip pi Rule o f Civ il 10 

### Proc edur e 25: [t]he case at bar is not anadv ersarial actionin its g enesis; it is n ot anactionto re cove r m oney o r to e nforcea c ontrac t, a debt, land ri ghts , e tc . In suc h adve rs aria l a ctions , a

subs ti tut ed party can pote nti al ly re cove r or provi de the relief sou ght in th e suit. H ow ever, in th e ca sea t ba r, a su bstitu ted p arty cannot prov idethere li ef

sought by [Jane t] , i .e . marriage . Shecannot be marrie d to an es tate andcertainly does not want t o be m ar ri ed t o another perso n substituted inplace o f [Ch arles]. (Em phas is adde d). Thus, eve n Janet ac knowle dges th at o nlyo ne of thetwo ne ce ss ar

y parti es re mains al ive , and thedec ea se d party c annot be s ubstit

ute d. 17 (1 9 5 8 ) (qu o ti n g G ri ffi th’s M issi ssipp i C h an ce ry P rac ti ce , S ec ti o n 5 9 1 ) (th e “ im p o ssib ili ty
o f” li ti g ati o n “c arried o n b y o r ag ains t an y d ec ea sed p erso n [, ] ” is “ap p are n t . . . u p o n it s m ere
m ent i on”)
. A ppl i cat i on of t hatpr i nci pl e i n a divorce- r evoca t i on cont extal i gns w i t h t he lo g ic a l a n d w e ll- re a s o n e d d e c is io n s b y th e c o u rt s o f o u r s is te r s ta te s . See D unevant v. D une v ant , 142 N . C . A pp. 169, 175, 542 S. E . 2d 242, 246 ( 2001) ( “the t r i al cour tm ay nots et
a sid e a v a li d divo rce de cre e an d th ere b y reviv e the m arit al st atus of a pa rty w h o is d e c e a se d .”); H

il l v. Lyo ns , 5 5 0 S o . 2 d 1 0 0 4 , 1 0 0 6 (A la. C iv . A p p . 1 9 8 9 ) ( fo llo w in g th e d e a th
o f on e p arty, “u p o n ti m ely m o ti o n the tri al co u rtha d juri sd ict ion to am en d , alt er, or m o d if y t he [ di vor ce] decr ee[ , ] ” i ns of aras i t“af

f ect ed pr oper t y r i ght s of

the par t i es [ ] . . . . T he tr i al

10
cour tdi d not , how ever , have the j uri s di cti on t o change t he adj udged m ar i tals tat us of t he p a rties .”) ( e m p h a sis a d d e d ); Cox v. D odd , 242 A l a. 37, 41, 4 So. 2d 736, 739 ( 1941) ( quot i ng 17 A m . Jur. § 4 62 , p. 37 8) ( w hen a divorce j ud gm ent does no taff ectpropert y ri gh t s,

“ [p ]ro c e e d in g s to v a c a te it w ill n o t lie a ft e r th e d e a th o f o n e o f t h e p a rt ie s . The onl y obj ect
w hi c h c ou ld b e at tai ne d would b e s e nt i m e ntal i n i t s na t ur e , f

orthe de ath o

f the pa r t i es ef f ectual l y s eve rs the m ar r i age r elat i on and the pr act i cal r es ul tof the j udgm ent

ordecr ee

### “So the l aw i s writte n.”Bla ck’ s Law Dic ti onar y 966 (4th ed. 1968). 11 

### 18 w ould notbe af

f ected . O n th e o th e r h a n d , w h e re th e ju d g m e n t o r d e c re e a ffe c ts p ro p e rty rig h ts, th e d e a th o f o n e p a rty o r b o th p a rties d o e s n o t af fe c t th e rig h t o f th e u n su c c e ss fu l p a rty
o r h is o r h e r r e p re s e n ta tiv e to in s titu te v a c a tio n p ro c e e d in g s . T h is is p e rm itte d , notf orthe p u rp o se o

f co n tin u in gth e c o n tro v e rs y to u c h in gth e rig h t to a d ivo rc e itse lf , butf ort he
as cert ai nm entof

w hetherthe pr oper t y ha s be en r i ght l y di ver t ed f r om i t s appr opr i at e cha nnel
o f d e v o lu tio n .” ) ( E m p h a s is a d d e d .) ¶3 9 . In sp it e o f G e ra u lt and t he above per s uas i ve author i t y, a m aj or i t y of our J us t i ces opt t o j udi ci al l y engr af

ti nt o the “ata ny t i m e” l anguage of M i s s i s s i ppi C ode Sect i on 93- 5- 31 t he perm i s s i bi l i t y of

a di vor ce r evoca t i on “eve n af t erthe dea t h of

one of t he par t i es . ” ( M aj
. O p. at¶¶ 27
- 28 ) ( c i t i ng M i s s . Code Ann. § 9 3- 5- 31 ( Rev. 2 00 4) )
. “ The p r i vi l e ge t o amend a
s t atut e, notc ons t i tut i onal l y i nf i r m , doe s notr es tw i t h thi s C our t . ” Mis s . E thi cs Com m ’n v. G r is ham , 957 So. 2d 997, 1003 ( M i s s . 2007)
. A s t he s t atut e makes no r ef er ence r egar di ng the d ea th o f a c o ap p li ca n t befo re d ec ree o r j u d g m en t, this C o u rth as n o au tho ri ty t o en g raft
s uch upon i t . I f

t he Legi s l atur e so desi r es , a s t atut ory amendm entt o t hatef f ect( as s um i ng t he cons t i tut i onal i t y t her eof ) i s perm i s s i bl e. B utthatamendm entdoes notl i e w i t hi n t he pr ovi nce of

t hi s Cour t . Forno w , “ on t he de a t h o f [ a ] pa r t y h i s i nt e r e s tc e a s e s , a nd the j ur i s di ct i on of

t he courtcea s es al s o. ” G e ra u lt , 1 8 1 8 W L 4 5 6 a t * 2 . Ita lex s cri pta est . 11 ¶40. T he l ack of

prudence i n the M aj or i t y’ s appr oach bec om es appar entw hen cons i der i ng sta tu tes p e rta in in g to d iv o rc e a n d m a rria g e . M iss iss ip p i C o d e S e c tio n 9 3 -5 -2 p ro v id e s, in p e rtin e n t p a rt, th a t:

### 19

( 1) D i vor ce f

r om t he bonds of

m atr i m ony m ay be grant ed on the gr ound of ir re c o n c ila b le d if

fe re n c e s , butonl

y upon the j oi ntcom

plai ntof the hus band
a n d w ife o r a c o m p lain t w h e re th e d e fe n d a n t h a s b e e n p e rso n a lly se rv e d w ith pr oces s orw her e the def endanthas ent er ed an appearance by w r i t t en w ai ver of process.

. . . (4) C om plai nts f or divorce on the grou ndof i rreconcilab l e dif f erences m ust ha ve b een on fi l e for si

xt y (60) da ys bef ore being h eard
. E xcep tas ot herw i se pr ovi ded i n s ubsect i on ( 3) of t hi s s ect i on, a j oi ntcompl ai ntof hus band and
w ife or a co m p lai n t w h ere th e d efe n d an t h as b ee n pe rson all y serv e d w ith pr oces s orw her e the def endanthas ent er ed an appear ance by w r i t t en w ai ver o f p ro c e ss , fo r d iv o rc e s o lely o n th e g ro u n d o f irre c o n c ilab le d iffe re n c e s, sh a ll be taken as pr oved and a f i nalj udgm ent

ent er ed ther eon , as i n othercas es and
w ith o u t p ro o f o r t e s tim o n y in te rm tim e o r v a c a tio n . . . . M i s s . C ode A nn. § 93- 5- 2 ( R ev. 2004) ( emphasi s added)
. T his st atut e l i kew i s e makes no
r ef er ence t o t he dea t h of one of the part i es fol l ow i ng t he f i l i ng of a j oi ntcompl ai nt (ev iden cing inten t t o d ivo rce ), b u t pri o r to the h ea ri n g a n d /or fina l j u d g m en t. Y et th is C o u rt has hel d t hat“[ t ] he author i t i es ar e cl earthatthe dea t h of compl ai nanti n t he di vor ce a ct i on p rio r to th e e x e c u tio n a n d e n try o f th e fin a l d e c re e b y th e lo w e r c o u rt ended the m ar r i age of t he part i es and c a n c e ledfu lly th e b ill o f c o m p la in t f

o r d iv o rc e a n d in c id e n ta l p ro p e rt y re lie f.”

### 20

B ar ton v. B ar ton , 790 So. 2d 169, 173 ( M i s s . 2001) ( quot i ng P itt m an v. P itt

m an , 375 So. 2 d 4 1 5 , 4 1 6 (M is s . 1 9 7 9 )) (e m p h a s is a d d e d ). I t is n o d if fe re n t o n a p p e a l. See How ard v. How ard , 243 M i s s . 68, 71, 137 So. 2d 191, 192 ( 1962) (“ t he death of ei t herpart y pendi ng an ap p ea l f

rom a jud g m en t i n a d ivo rce acti o n ab ates the ac ti o n inso far as itaffec ts th e m ere
m ar i t al s t atus . . . . ”)
. N o author i t y exi s t s f orthe pr opos i t i on that thi s s t atut e and the r el i ef
so u g h t sh o u ld b e d iffe re n t. ¶ 4 1 . B u t ev e n if o n e w o u ld a rg u e th a t d iv o rc e is d istin g u ish a b le b e c a u se d e a th e ffe c tiv e ly
acc om pl i s hes t he chi ef

purpos e f

ors uch an act i on by di s s ol vi ng t he mar r i age s t atus , cons i der th e e ff e c t o f th e d e a th o f o n e o f t h e p a rt ie s w h ile a tte m p tin g to e s ta b lis h m a rr ia g e s ta tu s . A
m arr i age i s i nval i d: unl ess t he con tract i ngpa rt i es shal lha ve ob tained a m arri ag e l i cense as o th e rw is e re q u ir e d b y la w , and unl es s al so the m arri ag e, after such l i cense shall ha ve bee n d uly issued theref or, sha l lh ave been p erf orm ed by o r bef

ore any per s on, r el igi ous s oci et

y, ins t i t ut i on, oror

ganiz at i on author iz ed by
s ect i ons 93- 1- 17 and 93- 1- 19 to s ol em ni z e m ar r i ages . F a ilu re in a n y c a se to compl y w i t h both pr er equis i t es af or es ai d, w hich shal l be cons t rued as
m an da t ory and notm er el y di r ect ory, s hal l r endert he purpor t ed mar r i age abs ol ut el y voi d.

M i s s . Code Ann. § 9 3- 1- 15 ( 1) ( Rev. 2 00 4) ( e mpha s i s a dd e d)
. Thi s s t a tut e make s no
r ef er en c e t o the de a t h o f

on e of t he pa r t i e s f

ol l owi ng t he l a w f

ul a c qu i s i t i on of

a marr i age l i cens e ( evi denci ng i nt entt o m arr y) , butpr i or t o sol em ni zat i on of the mar r i age. A ppl yi ng

### However, our irrec onci la ble
- di f f erenc e sdivorc e s tatute require s “ thejoint c ompl aint 12 

### of the hu sban d andwife or a comp laint where th e defen dant has b een p erson ally serv ed w ith proc es s . . . .” See Mis s. Code Ann. § 93-5- 2(1) (Re v. 2004)
. 21 th e M a jo rity ’s r e a so n in g , th e ab su rd res u lt o f a m a rria g e b e in g so lem n ize d d e sp ite th e d e a th of one pr os pect i ve s pous e ext ends beyond the r eal m of l egal perm i s s i bi l i t y. ¶ 4 2 . G e ra u lt

i s s ound beca us e of

i t s br i ght
- l i ne hol di ng, i
. e. , j ur i s di ct i on overan i ndi vi dual
c e a s e s a t d e a th
. See G e ra u lt , 1 8 1 8 W L 4 5 6 at *2
. T h e M ajority arg u es th a t G e ra u lt is i nappl i cabl e bec aus e i ti nvol ved an i n p e rs onam acti on, w hi l e the pr es entm at t er“i s one t ouchi ng upon t he m ar i t al s t atus of the part i es and i s an i n r em a c tio n . . . .” (M a j. O p . at ¶ 27) ( ci t i ng G e ra u lt , 1818 W L 456 at*2)
. A s s um i ng ar guendo tha tthe a dj ud i c a t i on of
m ar i t al s t atus and cus t ody ar e i n r em act i ons f orw hi ch “one spous e may obt ai n a di vor ce
w ith o u t pers onals ervi ce of pr oces s on t he other [ , ] ” ( M aj
. O p. a t¶ 25) , t he pr et ens i on t hat 12 a di s t i nct i on s houl d be ac cor ded i n r em versus i n pers onam di s appea r s w hen cons i der i ng t he ef f ectof a nec es s ary par t y’ s death i n di vor ce a nd chi l d- cus t ody act i on s. T his C our thas
c le a rl y s p o k e n to th e d iv o rc e c o n te x t. Se e ¶ 40 supra ( ci t i ng B ar ton , 790 So. 2d at173 ( quot i ng P itt

m an , 3 7 5 S o . 2 d a t 4 1 6 ); How ard , 137 S o. 2d at192)
. Si m i l ar l y, does the M aj ori t y t ake t he un t enab l e posi t i on that becau se a chi l d-cust od y acti on i s i n r em , a cour thas
a u th o rity to a w a rd th e c u sto d y o f a c h ild to a d e a d p e rso n ? S u re ly n o t. C o n sis ten t w ith G e ra u lt , w hen a nece s s ary par t y t o a di vor ce, di vor ce r evoca t i on, orchi l d- cus t ody act i on di es , t he tr i al c our t ’ s a ut hor i t y t o a l t ere i t herthe m arr i age s t atus orc hi l d cus t ody cea s es . T he
a p p li ca ti o n o f G e ra u lt i n s uch ci r cumst ance s i s emi nent l y corr ect , and the i n r em / in pers onam d istin c tio n is o f n o im p o rt.

### Th ere is no mentio n o f a filing requ irement inSectio n 9 3-5 -31 . See Mi s s . Code 13 

### Ann. § 93- 5-31 ( Rev. 2004). In the event th at th e co urt also find s “satisfacto ry evid ence of th eir recon ciliation .” 14 

### Mis s. Code Ann. § 93-5- 31 (Re v. 2004)
. Carli sl e’ s t es timony t

hat he pr evi ously had pr epare d four or f ivere vocati on 15 

### app lication s fo r C harles, each of wh ich Ch arles d ispo sed of, clearly evin ces th at any“intent” inferredfrom th e app licationis tenu ou s. 22 ¶4 3. The M a

j or i t y op i ni on cas t s as i de G e ra u lt ’s com pell i ng l og i c and l on gst andi ng vi nt age, and i ns t ead s ubs t i tut es w hatamount s t o a precari ous “i nt ent ” s t andar d. I n cas es i nvol vi ng t he death of a nec es s ary par t y, appl yi ng t hi s same “i nt ent ” st andar d t o i t s l ogi cal extr eme w oul d s anct i on d i vo r ces pr i ort o a f i nal decr ee be caus e the part i es ’ “i nt ent ” w as exp res sed i n the j ointcom plai nt, and m arr i ages pri or t o solem nizat i on becau se of the p art i es’ “i nt ent ” expr ess ed i n acqui s i t i on of a mar r i age l i cens e. U ndert he M aj or i t y’ s appr oach, sh o u ld w e n o t be g in ac c e p tin g u n sig n e d w ill s b e c a u se th e d e c e d e n t h a s s h o w n h is “ in ten t” t o di r ectt he di s pos i t i on of pr oper t y? A ppl yi ng t he M aj or i t y’ s i nt erpr et at i on of Sect i on 93- 5- 31, i f bot h per s ons exec ut e a j oi ntappl i cat i on and one di es , al bei tbef or e i ti s f

i l ed, 13
s uf f i ci ent“i nt ent ” i s s how n f orthe r evoca t i on of

a di vor ce as l ong a s i ti s conf i r m ed by the 14
s ur vi vi ng appl i cant , w ho ef f ect i vel y get s t o pr es enti r r ef uta bl e evi dence beca us e dea d p e rso n s c a n n e ith e r sp e a k n o r ch a n g e the ir m in d p rio r to trial. S u c h a n a p p ro a c h is le g a lly 15
err oneous and pr act i cal l y unt enabl e, a l egal f ol l y. ¶44. T hi s deci s i on can have fa r - r eac hi ng, i l l conse quence s on i nt err el at ed ar eas of l aw . For exampl e, t he l aw of

des centand di s t r i but i on pr ovi des that“[ a] l l per s onal pr oper t y s i tuat ed i n t hi s s t at e s hal l des cend a nd be di s tr i but ed ac cor di ng t o t he l aw s of thi s s t at e r egul at i ng t he des centa nd di s t r i but i on of s uch pr oper t y . . . . T he w i dow of s uch dec eas ed per s on s hal l t ake

### Sim il arly, the Ma jorit y’s approac h would a ll ow thesur viving party t o cl ai m Soc ia l 16 

### Sec uri ty bene fi ts a s a widow, and part akeof other tax advanta ges re se rve d for thespous e of a de ce as ed, des pit e the undi sput ed f ac t t hat theparti es wer e di vorc ed at t he tim e of

death. 23 hers har e i n t he per s onal est at e acc or di ng t o t he l aw s of thi s s t at e. ” M i s s . C ode A nn. § 91- 1- 1 ( R ev. 2004)
. I n t he abs ence of a w i l l , i f a di vor ce may be r evoked de s pi t e the pr ej udgm ent death o f on e of the p art i es, t hen the “w i do w of such d eceased p ers on , ” otherw i se
u n re c o g n iz e d , g a in s s ig n if ic a n t p ro p e rt y ri g h ts . See M iss. C o d e A n n . § § 9 1 -1-7 (“[i ] f a h u sb a n d d ie in tes tate a n d d o n o t lea v e c h ild re n o r d e sc e n d a n ts o f c h ild re n , h is w id o w sh a ll be ent i t l ed t o hi s ent i r e es t at e, r eal and per s onal , i n f ee s i m pl e, af

t erpaymentof

hi s debt s ; but
w her e the dec eas ed hus band s hal l l eave a chi l d or chi l dr en by t hator a f or m erm arr i age, or d e sc e n d a n ts o f su c h c h ild o r c h ild re n , h is w id o w s h a ll h a v e a c h ild ’s p a rt o f h is e sta te, in ei t hercas e i n f

ee s i m pl e. ”) ; 91- 1- 11 ( “[ w ] hen any per s on s hal l di e pos s es s ed of goods and chatt el s orper s onal es t at e notbequea t hed, t he s ame sha l l des cend t o and be di s t ri but ed among hi s orherhei r s i n t he s ame m annerthatr eal es t at e n ot devi s ed des cends
. ”) ( R ev. 2004)
. U ndert he M aj or i t y’ s appr oach, thes e s ubs t ant i al pr oper t y r i ght s ar e ac qui r ed nunc pr o t unc bas ed upon an unc ons um m at ed “i nt ent ” t o r evoke the di vor ce, des pi t e the 16 i r r ef ut abl e f actt hatatt he t i m e of

death, the part i es w er e di vor ced. ¶ 4 5 . U p o n h is d e a th , C h a rl e s’s “ tim e ” e x p ire d . T h e trial c o u rt w a s c o rre c t in in iti a lly quas hi ng t he j oi ntappl i cat i on t o r evoke the di vor ce based up on C har l es ’ s death, buterr ed in su b se q u e n tly “ e n ter tain [in g ] a m o tio n to re c o n sid e r th is fin d in g sh o u ld [Ja n e t] tim e ly file
s uch a r eques tand s how s uf f i ci entf act s evi denci ng a s at i s f act ory r econc i l i at i on of t he par t i es . ” Foral l of

t he above r eas ons , I j oi n J us t i ce L amar ’ s di s s ent , w hi ch decl ar es t hat“a

### 24

t ri al cou rti s w i t ho ut authori t y t o alt er the m ari t al st atus of a party w ho i s deceased.” ( D i s. O p . at ¶ 4 7 ). I like w ise d iss e n t. W AL LE R, C. J . , AND L AM AR, J . , J OI N T HI S OP I NI ON.

L AMAR , J US T I CE , DI S S E NT I NG :
¶4 6. T he i s s ue be f

or e the Courti s whethe rthe d e a t h of o ne of t he par t i es t o a j oi nt appl i cat i on t o r evoke di vor ce de pr i ves the tr i al cour tof j ur i s di ct i on t o pr ocee d on the j oi nt appl i cat i on a f

t erthe par t y’ s de ath. T he ques t i on of j ur i s di ct i on i s bas i c and f undament al , and if there is an ab sen ce o f j u ri sd ict ion – o v er e ith er the p erso n o r th e su b ject m att er – the c o u rt i s w i t houtpow ert o act . A tc om m on l aw , the dea t h of ei t herpar t y gener al l y putan end t o an act i on. In recogn i t i on of t hi s pr i nci pl e, t hi s C our tl ong ago hel d that“on the dea t h of [ a] par t y hi s i nt er es tceas es , and t he j ur i s di ct i on of the courtcea s es al s o. ” G er ault v. A nders on , 1 M i s s . 30, 1818 W L 456, *2 ( J une Ter m 1818)
. G r i f f i t h’ s M i s s i s s i ppi C hance r y Pr act i ce pr ovi des t hat : “A val i d j udgm entcannotbe r ender ed i n f avorof t w o per s ons , one of

w hom att he t i m e i s dead. Such j udgm enti s voi d. ” B r i dges & Shel s on, Mississi pp i C ha ncery P r act i ce § 6 2 0 ( 2 0 0 0 e d .). “A p ro c e e d in g to se t as id e a d iv o rc e d e c re e , tha t is v a lid o n its f ace and t hat deals excl us i vel y w i th t he part i es ’ m ar i t al s t atus , i s abat ed upon a f or m er s pous e’ s death. ” 24 A m . J ur . 2d D i vor ce and Se par at i on § 4 3 0 (20 0 8 ). ¶4 7. O urs t atut e s p r ov i de a p r oc e s s wher e by a j udgm entof di vor ce c an be r evoked. S ect i on 93 -5- 31 of the M i ssi ssi pp i C od e st at es:

### See e.g., Laroc ca v . Laro cca , 59 7 S o. 2 d 1 00 0, 1 00 4 (L a. 19 92 ) (Div orce is a 17 

### per sona l a ction t

hat abate s upon the de ath of oneof the partie s) ; In Re Estat e of Wi ll iams , 20 03 WL 19 61 80 5, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p., Ap r. 28 , 20 03 ) (same); In Re Mar ri age of Hime s , 965 P.2d 1087, 1093 (Wa sh. 1998) ( same ). 25 T he j udgm entof

di vor ce f

r om the bonds of

mat r i m ony may be r evoked atany t i m e by t he cour tw hi ch gr ant ed i t , undersuch r egul at i ons and r es t r i ct i ons as i tm ay dee m pr opert o i m pos e, upon the j oi ntappl i cat i on o f t he part i es , and u p o n th e p ro d u c tio n o f s a tis fa c to ry e v id e n c e o f t h e irre c o n c ilia tio n . M i s s . C ode A nn. § 93- 5- 31 ( R ev. 2004)
. T he maj or i t y f i nds t hat , beca us e the condi t i ons of t he s t atut e w er e met , J aneti s ent i t l ed t o pr ocee d on the appl i cat i on t o r evoke di vor ce, un aff ect ed by C harl es’ s death. I dis agree. T his act i on deal texcl usi vely w i th the p art i es’
m ar i t al s t atus , an ac t i on thatw as s t r i ct l y per s onal t o e ach of t hem, one w hi ch coul d notbe

17 assi gn ed, no r coul d an otherparty b e su b sti tuted i n thei r s t ead. Th us, t he acti on m ust
nece s s ar i l y abat e upon ei t herpar t y’ s death. I fi nd not hi ng i n t he l anguage of the st atut e that
com pels m e t o ignore t he w el l -f ou nd ed rul e t hat “on t he d eat h o f [ a] party h i s i nter estceases, and t he j ur i s di ct i on of

the cour tcea s es al s o. ” G e ra u lt , 1818 W L 456, at*2. I w oul d f i nd t hat
a tr ia l c o u rt is w ith o u t a u th o ri ty to a lte r t h e m a ri ta l s ta tu s o f a p a r ty w h o is d e c e a s e d . I th e re fo re d iss e n t. W AL LE R, C. J . , GRAVE S , P . J . , AND RA NDOL P H, J . , J OI N T HI S OP I NI ON.