2024 UT App 112

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LETICIA JAIMES AND FRANCISCO JAIMES,

Appellants,

v.

FRANCISCO ARELLANO-MEDINA,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20220959-CA

Filed August 8, 2024

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Adam T. Mow

No. 190907680

Brandon C. Stone, Attorney for Appellants

Joseph J. Joyce, Bryan J. Stoddard, and Blake A. 

Hallock, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, 

in which JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 This case arose when Francisco Arellano-Medina (Father) 

caused a minor car accident while his wife, Leticia Jaimes

(Mother), and son, Francisco Jaimes (Son), were passengers in the 

car. After the accident, Mother and Son (collectively, Plaintiffs)

sued Father to recover damages for alleged injuries stemming 

from the accident. Before and at trial, the court denied Plaintiffs’

requests that they be allowed to explain to the jury that they 

delayed seeking medical treatment after the accident because 

their automobile insurer initially denied their claim. The jury 

returned a no-cause verdict in favor of Father, and Plaintiffs

appeal the court’s evidentiary ruling. Because the court did not 

exceed its discretion in excluding the auto insurance evidence, we 

affirm.
Jaimes v. Arellano-Medina

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BACKGROUND

¶2 On the morning of September 28, 2018, Father was driving

the family car to take Mother to work and Son to school. In his 

haste, Father backed into the garage door of their home before it 

had fully opened, resulting in minor damage to the car’s trunk lid 

and a partially broken rear spoiler. The car’s airbags did not 

deploy, as the car was moving only “2 to 3 miles per hour” at the 

time it hit the garage door. The damage to the car was estimated 

to cost less than $1,200 to repair.

¶3 Following the accident, Plaintiffs sought out chiropractic 

treatment for their injuries but only after a thirty-nine-day delay.

The family maintained auto insurance through State Farm

Insurance Company (State Farm), which initially denied that 

Plaintiffs were entitled to personal injury protection benefits 

under their policy. However, State Farm reversed its initial 

coverage determination, and thereafter Plaintiffs began 

chiropractic treatment paid for by State Farm.

¶4 While Father admitted responsibility for causing the 

accident, the parties disputed whether Plaintiffs were injured in 

the accident and what damages Father was responsible for as a 

result. Eventually, Plaintiffs filed suit against Father to recover 

damages from the accident.1

¶5 Leading up to trial, Plaintiffs argued that they should be 

allowed to explain their delay in seeking medical treatment for 

their injuries by discussing the “auto insurance involvement in 

this case.” Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that they should be 

“allowed to discuss State Farm’s initial denial and later admitting 

of coverage.” Plaintiffs explained that they did “not plan and 

1. On appeal, Plaintiffs claim that Father was only a nominal 

defendant in the case because he did not dispute liability and is 

the husband of Mother and the father of Son. They argue that State 

Farm is the real party in interest for the defense in this matter.
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[were] not requesting that they be allowed to go into a lot of detail 

regarding the nuances of [the] insurance coverage.” Rather, “[i]t 

would be sufficient simply to state that State Farm . . . was 

involved, that State Farm initially told Plaintiffs that there was no 

coverage available but later changed its position and indicated 

that there was, that Plaintiffs were unable to afford chiropractic 

treatment on their own, and that [was] the reason for the delay in 

treatment.” Plaintiffs did not ask, however, that they be allowed 

to explain the treatment gap in a more general way by explaining 

simply that they did not have insurance coverage at first but did 

have it later. The defense opposed the motion, arguing that the 

delay in seeking medical treatment was highly relevant evidence

because it suggested a “lack of severe symptoms or real injury.”

The defense also asserted that under Utah’s evidentiary rules, 

mentioning “State Farm . . . (or any insurance) to the jury in any 

way” would be improper and inflammatory.

¶6 At the final pretrial conference, the court heard argument 

on Plaintiffs’ request to explain to the jury the reason for the 

delayed treatment. Plaintiffs asserted they should be allowed to 

explain that “State Farm initially denied coverage and then later 

admitted that there was . . . coverage.” In the alternative, Plaintiffs

argued that the court could exclude evidence of delay in treatment 

altogether or instruct the jury that “the fact there is insurance 

coverage does not mean that [Father] is liable.” The defense 

responded that while Plaintiffs were allowed to explain that they 

did not have the ability to pay for treatment right away, they 

should not be allowed to mention auto insurance.

¶7 The court denied Plaintiffs’ request and determined that 

while the parties could discuss the treatment delay and Plaintiffs

could argue that they were unable to afford treatment right after 

the accident, they would not be allowed to testify specifically that 

State Farm’s initial denial of personal injury protection benefits

was the reason they delayed seeking treatment. The court gave 

three reasons for its ruling: (1) the reason for the delay was a 
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20220959-CA 4 2024 UT App 112

factual determination to be made by the jury; (2) rule 411 of the 

Utah Rules of Evidence generally bars evidence that a person was 

or was not insured; and (3) if told that the cost of treatment was 

the problem, the jury could come up with valid reasons on its own 

that Plaintiffs would not have been able to afford the medical

treatment right after the accident but could then later pay for it. 

The court also ruled that under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 

Evidence, Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking treatment was “highly 

probative as to the extent and seriousness of the alleged injuries” 

but raising the issue of insurance coverage posed a substantial risk

of unfair prejudice. See generally Utah R. Evid. 403 (“The court may 

exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 

wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).

The court did state that if, at trial, the defense pushed the issue “to 

the extent that there is no other reasonable explanation” given for 

why Plaintiffs could later afford care, the court “may allow the 

insurance issue to be raised.” But the court cautioned that 

“discussing coverage determinations risks the jury . . . attaching 

too much to the fact that there is insurance,” and it emphasized 

that it did not “want any mention of insurance, . . . whether it’s 

State Farm or mentioned generally.”

¶8 At trial, in his opening statement, counsel for Plaintiffs

stated that Plaintiffs had neck and back pain following the 

accident. Counsel explained that Plaintiffs “waited a while” to get 

treatment because “they were worried about the cost of getting 

treatment” and because “[t]hey were hoping that the pain would 

go away on its own. It didn’t. In fact, it got worse over time. So 

finally they went to a chiropractor.” Plaintiffs testified about the 

accident and their alleged injuries. Mother said she felt pain in her 

back and neck after the accident, and the pain got worse before 

she went to see the chiropractor. Son testified that he started to 

feel back and neck pain a few hours after the accident, and that 

pain lasted a few months until he obtained chiropractic treatment. 
Jaimes v. Arellano-Medina

20220959-CA 5 2024 UT App 112

Neither Mother nor Son specifically addressed the thirty-nine-day 

delay in seeking treatment. But during cross-examination, Mother

acknowledged that she had previously testified, in her deposition,

that her pain had not worsened between the time of the accident 

and her first chiropractic appointment. Mother also 

acknowledged that she had been involved in two prior car 

accidents that had caused injuries to her neck and back. Mother

testified that on those previous occasions she had received 

treatment from the same chiropractor she saw after this accident

and thereafter filed personal injury claims seeking compensation.

¶9 Plaintiffs called as an expert witness their treating 

chiropractor, who opined that Mother and Son were injured in the 

accident, and he also testified as to the cost of the treatment he 

provided. After the cross-examination of the expert and outside 

the presence of the jury, Plaintiffs argued that defense counsel’s 

questioning had opened the door to further discussion of why 

they had waited to seek medical care after the accident. Plaintiffs

alleged that defense counsel had asked questions that zeroed in 

on the treatment gap being “unusual” and that the questions had 

an effect on “causation.” For example, defense counsel had asked 

the expert whether a patient’s delay in seeking treatment would 

“affect whether [he would] give them treatment in the moment” 

and whether “some delay between . . . an accident . . . and then 

[the patient] coming in to seek treatment” would “matter to [him] 

as far as treatment.” Based on these questions, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

asked that he be allowed to “reopen [the] motion to be able to . . .

discuss the reason for [the] gap in treatment and the . . . denial of 

insurance coverage during that time.” But defense counsel 

“disagree[d] with” Plaintiffs’ counsel’s “characterization of what 

[his] questions were,” asserting that he was “pretty careful” to 

avoid asking about the treatment gap “affect[ing] [the expert’s] 

opinion on causation” and instead “limit[ed] it to the fact that 

there was a gap and that [the expert] would treat [Plaintiffs] 

regardless of how long they waited.” The court denied the 

motion, stating: “I’m still at the same place where we originally 
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20220959-CA 6 2024 UT App 112

discussed that motion . . . [and] we’re not going to get into the 

insurance discussion.”

¶10 The main focus of the defense case was that the force of the 

auto accident was not sufficient to injure Plaintiffs. The defense 

called as a witness a biomechanical expert, who testified that 

according to his calculations, the parties’ vehicle was traveling 

two to three miles per hour at the time it hit the garage door and 

opined that the potential for injury under those facts was very 

low. The defense also called its own medical expert, who 

conducted physical examinations of Mother and Son and 

reviewed their medical records. The defense medical expert 

opined that he found no credible evidence of injury being 

incurred by either Mother or Son.

¶11 The jury determined that Father’s fault did not cause any 

injuries to Plaintiffs, and the court then entered a judgment in 

favor of Father of no cause of action.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 Plaintiffs now appeal and assert that the court abused its 

discretion when it excluded auto insurance coverage evidence 

while permitting the jury to hear that Plaintiffs waited thirty-nine 

days before seeking chiropractic treatment following the accident. 

A trial court is afforded broad discretion to admit or exclude 

evidence, and we will disturb its ruling only for an abuse of 

discretion. Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 21, 190 P.3d 1269. In 

reviewing for an abuse of discretion, “we will not reverse a trial 

court’s ruling on evidence unless the ruling was beyond the limits 

of reasonability.” Id. (quotation simplified); see also Anderson v. 

Larry H. Miller Commc’ns Corp., 2015 UT App 134, ¶ 17, 351 P.3d 

832.
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20220959-CA 7 2024 UT App 112

ANALYSIS

¶13 Plaintiffs challenge the court’s evidentiary ruling 

forbidding them from testifying that the reason they waited 

thirty-nine days after the accident to seek chiropractic treatment 

was that their auto insurer, State Farm, initially denied them nofault personal injury protection benefits. Though the parties and 

the court all agreed that the delay in treatment was a relevant 

issue at trial, the court barred Plaintiffs from specifically 

explaining to the jury that State Farm’s initial denial of personal 

injury protection benefits was why they could not pay for the 

chiropractic care right after the accident. In its ruling excluding

this evidence, the court undertook a balancing analysis under rule 

403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and determined that though the 

evidence was potentially relevant, the defense would be 

substantially prejudiced by its admission because “discussing 

coverage determinations risks the jury . . . attaching too much to 

the fact that there is insurance, which rule 411 [of the Utah Rules 

of Evidence] bars.”2

2. While the court correctly stated that rule 411 of the Utah Rules 

of Evidence generally prevents the admission of “[e]vidence that 

a person was or was not insured against liability . . . to prove 

whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully,” 

application of that rule does not necessarily compel the exclusion 

of the evidence here. Rule 411 allows the admission of evidence of 

liability insurance for purposes other than proving the negligence 

of a defendant. See, e.g., Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 

2009 UT 66, ¶ 37, 221 P.3d 256 (“Utah Rule of Evidence 411 

prohibits evidence of liability insurance to show that a person 

acted negligently but allows evidence of liability coverage to 

show a witness is biased or prejudiced.”). And Plaintiffs argue 

they did not seek to admit the explanation for the treatment delay 

as evidence of Father’s negligence but, instead, as evidence of the 

reason for their thirty-nine-day delay in seeking treatment.
Jaimes v. Arellano-Medina

20220959-CA 8 2024 UT App 112

¶14 Under rule 403, we generally defer to the trial court’s 

assessment of whether the probative value of the evidence is 

substantially outweighed by the potential for prejudice. See 

Glacier Land Co. v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs., 2006 UT App 516, ¶ 24, 

154 P.3d 852 (“[T]he trial court is granted broad discretion when 

weighing the probative value of evidence against the reasons for 

exclusion enumerated in rule 403.”), cert. denied, 168 P.3d 819

(Utah 2007). As recognized by the court here, the reason Plaintiffs

delayed seeking medical treatment had probative value, but we 

cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying 

the specific request Plaintiffs made, namely, that they be allowed 

to testify that “State Farm initially denied coverage and then later 

admitted that there was . . . coverage.” The court correctly 

observed that injecting the issue of auto insurance coverage into 

the case—and naming State Farm specifically—risked confusion 

of the issues and prejudice to the defense.

¶15 Importantly, at no time over the course of the litigation did 

Plaintiffs narrow their request and ask the court that they be 

allowed to explain their delay in seeking treatment without 

mentioning State Farm or even auto insurance. For example, 

Plaintiffs could have requested the ability to more generally and 

simply testify that they did not seek treatment right away because 

they did not have insurance—which could conceivably refer to 

either health insurance or auto insurance coverage—and could

not otherwise afford the treatment right after the accident. Based 

on the requests made to the court, Plaintiffs sought to specifically 

mention only State Farm and its initial coverage decision. While 

the court could have, and probably should have, allowed 

Plaintiffs to explain the gap in seeking treatment in more general

insurance-based terms, absent a specific request from Plaintiffs, 

the court was under no obligation to come up with such a solution 

on its own. And as we fail to perceive that the court’s decision to 

deny Plaintiffs’ specific request “was beyond the limits of 

reasonability,” Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 21, 190 P.3d 1269 
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20220959-CA 9 2024 UT App 112

(quotation simplified), we conclude there was no abuse of 

discretion in this case.

CONCLUSION

¶16 The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

Plaintiffs’ specific request to testify that the reason for their thirtynine-day delay in seeking treatment was State Farm’s initial 

denial of their auto insurance claim.

¶17 Affirmed.