1 RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Six

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ELECTRO NIC CIT

ATION: 2003 FED App . 0451P (6th C ir.) File Name: 03a04 51p.06



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXT H CIR CUIT

_________________
In re : D ALE R. B ROOKOVER ; M ONTGOMERY F ARMS ; J ACK G IUL ITTO , Debtors.

________________________
I RA B OD ENS TE IN , United States Trustee, Appellant

. X - - - -
> , - - - - - N No. 02-3237

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron. Nos. 01-01129; 01-01130; 01-01131— Marilyn Shea-Stonum, Ba nkruptcy Judge; David D. Dowd, Jr., District Judge. Argued: October 21, 2003
Decided and Filed: December 19, 2003

Befor e: KEITH, DAUG

HTREY, a

nd GILMAN , Circuit Judges. 2 In re Brookover, e t al. No. 02-3237

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: William Kanter, UNITED STATE S DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Ap pe llant. ON BRI EF: William Kan ter, Wend

y K eats, U NITED STATES DEPAR TMENT OF JUSTICE , Washingt on, D.C., f

or Appel lant.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ DAMONJ. KEITH, Circuit Judge. This appeal arises from three cases fi led under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. , in the bankrup t cy court of the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. The United States Trustee (“ UST”) app eals the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy c ourt’s order refusing to acce pt resignation of

the standing Chap ter 12 trustee and setting forth procedure s for suchre signati on. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s order.

I. BACKGROUND
The trustee for each case was Mi ch ae l V . D em cz yk (“Demczyk” ), the standingChapter 12 trustee appointed by the UST pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 586 (b) and 11 U .S .C . § 1 202 . In October 2000 , Demc zyk tendered his resig nation as standing trustee in these

cases to the UST, who accepted it and notified the bankruptcy c ourt tha t a suc cessor trustee would be appointed. In accord with the UST’s standa r d p ractice

to provide prompt notice to the court s and all interested parties regarding the

resignation of a trustee and the assig nment of a successor, on Novemb er 7, 200 0, th e UST sent a letter to Demczyk, with copie s to the b ankruptcy judg es, clerk and deputy clerks in charg e of the f

our cour t l ocat ions for theNo. 02-3237 In re Brookover, e t al. 3

Nor t hern District o f Ohio, Ea stern Div ision, and

certain individua ls in the UST's office in Cleveland. I n the letter, the UST accepted

the resignation of Demczy k. The letter r

ead, in part:

Ihave received y

our letter of resignation as Cha pter 12 Standing Trustee dated

October 31, 2000, which indicates that the resignation will be effective November 30, 2000. I accept y our resignation and thank y oufor your y ears of service as the Chapter 12 StandingTrustee for the Eastern Divis ionof the Northern District of Ohio. There have been insufficient Chapter

12 case filings over the past few years to support a Standing Trus t ee operation, and we apprec i ate your willingness to administer these cases for minimal compensation.
Notice will be filed

wi th the Bankruptcy

Court in each
c ase of y our resi gnation

and my appointme

nt as Ch apte r 12 interim trustee. My staff w ill be in cont act w ith you regarding the tran sition of f

unds a n d files to our office. We anticipa

te y our full c ooperat

ion in this r

egard and in the filing of y our fina l annual r eport.
J.A. at 12. On t

he same d ate, Nov ember 7, 2000, the UST sent
a letter to the bankruptcy judg e, with a copy sent to Joy ce Garner, Deputy Clerk in Charge in Akron. The letter read, in part:
Enclosed for your information is a copy of my letter accepting the re si gn at io n o f M ic ha el De mc zyk as Chapter 12 Standing Trustee for t he Eastern Division of the Northern District of

Ohio. There are no longer suff icient Chap ter 12 cases to justify a Standing Trustee under 28 U.S.C. § 586(b). On the active Chap ter 12 c ases, we anticipa te ap poin ting successor individual case trustees under 11 U.S.C. § 1202(a). These will be administe red in a similar manner a s Chapter

7 cases. 4 In re Brookover, e t al. No. 02-3237

J.A. at 13. Although the

UST did not “file” the letters with the court, the court

itself made the letters part of the court record. Information

onthe UST’s plan

to name a successor trustee was given to the court.

OnNovember 28, 2000, the bankruptcy court, sua sponte , i ssuedan identical Order in each of the case s, which was served on Demczy

k, the UST, and th e attorneys for the Chapter 1 2 debtors , stating , in pertinent part :
Michael V. Demczyk is the Standing Chapter 12 Trustee inthis case. The Court recently received correspondence from Donald M. Robiner, United States Trustee, Ohio/Michigan

Region 9, which c on sists of two letters dated Novembe

r 7, 2000 (

th e "L ette rs") . . . The Le tters raise a question about whether Mr. Demczy k wishes to continue to se rve as t he Cha pter 1 2 Trus tee. If a ch ange is request

e d, the Court will await a motion filed and served on all parties in interest. See 11 U.S .C. § 324. Mr. De mc zyk is to contin

ue to carry

out his re sponsibilit

ies in th is ca se , a bs en t a Co ur t O rd er to th e c on tr ar y.
J.A. at 14.

On December 7, 2000, the UST filed his motion t o reconsider, and

on January 23, 2001, he filed a memorandum in sup port o f the m otio n to re consi der. A h earing o n th e motion to recon sider wa s held on F ebruary 16, 2001. At the hearin g, the court was shown Demczyk’s resig

nation letter of October 31, 2000. T

he letter read, in part:
Please accept my r esig nation as the standing Chapter 12 trustee for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, effective November 30, 2000. I have pre vi ously discussed this matter with your staff regarding an

orderly tra

nsition of accounts, files, and other assets which mig

ht perta in to this trusteeship.No. 02-3237 In re Brookover, e t al. 5

Therefore, whateve

r I c an do to as sist this t

r ansition and make it as

efficie nt as poss i ble, please do not hesitate to contact me at y our earliest convenience.

J.A. at 35. Followingthe hearing , and with leave of court, on March 2, 2001, the UST fi l e d a supplemental memorandum in support of the motion to reconsider. The bankruptcy c ourt denied the UST’s motion to reconsider in a published opinion. In re Dale R. Brookov

er, et al. , 259 B.R. 884 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). The UST appe aledthe orde rs to the d

istrict c ourt purs

uant to 28 U.S.C. § 158 (a). The distric t court considered the three appeals , and issued an order affirming the bankruptcy court’s decisionfor

the reasons set forth therein. Robiner v. Demczyk 269 B.R. 167, 171 (N.D. Ohio 2001).

II. ANALY SIS

A. Standard of Review

Th is is an appeal in a bankruptcy case raising questions of lawonly. “I

n a case which comes to us from t he bankruptcy court by way of an app eal from a decis i on of a district court,
we review dire ctly

the decis ion of

the b ankr

uptcy c ourt. We accord no d efer ence to the district court's decision . . . [and] review de novo the bankruptcy c ourt's conclusions of law.” In
reHurtado , 342 F.3d

528, 531 ( 6th Ci r. 2003 ) (citing Brady-M orris v. Schilling

(In re Kenneth A llen Knight

Trust) , 303 F.3d 671, 676 (6th Cir.2002)).

B. Absent a n Express St atutory P rovision t o the

Contrary
The direct task before this court is to determine where t he power to acce pt the volu

ntary resignation of a

trustee i n 6 In re Brookover, e t al. No. 02-3237

1 There is a case that t ouches on some of the constituent parts running through the instan t c a se, see , e.g. , Richman v. Stral ey, 48 F.3d 1139, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 19 95), but no case sq uarel y addresses the core que stion b efore this cou rt. bankruptcy

lies. This issue has not

been extensively litigated. 1 The pivotal query in this case, howe v er , is directed at the relation ship between the common law and statutory authority
as it relate s to the pr

ocess of voluntar y r esigna ti on a nd acceptanceof that resignation. On this issue, the law provides adequate guidance.

Ge ne ra ll y, “where a common-law pri nciple is wellestablished

. . . the co

urts may take it as giv e n that Cong

ress has legislated with an expectation that the princ iple will a

pply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’” AstoriaFed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino , 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson , 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). Specifically, the UST a rgues that, under the common law, absent an express statutory provision to the contra ry, a public officer has the right to resign, a nd t he author

ity t o accept the resignation resides with the per son or body having authority to appointthe successor. See Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge C

o. , 35 F.2 d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 1929). The bankruptcy

court, however, found that “the UST, a creature of statute, cannot[, a s he is now attemptin

g,] simply

arrog ate to himself the powe

r to acc ept a tru stee’s r

esigna ti on, wit hout Congre ss so providing.” In re Dale R. Brookover , 259 B.R. at 890 (citi ng Louis iana P

ub. Se rv. Co mm'n v. F.C.C. , 476 U.S. 355, 374-76 (1986) (a federal ag ency may not confer powe r uponitself or expand its power)). The foundat ion of the bankruptcy

court’s position is, theref

ore, tha t a Congressional grant of authority must be the sole source of the UST’s power to accept a trustee’s voluntary resignation. Such a

proposition, howev er , provides ample space for the expression of that invested power to be explicit or implicit. Impli cit or incidental power can be found in the abs ence of

a “spec ific provision

to the contr ary.” Carlucci v. Doe , 488 U.S. 93, 99 (1988)No. 02-3237 In re Brookover, e t al. 7

2 Notice and heari ng are re quired wher e invol untary “for cause” removal purs uant

to 11 U.S .C. § 324 i s i nvok ed, see, e.g. , In the Matter of Chapt er 13, Pending and Future Cases , 19 B.R . 713, 714-17 (B ankr. W.D. W ash.198 2) (stating that notice and he aring is req uired and cause forremova l mus t be s hown wh en a s tanding trust ee f or Chapt er 13 ca se is remo ved for cau se (citing 1 1 U .S.C. § 324)), but there is no in dication anywhere that

such measu

res are necessary for acceptance of a voluntary resigna tion. ( “[A ]bsenta ‘specific provision to the contrary, the power of removal fro m of

fice is incident to the power of appointment.’”) (citation omitted) ). Thus, the threshold questionis whether there is a relevant statutory provision

that limits, expressly

or impliedly, the allege d common law authority of the UST to accept the vo lu ntary re signation of a trustee, where that UST has the express authority to replace the trustee without judicial or other oversight.

C. Application of 11 U.S.C. § 324

In t he present case, the bankruptcy court rejected the
commonlaw rule be cause it concluded that the Bankruptcy Code specifie s a role

for the c ourt in

accepting or refusing

the voluntary resignation of

a trustee. Specifically, the ba nkruptcy court stated that “[r]esort to common law is not proper in the face of a [Bankruptcy

] Code s ec tion clearly setting forth the statutory procedure to b e used when either a trustee seeks, or other office r of the c ourt or the Co urt seeks, the trustee’s removal from a pending case.” In re Dale R. Brookover , 259 B.R. at 889 (emphasis added). Impor tantly, the bankruptcy court uses the word “removal;” remov al is a separate and distinct process from resignation. 2
“[W]here Congre ss uses te rms that hav e accumulated settled meaningunder . . . the common law, a court m ust infer , unless the statute ot

herwise dictates , that Cong

ress mea ns to incorpor ate the established meaning of these terms.” Field v. Mans , 516 U.S. 59 , 69 (1995 ); Nationwide M ut. Ins. Co. v. Darden , 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992). Under the com mon law, 8 In re Brookover, e t al. No. 02-3237

“remova l” means “the dismissal from office,” whereas “resignation”means “re nouncement or relinquishment of an office.” B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTI ONARY 1295, 1310 (6th ed.1990). Und er t he terms of this discussion, it is conceded that the resignation

at issue is “voluntary” a

nd, therefore, distinct from
remo val, to the exten

t that the l atter, im

plicitly, if

no t
ex pl ic it ly, contains an element of involun

tariness

. Consistent with these und

erstand ings, C ongress has consistently treated resignati on and removal as distinct events, both under the Bankruptcy

Code, see 11 U.S.C. § § 703(a) and 1104(d), and under Bankruptcy

Rule 2012(b). Scrutiny of the specific provision governing involuntary removal , 11 U.S

. C. § 324, reveals that it does not control the administrationof

a trustee’ s voluntar

y r esigna tion. 11 U. S.C. § 324 state s: (a) The Court, after n otice and a h earing, may remove a trustee, other tha

n th e United States trustee, or an examiner, for cause

. (b) Whenever the cou rt removes a trustee or examiner under subsecti on (a) in

a case under this title, suchtrustee
or examiner shall thereby be removed in all other cases

under this title in which such trustee or examiner is then serving unless the court orders otherwise. 11 U.S.C. § 324 (emphasis added). 11 U.S.C. § 324 governs “for cause” rem oval, which implies involuntary termination based on some fault or

s hortcoming of the person being removed. The phrase “for cause” is not def ined in the Ba nk ru pt cy C od e. Ac co rd in g t o B la ck ’s Law Di ct io na ry:
Withrespect to removal from office, “for ca use” means for reasons which law and public policy recognize as sufficient warrant fo r removal and such cause is “lega l
ca use” and not merely a

cause which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficie nt .

. . The cause must be one in which the law and soundNo. 02-3237 In re Brookover, e t al. 9

3 The bankruptc y court

may be correct

when it st ates : “ By definit ion ‘f or caus e’ c ontempl ates consi de rations of publi c policy and law, which considerations would not, and could not , be ad dres sed if a t rustee were simply perm itted to resign wit hout notice to int erested parties and without the opp ortun ity for a he aring, which by necessi ty i nvolves the Court .” In

re Dale Brookover , 259 B.R at 891. The consi derati ons of publ ic poli cy and law, ho weve r, are d irectly co nnec ted to the “cau se” for the rem ova l, and not the eff ect of the removal. The rationale underlying t he nece ssity fordue process- lik e procedures i n a removal “for c ause” is , th erefore , inapp licable to a vol untary resi gnati on where t

he “becaus e” is n ot an iss ue. At the hearing i n this case, no suggestion was made by any participantthat Demczyk had done anything other than c omm end able work

. See J.A. at 35. public policy

will recognize as a cause for of ficial [sic] no longer occupy

ing his office.

B LACK ’ S L AW D ICTIONARY 644 (6th ed.1990) (c ita tions omitted).

It is possible

that some

faul t or shortcoming of a trustee could lie at the heart of

her decision to voluntarily resig n. That fault orshortcoming may , therefore, be the moving force behind the trus t ee’s private policy . Nonetheless, such a coincidence would not vitiate the understanding that the caus e of such a voluntary r

esignation and, more importantly , the force behind the decision to resign, lies in the trustee’s own
reasons

. 3 In thi s way , publicpolicy is neither the ca use nor the because of

underlying

the resignation.

For thesereasons, 11 U.S.C. § 324, the “for cause” removal provision, does not limit the authority of the UST, whethe r that authori ty is derived from a statutory scheme or the common law, to the exten

t that that authority governs the administration of a trustee’s voluntary

resignation. D. Applicat

ion of 28 U.S.C . § 586(b) Havingdetermined that 11 U.S.C. § 324 does not negate, or
even act upon, the authority of a UST to ac cept the voluntary 10 In re Brookover, e t al. No. 02-3237

4 Chap ters 7 and 11 of

the Code expr essly refer to the U ST ’s role in appointing a suc cess or trustee w ho “d ies,” or “res igns,” o r “is remo ved ,” whereas Chapters 12 and 13 d o no t. It was nec essary to spec ify the US T’s role in a ppoint ing indi vidu al s ucces sor trustees under C hapters 7 and 11 because that

role, u nlike its Ch apter s 12 a nd 1 3 pa rallel, is co ntingen t – in Chapter 7, on whether the credi tors h ave exerci sed thei r rig ht t o elect

a tru stee, see 11 U.S.C. § 70 3, and in Chapter 11, on whether the court ordered app ointm ent of a tru stee in the first instance

. See 1 1 U .S .C. § 1104 (d). The absence of an express provision, designed to deal with a spec ific cont ing encyin di ff erent Chapte rs, do es not

impact Chapte r 12, where that

specif ic cont ingency

is not at issue. “[Itis] hornbook teaching that ‘t he prov isi ons of

chapt ers 7, 9, 11, an d 13 do not apply in c hapte r 12 resignation

of a trustee, our

attention shifts to the examination of 28 U.S.C. § 586(b ) as a p otential positive source of that
au th or it y. Section 58 6(b) sta tes, in part: “ The [UST] . . . shall supervis e any such

individual appointed as standingtrustee i n the performance of the duties of the standing trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 586(b). Some of the additional enumerated duties of the UST includ

e: monitor

ing plan s file d under Chapter 12, appointing a standing trustee under Chap ter 12, and monitoring such trustee. 28 U.S.C. § 586. The bankruptcy court reasone d that, because acceptance of trustee resignations is not one of the UST’s enumerated duties under 28 U.S.C. § 586, the UST

is barred from such

a functi on under

the maxim express io unius est exclus io al terius , meaning that the expres sionof one thing is the exclusion of the other. In r e Dale R. Brookover , 259 B.R. a t 893-94. T his reas oning is flawed. First, as the UST rightly a vers, the enumerated d

u ty of the UST to “super

vise” is, argua

bly , broad e

nough to encompa ss the administr

ative au thorit y to accept a trustee’s voluntary
re signation, particu

larly when tha t authorit y is not expres sl y withheld. See Carlucci , 488 U.S. at 99. Second, the Bankruptcy

Code requires the UST to appoint a qualified

successor trustee who is automatically substituted i nthe case, with no abatement of any pending action o r procee ding. 11 U.S.C. § 325. 4 Where there is no BankruptcyNo. 02-3237 In re Brookover, e t al. 11

ca ses unles s speci fica lly incorporat ed by a part icul ar sect ion of ch ap te r 12.’” In re Dale R. Brookover , 259 B.R. at 890, n. 9 (quot ing 8 C OLLI ER ON B ANKRUPTCY § 1200 .02[2] (15th ed.)). At the s ame time, the conte nti on that

the U ST wields th e sole authority to appo int and supervise

succ essor

Chapte r 12 t rust ees i s undi sput ed. Code provision or Bankru ptcy Rule assig

ning the duty to accept the prior trustee’ s resig

nation to the court, it

is entire ly
con sistentwith cong

ressiona l intent to f

ind that the

auth ority to accept the resignation lies in common w ith the au thority to fill the vacancy

left by that resig

nation. Third, the acc eptance

of truste e resig

nations is e

ntirely consistent with the UST’s other statutorily assigne d duties for the appointme

nt, s upervision, and general administrative
m anagement

of trustees. Richman , 48 F.3d at 1143 -4 4 ( “Allowingthe same nonjudicial body to both appoi nt an d terminat e the appointment of standingtrustees was consistent with the legislative intent for the statutory scheme for the appointment

and removal of sta

nding tr ustees; the crony

ism and appear ance of improprie

ty that the leg

islature sought to remedy was the old system which had stan ding trustees appearing before the judges who appointed them. 11 U.S.C.A. § 324(a, b); 28 U.S.C.A. § 586(b)”). Moreover, imputing such
a role to the courts is contrary to the common law rule and d efeats the dominant purpose of Congress in creating the office of the United States Trustee – that is, to take over th e administrationof bankruptcy cases, including the ma

nagement of case trustees, from

the courts. Likewise, the cong ressional intentto “to stri

p bankruptcy c ourts of their administrative role
so that they

could better perform their judicial tasks,” Richman , 48 F.3d a

t 1144, milit

ate s again st the bankruptcy court’s interv entio n to the extent that the intervention sprang from its presumed a

uthority to regulate the trustee as an “officer of the court.”
Judi cial intervention in a trustee’s voluntary resignation , based on the premise that a trustee is an “officer of the court,” is unsound for several additional reasons. As an initial matter, 12 In re Brookover, e t al. No. 02-3237

a bankruptcy trustee

is not appointed b y the cou rt, is not a court employee or of

ficial, and is specifica lly

not requi red to be a lawyer. See28 U.S.C. § 586(d); 28 C.F.R. §§ 58.3(b) & 58.4(b). Rather, the trustee is a private individual app oin ted by the Executive Branch

to perform a public office under the Bankruptcy

Code.
Furth e rmore, a court ’s inh erent p ower t o mana ge procee dings is limited. Inthis case , Congre ss has del iberate ly taken administrative responsibility for t rust ees away

from courtsand placed it with the UST. 28 U.S.C. § 5 86. The Bankruptcy

Cod e alr eady

require s the UST to

appoint a qualified successor trustee who is automat ically substitute d in the case, w ith no abatement of any pending action or procee ding. 11 U.S.C. § 325. Finally, althoug h Demczyk is an at to rn ey, he is no t a ct in g a s a n a tt or ne y i n this case, and, therefore, Ohio disciplinary rule DR 2-110 and Ohio Local Civil Rule 83.9, which were cited by the bankruptcy

court and require court pe r mission for an attorney to withdra w from representation of a client in a pending proceeding, a re not applicable.

Ac co rd in gl y, if an y pr ov is io n, ex pl ic it ly o r i mp li ci tl y, gove rns the acc eptance

of a volun

tary resignation, it i s 2 8 U.S.C. § 586(b).

E. Under the Comm on Law, the Authority to Accept the Resignat ion Reside s with the P erson or Body Having Authority to Appoint a Successor
The Bankruptcy

Code and B ankruptc

y Ru les explici

tly mandate how a trustee may

be removed but

not how a trustee may voluntarily resig

n. The absence of an

express ma

ndatein the Bankru

ptcy Code and B ankruptc

y Ru les o n the i ssue of voluntary r es ignation may indica

te that, as discussed above, the power to

accept the volunt

ary resignation of a

trustee i s contained in the UST’s

supervis ory

authority

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 586(b). Alternatively, the power to appoi nt a successor with out an abatement in the proceedings, or anyNo. 02-3237 In re Brookover, e t al. 13

5 Even where court s are ves ted wit h the power to remove a t rust ee, that power has been h eld not t o be ex clusi ve. S ee Ric hman , 48 F.3d at 1143 (explaining t

he Bankruptcy Cod e section provi d ing t hat court may
remove trustee fo r cause and th at the rem ova l for cau se . . . did not precl ude the United S tates Trus tee, as t he party wit

h th e power of app ointm ent, from removi ng st anding Chapt er 12 and Chapter 13 t rust ee. 11 U .S.C.A . § 32 4(a, b ); 28 U .S.C.A . § 58 6(b )). judicial oversig

ht, ma y subsum e the power to accept the voluntary resignation of the predecessor. 11 U.S.C. § 325; Bankr. Rule 2012(

b) (“[w]he

n a truste e dies, re signs, is removed, or otherwise ce ases to hold office during the pendency of a c a se under the [Bankruptcy ] Code . . . the
succ ess or is automatically substituted.”). Under e ither proposition, the trustee’s choice to resign is, to the eyes of the court, a black box.

If th e authority to terminate, which is by definition an involuntary

process, is implicit in the pow er o f appoint ment, thenthere is no logical or statutory barrier to a finding that the
author ity to accept a resignation, which is by implication voluntary or at least less involuntary than removal , is likewise implicit in the power to appoint the successor trustee. Richman , 48 F.3d

at 1143-44 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]ermination authority was implic it inthe statutory power of appointment.” 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) (citations omitted)). M oreo ver, if the statutory authority

to remov e can be contained within the power to appoint

, it would be unsound to say that, where the UST holds the authority to appoint the successor, and the power to appoint the successor

is not judicially supervised, the UST does not have the po wer t o accept the voluntary resignation

of the predecessor. Carlucci v. Doe , 488 U.S. at 99 (statutory power to appoint imp licitly

encompa sses powe

r to remove, unless the

statute sp ecif

ic ally denies such powe

r). 5 The common law , r ecogn izing this verity, has long held that , absent an expres s statutor

y pr ovision to the contra

ry , a public officer has the right to re s ign and the authority to accept the resignation

resides with the pers on or body

having authority to 14 In re Brookover, e t al. No. 02-3237

appointthe successor. See Roc kingham Co unty , 35 F.2d at 306.
Whether viewed directly throug

h 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) or the prism of the commo n law, the

light of the law f alls squa rely upona single conclusion: the authority to accept the voluntary resignation

of a bankruptcy

trustee is vested

entirely within the purviewof

th e U ST ’s co ng re ss io na ll y co nf er re d a ut ho ri ty. Where, as is the case her e, a common l aw princ iple is we llestablished, the courts may take it as given

that Congress has legislated with an expectat

ion that the

principle will apply except “when a statutory

pur pose to the contrary

is evident.” Solimino , 501 U .S. at 108. No statutory purpose to the contrary is present in this case. Accordingly , the UST has the authority to accept the vo luntary resig nation of a bankruptcy trustee in a pending cas e , and the law does not require the decisionto be submitte d to the ba nkruptcy court for approval. Thus, the bankruptcy c ourt’s ru ling requiring a motion, evidentiary

hearing , and a jud

ic i al determination to decide whether a bankru ptcy trustee w ho wishes to resig n voluntar

ily is justified in so doing is not supported by law.

III. CONCL USION

For the reasons stated abov e, th e judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court’s ruling i s REVERSED , and the case

is R EM ANDED for fur ther p roceed ings consistent with this opinion.