UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4259

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KENDALL T. COHEN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior

District Judge. (2:09-cr-00160-PMD-1)

Submitted: March 17, 2015 Decided: April 7, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Janis Richardson Hall, Greenville, South Carolina, for 

Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Jimmie 

Ewing, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kendall T. Cohen appeals his conviction and 120-month 

sentence imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, to one count of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012). 

Cohen’s attorney filed a brief, pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising as a possible issue for 

review whether the district court committed reversible error 

when it allegedly failed to comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when 

it accepted Cohen’s guilty plea. Cohen filed a pro se 

supplemental brief, in which he repeats counsel’s assignment of 

error, and raises additional assignments of error, including 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. And in a supplemental 

brief filed by counsel, Cohen asserts that: (1) his prior South 

Carolina felony conviction for assault while resisting arrest is 

not a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines and, 

thus, his Guidelines range was erroneously calculated; and (2) 

the district court provided an insufficient explanation for his 

sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.

First, we conclude that the district court did not err when 

it accepted Cohen’s guilty plea. Because Cohen did not move in 

the district court to withdraw his plea, we review the guilty 

plea hearing for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 

F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, Cohen 
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must show: (1) there was error; (2) the error was plain; and 

(3) the error affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. 

United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126–27 (2013); 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). In the guilty 

plea context, a defendant meets this burden by “show[ing] a 

reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not 

have entered the plea.” United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 

337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We 

have reviewed the transcript of Cohen’s guilty plea hearing and 

conclude that the district court complied with Rule 11, that 

Cohen’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and that there 

was a factual basis for the plea. Accordingly, we affirm 

Cohen’s conviction.

We also discern no reversible error in the district court’s 

decision to impose a 120-month sentence. Although we review 

Cohen’s sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse-ofdiscretion standard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 

(2007), we review unpreserved non-structural sentencing errors 

for plain error. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 

(4th Cir. 2010). Our review requires consideration of both the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We first assess whether the district 

court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines range, 

considered the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), 
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analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49–51; see

Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575–76. If we find no procedural error, we 

review the sentence for substantive reasonableness, “examin[ing] 

the totality of the circumstances[.]” United States v. Mendoza–

Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). “Any sentence that 

is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is 

presumptively [substantively] reasonable” and “[s]uch a 

presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is 

unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).

We conclude that Cohen’s sentence is procedurally and 

substantively reasonable. The district court correctly 

calculated Cohen’s Guidelines range, listened to counsel’s 

argument, afforded Cohen an opportunity to allocute, and 

adequately explained its reasons for imposing the 120-month 

sentence. Thus, we affirm Cohen’s sentence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in 

this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.* We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

 * We have reviewed carefully the issues raised in Cohen’s 

pro se supplemental informal brief and find them to be without 

merit.
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requires counsel to inform Cohen, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Cohen requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court to withdraw from representation. 

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served 

on Cohen. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal arguments are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED