PRELIMINARY PRINT 

Volume 599 U. S. Part 1 

Pages 762–812 

OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

June 23, 2023 

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 

reporter of decisions 

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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 

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762 OCTOBER TERM, 2022 

Syllabus 

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN 

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 

the ninth circuit 

No. 22–179. Argued March 27, 2023—Decided June 23, 2023 

Respondent Helaman Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path to 

U. S. citizenship through “adult adoption.” But that was a scam. 

Though there is no path to citizenship through “adult adoption,” Hansen 

earned nearly $2 million from his scheme. The United States charged 

Hansen with, inter alia, violating 8 U. S. C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which 

forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside 

in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that 

such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.” Hansen was convicted 

and moved to dismiss the clause (iv) charges on First Amendment overbreadth grounds. The District Court rejected Hansen's argument, but 

the Ninth Circuit concluded that clause (iv) was unconstitutionally 

overbroad. 

Held: Because § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation 

and facilitation of specifc acts known to violate federal law, the clause 

is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Pp. 769–785. 

(a) Hansen's First Amendment overbreadth challenge rests on the 

claim that clause (iv) punishes so much protected speech that it cannot 

be applied to anyone, including him. A court will hold a statute facially 

invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if the law “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate 

sweep.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 292. In such a circumstance, society's interest in free expression outweighs its interest in 

the statute's lawful applications. Otherwise, courts must handle unconstitutional applications as they usually do—case-by-case. Pp. 769–770. 

(b) The issue here is whether Congress used “encourage” and “induce” in clause (iv) as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and 

facilitation (thus capturing only a narrow band of speech) or instead as 

those terms are used in ordinary conversation (thus encompassing a 

broader swath). Pp. 770–774. 

(1) Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement of an unlawful act, and facilitation—i. e., aiding and abetting—is the provision 

of assistance to a wrongdoer with the intent to further an offense's commission. Neither requires lending physical aid; for both, words may be 

enough. And both require an intent to bring about a particular unlawful act. The terms “encourage” and “induce,” found in clause (iv), are 
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Syllabus 

among the “most common” verbs used to denote solicitation and facilitation. 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.2(a). Their specialized usage is displayed in the federal criminal code as well as the criminal laws of every State. If the challenged statute uses those terms as 

they are typically understood in the criminal law, an overbreadth challenge would be hard to sustain. Pp. 771–773. 

(2) Hansen, like the Ninth Circuit, insists that clause (iv) uses “encourages” and “induces” in their ordinary rather than specialized sense. 

In ordinary parlance, “induce” means “[t]o lead on; to infuence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion or infuence,” Webster's New International Dictionary 1269, and “encourage” means to “inspire with courage, 

spirit, or hope,” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 747. If 

clause (iv) conveys these ordinary meanings, it arguably reaches abstract advocacy or general encouragement, and its applications to protected speech might render it vulnerable to an overbreadth challenge. 

Pp. 773–774. 

(c) The Court holds that clause (iv) uses “encourages or induces” in 

its specialized, criminal-law sense—that is, as incorporating commonlaw liability for solicitation and facilitation. Pp. 774–778. 

(1) Context indicates that Congress used those words as terms of 

art. “Encourage” and “induce” have well-established legal meanings— 

and when Congress “borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the 

legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably 

knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263. That 

inference is even stronger here, because clause (iv) prohibits “encouraging” and “inducing” a violation of law, which is the object of solicitation 

and facilitation too. The Ninth Circuit stacked the deck in favor of 

ordinary meaning, but it should have given specialized meaning a fair 

shake. When words have several plausible defnitions, context differentiates among them. Here, the context of these words indicates that 

Congress used them as terms of art. Pp. 774–775. 

(2) Statutory history is an important part of the relevant context. 

When Congress enacted in 1885 what would become the template for 

clause (iv), it criminalized “knowingly assisting, encouraging or soliciting” immigration under a contract to perform labor. 23 Stat. 333. 

Then, as now, “encourage” had a specialized meaning that channeled 

accomplice liability. And the words “assisting” and “soliciting,” which 

appeared alongside “encouraging,” reinforce the narrower criminal-law 

meaning. When Congress amended that provision in 1917, it added “induce,” which also carried solicitation and facilitation overtones. 39 

Stat. 879. In 1952, Congress enacted the immediate predecessor for 

clause (iv) and also simplifed the language from the 1917 Act, dropping 
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764 UNITED STATES v. HANSEN 

Syllabus 

the words “assist” and “solicit,” and making it a crime to “willfully or 

knowingly encourag[e] or induc[e], or attemp[t] to encourage or induce, 

either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States of . . . any 

alien . . . not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United 

States.” 66 Stat. 229. Hansen believes these changes dramatically 

broadened the scope of clause (iv)'s prohibition on encouragement, but 

accepting that argument would require the Court to assume that Congress took a circuitous route to convey a sweeping—and constitutionally 

dubious—message. The better understanding is that Congress simply 

streamlined the previous statutory language. Critically, the terms 

Congress retained (“encourage” and “induce”) substantially overlap in 

meaning with the terms it omitted (“assist” and “solicit”). Clause (iv) 

is thus best understood as a continuation of the past. Pp. 775–778. 

(d) Hansen argues that the absence of an express mens rea requirement in clause (iv) means that the statute is not limited to solicitation 

and facilitation. But when Congress placed “encourages” and “induces” 

in clause (iv), the traditional intent associated with solicitation and facilitation was part of the package. The federal aiding and abetting statute 

works the same way: It contains no express mens rea requirement but 

implicitly incorporates the traditional state of mind required for aiding 

and abetting. Rosemond v. United States, 572 U. S. 65, 70–71. Clause 

(iv) is situated among other provisions that function in the same manner. 

See, e. g., §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), (II). Since “encourages or induces” 

draws on the same common-law principles, clause (iv) also incorporates 

a mens rea requirement implicitly. Pp. 778–781. 

(e) Finally, it bears emphasis that the canon of constitutional avoidance counsels the Court to adopt the Government's reading if it is at 

least “ `fairly possible.' ” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. –––, –––. 

P. 781. 

(f) Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the purposeful 

solicitation and facilitation of specifc acts known to violate federal law. 

So understood, it does not “prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected 

speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” Williams, 553 U. S., 

at 292. It is undisputed that clause (iv) encompasses a great deal of 

nonexpressive conduct, which does not implicate the First Amendment 

at all, e. g., smuggling noncitizens into the country. Because these 

types of cases are heartland clause (iv) prosecutions, the “plainly legitimate sweep” of the provision is extensive. To the extent clause (iv) 

reaches any speech, it stretches no further than speech integral to unlawful conduct, which is unprotected. See, e. g., Giboney v. Empire 

Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 502. Hansen, on the other hand, fails 

to identify a single prosecution for ostensibly protected expression in 

the 70 years since Congress enacted clause (iv)'s immediate predecessor. 
Cite as: 599 U. S. 762 (2023) 765 

Syllabus 

Instead, he offers a string of hypotheticals, all premised on the expansive ordinary meanings of “encourage” and “induce.” None of these 

examples are fltered through the traditional elements of solicitation and 

facilitation—most importantly, the requirement that a defendant intend 

to bring about a specifc result. Because clause (iv) does not have the 

scope Hansen claims, it does not produce the horribles he parades. 

Hansen also resists the idea that Congress can criminalize speech that 

solicits or facilitates a civil violation, and some immigration violations 

are only civil. But even assuming that clause (iv) reaches some protected speech, and even assuming that its application to all of that 

speech is unconstitutional, the ratio of unlawful-to-lawful applications is 

not lopsided enough to justify facial invalidation for overbreadth. 

Pp. 781–785. 

25 F. 4th 1103, reversed and remanded. 

Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, 

C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. 

Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 785. Jackson, J., fled a 

dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., joined, post, p. 792. 

Principal Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher argued the 

cause for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor 

General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney General Polite, Deputy Solicitors General Feigin and Gannon, Matthew Guarnieri and J. Benton Hurst. 

Esha Bhandari argued the cause for respondent. With 

her on the brief were Heather E. Williams, Carolyn M. Wiggin, Jeffrey L. Fisher, David D. Cole, and Cecillia D. Wang.* 

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of Montana et al. by Austin Knudsen, Attorney General of Montana, Christian 

B. Corrigan, Solicitor General, Kathleen L. Smithgall, Deputy Solicitor 

General, and Peter M. Torstensen, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General, and by 

the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg Taylor of Alaska, Kristin K. Mayes of Arizona, 

Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Christopher M. Carr 

of Georgia, Raúl R. Labrador of Idaho, Theodore E. Rokita of Indiana, 

Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Andrew Bailey of Missouri, Mike Hilgers of Nebraska, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner F. Drummond of Oklahoma, 

Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Marty J. Jackley of South Dakota, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, 

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Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court. 

A federal law prohibits “encourag[ing] or induc[ing]” illegal immigration. 8 U. S. C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). After concluding that this statute criminalizes immigration advocacy 

and other protected speech, the Ninth Circuit held it unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. That 

was error. Properly interpreted, this provision forbids only 

the intentional solicitation or facilitation of certain unlawful 

acts. It does not “prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech”—let alone enough to justify throwing out the 

law's “plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 292 (2008). We reverse. 

I 

In 2014, Mana Nailati, a citizen of Fiji, heard that he could 

become a U. S. citizen through an “adult adoption” program 

run by Helaman Hansen. Eager for citizenship, Nailati few 

Jason Miyares of Virginia, Patrick Morrisey of West Virginia, and 

Bridget Hill of Wyoming; and for the Immigration Reform Law Institute 

by Lawrence J. Joseph and Christopher J. Hajec. 

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the City and 

County of San Francisco, California, et al. by Tara M. Steeley, Jaime M. 

Huling Delaye, and Molly Alarcon; for Asian Americans Advancing Justice|AAJC et al. by Niyati Shah and Emily T. Kuwahara; for the Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. by David Greene; for the First Amendment Coalition et al. by Penny Venetis; for Immigration Representatives 

et al. by William C. Perdue, Kolya D. Glick, and Sirine Shebaya; for the 

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Stephen R. 

Sady, Jeffrey T. Green, Xiao Wang, and Meredith R. Aska McBride; for 

Religious Organizations by Matthew S. Hellman, David A. Strauss, and 

Sarah M. Konsky; for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press 

by Bruce D. Brown; and for The Rutherford Institute et al. by Erin Glenn 

Busby, Lisa R. Eskow, Michael F. Sturley, John W. Whitehead, and Daniel 

M. Ortner. 

Briefs of amici curiae were fled for the Cato Institute by Clark M. 

Neily III; for Pfzer Inc., by Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Stefan P. 

Schropp, and Ilana H. Eisenstein; and for Eugene Volokh by Mr. Volokh, 

pro se. 

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to California to pursue the program. Hansen's wife told 

Nailati that adult adoption was the “quickest and easiest way 

to get citizenship here in America.” App. 88. For $4,500, 

Hansen's organization would arrange Nailati's adoption, and 

he could then inherit U. S. citizenship from his new parent. 

Nailati signed up. 

It was too good to be true. There is no path to citizenship 

through “adult adoption,” so Nailati waited for months with 

nothing to show for it. Faced with the expiration of his visa, 

he asked Hansen what to do. Hansen advised him to stay: 

“[O]nce you're in the program,” Hansen explained, “you're 

safe. Immigration cannot touch you.” Id., at 92. Believing that citizenship was around the corner, Nailati took Hansen's advice and remained in the country unlawfully. 

Hansen peddled his scam to other noncitizens too. After 

hearing about the program from their pastor, one husband 

and wife met with Hansen and wrote him a check for 

$9,000—initially saved for a payment on a house in Mexico— 

so that they could participate. Another noncitizen paid 

Hansen out of savings he had accumulated over 21 years as 

a housepainter. Still others borrowed from relatives and 

friends. All told, Hansen lured over 450 noncitizens into his 

program, and he raked in nearly $2 million as a result. 

The United States charged Hansen with (among other 

crimes) violations of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). That clause forbids 

“encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or 

reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard 

of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will 

be in violation of law.” In addition to convicting him under 

clause (iv), the jury found that Hansen had acted “for the 

purpose of private fnancial gain,” triggering a higher maximum penalty. App. 116; see § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i). 

After the verdict came in, Hansen saw a potential way out. 

Another case involving § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), United States v. 

Sineneng-Smith, was pending before the Ninth Circuit, 

which had sua sponte raised the question whether the clause 

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was an unconstitutionally overbroad restriction of speech. 

910 F. 3d 461, 469 (2018). Taking his cue from SinenengSmith, Hansen moved to dismiss the clause (iv) charges on 

First Amendment overbreadth grounds. The District 

Court rejected Hansen's argument and sentenced him. 

While Hansen's appeal was pending, the Ninth Circuit held 

in Sineneng-Smith that clause (iv) is unconstitutionally overbroad. Id., at 467–468. That holding was short-lived: We 

vacated the judgment, explaining that the panel's choice to 

inject the overbreadth issue into the appeal and appoint 

amici to argue it “departed so drastically from the principle 

of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” 

590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020). On remand, limited to the arguments that Sineneng-Smith had actually made, the Ninth 

Circuit affrmed her convictions. 982 F. 3d 766, 770 (2020). 

But Hansen's appeal was waiting in the wings, giving the 

Ninth Circuit a second chance to address the overbreadth 

question. It reprised its original holding in Sineneng-Smith. 

As in Sineneng-Smith, the Ninth Circuit focused on 

whether clause (iv) is a narrow prohibition covering solicitation and facilitation of illegal conduct, or a sweeping ban that 

would pull in “statements or conduct that are likely repeated 

countless times across the country every day.” 25 F. 4th 

1103, 1110 (2022). It adopted the latter interpretation, asserting that clause (iv) criminalizes speech such as “encouraging an undocumented immigrant to take shelter during 

a natural disaster, advising an undocumented immigrant 

about available social services, telling a tourist that she is 

unlikely to face serious consequences if she overstays her 

tourist visa, or providing certain legal advice to undocumented immigrants.” Ibid. Concluding that clause (iv) 

covers an “ `alarming' ” amount of protected speech relative 

to its narrow legitimate sweep, the Ninth Circuit held the 

provision facially overbroad. Ibid. 

The Ninth Circuit denied the Government's petition for 

rehearing en banc over the dissent of nine judges. Judge 

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Bumatay, who wrote the principal dissent, attributed the 

panel's overbreadth concern to a misreading of the statute. 

See 40 F. 4th 1049, 1057–1058 (2022). Correctly interpreted, 

he explained, clause (iv) reaches only criminal solicitation 

and aiding and abetting. Ibid. On that reading, the provision raises no overbreadth problem because, “[e]ven if 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) somehow reaches protected speech, that 

reach is far outweighed by the provision's broad legitimate 

sweep.” Id., at 1072. 

We granted certiorari. 598 U. S. ––– (2022). 

II 

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make 

no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” Wisely, Hansen does not claim that the First Amendment protects the 

communications for which he was prosecuted. Cf. Illinois 

ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U. S. 

600, 612 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment does not shield 

fraud”). Instead, he raises an overbreadth challenge: He argues that clause (iv) punishes so much protected speech that 

it cannot be applied to anyone, including him. Brief for Respondent 9–10. 

An overbreadth challenge is unusual. For one thing, litigants typically lack standing to assert the constitutional 

rights of third parties. See, e. g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 

400, 410 (1991). For another, litigants mounting a facial 

challenge to a statute normally “must establish that no set 

of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be 

valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) 

(emphasis added). Breaking from both of these rules, the 

overbreadth doctrine instructs a court to hold a statute facially unconstitutional even though it has lawful applications, 

and even at the behest of someone to whom the statute can 

be lawfully applied. 

We have justifed this doctrine on the ground that it provides breathing room for free expression. Overbroad laws 

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“may deter or `chill' constitutionally protected speech,” and 

if would-be speakers remain silent, society will lose their 

contributions to the “marketplace of ideas.” Virginia v. 

Hicks, 539 U. S. 113, 119 (2003). To guard against those 

harms, the overbreadth doctrine allows a litigant (even an 

undeserving one) to vindicate the rights of the silenced, as 

well as society's broader interest in hearing them speak. 

Williams, 553 U. S., at 292. If the challenger demonstrates 

that the statute “prohibits a substantial amount of protected 

speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep,” then society's interest in free expression outweighs its interest in the 

statute's lawful applications, and a court will hold the law 

facially invalid. Ibid.; see Hicks, 539 U. S., at 118–119. 

Because it destroys some good along with the bad, “[i]nvalidation for overbreadth is ` “strong medicine” ' that is not to 

be `casually employed.' ” Williams, 553 U. S., at 293. To 

justify facial invalidation, a law's unconstitutional applications must be realistic, not fanciful, and their number must 

be substantially disproportionate to the statute's lawful 

sweep. New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New 

York, 487 U. S. 1, 14 (1988); Members of City Council of Los 

Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 800–801 

(1984). In the absence of a lopsided ratio, courts must handle unconstitutional applications as they usually do—caseby-case. 

III 

A 

To judge whether a statute is overbroad, we must frst 

determine what it covers. Recall that § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) 

makes it unlawful to “encourag[e] or induc[e] an alien to come 

to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.” 1 The issue is 

1 Although the statutory terms are not coextensive, we use “alien” and 

“noncitizen” as rough equivalents here. See 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(3); Barton 

v. Barr, 590 U. S. –––, –––, n. 2 (2020). 

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whether Congress used “encourage” and “induce” as terms 

of art referring to criminal solicitation and facilitation (thus 

capturing only a narrow band of speech) or instead as those 

terms are used in everyday conversation (thus encompassing 

a broader swath). An overbreadth challenge obviously has 

better odds on the latter view. 

1 

We start with some background on solicitation and facilitation. Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement 

of an unlawful act. ALI, Model Penal Code § 5.02(1), p. 364 

(1985) (MPC); 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 11.1 

(3d ed. 2022) (LaFave). Facilitation—also called aiding and 

abetting—is the provision of assistance to a wrongdoer with 

the intent to further an offense's commission. See, e. g., 

Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471, 489–490 (2023). 

While the crime of solicitation is complete as soon as the 

encouragement occurs, see LaFave § 11.1, liability for aiding 

and abetting requires that a wrongful act be carried out, see 

id., § 13.2(a). Neither solicitation nor facilitation requires 

lending physical aid; for both, words may be enough. Reves 

v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170, 178 (1993) (one may aid 

and abet by providing “ `assistance rendered by words, acts, 

encouragement, support, or presence' ”); MPC § 5.02(2), at 

365 (solicitation may take place through words or conduct); 

LaFave § 11.1(c) (same). Both require an intent to bring 

about a particular unlawful act. See, e. g., Hicks v. United 

States, 150 U. S. 442, 449 (1893) (“[W]ords of encouragement 

and abetting must” be used with “the intention as respects 

the effect to be produced”). And both are longstanding 

criminal theories targeting those who support the crimes of 

a principal wrongdoer. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. 

v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164, 181 

(1994); LaFave § 11.1(a). 

The terms “encourage” and “induce” are among the “most 

common” verbs used to denote solicitation and facilitation. 

Id., § 13.2(a); see also 1 J. Ohlin, Wharton's Criminal Law 

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§ 10:1, p. 298 (16th ed. 2021) (Wharton) (“[A]dditional language—such as encourage, counsel, and command—usually 

accompanies `aid' or `abet' ” (emphasis added)). In fact, their 

criminal-law usage dates back hundreds of years. See 40 

F. 4th, at 1062–1064 (opinion of Bumatay, J.). A prominent 

early American legal dictionary, for instance, defnes “abet” 

as “[t]o encourage or set another on to commit a crime.” 1 J. 

Bouvier, Law Dictionary 30 (1839) (emphasis added). Other 

sources agree. See, e. g., Wharton § 10:1, at 298 (“ `abet,' ” at 

common law, meant “to encourage, advise, or instigate the 

commission of a crime” (emphasis added)); Black's Law Dictionary 6 (1st ed. 1891) (to “abet” “[i]n criminal law” was 

“[t]o encourage, incite, or set another on to commit a crime” 

(emphasis added)); cf. id., at 667 (11th ed. 2019) (defning “encourage” with, in part, a cross-reference to “aid and abet”). 

This pattern is on display in the federal criminal code, 

which, for over a century, has punished one who “induces” a 

crime as a principal. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 332, 35 Stat. 

1152 (“Whoever . . . aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, 

or procures [the commission of an offense] is a principal” (emphasis added)); 18 U. S. C. § 2(a) (listing the same verbs 

today). The Government offers other examples as well: The 

ban on soliciting a crime of violence penalizes those who 

“solici[t], comman[d], induc[e], or otherwise endeavo[r] to 

persuade” another person “to engage in [the unlawful] conduct.” § 373(a) (emphasis added). Federal law also criminalizes “persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], or coerc[ing]” 

one “to engage in prostitution” or other unlawful sexual 

activity involving interstate commerce. §§ 2422(a), (b) (emphasis added). The Model Penal Code echoes these formulations, defning solicitation as, in relevant part, “command-

[ing], encourag[ing] or request[ing] another person to engage in specifc [unlawful] conduct.” MPC § 5.02(1), at 364 

(emphasis added). And the commentary to the Model Penal 

Code notes that similar prohibitions may employ other verbs, 

such as “induce.” See id., Comment 3, at 372–373, n. 25 (collecting examples). 

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The use of both verbs to describe solicitation and facilitation is widespread in the States too. Nevada considers 

“[e]very person” who “aided, abetted, counseled, encouraged, 

hired, commanded, induced or procured” an offense to be a 

principal. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 195.020 (2021) (emphasis added). 

Arizona provides that one who “commands, encourages, requests, or solicits another person to engage in specifc conduct” commits the offense of solicitation. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

Ann. § 13–1002(A) (2020) (emphasis added). And New Mexico imposes criminal liability on one who “with the intent” 

for another to commit a crime “solicits, commands, requests, 

induces . . . or otherwise attempts to promote or facilitate” 

the offense. N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30–28–3(A) (2018) (emphasis 

added). These States are by no means outliers—“induce” or 

“encourage” describe similar offenses in the criminal codes 

of every State. App. to Brief for State of Montana et al. as 

Amici Curiae 1–44; see, e. g., Ala. Code § 13A–2–23(1) (2015) 

(“induces”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–1–603 (2022) (“encourages”); 

Fla. Stat. § 777.04(2) (2022) (“encourages”); Haw. Rev. Stat. 

§ 705–510(1) (2014) (“encourages”); Ind. Code § 35–41–2–4 

(2022) (“induces”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21–5303(a) (2020) (“encouraging”); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12.1–06–03(1) (2021) 

(“induces”); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2021) 

(“encourages”); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61–11–8a(b)(1) (Lexis 

2020) (“inducement”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–1–302(a) (2021) 

(“encourages”). 

In sum, the use of “encourage” and “induce” to describe 

solicitation and facilitation is both longstanding and pervasive. And if 8 U. S. C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) refers to solicitation and facilitation as they are typically understood, an 

overbreadth challenge would be hard to sustain. 

2 

Hansen, like the Ninth Circuit, insists that clause (iv) uses 

“encourages” and “induces” in their ordinary rather than 

their specialized sense. While he offers defnitions from 

multiple dictionaries, the terms are so familiar that two samPage Proof Pending Publication
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Opinion of the Court 

ples suffce. In ordinary parlance, “induce” means “[t]o lead 

on; to infuence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion or infuence.” Webster's New International Dictionary 1269 (2d 

ed. 1953). And “encourage” means to “inspire with courage, 

spirit, or hope.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 747 (1966). 

In Hansen's view, clause (iv)'s use of the bare words “encourages” or “induces” conveys these ordinary meanings. 

See Brief for Respondent 14. “[T]hat encouragement can 

include aiding and abetting,” he says, “does not mean it is 

restricted to aiding and abetting.” Id., at 25. And because 

clause (iv) “proscribes encouragement, full stop,” id., at 14, 

it prohibits even an “op-ed or public speech criticizing the 

immigration system and supporting the rights of long-term 

undocumented noncitizens to remain, at least where the 

author or speaker knows that, or recklessly disregards 

whether, any of her readers or listeners are undocumented.” 

Id., at 17–18. If the statute reaches the many examples that 

Hansen posits, its applications to protected speech might 

swamp its lawful applications, rendering it vulnerable to an 

overbreadth challenge. 

B 

We hold that clause (iv) uses “encourages or induces” in 

its specialized, criminal-law sense—that is, as incorporating 

common-law liability for solicitation and facilitation. In 

truth, the clash between defnitions is not much of a contest. 

“Encourage” and “induce” have well-established legal meanings—and when Congress “borrows terms of art in which 

are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries 

of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of 

ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952); see also, e. g., 

United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 13–14 (1994). 

To see how this works, consider the word “attempts,” 

which appears in clause (iv)'s next-door neighbors. See 

§§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). In a criminal prohibition, we would 

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not understand “attempt” in its ordinary sense of “try.” 

Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 133 (2d ed. 

2001). We would instead understand it to mean taking “a 

substantial step” toward the completion of a crime with the 

requisite mens rea. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 

U. S. 102, 107 (2007). “Encourages or induces” likewise carries a specialized meaning. After all, when a criminal-law 

term is used in a criminal-law statute, that—in and of itself— 

is a good clue that it takes its criminal-law meaning. And 

the inference is even stronger here, because clause (iv) prohibits “encouraging” and “inducing” a violation of law. See 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). That is the focus of criminal solicitation 

and facilitation too. 

In concluding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit stacked the 

deck in favor of ordinary meaning. See 25 F. 4th, at 1109– 

1110; see also United States v. Hernandez-Calvillo, 39 F. 4th 

1297, 1304 (CA10 2022) (“Our construction of [the verbs in 

clause (iv)] begins with their ordinary meaning, not their 

specialized meaning in criminal law”). But it should have 

given specialized meaning a fair shake. When words have 

several plausible defnitions, context differentiates among 

them. That is just as true when the choice is between ordinary and specialized meanings, see, e. g., Corning Glass 

Works v. Brennan, 417 U. S. 188, 202 (1974) (“While a layman 

might well assume that time of day worked refects one aspect of a job's `working conditions,' the term has a different 

and much more specifc meaning in the language of industrial 

relations”), as it is when a court must choose among multiple 

ordinary meanings, see, e. g., Muscarello v. United States, 

524 U. S. 125, 127–128 (1998) (choosing between ordinary 

meanings of “carry”). Here, the context of these words— 

the water in which they swim—indicates that Congress used 

them as terms of art. 

Statutory history is an important part of this context. In 

1885, Congress enacted a law that would become the template for clause (iv). That law prohibited “knowingly assistPage Proof Pending Publication
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Opinion of the Court 

ing, encouraging or soliciting” immigration under a contract 

to perform labor. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 3, 23 Stat. 

333 (1885 Act) (emphasis added). Then, as now, “encourage” 

had a specialized meaning that channeled accomplice liability. 

See 1 Bouvier, Law Dictionary 30 (“abet” means “[t]o encourage or set another on to commit a crime”); Black's Law Dictionary 6 (1891) (to “abet” is “[t]o encourage, incite, or set 

another on to commit a crime”). And the words “assisting” 

and “soliciting,” which appeared alongside “encouraging” in 

the 1885 Act, reinforce that Congress gave the word “encouraging” its narrower criminal-law meaning. See Dubin v. 

United States, 599 U. S. 110, 124–125 (2023) (a word capable 

of many meanings is refned by its neighbors, which often 

“ `avoid[s] the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of 

Congress' ”). Unsurprisingly, then, when this Court upheld 

the 1885 Act against a constitutional challenge, it explained 

that Congress “has the power to punish any who assist” in 

introducing noncitizens into the country—without suggesting that the term “encouraging” altered the scope of the prohibition. Lees v. United States, 150 U. S. 476, 480 (1893) 

(emphasis added). 

In the ensuing decades, Congress both added to and subtracted from the “encouraging” prohibition in the 1885 Act. 

Throughout, it continued to place “encouraging” alongside 

“assisting” and “soliciting.” See Act of Mar. 3, 1903, § 5, 32 

Stat. 1214–1215; Act of Feb. 20, 1907, § 5, 34 Stat. 900. Then, 

in 1917, Congress added “induce” to the string of verbs. Act 

of Feb. 5, 1917, § 5, 39 Stat. 879 (1917 Act) (making it a crime 

“to induce, assist, encourage, or solicit, or attempt to induce, 

assist, encourage, or solicit the importation or migration of 

any contract laborer . . . into the United States”). Like “encourage,” the word “induce” carried solicitation and facilitation overtones at the time of this enactment. See Black's 

Law Dictionary 617 (1891) (defning “inducement” to mean 

“that which leads or tempts to the commission of crime”). 

In fact, Congress had just recently used the term in a catchPage Proof Pending Publication
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all prohibition on criminal facilitation. See Act of Mar. 4, 

1909, § 332, 35 Stat. 1152 (“Whoever . . . aids, abets, counsels, 

commands, induces, or procures [the commission of an offense], is a principal” (emphasis added)). And as with “encourage,” the meaning of “induce” was clarifed and narrowed by its statutory neighbors in the 1917 Act—“assist” 

and “solicit.” 

Congress enacted the immediate forerunner of the modern 

clause (iv) in 1952 and, in doing so, simplifed the language 

from the 1917 Act. Most notably, the 1952 version dropped 

the words “assist” and “solicit,” instead making it a crime to 

“willfully or knowingly encourag[e] or induc[e], or attemp[t] 

to encourage or induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry 

into the United States of . . . any alien . . . not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States.” Immigration and Nationality Act, § 274(a)(4), 66 Stat. 229. Three 

decades later, Congress brought 8 U. S. C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) 

into its current form—still without the words “assist” or 

“solicit.” Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 

§ 112(a), 100 Stat. 3382 (making it a crime to “encourag[e] or 

induc[e] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United 

States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such 

coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of 

law”). 

On Hansen's view, these changes dramatically broadened 

the scope of clause (iv)'s prohibition on encouragement. Before 1952, he says, the words “assist” and “solicit” may have 

cabined “encourage” and “induce,” but eliminating them severed any connection the prohibition had to solicitation and 

facilitation. Brief for Respondent 25–26. In other words, 

Hansen claims, the 1952 and 1986 revisions show that Congress opted to make “protected speech, not conduct, a 

crime.” Id., at 27. 

We do not agree that the mere removal of the words “assist” and “solicit” turned an ordinary solicitation and facilitation offense into a novel and boundless restriction on speech. 

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Hansen's argument would require us to assume that Congress took a circuitous route to convey a sweeping—and constitutionally dubious—message. The better understanding 

is that Congress simply “streamlined” the pre-1952 statutory 

language—which, as any nonlawyer who has picked up the 

U. S. Code can tell you, is a commendable effort. 40 F. 4th, 

at 1066 (opinion of Bumatay, J.). In fact, the streamlined 

formulation mirrors this Court's own description of the 1917 

Act, which is further evidence that Congress was engaged in 

a cleanup project, not a renovation. See United States v. 

Lem Hoy, 330 U. S. 724, 727 (1947) (explaining that the 1917 

Act barred “contract laborers, defned as persons induced or 

encouraged to come to this country by offers or promises of 

employment” (emphasis added)); id., at 731 (describing the 

1917 Act as a “prohibition against employers inducing laborers to enter the country” (emphasis added)). And critically, 

the terms that Congress retained (“encourage” and “induce”) 

substantially overlap in meaning with the terms it omitted 

(“assist” and “solicit”). LaFave § 13.2(a). Clause (iv) is 

best understood as a continuation of the past, not a sharp 

break from it. 

C 

Hansen's primary counterargument is that clause (iv) is 

missing the necessary mens rea for solicitation and facilitation. Brief for Respondent 28–31. Both, as traditionally 

understood, require that the defendant specifcally intend 

that a particular act be carried out. Supra, at 771. “Encourages or induces,” however, is not modifed by any express intent requirement. Because the text of clause (iv) 

lacks that essential element, Hansen protests, it cannot possibly be limited to either solicitation or facilitation. 

Once again, Hansen ignores the longstanding history of 

these words. When Congress transplants a common-law 

term, the “ `old soil' ” comes with it. Taggart v. Lorenzen, 

587 U. S. –––, ––– – ––– (2019). So when Congress placed 

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tent associated with solicitation and facilitation was part of 

the package. That, in fact, is precisely how the federal 

aiding-and-abetting statute works. It contains no express 

mens rea requirement, providing only that a person who 

“aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” a federal offense is “punishable as a principal.” 18 U. S. C. § 2(a). 

Yet, consistent with “a centuries-old view of culpability,” we 

have held that the statute implicitly incorporates the traditional state of mind required for aiding and abetting. Rosemond v. United States, 572 U. S. 65, 70–71 (2014). 

Clause (iv) is situated among other provisions that work 

the same way. Consider those that immediately follow it: 

The frst makes it a crime to “engag[e] in any conspiracy to commit any of the preceding acts,” 8 U. S. C. 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), and the second makes it a crime to “ai[d] 

or abe[t] the commission of any of the preceding acts,” 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II). Neither of these clauses explicitly 

states an intent requirement. Yet both conspiracy and aiding and abetting are familiar common-law offenses that contain a particular mens rea. See Rosemond, 572 U. S., at 76 

(aiding and abetting); Ocasio v. United States, 578 U. S. 282, 

287–288 (2016) (conspiracy). Take an obvious example: If 

the words “aids or abets” in clause (v)(II) were considered in 

a vacuum, they could be read to cover a person who inadvertently helps another commit a § 1324(a)(1)(A) offense. But a 

prosecutor who tried to bring such a case would not succeed. 

Why? Because aiding and abetting implicitly carries a 

mens rea requirement—the defendant generally must intend 

to facilitate the commission of a crime. LaFave § 13.2(b). 

Since “encourages or induces” in clause (iv) draws on the 

same common-law principles, it too incorporates them 

implicitly.2 

2 The Ninth Circuit believed that the Government's “solicitation and facilitation” reading of clause (iv) would create impermissible surplusage 

with the aiding-and-abetting provision in clause (v)(II). 25 F. 4th 1103, 

1108–1109 (2022). Hansen does not press that argument before this 
780 UNITED STATES v. HANSEN 

Opinion of the Court 

Still, Hansen reiterates that if Congress had wanted to 

require intent, it could easily have said so—as it did elsewhere in clause (iv). The provision requires that the defendant encourage or induce an unlawful act and that the 

defendant “kno[w]” or “reckless[ly] disregard” the fact that 

the act encouraged “is or will be in violation of law.” 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Yet while Congress spelled out this requirement, it included no express mens rea element for “encourages or induces.” Indeed, Hansen continues, the statute used to require that the encouragement or inducement 

be committed “willfully or knowingly,” but Congress deleted 

those words in 1986. Brief for Respondent 30. Taken together, Hansen says, this evidence refects that Congress 

aimed to make a defendant liable for “encouraging or inducing” without respect to her state of mind. 

But there is a simple explanation for why “encourages or 

induces” is not modifed by an express mens rea requirement: There is no need for it. At the risk of sounding like 

a broken record, “encourage” and “induce,” as terms of art, 

carry the usual attributes of solicitation and facilitation— 

including, once again, the traditional mens rea. Congress 

might have rightfully seen the express mens rea requirement as unnecessary and cut it in a further effort to streamline clause (iv). And in any event, the omission of the unnecessary modifer is certainly not enough to overcome the 

“presumption of scienter” that typically separates wrongful 

acts “from `otherwise innocent conduct.' ” Xiulu Ruan v. 

United States, 597 U. S. –––, ––– (2022); see also Elonis v. 

United States, 575 U. S. 723, 736–737 (2015). 

Nor does the scienter applicable to a distinct element 

within clause (iv)—that the defendant “kno[w]” or “reckless[ly] disregard . . . the fact that” the noncitizen's “coming 

Court—for good reason. Clause (iv) criminalizes the aiding and abetting 

of an immigration violation, whereas clause (v)(II) prohibits the aiding and 

abetting of “any of the preceding acts.” In other words, clause (v)(II) 

applies to aiding and abetting a frst-line facilitator. Another difference: 

Clause (iv) criminalizes not only facilitation, but solicitation too. 

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to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law”—tell 

us anything about the mens rea for “encourages or induces.” 

Many criminal statutes do not require knowledge of illegality, but rather only “ `factual knowledge as distinguished 

from knowledge of the law.' ” Bryan v. United States, 524 

U. S. 184, 192 (1998). So Congress's choice to specify a mental state for this element tells us something that we might 

not normally infer, whereas the inclusion of a mens rea requirement for “encourages or induces” would add nothing. 

It bears emphasis that even if the Government's reading 

were not the best one, the interpretation is at least “ `fairly 

possible' ”—so the canon of constitutional avoidance would 

still counsel us to adopt it. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. 

–––, ––– (2018). This canon is normally a valuable ally for 

criminal defendants, who raise the prospect of unconstitutional applications to urge a narrower construction. But 

Hansen presses the clause toward the most expansive reading possible, effectively asking us to apply a canon of “ `constitutional collision.' ” 40 F. 4th, at 1059 (opinion of Bumatay, J.). This tactic is understandable in light of the odd 

incentives created by the overbreadth doctrine, but it is also 

wrong. When legislation and the Constitution brush up 

against each other, our task is to seek harmony, not to manufacture confict.3 

IV 

Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specifc acts known to 

violate federal law. So understood, the statute does not 

“prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” Williams, 553 U. S., 

at 292. 

3 The canon of constitutional avoidance is a problem for the dissent. Attempting to overcome it, Justice Jackson suggests that the canon has 

less force in the context of an overbreadth challenge. Post, at 807–808. 

Our cases offer no support for that proposition. In this context, as in 

others, ordinary principles of interpretation apply. 

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Start with clause (iv)'s valid reach. Hansen does not dispute that the provision encompasses a great deal of nonexpressive conduct—which does not implicate the First 

Amendment at all. Brief for Respondent 22–23. Consider 

just a few examples: smuggling noncitizens into the country, 

see United States v. Okatan, 728 F. 3d 111, 113–114 (CA2 

2013); United States v. Yoshida, 303 F. 3d 1145, 1148–1151 

(CA9 2002), providing counterfeit immigration documents, 

see United States v. Tracy, 456 Fed. Appx. 267, 269–270 (CA4 

2011) (per curiam); United States v. Castillo-Felix, 539 F. 2d 

9, 11 (CA9 1976), and issuing fraudulent Social Security numbers to noncitizens, see Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F. 3d 

1276, 1295–1297 (CA11 2010). A brief survey of the Federal 

Reporter confrms that these are heartland clause (iv) prosecutions. See 40 F. 4th, at 1072 (opinion of Bumatay, J.) 

(listing additional examples, including arranging fraudulent 

marriages and transporting noncitizens on boats). So the 

“plainly legitimate sweep” of the provision is extensive. 

When we turn to the other side of the ledger, we fnd it 

pretty much blank. Hansen fails to identify a single prosecution for ostensibly protected expression in the 70 years 

since Congress enacted clause (iv)'s immediate predecessor. 

Instead, he offers a string of hypotheticals, all premised on 

the expansive ordinary meanings of “encourage” and “induce.” In his view, clause (iv) would punish the author of an 

op-ed criticizing the immigration system, “[a] minister who 

welcomes undocumented people into the congregation and 

expresses the community's love and support,” and a government offcial who instructs “undocumented members of the 

community to shelter in place during a natural disaster.” 

Brief for Respondent 16–19. Yet none of Hansen's examples 

are fltered through the elements of solicitation or facilitation—most importantly, the requirement (which we again repeat) that a defendant intend to bring about a specifc result. 

See, e. g., Rosemond, 572 U. S., at 76. Clause (iv) does not 

have the scope Hansen claims, so it does not produce the 

horribles he parades. 

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To the extent that clause (iv) reaches any speech, it 

stretches no further than speech integral to unlawful conduct.4 “[I]t has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal 

merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, 

or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, 

or printed.” Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 

490, 502 (1949). Speech intended to bring about a particular 

unlawful act has no social value; therefore, it is unprotected. 

Williams, 553 U. S., at 298. We have applied this principle 

many times, including to the promotion of a particular piece 

of contraband, id., at 299, solicitation of unlawful employment, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on 

Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 388 (1973), and picketing 

with the “sole, unlawful [and] immediate objective” of “induc-

[ing]” a target to violate the law, Giboney, 336 U. S., at 502. 

It applies to clause (iv) too.5 

Hansen has no quibble with that conclusion to the extent 

that clause (iv) criminalizes speech that solicits or facilitates 

a criminal violation, like crossing the border unlawfully or 

remaining in the country while subject to a removal order. 

See §§ 1253(a), 1325(a), 1326(a). He agrees that these applications of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) are permissible—in fact, he con4 We also note that a number of clause (iv) prosecutions (like Hansen's) 

are predicated on fraudulent representations through speech for personal 

gain. See, e. g., United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 982 F. 3d 766, 776 (CA9 

2020); United States v. Kalu, 791 F. 3d 1194, 1198–1199 (CA10 2015). 

“[F]alse claims [that] are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other 

valuable considerations” are not protected by the First Amendment. 

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion). 

These examples increase the list of lawful applications. 5 Overbreadth doctrine traffcks in hypotheticals, so we do not (and cannot) hold that all future applications of clause (iv) will be lawful, nor do we 

suggest that they will necessarily fall into the speech-integral-to-conduct 

category. That would require a crystal ball. Nothing in our opinion 

today precludes a litigant from bringing an as-applied challenge to clause 

(iv) in the future—whether based on the First Amendment or another 

constitutional constraint. 

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cedes that he would lose if clause (iv) covered only solicitation and facilitation of criminal conduct. Tr. of Oral Arg. 

61–62. But he resists the idea that the First Amendment 

permits Congress to criminalize speech that solicits or facilitates a civil violation—and some immigration violations are 

only civil. Brief for Respondent 38. For instance, residing 

in the United States without lawful status is subject to the 

hefty penalty of removal, but it generally does not carry a 

criminal sentence. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U. S. 

387, 407 (2012). 

Call this the “mismatch” theory: Congress can impose 

criminal penalties on speech that solicits or facilitates a criminal violation and civil penalties on speech that solicits or 

facilitates a civil violation—but it cannot impose criminal 

penalties on speech that solicits or facilitates a civil violation. 

See Tr. of Oral Arg. 62–63; Brief for Eugene Volokh as Amicus Curiae 5–7. If this theory is sound, then clause (iv) 

reaches some expression that is outside the speech-integralto-unlawful-conduct exception. Of course, “that speech is 

not categorically unprotected does not mean it is immune 

from regulation, but only that ordinary First Amendment 

scrutiny would apply.” Brief for Respondent 44. 

We need not address this novel theory, because even if 

Hansen is right, his overbreadth challenge fails. To succeed, he has to show that clause (iv)'s overbreadth is “substantial . . . relative to [its] plainly legitimate sweep.” Williams, 553 U. S., at 292. As we have discussed, the 

provision has a wide legitimate reach insofar as it applies to 

nonexpressive conduct and speech soliciting or facilitating 

criminal violations of immigration law. Even assuming that 

clause (iv) reaches some protected speech, and even assuming that its application to all of that speech is unconstitutional, the ratio of unlawful-to-lawful applications is not lopsided enough to justify the “strong medicine” of facial 

invalidation for overbreadth. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 

U. S. 601, 613 (1973). In other words, Hansen asks us to 

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Thomas, J., concurring 

throw out too much of the good based on a speculative shot 

at the bad. This is not the stuff of overbreadth—as-applied 

challenges can take it from here. 

* * * 

The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the 

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

Justice Thomas, concurring. 

I join the Court's opinion in full. I write separately to 

emphasize how far afeld the facial overbreadth doctrine has 

carried the Judiciary from its constitutional role. The facial 

overbreadth doctrine “purports to grant federal courts the 

power to invalidate a law” that is constitutional as applied to 

the party before it “ `if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' ” Americans for Prosperity 

Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021) (Thomas, J., 

concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting 

United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. –––, ––– (2020) 

(Thomas, J., concurring)). As I have explained, this doctrine “lacks any basis in the text or history of the First 

Amendment, relaxes the traditional standard for facial challenges,” and distorts the judicial role. Id., at –––. 

There is no question that the First Amendment does not 

shield respondent's scheme from prosecution under 8 U. S. C. 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which prohibits “encourag[ing] or induc-

[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United 

States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such 

coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of 

law.” Respondent defrauded nearly 500 aliens by telling 

them that they could become U. S. citizens through adult 

adoption; he charged them up to $10,000 apiece, knowing full 

well that his scheme would not lead to citizenship. The 

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Thomas, J., concurring 

Ninth Circuit even acknowledged below that “it is clear,” 

both “from previous convictions under the statute . . . 

and likely from [respondent's] conduct here, that [§ 1324(a) 

(1)(A)(iv)] has at least some `plainly legitimate sweep.' ” 

25 F. 4th 1103, 1106–1107 (2022). 

Yet, instead of applying Congress' duly enacted law to respondent, the Ninth Circuit held the statute unconstitutional 

under this Court's facial overbreadth doctrine. Specifcally, 

it took the doctrine as license to “speculate about imaginary 

cases and sift through an endless stream of fanciful hypotheticals,” from which it concluded that the statute may be unconstitutional as applied to other (hypothetical) individuals 

in other (hypothetical) situations. 40 F. 4th 1049, 1071 

(2022) (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 

banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). It then tallied up 

those hypothetical constitutional violations and determined 

that they were “substantial” enough to warrant holding the 

law unconstitutional in toto. 25 F. 4th, at 1109–1111. That 

line of reasoning starkly demonstrates that this Court's facial 

overbreadth doctrine offers a license for federal courts to act 

as “roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the 

validity of the Nation's laws.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 

U. S. 601, 610–611 (1973) (majority opinion of White, J.). 

Such “roving commissions” are hardly a new idea. When 

they met in 1787, the Constitution's Framers were well 

aware of a body that wielded such power: the New York 

Council of Revision (Council). Created by the New York 

Constitution of 1777, the Council consisted of the Governor, 

the Chancellor, and the judges of the New York Supreme 

Court. 2 B. Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United 

States 1328, 1332 (2d ed. 1878). Noting that “laws inconsistent with the spirit of this constitution, or with the public 

good, may be hastily and unadvisedly passed,” section III of 

the New York Constitution required the two Houses of the 

New York Legislature to present “all bills which have passed 

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Thomas, J., concurring 

the senate and assembly” to the “council for their revisal 

and consideration.” Ibid. The Council's power “to revise 

legislation” meant that, if it “objected to any measure of a 

bill, it would return a detailed list of its objections to the 

legislature,” which “could change the bill to conform to those 

objections, override” them by a two-thirds vote of both 

Houses, “or simply let the bill die.” J. Barry, Comment: The 

Council of Revision and the Limits of Judicial Power, 56 

U. Chi. L. Rev. 235, 245 (1989) (Barry) (emphasis deleted).1 

The grounds for the Council's vetoes “ranged from an act 

being `inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution' to an 

act being passed without `the persons affected thereby having an opportunity of being heard' ” to an act being “ `inconsistent with the public good.' ” Id., at 245–246 (alteration 

and footnote omitted). 

At frst, the Council was a well-respected institution, and 

several prominent delegates to the Philadelphia Convention 

sought to replicate it in the Federal Constitution. Resolution 8 of the Virginia Plan proposed a federal council of revision composed of “the Executive and a convenient number of 

the National Judiciary” that would have “authority to examine [and veto] every act of the National Legislature before it 

shall operate.” 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 

1787, § 8, p. 21 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (Farrand). The Council's veto would “be fnal . . . unless the Act of the National 

Legislature be again passed.” Ibid.; see also J. Malcolm, 

Whatever the Judges Say It Is? The Founders and Judicial 

Review, 26 J. L. & Politics 1, 30–33 (2010). 

The proponents of a council were clear that they sought to 

empower judges to pass upon not only the constitutionality 

of laws, but also their policy. One of the council's main supporters, James Wilson, stated that the council would share 

1 The term “revise” was understood to mean “[t]o review.” 2 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 1773); N. Bailey, A 

Universal Etymological English Dictionary (22 ed. 1770) (“to review, to 

look over again”). 

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the New York Council's power of reviewing laws, not only 

on constitutional grounds, but also to determine if they were 

“unjust,” “unwise,” “dangerous,” or “destructive.” 2 Farrand 73. Such a power was needed, according to Wilson, 

because the ordinary judicial power of refusing to apply unconstitutional laws in cases or controversies did not include 

the authority to decline to give effect to a law on policy 

grounds. Ibid. The other leading proponent of a council, 

James Madison, similarly argued that the council would veto 

“laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form.” 

1 id., at 139. For Madison, the council was necessary to 

remedy the defect caused by the limits of judicial power: 

Judges could not prevent the “pursuit of . . . unwise & unjust 

measures.” 2 id., at 74. In that vein, George Mason similarly argued that a council was needed to prevent “unjust 

oppressive or pernicious” laws from taking effect. Id., at 78. 

Signifcantly, proponents of a council rejected the premise 

that judicial power included a power to refuse to apply a law 

for policy reasons. In fact, “[n]either side thought judges 

would or should be authorized to make policy—whether 

couched in the language of justice or rights—through their 

exercise of the judicial power. . . . [T]he debate over a council 

of revision was made necessary . . . because . . . not a single 

delegate on either side of the debate proposed or supported 

having judges perform a policymaking role from the 

bench.” J. Anderson, Learning From the Great Council of 

Revision Debate, 68 Rev. Politics 79, 99–100 (2006). From 

that shared premise, the council's proponents argued that 

such an institution was needed precisely because it would be 

incompatible with judicial duty to take policy concerns into 

account in adjudicating cases. See J. Mitchell, The Writ-ofErasure Fallacy, 104 Va. L. Rev. 933, 963 (2018).2 

2 Later statements of the proposed council's supporters confrm their 

understanding that the judicial station is incompatible with making policy 

judgments. See Moodie v. Ship Phoebe Anne, 3 Dall. 319 (1796) (Elsworth, C. J.) (“Suggestions of policy and conveniency cannot be considered 

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Thomas, J., concurring 

Despite the support of respected delegates like Wilson and 

Madison, the Convention voted against creating a federal 

council of revision on four different occasions. P. Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 511 (2008). No other proposal was considered and rejected so many times. Ibid. 

Like the council's supporters, opponents of the proposal understood that the judicial power is only the authority to “resolve private disputes between particular parties,” rather 

than “matters affecting the general public.” Barry 255. 

Working from that shared premise, they reasoned that it was 

“ `quite foreign from the nature of [the judicial] offce to make 

them judges of the policy of public measures,' ” as “ `[n]o 

maxim was better established' than that `the power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding, the 

law.' ” Ibid. (quoting 1 Farrand 97–98 (E. Gerry); 2 id., at 

75 (C. Strong)); see also 1 id., at 140 (J. Dickinson). Indeed, 

opponents observed that “the Judges” were “of all men the 

most unft to” have a veto on laws before their enactment. 

2 id., at 80 (J. Rutledge). This was so not only because 

judges could not be “presumed to possess any peculiar 

knowledge of the mere policy of public measures,” id., at 73 

(N. Ghorum), but also because, to preserve judicial integrity, 

they “ought never to give their opinion on a law till it comes 

before them” as an issue for decision in a concrete case or 

controversy, id., at 80 (J. Rutledge); see also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 121 (2015) (Thomas, J., 

concurring in judgment) (“[J]udicial involvement in such a 

council would foster internal biases”). Opponents thus concluded that to include judges in the policy decisions inherent 

in the legislative process would be a “dangerous innovation,” 

one that would erode public confdence in their ability to perform their “proper offcial character.” 2 Farrand 75–76 

(L. Martin); see also id., at 77 (“[T]he Supreme Judiciary 

in the judicial determination of a question of right”); 8 Writings of James 

Madison 387 (G. Hunt ed. 1908) (“[Q]uestions of policy and expediency, are 

unsusceptible of judicial cognizance and decision”). 
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should have the confdence of the people. This will soon be 

lost, if they are employed in the task of remonstrating 

ag[ainst] popular measures of the Legislature”). 

The later history of the New York Council of Revision 

demonstrates the wisdom of the Framers' decision. The 

Council naturally became politicized through its intrusive 

involvement in the legislative process. Over the course of 

its existence, it returned 169 bills to the legislature; the legislature, in turn, overrode only 51 of those vetoes and reenacted at least 26 bills with modifcations. Barry 245. 

Moreover, “[t]he Council did not shrink from tough stands on 

controversial or politically charged issues.” Id., at 246. 

For example, early in its existence, it vetoed a bill barring 

those convicted of adultery from remarrying and one that 

declared Loyalists aliens. Ibid. Decades later, it very 

nearly blocked the bill authorizing the Erie Canal's construction for policy reasons. P. Bernstein, Wedding of the Waters: The Erie Canal and the Making of a Great Nation 197– 

199 (2005). Some members of the Council opposed the bill 

due to “concern[s] about committing the state to this huge 

project before public opinion was more clearly and more emphatically in favor.” Id., at 198. Others were concerned 

that the legislation gave the canal commission arbitrary powers. Ibid. The canal legislation—one of the most important 

measures in the Nation's history—survived the Council's review only because Chancellor James Kent changed his deciding vote at the last minute, seemingly on a whim. Id., at 199. 

The Council contributed to its own abolition in 1820, when 

it vetoed a bill passed by the legislature that called for a 

convention to revise New York's Constitution. 1 C. Lincoln, 

The Constitutional History of New York 623–626 (1906) (Lincoln). The State Assembly then issued a report lambasting 

“the Council for usurping the legislature's role as the democratic representative of the people”; the legislature subsequently enacted a new bill that succeeded in calling for 
Cite as: 599 U. S. 762 (2023) 791 

Thomas, J., concurring 

a constitutional convention. Barry 247; Lincoln 626–629. 

The same sentiment arose at the convention when, echoing 

arguments that had also been made in Philadelphia against 

a federal council of revision, opponents of the Council argued 

that it had “ `usurped the power of judging the expediency 

as well as the constitutionality of bills passed by the legislature' ” and that it had “ `in fact become a third branch of 

the legislature.' ” Barry 247 (quoting N. Carter & W. Stone, 

Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention 

of 1821, pp. 55, 79 (1821)). Unsurprisingly, the Council was 

abolished, and New York's 1821 Constitution placed the veto 

power solely in the Governor. Barry 248. 

When courts apply the facial overbreadth doctrine, they 

function in a manner strikingly similar to the federal council 

of revision that the Framers rejected. The doctrine contemplates that courts can declare laws unconstitutional in 

the abstract without the law ever being applied against any 

individual in an unconstitutional manner. Along the way, 

courts must examine the sum total of the law's application 

to people who are not parties to any proceeding; courts then 

weigh the law's various applications to determine if any unconstitutional applications outweigh the law's constitutional 

sweep or might “chill” protected speech. That is nothing 

short of a society-wide policy determination of the sort that 

legislatures perform. Yet, the Court has never even attempted to ground this doctrine “in the text or history 

of the First Amendment.” Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S., at 

––– – ––– (concurring opinion). Instead, it has justifed it 

“solely by reference to” yet another layer of “policy considerations and value judgments” about “what serves the public 

good.” Id., at ––– – –––. As the debate over the federal 

council of revision demonstrates, this approach is fundamentally inconsistent with judicial duty. 

This case demonstrates just how far courts have drifted 

from their original station of adjudicating the rights of the 

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parties before them in accordance with law.3 In an appropriate case, we should carefully reconsider the facial overbreadth doctrine. 

Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Sotomayor joins, 

dissenting. 

At bottom, this case is about how to interpret a statute 

that prohibits “encourag[ing] or induc[ing]” a noncitizen “to 

come to, enter, or reside in the United States” unlawfully. 

8 U. S. C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). The Court reads that broad 

language as a narrow prohibition on the intentional solicitation or facilitation of a specifc act of unlawful immigration— 

and it thereby avoids having to invalidate this statute under 

our well-established First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. 

But the majority departs from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation to reach that result. Specifcally, it 

rewrites the provision's text to include elements that Congress once adopted but later removed as part of its incremental expansion of this particular criminal law over the last 

century. 

It is neither our job nor our prerogative to retroft federal 

statutes in a manner patently inconsistent with Congress's 

3 The facial overbreadth doctrine is but one manifestation of the Court's 

larger drift away from the limited judicial station envisioned by the Constitution. See J. Malcolm, Whatever the Judges Say It Is? The Founders 

and Judicial Review, 26 J. L. & Politics 1, 36–37 (2010). Justices have long 

noted that doctrines tasking judges with passing upon the policy of laws 

in the abstract resemble the council of revision the Framers rejected. 

See, e. g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 136 (1974) (Blackmun, J., 

joined by Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (overbreadth and 

vagueness doctrines); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 778 (1977) 

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suspect classifcations under the Fourteenth 

Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 513–515 (1965) 

(Black, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting) (substantive due process); 

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 273–274 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (due 

process for welfare benefts); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558, 571 (1948) 

(Jackson, J., dissenting) (review of time, place, and manner speech 

regulations). 
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Jackson, J., dissenting 

choices. Moreover, by acquiescing to the Government's 

newly minted pitch to narrow this statute in order to save 

it,1 the majority undermines the goal of the overbreadth doctrine, which aims to keep overly broad statutes off the books 

in order to avoid chilling constitutionally protected speech. 

See Dombrowski v. Pfster, 380 U. S. 479, 486–487 (1965). 

Because the majority's interpretation of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) 

diverges from the text and history of the provision, and simultaneously subverts the speech-protective goals of the 

constitutional doctrine plainly implicated here, I respectfully dissent. 

I 

Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) makes it a federal crime to “encourag[e] or induc[e]” a noncitizen “to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard 

of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will 

be in violation of law.” For ease of reference, I will refer to 

this as the “encouragement provision.” 

Respondent Hansen argues that the encouragement provision is unconstitutional under our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, and the Ninth Circuit below agreed. Neither the Government nor the majority disputes that 

conclusion if the statute is read according to its plain terms. 

And, indeed, when read literally, the encouragement provision prohibits so much protected speech that it appears to 

qualify as overbroad under our precedents. 

A 

A statute is overbroad—and thus facially invalid—if “a 

substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, 

judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.” 

United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 473 (2010) (internal 

1 Previously, even the Government rejected the majority's view of the 

statute's scope at trial, when it was seeking to convict the defendant. See 

Part III, infra. 

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quotation marks omitted). The overbreadth inquiry thus 

generally requires comparing the First Amendmentprotected expression that a statute impermissibly punishes, 

on the one hand (let's call that “category one”), with the unprotected speech and conduct that the statute validly prohibits, on the other (“category two”). 

Starting with category one: With respect to the sweep of 

the plain text of the encouragement provision, there is no 

dispute that, “[i]n ordinary parlance, `induce' means `[t]o lead 

on; to infuence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion or infuence,' ” and “ `encourage' means to `inspire with courage, 

spirit, or hope.' ” Ante, at 774. Thus, on its face, the encouragement provision's use of the terms “encourage” and 

“induce” seems to encompass any and all speech that merely 

persuades, infuences, or inspires a noncitizen to come to, 

enter, or reside in this country in violation of law. 

If speech of this nature is, in fact, suffcient to trigger potential prosecution under this statute, the provision would 

put all manner of protected speech in the Government's 

prosecutorial crosshairs. It would reach, for example, the 

grandmother who says she misses her noncitizen grandchild, 

leading the grandchild to move illegally to the United States. 

It would also apply to the doctor who informs a noncitizen 

patient that a necessary medical treatment is more readily 

available in the United States, infuencing the patient to stay 

beyond the expiration of his visa to await treatment. The 

college counselor who advises an undocumented student that 

she can obtain a private scholarship to attend college in the 

United States, inspiring the student to reside here, would 

also fall within the scope of the statute. 

The encouragement provision, on this broad reading, 

would also punish abstract advocacy of illegal conduct, even 

though such speech is plainly permissible under the First 

Amendment. For instance, the plain text of the statute appears to prohibit a person from saying to a noncitizen who 

has no authorization to reside here, “I encourage you to live 

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in the United States.” But that speech is plainly protected. 

See United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 298–300 (2008). 

In Williams, this Court explained that “abstract advocacy” 

of child pornography—including the phrase “I encourage you 

to obtain child pornography”—qualifes as protected speech, 

even though the “recommendation of a particular piece of 

purported child pornography with the intent of initiating a 

transfer” is properly proscribed by federal statute. Ibid. 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e. g., Ashcroft v. 

Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The mere 

tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a suffcient reason for banning it”). 

B 

The Government does not dispute that the encouragement 

provision is unconstitutional as overbroad if it is read according to its plain text, thereby reaching these various fact patterns. This point is worth repeating: Under the broad interpretation of the statute, the Government does not even 

attempt to argue that the unconstitutional applications in 

category one are not “substantial,” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 473, 

in relation to the constitutional applications that fall in category two.2 Rather, the Government argues that the statute 

can be saved from falling victim to today's overbreadth challenge by construing the broad terms of the encouragement 

provision narrowly—and, in particular, reading them as authorizing prosecution only for solicitation or facilitation. 

Citing this Court's general duty “to seek harmony, not to 

manufacture confict,” when “legislation and the Constitution 

brush up against each other,” ante, at 781, the majority 

obliges. But this Court also has a duty to refrain from taking the legislative reins and revising the text of a statute. 

2 There is accordingly no need to dwell on the contents of category two 

here. The majority discusses several examples, like “issuing fraudulent 

Social Security numbers to noncitizens.” Ante, at 782 (citing Edwards v. 

Prime, Inc., 602 F. 3d 1276, 1295–1297 (CA11 2010)). 
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It is well established that “[w]e will not rewrite a law to 

conform it to constitutional requirements.” Stevens, 559 

U. S., at 481 (emphasis added; alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, and in the overbreadth 

context in particular, the Court “may impose a limiting 

construction on a statute only if it is `readily susceptible' to 

such a construction.” Ibid. (some internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Application of our ordinary principles of statutory interpretation here reveals that the encouragement provision is 

not susceptible to the narrow solicitation or facilitation construction that the majority adopts, as explained below. 

Thus, this statute is overbroad and facially invalid under the 

First Amendment. 

II 

The majority contends that the encouragement provision 

uses “ `encourage' ” and “ `induce' ” in a “specialized, criminallaw sense,” under which those words are essentially synonymous with solicitation and facilitation and carry certain 

narrowing features of those crimes. Ante, at 774. But that 

construction of the statute is untenable for the reasons that 

follow. 

A 

The majority starts its interpretation of the encouragement provision “with some background on solicitation and 

facilitation,” ante, at 771, instead of addressing any of the 

terms in the encouragement provision itself. This is the frst 

clue that the majority's statutory analysis is unusual. Ordinarily, we start with the text of the statute being interpreted. 

Yet the words “solicitation” and “facilitation” appear nowhere 

in the encouragement provision. (As the majority notes, 

facilitation is “also called aiding and abetting,” ibid.—another term that is absent from the encouragement provision.) 

The majority goes on to explain that the terms that do 

appear in the encouragement provision—“encourage” and 

“induce”—are also often used (with other words) to defne 

“solicitation” and “facilitation.” Ante, at 771–773. For ex-
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Jackson, J., dissenting 

ample, the majority notes that one legal dictionary “defnes 

`abet' as `[t]o encourage or set another on to commit a 

crime,' ” and it cites other legal dictionaries that also use 

“encourage” to defne “abet.” Ante, at 772. Similarly, the 

majority observes that the federal “ban on soliciting a crime 

of violence . . . penalizes those who `solici[t], comman[d], induc[e], or otherwise endeavo[r] to persuade' another person 

`to engage in [the unlawful] conduct.' ” Ibid. Because the 

terms “encourage” and “induce” are used to defne the 

crimes of solicitation and facilitation, the majority concludes 

that the statutory terms “ `[e]ncourage' and `induce' have 

well-established legal meanings” that “incorporat[e] commonlaw liability for solicitation and facilitation.” Ante, at 774. 

This contention—that, because the broad terms that Congress actually used are sometimes spotted in the defnition 

of other, narrower words, the statute's broad terms are limited by the meaning of those narrower words and those 

words' characteristics—is puzzling. The majority cites no 

precedent for this novel approach to interpreting words in a 

statute. And its logic falls apart in light of the English lexicon and how dictionary defnitions tend to work. 

Broad words are often used to defne narrower ones. So 

the fact that a word is used to help defne another word does 

not necessarily mean that the former is synonymous with the 

latter or incorporates all of its connotations. For instance, 

the word “furniture” might be used in the defnition of a 

“chair,” but not all pieces of furniture are chairs, nor do all 

pieces of furniture have four legs or other common chair-like 

characteristics. Similarly, “to move” is used to defne “to 

walk,” “to run,” and “to fy.” But that does not make these 

four terms interchangeable. 

So, too, here. The phrase “encourages or induces” is not 

synonymous with “solicits” or “facilitates” (or “aids and 

abets”). For example, among the other characteristics of solicitation and facilitation (discussed further in Part II–C, 

infra) is the fact that they require “an intent to bring about 

a particular unlawful act,” ante, at 771 (emphasis added). But 

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the encouragement provision hints at no such thing. It 

simply prohibits “encourag[ing] or induc[ing]” a noncitizen “to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, 

knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of 

law.” § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Nor does the ordinary meaning 

of “encourages or induces” carry the intent requirement that solicitation and facilitation do: By describing the 

attractions of my hometown, for instance, I might end up 

inducing a listener to move there, even if that was not my 

intent. 

It is also telling that the very next subdivision of 

§ 1324(a)(1)(A) expressly prohibits “aid[ing] or abet[ting] the 

commission of any of the preceding acts.” § 1324(a) 

(1)(A)(v)(II). That provision indicates that Congress knows 

how to create an aiding-and-abetting prohibition when it 

wants to—and that it did not do so in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).3 

The majority's mere observation that the encouragement 

provision's terms are used to defne solicitation and facilitation is thus insuffcient to establish that the terms mean the 

same thing or incorporate the same features. 

B 

The majority next turns to “[s]tatutory history” to support 

its transformation of the broad encouragement provision that 

Congress wrote into a narrow solicitation or aiding-andabetting prohibition. Ante, at 775. I agree that the history 

of a statute can reveal Congress's intent to use terms in a 

narrower or specialized manner. But, here again, the particulars matter. And the history of this particular statute 

only underscores that it cannot be read as the majority 

3 This is not a surplusage argument. Cf. ante, at 779–780, n. 2. I agree 

with the majority that clause (iv) and clause (v)(II) have different aims. 

My point, instead, is that Congress's failure to use the classic “aids or 

abets” language in clause (iv), which it deploys just next door in clause 

(v)(II), should give us pause before concluding that we can read clause (iv) 

as if it included the same terms. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

wishes. At every turn, Congress has sought to expand the 

reach of this criminal law, including by deleting the terms 

and mens rea requirement that the majority attempts to 

read back into the statute. 

1 

The history of the encouragement provision is a tale of 

expansion. Up frst was an 1885 law focused specifcally on 

contract labor. Ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332. It made “knowingly 

assisting, encouraging or soliciting the migration or importation of” a noncitizen into the United States “to perform labor 

or service of any kind under contract or agreement” unlawful. § 3, id., at 333. Congress revised this prohibition in 

1917, to add “induce.” § 5, 39 Stat. 879. Thus, as of the 

early 20th century, it was a misdemeanor “to induce, assist, 

encourage, or solicit . . . the importation or migration of any 

contract laborer,” or to attempt to do the same. Ibid. 

Signifcantly for present purposes, in 1952, Congress deleted the statute's references to solicitation and assistance— 

leaving “encourages” and “induces” to stand alone. 66 Stat. 

229. What is more, Congress expanded the prohibition to 

all unlawful entry, not merely contract labor. Ibid. And it 

also ratcheted up the punishment. Ibid. So amended, the 

statute made it a felony to “willfully or knowingly encourag[e] or induc[e], or attemp[t] to encourage or induce, either 

directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States” of 

any noncitizen who had not been “duly admitted” or who was 

not “lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United 

States.” Ibid. 

Congress enacted the current version of the encouragement provision in 1986. It removed the mens rea requirement relating to the encouragement or inducement 

element—excising from the statute that a violator must 

“willfully or knowingly” encourage or induce a noncitizen to 

violate the immigration laws—while inserting a mens rea 

requirement for knowledge or reckless disregard of the noncitizen's immigration status. See Immigration Reform and 

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neously, and for the frst time, Congress made it a crime to 

encourage or induce an unauthorized noncitizen not merely 

to enter the United States, but also to encourage or induce 

such a person to “reside” here unlawfully. Ibid. 

Finally, in 1996, Congress crafted a separate penalty enhancement for certain kinds of violations. It raised the 

maximum punishment from 5 years to 10 years of imprisonment if the offender violates the encouragement provision 

“for the purpose of commercial advantage or private fnancial 

gain.” § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i); see Illegal Immigration Reform 

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 203(a), 110 Stat. 

3009–565. 

As these developments illustrate, Congress has repeatedly 

revisited the scope of the encouragement provision. And, in 

so doing, it has consistently expanded the reach and severity 

of this criminal law from its modest 1885 origins. Most notably, the particular amendments that Congress has made to 

the encouragement provision demonstrate its intent to specifcally reject the pillars of the majority's holding. 

To reiterate: The terms “solicit” and “assist” appeared in 

the text of the statute between 1885 and 1952, at which point 

Congress removed them. Likewise, between 1952 and 1986, 

violating this statute required that the speaker “willfully or 

knowingly” encourage or induce a noncitizen to transgress 

the immigration laws. But in 1986, Congress deleted this 

primary mens rea requirement. 

2 

The majority's efforts to spin the encouragement provision's enlightening enactment history in favor of the majority's narrow interpretation are unavailing. 

The majority frst points out that the 1885 version of 

the encouragement provision criminalized “knowingly assisting, encouraging or soliciting” certain immigration. § 3, 23 

Stat. 333 (emphasis added); see ante, at 775–776. Because 

the term “encouraging” was placed alongside “assisting” and 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

“soliciting” in this precursor provision, the majority maintains that the term “encouraging” is narrowed by the canon 

of noscitur a sociis, “which counsels that a word is given 

more precise content by the neighboring words with which 

it is associated.” Williams, 553 U. S., at 294; see ante, 

at 776. In Williams, the Court (in an opinion by Justice 

Scalia) reasoned that, “[w]hen taken in isolation,” the broad 

term “ `promotes' ” is “susceptible of multiple and wideranging meanings,” but that, “in a list that includes `solicits,' 

`distributes,' and `advertises,' [it] is most sensibly read to 

mean the act of recommending purported child pornography 

to another person for his acquisition.” 553 U. S., at 294–295. 

But, as the majority here ultimately goes on to acknowledge, ante, at 777, the statutory word “encouraging” was not 

actually accompanied by the narrower terms “soliciting” and 

“assisting” throughout the course of this statute's history. 

And for the history to be meaningfully referenced, the state 

of the statute must be considered over time, not just at particular points in which words that seem to support a particular reading might have appeared. The delta between the 

purportedly narrow version of the statute that the majority 

points to, and what later happened to the statutory text, is 

important—and there is no dispute that Congress later removed the terms “soliciting” and “assisting” from the encouragement provision, leaving “encouraging” and “inducing” to stand “in isolation,” 553 U. S., at 294. See ante, 

at 777–778. Tracing the history over time clearly establishes that Congress deleted the very narrowing terms that 

the majority now reads back into the statute.4 

4 This revealing revision also sets apart the encouragement provision's 

unadorned use of “encourages” and “induces” from the majority's long list 

of state solicitation and facilitation laws. Ante, at 773. The majority includes that list in its effort to demonstrate that “encourages” and “induces” in the encouragement provision actually mean “solicits” or “aids 

and abets.” But in the vast majority of the cited statutes, classic narrowing terms—like “aided,” “abetted,” “solicits,” “commands,” “hires,” “coerces,” or “compels”—appear alongside “encourages” or “induces.” Ibid.; 
802 UNITED STATES v. HANSEN 

Jackson, J., dissenting 

The majority brushes off Congress's revision by speculating that Congress was merely “engaged in a cleanup project” 

and was just “streamlin[ing]” the statutory language. Ante, 

at 778. This contention, however, gets our ordinary presumption in statutory interpretation cases precisely backwards. We “usually presume differences in language . . . 

convey differences in meaning,” absent some indication from 

Congress to the contrary. BNSF R. Co. v. Loos, 586 U. S. 

–––, ––– (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 

we have found the presumption overcome where, for example, Congress has expressly “billed” the changes as “effect[-

ing] only `[t]echnical [a]mendments.' ” Id., at –––. 

Here, the majority points to no signal from Congress that 

it sought to change the encouragement provision's language 

without changing its meaning. It seems that the only support the majority can muster for its “cleanup project” theory 

is a 1947 Supreme Court case that at several points refers 

to the statute as a prohibition on “encourag[ing]” or “induc[ing]” certain unlawful immigration. Ante, at 778 (citing 

United States v. Lem Hoy, 330 U. S. 724 (1947)). From this, 

the majority infers that, when Congress amended the encouragement provision fve years later to remove the words 

“solicit” and “assist,” it must have been adopting Lem Hoy's 

shorthand characterization of the statute. But the majority 

fails to support this connection—tenuous on its face—with 

any evidence that Congress actually consulted our 1947 decision when it drafted the 1952 amendments, or anything else 

that might establish the primary signifcance that the majority ascribes to our decision's phrasing. 

The majority similarly characterizes Congress's decision 

to remove the intent requirement from the statute in 1986 

as “a further effort to streamline” the encouragement provision. Ante, at 780. In other words, the Court today holds 

see App. to Brief for State of Montana et al. as Amici Curiae 1–44. Thus, 

unlike the one before us, such statutes might well be susceptible of a narrower reading. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

that Congress's removal of “willfully or knowingly” in the 

1986 amendments did not change the mens rea required to 

violate this statute. But the majority offers no support at 

all for its view that Congress didn't really mean for the 

amendment to effect any substantive change. Instead, it 

conjures up its own “simple explanation”: There was “no 

need” for an explicit mens rea because “encourage” and “induce” carry the mens rea associated with solicitation and 

facilitation. Ibid. see also ante, at 778–779 (reasoning that 

Congress's use of “encourages” and “induces” brought along 

the “old soil” of “the traditional intent associated with solicitation and facilitation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Of course, this argument merely assumes that Congress intended for “encourage” and “induce” as they appear in the 

encouragement provision to mean “solicit” and “facilitate”; it 

is a repackaging of the majority's unwarranted confation of 

those terms. See Part II–A, supra. 

The majority also invokes the presumption that a criminal 

law contains an intent requirement even where Congress 

does not explicitly include one. Ante, at 780–781. But, here, 

the statutory history undermines that presumption. Congress most certainly focused on the mens rea question because it not only decided to remove “willfully or knowingly” 

from the statute, it did so while inserting a separate mens 

rea requirement for the knowledge of the noncitizen's immigration status. The confuence of these choices implies that 

Congress's removal of the primary mens rea requirement 

was deliberate. And, when this deliberate choice is considered alongside the history of the provision's signifcant 

expansions, there is ample cause to think that Congress intended a substantive change in meaning. 

C 

Other features of the encouragement provision (beyond its 

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804 UNITED STATES v. HANSEN 

Jackson, J., dissenting 

ance with established characteristics of solicitation or aiding 

and abetting. These features further highlight the poor ft 

between this statute and the narrow solicitation/aiding-andabetting box into which the majority tries to squeeze Congress's broad language. 

Recall that, in 1986, Congress made it a crime to encourage 

or induce a noncitizen not just to “come to” or “enter” the 

United States, but also to “reside” in this country. 100 Stat. 

3382; supra, at 799–800.5 As the majority notes, while it is 

a crime for a noncitizen to enter the United States illegally, 

it is generally not a crime—just a civil violation—to remain 

in the United States without lawful status, such as when a 

noncitizen overstays a visitor or student visa. See Arizona 

v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 407 (2012); see ante, at 784. 

Thus, the encouragement provision on its face appears to 

criminally punish someone who merely encourages or induces a civil violation.6 

That feature of the provision does not sit easily with its 

categorization as a solicitation or facilitation statute, because, ordinarily, a person may only be held criminally liable 

5 As a side note: Congress's addition of “reside” might seem to sweep 

in speakers who encouraged or induced noncitizens “who were already 

unlawfully present in the U. S. to continue that unlawful presence.” 40 

F. 4th 1049, 1073, n. 1 (CA9 2022) (Collins, J., dissenting from denial of 

reh'g en banc). But as Judge Collins explained, the provision is “most 

naturally read” to reach only “those who encourage or induce particular 

[noncitizens] to acquire an unlawful presence or residence that they do 

not already have.” Ibid. After all, “[o]ne does not normally speak of 

`inducing' another to do what he or she is already doing.” Ibid. And the 

principle of noscitur a sociis counsels in favor of such an understanding, 

given that “the frst two listed verbs (`come to' and `enter') plainly refer 

to such an acquisition.” Ibid. 6 Hansen takes issue with this feature of the statute, arguing that the 

“ `speech integral to criminal conduct' exception” to the First Amendment's protection of free speech “does not permit the criminal punishment 

of speech encouraging only a civil law violation.” Brief for Respondent 

39. The majority declines to address this argument, leaving it available 

in future as-applied challenges to this and other statutes. Ante, at 783, 

n. 5, 784. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

for aiding and abetting or solicitation when the underlying 

offense is itself a crime. Aiding-and-abetting liability is “a 

centuries-old view of culpability: that a person may be responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if 

he helps another to complete its commission.” Rosemond v. 

United States, 572 U. S. 65, 70 (2014) (citing J. Hawley & 

M. McGregor, Criminal Law 81 (1899)); see also 18 U. S. C. 

§ 2(a) (the general federal aiding-and-abetting statute, providing that someone who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, 

induces or procures” the commission of a federal crime “is 

punishable as a principal”). As for solicitation, at common 

law, the solicited offense had to be a felony or a serious misdemeanor; otherwise, “the solicitor [was] guilty of no offense.” 1 J. Ohlin, Wharton's Criminal Law § 9:2 (16th ed. 

2021) (Wharton's). Today, “in some jurisdictions, the offense solicited may be a felony or a misdemeanor; but in others, it can only be a felony”—either way, though, the underlying offense must be criminal. Ibid. (footnotes omitted); see 

also 18 U. S. C. § 373 (the general federal solicitation statute, 

which is limited to the solicitation of violent felonies). 

Here, by contrast, the encouragement provision on its face 

appears to permit a person to be punished as a felon for 

merely encouraging a civil violation. Thus, the statute is 

not an easy ft for the solicitation and facilitation role in 

which the majority has cast it. 

This statute is fundamentally different from aiding-andabetting liability and solicitation in other ways as well. As 

noted, aiding-and-abetting liability is a form of vicarious liability—i. e., a way in which a person becomes liable for the 

crimes of the principal. Likewise, for solicitation, “the punishment . . . is usually geared to . . . the punishment provided 

for the offense solicited.” Wharton's § 9:11; see, e. g., 18 

U. S. C. § 373(a) (providing, for example, punishment of “not 

more than one-half the maximum term of imprisonment . . . 

of the crime solicited”). But, notably, a person who violates 

the encouragement provision is not punished as if he were a 

principal of the underlying offense, nor does the prescribed 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

punishment depend on the penalty for the underlying offense. So, for example, even if the underlying immigration 

offense is a civil violation, the person who encourages or induces that infraction could be punished by up to 10 years' 

imprisonment for violating the encouragement provision. 

Unlike solicitation and facilitation, then, punishment for violation of the encouragement provision is not tied in any way 

to the punishment prescribed for the underlying offense. 

It is also telling that aiding-and-abetting liability (but not 

solicitation) requires that the principal actually commit the 

underlying offense. 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal 

Law § 13.3(c) (3d ed. 2018) (“[T]he guilt of the principal must 

be established at the trial of the accomplice as a part of the 

proof on the charge against the accomplice”). Yet, the encouragement provision on its face does not require that a 

noncitizen actually enter or reside in the United States. 

* * * 

For these reasons, none of the traditional tools of statutory 

interpretation makes the encouragement provision readily 

susceptible to the majority's narrowing construction. 

III 

The majority nevertheless revises the statute, leaning on 

the canon of constitutional avoidance. Ante, at 781.7 But 

that canon “comes into play only when, after the application 

of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. –––, ––– (2018) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). It does not give the Court license “to rewrite a 

statute as it pleases.” Id., at –––. And, here, for the rea7 The majority implies that constitutional avoidance is a backup argument. Ante, at 781 (suggesting that its reading of the statute is the “best 

one”). But, in my view, the text and history of the encouragement provision make it hard to get even close to the majority's narrow reading without substantial reliance on the constitutional-avoidance principle. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

sons explained above, it is clear that the majority has 

mounted “a serious invasion of the legislative domain.” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The majority's rescue mission is especially problematic because it is taking place in the context of a First Amendment 

challenge to a statute on overbreadth grounds, as explained 

below. 

A 

Overbreadth challenges are an “exception to the usual 

rules governing standing,” a variation the Court has long 

permitted in recognition of the “danger of tolerating, in the 

area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal 

statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application.” 

Dombrowski, 380 U. S., at 486–487 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Absent overbreadth doctrine, “the contours of 

regulation[s]” that impinge on the freedom of speech “would 

have to be hammered out case by case—and tested only by 

those hardy enough to risk criminal prosecution to determine the proper scope of regulation.” Id., at 487. We thus 

allow defendants whose speech is constitutionally proscribed 

by a statute (like Hansen) to argue that the statute is nevertheless facially invalid under the First Amendment on the 

grounds that “a substantial number of its applications are 

unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly 

legitimate sweep.” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted). By permitting this kind of challenge, the Court has “avoided making vindication of freedom 

of expression await the outcome of protracted litigation.” 

Dombrowski, 380 U. S., at 487. 

If this Court is willing to redline Congress's work to save 

it from unconstitutionality, it “sharply diminish[es] Congress's incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the frst 

place,” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 481 (internal quotation marks 

omitted), which runs directly counter to overbreadth's goal 

of limiting criminal laws that chill constitutionally protected 

speech. Thus, in the particular context of an overbreadth 

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challenge, countervailing constitutional concerns—namely, 

that constitutionally protected speech will be chilled—must 

be considered alongside the values that underpin our ordinary canon of constitutional avoidance. 

Heavy reliance on constitutional avoidance where statutes 

would otherwise be facially overbroad also means that the 

broad language in the particular statute remains on the 

books—as compared to the alternative world, in which the 

Court holds the statute unconstitutional as facially overbroad and thereby prompts the enactment of a narrower 

replacement. Ordinary people confronted with the encouragement provision, for instance, will see only its broad, 

speech-chilling language. Even if they do consult this 

Court's decision, and do recognize that it substantially narrows the statute's scope, the Court's decision leaves many 

things about future potential prosecutions up in the air. 

For example, one does not know from today's determination whether a noncitizen must actually complete the underlying offense of coming to, entering, or residing in the United 

States (à la aiding and abetting) or whether completion is 

not a prerequisite for prosecution (à la solicitation). This 

sort of uncertainty—the clarifcation of which, by the way, 

should be Congress's policy prerogative—may itself dissuade 

people from engaging in protected speech.8 Thus, regardless of whether a potential speaker has the ability, means, 

and time to track down and interpret this decision (or hire a 

lawyer to do so) to understand what the law requires, the 

known unknowns of the majority's course portend further 

chill. 

8 The Government also struggled at oral argument before this Court to 

articulate what scenarios the statute would (and would not) reach under 

its theory. But it notably represented that it did not believe it could validly prosecute a son who reassures his noncitizen mother (who lives unlawfully in the United States with him and his family) that she is not a burden 

on them and that his children love having their grandmother around. See 

Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

B 

The majority attempts to downplay the encouragement 

provision's threat to free expression by highlighting that 

Hansen “fails to identify a single prosecution for ostensibly 

protected expression in the 70 years since Congress enacted 

clause (iv)'s immediate predecessor.” Ante, at 782. But the 

purported lack of past prosecutions provides no comfort for 

several reasons. 

The frst is that we have already said as much—this Court 

squarely rejected that kind of argument when the Government raised it in a prior overbreadth challenge. In Stevens, 

the Government vigorously asserted that it had never 

brought a prosecution implicating the kind of protected expression that the plain text of the statute in question swept 

in, and that it did not intend to do so. 559 U. S., at 480. 

The Government “hi[t] this theme hard, invoking its prosecutorial discretion several times.” Ibid. But we were not 

moved: Such a prosecution was permitted by the statute, we 

noted, and that was enough to make it a serious threat. 

“[T]he First Amendment protects against the Government; 

it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige.” Ibid. 

Second, just as in Stevens, “[t]his prosecution is itself evidence of the danger in putting faith in Government representations of prosecutorial restraint.” Ibid. At trial in this 

very case, the Government objected to Hansen's proposed 

jury instructions, which would have required, among other 

things, that the Government prove that Hansen intended the 

noncitizen in question to reside in the United States illegally. 

The Government's objection was telling. It was based on 

the argument that the proposed instructions added elements 

not found in the text of the statute itself. And the District 

Court was persuaded; it sided with the Government in that 

regard.9 But now that the statute's validity hangs in the 

9 As the Government conceded during oral argument before this Court, 

given that its elements argument prevailed below, the instructions that 

the District Court gave to the jury in this case were legally erroneous. 

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balance, the Government has reversed course entirely—it 

now implores us to read into the statute the very element 

that it earlier opposed as atextual. See Brief for United 

States 23–28. 

This debacle exemplifes the real and ever-present risk of 

continuing to have facially overbroad criminal statutes on 

the books. In its role as prosecutor, the Government often 

stakes out a maximalist position, only later to concede limits 

when the statute upon which it relies might be struck down 

entirely and the Government fnds itself on its back foot.10 

I am not suggesting bad faith on anyone's part; these kinds 

of turnabouts might well be chalked up to institutional incentives and coordination challenges in a massive prosecutorial 

system. But given these dynamics, the answer to whether 

the Government has, as of today, prosecuted Hansen's hypothetical scenarios may understandably provide cold comfort 

to those living and working with immigrants. 

In any event, it makes little sense for the number of unconstitutional prosecutions to be the litmus test for whether 

speech is being chilled by a facially overbroad statute. The 

number of people who have not exercised their right to speak 

out of fear of prosecution is, quite frankly, unknowable. 

Moreover, criminal prosecutions are not the only method 

by which statutes can be wielded to chill free speech. Hansen's amici detail how Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

relied on the encouragement provision to justify its creation 

of a “watchlist” of potential speakers that CBP had compiled 

in connection with its monitoring of a large group of migrants—a list that included journalists simply reporting facSee Tr. of Oral Arg. 11; see also id., at 39–40 (acknowledging that the 

Court “should send the case back to the Ninth Circuit and let the Ninth 

Circuit decide what's appropriate in light of ” the fawed instructions). 10 The Court has seen similar moves in multiple cases just this Term. 

See Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U. S. 306, 316–317 (2023); Percoco v. 

United States, 598 U. S. 319, 332–333 (2023); Dubin v. United States, 599 

U. S. 110, 115–116 (2023). 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

tual information about the group's progress. Brief for Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press as Amicus 

Curiae 5–6. CBP allegedly compiled dossiers on those reporters and singled them out as targets for special screenings. Ibid. There can be no doubt that this kind of Government surveillance—targeted at journalists reporting on 

an important topic of public concern, no less—tends to chill 

speech, even though it falls short of an actual prosecution. 

Hansen's amici also describe how a group of Members of 

Congress recently sent a letter to three religious organizations that help undocumented immigrants, directing the organizations to preserve documents and communications related to their work in advance of a potential congressional 

investigation into whether such organizations are “ `harbor-

[ing], transport[ing], and encourag[ing] ' ” noncitizens to settle unlawfully in this country. Brief for Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae 34 (emphasis added). Again, this 

kind of letter invoking the language of the encouragement 

provision can plainly chill speech, even though it is not a 

prosecution (and, for that matter, even if a formal investigation never materializes). 

The majority nevertheless derides the fears of Hansen and 

his amici as an overimaginative “parad[e]” of “horribles.” 

Ante, at 782. But what may seem “fanciful” to this Court 

at great remove, ante, at 770, might well prove to be a signifcant obstacle for those on the ground who operate daily in 

the shadow of the law. The “gravity” of the encouragement 

provision's chilling effect is “underscored by the flings of . . . 

amici curiae in support of” Hansen—including briefs from 

lawyers, immigration advocacy organizations, religious and 

other charitable organizations, journalists, local governments, and nonproft policy institutions from across the ideological spectrum. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. 

Bonta, 594 U. S. –––, ––– (2021). 

The substantial concerns that amici from such diverse 

walks of life raise illustrate that the “deterrent effect feared 

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Jackson, J., dissenting 

by” Hansen and his amici “is real and pervasive.” Id., 

at –––. Moreover, at the end of the day, those fears refect 

a determination to view enacted statutes as serious business, 

and, essentially, to take Congress at its word. This Court 

should have done the same. 

As written, the encouragement provision is overbroad. 

Therefore, it should have been deemed facially unconstitutional and invalid under the First Amendment, as the Ninth 

Circuit held. 

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Reporter’s Note 

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 

punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 

None