IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–70016

JOHN REYES MATAMOROS,

Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 

Correctional Institutions Division,

Respondent – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

A Texas jury found John Reyes Matamoros guilty of capital murder, and 

the state trial court sentenced him to death. Matamoros sought post-conviction 

relief on the ground that he is intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for the 

death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). After the state 

courts and the federal district court denied him relief, we granted a certificate 

of appealability (COA). Because Matamoros cannot meet his burden under 

AEDPA, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of relief.

I.

The district court’s opinion thoroughly recounts the factual background 

and procedural history of this case. See Matamoros v. Thaler, No. H-07-2613, 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 6, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2010 WL 1404368, at *1–3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2010). In November 1992,

Matamoros stood trial for the capital murder of his neighbor, Eddie Goebel. 

The jury found Matamoros guilty, and the state trial court sentenced him to 

death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Matamoros’s conviction 

and sentence on direct appeal. Matamoros v. State, 901 S.W. 2d 470 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1995). The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Matamoros’s initial 

state application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Matamoros, No. 50791-

01 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2001). After the Supreme Court decided Atkins, 

Matamoros filed his initial federal habeas petition, asserting that he is 

ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins because he is intellectually 

disabled.1 The district court stayed those proceedings so that Matamoros could 

exhaust his Atkins claim in state court.

The Court of Criminal Appeals received Matamoros’s successive state 

habeas application and remanded the case for the state trial court to address 

the merits of the Atkins claim. After an evidentiary hearing, the state trial 

court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending 

that the Court of Criminal Appeals deny relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals

denied Matamoros’s petition because Matamoros “fail[ed] to demonstrate by a 

preponderance of the evidence that he has sufficient deficiencies in adaptive 

functioning for a diagnosis of mental retardation or that there was an onset of 

mental retardation during [Matamoros’s] developmental period.” Ex parte 

Matamoros, No. WR-50791-02, 2007 WL 1707193, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 

13, 2007). The state trial court had also found that Matamoros did not meet 

1 The terms “mentally retarded” and “mental retardation” are used in this opinion 

only where they are part of a direct quote. Otherwise, we substitute the terms “intellectual 

disability” and “intellectually disabled,” which have been adopted by the Supreme Court and 

this circuit to describe the identical condition. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); 

Williams v. Stephens, 761 F.3d 561, 565 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2014).

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the first criterion for intellectual disability—significant sub-average 

intellectual functioning—but the Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed and 

found that Matamoros did meet that criterion. Id.

Matamoros then filed the federal habeas petition that gives rise to this 

appeal. The district court denied relief and denied a COA, concluding that the 

state court’s determination that Matamoros was not intellectually disabled 

was not unreasonable in light of the evidence before the state court. 

Matamoros, 2010 WL 1404368. Matamoros requested a COA from this court. 

While the request for a COA was pending, Matamoros moved to stay the 

proceedings so that he could return to state court to present newly available

evidence in support of his Atkins claim: in April 2011, Dr. George Denkowski, 

the psychologist who testified as the state’s expert at the state habeas court’s

2006 evidentiary hearing, had his license officially “reprimanded” because his 

“diagnostic practices [had] come under considerable professional scrutiny.” Ex 

Parte Matamoros, Nos. WR-50791-02–03, 2012 WL 4713563, at *2 (Tex. Crim. 

App. Oct. 3, 2012). Denkowski entered into a settlement agreement with the 

Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists, in which he agreed to “not 

accept any engagement to perform forensic psychological services in the 

evaluation of subjects for mental retardation or intellectual disability in 

criminal proceedings.” We granted Matamoros’s motion to stay the 

proceedings while he returned to state court to bring this development to the 

state court’s attention.

Following our stay, the Court of Criminal Appeals exercised its authority 

to reconsider the initial disposition of Matamoros’s writ. Ex Parte Matamoros, 

No. WR-50791–02, 2011 WL 6241295, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 2011). 

The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the cause to the state trial court “to

allow it the opportunity to re-evaluate its initial findings, conclusions, and 

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recommendation in light of the Denkowski Settlement Agreement.” Id. The 

Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the state trial court could “order 

affidavits or hold a live hearing if warranted.” Id. In the state trial court, 

Matamoros tendered new affidavits from Drs. Thomas Oakland and Jack 

Fletcher in support of his claim of intellectual disability and requested a 

hearing. Without acknowledging the new affidavits or holding a new hearing,

the state trial court signed an order adopting the state’s Amended Proposed 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which recommended that relief be 

denied. The state trial court stated in open court that it had discounted Dr. 

Denkowski’s testimony. See Ex Parte Matamoros, 2012 WL 4713563, at *3

(Price, J., dissenting). The Court of Criminal Appeals again denied 

Matamoros’s writ application, “[b]ased upon the trial court’s findings and 

conclusions and our own review.” Id. at *1. 

Two judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals dissented. They noted that 

the state trial court did not mention Matamoros’s new affidavits and that “the 

process by which [the] new recommended findings and conclusions were made 

does not inspire confidence.” Id. at *3. The dissenters further stated that

because Matamoros had “made a fairly compelling showing of mental 

retardation,” they “would not reject his claim without first remanding the 

cause to the convicting court for additional fact development.” Id. The 

dissenters specifically stated that they, as the state court, were not bound by 

“almost insurmountable” AEDPA deference and, for that reason, should not 

defer to the state trial court’s factual determination. Id. at *5.

Matamoros then filed a motion to lift the stay in this court and to remand 

for the district court “to reconsider [his] Atkins claim de novo without taking 

into account or in any respect relying on Dr. Denkowski’s analysis.” We 

granted the motion to lift the stay and carried the motion for remand with the 

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request for a COA. See Matamoros v. Stephens, 539 F. App’x 487, 491 (5th Cir. 

2013). We declined to remand the case to the district court because, “under 

AEDPA, it is the state trial court’s factual findings to which we must defer if 

reasonable,” so “remanding this case to the district court to allow it to make 

new findings would serve no meaningful purpose.” Id. at 494. We issued a 

COA on Matamoros’s Atkins claim. Id. This appeal followed.

II.

Federal habeas proceedings are subject to the rules prescribed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Under AEDPA, if a state court has adjudicated a habeas petitioner’s claim on 

the merits, federal habeas relief may be granted in either of two circumstances. 

First, relief may be granted if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1); see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97–98 (2011); Rivera v. 

Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 2007). “A state court’s decision is 

deemed contrary to clearly established federal law if it reaches a legal 

conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or if it 

reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Gray v. Epps, 616 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404–08 (2002)). “If this standard is difficult 

to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. 

Second, and of consequence here, relief may be granted if the state 

court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(2). Thus, we can grant Matamoros’s petition if the Court of Criminal 

Appeals unreasonably found that Matamoros was not intellectually disabled. 

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Although “[t]he term ‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to define . . . , a statecourt factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal 

habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” 

Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (alternation in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Even if “‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record 

might disagree’ about the finding in question, ‘on habeas review that does not 

suffice to supersede the trial court’s . . . determination.’” Id. (alterations in 

Wood) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2006)). Moreover, we 

presume the state court’s factual findings are correct, and a petitioner only 

may rebut this presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(1); see Miller-El v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d on 

other grounds, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).2

The question of whether a defendant is intellectually disabled is a fact 

question. Maldonado v. Thaler, 625 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, 

Matamoros bases his argument on § 2254(d)(2). Specifically, Matamoros 

2 The Supreme Court has “explicitly left open the question whether § 2254(e)(1) 

applies in every case presenting a challenge under § 2254(d)(2).” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 

300 (2010); see Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 339 (2006) (“[T]he parties disagree about whether 

and when [§ 2254(e)(1)’s presumption applies]. We need not address that question.”); see also 

Wood, 558 U.S. at 301 n.2 (describing possible ways to interpret the interplay of § 2254(e)(1) 

and § 2254(d)(2)). The courts of appeals are divided on the issue. Compare Trussell v. 

Bowersox, 447 F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying § 2254(e)(1) in a § 2254(d)(2) case) with 

Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that § 2254(e)(1) only applies 

in a challenge based on evidence outside the state trial court record); see also Justin F. 

Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), 82 Tul. L. 

Rev. 385 (2007). 

In our circuit, we apply § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption and “clear and convincing evidence” 

requirement to a state court’s determination of particular factual issues in § 2254(d)(2) cases. 

See Blue v. Thaler, 665 F.3d 647, 654 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The clear-and-convincing evidence 

standard of § 2254(e)(1)—which is arguably more deferential to the state court than is the 

unreasonable-determination standard of § 2254(d)(2)—pertains only to a state court’s 

determination of particular factual issues, while § 2254(d)(2) pertains to the state court’s

decision as a whole.”); Clark v. Quarterman, 457 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006).

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argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the Court of Criminal 

Appeals’s conclusion that he (Matamoros) is not intellectually disabled is an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before that 

court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, the question before us is whether 

Matamoros has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Court of 

Criminal Appeals unreasonably determined that Matamoros does not exhibit 

adaptive behavior deficits that originated before age eighteen. We now turn to 

that task. 

III.

A.

We begin with a discussion of the law that governs our analysis. In

Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 

execution of intellectually disabled persons. 536 U.S. at 321. The Court 

explained that there is a “national consensus” among state legislatures and 

Congress that the execution of mentally retarded offenders is excessive 

punishment, id. at 316–17, and the Court found “no reason to disagree with 

the judgment of the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter,” id.

at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Atkins Court noted that states 

which had already enacted “statutory definitions of mental 

retardation . . . generally conform to the clinical definitions” of the American 

Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and/or the American Psychiatric 

Association. Id. at 308 n.3, 317 n.22. However, the Court did not articulate a

governing standard for intellectual disability, instead leaving to the states “the 

task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction 

upon [their] execution of sentences.” Id. at 317 (alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

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In Texas, the standard for determining whether a person is intellectually 

disabled, and thus ineligible for the death penalty, was established by the 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2004). The Briseno court looked to the “definitions of ‘mental retardation’

set out by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and [the 

definition] contained in section 591.003(13) of the Texas Health and Safety 

Code.”3 Id. at 7. Both the AAMR and the Texas Code use a three-prong test 

for mental retardation: (1) significant sub-average intellectual functioning; (2) 

deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) onset before age 18. Id. The Briseno court 

held, with qualifications discussed below, that “[Texas] will follow the AAMR 

or section 591.003(13) criteria in addressing Atkins mental retardation claims,”

unless the legislature adopts an alternative statutory definition for use in 

capital cases.4 Id. at 8. The Briseno court placed the burden of proof on the 

defendant, who must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is 

intellectually disabled. Id. at 12.

The prong of the Briseno test most relevant here is the second prong—

deficits in adaptive behavior.5 “Adaptive behavior means the effectiveness 

with or degree to which a person meets the standards of personal independence 

and social responsibility expected of the person’s age and cultural group.” 

Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 n.25 (internal quotation marks omitted). The AAMR 

3 The subtitle of the Texas Health and Safety Code containing this definition concerns 

“the effective administration and coordination of mental health and mental retardation 

services at the state and local levels.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 531.001.

4 The Texas Legislature has not adopted such a definition.

5 The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Matamoros satisfied the first prong 

of the Briseno test, so we do not discuss that prong here. And because we rule against 

Matamoros on the adaptive behavior prong, we need not address whether his symptoms onset 

before age eighteen.

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identifies ten adaptive skill areas; a person must have deficits in at least two 

of these skill areas in order to meet the AAMR diagnostic criteria for adaptive 

behavior deficits. The ten adaptive skill areas are: “communication, self-care, 

home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, 

functional academics, leisure, and work.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Although the Briseno court stated that Texas courts would use the 

AAMR definitions, it also noted that “[t]he adaptive behavior criteria are 

exceedingly subjective.” 135 S.W.3d at 8. The Briseno court further noted that,

“[a]lthough experts may offer insightful opinions on the question of whether a 

particular person meets the psychological diagnostic criteria for mental 

retardation, the ultimate issue of whether [a] person is, in fact, mentally 

retarded . . . is one for the finder of fact, based upon all of the evidence and 

determinations of credibility.” Id. at 8–9.

Because of the “subjectiv[ity]” of scientific standards and expert 

testimony, the Briseno court listed seven additional factors that courts may 

consider in their adaptive behavior analysis. These factors have come to be 

known as “Briseno factors.” They are:

(1) Did those who knew the person best during the 

developmental stage—his family, friends, teachers, employers, 

authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if 

so, act in accordance with that determination? (2) Has the person 

formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct 

impulsive? (3) Does his conduct show leadership or does it show 

that he is led around by others? (4) Is his conduct in response to 

external stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it 

is socially acceptable? (5) Does he respond coherently, rationally, 

and on point to oral or written questions or do his responses 

wander from subject to subject to subject? (6) Can the person hide 

facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests? (7) Putting 

aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital 

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offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, 

planning, and complex execution of purpose? 

Id. We previously have held that Briseno is a constitutionally permissible 

interpretation and application of Atkins.6 See Lewis v. Thaler, 701 F.3d 783, 

793 (5th Cir. 2012); Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 346–47 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Indeed, we have denied habeas relief even where the state court relied only on 

the Briseno factors, to the exclusion of the AAMR adaptive behavior criteria. 

See Chester, 666 F.3d at 347 (“[W]e conclude that the application of the Briseno

factors, even in the absence of specific employment of the AAMR’s methodology 

for determining deficiencies in adaptive behavior, cannot be an ‘unreasonable 

application’ of Atkins’ broad holding.”); id. at 353 (Dennis, J., dissenting) 

(“[T]he TCCA in the present case used the Briseno factors as a substantive part 

of its mental retardation definition, instead of the second prong of the AAMR 

definition . . . .”). Thus, we are bound to apply the Briseno factors in our 

analysis of whether the state court unreasonably determined that Matamoros 

is not intellectually disabled.

This is so even in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida, 

134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). Matamoros argued, in a 28(j) letter, that Hall casts 

doubt on the propriety of a test that deviates from accepted medical practice. 

In Hall, the Supreme Court rejected Florida’s use of a strict 70-point IQ cutoff, in large part because “Florida’s rule disregards established medical 

6 Some have criticized the Briseno factors because they lack a scientific basis. See, 

e.g., Chester v. Thaler, 666 F.3d 340, 350–71 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., dissenting); John H. 

Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation 

in Death Penalty Cases, 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 689, 710–14 (2009); id. at 711–12 (“The 

Briseno factors present an array of divergences from the clinical definitions.”). That said, we 

may not “disregard the precedent that has been established by our previous decisions.” In re 

Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 690 F.3d 650, 663 (5th Cir. 2012). 

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practice.” Id. at 1995. After Matamoros filed the 28(j) letter, we rejected the

argument that Hall renders Briseno unconstitutional. See Mays v. Stephens, 

757 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 951 (2015). Our rule 

of orderliness prevents a three-judge panel from “disregard[ing] the precedent 

that has been established by our previous decisions.” In re Pilgrim’s Pride 

Corp., 690 F.3d 650, 663 (5th Cir. 2012). 

B.

Before we turn to the evidence on which the state habeas court based its

decision, we pause to discuss the evidence on which it disclaimed any reliance. 

As noted, Dr. Denkowski was the state’s expert witness at the 2006 state 

habeas proceedings. Dr. Denkowski administered numerous tests on 

Matamoros and reviewed affidavits, medical reports, behavioral reports, 

disciplinary records, and other documents about Matamoros. Most 

importantly for present purposes, Dr. Denkowski concluded that Matamoros 

had an adaptive deficit in functional academics but no other area. Dr. 

Denkowski’s conclusion was based, in large part, on adjustments he made to 

Matamoros’s scores on the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System (ABAS). For 

example, Matamoros attained a 3 out of 10 (i.e., a failing score) on the skill of 

“self-direction,” but Dr. Denkowski adjusted this score upward into the passing 

range based on Matamoros’s “description . . . of his system and plan for stealing 

cars and . . . [his] documented ability to formulate plans and carry them 

through, albeit criminal plans.” The state trial court adopted Dr. Denkowski’s

determination that Matamoros only had an adaptive deficit in functional 

academics, despite contrary determinations by Matamoros’s experts.

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In 2011, Dr. Denkowski entered into a settlement agreement in which 

his license was “reprimanded.” See Matamoros, 2012 WL 4713563, at *1.7 The 

Court of Criminal Appeals remanded Matamoros’s case “to allow the trial court 

the opportunity to re-evaluate its initial findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation in light of the Denkowski Settlement Agreement.” Id. 

On remand, the state trial court disclaimed any reliance on Dr. 

Denkowski’s testimony. However, the state trial court’s amended findings of 

fact closely mirrored its original findings of fact, except that the citations to 

Dr. Denkowski’s testimony were (usually) removed.8 This similarity between 

the original and the amended findings exists despite the fact that some of the 

7 Dr. Denkowski’s testimony and methodology were called into question in at least two

other cases in this circuit. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Thaler, 389 F. App’x 399, 403 (5th Cir. 

2010) (granting COA because the district court’s ruling “relied, in part, on the testimony of 

the State’s expert witness, Dr. George Denkowski”); Pierce v. Thaler, 355 F. App’x 784, 794

(5th Cir. 2009) (granting COA where petitioner’s “arguments focus almost exclusively on . . .

the credibility of the State’s expert witness, Dr. George Denkowski”). Indeed, the state has 

taken the position that it will no longer rely on any of Denkowski’s findings in any pending 

appeals.

8 For example, Finding of Fact 53 states: “The Court finds, based on the 2006 writ 

hearing, that Dr. Denkowski administered the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales – Fifth 

Edition . . . and the applicant obtained a Full-scale Score of 62 . . . .” Another example is 

Finding of Fact 64, which states: “The Court finds, based on the 2006 writ hearing, that 

maladaptive behaviors are behaviors that interfere with the performance of adaptive tasks . 

. . and that the presence of maladaptive behavior does not meet the criterion of significant 

limitations in adaptive functioning (I WH at 107–108)(III WH at 72–73).” The citations 

supporting this Finding of Fact are to Dr. Denkowski’s testimony, during which he testified: 

“[J]ust because you have maladaptive . . . behavior present gives no indication what your 

adaptive behavior really is . . . [Y]ou can’t assess adaptive behavior on the basis of 

maladaptive behavior.” A third example is Finding of Fact 114, in which the state trial court 

found, “based on the 2006 writ hearing, that Dr. Norsworthy did not assess the applicant’s 

adaptive behavior when evaluating him in 1980; therefore, Dr. Norsworthy’s evaluation does 

not meet the three-prong test required to diagnose mental retardation (I WH at 126–29)(III 

WH at 71).” The second citation is to Dr. Denkowski’s testimony, during which he testified 

that Dr. Norsworthy “couldn’t really make any kind of comment regarding retardation 

because among other things, no adaptive behavior assessment was done.”

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amended findings have no support in the record without Dr. Denkowski’s 

testimony. In recognition of this discrepancy, the state acknowledged at oral 

argument that the state trial court likely relied upon Dr. Denkowski’s 

testimony despite its representations to the contrary.

Matamoros argues that the state trial court’s reliance on Dr. 

Denkowski’s testimony makes its decision unreasonable and entitles 

Matamoros to relief. Matamoros is incorrect. We review the Court of Criminal 

Appeals’s decision, not the state trial court’s. See Woodfox v. Cain, 772 F.3d 

358, 369 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Under AEDPA, we review the last reasoned state 

court decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court of Criminal 

Appeals explicitly stated that it relied not only upon the state trial court’s 

factual findings, but also “[its] own review.” Matamoros, 2012 WL 4713563, at

*1. Thus, Matamoros cannot show that the relevant decisionmaker—the Court 

of Criminal Appeals—relied on Dr. Denkowski’s testimony.

Alternatively, our review is limited to the state court’s decision, “‘not the 

written opinion explaining that decision.’” Maldonado, 625 F.3d at 239 

(quoting Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)); see also 

Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The statute compels 

federal courts to review for reasonableness the state court’s ultimate decision, 

not every jot of its reasoning.”). Instead, we must conduct our own review of 

the evidence (excluding Dr. Denkowski’s testimony) and determine whether 

Matamoros has shown clearly and convincingly that the Court of Criminal 

Appeals’s decision—that Matamoros did not meet his burden of proof—was 

unreasonable.

C.

We now turn to the evidence in the record. Nearly all of the evidence 

before the Court of Criminal Appeals in 2012 was presented at the 2006 

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hearing. The evidence presented in 2006 includes: expert testimony from Dr. 

Susana Rosin; various test results; the transcript of Matamoros’s testimony 

during the punishment phase of his trial; testimony from Matamoros’s family 

members; and records of Matamoros’s personal history, particularly those 

collected while he was under state supervision.9

Matamoros offered expert testimony from Dr. Susana Rosin. Dr. Rosin 

testified that Matamoros was intellectually disabled because he had subaverage intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior deficits that had 

originated prior to age 18. With respect to the AAMR adaptive skills areas,

Dr. Rosin testified that Matamoros had adaptive deficits in communication, 

writing and math skills, ability to follow directions, living, and ability to adapt 

to basic rules.

Dr. Rosin based her conclusions on interviews with Matamoros and his 

family, a review of Matamoros’s family records, Texas Youth Commission 

(TYC) records, Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) records, 

Matamoros’s letters, various psychological reports, and Matamoros’s test 

results during his incarceration at TYC. 

9 We do not purport to list all of the evidence in the record. Instead, we have attempted 

to describe enough of the evidence to provide an accurate overview of the record. Moreover, 

although the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Matamoros satisfied the “subaverage intellectual functioning” prong of the intellectual disability test, we include some 

discussion of evidence related to intellectual functioning. As recounted in further detail 

below, several IQ tests were administered to Matamoros over the past few decades. A 1977 

test administered by Dr. Ronald Smith resulted in a full-scale IQ score of 71; a 1980 test 

administered by Dr. Ludy Norsworthy resulted in a full-scale IQ score of 74; a 2003 test 

resulted in a full-scale IQ score of 77 (the validity of this test was disputed, as it was based 

on an outdated test); a 2004 test administered by Dr. Susana Rosin resulted in a full-scale

IQ score of 65; and a 2005 test administered by Dr. George Denkowski resulted in a full-scale

IQ score of 62 (although Denkowski testified that he did “not believe that is an accurate 

measure of the applicant’s actual mental ability . . . [and] would evaluate the applicant’s IQ 

in the borderline normal range”).

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Based on Dr. Rosin’s review of the above-mentioned records, she 

concluded that: 

• The 1977 report diagnosing Matamoros as mildly intellectually 

disabled appeared to be a valid diagnosis.

• The personality testing in the 1977 report ties into the social behavior 

analysis that is required for adaptive behavioral analysis. 

• The 1977 report is consistent with the information provided by 

Matamoros’s sisters and the description of Matamoros in his other 

records. 

• Matamoros’s TYC admission records from June 1978, detailing his 

work history and family history, and his July 1978 testing placed 

him—when he was 15—around a second-grade academic level. 

• The TYC monthly reports from 1978—which generally described 

Matamoros as immature—were consistent with Dr. Smith’s 1977 

report. 

• Certain facts in Matamoros’s 1979 discharge papers—specifically the 

statement that he would benefit from learning to fill out an 

application—were consistent with intellectual disability. 

• A 1980 report found that Matamoros was at a 1.8 reading level and 

3.7 math level when he was 17 years old.

• Another psychologist, Dr. Ludy Norsworthy, performed an 

assessment and diagnosed Matamoros with “borderline mental 

retardation.”

• Matamoros’s adaptive behavioral problems were apparent in the 

descriptions of his behavior in his discharge papers from TYC in 1980. 

• Intellectual disability tends to run in families and Matamoros has a 

family history of cognitive and learning problems, including two

nephews who display some dysmorphic facial features. 

Based on Dr. Rosin’s testing of Matamoros, in combination with her 

review of prior records, Dr. Rosin testified that: 

• Matamoros’s adaptive behaviors were subnormal, but the test was 

difficult to administer because Matamoros is in a confined 

environment and does not have the opportunity to perform some 

of the tested behaviors. 

• Matamoros shows adaptive deficits that he has exhibited since 

childhood. 

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• Dr. Ronald Smith’s 1977 test—which concluded that Matamoros 

was intellectually disabled—is very significant because it was 

performed independent of any knowledge about the criminal 

proceedings. 

• Matamoros had deficits in communication, writing ability, and 

math ability. His deficits were demonstrated by trouble following 

directions in prison and in learning to adapt to fairly basic rules. 

Dr. Rosin testified that personality testing from the time Matamoros was 

incarcerated as a juvenile indicated that Matamoros was somewhat socially 

inept, direct, and simplistic in his dealings with others. He was highly group 

dependent and very easily led into becoming a venturesome participant. He 

depended highly upon individuals in his group to provide him with leadership 

and to support him in problem-solving behavior. He also appeared to view 

adults, particularly males, as a source of punishment. 

As part of her evaluation, Dr. Rosin administered the Vineland test, an 

I.Q. test, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 3 (W.A.I.S. III), the Wide Range 

Achievement Test, and the Benton Visual Retention Test, and she attempted 

to administer the Trail Making A and B test. Based upon the results of the 

W.A.I.S. III, Dr. Rosin found that Matamoros had a verbal I.Q. of 66, a 

performance I.Q. of 69, and a full-scale I.Q. of 65. 

Dr. Rosin specifically tested Matamoros’s adaptive behavior skills 

through the use of the Vineland test. The Vineland assesses adaptive behavior 

skills in three areas, which encompass the ten or eleven different areas under 

the AAMR or DSM, respectively: communications, daily living skills, and 

socialization. Matamoros scored a 44 in socialization (a moderate deficit), a 33 

in communication (a severe deficit), and a 57 in daily living (a mild deficit). Dr. 

Rosin concluded that Matamoros had deficits in communication, writing and 

math skills, ability to follow directions, living, and learning to adapt to basic 

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rules. Based on her own testing, her review of previous tests, and anecdotal 

evidence from Matamoros’s family, Rosin concluded that Matamoros had 

adaptive deficits originating prior to age 18 and met the criteria for intellectual 

disability.

In addition to Dr. Rosin’s testimony and supporting evidence, 

Matamoros also presented test-based evidence of intellectual disability. 

Beginning in 1977, Matamoros was evaluated and administered standardized 

tests on numerous occasions. In 1977, Dr. Smith administered Matamoros an 

intelligence test, the W.I.S.C. –R., now the W.I.S.C. –R –IV. He was also 

administered the Wide Range Achievement Test, the Cattell Culture Fair I.Q. 

Test, the Bender Gestalt, the Thematical Perception Test, and a number of 

personality tests. Dr. Smith assessed Matamoros’s reading level at about a 1.7 

grade equivalency, spelling at about a second-grade equivalency, and 

arithmetic at a 2.9 grade equivalency. This put Matamoros at about the first 

percentile in these categories. Dr. Smith’s 1977 report assessed Matamoros’s 

verbal I.Q. at 64, performance I.Q. at 82, and full-scale I.Q. at 71. Matamoros’s 

Culture Fair I.Q., based mainly on nonverbal abilities, was a 79. 

In 1978—when Matamoros was around the appropriate age for ninth 

grade—he was administered the Metropolitan Achievement Test (M.A.T.). 

Matamoros tested around a second-grade level, including a 1.9 in word 

knowledge; a 1.5 in word analysis; a 1.8 in reading; a 2.4 in math; and a 1.9 in 

total reading. In 1980, Matamoros was again administered the M.A.T., and he 

scored a 1.8 in reading and a 3.7 in math. He was also administered the 

W.A.I.S., the adult version of the Wechsler scales. His verbal I.Q. was 73, his 

performance I.Q. was 79, and his full-scale I.Q. was 74. In 2003, Matamoros 

was administered tests by Dr. Walter Quijano. Dr. Quijano found a verbal I.Q. 

of 72, a performance I.Q. of 84, and a full-scale I.Q. of 77. 

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Turning to the state’s case, the state’s evidence and argument at the 

2006 evidentiary hearing included Dr. Denkowski’s testimony, Matamoros’s 

actions after the crime and testimony at his trial, behavior reports from 

Matamoros’s time in state custody, and various criticisms of Matamoros’s 

evidence. For reasons discussed above, we do not consider Dr. Denkowski’s 

testimony.

The state argued that Matamoros’s testimony during the punishment 

phase of his trial was evidence of his ability to think logically, thoughtfully, 

and rationally. During the punishment phase of his trial, Matamoros took the 

stand and gave an account that explained the physical evidence placing him at 

the crime scene (including his blood and shoeprints). Matamoros testified that 

he and another man, Danny Castillo, were drinking in a parking lot near the 

victim’s house, that Castillo entered the victim’s house while Matamoros was 

urinating behind a car, that Matamoros only entered the victim’s house after 

hearing the victim yelling, that Castillo stabbed Matamoros before fleeing, and 

that Matamoros stood next to the victim for a moment before leaving. 

Matamoros further testified that he did not name Castillo as the “true” culprit 

until the punishment hearing because he feared retribution from Castillo, who 

was affiliated with the “Mexican Mafia.” The state argues that this story 

“represents a fairly sophisticated attempt to admit incriminating evidence 

while denying guilt.” Cf. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8 (“Can the person hide facts 

or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?”); id. (“Does he respond 

coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do his 

responses wander from subject to subject?”). 

Matamoros also denied that he committed certain offenses for which he 

previously had been accused or convicted. For example, he maintained that he 

had not actually committed an assault for which he had pleaded guilty, 

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explaining that he pleaded guilty only because he believed a jury was unlikely 

to believe his word over the victim’s word. Dr. Rosin conceded on crossexamination that Matamoros’s explanation “is based on logic and 

[Matamoros’s] understanding of how the criminal justice system worked.” Cf. 

Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8 (“Is his conduct in response to external stimuli 

rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?”). 

Matamoros further testified that, during his affiliation with the Mexican 

Mafia, he would be asked to perform certain tasks by other members of the 

Mexican Mafia, but that he sometimes would decline to perform some of the 

more violent of those tasks. Cf. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8 (“Does his conduct 

show leadership or does it show that he is led around by others?”).

According to the state, Matamoros’s crimes “exposed the same calculated 

rationality as did his testimony.” For example, Matamoros had threatened his 

murder victim the day before the murder, claiming that the victim owed him 

money. Similarly, the above-mentioned woman whom Matamoros assaulted 

had previously reported Matamoros for stealing a clipboard from a police car. 

Four or five months later, Matamoros broke into her house and assaulted her, 

telling her that “your time has come for you to pay your price.” The state 

argues that both of these crimes evidence Matamoros’s ability to make and 

follow through on plans. Cf. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8 (“Has the person 

formulated plans and carried them through or is his conduct impulsive?”); id.

at 8–9 (“Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the 

capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, 

planning, and complex execution of purpose?”).

The state also introduced records from Matamoros’s time in state 

custody, including reports from TYC and TDCJ and testimony from 

correctional officers. These records include descriptions and behaviors 

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inconsistent with adaptive behavior deficits. For example, some of the reports

state that Matamoros was social with other inmates, had the potential to be a 

leader, and did not have any socialization problems. A 1978 TYC report notes 

that Matamoros was very proficient at daily living skills, kept himself neat and 

clean, and was conscientious about his personal appearance. At TDCJ, 

Matamoros reportedly requested commissary items using the proper forms, 

successfully completed visitation forms, checked out books from the library, 

and possessed a chess set and an accompanying list of chess moves (suggesting 

that he was playing chess with other inmates). 

The state also pointed out flaws with the evidence presented by 

Matamoros. For example, Dr. Rosin’s administration of the Vineland test did 

not comport with accepted methods of administration; rather than asking 

someone close to Matamoros to answer the questions, she relied on 

Matamoros’s self-reporting. The state also cross-examined Dr. Rosin, with 

varying degrees of effectiveness, on the following topics: whether Matamoros’s 

inability to follow rules could be the result of an active choice; the fact that 

many of the TYC reports state that Matamoros was proficient at daily living, 

polite, and conscientious about his personal appearance; TYC reports that 

indicate Matamoros was not a behavior problem in class and that he had the 

potential to become a good leader with good social skills; and TYC reports 

indicating that Matamoros was manipulative. 

The state also attacked the earlier testing and reports. In particular, the 

state established that neither Dr. Smith nor Dr. Norsworthy tested Matamoros 

specifically for adaptive behavior deficits, as the presence of adaptive behavior 

deficits was not a prong of the intellectual disability diagnosis at the times the 

tests were administered.

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Matamoros argues that much of this evidence should not be considered 

because the state trial court “viewed the historical record through Denkowski’s 

skewed lens.” Although it is true the state trial court based its decision on 

much of the same evidence that Dr. Denkowski used (e.g. reports and records 

from TYC and TDCJ), we cannot say that this evidence is tainted solely 

because Dr. Denkowski mentioned it. The Briseno factors direct courts to 

evaluate a defendant’s interactions with others and ability to function in 

everyday life; under our precedent, courts can conduct that inquiry by referring 

to records of the defendant’s daily life or by examining his testimony. See, e.g., 

Maldonado, 625 F.3d at 241–44. In any event, we review the Court of Criminal 

Appeals’s decision, not the state trial court’s.

D.

In addition to all of the evidence presented at the 2006 evidentiary 

hearing, Matamoros submitted new affidavits in 2012 from Drs. Jack Fletcher 

and Thomas Oakland. The affidavits, which are described in greater detail 

below, are generally critical of the state trial court’s 2006 decision, of Dr. 

Denkowski’s methodology, and of the use of TYC records as a measure of 

adaptive behavior competency. It is unclear whether the state trial court or 

the Court of Criminal Appeals considered the affidavits of Drs. Fletcher and 

Oakland. 

Dr. Fletcher’s affidavit criticizes Dr. Denkowski’s methods; Dr. Fletcher 

“do[es] not believe that Dr. Denkowski utilizes accepted practices . . . and 

[believes] that Dr. Denkowski interprets assessment data in an idiosyncratic 

manner that is professionally unacceptable and unethical.” Further, Dr. 

Fletcher states that “Dr. Denkowski’s practice of adjusting adaptive behavior 

scores based on ‘trial testimony,’ reports of behavior in controlled settings like 

the Texas Youth Commission and prison, and evidence of a ‘criminal 

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personality’ is inappropriate.” Dr. Fletcher, based on his own review of 

Matamoros’s history, determined that “there are clear indications from 

caretakers of significant adaptive behavior deficits before age 18,” and that 

“[Matamoros] shows evidence of adaptive behavior weaknesses in conceptual, 

social, and practical domains consistent with a mild intellectual disability. 

Both the intellectual deficiencies and the adaptive behavior deficiencies were 

apparent during the developmental period (i.e., before 18 years of age).” Dr. 

Fletcher concludes that Matamoros “meets the criteria for an intellectual 

disability.” 

Dr. Oakland submitted two affidavits. The first sharply criticizes Dr. 

Denkowski’s testimony and findings. For example, Dr. Oakland states that 

“Dr. Denkowski’s reliance on Mr. Matamoros’s anti-social and criminal 

behavior as evidence of his adaptive behavior is unsupported and contrary to 

standard practice. Moreover, his belief that measures of adaptive behavior 

produce scores that tend to understate the actual functioning of persons 

engaged in criminal behaviors also is contrary to standard practice and lacks 

empirical support.” The affidavit further states that Dr. Denkowski 

inappropriately relied on records from when Matamoros was incarcerated, 

explaining that “[l]ife when incarcerated, by design, differs considerably from 

life on the outside. Life on the outside has more common life demands, is more

complex, and more reliant on one personally knowing what to do, when, and 

under what conditions.” Dr. Oakland ultimately concludes that, based upon 

his “review of Dr. Denkowski’s affidavit and testimony, it [is] my opinion that 

. . . Dr. Denkowski’s work concerning adaptive behavior deficit, in this case, 

reflects a lack of adherence to well established standards and practices and 

violates ethical standards.”

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Dr. Oakland’s second affidavit takes issue with the state trial court’s 

findings of fact in the 2006 proceeding. In particular, Dr. Oakland writes that 

“the judge’s findings display a lack of understanding of well-established 

standards and principles as well as scientific value.” The affidavit then 

proceeds to criticize approximately seventy of the state trial court’s factual 

findings. For example, with respect to the state trial court’s 2006 Findings of 

Fact 75 and 83, Dr. Oakland opined: “The judge erred in her judgment as to 

the behaviors that reflect adaptive behavior. She commonly and incorrectly 

assumes such qualities as “appeared to clearly understand, is logical, 

addressed questions appropriately, is capable, devise stories, provide a rational 

explanation, shows understanding, . . . reflect adaptive behavior. They reflect 

intelligence, not adaptive behavior.”

The parties dispute whether we may consider these affidavits. AEDPA 

limits our review to “the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Although Matamoros submitted the affidavits to the state 

trial court, it is unclear whether the state court ever accepted this submission. 

As noted, the Court of Criminal Appeals allowed the state trial court “the 

opportunity to re-evaluate its initial findings, conclusions, and 

recommendation in light of the Denkowski Settlement Agreement.” 

Matamoros, 2011 WL 6241295, at *1. The Court of Criminal Appeals stated 

that the state trial court could “order affidavits or hold a live hearing if 

warranted,” id., but it did not require the state trial court to accept new 

affidavits. The state trial court did not give any indication that it had reviewed 

the new affidavits. Thus, we cannot say whether the affidavits were “presented 

in the State court proceeding.” Indeed, the dissenting judges of the Court of 

Criminal Appeals wrote that the state trial court “apparently did not” consider 

the affidavits. Matamoros, 2012 WL 4713563, at *3 (Price, J., dissenting)

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(emphasis in original). And it is unclear whether the Court of Criminal 

Appeals considered the affidavits when it conducted “[its] own review” of the 

evidence.

In any event, the affidavits do not affect the outcome of this appeal. Even 

if the state trial court was properly presented with the affidavits’ criticism of 

using TYC records to gauge Matamoros’s adaptive functioning, the state trial 

court would not have been required to give those criticisms determinative (or 

any amount of) weight. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9 (“Although experts may 

offer insightful opinions on the question of whether a particular person meets 

the psychological diagnostic criteria for mental retardation, the ultimate issue 

of whether [a] person is, in fact, mentally retarded . . . is one for the finder of 

fact, based upon all of the evidence and determinations of credibility.”). 

Accordingly, even if the affidavits were in the record, we would not be able to 

say that the state trial court’s reliance on the TYC records was unreasonable.10

IV.

Oftentimes, the precise standard of review has little practical effect on 

the outcome of a case. Courts often comment that they “need not address” the 

standard of review, Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 339 (2006), that the result is 

the same “[w]ith or without . . . deference,” Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 156

(2010), that “we need not parse the differences between the two standards in 

this case,” McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014), 

or that a claim can be rejected “[u]nder any standard of review,” Quilloin v. 

Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). This is not one of those cases. The law 

permits us to grant relief only if Matamoros has shown, by clear and convincing 

10 In addition, the portions of the affidavits criticizing Dr. Denkowski are irrelevant, 

as we have not given any weight to Dr. Denkowski’s testimony or opinions. 

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evidence, that the Court of Criminal Appeals was unreasonable in concluding 

that Matamoros failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is 

intellectually disabled, as that term is defined in Briseno and has been 

interpreted by Texas courts.

Under that standard, Matamoros’s petition fails. Although Matamoros 

provided ample evidence that he exhibits adaptive behavior deficits—including 

multiple test results, multiple expert opinions, and multiple diagnoses 

spanning three decades—and although the state has no expert testimony in 

support of its position,11 instead relying primarily on historical and 

observational evidence, Matamoros has not shown that the Court of Criminal 

Appeals was unreasonable in concluding that Matamoros did not meet his 

burden. Under Briseno’s framework, the Court of Criminal Appeals was free 

to weigh the historical and observational evidence and its interpretation of 

Matamoros’s testimony more heavily than it weighed the scientific and expert 

reports presented by Matamoros. As we have recounted, the record contains 

evidence that Matamoros has formulated plans, has shown the potential for 

leadership, responds appropriately to external stimuli, answers questions 

directly, lies to protect his own interests, and has committed offenses requiring 

forethought. See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8–9. Moreover, the state used crossexamination to cast some doubt on Dr. Rosin’s methodology and findings, as 

well as those of other doctors who examined Matamoros. Thus, even though 

the only competent scientific evidence in the record suggests that Matamoros 

has deficits in numerous adaptive behavior areas, Matamoros has not clearly 

and convincingly shown that it was unreasonable for the Court of Criminal 

Appeals to conclude that Matamoros did not satisfy the Briseno test for 

11 Other than Dr. Denkowski’s testimony.

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adaptive behavioral defects. Cf. Mays, 757 F.3d at 219 (“[B]ecause Mays has 

made no attempt to present any evidence of limited adaptive functioning under 

Briseno, he has failed to provide evidence of mental retardation under Texas 

law . . . .”). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of relief. 

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