Filed 10/1/24 P. v. Gomez CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANGEL RAUL GOMEZ, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D084513

 (Super. Ct. No. INF1600337)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County, 

Honorable John D. Molloy, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, 

Collette C. Cavalier and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Angel Raul Gomez, Jr., appeals from a post-judgment order denying his 

petition to strike a prior prison term enhancement under Penal Code1 section 

667.5, subdivision (b), and hold a full resentencing hearing, pursuant to 

section 1172.75. We conclude that the trial court based its denial on an 

erroneous interpretation of section 1172.75. Accordingly, we reverse the trial 

court’s order and remand for a recall of Gomez’s sentence and a full 

resentencing in compliance with section 1172.75.2

In 2017, Gomez pled guilty to 12 felonies and 5 misdemeanors. He also 

admitted a strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) and 1170.12), a serious felony 

prior (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) 

The trial court sentenced Gomez to a total term of 17 years in prison.

As to the prior prison term, the court imposed and stayed the one-year 

enhancement. 

Through the passage of Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)

(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), the Legislature added section 1172.75 to the Penal 

Code. Section 1172.75 provides that prior prison term enhancements 

“imposed prior to January 1, 2020” pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), 

are “legally invalid,” except for those imposed for sexually violent offenses. 

(§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Subdivision (b) of section 1172.75 directs the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify to the 

sentencing court all persons in custody “currently serving a term for a 

judgment that includes an enhancement described by subdivision (a).” The 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Gomez’s request for judicial notice filed August 29, 2024 is granted as 

to Exhibit C and denied as to Exhibits A and B.
3

sentencing court must then recall the sentence and resentence a defendant if 

it determines the judgment against him includes such an enhancement. 

(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Unless the court finds a lesser sentence would 

endanger public safety, resentencing must “result in a lesser sentence than 

the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed 

enhancement.” (Id., subd. (d).)

The CDCR identified Gomez as a person currently serving a prison 

term that included an enhancement imposed under section 667.5, subdivision 

(b). Following a hearing in 2023, the sentencing court denied relief because

the enhancement was imposed and stayed, as opposed to imposed and 

executed. 

The sole issue in Gomez’s appeal is whether the trial court erred in its 

interpretation of section 1172.75. Gomez contends that the court erred 

because the statute affords relief to all defendants whose sentences include a 

section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, regardless of whether the 

enhancement was imposed and executed or imposed and stayed. The People 

contend that section 1172.75 affords relief only to defendants whose 

sentences include a section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement that was 

imposed and executed. We review this issue of statutory interpretation de 

novo. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.)

This issue has now been the subject of multiple published appellate 

opinions, including one from this division, and our Supreme Court has 

granted review to decide the question. (See, e.g., People v. Espino (2024) 104 

Cal.App.5th 188 (Espino); People v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, 

review granted Aug. 14, 2024, S285853 (Mayberry); People v. Saldana (2023) 

97 Cal.App.5th 1270, review granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283547 (Saldana); 

People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, review granted Feb. 21, 
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2024, S283189 (Christianson); People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 

review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169 (Rhodius); People v. Renteria (2023) 

96 Cal.App.5th 1276 (Renteria).)

Of these opinions, Rhodius was the only one to conclude that relief 

under section 1172.75 is limited to defendants whose sentences include a 

section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement that was imposed and executed. 

(Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 44, review granted.) Relying heavily on 

People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1126 (Gonzalez), which interpreted

the word “imposed” in section 12022.53, subdivision (f), to mean imposed and 

executed, the court reasoned that because section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1)

requires a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed, it does not apply 

to prison priors that were stayed because striking a stayed prior would not 

result in a lesser sentence. (Rhodius, at pp. 43–44.) The court also concluded

that this reading of the statute was most in line with its legislative history

and intent to reduce prison sentences. (Id. at p. 47.)

Conversely, this court, in Christianson, rejected such a narrow 

interpretation of section 1172.75 and held that the statute in fact applies to 

section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements that were imposed and stayed. 

(Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 305, review granted.) We observed 

that the use of “imposed” in section 1172.75, subdivision (a), is “at least 

somewhat ambiguous,” but taken together with its legislative intent and 

history, the statute does not limit relief to judgments with enhancements 

that were imposed and executed. (Christianson, at p. 311.) We disagreed 

with the position that extending section 1172.75 to stayed enhancements 

would cause disharmony with the lesser sentence requirement in subdivision 

(d)(1), because, in staying a punishment, the trial court “retains the ability to 

lift the stay and impose the term,” and removing the stayed enhancement 
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eliminates that potential. (Christianson, at p. 312.) We further doubted that 

the Legislature intended to require CDCR to identify a class of inmates based 

on the abstract of judgment, only to again have the sentencing court look at 

the same judgments and further determine whether the enhancements had 

been stayed. (Ibid.) While in Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at page 1126, our 

Supreme Court interpreted the word “imposed” in section 12022.53, 

subdivision (f) to mean imposed and executed, we did not find Gonzalez to be 

controlling. In our view, the high court had interpreted “imposed” in the 

context of a statute intended to ensure longer sentences for felons who use 

firearms, whereas section 1172.75 was “expressly aimed at reducing

sentences[.]” (Christianson, at p. 314.) And we found the legislative history 

to be consistent with our reading of section 1172.75. (Christianson, at 

p. 316.) As noted, other than Rhodius, every other court to consider this 

issue has reached the same result as Christianson. (Espino, supra, 104 

Cal.App.5th 188; Mayberry, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th 665, review granted; 

Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, review granted; Renteria, supra, 96 

Cal.App.5th 1276.)

“We see no good reason to reject the weight of authority interpreting 

section 1172.75” including our own decision in Christianson. (Espino, supra, 

104 Cal.App.5th at p. 196.) “Absent a compelling reason, the Courts of 

Appeal are normally loath to overrule prior decisions from another panel of 

the same undivided district or from the same division.” (Estate of Sapp

(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 109, fn. 9.) Therefore, we adopt the reasoning and 

holding of Christianson and conclude that section 1172.75 affords relief to 

defendants like Gomez whose sentences include a section 667.5, subdivision 

(b) enhancement that was imposed and stayed. Gomez is accordingly entitled 

to a full resentencing on remand, including the application of “any other 
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changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.” 

(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) 

DISPOSITION

The order denying Gomez’s motion for resentencing pursuant to section 

1172.75 is reversed. The matter is remanded with instructions to the trial

court to recall Gomez’s sentence and resentence him consistent with section 

1172.75 and current law.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.