SIXTH DIVISION March 21, 2008 No. 1-05- 3131 THE PEOPLE OF

THE STATE OF

ILLINO IS, ) Appe al fro m the

) Ci rcu it Court of Plai ntif f-A ppel lee, ) Co o k C o un t y.

) ) v. ) No. 93 CR 15476 (03) ) MICHAEL PERMA

NIAN, ) Ho no r ab le ) Kare n Tho mpso n-T obin, Def endan t-App el l an t. ) Judge Presi din g. JU STI CE JO SEPH G OR

DO N del iv ered th e op in i on

of th e c our t: Foll owing a jury trial , defen

dant Michael

Perman ia n was conv

icted of fi rst degree murder an d c o nsp ira cy t o co mmit firs t de gr ee mur de r , an d s en t en ce d t o an ex t en de d t er m o f 75 yea r s in pr i son . O n di re ct a pp ea l , de f en da nt' s j ud gm

en t wa s a f f i rm ed , but th e c as e w asre man

de d to re se n ten ce de f en da nt to 60 y ea rs in pr i son . Si xy ea rs l ate r, def en da n t f iled a m otion purs ua nt to sec tion 116-3 of th

e Code of C rim ina l Procedu re of 1963 ( 725 IL

CS 5/1 16-3 (W

est 200 4)), req ue sti ng DNA an d f ing erp ri nt a na l y si s on ce rtai n i tem s f ound a t the cri m e s cene . His m

oti on was deni ed, as was h

is subsequent motion to reconsi der. Defen dant now appeal s f

rom the deni

al of h i s m otion to recons i der h

i s req ues t for DN

A a nd f inge rpri nt anal y si s. Th i s appeal, howeve

r, does not address the propr ie ty of the tri al

court ’s den

ia l of defen dant’s secti

on 116-3 motion. No er r o ris r ais ed wit h r es pe ct t o t ha t o r de r . Ra t he r , de fen da nt r ais es a n ew co nt en t io n, co mple t ely unrelated to the section 116-3 order, att acki ng hi s origi nal judgm ent at tr ia l. Def endan t argues t hat his or iginal convict ions w er e impro per , a nd t her efo re void , be cau se a per so n canno t beNo. 1-05- 3131

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convi cted of both the in

choate and the pri

nci pal off ense. W e aff irm , for the reasons di scussed be l ow, i n th at (1 ) th i s c ourt does not h

ave j urisd i cti on to h ea r an ap pe al in th i s m an ne r, e ve n f rom a voi d judgm

ent, (2) even i

f we woul d have j urisdi

ction over a voi

d judgm ent, we would di sagree that t he j udgme

nt in this case was v

oid, but at best voidab

le , and theref

ore untim el y, an d (3) we di sagree th at the s en

tenc e i s i n a ctual ity i m proper or err

oneous . BACK GROUND In the earl

y m ornin g hours of Feb

ruary 18, 1988, Dana R

in aldi wa s f ound dead i

n he r car ou t side t he ap ar t ment c omp lex in which she lived wit h her husba nd, Jo sep h Rinaldi. T he med ica l ex amine rt es t ified at t r ial t ha t Da na ha d b ee n sh o t five t imes in t he fac e a nd he ad fr o m a di stan ce of 18 to 24 i

nche s. On

Jun e 10, 1 993, J oseph

Ri na l di (Ri na l di), Rona l d K l ine r (a cod efendant not a part y to t his appeal), and defendant were a rrest ed and charg ed with Dana’s murder an

d conspi racy to comm

it m urder. Upon recomme

ndation of

a 40-yea r sentence, Ri

nal di pled guil ty and agreed to t estif

y a gai nst Kl in er and def endan t. The facts establ

ished at trial re vealed t hat Rinaldi co nsult ed Kliner a nd de fendant abo ut killi ng his wife. Kliner and defen dant off ered to murder Dana on the condi tion that they rece

iv e part of the proceeds Rin aldi wo uld inher it fro m her life insura nce p olicies. Rinaldi agr eed . Aft er Dana was killed, Kliner a nd defend ant met w ith Rinaldi se ver al times, ove r t he co ur se o f the next seve ra l mont hs, t o r ece ive pay me nts. Thei r las t meetin

g occurred nearly

three ye ars bef

ore t hey were arrested. Def endan t was cha rged with a two-coun

t in dictm en t, ci tin g both conspi racy an d m urder, an d w as ult imat ely c o nvic t ed o f bo t h. On Au gu st 5, 19 96 , t he t r ial c o ur t fo un d d efe nd an t elig ible for the death pena

lty , but citi

ng m iti gating f actors, sentenced defen

dant to an extended term of 75No. 1-05- 3131

-3-

y ea rs in p ri son . W he n i m pos ing de f en da nt’ s s en ten ce , th e tri al court sta ted , “ [y]ou m

urdered f or mone y. Thi s pl aces y ou in a n ex tended term categorical

ly by receivi ng com pensation for your cri m e. I se nten ce y ou, si r, to 75 y earsin [pri son] .” Defend ant fil

ed a dire ct app eal, ra ising nine issues , no ne o f which alleged t hat defend ant wasim properl y conv i cted of both c onspi

racy to comm it mu rder a nd m urder. Howev er, de fen da nt did ar gu e t ha t t he co ur t er r ed wh en it se nt en ce d d efe nd an t t o an ex t en de d t er m, beca use it co nsider ed t he allege dly im pr op er fact or t hat defend ant re ceived co mpensa t ion fo r t he murd er . T his co ur t not ed t hat defend ant waived t his issue by no t ra ising it in his po st -se nt encing m otion , but revi

ewed it unde r the p l ai n e rror doctri

ne , wh i ch i s appl i cable wh en extended term sen tenc es a re i m posed wi thout legal

j usti f i cation. People v . Reed , 282 Ill . App. 3d 278, 281 (1996). This court found that whi le section 5-8-2(a)(1) of the Uni fi ed Code of Corrections (730 ILC S 5 /5 -8 -2 (a )( 1) (Wes t 199 6) ) p ro vides t hat an ext ende d t er m of 60 t o 1 00 yea rs may be impo se d fo ra fir st de gr ee mur de rco nvic t io n if t he t r ial ju dg e fin ds t he ex ist en ce o f ce r t ain ag gr av ati n g f ac tors , re ceiv in g c om

pen sa ti on f or a m urde r i s n ot one of th ose f ac tors . Th

e S tate conceded that the trial

court erred when i

t im posed the extended term s entence on def endan t, but re que st ed t hat t his co ur t re duc e de fendant ’s se nt ence t o 6 0 year s, t he maximum per missibl e no nextended term

sen tenc e tha t can be im posed f or fi rst degree m

urder. T his c o ur t ag r ee d t ha t t he ex t en de d t er m ha d t o be va ca t ed , an d t ha t t he se nt en ce sho uld be l im ited to a max

im um of 60 ye ars, recognizi

ng that a person convi

cted of fi rst degree murder may be sen tenc ed to a term

of 2 0 to 60 yearsin pr

i son. 7 30 ILCS 5/5 -8-1(a )(1)(a) ( We st 1996 ). We f ound that whil

e i n thi s case def

endan t could not be sentenced to an ex tended term unde

rNo. 1-05- 3131

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se ct io n 5

- 8- 2( a) ( 1) o f t he Co de , t his d id n o t r eq uir e v ac at ur o f t he 60

- yea rt er m impo se d in acc ordance wi

th secti on 5-8 -1(a)(1 )(a). Def en dan t’s c onv i cti on wa s af

f i rm ed, h i s ex tended-term sente nc e w asva

ca ted , an d h i s c as e w as rem

an de d to the tri

al court to re sente

nc e d ef en da nt to a 60-y ear term of i m pri sonm en t. People v . Perman

ia n , No. 1- 96-2069 (June 8, 1999) (unpubl ished order pur sua

nt to Suprem

e Court Rul e 23). On Ja nu ary 10, 200 5, def

en da nt f iled a m oti on with th

e tri al court, pu rs ua nt to s ec ti on 116 -3 of t he Co de o f Criminal Pro ced ur e o f 196 3 ( 725 ILC S 5 /1 16- 3) (Wes t 200 4) ), re que st ing DNA anal ys is of certain

item s f ound at the crim

e scene . Defen

dant’s m ot ion wa s deni

ed, as was hi s m ot ion to reconsi der, from wh ic h thi s appeal

is taken. However, as noted, t hi s appeal does not chal le nge the propriety

of the trial

court ’s den

ia l of hi s secti on 116-3 motion, but rather rai ses fo rt he firs t t ime t ha t he wa s imp r o pe r ly co nvic t ed o f bo t h c o nsp ira cy a nd mur de rby t he cir cu it cou rt. AN AL YSIS As a n init ial ma t t er , t he St at e c o nt en ds t ha t we do no t ha ve jur isd ict io n t o co nsid er t his issue. The St ate argu es that because t his is an appeal from the t rial court ’s denial of defendant’s se ct io n 1 16

- 3 mo t io n, t he o nly iss ue t ha t we ca n c o nsid er is w he t he rt he t r ial c o ur t pr o pe r ly denied t hat mot ion. W e f i rs t note , gene

ral l y , th at th i s c ourt h as j urisd i cti on to h ea r an ap pe al f rom a s ec ti on 116-3 order which

ei ther all ows or denies a

request for DNA anal

ysis . A secti on 116-3 order init iat es a s ep ar at e p ro ce ed ing ind ep end ent o f any c laim fo r p o st -c o nvict io n o r o t her re lief. Peopl e v . Sav ory , 19 7 Il

l . 2d 203 , 21 0 (2 001 ). A

n or der of the tri al court deny

ing su ch a m oti onNo. 1-05- 3131

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i s a j udgm

en t that f ina ll y di spose s of

the def en dan t’s c l ai m , an d i s thu s appeal

ab le. Sav ory , 197 Ill . 2d at 210-11. Despi

te the fact that this appeal fai ls to address or raise a

ny is sues en compass ed in t he r ulin g o n d efe nd an t ’s mo t io n u nd er se ct io n 1 16

- 3, fr o m wh ich t his a pp ea l is o st en sibly t ake n, d efenda nt maintains t hat t his co ur t is never t heless ve st ed w ith jur isdict ion bec aus e t he origi nal judgm ent rendered by

the ci rcuit court is voi

d, and theref

ore subj ect to attack at any tim e. It is a we ll-set t led pr inciple of law t hat a vo id o rd er may be at t ack ed a t any time, or in any court, ei ther d i rectl y or coll ateral

l y . Peop le v . Thom

ps on , 209 I ll . 2d 19, 25 (2004 ); see also Sar ki ss i an v. Ch i cago B oard

of Edu ca ti on , 20 1 I ll. 2 d 9 5, 10 3 ( 20 02 ) . I t is u nd isp ut ed t ha t t his princi ple al lows an attack o n a void j udgment to be heard for the fi rst t im e on appeal without first bei ng i ni tiated in the court bel

ow. See Th om

ps on , 20 9 I ll . 2d

at 2 5 ( f in di n g n o i m pe di m en t to gra nti ng rel i ef f rom a v oi d s en

ten ci ng orde r th at w as raise d f

or the f i rs t tim e on an ap pe al f rom the deni al of a post-conviction petition, when the a ppeal al leged other issues

that had been

argued in th e p eti ti on) ; s ee al so People v . Muntaner , 33 9 I ll. A pp . 3d 88 7 ( 20 03 ) ( va ca t ing a v o id sent encing o rd er t hat was ra ised fo r t he first t ime on an a ppe al fro m a po st -c onvict ion p et itio n, when that appeal

al so al l eged other i ssu es th at ha

d f i rst been argued be

l ow). Wh ere, h owev er, we

do not ha

ve an inde pen den t bas i s f or ju ri sdi cti on, we do not acq

ui re it by the me re all egation of a v

oid j udgme

nt. See Peopl

e v . Fl owers , 2 08 I ll. 2d 2 91 ( 200 2) . T he re levant fact s in Fl

owers are as f

oll ows: at t rial, the defen

dant ple aded gui

lty and was c onvi

cted an d s en t en ce d o n se ve n c o un t s o f fo r ge r y. T he r ea ft er , she wa s ins t r uc t ed by t he t r ial c o ur t t ha t if she wis he d t o ap pe al h er jud gme nt , she ha d t o firs t file a mo t io n u nd er Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 604 (d) (13 4 Il

l . 2d R. 6 04( d)) , re que sti

ng rec onsi derati

on of he r s en ten ce wi thi n 3 0 da y s ofNo. 1-05- 3131

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sent encing. Almost a year late r, t he de fendant fil ed a mot ion u nder Rule 6 04( d) , a lleging t hat t he t rial co ur t impro per ly f

ailed t o c ons ider t he t er ms of t he pa rt ies’ plea agr eement when impo sing h er se n ten ce . Th e c i rc ui t cou rt rul ed on th e m oti on , de sp ite i

ts un tim el in es s, an d rej ec ted it. On appeal, the defen

dant argued, among other thi ngs, that a provis ion i

n he r sentence wa s impro per and t her efo re void . T he r eviewing c ou rt ult imately agr eed wit h t he de fendant and va cated that portion

of h er se nten ce. Th e su prem e court con

cl uded , howeve

r, that the tria l court had l ost juris diction to hear defen dant’s Rul

e 604(d) motion 30 day s af ter sentenci

ng. Theref

ore, since t he circ uit co ur t had no jurisd ictio n t o e nt er t ain the mot ion, due t o it s unt imeli ness, t he ap pe ll ate court h ad

no j urisd i cti on to h ea r an ap pe al f rom tha t m oti on, de sp ite th

e c l ai m of voidn ess. Our suprem

e court found that although a voi d order may

be attacked at any

tim e, t he issue of vo idness mu st be r aised “in the c ont ext of a pr oc eed ing t hat is pro per ly pending in t he cou rt,”b ec au se

if a c our t l acksj ur i sd i cti on , i t ca n n ot co n f er an y re l i ef , e v en f rom pr i or j ud gm en ts that are voi d. Fl owers , 20 8 I ll. 2 d a t 30 8. T he co ur t we nt o n t o sa y t ha t t he “a pp ella t e c o ur t is not vested with authori

ty to consider the m

erits of a c ase m

erely because the dis pute inv olve s an order o r judgm

ent that is, or is a

ll eged to be, void.” Fl

owers , 20 8 I ll . 2d

at 3 08 . Th

e a pp el l ate court’spower a

ttache s onl

y upon c omp l

i ance wi th the rul es g overn ing a ppea l s. Fl owers , 20 8 I ll. 2d a t 308 . T he co ur t in Fl owers f oun d that c om

pl i an ce wi th appe ll ate cou rt ruleswe

re n ot m et, si n ce de f en da nt’s m oti on to the c i rc ui t cou rt w asn ot ti

m el y f iled , a n d th eref ore th e a pp el l ate court ha d no a uthori ty to en tertai n the def en dan t’s c l ai m of v oid ne ss. Fl owers , 208 Il

l . 2d at 30 9. Ac co r din gly, we kn o w fr o m Fl owers , w hich is co nsist ent wit h Thomas and Muntaner , that although a defendan

t can at tack a vo id j udgment for the fi rst t im e on appeal, he cannot do soNo. 1-05- 3131

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wi thout f i rst ha vi ng a n i nde pen den t bas i s of j uri sdi cti on, i n a proper pr

oceed ing b ef ore thi s court. In th e ca se a t bar, th ere is no in

depe nde nt j uri sdi cti onal ba si s f or enter taini ng th i s appeal . Sin ce no ap pe al is ac t ua lly t ak en fr o m t he se ct io n 1 16

- 3 o r de r , t he r e is no “p r o ce ed ing t ha t is properl y pen di ng” bef ore thi s court up on wh

i ch to support our j uri sdi

cti on. Fl owers , 208 Ill . 2d at 308. The use of section 116-3 as a bas is for thi s appeal

is nothin g more than an

em pty ve hi cle, wh ich is be ing us ed so lely a nd ex clu sive ly fo rch alle ng ing a v o id ju dg men t . As w as po int ed o ut in Fl owers , a def

endan t can not i ni tia te a col l ateral attack up on a v

oid j udgm en t in an appell ate court wit hou t subs t ant ively addr essing t he mat t er fro m which an ap pea l can rig ht fully be t ake n fro m the cir cu it co ur t be lo w. I n e ffec t , as is a pp ar en t fr o m Fl owers , whi

le a court o f rev

ie w ma y c onsider an attack on a voi d j udgm en t f or the f i rs t tim e on ap pe al , th e a

ppe ll ate f orum i s n ot av ai l able f or suc h an at t ack wit hou t first est ablishing an indep ende nt jurisd ictio nal basis, pr op er ly i nvok ing appel la te review . As di scussed bel ow, t hi s resul t do es not by

any me ans f oreclose or preclude a pa r t y fro m co llat er ally c ha lleng ing a v o id ju dg men t by fir st init iat ing t ha t at t ac k in t he cir cu it court, wh i ch i s a c ourt of ori

gi na l j uri sdi cti on. T he r e a r e t wo t r ad it io na l wa ys in w hic h vo id ju dg men t s c an ge ne r ally be co llat er ally attacked in the ci

rcuit court: a motion under section 2-1401 of the Code of Ci vi l Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-14 01 (W

est 200 4)) ( People v . Harvey , 1 96 I ll. 2d 4 44 ( 200 1) (su pr eme co ur t fou nd t hat t her e w as no issu e a s t o de fend ant ’s r ight t o se ek re dr es s fr o m a vo id ju dg ment by mea ns o f a secti on 2- 14 01 peti

ti on to the c i rc ui t cou rt)) , or a f re e- sta n di n g m oti on to v ac ate a voi d j ud gm

en t. People v . Harper , 34 5 I ll. A pp . 3d 27 6 ( 20 03 ) ( find ing t ha t if a d efe nd an t is c ha lleng ing a v o id judgment , t he t itle of t hat mot ion fil ed in the c ircuit c ou rt is irrelevant) ; Jo Jan Co rp v. B re nt , 307No. 1-05- 3131

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Il l . App. 496 ( 1999) (f

indi ng that ins tead of

origina tin g under a s

peci f i c provi si on or statute, a motion f or relief f rom a voi d judgm ent comes f

rom the i nhe rent powers of the court to expun ge void act s fro m its r eco rd s). Whet her bro ught unde r a sec t ion 2 -1 401 mot ion o r a free -st anding mot ion, t his co ur t has fo und t hat wher e a vo id judg ment is a t t ack ed in t he circ uit co ur t , “no special appearance n

eed be f il ed once the j udgme

nt is entered.” Pe o ple v. Re ymar Clinic Pharm acy , Inc. , 24 6 Il

l . A pp. 3d 8 35, 841 (19 93) . Mor eover, “ if the m ova nt m i sl ab el s h i s m oti on attacking the j udgme

nt, the court s shoul

d be l ib eral i n recogni zi ng the m ot ion a s a coll

ateral attack upo n a v oid j udgme nt.” Rey ma r , 24 6 Il l . A pp. 3d a t 841 . A ddi

ti ona ll y , a p eti ti on f or habeas corpus rel

i ef can be f il ed i n the ci rcui t court whe

re the origina l conv i cti on wa s v oid . Owe ns v. L ane , 19 6 I ll. A pp . 3d 35 8 ( 19 90 ) . Ac co r din gly, t he r e a r e a lt er na t ive av en ue s a va ilable t o a d efe nd an t by w hic h t o init iat e a co llat er al a t t ac k o n a n a lleg ed ly vo id ju dg men t in t he cir cu it court without att em

pting to in

itiate the att ack here i

n the appel

la te court without fi

rst acquiri ng an inde pen den t ju ri sdi cti onal ba si s. Ho we ve r , ev en if we we r e t o find t ha t t his w as a p r o pe rmet ho d b y wh ich t o co llat er ally attack a v oi d j udgm

en t, de f en da nt’ s j udgm

en t in th i s c as e w as not i

n f ac t voi d, a nd the ref ore n ot subjec t t o a t t ack at t his time. Defend ant is co rr ect t hat a pe rso n canno t be co nvicte d o f bot h t he in choate and t he prin

cipal offen se, and that conspiracy to commi

t murder is the in

choate o ff ense of murd er. 720 ILCS 5/8 -5 ( West 199 6); People v . Gomez , 286 Il l . App. 3d 23 2, 235 ( 1997) . However, a convi

ction on both charges does not necessari ly render the j udgme

nt void. Our sup re me co ur t , in Pe o ple v. Da vis , 156 Il l . 2d 149(1993 ), di scu ssed voi d j udgm en ts at l en gth. In Da vis , the c our

t n oted th at th e te rm “ v oi d” i s s o f

re qu en tl y us ed in ter chan ge abl y wi thNo. 1-05- 3131

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the term “v oidab l e,” th at i

t has l ost its pri

mary si gni f i can ce. Da vis , 156 Il

l . 2d at 15 5. W

he ther a j udgm en t is voi d or voi dabl e pres en

ts a que sti on of

j uri sdi cti on. Da vis , 156 Il

l . 2d at 15 5. If jurisdiction was l

acki ng i n the trial court , the resulti

ng j udgme

nt rendered wi

ll be deem ed voi d. Da vis , 15 6 I ll. 2d 15 5. On t he o t he rha nd , a v o id ab le ju dg men t is o ne er r o ne o us ly en t er ed by a court that had j uri sdi

cti on, an d i s not subj ect to attack at an y tim e. Da vis , 156 Ill . 2d at 155-56. In Il l inoi s, j uri sdi

cti on i s con

f erred by the c onsti

tution . Da vis , 15 6 I ll . 2d

at 1 56 . “Purs ua

n t to ar t icle VI , § 9 , o f o ur co nst it ut io n, t he cir cu it co ur t s ha ve jur isd ict io n o ve rall j usti ciab l e m atters. [c ite omi

tted]. As appl i ed i n th e con text of cri m ina l procee di ngs , the term ‘sub ject matter’ juri sdiction m eans the power to hear and determi ne a gi ven case.” Da vis , 156 Ill . 2d at 156. Ou rsu pr eme co ur t ha s he ld t ha t t he po we rt o r en de ra p ar t icu lar jud gme nt o rse nt en ce is as impo rt ant an element of jur isdict ion as is per so nal jurisdict ion and subjec t matt er jurisd ictio n. Da vis , 156 Il

l . 2d at 15 6. W

ithout such pow er, the

j udgm en t or sen tenc e i s v oid . Da vis , Ill . 2d at 156 . H ow ever , jur isdict ion o r p ow er t o r ende r a par t icular judg ment d oe s no t mean t hat t he judgm ent rendered m

ust be the one that should have been rendered, for “the power to decide carries with i t t he power to decide wrong as wel l as to decide right.” Da vis , Ill . 2d at 156. The co ur t in Da vis went on t o s ay tha t onc e a c ou rt has a cqu ired jurisd ictio n, g ener ally no sub seq uen t error wi l l oust that j uri sdi

cti on. Da vis , 15 6 Il

l . 2d at 1 56. A s s uc h, “ a c ourt m ay not lose j urisdi

ction because i

t makes a m

istake in determi ni ng ei ther the facts, the law or bot h.” Da vis , 15 6 Il

l . 2d at 1 56. He

re, the ci rcuit court h ad

j urisd i cti on to c onv

i ct d ef en da nt of con sp i racy , a n d to c on v i ct def

en da nt of m urde r, a n d a j ud gm en t on b oth wou l d m erel y con sti tuteNo. 1-05- 3131

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error, particularly

si nce the ul tim ate actual sen

tence did not exceed the statuto ry l im itations that woul d app l y f or mu rder, the con

vi cti on of the greater of

f en se. Even i f we we re to fi nd that defen

dant’s j udgme

nt void an d vacate the conspi

racy conviction, t here would be no basi s to remand the m att er for resent enci

ng. Defendan

t arg ues, re lyi ng o n Peo ple v. Bo ne , 103 Ill . App. 3d 1066 (1982), and People v . Guppy , 30 Ill . App. 3d 489 (197 5), t hat where a singl e sentence is i

mposed on dual convi

ctions, and one o f those conv i cti ons i s rev ersed, the def endan t is en titl ed to a new s en

tenc ing h eari ng. W e di sagree. In bot h Bo ne and Guppy , t he r eviewing c ou rt fou nd t hat beca use it co uld no t disce rn fro m the record h ow m uch wei ght wa s gi

ven to the i

m proper c onv

i cti on i n i m posi ng th e se nten ce, a re man d w asn ec es sa

ry . H ere, al

th oug h a s in gl e s en ten ce of 75 y ea rs wa s i m pos ed on b oth co nvic t io ns, we find t ha t t he t r ial c o ur t did no t su bst an t ially r ely o n t he co nsp ira cy c o nvic t io n in sen tenc ing d ef endan t, and theref ore a rem an d i s un ne ces sary . If a r eview o f the re co rd re veals t hat t he t rial judg e did no t “subst ant ially co nsider t he va cated c onv

i cti ons i n h i s i m posi tion of th e [se nten ce],”rem an dm en t is not requi red. Peo ple v. Bai le y , 24 Ill . App. 3d 79, 84 (1993); see Peo ple v. Ea st land , 257 Ill . App. 3d 394 (1993). In that regard, when a sen

tence is wi

thin statut ory guidel

in es, deference i s giv

en to t he trial court because it i s i n the b est position to determi ne a proper sentence.” Peo ple v. Ta bb , 374 Ill . App. 3d 680, 695 (2 007 ). A sent ence will be modified o nly i f it is “gr eat ly at var iance w ith t he sp irit a nd purpos e of

the l aw or i s m

an if estl y di sproportionate to the

na ture of the of f en se. Ta bb , 37 4 I ll. App. 3d a t 695. Dur

ing d ef endan t’s s en tenc ing h eari ng, th e tri al j udge neve r m en tion ed the word “co nspira cy.” The only st at ement she mad e in refe re nce t o t he co nspira cy was t hat defend antNo. 1-05- 3131

-11-

“m urdered for mone

y” and thereby w as el

igi bl e for an ex

tended term sen

tence. The trial

judge al so stat ed that defen

dant recei ved com pensation for hi s “cri

me ,” whi ch put hi m i n the ex tended t er m se nt en ce . Be ca us e t he t r ial ju dg e o nly mad e r efe r en ce t o a s ing le c r ime, t he mur de r , t he r e is an ins uf f i ci en t bas i s to conc l

ude that the c ourt im

properl y rel i ed on the c onspi

racy conv i cti on. Sub se que ntl y , thi s c ourt v ac ate d th

e e xte nd ed -ter m porti on of the sente nc e, whi ch wa s b as ed

on defend ant ’s r ece pt ion o f co mpensa t ion fo r his cr ime, and mandat ed a new 6 0- year s ent ence d t o be impose d. Pr esu mably, the n, w hat litt le infl uenc e t he co nspira cy co nvictio n co uld have had o n t he t r ial c o ur t , wa s r ec t ified o n r ev iew . T he r efo r e, we find t ha t t he 60 yea rse nt en ce de fen da nt is ser ving is within st at ut or y guidelines, and t hat t her e is no basis up on w hich to co nclude t hat t he sentence giv en was i nf lue nced b y the conspi racy c onvi

ction so as to warrant a remand. For the f oregoi ng r eas ons, w e af

f i rm the j udgm

en t of the ci rcui t court of C ook County . Af f i rm ed. McB RIDE, P.J ., and Mc NUL TY, J., c oncu

r.