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2015 PA Super 67

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.R., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.R., A MINOR

No. 1166 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Dispositional Order February 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-45-JV-0000016-2013

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.R., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.R., A MINOR

No. 1586 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Dispositional Order April 23, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-45-JV-0000016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

OPINION BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 06, 2015

Appellant, C.R., a minor, appeals from the February 10, 2014 

dispositional order entered following his adjudication of delinquency for 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a person who suffers from a 

mental disability, indecent exposure, and open lewdness,1and his 

commitment to Diversified Treatment Alternatives (DTA) juvenile facility. 

Additionally, Appellant appeals from the juvenile court’s subsequent April 23, 

2014 order granting the Commonwealth’s petition for re-disposition and 

placing Appellant in the Mathom House juvenile facility after Appellant was 

denied admission into DTA.2 After careful review, we affirm.

The juvenile court has summarized the relevant factual and procedural 

history of this case as follows.

An adjudication hearing was held on December 19, 

2013, where D.D., a minor victim, D.D.’s father and 

Trooper Nicholas De La Iglesia testified. The facts 

elicited at the hearing are as follows[.] In December

2012, [Appellant] was 12 years old and D.D., the 

victim, was 9 years old. After a complaint was 

lodged, Trooper De La Iglesia conducted an 

investigation of an alleged sexual assault on a school 

bus in December 2012. Trooper De La Iglesia went 

to the home of [Appellant], where his mother was 

present. Trooper De La Igelesia read [Appellant] his 

Miranda Rights after which [Appellant] and his 

mother waived those rights and agreed to speak to 

Trooper De La Iglesia. During the interview, 

[Appellant] admitted that he pulled down his pants 

on the school bus and told D.D. to “suck it.” 

[Appellant] stated that D.D. performed oral sex on 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(5), 3127(a), and 5901, respectively.

2 This Court has sua sponte consolidated Appellant’s appeals as the outcome 

of Appellant’s appeal at 1166 EDA 2014 necessarily implicates our 

jurisdiction to review Appellant’s claims at 1568 EDA 2014. See generally 

Pa.R.A.P. 513.
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him on two separate occasions three weeks prior to 

that day. [Appellant] also related that he knew D.D. 

was mentally challenged.

D.D. also testified at the adjudication hearing. 

D.D. was permitted to testify by contemporaneous 

alternative methods after an in-camera-hearing. 

D.D. stated that he sits next to [Appellant] on the 

school bus. While on the bus, [Appellant], “sucked

his weewee” and then [Appellant] asked him to “suck 

his weewee,” but he refused. D.D. then stated that 

he touched [Appellant]’s “weewee” with his hand. In 

addition, D.D.’s father testified about his son’s 

mental limitations. D.D.’s father stated that D.D. is 

mentally disabled and that D.D. was diagnosed with 

autism, bipolar disorder and oppositional defiance. 

D.D. has an Individual Educational Plan (IEP) at 

Pleasant Valley School District and he rides to school 

on a regular scheduled bus with other children.

At the end of the [December 19, 2013] 

hearing, [the juvenile court] adjudicated [Appellant] 

delinquent for the acts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual 

Intercourse (F-1); Indecent Exposure (M-1); and 

Open Lewdness (M-2). 

Juvenile Court Opinion, 5/14/14, at 1-2.3

Following a disposition hearing on February 10, 2014, the juvenile 

court ordered Appellant placed in the custody of Monroe County Children & 

Youth Agency (CYA) for placement at DTA. Juvenile Court Order, 2/12/14, 

at 1. On February 18, 2014, Appellant filed a timely post-disposition motion 

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 620(B)(1). On 

____________________________________________

3 The Juvenile Court’s opinion does not contain pagination. For ease of 

review, we have assigned each page a corresponding number.
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March 20, 2014, the juvenile court denied Appellant’s post-disposition 

motion and filed an opinion in support of said decision.

On April 3, 2014, the Commonwealth filed an “Expedited Motion for 

Re-Disposition[.]”4 In said motion, the Commonwealth asserted that “[o]n 

March 31, 2014, [Appellant] along with his parents, visited DTA as 

scheduled[,]” and that after meeting with the program supervisor and 

touring the facility, “[Appellant] and his parents were obstinate and wholly 

uncooperative with the treatment process.” Commonwealth’s Expedited 

Motion for Re-Disposition, 4/3/14, at ¶¶ 3-5. As a result, the DTA program 

supervisor informed the Commonwealth that he felt “[Appellant]’s placement 

with DTA would be detrimental to other juveniles at the facility and 

unsuccessful for [Appellant] himself, and therefore rescinded DTA’s offer of 

admission.” Id. at ¶ 6. The Commonwealth requested a re-disposition 

hearing be scheduled to address the matter. Id. at ¶ 8. A hearing was held 

on April 23, 2014, and on April 24, 2014, the juvenile court granted the 

Commonwealth’s petition for re-disposition, and ordered that Appellant be 

placed in the custody of Monroe County CYA and placed at the Mathom 

House. Juvenile Court Order, 4/24/14, at 1. 

While the re-disposition motion was pending, on April 10, 2014, 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the December 19, 2013 

____________________________________________

4 The Commonwealth’s motion was filed pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P. 610.
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adjudication of delinquency and the juvenile court’s subsequent February 10, 

2014 dispositional order. On April 11, 2014, Appellant was directed to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On April 23, 2014, 

Appellant timely complied, and on May 14, 2014, the juvenile court issued 

its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

Thereafter, on May 20, 2014, Appellant filed a second notice of appeal 

from the juvenile court’s April 23, 2014 order granting the Commonwealth’s 

motion for re-disposition. On May 22, 2014, the juvenile court adopted its 

May 14, 2014 Rule 1925(a) opinion for purposes of Appellant’s appeal at 

docket number 1166 EDA 2014.5

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.

[1.] Did the [juvenile] court violate Rule 1701 of the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure when it 

granted the Commonwealth’s petition for redisposition after ... Appellant had already filed a 

notice of appeal to the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania?

Appellant’s Brief (1166 EDA 2014) at 7. 

[2.] Where the testimony presented in the contested 

hearing established that ... Appellant and Victim, 

both of whom are incapable of consenting to sexual 

____________________________________________

5 We note that no portion of the juvenile court’s May 14, 2014 Rule 1925(a) 

opinion addresses the issue Appellant raised in his appeal at docket number 

1166 EDA 2014. Additionally, the Commonwealth has filed one brief under 

both docket numbers, however, the Commonwealth has also failed to 

address Appellant’s sole issue raised at docket number 1166 EDA 2014.
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activity as a result of their age, willingly took part in 

sexual experimentation, was the decision of the 

[juvenile] court to find only ... Appellant delinquent of 

crimes stemming from those acts against the weight 

of the evidence, based upon insufficient evidence 

and contrary to the law?

[3.] At the time of the disposition, did the [juvenile] 

court fail to adequately state upon the record 

reasons sufficient to justify placing ... Appellant in a 

juvenile rehabilitation facility?

Appellant’s Brief (1586 EDA 2014) at 7.

We begin by addressing Appellant’s appeal at 1166 EDA 2014, 

asserting that the juvenile court violated Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1701 by granting the Commonwealth’s motion for re-disposition. 

Appellant’s Brief (1166 EDA 2014) at 12. Specifically, Appellant asserts that 

the juvenile court “altered the disposition [of the February 10, 2014 order] 

by changing the location of placement after ... Appellant had already filed an 

appeal.” Id. 

Rule 1701, in pertinent part, states the following.

Rule 1701. Effect of Appeal Generally

(a) General rule. Except as otherwise prescribed by 

these rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a 

quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other 

government unit may no longer proceed further in 

the matter.

(b) Authority of a trial court or agency after 

appeal. After an appeal is taken or review of a 

quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other 

government unit may:
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(1) Take such action as may be necessary to 

preserve the status quo, correct formal errors 

in papers relating to the matter, cause the 

record to be transcribed, approved, filed and 

transmitted, grant leave to appeal in forma 

pauperis, grant supersedeas, and take other 

action permitted or required by these rules or 

otherwise ancillary to the appeal or petition for 

review proceeding.

(2) Enforce any order entered in the matter, 

unless the effect of the order has been 

superseded as prescribed in this chapter.

...

Pa.R.A.P. 1701.

In his brief, Appellant argues that Rule 1701(a) “authorizes the trial 

court to take action necessary to preserve the status quo,” but that “[t]hese 

exceptions do not permit the trial court to make any substantive 

modifications to any order which is the subject of this appeal.” Appellant’s 

Brief (1166 EDA 2014) at 12. However, pursuant to Rule 610, the juvenile 

court may conduct a dispositional review hearing at any time. Specifically, 

Rule 610 states, in pertinent part, as follows.

Rule 610. Dispositional and Commitment 

Review

A. Dispositional Review Hearing. The court shall 

review its disposition and conduct dispositional 

review hearings for the purpose of ensuring that the 

juvenile is receiving necessary treatment and 

services and that the terms and conditions of the 

disposition are being met.
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(1) In all cases, the court shall conduct 

dispositional review hearings at least every six 

months.

(2) In all cases, the juvenile shall appear in 

person at least once a year.

(3) The court may schedule a review hearing 

at any time.

B. Change in dispositional order. Whenever there 

is a request for a change in the dispositional order, 

other than a motion to revoke probation as provided 

in Rule 612, notice and an opportunity to be heard 

shall be given to the parties and the victim.

(1) The juvenile may be detained pending a 

court hearing.

(2) A detention hearing shall be held within 

seventy-two hours of the juvenile’s detention, 

if detained.

(3) The juvenile shall be given a statement of 

reasons for the discharge from a placement 

facility or request for change in the 

dispositional order.

(4) A review hearing shall be held within 

twenty days of the discharge from the 

placement facility or request for change in the 

dispositional order.

....

Pa.R.J.C.P. 610. 

Accordingly, upon receipt of the Commonwealth’s motion for 

redisposition, the juvenile court scheduled a hearing to evaluate if the 
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disposition was still serving the interest of Appellant and the protection of 

society.6 The juvenile court had both the authority and obligation, under 

Rule 610, to ensure that Appellant was “receiving necessary treatment and 

services and that the terms and conditions of the disposition are being 

met[.]” Further, Appellant’s pending appeal would not divest the juvenile 

court of its reviewing authority, as it is required to continually evaluate 

events and circumstances that occur after the original disposition. Appellant 

filed his notice of appeal on April 10, 2014, after the parties had been made 

aware that DTA had rescinded its invitation, and after the Commonwealth 

had filed a petition for re-disposition as the juvenile court’s February 10, 

2014 order could no longer be enforced as entered. Instantly, the terms of 

the disposition could not be met because DTA had rescinded Appellant’s 

invitation; therefore, the juvenile court properly entered a new dispositional 

order pursuant to Rule 610 directing Appellant be placed in Mathom House. 

As a result, Appellant’s first issue fails.

We turn now to Appellant’s two remaining issues in his appeal 

docketed at 1586 EDA 2014. In his second issue, Appellant argues that the 

evidence was insufficient because both Appellant and the victim are 

incapable of consenting; therefore, they are equally incapable of being held

____________________________________________

6 We note that the record does not contain a copy of the April 23, 2014 redisposition hearing. It is the responsibility of Appellant to ensure all 

necessary transcripts are included in the certified record. See generally 

Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a).
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criminally liable. Appellant’s Brief (1586 EDA 2014) at 13-14. Appellant 

further asserts that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence for 

the same reason. Id. at 15-16. For the reasons that follow, we conclude 

that both of Appellant’s arguments raised in his second issue lack merit.

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether the 

evidence presented at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, 

viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, 

support the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. 

Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 66 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 

Patterson v. Pennsylvania, 2015 WL 731963 (U.S. 2015). “The 

Commonwealth can meet its burden by wholly circumstantial evidence and 

any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.” 

Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 

(Pa. 2014). As an appellate court, we must review “the entire record ... and 

all evidence actually received[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “[T]he trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 64 (Pa. Super. 

2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014). “Because 
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evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 

119, 126 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Diamond v. 

Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 145 (2014).

Instantly, Appellant challenges his convictions for involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse with a person who suffers from a mental disability, 

indecent exposure, and open lewdness, the respective statutes for which 

provide, in relevant part, as follows.

§ 3123. Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony 

of the first degree when the person engages in 

deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant:

...

(5) who suffers from a mental disability which 

renders him or her incapable of consent; or 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(5).

§ 3127. Indecent exposure

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits indecent 

exposure if that person exposes his or her genitals in 

any public place or in any place where there are 

present other persons under circumstances in which 

he or she knows or should know that this conduct is 

likely to offend, affront or alarm.

Id. § 3127(a). 

§ 5901. Open lewdness

A person commits a misdemeanor of the third degree 

if he does any lewd act which he knows is likely to be 
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observed by others who would be affronted or 

alarmed.

Id. § 5901.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the 

aforementioned statutes, we note that Appellant solely argues that the 

Commonwealth failed to provide “testimony or evidence indicating that [the] 

victim was somehow forced to take part in these acts with [Appellant] or 

even that he did not want to engage in these acts.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. 

Accordingly, the only element Appellant challenges on appeal is consent. 

Relying on the case of In the Interest of B.A.M., 806 A.2d 893 (Pa. 

Super. 2002), Appellant asserts that while the statutes do not exclude “from 

criminal liability a child less than 13 years of age who engages in sexual 

activity with another child less than 13, such a result would be absurd 

because children younger than 13 are deemed by the legislature to be 

incapable of consenting to (or initiating) sexual activity.” Appellant’s Brief 

(1586 EDA 2014) at 14. First, we specifically disagree with Appellant’s 

interpretation of B.A.M. We note that B.A.M. does not hold that a 13-yearold cannot be held criminally liable for initiating sexual activity; rather, it 

held that one child could not be held criminally liable for the acts of two 11-

year-olds who consensually engaged in the conduct. Id. at 897. Further, in

B.A.M., the record evidence supported that the act between the two minors 

was consensual based on the victim’s testimony at trial. Id. at 898 (holding 

“[i]t is therefore absurd to penalize one youngster while the other faces no 
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sanction for precisely the same behavior. Either both boys must be punished 

... or neither can be; as the trial court definitively found, both boys were 

willingly participants”). This Court therefore concluded that the juvenile 

could not be held criminally liable for IDSI with a child under what is now 

Section 3123(b) or rape under what is presently Section 3121(c).

Further, a decade after B.A.M. was decided, this Court clarified our 

intended holding.

We acknowledge that our use of the term 

“consensual” in In re B.A.M. can be confusing and 

may appear to be in conflict. Specifically, in In re 

B.A.M. we held that “[t]here can be no legitimate 

interest in prosecuting consensual sexual activity 

between two children under 13,” but then go on to 

state that children under the age of 13 are incapable 

of consent. Appellant seeks to exploit that conflict, 

while turning the intent of our holding in In re 

B.A.M. on its head. According to Appellant’s 

interpretation, any sexual activity between children 

under the age of 13 is not a crime. Applying 

Appellant’s interpretation of In re B.A.M. to other 

scenarios, he would have that case determine that, 

regardless of the level of forcible compulsion used, a 

child under the age of 13 is incapable of rape. Such 

a dangerous result was certainly not our intent and is 

not supported by In re B.A.M.

To the contrary, we rendered the decision in In 

re B.A.M. to protect children while avoiding 

absurdities in application of our Legislature’s 

statutes. The entire basis of our holding in In re 

B.A.M. and the cases relied upon in reaching that 

decision focused on the fact that “the statutes before 

us are deliberately protective, specifically intended 

by the Legislature to shield young children from 

sexual predation by older teenagers and adults.” Id.

at 895. As was expressly noted by this Court in In re 

B.A.M. “[o]ur appellate courts have stated 
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definitively that those enactments were 

designed to protect children from exploitation 

by their elders.” Id. at 897 (emphasis added). 

Were we to have worded our holding in In re B.A.M.

more precisely, we would have strictly limited the 

holding to its facts wherein mutually agreed upon 

sexual activity between peers under the age of 13 is 

not a crime. ....

Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 879-880 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citation omitted).

Instantly, a review of the transcripts reveals that D.D., the victim in 

this case is a nine-year-old boy who “has mental retardation and he also has 

a degree of autism. He’s also bipolar and [has] oppositional defiance.” N.T., 

12/19/13, at 28. D.D. was riding the bus to school when twelve-year-old 

Appellant “pulled his own pants down and told [D.D.] to suck it.” Id. at 35. 

Appellant told police that he had wanted oral sex and asked D.D. to perform 

it on him. Id. at 35, 37. Pursuant to Section 3123(a)(5), a person commits 

a felony of the first degree when the person engages in deviate sexual 

intercourse with a complainant who “suffers from a mental disability which 

renders him or her incapable of consent[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(a)(5). This 

is precisely the conduct distinguished by the Bricker Court and specifically 

found to be beyond the scope of our holding in B.A.M. We continue to 

decline the invitation to extend B.A.M. Accordingly, we conclude that 

Appellant’s assertion that the Commonwealth failed to show the acts were 

not consensual, and that Appellant was incapable of criminal liability based 

on his age, must fail.
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Appellant also asserts that the finding of the juvenile court “shocks 

one’s sense of justice, and was therefore against the weight of the 

evidence.” Appellant’s Brief (1586 EDA 2014) at 16. However, Appellant 

devotes a mere two paragraphs to this argument without developing his 

claim whatsoever. See id. Further, the entire basis of Appellant’s argument 

contained in the two paragraphs is a reiteration of his sufficiency argument 

relying on B.A.M. Generally, appellate briefs are required to conform to the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 2119(a) requires that the argument section of an 

appellate brief include “citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Id.

at 2119(a). This Court will not consider an argument where an appellant 

fails to cite to any legal authority or otherwise develop the issue. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009), cert. denied, 

Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 131 S. Ct. 250 (2010); see also, e.g., In re 

Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating, “[f]ailure 

to cite relevant legal authority constitutes waiver of the claim on appeal[]”) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013). Therefore, 

Appellant’s failure to develop said issue results in waiver.7 See id.

____________________________________________

7 Even if we were to address Appellant’s claim, we would conclude the 

verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. An argument that the 

jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence concedes that the 

evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. Commonwealth v. 

Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, Lyons v. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Finally, in his last issue Appellant asserts that the juvenile court “failed 

to adequately set forth reasons why [] Appellant’s placement was the least 

restrictive alternative available.” Appellant’s Brief (1586 EDA 2014). 

Specifically, Appellant asserts that “the record does not demonstrate that 

[the juvenile court] weighed and considered any less restrictive forms of 

rehabilitation as required by [Pennsylvania] Rule [of Juvenile Court 

Procedure] 512D.” Id. at 18.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 1792 (2014). Our Supreme Court has 

admonished that “[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have 

arrived at a different conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 

1055 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). Instead, “the trial judge is to determine 

that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater 

weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is 

to deny justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] 

new trial should be awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice ....” Id. 

As an appellate court, it “is not [our role] to consider the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 91 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 

An argument that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

remains “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting ... a new trial ....” 

Id. (citation omitted). “Thus, only where the facts and inferences disclose a 

palpable abuse of discretion will the denial of a motion for a new trial based 

on the weight of the evidence be upset on appeal.” Id. (citation omitted; 

emphasis in original).

Instantly, the evidence adduced at trial showed that Appellant, a 12-

year-old, committed conduct in the presence of D.D., a 9-year-old victim 

incapable of consent, sufficient to convict him of involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse with a person who suffers from a mental disability, indecent 

exposure, and open lewdness. The cumulative testimony of the witnesses at 

trial corroborated D.D.’s allegations, and the trial court was free to believe 

the testimony of the witnesses. See Clay, supra.
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Rule 512 states the following. 

Rule 512. Dispositional Hearing

...

D. Court’s findings. The court shall enter its 

findings and conclusions of law into the record and 

enter an order pursuant to Rule 515. On the record 

in open court, the court shall state:

(1) its disposition;

(2) the reasons for its disposition;

(3) the terms, conditions, and limitations of the 

disposition; and

(4) if the juvenile is removed from the home:

(a) the name or type of any agency or 

institution that shall provide care, treatment, 

supervision, or rehabilitation of the juvenile, 

and 

(b) its findings and conclusions of law that 

formed the basis of its decision consistent with 

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301 and 6352, including why 

the court found that the out-of-home 

placement ordered is the least restrictive type 

of placement that is consistent with the 

protection of the public and best suited to the 

juvenile’s treatment, supervision, 

rehabilitation, and welfare; 

Pa.R.J.C.P. 512(D). 

A review of the dispositional hearing reveals the juvenile court 

considered all the factors listed in Rule 512(D) and that it found the least 
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restrictive option to be sentencing Appellant to DTA.8 At sentencing the 

juvenile court made the following findings.

These cases, juvenile cases, in general, are 

difficult. Dealing with juveniles that are as young as 

[Appellant] is, he’s - - I recognize he’s only 13 years 

old, he’s a very young man. And any time the 

[juvenile c]ourt is faced with the prospect of taking a 

young juvenile, or any juvenile for that matter, out 

of the home, that decision is not taken lightly. And I 

gave a lot of thought in this case. And I have some 

concerns about [Appellant]’s behavior in this 

particular incident for a young man. And the fact 

that he’s clearly had problems at the Pleasant Valley 

School District. According to the social summary 

report that I have reviewed, he had a history of 37 

disciplinary infractions ranging from disrespectful to 

physical confrontations. And that record essentially 

culminated with this incident, which again, I 

indicated is disturbing. The young victim in this case

was only nine years old, a special needs student by 

all accounts. That [Appellant] essentially took 

advantage of him in a serious manner. And then as 

a result of that, he’s expelled or suspended from 

school. He’s enrolled at Pius and apparently the 

nature of his expulsion from Pleasant Valley was 

made known to Pius at the time. But he enrolled in 

Pius and he’s been engaged in some counseling. I 

certainly recognize that. It sounds like he’s doing, 

academically, well. That things are not the same for 

[Appellant], that things are improving for him, and 

that’s a very positive sign. But it seems that there 

have been some setbacks. You know, the 

____________________________________________

8 We note, as discussed at length above, Appellant’s dispositional order 

sentencing him to DTA was amended following the Commonwealth’s petition 

for re-disposition placing Appellant in the Mathom House juvenile facility 

after Appellant was denied admission into DTA. Nevertheless, as Appellant’s 

challenge is to the juvenile court’s findings on the record regarding the least 

restrictive option being placement outside of the home, we are not precluded 

from reviewing Appellant’s issue.
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infractions for making noise in mass and not wearing 

his – wearing sneakers with his uniform can certainly 

be overlooked. But there’s another troubling 

allegation that he was cited for bullying and teasing 

or some inappropriate conduct with a female student 

that, in and of itself, for a 13 year old probably could 

be overlooked, but given his history, and the sexual 

history for this adjudication of delinquency in this 

particular case, it gives the [juvenile c]ourt some 

added concern. But I don’t think there’s any 

question that [Appellant] has made progress. And, 

quite frankly, I think that he’s got a very positive 

future ahead of him. He’s a young man. And I think 

things will go well for him in the future. But I think 

something more than leaving him in the present 

situation without some more intensive type of 

therapy or counseling I think the [juvenile c]ourt 

would be remiss [to] do that.

And, again, it’s very difficult for me to place 

any student, especially a young student like 

[Appellant]. The bottom line here is what is the best 

thing for him under the circumstances. And I feel, 

given my understanding of this program, the 

Diversified Treatment Alternative Program, that I feel 

that that is the best option for [Appellant]. 

Therefore, I’m going to adopt the recommendation of 

probation in this matter and I am not going to 

suspend that placement pending appeal in this 

matter.

...

[T]he [juvenile c]ourt finds that to allow [Appellant] 

to remain in the home would be contrary to the 

child’s welfare and reasonable efforts have been 

made to prevent removal of the child from the home. 

This disposition is consistent with the protection of 

the public and best suited to the treatment, 

supervision, rehabilitation and welfare of the child.

...
J-S70029-14

J-S70030-14

- 20 -

Okay, [Appellant], good luck to you. This is a good 

program. I think you’re going to get a benefit out of 

it. And I think it’s going to help you. You got a long 

way to go, you’re 13, okay. You’ve got a long way 

to go, and we just want to make sure things get 

better for you and you keep improving. 

N.T., 2/10/14, 14-15. The juvenile court thoroughly discussed its reasoning 

and conclusion for placing Appellant outside of the home. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s final issue fails.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s issues are either 

waived or devoid of merit. Therefore, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

February 10, 2014 dispositional order, and the juvenile court’s subsequent 

April 23, 2014 order granting the Commonwealth’s petition for redisposition.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2015