[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-13303

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-02091-ODE

CHRISTOPHER LOWE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

CROWN EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(April 6, 2015)

Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and COX, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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The Plaintiff, Christopher Lowe (“Lowe”), sued the Defendant, Crown

Equipment Corporation (“Crown”), for an injury to Lowe’s left foot allegedly 

caused by a Crown forklift that malfunctioned. Lowe’s Complaint alleges product 

liability and negligence claims. On simultaneously filed motions of Crown, the 

district court excluded the testimony of Lowe’s causation and alternative-design 

expert, Robert Friedmann (“Friedmann”), and granted summary judgment in favor 

of Crown and against Lowe. We affirm.1

I. Standards of Review

We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s order regarding the 

admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 

U.S. 136, 141-43, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1997); Cook ex rel. Tessier v. Sheriff of 

Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1103 (11th Cir. 2005). We will not reverse a ruling 

on the admissibility of expert testimony unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous. 

Id. Because of the “considerable leeway” afforded the district court in determining 

admissibility, we will not overturn its decision even if “we would have gone the 

other way had it been our call.” Id. This standard is not relaxed even if the 

decision we review is outcome-determinative. Id. at 1107 (citation omitted). We 

also review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to exclude expert

 1 We noted sua sponte deficient pleadings of diversity jurisdiction. We are satisfied from the 

parties’ submissions that the district court had diversity jurisdiction.

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testimony without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1113–14 (citing 

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152-53, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176). 

Finally, we review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. 

Williams v. Mast Biosurgery USA, Inc., 644 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2011).

II. Contentions of the Parties

Lowe contends: (1) that the district court abused its discretion by striking 

the entirety of Friedmann’s testimony; (2) that the district court abused its 

discretion by striking this evidence without conducting an evidentiary hearing; and 

(3) that the district court improperly granted Crown summary judgment even 

without Friedmann’s expert testimony.

Crown contends that the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

excluding Friedmann’s testimony without an evidentiary hearing, especially in 

light of Lowe’s failure to request one. Crown contends that the district court 

properly granted summary judgment because Lowe, without Friedmann’s 

testimony, could not produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact 

as to causation.

III. Discussion

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting 

Crown’s motion to exclude Friedmann’s testimony without holding an evidentiary

hearing that Lowe did not even request. We have carefully considered the court’s 

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order (Order, Doc. 66) granting both the motion to exclude and Crown’s motion 

for summary judgment. We agree with the court’s analysis and conclusions. 

Friendmann’s testimony was the only evidence of causation, an essential element 

of Lowe’s claims, and, without this evidence, Crown was entitled to summary

judgment.

IV. Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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