NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DANIA E., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, C.M., Appellees.

1

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0285

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD22445

The Honorable Connie Contes, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael F. Valenzuela

Counsel for Appellees

 

1 The caption has been amended to safeguard the child’s identity pursuant 

to Administrative Order 2013-0001.
DANIA E. v. DCS, C.M.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Diane M. Johnsen joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 Dania E. (Mother) argues the superior court erred in 

terminating her parental rights to C.M. because there was no clear and 

convincing evidence she would be unable, in the foreseeable future, to 

remedy the circumstances that brought C.M. into care and the court erred 

in not giving her more time. Because the record supports the superior 

court’s findings, the termination order is affirmed.

FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother’s child C.M. was born in 2009. In August 2012, the 

Department of Child Safety (DCS) took C.M. into care and filed a 

dependency petition alleging, as to Mother, neglect of C.M. due to 

substance abuse and domestic violence as well as failure to protect. C.M. 

was found dependent as to Mother in October 2012, when Mother failed to 

appear for a scheduled hearing, and the court adopted a family 

reunification case plan at that time. 

¶3 During the remainder of 2012, Mother minimally participated 

in services. Her participation then improved for a time, but later in 2013 and 

in 2014, her participation declined significantly. At DCS’ request, in 

February 2014, the court changed the case plan to severance and adoption. 

DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights based on substance abuse 

and 15-months time-in-care. After a September 2014 adjudication, where 

Mother testified, the court terminated her parental rights to C.M. based on

both grounds alleged. This court has jurisdiction over Mother’s timely 

appeal pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 8-235(A), 12-

 

2 This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the 

superior court’s findings. See Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 

205, 207 ¶ 2, 181 P.3d 1126, 1128 (App. 2008).
DANIA E. v. DCS, C.M.

Decision of the Court

3

120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1) and Arizona Rules of Procedure for the 

Juvenile Court 103–04 (2015).3

DISCUSSION 

I. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Terminating Mother’s Parental 

Rights.

¶4 The superior court may grant a motion to terminate if DCS 

proves by clear and convincing evidence at least one statutory ground for 

severance in A.R.S. § 8–533(B) and proves by a preponderance of the 

evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child. See Kent K. v. 

Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 42, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005); Michael J. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000). 

Because the superior court is in the best position to weigh and assess the 

evidence, including credibility and resolutions of factual disputes, an order 

terminating parental rights will be affirmed so long as it is supported by 

reasonable evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 

18, 219 P.3d 296, 303 (App. 2009).

¶5 To prevail on the substance abuse ground, DCS was required 

to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there were “reasonable 

grounds to believe” that Mother’s substance abuse “will continue for a 

prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). Mother argues the 

superior court erred by finding DCS had met its burden.

¶6 The evidence shows Mother had a significant history of 

substance abuse. She started using marijuana and then methamphetamines 

in her early teens. Mother admitted at trial that she had used

methamphetamine consistently for several years and that her use was 

“pretty consistent” the week C.M. was taken into care in August 2012.

¶7 DCS provided Mother with various services designed to 

address her substance abuse. Mother’s initial participation was 

inconsistent. For example, Mother failed to participate in substance abuse 

treatment in August 2012, and a referral was closed two months later. From 

August to November 2012, Mother missed 20 of 28 required drug tests and 

tested positive for amphetamines. 

¶8 Mother’s participation in services improved in the first part of 

2013. However, Mother’s follow up was inconsistent, she was closed out of 

 

3 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
DANIA E. v. DCS, C.M.

Decision of the Court

4

a substance abuse aftercare program for failing to participate and her 

participation declined in the second part of 2013. After a third referral for 

further treatment in October 2013, Mother failed to participate and the 

referral was closed.

¶9 In 2014, Mother’s participation in services further declined.

She did not participate in substance abuse treatment and missed nine of 

twelve random drug tests. At trial, Mother admitted she relapsed in 

February 2014 and used methamphetamine after a visit where C.M. called 

her “Mommy” and did not want her to leave, something the superior court 

found “[p]articularly troubling.” A DCS caseworker testified that during an 

April 2014 visit, Mother’s house smelled of marijuana, which Mother 

attributed to someone else in the home smoking marijuana. Although 

Mother testified she participated in a 72-hour rehabilitation program three 

months after her February 2014 relapse, she also admitted using 

methamphetamines shortly after completing that program. The DCS 

caseworker testified at trial that Mother’s substance abuse would continue 

“for a prolonged indeterminate period of time” because she failed to obtain 

the treatment needed to maintain sobriety. 

¶10 Mother argues A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) does not require that she 

be ready, “on the very day of trial,” to “resume normal parenting duties,”

and that she would have been sober and ready to parent “six weeks to two 

months” after trial. By the time of trial, however, C.M. had been in DCS’ 

care for more than two years. During that time, and notwithstanding a 

substantial history of substance abuse, Mother had failed to complete 

substance abuse services and had relapsed with methamphetamine just 

months before trial. This evidence supports the superior court’s ruling. See 

Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 378–79 ¶¶ 26–29, 231 

P.3d 377, 382–83 (App. 2010); Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 93 ¶ 18, 219 P.3d at 303.

¶11 Mother also asserts she “enthusiastically participated” in 

substance abuse treatment “and, for many months, tested clean.” After that

period, however, her participation in treatment declined, she missed a 

significant number of drug tests and relapsed by using methamphetamine 

a few months before trial, nearly two years after DCS took C.M. into care.

Moreover, the court was not required to accept Mother’s testimony that she 

had established stable housing, income, employment and participated in a 

support group and mentor activities. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

203 Ariz. 278, 280 ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002); see also Raymond F., 224 

Ariz. 373, 378–79 ¶¶ 24–29, 231 P.3d 377, 382–83 (rejecting argument that 

clean drug test during four months before termination adjudication showed 

there was no evidence drug abuse was likely to continue). Accordingly, 
DANIA E. v. DCS, C.M.

Decision of the Court

5

Mother has failed to show the superior court abused its discretion in finding 

DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that she had a history of 

chronic drug abuse and there were “reasonable grounds to believe” that her 

substance abuse “will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” See

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3); Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 379 ¶ 29, 231 P.3d at 383.4

II. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Denying Mother’s Request For 

Additional Time.

¶12 Mother claims she requested a trial continuance by asking 

during closing argument that she be given “additional time to participate 

in services.” Mother’s request appears to be an argument that she should 

be given more time to participate in services, as opposed to a request to 

continue trial. Mother did not file a written motion to continue and there is 

no indication the court waived the writing requirement. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. 

Ct. 46(A). Moreover, to the extent her oral request is construed as a proper 

motion to continue, Mother has not shown how she set forth the grounds 

required for such a motion or that the superior court abused its discretion 

in denying such a motion. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 46(F). Accordingly, Mother 

has not shown that the court abused its discretion in addressing this request 

for additional time.

CONCLUSION

¶13 The superior court’s order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to C.M. is affirmed.

 

4 Because the superior court properly found this ground for severance, this 

court need not address the other ground for severance found by that court. 

See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251 ¶ 27, 995 P.2d at 687.