J-S16016-15 & J-S16017-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.E.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: B.A.D., MOTHER No. 1625 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered August 28, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Civil 

Division, at No(s): CP-14-DP-0000021-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.E.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.S., SR., FATHER No. 1650 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered August 28, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Civil 

Division, at No(s): CP-14-DP-0000021-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON, and OTT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 06, 2015

B.A.D. (“Mother”), and C.S., Sr., (“Father”), the parents of the subject 

child, J.E.D., born in August of 2014, (“Child”), appeal the orders dated and 

entered August 28, 2014, granting the petition filed by Centre County 

Children and Youth Services (“CYS” or the “Agency”) to adjudicate Child 

dependent and remove him from the custody of his parents and place him in 

foster care, pursuant to sections 6302 and 6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6302 and 6351, and finding aggravated circumstances such 

that reunification services would not be provided for the family, pursuant to 

section 6341(c.1) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(c.1). We affirm.
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The trial court set forth the following:

The event that precipitated CYS’s involvement with 

[Father], Mother[ ] and J.E.D. [ ] occurred at the Mt. Nittany 

Medical Center in State College, Centre County, Pennsylvania on 

August --, 2014, less than 24 hours after J.E.D.’s birth. The 

child was brought to Mother’s room, and in less than half an 

hour, Mother fell asleep with J.E.D. in her arms. She was 

awoken [sic] by a nightmare and noticed J.E.D. lying on the 

ground. [Father] was also present and sleeping in the hospital 

room. Upon noticing J.E.D. on the floor, Mother picked him up, 

inspected him for injury, and attempted to give him a bottle. 

Neither [Father] nor Mother immediately sought medical 

attention for J.E.D., but eventually sought out nursing staff to 

evaluate him. Ultimately, when the nursing staff arrived, they 

learned from Mother that the child had fallen. J.E.D. had a CT 

scan and other medical evaluations which revealed the child had 

suffered a large hematoma and a right parietal skull fracture. 

No charges have been filed against [Father] or Mother at this 

time.

Trial Court Opinion re Father’s appeal, 10/7/14, at 3; Trial Court Opinion re 

Mother’s appeal, 10/7/14, at 3.

On August 15, 2014, CYS filed a petition for emergency protective 

custody and a shelter care petition with regard to Child. On August 15, 

2014, the trial court entered an order granting the petition for emergency 

protective custody.

On August 18, 2014, the trial court held a shelter care hearing. On 

that same date, the trial court also appointed a guardian ad litem for Child, 

Attorney Parviz Ansari. At the hearing on August 18, 2014, CYS presented

the testimony of Robin Cain, a CYS caseworker assigned to Child’s case. 

Counsel for Mother, Attorney Justin Miller, and the guardian ad litem
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conducted cross-examination of Ms. Cain.1 After the conclusion of the 

hearing on August 18, 2014, the trial court entered a shelter care order. 

Additionally, on August 18, 2014, the trial court entered orders appointing 

Attorney Miller as counsel for Mother, and Attorney Ronald McGlaughlin as 

counsel for Father. 

On August 19, 2014, CYS filed a dependency petition and a motion for 

a finding of aggravated circumstances. On August 28, 2014, the trial court 

held an adjudicatory hearing on the dependency of Child, and a hearing on 

the aggravated circumstances petition. At the hearing, CYS presented the 

testimony of Ms. Cain. Attorney Miller, Attorney McLaughlin, and the 

guardian ad litem conducted cross-examination of Ms. Cain.

Based on the testimony and other evidence at the hearing on August 

28, 2014, the trial court made the following findings of fact.

1) On August --, 2014, [B.A.D.] gave birth to [J.E.D.] at Mount 

Nittany Medical Center located in State College, Pennsylvania. 

The biological father had been identified as [B.A.D.’s] current 

paramour, [C.S.].

2) On August --, 2014, [B.A.D. and C.S] were the sole 

caregivers for [J.E.D.] at Mount Nittany Medical Center. At 9:40 

a.m., [B.A.D.] informed the hospital staff that between 9:20 

a.m. and 9:40 a.m., she dropped [J.E.D.] on the floor while 

sleeping in her hospital bed. It was determined by medical staff 

that [J.E.D.] sustained a large hematoma and a right parietal 

skull fracture. Due to the serious injuries [J.E.D.] suffered only 

hours after his birth, [B.A.D. and C.S.] are currently being 

investigated for suspected child abuse.

 

1

Father appeared pro se at the hearing, and did not question the witness. 

Attorney Miller did not represent Father, and recommended that Father 

request his own separate counsel. N.T., 8/18/14, at 17. 
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3) [B.A.D.] has an extensive history with Centre County Children 

and Youth Services. She was initially referred to the Agency on 

July 19, 2009, and has been intermittently involved since that 

time.

4) The [D.] family was opened for protective services on August 

11, 2011 and remained open until August 27, 2013, when 

[J.E.D.’s] three older half-siblings were placed in the care and 

custody of Centre County Children and Youth Services by an 

Order for Emergency Protective Custody.

5) Historically, issues of concern have been domestic violence 

between [B.A.D.] and the father of her three older children, 

[B.D., H.D. and D.D.], his addiction to alcohol, overcrowded, 

unclean and unorganized home conditions and harsh physical 

discipline by [B.A.D.].

6) On August 26, 2013, while in the care of her mother, 

[B.A.D.], [H.D.], age 31⁄2 years, suffered a dislocation of her 

elbow that resulted in pain if she used her arm and hand; the 

injury which impaired the child’s functioning was not treated in a 

reasonable period of time and treatment was obtained the 

following day only when her mother was directed to do so. On 

September 24, 2013, the [c]ourt found clear and convincing 

evidence that child abuse had occurred with regard to [H.D.], in 

that she had experienced impairment and severe pain and that

treatment had been delayed by her mother, [B.A.D.]. The 

report was filed as Founded to Child[L]ine.

7) On February 27, 2007, [C.S.], biological father of [J.E.D.], 

entered a guilty plea to Indecent Assault; 18 Pa.C.S. §3126(a) 

(1); M2. At that time the [c]ourt ordered that he not be in the 

lone company or be in a supervisory capacity of any person 

under the age of 18.

8) [C.S.] has recently undergone an assessment by Project Point 

of Light. It is anticipated that he will need to participate in 

treatment for a minimum of 18 months before a determination 

can be made regarding his ability to be in the company of minors 

without appropriate supervision. Until then, he remains a risk to 

minors.
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9) Formal reunification services have been provided to [B.A.D.] 

by the Centre County Youth Service Bureau since November of 

2013. To date, little progress has been made with regard to 

reuniting [B.A.D.] with her three older children.

10) Under these circumstances, the safety of [J.E.D.], a . . .-

day-old infant, could not be assured if he were to be returned to 

the care and custody of either or both of his biological parents.

Trial Court Findings of Fact, 8/28/14.

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court made the following 

determinations with regard to the procedural history and factual background 

of this matter.

[Father] is the biological father of [Child], as well as two 

other children. CYS has been involved with [Father’s] family 

intermittently with regard to his two other children who are not 

in his custody. On February 27, 2007, [Father] entered a guilty 

plea to Indecent Assault. At that time, the [trial court] ordered 

that he not be in the lone company or in a supervisory capacity 

of any person under the age of 18. At the end of 2013, [Father] 

sent a photo of his penis on his phone to a 14[-]year[-]old minor 

child. [Father] is currently involved in treatment at Project Point 

of Light, which he has previously completed, but has not finished 

the current program which is necessary to prove that he is safe 

to be around children.

[Mother] is the biological mother of [Child], as well as 

three older children: B.A.D. (D.O.B. 07/--/08), H.R.D. (D.O.B. 

02/--/10), and D.M.D. (D.O.B. 08/--/11). B.A.D., D.M.D., and 

H.R.D. are currently dependent and in foster care. CYS has an 

extensive history with Mother. CYS became involved with 

Mother’s family shortly after the birth of the firstborn child 

B.A.D., who is now 6 years old. Historically, CYS has been 

involved with the family due to concerns regarding home

conditions, domestic violence, alcohol dependency, hygiene, and 

the improper administration of corporal punishment, as well as 

general issues with parenting skills, housing, and homelessness. 

On August 26, 2013, while in the care of Mother, H.R.D. suffered 

an elbow dislocation. Mother did not seek medical care for 

H.R.D. until the following day when a family services provider 
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came to the house for a scheduled visit, immediately noticed 

H.R.D. in obvious pain, and instructed Mother that H.R.D. 

needed to go to the Emergency Room. The family services 

provider then cancelled their appointment and instead drove 

Mother and H.R.D. to the hospital. On September 24, 2013, the 

[trial court] found clear and convincing evidence that child abuse 

had occurred with regard to H.R.D.

Formal reunification services have been provided to Mother 

by CYS since November 13, 2013. To date, Mother has made 

little progress to reunite with her three older children and they 

remain in foster care. She initially made some progress, but her 

efforts have significantly dropped off. Her progress includes 

obtaining her driver’s license, maintaining a part-time cleaning 

job, and attending reunification services. However, she does not 

implement CYS feedback or suggestions consistently and has not 

made progress to warrant increasing her visitation from biweekly 

3-hour, fully supervised visits. Mother has been on notice that 

she must make significant progress to reunite with her children 

but has been unable or unwilling to do so. Throughout 

reunification, she stayed in her grandmother’s overcrowded 

apartment. Currently, she is technically homeless though she 

temporarily is staying with her parents as of September 11, 

2014. Mother makes less than $400/month and acknowledges 

that it is not enough to provide for her children, but does not 

utilize any of the resources CYS provides her to help her find a 

better job. CYS currently anticipates that they will recommend 

terminating reunification services at the next hearing in 

November 2014. CYS views Mother’s relationship with [Father] 

as a barrier to reunification with her three older children.

* * *

CYS concluded that no efforts should be made to reunite 

the family. CYS made this determination based on aggravated 

circumstances, namely Mother’s history based on her other three 

children, including a finding of child abuse; [Father’s] criminal 

history, including an Order that he not be around children; and 

the incident at the hospital less than 24 hours after J.E.D.’s birth 

wherein he sustained serious injuries. The [trial court] agreed 

with the CYS recommendation and therefore [adjudicated] J.E.D. 

dependent and found that aggravated circumstances existed. 

The [trial court] determined that CYS did not need to make 

additional efforts to reunite the family.
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Trial Court Opinion re Father’s appeal, 10/7/14, at 1-4; Trial Court Opinion 

re Mother’s appeal, 1/7/14, at 1-3.2 

On August 28, 2014, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Child 

dependent, directing that legal custody was with CYS, and ordering Child 

placed in foster care, with a permanency goal of adoption. The trial court 

also entered an order on August 28, 2014, finding aggravated circumstances 

existed as to Mother and Father, such that CYS was not to provide 

reunification services to reunify Child with Mother and Father. The orders 

entered on August 28, 2014 established a thirty-day permanency review 

hearing.

On September 15, 2014, CYS filed a permanency plan for Child. On 

September 25, 2014, the trial court held a permanency review hearing. At 

the hearing, CYS presented the testimony of Melanie Robison, its employee 

assigned to the case; and Raelee Hulek, a family counselor for the CYS 

reunification program. Counsel for Mother, Father, and the guardian ad 

litem conducted cross-examination of both witnesses. After the hearing on 

September 25, 2014, the trial court entered a permanency review order, 

 

2 The content of the trial court’s findings is the same in both of the trial court 

opinions regarding Mother’s and Father’s appeals. Additionally, the trial 

court found that another individual, T.M., is the biological father of three of 

Mother’s children: B.A.D., M.D., and H.R.D. Trial Court’s Opinion re Mother’s 

appeal, at 1. 
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maintaining Child in foster care placement, and maintaining his permanency 

goal as adoption, with legal custody retained by CYS. 

On September 29, 2014, Mother and Father timely filed their 

respective notices of appeal from the August 28, 2014 orders, along with 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (regarding computation of 

time).3

On appeal, Father and Mother raise an identical issue:

1. Did the Trial Court err and abuse its discretion in concluding 

that no efforts need to be made to reunify the family pursuant to 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(c.1)?

Father’s Brief at 9; Mother’s Brief at 10.

Additionally, Father raises a second issue, as follows:

* * *

II. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in allowing 

hearsay testimony relative to the psychosocial/sexual evaluation 

of Father from Project Point of Light in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6341(a)(2)?

Father’s Brief, at 9.

Our Supreme Court set forth our standard of review for dependency 

cases as follows.

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

 

3 This Court, acting sua sponte, listed the appeals consecutively on October 

22, 2014. We will review the appeals in one Memorandum for ease of 

disposition. 
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record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the 

lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we 

review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).

Additionally, “[t]he burden of proof in a dependency proceeding is on 

the petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that a child 

meets that statutory definition of dependency.” In re G., T., 845 A.2d 870, 

872 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act defines a “dependent child” as a child 

who:

(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, 

education as required by law, or other care or control necessary 

for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A 

determination that there is a lack of proper parental care 

or control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the 

parent, guardian or other custodian that places the 

health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including 

evidence of the parent’s, guardian’s or other custodian’s 

use of alcohol or a controlled substance that places the 

health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.] 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302(1) (emphasis added).

Section 6341(a) and (c) of the Juvenile Act provides in pertinent part:

(a) General rule.— After hearing the evidence on the petition 

the court shall make and file its findings as to whether the child 

is a dependent child. . . .

. . .

(c) Finding of Dependency.— If the court finds from clear and 

convincing evidence that the child is dependent, the court shall 

proceed immediately or at a postponed hearing, which shall 

occur not later than 20 days after adjudication if the child has 
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been removed from his home, to make a proper disposition of 

the case.

. . .

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(a) and (c).

In In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. 2002), a panel of this Court 

stated:

[A] court is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a) and (c) to make 

a finding that a child is dependent if the child meets the 

statutory definition by clear and convincing evidence. If the 

court finds that the child is dependent, then the court may make 

an appropriate disposition of the child to protect the child’s 

physical, mental and moral welfare, including allowing the child 

to remain with the parents subject to supervision, transferring 

temporary legal custody to a relative or public agency, or 

transferring custody to the juvenile court of another state. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 6351(a).

Id. at 617.

“The question of whether a child is lacking proper parental care and 

control so as to be a dependent child encompasses two discrete questions: 

whether the child presently is without proper care or control, and if so, 

whether such care and control are immediately available.” In re D.A., 801 

A.2d at 619 (citation omitted). 

Section 6341(c.1) of the Juvenile Act provides as follows:

(c.1) Aggravated circumstances.—If the county agency 

or the child’s attorney alleges the existence of aggravated 

circumstances and the court determines that the child is 

dependent, the court shall also determine if aggravated 

circumstances exist. If the court finds from clear and convincing 

evidence that aggravated circumstances exist, the court shall 

determine whether or not reasonable efforts to prevent or 

eliminate the need for removing the child from the home or to 
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preserve and reunify the family shall be made or continue to be 

made and schedule a dispositional hearing as required by section 

6341(c.1) (relating to disposition of dependent child).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(c.1). 

The Juvenile Act defines “aggravated circumstances” as including the 

following circumstances:

(2) The child or another child of the parent has been the victim 

of physical abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, sexual 

violence or aggravated physical neglect by the parent.

(3) The parent of the child has been convicted of any of the 

following offenses where the victim was a child: 

(iii) A misdemeanor under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 (relating to 

indecent assault). 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.

Father and Mother argue that there was no evidence to support the 

trial court’s finding in its August 28, 2014 order that no efforts for 

reunification were necessary. Father and Mother contend that the trial court 

wrongly used aggravated circumstances as related to Father and Mother to 

further deny them any reunification efforts. 

Neither Mother nor Father is entitled to relief as both parties concede 

the existence of sufficient evidence to support aggravated circumstances 

under section 6302. See Father’s Brief at 16; Mother’s Brief at 17. Mother 

perpetrated physical abuse against H.R.D. that resulted in serious bodily 

injury. In addition, Father has been convicted of indecent assault under 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3126. Since aggravated circumstances were established by 
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clear and convincing evidence, the trial court acted within its discretion in 

concluding that CYS no longer needed to provide reunification services. The 

trial court explained its decision as follows.

The [trial court] respectfully submits that it properly 

determined that CYS presented clear and convincing evidence of 

aggravated circumstances pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(c.1) 

such that reunification services should not be provided to 

[Mother] and Father with regard to [Child]. [Mother] argues 

that CYS had not met its burden at the time of the August 28, 

2014 Order, but the issue is now moot as [Mother’s] attorney 

acknowledged at the hearing on September 25, 2014, that CYS 

had fulfilled the statutory requirements of Section 6341 when he 

stated: “I think statutorily they’ve checked off all their 

requirements to establish aggravated circumstances; I’m not 

going to waste any time arguing over that.”

Importantly, the guardian ad litem stated that he agreed 

with CYS’s recommendation because he does not believe the 

parents should be afforded reunification services. He noted that 

when the incident happened, [Mother] and [Father] did not 

immediately notify medical staff at the hospital to seek help. 

Despite their arguments that they are capable of caring for their 

newborn infant, they are clearly unable to take care of him even 

when in a supervised environment like a hospital. CYS has 

experience with [Mother] from November 2013 until present with 

reunification services. Throughout that experience, [Mother] has 

made little progress despite being on notice that she must make 

significant progress, and CYS anticipates that it will seek to end 

reunification services in November 2014. [Father] has been 

convicted of Indecent Assault, does not have custody of his two 

older children, failed to participate successfully in Project Point of 

Light, and most recently sent an inappropriate photograph of his 

genitals to a 14-year-old minor child. For all of these reasons, 

the guardian ad litem argued that the best interests of the child 

would be served by forgoing reunification services. The [trial 

court] agreed with CYS and the guardian ad litem.

Trial Court Opinion re Mother, 10/7/14, at 3-4; Trial Court Opinion re Father, 

10/7/14, at 5-6.
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After a careful review of the evidence, we find that the trial court’s 

findings of fact and credibility assessments are supported by competent 

evidence of record. In view of our standard of review as set forth in In re 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190, we cannot disturb the findings and credibility 

assessments of the trial court. See also In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1093-

1094 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that this Court will not infringe upon the 

juvenile court’s credibility determinations). Therefore, we affirm the trial 

court’s dependency/disposition and aggravated circumstances orders.

Next, we will address Father’s second issue regarding whether the trial 

court improperly allowed hearsay testimony concerning the 

psychosocial/sexual evaluation of Father from the Project Point of Light 

report. Father urges that, in concluding that no reunification efforts were 

necessary with regard to him, the trial court relied on erroneously admitted 

testimony regarding a Project Point of Light report without the presence of 

the author of the report for cross-examination. He contends that the trial 

court’s admission of the content of the Project Point of Light report was in 

clear violation of Pennsylvania case law and statutory law, specifically 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(d)(2).

The Juvenile Act provides:

(d) Evidence on issue of disposition.—

* * *

(2) The parties or their counsel shall be afforded an 

opportunity to examine and controvert written reports so 

received and to cross-examine individuals making the 
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reports. Sources of information given in confidence need 

not be disclosed.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(d)(2).

The question of whether to admit evidence is in the sound discretion of 

the trial court, and we review the decision under an abuse of discretion 

standard. See A.J.B. v. M.P.B., 945 A.2d 744, 749 (Pa. Super. 2008). “An 

abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a 

conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment 

exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the 

product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused.” 

Bulgarelli v. Bulgarelli, 934 A.2d 107, 111 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Our Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a statement that:

(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current 

trial or hearing; and

(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted in the statement.

Pa.R.E. 801(c).

Further, we have explained, 

As a general rule, hearsay is inadmissible, because such 

evidence lacks guarantees of trustworthiness fundamental to our 

system of jurisprudence. The rule against admitting hearsay 

evidence stems from its presumed unreliability, because the 

declarant cannot be challenged regarding the accuracy of the 

statement. Notably, it is elemental that, [a]n out of court 

statement which is not offered for its truth, but to explain the 

witness’ course of conduct[,] is not hearsay.
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In re K.A.T., 69 A.3d 691, 702 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and quotations 

marks omitted).

In his brief, Father argues as follows.

The September 25, 2014 hearing resulted in additional 

testimony in an attempt to justify the [t]rial [c]ourt’s August 28, 

2014 Order that no efforts needed to be made to reunify the 

family. [] Father’s Indecent Assault plea in 2007 was being used 

against him for two distinct and separate purposes: Aggravated 

Circumstances and the Order providing no reunification services.

Testimony at the September 25, 2014 hearing also focused 

on a Project Point of Light assessment done of [] Father. Your 

undersigned objected to any disclosure of this report and 

requested a continuing objection to anything brought up by the 

people at Project Point of Light who performed the assessment 

(September 25, 2014 Disposition Hearing Transcript, pgs. 26-

28).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(d) provides that the [c]ourt should 

consider all evidence helpful in making a determination, 

including whether reasonable efforts are to be made to reunify 

the family; however, the parties or their counsel are to be 

afforded an opportunity to examine and controvert written 

reports and to cross-examine the author of any report being 

offered. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(d)(2).

[The Superior Court] indicated in In Re: R.T., 2001 Pa. 

Super. 157, 778 A.2d 670 (2001), “To permit a physician’s 

extrajudicial statement of medical opinion, made upon 

examination of a patient, to be received in evidence would run 

afoul not only of the hearsay exclusion but also of the rule which 

holds that expressions of medical opinion are generally 

inadmissible unless the physician expressing the opinion is 

available for cross-examination.” Id. (citations omitted).

The [t]rial [c]ourt’s admission of the conclusions of the 

Project Point of Light that they needed to see an 18-month 

period before [] Father should be allowed near minor children 

violated not only the general rule espoused above, but also the 

specific mandate of Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(d)(2). As is raised in Issue 

II herein, since that testimony should not have been admitted at 
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the time of the hearing, it did not form the basis for finding that 

no reunification efforts should be undertaken with respect to [] 

Father and [Child]. 

* * *

. . . Objections posed by Trial Counsel to the admission of 

the opinion and content of the Project Point of Light report were 

overruled by the Trial Court. (September 25, 2014 Disposition 

Hearing Transcript, pgs. 26-28). While it is recognized that the 

admission of evidence is in the sound discretion of the trial court, 

where the trial court overrides or misapplies the law, or its 

judgment is exercised in a manifestly unreasonable way, an 

abuse of discretion will be found. See Commonwealth v. 

Kriner, [915 A.2d 653 (Pa. Super. 2007)].

Consistent with the provisions of the case of In Re: R.T., 

supra, and the express language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(d)(2), 

the Trial Court misapplied the law and abused its discretion in 

allowing such hearsay statements from the Project Point of Light 

report to be admitted. This testimony was harmful to [] Father 

and the erroneous evidentiary decision made by the Trial Court 

in relying upon and using this testimony in its findings did not 

amount to harmless error.

Father’s Brief, at 18-21.

The trial court reasoned as follows.

[Father] argues that the [trial court] erred and abused its 

discretion in allowing hearsay evidence related to a Project Point 

of Light evaluation of [Father]. It is unclear when [Father] 

argues that the [trial court] did so. At the August 28, 2014 

hearing, the [c]ourt sustained [Father’s] objection related to the 

Project Point of Light evaluation because at that time the report 

was not available for [Father] or his counsel to review. The 

[c]ourt relied on [Father’s] admission that he was involved in 

Project Point of Light in finding fact number 8 of its August 28, 

2014 Order which summarized [Father’s] involvement in the 

program. [Father] appears to be referring to evidence that the 

[c]ourt permitted at the September 25, 2014 hearing over his 

objection, though that hearing occurred after the August 28, 

2014 Order from which [Father] appeals.
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The [c]ourt allowed evidence from the Project Point of 

Light evaluation pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341 at the 

September 25, 2014 hearing over [Father’s] objection. 

[Father’s] attorney stated that pursuant to Section 6341(d)(2) 

he should be afforded an opportunity to examine the reports 

(which he conceded he had) and to cross-examine individuals 

making the reports. Those individuals were not present at the 

hearing and thus could not be cross-examined. The [c]ourt 

nevertheless allowed minimal testimony from the report 

regarding [Father’s] experience at Project Point of Light. The 

[trial court] did not rely on this evidence because it also was 

presented with evidence regarding [Father’s] admissions to 

service providers as to the incident with the inappropriate 

photograph that he sent to a 14[-]year[-]old child on his cell 

phone. Any testimony the [c]ourt heard from the report was 

cumulative and was therefore not relied on by the [c]ourt.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/7/14, at 4-5.

We find that the trial court did not rely on improper hearsay evidence 

in concluding that Father had engaged in inappropriate behavior toward a 

minor, and would be unsafe to care for Child, so no reunification efforts 

would be required. We further conclude that, as of the entry of the August 

28, 2014 orders from which the parties have appealed, the record contained 

clear and convincing evidence that Child met the statutory criteria that 

define a “dependent child” and that aggravated circumstances were present 

such that CYS no longer needed to pursue reunification efforts. Since Father 

was not prejudiced by any evidentiary determination, his evidentiary claim 

merits no relief. See A.J.B., 945 A.2d at 751 (“To constitute reversible 

error, an evidentiary ruling must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the 

complaining party.”)
J-S16016-15 & J-S16017-15

- 18 -

Because the record supports the trial court’s findings, we cannot 

disturb its factual assessments and credibility determinations. In re R.J.T., 

9 A.3d at 1190; see also In re A.B., 19 A.3d at 1093-1094. Moreover, as 

we agree with the trial court’s conclusions of law, we affirm the trial court’s 

dependency/disposition and aggravated circumstances orders.

Orders affirmed.

Judge Panella joins this memorandum.

Judge Ott concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2015