In the matter of 

BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

THE IMPOSITION OF UNJUST USER CHARGES AT 

ITALIAN AIRPORTS 

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OST-2013-0038 

under Section 4131 0( c) of the International Air Transportation 

Fair Competitive Practices Act, as amended 

OBJECTIONS OF 

ALIT ALIA- COMPAGNIA AEREA ITALIANA S.p.A. TO ORDER 2013-3-1 

Communications with respect to this document should be sent to: 

March 22, 2013 

Richard D. Mathias 

Jonathon H. Foglia 

Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger, L.L.P. 

888 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 700 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

Tel: (202) 298-8660 

Fax: (202) 342-0683 

rdmathias@zsrlaw .com 

jhfoglia@zsrlaw. com 

Counsel for Alitalia - Compagnia Aerea 

Italiana S.p.A. 
BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

In the matter of 

THE IMPOSITION OF UNJUST USER CHARGES AT 

ITALIAN AIRPORTS 

under Section 4131 0( c) of the International Air Transportation 

Fair Competitive Practices Act, as amended 

OBJECTIONS OF 

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OST-2013-0038 

ALIT ALIA- COMPAGNIA AEREA ITALIANA S.p.A. TO ORDER 2013-3-1 

Alitalia- Compagnia Aerea Italiana S.p.A. ("Alitalia") hereby submits these objections 

to Order 2013-3-1 (served Mar. 15, 2013) (the "Order" or "Tentative Decision"), in which the 

Department has proposed to take the unprecedented step of barring Alitalia from "participating 

in any or all services (on-line, interline or codeshare) between any point or points in Italy, via 

any intermediate point in the EU, and any point or points in the United States." Id. at 2. This 

proposed action is based on the Department's tentative finding that the "Italian differentiated 

system of airport landing and takeoff user charges produces an unjust discriminatory effect on 

U.S. carriers, in violation of the U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement," resulting in "an 

unjustifiable discriminatory practice against U.S. air carriers" and "imposing an unjustifiable 

restriction on U.S. air carriers' access to the market." Id. Further to this finding, the Department 

summarily concludes that its proposal to effectively ban Alitalia's holding out of foreign air 

transportation to or from the United States via EU intermediate points in order to exert pressure 

on Italy, home to the third largest economy in the eurozone and a crucial trade partner with 

whom the United States has enjoyed a long, fruitful and positive aviation relationship for 

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decades, would somehow be consistent with the "public interest and the rules of proportionality." 

Id. Alitalia strenuously objects to the findings and conclusions set forth in the Order, and urges, 

for the reasons set forth herein, that the Department not finalize its Tentative Decision. 1 

I. Introduction and Summary of Position 

The Tentative Decision would impose extraordinarily harsh sanctions on Alitalia under 

the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41310, as 

amended ("IATFCP A"), in order to eliminate a system of differential airport user charges, over 

which Alitalia has no control, and that has been-and continues to be-the subject of 

governmental consultations within the U.S.-EU Joint Committee, as provided for under the U.S.-

EU Air Transport Agreement (the "Agreement"). Remarkably, the Tentative Decision fails to 

provide a reasoned analysis supporting the Department's conclusion that the airport user charges 

are either unjustifiably or unreasonably discriminatory under the IATFCP A and the Agreement, 

which, pursuant to Article 12, expressly allows such charges to reflect the cost to competent 

charging authorities providing the airport facilities. 

Furthermore, and as the Department is well aware, the Government of Italy has already, 

in government-to-government negotiations, indicated that the differential system will be 

eliminated. Nevertheless, if the Department were to determine that a violation of the Agreement 

1 To the extent the Department intends to amend or modify the foreign air carrier permit issued 

to Alitalia under 49 U.S.C. § 41302 pursuant to Order 2010-1-15, Alitalia hereby notifies the 

Department of its intention to request an administrative hearing, as required under 49 U.S.C. § 

41304, in order to take testimony regarding the differential fee system and to rebut the 

Department's tentative finding that the system produces an unjust discriminatory effect on U.S. 

air carriers, placing such carriers at a competitive disadvantage. A hearing also will assist with 

the full development of an agency record for purposes of seeking judicial review of any such 

amendment or modification to Alitalia' s foreign air carrier permit, as provided for under 49 

U.S.C. § 46110 and Aerolineas Argentinas S.A. v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 415 

F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

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exists, its proposed countermeasures represent a dangerous unilateral departure from the . 

established mechanism provided for under the Agreement, specifically Article 19, which 

provides for arbitration procedures to resolve nearly any dispute arising under the Agreement, 

after consultations have proven to be ineffective in resolving the dispute. Even assuming the 

differential airport user charges were unjustifiably or unreasonably discriminatory (which the 

Department has failed to established), and even were the U.S. Government to unilaterally act to 

the exclusion of the arbitration provisions of the Agreement (which it cannot and should not), the 

Department's proposed action departs from well-established principles of proportionality under 

international law and Departmental precedent. In short, the Department has not provided any, 

much less a compelling, explanation of why such a draconian countermeasure would be 

warranted under the circumstances or how its proposed action is in the public interest. 

II. The Tentative Decision Lacks A Reasoned Explanation To Support The Conclusion 

That The User Charges Are Either Unjustifiably Or Unreasonably Discriminatory 

The Tentative Decision, barely running over two pages, scarcely touches upon the 

reasoning underpinning the Department's conclusion that the airport user charges at issue 

constitute discrimination by a foreign government against U.S. air carriers properly within the 

scope of the IATFCP A. Rather, the Department concludes, ipso facto, that the mere existence of 

different user charges applicable to extra-EU and intra-EU flights at Italian airports is 

unjustifiably or unreasonably discriminatory. 

To be clear, the airport user charges at issue apply to flights of all airlines at Italian 

airports, regardless of nationality, when arriving directly from or departing directly to points 

outside the EU (extra-EU flights). Thus, the flights of U.S. air carriers and any foreign air 

carrier, including Alitalia, directly serving the United States, or any other point outside the EU, 

from an Italian airport are assessed the same tonnage-based user charges. U.S. air carriers do not 

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pay higher fees than Alitalia in this regard, nor could they under the Agreement, which requires 

that "user charges shall be assessed on the airlines of the other Party on terms not less favorable 

than the most favorable terms available to any other airline at the time the charges are assessed." 

Id. at Art. 12(1). Flights operating entirely within the EU (intra-EU flights), on the other hand, 

are subject to a lesser tonnage-based charge, but that charge, once again, is the same regardless 

of the nationality of the airline. 2 

Alitalia understands that it has previously been the position of the Government of Italy in 

government-to-government negotiations that this differential system reflects the increased cost of 

providing airport services to extra-EU flights, which generally utilize larger aircraft and carry 

significantly more passengers than flights within the EU. Moreover, extra-EU flights, by their 

very nature, require a greater degree of customs, agricultural and immigration inspection services 

than intra-EU flights, given that a significantly larger percentage of passengers aboard extra-EU 

flights are non-EU residents. In this regard, many customs and immigration formalities have 

been eliminated with respect to EU residents traveling within the Schengan area, ~' on intraEuropean flights, as provided for under Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European 

Parliament and of the Council. Most importantly, and as here relevant, Article 12 of the 

Agreement allows either party to establish charges up to the "full cost to the competent charging 

authorities or bodies providing" the airport service. 

Additionally, the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the "Chicago Convention") 

expressly permits a contracting State to impose or permit to be imposed airport charges on 

2 Of course, cabotage restrictions preclude a U.S. air carrier from providing air services wholly 

within the EU, just as 49 U.S.C. § 41703 prevents foreign air carriers from engaging in air 

services wholly within the United States absent the express authorization of the Department, 

but such restrictions are not at issue in this proceeding. 

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aircraft of any other contracting State engaged in scheduled international air transportation, 

provided such charges are no higher "than those that would be paid by its national aircraft 

provided in similar international air services." Id. at Art. 15(b) (emphasis added). The 

Department has not even attempted to reconcile the Tentative Decision, which seeks to eliminate 

Italian airport user charges assessed on aircraft of all nationalities engaged in similar 

international air services (extra-EU flights), with Article 15 of the Chicago Convention, which 

allows for a differential system of user charges when the international air services are not similar. 

Of course, the assessment of special and unique user charges on the operation or sale of 

international air services to or from U.S. airports is a concept widely embraced by the United 

States, with a litany of special fees and taxes hitting both airlines and passengers, including, but 

not limited to, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") aircraft fee under 7 

C.P.R. § 354.3(e), the APHIS passenger fee under 7 C.P.R. § 354.3(f), the customs user fee 

under 19 C.P.R. § 24.22(g), the immigration user fee under 8 C.P.R. § 286.2, and international 

arrival and departure taxes as required under 26 U.S.C. § 4261. 

At bottom, the Tentative Decision does not provide any indication that the Department 

even considered the inherent differences between intra-EU and extra-EU flights with regard to 

the cost of providing services at Italian airports, or how the application of higher user charges to 

extra-EU flights is any less reasonable than the user charges applicable to international air 

services at U.S. airports. Indeed, the Department has not provided any explanation to support its 

preliminary conclusion that the Italian user charges violate the Agreement and warrant remedial 

action under the IATPCP A. Nor has the Department provided any evidence of how the 

differential fee system produces an unjust discriminatory effect on U.S. air carriers, or how the 

system places U.S. air carriers at a competitive disadvantage. Similarly, the Department has not 

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described the additional costs incurred by U.S. air carriers and whether they constitute any 

meaningful component of such carriers' costs of providing transatlantic service to and from Italy. 

Moreover, U.S. air carriers have the competitive option of serving Italian airports via 

intermediate EU points on a code-share or interline basis, in which case such flights are subject 

to the lower tonnage user charges under the differential fee system. 

In short, the Tentative Decision fails to adhere to the well-settled principle that an agency 

"examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 

rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Expressed another way, "the decision [must be] based on a consideration of the 

relevant factors." Id. Where an agency decision is not so articulated, the decision shall be 

deemed unlawful and set aside as "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion or otherwise not 

in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Even assuming, arguendo, that an agency 

possesses the required statutory authority to take action in an area, such action must be held 

arbitrary and capricious when devoid of "reasoned decision-making." City of Kansas City v. 

Dep't ofHous. & Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 

Given that the Tentative Decision fails to articulate a reasoned basis for the findings and 

conclusion, it must not be finalized. Rather, the facts upon with the Department relied and the 

reasons forming the basis of for its conclusions must be fully articulated before the Department 

proposes to take this or any other countermeasure, so that Alitalia and all interested parties are 

provided notice and a meaningful opportunity to prepare and submit comments. 

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III. The Differential User Charges Are Presently The Subject Of Extensive 

Governmental Negotiations 

Unlike nearly all other pnor Departmental proceedings entailing proposed 

countermeasures under the IATFCPA, government-to-government negotiations regarding the 

Italian airport user charges have not reached an impasse or otherwise proven ineffective. Indeed, 

during the Tenth Meeting of the U.S.-EU Joint Committee held in December of 2011, 

representatives of the Government of Italy advised that Italy was in consultations with the 

European Commission regarding the system of differential user charges. And, at the Eleventh 

Joint Committee Meeting held in May of 2012, representatives of the Government of Italy 

explained that the Rome airport user charges would be revised once the Government of Italy 

establishes an independent supervisory authority, as required under Directive 2009/12/EC of the 

European Parliament and of the Council (the "Directive"), mandating a common framework 

regulating the essential features of airport charges and the way they are set. 

This independent supervisory authority will be responsible for ensuring the correct 

application of measures taken to comply with the Directive, including "the approval of the 

charging system and/or the level of airport charge." Id. at Art. 11(1). The Directive's impact to 

the Italian airport user charges at issue cannot be overstated, particularly in light of the 

Directive's requirement that airport charges "not discriminate against airport users, in accordance 

with Community law," id. at Art. 3, while simultaneously allowing for the "modulation of airport 

charges for issues of public and general interest," provided the criteria are "relevant, objective 

and transparent." Id. And, as provided elsewhere under the Directive, "the level of airport 

charges may be differentiated according to the quality and scope of [airport] services and their 

costs or any other objective and transparent justification." Id. at Art. 1 0(1 ). 

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As indicated in the Tentative Decision, further discussions were held regarding the Italian 

airport user charges during the Twelfth Joint Committee Meeting held in January of this year. 

Furthermore, and shortly before that meeting, the European Commission asked the Government 

of Italy for an explanation of the differentiated system of charges; Alitalia understands that the 

Government of Italy provided the European Commission with the requested information earlier 

this month. 

Based on the foregoing, Alitalia respectfully submits that government negotiations 

regarding the Italian airport user charges are extensive, ongoing and, thus far, have proven 

productive, with an objective of reaching a resolution of the matter. The Department must pause 

at this critical moment and heed its own prior admonishment that the "IATFCP A legislative 

approach favors, under prescribed parameters, negotiated resolution." Order 2003-10-18 at 2. 

Indeed, even where the Department, in the exercise its authority under the IA TFCP A, has 

found a violation of the underlying air services agreement, it has often declined to impose 

sanctions while government-to-government negotiations were either ongoing or expected to 

resume in the near future. For example, as the Department explained in Order 94-1-23 when it 

granted an IATFCPA complaint of Northwest against Lufthansa and the Government of the 

Federal Republic of Germany but deferred a decision on appropriate sanctions, "The issue ... 

has been the subject of numerous informal and formal consultations with the German 

Government over the past several months. We expect to have further discussions with Germany 

in the near future on this and other issues . . . In these circumstances, we believe that the public 

interest is best served if we defer the issue of sanctions while this process continues." Id. at 4. 

See also Order 93-10-36 (granting IA TFCP A complaint of Federal Express against the 

Government of Japan but deferring sanctions on the same grounds); Order 89-11-17 (granting 

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IA TFCP A complaint of Pan American against Varig, Trans brasil and Government of Brazil but 

deferring sanctions in light of continuing government-to-government efforts towards resolution). 

In light of the ongoing nature of consultations both within the U.S.-EU Joint Committee and 

between the Government of Italy and the European Commission, the public interest would best 

be served by similarly deferring a decision on sanctions at this time. 

Finally, given that the Italian airport user charges and European Community law are 

inextricably linked, and in light of the principle embodied in the Directive that a common 

approach to a system of airport charges is better achieved at the Community level, the 

Government of the United States should be negotiating a resolution of the matter pursuant to the 

procedures and mechanisms provided for under the Agreement-not by taking an extreme 

countermeasure against Alitalia in the hopes of unilaterally forcing Italy to eliminate the 

differential system of airport user charges. If the Department were to conclude that a violation of 

the Agreement exists, as tentatively determined in the Order, the Agreement mandates a dispute 

resolution procedure involving formal consultations and, if that fails, referral to a neutral body or 

formal arbitration, as discussed in Section IV, infra. The United States is not free to disregard 

the Agreement by unilaterally imposing sanctions, nor is the U.S. required to do so under the 

IATFCPA. This is particularly true in light of 49 U.S.C. § 40105(b), which requires the 

Secretary, when carrying out his authority under Subtitle VII, Part A (including his authority to 

take action under the IATFCP A) to "act consistently with [the] obligations of the United States 

Government under an international agreement." Cf. British Caledonian Airways v. Bond, 665 

F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 

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IV. If The Department Believes A Legitimate Dispute Under the Agreement Exists, The 

Agreement Compels Resolution By Formal Consultation and Arbitration 

The very agreement which the Department has tentatively determined is in breach by the 

Government of Italy specifically provides an agreed procedure for resolving that dispute. 

Pursuant to Article 19, Arbitration, the United States has expressly agreed that: 

[a ]ny dispute . relating to the application or interpretation of this Agreement, other than 

issues arising under Article 20 or under Annex 2, that is not resolved by a meeting of the 

Joint Committee may be referred to a person or body for decision by agreement of the 

Parties. If the Parties do not so agree, the dispute shall, at the request of either Party, be 

submitted to arbitration in accordance with the procedures [of Article 19]. 

If the Department determines to take actions directly impacting Alitalia's U.S. traffic rights due 

to an alleged breach of the Agreement, the proper mechanism is for the United States or the 

European Union, on behalf of its Member States, to invoke Article 19. 

To be certain, the United States should be the party invoking Article 19 of the 

Agreement, which is a particularly appropriate mechanism where, as here, the dispute involves 

essentially an interpretation of the reasonableness of charges imposed by airports of one party 

under the Agreement, in particular the cost to competent charging authorities providing the 

airport facilities. Article 19 evidences the parties' strong intent to resolve disputes in a way that 

maintains their positive aviation relationship, by formal consultations and, if necessary, by 

referring disputes to a neutral decision-maker, not by resorting to unilateral sanctions against an 

airline of the other party. Alitalia understands from Italian Authorities that the possibility to 

resolve the issue has been, and continues to be, explored through formal consultations within the 

context of the Joint Committee process under Article 18 of the Agreement as well as ongoing 

consultations between the European Commission and the Government of Italy, as discussed in 

Section III, supra. 

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The excessively punitive nature of the proposed sanctions without resort to arbitration is 

particularly remarkable in light of the U.S. Government's past willingness to submit, to a neutral 

arbitrator, disputes involving foreign airport charges assessed against U.S. air carriers, 

particularly where, as here, the U.S. Government has taken the position that the charges are not a 

reflection of the cost incurred to provide the service. The U.S. Government has, on several 

occasions, agreed to submit disputes with its international aviation trade partners to arbitration. 

See~ United States-United Kingdom Arbitration Concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges, 

24 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 335 (1993); France-United States Air Transport Arbitration, 3 Int'l 

Legal Materials 668 (1964); Italy-United States Air Transport Arbitration, 4 Int'l Legal Materials 

974 (1965). Against this backdrop, the Tentative Decision is wholly silent as to why arbitration 

under Article 19 of the Agreement would not be warranted here. 

More fundamentally, however, the U.S. cannot and should not cavalierly disregard the 

provisions in its international agreements that, as in this case, mandate a specific process for 

resolving disputes arising under such agreements. To do so here would violate both the spirit 

and the letter of the Agreement, bargained for between the United States and the European Union 

over the course of several years, damaging the positive aviation relationship that has always 

existed between Italy and the United States. 

Indeed, the very existence of the consultation and arbitration provisions of the Agreement 

establishes a mutual preference, agreed to between the U.S. and EU, to resolve differences 

without resorting to retaliation and other self-help measures, which are viewed under 

international law as an extreme, last resort action to be taken only if all possible remedies have 

been exhausted. It is axiomatic that self-help is unwarranted so long as meaningful governmentto-government consultations are possible. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 

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905 (1987), Comment£ (explaining, "[c]ountermeasures are to be avoided as long as genuine 

negotiation or third-party settlement is available and offers some promise of resolving the 

matter," and emphasizing that "[a] showing of necessity is particularly important before any 

drastic measures of self-help are taken"). Under this clearly established principle, Italy's 

willingness to consult, in good faith, on the matter of the differential system of airport charges 

forms more than a sufficient basis to not finalize the Tentative Decision. 

Finally, punishment directed against Alitalia in order to compel its homeland government 

to eliminate the differential fee system constitutes a breach of the Treaty of Friendship, 

Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Italy (the "Treaty"), which provides 

that corporations and associations of each High Contracting Party shall be permitted, without 

interference, to engage in commercial activities within the territories of other High Contracting 

Party in conformity with applicable laws and regulations, upon terms no less favorable than 

those accorded to corporations and associations of the such other High Contracting Party. I d. at 

Art. 11(3). Furthermore, "corporations and associations of either High Contracting Party shall not 

in any case . . . receive treatment less favorable than the treatment . . . accorded to corporations 

and associations of any third country." Id. at Art. II( 4). The rights and privileges secured to 

Alitalia by virtue of the commitments made by the Government of the United States under the 

Treaty, including the right to engage in commercial activities on terms no less favorable that U.S. 

air carriers, subject to applicable laws and regulations, would be violated were the Tentative 

Decision finalized, causing irreparable harm to Alitalia and constituting a breach of the Treaty. 

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V. The Proposed Sanctions Wholly Lack Proportionality 

If, notwithstanding the objections set forth above, the Department were to decide to 

impose sanctions, they must be bound by the rule of proportionality. As the Department has long 

recognized in the context of disputes between the Government of the United States and its 

international aviation treaty partners involving proposed sanctions under the IATFCP A, 

"countermeasures must not be clearly disproportionate to the alleged breach in light of (1) the 

injuries suffered by the company or companies concerned, and (2) the importance of the 

questions of principle arising from the alleged breach." Order 81-12-91 at 14 (citing U.S.-France 

Change-of-Gauge Arbitration, 54 Int'l Law Reports 304, 338 (1978)). Expressed another way, 

countermeasures taken by one party must be proportionate to the injury suffered to the party 

invoking the countermeasures. And, as the Department also has explained, "sanctions should be 

used with moderation and should be aimed at restoring equality between the Parties and 

encouraging the parties to continue negotiation toward a solution." Order 81-12-91 at 15. See 

also Restatement, supra, at§ 905, Reporters' Note 5 ("Countermeasures must have some degree 

of equivalence with the alleged breach and their aim should be to restore equality between the 

Parties and to encourage them to continue negotiations with mutual desire to reach an acceptable 

solution and to avoid escalation that would lead to worsening of the conflict") (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). This very principle is, moreover, embodied in the IA TFCP A, as 

discussed in Section III, supra. 

In contrast, the proposed penalties under the Tentative Decision are breathtakingly 

punitive in nature and extreme, departing from the rule of proportionality. And, by effectively 

blocking Alitalia from engaging in any and all air services between Italy and the United States 

via EU intermediate points, the Tentative Decision, if finalized, would severely disrupt shippers 

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and air travelers, as there would be few, if any, re-accommodation opportunities on other airlines 

given declining capacity and record load factors in the transatlantic air services market. Such an 

outcome clearly would be contrary to the public interest. 

Even where the Department, applying the rule of proportionality, has proposed to take the 

extraordinary step of restricting a foreign air carrier's traffic rights, it has, almost without 

exception, only done so where a foreign government has refused to authorize the services of a 

U.S. air carrier properly designated under an air services agreement, circumstances which are 

wholly absent from this case. See ~ Order 94-6-4 (proposing to limit operations of EL AL in 

the New York-Tel Aviv market in response to the Government of Israel's refusal to grant 

operating authority to World Airways); Order 93-11-22 (proposing to limit operations of LanChile and LADECO in the Miami-Santiago market in response to a Government of Chile order 

blocking American from increasing nonstop service); Order 93-5-13 (proposing to limit 

operations of Qantas in response to fifth-freedom traffic restrictions placed by the Government 

of Australia on Northwest); and Order 81-12-91 (proposing to defer pending statement of 

authorizations for Japan Air Lines in response to refusal by the Government of Japan to grant 

operating authority to United). In each of these cases, the Department only took such an 

extraordinary step in recognition of the "established precedent that the denial of operating 

authority is the maximum penalty that a bilateral aviation partner can impose." Order 93-5-13 at 

4. 

Of course, no U.S. air carrier properly designated by the Government of the United States 

under the Agreement has been denied the exercise of traffic rights provided for under the 

Agreement. Indeed, in one of the Department's more recent IATFCP A cases involving the 

imposition of airport charges deemed to be impermissibly discriminatory under the IATFCP A 

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and the underlying air services agreement, the Department expressly declined a request by U.S. 

air carriers to curtail or otherwise suspend the foreign air carrier's traffic rights. Order 2003-6-

33. Neither Alitalia, nor, for that matter, any other interested party, has been provided with any 

explanation in the Tentative Decision as to why the Department proposes to treat Alitalia 

differently in this case. The Tentative Decision, therefore, represents a serious and unfounded 

departure from the Department's longstanding precedent under the lA TFCP A and must not be 

finalized. 

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Alitalia - Compagnia Aerea Italiana S.p.A. 

respectfully submits these objections and urges that the Department of Transportation not to 

finalize the tentative findings and conclusions set forth in Order 2013-3-1. 

March 22,2013 

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Respectfully submitted, 

Richard D. Mathias 

Jonathon H. Foglia 

Zuckert, Scoutt & Rasenberger, L.L.P. 

888 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Suite 700 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

Tel: (202) 298-8660 

Fax: (202) 342-0683 

rdmathias@zsrlaw.com 

jhfoglia@zsrlaw.com 

Counsel for Alitalia - Compagnia Aerea 

Italiana S.p.A. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing objections of Alitalia- Compagnia 

Aerea Italiana S.p.A. to be served, this 22nd day of March, 2013, via email transmission, on the 

following individuals: 

paul. gretch@dot. gov 

mary.street@dot. gov 

esta.rosenberg@dot. gov 

lturpin@ustr.eop.gov 

urskr@state. gov 

eugene alford@ita.doc. gov 

agoerlich@ggh-airlaw.com 

andrew.harakas@clydeco. us 

anita.mosner@hklaw.com 

charles.hunnicutt@thompsonhine.com 

dmendersbee@zsrlaw.com 

david.heffeman@wilmerhale.com 

dhemandez@vedderprice.com 

dkirstein@yklaw.com 

dhainbach@ggh-airlaw.com 

eshar@eckertseamans.com 

ggarofalo@ggh-airlaw.com 

jyoung@yklaw.com 

john@mietuslaw.com 

j oseph.stefano@allenovery.com 

romanow@pillsburylaw.com 

herscovici 77 @yahoo.com 

lbridgeman@ziemanspeegle.com 

lhalloway@crowell.com 

matwood@cozen.com 

mgoldman@sgbdc.com 

mroller@rollerbauer.com 

wkaras@steptoe.com 

sascha. vanderbellen@delta.com 

benjamin slocum@usairways.com 

bob .lmeisley@wnco.com 

brian. gillman@mesa-air.com 

cbethke@airlines. org 

charles.donley@ssd.com 

cefelts@fedex.com 

dan. weiss@united.com 

dshort@fedex.com 

efaberman@wileyrein.com 

eheffeman@naca.cc 

francis.heil@aa.com 

gbleopard@fedex.com 

gpwicks@wicks-group.com 

gmurphy@crowell.com 

hershel.kamen@united.com 

howard kass@usairways.com 

j amestello@earthlink.net 

j effrey.manley@united.com 

jennifer.nowak@hklaw.com 

jrichardson@j ohnlrichardson.com 

j ohn.palo@evergreenaviation.com 

john.fredericksen@suncountry.com 

jhill@dowlohnes.com 

j onathan.linde@united.com 

kenneth.guinn@pillsburylaw .com 

kevin.montgomery@polaraircargo.com 

ldwasko@erols.com 

leslie.abbott@wnco.com 

lharig@wicks-group.com 

mlbenge@zsrlaw.com 

mcmillin@woa.com 

msinick@ssd.com 

mfrancesconi@ups.com 

nssparks@fedex.com 

patricia.snyder@thompsonhine.com 

pdoell@naca.cc 

pmurphy@lopmurphy.com 

ranj it. seth@evergreenairlines. com 

robert.cohn@hoganlovells.com 

rsilverberg@sgbdc.com 

robert. wirick@aa.com 

rpommer@atlasair.com 

scott.mcclain@delta.com 

lachter@erols.com 

cargoair@aol.com 

steve.morrissey@united.com 

tgillies@southernair .com 

Jonathon H. Foglia