```

[Senate Hearing 115-878]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                        S. Hrg. 115-878

                       KEEPING OUR SKIES SECURE:
                    OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION
                        SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 5, 2018
                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation
                             
                             
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                             

                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
57-581 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2024   

       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                   JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi            BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada                  TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma               GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  JON TESTER, Montana
                       Nick Rossi, Staff Director
                 Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
                    Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on September 5, 2018................................     1
Statement of Senator Thune.......................................     1
Statement of Senator Nelson......................................     3
Statement of Senator Wicker......................................    13
Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    15
Statement of Senator Udall.......................................    18
    Article dated February 20, 2018 from Government Executive 
      entitled ``TSA's Facial Recognition Pilot Program May Make 
      Travel Worse for Ethnic Minorities'' by Rosie Spinks.......    18
Statement of Senator Peters......................................    20
Statement of Senator Hassan......................................    23
Statement of Senator Sullivan....................................    25
Statement of Senator Markey......................................    28
Statement of Senator Inhofe......................................    31
Statement of Senator Lee.........................................    32
Statement of Senator Gardner.....................................    35

                               Witnesses

Hon. David Pekoske, Administrator, Transportation Security 
  Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation..............     3
    Prepared statement...........................................     6

                                Appendix

Response to written questions submitted to Hon. David Pekoske by:
    Hon. Deb Fischer.............................................    41
    Hon. Bill Nelson.............................................    42
    Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................    42
    Hon. Brian Schatz............................................    43
    Hon. Edward Markey...........................................    44
    Hon. Tom Udall...............................................    49
    Hon. Tammy Baldwin...........................................    50
    Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto..................................    53
    Hon. Jon Tester..............................................    61

 
                       KEEPING OUR SKIES SECURE:
                    OVERSIGHT OF THE TRANSPORTATION
                        SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

                              ----------                              

                      WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018

                                       U.S. Senate,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:22 a.m. in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Thune, 
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Thune [presiding], Nelson, Wicker, 
Cantwell, Udall, Peters, Hassan, Sullivan, Markey, Inhofe, Lee, 
and Gardner.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

    The Chairman. Well, good morning and welcome back, Admiral 
Pekoske.
    I want to begin by thanking you and the men and women of 
the TSA for the vital job that you do. That's probably 
something we don't say often enough. At the same time, I want 
to encourage you to continue improving, and that's the spirit 
that underpins our oversight hearing today.
    Over two years ago, the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security 
Act of 2016, or FESSA, was enacted into law. It included 
multiple provisions from my Airport Security Enhancement and 
Oversight Act designed to reform and refocus TSA's efforts.
    Two years after enactment, however, some important mandates 
contained in FESSA remain outstanding, including updated 
regulations to enhance airport and airline employee access 
controls.
    I look forward to hearing an update on implementation of 
these measures. As threats to aviation continually evolve, we 
must ensure that TSA is able to test, procure, and deploy new 
technologies to counter those threats.
    Recent advancements in computed tomography, biometrics, and 
credential authentication technologies empower TSA to enhance 
its layers of security and better respond to potential 
vulnerabilities.
    Nevertheless, TSA has had difficulty testing and deploying 
these technologies to airports in a timely manner as well as 
adequately communicating and adhering to its long-term 
technology investment plan, which makes it challenging for 
security technology manufacturers to do their part in 
supporting the agency's needs.
    TSA must provide certainty in its equipment procurement 
plans to enable the consistent rapid deployment of advanced 
security technologies.
    This past Labor Day weekend, an estimated 16 and a half 
million passengers were predicted to travel through our 
nation's airports, which is a new record for that particular 
holiday travel period.
    With so many passengers requiring screening at airport 
checkpoints, we're reminded of the importance of the PreCheck 
Program to pre-vet and expedite screening for low-risk 
travelers so that public airport areas are less vulnerable and 
TSA can focus on screening passengers who are higher-risk.
    Unfortunately, TSA has not significantly increased its pre-
check enrollment numbers in recent years and has not yet 
offered expanded services and options for travelers to make 
enrollment easier as required under FESSA.
    On the whole, however, TSA continues to lead the world in 
creating a secure global aviation environment. In the last 
year, TSA has issued security directives for airports with 
commercial flights to the United States aimed at countering 
threats related to personal electronic devices, powders, and 
air cargo.
    Since these security directives were announced, many 
countries have successfully implemented enhanced security 
screening protocols and some countries, including the United 
Kingdom, have followed the TSA's lead with similar directives, 
raising the global standard for aviation security, ensuring 
safer international travel.
    We want to ensure that TSA remains a global security leader 
and sets the standards for the rest of the world. The TSA 
Modernization Act, which I authored along with Senators Nelson, 
Blunt, and Cantwell, would help the agency do so by addressing 
the issues I've mentioned here today.
    I'm hopeful that we can enact this reauthorization bill in 
the coming weeks as part of our FAA reauthorization effort.
    Before concluding my remarks, I want to note the words of a 
man who led this Committee for many years. In April of 2000, 
months before the attacks of 9/11, he said the following in 
prepared remarks for an Aviation Security hearing, and I quote: 
``I am certainly aware that aviation security is a complex and 
difficult undertaking and any system involving humans is going 
to have flaws. Every effort must be made to increase awareness 
and performance. You can be sure that Osama bin Laden and 
others like him will continue to target Americans and American 
interests.''
    Those words were by then Chairman John McCain and they not 
only demonstrated a remarkable foresight but still hold true in 
many ways even though the names of those who want to do us harm 
have changed.
    It is also a reminder of the legacy and impact of our 
friend and colleague who as Chairman helped craft legislation 
establishing the TSA and stabilizing the airline industry in 
the wake of the horrific events of 9/11.
    As we near the 17th Anniversary of these attacks, we are 
soberly reminded once again of how important the TSA's work is 
and of all your agency does to keep the traveling public 
secure.
    With that, I reiterate my thanks to the Administrator for 
being here and will turn to Ranking Member Nelson for his 
opening remarks.
    Senator Nelson.

                STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

    Senator Nelson. And those comments sound just like John 
McCain, who had an extraordinary insight into matters of 
national security.
    As the Chairman said, we want to get TSA attached to the 
FAA bill and the TSA Modernization Act this Committee passed 
last October focused on improving security at airports by 
authorizing an increase in the Law Enforcement Officer 
Reimbursement Program.
    Expanding the use of explosive detection K-9 teams, which 
every TSA officer that I talk to says that's the most 
effective, and expediting the deployment of security screening 
equipment.
    We hope that this bill will help the TSA grow its pre-check 
program, which has been successful but continues to struggle 
with enrollment. I look forward to your updates.
    I also hope that we can shine some light on TSA's Quiet 
Skies Program, which has been in the news recently. Along with 
Senator McCaskill, we sent you a letter last week asking for 
clarification about this program. It's important for us to know 
the program's details, and I believe it's imperative that we 
have a discussion on the ways that TSA is responding to the 
emerging threat, as you and I, Admiral, discussed, of 3-D 
printed guns.
    As we have had that discussion, there's a great concern 
about the danger that these weapons pose to getting through the 
screening equipment.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
    Admiral Pekoske, as always, great to have you here, and 
thank you again to you and the many folks who work with you and 
for you at the TSA to keep our traveling public safe.
    But welcome, and we look forward to your remarks.

        STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID PEKOSKE, ADMINISTRATOR,

            TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

               U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 
Nelson and distinguished Members of this Committee. Thank you 
for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your and Ranking Member Nelson's 
opening comments, particularly with regards to Senator McCain. 
I also appreciate both of your leadership in support of TSA.
    First and foremost, let me acknowledge the outstanding men 
and women of TSA. It has been my privilege to serve as the 
Administrator to the over 63,000 dedicated professionals that 
provide security for millions and millions of travelers every 
day.
    On behalf of this team, I thank you for your support 
enabling TSA to accomplish a mission so critical to the safety, 
security, and economic well-being of the American people.
    I appreciate the Committee's work on the TSA Modernization 
Act that may be included with the FAA Reauthorization Act. They 
will, these Acts--the TSA Modernization Act, will certainly 
strengthen our ability to execute our mission.
    And I also appreciate, sir, you and your staff's input to 
the new TSA Strategy and Administrator's Intent.
    As you noted, we will mark the 17th Anniversary of 9/11 
next Tuesday. The threat today is no less concerning than it 
was immediately following 9/11. It is somewhat different. It's 
more diffuse. It has evolved and to meet the mission of 
protecting the Nation's transportation systems, we must evolve 
with the threat, and you have seen us do that over the past 
year.
    Let me highlight just a few of our many accomplishments.
    First, we've significantly improved security here at home, 
both in aviation and surface transportation security. You 
mentioned the development of the CT, CAT scan technology at our 
checkpoints. We have made significant progress in bringing the 
CT capability to our checkpoints.
    We are in the final phases of operational testing and 
evaluation as I speak. That program remains on track and I am 
very pleased so far with the results.
    With respect to K-9 teams, we have very much valued the 
additional layer that canines provide to our security. They 
provide an excellent deterrence and detection and I'm happy to 
report that between this time last year and today, we have 
increased the number of deployed K-9 teams at our security 
checkpoints by 41 percent. That's a very significant 
improvement and, in fact, our throughput results over the busy 
summer travel season reflects the addition of those K-9 teams, 
and I'll talk about that in just a second.
    We have also recently published the Pipeline Security 
Guidelines. I'm very focused, as you know, on surface 
transportation security. These guidelines were put together in 
great collaboration with the industry and have raised the 
security profile on the pipeline industry.
    As you mentioned, sir, we have also raised the global 
baseline for aviation security. We implemented our measures, 
thanks to the authority that you've provided in the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act, and this was done in full 
cooperation with our industry and international partners.
    And all the while, passenger growth continues to increase 
by about 4 percent per year. We just had our busiest summer 
travel season on record and just to think about a number, if 
you would, please, we screened over a quarter billion people 
through our security checkpoints here domestically between 
Memorial Day and Labor day this past Monday, and our passenger 
throughput was well within the norms for both pre-check and 
standard lay-in passengers.
    We also have recently received some very positive FEVs or 
Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Results that were contributed 
to by the TSA workforce.
    I'm happy to report that TSA was up in every single FEVs 
category. The greatest improvement in our FEV scores was with 
the Federal Air Marshal Service and this represents, in my 
view, continued steady progress in both workplace morale and 
job satisfaction. That will continue to have my focus, I know 
it has your focus, and we owe it to respond to the input that 
our workforce has provided to us.
    Two current issues that I'd like to address upfront with 
the Committee, the first is the incident at Seattle-Tacoma 
International Airport on August 10, which involved the theft of 
an aircraft.
    There are multiple investigations underway, including one 
by TSA. None of those investigations are yet complete, but once 
they are complete, we will review the results and then 
determine whether or not changes are needed.
    On the Quiet Skies Program, this program is not a new 
program but it is an intelligence-driven risk-based rules 
program that has been in place since 2011. Privacy impact 
statements have been filed and updated and there is, I assure 
you, strong oversight of this program from the department.
    I am confident that it has reduced risk for nearly seven 
years, and I would note that we're fortunate to have the Air 
Marshal capability supporting this program and I am proud of 
the professionalism of the Federal Air Marshal Service, and I 
would state unequivocally that we have the best Air Marshal 
Service in the world. Our Air Marshals are a critical element 
of aviation security.
    Much of the Quiet Skies Program, as you can appreciate, is 
security-sensitive information and the intel that supports it 
is classified. I am always available to answer your questions 
on SSI or classified matters in closed session.
    As I look to the future, I see several things immediately 
on the horizon: continued technology infusion throughout TSA, a 
refreshment of our Insider Threat Programs, continued K-9 
Program growth, enhanced air cargo security, the integration of 
the TSA PreCheck Program and Customs and Border Protections 
Global Entry Program, and the publishing of regulations and 
guidelines for surface transportation security.
    Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, Members of the 
Committee, I appreciate your oversight and support. My 
overarching goal is very simple, three simple words, better 
security faster, and I need your help to achieve this.
    And, finally, were it not for your support of my 
confirmation, I would not have had this opportunity to serve 
and I thank you all for your confidence in me.
    Sir, before I conclude my opening statement, I would like 
to introduce two members that are new to TSA over my left 
shoulder. Both are supervisory transportation security 
officers.
    I have brought uniformed officers into TSA Headquarters 
because when I arrived, I saw none, and uniformed officers 
represent the vast majority of the TSA workforce.
    The first is Supervisory Transportation Security Officer 
Charles Meador from Anchorage Airport and the second 
Supervisory Transportation Security Officer Cavel Malcolm from 
LaGuardia Airport. So we've gone from coast to coast but 
Charles sits in my front office, Cavel will in about 6 months, 
and they're there for our direct input and they participate in 
all of our policy discussions.
    I will bring and am soliciting at this point in time, one 
of our Federal Air Marshals also into the front office, because 
I want the frontline workforce to be right by my side and to 
have a view and to have input into how we develop policy and 
procedures inside TSA.
    So this concludes my opening statement, and I look forward 
to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Pekoske follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Hon. David P. Pekoske, Administrator,
                Transportation Security Administration,
                  U.S. Department of Homeland Security
    Good morning Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and 
distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me here 
today to testify about the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
and the work we are doing to keep our transportation system secure 
despite persistent threats. TSA appreciates the support of this 
Committee as we carry out our vital security mission. We are grateful 
for the constructive relationship TSA enjoys with each Member and are 
confident, that if enacted, the TSA-related provisions potentially to 
be included within H.R. 4, the FAA Reauthorization Act, will further 
strengthen the Agency's ability to execute its mission.
    Next week, the entire nation will reflect upon the 9/11 attacks. 
While aviation security operations have advanced significantly in 17 
years, we still face determined adversaries. The threat to aviation 
remains high and terrorists remain intent on attacking civil aviation. 
We also cannot ignore the real threat to the surface transportation 
system, as evidenced by the 2017 attacks in New York City, London, 
Paris, and Barcelona. Last month's vehicular attack outside of London's 
House of Parliament and the intentional crashing of an airplane in the 
vicinity of the Seattle-Tacoma airport are recent reminders of the 
types of dangers we face every day.
    We must remain vigilant in continually assessing vulnerabilities, 
identifying threats, and mitigating risks while ensuring massive 
volumes of passengers and commodities can move securely and efficiently 
through the transportation ``system of systems.'' That system is the 
lifeblood of our economy and way of life and one that requires all 
stakeholders to help protect it.
    Since being confirmed as Administrator a little over a year ago, I 
have spent a significant amount of my time at the front lines of TSA, 
engaging with employees at all levels of the organization, and meeting 
with our partners. I have visited many airports; numerous transit 
infrastructure venues, to include train stations and operation control 
centers; met with rail, pipeline, and motor carrier operators and 
owners; and traveled abroad to gain greater perspective regarding the 
security challenges we face and to advance discussions on how we 
continue to raise the global baseline for transportation security.
    Securing the Nation's transportation system requires the collective 
efforts of all segments of our society; it is not something that the 
government can accomplish alone. As such, I recognize the critical 
importance of partnering with and actively including as many of our 
stakeholders in the process of developing transportation security 
solutions. This is why I value the opportunity to engage with 
stakeholders directly as well as through the Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee (ASAC), the DHS Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory 
Committee's Transportation Systems Sector Coordinating Council, and 
other forums. In fact, later this month I will participate in a 
roundtable discussion with pipeline operators and government partners 
in Alaska to discuss the important topic of pipeline security.
    In all of my encounters, I have observed a deep commitment to our 
shared mission to protect the Nation's transportation system to ensure 
freedom of movement for people and commerce. This dedication is 
critically important because we face both multiple determined 
adversaries and a threat environment that remains complex, diverse, and 
persistent.
    I am honored to be leading the 63,000 dedicated professionals who 
make up TSA's workforce, share our core values of integrity, respect, 
and commitment, and provide security for millions of Americans using 
our transportation systems each and every day. I am also focused on 
ensuring we are prepared to address today's risks and tomorrow's 
threats. This challenge is compounded by increased user demand on the 
transportation system and passenger expectations for customized and 
seamless travel experiences. As it relates to air travel, my first year 
at TSA was the busiest in TSA history--with extremely busy spring and 
summer travel periods.
    Compared to the 771 million passengers screened in 2017, we are 
projected to screen more than 800 million passengers and crew this 
year. Of note, TSA has managed the nearly four percent annual passenger 
growth experienced over the last few years while only increasing the 
size of its Transportation Security Officer workforce at roughly half 
that rate each year as a result of funding limitations, which has 
impacted both training and morale. We have worked as efficiently as 
possible, are introducing more capable equipment (e.g., computed 
tomography (CT) screening systems), and are updating approaches for 
recruiting, retaining, and developing our personnel.
    TSA's continued success is contingent on our ability to rise to the 
challenge of outmatching a dynamic threat to our aviation and surface 
transportation systems. To be effective and efficient in a changing 
environment, TSA must continuously re-evaluate how it uses its 
resources and performs its mission.
    First, quintessential to using our resources as effectively as 
possible is understanding where they can best be directed to address 
the greatest level of risk. TSA uses several risk-based programs, 
including QUIET SKIES, to inform a series of operational actions--such 
as whether to conduct enhanced screening at the checkpoint and when to 
assign Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) coverage. These risk-based 
programs are critically important for our security. They are 
intelligence-based and designed to identify individuals who may pose a 
higher risk, so that TSA can take action to mitigate these security 
risks. We aggressively employ procedural and privacy safeguards and 
have robust review procedures within TSA and with the DHS Privacy 
Office,
    Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Office of the 
General Counsel. TSA's intelligence-driven risk-based programs rely on 
passenger provided data and do not use race, color, religion, 
disability, sexual orientation, or parental status as a basis for 
operational decisions.
    Second, every year as part of the Federal budget process, TSA is 
charged with considering ways to create operational efficiencies. For 
example, as part of that deliberative process for the Fiscal Year 2020 
budget request, TSA was required to respond to various budget scenarios 
and explain how limited resources would be allocated based on proposed 
funding levels. The possibility of eliminating security screening at 
low volume airports was one of many options discussed as part of the 
budget development process. Internal consideration of that option, 
however, did not constitute a decision. In fact, TSA decided not to 
propose that strategy for further consideration by the Department or 
Administration.
    In short, we must not only continue to work hard, but we must also 
work smarter and more strategically. This is why it was a priority for 
me to issue guidance within my first year to explain to our work force, 
Congress, and our stakeholders how TSA would continue to improve the 
execution of our mission into the future. I did so via the publication 
of my ``Administrator's Intent''--a document that lays out my 
priorities for the Agency and is intended to be updated periodically--
and the 2018-2026 TSA Strategy. Together, these structured documents 
ensure strategic alignment and a greater level of transparency.
    The TSA Strategy ensures our focus on capability innovation and 
threat-informed, information-driven operations. My Administrator's 
Intent explains how we will execute the strategy between now and 2020. 
The TSA Strategy and my Administrator's Intent detail the three main 
strategic priorities for the organization and how we will accomplish 
them. Both are posted on our website for public review and 
transparency. The first priority is to improve security and safeguard 
the transportation system. Our second is to accelerate action. And the 
final priority is to commit to our people. These priorities reflect my 
focus on preserving frontline operations, quickly transitioning to new 
technologies, and creating efficiencies to optimize limited resources.
Improve Security and Safeguard the Transportation System
    TSA's operational environment requires robust partnerships and 
effective security operations across all modes of transportation. We 
strive to strengthen our operational approach through a proficient and 
professional workforce, more effective detection capabilities, enhanced 
intelligence and vetting, and better communication and coordination 
with stakeholders.
    Simultaneously, we also strive to improve the passenger experience.
    For more than a year and in response to the evolving international 
aviation threat, TSA has mandated enhanced security requirements for 
all commercial flights to the United States. Those measures include 
enhanced screening of passengers and electronic devices and heightened 
security standards for aircraft and airports. These new security 
measures have been implemented at 280 last points of departure airports 
in over 105 countries. These airports service approximately 180 U.S. 
and foreign airlines transporting an average of 375,000 passengers on 
2,100 flights daily.
    In addition to raising the baseline for passenger aviation 
security, TSA has worked closely with U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) to ``raise the bar'' for cargo operations by requiring 
the use of the Air Cargo Advance Screening program for cargo on all 
flights destined for the United States. This allows CBP and TSA to 
target potential U.S. bound cargo before it is loaded aboard an 
aircraft, based on threat reporting, for a higher level of screening. 
As threats continue to evolve, TSA, in cooperation with partners world-
wide, will work to improve intelligence sharing and standardize best 
practices, while also pursuing technological security advancements.
    Domestically, TSA is also strengthening and expanding our security 
screening procedures and capabilities to address the dangers we face. 
We are working to expand participation in our TSA Pre3 program through 
improved marketing and partnership. For instance, since January 2018, 
TSA announced that TSA Pre3 expedited screening program would include 
eligible customers of certain airlines in addition to those already 
participating. The number of airlines participating in TSA Pre3 stands 
at 54 domestic and international carriers representing more than 90 
percent of passengers traveling to or within the U.S. TSA is also 
working with CBP to identify ways that we can better leverage and align 
the two DHS Trusted Traveler programs, Global Entry and TSA Pre3.
    To manage risk and resources more effectively, TSA is exploring 
ways to further segment the passenger screening process through 
innovative applications of its screening capabilities, including 
passenger screening canines. As a result of increased appropriations, 
TSA has been able to procure additional canines from domestic and 
international sources to build the capacity needed to implement this 
option more broadly. Efforts like this will be designed to make the 
screening process more efficient, match procedures with level of risk, 
and improve the passenger screening experience. In short, TSA is 
striving to provide better security, faster.
    Just as it is the case for passengers, knowing more about aviation 
workers and the air carrier population is a critical component of 
understanding the security risk associated with potential insider 
threats. TSA's implementation of FBI's RAP Back services, which 
provides recurrent vetting for those populations and automatic 
notification to airports and air carriers of new criminal activity, 
began in May 2016 at two airports and with one carrier. Today, RAP Back 
services have expanded to 132 airports and two airlines.
    In addition to our aviation passenger screening mission, we 
continue to oversee the security of the surface transportation system. 
The interconnected, varied, and expansive scope of the surface 
transportation system creates unique security challenges that are best 
addressed by system owners and operators. TSA's approach to surface 
transportation security reflects this reality and focuses on providing 
system owners and operators Federal support through communication, 
coordination, and collaboration. On a daily basis, TSA assists surface 
stakeholders through conducting vulnerability assessments, analyzing 
security programs across the surface sector, from pipelines, to mass 
transit, to freight rail, to over-the-road bus entities, providing 
training and exercise support, executing collaborative law enforcement 
and security operations, and sharing intelligence information.
    Additionally, TSA strives to keep pace with the fast-moving 
advancement of security technologies to address current and evolving 
threats by looking at emerging technologies, including from outside the 
transportation environment, to assess their potential applicability to 
the surface transportation environment. We work closely with surface 
transportation owners and operators to develop and deploy technology 
solutions to advance transit security through collaborative operational 
test beds for different modes of transportation (mass transit, highway 
motor carrier, pipeline, and freight rail). While TSA does not procure 
the technology for surface transportation operators and owners, our 
efforts are designed to assist with development of their technology 
requirements, to represent them in government technology forums, and to 
help inform their acquisition decision making process.
    A good example of the results of this process received national 
attention recently. On August 14, 2018, Los Angeles County Metro 
announced that it had become the first transit system in the country to 
purchase passenger screening technology capable of detecting weapons 
and explosive devices on passengers. TSA and L.A. Metro had been 
testing the equipment since last year. The same detection system has 
also been tested by Amtrak at Penn Station in New York City and New 
Jersey Transit at Newark Penn Station in New Jersey. This technology 
would have been able to detect the improvised explosive device on the 
individual that attempted a suicide attack while walking from the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey bus terminal to the New York 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority train last year.
Accelerate Action
    TSA is building a culture of innovation that can anticipate and 
rapidly counter the changing threats across the transportation system. 
Rapid development and deployment of technical or non-material solutions 
will enable TSA to continuously improve operations.
    TSA's Innovation Task Force, in partnership with stakeholders, has 
accelerated efforts to advance security technology. This year we 
expanded the use and testing of CT screening systems in numerous 
airports. We are grateful for the support of Congress, as well as CT 
equipment donated by American Airlines, that has enabled us to announce 
plans to expand testing of CT systems this year. Computed tomography 
technology allows TSA officers to more easily identify potential 
threats and in the future may eliminate the need for passengers to 
remove liquids, electronics and food items from carry-on passenger 
bags. This technology will significantly enhance the effectiveness of 
TSA's security screening process while also improving the passenger 
experience. As such, the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2019 calls 
for deployment of CT systems nationwide beginning in 2019. I appreciate 
your support of this important technology enhancement.
    TSA has also continued to work with airport and airline partners to 
deploy Automated Screening Lanes (ASL) to more airports. The ASLs are 
designed to improve the checkpoint screening process for travelers, 
including the ability for multiple passengers to divest their 
belongings at the same time. To date, thanks to Congressional support 
as well as donations from our airline and airport partners, there are 
over 140 lanes at more than a dozen airports, with additional 
deployments scheduled this year.
    Additionally, TSA has made significant advancements with the 
deployment of biometric and identity technology to improve security and 
strengthen the identification process. We continue to test and expand 
the use of Credential Authentication Technology (CAT), which allows us 
to validate the security features of a passenger's photo ID and match 
the information from the ID against our Secure Flight vetting system. 
Credential Authentication Technology is a cornerstone technology for 
TSA. Testing of CAT, which started with 17 systems at seven airports, 
has expanded to 42 active systems at 13 airports and we expect to award 
a contract in January 2019 for an additional 294 systems.
    Finally, TSA has conducted tests of facial recognition technology 
at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Last month, TSA conducted 
further testing, in collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), at the Tom Bradley International Terminal at LAX. 
During the most recent testing, TSA used CBP's traveler vetting systems 
to match facial images of international outbound passengers to photos 
in U.S. Government systems, such as photos obtained from passports or 
visa applications or taken at time of entry to the U.S., to verify a 
passenger's identity. This technology could help TSA improve identity 
validation and verification, an essential component of intelligence- 
and risk-based screening. Such was the case last month, where the CBP 
facial recognition technology we are currently testing was used to 
identify an individual at Dulles airport trying to enter the U.S. using 
a passport other than his own.
    Through embracing emerging technologies, leveraging agile 
processes, and continued collaboration efforts, TSA is positioning 
itself to keep pace with industry partners while advancing security 
across all modes of transportation. To that end, TSA has taken steps to 
formalize a strategic management process that aligns strategy and 
policy to operations by leveraging risk assessment capabilities to 
inform budgeting and investment decisions.
Commit to Our People
    The most critical element impacting our ability to keep the 
transportation system secure is our workforce. TSA is wholly committed 
to its people and recognizes that our strategic success depends upon 
how well we attract, hire, train, develop, promote, and equip our 
workforce at all levels of the organization. Over the past two years, 
TSA has seen the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) Employee 
Engagement Index increase by seven points. In fact, TSA's 2018 FEVS 
results that we just received several weeks ago reflect improvement on 
every index. We are encouraged by this progress and hopeful that the 
actions we are currently taking will continue these very positive 
trends.
    Our workforce is comprised of professionals from many disciplines 
within TSA, to include Transportation Security Officers, FAMS, 
inspectors, vetting experts, international representatives, and mission 
support personnel. Earlier this summer, TSA announced a new 
comprehensive career progression plan for frontline employees. This 
plan is designed to foster career growth and reflect an expanded 
investment in our Transportation Security Officers.
    Through defined career paths and standardized processes, TSA will 
provide greater transparency and opportunity to recognize, reward, and 
promote those who consistently excel in their role.
    Complementing this effort, TSA is implementing a new Annual 
Proficiency Review process that focuses on improving and sustaining 
Transportation Security Officers' ability to correctly perform security 
screening procedures through receiving real time feedback based on 
observations in a live screening environment. This approach represents 
a shift from performance remediation to a coaching model.
    Concurrent with its Career Progression Plan, TSA is also working to 
institutionalize TSA training and a development roadmap for our 
workforce. Through these efforts, TSA is focused on making its 
outstanding cadre of Transportation Security Officers and Inspectors 
even more effective and proficient in carrying out their mission.
    As a further reflection of TSA's commitment to facilitate 
leadership development at all levels of the workforce and effective 
communication throughout our ranks, I recently created two Advisor 
positions on my direct staff that are being filled by a Supervisory 
Transportation Security Officer and a FAM. The role of these two 
leaders is to provide frontline input directly to me on policies, 
procedures, and initiatives. Whenever there is a major decision within 
TSA that impacts the frontline screening workforce, these TSO and FAMS 
advisors will be part of the discussion.
Conclusion
    The future to which TSA aspires is ambitious. It requires 
accountable leadership. It requires the unique contributions of all 
members of our dedicated TSA workforce. It requires close collaboration 
with our partners to transform transportation security together on 
behalf of the American people. Noting such, I am confident that with 
the continued support of Congress and all of our stakeholders, TSA is 
well positioned to achieve the goals outlined in its Strategy.
    Since TSA's inception, it has functioned with the motto ``Not on My 
Watch.'' This has served as a powerful call to action for TSA but one 
that, not by intent, was limited. As security of our Nation's 
transportation system is a common objective for all segments of our 
society, it is one that is best achieved through a shared and 
complementary effort between government, industry, and the public. In 
short, to secure all modes of our transportation system requires an 
``All Hands On Deck'', collaborative approach. Consequently, TSA has 
adopted a new creed reflective of this fact. TSA hopes that its new 
motto, ``Not on Our Watch'', will serve as a reminder of the collective 
effort, commitment and vigilance we must all share to protect our 
Homeland.
    Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the 
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I 
am honored to serve in this capacity along with the dedicated men and 
women of TSA. I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, and we thank the members 
of your team for the great work that they do and encourage you 
to keep it up.
    There are constantly-evolving threats and we have to stay 
ahead of the bad guys. So thank you for all your efforts in 
that regard.
    Admiral, as I noted in my opening remarks, two years ago we 
had required TSA to update its rules on access controls and on 
vetting requirements for airport employees with access to 
secure areas of an airport.
    As you know, TSA has yet to issue even a Proposed 
Rulemaking for the vetting rulemaking and decided to take other 
action and not issue a rulemaking to update access control 
requirements.
    These requirements were centerpieces of FESSA designed to 
improve security by requiring TSA to consider adding more 
disqualifying criminal offenses and a longer look-back period 
for individuals seeking access to secure airport areas.
    What is the current status of TSA's efforts to implement 
each of these directives and why have they been so delayed?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, thank you for your question, and 
implementing the regulations is amongst our highest priorities 
and with respect to the vetting requirements for employees with 
site requirements, we do plan to issue a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking coming up in the first part of Calendar Year 2019.
    With respect to the access control issues, as we looked at 
the requirements in law, it's our view that those access 
control issues don't require new regulation, that we can do it 
within our existing regulatory regime.
    We have put out for comment a change to the Airport 
Security Plans and got a lot of comments back on the first 
round. We're about to issue the second round for comment in the 
next couple of days, but given the issues that we've seen with 
inside or across the board, Seattle-Tacoma one very recent 
example, this is a very high priority of mine.
    With respect to the TSA PreCheck Program, pre-check 
actually is growing quite a bit. We added 1.8 million pre-check 
registrants over the past year, so that's about a 30-percent 
growth. That's pretty healthy. I'm not satisfied yet, though, 
where we're at. We have about seven million registrants in TSA 
pre-check.
    Part of what we're looking at, as I mentioned in my opening 
statement, is this integration of CBP's global entry in TSA 
pre-check, particularly from an enrollment standpoint and also 
from an ease of marketing, ease of communication with the 
traveling public and so we're going to put a lot of effort 
because I would like to see many more passengers in our Trusted 
Travel Programs, either Global Entry or TSA PreCheck.
    The Chairman. TSA is currently preparing to undertake 
significant new technology acquisitions, including computed 
tomography or CT units, for more effective 3-D screening of 
carry-on bags and long-delayed credential authentication 
technology units for more accurate verification of travel 
identities.
    Given past delays associated with the testing and 
evaluation of some of these technologies, could you please 
update the Committee with the current timeline for the roll-out 
and full deployment of CT and CAT as well as TSA's next steps?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. CT is on track. In fact, you know, a 
year ago, we really didn't have much of a CT program in place 
whatsoever and so in the course of a year, we have gotten to 
the point where we have five vendors actively participating in 
the process, going through operational test and evaluation, 
four of the five going through OT&E.
    I've been out to airports. We have 13 airports around the 
country right now that have those CT systems in place. I've 
watched them in operation. They are a significant enhancement 
in security effectiveness and I've also watched passengers 
actually self-align behind the CT machines because it's a 
better passenger experience. Passengers are not required to 
take as many things out of their carry-on bags.
    We expect to be in the position to have awarded the initial 
contract for CT in the first quarter of 2019, sir, which is on 
the original schedule that we had established. So that project 
is on schedule. I expect to see roughly 200 CT machines 
procured over the course of the next year.
    With respect to CAT or the Credentialed Authentication 
Technology, we do have CAT deployed in a number of airports 
around the country and that has been very, very successful.
    CAT essentially does an automatic validation of a 
credential that a passenger provides to the first officer in 
the checkpoint and then automatically queries our Secure Flight 
database as that passenger is standing there, and for a 
passenger with the current credential authentication 
technology, that passenger will not need to have a boarding 
pass. So there's a passenger benefit to this and also a 
security benefit to us.
    We have in our Fiscal Year 2019 budget funds requested for 
300 more CAT machines and we intend to deploy those as rapidly 
as we can. The CAT machines individually are relatively 
inexpensive. They're about $15,000 apiece, but for me that's a 
really good investment for what it provides for better security 
and for passenger convenience.
    The Chairman. We also understand TSA is developing a 
biometrics roadmap, and my question is have industry 
stakeholders or U.S. Customs and Border Protection been 
consulted in the design of the roadmap?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. The roadmap is in final draft form. 
I expect that we will sign that out very, very shortly and 
certainly all of our interagency partners, including the Office 
of Biometric Identity Management in DHS, have been involved in 
this. We reached out to partners external to TSA and got their 
input, as well.
    The roadmap is in my view a very good one. It sets a path 
ahead for us with biometric technology and recognizes the fact 
that as TSA, we don't need to repeat the lessons that CPB has 
already learned with biometrics. We should benefit from what 
they have already demonstrated.
    As we speak, there is a demonstration project going on at 
the Tom Bradley International Terminal at LAX Airport that 
combines the CBP Biometric Exit Program with entrance into the 
TSA Security Line. So this is all an effort to integrate 
programs the best we can and to save taxpayer money in the 
process.
    The Chairman. Do you see CAT intersecting with biometric 
solutions?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I do. There is a corollary to CAT 
called BAT, everything's an acronym, and that's Biometric 
Authentication Technology, and we will continue to move forward 
on that, as well.
    As you know, sir, we have a registered traveler partner 
CLEAR that works with us that provides biometric identification 
for their customers and then we have CBP that has biometric 
capability, plus our own in TSA with this Biometric 
Authentication Technology. So part of the reason for the 
roadmap is to put a path ahead for those three programs.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Nelson.
    Senator Nelson. If you don't present a boarding pass, what 
do you present?
    Mr. Pekoske. You present your driver's license, sir, or 
your passport, and then when it queries--what the system does 
is it validates the credential of the--the authenticity of the 
credential, rather, and then it pulls the information from the 
credential off automatically. So it will pull your name, your 
date of birth, and your gender, and then while you're standing 
there, it queries the Secure Flight database.
    Secure Flight database will come back and tell us which 
flight, at what time, and which terminal, and also give us a 
risk assessment for that passenger. It's a huge step forward.
    Senator Nelson. You are testing that in Miami and I have 
seen that. Very good.
    Well,----
    Senator Wicker. Amen.
    Senator Nelson.--the big question is so much of TSA is 
trying to protect us on an airplane and now with 3-D guns and 
despite the court injunction about a thousand of those plans 
have been uploaded and downloaded. What are you going to do?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We've looked at this issue very 
carefully and I appreciate the conversation you and I had a 
couple of weeks ago.
    Our officers at the checkpoints are skilled in identifying 
3-D weapons. We can see them on the existing X-ray technology 
we have. The CT technology makes it even better because with 
the CT technology, you get that 3-dimensional view. It's much 
easier to discern what an object is and so what we've done is 
we've certainly trained our officers to use the existing 
technology to the best of our advantage to detect these 3-D 
printed weapons, but also work forward with the technology 
solution that enhances our capability.
    Senator Nelson. And the CT technology is the replacement 
for the metal detector?
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir. The CT technology is the replacement 
for the existing X-ray machines. The AIT, and the acronyms, I 
know, can be confusing, the AIT is the replacement eventually 
for the walk-through metal detector.
    Senator Nelson. Right. But the conveyor belt, that's an X-
ray?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    Senator Nelson. And so it's the CT that would detect then a 
bulge of plastic which could be a 3-D gun?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    Senator Nelson. And what's your time table for replacing 
the older technology with the new?
    Mr. Pekoske. So with the X-ray technology, sir, so that's 
what your carry-on bag goes through, that X-ray technology, 
we're in operational test and evaluation for that new CT or 
computed tomography technology or typically called CAT scan. We 
should begin a large-scale purchase of those systems beginning 
in the first quarter of Calendar Year 2019.
    With the AIT technology, which is the walk-through, the 
machine you put your hands over your heads, we are working very 
hard to upgrade the software with that technology to provide 
additional visibility into what a person might have on their 
person.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
    Senator Wicker.

              STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI

    Senator Wicker. Mr. Administrator, thank you for being with 
us.
    I appreciate the fact that Senator Nelson would ask about 
the Miami Airport and we are all interested in our large major 
airports. I think also, I think, across the board on both sides 
of the dais, we're interested in our medium-size airports and I 
have a question about a couple of them.
    Let's start with Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers Airport in 
Jackson, Mississippi. They've got particular design problems. 
They have two concourses, but right now they have only one 
screening line for each concourse. This prohibits them from 
having TSA PreCheck which is quite an inconvenience.
    Now the airport is being proactive. They have expansion 
plans, $1.5 million, to add one processing lane at each 
concourse. Here's our problem. We don't have an assurance from 
your agency that they will staff and provide the necessary 
resources for these additional lanes which are going to be done 
based on a local $1.5 million expansion plan.
    So can you work with us on that, and can you commit your 
agency's support to provide the necessary resources after we've 
done this new project?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I can absolutely commit to working 
with you on that, and I'm sure the Federal Security Director at 
that airport is already very much involved in the process.
    As you may know, sir, every year we look at where our 
resources are allocated and adjust those resource allocations 
based on what we see as throughput and so our primary metric is 
passenger throughput going through that particular airport, but 
we also have a desire to continue to enhance the TSA PreCheck 
brand and part of that process is to make sure that we have 
more predictable hours for PreCheck lanes to be open and 
closed, and where we do have the capability to expand the 
PreCheck footprint, we'd very much like to do that.
    I would also add that thanks to the work we've done with a 
lot of the airlines, we have more and more airlines signing up 
all the time for TSA PreCheck. So it's more available to 
passengers in Jackson if they're using a certain carrier. It's 
more likely than not they can use PreCheck with that carrier.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Let's talk about then 
passenger throughput, which is important, but I hope you can 
see also that there are other factors that are available and 
pertinent in determining the amount of, say, baggage scanners 
that an airport gets and particularly if you're a medium-size 
airport and you try to expand and getting more airlines in and 
successfully doing so, if you've got to use last year's 
throughput numbers, it's a handicap in attracting the 
additional business.
    So do you have any ideas about how TSA can adjust its 
formula to take into account other factors, such as stakeholder 
input, facility design, past costs incurred by the airport 
itself, as well as customer convenience?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, and we consider all those factors, 
and actually when we look at throughput projections----
    Senator Wicker. So it's not totally bound by this one----
    Mr. Pekoske. That's correct.
    Senator Wicker.--statistic?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. No, we look at the whole picture. We 
also look at, you know, does an airport have steady stream load 
throughout a day or is it just focused on certain parts of the 
day. That changes how we staff because we might go to more 
part-time employees, for example, in that regard, and so I can 
assure you that we collaborate very closely with the airports 
and if there is any issue, I'll take a look at Jackson myself, 
to make sure that we're taking a very close look at that to 
ensure that the airport investment is going--you know, that 
we're partnered with them very closely on that.
    Senator Wicker. OK. Now one other thing, when there's a 
security incident that TSA can't completely handle at an 
airport, local law enforcement has to come in, and we have a 
program called Law Enforcement Officer, LEO, Reimbursement 
Program, and there's a proposal coming out of the Budget Office 
to substantially cut funding for this reimbursement program.
    What can TSA do to mitigate the burden on small airports 
that are going to have to use these local law enforcement 
people but don't have the revenue streams to reimburse the 
local law enforcement personnel?
    Mr. Pekoske. Senator, we rely on law enforcement across the 
board, large airports, small airports, to provide a security 
presence at our checkpoints, and I will tell you that they are 
invaluable in providing that service to my officers at the 
checkpoint.
    Senator Wicker. You'll concede that this LEO Reimbursement 
Program is part and parcel to that?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I would. The Airport Security Plan 
requires the airports to provide security at the checkpoint. 
The Law Enforcement Reimbursement Program was designed to 
support work above and beyond what the Airport Security Plan 
requires.
    With the Airport Security Plan proposal to reduce the funds 
going to law enforcement agencies around the country, it's a 
tough choice. You know, we don't have the top-line budget 
that--you know, a budget is always a constrained document, by 
and large, and you have to make some tough choices in that and 
that was one of the very difficult choices that we made.
    But, you know, that budget is still up for congressional 
review and I know it's ready to go to a conference committee.
    Senator Wicker. Thank you very much and thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
    Senator Cantwell.

               STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

    Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for 
holding this important hearing, and thank you for mentioning 
the secure briefings and having several of them. I think this 
is something that's very important to our Committee and I hope 
we continue to do them.
    Some of this is the larger Homeland Security but I think 
our efforts to move our borders overseas that Senator Collins 
and I worked with Homeland on has been a great solution in 
stopping some people from coming to the United States and so 
there are many aspects to this aviation security and so we 
appreciate the fact that we can have secure briefings to talk 
about many of these elements.
    Administrator Pekoske, thank you so much for being here and 
I very much appreciate your prioritizing your challenges at the 
agency and what you're working on. I appreciate that very much, 
appreciate the 41-percent increase in the K-9 activity.
    For us at Sea-Tac, being one of the fastest-growing 
airports in the country, the amount of demand this K-9 
flexibility both in more canines, particularly at high season 
time, and more canines through the flexibility you're giving to 
airports, I just can't speak enough about. This is not just the 
speed of moving people through TSA lines, this is a layer of 
security that cannot be underestimated and so appreciate it and 
so appreciate that they are also in the outer terminal of the 
airport and doing good work, too, because that is a line of 
defense and very much appreciated.
    You mentioned the incident at Sea-Tac where an air-ground 
service agent was involved with the theft of a plane and I 
definitely want to recognize the air traffic controllers and 
the military and the first responders who handled this 
situation so well. We appreciate it.
    The incident, though, raises questions about our layers of 
security. My understanding is your--obviously there are lots of 
people involved here. There are airlines, there are airports, 
there's TSA, and your main responsibility as it relates to 
airports are the security plans and reviewing the security 
plans of airports, is that correct? Is that a good 
characterization of your role here and responsibility?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, but we're also responsible for 
overall security and that's really why--and we have a number of 
investigations underway. I want to see what those 
investigations say from a fact set.
    I would also reassure you that we've done a lot already on 
this issue. As soon as the incident happened--and we do this 
all the time, if something happens in a particular airport, we 
telegraph to all of our Federal Security Directors throughout 
the entire system so that they can work with their airline and 
airport partners in their locations to make sure we don't have 
a copycat issue, that we close up or put additional eyes on 
whatever vulnerability might have existed.
    The other thing that we have done is, you know, I have a 
great Aviation Security Advisory Committee and I appreciate the 
authorities that you have given me with respect to the ASAC.
    They have helped me immeasurably in my year in this 
position. I have asked the ASAC several times in several 
different ways to look at the insider issues. So I expect to 
get another report back from the ASAC sometime toward the end 
of the year.
    The final thing that I would just like to recognize is the 
industry initiative here. The airlines and the airports have 
gotten together and formed a work group so that they can share 
across their peers in the system best practices with respect to 
aircraft and airport security and they've agreed to feed their 
best practice input into our ASAC deliberations.
    So there's an awful lot of work being done on this insider 
issue.
    Senator Cantwell. So currently, right now, TSA has already 
implemented interim measures to help prevent copycat events 
from happening?
    Mr. Pekoske. Senator, we haven't changed any measures. What 
we've done is we've highlighted the incident and provided some 
additional detail to our Federal security directors so that 
they're particularly alert for this particular incident and 
then, as we get the investigative information in and look at 
the facts, we'll determine whether or not some changes are 
needed to procedures.
    Senator Cantwell. And I get that that's both interim and 
long-term and appreciate the----
    Mr. Pekoske. Right.
    Senator Cantwell.--fact that you're going through that 
investigative process or that there are several organizations 
going through that investigative process and will continue to 
get information.
    So, OK, on that point, one of the things that I'm always 
amazed about obviously coming from both an aviation and a 
technology state is that, you know, things like flight radar or 
flight aware, even, you know, you can stand on the shores of 
Puget Sound and get information about various----
    Mr. Pekoske. Right.
    Senator Cantwell.--vessels going through our waterways.
    As we look at Next Gen, why not have better situational 
awareness on all ground planes or all airport assets? Why is 
that not going to be part of the array in the future so that 
you actually know where every asset is on the airport and 
whether it should be or should not be being moved, given that 
you could have some data and information about that?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Senator, that is part of the review 
that's being done. As you mentioned, there are several 
investigations underway. There's one with TSA, one with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations, certainly one with the Port 
Authority of Seattle, and also one with the National 
Transportation Safety Board, and, you know, we collaborate very 
closely with each other on those investigations so that we can 
look at things, the technologies that might be available to 
help us at low or no-cost to provide that situational awareness 
for something that may be occurring that you don't necessarily 
have visual eyes on but you may have technology eyes on.
    Senator Cantwell. Well, I definitely encourage us to look 
at those. I'm pretty sure this is where we're going with Next 
Gen anyway because Next Gen is about moving all the assets cost 
effectively through the system as expeditiously.
    As you were saying, that it's not just security but also 
the efficiency of how we move things through the system and 
having that level of efficiency of knowing where everything on 
the ground is and where it's going and whether it should be 
moved or not be moved or is part of a repair plant, whatever 
the information is.
    I know that in past discussions here in the Committee, a 
lot of people think that's going to actually help us moving 
aircraft through the system on the ground because of the level 
of congestion that exists. So why not capitalize on that data 
and information and use it to our advantage on the security 
side, as well? So you're look at those details?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, along with our partners.
    Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
    Senator Udall.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO

    Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate you 
holding this hearing and, Administrator Pekoske, thank you for 
your efforts to keep us safe in our travels.
    And this hearing is very important in terms of oversight, 
as you recognized, the oversight Congress does and today, I'd 
like to focus on TSA's use of facial recognition technology.
    TSA claims this technology will streamline the security 
process but it is unclear how these technologies will impact 
efficiency and whether this software treats all travelers and 
all Americans equally in practice.
    A recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology study showed 
that facial recognition software can have an error rate as high 
as 35 percent for dark-skinned women. If a TSA agent was wrong 
a third of the time, they'd be considered ineffective at their 
job.
    So why would we want to implement technology that can be 
inaccurate for a large segment of the population?
    An ACLU test of one major facial recognition technology 
found that it falsely identified 28 members of Congress to 
arrest photos of people accused of crimes. Those 28 members 
were disproportionately people of color, including Civil Rights 
Hero John Lewis, and even included a member of this Committee, 
our law-abiding colleague, Senator Markey, who sits right here 
on my right.
    Additionally, we don't know whether the impact of this 
technology on the privacy of American travelers. Overseas, 
we're seeing authoritarian nations, like China, roll out facial 
recognition technology in public on a massive scale to surveil 
its population.
    As TSA considers scaling up this technology, I would urge 
you to halt full implementation until there is clear 
transparency into its effects this technology is having on our 
travelers.
    In February of this year, the Government Executive 
published an article titled ``TSA's Facial Recognition Pilot 
Program May Make Travel Worse for Ethnic Minorities,'' and, Mr. 
Chairman, I'd like to enter this into the record.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    [The Government Executive article follows:]

                Government Executive--February 20, 2018

     TSA's Facial Recognition Pilot Program May Make Travel Worse 
                         for Ethnic Minorities

                            By Rosie Spinks

    You'd be hard pressed to find a traveler who would describe getting 
through security at Los Angeles International Airport as an orderly or 
peaceful experience. Even when the threat level is deemed moderate, 
long lines, stringent security, and barking security agents are more or 
less the norm.
    But as of this week, the Transportation Security Administration is 
trying to streamline the experience, with an opt-in pilot program using 
biometric facial recognition technology, which is aimed at verifying 
and matching a passenger's identity to their travel documents. It's 
intended to automate the often repetitive and human error-prone process 
of verifying a passenger's boarding pass and passport several times 
over before boarding. The pilot project is being run at the boarding 
gate--documents will also be manually checked during the test program 
to ensure no security lapses--in a partnership with British Airways, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and LAX's Tom Bradley International 
terminal.
    According to industry intelligence agency CAPA Centre for Aviation, 
the plan is in keeping with President Donald Trump's wider aims to 
tighten border security measures. Though the technology existed before 
he took office--similar programs have been tested or are in use in the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and at Washington Dulles airport in 
2015 and New York's JFK in 2016--Trump has expedited implementation, 
despite the technology's so-called ``teething problems.''
    Whether you are a fan of Trump's policies to tighten border 
security or not, there is certainly a case to be made that biometric 
boarding could eventually be a boon for all travelers who dislike what 
CAPA colorfully calls the ``slow, mundane, intrusive, unfashionable and 
irritating'' process of airport security. If implemented at its highest 
capability, passengers theoretically wouldn't have to hold onto and 
flash their travel documents at multiple points throughout an airport 
visit.
    That could one day mean no more panicking that you've forgotten 
your passport or boarding pass--because your face would be all you 
need.
    In addition, costly snafus like All Nippon airway's ``flight to 
nowhere'' in December--when the plane had to make a U-turn because it 
had inadvertently allowed a non-ticketed passenger to board--would be 
less likely. Indeed, data from air travel IT and communications firm 
SITA shows that passengers are generally a fan of technology-enabled 
travel, with 57 percent reporting they would use biometrics for their 
next trip. Thus, passenger satisfaction is often positioned as the 
reason for the technology.
    But there's a huge caveat. Where the technology currently stands, 
face recognition doesn't work the same for everyone. As CAPA noted, 
``face recognition software is not so good at identifying ethnic 
minorities when most of the subjects used in training the technology 
were from the majority group.'' In addition, commonplace accessories or 
personal effects like hats, scarves, facial hair, long hair, heavy 
make-up or even low resolution images and poor lighting mean the 
current technology may perform inaccurately.
    Given those limitations, it's not hard to imagine a whole host of 
ways that biometric security could make travel more seamless for one 
set of travelers, and an even larger headache for others. Whether it's 
being asked to remove cultural dress such as head or face coverings, 
someone who's undergone corrective or plastic surgery, or having an ID 
photo that's not in CBP's database, there are number of scenarios in 
which ethnic minority, non-American, or heavily ornamented travelers 
could find biometric boarding the opposite of seamless.
    The CBP reports that the technology is 97.5 percent accurate, and 
has aspirations to roll it out at all U.S. airports within four years. 
While the technology still has a way to go, the desired end point for 
some in the industry is for airport security to be able to focus on 
``finding bad people, not bad objects.''

    Senator Udall. Thank you. And this seems to suggest that 
facial recognition does not work the same for everyone, and the 
article quotes the Center for Aviation saying, ``Face 
recognition software is not so good at identifying ethnic 
minorities when most of the subjects used in training the 
technology were from the majority group.'' That's the end of 
the quote there.
    Other factors that seem to affect the accuracy are facial 
hair or makeup, scars. Given these limitations, it's hard not 
to imagine a whole host of ways that biometric security could 
make travel more seamless for one set of travelers and an even 
larger headache for others.
    Can you guarantee that no population of U.S. travelers will 
be disproportionately inconvenienced, harassed, or 
discriminated against by this new TSA technology?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Senator. Thank you for your comments and 
I promise to you and to the entire Committee that I will 
carefully look at all those studies as we proceed forward with 
facial recognition biometrics in general, and the goal here is 
not to disproportionately affect any aspect of our population. 
So we will be very, very careful and completely transparent 
with all of you as we move forward.
    I would also mention----
    Senator Udall. Have you looked at these specific studies 
that I've talked about and mentioned?
    Mr. Pekoske. I haven't read them--sir, I haven't read them 
in detail, but I'm aware that they're out there.
    But, sir, the other thing I just wanted to mention to you 
is, you know, as we're registering new PreCheck passengers, so 
if somebody comes in and says, hey, I'm not currently a 
PreCheck passenger, they're going to register, let's say, in 
two or three months from now, we are capturing their facial 
biometric with their permission but we also capture a print, so 
we have two biometrics, and so, you know, there is a potential 
that the multiple biometrics that would be in a database, 
voluntarily given by a passenger, could begin to--you know, if 
that issue persists as the technology is developed, could 
provide a remedy for it.
    Senator Udall. Yes. Do you know if the technology that the 
TSA is using was tested on enough people of different genders 
and ethnicities so that it does not have the inherent bias that 
many of these technologies have?
    Mr. Pekoske. So we're using the technology that U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection has developed. I have not looked 
specifically at those test results but will, based on your 
comments.
    Senator Udall. OK. Thank you very much. I have a number of 
other questions but based on all the Members that are here, I'd 
like to put them in the record and work with you to make sure 
you get timely answers to them.
    Thank you, Admiral.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, and I'd be most happy, sir, you 
know, your schedule permitting, to come up and chat with you 
about some of this.
    Senator Udall. Happy for you to do that. Thank you.
    Mr. Pekoske. Thanks.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Udall.
    Senator Peters.

                STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

    Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Pekoske, it's good to have you here and thank you for 
your service every day in this very important job that you 
have.
    I want to take a moment and follow up on some questions 
that Senator Wicker asked you regarding expanding airports and 
how TSA resources are allocated to meet those growing needs.
    In Michigan, we have the Gerald R. Ford International 
Airport in Grand Rapids and they just completed the first phase 
of really a major transformation project which included an 
update to the checkpoint footprint that can accommodate seven 
active TSA screening lanes but, unfortunately, the local TSA 
only has equipment and staffing to operate six of those lanes.
    The Gerald R. Ford Airport, as you may know, is actually 
the second fastest-growing commercial airport in the United 
States right now and so it's absolutely critical that they have 
TSA staffing necessary for West Michigan and have already made 
substantial investment to make that happen.
    So I know you answered the question in terms of your 
process, the staffing and looking at throughputs and making 
that analysis, but my question is how often do you look at 
that?
    You mentioned annual, but it seems to me if an airport has 
just completed an expansion, has just brought in additional 
aircraft as a result of that, there needs to be some sort of 
expedited process. If you could walk me through that, I'd 
appreciate it.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question and really, 
you know, working with airports very closely, as we do, we 
review the designs for any checkpoint modifications that an 
airport is going to make before those designs are even approved 
and moved forward.
    So I'm pretty certain that our Federal Security Director 
was involved in that from the beginning and, you know, as we 
look at our algorithms for how we staff our checkpoints 
throughout the system, we would have that information in 
advance.
    So I'll go back and look specifically at the Gerald Ford 
staffing issues, but, you know, we don't really wait for a 
project to be complete and then decide how we're going to deal 
with the staffing. We usually do that as soon as the plans are 
put in place and plan our way through because, as you know, the 
budget process generally takes two years to provide new 
resources for new capability.
    Senator Peters. Well, good, and I appreciate you looking at 
that and we'd love to follow up with your office as to the 
status of that and what we might expect in the future, 
depending on what you find.
    You also mentioned your desire to expand PreCheck and 
that's, of course, important, increased throughputs, so we can 
get more people through these lines.
    One process is having offsite and onsite periodic 
enrollment events but those events, as you know, are usually 
completely booked and the airports that I've heard from say 
that permanent in-airport enrollment centers would be 
enormously helpful in order to increase it.
    So my question is how does the TSA currently pick where to 
set up enrollment sites?
    Mr. Pekoske. So the way we do it is we target in our 
PreCheck enrollment frequent flyers because those are the ones 
that will benefit most by the investment in PreCheck and for 
us, candidly, from a managing the throughput issue, we benefit 
most if frequent travelers are in PreCheck, as well.
    We've looked at many, many ways to make the enrollment 
process as easy as we possibly can. We have mobile enrollment 
vehicles that travel around the country, based on demand, and 
enroll people as, you know, just basically driving up to the 
front of an airport and enrolling people right there if there 
is no enrollment center at the airport.
    The other thing that I mentioned that's really important to 
this whole process is in our work with Customs and Border 
Protection to try to integrate the Global Entry and PreCheck 
Programs.
    Right now, we each have our own set of infrastructures that 
manage--you know, I have mine that manages TSA. CBP has theirs 
that manages Global Entry.
    We will have more capacity when we bring these programs 
closer together and one of the first things you'll see, sir, is 
a universal portal. So passengers just go to one place and it 
kind of steps you through the different criteria you have for 
your own travel and will recommend a solution that might be 
best for that passenger, but the whole idea is to make a better 
investment of the dual systems we have right now by integrating 
them together.
    Senator Peters. You mentioned your desire to expand the 
program. There is currently not a cap on the program, is that 
correct?
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir.
    Senator Peters. Do you think there will ever be an eventual 
need for a cap or do you believe that the program will be able 
to continue for the foreseeable future?
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir. I think the program will be able to 
continue for the foreseeable future. If you think about, you 
know, we have seven million people right now in the TSA 
PreCheck Program, probably another six or seven million in 
CBP's Global Entry, so let's say a total of 14 or 15 million 
passengers.
    On any given day, on a busy day in the summer, for example, 
we had 2.5 million people go through our security checkpoints. 
So I just see continued growth in the PreCheck Program which is 
good for security and it's good for passenger experience.
    Senator Peters. Yes. In response to some earlier questions, 
principally from Senator Nelson, you talked about 3-D printed 
firearms and your efforts to make sure you're protecting us 
from those firearms.
    My question to you is, what about international 
coordination? Are there other countries preparing for this 
threat, and are they taking measures to ensure that they are 
not trafficked in it on flights or used onboard to harm 
passengers, particularly those that may be heading towards the 
United States, and what are some of the lessons we can learn 
from what you're seeing around the world?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We coordinate very closely with our 
partners around the world, particularly our FVEY partners, with 
respect to threat information and exchange, and then also some 
of our other key partners in Europe, in the Middle East, and in 
Asia.
    I've traveled extensively to have personal relationships 
with my key partners around the globe. We do a very good job, I 
think, of sharing best practices and, in fact, we're trying to 
get to the point where we can more integrate our standards of 
performance so that, for example, as we're--you know, the CT 
technology that I mentioned earlier that we're deploying in our 
checkpoints is also being deployed at other airports around the 
world.
    We're sharing to the maximum extent we possibly can and 
vice versa with our test results, so that we don't relearn, but 
we're also trying to see where we can merge standards of 
technology development so that there's more of a seamless, 
there's more of a similarity in security around the globe to be 
part of the process.
    We're also very active participants in ICAO and ICAO has a 
Global Aviation Security Plan that's quite good and we are very 
strongly advocating, as are our key partners, to continue to 
advance the criteria in the Global Aviation Security Plan so 
that globally we get better all the time.
    Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
    Mr. Pekoske. Thanks.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Peters.
    Senator Hassan.

               STATEMENT OF HON. MAGGIE HASSAN, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

    Senator Hassan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning, 
Administrator Pekoske, it is so good to see you. Thank you 
again for your service to TSA and as a member of the Coast 
Guard. We are very lucky to have you.
    I wanted to follow up a little bit on a related line to 
what Senator Peters was just talking about. It was just about a 
year ago that you testified before this Committee as a nominee 
to be the TSA Administrator, and I asked you to look into the 
adequacy of our foreign partners in addressing insider threats.
    In particular, I asked you to provide your assessment of 
whether countries with airports that served as last points of 
departure into the United States were sufficiently screening 
their airport workers for terrorist threats.
    So kind of three questions here. At the time you committed 
to looking into the matter, so, first, have you since 
investigated it, and, two, in your view, are our allies and 
aviation partners in foreign countries doing enough to screen 
their workers, and, finally, are any of these allies 
specifically allowing TSA and the Federal Government to screen 
their workers against United States counterterrorism databases?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, and I remember our conversation, 
and I have looked very closely into the insider threat issue.
    In fact, if I look across the entire spectrum of what TSA 
does with respect to security, there are two that are going to 
be a key focus over the coming years, not that they're not a 
focus already. One is insider, the other is cargo security.
    On the insider piece, I have discussed this extensively 
with my international partners and, as you know, we do have 
standards of performance for insider that are established by 
ICAO. The countries agree to abide by and we audit their 
compliance with those standards for all last point of departure 
airports. So there is an active look, an active auditing 
process in place in doing that.
    I would submit that, given what we've seen around the 
world, I don't think any of us are really doing enough here and 
that's why I've asked the ASAC, the Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee, to take another look at this and that's why it's 
always an active topic of discussion amongst our key 
international partners because I think we can all do better 
with it.
    Some countries do have very, very good programs and I've 
stated publicly several times in international fora that the 
United States can learn from other countries' experience. You 
know, we never stand for the proposition that ours is always 
the best in every single aspect. There are other examples out 
there that we should learn from and we are doing that.
    Senator Hassan. OK. That is good to hear. Are they allowing 
TSA and the Federal Government to screen their workers against 
our counterterrorism databases?
    Mr. Pekoske. I'm sorry. That last question.
    Senator Hassan. Yes.
    Mr. Pekoske. Not that I am aware of, Senator, and that goes 
to specific country law and practices. So I'm not aware of them 
using our vetting systems for their airport workers at this 
point.
    Senator Hassan. Well, I think what I would suggest, and we 
can further discuss this, is that they allow us to vet their 
workers against our database, so giving us the information 
about their workers would seem to me to be a way that we don't 
have to get into necessarily their systems but we want enough 
from them to get into our systems, right?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, and thank you for that clarification, and 
we actually have engaged in some conversations with a key 
partner on doing that with respect to cargo, as well.
    Senator Hassan. OK. Well, thank you. I would look forward 
to following up with you on that.
    I also wanted to ask you about another conversation we had 
during your nomination hearing. Congress was considering the 
President's Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request at that time and 
there had been a cut in funding for the Viper Teams and the Law 
Enforcement Reimbursement Program.
    Many members, including myself, asked you at that hearing 
about whether you supported cutting these programs that help 
secure the public areas of airports, and at the time you 
pledged to thoroughly review the cost-benefit analysis of those 
proposed cuts.
    Now fast forward several months to the release of the 
President's Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request, and TSA, now under 
your leadership, again proposed the elimination of the Viper 
Teams and the Law Enforcement Office Reimbursement Program, 
which you spoke about a little bit ago, but the request in the 
budget, in the 2019 budget, certainly signals your support for 
cutting the only Federal programs that would help to secure the 
public areas of airports, the same public areas that have 
previously been targeted by ISIS and Al Qaeda.
    So now you are beginning your second year as TSA 
Administrator. There are reports that have also surfaced about 
TSA pondering proposals to eliminate screening all together for 
150 smaller airports.
    These proposals suggest that TSA is trying to pull back its 
resources from a large number of airports all across the 
country. If true, that's really an alarming trend. While terror 
groups, like ISIS and Al Qaeda, have suffered some defeats on 
the battlefield, they still pose an extraordinary threat to our 
homeland and to our aviation system, making these cuts all the 
more concerning.
    So can you please share with us your unclassified analysis 
of the terror threat to the homeland that TSA is using to 
justify these cutbacks?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am, and a couple comments. First on 
VIPR, as I testified in my confirmation hearing, I've testified 
since then in other committee settings that I'm a strong 
supporter of the VIPR Program. It has value. I like the 
program. The men and women who staff our VIPR Operations are 
largely Federal Air Marshals and they do an outstanding job.
    VIPR were particularly critical for us in hurricane 
response because in some locations they were the security in 
airports for a period of time. So it's a very, very valuable 
program.
    Senator Hassan. Right.
    Mr. Pekoske. I also, as I stated earlier, I very much 
strongly support Law Enforcement Reimbursement Program. I value 
what our law enforcement partners bring to the security 
checkpoint and we're better for their presence there.
    This all rolls up into what can you afford and if you have 
to make some reductions, where would you make them, because the 
budget is not unlimited, and so these are very difficult 
choices that we had to make but it does not in any way, shape, 
or form signal anything but strong support for those programs.
    The other part of this, if I could just for a second,----
    Senator Hassan. Yes.
    Mr. Pekoske.--is that these programs recognize the fact 
that there is some existing capability at the state and local 
level. So if you reduce VIPR, for example, it's not like the 
capability that's provided by the overall community is 
completely gone.
    Senator Hassan. So I appreciate that answer and I know I'm 
going over here, so I will wrap up, but please understand that 
what we expect from you is to stand up for the security needs--
--
    Mr. Pekoske. Right.
    Senator Hassan.--for our airports, for our homeland, and 
the notion that we would cut back after other priorities, like 
big tax cuts have been provided, is really astonishing to me.
    I will also tell you that state and local governments are 
already, most of them, very extended themselves and this is a 
Federal function to keep our airports safe. You said that a lot 
of the help you get from the reimbursement program really goes 
hand-in-hand with TSA and is critical to its mission, which is 
a Federal mission.
    So I would look forward to having further discussions with 
you. I think you need to be standing up for these programs and 
refusing to cut them, unless you have security information or 
intelligence information that tells us we don't need them 
anymore.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, ma'am. If I can just add one piece of 
this because I didn't answer your question on low-volume 
airports, we are not reducing our presence at low-volume 
airports. In fact, quite the contrary, I think we need to 
improve our security profile at smaller airports and so the 
reports that we were going to pull away from 150 airports 
around the country, that's not what we're doing.
    Senator Hassan. Good. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
    Senator Sullivan.

                STATEMENT OF HON. DAN SULLIVAN, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

    Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Admiral, 
welcome, and I want to reiterate the Chairman's opening 
statements.
    I think you and your team are doing a really good job. You 
don't always get that enough and it's, you know, obviously not 
perfect, but when you think about how far we've come from 9/11 
and standing up a brand-new Federal agency, I'm glad to see you 
got your frontline workers--particularly someone from Alaska--
but, you know, all of us, we travel a lot. I try to get home 
every weekend, and I always take the time to compliment your 
team in Alaska because I think they do outstanding work and 
it's not easy work. It's not perfect, but I just want to thank 
you and please pass that on to all of the members of TSA 
because I agree with what the Chairman said at the outset here.
    Let me ask an issue that I know it's not completely in your 
lane, but it's a really important one to so many of us, and 
that's TSA working with local law enforcement on drug 
interdiction issues.
    Like most states, Alaska's experiencing a lot of problems 
with addiction and the related crime. Fentanyl obviously is a 
big one. We're hopefully going to pass the STOP Act here, which 
is going to put more resources into stopping fentanyl coming in 
from China.
    That is actually remarkable that the Chinese could stop 
that, if they wanted to right now. It's a Communist state. I 
was in China several months ago and I asked them to stop 
sending fentanyl that's killing our citizens.
    But what are you doing or what can you do with local law 
enforcement to help? You know, we have small communities in 
Alaska, many of which are only served by airports, not even 
roads. So we know when drugs--a lot of times when drugs are 
coming in.
    Are there things that you can do more or you have ideas for 
maybe agencies that aren't in your--it's not your jurisdiction 
but the Post Office and others. I'm sure you get this question 
a lot. It's actually a very important one.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question and really 
thanks for your comments, as well.
    I agree wholeheartedly with your comments on the workforce, 
as I mentioned in my opening statement, and I'm really proud to 
lead these 63,000 professionals that do amazing work every 
single day, not just in the United States but around the globe.
    With respect to drug interdiction, sir, you're right, that 
is not a TSA mission per se. We do discover drugs in our 
screening process at security checkpoints, but our procedure is 
to turn that contraband over to local authorities and local 
authorities typically handle that very well for us.
    Your question really relates to when there is no local 
authority, how can we help? The only thing I could think of off 
the top of my head with respect to TSA, sir, is with our VIPR 
Teams, they do supplant some local requirements. So, in other 
words, if we have a VIPR Team operating in Anchorage, for 
example, that might free up some Alaska State Police to go 
somewhere else for a period of time and that's the way we could 
indirectly assist with this.
    Our requirement for VIPR is that they perform their mission 
around transportation centers, of course, because it is TSA.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask you another question that 
relates to my state, but it also relates nationally, in that 
TSA at one time had a Cargo Division. I know it's complex with 
regard to how cargo operates, how you screen it, but it's also 
a big security issue. Cargo hubs in my state are very big.
    What are you doing on that, and what are you looking at in 
the future with regard to cargo screening as a security 
measure?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I spent a significant amount of time 
with the major cargo carriers in this country. I've learned an 
awful lot in my visits with them, spent an entire day with 
most, and we recently established a Cargo Division in TSA 
Headquarters.
    I mentioned earlier that that's a key area of focus for me 
and I need to have an organizational structure that focuses on 
that, as well, and I want to provide an easy point of contact 
for the cargo industry inside TSA Headquarters.
    Senator Sullivan. Let me ask a final question. It's not 
necessarily related as much to my state but certainly out here, 
you know, every time I've gotten on a train, like a passenger 
train on the East Coast, I always kind of, you know, sense that 
this is a pretty soft target.
    What are you doing? I mean, there doesn't seem to be a lot 
of kind of visible presence from somebody who wanted to do 
damage to our commuter train system, particularly, you know, 
Amtrak and those high-volume areas on the East Coast. What are 
you doing on that, and do you need help from Congress on an 
area that to me seems, like I said, pretty vulnerable?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. We have very good relationships with 
the operators of major rail systems around the country, and 
I've spent significant amount of my time, my personal time in 
understanding these issues.
    We regularly provide intelligence updates to our rail 
partners, as we do across the entire surface transportation 
spectrum.
    Senator Sullivan. And is that relationship good?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, I think that relationship is outstanding, 
and for a number of the major systems, we also support their 
Explosive Detection K-9 Program. So those canines, a portion of 
them at least, are provided for and trained by TSA, and we also 
certify them every year. So there's a very good relationship 
back and forth between the major rail carriers in the country, 
in my view.
    Senator Sullivan. So you are not concerned about that as a 
vulnerability?
    Mr. Pekoske. I'm concerned about it as a vulnerability. I'm 
concerned about, you know, any vulnerability to a 
transportation system and certainly, as we've seen instances 
occur around the world, that that is very much a target, and I 
know the owners and operators of those systems very much feel 
that way, as well, and Amtrak in particular has a very robust, 
in my view, police presence and, you know, as I've seen before 
I came into this position, as I traveled up the Northeast 
Corridor, I would typically see Amtrak Police Officers on 
trains that I was on, not every single one but on a fairly 
regular basis, and the whole idea is to provide--you can't 
cover every transit, which you can't, is to provide that 
unpredictability of when you're going to be there.
    Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
    Senator Markey.

               STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Pekoske, recent reports have revealed concerning 
details about your agency's previously undisclosed Quiet Skies 
Program.
    Under the program, Air Marshals monitor American travelers 
who aren't suspected of any crime and aren't on any watch list.
    Mr. Pekoske, I want to learn more about what exactly the 
TSA is monitoring. Does the TSA monitor whether Americans go to 
the bathroom during flights?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, the Quiet Skies Program is not a new 
program. It has been in existence since about 2011.
    Senator Markey. Right. Does the TSA monitor whether 
Americans go to the bathroom during flights?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, we place Federal Air Marshals on flights 
where some Quiet Sky selectees may be passengers----
    Senator Markey. So yes or no? Do you monitor?
    Mr. Pekoske.--and part of their presence to mitigate the 
risk of a Quiet Skies passenger----
    Senator Markey. Yes or no?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, yes.
    Senator Markey. Does the TSA monitor what Americans eat or 
drink on a flight?
    Mr. Pekoske. We don't monitor--I would not use the term 
``monitor.'' We observe. This is a law enforcement mission.
    Senator Markey. So the answer is yes?
    Mr. Pekoske. They observe. Yes, sir.
    Senator Markey. Does the TSA follow Americans after they've 
deplaned and are walking to their car or taxi?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    Senator Markey. Yes. So, again, the American public does 
deserve to know the extent to which they are being surveilled. 
Again, we are talking about Americans who aren't on any watch 
list and aren't suspected of any crimes.
    Who at TSA determines what passengers land on the Quiet 
Skies list?
    Mr. Pekoske. Quiet Skies is an intelligence-based risk 
assessment program, sir, that's operated by rules and so the 
rules set are reviewed continuously and changes to those rules 
can only be approved by myself or my deputy.
    Senator Markey. OK. Once you gather information about 
flying Americans, where is the data stored and who has access 
to that information?
    Mr. Pekoske. The data is stored in our intelligence office 
and our intelligence professionals have access to the 
information.
    Senator Markey. It's limited to them?
    Mr. Pekoske. Right.
    Senator Markey. What do you do with the information about 
innocent Americans? Do you delete it immediately?
    Mr. Pekoske. With respect to an individual who would be a 
Quiet Skies selectee, based on rules, based on intelligence, 
if, after a certain period of time,----
    Senator Markey. What is the period of time?
    Mr. Pekoske. I can't reveal that in open session, sir, but 
there is a period of time. It is short.
    Senator Markey. Well, if they haven't done anything wrong, 
why is it not immediately?
    Mr. Pekoske. We, by our rules, want to see a certain number 
of encounters before they're removed from that program.
    Senator Markey. Even if you've already determined that 
they're innocent?
    Mr. Pekoske. We would not have made that determination----
    Senator Markey. Once you've determined that they're 
innocent, do you----
    Mr. Pekoske. We would----
    Senator Markey.--then delete it immediately?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, once we determine--I wouldn't use the 
term ``innocent'' either. Once we determine that they don't 
present a risk, an additional risk to security, then they are 
removed from the Quiet Skies Program. Those records are 
retained for 2 years.
    Senator Markey. Two years?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    Senator Markey. Even though they're innocent Americans. 
They haven't--you don't have any reason to have----
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I wouldn't say that. I would say that 
it's a rules-based program that assesses risk. People that are 
selected for Quiet Skies, based on patterns of travel, in our 
view, informed by intelligence, represent more risk than other 
passengers do.
    Senator Markey. Right. But having surveilled them and not 
able--and not having any evidence which has been developed, it 
just seems to me that they do have a right to the presumption 
of innocence.
    I'm also concerned that the Quiet Skies Program may not 
pass constitutional muster. Mr. Pekoske, does TSA take into 
account characteristics, like a traveler's name, when 
determining who to monitor?
    Mr. Pekoske. We take into consideration a traveler's 
record. We do not take into consideration a traveler's race or 
religion.
    Senator Markey. So identifiers, like race or religion or 
their name, can clearly be used as proxies for race and 
religion. Monitoring travelers based on these criteria raises 
pressing concerns about the constitutionality of the Quiet 
Skies Program.
    So you are saying that you do not use race, religion, or 
the traveler's name in determining who to monitor?
    Mr. Pekoske. We don't use race or religion, sir. We do, of 
course, use the traveler's name because that's part of the 
reservation data.
    Senator Markey. Right. But is a traveler's name used to 
create a suspect category just because of the traveler's name 
and with no other information gathered about him or her, with 
the exception of the name?
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir, it wouldn't be the name all by 
itself. It would be the name and other criteria.
    Senator Markey. All right. The American public also 
deserves to know whether other agencies, besides TSA, are 
involved here.
    Does the White House or Department of Justice have any 
involvement with this program?
    Mr. Pekoske. This program is part of a privacy impact 
assessment that has been published on the DHS website for years 
and we do use the travel vetting system that Customs and Border 
Protection employs.
    Senator Markey. So does the White House or Department of 
Justice have any involvement in this program?
    Mr. Pekoske. Involvement meaning what, sir?
    Senator Markey. Are they participating----
    Mr. Pekoske. Awareness?
    Senator Markey. Yes. Are they participating in this 
program?
    Mr. Pekoske. The White House, to my view, is not 
participating in the program.
    Senator Markey. OK. The Department of Justice, do they have 
any involvement with the program, the Department of Justice?
    Mr. Pekoske. This is a law enforcement program. Department 
of Justice may, in certain circumstances, but it wouldn't be 
based just on Quiet Skies.
    Senator Markey. Air Marshals have recently come forward and 
voiced doubts about the Quiet Skies Program, which they say 
saps their ability to do more vital law enforcement work.
    Approximately how many people has TSA monitored so far 
under the program?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I don't have those numbers right in front 
of me. I'd be happy to provide them to you for the record 
because we do record those numbers.
    Senator Markey. Could you give me a range?
    Mr. Pekoske. I would say, you know, in Quiet Skies, with 
the Air Marshal involvement, it's in the thousands of 
passengers.
    Senator Markey. OK. Of those, how many were American 
citizens?
    Mr. Pekoske. I don't have that information off the top of 
my head.
    Senator Markey. How many individuals surveilled under the 
Quiet Skies Program have been arrested or prosecuted?
    Mr. Pekoske. I don't believe anybody has been arrested or 
prosecuted. However, people that are in the Quiet Skies Program 
have eventually been determined to be part of a larger selectee 
pool, based on what the Quiet Skies Program----
    Senator Markey. I appreciate that, but no one has been 
arrested or prosecuted yet,----
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir.
    Senator Markey.--and how many threats has the program 
foiled thus far?
    Mr. Pekoske. The program is a prevention program designed 
to mitigate risks onboard aircraft and so, you know, like many 
of our prevention programs, there's no particular plot that has 
been foiled as a result.
    Senator Markey. So it hasn't foiled any threats yet?
    Mr. Pekoske. Not to my knowledge.
    Senator Markey. OK. And without knowing more, the program 
appears like a huge waste of taxpayer dollars and infringement 
on our privacy. This is a vast program that actually takes 
Americans and puts them into a suspect category and thus far 
there's no evidence that it has produced anything that would, 
in fact, enhance the safety of the American flying public.
    So from my perspective, it is something that you should 
seriously reconsider because to me it just does look like a 
huge waste of taxpayer dollars.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
    Senator Inhofe.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. JIM INHOFE, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA

    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I've got a couple of things that come from personal 
experience, and we had a discussion before this Committee about 
the K-9 Program and how effective it has been and some of the 
problems with it.
    Well, it has been very effective in Oklahoma. In fact, the 
Oklahoma City's Will Rogers World Airport, we had a canine that 
was working and was reassigned to DFW. Now immediately after it 
was reassigned and we have all the documentation on this, all 
of a sudden we had waiting times for passengers increase 
immediately after that.
    Now I know that the Homeland Security has in their 
appropriation bill, which we're working through right now, has 
an additional $10 million to fund more dogs and I think in your 
written testimony, you talked about some enhancements to that 
program.
    Tell me what is going on right now with that program. It 
has been very successful in Oklahoma.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. Thanks for your comments, and I 
agree it has been very successful. In fact, it has been so 
successful we want to continue to increase the number of K-9 
teams that are available throughout the system and so we've 
seen about a 41-percent increase in the number of K-9 teams 
available at airports between today and this time a year ago, 
so a very significant increase there.
    We have also increased the capacity at our K-9 Training 
Center down in San Antonio, Texas, so we can train 50 more 
teams per year. So that's quite a significant increase in 
capacity----
    Senator Inhofe. Yes.
    Mr. Pekoske.--at that training center.
    The final thing I'd mention to you, Senator, is that, as 
you may know, we have our Passenger Screening K-9s, which were 
operated by TSA handlers, and then we have our Law Enforcement 
K-9 Program, which are TSA canines trained at the TSA K-9 
Training Center but with local law enforcement officers being 
the handlers.
    We've offered to local law enforcement authorities the 
opportunity for them to up-train their canines in that program 
to the passenger screening standard that involves about four or 
five weeks of additional training at our K-9 Training Center 
and today we've had five law enforcement agencies agree to do 
that. So that again increases our capacity at the screening 
checkpoints.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, as we rebuild that program, keep 
Oklahoma in mind. Will you do that?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, will do.
    Senator Inhofe. All right. The other problem that I had is 
the search problem. I know you guys have the capacity to help 
with that and just as an example, if I take the early flight 
coming from Tulsa, Oklahoma, to Washington, you don't have a 
direct flight, if you could help us get a direct flight, I'd 
appreciate that, too, but if you get there for the early 
flight, which is about 6 o'clock in the morning, I mean, it's 
about a block long you're waiting in there. If you come back an 
hour later, there's nobody there.
    Now what is your capability of handling the surges, and do 
you have a program that might help with that type of thing?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, and that's one of the big challenges 
in the checkpoint screening because you do run into surges 
early in the day and early in the evening, large volumes of 
passengers trying to get through, and sometimes we're 
constrained by the infrastructure at the airport. We just can't 
put any more screening lanes in the existing footprint of the 
airport.
    We do use canines to help alleviate that,----
    Senator Inhofe. Yes, yes.
    Mr. Pekoske.--but one of the things, sir, with the canines 
is that canines are terrific at detection and deterrence both, 
and I want to make sure that as we deploy canines, we just 
don't deploy them during surge periods because an adversary can 
gain that system on us and just look and observe when we deploy 
canines and then if they're concerned about the canine 
capability, which they should be, then they would try to go 
through it at an off time and so we want to make sure that we 
kind of roll out that canine capability, but----
    Senator Inhofe. Yes.
    Mr. Pekoske.--we do pay very close attention to the surge 
issues and try to bring as much--as many officers as we can in 
for the checkpoint to speed the passengers through.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes, yes. Well, that makes sense. Well, 
you're doing a great job. Keep it up. All right.
    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Lee.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE LEE, 
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

    Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral, 
for being here with us today.
    Currently, there are 22 airports in the United States that 
participate in the TSA's Screening Partnership Program, or SPP, 
which, of course, allows the TSA to have oversight over 
screening services conducted not by Federal employees but by 
private screening personnel through a private screening service 
security company of some sort.
    Now in 2015, when the General Accountability Office 
produced a report, it reported that contract award prices for 
private screeners within the SPP Program carried an average of 
11 percent in savings compared to the TSA's own cost estimate 
for Federal screening.
    So as TSA considers better operational changes to more 
effectively allocate taxpayer dollars and ultimately make TSA 
more effective at fulfilling its mission, which is making the 
American people safer, is the SPP a viable option? Is that an 
attractive option? If so, why?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, the SPP remains an option for any airport 
that wants to, what we call, opt-in to the SPP Program.
    What they do is they just indicate a desire to participate 
in that program and then we within a very short period of time, 
30 to 60 days, engage with them and help them work through the 
process of becoming an SPP airport.
    SPP is a contract that TSA manages with a set of about 10 
or 12 vendors and then we basically do a task order bid for 
that particular airport because every location has different 
costs and different structure to it and then once we get those 
bids in, we award it to the best value bidder. So it's a fairly 
quick process for airports.
    Senator Lee. And ultimately that's your judgment call, not 
theirs? In other words, you review the bids, including the TSA 
being one of the bidders?
    Mr. Pekoske. The TSA is--if they opt to SPP, we are not one 
of the bidders, but the cost, sir, can't be more than what 
we're currently----
    Senator Lee. Right, right.
    Mr. Pekoske.--using for Federal service, and I do want the 
airport authorities to have visibility into that process.
    Senator Lee. Got it. Now the 2015 GAO report, as I 
understand it, also acknowledged that in that cost assessment 
that you run through, it's not necessarily an apples-to-apples 
comparison because it doesn't take into account some of the 
costs that are borne not by the TSA specifically, but are 
nonetheless borne by the Federal Government.
    Shouldn't be that be an apples-to-apples comparison?
    Mr. Pekoske. That's a very hard apples-to-apples 
comparison, as you can imagine,----
    Senator Lee. Sure.
    Mr. Pekoske.--to be able to make and it really----
    Senator Lee. But the GAO was able to acknowledge that, you 
know, there was this lag that should enable you to at least get 
closer, shouldn't it?
    Mr. Pekoske. It's easy to acknowledge a gap and very hard 
to figure out the metrics to close that gap.
    The other thing, sir, is, from a TSA perspective, for those 
non-TSA expenditures, that does not come out of my budget and 
so, you know, what TSA looks at is what is the TSA budget 
requirement for SPP and not letting the SPP cost exceed the 
Federal cost for TSA.
    Senator Lee. Sure.
    Mr. Pekoske. But you're right. There is a larger Federal 
cost that is very hard to quantify.
    Senator Lee. You can understand why, as a member of the 
U.S. Senate, I'd be concerned about costs that extend farther 
than your agency. I mean, as long as this is a cost comparison, 
you can understand why I would want it to incorporate costs to 
the Federal Government generally?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I understand the concept. Yes, sir.
    Senator Lee. So things like retirement, other things that 
might be backfilled by the Federal Government, sure, it's 
complex, but those can be estimated, can't they?
    Mr. Pekoske. They can be estimated. Yes, sir.
    Senator Lee. And so are you willing to look at that and 
take steps to work toward more of an apples-to-apples 
comparison?
    Mr. Pekoske. That is certainly something that, you know, 
I'm sure when we got the GAO report, which I believe was issued 
before I got into this position, so I haven't read it in 
detail, I'm sure TSA did a review, but I need to be careful 
personally because I'm recused from SPP issues for another 
year. So I can't directly get involved in that.
    Senator Lee. OK. I understand that, but would you agree as 
a general matter that within the SPP, private screeners ought 
to be evaluated on an equal even playing field within an 
apples-to-apples comparison with TSA services?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, I would always agree with apples to 
apples. My concern, though, as an agency would be would the 
costs to the agency be higher in that regard.
    Senator Lee. Would the costs to the agency be higher----
    Mr. Pekoske. Right.
    Senator Lee.--if they went with a private screener?
    Mr. Pekoske. That's correct. In other words, because I'm 
trying to manage a budget.
    Senator Lee. Sure, sure. OK. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask 
one more question, I see my time's expiring.
    In both 2015 and 2017, the Department of Homeland 
Security's Inspector General revealed some very alarming fail 
rates that documented how auditors from the IG's Office were 
able to consistently evade airport security screeners while 
they were carrying in banned items.
    Can you tell me what changes you've incorporated in order 
to stop this dangerous trajectory and to reverse it?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. I think the trajectory has been 
reversed and I've paid very close attention, as you would 
expect me to, to those IG audits, and I said in my response to 
the IG audit that I agreed with their results and that we would 
take steps to close the vulnerabilities that they identified.
    I would also add that we do our own red team or covert 
testing out of TSA Headquarters and we continue to do tests on 
the system to see what changes we've made and what kind of 
improvements have resulted from that.
    But to get to some of the changes, first and foremost, the 
CT technology, I mean, you know, as I look at this problem, 
there are kind of three ways you can address it. You can put 
better technology out there which we sorely need. You can 
change your procedures, and you can provide better training for 
your officers.
    One of the things that I have consistently stated is that 
those test results are not a reflection on officer performance. 
They're a reflection on technology procedures and training that 
systematically needs to be provided by the agency.
    So with technology, we've got the CT technology. As I 
mentioned, operational test and evaluation right now, very, 
very promising results from that that will be a game changer 
for us from a security perspective in the checkpoints.
    We are also looking at other technologies for on-body 
anomaly detection, for example, in the checkpoint. For 
procedures, we changed our procedures at the very end of last 
summer and so you may have seen this as you travel, sir, where 
the officers ask you to take more things out of your carry-on 
bag. That was a very deliberate change on our part that 
significantly enhanced security from the end of last summer all 
the way through the present day, and while we did have a 
temporary slow-down in throughput at our checkpoints, once 
passengers got used to it and once our officers got used to it, 
we've seen no change year over year, and then we've placed a 
significant emphasis on training for our officers, so that it's 
more face-to-face, less computer-based. So I think we're making 
progress there, sir.
    Senator Lee. I'm pleased to hear that. You can understand 
why I'd be concerned about that, not only for the safety itself 
but also as we hear from constituents. I've lost track of how 
many constituents have come to me themselves in tears talking 
about seeing their daughters, their sons subjected to invasive 
groping searches. Then when they read about reports like this 
one indicating lapses in security, they become even more upset 
about seeing their daughter groped.
    So I hope we can increase the security and do so in a way 
that respects the dignity of each American as he or she 
travels.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, Senator, and as you can appreciate that's 
an equally uncomfortable operation for our officers, and I 
don't think any of our officers groped any passengers. They're 
following the procedures that we put in place.
    Senator Lee. With all due respect, I've seen it happen. 
I've seen that happen to my own family members. They've been 
groped.
    Mr. Pekoske. Well, if the officers are following the 
standard operating procedure, that should not happen, but I 
would make a key point for you, Senator, and it goes right back 
to technology.
    The reason why those pat-downs occur is because a machine 
detected an anomaly. What I look at a lot is the false alarm 
rate on those machines and that's something that we need to 
address and we need to put more effort towards and we are doing 
that.
    Senator Lee. I appreciate that. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lee.
    Senator Gardner.

                STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

    Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 
Pekoske, for your time and testimony today and your service to 
our country, and I know we've had many conversations about 
Denver International Airport.
    I think they're in the process of about a $3 billion 
renovation effort, expanding their gates, redoing the Great 
Hall, and making some other improvements to their security 
system, of course, which you are partnering with them and 
working with them very closely on, and I'm grateful for that. 
So thank you for that.
    I also want to commend the folks over at Denver 
International Airport for the excellent trolling they're doing 
on Twitter right now. Part of the construction signs that they 
have, of course, if you live in Denver, if you've watched some 
late night comedy, they talk about the work camps underneath 
DIA, the horse outside of DIA that they've nicknamed 
``Blucifer'' and some other conspiracies at DIA.
    If you go through the airport now, you see the construction 
signs. You'll see signs like ``Construction or Cover-up? What 
are we doing? Planning for the end of the world.'' So this is a 
pretty great troll effort by DIA right now on social media.
    Mr. Pekoske, following up on the testimony, you talked a 
little bit about efforts to analyze and develop emerging 
security technology.
    In 2016, Congress, this Committee, authorized and passed 
legislation called the SCREEN FAST Act, which I introduced and 
sponsored. This bill established pilot programs at airports for 
the purpose of implementing innovative screening checkpoints to 
bolster security, passenger throughput and other things.
    Thank you very much to TSA for utilizing the pilot program 
to test and implement new technologies, like the automated 
screening lanes and now 3-D bag scanners, at the checkpoint.
    We've seen airlines, like DIA, stepping up, taking the 
initiative, prioritizing screening equipment, to the purchasing 
of equipment, and it's my understanding that TSA and DHS are 
working on a program that would allow their partner 
organizations to purchase security equipment and then gift it 
to TSA.
    Could you provide an update on that process?
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. First, thanks for your comments and 
I would just like to commend DIA. I think they're doing a 
terrific job in moving the checkpoint up to the mezzanine 
level, addressing a security issue in and of itself with having 
a mezzanine, and their great partnership with us along the way, 
and we do have the authority in law to accept gifts of 
equipment and that's what DIA is doing.
    They've agreed to purchase equipment and then they will 
gift it over to TSA and that's really a great solution because 
the airport is able to get technology that they're willing to 
purchase in place much faster than if we had to go through a 
Federal procurement process.
    I would also note, too, that the automated screening lanes 
in particular has allowed us to--you know, the fact that 
airlines and airports have been able to gift those to TSA will 
allow us to skip some steps or very much shorten some steps in 
our Federal acquisition process.
    So when we get into a large-scale acquisition for the rest 
of the system, we will benefit from all of the testing and 
evaluation, the manning studies, and everything else that has 
been done on that gifted equipment.
    What I would ask is that what we can't do right now is we 
cannot accept as a gift payment for services that TSA provides 
and a number of airports, for example, have hotels that are 
right in the airport and they would like to put a screening 
lane right at the hotel entrance.
    We would like to see that, too, because that actually helps 
us manage throughput to some degree. They can gift us the 
equipment, but they cannot reimburse us for the services to 
provide a separate screening lane, and we've asked for that to 
be considered as part of the TSA Mod Act.
    It would very much parallel but would not apply to the 
central checkpoint but would very much parallel authorities 
that Customs and Border Protection has and so, you know, I 
would just, you know, recognize the work of the airports, the 
airlines, our Innovation Task Force, to really kind of push the 
envelope and say, hey, how can we really embed technology, use 
the private sector capability to buy things quicker and put it 
in place so the passengers can see the immediate benefit of all 
that.
    I would tell you, sir, that with the CT, huge improvement 
in security, huge improvement in convenience. ASL, same 
comments, and so it has really been a really good program.
    Senator Gardner. So thank you and so the TSA Mod Act is 
where you've requested that language and working with----
    Mr. Pekoske. For reimbursement, yes, sir, and we've worked 
with our industry partners on that to make sure that they--you 
know, that was language they could live with, as well, and I 
think we're in a good place there.
    Senator Gardner. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
    Back to Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    I want to turn to facial recognition. TSA recently began 
taking pictures of American faces at a Los Angeles 
International Airport security checkpoint in collaboration with 
Customs and Border Protection, yet dating back to 2017, Senator 
Mike Lee and I had already called on the Department of Homeland 
Security, which includes both TSA and CBP, to implement formal 
rules to address important concerns with biometric technology 
at U.S. airports.
    Number One: Americans need to be able to opt out of facial 
recognition. Number Two: We need to ensure the security of 
traveler data. Number Three: We need to prevent any racial bias 
in the technology. Those are the concerns that Senator Lee and 
I have.
    In response to our letter, DHS promised to not expand the 
program until it completed a formal rulemaking to put privacy 
rules on the books. Yet, DHS continues to expand the program.
    I know how problematic facial recognition can be. The ACLU 
recently used Amazon's facial recognition software to see who 
of the 535 Members of Congress who matched with a criminal 
database. Well, 28 of us did, including me, Congressman John 
Lewis, and 26 others. So there are problems here.
    So, Mr. Pekoske, can you commit here to completing a formal 
rulemaking to address these issues before expanding TSA's use 
of biometric technology?
    Mr. Pekoske. Well, Senator, we are simply prototyping the 
biometrics in partnership with CBP and we are using CBP's 
technology. We're using CBP's testing and we have an updated 
privacy impact assessment for that prototype.
    We don't have any plans at this point for a formal program 
expansion. We just want to see how it works and passengers----
    Senator Markey. Will you commit to completing a formal 
rulemaking to address these issues before expanding TSA's use 
of biometric technology?
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, I will defer to the Department of 
Homeland Security, which is overseeing the overall biometric 
effort of the components.
    Senator Markey. Well, I am very disappointed, you know, 
that you and your agency will not commit to ensuring that these 
fundamental protections aren't in place through a formal 
rulemaking before you move forward.
    The American people deserve to have a set of guidelines 
which are put in place in order to protect their privacy. I 
already personally have had a mistake made with regard to 
facial recognition, a United States Senator.
    Now it's one thing for a United States Senator or 
Congressman. We can protect ourselves. But for an ordinary 
person of color in our country, that can cause real problems 
for them, and I just think that a formal rulemaking is the 
absolute prerequisite that your agency should engage in and I 
would like you again to make a commitment that you would do it.
    Mr. Pekoske. Sir, what I will commit to, without 
hesitation, is that whatever systems we put in place will 
provide equitable treatment for all.
    Senator Markey. No. We need a formal rulemaking. We need a 
formal rulemaking. This just can't be informal and a set of----
    Mr. Pekoske. Well, I think the larger thing, though, sir, 
is, are we concerned about privacy rights for passengers? 
Absolutely. Are we concerned with equity across all passengers? 
Absolutely. But where I might disagree is the method to get 
there.
    Senator Markey. OK.
    Mr. Pekoske. But the concept----
    Senator Markey. But we need a formal rulemaking. This is 
too important not to.
    And, finally, there's a proposal to cut screening at 150 
smaller airports in response to budgetary constraints. I find 
that very unfortunate in the aftermath of the September 11 
attacks. Two of the planes were hijacked from my congressional 
district. We lost 150 people on those two planes from 
Massachusetts.
    Congress established the September 11 Security Fee to help 
finance the cost of securing the Nation's aviation 
transportation system.
    Regrettably, the 2013 Congress began diverting 
approximately one-third of the revenue generated by these 
security fees for deficit reduction.
    Administrator Pekoske, would dedicating all of the revenue 
generated by the security fee help TSA provide basic aviation 
security and modernize their systems to address emerging 
threats?
    Mr. Pekoske. Well, sir, just a factual correction, if I 
could. We have no plans to reduce screening at any airport in 
the United States whatsoever. In fact, we have plans to enhance 
security at low-volume airports.
    Senator Markey. So you're saying this report that 150 small 
airports, there is going to be a cut in screening is erroneous?
    Mr. Pekoske. It's wrong.
    Senator Markey. It is wrong?
    Mr. Pekoske. It's wrong.
    Senator Markey. It's not going to happen?
    Mr. Pekoske. No, sir.
    Senator Markey. OK. Well, I am glad to hear that and just 
to make sure that that's the case, I'm introducing with Senator 
Blumenthal today The FASTER Act, which would ensure that none 
of these fees are diverted and that we'll just make that policy 
once and for all. The FASTER Act, Funding for Aviation 
Screeners and Threat Elimination and Restoration Act. In fact, 
it's my legislation in 2007 that passed in the 9/11 bill that 
requires for the screening of all cargo that goes on all 
passenger planes in America. That was a six-year battle by me 
to get that law on the books to screen.
    So any retreat on this is absolutely unnecessary if one-
third of the security funding is being diverted just to deficit 
reduction and not to the security of the passengers who are 
flying in our country.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. None whatsoever. In fact, further 
investment in both low-volume airports and cargo screening, 
and, sir, just a request from me for you to consider at your 
convenience. I would like to come and talk with you about Quiet 
Skies because I think some of the issues that you've raised, I 
could help provide more information to give you more context to 
that program because it is a very, very valuable program in my 
view, and I can't go through the details in this setting but I 
would very much like to have that conversation with you, if 
you're available.
    Senator Markey. OK. And, again, I would love to have that 
conversation in my office. I'm relying now on Air Marshals who 
are telling us that they just don't think it's worth the money.
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir. But in a large organization, you're 
going to have some people that have a different point of view. 
I would take a look at the intelligence information first.
    Senator Markey. I do appreciate that but thus far there has 
been no evidence that it has thwarted any attacks whatsoever, 
and I think that's----
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir.
    Senator Markey.--the relevant----
    Mr. Pekoske. Yes, sir, but there is evidence that it has 
transitioned some passengers identified in Quiet Skies to the 
known or suspected terrorist list, significant numbers. It is 
successful, and I would love to have that conversation with 
you.
    Senator Markey. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you for your generosity.
    The Chairman. It sounds like you guys need to have that 
conversation, and I, too, raised with Admiral Pekoske when 
there was reporting about reductions at low-volume airports and 
he assured me that that wasn't the case. That was like many 
other things that sometimes make it into the press, something 
that had not been agreed upon or implemented or anything like 
that. So we appreciate that.
    And when it comes to the biometric stuff, Senator Markey's 
often confused with Brad Pitt. So it's really important that we 
make sure that we get this right.
    We'll keep the hearing record open and ask members to 
submit questions and if you could, Admiral, respond to those as 
quickly as possible, keep the hearing record open for two 
weeks.
    But we appreciate you being here and your responsiveness 
and we'll look forward to working with you and your team to 
again ensure that Americans who travel here at home or abroad 
have the absolute top-level safety precautions put in place.
    So thank you again, and with that, this hearing is 
adjourned.
    Mr. Pekoske. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to 
                           Hon. David Pekoske
    Question 1. I have heard from airports across Nebraska that their 
passenger traffic has been increasing. To support that increase in 
traffic, airports from Eppley Airfield in Omaha to the Western Nebraska 
Regional Airport in Scottsbluff need additional TSA staff to maintain 
security and address longer wait times. How is TSA working with 
airports in Nebraska to ensure they have a sufficient number of TSA 
security officers to meet their needs?
    Answer. Strong passenger traffic growth is a challenge being faced 
by the majority of our airports nationwide. Each year, the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) evaluates the staffing 
requirements at each airport, with a heavy focus on individual airport 
growth rates. These passenger traffic increases are applied to our 
staffing model, which was validated as part of a Government 
Accountability Office review, and airport staffing allocations are 
adjusted appropriately. The President's budget request for Fiscal Year 
FY 2019 includes 717 Full Time Equivalents (FTE) for volume growth 
within TSA over current levels, and the Nebraska airports were 
allocated an additional 8 percent in staffing for the upcoming year. In 
particular, Eppley Airfield (OMA) received a 23 FTE (12 percent) 
increase in allocated staffing for FY 2019.
    Additionally, many of the airports in Nebraska, similar to other 
airports across the country, have seen an increase in Transportation 
Security Officer (TSO) attrition as the U.S. economy improves with 
additional job opportunities and competitive wages. This has been the 
case in OMA, where employment competition from both private sector 
employers and positions within the Federal Government that offer more 
traditional work schedules have resulted in attrition. To offset this 
impact, TSA recently put in place a retention incentive for OMA to help 
retain existing employees and attract new TSO applicants. TSA has also 
expanded our statewide recruitment efforts beyond traditional 
advertising venues by concentrating on digital and social media 
advertising to ensure we reach the broadest applicant pool. This, along 
with attending in person and virtual job fairs and working with local 
workforce offices to create our own employment events, is helping 
promote TSA's employment opportunities in the smaller communities. 
TSA's Recruitment and Hiring staff stays in close contact with the 
local TSA airport staff members to identify other opportunities to 
promote TSO position openings.

    Question 2. General aviation is particularly important in a rural 
state like Nebraska. TSA has received 19 recommendations in the past 
several years from the Aviation Security Advisory Committee to reform 
security programs related to general aviation. These recommendations 
cover a variety of issues, such as vetting for flight training 
candidates and compliance requirements. Can you provide an update on 
TSA's work to respond to the Aviation Security Advisory Committee's 
recommendations on general aviation security?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) concurred 
with 13 of the 19 recommendations put forth by the Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee's General Aviation Sub-Committee and non-concurred 
with the others after careful consideration and for reasons specific to 
each recommendation. Of the recommendations with which TSA concurred, 
six have been closed and the appropriate action taken. Of the seven 
recommendations which remain open, five are related to flight training 
candidates that are in the process of rulemaking.
    The remaining two open recommendations relate to ``Twelve Five'' 
operators.
    Unlike General Aviation, which is largely unregulated by TSA, each 
operator of an aircraft with a certificated takeoff weight of more than 
12,500 lbs. (i.e., ``Twelve Five''); in scheduled or charter service; 
carrying passengers or cargo or both; and not regulated by TSA under a 
full security program, partial security program, or full call-cargo 
security program is regulated by TSA under the Twelve Five Standard 
Security Program. See 49 CFR 1544.101(d). Many General Aviation 
stakeholders who serve on the ASAC General Aviation Subcommittee are 
also Twelve Five stakeholders and have advanced their recommendations 
through the General Aviation Subcommittee and will be addressed at the 
next meeting on December 12, 2018.
    As required by section 1952(d) of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 
2018, Pub. L. 115-254, TSA will provide a Report to Congress by 
February 3, 2019 regarding the implementation of certain 
recommendations that were submitted by the ASAC and with which the 
Administrator has concurred.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to 
                           Hon. David Pekoske
    Question. Mr. Administrator--There has been reporting in the media 
on allegations from several years ago that Federal Air Marshals at 
Orlando International Airport were encouraged to racially profile 
African-American travelers. I received TSA's statement disputing these 
allegations.
    Can you ensure this committee that you have thoroughly reviewed 
these allegations and that TSA is not racially profiling today?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) takes all 
allegations of profiling seriously and is committed to treating all 
travelers with dignity, courtesy, and respect. TSA thoroughly reviewed 
the allegations that were reported in the media regarding the profiling 
of African American travelers at Orlando International Airport and can 
assure the Committee that TSA is not racially profiling passengers.
    TSA is dedicated to operating our programs in compliance with 
Federal laws, executive orders, and directives. TSA follows a 2013 
policy statement, titled ``The Department of Homeland Security's 
Commitment to Nondiscriminatory Law Enforcement and Screening 
Activities'' and, as applicable, the 2014 Department of Justice 
``Guidance for Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Regarding the Use of 
Race, Ethnicity, Gender, National Origin, Religion, Sexual Orientation, 
or Gender Identity.''
    All TSA employees, including Federal Air Marshals, must complete 
mandatory ``multicultural awareness'' training on an annual basis. This 
training provides guidance to help employees better understand 
different religions and cultures. Additionally, all Federal Air 
Marshals must annually complete a training module called, ``Guidance 
Regarding the Use of Race for Law Enforcement Officers.''
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to 
                           Hon. David Pekoske
    Question 1. Passenger wait times are on the rise at airports across 
the country. Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP) has made 
significant investments to modernize and streamline its security 
checkpoints to address this trend, but a significant portion of the 
efficiency gains resulting from these investments are being lost due to 
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) staffing reductions. 
While the number of MSP passengers increased by 12 percent last year, 
TSA reduced its screeners by 9 percent. Administrator Pekoske, on 
September 4, 2018 I sent you a letter on the need to address recent 
increases in checkpoint wait times. What is TSA doing to ensure 
airports have the staffing they need to capitalize on new investments 
to improve security?
    Answer. As the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) deploys 
new technology, such as Automated Screening Lanes (ASL) and Computed 
Tomography (CT), staffing models are updated and airport staffing 
allocations are adjusted appropriately. TSA's staffing allocation 
process uses a proven methodology that was reviewed by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 without 
any resulting recommendations. This process ensures that each airport's 
staffing levels are based on their unique operating characteristics. 
TSA works closely with the airports and airline industry to ensure 
staffing models are updated to reflect changes to airport 
configurations, equipment, and flight trends. As changes occur that 
affect national staffing requirements, TSA works closely with other DHS 
elements such as the DHS Chief Financial Officer, as well as the Office 
of Management and Budget to ensure those requirements are represented 
in our budget requests. For example, the FY 2019 budget request 
supports an additional 717 Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) to support 
increased passenger loads.

    Question 2. The last time we faced extended wait times at MSP, I 
invited former TSA Administrator Neffenger to see the lines first-hand 
and worked with him to bring in more K-9 teams. These K-9 teams have 
proven very effective in expediting passenger screening and reducing 
wait times. The Senate FAA reauthorization bill that passed the Senate 
Commerce Committee in June 2017 includes provisions that would promote 
and expand the use of explosive detection K-9 teams. What operational 
benefits do these teams provide and does TSA currently have the 
capacity to meet demand for these K-9 units?
    Answer. Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) teams are an effective and 
versatile tool within the Transportation Security Administration's 
(TSA) multi-layered security process. They also serve as a highly 
visible deterrent against criminal and terrorist threats. TSA is able 
to deploy PSC teams at passenger security checkpoints in a manner that 
not only helps mitigate the explosives threat to aviation, but also 
helps mitigate the threat to the security checkpoints themselves.
    TSA has significantly increased the capacity for training canine 
teams at our Canine Training Center (CTC) in San Antonio, Texas. In 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 TSA trained 250 canines, while in FY 2017 and FY 
2018 TSA trained 300 canines each year. We are on track to meet all FY 
2019 projected canine requirements provided by the operators by 
training 350 canines, as well as continuing to increase capacity for 
anticipated future growth.
                                 ______
                                 
    Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Brian Schatz to 
                           Hon. David Pekoske
    Question 1. TSA is conducting pilots to use biometrics data 
collection for identifying and screening passengers.
    How is TSA informing travelers about what information is being 
collected in these pilots? Can travelers opt out of facial recognition? 
If so, how does the traveler's experience differ from those who do not 
opt out? How does TSA independently test the accuracy and potential 
bias of algorithms that are used for any face recognition?
    Answer. As part of the Transportation Security Administration's 
(TSA) collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on 
biometric technology pilots, CBP has provided general notification of 
the biometric pilots to travelers through airport signage, through 
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), published on www.dhs.gov/privacy and 
through program information readily available on www.cbp.gov. TSA has 
coordinated with CBP on providing these notices. For joint pilots 
conducted with CBP, travelers can opt out of facial recognition 
technology used in the pilot programs. Persons who choose not to 
participate undergo regular manual identity verification procedures 
using their travel documents.
    TSA currently does not have its own facial matching system. We are 
evaluating CBP's facial matching system--Traveler Verification Service 
(TVS)--for potential use at TSA checkpoints. CBP and other DHS partners 
are working to ensure the accuracy of any biometric services provided 
to TSA.
    CBP is working with DHS Science and Technology Directorate to 
continue to develop and refine methods to analyze differences in 
matching performance (e.g., age, gender, and citizenship) based on the 
available data garnered through biometric entry-exit operations. CBP is 
also moving towards formalizing a partnership with the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. Although CBP's currently 
available data does not at present demonstrate any significant 
difference in match rate between age, gender, or citizenship, CBP will 
continue to work with its partners to develop methods to address any 
performance variations within the system.

    Question 2. The number of guns brought into our airports is 
growing. Last year, TSA confiscated nearly 4,000 guns from security 
checkpoints--an increase of 17 percent from 2016. Based on information 
provided by your staff that number will go even higher this year. Do 
you believe that the presence of these weapons is a threat to the 
safety of the traveling public and to our aviation industry? What 
actions is TSA taking to prevent loaded guns from entering our airports 
in the first place? What more can be done?
    Answer. Yes, the presence of weapons of any kind, including 
firearms, continues to remain a threat to the safety of the traveling 
public and to the aviation industry. As such, the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) remains vigilant in its mission to 
protect the Nation's transportation systems and is committed to 
ensuring items on our Prohibited Items list do not enter the sterile 
area of an airport or cabin of any aircraft.
    TSA new hire and recurrent training curriculum addresses firearms 
via classroom lecture, x-ray image training, and checkpoint labs and 
simulations. Image training uses both threat and non-threat items to 
assist officers in detecting guns (both standard construction and 3D 
printed, as well as assembled and disassembled) and gun parts 
(including magazines, loose ammo, firing pins, etc.). In addition, TSA 
collaborates with external Government partners, including USSS, ICE, 
CBP, and ATF, to share intelligence information with regards to guns 
and guns parts to further enhance training and awareness for Officers 
and Supervisors.
    Further, TSA's Public Affairs Office has taken several steps to 
inform travelers that firearms are not permitted past airport 
checkpoints.

   TSA partners with airports to post signs in the airport 
        terminal that alert travelers that firearms are not permitted 
        past airport checkpoints. Additionally, TSA posts signs at 
        checkpoints with the same message.

   TSA maintains a detailed webpage dedicated to inform 
        travelers of the proper way to travel with firearms and 
        ammunition. https://www.tsa.gov/travel/transporting-firearms-
        and-ammunition

   TSA produced a video that demonstrates the proper way to 
        travel with firearms. The video is posted on TSA's website and 
        YouTube: https://www.tsa.gov/videos/travel-tips-traveling-
        firearms#

   TSA has a free downloadable app called ``My TSA'' that has a 
        useful feature called ``Can I bring?'' A traveler can enter the 
        name of the item (i.e., gun, rifle, pistol) and find out right 
        away if it cannot go into a carry-on bag or if there are 
        special instructions for proper transport.

   TSA's homepage has the same feature, entitled ``What can I 
        bring?'', in the upper right-hand corner of its home page. A 
        traveler can enter the name of the item (i.e., gun, rifle, 
        pistol) and find out right away if it cannot go into a carry-on 
        bag and if there are special instructions for proper transport. 
        https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/whatcanibring/all

   TSA operates its own social care program, which enables a 
        traveler to send a question to @AskTSA on Twitter and Facebook 
        Messenger about security policies and procedures. Travelers may 
        also send a photo of an item to find out if the item is 
        permitted in carry-on or checked baggage. @AskTSA operates 365 
        days a year.

   TSA has a customer call center with representatives 
        available every day of the year to answer questions from 
        travelers at 1-866-289-9673. The TSA Contact Center 
        representatives are available 8 a.m. to 11 p.m. ET weekdays; 
        and 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. on weekends and holidays.

   TSA issues a weekly blog post that features a rundown of 
        firearm discoveries and other interesting finds to bring public 
        attention to the fact that guns are not to be brought to 
        checkpoints and that TSA officers will detect firearms if they 
        are brought to checkpoints (visit https://www.tsa.gov/blog).

   TSA Public Affairs leverages its social media following to 
        educate travelers on what not to bring to the checkpoint, 
        including firearms and other weapons. Photos, videos, and 
        information about firearms are available on TSA's Instagram, 
        Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.

   TSA issues a year-end summary of gun catches on its blog and 
        it gets national media attention every year.

   TSA spokespeople across the country conduct media events at 
        airports regularly, during which they discuss and demonstrate 
        the proper way to travel with firearms stressing that 
        passengers should not bring guns to checkpoints. These events 
        typically garner significant local coverage in the cities and 
        towns where they/are conducted.

   The TSA Public Affairs Office also issues local news 
        releases on a daily basis about firearm catches to bring 
        awareness about the criminal and civil penalties to which 
        travelers are subject if they bring a firearm to the 
        checkpoint.

    Lastly, the TSA Public Affairs Office established a group this past 
spring to explore additional ways to message the public about the 
firearm regulations. The group is working to develop an awareness 
campaign on firearm travel.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to 
                           Hon. David Pekoske
    Question 1. How many individuals have been monitored under the 
Quiet Skies program? Of that total number, how many are American 
citizens?
    Answer. The response to the question includes Sensitive Security 
Information and can be briefed upon request.

    Question 2. How many individuals have been subject to Special 
Mission Coverage (SMC) under Quiet Skies since SMCs were initiated 
under this program in March 2018? Of that total, how many are American 
citizens?
    Answer. The response to the question includes Sensitive Security 
Information and can be briefed upon request.

    Question 3. At the hearing, Administrator Pekoske stated that the 
Quiet Skies program has ``transitioned some passengers identified in 
Quiet Skies to the known or suspected terrorist list.'' Please detail 
how many individuals monitored under the Quiet Skies program have been 
added to this list, and what precisely the list is. What percentage of 
all individuals monitored under the Quiet Skies program have been added 
to this list? Were these individuals added to this list specifically 
because of information gathered about them under the Quiet Skies 
program? Administrator Pekoske and Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) spokespersons have stated that the Quiet Skies 
program surveillance missions have identified no threats or activity 
meriting follow-up action. How are these statements consistent with the 
fact that Quiet Skies selectees have been added to a terrorist watch 
list? Please explain why someone who does not merit follow up action 
can also exhibit behavior that places them on a terrorist watch list.
    Answer. Quiet Skies is a risk-based, intelligence driven program to 
mitigate the threat from higher risk travel, not a surveillance 
program. Quiet Skies relies on an analysis of current intelligence 
reporting to develop rules that identify a small portion of the 
traveling population as higher risk to determine whether those 
passengers should receive enhanced screening. The Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) does not nominate individuals to the 
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) on account of matching a Quiet 
Skies rule, and would not share Quiet Skies matches with other agencies 
such as the Terrorist Screening Center unless suspicious activity is 
noted during the passenger's travel. Individuals must meet specific 
criteria in order to be nominated to the TSDB. The nomination of a 
subject to the TSDB is separate from and independent of Quiet Skies.
    TSA analyzed data on passengers who matched Quiet Skies rules over 
a period of time and preliminarily found that passengers over that time 
period who matched a Quiet Skies rule were subsequently added to the 
TSDB--for reasons independent of their match to a Quiet Skies rule--at 
a higher rate than all other passengers. This data shows that Quiet 
Skies, which is based on timely intelligence, is identifying travelers 
who are higher risk and who are unknown to the Federal Government or 
only partially identified at the time of the travel resulting in a 
Quiet Skies match. TSA can provide specific information regarding 
passengers identified by Quiet Skies who were later added to the TSDB 
in a classified briefing.

    Question 4. According to a TSA document published in the Boston 
Globe, ``Effective Tuesday, March 13, 2018, OLE/FAMS will initiate SMC 
on flights carrying Quiet Skies Selectees.'' What prompted this 
decision? Why was the program initiated on this date? Was there an 
incident or specific issue that promoted the decision? If so, what? 
What are the Quiet Skies rules and criteria for selection for SMC? On 
what intelligence is Quiet Skies mission coverage based? How does TSA 
choose who from the Quiet Skies selectee list to assign teams of 
Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) for SMC? Are all Quiet Skies selectees 
monitored in flight under SMC?
    Answer. Quiet Skies is an intelligence-driven, risk-based program 
designed to identify higher-risk patterns of travel. Quiet Skies rules 
are based upon current intelligence regarding threats to aviation 
security within the homeland. Explaining specific Quiet Skies rules and 
criteria for selection for Special Mission Coverage (SMC) requires 
conveyance of Sensitive Security Information (SSI) and classified 
information, which we can provide in a briefing in a secure setting. As 
part of its review of scheduling priorities, the Federal Air Marshal 
Service sought to improve the degree to which Federal Air Marshal 
deployments are based upon intelligence-informed risk analysis, and to 
add the unique law enforcement capabilities of the Federal Air Marshal 
Service to ensure aviation security where intelligence indicated higher 
risk associated with a particular flight.
    For additional detail regarding the Federal Air Marshal Service 
Concept of Operations, including priorities and rationales for SMC 
assignments, we recommend a private briefing in a secure setting.

    Question 5. Is there a minimum age for individuals monitored under 
the Quiet Skies program? Could a four-year-old child be the target of a 
Quiet Skies SMC assignment?
    Answer. The response to the question includes Sensitive Security 
Information and can be briefed upon request.

    Question 6. Please describe the selection process and intelligence 
collection and retention policies for the Silent Partner program. Who 
does this program target and what rules are used to select targets?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) bases 
Silent Partner rules on current intelligence indicating a current 
credible threat to aviation security or the Homeland, as assessed by 
TSA Intelligence and Analysis. TSA relies upon intelligence provided by 
the Intelligence Community (IC) to identify potential threats of 
concern to TSA. TSA uses its authorities, experience, and expertise in 
evaluating threats to transportation security to create the Silent 
Partner or Quiet Skies rules that are used to identify higher risk 
passenger itineraries based on terrorist travel, trends. The specific 
rules are sensitive and would need to be provided in a closed briefing.
    TSA retains specific information pertaining to the passenger's 
travel for a limited period of time, in accordance with established 
record retention schedules (two years for TSA Intelligence and Analysis 
Silent Partner/Quiet Skies program, seven years for Secure Flight 
records reflecting that an individual was selected for enhanced 
screening as a Silent Partner or Quiet Skies match and five years for 
Federal Air Marshal Service after action reports). TSA maintains these 
records for appropriate follow-up when there is suspicious activity 
during travel and for the purposes of evaluating program performance 
and effectiveness, redress, and litigation. TSA's operation of Silent 
Partner and Quiet Skies are reviewed on a routine basis by the DHS 
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the DHS Privacy Office, 
and the DHS Office of General Counsel.

    Question 7. At the hearing, Administrator Pekoske stated that 
intelligence collected during Quiet Skies SMC assignments is kept for 
two years after determining the passenger in question is cleared as a 
threat. According to investigations published in the Boston Globe, FAMs 
submit two types of reports to TSA after they complete Quiet Skies 
missions. Are there different conditions or guidelines governing the 
collection, retention, sharing or accessing of information in these two 
types of reports?
    Answer. Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) do not engage in intelligence 
collection and do not submit two reports. As a law enforcement officer, 
a FAM will look for suspicious behavior by engaging in observation of a 
Quiet Skies passenger and other passengers to ensure the security of 
the aircraft. These observations are not part of any larger 
investigation into a passenger. A FAM will either report that no 
suspicious activity was observed, or will document suspicious activity 
observed in an after-action report. In either case, the rules governing 
the retention of FAM reports are the same, which require a retention 
period of five years. TSA has begun the process of reducing the 
retention period of reports following Quiet Skies missions for which no 
suspicious activity was observed.
    TSA retains specific information pertaining to the passenger's 
travel for a limited period of time in accordance with established 
record retention schedules. This includes retention by TSA's Office of 
Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) Silent Partner/Quiet Skies program for 
two years, seven years for Secure Flight records reflecting that an 
individual was selected for enhanced screening as a Silent Partner or 
Quiet Skies match and five years for Federal Air Marshal Service after 
action reports). TSA maintains these records for appropriate follow-up 
when there is suspicious activity during travel and for the purposes of 
evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress, and 
litigation. This data is accessible to TSA personnel solely for one or 
more of these particular purposes. TSA, including both TSA I&A and the 
Federal Air Marshal Service, does not share this information unless it 
is necessary to accomplish one of these purposes (e.g., sharing Quiet 
Skies information with the Department of Homeland Security Traveler 
Redress Inquiry Program when necessary to resolve a redress 
application).

    Question 8. Why does TSA retain data about individuals cleared as a 
threat for two years? What is this data used for and what happens to it 
for those two years? What individuals and what agencies can access, 
copy or modify this data and under what circumstances?
    Answer. Following the attempted detonation of an explosive device 
onboard flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit by Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab in 2009, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
conducted a review of the existing threats to aviation security and 
determined that it needed to mitigate the risk to commercial aviation 
posed by unknown or partially known potential terrorists. Quiet Skies 
does not identify passengers as known threats. Quiet Skies relies on an 
analysis of current intelligence reporting to identify a small portion 
of the traveling population as higher risk to determine whether those 
passengers should receive enhanced screening for a defined number of 
flights or period of time. In accordance with established records 
retention schedules, TSA's Intelligence and Analysis Silent Partner/
Quiet Skies program retains data about Quiet Skies passengers for two 
years for the purposes of evaluating program performance and 
effectiveness, redress, and litigation, Secure Flight records 
reflecting that an individual was selected for enhanced screening as a 
Silent Partner or Quiet Skies match are retained for seven years and 
Federal Air Marshal Service after action reports are retained for five 
years. This data is only accessible to TSA personnel for carrying out 
one of those specific purposes. TSA does not share this information 
unless suspicious activity is noted during travel or is necessary to 
accomplish a specific purpose (e.g., sharing Quiet Skies information 
with the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry 
Program when necessary to resolve a redress application). To date, TSA 
does not share information it retains about Quiet Skies passengers 
except as consistent with the purposes described above. TSA's operation 
of Silent Partner and Quiet Skies are reviewed on a routine basis by 
the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the DHS Privacy 
Office, and the DHS Office of General Counsel.

    Question 9. TSA documents indicate that individuals selected for 
Quiet Skies SMC remain on this list for up to 90 days or 3 encounters, 
whichever comes first. After they are monitored on flights for this 
amount of time, they are then removed from the list and their 
information is removed from the database, TSA has stated. Please 
explain how this time-frame is consistent with the two-year time-frame 
Administrator Pekoske referenced at the hearing.
    Answer. The Quiet Skies program identifies higher risk passengers 
for enhanced screening, and automatically precludes an individual from 
receiving additional scrutiny based on the same Quiet Skies rule after 
the passenger has been encountered for a defined number of times or 
period of time, whichever comes first. The specific number of 
encounters and the period of time under which an individual may receive 
additional scrutiny on account of matching a Quiet Skies rule is 
Sensitive Security Information. This automated preclusion is built into 
the program in order to limit impact on passengers. At the end of the 
defined period of time, TSA's Intelligence and Analysis office retains 
specific information pertaining to the passenger's travel for two years 
in accordance with established record retention schedules for the 
purposes of evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress 
and litigation and, in accordance with established records retention 
schedules, Secure Flight records reflecting that an individual was 
selected for enhanced screening as a Silent Partner or Quiet Skies 
match are retained for seven years and Federal Air Marshal Service 
after action reports are retained for five years.

    Question 10. Is information about Quiet Skies targets who have been 
cleared as threats ever accessed by anyone at any agency or 
organization inside or outside government after the two-year period?
    Answer. Quiet Skies passengers are not identified as known threats. 
Quiet Skies relies on an analysis of current intelligence reporting to 
identify a small portion of the traveling population as higher risk to 
determine whether those passengers should receive enhanced screening 
for defined number of flights or period of time. The Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) retains Quiet Skies passenger data in 
accordance with established record retention schedules. TSA uses the 
information for appropriate follow-up when there is suspicious activity 
during travel and for the purposes of evaluating program performance 
and effectiveness, redress, and litigation. TSA does not share this 
information unless it is necessary to accomplish a specific purpose 
(e.g., sharing Quiet Skies information with the Department of Homeland 
Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program when necessary to resolve a 
redress application).

    Question 11. Administrator Pekoske has stated that ``intelligence 
professionals'' have access to data collected during Quiet Skies SMC 
missions. Who exactly is considered for this purpose an ``intelligence 
professional,'' and are these individuals all TSA employees? Do 
employees of any other agencies have access to information about Quiet 
Skies targets?
    Answer. ``Intelligence professionals'' refers to Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) personnel within TSA's Intelligence and 
Analysis office who fall within the intelligence series job 
classification. These individuals are responsible for reviewing all 
current and relevant information to ensure that Quiet Skies rules 
remain valid, based upon current intelligence, and participate in the 
redress process for individuals affected by Quiet Skies. Since TSA's 
Federal Air Marshal Service began mission coverage using Quiet Skies 
information to inform its mission deployments in March 2018, all 
information provided back to TSA intelligence analysts by the Federal 
Air Marshal Service has been for the purposes of evaluating whether the 
passenger is of low risk and should be removed from Quiet Skies. TSA 
does not share information about passengers identified for additional 
scrutiny by Quiet Skies outside of the agency unless suspicious 
activity is noted during travel, or as necessary for the purposes of 
evaluating program performance and effectiveness, redress, and 
litigation.

    Question 12. Is there any way in which Quiet Skies SMC is carried 
out differently than non-Quiet Skies missions such as SMC targeting 
subjects of active FBI terrorism investigations? Is information 
collected about targets of these different types of missions stored 
differently?
    Answer. There are differences between how Federal Air Marshals 
carry out Quiet Skies Special Mission Coverage (SMC) and non-Quiet 
Skies SMCs. Those differences are considered Sensitive Security 
Information. However, the information obtained is stored in the same 
manner, regardless of the type of SMC. For more information, we 
recommend a private briefing in a secure setting.

    Question 13. What agencies and individuals were involved in 
initiating SMC of Quiet Skies selectees? What agencies and individuals 
were made aware of this decision? Was anyone at the White House or 
Department of Justice involved in the initiation of Quiet Skies SMCs or 
notified about this initiation?
    Answer. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) new Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) that expands FAMS SMC deployments to include Quiet 
Skies missions was approved for implementation by the TSA Administrator 
on February 20, 2018 to improve the deployment CONOPS based on risk. 
The CONOPS was briefed to DHS leadership and relevant offices, the 
Office of Management and Budget, and Congressional Committees, 
including the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee. 
The new FAMS CONOPS took into account recommendations from Inspector 
General reports, congressional oversight, and internal assessments. The 
implementation of the new CONOPS further mitigates the risk presented 
by passengers onboard the aircraft.

    Question 13a. What agencies or officials at the Federal or state 
level are currently involved in the Quiet Skies program? More 
specifically, what agencies or officials can recommend someone for 
monitoring under Quiet Skies or Silent Partner programs, or any other 
kind of SMC? What agencies or officials can request or otherwise gain 
access to information gathered during the missions?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) bases 
Quiet Skies rules on current intelligence indicating a current credible 
threat to aviation security in the Homeland, as assessed by TSA 
Intelligence and Analysis. TSA relies upon intelligence provided by the 
Intelligence Community (IC) to identify potential threats of concern to 
TSA. Although the IC provides intelligence to TSA regarding threats to 
aviation security and the homeland, the IC does not provide 
recommendations to TSA about the creation of Silent Partner or Quiet 
Skies rules or the identification of passengers for additional scrutiny 
through Silent Partner or Quiet Skies. Indeed, no agency recommends any 
person for inclusion within Silent Partner or Quiet Skies. TSA uses its 
authorities, experience, and expertise in evaluating threats to 
transportation security to create the Silent Partner or Quiet Skies 
rules that are used to identify higher risk passenger itineraries. TSA 
may coordinate with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which assists 
in the operation of Quiet Skies through TSA's use of ATS-P, regarding 
TSA's rules to ensure the effective operation of Quiet Skies. CBP does 
not recommend that any person or group of persons be identified for 
additional scrutiny by TSA through Silent Partner or Quiet Skies. 
Information about Quiet Skies may be shared within the Department of 
Homeland Security for redress, litigation, and oversight purposes, and 
with the Department of Justice for litigation purposes.
    TSA does not collect intelligence through Silent Partner or Quiet 
Skies. TSA does not provide activity reports completed by the Federal 
Air Marshal Service to other external Federal agencies or internal DHS 
components unless suspicious activity is noted during travel.

    Question 14. At the hearing, Administrator Pekoske stated that ``in 
certain circumstances'' the Department of Justice may be involved in 
the Quiet Skies program. Please elaborate and detail any involvement of 
Department of Justice personnel in the Quiet Skies program.
    Answer. The Department of Justice does not have regular involvement 
in the Quiet Skies program. If a Federal Air Marshal notes suspicious 
activity or other conduct that appears to violate Federal law, the 
Federal Air Marshal Service may refer the activity or conduct to the 
Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation, regardless of 
whether the person has been identified by Quiet Skies or not. To date, 
the Federal Air Marshal Service has not referred any Quiet Skies 
information to the Department of Justice. The Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) may share Quiet Skies information with the 
Department of Justice for litigation purposes as appropriate.

    Question 15. Administrator Pekoske publicly responded, ``To my 
view, no,'' when asked if the White House is involved with the Quiet 
Skies Program. Please elaborate. Does the White House have any 
involvement in the Quiet Skies program?
    Answer. In a January 7, 2010 memorandum responding to the December 
25, 2009 attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253, President Obama 
concluded that immediate actions must be taken to enhance the security 
of the American people. Following this direction, and in coordination 
with interagency partners, TSA designed and implemented the Silent 
Partner program, leveraging capabilities already in use by U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, and subsequently, the related Quiet Skies 
program. The White House does not direct any person be included within 
Silent Partner or Quiet Skies or otherwise have any involvement in the 
operation of Quiet Skies. TSA's allocation of funding for Silent 
Partner and Quiet Skies has been a consistent element of TSA's budget, 
which is submitted through interagency budgeting processes.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to 
                           Hon. David Pekoske
    Question 1. Customs and Border Protection reports that the facial 
recognition technology is 97.5 percent accurate. This percentage seems 
to be dramatically higher than what is expected given the reported 
faults of the technology for ethnic populations and women and children. 
Does TSA keep its own statistics on accuracy of this technology in real 
world practice? What documentation about the accuracy of the technology 
will TSA share with this committee to be transparent about how this 
technology is performing?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently 
does not own a facial matching system. We are evaluating U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection's (CBP) facial matching system--Traveler 
Verification Service (TVS)--for potential use at TSA checkpoints. CBP 
and other Department of Homeland Security partners are working to 
ensure the accuracy of any biometric services provided to TSA.
    As of September 1, 2018, CBP has processed 600,000 travelers 
departing the United States from 15 airports and 1.7 million passengers 
arriving into the United States at 14 airports. The biometric match 
rate for departing travelers is 97 percent and for arriving travelers 
is 95 percent.
    CBP is working with DHS Science and Technology Directorate to 
continue to develop and refine methods to analyze differences in 
matching performance (e.g., age, gender, and citizenship) based on the 
available data garnered through biometric entry-exit operations. CBP is 
also moving towards formalizing a partnership with the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology. Although CBP's currently 
available data does not currently demonstrate any significant 
difference in match rate between age, gender, or citizenship, CBP will 
continue to work with its partners to develop methods to address any 
performance variations within the system.

    Question 2. Customs and Border Protection has aspirations to roll 
out the technology at all U.S. airports within four years. That kind of 
expedited time frame is concerning, especially considering all of the 
questions about the accuracy of the technology and who might get caught 
up in the program's inadequacies. How quickly does the TSA plan to 
expand the program from the current pilot? Is TSA hoping for the same 
expedited time frame?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not 
yet defined a timeline for the development and deployment of its 
biometrics capability. TSA's collaboration with CBP on a series of 
operational technology pilots is one of a series of efforts that TSA is 
engaged in to inform future requirements and acquisitions strategy for 
any biometrics capability. The results of the TSA-CBP pilot program 
testing will inform but not necessarily determine TSA's timeline.

    Question 3. Will there be increased reporting to this committee and 
the public as the pilot program expands?
    Answer. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is committed 
to informing Congress and the public of its development and exploration 
of biometric technologies. We will continue to engage on a regular 
basis with Congress to inform them of our progress with biometrics, 
including TSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
collaboration on biometric technology pilots. TSA is working to 
schedule a Biometrics Roadmap briefing with the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation in mid-November.

    Question 4. It is important for the data collected through the 
facial recognition program not to be abused. There seems to be a lack 
of transparency about how TSA will store this data and how widely the 
information stored will be shared. Travelers have a right to know what 
our government is doing with their sensitive biometric data. What 
protections exist to ensure that U.S. citizens biometric data and this 
technology is not abused?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not 
have its own facial matching system. TSA is collaborating with CBP on 
pilot programs testing the use of CBP's Traveler Verification System 
(TVS), a cloud-based matching service, at TSA security screening 
checkpoints to compare photographs voluntarily provided by 
international travelers at the checkpoint against a gallery of 
previously captured photographs (e.g., visa or passport photographs 
etc.). TSA does not collect or store photographs in TSA systems. 
Matching and storage of biometric data by the TVS system is conducted 
by CBP, in accordance with applicable privacy and information 
management requirements. For example, CBP has developed and posted for 
public availability, updates to the Privacy Impact Assessment for TVS, 
to address each phase of the pilot program with TSA, including the 
handling and protections for personally identifiable information 
collected using facial recognition technology at the checkpoint.

    Question 5. How will the TSA plan to address the privacy concerns 
associated with deploying biometrics?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is 
committed to protecting the privacy rights of individuals' subject to 
TSA security procedures and safeguarding personally identifiable 
information (PII) collected by TSA in accordance with Federal laws, 
regulations and DHS policies. TSA follows the eight DHS Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPP) of transparency, individual 
participation, purpose specification, data minimization, use 
limitation, data quality and integrity, security, and accountability 
and auditing, to analyze the collection of PII necessary to fulfill 
TSA's transportation security mission and to determine how TSA can best 
provide privacy protections to information collected under these 
principles.
    Before TSA implements any biometric-enabled technology as part of 
its standard security procedures, TSA will develop and make publicly 
available applicable Privacy Impact Assessments. Following from FIPPs, 
as described above, the PIA will address the privacy risks of deploying 
biometrics and how TSA plans to mitigate these risks. TSA will share 
the PIA with the traveling public to ensure awareness of any privacy 
risks inherent in the use of biometrics.

    Question 6. At full implementation, what is the projected cost for 
a full implementation of the facial recognition program? If the cost 
will be split with CBP, please explain this breakdown.
    Answer. TSA is also working with other DHS elements, including the 
Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM),to conduct an 
independent business case analysis for different population segments 
that TSA services. This analysis is expected to begin in Q1 FY19. 
Currently, TSA screens up to 2.5M passengers a day, with volume 
increasing year over year. With such volume, TSA will not likely have a 
``one-size-fits-all'' biometrics solution to include all the various 
populations that we screen. Therefore, a business case analysis that 
articulates the cost-benefits of deploying biometrics capability to 
different populations would be critical to design the appropriate 
solution architecture and governance framework. TSA is also leveraging 
and strengthening existing security partnerships within the Department 
(such as CBP, OBIM, etc.) and aviation security stakeholders on 
biometrics, working to clearly articulate public and private sector 
roles and responsibilities in the context of applicable laws and 
regulation.
    Because TSA has not established what a complete facial recognition 
solution would look like at this time, full costs for TSA`s 
implementation of biometric final operating capability (FOC) are 
unknown. While the costs are unknown, the benefits are clear. On the 
basis of pilots conducted to date, TSA anticipates that biometric 
solutions will enhance security effectiveness, capture operational 
efficiencies, and improve the passenger experience, but additional 
study is needed.
                                 ______
                                 
   Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tammy Baldwin to 
                           Hon. David Pekoske
    Question 1. I remain concerned by the potential dangers posed by 
the lack of adequate in-flight security measures whenever pilots unlock 
flight deck doors, including to get food, sleep, or use the lavatory. 
It is my understanding that a veteran Air Marshal has raised concerns 
internally with DHS, TSA and Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) 
officials regarding the threats to aviation security posed by the 
potential use of weaponized synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl or 
carfentanyl, and so-called rush attacks. What steps are TSA and FAMS 
taking to combat the potential use of weaponized synthetic opioids to 
attack pilots when flight deck doors are unlocked?
    Answer. The tactical mission statement of the Federal Air Marshal 
Service is to ensure the security of the flight deck, protect the 
integrity of the aircraft, and the safety of the crew and passengers.
    To increase awareness and a Federal Air Marshal's (FAMs) ability to 
combat opioid and chemical attacks, training courses and materials were 
made available to FAMs. TSA most recently provided training to Federal 
Air Marshals (FAMs) in early 2018 to increase awareness and ability to 
combat opioid and chemical attacks. In February 2018, TSA provided a 
Fentanyl Awareness presentation, a Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) Fentanyl Awareness video, and a DEA Fentanyl Briefing Guide for 
First Responders. All armed LE/FAMS personnel received this training by 
July 31, 2018. As threats evolve, TSA updates training materials to 
address the current threats.
    Additionally, TSA published advisories in August and September 
2017: Emergency Response to Chemical or Biological Threats Against 
Aircraft, Acid Attack First Aid, Small Scale Poisons and Toxins, and a 
presentation on the Chemical and Biological Threats to Aircraft. In 
June 2016, the TSA issued a Training Advisory to the LE/FAMS workforce 
to ensure review of a DEA produced training video regarding the safety 
issues related to Fentanyl exposure. The TSA continues to work with the 
DEA and other agencies to update training materials commensurate with 
the current threat.

    Question 2. What steps are being taken to combat potential rush 
attacks when flight deck doors are unlocked? Do you believe that 
current safety protocols related to rush attacks are effective?
    Answer. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the primary 
regulatory authority over flight deck doors. Under the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, TSA works with the FAA on actions or 
activities that may affect aviation security or air carrier operations. 
49 U.S.C. 114 (f) (13).
    The FAA issued a final rule on August 15, 2007 (Flightdeck Door 
Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting Systems), requiring a means for 
flight crews to visually monitor the door area outside the flightdeck 
and requiring that flight attendants have a means to discretely notify 
the flight crew of suspicious activity or security breaches in the 
cabin. See 72 FR 45629; 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) part 121. 
The current safety protocol in 14 CFR Section 121.584(a)(1) states that 
prior to the flight deck door opening the flight crew must ensure ``the 
area outside the flight deck door is secure.''

    Question 3. Do you believe that physical secondary barriers should 
be installed on all aircraft to prevent successful rush attacks?
    Answer. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has the primary 
regulatory authority over flight deck doors, and in 2015, published an 
Advisory Circular addressing the issue of secondary cockpit barriers on 
all commercial aircraft by developing guidance on onboard procedures to 
safeguard the flight deck when the flight deck door is unsecured during 
flight. The Advisory Circular listed three acceptable methods of 
secondary flight deck security: (1) installation of physical secondary 
barriers; (2) use of improvised non-installed secondary barriers; and 
(3) human secondary barriers (flightcrew members). At the present time, 
FAA subject matter experts have informed TSA that FAA does not require 
commercial aircraft to install secondary barriers, but they report that 
all aircraft carriers are in voluntary compliance with the Advisory 
Circular. Additionally, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 requires 
TSA, in consultation with the FAA to complete a threat assessment to 
identify any safety or security risks associated with unauthorized 
access to the flight decks on commercial aircraft and any appropriate 
measures that should be taken based on the risks.
    In order to assess the landscape of existing information on the 
issue of secondary barriers on commercial aircraft, on July 15, 2018, 
TSA tasked the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) with 
conducting an assessment of secondary barriers. TSA has asked that the 
ASAC:

   Consult with the FAA with respect to activities or actions 
        taken concerning air carrier operations that may affect the 
        ASAC's assessment;

   Review documents and literature on secondary barriers such 
        as circulars, white papers, and reports;

   Evaluate the types of secondary barriers that are currently 
        installed and in use onboard commercial passenger aircraft and/
        or are available to install onboard aircraft;

   Evaluate the security risk of not having a secondary barrier 
        and provide a cost benefit analysis should such barriers be 
        required; and

   Include the number of passenger airlines currently using a 
        secondary barrier or are considering the use of secondary 
        barrier onboard their aircraft.

    TSA anticipates receiving the report shortly, and will carefully 
review the ASAC's findings to determine appropriate next steps, if any.

    Question 4. I remain concerned by the lesser Federal civil service 
rights and protections afforded to Transportation Security Officers 
(TSOs) compared to the rest of the TSA workforce. This unequal 
treatment of TSOs is the result of TSA deviating from the statutory 
framework-set out in Title 5 U.S. Code-governing Federal civil service, 
including labor-management relations.
    The following is a list of labor rights and standards that apply to 
the Federal workforce:

        Neutral Merit Systems Protection Board review of personnel 
        decisions, including adverse actions.

        A negotiated grievance/arbitration procedure with Federal Labor 
        Relations Authority and U.S. Court oversight.

        Statutory civil rights (protections under the Rehabilitation 
        Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Equal 
        Pay Act).

        The Fair Labor Standards Act, including enforcement by the Wage 
        and Hour division of the U.S. Department of Labor.

        The Back Pay Act (5th Amendment right to Due Process against 
        wrongful taking, including back pay awarded due to an agency's 
        unjustified personnel action).

    For each of the following categories of TSA employees, please tell 
me whether the aforementioned labor rights and standards apply and, if 
they do not, please tell me why not and whether in your judgment, the 
effectiveness of the category of employees in question would be 
improved by applying such labor rights and standards.

        Federal Air Marshals

        Cargo Inspectors

        Criminal Investigators

        Executive Assistant

        Truck Driver

        Telecommunications Specialist

        Budget Analyst

        Accounting and Civilian Pay Technician

        Contract Specialist

        Administrative Assistant

        Screening Manager

        Transportation Security Officer

    Why does TSA extend the aforementioned labor rights to a minority 
of its employees and limit or deny rights to the majority that work as 
TSOs?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has unique 
requirements because of its mission to protect the Nation's 
transportation systems and ensure the freedom of movement of people and 
commerce. TSA was established by Congress as an excepted service agency 
under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) in 2001. ATSA 
gives TSA the flexibility required to complete its security-based 
mission and be responsive and agile in managing a workforce while 
responding to an emerging threat or national emergency. Under ATSA, 
there are two categories of TSA employees for purposes of personnel 
management. For non-screener employees, ATSA provides that the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel management system applies, 
subject to modifications by the TSA Administrator. Like FAA, TSA non-
screener employees are not covered by Title 5, with the exception of a 
few specific provisions such as veterans' preference, whistleblower 
protections, labor management relations, anti-discrimination, 
suitability, compensation for work injury, retirement benefits, 
unemployment compensation, and insurance coverage and MSPB appeal 
rights. For the screening workforce, the Transportation Security 
Officers (TSOs), ATSA vests authority and responsibility for all final 
employment actions with the TSA Administrator.
    TSA has implemented many policies and procedures for the entire 
workforce, both screening and non-screening employees, that are similar 
to Title 5 through TSA's Management Directives and other human capital 
policies. For example, TSA employees, including TSOs, are covered by 
TSA policies on Premium Pay (overtime, night pay differential, split 
shift differential, etc.) and Back Pay. In addition, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, and the Rehabilitation Act have been applied to the TSA 
workforce since TSA's inception. Further, TSA complies with Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission regulations and guidance. Please note 
that TSO applicants and TSOs must still meet the statutory requirements 
of the position, including physical and medical requirements, as set 
forth in ATSA.
    As stated above, the TSA Administrator has the authority and 
responsibility for all final employment actions for the screening 
workforce. TSA's labor framework for the non-supervisory screening 
workforce is designed to be implemented in the context of how to best 
achieve TSA's critical security mission and not adversely impact the 
resources and agility necessary to protect the security of the 
traveling public.
    The non-screening workforce (all positions listed above except TSO 
positions) may appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), as 
MSPB appeal rights are covered under the specific, limited Title 5 
provisions noted above. However, the screening workforce (TSO 
positions) may appeal adverse actions to an impartial internal board, 
the TSA Office of Professional Responsibility Appellate Board (AB). The 
AB is independent from Security Operations, the office in which the 
screening workforce resides. On average, the AB process is quicker than 
the MSPB process. In addition, the AB overturns and mitigates a higher 
percentage of cases than the MSPB.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The data available for the MSPB does not separate adverse 
actions from other types of appeals (e.g., reduction in force, 
performance, retirement) when reporting percentage of cases overturned, 
mitigated, and upheld. However, adverse actions make up approximately 
40 percent of the appeals cases reported. Source: Table 2, Disposition 
of Appeals Decided in the Regional and Field Offices, by Type of Case, 
p. 14, MSPB Annual Report for FY2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are two areas for which Congress acted to grant two 
exceptions permitting screening workforce appeals to MSPB: 1) 
application of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act (USERRA) to the screening workforce, and 2) enactment of the 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act to afford all TSA employees 
coverage for discrimination, whistleblower retaliation, and certain 
other forms of retaliation.

    Question 5. What percentage of the TSA workforce is employed in the 
TSO classification?
    Answer. 77.2 percent of the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) workforce is employed in the Transportation Security Officer 
(TSO) classification.
                                 ______
                                 
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto 
                         to Hon. David Pekoske
    Question 1. As you know, McCarran International in Las Vegas is 
among the busiest airports in the world. So obviously safety is a huge 
priority for them, and to ensure that passengers can travel in and out 
of our great state they convey that canine teams are a huge success in 
assisting them with screenings. However, they have expressed some 
concerns about delays in getting their canine teams because of the 
training is not completed on time. This is a very important program for 
McCarran, so we need to ensure that it continues to operate is a way 
that is useful and efficient. Given the challenges the TSA has in 
training canines, have you been able to identify any improvements to 
the overall status and future of the program?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
significantly increased the capacity for training canine teams at our 
Canine Training Center in San Antonio, Texas. Since 2015, the Canine 
Training Center has increased production by 57 percent (from 200 to 
350) to meet operational requirements and is continuing to increase 
capacity for future growth. In the past months, four additional Las 
Vegas Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) handler teams have graduated 
from training and are now operationally deployed. This brings LAS's 
total number of PSC teams available for duty to 11. In FY19, LAS is 
scheduled to receive two additional teams to their authorized 
allocation, bringing the total number of PSC teams working at LAS to 
13.

    Question 2. Both of the major airports in Nevada, McCarran and 
Reno-Tahoe, have emphasized the importance of the TSA staffing exit 
lanes as well as ensuring that there is proper reimbursement for our 
the service of our law enforcement officers. You may remember I asked 
about you about this issue during your nomination hearing before the 
committee, when proposed budget cuts would have cut this staffing, and 
you replied that you weren't involved in the decision but would review 
them. Now fully entrenched in your position, do you think it would be a 
wise decision to cut the ability of the TSA to staff these lanes?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently 
staffs exit lanes by utilizing its existing checkpoint resources as 
mandated by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. TSA will continue to 
staff exit lanes as required by law, to include Las Vegas, McCarran, 
and Reno-Tahoe.
    Staffing exit lanes does not require the specialized skills of 
TSA's Transportation Security Officers. We believe moving those TSOs 
from exit lanes to screening positions is better for both safety and 
efficiency. TSA also plans to work with airports on implementing exit 
lane technology solutions, such as double doors with monitoring 
systems, which are also more effective and efficient than monitoring by 
staff.

    Question 3. In your testimony you note that ``every year as part of 
the Federal budget process, TSA is charged with considering ways to 
create operational efficiencies.'' It's vital that the Federal 
Government operate efficiently and we work to reduce the deficit, but 
often times in this administration this language has meant proposing to 
gut agencies without any thought as to how they will continue to 
perform their important missions, like keeping our skies safe. For 
example, in the President's FY 2017 budget proposal he eliminated the 
Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program, which pays our law 
enforcement professionals for keeping our airports secure. Can you 
please describe how you've been advocating internally for the resources 
you need to maintain effectively addressing the agency's mission?
    Answer. TSA is committed to being a responsible steward of taxpayer 
dollars as we pursue our mission to protect the Nation's transportation 
systems. As part of the annual budget process, program reviews are 
performed as well as a select number of internal studies. Each are 
designed to provide TSA leadership with information to identify areas 
in need of funding or potential savings. TSA crafts its budget and 
advocates for resources in accordance with the Administration's 
priorities and program requirements to best fulfill its mission through 
negotiations with DHS and OMB.

    Question 4. In Nevada we have a great group called Gender Justice 
Nevada which has talked with me about some of the security screening 
issues they're having at airports. In June of this year, 
Representatives Jayapal and Kennedy wrote a letter to you about this, 
which they cite a survey in which 43 percent of transgender individuals 
reported having had negative experiences passing through TSA. This 
includes false alarms, intimate pat-downs, and intrusive personal 
questions. My understanding is that TSA has looked at both potential 
software and hardware improvements to its advanced imaging technology 
to make traveling more comfortable for these individuals. Can you 
describe what is being done in the screening process to make it more 
inclusive, both from a technical and training perspective? Is there a 
timeline for when travelers will be able to notice some of these 
changes?
    Answer. From a technical perspective, you are correct that we would 
like to update Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) software to improve 
the screening experience for transgender individuals. The 
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Acquisition Program 
Management office is analyzing the AIT market, encouraging development 
of gender-neutral algorithms that also improve threat detection and 
decrease false alarms.
    TSA is committed to ensuring all travelers are treated with respect 
and courtesy and that screening is conducted without regard to a 
person's race, color, sex, gender identity, national origin, religion 
or disability. TSA recognizes the concerns that some members of the 
transgender community may have with certain security screening 
procedures at the Nation's security checkpoints.
    To ensure all our employees understand how to screen transgender 
passengers, TSA has added a module in its Transportation Security 
Officer (TSO) Basic Training Program focused on transgender awareness. 
This course places a heavy emphasis on respecting privacy when 
interacting with a traveler who self-identifies as transgender.
    In addition, TSA offers a series of webinars, which are available 
on-demand through our Online Learning Center. These webinars focus on 
transgender etiquette and sensitivity in security screening, and 
feature guest speakers from TSA's Multicultural Coalition, such as 
Gender Justice Nevada, the National Center for Transgender Equality, 
Kristin Beck, Lady Valor, Equality Florida, and former Federal Air 
Marshal Veronica Pickell. Also, when feasible, our Civil Rights & 
Liberties Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement (CRL/OTE) office delivers 
in-person civil rights and liberties training to officers at airports 
across the country, which includes a discussion of communicating with, 
and screening, transgender passengers. During 2018, CRL/OTE conducted 
onsite training at Denver International Airport, Newark International 
Airport, Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Phoenix Sky Harbor 
International Airport, Tucson International Airport, San Francisco 
International Airport, and Philadelphia International Airport.

    Question 5. What is the best way for this population to report some 
of these concerns when they are the victim of some of this, frankly, 
rude and discriminatory behavior?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
multiple avenues for individuals to report concerns about their 
screening experience. The TSA Contact Center (TCC) is the main portal 
for individuals to communicate concerns with the Agency. The TCC can be 
reached by phone at (866) 289-9673 (Federal Relay 711). Information is 
available in multiple languages and agents are available from 8 a.m. to 
11 p.m. ET on weekdays, and 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. on weekends and holidays. 
The TCC can also be e-mailed at TSA-ContactCenter@tsa.dhs.gov. In 
addition, we encourage individuals to ask to speak with the Supervisory 
Transportation Security Officer at the screening checkpoint to discuss 
their concerns.

    Question 6. When you were nominated for this position, you 
highlighted workforce engagement as a specific challenge and priority 
of yours. I appreciate that you specifically highlighted some of these 
issues in your testimony, but how is this process going? What specific 
metrics are you using to measure any improvement?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is showing 
a promising upward trend in morale over the past two years. This data 
is based on the Employee Engagement Index (EEI) of the Office of 
Personnel Management's Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. TSA 
experienced a seven-point increase in this index in the two year 
period. We are making improvements in all the indices comprising the 
EEI--including satisfaction levels regarding topics, such as Leader's 
Lead, Supervisors, and Intrinsic Work Experience.
    Airports are a particular sub-element within TSA driving the 
overall improvement in EEI. Our 2018 results indicate that 70 airports 
improved their EEI by at least 10 points while 58 airports had an EEI 
of 65 percent or higher. Additionally, LE/FAMS improved their EEI by 6 
points this year.
    To help further the progress we have made on the EEI, we recently 
conducted a study to analyze the drivers of airports and offices with 
the highest employee engagement survey scores. We are using the lessons 
learned from this study to replicate them enterprise-wide and help 
worksites with lower morale improve in key areas that drive employee 
satisfaction and morale, such as creating a supportive environment, 
empowering employees, and open communication.
    In addition, I have spent a lot of time on the road visiting our 
frontline workforce, traveling to almost all of our Category X \1\ 
airports within my first year. We've also created a new Uniformed 
Advisors position in our Front Office to allow our Transportation 
Security Officers (TSOs) to engage with senior leadership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Category X is an airport where screening is performed and the 
number of annual enplanements is 5 million or more and international 
enplanements of 1 million or more.

    Question 7. There are various improvements that are needed to 
improve the morale and retention of these workers we pay to train and 
need to be our first level of defense. What was the attrition rate 
prior to your arrival? What is it now?
    Answer.

      Attrition Rates for Transportation Security Officers Prior to
                     Administrator Pekoske's Arrival
 (Year to date attrition as of Pay Period 15 of 2017: July 23-August 5,
                                  2017)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Time Attrition Rate                                        12.42%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part Time Attrition Rate                                        29.53%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Attrition Rate                                            15.92%
------------------------------------------------------------------------

       Attrition Rates for Transportation Security Officers as of
(Year to date attrition as of Pay Period 17 of 2018: August 19-September
                                1, 2018)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full Time Attrition Rate                                        13.92%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part Time Attrition Rate                                        28.60%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Attrition Rate                                            16.74%
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are continually analyzing our attrition rates, why individuals 
separate, and ways to increase satisfaction in the Agency in order to 
retain our employees and continue to meet our critical mission. We are 
also further developing initiatives, including improved employee 
recognition and career development opportunities as well as exploring 
incentives to improve satisfaction in the workforce.
    In August 2018, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
implemented Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Career Progression, 
which allows TSOs, depending on operational need, to remain at their 
home airport for approximately 2 to 6 months before attending 
Transportation Security Officer--Basic Training Program (TSO-BTP) at 
the TSA Academy to potentially address attrition among new TSOs. The 
program is designed to show new hires the specific steps and timelines 
for advancing their career at TSA.
    On an encouraging note, TSA saw a reduction in the attrition rate 
during the first 180 days of being hired for those attending TSO Basic 
Training at the Academy in 2016 versus those who received their initial 
training at field airports through the New Hire Training Program.

    Question 8. In your nomination hearing last June, we discussed the 
TSA workforce, and my hope you'd be an advocate on behalf of the staff. 
You noted that that was a ``key aspect of my job'' and that you planned 
``to invest an awful lot of time in developing relationships within 
TSA, understanding what they deal with day in and day out. . .and how 
TSA can best support them.'' So how has that process been going, and 
what have they expressed to you?
    Answer. Since becoming Administrator I have made it a goal to get 
out and interact with the workforce as much as possible. By the end of 
my first year as Administrator, I was able to visit all Category X 
airports in the United States with the exception of one, and that visit 
is scheduled for early 2019. I have managed to visit numerous other 
airports and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) facilities in 
that time as well. Those travels have helped me better understand the 
operational aspects of TSA and they have afforded me the opportunity to 
engage with our employees across the country. I make it a point to have 
engagements with the workforce at every location visited, which 
includes the opportunity for the employees to share feedback directly 
with me. This practice will continue as long as I am privileged to hold 
this position. I have also held Town Halls at our Headquarters 
location-simultaneously broadcast to the field-and encourage all 
employees to submit questions in person or electronically. It is also a 
priority to be as responsive as possible to those employees who e-mail 
me personally. I have found that our employees are not shy in letting 
me know about their thoughts and concerns, and I listen, no matter what 
way they choose to communicate with me.
    In the coming months we will utilize our crowdsourcing 
functionality known as Idea Factory to pulse the entire TSA community 
on various topics. The Idea Factory is a way of hearing what is most 
important to the workforce. It is a mechanism for our workforce to be 
heard, to submit ideas, based upon their frontline experiences, that 
they feel will improve and strengthen TSA.
    In August, we brought on two Supervisory Transportation Security 
Officers (STSOs) from the field, one from Anchorage, AK, and one from 
New York City, to act as Uniformed Advisors to the Administrator. 
Additionally, I plan to bring on a Federal Air Marshal Advisor in the 
coming months. The Uniformed Advisor role is a one-year detail 
position, and we intend to continue this role, rotating in new 
Uniformed Advisors each year so we get a diverse field of candidates 
with varied background and experience. We have tasked the current 
Uniformed Advisors to come up with a process for a feedback loop for 
the front office that we believe will pay extensive dividends in making 
policy and procedures that are heavily informed by the field. The 
intent will be communications out to the field on items that would be 
of interest to our front line employees, but also an opportunity for 
our workforce to reach into the front office of TSA. I believe by 
building on the relationships between Headquarters and field employees, 
and increasing two-way communication, this will lead to higher job 
satisfaction and lower attrition rates.
    Further, being exposed to frontline employee's thoughts and 
concerns is the only way to ensure that we make informed policy 
decisions for the workforce and for the traveling public, and this is a 
top priority for my time here. These efforts, among others, will 
advance TSA's strategic priority to commit to our people.

    Question 9. During July TSA rolled out the TSO Career Progression 
Program, in part to address career advancement, training, and hopefully 
morale among the Transportation Security Officer workforce. Career 
advancement, access to training and a boost in morale are very welcome, 
especially by the TSO workforce. Under the career progression program, 
new hires receive a pay raise after the completion of initial training. 
This is not available to incumbent TSOs. In addition, incumbent TSOs 
were not included in a 5 percent 2014 pay raise for new TSOs. In a 
sense, TSOs with experience on the job and commitment to aviation 
security have missed out on two 5 percent pay increases. Are TSOs who 
complete trainings under the career progression program ensured a 
promotion or raise? How will the TSO workforce be eligible for 
promotions under your framework?
    Answer. In 2014, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
increased the entry-level pay for newly hired D Band Transportation 
Security Officers (TSOs) by five percent, and also increased the 
minimum rate for TSOs who are promoted to the E Band. At that time, we 
provided an increase to all current D Band and E Band TSOs in order to 
keep their pay comparable to TSOs who would be hired after 
implementation of those new minimum salary rates.
    The TSO Career Progression program, which went into effect on 
August 5, 2018, is a strategic and comprehensive approach which 
establishes a clearly defined and transparent career path with pay 
increases tied to enhanced skills and training for the TSA frontline 
workforce. TSOs hired after the implementation of the Career 
Progression program and incumbent TSOs hired before the program's 
implementation will be paid the same amount once they reach the E Band, 
which is five percent over the minimum rate of our E Band. The 
difference is that pay adjustments and the promotion to E Band for 
these two groups of employees are staged at different points in their 
career. While TSOs hired after August 5, 2018 will receive a five 
percent pay adjustment after successfully completing required training 
and being employed for six months, TSOs hired before August 5, 2018 
will be eligible for promotion to the E band one year after being on 
board, which is likely sooner than their Career Progression 
counterparts depending on timing of Career Progression training 
completion. Additionally, TSA implemented an On-the-Job Training (OJT) 
Coach program for which certified OJT Coaches, selected from among 
high-performing E Band TSOs (regardless of hire date), are eligible to 
receive an incentive of $300 per quarter.
    The Career Progression program will be further developed to address 
progression beyond the TSO position and into the Lead TSO, Supervisory 
TSO, and Transportation Security Manager positions. We also exploring a 
similar Career Progression pay adjustment opportunity for E Band TSOs 
who acquire specific skills or complete training courses. In order to 
maintain pay comparability with TSOs hired prior to the implementation 
of Career Progression, we will provide this same opportunity to all E 
Band TSOs.

    Question 10. You also stated in your testimony before the House 
Homeland Security Committee that the issue of TSO pay is not one of 
your authority, but ``the ability with respect to funding to pay 
workers.'' Did the FY 2019 TSA budget request include a request for 
additional funding to cover a TSO pay raise, and if not, why?
    Answer. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) budget includes annualization for the FY18 pay 
raise, but does not include a request for additional funding to cover a 
pay raise for any TSA employee, including Transportation Security 
Officers (TSOs).

    Question 11. Mr. Administrator--in questions for the record after 
your last appearance, you described challenges in attracting and 
retaining the workforce within TSA. One area you focused on was the 
compensation available to your employees. Can you explain where you are 
as far as a competitive wage and what you're doing to work within your 
position to advocate for improvements or increases to the compensation 
package you need to maintain the best of your labor force?
    Answer. We have initiated and are evaluating various options to 
address compensation issues, particularly for the Transportation 
Security Officer (TSO) workforce.
    In August 2018, we rolled out the TSO Career Progression 
initiative, a strategic and comprehensive approach that established a 
clearly defined and transparent career path for the TSO workforce with 
pay increases and promotions tied to enhanced skills and training. 
Additionally, we implemented an On-the-Job Training (OJT) Coach program 
for which certified OJT Coaches, selected from among high-performing E 
Band TSOs, are eligible to receive an incentive of $300 per quarter. 
Peer-to-peer coaching is a fundamental component of mission success and 
this new model recognizes and rewards TSOs who seek additional training 
and acquire additional security and leadership skills.
    We have also identified approximately 70 geographic areas for the 
use of targeted retention incentives for TSOs. Some of these are carry-
overs from incentives that were in effect during the previous Fiscal 
Year, while others are additions. The incentive rates for Fiscal Year 
2019 became effective on October 1, 2018. We will evaluate the labor 
market conditions throughout the year and may add localities to the 
list of retention incentive locations, or may adjust the amount of the 
incentives, as needed.
    We are also taking an in-depth look at vacancy and attrition rates 
for both our screener and non-screener workforce to determine whether 
pay rate adjustments may be necessary, and what is possible within 
current budget constraints. We plan to make a determination on a way 
forward during FY19.

    Question 12. Because you highlighted the competition you have with 
staff leaving for other posts within the Federal Government, so we need 
to analyze what can be done to increase their professional 
satisfaction, in those cases, for individuals we've paid to train and 
develop. You noted some of this in your testimony, but do you feel 
that's sufficient to adequately staff this priority agency?
    Answer. We are continually analyzing our attrition rates, why 
individuals separate, and ways to increase satisfaction in the Agency 
in order to retain our employees and continue to meet our critical 
mission. We are also continually developing initiatives, including 
improved employee recognition and career development opportunities such 
as our recent launch of Career Progression for our Transportation 
Security Officers, as well as exploring incentives to improve 
satisfaction in the workforce. In addition, I've recently asked our 
senior leaders to review their local Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey 
(FEVS) results and create action plans that lead to tangible 
improvements in employee satisfaction across TSA.

    Question 13. You raise the Employee Viewpoint Survey Employee 
Engagement Index in your testimony. Specifically you note an increase 
in the TSA by seven points. Where does that leave in you the overall 
ranking with in the Federal Government? And as you note the increase, 
looking at the 2018 results, as well as previous years, what do you 
read from these results as the top three challenges to your agency's 
workforce satisfaction viewpoint, because as you know, the TSA has also 
ranks very poorly in the nonpartisan rankings for the ``Best Places to 
Work in the Federal Government?''
    Answer. Although the 2018 government-wide report has not been 
released yet by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), we do know 
that our scores are below the government average. However, it is 
interesting to note that within TSA, headquarters employee scores match 
the government average at 68 percent positive responses on the Employee 
Engagement Index, a key metric on the OPM Federal Employee Viewpoint 
Survey (FEVS). Airports and Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshals scores 
are still below the government average, but they have made notable 
progress this year.
    The Best Places to Work in the Federal Government rankings for 2018 
have not been released yet, but our preliminary FEVS scores from OPM 
improved on the three items the Partnership for Public Service uses to 
calculate their annual rankings:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      2016   2017   2018
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I recommend my organization as a good place to         37%    43%    47%
 work.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Considering everything, how satisfied are you with     46%    53%    54%
 your job?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Considering everything, how satisfied are you with     32%    40%    43%
 your organization?
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    According to our survey scores for 2018, our most challenging areas 
are consistent with those of previous years:

   Leaders Lead: Employee perceptions of the integrity of 
        leadership, as well as leadership behaviors such as 
        communication and workforce motivation;

   Collaborative Management: Management styles that promote and 
        support collaborative communication and teamwork in completing 
        projects and accomplishing goals/objectives; and

   Performance Recognition and Reward: Providing incentives to, 
        and recognition of, employees for their performance, and 
        acknowledging employee contributions to the agency's mission.

    Leaders Lead, at 44 percent positive, has shown notable improvement 
in the past two years, improving by four points since 2017 and by 10 
points since 2016. We continue to focus on these areas and monitor our 
progress.

    Question 14. You've noted that in an attempt to ``facilitate 
leadership development at all levels of the workforce'' you have 
created two Advisor positions on your direct staff. I couldn't agree 
more with you about the need to get create input from staff at all 
levels and the need to create an atmosphere for mentorship and 
leadership development. Now, are these standing positions within your 
office, or will you be rotating those individuals to sit in these 
positions to help generate an on-going development process and 
generating an ever changing dialogue with more of your subordinates?
    Answer. Establishing a position for a Uniformed Advisor to the 
Administrator was one of my initial goals as the TSA Administrator. 
This past summer, we posted an announcement to the field, looking for a 
Supervisory Transportation Security Officer (STSO) to serve as a 
Uniformed Advisor to my office. In fact, in recognition of the positive 
effects this role could have within TSA, we also sought a Uniformed 
Advisor for our Security Operations office, as well. In August, we 
brought on two STSOs from the field, one from Anchorage, and one from 
New York City, to fill these two details.
    The Uniformed Advisor role is a one-year detail position, rotating 
in new Uniformed Advisors each year, so we get a diverse field of 
Advisors with varied backgrounds and experience. These Advisors have 
jumped right in and began participating and advising on policy from Day 
One of their details.
    The current Uniformed Advisors are creating a feedback loop process 
that we believe will pay extensive dividends in making policy and 
procedures that are heavily informed by the field. The intent of the 
process is ensuring that we get communications widely disseminated to 
the field on items of interest to our front-line employees, but also 
ensuring there is an opportunity for our front-line employees to 
communicate back to the TSA Front Office.
    Additionally, I plan to add a Federal Air Marshal Advisor to my 
office in the coming months. The Federal Air Marshal Advisor selection 
and detail term will mirror the process used for the Uniformed Advisor 
positions.
    We are very excited about these roles and the opportunities they 
offer for making more informed decisions for all employees, as well as 
the traveling public.

    Question 15. What else are you doing to create a sense of potential 
upward mobility in your workforce, and giving them a platform to 
provide you more direct input from all levels within the agency?
    Answer. In addition to Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Career 
Progression, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)'s Human 
Capital office is developing an agency-wide career mapping system that 
will enable employees to map a progressive career ladder of job 
opportunities within TSA, as well as view skills, abilities, 
competencies, recommended training, and developmental activities 
necessary to advance from one position to another. The first iteration 
of the system, which is anticipated to be available in 2019, will 
include maps for TSOs, Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshals (LE/FAMs), 
and certain support positions (e.g., Human Resources Specialist, 
Financial Specialist, Program Specialist).
    The Administrator also holds periodic employee town halls at 
headquarters--in addition to the employee engagements he conducts 
during his field site visits. During his headquarters events, he 
dedicates more than half of the time to Q&A, which includes a polling 
feature that any employee can access, whether they physically attend 
the town hall or not. The poll allows employees to not only answer 
questions the Administrator's staff publishes, but it also allows 
people to ask their own questions of the Administrator. Many dozens of 
questions were submitted during the latest town hall (September 25). As 
many questions were answered as time allowed. As in the past, all 
questions will be grouped and answered; and the answers will be 
published on a dedicated SharePoint page for all employees to access.

    Question 16. During our conversation at your last appearance in 
this committee on surface transportation security, you noted that you 
believed TSA needed ``to look at our risk quotient overall within the 
transportation system and then allocate the resources where we the see 
the greatest risk.'' That was in January. Have you made progress on 
this priority that you flagged, and where do we stand on it? And how 
are you incorporating this analysis into your budget formations?
    Answer. As part of our upcoming budget planning process, the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) analyzed each proposed 
initiative and evaluated them within a risk-metric system. The analysis 
showed TSA has an appropriate alignment with the level of risk 
identified by the Agency; meaning, we are successfully investing more 
funding (75 percent) to those areas we have determined to be of the 
most significant risk; less funding (10 percent) in those areas we have 
assessed to be of lower risk; and some funding (15 percent) in those 
areas we are willing to accept additional risk in order to be 
successful.

    Question 17. In your testimony you noted that ``TSA is also working 
with CBP to identify ways that we can better leverage and align the two 
DHS Trusted Traveler programs, Global Entry and TSA PreCheck.'' Please 
describe what that coordination looks like for the Nevadans I know who 
travel, as well as the millions we bring into our state every year.
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are working towards finding 
efficiencies between the various Trusted Traveler Programs, including 
TSA Pre3 and CBP Global Entry.
    TSA Pre3 and CBP Global Entry leadership are focusing on ways to 
increase security effectiveness, leverage resources to create cost 
savings, and enhance the traveler experience. Currently, TSA and CBP 
are examining integration of public-facing messaging and enrollment 
activities, such as a joint landing page for all trusted traveler 
programs. We anticipate a six month's level of effort for completion of 
the Landing Page once the task has been prioritized by both Components. 
We are still assessing the other efforts.

    Question 18. As we've discussed multiple times, I'm a big proponent 
of innovation when it can be done safely and effectively. Now, you 
noted in your testimony that TSA is conducting ``tests of facial 
recognition technology at JFK Airport.'' Can you walk me through how 
that testing has been going, whether you've seen any specific concerns 
related to the implementation of this technology related to traveler's 
race?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have launched a series of 
operational technology pilots to evaluate the use of facial recognition 
technology that CBP developed called the Traveler Verification Service 
(TVS).
    Phase I, which was voluntary for passengers, was completed in 
November 2017 at John F. Kennedy International Airport. It explored the 
feasibility of using TVS at the TSA checkpoint; no TSA Standard 
Operating Procedure was altered. The technology was used in parallel to 
the standard TSA identification verification process in order to see 
whether CBP's facial matching system could be scaled up to handle the 
volume of passengers through a TSA checkpoint. The scalability and 
responsiveness of CBP's system when stressed with TSA passenger volume 
justified TSA-CBP moving to the next phase of the pilot program.
    Phase II, initiated in August 2018 at Tom Bradley International 
Terminal at Los Angeles International Airport, which is also voluntary, 
uses TVS to verify the identity of passengers when there is a positive 
match, in lieu of the manual processes currently performed by the 
Transportation Security Officer (TSO) at the Travel Document Checker 
(TDC) stations. Phase III, which is still under development, may allow 
data sharing between CBP and TSA systems to test potential automation 
of certain TDC manual functions to reduce the need for travelers to 
present a boarding pass and/or physical identification to TDC. These 
pilots aim to test whether this technology is a viable way to improve 
TSA operations, achieve efficiencies, and streamline the passenger 
experience by bringing biometric capabilities to the TSA checkpoint.
    TSA currently does not own a facial matching system. We are 
evaluating CBP's facial matching system--TVS--for potential use at TSA 
checkpoints. According to CBP, its presently available data does not 
currently demonstrate any significant difference in match rate through 
TVS between age, gender, or citizenship. CBP and other DHS partners are 
working to ensure the accuracy of any biometric services provided to 
TSA.
    CBP should be consulted for additional information regarding the 
capabilities of its biometric systems.
    During the hearing, several of your colleagues raised concerns 
about this issue and cited studies that had been done on the topic of 
biometrics and race. In an effort to fully understand the concerns I 
have asked my team to research the mentioned studies to make sure we 
are mindful of their findings as we move forward in our pilots with 
CBP.
    CBP is seeking to enter into an interagency agreement with NIST to 
provide verification and validation for CBP's face recognition system. 
NIST will examine the technology, methodology, and data from the 
biometrics pilot programs that have been based on the Traveler 
Verification Service (TVS) that CBP has built. In parallel, CBP and TSA 
have regular joint-technical team meetings to discuss the solution 
architecture and governance related to the further expansion and 
integration of biometrics technology between CBP and TSA, including 
analysis of matching data in testing and operational environments.
    As we have specifically stated in the recently published TSA 
Biometrics Roadmap, we will be deliberate, intentional, and transparent 
as it tests and deploys biometrics-based identification verification 
capability. TSA will adopt a ``privacy by design'' mindset that 
incorporates privacy considerations into each phase of biometric 
solution development (design, build, implement).
    To address the Privacy considerations embedded in TSA pilots with 
CBP, DHS/CBP have issued Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA), available at 
www.dhs.gov/privacy; TSA contributed in the PIA for CBP-TSA Technical 
Demonstration Phase II, issued in August 2018. Additionally, CBP has 
issued program information, such as Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 
on www.CBP.gov; there are Public signage is available at pilot sites; 
and U.S. Citizens can request not to participate in biometric pilots 
and seek an alternative means of verifying their identity and 
documents.

    Question 19. If you can, what are the current tangible logistical 
benefits of the use of this technology, and what are the ongoing 
challenges?
    Answer. Facial recognition technology will increase security by 
allowing the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to verify the 
identity of passengers more reliably and will improve the travel 
experience by enabling more passengers to get through the checkpoint 
more quickly.
    Aviation travel volume is increasing rapidly year after year. The 
summer of 2018 was TSA's busiest summer to date. Between the Wednesday 
before Memorial Day from until the Tuesday after Labor Day, we screened 
253 million-more than a quarter of a billion--travelers and nearly 165 
million pieces of checked baggage.
    A challenge to throughput is the need to ensure identity 
verification, a crucial security layer at this key entry point to the 
screening process, and deployment of TSA resources to address potential 
security threats. Today, Transportation Security Officers and airline 
employees manually compare the passenger in front of them to their 
photo identification to verify their identities for bag drop and 
checkpoint screening. Technological solutions for biometric 
verification can provide automation to improve the accuracy and speed 
of identity verification, making the passenger experience faster and 
more seamless without any negative impact on security.
    Facial recognition technology has several potential benefits for 
TSA's processes: it can be self-service, facilitative, and incorporate 
anti-tampering countermeasures. These features can reduce reliance on 
physical travel documents.
    We recognize the potential benefits of these new technologies and 
are monitoring their development with the goal of using biometrics to 
reduce the need for passengers to physically present identification 
documents to verify their identity.

    Question 20. Have you begun to make any kind of determinations on 
the cost benefit of implementing more of this technology?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working 
with the Office of Biometric Identity Management, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, the Science and Technology Directorate, and 
appropriate industry stakeholders to conduct an independent business 
case analysis for different population segments that TSA services. This 
analysis is expected to begin in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2019. 
As TSA will not likely have a ``one-size-fits-all'' biometrics solution 
for all the various populations that it screens, a business case 
analysis that articulates the costs and benefits of deploying different 
available types of biometrics capabilities to different populations is 
critical to design the appropriate solution architectures and 
governance frameworks.
                                 ______
                                 
     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Jon Tester to 
                           Hon. David Pekoske
    Question 1. How is TSA working with small and rural commercial 
service airports to identify specific challenges pertaining to airport 
access control measures and surveillance technologies and implement 
best practices?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working 
with small rural airports to overcome challenges with access control, 
surveillance technologies, and best practices in several ways. The 
following highlights a few initiatives specifically focused on rural 
airports:

   In July 2015, TSA issued the Airport Security Design 
        Guidelines, which offers several recommendations on the use of 
        Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). This document is intended to 
        bring to the attention of the airport planning, design, and 
        engineering community the serious security concerns that must 
        be considered for incorporation into an airport design at the 
        earliest possible planning stage, in order to bring the most 
        efficient and cost-effective security solutions to bear. The 
        Guidelines are available for small airports to use when 
        considering new or upgrading existing surveillance systems.

   In October 2017, TSA shared with industry a List of 
        Effective Measures from Airport Vulnerability Assessments 
        developed after completing airport assessments of perimeter and 
        access controls to support voluntary initiatives to mitigate 
        vulnerabilities. Approximately 145 small and rural airports 
        were included in the assessments.

   TSA continues to provide National Safe Skies Alliance 
        evaluations and reports on varying topics regarding access 
        control and surveillance testing for airports to provide 
        insights into technologies being tested without the individual 
        investment from a small airport. National Safe Skies Alliance, 
        Inc. (Safe Skies) is a non-profit organization that works with 
        airports, government, and industry to maintain a safe and 
        effective aviation security system. Safe Skies' core services 
        focus on helping airport operators make informed decisions 
        about their perimeter and access control security. Safe Skies 
        evaluations and reports are available for small and rural 
        airports to use when considering new or upgrading existing 
        access control and surveillance systems. National Safe Skies 
        Alliance posted guidelines regarding airport security design in 
        April, 2017 on their public website.

    In addition, TSA looks at the environmental and demographic needs 
of small airports when considering demonstration activity through work 
within its Innovation Task Force (ITF). Through ITF's work, TSA is 
better positioned to refine a long-term investment strategy, inform 
future requirements and refine potential solutions with a ``system of 
systems'' approach. ITF approaches technology demonstrations with the 
understanding that no two airport environments are alike, and has the 
ability to complete demonstrations at specialty sites such as small 
airports. The TSA Innovation Task Force supports TSA's mission to 
foster innovation by working with key stakeholders to identify and 
demonstrate emerging solutions that increase security effectiveness and 
efficiency, improve passenger experience and the flow of commerce, and 
deliver solutions that secure the freedom of movement throughout the 
Nation's transportation systems.
    In addition to these initiatives, TSA initiated several changes to 
its security program requirements and recommendations related to access 
media, watch list vetting, and security of identification documents. 
Rural and small airports are being directly consulted on the impact of 
these requirements. TSA can provide a secure briefing on these issues 
upon request.

    Question 2. The Horizon Air incident displayed in full view an 
issue that is normally out-of-sight to the general public--threats to 
aviation security by insider employees. Presently, TSA conducts 
background checks and airports rely upon TSA's findings from those 
background checks when determining whether or not to issue a Security 
Identification Area (SIDA) badge. Does TSA know when an airport revokes 
a SIDA badge? If yes, what is the process for TSA being notified? If 
no, how does TSA prevent the situation where an employee whose SIDA 
badge has been revoked at one airport, lands a job at a different 
airport and is issued a new SIDA badge?
    Answer. Yes, airports are required to notify the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) when they revoke a Security 
Identification Area (SIDA) badge for cause, electronically through 
TSA's Vetting System. TSA is in the process of establishing a national 
database of revoked badges that should be operational in Fiscal Year 
2019. This aligns with Congress' intent, as reflected in Section 1934 
of H.R. 302, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.

    Question 3. Regarding revoked SIDA badges, does TSA have a 
nationwide database of employees whose SIDA badges have been revoked? 
If not, is TSA planning to establish such a database?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is in the 
process of establishing a database of individuals whose SIDA badges 
have been revoked for cause, which may be operational in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2019, depending on whether notice and comment is necessary. TSA 
intends to complete its analysis and determination regarding notice and 
comment requirements by the end of Q2 FY19. This database would be for 
use by airports and would align with Congress' intent, as reflected in 
Section 1934 of H.R. 302, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.

    Question 3a. What issues would need to be addressed in any 
guidelines for managing the database's content (e.g., duration of data 
retention, deletion, mistaken identity)?
    Answer. We must work with the airports to establish the parameters 
that govern when it is appropriate to list an individual in the 
database, what information should be included, privacy protections to 
prevent unauthorized disclosures, procedures to prevent errant 
listings, and appropriate redress procedures to remove listings that 
are determined to be incorrect. Some considerations involve:

   The need to create new data inputs to distinguish revocation 
        based on voluntary separation,

   Disqualifying offenses,

   Suitability determinations by airports unrelated to 
        transportation security, and

   The length of time for which an individual's information 
        should be retained in such a database and other privacy 
        considerations.

    Question 3b. Would TSA issue draft rules for public comment?
    Answer. TSA continues to analyze this issue to determine what, if 
any, notice and comment opportunity must be afforded. Whether database 
input is mandatory or voluntary, as well as the database content, will 
inform this analysis. TSA intends to complete its analysis and 
determination regarding notice and comment requirements by end of Q2 
FY19.

    Question 4. How would TSA ensure the database's validity while 
safeguarding individuals' privacy? What role would the Department of 
Homeland Security play in the establishment of this database or in its 
data validation?
    Answer. As with all Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
systems, we implement U.S. Department of Homeland Security directives 
and guidance on information technology standards to ensure the 
protection and accuracy of an individual's information. This includes 
establishing parameters that govern when it is appropriate to list an 
individual in the database, what information should be included, 
privacy protections to prevent unauthorized disclosures, procedures to 
prevent errant listings, and appropriate redress procedures to remove 
listings that are determined to be incorrect.

    Question 5. With regard to passenger screening technologies, TSA 
has prioritized deployments of various checkpoint security systems, 
such as Advanced Imaging Technology whole-body scanners and now 
Computed Tomography scanners for carry-on bags, to the Nation's largest 
airports. Are there any innovative strategies that TSA is exploring or 
implementing to address the various challenges of applying cost-
effective passenger and baggage screening at smaller airports?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) looks at a 
diverse range of solutions across a variety of metrics and measures 
that apply to smaller airports. TSA engages and collaborates with 
transportation security equipment (TSE) stakeholders (such as, original 
equipment manufacturers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Science 
and Technology Directorate, national laboratories, academia, and 
industry) in part to address the overall physical footprint of TSE in 
order to accommodate smaller-sized airports.
    As part of its efforts to develop and mature TSE technology for 
future procurements, TSA is committed to defining cost-effective system 
requirements with multiple hardware configurations. These efforts seek 
to accommodate the types of space and staffing constraints, such as 
those common in small airport environments, within the broader context 
of maintaining operational efficiencies and security effectiveness.
    TSA is also exploring innovative screening capabilities (e.g., 
remote screening), which will reduce overall costs, including TSE and 
staffing, for checkpoint screening. Remote screening offers the 
opportunity to build and operate a centralized image interpretation 
room that allows a single security officer to oversee multiple carry-on 
screening lanes, thus reducing the number of operators required to 
fully staff a lane. In addition to screening equipment, TSA also 
understands the crucial needs of staffing and scheduling in the small 
airport environment and is identifying solutions that will alleviate 
local staffing and scheduling burdens for a more integrated and 
comprehensive system.

    Question 6. Has TSA investigated new software products that utilize 
deep learning and computer vision technology to enhance current and 
future screening machines?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) actively 
engages industry, national laboratories, and academic partners to 
develop and test advanced algorithms based on deep learning for 
automated threat detection. To date, these efforts have provided us 
with a path forward for automated prohibited items detection in carry-
on baggage for both current Advanced Technology and future Computed 
Tomography systems, as well as shown enhancements for explosives 
detection and false alarm reduction in both carry-on and checked 
baggage screening. Future plans include further applications of machine 
learning to passenger and baggage screening systems, as well as 
security system optimization.

    Question 7. Earlier this year, TSA withdrew its long-delayed 
rulemaking proposal on security for large general aviation aircraft 
(known as the Large Aircraft Security Program or LASP). What is TSA 
doing to work with the general aviation community (including general 
aviation airports, fixed-base operators, and aircraft owners and 
pilots) to strengthen security measures and access controls to general 
aviation facilities and aircraft, particularly large business and 
private jets?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues 
to work with the general aviation (GA) community and industry partners 
to strengthen security measures and awareness surrounding general 
aviation operations. The GA subcommittee of the Aviation Security 
Advisory Committee collaborates regularly to offer suggestions to 
enhance GA security.
    TSA partnered with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association to 
develop the Airport Watch program. Similar to the If You See Something, 
Say Something campaign, it encourages pilots, airport employees, and 
associated personnel to take an active role in securing GA facilities 
and aircraft. The program promotes a hotline (866 GA SECURE) to report 
security concerns in the GA environment. This hotline is answered by 
TSA personnel on a 24/7 basis.
    TSA also published Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airport 
Operators and Users which was developed jointly with the GA community. 
The document provides suggested security enhancements for GA airports 
including lighting, fencing, access control, closed circuit television, 
etc. It also covers associated areas such as fixed base operators and 
fuel storage facilities. The full document can be found at: https://
www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/2017_ga_security_guidelines.pdf

    Question 8. What are some of the unique characteristics of general 
aviation that have made it so challenging to move forward with these 
security regulations?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is not 
moving forward with this rulemaking for three primary reasons: (1) an 
assessment of the relative risk associated with general aviation 
operations; (2) feedback from the industry; and (3) alignment with the 
Executive Orders related to regulatory costs and regulatory reform.
    First, TSA regularly assesses the risk of the aviation sector and 
has determined that the risk from GA aircraft is relatively low. Unlike 
commercial aviation, most GA aircraft are operated by recreational 
pilots or serve as corporate aircraft. The low risk is attributed to 
the fact that passengers and crew are typically family, friends, and/or 
business colleagues. Thus, the familiarity of the passengers would 
generally result in identifying bad actors and preventing them from 
boarding. The low risk evaluation also considers that GA operations 
often involve small aircraft with minimal fuel and passenger loads, 
which are less likely to do the kind of harm that commercial operations 
can cause. Finally, GA operators do not fly with the same frequency as 
commercial flights, which further reduces the opportunities for these 
operators to do harm.
    Second, in a rulemaking proceeding TSA initiated several years ago, 
more than 7,000 pilots, aircraft operators, airports, aviation workers, 
individuals, Members of Congress, aviation associations, and civic 
organizations provided comments objecting to the proposed regulations. 
The overwhelming majority of commenters asserted that the rulemaking 
would increase costs and other burdens unnecessarily, and would lead 
small airport and aircraft operators to go out of business, causing 
loss of employment. Also, the commenters noted that they did not 
support TSA issuance of regulations absent a statutory mandate.
    Third, in January 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders 
(EOs) related to regulatory reform. EO 13771 directs all Federal 
agencies to eliminate two regulations for every one regulation the 
agency implements and ensure that any new regulatory action has a $0 
net cost.
    In consideration of all of these factors, TSA decided not to pursue 
a rulemaking and issued a notice in March 2018 to withdraw the notice 
of proposed rulemaking. Should TSA determine the threat to or from 
general aviation has increased, the agency has authority to take 
appropriate action. This action can be taken quickly, as it was in 2001 
when general aviation operations were prohibited at Ronald Reagan 
National Airport (DCA), or through notice and comment rulemaking.

    Question 9. What alternative approaches can strengthen general 
aviation security in the future?
    Answer. TSA continues to work with the general aviation (GA) 
community and industry partners to strengthen security measures and 
awareness surrounding general aviation operations. The GA subcommittee 
of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee collaborates regularly to 
offer suggestions to enhance GA security.
    TSA partnered with the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association to 
develop the Airport Watch program. Similar to the If You See Something, 
Say Something campaign, it encourages pilots, airport employees, and 
associated personnel to take an active role in securing GA facilities 
and aircraft. The program promotes a hotline (866 GA SECURE) to report 
security concerns in the GA environment. This hotline is answered by 
TSA personnel on a 24/7 basis.
    TSA also published Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airport 
Operators and Users which was developed jointly with the GA community. 
The document provides suggested security enhancements for GA airports 
including lighting, fencing, access control, closed circuit television, 
etc. It also covers associated areas such as fixed base operators and 
fuel storage facilities. The full document can be found at: https://
www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/2017_ga_security_guidelines.pdf

    Question 10. In January 2016, TSA centralized the training of its 
security officers under the TSO Basic Training program by sending staff 
to Glynco, Georgia for two weeks of training that includes standard 
operating procedures, threat detection, and the use of screening 
equipment. Has there been a measurable difference of performance by 
TSOs since the Basic Training program was instituted? What metrics is 
TSA using to measure performance?
    Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses the 
industry standard Kirkpatrick Evaluation Model to determine the 
effectiveness of its training, which includes the Transportation 
Security Officer Basic Training Program (TSO-BTP) at the TSA Academy in 
Glynco, Georgia. We have complete data for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. A 
Level 1 Kirkpatrick evaluation refers to the immediate feedback from 
students participating in the course, and the Level 1 data has been 
overwhelmingly positive. In addition, Human Capital's 2017 Employee 
Engagement Survey revealed that overall morale was 11 percent higher 
for TSO-BTP graduates when compared to their peers trained at local 
airports. Organizational commitment, which is a measure of an 
individual's attachment to the organization, was also 12 percent higher 
for TSO-BTP graduates, and overall satisfaction was 13 percent higher.
    A Level 2 Kirkpatrick evaluation refers to transferred knowledge, 
which is measured at the end of training or a segment of training. For 
TSO-BTP, that means a Job Knowledge Test and an Image Interpretation 
Test (IIT). To meet operational needs, some local new-hire training was 
conducted at airports during FY 2017. We were therefore able to look at 
Level 2 data, comparing the results of traditional new-hire training at 
the airports with TSO-BTP at the TSA Academy. Initial IIT results show 
that TSO-BTP students trained at the TSA Academy achieved passing rates 
that were higher than those of TSOs trained locally.

    Question 10a. In your estimation, when will TSA have enough data to 
show whether attrition at TSA slowed as a result of this Basic Training 
program?
    Answer. Attrition is a complex problem and factors outside of 
training become more important the longer an employee is with the 
organization. Two factors outside of training which can affect 
attrition are pay and the economy.
    Noting the importance of these factors and the difficulty linking 
attrition to a single training event, TSA did see positive results in 
the population of new hires attending TSO-BTP at the TSA Academy. 
According to data collected in 2016, graduates from TSO-BTP showed 
lower attrition rates within their first 180 days of employment, when 
compared to new hires trained at field airports. Within this 180-day 
period, the attrition rate for new hires attending TSO-BTP at the TSA 
Academy in 2016 was 12.76 percent, while the attrition rate for field 
trainees was 15.66 percent. This approximately three-percent difference 
indicates a positive trend in the first six months for students 
receiving a standardized, Academy-delivered basic training program.
    TSA has also implemented TSO Career Progression, which allows TSOs, 
depending on operational need, to remain at their home airport for 
approximately two to six months before attending TSO-BTP at the TSA 
Academy. The timing shift is intended to increase operational capacity 
at the airports, help ensure career fit prior to further training 
investment, and potentially address attrition among new TSOs.
    TSA also has implemented TSO Career Progression, which allows TSOs, 
depending on operational need, to remain at their home airport for 
approximately two-to six-months before attending TSO-BTP at the TSA 
Academy to potentially address attrition among new TSOs.

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