J-S22043-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHANE NELSON BUNTING

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1450 MDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 17, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0002591-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: MAY 20, 2019

Shane Nelson Bunting (Bunting) appeals from an order the Court of 

Common Pleas of Lancaster County (PCRA court) denying his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 

We affirm.

We take the following pertinent factual and procedural background from 

the PCRA court’s December 13, 2018 opinion and our independent review of 

the certified record. On January 31, 2017, Bunting pled guilty to SolicitationRape of a Child, 18 Pa.C.S. § 902(a), pursuant to a negotiated plea. The same 

day, the court sentenced him according to the agreement’s terms, to not less 

than five-and-one-half nor more than eleven years. Consistent with the 

registration signed by Bunting, the sentencing court informed him that he was 

a lifetime registrant pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
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Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.

1

 Bunting did not file a direct 

appeal.

On June 20, 2018, he filed a pro se “Motion to be Removed from SORNA 

as it is Punitive,” which the court treated as a PCRA petition. The PCRA court 

appointed counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley2 “no merit” letter and petition 

to withdraw, which the PCRA court granted. The PCRA court denied Bunting’s 

petition as untimely, with no exception to the one-year time bar pled or 

proven. Bunting timely appealed.3 (See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/13/18, at 

3-4). He and the court complied with the requirements of Rule 1925. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

A PCRA petition “shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment becomes final at the 

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1 Under SORNA, the sentencing judge is to inform the offender that he or she 

has to register under SORNA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.20. However, the sentencing 

court’s failure to do so is irrelevant: “Failure by the court to provide the 

information . . . to correctly inform . . . or to require a sexual offender to 

register shall not relieve the sexual offender from the requirements of this 

subchapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.23(b)(1). In fact, with limited exceptions, a 

court has “no authority to relieve a sexual offender from the duty to register 

. . . or to modify the requirements[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.23(b)(2).

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

3 “Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining whether the 

PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its 

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 

130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted).
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conclusion of direct review by this Court or the United States Supreme Court 

or at the expiration of the time for seeking such review. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3). “The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional; 

therefore, a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the 

petition was not timely filed[,]” unless an appellant pleads and proves a 

timeliness exception. Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012) 

(citations omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).4 “The PCRA 

squarely places upon the petitioner the burden of proving an untimely petition 

fits within one of the three exceptions.” Jones, supra at 17 (citation 

omitted). The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA petitions, regardless 

of the nature of the individual claims raised therein. See Jones, supra at 17 

(citation omitted).

In this case, Bunting’s judgment of sentence became final on March 2, 

2017. Therefore, he had one year from that date to file a petition for collateral 

relief unless he pleaded and proved that a timeliness exception applied. See 

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Because Bunting’s petition was filed on June 

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4 The three exceptions that allow for review of an untimely PCRA petition are 

limited to: (1) the petitioner’s inability to raise a claim because of 

governmental interference; (2) the discovery of previously unknown facts that 

would have supported a claim; and (3) a newly recognized constitutional right. 

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke these 

exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been 

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v.

Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000).
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20, 2018, it is untimely on its face and we lack jurisdiction to consider its merit

unless he pleads and proves one of the statutory exceptions to the time bar.

Although Bunting argues that the court erred in denying his PCRA 

petition because SORNA is unconstitutionally punitive, (see Bunting’s Brief, at 

v), we lack jurisdiction to consider this issue where he failed to either 

acknowledge the untimeliness of his petition or argue the applicability of a 

timeliness exception. (See id. at 1-15). Because he has failed to meet his 

burden of pleading and proving a timeliness exception, we lack jurisdiction to 

review the merits of his claim. See Jones, supra at 17.

Additionally, even if we were to ignore that his reliance on

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. 

Ct. 925 (2018) is misplaced5 because its holding does not apply to him, 

Bunting still is not due any relief.

6

 (See PCRA Ct. Op., at 3). In fact, this 

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5

In Muniz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the retroactive 

application of SORNA’s registration scheme to sexual offenders who 

committed their crimes before the SORNA’s effective date violates 

Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause because of the scheme’s punitive nature. 

See Muniz, supra at 1217. Muniz does not hold that SORNA is 

unconstitutional nor does it invalidate SORNA’s registration requirements. It 

holds only that SORNA violates the ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution when its provisions are applied retroactively. See 

Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 667 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2017).

6 Muniz was decided on July 19, 2017. Therefore, Bunting failed to comply 

with the requirement that he file his petition within sixty days of the date when 

the claim could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); 

Gamboa-Taylor, supra at 783.
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Court has expressly held that Muniz does not satisfy the requirements of 

Section 9545(b)(1)(iii). See Commonwealth v. Greco, ___ A.3d ___, 2019 

WL 510129, at*4 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 8, 2019).

There are two requirements for the applicability of the newly recognized 

constitutional right exception to the PCRA. “First, [42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) 

requires] that the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or [the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court] after the time provided in this section. Second, it provides that the 

right “has been held” by “that court” to apply “retroactively.” 

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402, 405 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted).

In Greco, like Bunting, the appellant challenged the application of 

SORNA’s registration provision on the basis of Muniz in an untimely PCRA 

petition. In considering the issue, “we acknowledge[d] that this Court has

declared that ‘Muniz created a substantive rule that retroactively applies in

the collateral context.’” Greco, supra at *4 (citing Commonwealth v.

Rivera-Figueroa, 174 A.3d 674, 678 (Pa. Super. 2017)). We found,

however, that

because [a]ppellant’s PCRA petition is untimely (unlike the

petition at issue in Rivera-Figueroa), he must demonstrate that

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Muniz applies

retroactively in order to satisfy section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Because

at this time, no such holding has been issued by our Supreme

Court, [a]ppellant cannot rely on Muniz to meet that timeliness

exception.
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Greco, supra at *4 (citations omitted).

Based on the foregoing, Bunting failed to plead and prove the 

applicability of the newly discovered constitutional right exception by relying 

on Muniz.

7

 Additionally, he has failed to establish any other timeliness 

exception. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of his 

petition. See Jones, supra at 16-17. We affirm the PCRA court’s order 

dismissing Bunting’s petition as untimely.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/20/2019

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7 Moreover, as we noted previously, Bunting would be due no relief based on 

Muniz, even if it did satisfy the requirements of the timeliness exception,

because Muniz is inapplicable to him. In Muniz, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court held that the retroactive application of SORNA’s registration scheme 

to sexual offenders who committed their crimes before the SORNA’s 

effective date violates Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause. SORNA’s 

effective date was December 12, 2012. Bunting committed his crimes in 

2015. Hence, the holding of Muniz does not apply to him because SORNA 

was not retroactively applied to him in violation of ex post facto provisions. 

See Commonwealth v. Horning, 193 A.3d 411, 417 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(holding that critical inquiry for determining whether application of SORNA to 

a convicted sex offender violates ex post facto prohibitions is the date of the 

offense).