FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LONE STAR SECURITY AND VIDEO,

INC., a California corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CITY OF

SANTA CLARITA; CITY OF RANCHO

CUCAMONGA; CITY OF LOMA LINDA,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-55014

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-02113-

ODW-MRW

SAMI AMMARI, an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-55050

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-04644-

ODW-MRW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 11, 2016

Pasadena, California
2 LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Filed July 7, 2016

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Mary H. Murguia,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Murguia;

Concurrence by Judge Owens

SUMMARY*

Constitutional Law

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment in favor

of defendant municipalities, the panel held that five city

ordinances regulating mobile billboards withstood First

Amendment scrutiny as content-neutral, reasonable, time,

place, and manner restrictions on speech.

One of the ordinances limited the type of sign that could

be affixed to motor vehicles parked or left standing on public

streets, and the others prohibited non-motorized, “mobile

billboard advertising displays” within city limits. 

Distinguishing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218

(2015), the panel held that the ordinances were content

neutral. The panel concluded that the word “advertising” did

not render the ordinances content based on their face, and the

ordinances regulated the manner, not the content, of affected

speech. The panel held that the ordinances were narrowly

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 3

tailored to significant government interests in traffic control,

public safety, and aesthetics. In addition, the ordinances left

open adequate alternative opportunities for advertising.

Concurring in the majority’s opinion, Judge Owens wrote

that the Supreme Court should take a second look at Members

of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for

Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984), because if “aesthetics” are to

play a part in speech restriction, then they should apply

equally to all unattractive signs or decals.

COUNSEL

George M. Wallace (argued), Wallace, Brown & Schwartz,

Pasadena, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Kimberly A. Erickson (argued), Deputy City Attorney;

Ronald S. Whitaker, Assistant City Attorney; Thomas H.

Peters, Chief Assistant City Attorney; Michael N. Feuer, City

Attorney; Office of the City Attorney, Los Angeles,

California, for Defendant-Appellee City of Los Angeles.

Joseph P. Buchman (argued), Brian A. Pierick, and Joseph M.

Montes, City Attorney; Burke, Williams & Sorensen LLP,

Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee City of

Santa Clarita.

Richard E. Holdaway (argued), City Attorney, Robbins &

Holdaway, Ontario, California, for Defendant-Appellee City

of Loma Linda.
4 LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Jules S. Zeman, Kevin M. Osterberg, Melinda Carrido, and

Vangi M. Johnson; Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP, Los

Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellee City of Rancho

Cucamonga.

OPINION

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated appeals concern the constitutionality

of five city ordinances that regulate mobile billboards. One

of the ordinances limits the type of sign that may be affixed

to motor vehicles parked or left standing on public streets; the

other ordinances prohibit non-motorized, “mobile billboard

advertising displays” within city limits. Appellants, who

have been subject to enforcement under the ordinances,

brought suit against the municipalities arguing that the mobile

billboard laws impermissibly restrict their freedom of speech

in violation of the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the

municipalities. We hold that the ordinances withstand First

Amendment scrutiny as content-neutral, reasonable, time,

place, and manner restrictions on speech. See Long Beach

Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011,

1019 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Between 2010 and 2012, the California Legislature

enacted a series of amendments to the Vehicle Code

empowering local municipalities to regulate mobile

billboards, which the Legislature found to blight city streets,
LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 5

endanger residents, and reduce available on-street parking.

1

See Assemb. B. 2756, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); see

also Assemb. B. 1298, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011);

Assemb. B. 2291, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). The

new sections of the Vehicle Code authorized cities to adopt

laws penalizing the parking of portable, non-motorized,

wheeled vehicles that carry signs and are “for the primary

purpose of advertising”—known as “mobile billboard

advertising displays.” See Cal. Veh. Code §§ 395.5,

21100(m), 22651(v). The enabling legislation also allowed

cities to regulate motor vehicles bearing “advertising signs”

that are not “permanently affixed” and that “extend beyond

the overall length, width, or height of the vehicle.” See id.

§ 21100(p)(2). Under the Vehicle Code, an advertising sign

is “permanently affixed” if it is “[p]ainted directly on the

body of a motor vehicle” or “[a]pplied as a decal.” Id.

§ 21100(p)(3). In sum, these code sections authorized cities

to regulate two types of mobile billboard advertising:

advertisements affixed to portable, non-motorized, wheeled

vehicles (“non-motorized mobile billboards”), and

advertisements attached to motorized vehicles (“motorized

mobile billboards”).

In response, the cities of Los Angeles, Santa Clarita,

Rancho Cucamonga, and Loma Linda passed virtually

identical ordinances banning one or both types of mobile

 

1 Under California law, a vehicle can be removed and impounded only

when that action is expressly authorized by the California Vehicle Code. 

Cal. Veh. Code § 22650 (“It is unlawful for any peace officer . . . to

remove any unattended vehicle from a highway to a garage or to any other

place, except as provided in this code. . . .”). Before 2010, impounding a

legally parked vehicle because it was a mobile billboard was not

authorized by the California Vehicle Code, and thus exceeded local

governments’ authority.
6 LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

billboards and permitting public officials to exact civil

penalties and impound vehicles sporting signs that violate the

ordinances. The cities’ ordinances mirror and explicitly

reference the California Legislature’s amendments to the

Vehicle Code. For example, section 87.54 of the Los

Angeles Municipal Code (the “motorized mobile billboard

ordinance”) provides, in pertinent part:

A motor vehicle maycontain advertising signs

that are painted directly upon or are

permanently affixed to the body of, an integral

part of, or fixture of a motor vehicle for

permanent decoration, identification, or

display and that do not extend beyond the

overall length, width, or height of the vehicle. 

Advertising signs that are painted directly

upon or permanently affixed to a motor

vehicle shall not be painted directly upon or

permanently affixed in such a manner as to

make the motor vehicle unsafe to be driven,

moved, parked or left standing on any public

street or public lands in the City. Motor

vehicles that pose a safety hazard shall be

impounded pursuant to [the] California

Vehicle Code . . . .

L.A. Mun. Code § 87.54 (2012). The other four ordinances

(the “non-motorized mobile billboard ordinances”) make it

unlawful to park a “mobile billboard advertising display” on

any public street within city limits. See L.A. Mun. Code

§ 87.53 (2013); Loma Linda Mun. Code § 10.36.070 (2011);

Rancho Cucamonga Mun. Code § 10.52.080 (2011); Santa

Clarita Mun. Code § 12.84 (2011). The non-motorized

mobile billboard ordinances all incorporate the definition of
LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 7

“mobile billboard advertising display” codified at California

Vehicle Code section 395.5: “advertising display[s]” that are

attached to non-motorized vehicles, carry a sign or billboard,

and are “for the primary purpose of advertising.”

Appellants Lone Star Security & Video, Inc. and Sami

Ammari own mobile billboards that are subject to the cities’

bans. Lone Star Security operates a fleet of standalone

trailers that were specially constructed to display signs or

banners, which Lone Star Security uses to advertise its

burglary alarm services as well as other products and political

causes. Ammari promotes his Los Angeles-based businesses

by bolting signs to motor vehicles that he parks on city

streets. After the ordinances took effect, Lone Star Security

and Ammari brought suit alleging that the mobile billboard

bans are facially invalid because they abridge the freedom of

speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Lone Star

Securityspecificallychallenges the cities’ prohibition on nonmotorized mobile billboard advertising displays, whereas

Ammari’s case concerns the constitutionality of Los

Angeles’s regulation of mobile billboards on parked,

motorized vehicles.

Lone Star Security was last before this court in 2013,

when a panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a

preliminary injunction blocking the cities from enforcing the

non-motorized mobile billboard ordinances. See Lone Star

Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, No. 12-56333 (9th

Cir. Mar. 21, 2013). Upon remand, the district court

consolidated Lone Star Security’s case with Ammari’s, who

had filed his complaint shortly before Lone Star Security’s

first appeal. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the

district court concluded that the mobile billboard bans were

content-neutral, reasonable, time, place, and manner
8 LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

restrictions on speech that did not violate the First

Amendment. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in

favor of the cities and against Lone Star Security and

Ammari. These appeals followed.

DISCUSSION

The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits state and local

governments from enacting laws “abridging the freedom of

speech.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226

(2015) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). Certain types of

speech regulations are presumptively invalid, including laws

that “target speech based on its communicative content. Id. 

These kinds of regulations are strictly scrutinized and will be

upheld only if “they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling

state interests.” Id. Laws affecting speech in traditional

public fora like sidewalks and city streets are also

presumptively invalid, Long Beach Area, 574 F.3d at

1020–22, 1024, although the government may impose

reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in

traditional public fora so long as the restrictions are content

neutral, are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant

governmental interest,” and “leave open ample alternative

channels for communication of the information.” Clark v.

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).

The cities bear the burden of proving the constitutionality

of the ordinances at issue. See United States v. Playboy

Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) (“When the

Government restricts speech, the Government bears the

burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”). 

Because Appellants raise facial challenges to the municipal

ordinances, we will strike down the mobile billboard
LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 9

regulations if they are “unconstitutional in every conceivable

application,” or if they “seek[] to prohibit such a broad range

of protected conduct that [they are] unconstitutionally

overbroad.” See Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629,

635 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Members of City Council of City

of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796

(1984)). The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case,

so “the only question we must determine is whether the

district court correctly applied the law.” EEOC v. Luce,

Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir.

2003) (citation omitted).

I. Content Neutrality

The parties concede that all of the ordinances at issue bear

upon interests that the First Amendment protects. Thus, we

consider first whether the regulations are content neutral or

content based.2 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–27.

A regulation is content based if, “on its face,” it “draws

distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.” Id. at

2

In affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction to Lone Star

Security, a panel of this court found that the non-motorized mobile

billboard ordinances are content neutral. The panel relied on our holding

in Reed v. Town of Gilbert(“Reed I”), 587 F.3d 966 (9thCir. 2009), which

concluded that a sign regulation restricting the size, duration, and location

of directional signs was content neutral. Id. at 977; accord Reed v. Town

of Gilbert (“Reed II”), 707 F.3d 1057, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2013). That

holding, however, was later overruled by the Supreme Court. See Reed,

135 S. Ct. at 2232. Therefore, we revisit the content neutrality of the

mobile billboard bans in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed. 

See United States v. Bad Marriage, 439 F.3d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 2006)

(explaining that the law of the case need not be followed when

“intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate”

(citation omitted)).
10 LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

2227. A regulation that defines regulated speech by a

particular subject matter or that discriminates between

viewpoints is plainly content based. Id. at 2227, 2230. For

example, the Supreme Court recently held that an ordinance

that imposed more stringent restrictions on signs directing the

public to a church meeting than on “political” signs was

content based. See id. at 2232. In addition, an ostensibly

viewpoint-neutral law is content based if it was “adopted by

the government because of disagreement with the message

the speech conveys.” Id. at 2227 (internal quotation marks

and alterations omitted).

By its terms, the motorized billboard ordinance regulates

the way in which “advertising signs” may be affixed to motor

vehicles on city streets. The non-motorized billboard

ordinances likewise apply to “mobile billboard advertising

displays” within the meaning of California Vehicle Code

section 395.5, which includes as part of the definition that the

vehicle be “for the primary purpose of advertising.” Neither

the California Vehicle Code nor the mobile billboard

ordinances define “advertising,” however, and Appellants

insist that the ordinances are content based because they

distinguish between billboards that “advertise” and all other

signs, such as those that do not advertise. Appellants’

argument, in essence, is that the only signs that “advertise”

are those that propose a commercial transaction.3

 

3

 Appellants have not directly challenged the mobile billboard laws on

the grounds that they unduly restrict “commercial speech” in the

constitutional sense—in fact, Lone Star Security objects that the

ordinances affect his ability to convey political messages regarding local

elected officials or ballot proposals usingmobile billboards. Nevertheless,

Appellants appear to overwhelmingly conflate “advertising” speech with

“commercial speech,” which refers to speech that “does ‘no more than

propose a commercial transaction.’” See Coyote Pub., Inc. v. Miller,
LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 11

We disagree that the word “advertising” renders the

challenged regulations content based on their face. In the

context of mobile billboard regulations, the California Court

of Appeal has already recognized that the word “advertising”

refers to the activity of displaying a message to the public,

not to any particular content that may be displayed. In

Showing Animals Respect & Kindness v. City of West

Hollywood, the California Court of Appeal rejected a

constitutional challenge to a nearly identical municipal ban

on mobile billboard advertising displays after finding that the

ordinance was content neutral.4

See 166 Cal. App. 4th 815,

819–20, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 134, 137–38 (2008). The plaintiff

in that case was a non-profit organization that used mobile

billboards—accompaniedwith loudspeaker announcements—

to protest animal cruelty. The California Court of Appeal

concluded that West Hollywood’s “advertising” ban was

598 F.3d 592, 598 (9th Cir. 2010). But, although laws that restrict only

commercial speech are content based, see Reed III, 135 S. Ct. at 2232,

such restrictions need only withstand intermediate scrutiny. See Central

Hudson Gas &Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S.

557, 564 (1980) (requiring that laws affecting commercial speech seek to

implement a substantial governmental interest, directly advance that

interest, and reach no further than necessary to accomplish the given

objective).

4 West Hollywood Municipal Code section 11.44.020 states: “It is

unlawful for any person to conduct, or cause to be conducted, any mobile

billboard advertising upon any street, or other public place within the city

in which the public has the right of travel. . . . Mobile billboard advertising

includes any vehicle, or wheeled conveyance which carries, conveys,

pulls, or transports any sign or billboard for the primary purpose of

advertising.” However, the ordinance exempted from the prohibition the

following: “[a]ny vehicle which displays an advertisement or business

identification of its owner, so long as such vehicle is engaged in the usual

business or regular work of the owner, and not used merely, mainly or

primarily to display advertisements,” as well as buses and taxicabs. Id.
12 LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

content neutral because it did not differentiate between

categories of speech:

The term “advertise” is not limited to calling

the public’s attention to a product or a

business. The definition of “advertise” is more

general: “to make something known to[;] . . .

to make publicly and generally known[;] . . .

to announce publicly esp[ecially] by a printed

notice or a broadcast . . . .” (Merrian

[sic]–Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed.,

1995) p. 18; italics added.) Thus, although the

subject of the matter brought to notice may be

commercial, it is not necessarily so. Messages

endorsing a political candidate, a social cause

or a religious belief would also fall within the

term “advertise.”

Id. at 819–20, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 138. The California Court

of Appeal further noted that the ordinance defined “mobile

billboard advertising” as “anyvehicle or wheeled conveyance

which carries, conveys, pulls, or transports any sign or

billboard,” and reasoned that these active verbs demonstrated

that “the ordinance [was] concerned with the speaker’s acts,

not the content of the speech.” Id. at 823, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at

140–41.

In evaluating a facial challenge we “must consider the

[municipality’s] authoritative constructions of the ordinance,

including its own implementation and interpretation of it.” 

Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131

(1992); see also Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395,

1399 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that we defer to a state court’s

interpretation of its own laws unless that interpretation is
LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 13

“untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review

of a constitutional violation”). We will “follow the decision

of the intermediate appellate courts of the state unless there

is convincing evidence that the highest court of the state

would decide differently.” In re Schwarzkopf, 626 F.3d 1032,

1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Owen ex. rel Owen v. United

States, 713 F.2d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983)). The definition

of “advertising” that the California Court of Appeal

articulated in Showing Animals Respect is neither untenable

nor an obvious subterfuge to avoid federal review. See

166 Cal. App. 4th at 819–20, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 138 (holding

that the term “advertising” applies to both commercial and

noncommercial speech). Therefore, absent convincing

evidence that the California Supreme Court would construe

the term “advertise” in this situation differently, we cannot

depart from the construction of the California Court of

Appeal; neither Appellant offers such evidence. Accordingly,

we hold that the mobile billboard bans regulate the

manner—not the content—of affected speech. The

ordinances address only the types of sign-bearing vehicles

subject to regulation, and discriminate against prohibited

billboards on the basis of their size and mobility alone, and

are thus content neutral. Even a regulated vehicle bearing a

blank sign could conceivably violate the ordinances.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Reed does not

alter our conclusion.5 Unlike Reed, the mobile billboard

ordinances do not single out a specific subject matter for

5

In Reed, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor,

wrote separately to opine that rules regulating the “size of signs” or “the

locations in which signs may be placed,” including rules that “distinguish

between free-standing signs and those attached to buildings” would not be

content based. 135 S. Ct. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring).
14 LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

differential treatment, nor is any kind of mobile billboard

exempted from regulation based on its content. There has

been no suggestion that the ordinances apply differently to

Lone Star Security’s political endorsements than to its

commercial promotional campaigns, for example. Rather, an

officer seeking to enforce the non-motorized billboard

ordinances must decide only whether an offending vehicle

constitutes a prohibited “advertising display” because its

primary purpose is to display messages, as opposed to

transporting passengers or carrying cargo. Cf. S.O.C., Inc. v.

County of Clark, 152 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998)

(holding that a county ordinance that prohibited canvassing

on public streets and sidewalks within the Las Vegas resort

district was content based, for First Amendment purposes,

because any officer seeking to enforce the ordinance would

need to examine the contents of a leaflet to determine whether

the ordinance prohibited its distribution). In the case of the

motorized billboard ordinance, an enforcing officer would

simply need to distinguish between signs that are permanent

or non-permanent, and larger or smaller than the vehicles to

which the signs are affixed to determine whether the vehicle

violates the ordinance. See id. Therefore, the district court

appropriately found the ordinances to be content neutral.

II. Narrowly Tailored to a Significant Government

Interest

The parties do not dispute that the cities’ stated interests

in traffic control, public safety, and aesthetics are sufficiently

weighty to justify content-neutral, time, place, or manner

restrictions on speech, nor could they. The Supreme Court

and this Court have repeatedly confirmed that local

governments may exercise their police powers to advance

these goals by prohibiting intrusive or unsightly forms of
LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 15

expression. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808; G.K.

Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1072–73

(9th Cir. 2006). Instead, we focus on whether the mobile

billboard regulations are narrowly tailored to the cities’

interests.

A speech regulation is narrowly tailored if it “promotes a

substantial government interest that would be achieved less

effectively absent the regulation.” Ward v. Rock Against

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (citation omitted). The

fact that “the government’s interest could be adequately

served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative” will not

invalidate an otherwise reasonable time, place, or manner

restriction “[s]o long as the means chosen are not

substantially broader than necessary.” Id. at 800.

None of the ordinances in this case are “substantially

broader than necessary” to accomplish the cities’ goals of 

eliminating visual blight and promoting the safe and

convenient flow of traffic. Controlling case law compels our

conclusion that the cities’ interest in aesthetics alone justifies

the ordinances. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808

(holding that a total restriction on a certain type of visual

advertising is narrowly tailored because, by banning the type

of signs that the city determined to constitute “visual clutter

and blight,” the city “did no more than eliminate the exact

source of the evil it sought to remedy”). Under this binding

precedent, it is therefore enough that the Appellees believed

that the advertising displays prohibited by the mobile

billboard regulations detract from the cities’ overall

appearance; the outright ban directly serves this stated

interest.
16 LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Further, by removing from city streets vehicles that have

no purpose other than advertising, the mobile billboard

regulations are narrowly tailored to the cities’ interests in

parking control and reducing traffic hazards. Because the

utility of mobile billboards stems from owners’ ability to park

them for periods of hours or days at a time, they reduce

available on-street parking. Non-motorized mobile billboards

are also likely to impair pedestrians’ and drivers’ visibility

and pose a safety risk to motorists who are forced to veer

around them into the next lane of traffic to bypass them. 

And, they may roll onto the roadway after being parked.

In addition, the motorized billboard ordinance serves Los

Angeles’s asserted interest in public safety by prohibiting

non-permanently affixed signs and permanently affixed signs

that are larger than the dimensions of a vehicle. Temporary

signs, by their nature, are impermanent and thus pose a

greater danger to pedestrians and motor vehicles because of

the risk that they will come detached.6 Signs larger than the

dimensions of the vehicle are also more likely to obstruct

traffic and impede drivers’ field of vision. For instance, some

of Ammari’s billboards blocked the side and rear windows of

his vans, reducing the operator’s ability to see passing cars,

pedestrians, or other roadside hazards.

The cities’ goals would be achieved less effectively

absent the challenged regulations. See Ward, 491 U.S. at

799. Mobile billboards are difficult to control precisely

6 The City of Los Angeles offered another rationale for § 87.54—that

temporary signs pose a safety risk when the vehicle is “driven during high

wind conditions.” As § 87.54 is a parking ordinance, driving-related

safety risks are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to justify the speech

restrictions imposed by the regulation.
LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 17

because they can be moved in and out of a jurisdiction with

ease. As the Supreme Court has noted, if a municipality “has

a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic

hazards and are unattractive, then obviously the most direct

and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the

problems they create is to prohibit them.” See Metromedia,

Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981).

III. Alternatives

Lastly, to satisfy the First Amendment, a time, place, and

manner regulation must “leave open ample alternative

channels for communication.” Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 

“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to

communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any

manner that may be desired.” Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for

Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981). 

However, “a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid

if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate.” 

Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.

The mobile billboard ordinances leave open adequate

alternative opportunities for advertising. The challenged

regulations foreclose only one form of expression—mobile

billboards—by placing limited restrictions on the types of

vehicles to which mobile billboards may be affixed (vehicles

whose primary purpose is something other than advertising),

and the manner in which billboard advertisements can be

displayed on a motor vehicle (in a permanent fashion and no

larger than the dimensions of the vehicle). Appellants are

free to disseminate their messages through myriad other

channels, such as stationary billboards, bus benches, flyers,

newspapers, or handbills. Appellants may also paint signs on

vehicles and attach decals or bumper stickers. Although
18 LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

mobile billboards are a unique mode of communication,

nothing in the record suggests that Appellants’ overall

“ability to communicate effectively is threatened.” 

Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812. Therefore, given the

ample alternative modes of advertising available in the

Appellee cities, we will not invalidate the mobile billboard

bans merely because they restrict Appellants’ preferred

method of communication. Id.; G.K. Ltd. Travel, 436 F.3d at

1074. The remaining alternatives for expressive conduct are

sufficient to vindicateAppellants’ First Amendment interests.

Because the mobile billboard ordinances are content

neutral, narrowly tailored to serve the governments’

significant aesthetic and safety interests, and leave open

ample alternative channels of communication, the judgment

of the district court is AFFIRMED.

OWENS, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the majority’s opinion, as it faithfully follows

the current controlling case law. I write separately because,

in my view, the Supreme Court should take a second look at

an important aspect of Members of City Council of City of

Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).

This case is about ugly signs on vehicles, and no doubt I

would not want these vehicles and their signs parked in front

of my house. But under the ordinances at issue, a car with

equally ugly decals—including a decal of a vehicle with an

ugly sign—would not “go to jail,” but instead treat my curb

like the upper left corner of a Monopoly board.
LONE STAR SEC. & VIDEO V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 19

If “aesthetics” are to play a part in speech restriction, then

such aesthetics should apply equally, decal or sign. Yet under

Taxpayers for Vincent, the Court rejected the very point that

I now make. See 466 U.S. 810–12 (rejecting the Ninth

Circuit’s holding that “a prohibition against the use of

unattractive signs cannot be justified on esthetic grounds if it

fails to apply to all equally unattractive signs wherever they

might be located”). I think our court was right then, and the

Supreme Court should reconsider this portion of Taxpayers

for Vincent. As it currently stands, politicians can use

Taxpayers for Vincent and its beholderish “aesthetics” to

covertly ensure homogeneous thinking and political

discourse. That is a dimension we should avoid. See The

Twilight Zone: Eye of the Beholder(CBS television broadcast

Nov. 11, 1960).