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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 16 AND 17, 1965 •

PART'2.

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

48-902 WASHINGTON: 1965
15.24 4

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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota

SAM J. ERVIN, Ja., North Carolina CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska

ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska JACOB K. JAVITS, New York

EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine MILWARD L. SIMPSON, Wyoming

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut

FRED R. HARRIS, Oklahoma

ROBERT F. KENNEDY, New York

LEE METCALF, Montana

JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico

WALTER L. REYNOLDS, Chief Clerk and Staff Director

ARTHUR A. SHARP, Staff Editor

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, Chairman

EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut JACOB K. JAVITS, New York

FRED R. HARRIS, Oklahoma MILWARD L. SIMPSON, Wyoming

ROBERT F. KENNEDY, New York

LEE METCALF, Montana

DOROTHY FOSDICK, Staff Director

ROBERT W. TUFTS, Chief Consultant

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, Special Consultant

+011100 CTOR R. SWENSON, Research Assistant

44 

44'4 

L A. ENGBERG, MinOrity COM/Want

JUDITH J. SPAHR, Chief Clerk

I
CONTENTS

JUNE 16, 1965

Page

Opening statement, Senator Henry M. Jackson 77

Testimony of Gen. Thomas D. White 78

JUNE 17, 1965

Opening statement, Senator Henry M. Jackson 101

Testimony of Dr. Walter H. Brattain 102

III

CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1965

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON 'GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

TV asking ton, D .0 .

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3110,

New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Harris, Kennedy of New York, Metcalf, and Simpson.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Victor R.

Swenson, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel

A. Engberg, minority consultant.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning our Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations continues its hearings on the conduct of national

security policy. The subcommittee is studying problem areas of the

national security policy process and of international operations. The

main questions of concern to the subcommittee are indicated in our

initial memorandum.

This inquiry is being conducted on a professional and nonpartisan

basis, and we will make suggestions and recommendations for improvement as appropriate. For our opening group of hearings, we have

invited a number of distinguished Americans with a reputation for

independent judgment to speak to the challenges facing this country in

key areas of national policy and operations that affect our capacity to

act effectively in international affairs.

Our witness today has dedicated more than four decades of his life

to the service of his country. General White graduated from the U.S.

Military 'Academy at West Point in June 1920. He served in the

grades of second lieutenant through general and retired as Chief of

Staff, U.S. Air Force, on June 30,1961.

In the course of his career he served in many parts of the world and

in many key posts at home. For example, he was a Chinese language

officer in 1927-1931, in Peking, China, our first Air Attache to the

Soviet Union in Moscow 1934-1935, and Chief of the U.S. Air Mission

to Brazil 1940-1942. He was Chief of Staff, Pacific Air Command in

Tokyo and Commander, Fifth Air Force in Nagoya, Japan, during

the years 1945-1948. He served successively as Director of Plans;

77
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations; Vice Chief of Staff and Chief of

Staff, United States Air Force.

General White's notable career has been recognized by the award of

the Distinguished Service Medal; the Legion of Merit and Air Medal,

each one with one oak leaf cluster; and he is the recipient of numerous

foreign decorations.

It is hardly appropriate, of course, to speak of General White as

retired. He is a Contributing Editor of Newsweek magazine. Recently, he served as Chairman of the Special Advisory Committee on

the United States Air Force Academy. Among his other activities,

he is a member of the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency and the Board of Consultants of the

National War College.

In these days balanced, diversified American military power is

essential to effective national security policies. By and large, the

United States has done a good job in recent years in building its military strength. The question now is whether we will continue to make

major advances in military technology to maintain and improve our

deterrent capability, and whether we will use our military power

wisely to help protect and advance our enlightened national interests.

General White, we are indeed honored to have you with us today.

You bring to our discussion a rich background of experience and

understanding of military-foreign policy problems.

I want to add also that I know you made a special effort to be here

this morning and we are in your debt for that. You may proceed in

your own way.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL THOMAS D. WHITE, USAF, RETIRED

FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a formal statement which I believe is customary to present and with your permission

I would like to read it.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, for a long time I have

followed with keen interest your continuing and penetrating review

of the national security process. Therefore, I appear before this

committee with a great sense of privilege.

At the beginning I must point out that whatever views I have stem

from many years' service as a career officer in the United States Air

Force and from my four most recent years in retired status. This latter period has involved me in numerous civilian activities ranging all

the way from being a columnist for Newsweek Magazine, to engaging in

business affairs and to serving as a member of the General Advisory

Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Result:

I have views on a great many of the problems that you are concerned

with—but on only a few do I have convictions. It is some of these

last that I would like to cover here.

First, it seems to me that a great many Americans believe that an

atomic war is impossible.

We should, indeed, strive to make such a war or any war impossible. But let us be sure that the wish is not father to the thought.

If it could be said that human nature has changed, then there could
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 79

be some basis for the view that atomic war is impossible or at least

unlikely. But, in my opinion, it is a fallacy,to consider that the

development of a particular weapon (the atomic weapon) has altered

mankind. On the scale of biological time this seems to me to have

no more validity than such an observation would have had when an

ancestor of Mao Tse-tung invented gunpowder.

Many anthropologists say that man has been a bloodthirsty aggressor throughout his evolution. Can it now be said that the human

being has changed his fundamental nature and at last is ready to

forego the use of his most fearsome weapon?

If it could be said that major war is impossible because statesmen

have become wise enough to avoid war, then something new in the

history of mankind has happened.

The historian would surely point out that there have been wars of

national extinction since the beginning of human history. The last

such war ended only 20 years ago—a mere instant in either historical

or biological time. Can the historian give assurance that the recurring pattern of major wars will not project into the future because

mankind now has the nuclear bomb?

Last November I toured the Near and Middle East. I was impressed by the efforts of countless archaeologists digging and probing

to uncover the history of man. They were digging up vestiges of

civilizations and empires long expired—expired because in one way or

another they failed. Some failed in economic progress, some expired

because they did not keep up in technology, others made strategic

errors, and some crumbled because of internal weakness.

I am sobered as I contemplate our own disorderly world. Our

modern world is profoundly affected by scientific developments,

political movements and natural phenomena that have a periodicity of

decades or of centuries or more, while our problem-solving responses

oscillate only in about four or five year cycles. It seems to me m this

age of atomics and space that what we need more is the exact opposite

of archaeologists, useful as members of that profession may be. We

ought to be going all out to foresee and influence our destiny for at

least 25 years ahead.

Little about the future will be clear. But I suggest that several

things are quite discernible now—and all of them are ominous.

(a) Communism will still be our critical enemy; its threat will

continue to exist on every front—military, economic and ideological.

(b) Communist China will become a first class atomic power with

sufficient weapon stockpile and delivery systems to threaten the rest

of the world.

(e) Space and space weapons will become increasingly important

in war strategy.

These are a few military facets of the medium term future as I see

them.

As for the recent past it should be noted that in only 11 years time

the United States has been involved in military crises in 9 different

areas of the world ranging from Korea to Cuba. In at least three of

those crises (Suez, Berlin, Cuba) global war was certainly a possible

outcome.

Currently, of course, we are settling our involvement in Santo

Domingo. We are also deeply engaged in a war in Southeast Asia.
80, CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Moreover 'we have troops, ships and aircraft deployed all over the

world in support of our basic strategy.

That global war is not impossible seems established under the

future, past and present circumstances cited. Aside from this, however, some other important military conclusions can be drawn.

For example: each of our military involvements has demanded

different degrees of force or "shows of force". There is a requirement for varying types of military units to carry out our strategies.

The Korean War was largely a land and air force affair, QuemoyMatsu predominantly naval, while the Cuban missile confrontation of

1962 involved all forces.

In almost every crisis, unseen, unheard and unpublicized at the time

in the U.S. but well known to the Russians, our strategic forces were

on instant alert. Our strategic bombers, intercontinental missiles and

our Polaris missile fleet, though not actual participants in any shooting, were powerful elements of our strategy. They served as a steel

and atomic umbrella under which all other action could take place.

In every instance our diplomats and the Department of State were

also involved—prior to and concurrently with each military crisis.

Perhaps one might say that our diplomatic service and the Department of State constitute our first line of defense—not the Armed.

Forces and the Department of Defense. However, in this age of instant world-girdling diplomatic communications and of trans-ocean

military deployments executed in hours, these two key arms of our

national security must, in fact, be as closely coordinated as hand in

glove.

Our foreign policymakers must understand, as never before, the

capabilities and limitations of our Armed Forces. Likewise the military command must not only understand thoroughly its missions in

terms of foreign policy but it must also have opportunity to express

the military viewpoint in policy decisions.

The military have the mission of carrying out, but not making, national policy whenever force is an element. It is not a requirement

of good national security operations that national policy be always

based on sound military strategy or tactics. Higher considerations

sometimes though rarely, should prevail. Nevertheless it is palpably

true that when sound policy and sound strategy coincide results are

likely to be optimum.

We probably have had, until quite recently, an example of foreign

policy dictating, over a period of years, unsound strategy in southeast

_Asia. On the other hand, and on a much smaller scale, the recent

military operation in Santo Domingo seems to have been well timed

and fully coordinated.

In the realm of arms control and disarmament the utmost in free

and frequent discussion between the policymakers and the military is

vital. In the honest search for peace it is too easy to make a danfferous concession. While the military should not have responsibility for

arms control or disarmament their voice in deliberations is vital.

I am convinced that the United States must continue its efforts in

the direction of arms control.

I can simplify and rationalize this by suggesting that two men each

with a fatally loaded pistol pointed at the other probably would be

wise to talk and keep on talking.
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 81

Also it is barely possible that mankind and statesmen have achieved

something new in the world and that the atomic age will also become

the age of reason.

The advent of Communist China as an atomic power puts a whole

new element in the equation of arms control. If we look down the

road it must be plain that within the lifetime of more than half the

present population of the United States, Communist China can become

a menace to all future generations.

In addition to Communist China there are another dozen or so nations such as India, Israel, and Sweden with enough technical knowhow to build nuclear weapons either now or in the near future. In

some cases only the decision to go ahead is needed. If the spread or

proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be stopped, now is the time to

do it.

I should now like to summarize the foregoing and in the process formulate some corollaries.

The best insurance we can have against atomic war is great military

strength. We must maintain armaments and forces of all types needed

to successfully meet communism at all critical points. Most vitally we

must maintain decisive superiority in our strategic forces.

We hear much about the inevitability of "parity" of missile and

bomber forces. "Parity" or "stalemate" could be only a transient state.

Technology would be certain to upset it. The development of weapons

in space or a positive defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles

might be examples of the kind of technological advances that could

destroy any temporary balance in strategic forces.

Research and development is, therefore, the cornerstone of national

defense. It is vital that we hold the lead in military technology at

whatever cost.

The search for improvement in our national security problem-solving mechanisms is the particular province of your committee.

I have suggested that we do not look far enough into the future.

Perhaps one of the reasons is that we are so bogged-down with the

problems of today that few in government can even look beyond tomorrow.

Long observation and some personal experience convince me that as

a general rule our senior government officials are grossly overworked.

This applies to a great many members of the Congress. It particularly

applies to officials in the Department of State and to both the civil and

military in the Department of Defense.

I suggest that on the executive side of the government the tendency

to concentrate authority be reversed and the delegation of it be reinstituted as a major project in management improvement.

It seems to me that the Congress itself can do much to reduce its own

burden and to ease that of the Executive as well. Judicious combining of committees and the amalgamation of hearings on legislation occur to me as examples. No doubt there are many other areas with

which members of the committee are far more familiar than I.

I would encourage even closer relations between the Department of

State and Defense.

I read with interest a column by Mr. C. L. Sulzberger in the 23 May

issue of The New York Times. Mr. Sulzberger took account of the

important work being done by your committee and among other points

48-902-65-pt. 2-2
82 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

suggested that the Secretary of Defense exercises too heavy an influence

in the critically important State-Defense relationship.

Certainly I have no inside knowledge of the respective influences

of these two key national security departments. It is my judgment,

however, that they are about in balance and that in any case the

President, who is the final arbiter and authority in matters of national

security policy, gives full weight to both sides.

Nevertheless, revival of the machinery of the now inactive Planning

Board of the National Security Council to operate in the manner and

with the calibre of personnel of some years ago could provide a very

useful function. It would help prevent the possibility of the kind

of situation Mr. Sulzberger believes exists today.

The opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be another important element in the formulation and execution of national security

policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff must be preserved, with the Congress as their jealous guardian, as a nonpartisan, wholly professional

group dedicated solely to the objective execution of their statutory

duties—not the least of which is serving as the principal military

advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

In the endeavor to control armaments and achieve disarmament no

nation excels the United States. But we must be forever on our guard

not to accede to any provision of any arms agreement with a Communist state that does not provide for foolproof inspection. We must

never take anything in that respect on faith. The stakes are too

high—they could be our national survival.

The Communist Chinese atomic spectre has not had much impact—

yet. This is a perfect example of our failure to look very far into

the future. Perhaps one reason that both government and the press

are relatively silent on the subject is that nobody really knows what

to do about it.

Yet our responsible officials and the people of the world—those

who face now the urgent hour of decision in the crisis of nuclear

proliferation should take a long look at the destiny of man. We are

at the point of no return.

We can2 of course, proceed in the usual manner with conferences

and negotiations. This is the traditional procedure.

But the nuclear advent of Communist China demands something

new, and this problem should be very high on the national security

agenda.

I have read suggestions that we destroy the atomic installations

m China by missiles or bombers. This could be only a temporary

palliative and its long-range implications are totally unfavorable.

Finally, going back to the notion that war is impossible—it is this

kmd of complacency that can sap the vitals of the country. The

greatest danger that looms before us today is the euphoria of

ignorance.

It seems to me that this committee is doing much to throw light on

how the United States can use its influence and its power more wisely

and effectively in protecting our vital national interests.

This is precisely one of the facets of your mission and I consider it,

Mr. Chairman, a great honor to have had a small participation in

your endeavors. Thank you.
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 83

(The article referred to follows:)

[The New York Times, Sunday, May 23, 1965]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: STATE VS. PENTAGON IN POLICY

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

HANOVER, N.H.—Even though the present policy debate confirms the vigor of

American democracy, it is national and public rather than Congressional. Congress finds itself in a difficult position to dissent from the Executive during

crises, for, since the days of Truman, it has been in the habit of signing advance

Presidential blank checks. Now it is being mastered by an expert, Lyndon

Johnson..

Nevertheless, the extent of minority criticism on foreign affairs has not

escaped our legislators. This will surely be shown in new hearings to be

held by Senator Jackson's remarkable Subcommittee on National Security and

International Operations.

Ambiguous policy

This body is to inquire into ambiguities in policy elaboration and, as its

preliminary report says, the tendency of governmental departments and agencies "to mount their horses and ride off in all directions." The subcommittee

suspects resultant "disarray, inviting others, including members of Congress,

to peddle, sometimes in an irresponsible manner, their own special tonics for

our national aches and pains" and "unwarranted extension and scattering of

American commitments."

The Jackson group believes the relationship between the State and Defense

Departments is "central." It observes a "tendency of some American policymakers to treat psychological and political problems as if they were primarily

technical, and to try to solve political problems with technical expedients."

There has often been an abrupt air of improvisation in U.S. actions during

the past fifteen years. While Johnson is sometimes now excoriated, similar

tendencies have been evident since 1950. Already in 1955 Secretary Dulles

regarded endorsement of SEATO as tantamount to giving President Eisenhower

an advance blank check in Southeast Asia.

Dulles diplomacy

The diplomatic style of Dulles, who was allowed by Eisenhower to seize

the reins, was peripatetic, harsh and sometimes tricky. The Kennedy style

was awkward and deceptive at the time of the Bay of Pigs but later acquired

elegant assurance. The Johnson style has recently shown haste and clumsiness

although, underneath, the President calmly pursues essential goals.

Mr. Johnson relies heavily on Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and McGeorge

Bundy for help in making immediate decisions. Under Secretary Mann is high

on the list of subsidiary advisers and, while remaining anonymous, Vice President Humphrey is in constant, close contact.

Such coordination seemingly works in the parallel sense of keeping abreast

Governmental branches most concerned with foreign affairs; but it doesn't work

in the vertical sense. The Pentagon leans heavily upon computers for precise,

swift answers. No other department is similarly equipped. The result is

that McNamara, willy-nilly, has gained a heavier specific gravity in foreign

policy than properly should be his due.

McNamara believes in civilian rule as confirmed by the grumbling of his

admirals and generals. Nevertheless, the exact brilliance that enables him to

control the huge military establishment has—with the aid of quick computer

planning—allowed him to intrude excessively into diplomatic decisions; and the

State Department hasn't been strong enough to prevent this.

Logic vs. Sensitivity

While President Johnson makes decisions, the counsel he receives is often

overweighted by Pentagon calculations. The necessarily nebulous advice of the

State Department appears at a disadvantage. Abstract logic frequently outweighs human sensitivity in our policy decisions.

There were logical reasons, for example, to delay Prime Minister Shastri's

Washington visit; but the brusque way this was done caused unnecessary Indian

irritation. The question of shipping nontoxic gases to South Vietnam was
84 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

apparently never considered in human implications. Offense could have been

minimized with advance information and avoidance of the dreadful word "gas."

Awareness of the dirty meaning in Latin America of the word "Marines" might

have caused us to use airborne infantry instead in Santo Domingo.

Any pretender to great power status occasionally has to do grim things in what

It conceives to be its interests. Khrushchev behaved brutally in Hungary because he felt the entire Soviet system menaced. The British are being tough

in Aden. Prance ruthlessly squashed a coup in Gabon, prime uranium source for

its nuclear force.

The Mown touch

The important thing is for our President to weigh diplomatic actions in imprecise human as well as precise practical terms. The State Deparment must

assert itself more boldly. It should have at hand from the start such plans as

that for an international Latin-American military force which has now been

exhumed.

The Pentagon cannot be blamed for its computer mentality, imposed upon it by.

the technological revolution. But Foggy Bottom should emerge from the fog

and clamber off the bottom. The content of great power policy must sometimes

be blunt; its style should always be burnished.

Senator JACKSON. General White, we want to thank you for an excellent statement. You have brought to this committee the thoughtful observations and comments of a great military leader and, in my

judgment, an able military scholar, and we want you to know that we

appreciate very much the time you have given to us.

You made reference to C. L. Sulzberger's article in the May 23

edition of The New York Times. If there is no objection I think it

would be well to include the entire article at the conclusion of General

White's comments.

General, I gather from your statement this morning that you believe international peace and security depend not on a balance of

power, but on a certain imbalance of power in favor of the protectors

of peace—in which the strength of the peace-keeper is greater than

that of the peace-upsetter—or, in other words, an imbalance of power

which will help persuade would-be aggressors not to be. I was impressed by your observations on this point and I wonder if you would

comment a little further on it.

General WHITE. Well, sir, a real balance of power, if it could be

maintained, might be a solution, but it is my impression from observation of technology as well as, let's say, international politics that a

balance is a very transitory thing, and at the rate at which technology

is advancing a balance that might exist today is most unlikely to exist

tomorrow.

By tomorrow I mean within the next ten or 15 years. Let's cite

one little technological surprise that I guess we all read about in the

paper. That is this enormous air transport that the Soviet Union

has unveiled at the air show in Paris. We are talking about building

a C-5 and here is an airplane built already and put on public display

by the Soviet Union, and as far as I know this is the first time the

public in this country has known anything about it.

I assume, and I hope, that our intelligence people have been aware

of this, but here is in a sense, as far as the people are concerned, a

technological surprise which, while a minor apparatus perhaps in

the overall matter of balance of power, nevertheless has a considerable

value in the quick transport of troops to areas of danger. It is

something that we ourselves have been thinking about and here our
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 85

prime enemies already have such a thing and it is being shown in a

world public display of advanced aircraft.

The same sort of thing can occur in any number of technological

fields and we won't know any more about it than we did about this,

until it is too late perhaps.

Senator JACKSON. Historically the Soviets have manifested an interest in those weapons essential to their own defense. Do you read

into this big plane with the enormous airlift capability some indication of a possible interest in expanding their spheres of influence

in other areas of the world?

General WHITE. It certainly seems to me to give them a capability—

provided they and the Communist Chinese can work it out, and I

don't think there would be much difficulty myself—for a very quick

way to get troops to South Vietnam from the Soviet Union, for

example.

Heretofore they certainly haven't had this kind of a capability.

I don't suppose they have many of these aircraft yet in service, but

it won't be long now if that is what they want. So I would say that

with this aircraft alone—in our own major strategic field, that is,

the counter insurgency and the local brush fire, the limited war type

of thing—they have suddenly come up with a very important element

of strategy, either defensive or offensive.

It doesn't influence the global war type of thing very much in my

opinion.

Senator JACKSON. But it could have a real impact in the continuing

cold war struggle in support of wars of national liberation.

General WHITE. Support and limited war—

Senator JACKSON. Short of general war. Up to now we have had

the clear advantage of being able to maintain dominance on the seas

and in heavy transport to move American requirements to any given

place on the globe.

Is this not correct?

General WHITE. Yes, sir. We have just gone into production not

so long ago, as I understand it, of the C-141, which is a very large

jet transport, the very purpose of which is to be able to transport

troops and supplies over long distances very quickly. Well, then we

are talking about the C-5 as something that carries on further with

more troops. Here the Soviet Union suddenly has capped us again

in technology, this time in a sense in a minor field, but it also is a

countermove to our own, I will say, now popular strategy.

Senator JACKSON. So here at this time is a new possible weapons

system that could be an indication of future plans as far as the Soviets

are concerned?

General WHITE. I cite it, sir, as an example of why balance is a

precarious sort of thing.

Senator 'JACKSON. Isn't it true too, that this doctrine we are just

talking about—maintaining an imbalance of power in favor of the

west—is essential because we are not apt to be the one that would

strike the first blow. Therefore, we must maintain not only a qualitative, but also a quantitative advantage over our adversary.

The fellow who intends to strike the first blow would not need as

much in the way of military hardware in this atomic age as the fellow

who is not going to respond until attacked.
86 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

General WHITE. That is certainly true and especially vital it seems

to me in the matter of an atomic war.

It also applies in limited wars. It goes back to—was it Nathan

Forrest? The fellow who gets there "firstest with the moste,st" applies in this clay just as well. The only difference is we are using jet

transports.

Senator JACKSON. That is right. Actually in counter insurgency—

while you hear all sorts of figures—the country that is trying to defend itself against guerrilla activity must maintain a troop ratio of

something like a range of about 10 to one over the insurgents. So

again you have this problem of maintaining a quantitative and hopefully a qualitative advantage.

General WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. I wanted to ask a question about the issue of unilateral disarmament that keeps coming up. We know that it was

not an arms race that led to World War II. Rather, it was the

unilateral disarmament of the western democracies and the disarmament of their will to prepare which opened the way for Hitler in

1939. This is the reason, as I recall, that Winston Churchill referred

to the Second World War as "The Unnecessary War."

I wonder if you might comment on some of the current pressures

for unilateral disarmament.

General WHITE. I have the impression that there is such thinking,

and I think it is only a fringe element among college and university

students, aided and abetted by certain, I would also say, fringe groups

of professors and others who like to call themselves intellectuals who

in my opinion have never achieved anything except in a scholastic

sense which may or may not be very good, within the confinesof

a college or a university, but which in my opinion doesn't qualify them

to be experts on world affairs or government affairs.

This doesn't apply to the same type of individual who has proved

himself by serving in the government of the United States or another

government, or in business even. But the purely theoretical flag waving, very often bearded, and usually shoeless, students—some of whom

I saw recently at a great university—don't impress me as being very

good judges of where the world should go. Nevertheless, that seems

to me to be the vanguard of the unilateral disarmament type of thinking.

At the same time I think it is only fair to say that the extreme right

are in my opinion equally wrong, and that usually applies in most anything, in politics or the affairs of men.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you for your observation. With reference

now to your comment on foolproof in§pection, it seems probable from

what we have heard lately that a group of nations, with Soviet encouragement, will seek to amend or extend the test ban treaty so as to ban

underground tests without inspection or with wholly inadequate

arrangements for inspection.

There are already strong pressures from some scientists and domestic

pressure groups to accept a ban on underground tests without satisfactory inspection. I wonder if you might indicate what can and what

should be done to alert the public to that danger.

General WHITE. It seems to me that in a world where we have an

unfriendly nation, the Soviet Union, that has declared as a cornerstone
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 87

of its policy the defeat of democracy, and of the United States in particular, a nation which has had a complete history of unfaithfulness to

obligations, all this ought to be readily translatable into the daily

affairs of the least-informed American in terms that he can

understand.

For example, if he knew that in his neighborhood there was a gang

which has the avowed purpose of at least robbing him and probably

killing him and he had certain weapons or doors that he could lock and

bars on the doors and certain other defensive mechanisms, I think he

would understand it would be exceedingly stupid on the word of this

particular gang to say, that, "I will now unlock my doors, turn off the

lights, throw away my ammunition, and sit here and trust you."

Perhaps the answer to informing the public which I believe, Senator,

is the way you framed the question, is to put it in terms of the every

day life of the American individual.

Senator JACKSON. I think you have given a good illustration that

most people—especially those in some of the big cities these days

General WHITE. They understand it.

Senator JACKSON.-should understand.

In your statement you said this: "It is vital that we hold the lead

in military technology at whatever cost."

In this connection, as you know, there are some people who maintain

that we are moving on a "technological plateau," in the sense that no

major breakthroughs quantum advances—in military technology are

now in sight.

I wonder if you might comment on this issue.

General WHrrE. First let me say, of course, in the technological field

I am a complete layman, but I have a number of friends who are in my

opinion experts, and I think in the eyes of the world, experts. The

best of them tell me that technology is going to advance at an ever increasing rate.

I think that the history of the past 20 to 25 years proves them to be

right. There is no reason to think that a curve of advancement such

as we can trace today is suddenly going to level off. Space is a good

example of where new things can develop that we don't even dream of.

We didn't dream anybody was going to be floating in space hitched to

an umbilical cord even 5 years ago.

I am sure we are going to have men on the moon pretty soon. I

don't necessarily say the moon itself is of strategic value, but the accomplishment—what we learn, the side contributions of that kind of

technology to military technology—is certainly going to keep this

curve moving.

We have new kinds of energies such as the laser, and the maser and

other things that we haven't heard about coming along. Fuel cells

are something coming along. The whole world is burgeoning with

new technology.

I am sure of one thing. If technology suddenly levels off everything else in the world is going to level off. I think technology is

going very fast and going faster almost than any other element of

society.

Senator JACKSON. General, don't you think, because we are living in

an age of awesome weapons catastrophic weapons—that some people

feel that even thinking about even more catastrophic weapons coming

along is just out of order and so they want to bury their heads in the
88 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

proverbial sand so as to avoid even thinking about it? Yet, the history of science is such that we know that there is no such thing as a

plateau in either science or technology.

General WHITE. That is true.

Senator JACKSON. Don't you feel that in all this the thinking of

many people is influenced by fear?

General WHITE. That is exactly right. I think that is the basic

reason so many people think war is impossible. They have just decided that it is unthinkable, as has been cited by a number of people.

Well, it isn't something you like to think about, but it is something

we must think about and something the American people must bear in

mind at all times. The affluence of this country, the euphoria which

has taken over, has caused I think altogether too many people to foret that there are an awful lot of nations in this world, an awful lot

of people, who envy this country, rightly so, and who would not hesitate, given the secure opportunity, to take advantage of us.

Senator JACKSON. I take it from what you said you believe we must

be unrelenting in our efforts in research, both in science and in technology on the assumption that a resourceful adversary could make any

discovery we are able to discern.

General WkirrE. I feel that very strongly.

Senator JACKSON. And in order to maintain an imbalance of power

in favor of the democratic Western countries.

As you suggest in your statement regarding the role of strategic

power in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, military power is one important means of communicating with an adversary, of making disclosures about one's resolve, one's contingent plans and capabilities,

and therefore of influencing his behavior.

Indeed fighting itself, and the manner in which it is done, is a form

of communication. This is the case I think today in Vietnam.

Would you comment on the need to judge and review military hardware and doctrine not only in terms of military capability but also as

a system of communication?

General WHITE. Certainly you have cited in my opinion a very good

example. The communication in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was not

only in so many words, but the communication was by certain actions,

and the old axiom that actions speak louder than words certainly

applied.

In the hardware and doctrine field I have some diffidence as an

Air Force person talking about the manned aircraft, but it has one

aspect, regardless of its other virtues and lack of virtues, that I don't

think is stressed enough and it is in this very field of communication

to the enemy.

Take the missiles now, which I am not being critical of, buried under

the rocks and sands of a number of States—many in your State, sir,

many in the States of other members on the committee—where there

are two officers and other men on the crew. All they have to have is

the word, and they are ready to go 24 hours a day, 30 days a month, 12

months in the year.

There is no higher degree of alert possible for those people, but with

the manned aircraft .you can have a higher degree of alert because you

can speed up the maintenance, the readiness of the aircraft. You can

raise the number of crews. You can, under the system of positive
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 89

control, let aircraft take off and go a certain number of hours until

they reach the enemy radar screen and until that time the President

of the United States has the option to turn them back: the Commander

in Chief of SAC also has that authority.

Of course that is a very rigidly controlled affair, but that is a way to

let the Russians know that we mean business. I read that an infantry

unit is being alerted somewhere in the USA, which probably is a communication to the Hanoi Government, or the Chinese Government, or

the Soviet Government that we may or may not be going to increase

the strength of the U.S. troops in Southeast Asia. That is another

type of communication which is exactly along the lines that you have

indicated.

It seems to me that the doctrine depends on the weapons system, and

the weapons system itself either speaks louder than words or it doesn't,

and I think these are two examples where actions are possible that

speak louder than words.

Senator JACKSON. I think you have given some very good illustrations. It is true that we can make these moves by shifting planes from

one airfield to another, putting more planes in the air or sending ships

to sea, without the general public knowing about it, but with the enemy

knowing about it. And with such military moves the hand of the

diplomat can be strengthened. Doesn't this bring up the need for the

close coordination that you have mentioned between the State Depart.

ment and the Defense Department?

General WHITE. I think those are good examples where obviously

the foreign policy makers, with the President's approval or authority,

would call on the Armed Forces to do these things.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you very much, General.

I will now turn to my colleague Senator Simpson.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me compliment

our able chairman for bringing General White before us.

General, this statement of yours I confess gives me a few butterflies

in the midriff. I happen to be one of those who thought we never

went far enough in the Bay of Pigs to cover the invasion and that we

went too far with the test ban treaty. I was wondering in reading

your statement—you weren't Chief of Staff then—was your advice or

the advice of the Chief of Staff taken in the test ban treaty hearing?

General WHITE. I was not a member. That took place after my retirement. As I recall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave rather a political—and not a military—reply which was finally made public, with the

possible exception of General LeMay who wasn't quite as happy about

it as his colleagues. It seems to me that the Joint Chiefs of Staff said

that maybe in recognition of a higher political purpose this should be

done. The record would be clear on that, Senator, and I am afraid I

am only going back rather foggily in my memory on it.

Senator SIMPSON. I attended all the 'hearings. You may recollect

the attitude of the Chiefs of Staff that militarily it was disadvantageous, but prdbably the military was outweighed by the political advantages.

I was wondering what indoctrination the Chiefs of Staff have on

politics?

General WHITE. In my humble opinion—I don't know what I would

have done if I had been sitting as a member of the Chiefs of Staff—I

48-902-65-pt. 2-3
90 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

think they went far enough when they said that militarily it is to our

disadvantage. On the political side of it, in that context at least, I

don't think it is up to them to comment. They are supposed to be the

military experts and in my opinion should reserve their comments to

their particular field.

Senator SimrsoN. Yes. I confess that with you the Chief of Staff

of the Air Force, and General Curtis LeMay, subsequently, I slept better at night than I am doing now and I think the people of America

feel that way about it. This statement of yours is a very commanding

statement and I certainly want to compliment you on it.

I would like to ask you another question. While we are looking to

the far right and the extreme right—extreme so-called—over the

months back of us we fail to take cognizance of the far left groups

among the youth and in the colleges of the country.

I was at Cherry Point and saw some of the boys prior to their departure for Vietnam. They were willing to go, wanted to go because of what it meant to our country. I return to Washington and

see this bunch of bearded beatniks and kooks, aided and abetted by

a few colleagues, some college professors, camped on the doorstep of

our Chief Executive.

Do you think that we are giving enough support and help to the

great majority of students in our land who aren't saying anything

about this? Are we leaving the impression that this other group, this

minority group, constitute a majority group which might lead to difficulties abroad?

General WHITE. I think you have made a very good point. I personally think that the press is largely to blame for sensationalizing the

mouthings of a fringe few who happen to parade with placards and

who I think create a very small disturbance on the surface of American

life. But the press plays it up with pure sensationalism. I don't approve of it.

It seems to me, as you say, the great majority of students in this

country are sober, hardworking people and their views are I think

considerably less sensational than this fringe we are talking about,

and I disapprove of giving a vociferous and what is obviously a minority view the majority space on the front page.

Senator SIMPSON. It is startling to me, and I know it must be to you

as well as other members of our committee, that there has grown out

of this certain far left civil rights group organizations like S.N.C.C.,

which is the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the

W.E.B. DuBois clubs, the Young Socialist Alliance, and over 200 other

organizations, some with staffs such as S.N.C.C. with 230 paid employees and 150 of their so-called chapters in universities throughout

the country. I am wondering how far we should tolerate this?

. General WHITE. I don't think I am very competent to talk about

civil rights. I don't believe civil rights in themselves have an immediate bearing on the national security of this country. I naturally

have views as a citizen of the United States, but I don't think it is

appropriate for me sitting here under the circumstances to comment on

the subject.

Senator SimrsoN. I would like to know if you will be available when

we need you again.

General WHITE. Thank you, sir.
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 91

Senator SIMPSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Harris.

Senator HARRIS. I would like to join, General, with our chairman

in commending you for a fine statement and for your willingness to

come here and present it and answer questions concerning it.

If I understand you correctly I believe your testimony indicates that

you feel Members of Congress and congressional committees should

jealously guard their right to hear full and complete answers from

military witnesses properly before the Congress and should be alert to

inhibited military witnesses. I wonder if you might discuss that in

a little more detail, the dilemmas—or the conflicts—which confront

military witnesses when they appear before congressional committees.

General WHITE. I really do think that the members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff have a tremendous conflict in a great many ways.

They are of course part of the Executive. They are appointed by

the President and I hardly think would ever be appointed without

the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and probably the

recommendations of the Service Secretary, so their loyalties in the

sense of who gave them the job must lie in that field.

The job itself is full of conflict because as service chiefs they are

responsible and they are the champions of their service, the Army,

Navy, and the Air Force.

Then they become members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, putting on

a tricolored hat, we will say, and suddenly their vision is supposed to

widen and is no longer confined to the Army, the Navy, or the Air

Force, but the entire national good. That is very easy when you are

talking in theory and in high doctrine and strategy, but when you

translate it to dollars and cents and the kind of forces you feel you

should have as an enthusiast for your service because you are an

expert in it, that creates conflict.

You then have these officers as advisers to the President. They go

down to the ranch—or it used to be in my day down in Warm

Springs—to have a discussion with the Commander in Chief on the

budget. You defend your budget as you see it and naturally the

Commander in Chief says, "This is the way it is," and that is the way

it is as far as the budget is concerned. Then you are called before

four committees of Congress, two authorizing committees, one from

each House, and then two appropriations committees, and you are

then asked your opinion about certain things.

It used to be—and I am not sure that it still applies—that a chief

could say, "This is my official opinion, but personally I think so and so."

I believe that that type of reply should be encouraged.

I have no overt reason to feel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are

political appointees today. I only raise it as a point for this committee to bear in mind, that it would be possible to appoint a group

of "yes men" over a period of time who would have views that are

entirely dictated from on high. And the only agencies, in my opinion,

that can put members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the wringer

are the congressional committees, and that often should be done in my

opinion by putting these officers under oath.

Senator HARRIS. It would not be necessary, I take it, that that always be done in public hearings.
92 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

General WnrrE. Most assuredly in my opinion it should not be done in public hearings.

Senator HARRIS. Last year in your column in Newsweek, General White, you wrote this:

During the years I was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our national military policy was set forth by the National Security Council. In more recent months the National Security Council appears to have become less influential. Now national military policy seems to stem chiefly from speeches and state- ments by high ranking officials. Ill defined policy certainly provides flexibility in foreign affairs; it also demands that each crisis be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. But as a cornerstone for the formulation of strategy from which long lead-time weapons systems for future military forces can be derived, uncodified policy must surely defy the mechanical perfection of computers as well as the considerable brainpower of our civilian and military planners.

I wondered how, in your view, executive departments and agencies

can be better furnished with timely, coherent, sharp-edged policy guidance on national security issues.

General WHITE. I am already going back to the Indian days because it was four years ago that I took off my uniform, but prior to that time

we had a series of national security documents. They were numbered and we had a basic national security policy. We had policy statements for various contingencies around the world, in writing, and obviously highly classified, which did give the military something on which to go. I am no longer completely privy to how it works, but I am quite sure that the National Security Council does not operate as it did in those days. I know that the Planning Board does not operate. I mentioned that in this little statement of mine. There is where that type of docu- ment was formulated.

It is true that very often when a crisis arose we would have a policy that would say just what we were going to do and when we got right

up and looked over the precipice

'

then we backed up and didn't do what the policy said at all. But at least we had a guide, and, while I

can't say that I disagree in any sense—to my surprise—with what is going on today in the foreign policy field, nevertheless, I think that we do not have the same kind of formalized formulation of security policies that we have had at sometimes in the past.

Senator HARRIS. Thank you very much. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Kennedy, do you want to defer for a moment?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, please.

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question?

Senator JACKSON. Yes.

Senator SIMPSON. General, in your statement you say:

In every instance our diplomats and the Department of State were also in- volved—prior to and concurrently with each military crisis. Perhaps one might

say that our diplomatic service and the Department of State constitute our first line of defense.

Do you think it should be reversed.?

General WHITE. I think the State Department and the Foreign Service corps could make a little more propaganda for themselves by claiming to be the first line of defense, because they are. It is an old adage that the military only come in when all else fails, and the "all else" in this case is foreign policy, is our Department of State and our
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 93

Diplomatic Service. Therefore, I think they are the first line of defense. When they fail or when they have to have outside help, which

means they haven't been able to do it all themselves, then they call on

the military, so when you say reverse it, the Navy used to say they are

the first line of defense and the Air Force likes to say it is, and I personally think that the Department of State and the Foreign Service

really are the first line of defense in this country.

Senator SIMPSON. You indicate, then, to continue reading your

statement:

However, in this age of instant world-girdling diplomatic communications and

of trans-ocean military deployments executed in hours, these two key arms of

our national security must, in fact, be as closely coordinated as hand in glove.

I am one of those who believe it is not coordinated to that extent and

I may be reading into this that it is your hope that it can be.

General WHITE. I think it is pretty closely coordinated, but I think

there is room for improvement in that field. There has been quite

a great exchange of officers of the Armed Forces who now work in the

Department of State. We have attaches in Embassies all over the

world. There are Foreign Service officers, or at least State Department officers, in the Department of Defense in a great many places.

We have students at the National War College, and I think some of the

other higher level military schools, from the Department of State as

well as from other civil parts of the Government. I think these arrangements are all to the good, but I think we can still do more.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Kennedy?

Senator KENNEDY. I was not here for your whole statement, General,

but I am delighted to get an opportunity to hear you. I gather that

you feel from your personal experience that perhaps more effort should

be made by the National Security Council and that we should deal

more through the National Security Council.

General WHITE. I think a formalized arrangement would be an improvement over what now, from where I sit, appears to be rather an

in formaliz ed one.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you think you could actually develop policy

through the National Security Council?

General WHITE. Yes; it certainly happened and I think it could be

done. I think it might be even more effective now than it used to be.

Senator KENNEDY. What was the smallest number of people that

attended a National Security Council meeting that you attended?

General WHITE. Well, I am sure I didn't go to all of them, Senator

Kennedy. I never went to one in which the whole table was not full

and people sitting around the sides.

Senator KENNEDY. There would probably be 35 or 40 people there,

really, would there not?

General WHITE. I would say 20, perhaps.

Senator KENNEDY. Have you ever been to a National Security

Council meeting when there were only 20? Were there ever that

small a number?

General WHITE. I think 'so; yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. But at least there were 20 or more?
94 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

General WHITE. I would say at least 20, never less than 20. Many of them were just sitting there in case they got called on by somebody, but the people at the table were the only ones who were statutory members of the National Security Council and some, as I recall, that sat at the table were there ad hoc.

Senator KENNEDY. I just raise the question of whether the National Security Council in itself now has become so large and 'cumbersome that it is difficult to evolve and develop policy there.

General WHITE. I couldn't disagree with that, but I still stick to the point that I think some formalized arrangement would be helpful from the military point of view.

Now, 

a smaller one might be better.

Senator KENNEDY. I think that that is correct, but I think it comes down to perhaps the personal experience of each President, which has been really that the National Security Council in fact has become less important, in my judgment, partially due to its size and the cumbersomeness of its meetings. Would you agree with that?

General WHITE. A very good point, yes. I think that there used

to be present at National Security Council meetings at the table—I

don't mean the people like myself that sat in the back row—people

who really didn't have anything to contribute and that a smaller group

would be better.

Senator KENNEDY. So what you really have to do is 'perhaps either

change the National Security Council in some way or develop a different kind of a committee, or commission, or group which is going

to develop the kind of foreign-military policy that you have described.

Isn't that so?

General WHITE. Right. I suppose that is what happened today. I

certainly don't know just how it works. I know from where I sit and

from what I hear and feel that from the military point of view there

is a gap in the machinery of national policymaking, not that the

policies that come out are not OK. I am not saying that. I am simply

saying that it is hard to keep up with them and there is nothing that

is formalized about them ahead of time.

Senator KENNEDY. I join with you in thinking that this is a key

problem and I think every President has to develop a machinery that

best fits his personality and develop machinery out of which can

come some of the ideas, or suggestions, or recommendations on which

he can act. I think that is frequently very difficult because there are

so many conflicting forces within the Government itself, and so much

is based

'

wouldn't you agree, on the personality not only of the President of the United States, but the personality of those who have the responsibility for foreign affairs, which would include the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs oeStaff, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of

State, the head of the CIA, and the head, to a lesser extent but cer- tainly involved, of the USIA, plus perhaps other people?

General WHITE. I can only refer back to military experience. The Commander has a staff. He picks his own staff. He may inherit

some of it, but eventually he would get his own people. However, he

uses them pretty much according to a standard procedure that everybody understands.

Now, 

the President obviously has a similar problem of getting people that he works closely with and I think the only point, Senator
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 95

Kennedy, I am making is that I can't be sure from where I sit that

every element of the Government that really has a bearing on these

problems is consulted or that due weight is given to what he has to

say. I could be wrong about that. I am not sure that the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is always consulted. I think he should

be when there is a major national issue at stake. I suspect that, and

a very wise man he is, very often the Secretary of Defense speaks for

the Department of Defense, but the man who by law is the President's

chief military advisor may or may not be there. I don't know. I

know he was there when we had the National Security Council and I

think if a smaller version of it were created and used it would at least

be reassuring to me that every cogent element has had a voice.

Senator KENNEDY. I might say—again I am basing this just on my

own personal experience and I don't know what the situation is as

of the last 12 months—certainly the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff or representatives of the Chiefs of Staff were always present

when any matter was decided either by President Kennedy or by

President Johnson up through certainly 1964, and I don't know that

that has changed. I haven't heard that it had, but certainly that was

true prior to that time.

Thank you.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you.

Senator Harris?

Senator HARRIS. I had one additional question.

General, back in February, February 24, 1964, you wrote in your

Newsweek column quoting from Secretary of Defense McNamara:

"-What we are proposing is the capability to strike back after absorbing

the first blow."

And thereafter you commented:

In the age of atomic weapons, missiles, and space, at a time

advances in quantum leaps, in an era full of military unknowns, i

ous policy to forswear the first strike under any and all condi

I wondered if you might comment on that point an

when you say "under any and all conditions."

General WHITE. I certainly do think that we might st

intention never to strike the first blow, but I would be very

a human being alive in this country that if I were real sure t a we

were going to be hit tomorrow, I wouldn't wait until we got hit. I

would sure hit back right away and I would hope that that is what

would happen. In fact, further along in that article—or somewhere

else—I said I suspect that this would happen, that we could count on

the President pushing the button under those circumstances, despite

any public statements. I don't remember that article completely, but

I believe I pointed out the hope surely that we would not sit here in the

face of clear evidence that we were going to be struck tomorrow and

just wait until the blow fell.

Senator KENNEDY. How would you have that kind of evidence?

General WHITE. How would you have that kind of 

Senator KENNEDY. Evidence.

General WHrrE. Evidence. Well, I think you could. I hope our

intelligence is infiltrating the Soviet Union. I admit it is more difficult

with missiles than it was with aircraft, but I believe that we could be
96 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

reasonably sure. Reasonably sure is sufficient for me. I don't expect it to be ninety-nine percent, but I would say eighty-five percent sure. Senator KENNEDY. You mean if you were reasonably sure that the Russians were going to attack you tomorrow then you would be in favor of sending your missiles?

General WurrE. I would.

Senator KENNEDY. And in their retaliation which would lead to the death of probably 60 or 70 million Americans?

General WHITE. You would have to have a situation, it seems to me, where there is already tension to have that sort of thing—a build up, where the odds are getting pretty high that something is going to happen, anyhow. Yes, I would not sit back and wait until I was struck, if I was reasonably sure, and reasonably sure means to me based on good reasons that appeal to the reasonable man as a reasonable prob- ability.

Senator KENNEDY. May I just say as a member of this committee that I do not agree with that. Thank you.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Engberg, consultant for the minority, has a

few questions.

Mr. ENGBERG. You mention in your statement first that foreign policy apparently dictated unsound strategy in Southeast Asia. You also have referred to the need for an impartial Joint Chiefs of Staff. You have also suggested that the military should have the opportunity to express the military viewpoint in determining policy.

I remember back a number of years ago we had a great deal of counsel and disagreement about the combining of the military services into the Department of Defense. Do you see any feasibility in corn- bhTh the State Department and the Department of Defense into a

„. Department of National Security taking into consideration that times • and conditions have changed and that we have this extreme need for close collaboration between the two departments? er General WurrE. That idea has never occurred to me. I can't say offharatha think there is a need for it at this time. I still main- tain tfi637 t work closely together, but I doubt if it is necessary Aat 

, 

they e Integrated. I think that normal activities are so far for many other reasons I would not urge such a thing. We have thePresident, at the apex.

Mr. ENGBERG. Another question in a little different area. Due to the fact that nuclear war carries with it such complete and utter destruction and also carries with it at the present time a very deep psychological fear on the part of all the people, and that we have placed major reliance upon missiles for both defensive and offensive action, I am wondering if you feel that this has caused an increase in so-called brush-fire wars among so-called nonaligned nations which could be of serious consequence to our security? General WHITE. I personally don't see that the advent of these nearly decisive strategic weapons necessarily has increased the limited war type of affair.

Mr. ENGBERG. Do you feel that we have the necessary conventional hardware and perhaps newly developed hardware to handle these so- called brush-fire wars?

General WHITE. I can only say that in my opinion we have done a great deal to increase the effectiveness of our conventional forces
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 97

in the last several years, something that I thoroughly approve of.

I think it is paying off now. The R&D effort on conventional type

weapons, as I understand, has been very considerably stepped up.

I commend that. I think that we are perhaps going a little slower

on the strategic side and I worry about the military effort in space,

but on the specific side that you mention I think we have done a good.

deal. I am not in a position to judge whether it is enough. Certainly the direction has been right in my opinion.

Mr. ENGBERG. My thought was that, with the emphasis on missiles

and nuclear hardware, perhaps the vast number of so-called nonaligned nations would be and could be playing the United States

for what they could get and then moving into rather small war areas

of their own. It would be more difficult for us to control them for

the simple reason that we certainly cannot use nuclear weapons

against them. But these rather small conflicts could, due to the

competition, build themselves into something of greater danger.

General WHITE. I personally think that every shooting war of

almost any size can lead to something more.

Mr. ENGBERG. But you do not feel that the danger is any greater

now than it has been?

General WHITE. I don't, honestly. I doubt if we would have had

a global conventional war even if we had not had strategic weapons

over the last ten or fifteen years in any case.

Mr. ENGBERG. One other question, if I might, Senator Jackson:

I am wondering whether you feel that our international commitments, primarily military, are somewhat outmoded as to purpose and that we are perhaps over-extended in terms of "operational feasi- bility"—to use the language of our initial memorandum.

General WHITE. You are talking about military aid programs?

Mr. ENGBERG. Yes, military aid.

General WHITE. I am afraid I am not an expert on this subject.

I have the feeling that we are not as discriminating as we should be.

There are several countries to which we give aid which seems to me

to be unnecessary. I would as a matter of principle want to give

more aid to the people that are obviously our friends who need it than I would those who are obviously not our friends, and it seems

to me we are pretty indiscriminate about the way we dish out this

largesse, but there are undoubtedly reasons behind each of these things. We are trying to keep these regimes from toppling even

farther to the left and it is possible if we don't give this aid that will happen. I suppose India is a good example. I read the other day that we are shipping two 10,000-ton shiploads of wheat every

day to India. That rather shocked me. That is flat, military aid, but it is certainly aid and I suppose that if India didn't have that

20,000 tons of wheat a day the problems would be even more difficult.

So aid is a very complex subject and one that I am inclined to think the State Department and the Department of Defense work

out very thoroughly, and then they get it pretty well shaken out before the Bureau of the Budget, and then it comes over here to the

Congress, so when it finally comes out I suspect it is probably pretty

good.

Mr. ENGBERG. Do you feel that this economic and military aid could be more beneficially used from the standpoint of American na-
98 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

tional security if there was more careful consultation between our

government and other governments in the world who are interested

in the same general ends?

General WHITE. It seems to me that in some areas of aid we might

demand more in the way of a quid pro quo from foreign governments than we do and I suppose getting a quid pro quo would involve

the discussions you raise. I doubt if we just force money on any

foreign nation, but I think at the same time we do turn over certain

aid for which we ought to demand a greater quid pro quo than we

do in some countries.

Mr. ENGBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JACKSON. General, I have one last question.

In your view, what steps would be particularly helpful to better

prepare the military professional for participation in the national

security policy process?

We would be glad to have any comments you care to make in this

area.

General WurrE. I think I have to start by saying, in my opinion,

a great deal along that line is being done now in the many service

schools. They even start at the service academies with elements of

foreign policy. That can always be increased.

The thing that occurs to me, and this applies particularly to the

Air Force, with which I am more familiar, is that a more rapid turnover of our junior officers would be beneficial. I think it is stultifying

for a young officer to spend many years in a missile silo, for example.

While it does give him an opportunity to study, and some universities

have been very helpful in providing either correspondence courses or

even professors at centers to help these young officers get higher

degrees, nevertheless, I think that a variety of assignments is better—

and there are enough assignments world-wide today to give every officer a chance to have more of a feel for the part that the military has

in world affairs and its relation to domestic and foreign policy. For

that reason I think that we can move our young officers sooner, and

this may or may not apply in the other services, but I think it applies

in the Air Force. Let's give them a chance to get out and get a broader

view of things a little sooner than we do today.

Senator JACKSON. By "turnover" of junior officers, I take it 

General WHITE. "Transfer" is what I had in mind.

Senator JACKSON. you mean better assignments.

General WHITE. Different assignments, let's say.

Senator JACKSON. That is right, with a broader type of experience

than some of the long-term assignments that you have referred to—

such as being in a missile silo for a long time . . .

General WHITE. Exactly.

Senator JACKSON. To provide early a broad base of experience dealing as much as possible with the key elements of national security in

the broadest sense. Is that correct?

General WHITE. Exposure to them, at least.

Senator JACKSON. Right.

Senator Simpson?

Senator SimpsoN. I have found it very interesting and very informative and I genuinely want to compliment this fine man, General White,

for the service he has done the committee here.
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 99

Senator JACKSON. In giving the committee his biography I neglected to mention that his background is not all military. He is the

son of an Episcopalian Bishop of Illinois. Have I stated it correctly?

General WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. So he comes here with theological background.

Senator SIMPSON. That is my church. This is all right.

Senator JACKSON. General, as I said at the conclusion of your statement, we want to thank you for this special effort that you have made

to come here this morning. I think all of us have profited by your

counsel and advice and we want you to know how much we do appreciate what you have done.

General WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I say again it has

been an honor and a privilege to have a participation with your very

important committee.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you.

The Chair wanted to announce that tomorrow, Dr. Walter H. Brattain, the Nobel Prize physicist and co-inventor of the transistor, will

appear at the hearing starting at ten o'clock.

General WHITE. May I hope that some member of the committee

will ask this distinguished scientist what he thinks about a plateau of

technology.

Senator JACKSON. I have a hunch that that question will be raised.

Again, many thanks General White and we certainly are grateful to

you. The committee will now recess.

(Whereupon, the committee was recessed at 11 :35 a.m. to reconvene on Thursday, June 17, at 10:00 a.m.)

CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1965

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

W ashing ton, D .0 .

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3110,

New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of

the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Harris, and Simpson.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Victor R.

Swenson, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel

A. Engberg, minority consultant.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The committee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations continues today its hearings on vital issues in the conduct of

national security policy. The main questions under study are set

forth in the initial memorandum of the subcommittee.

At the outset of our hearings we have called as witnesses a number

of distinguished Americans with wide experience and well-established

reputations for independent judgment. We have asked them to speak

to the challenge before our Nation in key areas of national policy and

operations that affect our national security and our capacity for effective diplomatic, political, or military action.

We are honored to have as our witness today the distinguished

Nobel Prize physicist and co-inventor of the transistor, Dr. Walter H.

Brattain.

Dr. Brattain graduated from Whitman College, Walla Walla,

Wash., in 1924, received his M.A. from the University of Oregon in

1926, and his Ph. D. from the University of Minnesota in 1929. Since

1929 he has been research physicist at the Bell Telephone Laboratories,

and since 1962 he has also'been Visiting Professor of Physics at -Whitman College.

Joint recipient of the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1956 for research on

semiconductors and discovery of the transistor effect, Dr. Brattain is

a member of the Defense Science Board and the Naval Research Advisory Committee.

The continued high standing of our Nation in the world requires

that we maintain a world position of leadership in science and technology. The health and productivity of our economy, our military

defenses, and our effectiveness in foreign policy—all depend in large

101
102 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

measure upon our pursuit of new scientific knowledge and our wise

use of science and its applications.

In science, of course, we cannot know for sure what to expect. An

example of this is the famous von Karman report of 1945 entitled

"Toward New Horizons." In defense circles, this report is hailed as

a landmark, and it was one, because it pointed the way to the ballistic

missile program. Yet the ballistic missile, and the space age achievements that have followed, would have been impossible without the

transistor. And the transistor is not mentioned in the von Kfirman

report. Nobody had heard of it—and nobody predicted it. It was

Dr. Brattain—and his co-workers, William Shockley and John Bardeen—who invented it only a few years later.

Dr. Brattain, we are delighted and honored to have you with us this

morning.

STATEMENT OF DR. WALTER H. BRATTAIN, CO-INVENTOR OF THE

TRANSISTOR, NOBEL PRIZE RESEARCH PHYSICIST, BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES

Dr. BRATTAIN. Thank you, Senator Jackson. I greatly appreciate

the opportunity to appear before you. I hope what I have to say will

be of some help to this committee which is dealing with one of the

central issues of this century—the conduct of American defense and

foreign policy.

Your committee has invited me to give my views with particular

reference to the relation of sound scientific policies and programs to

effective national security policy and operations. I commend you in

your desire to have a hard look at some of the issues in this critically

important area.

Bask Distinction: Science and Technology

Since in government, science and technology are inextricably mixed

together, under the forbidding heading Research, Development, Test

and Evaluation, RDT&E, I would first like to clarify the terms science

and technology, or at least say what I shall mean by my use of the

terms. For example, "Research" has become a magic word and one

must be careful how he uses it. I might add that in the old days the

witch doctors made magic words; today our advertising agencies

make them.

Science—or scientific research—is work or investigation that contributes to understanding of "how" things happen in our world—or

better, in our environment. Usually such work is dedicated to this

purpose. But regardless of dedication, if it contributes to this understanding, it has a claim to be called scientific research.

I have a quotation that for me expresses the philosophy of a scientist

better than any other statement I have ever come across:

The history of the human race is a continual struggle from darkness toward

light. It is therefore to no purpose to discuss the use of knowledge; man wants

to know and when he ceases to do so he is no longer man.

This is a quotation from the Arctic explorer, Fridtjof Nansen.

Now the body of science is not just a catalogue of the sum total of

this understanding or knowledge at any given time but, rather, a rational logical theoretical construct from which most of the "how" of

events in this world can be deduced.
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 103

Science however is never static. The value of the scientist's theory

is to predict into unknown areas of experience. This is the final test of

any body of scientific theory, and the scientist is continually testing,

revising, and refining his theoretical knowledge and thus improving

his understanding.

This understanding, this knowledge, gives us power to do things.

Within the limits of our knowledge at any given time we can predict

what is possible and what is not possible to do. Technology is the art

of accomplishing what it is possible to do—within our economic means.

Responsibility for Use of Scientific Understanding

Clearly it takes power or muscle to do anything. On the other hand,

raw power is of little use unless you can intelligently control the power

to your purpose. Man's knowledge and understanding has continually

made available for his use more and more raw power, and we hope,

the intelligence to control that power to accomplish useful beneficial

purposes. Our present day economic well-being is completely traceable through these two factors to our scientific understanding.

There is, of course, a moral question here. Concentrated power is

dangerous. Even with the best intentions it can by accident go off.

A pint of gasoline is dangerous especially when mixed with alcohol—

in an automobile. Concentrated power in the hands of selfish but intelligent individuals or groups can be used to enslave or destroy. This

is probably the greatest concern of our age. Man as a whole sees this

danger. He does not like it. He wants somebody to blame and has a

tendency to pick on the scientist, the man whose understanding created

the situation.

In doing this he does not see or realize all the vast economic benefits

that he has gained from this understanding nor would he for one moment be willing to go back to the primeval state from which he evolved,

by virtue of man's desire to know.

Surely, the scientist is not wholly responsible for the way man

chooses to use his understanding for good or evil. Man has eaten

of the apple of knowledge and if he desires and accepts the benefits he

must take the responsibility for the use he makes of it.

These matters are, of course, very important to our whole national

policy. The money the government spends on scientific research and

how best to assure a continual advance in our understanding and

knowledge are of great concern to us.

The future existence and survival of man on this planet may ultimately depend on the use we make of this knowledge, that is to say, on

our technology. This will depend both on our general economic technological development and our military technology. Our capabilities

in the latter are really quite dependent on the former, by the way.

How Best Assure Continual Advance in Our Understanding and

Knowledge

The rate of increase of government spending in the area of research

and development or what goes by the name of RDT&E has been so

large that if this rate continues indefinitely it is easy to predict that

the time will soon come when this spending will be equal to the whole

Federal budget. This, of course, is impossible so it follows that the

time will come when this spending can only increase at the same rate

as our gross national product.
104 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

In considering this problem it is important to remember that the

amount of money spent on scientific research is a small fraction of

that spent on RDT&E which includes technology, and that it is important, if possible, to separate out the amount spent on research and

consider it separately.

Improved understanding is like money in the bank, namely means to

do what needs to he done in the future when we need to. In any period

that it is expedient to cut our technological spending, it is especially

important that we do not cut back on scientific research. In fact, it

is good policy at such a time to increase the scientific effort.

This is the proper converse of what we do in times of stress, such

as World War II, when we let the scientific research effort go and

used what knowledge and understanding we had to best get us out of

the hole we were in. Contrary to the belief of many, this is exactly

what we did in 1941 to 1945. Little new fundamental knowledge or

understanding was achieved. Scientists became engineers and devoted

themselves to the technology of winning the war—using almost entirely what was already in the bank.

An important point here is how best to allocate the money we do

spend on scientific research. Some of the most significant advances

come from the most peculiar and unpredictable places. Where they

are going to come from and what they are going to be is impossible

to predict. Who would have guessed that a patent clerk in Switzerland, one who today would classify as a "drop out" would while working at night in his spare time, lay the basis for most of our presentday scientific understanding—quantum mechanics—solid state—

atomic energy. This man was Einstein. The story is in Physics Today, January 1965. One of his results—energy and mass are equivalent, E =MC2, is almost a colloquialism today. We need to spend this

money as best we can to encourage not just excellence but the combination of competence and motivation wherever it appears!

Still another point is this: Scientists are human. They sometimes

do foolish things, including spending government money in ways not

intended by Congress. This irritates Congress no end.

Congress tries to stop this by passing regulations to make such

action almost impossible. These regulations increase the cost of administering the government funds for scientific research without contributing to the actual research done, I believe, to the point where

the increase in cost is way out of proportion to the original amount

misspent.

Also such action usually increases greatly the amount of time the

actual scientist has to spend on nonproductive work in order to satisfy

the administrator. I can only urge Congress, in this period of need

for some limits on government money for scientific research, to at least

balance the added cost of regulation against the waste of foolish expenditure—of which there will always be some in any human endeavor

no matter how tight and costly the control.

Nature and Competence of Scientific Advice to Our National Government

Our U.S. Government, the President, the executive departments, the

legislature, all need the most unbiased competent scientific advice they

can obtain. Since I am serving in such an advisory capacity in two

instances, the Naval Research Advisory Committee, NRAC, and the
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 105

Defense Science Board, DSB, I may be biased. However, I would like

to comment as follows:

As near as I can tell scientists who accept advisory positions to

government do so as patriotic citizens without regard to their other

affiliations or loyalties. I believe that the President's Science Advisory Committee, PSAC, has had a very good effect on all advisory

committees. It is very easy for an executive department, military for

example, to say "thank you" and proceed to disregard any advice

given. The military have sometimes been past masters of this art,

by the way.

This leads to a tendency for advisory committees to criticize everything since they know nobody will pay any attention anyway. With

the advent of PSAC the situation changed. We, as advisors, had an

independent channel to the top. Therefore we were listened to and

taken seriously, at least part of the time. Therefore we had to be sure

we knew what we were talking about before we made a fuss. We had

to be more responsible. This is a lesson a person learns in life.

As long as one's boss has the final responsibility one is likely to

urge and work at him for many things:seeing only one side of the

question, but when one has final responsibility or is in a place of real

influence he takes a different attitude. A little more use of this principle might be beneficial in all government operations.

I sincerely believe that any scientist that commits himself to an

extreme, possibly emotional, view in a public manner is, perforce, no

longer useful in an advisory capacity to the government. Any advice

that he might give even in the area of his competence, is necessarily

suspect. To my knowledge this is not a problem at present, but it

behooves a scientist that wishes to be of service to his government to

be circumspect in his attitudes, and as unbiased as humanly possible.

He must also remember that his scientific competence does not mean

that he has more right than any other citizen to say how his country

or the world should be run. He must, however, be willing to stand

up and face it out when he is sure of his ground on the basis of a

rational scientific judgment. It is often a mistake for a scientific

advisor to concentrate on proving that he is right. If he really wishes

to be of service he should have enough patience to try to get others

to see for themselves the essential correctness of what he advises.

I also feel that it is particularly important that the State Department have proper scientific advice and it worries me that almost a year

has gone by with a vacancy in the Office of Director of International

Scientific Affairs—now designated as International Scientific and

Technological Affairs. I might add that with that new name it looks

like it is a job for two men, not one.

1?o7e of In-House Government Laboratories

I believe because of the importance of science and technology in government operations that it is essential that government have good inhouse government laboratories. In these days of large expenditures

for science and technology the diversification and proliferation of such

laboratories sometimes makes Congress question whether there is not

unnecessary duplication, whether one could not save money by concentration of this effort in fewer places or maybe in one place. They

then put pressure on the departments to justify what they are doing
106 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

and to limit what each department can do. This defeats the purpose of these laboratories by hemming them in with rigid restrictions.

As an advisor to the government, I have had a small part in urging

changes in the military laboratories to raise the morale therein. The

most important function of these laboratories is innovation and my

colleagues and I feel strongly that each laboratory director should

have a given percentage of his budget for him to spend at his discretion. The evidence seems to be that important innovations tend to

occur where this is the case.

Congress should do what it can to attract and keep competent men

in these laboratories.

Plateau in Military Technology?

Military technology is limited by many factors. First, we have the

question of what we can accomplish within our available economic

means and not just what one would predict would be possible with

our present scientific understanding. Second, military technology

is only justifiable insofar as it contributes to our national security,

which immediately takes one into areas of national and international

politics wherein the scientist or engineer has no special competence.

It has been suggested that we have reached a plateau here beyond

which it is not possible to go consistent with the above limitations.

This viewpoint has been misinterpreted in certain quarters to mean

that scientific understanding has reached a plateau. This conclusion

is most certainly wrong. In the first place past experience shows that

whenever one thinks he understands everything, then is just the time

when unexpected new understanding is most likely to occur. This

was the case at the beginning of the 20th century when the experimental results of Michelson-Morley and the work of Planck laid the

basis for the work of Einstein, Bohr and others that completely

revolutionized our thinking and understanding. One can also quote

Ernest Mach, a famous theoretical physicist of the 19th century:

"The French Encyclopaedists of the eighteenth century imagined

they were not far from a final explanation of the world by physical

and mechanical principles. Laplace even conceived a mind competent

to foretell the progress of nature for all eternity if but the masses and

their velocities were given." Little did they know of the importance

of the electrical nature of matter that was to come out of the work of

Faraday, Ohm, Joule, Oersted, Maxwell and others which had its

start early in the 19th century.

Before the war, proven methods in military technology acted as

a brake on innovation. It was hard to convince the military that

there were new and better ways of doing things. The success of

newer military technology (radar, missiles, computers and nuclear

weapons) swung the balance the other way. The demand of the military for new devices, sometimes even beyond the technological art,

has led to a high degree of sophistication and complication in our

military equipment. This in turn has led to a great increase in

expense. Much of this equipment has yet to be tested in actual war

use. Sophistication is very expensive and could turn out to be

doubly so, if it failed to work as planned when really needed. I believe we badly need in military technology to concentrate on how to

simplify our sophisticated armament, adding redundancy to make

it more reliable and doing everything we can to make it easier for the
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 107

men who use it to control it and operate it. The interface between the

man and the machine has reached the place where the training necessary to operate the expensive machine is such that it is nearly impossible to recruit the competent operator. We are almost in the

position of asking the enlisted man to do what the general officer

does not know how to do.

The cost of training the recruit in turn adds greatly to the overall

cost. This does not mean that we should not take full advantage of

such innovations as nuclear power for propulsion, just as we took advantage of steam. It just stands to reason that there is ever so much

that we can do in the real use of technology to improve, simplify, and

make more reliable our present military machine.

Cost effectiveness has its role to play here but it should be used with

caution in applying it, too early, to real innovations such as nuclear

power and propulsion. It is also necessary to keep in mind the whole

overall cost and not just a piece of the cost. Certainly we have great

need for more effective means for combating insurgency.

During the last war we should have learned that sophisticated equipment is useless, expensive junk if the man in the Armed Forces is for

one reason or another not going to use it effectively.

Certainly there is no reason even to speak of a plateau in military

technology. Ordinary economic technology is always finding better

ways to do things and there is no reason that the military should ever

cease in this effort, within the limitations set by our national and international policy.

In closing, let me say that one could go into much more detail in regard to all the points mentioned. For example the recent report to

the Committee on Science and Astronautics of the U.S. House of Representatives by the National Academy of Sciences entitled "Basic

Research and National Goals" gives the separate, thoughtful views of

several very competent scientists. I started to read it after preparing

this statement and the further I read the more I found that one way or

another the things I have said are in this report. I recommend this

report to you, and I thank you for listening.

Senator JACKSON. Dr. Brattain, I know I speak for my colleagues

in expressing our appreciation to you for this very fine statement.

The Bell Laboratories where you and your co-workers discovered the

transistor is one of this country's great laboratories. Would you tell

us how the discovery of the transistor came about? What is the organization and general atmosphere of Bell Labs, and are there some lessons here for science in government?

Dr. BRATTAIN. That is a big question and I could talk for a whole

hour on that subject.

With respect to your first query, the Bell Laboratories grew like

Topsy out of an organization—created in the First World War—

where the important factor was communications and into which they

pulled from any place they could get them people like Davisson and

put them to work.

There was no transcontinental telephone in those days—and better

communications were essential for the war effort.

Senator JACKSON. What year was this? 1917?

Dr. BRATTAIN. In the period of the First World War. With the

experience obtained from the work of these people on technological
108 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

problems during World War I, it was decided at the suggestion of Dr.

Jewett to keep this group in being after the war. They were then

working for the Western Electric Company, and Bell Telephone Laboratories were organized.

Gradually from the influence of the scientific people that happened

to be in the organization, and those they hired afterwards, the organization grew to the place where it had traditions of scientific research,

and management became more knowledgeable about managing this

type of work.

Davisson and Germer did the work on the wave nature of electrons

which won a Nobel Prize. Slowly the organization evolved to the

place where the administrators were chosen from the scientists and

engineers in our own organization who understood what we were doing.

In a particular area the phenomena at the surfaces of semiconductors

were of interest. I have worked on surface physics ever since I went

to the Bell Laboratories, trying to understand. This was in the small

group of which I am a member at the Bell Laboratories at the present

time where our only instructions are to understand physical phenomena, scientific phenomena, of interest to the communications industry, and this covers nearly everything you can think of in science.

The analogy between the vacuum tube and a solid state rectifier, in

particular the copper oxide rectifier, was very clear to anybody who

thought about it and the question WAS how do you put in the third

element and make an amplifier. This didn't work.

After the war it was decided to set up a group in the solid state area

which was beginning to be understood by the use of quantum mechanics. Before quantum mechanics, while we had empirical knowledge about solids, we just didn't understand solids. We didn't understand what held them together from first principles, but with quantum

mechanics this understanding, background, was available and great

progress was made.

In this group were a number of people who were particularly interested in semiconductors, experimentalists and theorists, and we

proceeded to try to understand them. It was a joint group. There

was a chemist and a physicist at the head of it--S. 0. Morgan and

William Shockley. Shockley had an idea he thought of based upon

the then current theory of semiconductors as to how to make an amplifier, only it didn't work.

There were a large group of phenomena that we became aware of,

which I won't bore you with, that were not explained by the current

theory and we began to realize that if we explained one of these away

we would explain all of them, and it was John Bardeen who came up

with the idea that the previous assumptions and the theory were somewhat naive and gave an explanation (Surface States) of practically all

these phenomena.

As a result of this theory we could immediately make predictions

and these predictions suggest new experiments, and in the course of

doing these experiments we were led to observe things that had never

been observed before.

As to the importance of a particular experiment in an area of this

significance, the reason for doing the experiment is often of no pertinence, except for the fact that you are led to do something and observe

something that you did not even expect.
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 109

When one has finally done this and when one looks around one

realizes that scientists do not make great innovations of this kind in

general until the background knowledge has built up to a place where

it is almost impossible for an intelligent observer not to see the next

step.

In fact, this is the reason why in a great many cases, such as

Davisson's and Germer's work on the wave nature of electrons, a man

in England, Thomson, working entirely independently, unknown to

them, published results that were equivalent almost contemporaneously—and this often happens.

As to your second question, and the implications for science in

government, the Bell Laboratories through the course of its growth

has recognized the importance of having a small group in the laboratories whose only job is to understand and to hire the best men that

they can get for this group.

In doing this they do not ask whether the man is an expert electronics man or an expert chemist in a particular field, or expert in

any specialization. They ask how good a scientist he is, and nowadays

he is supposed to be good enough that once he is hired he can pick out

his line of work by himself. He always has several choices.

This is a small research group of about 500 in the Bell Laboratories—

which now numbers, through the technological field, 12,000 or 14,000

total personnel. They hire into this research group more men than they

can keep in this group because they find that these men won't accept

positions in the laboratories unless they are allowed to start in this

group, but after they have been in the laboratory for awhile and see

what it does they find other challenges, and choose to leave this research

group and go into the technological area or into our administrative

area.

Senator JACKSON. You mentioned in your remarks, in connection

with the government laboratories that 

"The most important function of these laboratories is innovation

and my colleagues and I feel strongly that each laboratory Director

should have a given percentage of his budget for him to spend at his

discretion."

Relating that to your experience at Bell Labs, is considerable latitude

granted to the Director of the laboratory and to the scientists in the

pursuit of their particular disciplines? And is there a lesson here

for the government?

Dr. BRATTAIN. I am not an administrator at the Bell Labs, but

from the scientists' standpoint the administrator's job in the Bell

Labs is to protect us from interference—from people who think they

know what ought to be done.

Senator JACKSON. The point, I take it, that you made in your main

remarks is that there might well be greater discretion granted to the

Director in the government laboratories, and also that in our great

private laboratories wide latitude is given to the Director.

Dr. BRArrAm. Yes, sir, and there has been a tradition in some of the

government labs where this has occurred, and a study has shown that

this is where the innovation in the government labs tends to occur

most often.

Let me state this another way. I think, while my organization might

not appreciate this too much, that the Bell Telephone Laboratories
110 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

today are proudest of things that were done in the past by their organization, many of which were done in spite of management at that time.

Senator JACKSON. What part do you believe is played by interservice and inter-institutional rivalry as spurs to efficient development

of new weapons? For example, what about the development of the

Polaris? What about the rivalry that has existed between Livermore

and Los Alamos? I might ask from this point of view, can there be

too much "unifying" and "consolidating" and "streamlining" of

structures? And at what point does rivalry or competition in this

kind of undertaking become wasteful rather than helpful?

Dr. BRATrAIN. I am not competent to discuss these particular areas,

but I can say that during the war I was on a project and we had competition in that project, and if you are trying to accomplish something

it is certainly good to have at least two groups working somewhat

independently toward the same thing because what one group might

not see the other group will see.

A rivalry is always good insofar as it adds to motivation. It is

sometimes a mistake, though, for a research scientist, if one has thought

out a line of research and decided on it, to pay too much attention to

things that others are doing.

If he switches around and tries to change every time something new

comes out he may miss what he is going after and never get anything

done.

Senator JACKSON. I was much interested in your analysis and criticism of the idea that we are now moving on a technological plateau.

I know that some observers of military Research and Development

and some spokesmen of the science community believe in the idea of

a "technological plateau."

Do many scientists and engineers actually involved in weapons development agree with this notion?

Dr. BRATTAIN. I don't really know nor am I in a position to say

how some of these scientists feel, but I sincerely doubt this.

Senator JACKSON. You doubt that they really believe in this

doctrine?

Dr. BRATTAIN. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Especially the ones who have themselves discovered that there is no such thing as a plateau.

Senator Simpson?

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Chairman, again I want to compliment you

on the caliber of witnesses you are getting here before our committee.

Doctor, I wonder if you would spell out the statement that you

made:

Certainly we have great need for more effective means for combating

Insurgency.

Would you dwell on that please?

Dr. BRATrAar. I think this was recognized. There was a period—

this is common knowledge—in which we were depending almost solely

on strategic deterrents and we realized that this was not enough—that

we were going to have to be in a position to counter other types of

activity. The question of what we can do in this area has been before

advisory committees for some 3 or 4 years now and, as I understand it, there is a larger effort in the military to improve their ability

in this area.
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 111

Senator SIMPSON. General White yesterday, and General LeMay

before the Armed Services Committee during the hearings on the testban treaty, both stressed that the United States in its own security and

to deter aggression, must maintain an overall nuclear superiority in

relation to the adversary. Assuming that the adversary also has a substantial nuclear capability, what is your attitude with respect to this?

Dr. BRATTAIN. I think this is really out of my area of competence,

but my private opinion is that in past history, in general, the leader

who caused the trouble always had the chance to come out scot free—

to get asylum some place.

I think people like Hitler, where they should occur in the world in

the future, if they are at all intelligent, know they have no chance to

survive anything that they start. And the people in the nations are

slowly coming to this knowledge that they cannot survive either, so I

really think and hope that we are not going to have a general nuclear

war.

Senator JACKSON. Dr. Brattain, I believe one of the most important

points you have made this morning is in these sentences, and I quote

from your statement.

Improved understanding is like money in the bank, namely means to do what

needs to be done in the future when we need to. In any period that it is expedient

to cut our technological spending, it is especially important that we do not cut

back on scientific research. In fact it is good policy at such a time to increase

the scientific effort.

To what extent would you say this point of view is accepted in

Government circles today?

Dr. BRATTAIN. I think this point of view is recognized to a fairly

high level in administration. The difficulty comes that when budgets

are cut, either by the administration or by Congress, the research is

the one that gets doubly cut.

Senator JACKSON. Why do you say doubly cut?

Dr. BRArrAiN. Well, because if development programs are underway and the administrative department tries to keep these developments going, and the money for scientific research is not budgeted separately, the tendency is to spend the money on the going projects (technology) and keep them going and cut back on the other.

There is just really no way out of it. In fact, these committees I

serve on are in a sense sounding boards for these departments to tell

their troubles to and every time there is a cut of any kind like this, this

question comes up: How do we maintain the level of scientific research

in such a situation?

Senator JACKSON. Just to follow that up, we are, spending of course

billions of dollars within the Federal agencies on research and development. How do we come up with the right system of priorities to

determine what areas should be exploited and in what areas we should

cut back?

We have built-in lobbies for certain causes and they keep pursuing

them, even though they are on the wrong track. In short, it seems

to me that one of the hardest problems of those of us who have to pass

on the authorizations in the field of research and development is to

know whether we are getting the best judgment as to the priorities that

should 'be followed. Do you have any general comments?

Dr. BRArrAmr. In the technological area when you think it is pressing to develop a technology in a certain area, a certain type, a weapon
112 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

for a certain purpose to meet a certain threat, if it is real urgent you

have to try at the start various methods of meeting this threat, so you

start several programs.

After these programs have gone on for awhile it becomes evident

that one of these is the right way to go. The difficulty then comes in

stopping the others, and it takes hardboiled action and sometimes action that certain communities in the United States that are economically dependent upon one of these developments don't like. But, once

you get to this point it is certainly wasteful to go on.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, the usual argument is made we

have invested so much in this we ought to go on and finish it. Your

point is, I take it, that this should not be a reason to pursue the project

if in the judgment of the people who should have the information it

ought to be chopped off and the resources that are going into that

project transferred to one that offers more promise.

Is that right?

Dr. BRATTAIN. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. SO there is no substitute, I take it, for tough administration.

Dr. BRATI'AIN. This, however, applies specifically to technology. In

scientific research one can't predict where the interesting result is

going to come and all one can do is to hope that one spreads his money

in such a way as to encourage, as I suggested, not just excellence—

excellence only is not worth the effort to cultivate it—but competence

and motivation.

Senator JACKSON. YOU said in your statement:

Cost effectiveness has its role to play here but it should be used with caution in

Applying it, too early, to real innovations such as nuclear power and propulsion.

I wonder if you might comment a little more fully on that point.

Dr. BRATTAIN. Well, I don't want to get into trouble, but I think

it was applied recently to a use of nuclear power in Navy ships and

I think that was a mistake.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, you feel that the cost effectiveness doctrine has its usefulness, provided that it is employed with

intelligent regard for its shortcomings? For example, it may be used

as too much of a brake on really new ideas.

Dr. BRATTAIN. Let's give an example. Would we have changed

from sail to steam if we had applied cost effectiveness to it?

Senator JACKSON. Well, you are the witness. I think the answer is

obvious.

I must say I liked your emphasis on the importance of maintaining

our capacity for military R and D and especially our great Government laboratories, at a high level of performance.

As you know, some moves to control or limit arms—even one like

the limited nuclear test ban treaty—may have the indirect consequence

of retarding development work when certain of our laboratories are

made uncertain of their mission and have difficulty in keeping and

recruiting top scientific and engineering talent.

What is your view on this problem?

Dr. BRATTAIN. I am really not privy to what is going on in the

nuclear energy field. I don't see, though, in a general fashion why

the nuclear test ban should have any influence on our ability, first,
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 113

to advance our understanding and, second, to use our technology,

use that understanding, to improve our technology in areas consistent

with this treaty.

On this laboratory question let me make one remark about the need

for research in the Government laboratories. In the Government

laboratories you need talent. There is a certain type of scientific

talent that you can only attract to these laboratories if you give them

opportunity to do scientific research.

They, like the 500 in the Bell Labs, add a tone to the place. Talent'

likes to work with other talent. The presence of this talent in the

laboratories attracts other talent, good engineers, and so on. The

presence of that talent allows the laboratory in times of stress or in

special situations to accomplish its purpose in a way the laboratory

could not otherwise do.

To take a specific example let's take the case of Telstar. There is

a man by the name of Dr. Walter Brown whose office was then only

a couple of doors away from mine. He is a research physicist at

Bell Labs. He is asked, not told, if he will spend some of his time

on this job. Being asked he does it. His talent is available.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Engberg, consultant for the minority, may

have some questions.

Senator SimpsoN. Mr. Chairman?

Senator JACKSON. Yes. Senator Simpson.

Senator SimpsoN. I want to follow an idea that came to me from

your interrogation of Dr. Brattain. I am thinking now in terms of

our defense and of our well being. Who initiates these projects and

determines the types ot research? Do you wait for word from the

armed services, for instance, that they want to put you on some research that they need, or do you bring this about and then report it

to them?

Dr. BRATTAIN. Oh, I think the Department of Defense is very receptive to any ideas that may have pertinence in national defense. In

fact I think there are people in this Department that complain about

the scarcity of ideas to do things. There are certain areas in which

they would welcome some new innovation—in which the current ideas

are just not good enough.

Senator SimrsoN. Who controls the types of research so as to do

away with or bypass the marginal project?

Dr. BRArrAix. This I don't know too well. I believe we are possibly

mixing up the two elements here. With respect to research, you don't

know where the significant things are going to come out of research.

You can do scientific research solely dedicated to increasing the understanding of our environment. You can in certain government laboratories do what is generally called applied scientific research where you

work in areas that you think will help the technology of the particular

thing you want to do.

Senator SI1VIPSON. Does that necessitate pretty close cooperation?

Dr. BRATTAIN. This is scientific research that appears to have relevance to the particular function of the government department at that

time and one tries to control this research in relation to the mission of

that particular department, but the most important innovation may

come out of some other area of scientific research.
114 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

One never knows where a new element of understanding is going

to be used.

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Engberg.

Mr. ENGBERG. Not being in any sense a physical scientist I would

like to ask a question or two of you, Dr. Brattain, that fall a bit more

into the area of perhaps feasible organization and procedure.

Being connected with a university where there is a rather large

engineering college I have a feeling that much of the emphasis is

spent on technological work. What is your feeling in this respect?

Would it be of greater value to the nation if our universities moved

more heavily into pure research?

Dr. BRATrAIN. I think the experience has been that at least up to

a certain level in education it is beneficial to give those that have the

particular aptitude and motivation a chance to go into the laboratory

and find out for themselves.

This background is valuable experience to them. This is what

science gives to all of them, the chance to find out for themselves.

Many of these men as they go on become, because of their particular

qualifications, great engineers, not necessarily scientists.

In fact, in my day at Minnesota when I was working for my Ph.D.

a large number of graduate students in the department—and it was a

particularly good group at that time as things fluctuate from one university to another—had taken their undergraduate work in engineering

because at that time the youngster who had this type of aptitude and

motivation thought it was engineering he was interested in, and after

getting his first degree in engineering he then switched into the

physics department. •

Mr. ENGBERG. There has been some discussion and some writing

about the value of a government institution—perhaps we shouldn't

call it a university, but government institution—that would be financed

by the Federal Government and that would devote most, or primarily

all, of its efforts to scientific research, eliminating the technological

fields, since the different areas and departments would need to develop

and apply the research.

What is your thinking in regard to such an institution?

Dr. BRATrAmr. I would have to study this before I was absolutely

sure, but my first reaction is no.

Mr. ENGBERG. Why would you say no?

Dr. BRATrAIN. We have in our universities all we need if we encourage it. We want diversification in this area. One doesn't know

where Einsteins are going to come from and the Einsteins are probably not going to come out of this institute. They are going to come

out of some corner in some university where somebody is inadvertently

supporting them.

Mr. ENGBERG. Such as Whitman College?

Dr. BRATTAIN. Well, all right.

Mr. ENGBERG. One other question

'

Dr. Brattain. You implied in

your memorandum that the scientist cannot morally judge the scientific knowledge that he discovers. You also point out that it is probably a mistake for the scientist to try to prove that he is right.

I am wondering if there isn't perhaps a national security danger involved in this, since the average administrator, whether he is executive or congressional, is rather naive in the field of scientific knowl-
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 115

edge. Don't you think that there is a basic danger in the competent

scientist not standing up for what he believes?

Dr. BRATTAIN. I think you took that a little bit out of context.

What I was trying to say there was that if you want to accomplish

something the worse thing you can do is to irritate the man who sees it

the other way by proving that you are right.

The thing you have to do is to somehow present it to him so that

he thinks he has found out that this is the right thing to do, and then

you get things done. That is what I meant by proving you are

right.

Oh, if the scientist is sure on the basis of his best judgment, and unbiased judgment, that a certain action is appropriate he should.do

everything he can to persuade others to see it his way. I am just

suggesting a mode of action.

Mr. ENGBERG. I merely asked the question to clear up the point.

Dr. BRATTAIN. There was another point in your question that I have

now forgotten and I would like to comment on it.

Mr. ENGBERG. You mentioned that scientists probably cannot

morally judge scientific knowledge.

Dr. BRATTAIN. Science only has relevance in answering the question,

or giving understanding, as to how things happen and a scientist as a

scientist should not make a value judgment. But he has as much right

as any other citizen to make a moral judgment.

However, he is not to be blamed for the use that his nation or the

world makes of his understanding.

Mr. ENGBERG. One other brief question, Senator Jackson, if I might,.

I am wondering what your thinking is in regard to our various international groupings and consultations on scientific research. Is it

highly beneficial to our national security?

Dr. BRATTAIN. I think it is a distinct advantage to the United States,

within the limits consistent with military security, to allow any qualified scientist to come to this country and see for himself what is going

on here.

I have been in contact with scientists from all parts of the world.

I find them, as long as you keep on scientific subjects, very reasonable

human beings. We sometimes do things we should not in refusing visas

to qualified scientists in the satellite countries.

Senator JACKSON. I have one last question and then I will turn to

Senator Simpson.

The history of warfare has some classic cases of using existing

weapons in unexpected ways—for example, when Philip of Macedon

organized his soldiers in phalanxes, or when the English at the battle

of Agincourt used dismounted bowmen in a new way. In World War

TI the Germans used the A-88 antiaircraft gun against heavy fortifications. The point has been made that while we concern ourselves vigorously with research for new and advanced military hardware, we make

no comparable effort to find new ways of using existing hardware in

helpful new ways.

Would you comment on this?

Dr. BRATTAIN. Of course, I am not the historian that you are, but I

think one scientific contribution to this type of innovation was the

effort that came out of the Second World War—which is now called

operations research—in which competent men actually went out into
116 CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

the field, saw how our weapons were being used, looked at the situation,

made recommendations for more effective use, and, knowing of other

weapons that weren't present, said, "Well, this weapon could be used

for that purpose."

I don't know how you do this in times when you are not using these

weapons.

Senator JACKSON. Wouldn't this same principle be applicable in

counter-insurgency? I understand we are doing some field research

in Vietnam at the present time to improve existing weapons to deal

with. the non-classical war situation. For instance, one of the discoveries in the early days of the conflict out there was that the befit

close-in fighter support plane was a T-28, which was, as the title

indicates, a trainer built in 1945. It is still being used.

Many people say, "Well, we are pouring billions into research to

improve our military posture, and yet when a war comes along that

we are directly engaged in—a counter-insurgency situation—we are

using equipment for direct military support that was developed for

training purposes in 1945."

In other words, do you think enough is being done in this area?

Dr. BRATTAIN. In the first place, I don't like your suggestion that

we are pouring billions into scientific research. We are pouring it

into technology.

Senator. JACKSON. I stand corrected. Over the years we have put

billions into research, but I agree we are not doing it annually.

Dr. BRAITAIN. The thing that I think of in this situation is the

fact that it wasn't so many years ago that we learned excellent ways

of fightingIndians ; we learned to adapt ourselves to the situation.

At a time in our history General Braddock insisted on keeping his

troops in a solid line, and the man who later became our first President, Washington, saved the day with his Indian fighters behind the

trees. Maybe we are now too well off. We may have lost the technique of adaptation.

Senator JACKSON. Maybe we are too far advanced.

Dr. BRATTAIN. Yes.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Simpson?

• Senator SIMPSON. Dr. Brattain, in your statement you say:

I believe because of the importance of science and technology in government

operations that it is essential that government have good in-house government

laboratories.

Are our in-house laboratories good now?

Dr. BRATTAIN. I think some of our government laboratory work is

i

outstanding. The Bureau of Standards is one. The Naval Research

laboratory s another one. There has been a tendency in periods of

stress to bypass the actual government laboratory because of the

restrictions of Civil Service when you have a need to do a high priority

job in a hurry.

Senator SIMPSON. Is that still so?

Dr. BRATTAIN. I will probably get crucified, but my feeling is that 

we should build up the in-house laboratories to the place where we do

not have to do this.

Senator SIMPSON. We would probably get crucified if we didn't

interrogate you along those lines too.

That is all.
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 117

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Senator Simpson. Dr. Brattain, we

are indebted to you for your valuable contribution. We equally appreciate your candid and thoughtful responses to the questions that we

have put to you today and we appreciate your taking tune out at a very

busy time of the year for you to come down and be with us.

Thank you very much.

Dr. BRATTAIN. I thank you for the privilege.

Senator SIMPSON. I want to add my appreciation and thanks to that

too, Doctor.

Senator JACKSON. The committee will recess subject to call of the

Chair.

(Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene

at the call of the Chair.)

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