Filed 12/7/20 P. v. Montes de Oca CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM MONTES DE OCA,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B300064

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. 9PH01947)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Robert M. Kawahara, Judge. Affirmed. 

Karyn H. Bucur, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Deputy Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Theresa A. 

Patterson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.

* * * * * * * * * *
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Defendant and appellant William Montes de Oca appeals 

from the court’s order revoking his parole and remanding him to 

the custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

and the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole Hearings for future

parole consideration. 

We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder in 

October 1988 and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole 

(Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. A956489). In December 2017, 

defendant was released on supervised lifetime parole. (Pen. 

Code, § 3000.1.) The petition for revocation of defendant’s parole, 

filed on March 21, 2019, reported the relevant terms and 

conditions of parole, the circumstances of the alleged violation, 

and defendant’s pertinent history and background, and explained 

why his parole agent, Don Gonzales, recommended parole be 

revoked. We summarize below the petition and the testimony at 

the parole revocation hearing. 

The terms and conditions of parole, acknowledged and

signed by defendant before his release from prison, included the 

condition that he report to his parole agent on the first working 

day after his release from custody and provide his residence

address, telephone number, and employment information. The 

terms and conditions also required that he report to his parole 

agent, in advance, any anticipated change of residence, and that 

he inform his parole agent within 72 hours of any change of 

employer, employment location or termination of employment. 

Defendant initially was placed in a transitional housing

program that “addresse[d] anti-social cognitions and promote[d] a 

positive reintegration” and he also received “other resources” 
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from the Division of Adult Parole Operations (DAPO). 

Mr. Gonzales spoke with defendant by cell phone and “carefully 

explained” that a warrant could be issued if he failed to report. 

Defendant repeatedly said, “I’ll be there, Gonzales, I’ll be there.” 

Mr. Gonzales also spoke with a program representative by cell 

phone, who said he further emphasized to defendant the 

importance that he “absolutely needed” to check in with his 

parole agent. But defendant left the program without permission 

and without leaving a forwarding address.

A warrant issued and defendant was arrested for 

absconding from parole supervision on January 15, 2019. He was 

released from custody on January 18 “unbeknownst to DAPO”

(apparently, the county jail did not place a parole hold on 

defendant’s release), and he did not report to Mr. Gonzales. 

Mr. Gonzales made many unsuccessful attempts to locate 

defendant, including driving through the high transient areas of 

Los Angeles and speaking with a representative of the program 

from which he absconded to ask if they had heard from defendant 

and request that, if he arrived unannounced, they tell him to 

check in with his parole agent. Mr. Gonzales submitted a second 

warrant, and on March 15, 2019, defendant was arrested again. 

The petition to revoke parole stated that “[i]ntermediate 

sanctions have been considered. However, they have been 

deemed not appropriate at this time.” The petition explained 

defendant is a 52-year-old lifer parolee on parole for murder, who 

left his transitional housing program “without prior approval 

from DAPO and failed to provide a forwarding address.” 

Defendant “is a chronic absconder.” DAPO considered referring 

defendant to a residential drug treatment program as an 

intermediate sanction to address this violation but concluded “his 
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negative behavior has clearly escalated and has become a 

lifestyle.” 

The contested revocation hearing was held on April 29, 

2019. Defendant did not demur to the petition or otherwise

object that the petition failed to comply with statutory

requirements. 

Mr. Gonzales testified to the efforts he made to locate 

defendant, including contacting the transitional housing program 

defendant left without notice to see if he had been in touch with 

anyone there, and looking for him on the streets. Mr. Gonzales

received no calls or messages from defendant, and defendant’s 

name was not on any of the sign-in sheets at the office, indicating 

defendant had not reported to the parole office sometime when 

Mr. Gonzales was out in the field. Mr. Gonzales did receive a 

message about a month after the second warrant issued that 

might have been from defendant (the person had a similar 

accent), but that person did not leave his name, saying only he 

wanted to check in. 

Defendant also testified. He said he tried to call 

Mr. Gonzales several days after his release. Defendant also tried

to report in person, going to the office in Inglewood to explain he 

“was out of the county,” and he was told Mr. Gonzales was not 

there. Defendant said his original parole agent used to make 

field visits, and he never had to go into any office to report. 

Defendant said he left a message for Mr. Gonzales, who never 

called him back. 

Agent Cecelia Mann testified the parole office in Inglewood 

has been closed since 2013 (six years before defendant claimed to 

have reported there). 
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The court found defendant’s testimony was not credible and 

that he had violated the terms of parole. The court revoked 

parole and remanded defendant to the custody of the Department 

of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the jurisdiction of the 

Board of Parole Hearings for further consideration in accordance 

with Penal Code section 3000.08, subdivision (h). This appeal 

followed.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the court erred in not requiring DAPO 

to plead and prove it had considered intermediate sanctions short 

of revocation, as required by Penal Code section 3000.08, 

subdivision (f) and California Rule of Court, rule 4.541(e). 

The contention has been forfeited. Defendant did not 

challenge the petition by way of demurrer or otherwise raise any 

objection on this ground in the trial court. “The forfeiture 

doctrine is a ‘well-established procedural principle that, with 

certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of 

error that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial 

court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Strong policy reasons support this 

rule: ‘It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error 

on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial 

court, could have been easily corrected or avoided. [Citations.]’ ” 

(People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114; see also People v. 

Upsher (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318 [“Objections to defects 

in the form of an accusatory pleading must be made by way of 

demurrer. . . . When a defendant fails to demur, ‘the claimed 

defect in the information [is] waived.’ ”].) 

If defendant had raised this objection below, DAPO and the 

court would have had an opportunity to clarify any claimed 

ambiguity as to any intermediate sanctions considered and 
6

rejected. Having not done so, defendant may not raise the issue 

for the first time on appeal.

In any event, his contention has no merit. The petition

described above complies with the statutory requirements. 

(Pen. Code, § 3000.08, subd. (f) [“The petition shall include a 

written report that contains additional information regarding the 

petition, including the relevant terms and conditions of parole, 

the circumstances of the alleged underlying violation, the history 

and background of the parolee, and any recommendations.”]; 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.541(e) [“In addition to the minimum 

contents described in (c), a report filed by the supervising agency 

in conjunction with a petition to revoke parole . . . must include 

the reasons for that agency’s determination that intermediate 

sanctions without court intervention . . . are inappropriate 

responses to the alleged violations.”].) The petition adequately 

alleged why DAPO concluded that, despite “diverse efforts” to 

reintegrate defendant back into the community, defendant did 

not “incorporate” these resources before he absconded, and he 

became “a chronic absconder.” 

DISPOSITION

The order revoking defendant’s parole is affirmed. 

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STRATTON, J. 

WILEY, J.