J. A29003/15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. :

:

DORIAN WILLIAMS, : No. 1671 WDA 2014 

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, April 7, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0016576-2012 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES AND MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2015 

 Dorian Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence of April 7, 

2014, resulting from his conviction of first-degree murder.1 We affirm. 

 The trial court recited the following relevant facts: 

 In August of 2012, Appellant and Susan 

Hammond were living together in an apartment at 

2102 Patricia Lane, in North Versailles, Allegheny 

County. They had been dating for approximately 

six months at that juncture. In the evening hours of 

August 26, 2012, Appellant and Hammond returned 

to their apartment after visiting Hammond’s sisters, 

Ameshia and Ashley Hammond. Appellant and 

Hammond argued during that visit, and continued to 

argue when they returned home. 

 Shortly before 11:30 P.M., Dorrian Freeman, 

Appellant’s brother, arrived in the parking lot of 

2102 Patricia Lane along with their mother, 

Barbara Freeman-Moore. Freeman-Moore was living 

 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). 
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with Appellant and Hammond at the time but did not 

have a key for the apartment and had to be let into

the building by Appellant or Hammond. Appellant 

and Hammond exited the apartment together and let 

Freeman-Moore into the apartment. Hammond was 

on her way to work as a nurse, and Appellant 

followed her to the parking lot, apparently intent on 

continuing the argument. As Hammond walked to 

her car, Appellant approached Dorrian Freeman and 

told him that he was tired of Hammond and stated, 

“I got something for her.” Freeman drove away, 

leaving Appellant and Hammond alone in the parking 

lot. 

 Appellant and Hammond continued to argue by 

her car as she attempted to leave for work. 

Hammond entered her car and Appellant also 

entered and continued the argument. Appellant 

pulled out a firearm, prompting Hammond to exit the

car and run towards a dumpster. Hammond pleaded 

with Appellant, “Let’s just go inside, let’s just go 

inside.” Appellant chased her and shot her once in

the back of the head as she ran between two cars. 

Hammond immediately fell over onto one of the cars 

and slid to the ground in a kneeling position, with

her back against the car. Appellant checked for a 

shell casing in the parking lot before fleeing in 

Hammond’s car at 11:45 P.M. 

 Appellant immediately called a neighbor, 

Carlos Smith, to ask him if he had heard a gunshot 

in the parking lot. Smith stated that he had not. 

Appellant called Smith six more times that 

night/early morning: four times requesting that 

Smith look outside into the parking lot to make sure 

that no police were present; once at 12:26 A.M. 

requesting that Smith stay on the phone with 

Appellant while he drove back to the apartment 

complex and that Smith notify Appellant if anyone 

approached the parking lot; and a final time at 

12:35 A.M. to thank Smith for his help. At 

12:35 A.M. Appellant parked Hammond’s car and 

verified that Hammond was still lying between two 

cars, clearly deceased. After that final call to Smith, 
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Appellant ran into the nearby wooded area to await a 

ride he had arranged. 

 At approximately 7:30 A.M. (August 27, 2012), 

a neighbor found Hammond’s body between the two 

cars in the parking lot and called the police. Police 

and paramedics arrived shortly thereafter, and 

pronounced Hammond dead. Hammond was 

identified, the scene was secured, and neighbors 

were interviewed. 

 Appellant was on probation at the time, and he 

had failed to appear for his scheduled report date in 

August. Consequently, a probation violation arrest

warrant was issued for Appellant on August 28, 

2012. Appellant was not located until October 29, 

2012, when he was apprehended in the East Hills 

section of the City of Pittsburgh, by the 

U.S. Marshals Fugitive Task Force. Appellant was 

interviewed by homicide detectives on October 29, 

2012, and acknowledged his presence at the scene, 

but attributed Hammond’s murder to a drive-by 

shooting targeting Appellant. Appellant initially 

stated that he blacked out after the gunshot. He 

later stated during the same interview that he fled

the scene in Hammond’s car immediately after the 

gunshot because he was the intended target, and 

after returning to the apartment he fled the 

North Versailles area because he had an outstanding

bench warrant. 

Trial court opinion, 4/14/15 at 4-7 (citations omitted). 

 Appellant was charged with criminal homicide.2 A jury trial was held 

and appellant was convicted of first-degree murder on January 9, 2014. 

Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole on April 7, 2014. Timely post-sentence motions were filed on 

 

2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501. 
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April 16, 2014; and appellant’s trial counsel, Kirsha Weyandt, Esq., withdrew 

as counsel. On May 8, 2014, the trial court appointed Thomas Farrell, Esq., 

as appellant’s counsel. The trial court granted Attorney Farrell an extension 

of time to file amended post-sentence motions on August 13, 2014. 

Appellant filed an amended post-sentence motion on September 2, 2014, 

which the trial court denied on September 9, 2014. Appellant then filed a 

timely notice of appeal to this court on October 9, 2014. The trial court 

ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); appellant complied with the trial 

court’s order on January 8, 2015, and the trial court filed an opinion 

pursuant to Rule 1925(a). 

 Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

failing to grant a hearing and/or a new trial 

when the trial court denied the amended 

post-sentencing motions that requested a new 

trial based upon the after-discovered evidence? 

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

allowing testimony that Appellant never went 

to the funeral of the victim when the probative 

value did not outweigh the danger of unfair 

prejudice? 

Appellant’s brief at 5. 

 Appellant’s first issue for our review relates to after-discovered 

evidence. When considering whether an appellant is entitled to relief for 

after-discovered evidence, we are subject to the following standard: 
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To be granted a new trial based on after-discovered

evidence: 

[Defendant] must demonstrate that the 

evidence: (1) could not have been 

obtained prior to the conclusion of the 

trial by exercise of reasonable diligence; 

(2) is not merely corroborative or 

cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to 

impeach the credibility of a witness; and 

(4) would likely result in a different 

verdict if a new trial were granted. 

Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (Pa. 

2008, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1198 (2009) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 

1283 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1058 

(2006)). The test is conjunctive; the defendant 

must show by a preponderance of the evidence that 

each of these facts has been met in order for a new

trial to be warranted. See Pagan, supra; 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939 A.2d 355, 359 

(Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1047 

(Pa. 2008). 

. . . . 

Further, a defendant seeking a new trial must 

demonstrate he will not use the alleged 

after-discovered evidence solely to impeach the 

credibility of a witness. See Pagan, supra. 

“Whenever a party offers a witness to provide 

evidence that contradicts other evidence previously

given by another witness, it constitutes 

impeachment. . . .” Commonwealth v. Weis, 611 

A.2d 1218, 1229 (Pa. 1992). 

. . . . 

Finally, before granting a new trial, a court must 

assess whether the alleged after-discovered evidence 

is of such nature and character that it would likely 

compel a different verdict if a new trial is granted. 

See Pagan, supra; Commonwealth v. Moore, 
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633 A.2d 1119, 1136 (Pa. 1993). In making that 

determination, a court should consider the integrity 

of the alleged after-discovered evidence and the 

overall strength of the evidence supporting the 

conviction. Commonwealth v. Parker, 431 A.2d 

216, 218 (Pa. 1981) (stating conflicting accounts are 

inherently unreliable and would not compel different 

verdict in new trial). See also Commonwealth v. 

Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 597 (Pa. 2007) (stating 

exculpatory accomplice testimony should be viewed 

with suspicion where accomplice has already been 

tried and has nothing to lose); Argyrou v. State, 

709 A.2d 1194, 1202-1203 (Md. 1998) (noting 

“cases that have addressed [newly-discovered 

evidence] have focused not simply on the credibility 

of the person offering the exculpatory evidence, but 

on the credibility or trustworthiness of the evidence 

itself, as well as the motive, or other impeaching 

charateristics, of those offering it”). . . 

Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 363-365 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

(citations formatted), appeal denied, 14 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2010). 

 Appellant offers the following letter as after-discovered evidence: 

7-25-14 

To whom it may concern, 

 My name is Joshua Yingling inmate #LN 8033, 

an inmate at SCI Camp Hill. In October 2012 I was 

at Allegheny County Jail in intake with My 

co-defendant Clayton McKinnon. At that time he had

approached me saying that he had a way that we 

could get out of jail. I asked him what he was 

talking about. He then told me knew about a 

shooting that had happened to his friends cousin. 

He told me that they didn’t know who did it but there 

was someone in intake with us by the name of 

Dorian Williams that he could blame it on to get out 

of trouble. I told him that would be lying and 

wouldn’t be right, but he then said he don’t care as 

long as he don’t go back to jail. I said that I didn’t 

want anything to do with it. I later heard them 
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talking and Clayton asked Dorian “Yo I heard you 

smoked somebody,” and Dorian said “Naw, they got 

the wrong dude.” I then approached Clayton again 

and told him that what he was doing was wrong and 

that he was lying about something that had nothing 

to do with him. He then told me I was right and that 

he wasn’t going to get involved. I then found out a 

month ago that Clayton did in fact testify against 

Dorian Williams. I know for a fact that Clayton was 

lying on the stand to get out of trouble. I feel it 

wouldn’t be right to hear about this and let another 

man (Dorian Williams) do time for a crime he did not 

do. I know for a fact Clayton was lying. Please get 

in touch with me as soon as you can so I know what 

I can do to help. I just wish I would have known 

sooner so I could have prevented this from 

happening. Please contact me at . . . 

. . . . 

Sincerely: 

/s/ Joshua Yingling 

Docket entry 37. 

 There is no dispute that appellant’s after-discovered evidence meets 

the first two requirements established by Pagan -- that the after-discovered 

evidence could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial, 

and that the after-discovered evidence will not be cumulative or simply 

corroborate evidence from trial. The trial court held that appellant failed to 

meet the third and fourth requirements under Pagan and, as a result, is not 

entitled to a new trial. (See trial court opinion, 4/14/15 at 15.) 

 Appellant fails to meet the third prong of the Pagan test because he 

has failed to establish that Yingling’s letter does anything other than 

impeach McKinnon’s testimony. Yingling’s letter alleges that McKinnon, 
J. A29003/15 

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while in intake at the Allegheny County Jail, decided to falsely implicate 

appellant in the victim’s murder. Yingling then states that McKinnon lied on 

the stand about appellant’s confession, and that appellant had actually 

denied any involvement in the victim’s murder to McKinnon. This evidence 

serves no purpose other than to contradict McKinnon’s previous testimony 

and otherwise discredit McKinnon. See Weis, supra. Therefore, appellant’s 

after-discovered evidence claim has no legal merit.

 Appellant brings to our attention several cases in which defendants 

have been granted new trials on the basis of after-discovered evidence 

uncovering perjury during trial. See Commonwealth v. Coroniti, 85 A.2d 

673, 675 (Pa.Super. 1952) (“If perjury by an essential witness is admitted 

or is shown by incontrovertible evidence, a new trial should be granted, 

but if there is doubt as to the falsity of the testimony a new trial is properly 

refused) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Scott, 

426 A.2d 128, 130 (Pa.Super. 1981) (implying that a new trial should be 

granted for after-discovered evidence involving perjurious testimony at 

trial). (Appellant’s brief at 21.) 

 We find that Coroniti is inapposite in the instant case for two reasons: 

(1) McKinnon was not an essential witness; and (2) the after-discovered 

evidence produced by appellant is not incontrovertible. As discussed below, 

and as noted by the trial court, the Commonwealth presented an 

overwhelming amount of evidence against appellant at trial. After carefully 
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reviewing the trial record, we find that McKinnon was not an essential 

witness to the Commonwealth’s case. We also find that the after-discovered 

evidence produced by appellant is not incontrovertible. Appellant produced 

a letter from an inmate who was with McKinnon and appellant in intake at 

the Allegheny County Jail. Without any corroborating evidence that verifies 

the contents of Yingling’s letter and indicates that McKinnon did indeed 

commit perjury during appellant’s trial, we cannot determine that Yingling’s 

letter constitutes incontrovertible evidence as required by Coroniti. 

 Moreover, even if appellant’s purpose of using Yingling’s letter was not 

solely to impeach McKinnon, we agree with the trial court that the evidence 

against appellant, even without McKinnon’s testimony, was overwhelming. 

Specifically, the trial court provided the following list indicating the 

overwhelming amount of evidence that the Commonwealth presented: 

This evidence included: (1) physical evidence from

the scene; (2) Appellant’s statement to police where 

he stated that an unknown individual shot Hammond 

as she was walking in the middle of the roadway, 

which was inconsistent with where her body was 

found; (3) Appellant’s statement to William Powell,

his cellmate in the Allegheny County Jail, wherein 

Appellant admitted to shooting Hammond as he 

chased her and she fell between two cars, which was

consistent with where Hammond’s body was found; 

(4) testimony that Appellant and Hammond had 

been arguing frequently for months, Appellant would

have violent outbursts during these arguments, and 

that Hammond and Appellant were arguing that 

evening; (5) testimony that Appellant told his 

brother, “I got something for her” minutes before 

Hammond was shot; (7) Appellant called a neighbor 

to see if he had heard a gunshot immediately after 
J. A29003/15 

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Hammond was shot; (8) Appellant fled the area in 

Hammond’s vehicle and only returned an hour later 

when he verified through his neighbor that no police 

had responded to the gunshot; (9) Appellant fled the 

area and was not located until October 29, 2012; 

and (10) Appellant had been seen with a firearm that 

was consistent with the type of firearm that fired the 

bullet found in Hammond’s skull. 

Trial court opinion, 4/14/15 at 15 n.5 (citations omitted). Given the 

overwhelming evidence presented against appellant at trial, appellant has 

failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a new trial in which 

Yingling were to testify about his conversation with McKinnon would likely 

result in a different verdict. Therefore, we find that the trial judge did not 

abuse his discretion, and this claim is without merit. 

 In his second issue on appeal, appellant alleges that the trial court 

abused its discretion by allowing testimony that appellant did not attend the 

victim’s funeral. Specifically, appellant claims that such testimony was 

unfairly prejudicial. (Appellant’s brief at 30.) The trial court stated that it 

admitted evidence that appellant did not attend the victim’s funeral, “to 

show consciousness of guilt given [appellant’s] statement to police that he 

loved and cared for [the victim.]” (Trial court opinion, 4/14/15 at 23.) 

 When reviewing the admissibility of evidence at trial, we are held to 

the following standard: 

Our standard of review regarding the admissibility of 

evidence is an abuse of discretion. “[T]he 

admissibility of evidence is a matter addressed to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and . . . an 

appellate court may only reverse upon a showing 
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that the trial court abused its discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Weiss, 776 A.2d 658, 697 (Pa. 

2001) (citations omitted). “An abuse of discretion is 

not a mere error in judgment but, rather involves 

bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, manifest 

unreasonableness, or misapplication of law.” 

Commonwealth v. Hoover, 16 A.3d 1148, 1150 

(Pa.Super. 2011). 

Commonwealth v. Cox, 115 A.3d 333, 336 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251-1252 (Pa.Super. 

2013), appeal denied, 80 A.3d 774 (Pa. 2013). “The court may exclude 

relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or 

more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 

jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 

evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403. “[U]nfair prejudice is defined as ‘a tendency to 

suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away 

from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.’” Commonwealth v. 

Jemison, 98 A.3d 1254, 1262 (Pa. 2014), quoting Pa.R.E. 403 comment. 

 Our cases provide very limited guidance that is analogous to the facts 

at issue. We find Williams v. United States, 52 A.3d 25 (D.C. 2012), to 

be instructive in this case, despite the difference between the Federal and 
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Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.3 In Williams, the District of Columbia 

Court of Appeals stated that, “the failure to attend the funeral of one’s wife 

after her murder, when considered without further information, is 

inconsistent with the way a reasonable person would have acted.” Id. at 41, 

citing Allen v. United States, 603 A.2d 1219, 1233 (D.C. 1992) 

(Rogers, C.J., concurring). The Williams court further notes that, 

without trial court findings that the probative value 

of appellant’s absence (reflecting guilt 

consciousness) exceeded the prejudicial impact 

(inflaming the jury), we cannot say as a matter of 

law that the funeral evidence was properly admitted, 

especially because “improper inferences [based on 

defendant’s inaction] are likely to be over-valued by 

juries.” 

Williams, 52 A.3d at 41, quoting Allen, 603 A.2d at 1231 (Rogers, C.J., 

concurring). 

 Unlike Williams, the trial court here provided a finding of probative 

value of appellant’s absence from the victim’s funeral. Specifically, the trial 

court noted that appellant made statements to the police that he “loved and 

cared for [the victim.]” (Trial court opinion, 4/14/15 at 23.) Appellant 

showed the police that he had the victim’s name tattooed on his neck with 

 

3

 The District of Columbia has adopted F.R.E. 403. Johnson v. United 

States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1099 (D.C. 1996). The official comment to 

Pa.R.E. 403 notes that the difference between the Federal Rules and the 

Pennsylvania Rules is that Pennsylvania does not require unfair prejudice to 

“substantially outweigh” probative value. Pa.R.E. 403 Comment, see also 

Commonwealth v. Boyle, 447 A.2d 250, 254 (Pa. 1982). 
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the phrase “all in,” which he indicated to mean that he was “all in the 

relationship with [the victim.]” (Notes of testimony, 1/6/14 at 219.) 

 Unlike the defendant in Williams, who did not attend his wife’s funeral 

because her family suspected that he was responsible for her death, nothing 

in the record in the instant case indicates that the victim’s family suspected 

appellant in her death and that he was not welcome to attend her funeral. 

Therefore, the probative value concerning appellant’s failure to attend the 

victim’s funeral is not outweighed by unfair prejudice, and the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in admitting such testimony. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Motion to remand is denied as moot. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 12/18/2015