138 Nei., Advance Opinion tr.) 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

TRP FUND VI, LLC, A DELAWARE 

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, A 

FOREIGN CORPORATION; AND 

FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE 

ASSOCIATION, A NATIONAL 

BANKING ENTITY, 

Respondents. 

No. 84407 

FILE 

Emergency motion for stay and/or injunction pending appeal. 

Motion denied. 

The Wright Law Group and John Henry Wright, Las Vegas, 

for Appellant. 

Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP, and Christina V. Miller, Las Vegas, 

for Respondents. 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, SILVER, CADISH, and PICKERING, 

JJ. 

OPINION 

PER CURIAM: 

When filing emergency motions and motions for stay, moving 

parties must meet certain requirements designed to provide prompt notice, 

quick access to the information needed to resolve the motion, and proof that 

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they have first sought relief in the district court or that doing so is 

impracticable. Failure to comply with these requirements may result in 

summary denial of the motion. 

FACTS 

In the underlying quiet title and declaratory relief action, 

appellant TRP Fund VI, LLC, sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin 

respondents PHH Mortgage Corporation and Federal National Mortgage 

Association from foreclosing under the first position deed of trust on its 

property. On March 10, 2022, the district court entered an order denying 

the preliminary injunction, and TRP Fund appealed. 

TRP Fund filed in this court an emergency motion for stay 

and/or injunction on March 21, seeking relief before a foreclosure sale 

scheduled for April 1, and paid the filing fee the next day. See NRAP 3(e) 

(requiring the payment of a filing fee); NRAP 45(f) (The clerk shall not be 

required to file any paper or record in the clerk's office or docket any 

proceeding until the fee required by law and these Rules has been paid."). 

An NRAP 27(e) certificate, which must accompany emergency motions, was 

not attached to the stay motion but was attached to a simultaneously filed 

motion to exceed the page limit. In the stay motion, TRP Fund asserted 

that it was "clearlY impracticable" to seek a stay pending appeal in the 

district court as set forth in NRAP 8(a) because the district court had just 

refused to grant it a preliminary injunction seeking similar relief, such that 

it "would be a waste of time and resourcee to ask that court for a stay. 

Respondents timely filed a response to the stay motion,' 

arguing that the stay motion should be summarily denied because TRP 

1TRP Fund's and respondents motions for leave to file a stay motion 

and an opposition thereto that exceed the NRAP 27(d)(2) page limits are 

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Fund failed to include the NRAP 27(e) certificate with the emergency 

motion and failed to first seek stay relief in the district court or to 

demonstrate that doing so was impracticable. In the response, respondents 

contend that TRP Fund did not attempt to comply with the NRAP 27(e) 

requirement to notify them of its intent to seek emergency relief before it 

filed the stay motion. 

DISCUSSION 

Due to their urgent nature, emergency motions use 

considerable court and party resources. When relief is needed within 14 

days to avoid irreparable harm, NRAP 27 requires the movant to take 

certain enumerated steps to ensure both that the parties and the court are 

notified of the emergency as soon as possible and that the information 

needed to process the motion is readily available. To those ends, NRAP 

27(e)(1) requires the movant, before filing the motion, to "make every 

practicable effort to notify the clerk of the Supreme Court, opposing counsel, 

and any opposing parties proceeding without counsel and to serve the 

motion at the earliest possible time." • The motion must be accompanied by 

a certificate providing the contact information for the parties, the facts 

demonstrating both the existence and the nature of the asserted emergency, 

and when and how the other parties were notified of the emergency and 

served with the motion. NRAP 27(e)(3). Further, the movant must explain 

in the motion whether relief was available and sought in the district court 

and, if not sought, why the motion should not be denied. NRAP 27(e)(4). 

Finally, when the movant is seeking a stay or injunction, the movant must 

also comply with NRAP 8(a)(1), which states that "[a] party must ordinarily 

granted. The motion and opposition were filed on March 21 and March 28, 

respectively. 

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move first [for such relief] in the district court." Any movant that seeks a 

stay from this court without first applying in the district court must 

demonstrate that first. seeking relief in the district court would be 

"impracticable." NRAP 8(a)(2)(A)(i). 

Here, TRP Fund's NRAP 27(e) certificate fails to meet the 

stated requirements. It was rot attached to the emergency stay motion and, 

while certifying that the motion was made "at the earliest opportunity," 

TRP Fund does not further explain that statement or demonstrate that it 

attempted to notify respondents of the emergency before filing the motion. 

More problematically, TRP Fund admittedly did not first seek 

relief in the district court and failed to demonstrate that doing so was 

impracticable. "Impracticable requires the movant to show that it was "not 

capable" of first seeking relief in the district court or that such an act could 

not be done. Webster's II New College Dictionary, at 556 (1995). TRP Fund 

argues only that seeking a stay in the district court was • unwarranted 

because the district court denied it a preliminary injunction, not that it was 

unable to file the motion or that the court was incapable of granting the 

requested relief. While considerations in determining whether to grant a 

preliminary injunction overlap with those in determining whether to grant 

a stay or injunction pending appe4 they are not the same. Compare 

Excellence Cmty. Mgmt., LLC v. Gilmore, 131 Nev. 347, 350-51, 351 P.3d 

720, 722 (2015) (noting that a prelitninary injunctión may issue when the 

moVing party has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of successr on the 

merits of its claims and irreparable harm), with NRCP 62(c) (proViding that 

when an appeal from preliminary injunction is pending, the district court 

may "grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the 

opposing party's righte), and NRAP 8(c) (listing four factors for courts. to 

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consider when determining a motion for stay or injunction pending appeal). 

Although both analyses look to the likelihood of success on the merits, in 

determining whether to grant a stay or injunction pending appeal, the 

district court may also take into consideration the purposes of the requested 

stay or injunction, the novelty or unsettledness of a legal issue, and any 

other issues of security and harm. 

Here, the district court denied a preliminary injunction based 

on its review of the merits but did not delve into other considerations that 

rnay weigh in favor of a stay or •injunction pending appeal. As we have 

acknowledged before, this court's strong policy favoring an initial stay 

decision from the district court is based on that court's vastly greater 

familiarity with the facts and circumstances of the case and better position 

to resolve such factual issues, including those of duration and bond 

necessity and amount.2 Nelson v. Heer, 121 Nev. 832, 836, 122 P.3d 1252, 

1254 (2005), as modified (Jan. 25. 2006); see generally In re Grand Jury 

Proc. U.S., 626 F.2d 1051, 1059 (1st Cir. 1980) (recognizing that the federal 

rule analogous to NRAP 8 embodies a strong policy that a request for a 

stay or injunction pending appeal be directed in the first instance to the 

district court, which is familiar with the controversy and better able to 

assess potential prejudice to a party from the grant or denial of interim 

relier), receded from on other grounds by In re Kaye, 760 F.2d 343, 356 (1st 

Cir. 1985). Thus, unless movants can demonstrate that first asking the 

district court for relief is truly impracticable, they are required to seek stay 

and injunctive relief pending appeal in the district court even when that 

2We note, for example, that respondents argue that the lis pendens 

TRP Fund has recorded against the property is sufficient to protect its 

interest. 

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court has denied them a preliminary injunction. TRP Fund's failure to do 

so here bars relief, and we deny the emergency motion for stay or injunction. 

J. 

Silver 

Cadish 

J. 

J. 

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