Filed 5/28/15 Phelps v. Bishop CA2/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

WILLIE PHELPS, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

REGGIE LYN BISHOP, SR., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B252583 and B254891 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BC478175) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Steven J. Kleifield, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Reggie L. Bishop, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. 

 Campbell & Farahani, Frances M. Campbell and Nima Farahani for Plaintiff 

and Respondent. 
2

 Plaintiff and respondent Willie Phelps sued her former landlord, appellant 

Reggie Lyn Bishop, Sr., for constructive eviction by turning off the water and gas 

to her apartment and for a violation of Civil Code section 789.3.1

 A jury awarded 

respondent damages in the amount of $154,500, and the trial court awarded 

respondent $106,924 in attorney fees and entered judgment in her favor. 

Appellant, in propria persona, appeals the jury verdict in appeal No. B252583 and 

the award of attorney fees in appeal No. B254891.2

 We affirm the judgment in its 

entirety. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

 Respondent lived in a rent-controlled apartment on Stocker Street in the City 

of Los Angeles from 1997 through 2011.4

 Respondent testified that she had a good 

relationship with her previous landlord, but after appellant became the landlord in 

2009, he began to harass her in what she believed was an attempt to force her to 

move out. For example, in April 2011, appellant demanded that respondent 

complete a new rental application on the basis that she had exceeded the allowable 

number of occupants in the apartment, even though the previous landlord had 

 

1

 All unspecified statutory references are to the Civil Code. Section 789.3 prohibits 

a landlord from willfully causing, directly or indirectly, the interruption or termination of 

any utilities to a tenant with the intent to terminate the tenant’s occupancy. (§ 789.3, 

subd. (a).) 

2

 The appeals were consolidated for the purposes of oral argument and decision. 

3

 The record contains no reporter’s transcript. However, the court approved 

respondent’s proposed settled statement of the oral proceedings of the case, summarizing 

the witnesses’ testimony. 

4

 A real estate agent testified that the fair market value of respondent’s apartment 

was $1,800 per month. Respondent paid $750 per month. 
3

approved the number of occupants. In addition, appellant repeatedly demanded 

that respondent allow entry to her apartment for unneeded repairs and then failed to 

send a repair person. In June and August 2011, appellant served respondent with 

notices to quit for her alleged refusal to allow access for repairs, although no 

repairs were needed and no one came to make repairs. In September 2011, 

appellant served respondent with a notice to quit for the alleged failure to pay rent, 

even though she had paid it. 

 In August 2011, appellant sued respondent for unlawful detainer, demanding 

that respondent give him access to her apartment. However, in October 2011, 

there was a fire in a different apartment at the property. Appellant notified 

respondent that the utilities at the building were being discontinued for an 

indefinite time due to fire damage and advised her to seek shelter with the Red 

Cross. 

 Felipe Hernandez, a code enforcement officer with the Los Angeles Housing 

Department (housing department) inspected the property after the fire and told 

appellant to restore the gas and water to respondent’s apartment, but appellant 

refused. Hernandez testified that there was nothing wrong with the property that 

required the utilities to remain off. On October 18, 2011, a housing department 

inspector posted a two-day notice to restore the utilities to respondent’s apartment. 

Appellant claimed he had been ordered not to turn on the utilities. However, 

Hernandez checked with the Los Angeles Fire Department, the Los Angeles 

Department of Building and Safety, and appellant’s insurance company, and none 

of those entities had instructed appellant to keep the utilities off. Because 

appellant refused to turn on the utilities, the housing department issued a Notice to 

Vacate Substandard Building, ordering appellant to evict respondent and pay her 

relocation fees. 
4

 Respondent moved out of the building from approximately October 14, 2011 

through the end of November 2011, paying $3,600 for housing in a neighborhood 

she felt was dangerous. She had not wanted to move out of her apartment because 

she had strong ties to the community there. Respondent was 77 years old at the 

time of trial and on a fixed income and thus had limited resources to obtain 

housing in a safer neighborhood. 

 Respondent’s attorney advised respondent to settle the unlawful detainer 

case so that she would not need to return to an apartment with no utilities, and 

thereafter sue appellant for constructive eviction. On November 9, 2011, appellant 

and respondent settled the unlawful detainer action by a superior court form, 

“Unlawful Detainer Stipulation and Judgment.” Respondent’s attorney informed 

appellant’s attorney that respondent planned to sue appellant for constructive 

eviction and refused to waive her right to do so. Pursuant to the agreement, 

respondent agreed to vacate the apartment by November 30, 2011, and appellant 

agreed to pay respondent the $17,000 relocation fee ordered by the housing 

department. The agreement provided that judgment would be entered in favor of 

appellant only if respondent failed to vacate the premises. Appellant agreed that if 

respondent vacated the premises, he would dismiss the action with prejudice. 

Respondent vacated the premises pursuant to the agreement, and the action was 

dismissed. 

 In February 2012, respondent filed a complaint against appellant alleging 

five causes of action: breach of the warranty of habitability, constructive eviction, 

negligent maintenance of the premises, violation of section 789.3, and intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. The trial court overruled appellant’s demurrer to 

the complaint and sustained respondent’s demurrer to appellant’s cross-complaint. 
5

The court denied appellant’s summary judgment motion, and the case proceeded to 

a jury trial. 

 The jury returned a special verdict in favor of respondent on her section 

789.3 claim and her constructive eviction claim.5

 The jury found that appellant 

had willfully caused respondent’s gas and water to remain off for the purpose of 

terminating her occupancy and that he constructively evicted her. The jury 

awarded respondent damages in the amount of $154,500. The trial court entered 

judgment in respondent’s favor, awarding her $154,500 in damages, $2,305.35 in 

costs, and $106,924 in attorney fees. Appellant timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

 Appellant raises several arguments, none of which are meritorious.6

 

 

5

 As to respondent’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the jury found 

that appellant’s conduct was outrageous but he did not intend to cause her emotional 

distress. Respondent’s claims of the breach of the warranty of habitability and negligent 

maintenance of the premises apparently were not sent to the jury because there are no 

jury instructions or verdicts on those claims. 

6

 Respondent has moved to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the disentitlement 

doctrine. Under this discretionary doctrine, “[a]n appellate court may dismiss an appeal 

where the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower court’s orders or engaged in 

obstructive tactics. [Citation.] [¶] The disentitlement doctrine has been applied to a 

wide range of cases, including cases in which an appellant is a judgment debtor who has 

frustrated or obstructed legitimate efforts to enforce a judgment. [Citations.]” (Gwartz v. 

Weilert (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 750, 757-758.) Respondent’s motion is based on 

allegations of appellant’s post-judgment efforts to prevent her from collecting on the 

judgment, such as by transferring the apartment building to his daughter without 

consideration. We decline, however, to exercise our discretion to engage in the factfinding needed to apply the disentitlement doctrine and therefore deny respondent’s 

motion to dismiss. 
6

1. The Unlawful Detainer Settlement Agreement Does Not Bar 

 Respondent’s Constructive Eviction Claim 

 Appellant contends that the settlement agreement in his unlawful detainer 

action should have acted as res judicata against respondent’s constructive eviction 

claim. Respondent contends that appellant has forfeited the defense of res judicata 

by failing to raise it in the trial court. (See JSJ Limited Partnership v. Mehrban

(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1526 [res judicata is an affirmative defense that is 

forfeited if not raised and proven in the trial court]; In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 

428, 506 [same].) Respondent is incorrect. Although appellant did not raise res 

judicata in his answer to the complaint, he did assert res judicata in his demurrer, 

as well as in his summary judgment motion. Nonetheless, appellant’s res judicata 

claim is unmeritorious because respondent’s constructive eviction claim was not 

argued and decided in the unlawful detainer action. (See Landeros v. Pankey

(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1171 [unlawful detainer action resolved by stipulated 

judgment had no collateral estoppel effect as to breach of warranty of habitability 

claim that was not litigated and determined in the prior action] (Landeros).) 

 “The tenets of res judicata prescribe the preclusive effect of a prior final 

judgment on the merits. [Citation.] The doctrine has two distinct aspects: claim 

preclusion and issue preclusion. [Citation.] Claim preclusion, often referred to as 

res judicata, provides that ‘a valid, final judgment on the merits precludes parties 

or their privies from relitigating the same “cause of action” in a subsequent suit.’ 

[Citation.] Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, ‘“precludes relitigation of 

issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.”’ [Citation.]” (City of Oakland v. 

Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210, 227-228.) 

“The party asserting collateral estoppel has the burden to show from the record of 
7

the prior action that the asserted issue was previously litigated and determined. 

[Citation.]” (Landeros, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171.) 

 The unlawful detainer statutory scheme “is intended and designed to provide 

an expeditious remedy for the recovery of possession of real property. [Citation.] 

Unlawful detainer actions are, accordingly, of limited scope, generally dealing only 

with the issue of right to possession and not other claims between the parties, even 

if related to the property. [Citation.]” (Larson v. City and County of San 

Francisco (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1297 (Larson); see also Martin-Bragg v. 

Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 385 [“In unlawful detainer proceedings, 

ordinarily the only triable issue is the right to possession of the disputed premises, 

along with incidental damages resulting from the unlawful detention. 

[Citations.]”].) 

 Because of the limited scope of an unlawful detainer action, “a judgment in 

unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect and will not prevent 

one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of 

title [citations], or to adjudicate other legal and equitable claims between the 

parties [citations].” (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255; Malkoskie v. 

Option One Mortgage Corp. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 968, 973 [judgment arising 

from unlawful detainer action is given limited res judicata effect]; Gombiner v. 

Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371 [“an unlawful detainer judgment has 

limited res judicata force because it typically follows a summary proceeding 

focused only on deciding a party’s right to immediate possession of property”].) 

 Appellant contends that respondent forfeited her right to sue him, citing 

language from a box checked on the superior court form that states, “Defendant(s) 

[sic] rights under lease or rental agreement are forfeited.” As stated above, 

unlawful detainer actions are limited in scope, generally addressing only the right 
8

to immediate possession of the premises, not other claims between the parties, 

even those related to the property. (Larson, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297.) 

This pro forma language on the superior court form does not constitute a forfeiture 

of respondent’s other claims against appellant. The settlement agreement provided 

that respondent agreed to waive her right to “additional relocation fees above what 

she receives in this agreement,” but she did not agree to waive any other claims. 

The attorney who represented respondent in the unlawful detainer proceeding 

testified at trial that he specifically told appellant’s attorney that respondent 

planned to sue appellant for constructive eviction and refused to waive her right to 

do so. 

 The settlement agreement in appellant’s unlawful detainer action provided 

that respondent would move out of the apartment and appellant would pay the 

relocation fees ordered by the housing department. The agreement did not address 

any issues other than appellant’s right to possession and respondent’s right to 

relocation fees. 

 The stipulation “made no mention of a relinquishment by [respondent] of 

claims arising from a [constructive] eviction.” (Pelletier v. Alameda Yacht Harbor

(1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 1551, 1557.) Her claims accordingly were “not fully and 

fairly litigated in an adversary hearing, and thus [were] not conclusively 

established. [Citation.]” (Ibid. [stipulated judgment in unlawful detainer 

proceeding did not have collateral estoppel effect on retaliatory eviction claim]; 

Landeros, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171 [stipulated judgment in unlawful 

detainer proceeding that contained “no language of comprehensive settlement of 

all matters between the parties arising from the lease” did not bar breach of 
9

warranty of habitability claim].) Res judicata accordingly does not bar 

respondent’s constructive eviction claim.7

2. The Evidence is Sufficient to Support the Jury’s Award of Damages and the 

Finding That Appellant Caused the Interruption of Utilities in Respondent’s 

Apartment8

 Appellant’s second argument is that the jury award is “constitutionally 

excessive” because he did not deprive respondent of utilities. In essence, this 

contention is a challenge to the jury’s finding that appellant willfully caused 

respondent’s utilities to remain off. Appellant’s fifth argument is that the evidence 

does not support the findings that he constructively evicted respondent and violated 

section 789.3. We conclude that the evidence supports the jury’s findings, 

including the amount of damages awarded. 

 “‘“‘When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any 

substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends

with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted 

or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.’”’ [Citation.] ‘[W]e 

 

7

 Appellant raises various other claims related to his res judicata argument. He 

contends that respondent entered into the settlement agreement in bad faith; respondent’s 

action was a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) action (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 425.16; Olsen v. Harbison (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 278, 280); and that the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction to consider respondent’s claim because of the unlawful detainer 

settlement. Appellant did not raise these claims in the trial court and thus has forfeited 

them. (See Tutti Mangia Italian Grill, Inc. v. American Textile Maintenance Co. (2011) 

197 Cal.App.4th 733, 740 [argument not litigated in trial court was forfeited on appeal].) 

8

 Appellant’s second argument, that the jury award is excessive because he did not 

deprive respondent of her utilities, is essentially the same as his fifth argument that the 

evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s findings that he constructively evicted her 

and violated section 789.3. We therefore discuss these arguments together. 
10

presume that the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact. 

[Citation.] It is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate that it does not.’ [Citation.]” 

(Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 

26, 43.) “We must ‘view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts 

in its favor . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169 

Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188.) 

 “‘A constructive eviction occurs when the acts or omissions . . . of a 

landlord, or any disturbance or interference with the tenant’s possession by the 

landlord, renders the premises, or a substantial portion thereof, unfit for the 

purposes for which they were leased, or has the effect of depriving the tenant for a 

substantial period of time of the beneficial enjoyment or use of the premises.’ 

[Citations.]” (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 925-926; see 

Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1300 

[“‘“[A]ny disturbance of the tenant’s possession by the lessor or at his procurement 

. . . which has the effect of depriving the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the 

premises, amounts to a constructive eviction, provided the tenant vacates the 

premises within a reasonable time. [Citations.]” [Citations.]’”].) 

 Section 789.3 prohibits a landlord from willfully causing the interruption of 

utilities to a tenant with the intent to terminate the tenant’s occupancy. (§ 789.3, 

subd. (a).) A landlord who violates this section is liable for the tenant’s actual 

damages, up to “one hundred dollars ($100) for each day or part thereof the 

landlord remains in violation of this section,” but not less than $250, plus attorney 

fees. (Id., subd. (c)(2).) 

 The jury’s findings that appellant willfully deprived respondent’s apartment 

of utilities and that he constructively evicted her are supported by substantial 
11

evidence. After the fire in October 2011, appellant turned off the water and gas to 

respondent’s apartment, told her the utilities would be “unavailable for an 

indefinite period,” and suggested she “seek shelter with the Red Cross.” Appellant 

refused to restore the utilities despite being ordered to do so by Hernandez, the 

code enforcement officer with the housing department. Hernandez testified that, if 

there had been a problem with the property that required the utilities to remain off, 

the city would have made the repair, but no repairs were needed. Appellant 

continued to refuse to restore the utilities after a housing department inspector 

posted a two-day notice to restore them. Los Angeles Fire Department battalion 

chief Timothy Kerbrat testified that the Los Angeles Fire Department did not order 

appellant to turn off the water or the gas at respondent’s apartment and that the fire 

department would not order a property owner to leave the water and gas off for six 

weeks. Nor had the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety or appellant’s 

insurance company told appellant to keep the utilities off. 

 Respondent testified about appellant’s attempts to force her to move out of 

her apartment by accusing her falsely of refusing to allow entry for repairs and of 

failing to pay her rent. Respondent’s son, Thomas Patton, corroborated 

respondent’s testimony that appellant repeatedly sent her notices that he was 

coming to make repairs to her apartment when no repairs were needed, and that he 

would not show up. He further testified that appellant told him that if respondent 

refused to sign a new rental agreement, “he would ‘get her M.F. ass out of there.’” 

Patton also testified that he called the Department of Water and Power and the gas 

company to have the utilities turned on, but the agencies told him they had not 

turned off the utilities. 

 The evidence supports the jury’s findings that appellant deprived respondent 

of utility services with the intent to terminate her occupancy and that, in doing so, 
12

he constructively evicted her by rendering the premises unfit and depriving her of 

the use of the premises. 

 The jury’s award of damages also is supported by substantial evidence. The 

jury received instructions on economic, noneconomic, and statutory damages, and 

it awarded respondent $2000 in economic damages and $1500 in statutory 

damages on her section 789.3 claim. As to her constructive eviction claim, the jury 

was instructed to determine respondent’s monthly loss as the difference between 

her rent and the fair market value of the apartment, multiplied by the number of 

months she would have remained in the apartment absent the constructive eviction. 

The jury also was instructed that, according to Social Security Online, the average 

life expectancy of a 76-year-old woman was 12 years. The difference between 

respondent’s rent and the fair market value of her apartment was $1050 per month, 

which, over 10 years, would result in damages of $126,000. The jury awarded 

respondent $23,000 in past economic damages, $8,000 in past non-economic 

damages, and $120,000 in future economic damages on her constructive eviction 

claim. The jury’s award was not excessive. 

 3. The Jury’s Findings Are Not Inconsistent9

 Appellant’s fourth argument is that the jury’s findings are inconsistent. His 

first contention is that the jury awarded respondent $154,500, but the trial court 

entered judgment in the amount of $263,729.35. The trial court’s award reflects 

costs of $2,305.35 and $106,924 in attorney fees. 

 

9

 We need not address appellant’s third argument, that he did not breach the 

warranty of habitability or negligently maintain the premises. As noted above, these two 

claims were not sent to the jury. There are no jury instructions or verdict on the claims 

and therefore no findings or judgment to challenge. 
13

 Appellant further contends that the jury’s finding that he violated section 

789.3 is inconsistent with its finding that he did not intentionally cause respondent 

emotional distress. The jury found that, although appellant’s conduct toward 

respondent was outrageous, he did not intend to cause her emotional distress. 

Appellant contends that this finding is inconsistent with the finding that he 

willfully caused respondent’s gas and water to remain off for the purpose of 

terminating her occupancy of the apartment. We reject his argument for two 

reasons. 

 First, appellant did not raise this issue in the trial court and accordingly has 

forfeited it. (See Little v. Amber Hotel Co. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 280, 299 [if a 

verdict is merely ambiguous, “a party’s failure to seek clarification of the verdict 

before the jury is discharged may work a forfeiture of the purported defect on 

appeal”].) Even if not forfeited, appellant is incorrect. 

 The jury’s finding that appellant violated section 789.3 merely requires a 

finding that appellant intended to terminate respondent’s occupancy of her 

apartment. Whether appellant intended to cause respondent emotional distress is a 

different question from whether respondent intended to terminate respondent’s 

occupancy of her apartment. Appellant may have intended to terminate 

respondent’s occupancy of the apartment for reasons other than to cause 

respondent emotional distress, such as for financial gain. The jury’s finding that 

appellant intended to terminate respondent’s occupancy of her apartment 

accordingly is not inconsistent with its finding that appellant did not intend to 

cause respondent emotional distress. 
14

4. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Awarding Respondent 

 Attorney Fees10

 Appellant contends that the trial court’s award of $106,924 in attorney fees 

is excessive and that respondent is not entitled to attorney fees because he did not 

violate section 789.3.11 “‘We review the amount of attorney fees awarded for 

abuse of discretion. [Citation.] A trial court’s attorney fee award will not be set 

aside “absent a showing that it is manifestly excessive in the circumstances.” 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 

459, 487 (Lunada Biomedical).) 

 Appellant did not oppose respondent’s motion for attorney fees. “In 

challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are 

claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items 

challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General 

arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. 

Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.” 

(Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn.

(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564; see also City of Santa Paula v. Narula (2003) 

114 Cal.App.4th 485, 494 [failure to raise objections about unnecessary attorney 

fees in the trial court waives the issue on appeal].) Because appellant did not 

challenge respondent’s motion for attorney fees in the trial court, he has forfeited 

the issue. 

 

10 The attorney fee award is the subject of the appeal in No. B254891, although 

appellant also raises it in No. B252583. 

11 As discussed above, the jury’s finding that appellant violated section 789.3 is 

supported by substantial evidence. Appellant’s argument based on this contention 

accordingly is not discussed here. 
15

 Appellant relies on Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388 (Hale) to argue 

that he may challenge attorney fees for the first time on appeal, but Hale is 

distinguishable. The issue in Hale was the constitutionality of section 789.3, an 

issue raised in an oblique manner in the trial court in that case. The California 

Supreme Court reasoned that, although a constitutional question generally is 

waived if not raised at the earliest opportunity, the defendant’s argument that the 

imposition of substantial penalties under section 789.3 was “a ‘great injustice’” 

sufficed to raise the constitutional challenge below. (Id. at p. 394.) Hale therefore 

does not support the proposition that the amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant 

to section 789.3 may be raised for the first time on appeal. 

 Even if not forfeited, appellant’s challenge to the amount of attorney fees 

would fail. “In awarding attorney fees, the court has broad discretion to determine 

the reasonableness of the fees claimed in light of a number of factors, including the 

nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the skill required in its handling, the skill 

employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances. 

[Citation.] ‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of 

professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course 

subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced 

that it is clearly wrong.”’ [Citations.]” (Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of 

Redondo Beach (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 873.) 

 Respondent submitted detailed billing sheets and declarations in support of 

the motion for attorney fees. Appellant argues that the motion does not specify 

work rendered by support staff, but the billing sheets and declarations indicate that 

the work was performed by the attorneys and two associates. Appellant’s general 

argument that the fees are unconscionable is not sufficient to establish that the trial 

court abused its discretion. Appellant thus has failed to establish that the award 
16

was “‘“manifestly excessive in the circumstances.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” 

(Lunada Biomedical, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 487.)12

5. Appellant Was Not Denied the Right to Present Evidence

 Appellant contends that he was denied the right to present evidence, citing 

respondent’s objection to exhibits appellant sought to introduce, which was based 

on appellant’s failure to produce those documents during discovery. According to 

respondent’s objections, she requested from appellant any documents related to 

repairs of the property after the fire and communications with the fire department 

related to utility service at the property, but appellant replied to both these requests, 

“None.” Nonetheless, appellant sought to introduce as exhibits numerous 

documents that were responsive to the discovery exhibits, prompting respondent’s 

objections. 

 Appellant cites former Code of Civil Procedure section 2031 to contend that 

respondent should have filed a motion to compel further responses instead of filing 

objections to his defense exhibits. However, given that appellant responded that he 

did not have any responsive documents, there was no basis to make a motion to 

compel. 

 Appellant also cites respondent’s motion in limine to preclude evidence on 

his cross-complaint for breach of contract, which was based on the court’s having 

sustained her demurrer to the cross-complaint. He cites former Code of Civil 

 

12 Appellant also purports to move to quash service of process, arguing that he was 

not properly served with respondent’s motion for attorney fees, citing Code of Civil 

Procedure sections 1010 and 1005, subdivision (b). However, the statutory sections he 

cites do not support his contention. Code of Civil Procedure section 1010 merely sets 

forth general requirements regarding service, and section 1005 does not address a motion 

for attorney fees. Moreover, he did not raise this issue in the trial court. 
17

Procedure section 2023, which addressed sanctions for discovery misuse. 

However, there is no indication in the record that the court granted the motion in 

limine as a discovery sanction.13 Appellant does not explain how the court’s 

rulings denied him of the right to present evidence, and he does not provide any 

other citations to the record that would support his claim. 

DISPOSITION14

 The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on 

appeal. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 WILLHITE, Acting P.J. 

 We concur: 

 MANELLA, J. COLLINS, J. 

 

13 Appellant relies on Alliance Bank v. Murray (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1, which 

upheld the entry of default judgment as a sanction for the plaintiff’s willful failure to 

attend two properly noticed depositions. That case involved the imposition of discovery 

sanctions, which did not occur here, and therefore is inapposite. 

14 Appellant has filed numerous requests for judicial notice. His requests are denied.