Supreme Court of Louisiana

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #028

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 12th day of May, 2017, are as follows:

PER CURIAM: 

2015-K-1845 

C/W 

2015-K-1846

STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHAKA STEWART (Parish of Orleans) 

Because we agree that the motions to quash were granted in error, 

we remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. 

JOHNSON, C.J., dissents. 

HUGHES, J., dissents with reasons. 

GENOVESE, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by 

Justice Hughes.
05/12/17

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2015-K-1845

CONSOLIDATED WITH

No. 2015-K-1846

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHAKA STEWART

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, 

FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

PER CURIAM:

We granted writs to examine the timeliness of a prosecution following 

defendant’s failure to appear in court after receiving actual notice and whether the 

court of appeal erroneously reversed the trial court’s ruling. The trial court granted 

defendant’s motion to quash, finding the prosecution untimely. For the following 

reasons, we affirm the court of appeal’s ruling, which reversed the quashal and 

found the state has no affirmative duty to locate an absent defendant, and remand 

these cases to the trial court for further proceedings.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 29, 2011, defendant was charged by bill of information with one 

count of possession of marijuana, second offense; one count of possession with 

intent to distribute heroin; and one count of possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine. On August 3, 2011, he was charged by a separate bill of information with 

one count of drag racing resulting in serious bodily injury. The trial court 

ultimately transferred the drag racing case so as to track the previously filed 

narcotics case. 

Following his appearances for status hearings and pre-trial matters, 
2

defendant received notice—proof of which is in the record—to appear on May 17, 

2012. At some point before this date, however, defendant was arrested on federal 

charges, and thus did not appear as scheduled on May 17, 2012. On that date, a 

minute entry reflects that defense counsel did appear and announce that defendant 

was detained in federal custody. The matter was continued, and the minute entry 

also shows that the state indicated its intent to secure defendant’s presence for the 

next scheduled court date. 

On July 23, 2012, the state filed a motion and order for writ of habeas corpus 

ad prosequendum directed to the United States Marshal Service for the Eastern 

District of Louisiana, which the trial court granted. No further action was taken on 

the writ, however, and thus defendant again failed to appear. The matters were 

continued several times over the course of the following year, with each minute 

entry indicating again that defendant was in federal custody and that the state was 

to file a writ to secure his presence. 

On July 23, 2013, one year after its first motion, the state filed a second 

motion and order for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum—this time directed 

to the specific penitentiary in Arkansas where defendant was serving a federal 

sentence. Still, defendant’s absence from court persisted. After several more 

continuances, the trial court issued an alias capias for defendant in February 2014;

and at a bond forfeiture hearing on April 30, 2014, counsel for the surety appeared 

and advised that defendant was in federal custody in Arkansas, and provided a 

certificate of incarceration. The matter was continued, and on July 25, 2014, 

defendant filed a motion to quash all charges on speedy trial grounds, which the 

trial court granted. 

The court of appeal reversed the quashal, because even though the state 

knew that defendant was in federal custody, the two-year limitations period within 
3

which it had to bring him to trial was interrupted by defendant’s initial failure to 

appear and did not begin to run anew until the surety filed the certificate of 

defendant’s incarceration in Arkansas on April 30, 2014. Thus, the court of appeal 

found that the state had two years from that date, i.e., until April 30, 2016, to bring 

defendant to trial. State v. Stewart, 15-0135 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/9/15), 176 So.3d 

465;

1 State v. Stewart, 15-0136 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/15). 

ANALYSIS

After careful review, we find that the court of appeal reached the correct 

result. We agree that when defendant failed to appear on May 17, 2012, despite 

having actual notice that he was required to, the two-year period within which the 

state was required to bring defendant to trial was interrupted. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 

578(A)(2). We also agree that in the event of such an interruption, La.C.Cr.P. art. 

579(A)(3) does not require the state to search for a defendant who has failed to 

appear. State v. Romar, 07-2140 (La. 7/1/08), 985 So.2d 722. Rather, the 

limitations period begins to run anew only when the state receives notice of an 

incarcerated defendant’s custodial location. See, e.g., State v. Baptiste, 08-2468 

(La. 6/23/10), 38 So.3d 247 (limitations period did not begin to run anew until 

authorities from parish in which defendant was incarcerated contacted authorities 

where charges were pending and informed them of defendant’s custodial status and 

location).

 1 The court of appeal further found that La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(C), which went into effect on August 

1, 2013, retroactively applied. Article 579(C) provides that when a defendant fails to appear and 

is subsequently incarcerated, he must either appear in open court where the charges are pending, 

or provide the state with one of two specific forms of notice of his custodial location in order for 

the limitations period to begin running anew. The court found defendant failed to meet those 

specific notice requirements until April 30, 2014, upon the surety’s filing of the certificate of 

incarceration.

Because it found that the trial court erred in granting the motions to quash, the court of appeal 

pretermitted the issue of whether the trial court also erred in conducting the hearing on the 

motion without defendant’s presence in court. Stewart, 15-0135, p. 5, 176 So.3d at 468.
4

Here, the record indicates that the state had notice of defendant’s custodial 

location by July 23, 2013––when it filed its motion and order for writ of habeas 

corpus ad prosequendum directed to the specific penitentiary in Arkansas where 

defendant was in federal custody. Before this date, though the record suggests the 

state had some indication of defendant’s general whereabouts, i.e., according to 

defense counsel’s advisement, he was “in federal custody,” the state would have 

had to take affirmative steps to discern defendant’s specific location. 

As we explained in Romar, the state has no affirmative duty to locate an 

absent defendant. Rather, it was incumbent upon defendant to provide the state 

with notice of his location to trigger commencement of a new limitations period 

under La.C.Cr.P. art. 578. See Romar, 07-2140, pp. 7–8, 985 So.2d at 727 (“The 

burden . . . falls not on the state to show that defendant had placed himself outside 

of its control . . . but on defendant and his sureties to avoid the consequences of his 

failure to appear. . . [O]ne of those consequences, since 1984, is the interruption of 

the time limits placed on trial.”). Because the record does not show that the state 

had notice of defendant’s custodial location before July 23, 2013, when it filed a

writ specifically directed to the Arkansas penitentiary, the trial court erred in 

granting the motions to quash filed on July 25, 2014.

Unlike the court of appeal, we find it immaterial whether the more specific 

notice requirements of La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(C) were met, because Subpart C did not 

go into effect until August 1, 2013, after commencement of the prosecution in this 

case. Given that Subpart C imposes new substantive obligations on a defendant, 

and because those obligations impact a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy 

trial, it does not apply retroactively. This is consistent with the Court’s prior 

decision that La.C.Cr.P. art. 579(A)(3) could not be retroactively applied. See State 

v. Groth, 85-1528 (La. 1986), 483 So.2d 596, 599; see also State v. Kraft, 86-0155 
5

(La. App. 5 Cir. 1987), 501 So.2d 313, 315 (“Moreover, since [La.C.Cr.P. art. 

579(A)(3)] provides for an additional method for interruption of the prescriptive 

period, it bears upon a defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Thus, [it] should not be 

given retroactive application in light of the constitutional safeguard of the right to a 

speedy trial.”). Though we maintain that the state has no duty to take affirmative 

steps to locate an absent defendant, we also note that in circumstances such as 

these, in which the state has become aware (whether by its own efforts or 

otherwise) of an absent defendant’s location, that awareness is sufficient in a case 

initiated before Subpart C’s effective date to trigger the commencement of a new 

limitations period. Thus, because the record supports a finding that the state was 

aware of defendant’s custodial location by July 23, 2013, the limitations period of 

La.C.Cr.P. art. 578 began to run anew on that date. 

Moreover, we note that the limitations period has been suspended during the 

pendency of this litigation following the trial court’s rulings on the motions to 

quash. Though La.C.Cr.P. art. 580 provides that the filing of a motion to quash 

suspends the limitations period only until the court has ruled on the motion,

because the parties have pursued review in the court of appeal and here, the 

limitations period has been suspended pending finality of this review. La.C.Cr.P. 

art. 922; see, e.g., State v. Fish, 05-1929, p. 4 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So.2d 493, 495 

(“[C]ounsel’s motion to quash the prosecution on grounds of prescription then 

suspended that date and continues to suspend it while the appellate courts review 

the merits of the prescription issue.”); State v. Brocato, 99-1620 (La. App. 4 Cir. 

9/15/99), 744 So.2d 178, 180 (“When the trial court granted relator’s first motion 

to quash, the State could not try relator; and it remained unable to do so until the 

reversal of the trial court’s ruling became final.”), writ denied, 99-2943 (La. 

12/17/99), 751 So.2d 883. Once this ruling becomes final, the law affords the state 
6

one year to commence trial on the charges. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 580 (though the 

balance of the new two-year period that commenced July 23, 2013 would have 

been the 363 days that remained after defendant filed the motions to quash, Art. 

580 endows the state with a minimum of one year to commence trial after a 

suspension of the limitations period).

Because we agree that the motions to quash were granted in error, we 

remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
05/12/17

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 

No. 2015-K-1845 

CONSOLIDATED WITH

No. 2015-K-1846 

STATE OF LOUISIANA 

v.

CHAKA STEWART

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

JOHNSON, C.J., dissents.
1

05/12/17

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2015-K-1845

CONSOLIDATED WITH

No. 2015-K-1846

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHAKA STEWART

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL,

FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

Hughes, J., dissenting.

Respectfully, this case must be distinguished from State v. Romar and is 

much closer to State v. Baptiste.

A distinction should be drawn between the situation where a properly 

noticed defendant voluntarily fails to appear in court (Romar) and the current 

situation where it was physically impossible for the defendant to appear because he 

was in federal custody. This fact was known to all and appears in the minutes of 

court. The defendant even provided his attorney with an affidavit stating same so 

that his attorney could continue to represent him in his absence. This is not a 

situation where the state has no duty to locate a truly “absent” defendant pursuant 

to Romar.
05/12/17

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No. 2015-K-1845

CONSOLIDATED WITH

No. 2015-K-1846

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

CHAKA STEWART

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, 

FOURTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF ORLEANS

GENOVESE, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Hughes.