U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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CLOSING THE SKIES, LIBERATING UKRAINE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 16, 2024 

Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE118–3] 

( 

Available via www.csce.gov 


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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION 

U.S. HOUSE U.S SENATE 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina Chairman 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Ranking Member 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

MICHAEL LAWLER, New York 

VICTORIA SPARTZ, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland CoChairman 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi Ranking 

Member 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

TINA SMITH, Minnesota 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH 

Department of State - Erin Barclay 

Department of Defense - Celeste Wallander 

Department of Commerce - Don Graves 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

COMMISSIONERS 

Hon. Joe Wilson, Chairman, from South Carolina ............................................... 1 

Hon. Marc A. Veasey, from Texas .......................................................................... 2 

Hon. Steve Cohen, Ranking Member, from Tennesee .......................................... 11 

Hon. Richard Blumenthal, from Connecticut ........................................................ 15 

Hon. Victoria Spartz, from Indiana ........................................................................ 17 

Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse, from Rhode Island ...................................................... 19 

OTHER MEMBERS PRESENT 

Hon. Jim Costa, from California ............................................................................ 23 

WITNESSES 

Nataliya Bugayova, Non-Resident Fellow, Institute for the Study of War ........ 4 

Ambassador John Herbst [ret.], Senior Director, Atlantic Council ..................... 7 

Michael Ryan, Former Deputy Assistant, Secretary of Defense .......................... 9 


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CLOSING THE SKIES, LIBERATING UKRAINE 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY & COOPERATION 

IN EUROPE, 

U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION, 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

Thursday, May 16, 2024. 

The hearing was held from 2:06 p.m. to 3:24 p.m., Room 2212, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Representative Joe Wilson [R-SC], 

Chairman, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Representative Joe Wilson [RSC], Chairman; Representative Steve Cohen [D-TN], Ranking 

Member; Representative Marc Veasey [D-TX]; Senator Richard 

Blumenthal [D-CT]; Representative Victoria Spartz [R-IN]; Senator 

Sheldon Whitehouse [D-RI]. 

Other Members Present: Representative Jim Costa [D-CA]. 

Witnesses: Nataliya Bugayova, Non-Resident Fellow, Institute 

for the Study of War; Ambassador John Herbst [ret.], Senior Director, Atlantic Council; Michael Ryan, Former Deputy Assistant, Secretary of Defense. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF JOE WILSON, CHAIRMAN, U.S. 

HOUSE, FROM SOUTH CAROLINA 

Chairman WILSON: The good thing is that, indeed, with the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe this is bipartisan, bicameral. We are really hoping that members of the Senate 

might be able to come across to be. 

The bottom line, we are grateful to be here with all of you. I am 

looking forward to our ranking member, Congressman Steve 

Cohen, to be here. As we proceed I want to thank all of you for 

coming—to be here today on behalf of the United States Helsinki 

Commission. 

This hearing comes at a critical time for the people of Ukraine 

and the urgent defense against war criminal Putin’s genocidal invasion. Ukrainians continue courageously to fight for their lives, 

their families, and their homeland. 

As we speak war criminal Putin is relentlessly attacking Kharkiv 

with a population of 1.5 million innocent civilians. The need for a 

vital air defense and long-range munitions has never been more 

dire. 

I am grateful that President Biden has provided long-range missiles but Ukraine must be able to legitimately defend itself from attacks launched from within the borders of the Russian Federation. 

We have seen a clear and repeated pattern when Putin attacks. 

The mass murdering Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad welcomed 


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Putin’s involvement to quash the Syrian revolution of 2015. Putin’s 

atrocities committed against innocent Syrians are being replicated 

to murder innocent Ukrainians, including chemical weapons and 

incendiary munitions. 

War criminal Putin is also known for the double tap strikes 

which gruesomely target emergency personnel, medical personnel, 

police, fire, and volunteers as they search for survivors following 

the first round of attacks. 

The once vibrant city of Aleppo in Syria had a population of 2.5 

million people before it was decimated to rubble by war criminals 

Putin and Assad. This was done also in Mariupol, sadly, with a 

once-vibrant population of half a million people. 

Now war criminal Putin threatens Kharkiv, the population of the 

second largest city of Ukraine of 1.5 million people, which historically at one time was the capital of Ukraine, and has so many 

beautiful historical artifacts and indications such as the beautiful 

Orthodox churches and libraries and museums and universities. 

We, sadly, know the intent of war criminal Putin is to create total 

rubble, which is inconceivable in the 21st century, of targeting civilian targets. 

With speaker Mike Johnson’s leadership, I am grateful for the 

passage of the significant support for Ukraine. Now it is time to expedite what Ukraine needs and remove arbitrary restrictions that 

tie the hands of the Ukrainian defenders. 

Make no mistake, without shortages and delays Ukrainian victory could have already become a reality. Europe also should be 

recognized for being fully engaged in Ukraine as America is sixteenth in order of aid per gross domestic product. We are behind 

Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. 

With military aid to Ukraine back online there is renewed hope 

that we can ensure that every assistance package to Ukraine matters and is tied very specifically to Ukrainian victory with the defeat of war criminal Putin and his thugs. 

We have it with us today, and I appreciate that Congressman 

Veasey found it right away, this is a fragment of a Russian Kalibr, 

a cruise missile that was fired upon the homes of innocent Ukrainians in the city of Kherson shortly after it was liberated by Ukrainian forces in late 2022. 

I want to pass this around to our colleagues to have a closer look 

and be careful, indeed, it has jagged portions to its—edges. The 

cost of one of the Kalibr missiles is over seven million—seven million dollars—fired purposely at Ukrainian civilians simply to exist 

as Ukrainians. 

That is the enemy that Ukraine is facing, one that is so invested 

in their physical, cultural, and political destruction that they will 

spend enormous sums to build advanced weapons of war—by the 

Putinists to rain down on Ukrainian families. When they run out 

they are supplied by the terrorist regime in Tehran and the maniacal regime of Kim Jong-un of DPRK, North Korea. 

Clearly, with war criminal Putin and Beijing today the axis of 

evil has never been clearer than dictators with the rule of guns invading democracies with the rule of law. War criminal Putin comes 

up with false excuses every day for his mass murder to further his 

expansionist goals. 


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His August 2021 treatise was clear and that is he believes that— 

and wants to ensure that Ukraine does not exist as he attempts to 

recreate the evil empire of the Soviet Union. Last May while I was 

in Berlin I was really disturbed and shocked to see the massive 

Russian embassy there it still has on top of it a hammer and sickle, 

and to me, that is the equivalent of having a swastika. 

The thought that there would be the existence of a hammer and 

sickle is amazing, and we must face reality. Despite enormous casualties and equipment losses, Russia continues to press on with a 

full war economy while oppressing the people of Russia itself. 

The Ukrainian victory will happen, not because Putin comes to 

his senses but when Ukraine has achieved clear military superiority in their country, diminishing Russian ability to wage war effectively and establishing territorial integrity. Every aid package 

should be tied to the objective of territorial integrity. 

I now yield to Congressman Marc Veasey of Texas. 

STATEMENT OF MARC A. VEASEY, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TEXAS 

Representative VEASEY: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I 

appreciate that. I am glad that we are having these hearings and 

I am glad to see that you are steadfast and nonwavering in your 

commitment to maintaining freedom in Europe. 

I really wish that everyone would go back and listen to Ronald 

Reagan’s entire speech when he said, ′′Mr. Gorbachev, tear down 

this wall′′ because people hear that part of the speech but they forget about what was the contents of the speech, and he talked about 

the checkpoints. He talked about people’s lack of freedom. 

People forget that in—literally, in East Germany they had an organization known as the Stasi that spied on people, that spied on 

its own citizens, and if they would do things like politically gather 

and protest they would keep secret files on these people. 

We know that countries that do things like that are evil and that 

countries that spy on their own people are bad, and I really wish 

that people could go back and just, again, listen to the contents of 

that speech because it was talking about America’s unwavering 

commitment to freedom and democracy in Europe, and that is important. 

One of the things that I wish that the president would do is talk 

more about the fact that energy—because of the record amount of 

oil and gas that President Biden has produced, a lot more than his 

predecessor, has helped keep Europe and has helped keep Putin at 

bay. 

This would be a lot worse. If you want to stop death and destruction and you want to really squeeze Putin let him not be able to 

control the flow of energy in Europe and right now he is not. He 

thought he was going to be able to. He thought that there was 

going to be one harsh winter and that was going to be it and it did 

not happen, and we should be grateful for that because it could 

have been a lot worse. It could have been a lot worse. 

We need to continue having conversations about that. If we can 

squeeze Putin without having to squeeze U.S. triggers ultimately 

then that is a good thing. 

In closing, Joe and I have been to several of the Helsinki meetings and the winter meetings that they have—annually in Vienna 


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and, of course, the other meetings that they do in the summer that 

move from different European countries. 

The officials and the people—they are the PMs in those countries 

and the electeds in those countries and the business leaders in 

those countries—they want to know that our country is committed 

to maintaining peace and prosperity in Europe. 

They want to know that we are committed to making sure that 

this does not spread beyond Ukraine because if we do not stop 

Putin now and this spreads beyond Ukraine and it goes into Romania and it goes into Estonia we are going to have a lot more bloodshed and there will not be anything that anybody can do about it. 

We need to make sure that this is the end, and when Joe and 

I go to Europe this summer I want to be able to tell those officials 

that we are going to meet with in Romania that we are committed 

to making sure that it does not go whether for any administration, 

that it stops now, that this is it and that we are committed to making sure that Ukraine can defend itself against this unlawful invasion and that they can continue to experience and get back to having peace and prosperity and rebuilding that country. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and thank you for putting 

this hearing together today. 

Chairman WILSON: Thank you very much, and thank you, Congressman Veasey. 

We now have the—as the witnesses today we have Nataliya 

Bugayova, the nonresident fellow of the Institute of War. Additionally, I am grateful we have Ambassador John Herbst, who is the 

senior director of the Atlantic Council; and we also have Michael 

Ryan, who is the former deputy assistant secretary of defense. 

Each one of you is welcome to be here today and it is wonderful 

that we have a free speech for Nataliya to begin. Thank you. 

[LAUGHTER.] 

TESTIMONY OF NATALIYA BUGAYOVA, NON-RESIDENT 

FELLOW, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR 

Ms. BUGAYOVA: Thank you, Chairman, and thanks for the opportunity to be here and contribute to the discussion. 

I will start by saying that the battlefield situation will likely get 

worse for Ukraine before it gets better. Russia is exploiting 

vulnerabilities across the entire front line, in large part because of 

the delays in Western aid. The Kremlin’s main objective is to convince the U.S. that U.S. aid will not make a difference, especially 

as we approach critical milestones such as the NATO summit and 

the U.S. elections. 

In our assessment, Ukraine, however, will be able to stabilize the 

front line and blunt the incoming Russian offensive as the aid arrives. Where we go from there and whether Ukraine is on the path 

to victory depends in large part on whether the U.S. learns critical 

lessons from the last two years of this war, and I would like to 

focus on two larger points in this respect. 

The first one is that U.S. interests and the most advantageous 

outcome for the U.S. in this war remain the same. Russia is a selfdeclared adversary to the U.S. and any effective U.S. strategy to 

counter this challenge will recognize that the outcome of this war 


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is the center of gravity of Russia’s power and its ability to threaten 

our interests. 

Russia’s ability to reconstitute, confront NATO, to contribute 

militarily to its partners like Iran, all depends disproportionately 

on whether Russia keeps or loses its gains in Ukraine but, it is not 

just about capability. It is also about the intent. 

This war has empowered a nationalist community inside of Russia that believes in expansion by force and it is inherently antiWestern. If Russia is defeated in Ukraine the next after Putin may 

or may not be worse. 

If Russia prevails in Ukraine the next after Putin will most certainly be like Putin or worse because of the political imperatives 

that this empowered nationalist community will generate. Given 

these realities, the most dangerous outcome for the U.S. is allowing 

Russia to win this war. The risk of a Russia-NATO war will rise 

exponentially and U.S. will face a reconstituted Russia that is also 

more determined to undermine the U.S. 

In an alternative scenario in which Russia gets reprieve on the 

battlefield—in an alternative scenario in which Russia gets a reprieve on the battlefield either as a result of a premature ceasefire 

or insufficient Western aid that outcome is still far more costly for 

the United States than helping Ukraine to continue to fight because in this case Russia will have ability to rebuild and attack 

Ukraine again, which means U.S. will face the same problem under 

worse escalation risk, higher costs, and conditions that favor Russia. 

The most advantageous outcome for Ukraine—for the U.S. remains helping Ukraine liberate its territory and its people as the 

only path to an actual durable peace and not a temporary respite, 

and then helping rebuild Ukraine and putting the largest combatcapable friendly military at the forefront of the NATO’s defense. 

As long as this outcome remains Ukraine’s choice the most prudent U.S. strategy is helping Ukraine actually achieve it, which 

brings me to the second issue, what will it take at this point to 

reset Ukraine on the path to victory, I would like to highlight a 

couple of key requirements. 

The first one, after Ukraine stabilizes the alliance, the priority 

should be helping Ukraine restore its ability to maneuver on the 

battlefield. This will require a lot more ground-based long-range 

strike capability. 

Second, we must deny Russia sanctuaries. Russia is not entitled 

to sanctuaries when it is trying to erase a nation. Right now, as 

we speak Russian Air Force is conducting live bomb attacks from 

Russia’s aerospace sanctuary on Kharkiv and it can do so indefinitely, as my colleague George Barros has written this week. We 

must abandon the Russian information line that Russia can somehow demand immunity from being attacked when it is waging an 

unprovoked war. 

We must remove any existing constraints on Ukraine to target 

Russian legitimate military and defense industrial capabilities inside of Russia. This is critical if we are actually serious about imposing strategic costs on Russia across the board. 

The third is that we must really think beyond the standard force 

ratios and focus on asymmetries. Ukraine’s effort in the Black Sea 


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is a quintessential example of an effort producing outsized effects, 

effects the Kremlin, by the way, is going out of its way trying to 

downplay. 

With more resources, this effort can have even larger effects including on-the-ground war. Other asymmetric opportunities include 

helping Ukraine scale its rapid innovation through—essentially 

helping Ukraine scale its rapid innovation and helping Ukraine’s 

defense industrial base reach its potential. Ukraine’s minister of 

strategic industry estimates that Ukraine has 10 billion dollars in 

additional production capacity if properly resourced. 

The final point I will mention is that we also must surge our own 

capacity. Figuring out how to creatively allocate resources that we 

have while gradually aiding capability is important but that is not 

the main problem that we need to solve. 

The U.S. needs to lead a global coalition of partners in Europe 

and Asia to dramatically increase the overall stack of capabilities 

that matter in Ukraine but they will also matter for our own ability to deter and fight future wars. 

Look, the combined [GDP] Gross Domestic Product of the U.S., 

our European partners, and our Asian allies is on the order of 63 

trillion dollars. Russia’s GDP is around 1.9 trillion dollars. Iran 

and North Korea add little. 

China is an enabler of Russia, but it has not mobilized, and if 

we mobilize and lean in Russia loses, and mobilizing means not 

just a surge in production, sparing more of the existing capabilities, 

but also accepting the higher threshold for pain and risk now to 

avoid more risk, more cost, and higher pain in the future. 

The final point I will make is that the U.S. should also recognize 

that the spirit of decision-making has been a critical, at times the 

most critical, factor in this war. The key successes of Ukraine and 

its partners in this war have resulted from strategic clarity and 

lost opportunities have resulted from the inability to connect the 

ground truth to our interests and capabilities fast enough to act. 

The front line would look different now had the U.S. proactively 

invested in Ukraine’s initiative in the winter of 2023 or passed the 

supplemental earlier. Russia learned that lesson very early, so 

much so that Russia’s entire strategy for the last two years has 

been focused on deterring and delaying U.S. decision-making. 

We should learn that lesson, too, and recognize that we should 

plan to proactively resource multiple Ukraine campaigns, not expecting any single operation to have a decisive outcome. The U.S. 

should also expand its knowledge sharing with Ukrainian partners 

including growing physical presence in Ukraine to connect the 

ground truth to our decision faster, recognizing that the outcome 

of this war depends as much on our decision-making speed as it 

does on the military capability. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman WILSON: Thank you so much, Ms. Bugayova, and I 

told you all—I am correct again that the ranking member Steve 

Cohen would be here. Now, I did not realize he was going to be 

bringing his fan club with him, too. [LAUGHTER.] That is proof of 

his effectiveness and so that he would attract such a crowd. 

With this in mind, Ambassador, we will proceed and what we 

will do, everybody at five minutes and then so that we can have— 


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and even the politician is going to be held to five minutes and 

Stephanie Pendarvis is going to make sure that the timing is correct. 

As we proceed, thank you, Ambassador. 

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR JOHN HERBST [RET.], SENIOR 

DIRECTOR, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. HERBST: I just want to quickly—[off mic]—[comes on mic]— 

with Nataliya. Okay. 

The greatest national security challenge that we face is the partnership of aggressive authoritarian regimes seeking to undermine 

our global leadership. The larger longer-range threat, of course, is 

China with a real economy but the greatest short-term danger 

comes from our peer nuclear power Russia which is conducting a 

savage war of conquest to subjugate Ukraine in Europe and would 

like to restore control, at a minimum, over all the territory of the 

former Soviet Union which happens to include three NATO allies. 

Ukraine is the place where we can and must deal a decisive blow 

to our adversaries. If we help Kyiv defeat Putin in Ukraine we prevent further Russian aggression to the west and send a cautionary 

message to Xi to lay off Taiwan. 

It would also make it harder for Moscow to enable further Iranian aggression in the Middle East, a key factor in Hamas assault 

on Israel and the Houthis attacks on global shipping. What does 

this mean for U.S. policy now that Congress has passed the aid 

bill? 

First, the administration must identify what is at stake in 

Ukraine clearly. The problem is not a war in Ukraine but a nuclear 

power seeking to subjugate Ukraine and then move further west. 

Two things flow from this. First, we need a policy of containment 

for Russia, a position endorsed by representatives from 10 think 

tanks here on Capitol Hill in early February. The place, again, to 

defeat and contain Moscow is Ukraine, a large country fighting for 

its right to live free as proud Ukrainians. 

Stopping Moscow there does not involve American soldiers. If our 

need is to contain and defeat Russia so that we can enjoy a free 

society allowing people like that who do not understand but have 

a clear point of view to speak, yes. 

Providing $40 billion a year in aid to Russia—to Ukraine is not 

a gift to Ukraine. It is the smart way to defend the United States, 

to defend our security and our prosperity, and it represents, roughly, four percent or less of our defense budget. That is first. We need 

to understand that we have a problem containing this nuclear 

rogue power. 

Secondly, we need a clear power towards Moscow’s war on 

Ukraine. The administration has frequently said we would stay 

with Ukraine as long as it takes. That is not good enough. We need 

a clear signal to defeat Russia to enable victory in Ukraine for 

Ukraine. 

What does this look like? The first order of business is to enhance Ukraine’s defensive line, so Russia does not add to the incremental gains when American military aid is in doubt. They are 

right now bombarding Kharkiv 30 kilometers from Ukraine’s borVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:34 Dec 18, 2024 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\USERS\KKEY\ONEDRIVE - US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES\DOCUMENTS\118TH 

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der with Russia. They are also making incremental gains around 

Kharkiv. 

Though, lately, the administration has moved smartly to get ammunition and artillery to Ukraine. But it needs to do much more 

to protect Kharkiv and other Ukrainian cities, Ukrainian critical 

energy infrastructure, from Moscow’s massive aerial assault. This 

means more air defense systems, Patriots, and French SAMP/Ts. 

Ukraine has three Patriot batteries. They need at least nine more. 

There is a—our allies, some of them could help fill this void. 

There is a second dimension to this problem coming from American reluctance until mid-last year to back sending of F–16s to 

Ukraine even from European countries. Allies are now on track to 

deliver about a brigade’s worth of aircraft. Ukraine needs well over 

a hundred. 

With that, they could stop the successful glide bombs Moscow 

was using to pound Kharkiv and other places in Ukraine. Those F– 

16s will be essential to Ukraine’s offensive in 2025. The White 

House needs to decide how to arrange the transfer of that many 

F–16s with all the necessary avionics and missiles. 

Kyiv will choose the target of its next offensive but Moscow’s 

greatest achievement in its 10-year war on Ukraine is the seizure 

of Crimea. That is also its greatest liability because Crimea needs 

to be supplied by the Kerch Bridge and by the land bridge from 

Donbas-occupied Donbas to Crimea. 

If we give Ukraine the necessary weapons, the longer-range fires, 

the artillery, the tanks, the airplanes, they can seriously disrupt if 

not deny supply of those weapons to Ukraine, forcing Ukrainian 

troops—Russian troops to retreat from south mainland Ukraine 

and posing a severe political problem for Putin. 

We need to do this. A strong policy to promote Ukrainian victory 

would not just involve sending the right weapons Ukraine needs 

but we need to change our rules of engagement. Allow Ukraine to 

strike Russian tower targets in Russia which are currently pounding Ukraine. Ukraine—again, Kharkiv is less than 30 miles—excuse me, 20 miles from Russia. 

Russian forces are massed within Russia along the border. Russian airplanes flying in Russian air space are pounding Odesa—excuse me, Kharkiv as well as Odesa. That is a different story. 

We need to allow the Ukrainians to strike back at them. We 

must also organize ourselves to meet the current security challenge. I have got about one more minute. 

We need to ramp up our arms production. Arms—we learned in 

Ukraine that a major power war is heavily arms-intensive. We 

need that not just to help Russia lose in Ukraine, to help Ukraine 

defeat Russia, but so we can deal with a confrontation with China 

or Russia. 

We also need to be flexible in the way we run this war. We need 

a senior official responsible for overall coordination of our policy on 

this war, meaning ramping up arms production, meaning making 

sure Ukraine gets the weapons it needs, meaning making sure the 

American government can react properly to changes on the battlefield. 

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has happened in Kharkiv. Hopefully, it will change but we need a 

senior administration official responsible for that. 

Finally, Congress. Congress has been strong pushing the administration to do more. It got the aid package passed. However, we 

need greater flexibility in the way we allocate appropriate weapons. 

American weapons, even new ones, are facing challenges with electronic warfare in the battle space. We need to in the appropriations 

process agree to changes in weapons design to meet those challenges on the battlefield. 

All right. Basic point—we have done this before. We defeated 

massive armed aggressors in World War II. We can do this now. 

Thank you. 

Chairman WILSON: Ambassador, thank you so much. As we proceed, I would like to point out that despite the fan club members 

of Mr. Cohen we do not want to have people harassed as they are 

coming into the building or into the room, and that—anyone obstructing needs to know that obstructing the entrance is a fire code 

violation and they will be removed. 

With that in mind, we now proceed to Secretary Michael Ryan. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL RYAN, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT, 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Mr. RYAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Cohen, and Congressman 

Veasey, I am honored to testify today. 

Ukraine has a pathway to victory with our support. Kyiv’s challenge is simply this—how does a smaller force fighting for its survival defeat a genocidal Goliath? 

It is clear President Putin is in it to win it. He has no other option. Our strategic objective, therefore, must be a Ukrainian victory 

on Kyiv’s terms. To achieve this there is much we must do. It is 

in our vital interest to do so. 

Together with our European and global partners, we must give 

Ukraine decisive advantages in munition stockpiles, rates and 

ranges of fires, speed and skill of maneuver, air defense, air offense, and intelligence while compensating for Ukraine’s relative 

lack of manpower and Russia’s resurgent defense industry bolstered by the unholy alliance of China, Iran, and North Korea. 

We must also find ways for Ukraine to hold Russian forces at 

risk wherever they may be. Time is of the essence. This summer 

may be decisive. By the fall it could all be over. Therefore, we must 

rapidly adapt before it is too late. Strategic and operational success 

requires that we do three things. 

First, clearly and publicly state our strategic objective, the defeat 

of Russia, so we can comprehensively plan for success and let Mr. 

Putin know he cannot win. 

Second, we need to substantially resupply Kyiv in the next weeks 

to two months where a Russian breakthrough on the battlefield is 

possible. Russia has the initiative. The 300-plus missile and drone 

attack on Israel on April 13 happens every week in Ukraine but 

with greater ferocity. 

Third, we need to intelligently tailor our assistance to a specific 

strategy and plan that will bring victory to Ukraine. Ukraine cannot win on defense. They must take the fight to the enemy. Rapid 


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resupply from our own stocks is imperative on par with the 1973 

resupply of Israel during the Yom Kippur War. 

We need to give Ukraine a Patriot battery now. This could be the 

difference between winning in the long run or losing this summer. 

Ukraine needs more weapons and better tactics. To provide the 

weapons we should fully exploit the Defense Production Act and 

appoint a weapons czar to bring the industry in line with our strategic objective. 

Russia’s economy is on a war footing. Ours is not. We can help 

Ukraine help itself. American companies should partner with 

Ukrainian ones. Ukrainian warehouses are full of damaged equipment. American companies can repair this equipment. 

A specific strategy and plan for victory includes tactics and 

knowing how to beat your enemy. Tactics inform requirements. 

Combining existing methods in innovative ways can be decisive. 

To that end, former NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose 

Gottemoeller and I wrote an article in Foreign Policy titled 

′′Ukraine has a Pathway to Victory′′ that lays out how Ukrainian 

forces can recombine existing tactics and technologies into a new 

scheme of maneuver based on our Cold War Joint Air Attack Team, 

or JAAT, concept. As Russian forces move out from behind their 

prepared defenses, the updated eJAAT, as we call it, is an ideal 

counteroffensive tactic to blunt and defeat their advance. To win, 

Ukraine needs localized and temporary air and electromagnetic superiority at points of its own choosing. Fighter unmanned aerial vehicles that can autonomously find and destroy Russian surveillance 

and attack drones, could sweep the skies. Such systems should be 

rapidly developed and fielded. 

Ukrainian ′′Wild Weasel′′ missions for suppression of enemy air 

defense are already active using U.S.-provided missiles and with 

the support of the eJAAT. The F–16 will enhance the effectiveness 

of this mission. The threat of Russian aircraft could be mitigated 

by UAVs, such as MQ–9s armed with air-to-air missiles. European 

leaders are now suggesting that NATO air defense could help clear 

the skies in Western Ukraine. 

Electromagnetic superiority is a thornier problem. The work 

under the DOD Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy 

should be fully exploited. 

All this we must do—and more. For the want of a nail, the horse 

was lost. If Ukraine loses, which they could very well do this summer, the very expensive and dangerous implications are that, in his 

newly acquired position of strength, President Putin will not negotiate. Rather, he will push for total victory. His air force and navy 

are largely intact, as are his Strategic Rocket Forces. If Ukraine 

loses, tens of thousands of Russian troops will be on the borders 

of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The Black Sea will be 

a Russian lake. Russia will no longer be fighting Ukraine and degrading its own capabilities, but instead, its wartime economy will 

be restoring its strength, particularly in drones, cruise missiles, 

and hypersonics, which threaten all of NATO’s European territory. 

Most destabilizing in the short term would be the five to 15 million Ukrainian refugees flooding into Europe. In the long term, the 

damage to U.S. and NATO credibility will affect the Middle East, 

Africa, and most importantly, Taiwan and the South China Sea. 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
11 

The entire global security dynamic will change. NATO’s 75th Anniversary Summit is this July in Washington. Ukraine back on the 

offensive would be the perfect backdrop; Ukraine in retreat would 

not. 

China is watching. The world is watching. The choice is ours. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WILSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Indeed, 

each of your statements—it is so refreshing. I agree with everything you said, okay? I have never been to a hearing like that. 

Then it would be interesting to find out now if people of another 

political party feel the same way, so I will refer to opening statements by Congressman Cohen. 

STATEMENT OF STEVE COHEN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TENNESSEE 

Representative COHEN: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I do not know if 

I need—really need to do an opening statement. I would just as 

soon move into the five minutes and just do that now. 

Chairman WILSON: You see what a great team member he is, 

and another team member is here all the way from Indiana, and 

that is Congresswoman Victoria Spartz, Indiana by way of 

Ukraine. We are delighted to have Congresswoman Spartz here. 

We will begin with the five minutes, and hold everybody—beginning with me—to the five minutes. 

Indeed, your comments were so important, but my hopes for the 

people of Ukraine—when I was there in December, before the invasion, it was—at that time, the planning was for resistance and 

guerrilla warfare. Well, the people of Ukraine have done so much 

better than that, and so just perceived that they could be overrun 

with mass slaughter. The people of Ukraine stood firm, and so we 

need to be doing that. 

Then I appreciate, indeed, something that all of us have seen, 

and that is that we are talking about Ukraine, but it goes far beyond, and the implications are really clear. We have been together 

at the Narva River there in Estonia, and war criminal Putin—one 

time by accident a couple of months ago—by accident said how 

much he really appreciated Narva. You know, he does. That is 

called—NATO it is called Article 5, and we need to avoid it. 

Then as specific as you were talking, and that is, with 

Transnistria of Moldova, with obsession with Abkhazia of Georgia, 

he already illegally occupies other countries. With 4,000 troops in 

Armenia that are there for peacekeeping, they could be an occupation force so, it just keeps on going. 

For people not to realize the implications of how far this could 

go—and so many of us—and you are going to see it, I believe—and 

that is, it is bipartisan. I truly want Mr. Biden to succeed, and I 

am glad about the change of policy about the long-range missiles. 

I am hoping for other policies. I hope for expediting equipment. 

Then I am really pleased—bipartisan—we had—I would say we 

would get 300 votes for aid; no, it was 311, and so—and Speaker 

Mike Johnson did a great job. 

Over and over again, it has been bipartisan. President Trump 

himself placed Javelin missiles in Ukraine to try to deter this. 

President Trump put American troops in Poland—so historically 

significant—and President Trump is the one who warned Angela 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
12 

Merkel that Nord Stream 2 was going to finance the capitulation 

of Western civilization to Putin. 

Over and over again, we see coming together—and beginning 

when—and Nataliya, I would like your point of view on the impact 

that you see—how important for success for the people of Ukraine. 

Ms. BUGAYOVA: Thank you.I think two points on that—first of 

all, for Ukraine, this remains to be an existential war, and the 

choice is actually very simple, and it has never been just about 

choosing between Russia and the West. The choice remains about 

the way of life, and we see the two ways of life that Ukraine is 

choosing between on two sides of the front line: On one side a Russian occupation where you have atrocities on a daily basis committed against civilians, where you have extrajudicial killings, torture, deportation; and then on the other side you have Ukraine, 

that is free, unoccupied, and as imperfect as it is, striving to be a 

better state every day. Therefore, what stands in between those 

two ways of life is essentially Ukrainian armed forces, supported 

by the population of Ukraine, and its partners like the United 

States. For Ukraine, the choice remains clear. 

I think there is a lot more at stake in this war than the existence 

of Ukraine, as we discussed, including vital U.S. national security 

interests, but also the future of NATO because, as you know well, 

Article 5, or NATO border, are not magic shields, and NATO’s decision-making depends very much on the perceptions and assessments of individual member states, on the credibility of other member states in the alliance. 

Chairman WILSON: Hear, hear. Ambassador? 

Mr. HERBST: Again, I agree with what Nataliya said. The 

Ukrainian people have no choice. Putin has made clear—and our 

intelligence agencies brilliantly picked this up before the big invasion—their intention to impose their vision of what Ukrainians 

should be, which is—to use a historic and not much—appreciated 

phrase in Ukraine—little Russians, not to have their own identity 

as a separate people. 

We see this in the brutal war crimes that are being conducted 

in occupied Ukraine against Ukrainians who want to speak the 

Ukrainian language, and who do not want to worship in the Russian Orthodox Church, so Ukraine had no choice. The people understand that, and even though they are suffering greatly, they do 

not have an alternative but to fight on because, as the former leader and her son said to me 18 months ago, living under Russian 

bombs is bad, but living under Russian occupation is far worse. 

They are in this to the end, and they will win if we provide the 

necessary support—which again, as all three of us have made 

clear—is critical to American interests. It is a smart way to deal 

with a rogue nuclear superpower. 

Chairman WILSON: Hear, hear. 

Mr. HERBST: Beat them in Ukraine. 

Chairman WILSON: Hear, hear. 

Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. RYAN: Sir, I completely agree with the two other witnesses. 

I would just add, as an attacker, Russia has two choices because 

Ukraine is fighting for its survival. It can either capitulate or annihilate, and they are on track to try to annihilate, and therefore it 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
13 

is extremely important that we do everything possible now to prevent that from happening. Thank you. 

Chairman WILSON: Thank you so much, I am really grateful that 

we have been joined by Congressman Jim Costa from California, 

and I am really grateful that we have with us Senator Richard 

Blumenthal, all the way from Rhode Island. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL: Connecticut. 

Chairman WILSON: That is okay—[LAUGHTER]—it is one of those 

assorted—hey, it is one of those assorted northeastern states, okay? 

[LAUGHTER.] They get confused. 

Aside from that, before I embarrass myself again, we will proceed 

now. We have—beginning with Congressman Cohen. 

Representative COHEN: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Let me ask—we started off—first, let me say what I think is— 

Ambassador Herbst, did you say that Congress moved the administration along to get the security bill passed? 

Mr. HERBST: No. What I was referring to was they said that 

the—excuse me, the bill that was passed encouraged the administration to send—[off mic]. Now, of course, the administration sent— 

Representative COHEN: No, I am not talking about that; I am 

talking about the security package. I thought you said that Congress had done some things, and one of the things they did was 

they helped the administration get that. 

Regardless, the administration was for it; Congress was slow, 

and if it were not for Congress, we could have got that done three 

months earlier. Okay, good. Pass without a— 

Chairman WILSON: We all agree. 

Representative COHEN: Yes, let me ask you this. We started off 

with the sanctions. Do you think the sanctions worked? 

Mr. HERBST: I do not have any doubt that the sanctions have 

cost the Russian economy 2 or 3 percent of growth annually, and 

perhaps a little bit less over time as Moscow has adjusted to it and 

Moscow’s pals have adjusted to it. What it has not done, of course, 

is force Putin to end the war. 

There is a lot of controversy about statistics regarding Russian 

economic growth. You could say according to [IMF]International 

Monetary Fund and the World Bank the Russian economy grew 

more than 3 percent last year. The problem is that those statistics 

are essentially based on Russian economic numbers. Russia puts 

out statistics designed to meet the political needs of the government. 

Representative COHEN: Kind of like Hamas and Palestine saying 

how many children have been killed every week. 

Mr. HERBST: Civilian casualties. U.N. agencies accept it as real. 

Representative COHEN: Well, last week the U.N. said that they 

were not right and there were about 5,000 people that they said 

were dead, they have no conclusion that is dead and that the children were a greater number than ever. The New York Times just 

had not picked up on that yet. 

Mr. HERBST: Indeed. 

Representative COHEN: Anyway, so sanctions, you think they 

have helped. 

Mr. HERBST: Correct. 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
14 

Representative COHEN: Nevertheless, they were not the panacea. 

They did not effectively kill the Russians— 

Mr. HERBST: The advocates for sanctions were not saying they 

would be a panacea. They were saying they would place an immediate and a long-term cost. Perhaps the most effective of the sanctions, although not as effective as we like, have been the technology 

control sanctions. They have clearly made it much harder for Moscow to develop weapons, or rather to produce weapons that are effective. Of course, they are finding ways around it, especially with 

help from China. 

Representative COHEN: I agree with you we need to have—allow 

Ukraine to use weapons to go into Russia. It makes no sense, them 

coming and destroying all of the utilities, energy sources, et cetera, 

et cetera, et cetera, and then Ukraine’s got their hands tied behind 

their back. Putin’s not thinking nicely of us—we give $60 billion; 

he is going to think, oh, but we let them shoot weapons into 

Belgorod or whatever it is called. 

Mr. HERBST: There is no doubt about that. All of us agree on it. 

I would just note that when the House finally passed the aid package, a lot of people in Moscow were unhappy and they did not hide 

it. 

Representative COHEN: I am sure they were unhappy. Let me 

ask you this: We passed the aid package. We need to get them 

weapons on the front line to protect Kharkiv and areas on their 

eastern front, but at the same time, we need to get them the Patriot missiles and defensive missiles. Do we have any idea what is 

been prioritized and what has not? 

Mr. HERBST: Sadly, our—we are providing merely missiles for 

Patriot batteries, as opposed to batteries themselves. 

Representative COHEN: Oh. 

Mr. HERBST: I think—I am not an expert on this but I believe 

we have like 19 or 20 Patriot batteries ourselves. I do not know if 

we believe we can spare that. Some of those are protecting our 

troops in the Middle East so that is work that has to be done. They 

need to be there. We know that some of our allies who are not in 

any danger right now have one or two or three that could be provided. I think the administration could be stronger in pushing for 

that. 

Representative COHEN: Yes, I think—I think it was Romania offered some of their batteries, one of the Eastern Bloc countries. 

Mr. Ryan, do you have any thoughts on that, about the ability 

to get them batteries or Patriot missiles, defensive missiles? 

Mr. RYAN: Yes, sir. The most important near-term thing we could 

do: Spain has a Patriot battery in Turkey; it is been there for a 

long time. We could get the Spanish to move that into Ukraine and 

then we could put one of our batteries there, which helps us in the 

Middle East with the problem Ambassador Herbst was talking 

about. That we could do fairly quickly. 

Representative COHEN: Thank you. Thank you. 

I appreciate what is been done. Are you from Russia? 

Ms. BUGAYOVA: No, I am not. I am an American and I grew up 

in Ukraine. 

Representative COHEN: You grew up in Ukraine. Okay, well 

there was something in there, your biography, that made me think 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
15 

about that and I was just thinking about Vladimir Kara-Murza and 

how much—he is still imprisoned and we need to get him free and 

it is awful. I mean, Russia just—thank you. 

Yield back. 

Chairman WILSON: I do not want to ruin Congressman Cohen’s 

reputation but he was thinking of Vladimir Kara-Murza and I was 

thinking of Alexei Navalny, so there are brave Russians. 

With this, we now proceed to—this is bipartisan, bicameral, and 

so we are so grateful to have Senator Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut. You all are familiar with that. It is the Nutmeg State. 

[LAUGHTER.] 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, U.S. SENATE, FROM 

CONNECTICUT 

Senator BLUMENTHAL: Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate 

your letting me ask just a few questions and the courtesy of my 

House colleagues. Thank you for conducting this hearing. 

Thank you for being here. Each of you has very extraordinary 

knowledge and experience in this area, and I think you are united 

in the sense that we need to defeat Russia. Our own national security is at stake, and we ought to do everything possible. 

I want to ask you about something unrelated to the arms. I think 

we need to do more long-range artillery, the F–16s, whatever is 

necessary to extend the field of battle, even into Russian territory, 

so as to disrupt their command and their supply of weapons, and 

we need to do it quickly because obviously, the offensive is coming. 

But there are two areas where I would like you to comment. 

Number one: How effective have our sanctions been? On the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in the Senate, we are 

doing an investigation of violations of sanctions, how countries like 

Uzbekistan—you are very familiar with that country, Mr. Ambassador—are potentially, whether purposefully or unwittingly, providing a means for sending semiconductors, parts, components that 

have been found in the weapons used against Ukraine. They have 

been found by the Ukrainians. Last time I was in Ukraine I sat 

across from President Zelensky. I have been there five times and 

met with him over each of those meetings, and the last time he 

handed me photographs, and documents in a file on what they 

found in terms of components and parts made by Americans in 

Russian weapons. 

The second relates to financial resources that we could use, Russian assets. The REPO Act—you may be familiar with it—endeavors to take—seize and use those Russian assets to support Ukraine, 

and whether there is more we can do to push our allies in Europe 

to side with us in this effort. I think they have been the reluctant 

party. Our government was reluctant for a long time but I think 

they have demonstrated more resolve. 

Mr. HERBST: There is no question that there have been unusual 

changes, increase in trade between, say, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, 

some of the other Central Asian republics and Russia, Georgia, and 

Russia, maybe Turkey and Russia, and they may well be explained 

by sanctions evasion. Therefore, yes, we need to—we need to have 

a very serious conversation with all of the countries in question— 

of course, with China, which apparently Secretary Blinken did a 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
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few weeks ago. In fact, Chinese-Russian trade dipped somewhat in 

March and April, which may have reflected those efforts. We need 

to do more, for sure. For sure. Because Russia is not really hightech in the way we are, and so they need those components to run 

their weapons so, we should do more. 

On the frozen Russian state assets, I agree with you. We need 

to do a lot more on this. I credit the administration, Daleep Singh, 

for his initiative, which is to allow the use of interest—20 years’ 

worth of interest from the 300 billion of frozen state assets, so they 

can—Ukraine could receive $50 billion in the next few months if 

everybody agreed. Sadly, this is the U.S.—I mean, it is good it is 

the U.S. position; my understanding is that London and Ottawa 

are also in favor of this, and the rest of the G–7 are not. I know 

that Singh has been arduously pushing this agenda. I think he 

could use some help from the most senior members of the administration, starting with his boss, Secretary Yellen, but also the president. I think if we pushed hard, we might be able to persuade our 

allies to do this. 

I also think that this is an even better idea than the one that 

Daleep Singh is pushing. This is an idea associated with Philip 

Zelikow, Bob Zoellick, and Larry Summers, to simply transfer almost all of that 300 billion to Ukraine. There have—there is a justification for this. I know that there is interest in this elsewhere. 

However, if we could start with what I call the Singh issue, that 

would be wonderful. To the extent that Congress can encourage the 

administration to use its vast influence to persuade the allies, that 

would be welcome. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL: Thank you. 

Ms. BUGAYOVA: I would add, on the sanctions part, I think the 

core question is how do we assess the effectiveness of the sanctions, 

and whether we assess them on trying to affect Russia’s intent to 

wage the war, or Russia’s actual capability to wage the war. I think 

if we try to assess from the perspective of intent, that is not necessarily the most helpful metric, because Russia’s objectives remain 

maximalist. Very few things are capable of changing them. 

However, sanctions certainly degraded Russia’s ability to an extent to conduct the war. Russia’s defense industrial base and its 

ability to surge its production is not without constraint, and it is 

not without limitation. I think the issue is that the sanctions are 

A, insufficient; second, it is—a lot of it is cat-and-mouse, as Russia 

adapts to the sanctions. For them to be more effective, they have 

to be increasingly proactive, and they have to be increasingly tied 

with other efforts, including the military campaign, the questions 

of the global contested logistics, and the question of the Russian 

shadow fleet. It is a question of proactiveness and comprehensiveness. But they certainly have an effect on Russia’s ability to sustain the war. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL: Thank you. 

Chairman WILSON: Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL: Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WILSON: Indeed, we have discovered the senator from 

Rhode Island—[LAUGHTER]—okay, Senator Sheldon. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: It is quite near Connecticut. [LAUGHTER.] 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
17 

Chairman WILSON: Might I— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: Kind of our western suburb, in fact. 

[LAUGHTER.] 

Chairman WILSON: Hey, that— 

Senator BLUMENTHAL: I want to just tell my colleague from 

Rhode Island that I was mistaken for him— 

Chairman WILSON: No, no—no—no, no—the—hey, the—please, 

the states were confused. Because of the assorted northeastern 

states. We cannot remember all of them, okay? [LAUGHTER.] 

Senator BLUMENTHAL: They were all so close together, right? 

Chairman WILSON: Quite close. 

Keeping all this in order, somehow, I want to—indeed, we are delighted, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, who is going to soon be the 

incoming co-chair of the OSCE. What a northern gentleman he is. 

He is going to be deferring to Congresswoman Virginia—Victoria 

Spartz of Indiana. 

STATEMENT OF VICTORIA SPARTZ, U.S. HOUSE, FROM 

INDIANA 

Representative SPARTZ: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will try to make a brief statement. My question is going to have 

quick five parts. I mean, from my perspective, we either did not 

have a strategy or had a bad strategy, because the situation tilted 

in the direction of Russia. 

You know, so in five items, I want to get your assessment of 

where we are positive and negative on these five items related to 

Ukraine. You know, I understand Ukraine did a lot of changes. 

They changed generals, and a lot of things happened. They still did 

not put the country in war mode. Russia did; Ukraine did not. Can 

you assess what is happening in Ukraine? 

The United States. Obviously, we did not give—[LAUGHS]—you 

know, the cluster munitions for no reason. We also did not really 

supply—resupply and did not put our industry in the proper mode 

to be able to have even—if we plan to have long wars, which I do 

not think is a good idea. I think decisiveness and speed benefit the 

West much more. 

Then China, what is happening in China, your assessment of 

where they are with this. They facilitated this war for Russia. 

Europe. Europe does a lot of grandiose talk, but generally, all 

ends in grandiose talk and a lot of statements. 

Then the rest of the world and Global South, what is happening 

in Africa, Global South, and the rest of the world. What are the dynamics right there? 

On these five items—Ukraine, USA, Europe, China, Global 

South, and the rest of the world—if you can just—we can start 

maybe with Mr. Ryan. 

Mr. RYAN: Thank you. Perfect. Clearly, they are all related. As 

was said earlier, Ukraine, the situation there is the center of gravity for our interests, and the interests of our allies and partners in 

Europe, and in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Start with the Global South: They are watching. They are being 

played by both China and Russia, who are both trying to change 

the rules-based world order to one more favorable to autocracy, and 

they are offering autocracy as a better way to meet the needs of 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
18 

the people and ensure peace in the world. That is a narrative that 

we have to defeat. Defeating Russia in Ukraine will help us defeat 

that narrative. 

In Europe, the narrative has not taken place. Europe has 

transitioned significantly, as Ambassador Herbst said earlier, well 

beyond what we thought they would do. They are slowly getting 

things forward, but I would note the Germans are now putting together an initiative across Europe for air defense in Ukraine. 

Therefore, there are some positive signs coming forward. 

China is playing its own game, of course. They need Russia to 

be able to push their narrative around the world, that they are the 

best form of government, and everyone should be like them. Without Russia, that is going to start to fall on deaf ears, and China’s 

interests will be lessened. 

Now, in the United States, we are starting to come to grips, as 

we always do, slowly—but now that we are getting together on the 

same sheet of music if you will, we have the opportunity to invoke 

our industrial might, as we have in the past. Because this next 

year on the ground in Ukraine, is going to be an industrial competition between what Russia can do with Chinese, Iranian, and 

North Korean support, and what we can do with our European 

friends. We really need to move forward in that area. 

In Ukraine, as we all know, Ukraine has done a spectacular job. 

The beginning of your question, I think, was exactly right. We did 

not start with a strategy. At first, we thought Ukraine would lose, 

then when they started to win, we were late to need, and we were 

not able to reinforce their success. That gave the Russians time to 

dig in. Then we just assumed that the Russians were going to be 

bad forever, and the Ukrainians were undefeatable. The counteroffensive did not go as planned, because we did not diligently get 

in there, and tie our assistance to the strategy and the tactics employed on the ground. Now, it is a moment of reset, and everyone 

is looking. We need to reset correctly and go on the offensive as 

soon as possible. In the very near term, we need to get as much 

assistance, as intelligently as possible, to the forces in Ukraine so 

that they can start to turn the tide. 

Representative SPARTZ: What—if you would say, what top three 

things that need to be done in the immediate term better? What 

needs to be done? Three things, if you just— 

Mr. RYAN: We need to provide long-range fires for the Ukrainian 

military, so they can interdict Russian forces wherever they are, including in the Russian Federation, in order to stop the destruction 

of Kharkiv, and to regain the initiative. Because once Russia can 

no longer supply its troops, and they can no longer sustain their 

command and control—in other words, we can—Ukraine can destroy their headquarters—then the Ukrainian army is more motivated and better trained, and they will start to prevail. 

The next thing is to provide air defense because we need to protect Ukrainian cities and the Ukrainian population. The third thing 

is we need to get in, with the Ukrainians, provide a strategy for 

victory, one that is tied to our industrial support, our political support, our ability to marshal allies, particularly in Europe, to align 

the Europeans’ effort to areas where we are not as strong as they 

are, and they can get in and do it as well. 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
19 

Also, listen to our Eastern European counterparts, because they 

know the situation better than anybody. They were proven right. 

Representative SPARTZ: Right. I know the strategy not to lose if 

you—how might lose, but you will never win. You have to have a 

strategy and action to win. 

Mr. RYAN: Exactly. 

Representative SPARTZ: Thank you so much, sir. 

My time has expired, so I yield back. 

Chairman WILSON: Thank you very much, Congresswoman 

Spartz. 

We will now proceed to Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island. 

STATEMENT OF SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, U.S. SENATE, FROM 

RHODE ISLAND 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: Thanks very much, Chairman. 

While I am here among so many House members, may I take a 

moment to thank all of you for seeing to it that the REPO Bill got 

into the supplemental. I know it is always a little bit of a challenge 

when House members have to put a Senate bill into something that 

they have been working on. Chairman Wilson, you all should know, 

was an extremely powerful voice for getting that done. 

Chairman WILSON: Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: A sponsor of the bill over on this side. I 

just want to express appreciation to the House in general for 

achieving that, and to the Chairman in particular— 

Chairman WILSON: Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: For his leadership and oomph, to get that 

done. 

Ambassador Ryan, I am delighted to hear—[LAUGHS]—you think 

that we would add strategic value to the Ukrainians as they find 

their way to victory. So far, we have managed to—seem to have 

gotten most things wrong. I hope that, as we support the Ukrainians on their path to victory, we are a lot more humble about deferring to their good judgments, rather than insisting on our own. We 

do not have much a—of a track record right now, beginning with 

that horrible, huge briefing over in the joint secure space here, in 

which every single member of the executive branch said they had 

five days to two weeks, and then it was all done. There were people 

in the audience who did not believe that. I was one of them, and 

sure enough, here we are. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL : I remember it well. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: I am trying to—yes, was not that an awful 

moment? 

Anyway, on—right now, I think a key focus is air defense. I am 

not a defense expert, a strategy expert, a weapons expert. What do 

you think is the best place to go for a comparison between what 

Ukraine has, and what it needs to provide its own Iron Domeequivalent, to be able to defend its territory from air attack most 

effectively? Is there some published resource that is best at that? 

Or who should I ask? 

If you know, just go ahead and give me the answer. I suspect 

this is not the panel for that detailed question. 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
20 

Mr. RYAN: Thank you for the question, sir. I would suggest— 

General Dave Allvin, the chief of staff of the United States Air 

Force. I used to sit beside him every day when we were stationed 

together at U.S. European Command. He gets it. 

Air defense is a layered—a multisystem approach. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: Yes. 

Mr. RYAN: Therefore, at the high altitude, to intercept the most 

dangerous payloads, that have the largest bang, Patriot is absolutely outstanding for that. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: Yes. 

Mr. RYAN: Some of the European systems, including former Soviet-made systems, like the S–300, all integrate it together, so to 

have the launchers is necessary. To have the radar that can see 

through the clutter of the electromagnetic jamming, so that they 

can then engage those targets, is extremely important. Then 

ground-based air defense, so nearer into the targets, to get that 

last mile. The way the Israelis do it, is the Iron Dome, then they 

have David’s Sling, which is the next layer out. Then they have the 

David—the Arrow system— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: Yes. 

Mr. RYAN: —Which is even further, and then we supplement that 

with our own assets. 

It has to be layered. It has to be supported by outstanding radars. It has to have an electromagnetic aspect to it. However, General Allvin can give you the best answers on that. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: I could not help but notice that when Iran 

rocketed Israel, a phalanx of allies was able to come together, and 

pretty much knock every missile out of the sky. That was a stark 

comparison to what Ukraine is experiencing. 

In your view, if 10 is the best-quality interception and defense 

capability against incoming artillery and missiles, where have we 

left Ukraine right now, in terms of the equipment? Are they at 

two? Are they at four? Are they at six? How big is the hole that 

we need to fill to protect their skies? 

Mr. RYAN: The answer varies based on geography. Kyiv is a 10. 

Other parts of Ukraine are a two. It is the scope and scale, and 

what Russia has been doing is trying to get maximum effect in 

areas that have the least amount of defense. To have—as Ambassador Herbst mentioned earlier—nine Patriot batteries forward, 

really is the way you protect the rest of Ukraine. It is like a hockey 

goalie coming out of the goal. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: Yes. 

Mr. RYAN: You take—you cut the angles down, and then you can 

defend with less. We need to do that. That means we need to have 

security forward, which means the Ukrainian army—as they push 

forward, we can push the air defense forward. It is that capability 

that we are after. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: Did you notice the hockey goalie example, 

for New—for New—we New Englanders? [LAUGHTER.] [Fed ?] right 

to us. 

Chairman WILSON: Yes, you and Tom Emmer an example to me 

later. [LAUGHTER.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: All right. 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
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Well, thank you all very much. I think if there has been one concern that I have had, it is that we have always been there to give 

the Ukrainians what they needed, and we have always been there 

six months late. I hope that we can pick up our pace so that they 

are not crying for Javelins, and then crying for HIMARS, and then 

crying for Abrams, and crying for ATACMS, and crying for 300s, 

and now F–16s—always there, always late, seems to be our practice. I hope we can fix that. 

Thank you very much, Chairman. 

Chairman WILSON: Hey, thank you so much, soon-to-be Ranking 

Co-Chair. 

Very important, very perceptive, as an identification of the phalanx of countries coming together. One of those, incredibly enough, 

was France. I was really grateful, last week, to be with the senator 

for the 80th anniversary reception at the French ambassador’s residence. As an indication that all Americans should see how Europe 

is coming together, at home is a huge copy of the Statue of Liberty. 

On this, at the ambassador’s residence, is also a Ukrainian flag. If 

the people wonder about countries coming—Europe coming together, it is real, and we have had the opportunity to see that. 

Also, real—I want to credit Congressman Marc Veasey for his 

being here first. Congressman Veasey. 

Representative VEASEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank the panel for being here, as well. 

I was hoping that you could give us some examples—because I 

think that this is important, as we sort of move forward, when we 

have to come back for—and ask for funding in the future. Can you 

provide some really specific examples of how the bipartisan foreign 

aid package that was passed, how it is already tangibly helped 

Ukraine against capabilities for Russia’s unlawful invasion? Is 

there anything that is very tangible, that we can like, take away, 

and go back and share with our constituents? 

Mr. HERBST: Tangible. There is no question that once the bill 

passed the House, right, before it became law, Ukraine began to reduce its rationing of ammunition and other weapons supplies. It 

took another step towards reduced rationing after the bill became 

law, and the administration has moved, I think, almost as quickly 

as possible, to get stuff out. Would still—they are still a way in the 

hole because we are months behind but, they have done things. 

Beyond that, it is hard to say. Well, actually, there are two other 

points. The Russians were clearly deeply unhappy about this. They 

were sort of counting on this to continue. However this had—may 

have had a perverse impact on their operations. They see this as 

a window closing, and this may have persuaded them to push a little bit harder, especially in the northeast around Kharkiv. However, that is the only—that is the only thing I can see. 

Representative VEASEY: Yes. Yes. 

Ms. BUGAYOVA: I can—I can elaborate on that point. 

Representative VEASEY: Yes, please. 

Ms. BUGAYOVA: I think three additional points. First of all, before 

the aid package was passed, actually, we were in a moment where 

the range of possibilities was exceptionally wide. It actually included the most dangerous scenario, of Russia essentially putting 

Ukrainian forces on the path of collapse. With the aid package 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
22 

being passed, that most dangerous scenario is not presently on the 

table, and it reset the range of outcomes that are possible in this 

war, that still includes Ukraine’s victory. 

I think secondly, more concretely, the aid package is also exceptionally important for Ukraine’s ability to plan operations ahead. 

Third, it does matter also for Ukraine’s ability to resolve its manpower issues. Ukraine has taken concrete steps legislatively and 

practically, but having the ability to plan around concrete aid deliveries will also help units who have limited capabilities to be able 

to relieve from the front, and essentially participate in training. It 

is also very important for the manpower planning component. 

Representative VEASEY: Thank you very much. Yes, that is very 

helpful. 

Ambassador and Mr. Ryan, I was hoping that maybe you could 

also tell us what sort of dangers, or problems may occur for Russia’s sustained use of Iranian and North Korean weaponry and 

technology in this conflict. I know that there has been some talk 

about that and was hoping that you could shed some light on how 

that may further—or how that could hurt us in the future if they 

are going to continue to use these weapons, and how that is giving 

Russia, or any of these other countries, some sort of a military advantage. 

Mr. RYAN: Thank you, Congressman. 

Proliferation around the world of these types of weapons, that 

contribute to instability in Africa, South America, and other parts 

of the world, generally comes from North Korea and Iran. By funding their arms production, through Russian acquisition, the Russians are actually enabling their ability to be more disruptive in 

more places in the world, which creates a greater problem for us. 

President Putin early on decided—and this was in Secretary Ash 

Carter’s memoirs—that he needed to oppose U.S. policy everywhere 

in the world and create as many problems for us as he could. Using 

North Korean and Iranian proliferation of weapons does that. 

When we look at the domino effect of coups in Africa, it is directly 

related back to that Russian policy dictated by President Putin, 

and as enabled by Iranian and North Korean shipments. 

Representative VEASEY: Okay. 

Mr. HERBST: I would add that Iran has long sought more advanced Russian weapons technology—planes, and missiles. The 

Russians have been somewhat reluctant to do that. Yet, Russia has 

been dependent on Iranian drones since Month Two of the big invasion. This has enhanced Iranian leverage to, for example, maybe 

get the technology, and start producing more and more advanced 

Russian jets with Iran. 

As far as I know, this has not happened yet. This is—I mean— 

I mean, you can—you can go to the intel community, and find out 

where this stands. This is certainly something Iran is trying to get 

from Russia, and for that matter, the North Koreans, as well. 

When Putin went hat in hand for artillery from North Korea, a lot 

of which are to have proved to be duds, the North Koreans were 

also asking about ramping up their missile technology with Russia. 

I am not sure the Russians have done anything yet. Again, this 

stuff is in play. 

Representative VEASEY: Yes. Thank you very much. 


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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WILSON: Thank you very much, Congressman Veasey. 

Again, I want to recognize Congressman Veasey as the first person here, so that should be remembered. We appreciate it. 

As we conclude, it really is—I hope people see symbolically that 

what we have is—again, recognition from California, with Jim 

Costa. 

STATEMENT OF JIM COSTA, U.S. HOUSE, FROM CALIFORNIA 

Representative COSTA: I wanted to thank— 

Chairman WILSON: Now, I want to point out, that he is with the 

Trans-Atlantic Dialogue, okay? He is very perceptive. 

Thank you. 

Representative COSTA: Well, thank you very much, my friend. I 

appreciate your leadership, as was noted before, on these efforts. 

I think there is a lot of consensus here, is what we are hearing. 

I think learning the lessons of the last two-and-a-half years is what 

is critical for the purpose of the testimony here. As we go forward, 

not to recount, well, if we coulda, shoulda, woulda, that is fine but, 

that is in the past. 

My questions are directed toward the short term, with the passage of this package, and the longer term, and how we put together 

a concentrated bipartisan effort to support Ukraine. We have got 

10 members of their parliament here this week. They are aggressively trying to seek support, both in the short term and the long 

term, as we all should be doing. I have worked with two of you 

here before. We have gone to Ukraine several times, three times 

for me in the last 18 months. Just came back in February. 

My question is, how do we focus on doing everything we can? The 

administration is, as has been noted, has done the right thing, but 

oftentimes, three and six months too late. This micromanaging, 

this tending of micromanaging the Ukrainians’ efforts from the 

West Wing has got to change. I do not know what advice you might 

have to suggest on how we do that in a way that does not politicize 

this thing because obviously, that will have other impacts that 

we—I do not want to see take place. 

What would your priorities be? Ms. Bugayova, we will start with 

you, in terms of recommendations to us in Congress, in terms of 

short-term and long-term efforts and priorities? I want to ask the 

same question with you, my friend, Ambassador Herbst. 

I want to end with Mr. Ryan there on F–16s. 

Ms. BUGAYOVA: Thank you. 

To recap, I think there are concrete steps, and also a change in 

approach that is required, based on the lessons learned from the 

last two years. I think the concrete steps are providing Ukraine 

with what it needs to help Ukraine restore its ability to maneuver 

on the battlefield. That is the priority, which requires a lot more 

ground-based long-range strike capabilities. 

We discussed about denying Russia sanctuary space, and that is 

to the question of air defense that was asked earlier. No amount 

of Patriot batteries will solve the glide bomb problem that Russia 

is—that Ukraine is experiencing right now in Kharkiv. Ukraine 

has to be able to strike Russian targets inside of Russia. 


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Representative COSTA: No, absolutely. I mean, this is the—they 

are offensive. They are the aggressor, and I do not see how you can 

conduct any legitimate counter-strategy without doing that. 

Ms. BUGAYOVA: Yes. I will say, the final point, in terms of the 

change of the approach, as we learned, the decision-making speed 

is a critical asset in this war. I think it, for the U.S., is really important to be able to connect the ground truth to our capabilities 

and interests fast enough. That requires expanding knowledgesharing with Ukrainians, including potentially expanding U.S. 

ground presence in Ukraine, recognizing that decision-making 

speed will determine the outcome of this war, very much so, as 

well. 

Representative COSTA: Thank you. 

We will follow up, Ambassador Herbst. 

Mr. HERBST: It would start with the administration wanting victory as a policy goal, and deciding it was a critical interest of the 

United States to accelerate that victory. When we—when we— 

when we talk about our—when we talk to Ukraine about their 

campaign plans, we follow the battlefield closely. We send them the 

weapons they need to achieve the objectives that we understand 

make sense to win this war quickly. You need to have someone at 

a—at a very senior level in the administration, maybe even a special—a special manager for the overall Ukrainian—win the Ukrainian war effort. They are—they make sure that weapons that 

Ukraine needs are gotten there in time, that we are looking 

proactively to how we can help with this, as opposed to waiting for 

simply Ukrainian requests. They also make sure that we ramp up 

our arms production, which we have been talking about for two 

years, and have not done much to do. These—we decide this is a— 

we decide this is a priority for us. We will organize ourselves to 

win. If—that is what the Biden administration did with passing the 

IRA, that is what happened with COVID on the previous administration, we can do this. Of course, we have won— 

Representative COSTA: The world has changed since February 24, 

2022. 

Mr. HERBST: Right. 

Representative COSTA: We recognize that, and now we need to 

act on it. 

The Air National Guard in California has been working, as you 

know, my friend for 23 years. We have been trying to coordinate 

this transfer and training of pilots for the F–16s. It has been slow, 

terribly slow. It looks like we have maybe close to 16 pilots training. We need to fund these. The amount of the inventory of these 

platforms, I understand, is there. How would you offer the best 

way to accelerate this effort? Are—my friends on our side say they 

would never urge an offensive like we—the Ukrainians tried last 

year without an air offensive. I mean, it was just crazy. We would 

not do it. However yet, we expected the Ukrainians to make a miracle out of this without the proper air cover. 

Mr. RYAN: Yes sir, absolutely correct. 

First, I would say, all of the above. If we do those things, then 

we are in a position to utilize the F–16s appropriately. The thing 

that underpins that, which we often miss in the debates, is the 

supply chains, the logistics, the maintenance, and the repair of 


CSCE18-11 with DISTILLER
25 

damaged equipment, all of which are part of a long-term strategy 

to make the F–16 a winning contribution to the war effort in 

Ukraine. I know the California National Guard has been working 

that with the Ukrainians for a very long time. We have to do those 

things. 

As an A–10 pilot, I actually flew the F–16 once. It is easy to fly. 

It is very hard to employ it in a way that we employ it, in a very 

complex air scenario that supports ground maneuver. That is 

where we need to get the Ukrainians to because you are absolutely 

right. Without that cover for their ground maneuver, they are not 

going to win. With it, they are going to win. That is why we need 

to do that. 

The funding is very important. The number of pilots is very important. Experienced pilots can learn the aircraft very quickly; new 

pilots can learn it relatively quickly. We need to get them— 

Representative COSTA: I hear they have good pilots. 

Mr. RYAN: They have very good pilots. We need to get them into 

the mission scenarios where they actually learn to employ the aircraft effectively. They are already doing that with the suppression 

of enemy air defense with their own aircraft, with our missiles. 

That is great training for them to transition to the F–16. 

Representative COSTA: They are the original MacGyvers. 

Mr. RYAN: They are, yes, sir, absolutely. 

Taking the picture holistically as part of a winning strategy 

based on a clear objective will allow us to put the training resources against the F–16 requirements of the Ukrainians, get the 

Europeans fully involved in supporting those aircraft on the 

ground, getting them bedded down where they can be useful— 

Chairman WILSON: Hey, Mr. Secretary, I want to take a quick 

picture. I want the three of you to come here. We want to get a 

picture while the senator is still here. 

Please, you all come around, but—and we shall—[LAUGHTER]— 

hey. 

Mr. RYAN: I was finished. 

Chairman WILSON: Trans-Atlantic Chairman, thank you. We now 

will be concluding, and—but hey, to him— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE: Stand in front of the podiums here, or— 

Chairman WILSON: I was going to get them and we will stand 

right here. We want that backdrop behind us, okay? [Sounds 

gavel.] 

[Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the hearing ended.] 


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ADDITIONAL STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CO-CHAIRMAN CARDIN, U.S. SENATE, FROM MARYLAND

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This hearing is both timely and crucial. As leaders of 

the Helsinki Commission, all of us here are keenly aware that Russia’s war against 

Ukraine is a crisis for human rights and a humanitarian catastrophe. 

The Helsinki Final Act, adopted in 1975 between the United States, the Soviet 

Union, and 33 other states, gave rise to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as our own Commission. This seminal agreement articulated 

ten distinct principles: Sovereign equality; non-use of force; inviolability of frontiers; 

territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; self-determination of peoples; cooperation among states; and fulfillment of obligations under international 

law. 

At no point since the adoption of the Helsinki Accords have these principles been 

more thoroughly and egregiously tested. Today, in Ukraine, Russia is clearly violating every single one of these principles. Every single one. 

Any pretense of good faith that Russia once projected around its Helsinki obligations has not only been undermined—but completely shredded. It is an aggressor 

against Ukraine, posing a major threat to Europe as a whole, as it pursues a campaign against Ukraine’s people and their very nationhood itself. It is no exaggeration to say that the Ukrainian victory is the most urgent human rights cause in 

Europe today, and that cause only can advance with the provision of Western arms. 

Meanwhile, Russia clearly has broader imperial ambitions in Europe. Its soft annexation of Belarus, its influence campaign undermining Georgia, and its many 

threats against the free nations of Europe demonstrate that it does not intend to 

stop with Ukraine. Europe’s peace, which the United States relies on for our own 

security, is being defended today by Ukraine and its heroic people. We must support 

them in this fight. 

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses to hear more about 

how we can better support Ukraine during this critical and dangerous time. Thank 

you. 

TESTIMONY OF ISW NON-RESIDENT RUSSIA FELLOW NATALIYA BUGAYOVA

Thank you, Chairman Wilson and honorable members of the Commission for the 

opportunity to contribute to this critical discussion. 

The battlefield situation in Ukraine will likely get worse for Ukraine before it gets 

better. The delays in Western materiel deliveries came at the cost of Ukraine’s advantage. Russia is exploiting vulnerabilities across the frontline. Russia seeks to 

achieve battlefield effects in the remaining window of opportunity before Western 

military assistance reaches the frontline at scale. 

Russia’s main objective, however, is to falsely convince the United States that the 

aid will not make a difference—especially amid upcoming political milestones, such 

as the NATO summit, European Parliament elections, and US elections. 

Ukraine is likely to be able to stabilize the frontline and blunt the Russian offensive as the aid arrives and Ukraine continues to address its manpower shortages. 

The supplemental aid package helped avoid a path to the most dangerous outcome 

and reset a range of possible outcomes for the war that still includes a Russian defeat and Ukrainian victory. Which outcome Ukraine is moving toward depends in 

no small part on the US learning lessons of the last two years. 

LESSON #1: US interests in this war remain unchanged, and so does the most advantageous outcome for the US. This will likely remain true regardless of the ebbs 

and flows on the battlefield. 

Russia is a self-declared adversary to the United States. Any effective US strategy 

to counter the Russian challenge will recognize the outcome of this war as a center 

of gravity of Russia’s power and Russia’s ability to threaten US interests. Russia’s 

ability to reconstitute, to subjugate its neighbors, to confront NATO, to cooperate 

militarily with its partners like Iran, disproportionately depend on whether Russia 

keeps or loses its gains in Ukraine. It is not just about Russia’s capability; it is 

about Russia’s intent too. Putin is not seeking any offramps from his objectives to 

erase Ukraine a State, to fracture NATO, and to undermine the US. Moreover, the 

war has empowered an ultra-nationalist community inside of Russia that believes 

in expansion by force and is inherently anti-Western. If Russia is defeated, the next 

Russian leader may or may not be worse than Putin. Russian victory in Ukraine 

is a nearly guaranteed path to another Putin or worse because of the political imperatives that an empowered nationalist community would create. 


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Given these realities, the most dangerous outcome for the United States is allowing Russia to prevail in this war. The United States would face the worst threat 

from Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as a victorious Russia would 

emerge reconstituted and more determined to undermine the United States—and 

confident that it can. The risks of a Russian attack against NATO will rise. The 

challenge of defending the Baltic States could become almost insurmountable. A 

Russian victory would diminish America’s deterrence around the world. If Russia 

wins in Ukraine as a result of diminished US aid, our adversaries would learn that 

the US can be manipulated into abandoning its interests in a winnable fight. Russia 

prevailing in Ukraine would constitute a convincing argument for the effectiveness 

of nuclear blackmail and would likely accelerate nuclear proliferation. 

A scenario in which Russia gets a reprieve via a premature cease-fire or insufficient Western aid that halts Ukraine’s advance is far more costly than continuing 

to help Ukraine fight. This scenario would simply allow Russia to rebuild, launch 

new attacks on Ukraine, and confront NATO. The United States would face another 

invasion but at a higher cost of Ukrainian lives and US taxpayer dollars, worse escalation risks including those that could risk American lives, and under conditions 

that favor Russia, including a strengthened Putin regime, a stronger Russian military that is experienced in fighting a NATO-supplied adversary on a contemporary 

battlefield, more advantageous starting lines for Russia compared to February 2022, 

and higher Russian immunity to coercive measures. 

The most advantageous outcome remains helping Ukraine liberate its territory 

and people, as it is the only path to a durable peace, rather than a temporary respite; and then helping Ukraine rebuild, putting the largest and most powerful 

friendly military in Europe at the forefront of NATO’s defense. 

As long as this course of action remains Ukraine’s choice and will, the most prudent US strategy is helping Ukraine achieve it and accepting the short-term risks 

of helping Ukraine liberate itself to decrease the chances of a larger risk of escalation and costs in the future. 

LESSON #2 Putting Ukraine on the path to victory requires more capabilities but 

also different approaches. More capabilities are needed because delays of materiel 

provision have come at a cost of Ukraine’s advantage and because they provided 

Russia with time and space to adapt. Ukraine and its partners also require new approaches in this phase of the war: 

Helping Ukraine restore its own ability to maneuver on the battlefield, after it 

stabilizes the lines, is a priority. Achieving this objective will require more capabilities and an evolving warfighting concept to overcome positional warfare. A key task 

will be achieving temporary effects of air superiority without having what is conventionally defined as air superiority. This will require a much larger scale of groundbased long-range strike capabilities. Ukrainian forces may be able to restrict movements of Russian troops and supplies within a selected area of the front provided 

they have a sufficient of quantity of long-range precision strike missiles, for example. Ukraine may also be able to innovate, achieve, and exploit a version of air superiority at lower altitudes if its partners continue to support its unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities. 

Ukraine needs additional air defense capabilities deployed at the frontlines to 

deny and contest Russia’s ability to maintain localized air superiority. In sum, 

Ukraine needs capabilities to protect Ukrainian forces during maneuver, disrupt 

Russia’s reconnaissance strike complex, employ offensive and defensive electronic 

warfare at scale, defend Ukraine’s airspace, disrupt Russian rear areas—including 

rear areas in Russia itself. 

Denying Russia’s sanctuaries. Russia is not entitled to sanctuaries when it is trying to erase a nation. As we speak, the Russian Air Force is conducting glide bomb 

attacks from Russia’s airspace sanctuary on Kharkiv Oblast and can do so indefinitely, as my colleague George Barros has written. The West must abandon the Russian information line that Russia, having launched an unprovoked invasion of 

Ukraine, can somehow demand immunity from attack on the Russian rear with 

Western or Ukrainian weapons. The US must remove any existing constraints on 

Ukraine to target legitimate Russian military and defense industrial capabilities in 

Russia. The West should also develop a long-term strategy against ‘‘sacred Russian 

cows’’ in the West, such as the Russian State nuclear energy corporation Rosatom. 

Shrinking Russia’s sanctuary spaces in Russia and globally is key to imposing strategic dilemmas on the Kremlin. 

Thinking beyond standard force ratios and focusing on asymmetries. Ukraine’s effort in the Black Sea is a quintessential example of an effort producing outsized effects across multiple domains. This is exactly the kind of effort that the US needs 

to amplify with more resources—given its potential to have an even larger effect, 

including on the ground war. Other asymmetric opportunities include helping 


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1 https://kyivindependent.com/minister-ukraine-to-produce-more-weapons-worth–10-billion-iffinanced/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russiaskharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias 

Ukraine scale its rapid innovation cycle, as well as helping Ukraine’s defense industrial base [DIB] realize its potential. Ukraine’s Ministry of Strategic Industries estimates that Ukraine has additional ten billion in production capability, if resourced 

properly.1

Surging Western capabilities. Figuring out how to creatively allocate existing 

Western military assets while gradually adding new capability is important, but it 

is not the main problem we need to solve. The United States needs to lead a global 

coalition of partners—both in Europe and Asia—to dramatically increase the overall 

stock of capabilities that are making the difference in Ukraine, but which are also 

likely to matter to US efforts to deter and fight future wars. The West’s existing 

and latent capability dwarfs that of Russia. The combined GDP of NATO countries, 

non-NATO EU states, and our Asian allies is over $63 trillion. The Russian GDP 

is on the close order of $1.9 trillion. Iran and North Korea add little. China is enabling Russia, but it is not mobilized on behalf of Russia. If we lean in and mobilize 

a higher percentage of our latent capacity, Russia loses. Mobilizing would mean 

surging military production, sparing more of our existing military capabilities and 

economic assets, but also accepting a higher threshold for pain and risk now to 

avoid more cost and pain and risk in the future. 

LESSON #3: Decisionmaking speed has been a critical factor defining successes and 

failures in this war. 

The key successes achieved by Ukraine and its partners have resulted from strategic clarity. Lost opportunities have resulted from the West’s failure to connect 

ground truths to our interests quickly enough to act. The world had a moment of 

clarity in February 2022, recognizing Russia’s true intent and the stakes of the war. 

This clarity informed a myriad of actions by individuals and leaders in Ukraine, in 

the United States and globally. These actions helped Ukraine defeat Russia in the 

Battle of Kyiv, which meant the difference between the world’s largest present-day 

war and what would have been the world’s largest insurgency. Conversely, the 

West’s slow decisions about materiel delivery in part driven by the Russian manipulations of Western perception, cost Ukraine on the battlefield. For example, US failure to proactively resource Ukraine’s initiative after two successful counteroffensive 

operations in the fall of 2022 contributed to a missed opportunity for Ukraine to 

conduct a third phase of counteroffensive operations in the winter of 2022–2023. 

This reprieve allowed Russia to build its defenses in depth and to shore up manpower, making Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive an extraordinarily difficult undertaking. 

The frontline as of May 2024 would look different had the US proactively invested 

in Ukraine’s initiative in 2022, had the US delivered advanced capabilities or passed 

the supplemental earlier. 

Russia has learned this lesson early. So much so that the Kremlin’s main effor— 

since its failed ‘‘three-day war’’—has focused on targeting US decisionmaking with 

the goal of slowing down Western support. 

The United States should learn this lesson as well and plan to proactively resource multiple Ukraine’s campaigns and not expect any single operation to be decisive. A sustained US effort will also grant Ukraine the certainty about resourcing 

so Ukraine can plan for future operations and disabuse Putin of the notion that he 

can outlast the West. 

The United States should recognize that the speed of knowledge transfer and decisionmaking matters disproportionately in this war, as Russia is using perception 

manipulation to achieve goals beyond the limits of its real capability. The US should 

improve knowledge sharing with Ukraine and its partners, including by increasing 

physical presence in Ukraine to connect the ground truth to our decisions and capabilities fast enough to act. The US must also build resistance against Russian influence campaigns that aim to manipulate US decisionmaking, including the current 

Russian information operation supported by its intensified military action in 

Ukraine. 

LESSON #4: The West has the advantage over Russia; it needs to choose to use 

it. 


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The gap that Ukraine and its partners need to close to help Ukraine liberate its 

territory and people is smaller than the gap that Russia needs to close to achieve 

its unchanged objectives of subjugating Ukraine. Make no mistake—the Kremlin intends to close this gap. Putin has additional resources he can and will mobilize. The 

recent appointment of an economist, Andrei Belousov, to lead Russian Ministry of 

Defense is another indicator of Putin’s prioritization of Russia’s defense industrial 

base. 

Nevertheless, Russia’s surge capacity is neither unlimited nor without constraints. 

ISW has continued to observe the indicators of these limitations. For example, recent satellite imagery indicates that Russia is largely sustaining its war effort by 

pulling old armored vehicles from storage and modernizing them rather than producing new vehicles and weapons systems at scale. What the Kremlin has mobilized 

to date is orders of magnitude higher than what the West has mobilized on behalf 

of Ukraine. Russia had every advantage in the last 10 years and occupied 18 percent of Ukraine at an enormous cost. 

The Kremlin cannot accomplish its maximalist objectives in Ukraine if Ukraine’s 

will to fight persists alongside Western support. The Kremlin’s main effort—in addition to ramping up its own capacity—is to convince us that Russia prevailing in 

Ukraine is inevitable and that we must stay on the sidelines, allowing Russia to 

fight Ukraine in isolation. The notion that the war is unwinnable because of Russia’s dominance is a Russian information operation, which gives us a glimpse of the 

Kremlin’s real strategy and only real hope of success—a strategy that the US has 

the power and vital interest to deny. 

Æ 


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