PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 09-4219

GREGORY YOUNG BOWLES, a/k/a

New York,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken.

Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.

(1:04-cr-00170-MBS-1)

Argued: March 24, 2010

Decided: April 23, 2010

Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Shedd wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Katherine E. Evatt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL

PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. James Chris Leventis, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: W. Walter Wilkins, United States Attorney,

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

OPINION

SHEDD, Circuit Judge:

Gregory Bowles pled guilty to being a felon in possession

of a firearm and the district court sentenced him to 188

months imprisonment. Bowles now appeals his conviction

arguing the court erred by ordering him to be forcibly medicated to render him competent to stand trial. Because we find

that Bowles has waived his right to challenge the forcible

medication order, we dismiss the appeal. 

I.

The government indicted Bowles on several drugs and

weapons charges, including being a felon in possession of a

firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After his initial court

appearance, the district court granted Bowles’ unopposed

motion to have a psychiatric evaluation conducted. Thereafter, he was diagnosed with a "persecutory type" of delusional

disorder and antisocial personality disorder. Consequently, the

district court found him incompetent to stand trial and committed him for treatment. Over the course of approximately

four years, the district court held several hearings regarding

Bowles’ competency and the proper psychiatric treatment

methods needed for Bowles. Eventually, the court granted the

government’s motion and ordered Bowles to be forcibly medicated to render him competent to stand trial. Bowles did not

seek an interlocutory appeal of the forcible medication order.

Thereafter, Bowles was rendered competent and pled guilty

pursuant to a written plea agreement to one count of being a

2 UNITED STATES v. BOWLES
felon in possession of a firearm. The district court conducted

a Rule 11 colloquy and in accepting his plea found that he

was "fully competent and capable of entering an informed

plea [and] that his plea of guilty is a knowing and voluntary

plea." J.A. 235. The court imposed a sentence of 188 months

imprisonment. Bowles now seeks to appeal the forcible medication order and have his conviction vacated. 

II.

A plea of guilty "represents a break in the chain of events

which has preceded it in the criminal process." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). Accordingly, we have held

that "[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to entry

of the plea." United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 644 (4th

Cir. 2004). Indeed, relying on these principles, we recently

held in United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279 (4th

Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted),

that a "defendant who has pled guilty has no nonjurisdictional ground upon which to attack that judgment

except the inadequacy of the plea, or the government’s power

to bring any indictment at all." 

Here, Bowles seeks to reopen his judgment of conviction

upon his guilty plea on a nonjurisdictional issue – the forcible

medication order. However, as the foregoing authorities make

clear, such a course of action is not permitted. We note that

Bowles could have preserved this issue through an interlocutory appeal. See e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176

(2003) (finding review of the district court’s forcible medication order is proper as an interlocutory appeal under the "collateral order" doctrine because it "(1) conclusively

determine[s] the disputed question, (2) resolve[s] an important

issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and

(3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(emphasis added); see also United States v. Bush, 585 F.3d

UNITED STATES v. BOWLES 3
806, 812 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d

227, 235 (4th Cir. 2005). Further, Bowles could have

attempted to negotiate a conditional plea, see Fed. R. Crim.

Proc. 11(a)(2), or he could have proceeded to trial, which

would also have preserved this issue for our review. Because

Bowles did not take these necessary steps, he has waived his

right to appeal the forcible medication order.* Accordingly,

we dismiss his appeal.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we find Bowles’ argument

waived and dismiss the appeal.

DISMISSED

*We ordered supplemental briefing on the waiver issue. In his supplemental brief and at oral argument, Bowles argued for the first time that his

guilty plea was not voluntary or competent. We find this argument is

waived. See United States v. Jones, 308 F.3d 425, 427 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002)

(holding that an argument not raised in the opening brief is waived). In

any event, we find these arguments are not supported by the record. 

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