[Cite as State v. Hansard, 2018-Ohio-5181.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LAKE COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 CASE NO. 2017-L-153

 - vs - : 

 

NICHOLAS HANSARD, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2017 CR 

000667. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Charles Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Karen Sheppert, Assistant Prosecutor, 

Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 

44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

Matthew Bangerter, P.O. Box 148, Mentor, OH 44061 (For Defendant-Appellant). 

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Nicholas Hansard, appeals from the October 19, 2017 

judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him for aggravated 

robbery with a firearm specification and telecommunications fraud following a bench 

trial. On appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29(A) 

motion for acquittal. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 
 2

{¶2} Nick Simons and Chris Sanders placed an ad to sell an X-Box video game 

console on a website called OfferUp. On January 6, 2017, a potential buyer with an 

account name of “Brandon Jacobs” made contact with the men expressing interest in 

the item. The buyer indicated he would meet them and would be driving a black car. 

Simons and Sanders met the buyer by the front door of Simons’ apartment building after 

dark. 

{¶3} The buyer was a light-skinned African American man, possibly bald, 

wearing black boots, blue pants, a gray hooded sweatshirt, a dark-colored jacket with a 

subtle camouflage design, and had a black snow mask covering his face below his 

eyes. Simons and Sanders estimated the buyer’s height at six feet five inches, the 

same height as Simons, and weighing between 275 and 300 pounds. Surveillance 

video taken from the apartment complex’s security cameras confirm the descriptions of 

the buyer and demonstrate he never removed the mask. The buyer asked to use a 

phone. Sanders went upstairs to retrieve one for him. 

{¶4} After Sanders left, the buyer pulled a gun on Simons. Simons described 

the firearm as “huge,” approximately a foot long and black in color. The buyer pointed 

the gun at Simons’ head and threatened to shoot him if he moved. Simons complied 

with the buyer’s demand. The male then grabbed the X-Box and ran out of the building. 

Surveillance video shows a male fleeing the building at 7:53 p.m., carrying an X-Box in 

one hand and holding an apparent gun in the other hand. Simons reported that the 

male left in a black Chevy Cruze. Simons never saw the male again. 

{¶5} On June 16, 2017, appellant was indicted by the Lake County Grand Jury 

on one count of aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 
 3

2911.01(A)(1), with a firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145, and one count of 

telecommunications fraud, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2913.05. 

Appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment and waived his right to a jury trial.1 

{¶6} A bench trial was held on August 29, 2017. To support the victim’s 

testimony, the state provided both physical and technological evidence connecting 

appellant to the offenses described. 

{¶7} The trial court subsequently found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery 

with a firearm specification and telecommunications fraud. On October 19, 2017, the 

court sentenced appellant to a total prison term of eight years. Appellant filed a timely 

appeal and raises the following assignment of error: 

{¶8} “The trial court erred to the prejudice of the Defendant-Appellant in 

denying his Motion for Acquittal made pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A).” 

{¶9} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in 

denying his Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal which was made at the conclusion of the 

state’s case. Appellant contends the state failed to present sufficient evidence to 

sustain his convictions for aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and 

telecommunications fraud. 

{¶10} In State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261 (1978), the Supreme Court of 

Ohio established the test for determining whether a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal is 

properly denied. The Court stated that “[p]ursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not 

order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can 

reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been 

 

1. Appellant also pleaded no contest to, and was convicted of, one count of attempted robbery, a felony of 

the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(3), in Case No. 17 CR 227. 
 4

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at syllabus. “Thus, when an appellant makes a 

Crim.R. 29 motion, he or she is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence introduced 

by the state.” State v. Patrick, 11th Dist. Trumbull Nos. 2003-T-0166 and 2003-T-0167, 

2004-Ohio-6688, ¶18. 

{¶11} As this court stated in State v. Schlee, 11th Dist. Lake No. 93-L-082, 1994 

WL 738452, *4-5 (Dec. 23, 1994):

{¶12} “‘Sufficiency’ challenges whether the prosecution has presented evidence 

on each element of the offense to allow the matter to go to the [trier of fact], while 

‘manifest weight’ contests the believability of the evidence presented.

{¶13} “‘“The test (for sufficiency of the evidence) is whether after viewing the 

probative evidence and the inference[s] drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The claim of insufficient evidence invokes an 

inquiry about due process. It raises a question of law, the resolution of which does not 

allow the court to weigh the evidence.”’

{¶14} “In other words, the standard to be applied on a question concerning 

sufficiency is: when viewing the evidence ‘in a light most favorable to the prosecution,’ 

‘(a) reviewing court (should) not reverse a [guilty] verdict where there is substantial 

evidence upon which the [trier of fact] could reasonably conclude that all of the 

elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” * * *” 

(Emphasis sic.) (Citations omitted.)

{¶15} “[A] reviewing court must look to the evidence presented * * * to assess 

whether the state offered evidence on each statutory element of the offense, so that a 
 5

rational trier of fact may infer that the offense was committed beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” State v. March, 11th Dist. Lake No. 98-L-065, 1999 WL 535675, *3 (July 16, 

1999). The evidence is to be viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution when 

conducting this inquiry. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, paragraph two of the 

syllabus (1991), superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds as 

stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Further, the verdict will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless the reviewing court finds that reasonable minds could not 

have arrived at the conclusion reached by the trier of fact. State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio 

St.3d 421, 430 (1997).

{¶16} “[C]ircumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the 

same probative value.” State v. Fasline, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0004, 2015-

Ohio-715, ¶39, citing State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 447 (1997), citing Jenks, supra, 

paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶17} Appellant takes issue with the guilty finding for aggravated robbery, a 

felony of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), with a firearm specification 

pursuant to R.C. 2941.145. 

{¶18} R.C. 2911.01, “Aggravated robbery,” states: 

{¶19} “(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in 

section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or 

offense, shall do any of the following:

{¶20} “(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the 

offender’s control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the offender 

possesses it, or use it[.]”
 6

{¶21} A “‘Deadly weapon’ means any instrument, device, or thing capable of 

inflicting death, and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, 

carried, or used as a weapon.” R.C. 2923.11(A).

{¶22} R.C. 2941.145 provides the framework for convicting an individual of a 

firearm specification, stating in part:

{¶23} “(A) Imposition of a three-year mandatory prison term upon an offender 

under division (B)(1)(a)(ii) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code is precluded unless 

the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense specifies that 

the offender had a firearm on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s 

control while committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, 

indicated that the offender possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate the offense.”

{¶24} R.C. 2923.11(B) states:

{¶25} “(1) ‘Firearm’ means any deadly weapon capable of expelling or propelling 

one or more projectiles by the action of an explosive or combustible propellant. 

‘Firearm’ includes an unloaded firearm, and any firearm that is inoperable but that can 

readily be rendered operable.

{¶26} “(2) When determining whether a firearm is capable of expelling or 

propelling one or more projectiles by the action of an explosive or combustible 

propellant, the trier of fact may rely upon circumstantial evidence, including, but not 

limited to, the representations and actions of the individual exercising control over the 

firearm.”

{¶27} Testimony from witnesses who had the opportunity to observe the weapon 

and surrounding circumstances can be used to establish operability. State v. Burkett, 
 7

11th Dist. Portage No. 2009-P-0069, 2010-Ohio-6250, ¶39, quoting State v. Cook, 10th 

Dist. Franklin Nos. 09AP-316 and 09AP-317, 2010-Ohio-2726, ¶60. It is not necessary 

for the state to admit into evidence the firearm used during the offense. State v. Bryant, 

11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2015-T-0100, 2016-Ohio-4928, ¶35, quoting State v. Johns, 

11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0036, 2015-Ohio-2455, ¶31. 

{¶28} Appellant also takes issue with the guilty finding for telecommunications 

fraud, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 2913.05.

{¶29} R.C. 2913.05(A) states: “No person, having devised a scheme to defraud, 

shall knowingly disseminate, transmit, or cause to be disseminated or transmitted by 

means of a wire, radio, satellite, telecommunication, telecommunications device, or 

telecommunications service any writing, data, sign, signal, picture, sound, or image with 

purpose to execute or otherwise further the scheme to defraud.”

{¶30} In this case, Simons, the robbery victim, testified in clear detail about what 

had transpired. Simons used OfferUp, an app on a mobile device that is used to buy 

and sell items via the internet, to sell an X-Box for Sanders, who was his mother’s 

boyfriend at the time. Simons corresponded with an interested buyer who identified 

himself as “Brandon Jacobs” using the app. The screenshots of their correspondence, 

obtained from Simons’ cell phone, confirm his testimony, i.e., that the buyer initiated the 

contact and the terms of sale were negotiated. 

{¶31} The buyer agreed to meet on January 6, 2017 at Simons’ apartment 

complex to purchase the X-Box. Simons and Sanders described the buyer in detail 

which was confirmed via video surveillance. Simons testified that when Sanders 

returned to the apartment to retrieve a cell phone for the buyer, the buyer pulled a long, 
 8

black handgun out of his waistband and pointed it directly at Simons, about an inch from 

his forehead. The buyer threatened Simons not to move or he would shoot him. The 

male grabbed the X-Box from Simons and fled the scene holding both the X-Box and 

the gun. 

{¶32} Detective Steve Ondercin testified regarding articles of clothing later found 

in appellant’s vehicle subsequent to an unrelated arrest that matched items seen on the 

robber during the January 6, 2017 incident. Detective Ondercin explained that a gray 

hooded sweatshirt was found in appellant’s vehicle when he was arrested as well as a 

dark-colored jacket with a subtle camouflage design. 

{¶33} Appellant’s cell phone also revealed key evidence. Detective Ondercin 

indicated he searched an older iPhone found within appellant’s possession when he 

was arrested which contained the OfferUp app. Detective Ondercin informed the court 

that OfferUp had been downloaded at some point on some device associated with that 

iTunes account. Appellant’s phone also contained multiple photos of himself. In one 

photo, appellant was seen posing near a similar jacket to the one worn by the robber. 

{¶34} OfferUp records reveal four accounts associated with “Brandon Jacobs,” 

the person that Simons thought he was meeting, all created with the same mobile 

device. Detective Ondercin testified that OfferUp’s records only indicate the IP address 

associated with an account when it was created, not where the account was used 

subsequently. An email address listed on appellant’s business card, which was inside 

his wallet when he was arrested, is strikingly similar to the email address provided for 

one of these accounts, daveguru480@gmail.com and daveguru570@gmail.com. Also, 

three of the four OfferUp accounts were associated with the same AT&T U-Verse IP 
 9

address. This address was registered to Lori Harris living on Sperry Road in 

Chesterland, Ohio. Appellant offered this Sperry Road address as his residence and 

his vehicle and driver’s license are also associated with that address. 

{¶35} The OfferUp records show a consistent pattern of communication among 

the accounts in which the buyer/account owner inquires about the availability of higherend items, including electronics. In each message, including the message in the instant 

case, the prospective buyer specifically asks the seller if the item is available “for sell,” 

instead of the grammatically correct phrase, “for sale.” Screenshots of the messages 

on Simons’ cell phone confirm this language. 

{¶36} The state also presented Verizon records for the phone number belonging 

to appellant. This number was displayed on appellant’s business card and was 

provided by appellant himself during his interview. Verizon records clearly placed 

appellant’s phone number in the vicinity where the robbery at issue occurred. 

{¶37} As addressed, the totality of circumstances show that appellant had an 

operable firearm under his control and brandished said firearm as he committed the 

robbery offense. As a whole, the evidence sufficiently proves that the state 

demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the firearm used in the robbery was 

operable or could have been operable at the moment of the offense. In addition, 

Simons’ testimony reveals the firearm was intended to be used as a deadly weapon. 

{¶38} Pursuant to Schlee, supra, there is sufficient evidence upon which the trier 

of fact could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the elements of 

aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and telecommunications fraud were 

proven. Thus, the trial court did not err in overruling appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion.
 10

{¶39} For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s sole assignment of error is not welltaken. The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., 

concur.