Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed September 25, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00725-CR

JASON MICHAEL PLACIDE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 180th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1353416

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Jason Michael Placide appeals his conviction for possession of 

cocaine. In two issues, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress because (1) the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him; and 

(2) his statement was made as a result of custodial interrogation and was 

inadmissible under article 38.22, section 3 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure. We affirm.
2

BACKGROUND

Appellant was indicted for possession of between one and four grams of 

cocaine. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.115(c). Appellant filed a pretrial 

motion to suppress in which he argued that a Houston Police officer “broke into”

his vehicle and searched the vehicle without consent. Appellant argued that “[a]ny 

controlled substances found in the vehicle” should be suppressed because the 

search was without a warrant and without probable cause. Appellant also sought 

suppression of “[a]ny other matters that the Court finds should be suppressed upon 

hearing of this motion.” Appellant argued that the evidence should be suppressed 

because (1) the narcotics were not in plain view in the vehicle; and (2) the vehicle 

search was not incident to a lawful arrest.

At the hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress Officer Joseph Little of the 

Houston Police Department testified that at approximately 4:00 a.m. on July 6, 

2012, he was patrolling the north side of Houston in an area known for narcotics 

and crime. He received a dispatch call for a disturbance at an apartment complex 

located at 8034 Antoine. The 911 caller reported three or four African-American 

males using narcotics and loading guns while standing outside a white truck near a 

black Dodge Magnum. When Little arrived at the apartment complex he observed 

three African-American males standing outside of a white pickup truck near a 

black Dodge Magnum. He identified appellant as one of the men he saw that night. 

Because Little had received a report that the men were loading weapons, he 

detained all three men, handcuffed them, and placed them in separate patrol cars. 

In conducting his investigation, Little shined a flashlight into the black 

Dodge Magnum, and observed narcotics on the car’s console. Little saw a bag of 

marijuana and a bag of clear pills with no label on them. Little asked appellant if 

the black Dodge Magnum was his car, and appellant “admitted that that was his car 
3

and he had been driving it and he lives at the registered address.” Appellant was 

arrested after the marijuana and pills were discovered in the vehicle. After 

appellant was arrested, officers found crack cocaine in the vehicle. The pills also 

tested positive for cocaine.

On cross-examination, Little testified that he did not know the identity of the 

911 caller. The officers searched all three men, but did not find weapons.

Officer Matthew was also on the scene and testified to the same events.1

Matthew Little testified that the three men were detained because the call reported 

they were loading weapons. The men were handcuffed for officer safety and placed 

in the patrol cars so they could not flee the scene until the investigation was 

complete.

Appellant testified that the car belonged to his mother and he had no 

knowledge of drugs in the car. On cross-examination, appellant admitted more than 

one prior conviction for possession of controlled substances but could not 

remember an exact number of prior convictions. Appellant believed he was under 

arrest at the time he was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car.

During his closing statement, appellant’s counsel argued that (1) appellant’s 

statement that he owned the car should be excluded because he was under arrest 

and officers did not read his Miranda rights;2and (2) the evidence should be 

excluded because the search was warrantless and not a proper inventory search 

incident to arrest. The State argued that the officers had reasonable suspicion of a 

threat to their safety as a result of the potential weapons reported in the police 

dispatch. Officers detained appellant and the other individuals for their safety 

 

1 We refer to Joseph Little as “Little” throughout this opinion and refer to Matthew Little 

as “Matthew Little.”

2

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
4

while they conducted an investigation. The investigation revealed marijuana in 

plain view on the console of the black Dodge Magnum. The State further argued 

that appellant’s argument about his statement fell outside the scope of the hearing.

The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law with the 

following preface:

During the aforementioned hearing, in addition to urging the

suppression of physical evidence, the Defendant also urged 

suppression of certain oral statements, although such statements were 

NOT mentioned in the MOTION TO SUPPRESS. At the conclusion 

of said hearing, this Court denied the aforementioned MOTION TO

SUPPRESS. This Court makes the following FINDINGS OF FACT 

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW with regard to BOTH the physical 

evidence seized and the oral statements made by the Defendant, while 

not conceding that the consideration of such statements was properly 

before the Court based on the aforementioned MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS:

Findings of Fact

1. The Defendant, Jason Michael Placide, was charged by indictment 

in the above styled and numbered cause with the felony offense of 

Possession of a Controlled Substance.

2. Officers Joseph Little and Matthew Little of the Houston Police 

Department are credible and reliable witnesses who testified truthfully 

at the hearing regarding Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Evidence.

3. On July 6, 2013, at approximately 4:00 a.m. a report was made to 

the Houston Police Department that three to four black males were 

standing in the area of a white truck and a black Dodge Magnum at 

8034 Antoine, Houston, Harris County, Texas, in possession of

narcotics and weapons.

4. On July 6, 2013, shortly after 4:00a.m., Officers Joseph Little and 

Matthew Little responded to the reported disturbance at 8034 Antoine, 

Houston, Harris County, Texas, involving three to four black males 

allegedly in possession of narcotics and weapons in the area of a white

truck and a black Dodge Magnum.

5. 8034 Antoine, Houston, Harris County, Texas, is in a high crime 
5

area known for narcotics, and the officers arrived on scene at 

approximately 4:00 a.m., in the hours of darkness.

6. When the officers arrived at 8034 Antoine, Houston, Harris County, 

Texas, they observed three black males in the area of a white truck, 

and a black Dodge Magnum within three parking spaces of the white 

truck, confirming several pieces of information from the report.

7. The officers briefly detained each of the three men, including the 

Defendant, Jason Placide, in order to safely investigate and ensure the 

continued presence of the suspects at the scene.

8. At the time the Defendant was detained, the scene of the 

investigation was not yet secure, and the officers could not be certain 

whether there were unsecured weapons in the area.

9. There was no significant show of force during the investigative 

detention.

10. As part of the detention, the Defendant was frisked for weapons, 

handcuffed, and placed in the back of a patrol car.

11. While conducting their brief investigation with the help of a third 

HPD officer, Officers Joseph Little and Matthew Little looked into the 

window of the black Dodge Magnum vehicle (with the aid of a 360 

lumen flashlight) from outside the vehicle, and observed what they 

both believed to be marijuana, based on their training and experience.

12. The Defendant admitted to officers that the black Dodge Magnum 

was the vehicle he had been driving, and that he lived at the same 

address where the vehicle was registered.

13. The Defendant was arrested after the discovery and recovery of 

the marijuana, and after he was linked to the black Dodge Magnum

through his statements.

Conclusions of Law

1. The officer’s testimony established specific, articulable facts (the 

confirmed details of the call, the nature of the high crime area, time of 

night, and presence of the suspects in suspicious circumstances) and 

reasonable inferences substantial enough to support reasonable 

suspicion that the suspects had been engaged in criminal activity.

2. The investigative detention of the Defendant was lawful, in order to 

ensure officer safety, maintain the status quo, and ensure the 

continued presence of the Defendant during the course of a brief 
6

investigation, taking into consideration the nature of the area, time of 

night, and verified details of the call. State v. Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 

281,291 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Chambers v. State, 397 S.W.3d 777 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013).

3. The marijuana in the black Dodge Magnum was in plain view and 

immediately recognizable to the officers as contraband, and the 

officers involved viewed the marijuana from a location where they 

were legitimately and lawfully present.

4. The officers involved had probable cause to search the black Dodge 

Magnum, and the seizure of the narcotics without a warrant was 

lawful under the automobile exception.

5. Probable cause to arrest the Defendant did not exist prior to his 

statements linking him to the black Dodge Magnum.

6. The officers used only a minimal amount of force required to 

investigate, maintain the status quo, and ensure officer safety.

7. The statements of the Defendant in regards to his connection to the 

black Dodge Magnum were made during an investigative detention 

that had not evolved into custodial interrogation, and therefore are 

admissible pursuant to Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of 

discretion. Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Thomas 

v. State, 297 S.W.3d 458, 459 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d). 

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. 

Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The trial court is 

the exclusive factfinder and judge of the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Ross, 

32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 576 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). We afford almost total 

deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts supported by the 

record, especially when the trial court’s findings are based on an evaluation of 

credibility and demeanor. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim.
7

App. 1997). We afford the same amount of deference to the trial court’s ruling on 

mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of these questions turns on an 

evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We review questions not turning on 

credibility and demeanor de novo. Id. If the trial court’s decision is correct under 

any theory of law applicable to the case, the decision will be sustained. Estrada v. 

State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

PRESERVATION OF ERROR

In his first issue appellant argues his statement was the fruit of a Fourth 

Amendment violation because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to 

detain him. The State argues appellant failed to preserve error with regard to the 

denial of his motion to suppress his statement because appellant’s written motion 

to suppress only sought to suppress the physical evidence recovered from the car.

A motion to suppress is a specialized objection to the admissibility of 

evidence and must be timely and sufficiently specific to inform the trial court of 

the complaint. Johnson v. State, 171 S.W.3d 643, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). To preserve error for appellate review, an appellant must 

“let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and . .

. do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court 

is in a proper position to do something about it.” Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 

907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 

Appellant’s written motion specifically sought to suppress the physical 

evidence recovered from the car, and vaguely sought suppression of “[a]ny other 

matters that the Court finds should be suppressed upon hearing of this motion.” 

During the oral hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress, appellant argued that his 

statement should be suppressed because he was in custody at the time he made it 

and officers did not inform him of his Miranda rights. We assume for purposes of 
8

the analysis below that appellant’s argument at the hearing regarding suppression 

of his statement sufficed to preserved error. 

Appellant also argues on appeal that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion 

to detain him and that his statement was an impermissible fruit of that Fourth 

Amendment violation. Appellant did not bring such a contention to the attention of 

the trial court either in his written motion to suppress or during the oral hearing; he 

did not ask the trial court to decide the issue of reasonable suspicion and issue a 

ruling. His motion failed to preserve his contention on appeal because it did not 

alert the trial court that he wished the issue to be decided. See Tex. R. App. P. 

33.1(a)(1) (requiring, in order to preserve error, sufficient specificity to make trial 

court aware of complaint and ruling by court on complaint); Broxton v. State, 909 

S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that issue on appeal must 

comport with complaint made at trial). 

On appeal, appellant argues the officers failed to corroborate the facts of the 

dispatch that indicated the occurrence of criminal activity. Appellant did not make 

this argument to the trial court; instead, he argued that the search of the vehicle 

was improper because (1) the officers could not have seen the contraband in plain 

view, and (2) the search was not conducted as a proper inventory search after 

arrest. We conclude that appellant did not preserve this contention for appeal 

because neither his written motion nor his arguments at the hearing alerted the trial 

court to a contention that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion justifying an 

investigation. Additionally, appellant did not secure a ruling on such a complaint. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005) (concluding that when appellant failed to object to admission of 

statement at motion-to-suppress hearing on ground for suppression raised on 

appeal, but instead, argued a different basis for suppression, issue was not 
9

preserved); Mbugua v. State, 312 S.W.3d 657, 666–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (holding that appellant did not preserve his complaint 

regarding admissibility of his custodial statement because complaint on appeal did 

not comport with grounds argued in motion to suppress). We overrule appellant’s 

first issue.

CUSTODY

In his second issue, appellant argues his statement concerning ownership of 

the car was the product of a custodial interrogation. Appellant argues the statement 

was inadmissible because he did not receive warnings under Miranda. 

The Fourth Amendment and article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure allow admission of noncustodial statements. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 

U.S. at 444; Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Thus, 

to determine whether appellant’s statement about ownership of the car was

admissible, we must first determine the point at which officers placed appellant in 

custody.

A police officer may stop and briefly detain a person reasonably suspected 

of criminal activity in the absence of probable cause to arrest the person. Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). The officer may use such force as is reasonably 

necessary to effect the goal of the stop: investigation, maintenance of the status 

quo, or officer safety. Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App.), 

cert. denied, 522 U.S. 894 (1997). There is no bright-line test providing that mere 

handcuffing is always the equivalent of an arrest. Id. at 118. Instead, when 

evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, “common sense and 

ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” Id. 

A police officer’s interaction with a citizen can be classified as an encounter, 
10

detention, or arrest. See State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). “A person is arrested when he has been actually placed under restraint 

or taken into custody by an officer or person executing a warrant of arrest, or by an 

officer or person arresting without a warrant.” Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. art. 15.22; 

Mount v. State, 217 S.W.3d 716, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no 

pet.). But this restraint-of-liberty standard is not adequate when distinguishing 

between an arrest and a detention because it is a characteristic common to both. 

Mount, 217 S.W.3d at 724. Rather, the distinction is a matter of degree depending 

on the length of the detention, the amount of force employed, and whether the 

officer actually conducted an investigation. Id.; Woods v. State, 970 S.W.2d 770, 

775 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d). 

A court must determine reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable 

officer at the scene, making allowances for the fact that officers must often make 

quick decisions under tense, uncertain, and rapidly changing circumstances. 

Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 118. Relevant factors in the reasonableness inquiry are the 

nature of the crime under investigation, the degree of suspicion, the location of the 

stop, the time of day, the reaction of the suspect, and whether the officer actually 

conducted an investigation after seizing the suspect. Mount, 217 S.W.3d at 725; 

Chambers v. State, 397 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, 

pet. ref’d).

The trial court found that “[t]he investigative detention of the Defendant was 

lawful, in order to ensure officer safety, maintain the status quo, and ensure the 

continued presence of the Defendant during the course of a brief investigation, 

taking into consideration the nature of the area, time of night, and verified details 

of the call.”

During the suppression hearing, Little testified that he received a dispatch 
11

describing three or four African-American males using drugs and loading weapons 

near a white pickup truck and a black Dodge Magnum at 8034 Antoine. When the 

officers arrived at 8034 Antoine, they observed three African-American males 

standing around a white pickup truck with a black Dodge Magnum parked nearby. 

For officer safety the officers patted down the three men, handcuffed them, and 

placed them in separate patrol cars. Little testified that although they found no 

weapons during the pat-down search the handcuffs were necessary for the officers’ 

safety, and detention in the patrol cars was necessary to prevent the suspects from 

fleeing. The officers then shined a flashlight into the white pickup truck and the 

black Dodge Magnum. In response to Little’s question, appellant admitted the 

Dodge Magnum was his vehicle. 

Although Little detained appellant in the patrol car with handcuffs, the 

amount of force was reasonable under the circumstances. The incident took place 

at 4:00 a.m. in a parking lot in a high-crime area where Little had previously 

responded to narcotics and weapons calls. Little conducted a brief investigation in 

which he discovered narcotics in a car appellant admitted to be his. The trial 

court’s finding that Little did not use more force than reasonably necessary to 

protect himself and those around him during his brief investigation is supported by 

the evidence at the hearing. See Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2002) (handcuffing and escorting appellant to patrol car did not transform 

investigative detention into arrest where officer had reasonable concern for safety 

because he was investigating crime involving a weapon). 

Appellant argues the officers deprived him of his freedom to a degree 

comparable to a formal arrest. In support of his argument, appellant cites Ramirez 

v. State, 105 S.W.3d 730, 740 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.), and Alford v.

State, 22 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d). Ramirez and 
12

Alford are distinguishable.

In Ramirez, an officer who arrived at Ramirez’s home in response to a 

neighbor’s complaint noticed marijuana paraphernalia, marijuana residue, and the 

odor of marijuana as Ramirez stepped out of the garage and closed the door behind 

him. 105 S.W.3d at 735. A second individual, Reynosa, exited the garage and left 

the door partially open. Id. at 736. The officer called for back-up because he 

recognized Reynosa as a suspect in a shooting and became concerned that Reynosa 

or Ramirez may have had weapons. Id. Reynosa was subjected to a pat down, 

which revealed a knife and a plastic bag containing marijuana. Id. Reynosa was 

arrested and moved away from the garage. Id. Ramirez was also subjected to a pat 

down; while conducting the pat down, the officer told Ramirez he was being 

detained and placed him in handcuffs. Id. The officer informed Ramirez that he 

could see drug paraphernalia and drug residue in the garage and asked, “Is there 

anything else I’m going to find in there that’s illegal, any more marijuana?” Id.

Ramirez replied, “Well, I guess there’s some pot in the red cooler.” Id.

The Austin Court of Appeals determined that Ramirez was in custody at the 

time the officer asked whether he was going to find anything else in the garage 

because a reasonable person in Ramirez’s position would likely believe his 

freedom of movement had been restrained to the degree associated with an arrest. 

Id. at 740. The court determined that by handcuffing Ramirez, telling him he was 

being detained, and informing him that they had seen illegal items in the garage, a 

reasonable person would have thought he was under arrest. Id.

The facts in Ramirez are distinguishable because Ramirez was near his 

home; had been told he was being detained; and knew the officers had seen illegal 

contraband in his garage. In contrast, the officers in this case had a report that there 

were weapons being loaded and the men were in a parking lot in a high crime area 
13

after dark. In Ramirez, unlike this case, the officers did not conduct an 

investigation after detaining Ramirez.

In Alford, the appellant was seen driving on an interstate highway passing 

cars and weaving in and out of lanes. Id. at 671. A police officer activated his siren 

after following Alford’s truck for a distance; Alford responded by turning off the 

interstate highway and into the back of a mobile home park. Id. When Alford did 

not heed the officer’s request to get out of the truck, the officer pulled Alford out 

of the truck; placed him on the ground; handcuffed him; and called for back-up. Id.

When back-up arrived six or seven minutes later, Alford was still in handcuffs and 

the arriving officer asked whether he had been drinking. Id. at 672. Alford 

admitted drinking six beers. Id.

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Alford was in custody at the time 

he admitted to drinking six beers. The court emphasized that by removing Alford 

from the vehicle, placing him on the ground, handcuffing him, and holding him for 

back-up officers, the circumstances were elevated beyond those of an ordinary 

traffic stop. Id. at 673.

Alford is distinguishable because Alford was physically removed from his 

truck, placed on the ground, and handcuffed following a traffic stop. Id. at 671. 

Alford then remained handcuffed for six or seven minutes until another officer 

arrived on the scene who questioned him about his alcohol consumption. Id. at 

671–72. In Alford, as in Ramirez, no investigation took place, and Alford was 

“subjected to treatment that resulted in his being in custody for practical purposes.” 

Id. at 673.

The facts here are closer to Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d at 767. Balentine 

was placed in handcuffs and escorted to a patrol car while being questioned. 

Before placing Balentine in the patrol car, an officer frisked him and did not find 
14

any weapons. Id. Despite finding no weapons, the officer handcuffed Balentine, 

placed him in a patrol car, and drove Balentine to a friend’s home. Id. Before being 

released Balentine was patted down a second time and handcuffed for officer 

safety despite the fact that the officer did not find any weapons. Id. The Court of 

Criminal Appeals concluded that Balentine’s detention was not an arrest based on 

the circumstances surrounding the investigation. Id. at 771. The court determined 

that the detention was temporary and that the handcuffs and placement in the patrol 

car did not elevate the temporary detention to an arrest because the officer 

encountered Balentine in an area where gunfire had been reported; Balentine 

exhibited suspicious behavior; and the restraint was necessary for officer safety 

while investigating Balentine’s possible involvement in gunfire. Id. at 771. 

We conclude that Little’s investigative detention of appellant was reasonable 

and justified under the circumstances and did not constitute an unlawful arrest. The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress appellant’s 

oral statement. We overrule appellant’s second issue.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ William J. Boyce

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Donovan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).