COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Bumgardner 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

TOMMY DEWEY MARTIN, S/K/A 

 TOMMY DEWEY MARTIN, JR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1676-97-3 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 MAY 12, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE 

Charles M. Stone, Judge 

 Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Director 

Capital/Appellate Services (Public Defender 

Commission, on briefs), for appellant. 

 Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; 

John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Tommy Dewey Martin, Jr. (defendant) appeals his convictions 

for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-308.2, possession of cocaine with intent to 

distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248, and possession of a 

firearm while in possession of cocaine, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-308.4. He contends on appeal that the police lacked 

probable cause because it was based solely on information 

provided by an unreliable informant. His arrest, therefore, 

would have violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and the subsequent search of his vehicle was 

unlawful. Because we find the informant was reliable, we affirm. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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 The facts are not in dispute. On July 24, 1996 at 

approximately 5:00 p.m., an unidentified informant called the 

City of Martinsville Police Department and informed them 

defendant would shortly deliver cocaine to the Patrick Henry 

Mall. The informant told police that defendant would drive a 

blue Honda Accord with tinted windows and chrome wheels bearing 

license plate number ACL-1864. While the police would not reveal 

the informant's identity, several officers testified the 

informant had been reliable in the past and his information had 

led to six search warrants, twelve arrests and convictions, and 

the capture of two fugitives. The informant had never provided 

false information. 

 The Martinsville police staked out the mall and at 

approximately 6:00 p.m., defendant arrived. He was driving a car 

matching the description given including the license plate 

number. He pulled up to a waiting pedestrian who entered the 

car, and then drove to an unoccupied part of the mall's parking 

lot. After sitting for several minutes, the passenger exited the 

car and defendant began to drive away. It was at that moment 

police closed in and stopped defendant. The passenger escaped on 

foot. Police arrested defendant and searched his car, finding a 

.22 caliber handgun, a shotgun and 13 grams of cocaine. 

 "The warrantless search of an automobile, 'where there are 

both probable cause to believe the car contains evidence of crime 

and exigent circumstances,' is a well established exception to 
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the warrant requirement." Jackson v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 

347, 355, 470 S.E.2d 138, 143 (1996) (quoting McCary v. 

Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 227, 321 S.E.2d 637, 641 (1984)). 

Defendant concedes that the ambulatory nature of the vehicle and 

the short time frame involved constitute exigent circumstances. 

Therefore, the only issue presented is whether the informant's 

tip rose to the level of probable cause. 

 "[T]he test for constitutional validity [of a warrantless 

arrest] is whether at the moment of arrest the arresting officer 

had knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a 

reasonable man in believing that an offense has been committed." 

Bryson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 85, 86-87, 175 S.E.2d 248, 250 

(1970). The existence of probable cause is determined by 

examining a "totality of the circumstances." Miles v. 

Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 64, 68, 408 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1991). 

When the information comes from an informant, these circumstances 

include the "veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge" of 

the tipster. See Polston v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 738, 744, 

485 S.E.2d 632, 635 (1997) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 

213, 230 (1983)). Yet none of these factors are dispositive. A 

deficiency in one may be compensated by an abundance in another. 

See id.; Beckner v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 533, 535, 425 

S.E.2d 530, 531 (1993). 

 The facts proven at trial clearly support probable cause. 

The unidentified, but not anonymous, informant gave detailed 
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information regarding the time, place and identity of a drug 

transaction. The informant had been used extensively and with 

great success in the past. While the informant's basis of 

knowledge was not shown, police officers testified he was both 

reliable and accurate. Such testimony was sufficient to support 

the trial court's conclusion that the informant was reliable. 

See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1959) (holding 

hearsay statements presented through police officers' testimony 

were cognizable for probable cause analysis purposes). 

 Because the information gleaned from the unidentified 

informant was sufficient to provide probable cause to arrest and 

search defendant, the evidence seized pursuant to the search was 

properly admitted against him at trial. Accordingly, his 

convictions are affirmed. 

 Affirmed.