### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 574 -CV

William L. Lind ig and P eggy L. Lind ig , Appellan ts
v. City of John son City, David Dockery, Indivi dual ly and in Hi s Capacity as City Manager/City Adm inis trat or of the City of John son City, P ete r Mc Kinney, Ind ividu ally and in Hi s Capacity as Buil din g Of fi cial of the City of Joh nson City, Rho nda St e ll, in He r Ca pac it y a s M e m be r of Bo ar d of A dj ust m e ntof t he City of John son City, Jam es Steve nson , in Hi s Capacity as Me m ber of Board of Adjustm ent of the City of Joh nson City, Ralph Moss, in His Capacity as Mem ber of Board of Adjustm ent of the City of Joh nson City, and Alice Duncan, in Her Capacity as Me m ber of Board of Adjustm ent of the City of Joh nson City, Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B LANCO COUNTY , 424TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. CV0653 0 , HO NORAB LE DANIEL H. M ILLS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe l l e e C i t

y of John so n Ci ty

su e d a pp e lla nts Willi am L . L ind igand

Pe g g y L . L ind ig
se e kin g a te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n a

nd c ivi l pe na lti e s a ft e r t

he L ind ig s c on tin

ue d c on str

uc tio n o n th e ir Bl an co C o un ty

p ro p erty wi th o u to b t ai n i n g a b u i l d i n g p e r m i t fr o mth e C i ty . T h e Lin d i gs counter claimed a g ainst the City , the Board of Adjustment, and var ious Cit y officia ls challeng ing the
va lid ity of the bu ild ing -p e rm it- fe e or din anc e and se e kin g dama g e s a g a ins t t he Ci ty and the City of fi c ia ls f or an unc on sti tut ion a l t a

k i n g a n d c ivi l c on sp ir a c y . T he dis tr ic t c ourt dis mis se d th e L ind ig s’
c la ims a g a ins t the City and the ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants fo r l a c k o f s ub je c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n. We w ill
a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r o f d ism iss a l in pa rt and re ve rs e and

re mand in p art
.2 F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND I n Dec ember

2007, the L indigs applied for a permit in or der to c onduct “r esidential remode ling” construction work on their residence
. Acc ording to Wil liam L indig, he filled out the application at City

Hall and wa s told by

the City secr etar y that he could be g in the projec t. The following month, Peter McKinney , the City ’s Building Offic ial, acte d on the L indigs’ app l ication and set the building permit fee at $ 1 , 0 0 0 , b as ed on his deter mination that the project should be tr e a te d a s “ ne w c on str

uc tio n” in a c c or da

nc e wi th s e c tio n 0 6- 01 5 o f t he City ’s Cod e of

Or din anc e s. The L indigs re fused to pay the fe e, and the City

issued a stop-wor

k order
. City ’s Di str ic t Co ur t Su it The City then filed suit in Blanc o Coun t y d i s t ri ct cour t seekinga tempora

ry restra ining or der a

nd temporar

y and per manent i n ju n c ti v e r e li e f

a g a inst further c onstruction, alleg ing that the L indigs ha d ref

used to obey

the City ’s orde rs to cea se all work until a building permit was issued. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. §§ 54.012(1) ( municipality may b ri ng civil action for enfor ceme nt of ordina n ce relating to mater ials or methods used to construc t buildings), .016 (injunctive re lief) ( West 2008). The City also soug ht c ivil pena lties f or the L indigs’ violation of the stop-wor

k order
. See id. § 54.017 (West 2008). The L indigs a nswere d by

alleg ing that the City was “bar

red as a matter of law from enfor cingthe Code provisions by the principles of

estoppel and wa iver. F urther, the City has waived e nforc ement of the building per mit by failing to enforc e other sim ilar vi olations of which the City Offic ials have know ledg e or should have knowledg e.” T he L indigs a lso counterc laimed ag ainst the City , asser ting that they wer e entitl ed to the followingrelief :3

• Under

the Texas Uniform De clar atory J udg ment Act, see Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011 (West 2008), decla rations that (i) the City ’s building-f

ee- permit ordinanc e is inval i d , void, unenforc eable , and unconstituti o n al as it relates to permit fee s char g ed for residential r emodel c on str uc tio n jo bs , in c lud ingthe L ind igpr oje c t; ( ii) the City mus t re fu nd a ll re sid e nti a l r e mod e l pe rm it f e e s il le g a lly

pr oc ur e d und e r t

he vo id o rd ina

nc e s; and (iii) the City ’s stop-work or der w as illeg al, void, and unenf orce able;

• Tempora

ry and per manent injunctions restra ining the City from cha rg ing a nd pr oc ur ingil le g a l bu ild ingpe rm it f e e s f or re sid e nti a l r e mod e l pr oje c ts, perf orming future illega l a cts, and ref using to a llow the L indigs to continue construction at their

residenc e;

• Damag es ag ainst Peter McK inney and David Docker

y in their individual capa cities for f

raud a nd “civil conspira cy to unlawfully procur e thousands of dollars in building permit fee s for residential remode ls while kn o wi n g that there is absolutely no leg al basis to char g e the fees,” including “ punitive and exemplary

damages ” b as edo nM cK i n n ey an d Do ck ery ’s “gr o s s m i sconduct,”
“ fr a ud ule nt m isp re se ntatio ns of fa c t and law to the L I ND I GS wh ic h, in f

a c t, are no t tr ue ,” and “ g ro ss n e g lig e nc e , ma lic e and , a t the ve ry le a st, ba d f

a ith in unlawfully

demandingand proc uring these fe es”;

• Compensation for the City ’s unlawf ul taking of

their prope rty ; and

• Attor

ne y ’s fe e s, c ourt

c os ts, and

pr e - a nd po st- jud g me nt i nte re st.
I n support of their claims for aff irmative relief

, the L indigs alleg ed that Doc kery had testified that the City does not ha ve a building permit fee schedule for residential repa ir or re model pr oje c ts a nd y e t he and

oth e r C ity

of fi c ia ls k no wi ng ly c ha rg e d th e L ind ig s and

oth e r C ity

re sid e nts fe e s f or su c h p ro je c ts. Pursuant to an ag ree ment betwee n the par ties, the district court enj o ined furthe r construction wor

k while the L indigs pursue d their counter claims ag ainst the City . In response to the L indigs’ c ounter-pe tition, t he City filed spec ial exceptions assertingthat the L indigs lac ked standing to seek judicial re view of the validity of the building code, arguing that only the Attorney

Gene ralThe re cord doe s not indicate whe ther the tria l court eve r ruled on the City ’s spec ial 1 e xce pti on s. 4 could pursue suc h a challeng e throug h a quo wa rra nto proce eding , and that the L indigs ha d failed to exhaust their admini strative re medies by appea ling the B uilding Of ficial’s de cision to the City ’s B oa rd of Ad jus tme nt. In addition, the City filed a ple a to the jurisdiction, f urther a rguing that the 1 L indigs’ f

ailure to e x haust their administrative r emedies de prived the c ourt of subjec t-matter jurisdiction over their c ounterc laims. The L indigs did not file a r esponse to the City ’s plea.
Lin dig s’ Cou nty Cou rt S uit After the City filed its plea to the jurisdiction in the dist rict cour t, the L indigs filed
a ver ified petition f

or writ of cer

tiorari in the county

court of B lanco County

appea ling the B oard of Adjustment’s decision. See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 211.011(a) (1) ( West 2008) (providing that
an y person a g g rieve d by

decision of boa

rd of a djustment may

file ver ified petition in district or
c ounty c ourt statin g tha

t de c isi on is i lle g a l) ; see also id. § 211.011(c) (providingthat court may g rant writ of ce rtiorar i directe d to board to re view its decision). The L indigs’ pe tition for writ of ce rtiorar i
s t at edth at(1 ) th e Bo ar d ’s s t o p -w o rko rd er wa s i n v al i d

o ni t s fa ce b ec au s e i td i d

n o tp u tth e Lin d i gs on notice of the alleg ed p ro s cribed conduct; (2) the B oard’ s determination that the L indigs owe d $1,000 was ba sed on its errone ous interpre tation of the City ’s building permit fee schedule ; (3) the ordinanc e esta

blishing the f

ee schedule was ove rly

broad, va g ue, ambiguous, and g ave unbr idled
a dmi nis tr a tiv e dis c re tio n to City of fi cia ls a nd e mpl oye e s; a

nd (4 ) “ [i]n th e a lte rn a tiv e ,” “ the City [wa]s barr ed as a

matter of la

w from e nforc ing the Ordinanc e provisions by the principles of

estoppel and wa iver.”As a uth or ize d by statut e , the City Cou nc il o f Joh

ns on City a c ts a s th e B oa

rd of Ad jus tme nt. 2 See Tex. L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 2 1 1
. 0 0 8 (g ) (West 2008) (“ The g overningbody of a Ty pe A g e ne ra l- law mun ic ipa lity by or din anc e may g ra nt the me mbe rs of

the g ov e rn ingbo dy

the a uth or ity to act as a board of adjustment under this cha pter.” ). 5 Com bin e d w iththe ir pe tit ion fo r wr it of c e rt ior ari , the L ind ig s a lso fi le d in t he c ounty court their “ Orig inal Petition, P etition for Dec l aratory J udg ment, & A

pplication for Restra ining Ord e r” a g a ins t th e B oa

rd of Ad jus tme nt a

nd B oa rd Me mbe rs . T h e L in d ig s ’ p e ti ti o n a s s e rte d the 2
same c laims ag ainst the Boa rd and B oard Me mbers that they had ra ised in their counter-p etition ag ainst the City

in the district court. As a r esult, the parties ha d pendinglitigation in both district and county

court re g ardingthe same dispute. Th e B oa rd of A dj us tme nt a

nd the B oa rd Me mbe rs , a ll o f who m w e re su e d in the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c ity , f ile d a mot ion to d ism iss the L ind ig s’ c ounty c ourt su it. Th e mot ion

to d ism iss
a sse rt e d th a t: ( 1) the L ind ig s’ c la im f or de c lara tor y re lie f r e g ard in g t he leg a lity of the c ity ordinanc es, taking s claim, and reque st f or attorney ’s fee s wer e not yet ripe beca use the appe al of the Boa rd of Adjustm ent’s decision was sti ll pending ; (2) the L indigs’ suit ag ainst the members of the Boa rd of Adjustm ent i n their official ca pacity involved the same c laims that the L indigs ha d raised ag ainst the Boa

rd of Adjustment itself, and so t h e i ndividually named de fenda

nt members of the Boa rd s h o u l d be dismissed; (3) the L indigs fa iled to plead that they had suff ere d a par ticularized inj ur y to g ive the m st and ing to ch a lle ng e the bu ild ingpe rm it f e e s o r s e e k a

g e ne ra l “ re imb ur se me nt” of all fe es paid by

J ohnson City

reside n t s ; (4 ) t h e L indigs’ f ailure to pa

y under pr otest the fee assessed a g ainst them deprived the m of standing to attack the validity of the ordina nce; a nd (5) theA motion to dismiss ba sed on the absenc e of subject-matter jurisdiction is t he func tional 3 equivalent to a plea to the jurisdiction c halleng ing the trial court’s authority to determine the subject matter of a cause of ac tion. Lac yv . B as se tt , 132 S.W .3d 119, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2 0 0 4 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Bland Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000)). 6 L i n d i g s ’ p l e a d i n g s w e r e i n s u f f i c i e n tt o s u

p p o rt an e s t o p p e l o r w a i v e r c l a i m a g a i n s tth e C i ty. With 3 respe ct to the L indigs’ pe tition for writ of ce rtiorar i, the Boa rd as s er t ed that, pursuant to section 211.011 of the loca l gove rnment code , the only issue pro perly

befor e the c ourt was the le g ality of th e B o ar d ’ s o r d e r , an d th e r e f o r e th e c o urt s h o u ld n o t c o n s id e r an y o f th e L in d ig s ’ o th e r c a u s e s of
a c t i o nun t i l th e r e w a s a

f i n a l j u d g m e n td e t e r

m i n i n g th e o r d e r ’ s l e g a l i ty. Th e c ounty

c ourt su bs e qu e ntl y

g ra nte d th e L ind ig s’ pet it io n for wr it o f c e rt ior ari , direc ting th e Bo ard to review a nd return its dec ision withi n ten day s of the date of the orde r. S ee id. § 2 1 1
. 0 1 1 ( “ O nth e p r e s e n tati o no f th e p e ti ti o n , th e c o urt m ay g r an t a w r it o f c e rtiorar i direc ted to the board to re view the boa rd’s de cision.”). The rec ord shows that the B oard he ard the L indigs’ a

ppeal on J uly 18, 2008, and, following a public hear ing, deter mined that the dec ision of the B uilding Of

ficial should be uphe ld.
Con so lid ati on of D ist

ric t an d Co un ty

Cou rt S uit s On the City ’s motion, the district court and c ounty court suits were then consolidated, such that both the City ’s plea to the jur isdiction and the Boa rd’s motio n t o d i s m i s s wer e pending befor e the distric t co u rt . Followingthe consolidation, the district court dismissed for la ck of jurisdiction the L indigs’ c laims (1) ag ainst Docke ry and McKinney ; ( 2) “ag ainst the City of Johns onIn s up po rt of its or de r o f d ism iss a l, t

he tr ia l c ourt

ma de the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s: 4 1. De fe nd ants -C ounte r P la int if fs have c ha lle ng e d

t h e C i t y o f Jo hn so n Ci ty

bu ild ingpe rm it f

e e s, but have not paid suc h fee s in this case , and do not have standing to see k aff irmative re lief ag ainst the City

of Johns on Ci t y , Texas, David Docke ry in his indi vidual and off icial capa city , Peter McK inney i n h i s individual and officia l capa city , [and the members of the B o ar d o f A d ju s tm e n t, in

th e ir o f f ic ia l c a p a c it ie s ]. 2. Def

endants-Counter

Plaintiff s h a v e s u e d D a v id D o cker y and Peter McKinney

in their offic ial c a pa c iti e s. A s uit

a g a ins t a publ ic of

fi c ia l in his or he r of

fi c ia l c a pa c ity is i n a c tua lity

a su it ag a in s t th e g o v e r

n me n ta l e n ti ty th a t th e p u b li c o f f ic ia l r e p r e s e n ts ; th a t s u c h c laims are duplicative and do not c reate a c ase a nd controve rsy ; and that this Court does not have jur isd ic tio n o ve r s uc h c la ims
. De fe nd ants -C ounte r P la int if fs have a lso su e d D avid

Do c ke ry and Pe te r M c Ki nn e y

in t he ir individual capac ities, but it is clea r from the Defenda

nts’ pleading s that the ac ts complained of we re take n in

the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s. 3. Def

endants-Counter

Plaintiffs have sued Rhonda Stell, J ames S tevenson, Ralph Moss and Alice Dunc an in their off

icial capacities. A s uit ag ainst a publi c official i n his or her of ficial capa city is i na c tu a li ty

a s u it a g a in s t t

h e g o v e r n me n ta l e n ti ty

th a t t h e p u b li c o f f ic ia l repr esents; that such claims are duplicative and do not c reate a c ase a nd controve rsy ; and that thi s Co ur t do e s n ot h ave jur isd ic tio n o ve r s uc h c la ims
. 7 City alleg ing a

n unlawful or illeg al tax or fee” ; (3) “a g ainst t he City of Johns on City

alleg ing estoppel and w aiver ”; an d (4 ) “aga inst Rhonda St ell, J ames Stevenson, Ralph Moss and Alice Dunca n.” 4 The L indigs pe rfe cted a n interlocutory

appea l from the district cour t’s order of dismiss al. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 5 1
. 0 1 4 (a)(8) ( West 2008). On appea l, the L indigs a rgue that the tria l court er red by dismiss ing the ir ch al l en ges t o the validity of the City ’s ordinanc e, despite the ir failure to pay the per mit fe e, beca

use the City

“opene d the door” for suc h an attac k when it filed suit ag ainst the L indigs for injunctive relief
. They further asser

t that requiring them to pay

the per mit fee in orde r to have standing to challeng e the f ee’ s validity

violates the Ope n8

Courts provision of the Texas Constit ution, that the court had jurisdi ction to hear their cla ims under the UDJA, and that they proper ly invoked t he court’s jurisdiction by filing the ir petition for writ of
c e rt ior ari . F ina lly , th e L ind ig s urg e that the t ri a l c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin g the ir

re ma ini ngc la ims ag ainst the City and the individual officia ls for lack of jurisdiction beca use t he trial court’s de cision amounted to a r

uling “ on the merits” r ather than one r eg ardingjurisdiction.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law subjec t to de novo revie w. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. I T-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 855 (Tex
. 2 0 02). The subjec t-matter jurisdiction of a trial court may

be cha lleng ed throug h a plea to the jurisdiction, as the City

has done in this case
. See Tex as Dep’t of Parks &W ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 22 5- 26 (T e x. 20 04 ). In d e c idi nga ple a to t he ju ri sd ic tio n th a t c ha lle ng e s o nly the pla int if

fs ’ pleading s, we de termine if the ple ader has alleg ed fa cts that aff irmatively

demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hea

r the c ause. Id. at 226. We construe the pleading s liberally in favor of

the plaintiff and look to the pleade r’s intent. Id.

Th e a pp e ll ees c hal len ged th e tr ial cou rt ’s s ub jec t- mat ter

ju ri sd ict io n o n s eve ra l ba se s, inc ludi ng st and ing , r ipe ne ss, and fa ilure to e xha

us t a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s. Stand ingis a component of subjec t-matter jurisdiction that can be raised at any time and ca

nnot be waive d. Texas Ass’n of B us. v. Texas Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 444-45 (Te x . 1993). The g ener al test for standing require s that there be a re al controve rsy betwee n the par

ties that can be dete rmined by the judicial decla

ration soug ht. Id. a t 446. Th e re mus t be a re str ic tio n o f t

he pla int if

f’ s r ig hts —n ot t

ho se of anothe r. Ba ile

y v . Ci ty of A us tin , 972 S.W .2d 180, 184-85 (Te x . App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied)
.9

In revie wing a trial court’s order on a motion to di smiss for want of standing , we c onsider the issue
as we would in a plea to the jur isdiction, co n s t ru i n g t h e pleadings in fa vor of the pla intiff. See B rown v. Todd , 53 S.W. 3d 29 7, 30 5 n. 3 (T e x. 20 01 ); se e als o W ar th v . S e ldi n , 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1 97 5) (F or

purp os e s o f r

uli ngon a mot ion to d ism iss fo r wan t of

sta nd ing , . . . re vie wi ngc ourt s
mus t a c c e pt a s tr

ue a ll mat eri al alle g a tio ns of the c omp la int , a

nd mus t c on str

ue the c omp la int

in favor of the c omplaining pa

rty .”). Ripeness is a threshold issue that implicates subject- matter jurisdiction. Perry v . Del Ri o , 6 6 S
. W
. 3 d

2 3 9 , 2 5 9 (T ex . 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Patterson v. Planned Pare nthood , 971 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)). The ripeness doctrine examines when claims may be brought and asks whether, at the tim e a laws uit is f ile d, the fa c ts a

re su ff ic ie ntl y de ve lop e d s o th a t an in

jur y ha s o c c ur re d o r i s li ke ly to occur , rathe r than be i n g co n t i n g ent or re mote. Id. (c i t i n g W aco Inde p. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson , 22 S.W .3d 849, 851-52 (Te x . 2000)). The ripene ss doctrine holds that if a plaintiff’ s injury is not
concr ete, but depends on conting ent or hy pothetical facts, t he trial court doe s not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Gibson , 22 S.W .3d at 852. To deter mine if the plaintiff’s claims wer e ripe , the appellate court must look to the facts and evidence exi sting when the s uit was filed. Id. at 851-52.

The re quirement that ad m inistrative reme dies must be exhausted repr esents the legi s l at ure ’s d es i re t h atad m i n i s tra t i v e a gen ci es i n i t i al l y d et erm i n e d i s p u t edqu es t i o ns of fa ct and law in cer tain situations. Es sen bu rg v . D all as Cou nty , 988 S.W .2d 188, 189 (Tex. 1998). When an ag ency has exclusive jurisdiction, courts have no subje ct-matter jurisdiction until the claimant ha s exhausted all administrative reme dies within the ag ency . See I n re Entergy

Corp. , 142 S.W .3d 316, 32 1- 22 (T e x. 20 04 ). Whe the r t he le g isl a tur e ha s g ra

nte d e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n to an a g e nc y is a10

matter of statutory

interpre tation, which w e review de novo. Se eEm plo y e es R e tir e me nt S

y s. v. Due nez , ___ S.W .3d ___, No. 07-0410, 2009 Te x . L EXI S 477, at *31 (Tex. J uly 3, 2009).
DI SCU SSIO N B y the ir fi rs t is su e , the L in di gs ur g e that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin g the ir challeng e to the validity of the City ’s building- permit ordinanc e bec ause the y had standingto bring the ir cla im, de sp ite no t ha vin g pa id t

he re qu ir e d f

e e . In s o a

rguin g , th e y

a sse rt tha t ( 1) the City invited jurisdiction over t heir c ounterc laims when it filed its lawsuit ag ainst them; (2) they demonstrated a

particula rized injury

distinct from the g ener al publ ic; (3) requiring them to pay the fee befor e cha lleng ing the ordinanc e violates the Open Courts provision of the Texas Consti tution; (4) the Uniform Dec laratory J udg ments Act enables t hem t o challeng e the va lidity of the ordina

nce and asse rt their counte rcla ims ag ainst the City ; and (5) the y invoked t he trial court’s jurisdiction by filing the ir petition for writ of certiorar i pursuant to section 211.011 of the local g overnme nt code. By their sec ond issue, the L indigs argue that the trial court e rre d in dismi ssing their claims “a sserting estoppel, waiver , illega l tax or fee , and regulatory taking ag ainst the City , and asse rting individual claims ag ainst David Doc kery , Peter McKinney , Rhonda Stell, James Steve nson, Ralph Moss and A li c e D un c an ” b e c a

u s e it “ ma d e a r

u li n g o n th e me r it s w it

h o u t h e ar in g e v id e n c e o n the merits.” They maintain that it was err or for the trial cour

t to make a r

uling that “ essentially

say s that the trial court doe s not have jurisdiction bec ause the L indigs’ c ase doe s not have mer it.”11

The Li ndi gs ’ U DJ A Cla ims Aga inst

the City Th e tr ia l court dis mis se d for la c k of sub je c t- matte r jur isd ic tio n the L ind ig s’ c la ims ag ainst the City

“alleg ing a

n unlawful or illega l tax or fee .” The L indigs soug ht an injunction and decla rations under

the UDJA that the City ’s building- permit-fe e or dinance was “ invalid, void,
un e nf or c e a ble , a nd un c on sti tut ion a l” —w ithre sp e c t to a ll re sid e nti a l r e mod e l c on str uc tio n jo bs in t h e C i ty and a s a

p p l i e d t o th e L i n d i g s ’ p r o j e c t

— an d th a t th e C i ty mu s t r e f un d a l l f e e s ill e g a lly procur ed under the void ordinanc e. The UDJA provides that a per son whose rig hts, status, or other le g a l r e latio ns are a ff

e c te d b y a statut e may

have de te rm ine d a

ny qu e sti on of c on str uc tio n o r v a lid ity arisingunder the statute and may obtain a dec laration of

rig hts, status, or other leg al re lations the r e un d e r . T e x. Ci v . Pr a c . & Re m. Co d e A n n . § 3 7
. 0 0 4 ( a ) ( We s t 2 0 0 8 )
. I t d o e s n o t, howeve r, “extend a trial c ourt’s ju ri s d i ct i o n , and a litig ant’s re quest for de clar atory relief does not confe r ju r is d ic ti o n o n a c o urt.” IT-Davy , 74 S.W. 3d at 85 5. A d e c larator

y jud g me nt i s a

pp ro pr iate on ly when ther e is a justiciable c ontroversy about the rig hts and status of the parties, and the dec laration would resolve the controve rsy . Bo nh am Sta te Ba nk v . B e ad le , 907 S.W .2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995). B e fo re we a dd

re ss t he tr ia l c ourt ’s ana ly sis of the L ind ig s’ sta

nd ingto b ri ngthe se claims under the UDJA, we first examine our j urisdiction to hear this appea l. See M.O. De ntal Lab v. Rape , 139 S.W .3d 671, 673 (Tex. 200 4 ) (s t ati ng that appellate court ha s duty to assess its own jur isd ic tio n sua sp on te ). Ap art fr om g e ne ra lly a sse rt ing that the fe e is u nc on sti tut ion a l, t

he L ind ig s’ counter -petition did not identify any specific constitutional violation or ot herw ise indicate why the ordinanc e is unconstitutional “as it relate s to permit fee s cha r g e d f o r r esidential re model construction jobs, including the L I

NDI G projec t.” The UDJ A provides that “[i] n any proce eding that involves12

the va lid ity

of a mun ic ipa l or din anc e or

fr anc his e , th e mun ic ipal it y mu st be ma de a pa rt y and is entitled to be hea

rd, and if the statute, ordinanc e, or franc hise is alleg ed to be unc onstitut ional, the attorney g ener al of the state must also be serve d with a copy of t he procee ding and i s entitled to be hear d.” Te x . Civ. P rac . & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.006(b) (West 2008) . Fa ilure to do so deprive s the trial court, a

nd there fore this Court, of jurisdiction. See Comm erceIndep

. S ch. Dist. v. Ham

pton , 57 7 S.W. 2d 74 0, 74 1 (T e x. Civ
. Ap p. —E a stl and 19 79 , no wr it) ; Commissioners Court v. Pe oples Nat’l Util. Co. , 538 S.W .2d 228, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [ 14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref ’d n.r.e .); see also In reC.M.D. , N o . 1 4

- 0 8

- 0 0 1 1 3

- CV , 2 0 0 9 T e x. Ap p . L E X I S 4785 , a t * 5 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] J une 25, 2009, no pet. h.) ; McPhe rson v . City of L ake R ansom Canyon , No. 07-02-00 57-CV, 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 2534, at *4-5 (Te x . App.—Amar illo Mar. 26, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Th e re c or d c on ta ins no ind ic a tio n that the L ind ig s se rv e d th e Attor ne y Ge ne ra l w ith
a c op y of the ir pe tit ion , a s re qu ir e d by se c tio n 37 .0 06 (b ). Th e re fo re , ne ith e r the tr ia l c ourt no r t his Court has jurisdiction over the L indigs’ c laim for dec laratory relief reg ardingthe constitutionality of the City ’s ordinanc e. See H ampton , 57 7 S.W. 2d

a t 74 1; Com mi

ssi on e rs C

ou rt , 538 S.W .2d at 229. Turningto the L indigs’ remaining challeng es t o the validity of the ordina

nce a nd the City ’s authority

to interpret its b u ilding per mit fee to apply

to “re sidential remodel c onstruction pr oje c ts, ” we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt c or re c tly de te rm ine d th a t th e L ind ig s la c ke d s tand ingto (1) e njoin the Cit y

from cha

rg ing buildingpermit fee s for a ll residential re model construction projec ts, (2) see k a dec laration t h at the City ’s ordinanc e is invalid as applied to eve ry residential remode l project in the C ity , and (3) seek r eimbursement of all building fe es pre viously assessed by13

the City . Unless standing is confer red by statut e, the c ommon-law rule in Te x as is that a per son seekingto en

join the actions of a g overnme ntal body must plead and prove that he has suf fer ed a “spec ial injury ,” i.e. , h e mus t a lle g e and sh ow ho w h e ha s b e e n d ama g e d o r i nju re d o the r t

ha n a s a member of the g ener al public. Scott v. Board of Adjustment , 4 05 S.W. 2d 55 , 5 6 ( Te x. 19 66 ); W

alker

v. City o f G e or ge tow n , 8 6 S
. W
. 3 d

2 4 9 , 2 5 3 ( T e x . Ap p . —

A u s t i n2 0 0 2 , p e t
. d e n i e d )
. S p e c i f i c a l l y, a p l ai n t i ff h as s t an d i n g t o s u e i f: (1 ) h e h as s u s t ai n ed , o r i s i m m e d i a t el y i nd an ger

o f s u s t ai n i n g, some direc t injury

as a r esult of the wr ong ful ac t of which he compl ai n s ; (2 ) t here is a direc t
re latio ns hip be tw e e n th e a lle g e d in jur y and the c la im t o b e a dju dic a te d; ( 3) the plai nt if f has a pe rs on a l st ake in t

he c on tr ov e rs y ; ( 4) the c ha lle ng e d a c tio n h a s c a us e d th e pla int if

f s ome inj ur

y in fa c t, e ith e r e c on omi c , r e c re a tio na l, e nv ir on me nta l, o r o the rw ise ; or (5 ) the pla int if f i s an a pp ro pr iate party to assert the public inter est in the matter as well as his own interest. W alker , 86 S.W .3d at 253 (c i t i n g El Pa so Cm ty . P ar tne rs v . B & G/ Su nr iseJ oin t V e ntu re , 2 4 S. W. 3 d

6 2 0 , 6 2 4 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.)).

Her e, the L i n d i gs h av e n o tar gu edth at th e C i ty ’s p urp o rt edp ra ct i ce o f c h arg ing illeg al fee s to other citizens has resulted in any injury to them persona lly
. Nor have they shown that they have a persona l stake in the re imbursement of a ll unlawfully procur ed fe es collec ted by the City or that they are the appr opriate pa

rties to asser

t such a c halleng e on beha lf of all City residents who have been assessed an unlawful building permit fee
. Cf. City of Arl ing ton v . S c alf , 117 S.W .3d 345, 346-47 (Te x . App.—For

t Worth 2003, pet. denied) (plaintiff lac ked standingto challeng e municipal str ee t -m ai ntenanc e fe e on beha lf of propose d class of pe rsons who had be en billed for stre et14

ma int e na nc e se rv ic e s) . T he se c la ims fo r d e c larator y re lie f we re thu s p ro pe rl y dis mis se d o n th e ba sis that th e L ind ig s la c ke d s tand ingto a sse rt the m. We now turn to the claims that the L indigs brought resul t ing f rom the City ’s application of the building permit fee ag ainst them. Acc ording to their pl eading s, the L indigs have been a ssessed an illeg al fe e of $1,000 based on a n invalid ordinance , wer e orde red to stop work on their re sidence as a r esult of the City ’s erroneous interpr etation of its ordinanc e, and ma y incur further civil pe nalties. Such injuries are sufficie ntly concr ete a

nd particula

rized to confer

standing on the L indigs. The City asser ts, however , that the L indigs’ f ailure to pa

y the building pe rmit fee deprive d them of standingto challeng e the va lidity of the fe e ordina

nce unde r the UD J A. Whil e it is true wit h respe ct t o many taxes and fees that plaintiffs a re r equire d to pay the tax or fee unde r pro t es t b efor e bring ing suit to cha lleng e its validity , such proc edure s are mandatory

only wher e expressly

require d by s tatute. Se e Da lla s Co un ty Cm ty . Co lle

geDi st. v. Bolton , 1 85 S.W. 3d

86 8, 87 9 (T e x. 20 05 ) (c iti ng Te x. Tax Cod e Ann. §§ 31 .1 15 (r e qu ir ingpr ote st p ay m en to f a d v a l o re mp ro p erty t ax es ), 1 1 2
. 0 5 1 (r equ i ri n g p ro t es tp ay m en ti no rd er

t o ch al l en ge state taxes and fe es collec ted by Comptroller), 403.202 (r eq u i ri ng protest pay ment of occ upation, excise, g ross rec eipts, fra

nchise, lice nse, or pr ivilege taxes or fee s in order to c ontend t hat t ax or fe e is ill eg al) (West 2008)) . As with the building pe rmit fees at issue in the case at b ar , t he student service s fee s char g ed by

the junior colleg es in Bolton wer e not s ubject to any mandatory

statutory protest provisions. See id. a t 879- 80
. Ac c or din g ly , the su pr e me c ourt

no te d th a t th e c la ss o f s tud e nts p ro t est ing the leg ality

of the fe es had se vera l remedie s at their disposal: “they could file a decla ratory judgme nt action contestingthe fe e’s leg ality , or they could seek to e njoin collection ofBe cause we hold that the L indigs we re not re quired to pay the fe e in orde r to have standing 5 to challeng e it s validity , we need not rea ch their a rgument that the trial cour t’s order amounts to a violation of the Open Courts provision of the Te x as Constitut ion. 15 the fe es.” Id. at8 8 1 n . 9 (c i t i n g Shaw v. Phillips C rane &Rigging, Inc. , 6 3 6 S. W. 2 d 1 8 6 , 1 8 8 ( T e x. 19 82 ) ( no tin g that taxpay e r “ may br inga su it f or de c lara tor y jud g me nt to de te rm ine
. . . the le g a lity
o f t h e t ax es” and “may bring a suit to enjoin the collection of the alleg ed illega l tax es pending a hear ing on the leg ality of same”)). The City failed to e stablish that the statutory scheme under which the L indigs’ c laims aris e require s them to pay the fe es under

protest and, thus, that they lacke d sta nd ingon thi s b a sis
. 5 Th e City fu rt he r a rgue d th a t th e L ind ig s’ c ha lle ng e s are ba rr e d b e c a us e the y c an o nly have be en ra ised pursuant to the statutory revie w proce dures set forth in sec tion 211.011 of the local g ov e rnme nt c od e . Se c tio n 2 11 .0 11 pe rm its “ a pe rs on a g g ri e ve d b y

a de c isi on of th e bo ard ” to “pre sent to a district court, co u n t y court, or c ounty court at law a ve rified pe tition s tating that the decision of the boa

rd of adjustment is illega l in whole or in pa rt and spec ifying the g rounds of the illega lity .” Te x . L oc. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 211.011(a) (1). This is the proc edure that the leg islature “has e x pressly

provided . . . for challeng ing an action taken by a city ’s zoning boar d of adjustment.” City of San Antonio v. El Dorado Amuseme nt Co. , 1 95 S.W. 3d 23 8, 24 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 2 0 0 6 , p et
. d en i ed ) ( ci t i n g W est Tex. W ater Refiners, Inc. v. S&

B Bev erage Co. , 915 S.W .2d 623, 626 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ)). “ This cer tiorari re quirement is an a dminist rative
reme dy provided by

the Texas L ocal Gove rnment Code, which must be e x hausted be fore board decisions may

be brought before the cour ts.” Lamar Corp. v. City of Longview , 270 S.W .3d 609, 613 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.). “A suit not broug ht pursuant to the s tatutory provisions16

is an impermissible collatera l attack.” El Dorado Amuseme nt , 195 S.W .3d at 250; se e W inn v . Ci ty of Irving , 770 S.W .2d 10, 11 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no wr it).

I n th is c a se , th e pa

rt ie s d ispute wh e the r t

he L ind ig s h ave e xha

us te d th e ir administrative re medies as r equire d by section 211.011. The City asser ts that the L indigs’ a

ppeal of the B oa rd of Ad jus tme nt’ s d e c isi on

is “ c ur re ntl y pe nd ing ” and

that th e ir fa ilure to e xha

us t is a jurisdictional bar to all of their counter claims ag ainst the City . The L indigs maintain, howe ver, a nd
we agr ee , th atth e r ec o rd s h o ws th e B o ar d ’s d ec i s i o ni s n o w f i n al

— al th o u gh , at t h e t i m e t h e Lin d i gs orig inally filed their c ounter-pe tition ag ainst the City challeng ing the validity of the ordina

nce a nd the assessment of

the per mit fe e, t h ey h ad not y et filed their pe tition for writ of ce rtiorar i and the Boa rd had not y et re viewed its dec ision under sec tion 211.011. In essenc e, the L indigs’ position on appea l is that even if filing the petition for wr it of cer tiorari was nece ssary to confe r jurisdiction over the ir cou nt e rc la ims a g a ins t th e City , a ny jur isd ic tio na l de fe c t ha s si nc e be e n c ur e d b y the ir subsequent exhaustion per the wr it of cer tiorari proc edure
. As t h is Co u r t r e c e ntly explained in Ma rb le Fa lls In de pe nd e nt S c ho ol D ist

ric t v . S c ott , 275 S.W .3d 558 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. filed), ther e ar e s o m e cases in which cour ts have
rec og nized that a jurisdictional defe ct cr eate d by a fa ilure to exhaust administ rative r emedies ma y be cur ed rather than r equire dismiss al for la ck of subjec t-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 565. W e noted that in suc h case s, “the a

ppealingparties we re attempting to bringcommon-law c laims,” over which trial courts have jurisdi ction by way of t heir ge nera l statutory and constit utional power s, “in addition to seekingjudicial revie w of a n administrative dec ision.” Id. a t 56 6. On the oth e r h and , a s in Ma rb leFa lls , th e fa ilure to a lle g e a c omm on -l aw c la im o ve r whic h th e tr ia l c ourt cou ld e xer c iseFur ther, some of

the re lief they reque sted under the UDJA exceede d the scope of the issue 6 to be dec ided by

the B oard— wh et h er i t s decision to assess the L indigs a building per

mit fee wa s le g a l—a nd c ha lle ng e d th e City ’s a

uth or ity to a sse ss p e rm it f

e e s f or re sid e nti a l r e mod e lin g pr oje c ts. See City of San Antonio v. El Dorado Amusement Co. , 1 9 5 S .W.3d 238, 250 (Tex. App.—S an Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (only question that may be raised by petition for writ of c ertiora ri under section 211.011 is leg ality of boar d’s orde r); c

f. Mi tz v. Te

x as St. Bd

. o f V e te rin ar yMe d. Ex am ’r

s , 278 S.W .3d 17, 22-24 (Te x . App.—Austin 2 008, pet. filed) ( acknow leding that while Vete rinary Boa rd had jurisdiction to administer Veter inary L icensing Act, leg islature did not intend it to resolve dis pute s c on c e rn ingva lid ity of Ac t and ho ldi ng that pa

rt ie s br ing ingsu c h c ha lle ng e did no t ne e d to exhaust administ rative r emedies be fore Boa rd). The subset of cla ims unrelated to the leg ality of the Boa rd’s fina l decision is not intended to be resolved t hroug h the Board’ s administrative proc esses and thus does not fall wit hin the ex clusive j urisdiction of the B oard. A s a re sult, these challeng es could not be jurisdi ctionally barr ed as a re sult of a fa ilure to exhaust the section 211.011 proce dure. 17 partial jurisdi ction means that the tria l court neve r ac quires jurisdiction over the case and ca nnot there fore abate to allow time to cure. Id.

In th e c a s e a tb ar , th e L i n d i g s a l l e g e d c o m m o n - l aw c l a i m s f o r f r a u d , c i v i l c o n s p i r a c y, and an unc onstitut ional taking in addition to their reques t s for de clar atory and injunctive re lief reg ardingthe validity

of the B oard’ s decision. The L indigs we re thus entitl ed to cure any jur isd ic tio na l de fe c t pr e se nte d b y the ir fa ilure to f

ile the ir pe tit ion fo r wri t of

c e rt ior ari and

ob ta in a fina l Boa

rd dec ision before filing the ir counter claims ag ainst the City . They h av e d o n e so, and since their counterc laims ag ainst the C ity wer e consolidated with their sui t for judicial revie w of the Boa rd’s de cision, the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the L indigs’ c halleng es to the validity and enf orce ability of t he ordinance as applied to them—with the exceptions discussed above
re g ard ing the ir c la im that the or din anc e is un c on sti tut ion a l and the ir fa c ia l c ha lle ng e s to the va lid ity of the or din anc e , w hic h th e y do no t ha

ve sta nd ingto a sse rt
. Wit h these c aveats, we sustain the 6 L indigs’ f irst issue reg arding the di smissal of t heir claims ag ainst the City alleg ing a

n unlawful tax
or fe e a s a pp lie d to the m.18

The Li ndi gs ’ T aking s Cl aim We a lso c onstrue the trial court’ s order as havingdismiss ed for

lack of standing the L indigs’ c laims for an unc onstitut ional taking based on the City ’s i ssuance of t he stop-wor k order , as we ll as the L indigs’ r equest for decla ratory relief that the stop-work or der c onstitut ed an unla wful taking . Article I , section 17 of t he Tex as C onstitut ion states, “No pe rson’s prope rty shall be take n, damag ed, or de stroy ed for or applied to public use w ithout adequate c omp en s at i o n beingmade.” Tex. Const. art. I , § 17. To rec over on an inver se conde mnation claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1 ) t he State or

oth e r g ov ernm ental e nti ty int e nti on a lly

pe rf or me d c e rt a in a c ts, (2 ) t

hat r e su lte d in the taking , damag ing, or

destruction of the owner ’s prope rty , (3) f or public use. Ge ne ra l Ser v s. Co m m ’ n v . Li tt le

- Te

x I n s u la ti o n Co., Inc. , 39 S.W .3d 591, 598 (Tex. 2001); Steele v . City of Houston , 603 S.W .2d 786, 788-92 (Te x . 1980).

T h e C i t y ’ s o n l y

ch al l en ge t o th e t ri al co urt ’s j uri s d i ct i o no v er th e Lin d i gs ’ t ak i n gs claim was that it was not ripe for a djudication beca use ap p eal had not been take n to the Boa rd, pursuant to sec tion 211.011 of the local g overnme nt. As the City argued to the trial c ourt, “in orde r for a regulatory

taking s claim to be ripe, the re must be a final decision reg ardingthe application of the re g ulations to the property at issue.” M

a y h e w v . T

o w n o f S u n n y v ale , 9 6 4 S .W.2d 922, 929 (T ex . 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’ l Planning Agency , 5 20 U. S. 7 25 , 7 34 (1 99 7) ; W illiamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v . Hamilton Bank , 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)). The City maintains that bec a us e the a pp e a l of the de c isi on

of the B oa rd is “ c ur re ntl y pe nd ing ,” the tr ia l c ourt

c or re c tly fo un d th a t it

ha d n o ju ri sd ic tio n to e nte rt a in t

he takin g s c la im.19 Se ve ra l of our sis te r c ourt s have e xpre ssl y re je c te d the City ’s argume nt, ho ldi ngthat, “[w]here a c onstitut ional taking issue is broug ht, it can be c onsidered e ven thoug h other c laims are dismiss ed for

failure to exhaust admini strative re medies under Section 211.011 of the Te x as Gover nment Code.” Lamar Corp. , 2 7 0 S
. W
. 3 d at 6 1 4 -1 5 (c i t i n g Ce nte no v . City of Ala mo He igh ts , No. 04-00-00546- CV, 2001 Tex. App. L EXI S 3141, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 16, 2001,
no pe t.) (n ot d e signate d f

or pu bli c a tio n) ; Hitchcoc k v. Board of Trustees, Cypress-Fairbanks I ndep. Sc h. Di st. , 2 32 S.W. 3d

20 8, 21 9 (Tex
. App .— Housto n [1s t D ist .] 20 07 , n o p e t.) ). Th is v ie w i s
e sp e c ia lly pe rs ua siv e si nce, un de r t he un iqu e re vie w p ro c e dure s o f s e c tio n 2 11 .0 11 , th e on ly question that may

be ra ised by a p et i t i o n for wr it of cer tiorari is the leg ality

of the boa

rd’s orde r. City of S an An ge lo v . B oe hm e Ba k e ry , 190 S.W .2d 67, 7 0 (T ex . 1 9 4 5) (c onstruing pr ior statute); El Dorado Amusem ent Co. , 1 95 S.W. 3d a t 25 0; Board of Adjustment v. Ame lang , 737 S.W .2d 405, 406 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1987, writ denied)
.

Stil l, a s s u m i n g w i th o u td e c i d i n g th a tth e L i n d i g s w e r e r e qu i r e d t o e xh a u s tth e ir
a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s und e r t he loc a l g ov e rnme nt c od e in o rd e r to b ri nga takin g s c la im a g a ins t the City , the rec ord shows that they have done so. As the Texas Supreme Court has a cknowledg ed, the proc edure s for c halleng ing a board of adjustment’s decision under section 211.011 are “rather unique.” Te lle

z v . Ci ty of S oc c or o , 226 S.W .3d 413, 414 (Tex. 2007). Section 211.011 require s that a per son ag g rieve d by

a boar d’s dec ision prese nt to a dis trict court, county court, or c ounty

court at l awa v e r i f i e d p e t i t i o ns t a t i n g th a tth e d e c i s i o ni s i l l e g a l an d s t a t i n g th e b a s i s f

o r th e i l l e g a l i ty. SeeT e x . L o c . G o v ’ tC o d e A n n . § 2 1 1
. 0 1 1 ( a ) ( 1 )
. T h e p e t i t i o nmu s t b e p r e s e n t e d w i th i nt e nd ays afte r t h e d at e t h e d ec i sion is filed in the board’s of fice
. Id. § 211.011(b). On pr esentation of theTo the ex tent that the C ity is arguing that the L indigs’ c laims were not ripe whe n they filed 7 their orig inal petition ag ainst the Boa rd bec ause the ir application f or writ of c ertiora

ri was f iled concur rently , we r ejec t this arg ument as we ll. I n Pe rry v . D e l R io , 66 S.W .3d 239 (Tex. 2001), the Texas Supreme Court held that a c laim’s lack of ripene ss when sui t i s filed is not a jurisdictional infirmity requiring dismiss al if, as he re, the case matures dur ing the pendenc y of the suit. Se e Pe rry , 66 S.W .3d at 256 (indicatingthat ripene ss should be determined at time of adjudication, base d on all information ava ilable to court, includinginterveningevents). 20 petition, the court may

then g rant a

writ of ce rtiorar i directe d to the board to re view its decision, id. § 211.011(c) , and, if g rante d, the board must make a ver ified re turn and state the pertinent a nd materia l fac ts that show the g rounds of the de cision under a ppeal, id. § 211.011(d). A c c o r d i n g t o th e s u

p r e m e c o urt , “ [ o ] n c e a

p arty f i l e s a p e t i t i o nw i th i nt e n( 1 0 ) d ays afte r a zoning board de cision, the court ha s su b ject matter

jurisdiction to hear a

nd deter mine a claim.” Davis v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment , 865 S.W .2d 941, 942 & n.3 ( Tex. 1993) (disapproving lower c ourt’s dec ision to extent it held that trial court’s jurisdiction depended on se rvice and re turn of wr it) ; see Tellez , 226 S.W .3d at 414. In this case , the L indigs not only filed t heir verified pe tition for writ of cer

tiorari, but the re cord e stablishes that the writ was g rante d and the B oa rd fi na lize d it s decision, upholding the B uilding Of ficial’s de cision and af firming the assessment of the $1,000 permit fee
. The L indigs have thus c omplied with the proce dures e stablished under se ction 211.011 for c halleng ing the Boa rd’s de cisio n and conferr ed jurisdiction on the trial cour t to bring their taking s claims. Se e Da v is , 865 S.W .2d at 942. We sustain the L indigs’ f irst issue with respec t 7 to t he ir takin g s c la ims
.They also argued by

their petition for wr i t o f certiorar i as alternative g rounds for 8 o v e rtu r n in g th e B o ar d ’ s d e c is io n th a t t h e Ci ty s h o u ld b e e s to p p e d

f r o m e n f o r c in g th e o r d in an c e . We do n o t co n s true the tria l court’s orde r of dismissal as re achingany of the a rguments raised in the L ind ig s’ pe tit ion , in c lud ingthe ir e sto pp e l argume nt.

21 Estoppel and W

aiver The trial court also dismiss ed for lack of jurisdiction the L indigs’ “cla ims a g ainst the City of Johns on City alleg ing estoppel and waiver.” In their answe r to the City ’s orig inal petition for injunctive r elief a

nd civil penalties, the L indigs a sserted that the City was ba rre d from enf

orcing its buil ding- permit-fe e ordina nce by the principles of

estoppel and w aiver
. 8 The B oard’ s motion t o dismiss , which wa s pending befor e the dis tric t court following the c on so lid a tio n o f t

he tw o s uit s, a sse rt e d th a t th e L ind ig s h a d fai led to ple a d s uf fi c ie nt f a c ts “ to support an estoppe l/waiver c laim ag ainst a g overnme ntal entity .” I t argued that t h e d o ct rine of estoppel g ener ally

does n o t ap p l y

ag ainst a g overnme ntal unit ex erc ising its public or g overnme ntal functions except in those ca ses wher e justice re quires its application. See City of W hite Settlement v . Super W ash, Inc. , 198 S.W .3d 770, 773 (Tex. 2006); Ci t y of Hutchins v. Prasifka , 4 50 S.W. 2d

82 9, 83 5 ( Te x. 19 70 ); Ro lis on v . P uc k e tt , 198 S.W .2d 74, 77 (Tex. 1946). Reurg ing this ar g ument on appea l, the City sug g es t s that the trial cour t lacked jurisdict i o n beca

use estoppel c annot be invoked to ba r its application of its building-pe rmit-fee ordi n an ce. While the L indigs’ ple ading s may not establish “an e x ceptional c ase in whic h justice require s estoppel,” se e Su pe r W as h , 198 S.W .3d at 776, the City has not shown that this is a prope r basis for a jur isd

ic tio na l challeng e, cf. City of Argyle v. P ierce , 258 S.W .3d 674, 682 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2008, pet. dism ’d) ( “In essenc e, the City is a rguing that the trial cour

t does not have jurisdiction beca use the Signer s’ cause of action is w ithout mer it. Howeve r, the City has22

no t sh ow n th a t th is i s a

pr op e r m ann e r i n w hic h to c ha lle ng e the tr ia l c ourt ’s jur isd ic tio n. ” ). B e c a us e the L ind ig s’ de fe ns ive a sse rt ion of e sto pp e l a g a ins t th e c la ims br ou g ht a g a ins t th e m by the City is not a “claim ” o v e r

w h ic hth e tr ia l c o urt m u s t h av e s u

b je c t- matt e r

ju r is d ic ti o n , w e s u s ta in

the L indigs’ issue r eg ardingestoppel and w aiver
. Claim s Again st Dockery

and McKin ney The L indigs a sserted c laims ag ainst Docke ry and McKinney in the ir individual and officia l capa cities for f

raud a nd civil conspirac y

and, by their first ame nded counte r-p et i t ion ag ainst the City , soug ht “punitive and exemplary damag es a gai n s t DAVI D DOCKERY a nd PETER MCKI

NNEY” for g ross misconduct. Ty p i ca l l y , an official sued in both his official a nd ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s sh ou ld f

ile a ple a to the jur isd ic tio n in def e ns e of the of

fi c ia l ca pa c ity c la ims
a g a ins t hi m and , at th e same tim e , f ile a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt o n o ff

ic ia l im mun ity g rounds on the individual ca p ac i t y claims ag ainst him. Se e Te x as A& M U niv . S y s. v . Ko se og lu , 233 S.W .3d 835, 845-46 (Te x . 2007). In this case, Doc kery and McK inn ey

did neither. Neve rtheless, the tria l court found that the c laims ag ainst them in their official ca p ac i t i es wer e de ri vativ e ly

ba rr e d a s a re su lt o f i ts d e te rm inatio n that it la c ke d ju ri sd ic tio n o ve r t

he L ind ig s’ c la ims ag ainst the City
. See id. a t 84 4 ( su it a g a ins t st a te of fi c ia l in his of fi c ia l c a pa c ity a c tua lly se e ks to impose liabilit y

ag ainst g overnme ntal unit rather tha n on individual specifica lly named a

nd is there fo re a g a ins t e nti ty its e lf ). Ac c or din g ly , to the e xten t th a t w e have de te rm ine d th e re is subject-matter jurisdiction ove r cer tain of the L indigs’ c laims ag ainst the City , we must reve rse the po rt ion of the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r d ism iss ingthe c la ims a g a ins t D oc ke ry and Mc Ki nn e y . We su sta in th e L i n d i g s ’ i s s u e a s t o th e i r c l a i m s a g a i n s tD o c k e r

y an d M c K i n n e y.23

Cla ims Aga inst

Boa rd Member s The trial c ourt also dismissed the L indigs’ c laims ag ainst the members of the B oard of Adjustment in their officia l capa cities. Their moti on soug ht dismi ssal on the sole basis that the L ind i gs h ad as serted ide ntical claims ag ainst the Boa rd and the Boa

rd Member s. The B oard Me mbe rs c ite no c a se , n or have we fo un d o ne , h old ingthat an indi vid ua l sue d in his off

ic ia l c a pa c ity sh ou ld b e dis mis se d w he n th e g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty that he se rv e s r e ma ins a

pa rt y , me re ly be c a us e the claims ag ainst the entity and the indivi dual are duplicative. A lthough the dismissal of the B oard
wo uld ne c e ssa ri ly re su lt i n th e dis mis sa l o f it s off icer s w ho we re su e d in

the ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s,
se e Ha llm ar

k v . Ci ty of F re de ric k sb ur g , 9 4 S.W. 3d 70 3, 70 8 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n An ton io 20 02 , p e t. de nie d) , the B oa

rd ha s no t be e n dis mis se d and re ma ins a pa rt y to the su it. Unless and until the B oard it s e lf is d is mi s s e d , th e B o ar d

M e mb e r s s u e d

in th e ir o f f ic ia l c a p a c it ie s r e ma in n o mi n a l p arti e s . We
su sta in t he L ind ig s’ iss ue a s to the ir c la ims a g a ins t the B oa rd Me mbe rs in the ir

of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s.
CO NC LU SION We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r of dis mis sa l for la c k of jur isd ic tio n a s to the L ind ig s’ claims for ( 1) a decla

ration t hat t he C ity ’s bui lding- permit-fe e ordinance is unconstitutional; (2) a decla ration that the City must re fund all residential r emodel per mit fees illeg ally

procur ed; and ( 3) an injunction restrainingthe City from cha

rg ing a nd procur ing illeg al building perm i t fee s and perf orming future illega l acts. We reve rse the r emainder of the orde r and r emand those por tions of the c a us e to t he dis tr ic t c ourt

fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.24 __________________________________________ J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and He nson Affir med in Part, Rever sed and Rema nded in Part Filed: August 11, 2009