* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30392

Summary Calendar

LESTER L WASHINGTON, MA, M.ED, LCGC, ABD, Past President of East

Baton Rouge Parish Association of Educators

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

REGGIE WEAVER, National Education Association (NEA) President,

CAROL DAVIS, Louisiana Association of Educators (LAE) President; EAST

BATON ROUGE PARISH ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS BOARD OF

DIRECTORS (EBRPAE) of 2001-2003; SUSIE RIVET; ANITA HAYWOOD;

VENTRESS COFER; VERA ELLOIS; LOUISE SMITH; FRAN SCHURTZ;

ERNIE BLANSON; CHRIS BLANCHARD; JEFF TRAVASOS; BERNADINE

MCFADDEN

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:07-CV-451

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lester L. Washington (“Washington”) challenges the district court’s grant

of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and denial of his

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 20, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-30392

1 Though not raised by the parties, we must examine our jurisdiction in all cases sua

sponte. There is some confusion as to whether Washington intended to sue Reggie Weaver

(who was NEA president), the NEA itself, or both; and whether he intended to sue Carol Davis

(who was LAE president), the LAE, or both. The record indicates that Weaver, the NEA, and

the LAE were not properly served, nor did they appear. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). The district

court dismissed the complaint as to defendants Carol Davis, East Baton Rouge Parish

Association of Educators Board of Directors (EBRPAE) of 2001-2003, Susie Rivet, Anita

Haywood, Ventress Cofer, Vera Ellois, Louise Smith, Fran Schurtz, Ernie Blanson, Chris

Blanchard, Jeff Travasos, and Bernadine McFadden; however, the court did not mention

Weaver, the NEA, or the LAE. We have held that “unserved defendants are not parties for

purposes of Rule 54(b) and a judgment does not lack the finality necessary for appeal merely

because claims against unserved defendants are unresolved.” Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Dealy, 911

F.2d 1096, 1099 (5th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 

2

motion to amend, and he claims various errors by the district court.1

Washington’s pro se complaint consists of forty-nine pages of conclusory

statements and an additional 134 pages of attachments, including

correspondence, handwritten notes, handbook excerpts, and bank statements.

Together, these items fail to allege sufficient facts to indicate that Washington

is entitled to relief. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order of dismissal.

Because Washington’s proposed amendment simply provides twenty pages of

additional conclusory allegations, another $10 million of claimed losses, and

adds nothing of substance to his prior complaint, we agree with the district court

that permitting the amendment would be futile. We also find no abuse of

discretion in the various rulings ofthe district court that Washington challenges.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), viewing

all well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g.,

Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). “[A] complaint ‘does not

need detailed factual allegations,’ but must provide the plaintiff’s grounds for

entitlement to relief – including factual allegations that when assumed to be

true ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). Although we

construe pro se complaints liberally, we will not “‘accept as true conclusory
No. 08-30392

2 See n.1, supra.

3

allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact.’” Great Plains Trust Co. v.

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000)). 

We review a district court’s denial of leave to amend under Rule 15(a) for

an abuse of discretion; however such discretion is limited by the rule, which

states that leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.”

FED. R. CIV.P15(a)(2); Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 872 (5th Cir.

2000) (noting that Rule 15(a) “evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to

amend.”). “Generally a district court errs in dismissing a pro se complaint for

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an

opportunity to amend.” Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998).

However, it is within the district court’s discretion to deny a motion to amend if

it is futile. Stripling, 234 F.3d at 872-73.

Washington has brought suit against the National Education Association

(“NEA”), and/or its president, Reggie Weaver2; Louisiana Association of

Educators (“LAE”) and/or its president Carol Davis; the East Baton Rouge

Parish Association of Educators (“EBRPAE”) board of directors from 2001

through 2003, Susie Rivet, a past president of the association, and board

members Anita Haywood, Ventress Cofer, Vera Ellois, Louise Smith, Fran

Schurtz, Ernie Blanson, Chris Blanchard, Jeff Travasos, and Bernadine

McFadden. Washington was the president of the EBRPAE, a constituent

organization of the NEA and LAE, beginning in 2001, but was removed from

office in 2002 in connection with a criminal prosecution that resulted in his

conviction. Washington’s complaint sets forth a lengthy list of grievances

againstthe defendants, documenting perceived mistreatmentin connection with

his stewardship of the organization and his criminal prosecution. 
No. 08-30392

4

The appellant raises numerous theories of liability as to which he lacks

standing. For example, he sues under the Fourteenth Amendment. None of the

twelve defendants are state actors, so no claim lies under the Fourteenth

Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, his claims for alleged

violations of child abuse laws, Title IX, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were

properly dismissed for lack of standing. Dismissal was also appropriate as to

Washington’s allegations that defendants are liable for misapplying the

Louisiana civil service rules regarding paid leave, since none of the defendants

are state actors subject to the leave requirements. 

Washington argues that the defendants improperly obtained insurance

proceeds for losses they wrongly attributed to theft by Washington when the

money was actually stolen by one or more of the defendants. Whatever the

validity of this belief, there is no indication that Washington himself suffered

any compensable harm; accordingly, there is no factual support for his standing

to assert this claim. 

There is no factual support to Washington’s contention that the

defendants were derelict or negligent in any duty they owed to him. In short,

there are no allegations that the defendants – supervisors or board members of

an organization that Washington presided over – had any specific duty with

regard to Washington, nor that any claimed negligence or dereliction in their

supervision of the EBRPAE can be remedied by Washington’s lawsuit. In

addition, Washington’s lengthy complaint shows beyond doubt that he may

prove no set of facts to entitle him to relief under whistleblower protection laws,

the Federal False Claims Act, Title VII, the Louisiana Crisis Leave Program,

and under theories of contractual violations, libel, slander, and defamation.

Initially, Washington claims that he was mistreated in retaliation for reporting

“child abuse” against a seventeen year old office worker in the EBRPAE office;

however, it is unclear what statutorily-protected activity Washington claims to
No. 08-30392

5

have engaged in, or the acts of defendants to retaliate against him. He appears

to claim protection under the federal Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. §

2303(b) (1989) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, the Whistleblower

Protection Act only applies to claims by federal civil servants against their

governmental employers, and there is no indication that Washington made any

report of Sarbanes-Oxley improprieties. Such statutes, therefore, do not apply

here. 

Similarly, Washington fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted under the False Claims Act. Again, this statute only imposes liability

for false or fraudulent conduct with regard to claims made against the

government. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994). Washington does not allege that the

defendants in this case committed any wrongdoing in connection with claims

against the government; accordingly, no cause of action lies. 

It is again unclear what claims Washington wishes to bring under Title

VII, since his conclusory allegations include no specific instances detailing

discrimination or a hostile workplace, nor that any of the defendants are his

“employer” for purposes ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964. In any case, Washington

failed to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after

learning of any discriminatory conduct; accordingly, his claims would be

prescribed. Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). 

Finally, Washington alleges an undifferentiated set of wrongdoing

including unnamed contractual violations and “INTENTIONAL LIBEL,

SLANDER AND DEFAMATION: TO DESTROY ONE’S CAREER,

REPUTATION, AND FUTURE: intentional, WILLFUL, HOSTILE AND

MALICIOUS slander and defamation of a Licensed and certified Tenured

Guidance Counselor without holding a DueProcess, Grievance, or Impeachment

Hearing according to EBRPSS, EBRPAE, NEA, LAE, LDOE, USDOE, Const.
No. 08-30392

6

Amendment 14 and other Laws and Policies.” Despite the marked length of

Washington’s complaint, his allegations fail to “provide notice of the

circumstances which give rise to the complaint,” or “set forth sufficient

information to outline the elements ofthe claim or permitinferences to be drawn

that these elements exist.” Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164

(5th Cir. 1999). The complaint certainly does not sufficiently state a claim for

relief under any of these theories of liability. Accordingly, dismissal was

appropriate.

Although dismissal without leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15 is disapproved of, it is appropriate where the plaintiff has clearly

alleged his best case, Bazrowx, 136 F.3d at 1054, or amendment would be futile.

Stripling, 234 F.3d at 872-73. Here, the amended complaint proposed by

Washington does nothing to cure his failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. In sum, the proposed amendment makes clear that leave to

amend will not remedy Washington’s failure to state a claim. Accordingly, the

district court did not err in dismissing Washington’s complaint without

prejudice.

Finally, Washington appears to challenge a number of rulings by the

district court, including the refusal to accept a number of documents filed while

this case was on appeal. Washington argues, in part, that the court “engaged in

intention or unintentional obstruction of justice and suppression and

sequestering of evidence . . .,” “misread[] the complaint and enter[ed] false

accusations and information in [the] docket . . .,” “erred in allowing the defense

to illegally file documents and motions without sending them to the Pro Se

Plaintiff for responses,” “erred in rushing to dismiss the case in violation of

FRAP Rules without clear factual reasons, support, or basis . . .,” “intentionally

ignored volumes of facts, due process of law, amendments, and illegally

dismissed this case . . .,” “showed (unintentional) bias, prejudice, and
No. 08-30392

7

discrimination against him as a Pro Se Plaintiff in not allowing him to file

responses electronically . . .,” and “erred in assuming that because the Plaintiff

Pleaded No Contestin his criminaltrialthat he is guilty, suffered no harms, had

a fair trial in the 19th JDC, and did not deserve a fair trial in the USDC MDL

with all facts, affidavits, depositions, sworn statements, discovery, pretrial

conferences,time dated materials and other FRAP requirement[s] adhered to[.]”

After reviewing the record and Washington’s allegations, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion. 

As the district court explained, liberal construction of a pro se complaint

does not permit a plaintiffto make baseless assertions againstthe judiciary. We

concur that,

Neither the modern view of civil pleading nor the liberal pro se

practice of this court has done away with the time honored notion

that the law and the courts ofthe United States are important parts

of American society worthy of respect. This court simply will not

allow liberal pleading rules and pro se practice to be a vehicle for

abusive documents. Our pro se practice is a shield against the

technical requirements of a past age; it is not a sword with which to

insult a trial judge. 

Theriault v. Silber, 579 F.2d 302, 303 (5th Cir. 1978).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s order.