CLD-103 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 12-4218

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FELICIA SHARON SINGLETON,

Appellant

v.

SHANNON COLLINS; MICHAEL COLLINS

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2:12-cv-05974)

District Judge: Honorable Norma L. Shapiro

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Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

January 31, 2013

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 13, 2013)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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PER CURIAM

Felicia Sharon Singleton appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing 

her complaint. Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily 

affirm the District Court’s order.
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I.

In 2011, the Bucks County Orphans’ Court terminated Singleton’s parental rights, 

and awarded custody of her son to the defendants, Shannon and Michael Collins. 

According to a motion she filed in the District Court, which the court treated as a motion 

for reconsideration, Singleton later underwent psychiatric treatment and now believes she 

is sufficiently mentally stable to care for her son. Although she did not state a claim for 

relief in the complaint, her motion for reconsideration appeared to seek reinstatement of 

her parental rights.

 During screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the District Court read

Singleton’s complaint to be a request for federal review of the custody determination 

made by the Bucks County Orphans’ Court. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed 

her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 

Singleton filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary 

review over the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint under section 1915(e)(2)(B). 

See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We review de novo 

determinations regarding the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Metro. Life 

Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F.3d 271, 275 (3d Cir. 2007). We may summarily affirm a 

judgment of the District Court on any basis supported by the record if the appeal does not 
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raise a substantial question. See I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 

247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

III.

Although the intent of Singleton’s complaint is unclear, to the extent that she

sought federal review of the decision of the Bucks County Orphans’ Court, the District 

Court properly dismissed her complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under 

Rooker-Feldman, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to engage in 

appellate review of state court determinations. See Turner v. Crawford Square 

Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). Rooker-Feldman is confined to 

“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court 

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district 

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basics 

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “[T]here are four requirements that must be met 

for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) 

the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those 

judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting

the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining & Mineral 

Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks 

and brackets removed), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1798 (2011). Singleton’s complaint, read 

together with her motion for reconsideration and her filings in this Court, demonstrate 

that all four Rooker-Feldman requirements are met. Singleton alleged that her parental 
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rights were terminated pursuant to an adverse judgment of the Bucks County Orphans’ 

Court. Although she named the custodial parents as defendants in her suit, it appears that 

she was seeking a federal court ruling reinstating her parental rights. Therefore, the 

District Court properly applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss Singleton’s 

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Her remedy, if any, lies in the state 

courts, not the federal courts.

Accordingly, the District Court did not err in dismissing Singleton’s complaint for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

order. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.