J-S04038-15

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellant

 v.

AARON DELMAR RASCOE,

 Appellee

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 751 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered April 21, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-67-CR-0004515-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED APRIL 06, 2015

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) appeals from 

the April 21, 2014 order which granted the motion to suppress filed by Aaron 

Delmar Rascoe (Rascoe). We affirm.

The suppression court summarized the underlying facts of this case as 

follows.

[On February 21, 2013, at about 2:30 a.m., Pennsylvania 

State Troopers Bernam and Bennett] pulled over a Chevy 

Suburban because it had a headlight out. This traffic stop 

occurred near the 600 block of West Princess Street, and 

[Trooper Bernam] explained from his experience as a state 

trooper that this was a high crime area in York city. Both 

officers approached the vehicle and identified [Rascoe] as the 

passenger of the vehicle. The driver provided Trooper Bennett 

with documentation confirming that the headlight was damaged 

in an accident that occurred earlier that day.

While running a warrant check on both the driver and 

[Rascoe], Trooper Bennett testified that he told Trooper Bernam 
J-S04038-15

- 2 -

he detected an odor of marijuana in the vehicle. Trooper 

Bennett started with the Pennsylvania State Police on January 2, 

2013. Both officers re-approached the vehicle and the driver 

was ordered to step outside. When Trooper Bernam opened the 

passenger door, he testified that he too smelled the odor of 

marijuana. The driver denied smoking marijuana and further 

denied the presence of any marijuana in the car. Trooper 

Bennett briefly patted down the driver and found no weapons or 

contraband. The officers asked the driver if he would consent to 

a search of the vehicle. The driver refused, explaining that he 

was not the vehicle’s owner. He was then advised that the 

vehicle would be impounded and towed. While this was taking 

place, [Rascoe] remained in the front passenger seat of the 

vehicle and stayed there as the driver made a phone call to tell 

someone the car would be impounded.

Eventually, Trooper Bernam asked [Rascoe] to exit the 

vehicle. Before exiting the vehicle, [Rascoe] reached over and 

turned off the vehicle’s ignition and removed the keys. The 

trooper immediately took the keys from [Rascoe]. Significantly, 

Trooper Bernam did not pat down or search [Rascoe] for 

weapons when he exited the vehicle’s passenger side door. 

After the trooper took the keys from [Rascoe], he informed 

[Rascoe] and the driver that they were both free to leave. They 

also informed the driver that they were going to impound the car 

and get a warrant to search it because they smelled marijuana 

and because the driver would not consent to a vehicle search.

While [Rascoe] was still standing on the sidewalk, the 

vehicle’s driver quickly grabbed the car keys out of Trooper 

Bernam’s hands and ran from the scene. Trooper Bernam 

testified that he was shocked. Since York City Police had arrived 

on the scene, they pursued the fleeing driver. Trooper Bernam 

stayed with [Rascoe], who had not moved since the keys were 

taken from him. At this point, Trooper Bernam explained that he 

wanted to detain [Rascoe] for safety reasons so he ordered 

[Rascoe] to get on the ground. When [Rascoe] did not comply, 

both Trooper Bernam and Trooper Bennett forced [Rascoe] to 

the ground and placed him in handcuffs. While on the ground, 

Trooper Bernam testified that he patted down [Rascoe] and felt 

a bulge that he believed to be drug packaging inside [Rascoe’s] 

coat pocket. When [Trooper Bernam] reached into [Rascoe’s] 
J-S04038-15

- 3 -

pocket, he found a glove and a container with crack cocaine. 

Trooper Bernam eventually found marijuana and more cocaine 

on [Rascoe] after a further search of his person.

Suppression Court Opinion, 4/21/2014, at 1-3.

Rascoe filed a motion to suppress. Following a hearing, the 

suppression court granted the motion. In so doing, the suppression court 

concluded that the above encounter amounted to an arrest of Rascoe which 

was not supported by probable cause and, thus, the search of Rascoe was 

illegal. The suppression court further reasoned that, even if it viewed the 

incident as a less-intrusive Terry1-type stop and frisk, the troopers lacked 

the requisite reasonable suspicion. The Commonwealth timely filed a notice 

of appeal.2 Both the suppression court and the Commonwealth have 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3

The Commonwealth presents one issue for this Court’s review: 

whether “the suppression court erred when it suppressed the fruits of a 

search on the basis that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to perform 

a frisk of [Rascoe].” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

 

1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2 The Commonwealth has certified that the suppression order substantially 

handicaps the prosecution, making this an interlocutory appeal as of right 

under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).

3 The suppression court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on June 16, 2014, 

incorporating its analysis of the issues set forth in its April 21, 2014 opinion 

filed with its order granting Rascoe’s motion to suppress.
J-S04038-15

- 4 -

We consider the Commonwealth’s issue mindful of the following.

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, this 

Court follows a clearly defined scope and standard of review. We 

consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses

together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in 

the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. This 

Court must first determine whether the record supports the 

factual findings of the suppression court and then determine the 

reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn 

from those findings. In appeals where there is no meaningful 

dispute of fact, as in the case sub judice, our duty is to 

determine whether the suppression court properly applied the 

law to the facts of the case.

Commonwealth v. Gorbea-Lespier, 66 A.3d 382, 385-86 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Arthur, 62 A.3d 424, 427 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

Initially, we note that the Commonwealth dedicates its entire 

argument to a discussion of why the troopers had reasonable suspicion to 

stop and frisk Rascoe pursuant to the “automatic companion rule.” In so 

doing, the Commonwealth fails to address the reasoning by the suppression 

court that the troopers’ detention of Rascoe amounted to an arrest that was 

not supported by probable cause and, thus, the subsequent search of 

Rascoe was illegal. Suppression Court Opinion, 4/21/2014, at 5-8. Upon 

review, we agree with the suppression court’s sound reasoning and 

conclusion in this regard. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the 

troopers’ conduct merely amounted to a Terry-type stop and frisk, we also 
J-S04038-15

- 5 -

agree with the suppression court that the troopers lacked the requisite 

reasonable suspicion to justify their actions.4 Id. at 8-9. 

 

4 With respect to the automatic companion rule in particular, we provide the 

following: 

The “automatic companion” rule provides that “all companions of 

[an] arrestee within the immediate vicinity, capable of 

accomplishing a harmful assault on the officer, are 

constitutionally subjected to the cursory ‘pat-down’ reasonably 

necessary to give assurance that they are unarmed.” The 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not yet addressed the 

constitutionality of this rule, although it has noted the existence 

of the rule in several decisions.

This Court has ruled that a Terry frisk of an arrestee’s 

companion is permissible and, recently, addressed the 

constitutionality of the automatic companion rule. ...

... [I]n Commonwealth v. Graham, 454 Pa. Super. 169, 685 

A.2d 132 (Pa. Super. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 554 Pa. 

472, 721 A.2d 1075 (1998)[, this Court] rejected a per se rule 

that a companion of an arrestee is subject to a “pat-down” 

regardless of the justification for such search as contrary to the 

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 

I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In Graham, we 

reiterated the two separate standards that generally must be 

met for a proper stop and frisk, i.e., the officer must have 

reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that criminal 

activity may be afoot and that the suspect may be armed and 

dangerous. 

The Graham court held that the first prong of the “stop and 

frisk” test is a nullity in cases involving companions of arrestees. 

... Thus, in cases involving the frisk of an arrestee’s companion, 

the sole question becomes whether the police officer had a 

reasonable belief that the companion was armed and dangerous.
J-S04038-15

- 6 -

Because we conclude that the Honorable Michael E. Bortner has 

crafted a thorough decision disposing of the Commonwealth’s issue on 

appeal, we adopt the suppression court’s opinion filed April 21, 2014, as our 

own and affirm on the basis of that opinion. The parties shall attach a copy 

of the suppression court opinion in the event of further proceedings.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2015

 

Commonwealth v. Reed, 19 A.3d 1163, 1169 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

and footnote omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 907 A.2d 540, 

543-45 (Pa. Super. 2006)).

As demonstrated in the suppression court’s decision, Troopers Bernam 

and Bennett did not reasonably believe that Rascoe was armed and 

dangerous. Thus, the automatic companion rule does not warrant relief for 

the Commonwealth.
COMMONWEAL TH REPRODUCED RECO D 3a 

Pennsylvania State Policemen-Trooper Bernam and Trooper Bennett-to testify about an incident that 

~{) 

·,..- 

p~)urred around 2:30 a.m, on February 2 I, 2013. Trooper Bernam testified that he pulled over a Chevy 

_:·b 

\J.J <,?., 

'§vB!Jrban because it had a headlight out. This traffic stop occurred near the 600 block of West Princess oO 

~ and the officer explained from his experience as a state trooper that this was a high crime area in 

01.iJ _J 

(...) 

During the hearing on the Defendant's suppression motion, the Commonwealth called two 

I. Facts 

of that Order. 

case law, we hereby GRANT the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and now issue this Opinion in support 

hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement. After consideration of all testimony, evidence, and 

parties. The Defendant's current counsel represented him during this hearing. At the conclusion of the 

hearing was held on March 21, 2014, at which time this Court heard testimony and argument from both 

The Defendant, through prior counsel, filed a Motion to Suppress on December 19, 2013. A 

OPINION IN SUPPORT OF ORDER 

For the Defendant: 

Heather A. Reiner, Esquire 

For the Commonwealth: 

Jennifer M. Smith, Esquire 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

AARON DELMAR RASCOE, 

Defendant 

v. 

COMMONWEALTH NO. CP-67-CR-4515-2013 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

!...:., -·1 

r. 

k. 

o: 

v. 

f--' 

(l' 

e::: 

<::::: 

u: 

..f::, 

k. 

h •. 

c: 

~'-~~~~~*-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-!-- 

Circulated 03/11/2015 O ·21 PM 

v-. 

v· 

ti 

c,:, 
car keys out of Trooper Bernam's hands and ran from the scene. Trooper Bernam testified that he was 

2 

While the Defendant was still standing on the sidewalk, the vehicle's driver quickly grabbed the 

they smelled marijuana and because the driver would not consent to a vehicle search. 

also informed the driver that they were going to impound the car and get a warrant to search it because 

keys from the Defendant, he informed the Defend ant and the driver that they were both free to leave. They 

the Defendant for weapons when he exited the vehicle's passenger side door. After the trooper took the 

immediately took the keys from the Defendant. Significantly, Trooper Bemam did not pat down or search 

the Defendant reached over and turned off the vehicle's ignition and removed the keys. The trooper 

Eventually, Trooper Bernam asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle. Before exiting the vehicle, 

the vehicle and stayed there as the driver made a phone call to tell someone the car would be impounded. 

impounded and towed. While this was taking place, the Defendant remained in the front passenger seat of 

refused, explaining that he was not the vehicle's owner. He was then advised that the vehicle would be 

contraband. The officers asked the driver if he would consent to a search of the vehicle. The driver 

any marijuana in the car. Trooper Bennett briefly patted down the driver and found no weapons or 

~··. 

smelled the odor of marijuana. The driver denied smoking marijuana and further denied the presence of 

was ordered to step outside. When Trooper Bemam opened the passenger door, he testified that he too 

O·: 

v. 

1-: 

the Pennsylvania State Pol ice on January 2, 2013. Both officers re-approached the vehicle and the driver 

that he told Trooper Bemam he detected an odor of marijuana in the vehicle. Trooper Bennett started with 

<:::: 

<J.: 

While running a warrant check on both the driver and the Defendant, Trooper Bennett testified 

damaged in an accident that occurred earlier that day. 

vehicle. The driver provided Trooper Bennett with documentation confirming that the headlight was 

t·- •. 

e::: 

f-< 

York city. Both officers approached the vehicle and identified the Defendant as the passenger of the r·~. 

t- •. 

G.: 

~'~~~~~---11r-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--LV·. 

:;:. 

COMMONWEAL TH REPRODUCED RECORD 4a 

, .. r" 

Circulated 03/11/2015 02:21 PM 
determine whether reasonable suspicion exists by examining the totality of the circumstances. In re D.M, 

3 

detention, but it does not have the coercive conditions that would constuute an arrest. Id The courts 

detention" must be supported by reasonable suspicion and subjects the suspect to a stop and a period of 

1026, I 030 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 685, 934 A.2d 71 (2007). An "investigative 

suspicion but carries no official compulsion to slop or respond. Commonwealth v. Clinton, 905 A.2d 

enforcement officials and private citizens. A "mere encounter" need not be supported by any level of 

It has been established through case law that there are three types of encounters between law 

and pursuant to that stop, conduct a search for weapons. 

actions and that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant, 

suspicion to stop and frisk him. The Commonwealth argues that the troopers were warranted in their 

suppressed because the officer lacked both probable cause to arrest the Defendant and reasonable 

The Defendant argues that the evidence obtained as a result of the search and seizure should be 

JI. Motion to Suppress 

011 the Defendant after a further search of his person. 

glove and a container with crack cocaine. Trooper Bernarn eventually found marijuana and more cocaine ,,.., 

inside the Defendant's coat pocket. When the trooper reached into the Defendant's pocket, he found a 0: 

v. 

Bernam testified that he patted down the Defendant and felt a bulge that he believed to be drug packaging 

Bennett forced the Defendant to the ground and placed him in handcuffs. While on the ground, Trooper 

Defendant to get on the ground. When the Defendant did not comply, both Trooper Bern am and Trooper 

c: 

«: 

Trooper Bernam explained that he wanted to detain the Defendant for safety reasons so he ordered the 

Bernam stayed with the Defendant, who had not moved since the keys were taken from him. At this point, 

shocked. Since York City Police had arrived on the scene, they pursued the fleeing driver. Trooper 1· ... 

k. 

(7:: 

.f:: ~~~~~-tt~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.i- 

'•I·, 

COMMONWEAL TH REPRODUCED RECORD Sa 

r· 

c: 

r: 

Circulated 03/11/2015 02:21 PM 
evidence but must be more than just a hunch. Shelly, 703 A.2d at 503. 

4 

armed and dangerous." Id The officer's level of suspicion can be less than a preponderance of the 

Shelly, 103 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. 1997)). Second, the police must believe "that the suspect may be 

'reasonable and articulable suspicion' that criminal activity may be afoot." Id. ( citing Commonwealth v. 

meet two separate and distinct standards." Jackson, 907 A.2d at 543. First, "the police officer must have a 

reasonable. In order for an officer's stop and frisk under Terry to be reasonable, "the police conduct must 

The Pennsylvania courts have adopted a test to determine whether an officer's Terry stop is 

is manifestly insufficient to justify a Terry stop. Id. at 1210 (citing 111 re D.M, supra). 

note that Pennsylvania "caselaw is quite emphatic that an individual's mere presence in a high crime area 

Commonwealth v, Ayala, 191 A.2d 1202, 1209 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). It is important to 

Jn order for a stop to be reasonable under Terry [ J, the police officer's reasonable 

and articulable belief that criminal activity was afoot must be linked with his 

observation of suspicious or irregular behavior on the part of the particular defendant 

stopped. Mere presence near a high crime area ... or in the vicinity of a recently 

reported crime ... does not justify a stop under Terry. Conversely, an officer's 

observation of irregular behavior without a concurrent belief that crime is afoot also 

renders a stop unreasonable. 

Pennsylvania courts have further elaborated: 

o, 

<,;., 

>--·: 

v· 

1995)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). When discussing this very narrow exception, 

A.2d 540, 543 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 666 A.2d 323, 325 (Pa. Super. 

conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be afoot.'" Commonwealth v. Jackson, 907 

for investigatory purposes if the officer 'observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably 

('.!: 

'J_' 

Under Pennsylvania law, "the Terry exception permits a police officer to briefly detain a citizen 

905 A.2d at 1030. 

~- . 727 A.2d 556, 559. An arrest, or "custodial detention," must be supported by probable cause. Clinton, 

~ . 

c: 

+": ~~~~~-tt~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.1- 

COMMONWEAL TH REPRODUCED RECORD Ga 

v· 

Circulated 03/11/2015 02:21 PM 

<::: 
A.2d 412, 419 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (quoting Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 435 A.2d 174, 175 (Pa. 1981)). 

5 

the strictly subjective view of the officers or the persons being seized." Commonwealth v. Douglass, 539 

viewed in the light of the reasonable impression conveyed to the person subjected to the seizure rather than 

Commonwealth v. Woodson, 493 A.2d 78, 79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). The test "is an objective one, i.e., 

person into custody and subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest." 

amounts to a full-blown arrest, "An arrest is defined as 'any act that indicates an intention to take the 

These facts create a scenario far more intrusive than the limited attention envisioned by Terry and 

both officers physically forced him onto the ground, where he was restrained, handcuffed and searched. 

made no moves at all. At that time, the troopers ordered him to the ground, and when he failed to comply, 

Defendant continued to remain at the scene. He made no furtive or suspicious movements, and in fact, he 

exiting the vehicle. When his companion grabbed the keys to the automobile from Trooper Bemam, the 

exit the vehicle. Furthermore, the police officers advised him that he was free to leave the scene after 

officers, he was under arrest. Immediately prior to the arrest, the defendant had complied with a request to 

When the defendant was forcibly taken to the ground, handcuffed and then searched by the police 

A. Defendant's arrest and custodial detention was without probable cause. 

0: 

C.,., 

k: 

(citing Commonwealth v. Graham, 685 A,2d 132, 137 (Pa. Super. 1996)). 

c 

o· 

whether the police officer had a reasonable belief that the companion was armed and dangerous." Id 

further held that "in cases involving the frisk of an arrestee's companion, the sole question becomes 

"pat-down" regardless of the justification for such search." Jackson, 901 A.2d at 544. The courts have 

Commonwealth v. Graham, the "court rejected aper se rule that a companion of an arrestee is subject to a 

t.,. Pennsylvania courts have also addressed the constitutionality of the automatic companion rule. In 

t·- •. 

'!: 

~·~~~~~,t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~J_. 

v. 

,., 

COMMONWEAL TH REPRODUCED R RD7a 

v· 

Circulated 03/11/2015 02:21 PM 
the area after exiting the vehicle, it is clear that the troopers lacked probable cause to arrest the Defendant 

6 

search him incident to that arrest, Because the troopers informed the Defendant that he was free to leave 

Second, we conclude that the troopers lacked probable cause to arrest the Defendant and then to 

See Woodson, supra. 

under the actual control and will of the troopers. The Court concludes that these facts amount to an arrest. 

on the ground. Under these circumstances, any reasonable person would believe he was in custody and 

troopers forced him to the ground. The officers then handcuffed him while he was still laying facedown 

did not ask, but rather commanded, the Defendant to get on the ground, and after he did not comply, both 

suspicion at that time. The method of detention and the use of force were extreme as well. The troopers 

informed the Defendant that he was free to leave, the troopers obviously did not have any grounds for 

did nothing that made either trooper suspect that he was committing a crime. Because they had just 

detention of the Defendant according to Trooper Bertram's testimony. After this occurred, the Defendant 

the car keys from Trooper Bemam and fled the scene. The driver's actions were the sole reason for the 

Douglass, supra. In this case, the troopers took the Defendant to the ground solely because the driver stole 

Defendant. In reaching its conclusion, the Court must analyze the factors mentioned previously. See 

First, we conclude that this encounter amounted to an arrest, or custodial detention, of the 

detention, must be supported by probable cause. See Clinton, supra. 

methods used to confirm or dispel suspicions. Id. at 421. As mentioned above, an arrest, or custodial 

<:o: 

<.f.: 

why); the method of detention: whether there was a show, threat, or use of force; and the investigative 

location of detention (public or private); whether the suspect was transported against his will (how far and 

including: the basis for the detention ( crime suspected and grounds for suspicion); duration of detention; 

,~. Several factors are generally considered in determining whether a detention is investigative or custodial, 

1- ..... 

(I' 

+:: -tt------------------------------------1-- 

v·. 

COMMONWEALTH REPRODUCED RECORD Ba 

Circulated 03/11/2015 02:21 PM 
ensuing search yielding the contraband was improper. As a result, the evidence seized by the troopers 

7 

cause and to arrest the Defendant. Since the arrest lacked probable cause, we further conclude that the 

See Ayala, supra. For these reasons, we conclude that no particularized facts existed to establish probable 

Pennsylvania law, this fact alone is not sufficient to establish probable cause or even reasonable suspicion. 

The only remaining circumstance is that the incident occurred in a high crime area. Under 

commission of another's crime does not warrant an arrest. 

establish the requisite probable cause. Simply being in the presence of irregular behavior or the 

from Trooper Bemam and fled the scene. The driver's actions cannot be used against the Defendant to 

prudent officer in believing that a crime was committed. The driver, not the Defendant, snatched the keys 

that he was free to leave the area, the Defendant's actions (or Jack thereof) did not warrant any reasonable, 

Trooper Bern am conducted an ii legal search of the Defendant. After the troopers informed the Defendant 

The troopers lacked the necessary probable cause in this case to arrest the Defendant, and as such, 

custodial search of the suspect's person at that time. In the Interest of R.P., 9 I 8 A.2d at 120. 

and training." Id. When probable cause exists and an arrest is made, the officer may conduct a full 

prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer on the scene at the time of'the arrest guided by his experience 

Probable cause is governed by an objective standard, and it "must be viewed from the vantage point of a 

O: 

V·. 

;-, 

0: 

1999)). Probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Clark, 735 A.2d at 1252. 

~: 

(J' 

918 A.2d 115, 120-21 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248, 1251 (Pa. 

cause" to believe the suspect committed a felony or misdemeanor in his presence. /11 the Interest of R.P., 

Generally, a police officer "may arrest a suspect without a warrant if the officer has probable 

informed he was free to leave. 

t·- •. at that point. The Court must then examine whether probable cause arose after the Defendant was 

t~. 

'-./·. 

,·1 

(.1"• 

COMMONWEAL TH REPRODUCED RECORD 9a 

,, -, 

c.: 

r: 

Circulated 03/11/2015 02:21 PM 
odor of marijuana in the vehicle. Trooper Bernam also noticed this odor when he approached the 

8 

the vehicle's headlight was out. When the troopers approached the vehicle, Trooper Bennett smelled the 

first encounter with the Defendant and the vehicle's driver. The troopers executed a traffic stop because 

The Court does not deny that Troopers Bernam and Bennett had reasonable suspicion during the 

free to leave until the troopers forced him to the ground and searched him. 

leave the area. The second, and more important, encounter took place from the time the Defendant was 

took place from the time the vehicle was pulled over until the troopers told the Defendant he was free to 

The Court views this incident as two separate encounters with the Defendant. The first encounter 

surrounding the particular Defendant. 

suspicion and resolve the narrower issues, the Court must examine the totality of the circumstances 

police believed the Defendant was armed and dangerous. See Jackson, supra. To determine reasonable 

articulable suspicion, particular to the Defendant, that criminal activity was afoot; and 2) whether the 

frisk the Defendant. Going further, the narrower issues are: 1) whether the troopers had a reasonable and 

whether or not the applicable standard, i.e. reasonable suspicion, was met to allow police to stop and then 

time Troopers Bernam and Bennett ordered him to the ground and searched him. The issue then becomes 

The Commonwealth argues that the Defendant was the subject of an investigative detention at the 

intrusive Teny-type stop and frisk, the evidence must still be suppressed. 

c: 

o· 

police officers and that such arrest lacked probable cause.However, even if we view this incident as a less 

(;.": 

u:: 

As noted above, this court takes the position that the defendant was placed under arrest by the 

B. Defendant's detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion . 

,v:·, 

......... 

k. 

must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal search. 

(:.: 

~'~~~~~~;t-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--1-~ 

v, 

COMMONWEALTH REPRODUCED RECORD 10a 

-~· 

Circulated 03/11/2015 02: 1 PM 
suspicion existed to warrant a stop and frisk of the Defendant under these circumstances. 

9 

because another person commits a crime nearby. For these reasons, we conclude that no reasonable 

before he was cleared to leave the area. The Defendant cannot automatically become a threat merely 

clear because Trooper Bernam did not frisk the Defendant for weapons when he first exited the car and 

believe that the Defendant was armed and dangerous. See Shelly and Jackson, supra. This conclusion is 

opines that Trooper Bernam's purported frisk of the Defendant was not warranted because he did not 

required for an investigative detention or Terry-type stop and frisk. See Ayala, supra. The Court further 

Pennsylvania law, this fact alone is not enough to establish the particularized, reasonable suspicion 

circumstance is that the area happened to be a known, high crime area in York city. However, under 

suspicion after the troopers informed him that he was free to leave the area. The only remaining 

Defendant during the second encounter. As mentioned previously, the Defendant did nothing to create 

We must now consider whether the troopers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the 

trooper's original reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant ended as well. 

the Defendant of this, the Court finds that the first encounter ended. Since the first encounter ended, the 

vehicle, Trooper Bernam advised him that he was free to leave the area. Once Trooper Bemam advised 

():: 

<..,, -, 

r ••. 

<:::: 

Defendant was a threat to his or Trooper Bennett's safety. In fact, after having the Defendant exit the 

not frisking the Defendant for weapons> Trooper Bemam demonstrated that he did not believe that the 

to exit the passenger side of the vehicle, he did not "frisk" the Defendant for weapons. Jt is telling that by 

However, the troopers chose not to detain the Defendant at that time. After asking the Defendant 

circumstances, the troopers did have reasonable suspicion to order the Defendant from the vehicle. 

area of 600 West Princess Street is a high crime area in York city. Under the totality of these 

passenger side of the vehicle a second time. In light of his experience, Trooper Bemam also knew that the ~~. 

I·- », 

<:::: 

-~,~~~~~-it~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

V·. 

COMMONWEAL TH REPRODUCED RECORD 11 a 

Circulated 03/11/2015 02:21 PM 
JO 

DATED: April il, 2014 

BY THE COURT, 

Suppress. 

For the reasons stated above> the Court hereby GRANTS the Defendant's Motion to 

found on the Defendant because it resulted from an illegal search and seizure. 

Jacked any basis for either an investigative or custodial detention, the Court must suppress the evidence 

requires probable cause-an even more stringent standard than reasonable suspicion. Because the troopers 

opines that once the troopers ordered and forced the Defendant to the ground he was in custody, which 

the reasonable suspicion standard and to stop and frisk the Defendant under Terry. Furthermore, the Court 

Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to satisfy 

<::::: 

~:~~~~~~tt-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~J.- 

III. Conclusion 

COMMONWEALTH REPRODUCED RECORD 12a 

Circulated 03/11/2015 02: 1 PM