United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued July 10, 2013

Decided August 29, 2013

Before

 WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

 JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

 DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

 

No. 12-3702

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

IVAN C. THOMAS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 10 CR 792-1

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan,

Judge.

O R D E R

Ivan Thomas appeals his 235-month sentence for his role in a large-scale drug

conspiracy. He challenges the district court’s findings that he distributed more than

10 kilograms of heroin and acted as a leader or organizer of his drug-distribution ring, but

because these findings are supported by the record we affirm the sentence.

Between 2005 and 2010, Thomas supplied heroin and crack cocaine to street dealers in

the Conservative Vice Lords gang. Operating from his girlfriend’s apartment, Thomas cut,

weighed, and bagged the drugs, set their sale price, and collected proceeds from the

“runners” who delivered the drugs to dealers.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 12-3702 Page 2

Thomas was arrested in 2010 after supplying crack to an undercover agent and a

confidential informant. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846, and three counts of possession with

intent to distribute controlled substances, id. § 841(a)(1). The probation officer who

prepared the presentence report calculated a guidelines range of 235 to 293 months, after

concluding that Thomas was responsible for about 20 kilograms of heroin and 156 grams

of crack, see U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(2), and had acted as a leader or organizer of the

drug conspiracy, seeid. § 3B1.1(a). Thomas objected to the quantity of heroin, asserting that

he was responsible for a maximum of only three kilograms, and that a coconspirator’s

testimony to the contrary was unreliable. He further maintained that the four-point

adjustment for his role in the offense was unsupported by evidence that he exercised

authority over his coconspirators.

Over Thomas’s objection, the district court adopted the presentence report’s

calculations and sentenced him to 235 months on the conspiracy count and 60 months

concurrently on the otherthree counts. In determining that Thomas was responsible for 20

kilograms of heroin, the court noted that his coconspirator, Anthony Grant, had testified

credibly about drug quantities both at the sentencing of one of Thomas’s codefendants and

before the grand jury. The court also credited the sworn plea declaration of another

codefendant, Reynaldo Davis, who admitted to personally distributing about a kilogram

of heroin on Thomas’s behalf during the same period. The court rejected Thomas’s

argument that the leader/organizer adjustment was unwarranted, noting that Grant’s

testimony and Davis’s plea declaration made clear that both men worked for Thomas, who

oversaw drug transactions and collected the proceeds from his runners.

On appeal Thomas first argues that the district court erred by relying on information

from Grant and Davis in determining that he was responsible for 10 kilograms or more of

heroin. The court, Thomas asserts, should have presumed Davis’s statements unreliable

because, as a codefendant, Davis might have been attempting to shift blame from himself

or to curry favor with the prosecution. Thomas also points out inconsistencies in Grant’s

statements tolawenforcement that he says undermine Grant’s credibility, and he maintains

that the court should have disregarded the statements of Grant and Davis as

uncorroborated hearsay.

Thomas’s argument misstates the law of this circuit. Contrary to his assertions, no

presumption of unreliability attaches to the statements of codefendants or coconspirators

in the sentencing context. See United States v. Isom, 635 F.3d 904, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The

presumption of unreliability for non-testifying coconspirators is premised on the

defendant’s right at trial to confront his accusers, . . . but the Confrontation Clause does not

apply at sentencing.”); see also United States v. Platte, 577 F.3d 387, 393 (1st Cir. 2009); United
No. 12-3702 Page 3

States v. Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652, 659–60 (6th Cir. 2007). There is no clear error even when

the district court credits the “totally uncorroborated” testimony of an “admitted liar.” Isom,

635 F.3d at 907–08; see United States v. Johnson, 489 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2007); United States

v. White, 360 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Gant, 663 F.3d 1023,

1029–30 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 2011); United States

v. Nava, 624 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2010). And indeed, the statements of a single, potentially

biased witness will support a district court’s findings of fact. See United States v. Zehm, 217

F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Ngatia, 477 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 2007).

The cases Thomas cites are inapposite. He invokes Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545

(1986), and United States v. House, 551 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2008), for the proposition that the

statements of a codefendant or coconspirator are subject to a presumption of unreliability

for purposes of sentencing. But Lee involved the admission of a codefendant’s hearsay

confession at trial, and House holds only that sentencing courts may consider hearsay

statements that are supported by “sufficient indicia of reliability.” House, 551 F.3d at 698.

Here, the district court explained that it had observed Grant’s testimony firsthand and

found it credible, noting that Grant testified in detail regarding the amount and frequency

of Thomas’s drug distribution.

Thomas also characterizesGrant’s statements asunreliable because they addressed the

volume of his drug sales but not the duration that he sold at this volume. We disagree.

Grant testified that he distributed heroin as a “runner” on Thomas’s behalf for about 18

months, distributing at least 14 grams of heroin per week. He also stated that during this

period he handed off a minimum of 84 grams of heroin per week to another runner, Ervin

Hewing. Based on this testimony alone,Grant and Hewing moved more than 7.5 kilograms

of heroin over the course of the conspiracy. In addition, Davis pleaded guilty to

distributing at least one kilogram of heroin, and according to Grant’s testimony he had

distributed at least 100 grams per week. Grant also testified that he sometimes dropped off

bundles of between 3.6 and 14.4 grams of heroin to each of three otherrunners, who in turn

submitted weekly proceeds to Thomas. Although it is unclear how frequently these other

runners received deliveries or for how long they worked for Thomas, the record readily

supports the conclusion that Thomas distributed at least 10 kilograms of heroin based on

conservative figures and the assumption that the runners occasionally distributed more

than Grant’s low-end estimates. See United States v. Fleming, 676 F.3d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 2012)

(endorsing district courts’ use of “reasoned speculationandreasonable estimation” of drug

quantities) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Thomas also argues that the district court improperly increased his offense level based

on the finding that he was a leader or organizer of the drug conspiracy. As with his drug-
No. 12-3702 Page 4

quantity argument, he maintains that the upward adjustment was unwarranted because

it was based on the dubious statements of Davis and Grant. He further maintains that he

did not exercise the control or authority necessary to support the adjustment because he

received drugs from higher ranking members of the conspiracy and because Grant cut him

out of some of the drug transactions. At most, Thomas says, he should have received only

a three-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) for acting as a manager or supervisor.

The record supports the district court’s finding that Thomas acted as a leader or

organizer. The court was entitled to rely both on Grant’s testimony that he recruited

workers to the conspiracy on Thomas’s behalf and on the statements of an agent from the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives who was interviewed in connection

with the presentence report and who described how Thomas supervised his runners,

collected drug proceeds, negotiated with buyers, and set the sale prices for his drugs—all

activities that will support a finding that a defendant acted as a leader or organizer. See

United States v. Mendoza, 576 F.3d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that defendant played

coordinating or organizing role by controlling sale price of cocaine and recruiting another

member to the conspiracy); United States v. Skoczen, 405 F.3d 537, 550 (7th Cir. 2005)

(upholding adjustment where defendant negotiated prices, recruited buyer, and set details

of delivery); see also U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4 (identifying seven factors bearing on the

inquiry). Moreover, although Thomas maintains that he was not the “head” of the drugtrafficking organization, his position as a “mere middleman” would not render the

adjustment inappropriate; the key inquiry is his “relative responsibility and control over

other participants,” Mendoza, 576 F.3d at 720, and the record demonstrates that Thomas

played a central role in organizing and coordinating the runners who reported to him.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the sentence.