J-S06018-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF 

PARENTAL RIGHTS TO D.V.M.R.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: G.R., FATHER

No. 1266 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered June 22, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 3956-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2016

Appellant, G.R. (Father) appeals from the June 22, 2015 order 

involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his minor son, D.V.M.R., born 

in March 2011.1 After careful review, we affirm.2

The orphans’ court summarized the factual history of this matter as 

follows.

[Centre County Children and Youth Services 

(CYS)] was involved with [Mother] and [Father] 

concerning their older son, [N.R.]. [N.R.] was 

____________________________________________

1 The parental rights of D.V.M.R.’s mother, L.W. (Mother), were terminated 

by the same order. The disposition of Mother’s appeal is by separate 

memorandum at docket number 1258 MDA 2015.

2 The Guardian Ad Litem has filed a brief in support of the involuntary 

termination decree.
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adjudicated dependent in October, 2009. [Father] 

was incarcerated at the time [N.R.] was found 

dependent. Family Intervention Cris[i]s Services 

(FICS) was contacted to take reunification steps with 

[N.R.] and the efforts began with [Mother] in 

November, 2009 and for [Father] in March, 2010, 

when he was released from Blair County Correctional 

Facility. The reunification efforts were not successful 

as [Mother] had no housing, did not participate in 

lifestyle checks with FICS, and did not schedule 

sessions with reunification counselors. In August, 

2010, there was no progress in reunification and on 

December 30, 2010, reunification services ended as 

the parents failed to meet the required goals.

When [D.V.M.R.] was born in March, 2011, 

new services were provided by FICS since [D.V.M.R.] 

was in the home with the parents and reunification 

efforts were again commenced for [N.R.]. There was 

progress toward reunification and things went 

relatively well. The reunification efforts ended when 

[Mother] was incarcerated in December, 2011. 

[Father] had a warrant out for his arrest at that time 

and his whereabouts were unknown. [Mother] was 

to be incarcerated until February, 2014, and [Father] 

was incarcerated through September, 2012.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/22/15, at 2.

On March 10, 2014, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate the 

parental rights of Father and Mother. Termination hearings were held on 

June 9, 2014, July 30, 2014, and October 31, 2014, during which the 

orphans’ court heard the testimony of former CYS caseworker, Lindsay 

Schreffler; D.V.M.R.’s foster father, J.F. (Foster Father); D.V.M.R.’s foster 

mother, M.J.F. (Foster Mother); CYS caseworker, Tammi Eddy; Mother’s 

maternal aunt, M.M.-K.; Mother; Father’s mother, P.K. (Paternal 

Grandmother); and Father. On November 24, 2014, before the orphans’ 
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court ruled on the termination petition, CYS filed a petition to reopen the 

record in order to present new evidence concerning ongoing drug use by 

Mother. The orphans’ court granted the petition, and additional testimony 

was heard on January 2, 2015. Specifically, the orphans’ court heard the 

testimony of psychiatrist, Elmer Cupino, M.D.; and CYS caseworker, Brittany 

Werner. 

On June 22, 2015, the orphans’ court entered its order involuntarily 

terminating Father’s parental rights to D.V.M.R. Father timely filed a notice 

of appeal on July 22, 2015, along with a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i). The orphans’ court has adopted its June 22, 2015 

opinion for purposes of Rule 1925(a). 

Father now raises the following issues for our review.

I. Did the [orphans’] court err in finding clear and 

convincing evidence to justify termination pursuant 

to either 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), or 

(a)(8)?

II. Did the [orphans’] court err in concluding that 

termination would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child, more specifically did the [orphans’] 

court err in failing to give adequate consideration to 

the bond between siblings and the impact of 

termination on the bond between the minor child and 

his natural father?

Father’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

We consider Father’s claims mindful of our well-settled standard of 

review.
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The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the 

factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error 

of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely

because the record would support a different result. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to 

trial courts that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. 

The party seeking termination must prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
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In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with 

the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, 

we analyze the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate under Sections 

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows.

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds:

...

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

...

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 
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conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). “The 

grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied 

are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds 

may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” 

In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations omitted). “[A] 

parent’s incarceration is relevant to the section (a)(2) analysis and, 

depending on the circumstances of the case, it may be dispositive of a 

parent’s ability to provide the ‘essential parental care, control or subsistence’ 

that the section contemplates.” In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 

2014), quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012).

Instantly, the orphans’ court found that Father has engaged in a 

“repeated pattern of criminal activity” which has caused D.V.M.R. to be 

without essential parental care. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/22/15, at 10. 

The orphans’ court further found that Father is unable to remedy this issue. 

Id. Father argues that he has remedied the situation which prevented him 

from caring for D.V.M.R., in that he is no longer incarcerated. Father’s Brief 

at 15. Father also contends that it was improper to terminate his parental 
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rights because he never was offered reunification services with respect to 

D.V.M.R. Id.

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that 

the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating 

Father’s parental rights to D.V.M.R. During the termination hearing, CYS 

caseworker, Tammi Eddy, testified that she was assigned to this matter in 

October of 2013. N.T., 6/9/14 (Part 2), at 113. Ms. Eddy believed that 

Father was released from incarceration in Centre County on January 20, 

2012. Id. at 76. However, she noted that, “my understanding from the 

agency record is that he was on a detainer to Blair County at that point too.” 

Id. Ms. Eddy did not have the dates of Father’s incarceration in Blair 

County, but she provided several additional dates during which Father was 

incarcerated in Centre County. Id. at 76-77. Father was incarcerated at the 

Centre County Correctional Facility from March 15, 2012, until March 20, 

2012; from April 2, 2012, until April 3, 2012; from May 21, 2012, until May 

23, 2012; from June 1, 2012, until June 29, 2012; from August 20, 2012, 

until August 21, 2012, and from October 21, 2013, until November 4, 2013.3 

____________________________________________

3 Counsel for Father indicated that Father was incarcerated in Blair County 

for an unspecified period of time, and that several of these dates represent 

“transportation from Blair County where he is in Centre County for a day[.]” 

N.T., 6/9/14 (Part 2), at 77. Ms. Eddy stated that Father’s most recent 

period of incarceration resulted from a “Domestic Relations incident.” Id. at 

78. Ms. Eddy reported that, as of October of 2013, Father owed in excess of 

$18,000 in child support. Id. at 81. 
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Id. at 76-78. Ms. Eddy stated that Father currently is facing charges due to 

an incident which took place on December 26, 2012. Id. at 78. Ms. Eddy 

specified that Father was charged with “driving while driving privileges 

suspended, period for required lighted lamps, and habitual offenders[.]” Id.

Father admitted that he has a history of criminal convictions dating 

back to 1992. N.T., 10/31/14, at 47. Specifically, Father had convictions in 

1992, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008, including three convictions for 

driving under the influence. Id. at 47-49, 51. Father explained that he was 

incarcerated on December 13, 2011, due to either a receiving stolen 

property charge, or because he violated his probation. Id. at 28, 66. Father 

believed that he was released from incarceration in approximately August or 

September of 2012. Id. at 39, 61, 66. Father stated that he again was 

incarcerated in the fall of 2013 “for contempt of D.V.M.R. support.” Id. at 

26-27. With respect to his current criminal charges, Father indicated that 

his conviction is on appeal. Id. at 46. Father admitted that, if his judgment 

of sentence is affirmed, he will be incarcerated for a minimum of sixty days 

and a maximum of twenty-three months. Id. 

Accordingly, the record supports the conclusion of the orphans’ court 

that Father is incapable of providing D.V.M.R. with essential parental care, 

control, or subsistence necessary for D.V.M.R.’s physical or mental wellbeing. Moreover, Father cannot, or will not, remedy his parental incapacity. 

Father has an extensive criminal history, which has resulted in two periods 
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of incarceration during D.V.M.R.’s life. At the time Father testified during 

the termination hearing, he was facing yet another possible incarceration.4 

Father has proven that he is either unwilling or incapable of curbing his 

criminal tendencies, and it was proper for the orphans’ court to conclude 

that D.V.M.R. should no longer be denied permanency.5 In re Adoption of 

M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“[a] child’s life simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting[]”) (citations omitted).

Additionally, we reject Father’s contention that his parental rights 

should not have been terminated because CYS failed to provide him with 

reunification services with respect to D.V.M.R. Our Supreme Court recently 

held that reasonable reunification efforts are not necessary to support a 

decree terminating parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). We have 

discussed the Court’s decision as follows.

In In re D.C.D., ___ Pa. ___, 105 A.3d 662 (2014), 

our Supreme Court analyzed the language of Section 

2511(a)(2) of the Adoption Act, as well as Section 

6351 of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. The 

Court reasoned that, while “reasonable efforts may 

____________________________________________

4 This Court affirmed Father’s judgment of sentence on December 19, 2014, 

and our Supreme Court denied allocatur on June 11, 2015.

5

In his brief, Father appears to indicate that incarceration cannot be “the 

sole basis” for terminating a person’s parental rights. Father’s Brief at 15. 

As noted supra, our Supreme Court has held that incarceration may be 

“dispositive of a parent’s ability to provide [] ‘essential parental care, control 

or subsistence’ ....” See A.D., supra at 897.
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be relevant to a court’s consideration of both the 

grounds for termination and the best interests of the 

child,” neither of these provisions, when read 

together or individually, requires reasonable efforts. 

The Court also concluded that reasonable efforts 

were not required to protect a parent’s constitutional 

right to the care, custody, and control of his or her 

child....

In re Adoption of C.J.P., 114 A.3d 1046, 1055 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some 

citations omitted). Thus, Father is not entitled to relief.

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have 

discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of 

parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. As this Court has explained, Section 2511(b)

does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the 

term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case 

law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional 

bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to 

be considered as part of our analysis. While a 

parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors 

to be considered by the court when determining 

what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial 

court can equally emphasize the safety needs 

of the child, and should also consider the 

intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, 

and stability the child might have with the 

foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and 

whether any existing parent-child bond can be 
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severed without detrimental effects on the 

child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015), quoting

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court found that terminating the parental rights of 

Father and Mother would best serve the needs and welfare of D.V.M.R. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/22/15, at 10-11. The orphans’ court explained 

that it considered the bond between D.V.M.R. and his parents, and 

concluded that D.V.M.R. would not suffer emotionally if parental rights are 

terminated. Id. at 10. The orphans’ court observed that D.V.M.R. shared a 

stronger bond with his foster parents. Id. Finally, the orphans’ court noted 

that it would be best for D.V.M.R. to continue residing with his foster 

parents, even though this will prevent D.V.M.R. from residing with his

brother N.R. Id. at 11. The orphans’ court expressed hope that D.V.M.R.’s 

foster parents would work with N.R.’s foster parents, and with CYS, to foster 

a relationship between D.V.M.R. and N.R. Id. 

Father argues that it was improper to terminate Father’s parental 

rights because the orphans’ court failed to discuss the harm that may befall 

D.V.M.R. if his bond with N.R. is severed. Father’s Brief at 17-19. Father 

contends that the orphans’ court also failed to provide a “substantive 

evaluation” of the bond between D.V.M.R. and Father. Id. at 20. Father 
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insists that a bonding evaluation should have been conducted with respect to 

D.V.M.R. and N.R., and with respect to D.V.M.R. and Father. Id. at 19-20. 

We again discern no abuse of discretion. Ms. Eddy testified that she 

did not believe that D.V.M.R. would suffer emotional harm if the parental 

rights of Father and Mother are terminated. N.T., 6/9/14 (Part 2), at 100. 

Ms. Eddy explained that she has attended approximately four visits between 

D.V.M.R. and his parents. Id. at 116-17. In addition, Ms. Eddy has 

transported D.V.M.R. back from visits. Id. at 95-96. While being driven 

back after a visit, D.V.M.R. frequently asks when they are going to be home, 

and says, “I want Mommy [J.], I want my mommy,” meaning Foster Mother. 

Id. at 96. In contrast, Ms. Eddy described an incident during which she 

arrived at the foster home, and D.V.M.R. mistakenly believed that she was 

there to take him to a visit with his parents. Id. at 96. D.V.M.R. “ran 

upstairs screaming [‘]I don’t want to go, I don’t want to go.[’] He then 

started throwing books at the [foster parents’] daughter.”6 Id. at 96-97. 

Concerning D.V.M.R.’s bond with his brother N.R., Foster Mother 

testified that D.V.M.R. and N.R. initially were placed together in her home. 

Id. at 39-40. However, N.R. engaged in numerous inappropriate behaviors, 

including acts of violence against D.V.M.R. Id. at 41-43. Foster Mother and 

____________________________________________

6 While describing this incident, Ms. Eddy used N.R.’s first name rather than 

D.V.M.R.’s first name. However, it is clear from the context that she was 

referring to D.V.M.R. 
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Foster Father struggled to ensure D.V.M.R.’s safety, and Foster Mother called 

CYS asking for assistance. Id. at 40, 42, 52. As a result, N.R. was sent to 

be evaluated at a facility called Kids Peace. Id. at 53-54. During N.R.’s 

time at Kids Peace, it was determined that N.R. should not reside with other 

children. Id. at 56. Thus, N.R. was placed in the care of Paternal 

Grandmother. Id. Foster Mother noted that N.R. was present during some 

of D.V.M.R.’s visits with Mother and Father, and that D.V.M.R. is more willing 

to attend visits if he knows N.R. will be there. Id. at 49-50, 61-62. Foster 

Mother indicated that she would support D.V.M.R. and N.R. maintaining a 

relationship, even after she and Foster Father adopt D.V.M.R. Id. at 62. 

Thus, the record supports the conclusion of the orphans’ court that it 

would best serve D.V.M.R.’s needs and welfare to terminate Father’s 

parental rights. D.V.M.R. was removed from Father’s care in December of 

2011, when he was about nine months old. D.V.M.R. was placed with his 

current foster parents in March of 2012, and has resided with them 

continuously since that time. N.T., 6/9/14 (Part 1), at 34, 88. While Father 

suggests that the orphans’ court should have procured a bonding evaluation, 

it is well-settled that a court in a termination proceeding “is not required by 

statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation be performed by 

an expert.” In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). The orphans’ court was well within its discretion when it relied on 
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the testimony of Ms. Eddy, among others, to conclude that D.V.M.R. would 

not suffer emotional harm if Father’s parental rights are terminated. 

Moreover, it was proper for the orphans’ court to conclude that 

D.V.M.R.’s relationship with N.R. should not prevent Father’s parental rights 

from being terminated. As Father admits, “the rule against separation of 

siblings is not necessarily controlling in an involuntarily termination case.” 

Father’s Brief at 17, citing In Re R.P., 956 A.2d 449 (Pa. Super. 2008).7 

We agree with the orphans’ court that whatever bond the brothers share is 

outweighed in the instant matter by other concerns, including D.V.M.R.’s 

bond with his foster parents, D.V.M.R.’s need for permanence and stability, 

and by Father’s repeated incarcerations. As noted supra, Foster Mother 

____________________________________________

7 R.P. was a goal change case in which a panel of this Court considered 

whether a trial court abused its discretion by separating R.P. and his sibling, 

L.P. R.P., supra at 457-58. This Court held that Mother waived this claim 

by failing to raise it before the trial court. Id. at 457. This Court further 

noted that, even if this claim had properly been preserved, Mother’s 

argument was specious, given that R.P. remained hospitalized at the time of 

the permanency review hearing, and it was impossible to place him with L.P. 

Id. at 457-58. Finally, the Court explained as follows.

While a decision ultimately may be made to place the children 

together in the future, the general rule disfavoring separation of 

siblings ... is not controlling as no absolute constitutional or 

statutory right to be raised with a sibling yet exists in our 

jurisprudence. The court, in any event, has discretion to place 

R.P. and L.P. according to the individual best interests of each 

child. The health, safety, and welfare of each child supersede all 

other considerations. 

Id. at 458 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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indicated during the termination hearing that she would support D.V.M.R. 

and N.R maintaining a relationship, even after she has adopted D.V.M.R.8

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not 

abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to 

D.V.M.R. See T.S.M., supra. Accordingly, we affirm the June 22, 2015 

order of the orphans’ court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/4/2016

____________________________________________

8 Similarly, Foster Father stated, “I would make sure that those boys stayed 

in contact with each other, seen [sic] each other. I have no problem with 

them communicating with each other.... I assure you that ... they will be in 

contact with each other.” N.T., 6/9/14 (Part 2), at 26.