1

Filed 3/27/15 P. v. Morris CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRANDY MORRIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

C076243

(Super. Ct. No. 13F01692 )

A jury found defendant Brandy Morris guilty of receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. 

Code, § 496d, subd. (a)),1receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and possessing 

methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The trial court found true 

allegations that defendant had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 

subds. (a)-(d)) and had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial 

court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 11 years 8 months in prison.

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing a one-year fourmonth consecutive term for receiving stolen property. She claims section 654 bars such a 

sentence because she received the stolen property (a car owner’s manual & vehicle 

registration) at the same time as she received the stolen vehicle (a sport utility vehicle 

(SUV)), as part of a single criminal act with a single purpose.

We conclude that the trial court erred, but for different reasons. Because the 

contemporaneous receipt of two or more items of stolen property can only support a 

single conviction (People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 275 (Lyons), overruled on other 

grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1; People v. Smith (1945) 26 Cal.2d 854, 

859 (Smith)), and because defendant received the owner’s manual and registration at the 

same time as she received the SUV, we will reverse defendant’s conviction and sentence 

for receiving the stolen owner’s manual and registration. We affirm the judgment in all 

other respects.

BACKGROUND

Sarrah Ambriz’s silver SUV was stolen from the parking lot of her Roseville 

apartment complex in November 2012. Her husband’s car keys were also missing.

Folsom Police Officer Christopher Hill saw a silver SUV back out of the driveway 

of 9380 Ottoman Way in the early morning hours of November 26, 2012. Officer Hill 

could not see the driver, but broadcast a description of the SUV over the police radio.

Folsom Police Sergeant John Lewis heard the broadcast and spotted the SUV 

moments later. Sergeant Lewis followed the SUV to the driveway of a nearby house. 

Sergeant Lewis looked in the SUV, but did not see anyone. He heard someone jumping 

over a fence behind the house, and found a sweatshirt and a pair of slippers on the ground 

nearby. Sergeant Lewis did not see the driver.

The SUV was unlocked and the keys were in the ignition. The SUV’s rear license 

plate had been covered over with paper-covered dealer plates.
3

Sergeant Lewis called dispatch and learned the SUV had been stolen. He searched 

the interior of the SUV and found a wallet containing defendant’s California 

identification card. The address on the identification card was 9380 Ottoman Way, the 

same address where Officer Hill had seen the SUV earlier.

Sergeant Lewis went to 9380 Ottoman Way. Defendant was not home, but her 

mother or stepmother opened the door. Sergeant Lewis searched defendant’s bedroom 

and found the owner’s manual and vehicle registration for the SUV on defendant’s bed.

Approximately four months later, on April 1, 2013, Citrus Heights Police Officer 

David Moranz stopped defendant for driving a car with no license plates and a large 

crack on the front windshield. Officer Moranz ran defendant’s name through dispatch 

and learned that she had a warrant out for her arrest.

Officer Moranz turned defendant over to Citrus Heights Police Officer Nathan 

Ferguson for booking. Officer Ferguson asked defendant whether she had any 

contraband on her, and defendant admitted that she had methamphetamine in her bra.

On May 29, 2013, defendant was charged by amended complaint (later deemed an 

information) with four counts as follows: (1) unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle 

(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count one); (2) receiving a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, 

subd. (a); count two); (3) receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count three), and (4) 

possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count four). With 

respect to counts one and two, the prosecution alleged that defendant had suffered three 

prior convictions for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, 

subd. (a)) and one prior conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle (§§ 496d, subd. (a), 

666.5, subd. (a).) The prosecution further alleged that defendant had suffered a prior 

strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had served three 

prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges and 

denied the truth of the prior conviction allegations.
4

On February 24, 2014, the jury found defendant guilty on counts two, three, and 

four, and not guilty on count one. On March 28, 2014, the trial court found the prior 

conviction allegations true. The trial court then sentenced defendant to eleven years eight 

months in state prison, as follows: three years, the midterm, on count two (doubled to six 

years for the strike prior); a consecutive eight months, one-third the midterm, on count

three (doubled to one year four months for the strike prior); a consecutive eight months, 

one-third the midterm, on count four (doubled to one year four months for the strike 

prior); and one year for each of the three prison priors. During sentencing, the trial court 

explained that the sentence on count three would be consecutive to the sentence on count 

two “pursuant to [California Rules of Court,] rule 4.425 sub (a) sub (3) in that the crime 

in Count 3 was committed at a different time and a separate place rather than being 

committed so close in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.”

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that section 654 bars multiple punishment for counts 2 and 3 

because she received the stolen property (the owner’s manual & vehicle registration) at 

the same time as she received the stolen SUV, as part of a single criminal act with a 

single purpose. We agree that the trial court erred in imposing a term of imprisonment 

for count three; however, we reach our conclusion by means of a different analytical 

route.

California courts have long held that the receipt, on a single occasion, of two or 

more stolen goods constitutes a single offense of receiving stolen property. (Lyons, 

supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 275 [receipt of stolen watch and fur coat on a single occasion is 

one offense even if received from different sources]; see also Smith, supra, 26 Cal.2d at 

p. 859.) Thus, two or more stolen items received in the same transaction do not 

constitute separate offenses and cannot be charged separately. (Lyons, supra, 50 Cal.2d 

at p. 275; Smith, supra, 26 Cal.2d at pp. 858-859.)
5

In this case, the information charges defendant with one count of receiving a 

stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)) and one count of receiving an “owner’s manual and 

registration card taken from within a stolen vehicle” (§ 496, subd. (a)). Both offenses are 

alleged to have taken place “[o]n or about November 26, 2012.”

No evidence was presented as to when defendant actually received the stolen SUV 

and owner’s manual and registration. However, defendant claims without citation to the 

record that “both the registration and vehicle owner’s manual were left inside the car at 

the time of the theft.” The People also claim--also without proper citation to the record--

that “the owner’s manual and registration . . . were in the car when it was stolen . . . .”

2

Although we generally disregard unsupported assertions (Duarte v. Chino Community 

Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856), where the parties agree, we accept their 

agreed facts as mutual concessions. (Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 

170, 175, fn. 3.) Accordingly, we accept the parties’ assertions that the owner’s manual 

and registration were in the SUV at the time it was stolen. That being the case, it follows 

that defendant received the owner’s manual and registration at the same time as she 

received the SUV, as part of a single transaction. We have reviewed the entire record and 

find nothing to suggest that defendant received the owner’s manual and registration on 

any other occasion, despite the trial court’s statement “that the crime in Count 3 was 

committed at a different time and a separate place rather than being committed so close in 

time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.”

 

2 The People purport to find support for their assertion in Ambriz’s trial testimony. 

However, Ambriz merely testified that she recognized the owner’s manual. She did not 

testify that she kept the owner’s manual and registration in the SUV or that they were in 

the SUV at the time it was stolen.

The People also refer to Sergeant Lewis’s testimony. Sergeant Lewis testified that he 

did not know when the owner’s manual was removed from the SUV. He did not testify 

that the owner’s manual and registration were in the SUV at the time it was stolen.
6

Because defendant received the stolen owner’s manual and registration at the same 

time as the stolen SUV, she could only be subjected to one conviction for receiving stolen 

property, not two. (Lyons, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 275; Smith, supra, 26 Cal.2d at pp. 858-

859.) Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in imposing a term of 

imprisonment on each conviction for counts two and three. This constitutes an 

unauthorized sentence, as the receipt of the stolen SUV in count two and the owner’s 

manual and registration in count three constituted a single criminal transaction. (Lyons, 

supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 275.) Under these circumstances, the appropriate course is to 

affirm the conviction as to one count and reverse as to the other. (Id. at pp. 275-276; 

People v. Bowie (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 143, 157.) Therefore, we will reverse as to count 

three and affirm as to count two. 

DISPOSITION

Defendant’s conviction in count three for receiving the stolen owner’s manual and 

registration is reversed and her sentence on count three is stricken. The judgment is 

affirmed in all other respects. The trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of 

judgment that deletes the sentence on count three (and the corresponding 16-month term), 

recalculates the aggregate term, and forward a certified copy to the Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation.

 BLEASE , Acting P. J.

We concur:

 NICHOLSON , J.

 BUTZ , J.