*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 10, 2005*

Decided November 15, 2005

Before

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

 Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 05-1640

CINQUE ROBINSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANDREW WOLFE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 04 C 3678

Suzanne B. Conlon, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Cinque Robinson brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Andrew

Wolfe, Helen Kim, and the University of Chicago, and under Title VII against the

university. He alleged that the defendants discriminated against him based on his

race, retaliated against him, and violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The

district court dismissed the ADA claims with respect to all defendants and

subsequently granted the defendants summary judgment on the remaining claims. 

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-1640 Page 2

Robinson, who is African-American, began working for the University of

Chicago’s Radovick Laboratory in August 2002 as a Junior Research Technician. 

Defendants Wolfe and Kim, Robinson’s supervisors throughout his employment,

made several concessions in order to employ Robinson: he was employed despite his

lack of an undergraduate degree––normally a requirement for the position––and

allowed to maintain a working schedule planned around his class hours. Despite

this flexible schedule, Robinson’s performance suffered; by November, Kim and

Wolfe had spoken to Robinson several times about a backlog of work and errors in

the work that had been done. Robinson in return sent emails to Wolfe, telling him

that he needed to be “yelled at” for not keeping up with Robinson’s tasks while

Robinson was away from the lab, and to Kim, expressing his displeasure at what he

characterized as her false accusations regarding his performance. The laboratory

then issued a “Notice of Corrective Action” based on Robinson’s “unsatisfactory

performance of duties” and insubordination, citing the emails. In December,

Robinson threatened to make a citizen’s arrest of Wolfe “on the grounds of unlawful

retaliation.” Three days later, the university issued a second “Notice of Corrective

Action,” again citing Robinson’s work performance and insubordination, and

suspended him; shortly thereafter Robinson was terminated.

Robinson filed suit and alleged racial discrimination under of Title VII and

that the defendants broke an implied contract in violation of § 1981, as well as

violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court dismissed the

ADA claim against the university because it had not been raised in the charge he

filed initially with the EEOC, and both the ADA the Title VII claims against Wolfe

and Kim because they were not “employers” for statutory purposes. This left a

§ 1981 claim that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his race

when they broke an implied agreement to let him work a flexible schedule and then

fired him and a Title VII claim against the university, alleging discrimination and

harassment.

The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on the

surviving claims. The court found that Robinson’s evidence was insufficient to

allow him to proceed under the direct method of proving his case. The court

determined that Robinson failed to make his prima facie case under the indirect

method because he had not shown that he met the appellees’ legitimate work

expectations, that the changes to his work schedule were an adverse employment

action, or that similarly situated employees received favorable treatment. The

court added that even if Robinson had made out his prima facie case, he could not

show that the appellees’ stated non-discriminatory reasons for firing him were

pretextual. As for Robinson’s § 1981 claim, the court found no evidence that the

alleged harassment was on account of his race or that it was severe enough to be

actionable.
No. 05-1640 Page 3

Robinson generally appeals both the dismissal of his claims under the ADA

and the grant of summary judgment on his Title VII and § 1981 claims. Although

he reiterates his arguments under the ADA and asserts that they bear on his racial

discrimination claims, Robinson does not address the district court’s findings that

he failed to present an ADA claim in his EEOC complaint or that Wolfe and Kim

were not employers under the ADA. Thus Robinson has forfeited any challenge to

these findings, see Carreon v. Illinois Dept. of Human Services, 395 F.3d 786, 798

(7th Cir. 2005). 

As for the grant of summary judgment, Robinson asserts in conclusory

fashion only that he did make out a prima facie case of discrimination. He does not

identify any particular error of the district court, but rather argues that his

employers’ expectations were illegitimate because they did not take his disability,

chronic fatigue syndrome, into account, and that his white co-workers were

similarly situated to himself. His argument primarily consists of one of his filings

from the district court, resubmitted as a brief with only the bald assertion that it

demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact for trial. This is insufficient. 

“Perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived, especially when, as here, a

party fails to develop the factual basis of a claim on appeal and, instead, merely

draws and relies upon bare conclusions.” Campania Management Co., Inc. v.

Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d 843, 852 (7th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). 

AFFIRMED.