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I 8 1977

F A R R E L L L 'F 'A RY 

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY HEARING 

BEFO RE TH E

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITE D STATES SENATE

NIN ET Y-FIF TH CONGR ESS 

FIRST SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF HON. CYRUS R. VANCE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE 4CA

frkbF

JANUARY 11, 1977

Printe d for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINT ING OFFICE

81-894 WASHINGTON : 1977
■h

» -X

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island

GEORGE S. MCGOVERN, South Dakota

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota

DICK CLARK, Iowa

JOSEPH R. BID EN, Ja., D elaware

EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska

(Temporary)

SPARK M. MATSUNAGA, Hawaii

(Temporary)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama, C ha irm an

CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey

JACOB K. JAVITS, New York

JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas

CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois

ROBERT P. GRIF FIN, Michigan

JOHN C. DANFORTH, Missouri

(Temporary)

P at M. Hour, Chief of Staff

Arthur M. Kuhl, Chief Clerk

i n i
C O N T E N T S

Statements by: Page

Cohen, Richard, National Committee of the U.S. Labor Pa rty _____ 95

Fierro, Manuel, President, National Congress of Hispanic-American

Citizens________________________________________________ 79

Javits, Hon. Jacob, U.S. Senator from New York_______________ 2

Korry, Hon. Edward, former Ambassador to Ethiopia and Chile___ 47

Lerner, Eric, Representative of Fusion Energy Foundation_______ 83

Moynihan, Hon. Patrick, U.S. Senator from New York__________ 3

Rittenhouse, Stanley E., legislative aide, Liberty Lobby________ 88

Vance, Hon. Cyrus, nominee to be Secretary of State of the United

States of America________________________________________ 4

Insertions for the record:

Biographical sketch of Cyrus Vance___________________________ 3

Prepared statement of Edward M. K orry______________________ 65

Prepared statement of Eric Lerner____________________________ 86

Prepared statement of E. Stanley Rittenhouse__________________ 92

Prepared statement of Richard Cohen_________________________ 97

Appendix:

Mr. Vance’s responses to additional questions for the record from 

Senator Case____________________________________________ 99

Letter and enclosed statement addressed to Senator John Sparkman 

from Joseph Leib, dated January 10, 1977_____________________ 100

“Carter Chooses the Painful Past,” article by William Greider, from 

the Washington Post, December 26, 1976______________________ 109

“The Untold Story of Cambodia’s Agony,” article by William Shawcross, from the Washington Post, Janua ry 2, 1977______________ 113

“Ending the Feud With Castro’s Cuba,” article by Abraham F.

Lowenthal, from the Washington Post, January 9, 1977__________ 122

(in)

9

VANCE NOMINATION

TUESD A Y , JA N U A R Y 11, 19 77

U nit ed S ta te s S en ate , 

C om mit te e on F or eig n R el ati ons,

Washington, D.C.

* The committee met, purs uant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221,

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Sparkm an, chairman of 

the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Church, Pell, McGovern, Humphrey, 

Clark, Biden, Matsunaga, Zorinsky, Case, Javits. Percy and Danforth.

Also Presen t: Senator Moynihan.

Also Pres ent: Mr. Pa t Holt, chief of staff.

The Chairman. Let the committee come to order, please.

O PE N IN G ST ATEM ENT

The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate meets this morning 

to consider the prospective nomination of Mr. Cyrus R. Vance to be 

the next Secretary of State of the United States.

Mr. Vance is no stranger to any of this committee's members, or to 

Capitol Hill, or to the executive branch of Government. I personally 

have known him for at least 20 years. In fact, back in the late 1950's, 

lie worked as a staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee 

and also on the Special Committee on Space and Astronautics.

I am sure that experience bodes well for our mutual relationships 

in the future.

In addition, he has served in the U.S. Navy, also as Secretary of the 

Army and as Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was one of President 

> Johnson's negotiators at the Paris Peace Talks and served as the

President's special representative during various crises in Panama, 

the Dominican Republic, Cyprus, and South Korea.

Othe r special assignments found Mr. Vance representing the PresiV dent durin g those terrible days in the late 1960's when urban strife

broke out in the streets of Detroit and Washington, D.C.

During the past few months I have given a fair amount of thought 

to the events of the past few years. We have seen the end of the PostWorld War II era, the end of Vietnam, and Watergate. On January 20 

the United States will inaugurate a new President and see the birth of 

a new administration. This provides a new opportunity to put the 

divisions of the past behind us and to develop a foreign policy based 

on a sober assessment of the national interests and the national capabil ities of the United States.

We must first give our attention in my judgment to the economic 

malaise which threatens the underpinnings of the Western World. 

Scarcely less urgent are our relations with the Soviet Union, with 

(1)
2

China, and the problem of how to gain control of nuclear energy— 

not only the overgrowing capability of the super powers for global 

destruction, but also the ever-spreading proliferation of nuclear 

weapons. I want to assure you, Mr. Secretary, that in grappling with these 

and other problems you will find this committee a willing and cooperative partn er. 1 emphasize “partner,” as the agent of the Senate in 

performing special foreign policy functions given to the Senate by 

the Constitution.

I am confident also, Mr. Secretary, t ha t you will find the committee nonpartisan. If we differ, it will not be for partisan reasons. I am 

encouraged to believe, however, that working together we can develop 

a greater consensus than has existed.

With that positive outlook, Mr. Vance, I welcome you to the Foreign 

Relations Committee.

Before we hear from you, however, I am sure that your long-time 

friend, and mine, the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Clifford Case of New Jersey, would want to say a 

word. Unfortunately Cliff has not yet come in, but he will be here 

later and we will give him an opportunity to say something at that 

time.

We, as I say, are very glad to have you. I notice you are flanked 

by your two New York Senators, each one of whom wishes to say 

something on your behalf.

I will first call on the senior Senator, Senator Javits, who, by the 

way, is a member of this committee.

STA TEM ENT OF HON. JACOB J AV ITS, U.S. SENATOR FROM NE W YORK

Senator J avits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From a lifetime of experience and relationship in the profession 

of the law and in the public domain, where I have encountered Cyrus 

Vance as the President's negotiator and in many other capacities, I 

commend him highly to the committee.

His life's story is very open and he has been submitted to questioning 

many, many times. I can affirm the fact that he is one of New York 

City's most eminent sons. lie is a tremendous factor in the morale 

and the moral character of the city. To give the committee one example, 

we are all deeply concerned about the future of New York and who 

will be the next mayor. When I came to make a list of the eminent 

citizens that should be consulted by me insofar as I was going to try 

to be helpful on that subject, Cy Vance headed the list. I think th at is 

the measure of the man.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I -wish to promise you that this will not diminish the intensity with which T shall question the nominee. But as to his 

fitness and a bility to be the Secretary of State of the United States, I 

can only say that Jimmy Carter has done well.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Javits.

We are glad to welcome to the committee th is morning the junior 

Senator from New York, Senator Moynihan.

I have told this story on our old friend. Pa t Moynihan. T got a letter 

from him one day and when it came in, I thought to myself, “Well,
3

good. li e is go ing to say lie want s to ge t on th e F or eign R ela tio ns C ommittee.” When I r ead the letter my feathe rs fell because he was a sk ing 

my su pp ort on the selec ting com mittee to pu t him on the Fi na nc e 

Com mittee.

Regardless of th at , we are very gl ad t o he ar fro m you at th is time, 

Se na tor Mo ynihan .

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

NEW YORK

Se nator Moy niha n. Th an k yo u, Mr. C hairm an.

Mr. Ch air man, you have heard how bad th in gs are in New York. 

It is n ot just th at some of us can’t afford to be on th e Fo reign Re lat ion s 

Com mittee, bu t it has reache d the po int where p eople would ra th er be 

Se cre tar y of St ate th an ma yo r of th at city [lau gh ter] th at would 

sug ges t some extre mi ty.

I wou ld scarcely add to yo ur rema rks and to those of S en ator Jav its, 

sir. I would sim ply like to mak e the one fu rt her c omm ent that, Cy rus 

Vance is no t me rely a distinguis hed New Yo rker. He is a member of 

the New Yo rk Bar an d fo r the pa st 2 years ha s been president of the 

ba r, a d istinction wh ich ha s ad ded to its em inence, p erh aps, ra th er th an 

to his.

It is a gr ea t h on or to jo in S en ator J avit s in spo nsori ng my frie nd to 

this co mmittee. H e is indeed a di sting uis he d A me rican.

The Chair man . T han k yo u v er y muc h.

10 -M INUT E RULE

Le t me say to th e me mbers of th is committee th at we w ill be o pe ratin g 

un de r the 1 0-m inute rule this mo rning. Ple ase keep y ou r eyes on thes e 

lig hts over here [ind icating] . You will see th at the green lig ht gives 

you th e go-ahead. W he n the one in the middle, the yellow lig ht , comes 

on, it is a war ning t h at you hav e 1 mi nu te more. When the red lig ht 

comes on, th at cu ts you off.

If we w ill do t ha t, we will be able to go arou nd th e t able pre tty well.

Se na tor Chu rc h. Mr. C hairm an, do th e lig hts lim it our question s o r 

Mr. V ance’s answers ?

[Gene ral l au gh ter.]

The Chairm an. It includes both.

[G ene ral l au gh ter.]

The C hairm an. Wh en Sen ator Case comes in , I will ask h im to make 

some ope nin g rem ark s.

MR. Van ce’s BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

We do have Mr. Vance 's biog raph ica l sketch and th at w ill be placed 

in the record .

[The in form ation re fe rred to fo llo ws:]

Biographical Sketch of Cyrus Vance

Vance. Cyrus Roberts, B.A.. LL. B .; American lawyer and fmr. government 

official; 27 March 1917. Clarksburg, W. Va.; s. of John Carl and Amv Roberts Vance; tn. Gracie Elsie Sloane 1947; one a. four d.; ed. Kent School and 

Yale Univ.
4

Lieutenan t, U.S. Navy 42-46; Asst, to Pres. The Mead Corpn. 46-47; Simpson,

Thaclier and Bartlett, N.Y. (law firm) 47-61, Pa rtn er 56-61, 69-; Special Counsel, Preparedness Investigating Subcttee., Cttee on Armed Services of the U.S.

Senate 57-60; Consulting Counsel to Special Cttee. on Space and Astronautics,

U.S. Senate 58; Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Defense 61-62 ; Chair. Cttee. Adjudication 

of Claims of the Admin. Conf, of the U.S. 61-62; Sec. of the Army 62-64; Dep.

Sec. of Defense 64-67; Pres. Johnson’s Special Envoy on Cyprus Situation 67. 

on Korean Situ ation 68; negotiator at Pa ris talks on Viet-nam 6S-69; Dir. Pan 

American World Airways 69-; Chair. Board of Rockefeller Found ation; Pres.

Bar Asscn. of City of N.Y. 74— ; mem. Board of IBM (In t. Business Machines 

Corpn.), New York Times Co.; mem. U.S. Supreme Court. American Bar Asscn.,

N.Y., Sta te Ba r Assn.; Fellow, American Coll. Trial La wy ers; Medal of Fre edom 69. *

One Ba tte ry Pa rk Plaza. New York, U.S.A.

Telephon e: 212-483-9000.

Source : I nte rnational Who's Who, 1976-77, Fortieth E dition.

m r. va nc e’s fin a n c ia l st at em en t

T)o we have a financial statement of our candidate on file?

Mr. ITolt. Y es, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. That financial statement will be held by tbe committee. It is confidential. Any member may examine it here in the 

committee room. We do not allow it to leave the committee room. It 

will be placed in our confidential files and kept there. I think the rule 

we usually observe is we keep it there for the time tha t the Secretary 

serves and for 2 years thereafter. T hat will be observed.

We had Secretary Vance before us informally yesterday afternoon.

I thin k we questioned him rather closely. However, there will, of 

course, be questions th at we will want to put on the public record.

Senator Church, would you please start off ?

Senator Church. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

POSSIBLE CHANGES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Vance, we have just come through an election campaign in 

which there was a lively debate on foreign policy matters. I th ink as a 

result of the election there is th e expectation that the new President 

will be initiating changes in American foreign policy.

I wonder if you might headline for the committee what you think 

some of those changes may be, and what your own view may be (

respecting that.

STATEMENT OF CYRUS VANCE, NOMINEE TO BE SECRETARY OF 

STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. Vance. Thank you very much, Senator Church. I would be very 

hap py to do that.

Fir st, let me start by briefly sketching what I would consider to be 

the fundamental policy principles which one could expect to guide 

the development of foreign policy during the next administration.

Let, me say that in doing this I run the risk of vastly oversimplifying 

the problem. B ut with tha t caveat at the outset, let me try.

The first principle is the maintenance of peace. This depends upon 

healthy alliances. American streng th, creative efforts to facilitate the 

resolution of regional disputes, as, for example, the problems of the 

Middle East. In this connection I think we must remember that Amer-
5

ican stre ng th and lea dersh ip ab road proceed fir st fro m a stro ng 

Am erica at home—st ro ng in ou r economy, s tron g in ou r cohesiveness, 

str on g in ou r confidence an d our comm itm ent t o fund am en tal values.

The second principle is a public confidence in ou r foreign policy 

requires confidence in how those policies are made. Th is, i n my ju dg ­

ment, has at the he ar t of it a close an d coopera tive relatio ns hip betwe en the executiv e bran ch a nd th e leg islative bran ch. I do n ot believe 

th at we c an develop or pr op erly im ple me nt Am erican foreign policy 

wi thou t the closest coopera tion betw een these two branch es of the 

g Gov ernment.

I piedge myself a nd this ad minist ratio n to th at end.

Next, I believe th at we mu st have openness, and toward th at end 

all th at c an pr op erly be disclosed in open sessions sho uld be disclosed 

in open sessions. Th ere will obviously be tim es when thing s cannot be, 

but the g uiding p rin ciple will be t hat we will t ry a nd be as much ope n 

as possible. I know th at th e President-e lec t int ends to com municate 

openly wi th the Am erican people th ro ug h the process of fireside chats 

in disc ussing fo rei gn po licy as well as domestic policy.

I inten d to meet once a mo nth w ith the press, if not more of ten because of spe cial circ umstance s, an d hold a press con fere nce to discuss w ith the m wha tev er q uestion s they ma y have.

Th e th ir d pr inciple is the need fo r clear, easily understood, substa ntive pr iorit ies th at will co ntr ibute to bu ild ing the wo rld th at we 

wa nt to live in. I ha ve fo ur pa rtic ul ar ly in mind.

Fir st is a streng then ing of coopera tion am ong ou r allies. Thi s is 

ce ntral to e ve rything else.

Second, Ea st- W est rel ati ons are crit ical because th ey affect t he questio n of world peace. In my judg men t we should pu rsu e the less ening 

of tensions with the Sov iet Union in an active an d agg ressive way, 

pa rtic ul ar ly in th e are a of the reducti on an d control of nu cle ar 

weapons.

Fur th er , I believe th at we should seek a cle are r un de rstand ing betwe en th e U.S . and th e Sovie t Un ion on the me aning of deten te so 

th at we un de rstand be tte r how each of u s perc eive s the process to opera te. I th in k thi s is possible and can be done. In s ay ing th is, I do n ot 

believe t hat we will not con tinue to hav e politica l c om pet itio n. I th in k 

> inde ed th at we will have politi cal comp etition wi th t he Sovie t Union .

Bu t I do th in k it is im po rtan t to have a b etter un de rstand ing of w ha t 

the ground r ule s are an d wh at we can expect of each other.

Le t me note th at I do no t th in k th at the pre occupatio n with these 

■* vitally im po rtan t issue s sho uld so domi nate ou r foreign policy th at

we neglect othe r critica l issues whi ch are grow ing inc rea sin gly im ­

po rta nt.

Let me turn to them.

These I con sid er to be of cardina l i m po rtan ce : I believe we m ust keep 

ou r eyes fixed on long-t erm objectiv es as well as on imm ediate po litical 

crises. These lon g-term objectives incl ude con trol of n uclear arm s and 

nucle ar prolife ratio n, economic dev elo pm ent and the dign ity of the 

dev eloping world, energ y, food , po pu lat ion , environme nt, and conv entio na l arm s t rans fers.

The se are the global issues w hich will det erm ine how t he n ext ge ne ratio n lives, an d even w he ther it lives.
6

I note, as all of yon know better than I, tha t foreign policy is in ­

creasingly intertwined with economic policy. These sets of intertwined 

issues in my judgment are going to be some of the most important and 

complex issues with which we will be dealing in the years ahead. In ­

deed, I believe as we look over the next 5 to 10 years, we may find that 

these issues will be replacing many of the security issues which have 

so dominated the foreign policy agenda in the last 10 or 20 years as 

the most important issues with which we have to deal.

Fina lly, we must have policies based upon fundamental values. In 

particular, we must stand for human rights. Without being interventionist I believe we can make this concern a major focus of our 

foreign policy calculations.

I apologize for the condensation of these many and complex problems. But perhaps this will serve as a basis from which to s tar t our 

discussion.

COMMENDATION OF MR. VANCE’S STATEMENT

Senator Church. Thank you very much. Mr. Vance. You have done 

us a service by using the first question as an opportunity to present 

is precis form what would otherwise be an opening statement. Aly 

chairman tells me that my 10 minutes will run from this point. But 

I will, at this moment, defer to any opening remarks tha t Senator Case 

may wish to make before I continue.

The Chairman. Let me say this before Senator Case speaks.

I do th ink this is a very fine opening statement. I had understood 

tha t he did not have an opening statement. We will count this as such. 

I think it might be very well for us to have a copy inserted in the 

Congressional Record. I think it will be very fine to make this available to all of the readers of the Congressional Record.

Pat, would you please see to it tha t tha t be done ?

Air. Holt. [Nods affirmatively.]

The Chairman. Now I will call on Senator Case fo r any opening 

remarks he may wish to make.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CASE

Senator Case. Th ank you, Air. Chairman, and thank you, my colleague from Idaho.

Air. Secretary, I shall not, for reasons, which I guess ought be obvious to everybody, indulge in an explication of the reasons for my 

satisfaction with the President-elect’s recommendation of you to us 

for this important job. AIv satisfaction runs very deep on both personal grounds and on grounds related to mv convictions. He could 

not have done better for the sake of the country and for the sake of 

the world.

Thank you, Air. Chairman.

The Chairman. All right. Senator Church, you may start your 10 

minutes.

Senator Church. Thank you, Air. Chairman.

Before I begin my questions, I just wanted to join in the sentiment 

tha t has been expressed by Senator Case. I feel the same way and I 

am sure the other members of the committee join in that. AVe offer our 

best wishes for your success.
7

Senator P ell. We do, indeed.

Mr. Vance. Thank you very much.

CHARACTER OF GOVERNMENTS WE SUPPORT WITH AID PROGRAMS

Senator Church. We know the big burden you are assuming.

I would like to go to the last point you made in connection with 

the major objectives of foreign policy as you envision them. That point 

has to do with policies tha t are based on fundamental values.

« This came up time and time again during the foreign policy debates during the recent national campaign. I for one am very happy 

tha t you have listed this as a point of departure for your own policy 

because I think that our foreign policy should reflect our values as a 

„ country. If we are going to mean anything to the world, we have to

be tine to ourselves.

I would hope that th is will translate into some refusal on the part 

of the administration to continue to extend military and economic 

aid to regimes that are systematically engaged in the repression of 

human rights, at least in the absence of overriding considerations of 

national security th at might require us to adopt a different policy. 

Do I understand that by placing greater emphasis upon these fundamental values we can expect tha t your administration of the State 

Department will take into greater account the kinds of governments 

we are supplying aid to in the future ?

Mr. Vance. Yes; you can.

Matters of human rights will be given a greater emphasis with 

respect to those decisions. But I think it is important to make the. 

point tha t you did; namely, tha t there are cases in which the security 

aspects are of overriding importance and that that has to be borne in 

mind.

Senator Church. Of course.

I can think of many countries to which we have given large amounts 

of aid under previous administrations tha t have had little or no impact upon the national security of the United States. I am encouraged bv your statement th at more attention will be given in th e future 

to the nature and the character of the governments which we suppo rt 

» with our aid programs.

FUTU RE POLICY CONCERNING COVERT OPERATIONS

Mr. Vance, the other side of the coin in the m atter of human rights 

and fundamental values has to do with the methods that we use. 

Everyone knows today that under both Democratic and Republican 

Presidents in our recent past we have intervened throu gh covert operations in many countries with a will, indeed with a zeal. Xow these 

covert operations were unconnected with the gathering of central intelligence information, but were secret undertakings in foreign lands 

to manipulate political events in ways thought to be advantageous to 

the United States.

Our methods were justified on the grounds tha t we must use them 

because the Russians do. They have embraced all of the black arts of 

covert operations—bribery, false propaganda, physical coercion, abduction. indeed even attempted assassination of foreign leaders.
8

I don’t know how we can be true to our own values as a country 

and continue to believe tha t it is our right to use such methods; 

though again, I recognize tha t in extremity a nation must do what is 

needed to assure its own survival. But we are not discussing cases 

of extremity, and the habit of the past has been to intervene in these 

ways in the affairs of other lands, even when the objective was purely 

technical.

Now I would like your own view on this. If method is the essence 

of whether or not we do adhere to our professed values as a nation, 

what are your views and what will be your policy as Secretary of *

State when it comes to decisions with respect to secret interventions in 

the affairs of other lands?

Mr. Vaxce. I am very happy to give my views on this.

Let me say by way of background tha t these kinds of covert actions .

have been going on for a long time. They were going on when I was 

in the Government, and I was part of the oversight committee at one 

point in connection with them. So I have thought long and carefully 

about this subject.

I have come to the conclusion tha t covert actions—and I distinguish between covert collection of intelligence on the one pa rt and 

covert actions against other countries, and I am talking about the 

latter—I am convinced tha t covert action against other countries 

should be carried out only in the most extraordinary circumstances. I 

believe that procedures should be established so that if there is a proposal to carry out a covert action, th at it first has to be passed upon 

by a committee of the senior Cabinet officers, to include the Secretary of 

State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser, and 

importantly in my judgment, the Attorney General of the United 

States.

1 feel very strongly that the Attorney General of the United States 

should participate in the decisionmaking process by which the decision is arrived at which goes to the President of the United States.

I th ink then th at the President of the United States should personally 

approve in writing saying that he believes this to be vital to the 

national security and so endorse the carrying forward of this extraordinary circumstance.

I then feel th at notice should be given in advance to the appropriate 

<

committee or committees of the Congress so that they can provide 

their views to the President if they disagree with the proposal.

I do not believe that the Congress should have a veto in tha t regard 

because I think that splits the responsibility. But I think tha t it is w

very likelv that if the congressional committee said to the President,

“AV e want to come in to see you as we have great concern for what is 

being proposed here,” this would have great weight with any President as to whether he would then go forward with the operation.

Finally, I believe there should be an adequate monitoring system 

so that once a covert action is approved, one keeps on top of it to determine what is happening, how it is proceeding, and whether it 

should be terminated.

Unfortunately, experience in the past has shown that these develop 

a life of their own. Once started they are hard to turn back.

Senator Church. T am very much reassured by your answer, Mr.

Vance. I think it reflects conclusions that were reached by my own
9

committee investigating the intelligence services. Now t hat the Senate is possessed of a permanent Intelligence Committee, I think what 

yon have said is in line with the prevailing view on tha t committee, 

and indeed, in the Senate itself, where the decision was taken to establish that prevention.

My time is up. Let me just end with this comment.

When you establish a test, the one you have suggested, th at covert 

operations be undertaken only in the most extra ordinary circumstances, it is well to keep in mind tha t in our kind of society, sooner 

or la ter, as long as we are a free society, the covert operation is going 

to come into service in some line. It has not met so exacting a standard.

Once it surfaces it does grave injury to the good name and repu tation of the United States througho ut the world.

Mr. Vance. I agree.

Senator Church. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Case.

Senator Case. I shall forego questioning at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Idle Chairman. Senator Pell.

Senator Pell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FU TU RE SH IF T IN FOR EIGN POLIC Y

I would like to return to the thrust of Senator Church’s question 

and examine the areas of difference in our foreign policy. I th ink you 

are probably one of the few who was at the San Francisco Conference. 

In looking back over the last 80 years to see whether or not our foreign 

policy has been a success, we can have varied responses. From the 

viewpoint of avoiding nuclear holocaust, it has worked. We are all 

still here on the planet Earth.

But on the other hand in the last 30 years we have seen the will for 

international cooperation decrease; we have seen nuclear proliferation and the danger of nuclear holocaust vastly increase; we have seen 

human rights no better off and in many countries worse off. I am 

among those who believe and hope tha t we will see a sharp shift in 

foreign policy.

Tn this regard I am delighted at your appointment. My regard, 

admiration and affection for you are tremendous. I wonder if you see 

in specific terms a reduction coming in our bilateral interventions and 

commitments around the world—we have at present half a million 

people overseas—and perhaps an expansion in our cultural relations 

with the exchange of peoples. Do you see any shifts coming?

Mr. Vance. With respect to the importance of the economic and 

social problems, T think it is clear, as I tried to indicate earlier, tha t 

these are obviously going to become of increasing importance as we 

move through the years ahead. With respect to the question of reduction of forces abroad, I think this will depend on a number of ongoing negotiations and on the general change in climate with respect 

to the resolution of problems throu gh negotiation, rather than through 

conflict in the military sense.

For example, I thin k it is of utmost importance that we make 

progress in the ongoing SALT talks and that we early set an agenda 

for SAL T III where we would seek further progress, and most p articularly the further reduction of nuclear weapons. I place very high
10

prio rity on the MBF R [mutual and balanced force reduction] talks 

going on in Vienna, which have been going on for 3 years now without

a great deal of progress, which would lead to the reduction of conventional forces in the central area of Europe.

I think we have to find a way to give greater thrust to those talks and 

see if we cannot move them forward. If that were done, then tha t 

would lead to a reduction of forces.

In the long run, I think we are looking to a reduction of forces in 

the Korean area. We have a security commitment there. Th at area is 

of vital importance to us and to our allies. The Japanese place great B

importance upon this. Therefore, any actions which we might take 

with respect to the reduction in forces in tha t area would have to be 

approached carefully with full discussion with the Japanese and the 

South Koreans. . . . *

But in the long run I see the possibility of reduction of forces 

there. I also see the necessity to review our base structures overseas 

together with other elements of the Defense Department to see 

whether or not further reductions can be made. As a matter of fact, 

some considerable progress has been made in the last 10 years. The 

major bases have been reduced by some 100; the minor bases have been 

reduced, as I recall it, by some 1,000 over tha t period of time. But I 

think it is proper to take a fresh look.

We must remain strong. We must be able to cope with contingencies 

which may arise under unforeseen circumstances. But tha t is not incompatible with doing the kinds of things I have just mentioned.

Senator P ell. Thank you.

I think the reduction in bases has been perhaps at the behest of 

Congress as much as of the executive branch in the past years. Records 

would show we still have 305 major bases and 1,428 other bases scattered outside the U nited States.

LA W OF T H E SEA CONFE RENCE

Talk ing about the 70 percent of the Ea rth covered by the oceans, I 

am wondering what your plans are regarding the Law of the Sea Conference. It has not received the high-level attention it should. We see 

spillage from oil tankers, the development of military bases in the «

Indian Ocean and the increasing economic exploitation of the ocean 

provoking an increasing interest of the inhabitants of the Eart h in the 

oceans.

What are your plans with regard to that ?

Mr. Vance. I think the Law of the Sea Conference is of fundamental importance. It is one of the most significant negotiations t ha t this 

country has ever been involved in because of the vast area it encompasses and the vast number of problems which come within its ambit.

Currently it is bogged down on several very important issues. Aly 

recollection is tha t it will reconvene some time in March or April.

We are in the process even now, before Janu ary 20, in starting our 

work to review what can he done to try and resolve those remaining 

problems. I think it would be a very unfortunate, indeed almost disastrous. event if we were not able to come up with some new ideas that 

might be used to resolve these remaining issues, the most difficult of 

which is deep seabed mining. We arc going to do everything within
11

our power, and I would expect that with the cooperation of this committee we could search out ideas so th at we could develop a construc1 ive program that might be advanced at the next meeting of the Law 

of the Sea Conference.

REQUIRING INTERNA TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

Senator P ell. I introduced a resolution last August calling upon the 

then administration to take the initiative in proposing a multilateral 

negotiation of treaties requiring international environmental impact 

statements for any major project likely to have a significant, harmful 

effect on the environment of another nation—somewhat like our national environmental impact statements.

I will be reintroducing this resolution in this Congress and was wondering what your reactions are to the thought of having an international environmental impact statement in a treaty or convention?

Mr. Vance. I would like to study it; but offhand it seems to me to 

make sense.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

BILATERAL TREATIES WITH TURKEY AND GREECE

The other, very specific, question is in connection with Greece and 

Turkey.

As you know, the Turks are now using American weapons, in violation of American law, in their occupation of Cyprus. The Congress 

has been reluctant to move ahead with a proposed 4-year treaty. The 

administration insisted on sending it up even though it was warned it 

would not get it through in this past Congress.

Wh at are your views, Mr. Secretary-designate, with regard to 

whether we should forge ahead with these 4-year bilateral treaties 

with Turkey and Greece, or whether we ought to merely continue as 

we have with 1-year treaties within the general context of NATO ?

If we do go ahead with 4-year treaties with those two nations, all of 

the other nations will be lining up with their hands out afterwards.

Mr. Vance. Let me say first tha t this is an area in which I have had 

some considerable background in the past and an area in which I have 

a great interest. I believe it is of great importance to the United States 

to maintain good relations with Greece and Turkey and strengthen 

them. I th ink we should stand ready as both allies and friends to help 

these countries ease their differences.

In that connection I might note that I am encouraged to see tha t on 

the problems of the Aegean, both the air rig hts problems and the seabed resources problems, talks are now going on in Geneva and Berne. 

The results so far are encouraging.

Now. with respect to Cyprus, I think it is clear as clear can be that a 

just and durable solution to that problem is perhaps even more important than it was before.

In the weeks ahead we are going to be involved in a search for new 

ideas which might help to bring some meaningful progress in the 

Cyprus problem. In this we will, of course, expect to consult with the 

Congress, both the members of this committee and the Members of the 

House, both of whom have had considerable experience in this area. 

With respect to the defense cooperation agreements to which you
12

referred, we are examining the matter carefully. I would prefer at 

this point not to comment until I have had a chance to take a look at 

them in the full context.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

I would hope your conclusion would be that we would not continue 

as we have, but would examine each of these on its own merit.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Javits.

Senator J avits. Mr. Vance, I realize for myself and my own questioning the difficulty you have in answering detailed questions on .

future policy. The President-elect has not been sworn in, you have 

not been confirmed, and I can understand tha t you would want to look 

these things over, notwithstanding your experience.

I thin k we are entitled, however, to inquire into your own thinking, •

philosophy, and outlook in order to determine whether you should be 

confirmed. Therefore, the questions I will ask will be directed toward 

tha t end.

I have no desire—and stop me if I err—to ask you about what you 

are going to do in a specific case or about a specific country.

MAINTAIN ING CLOSENESS OF RELATIONS WITH CONGRESS

You said, and I listened very carefully, you pledged yourself and 

this administration to close and cooperative relations between the executive branch and the legislative branch.

Mr. Secretary-to-be, you have addressed yourself to probably the 

most historic element in American foreign policy of our time, because from 1940 to 1965, Congress did not run the foreign polic y; the 

President did, in the main, except fo r the Vandenberg period, when he 

happened to agree with the President on the U.N., et cetera.

Our authority dried up in respect to the war power, in respect to 

the difference between treaties and executive agreements, and in respect of the claims of executive privilege which knew no bounds when 

the President told us tha t he does not have to tell us anything about 

anything, and even in the making of major decisions, as for example, 

the invasion of Cambodia.

You are just as sophisticated as we are. In a sense you are our agent. 

The President does not appear here; you do. We confirm you, not the 

President. He is very much at arm ’s length with us if he wishes to be.

Will you tell us, therefore, how you intend, as the Secretary of State, 

to maintain the closeness of relations with the Congress—and we are 

the arm of the Congress and the Senate—which will give the American 

people these assurances tha t Jimm y Carter promised them, tha t we 

would have an open foreign policy, et cetera.

With all respect, while I may welcome the fireside chats and will 

listen to them, tha t is just his position. lie is going to tell what he 

has done or is going to do and he is going to tell what he likes and what 

he does not like. B ut we can cross-examine you if we get you often 

enough and if you come clean enough with us.

I would like to know your feeling on that subject.

Mr. Vance. Firs t, let me say th at I will come completely clean with 

you. Of that you can be assured.

Second, I said to the committee yesterday in the executive session 

that anytime any member of the committee has any question they want 

to pu t to me, I would hope they would pick up the phone and call me.
13

Senator Case. Will you give us your telephone number the way 

President-elect Ca rter did? [General laughter.]

Mr. Vance. Yes.

I will respond immediately, come over and meet with you to discuss 

it if you so desire.

Second, I would hope that you would feel free to do tha t with the 

senior members of the staff, the Deputy, who will lx? my alter ego, and 

the Under Secretaries.

Also, I indicated that I would be happy at the pleasure of the com-

* mittee to come on a regular basis. Yesterday we had some discussion 

about what would be the appropriate kind of time, and we spoke 

about the possibility of it being every 2 months to just come, sit with 

you, and discuss with you any questions which you may have on your

* mind and wished to raise.

In addition to those procedures, as I have indicated, we are going 

to seek out your views on many of these tho rny issues which we face 

because we need those views. I take as an indication one of the best 

examples of executive legislative cooperation, is what happened in the 

Seventh Special Session where a speech delivered by Secretary 

Kissinger was worked out in a fully cooperative fashion, as I unde rstand it, between the Congress and the Secretary. As a result of that, 

I think a major step forward was made in the development of new and 

constructive ideas in dealing with the problems which were raised by 

the demands for a new international economic order. There were 

many, many good concrete proposals that were in the U.S. proposal. 

I indicated I would be very happy at an early date to come and talk 

to the committee here about where we stand on each one of those 

proposals: What the implementation has been, which ones have not 

yet been fully implemented, and what can be done. I t is th at kind of 

process in which I would hope we could engage.

secretary’s and congress’ access to information

Senator J avits. I like th at very much. You almost disarm me because 

I was one of the operators of tha t particular committee tha t was 

advising Dr. Kissinger along with Senator McGee and others.

* I would like to pursue th at for one moment. You know, we have had 

an example of a Secretary testifying before us just before an invasion 

tha t was going to take place with U.S. forces and not telling us about

%

it either because we did not ask him specifically, “Are you going to

invade Cambodia tomorrow,” or because we didn’t know, or because 

he didn't know, which is even more critical.

To what extent as to your tone and disposition—because we have 

had a very gifted Secretary of State in the last years in Henry 

Kissinger where tone accounted fo r a great deal—to what extent will 

you fight to see tha t you are able to, informed about, as well as 

permitted to, give to the Congress what it is entitled to know, and 

tha t you will not be taken over by the White House, or the National 

Security Council, or the Pentagon, all of which compete with every 

Secretary of State and will, whether you think so or not, compete very 

ardently with you ?

Mr. Vance. First let me say I have no question but tha t I will be 

fully informed on everything.

81 -89 4— 77------ 2
14

Second, if informed, I commit to you that I simply will not mislead 

you.

Senator J avits. You are a man of great honor and credit. T hat is one 

of the things we have all said, and I was probably the first to say it in 

this hearing. It is critically important, Mr. Secretary, t hat this m atter 

be approached in this very sophisticated way. From your experience 

in the Government I really feel tha t there is a very good likelihood 

that this is the way it will go. But I can tell you from my own experience, which is perhaps as long or even longer than yours, tha t you 

are going to have to fight for it. It is not going to be automatic. «. Therefore, your assurances, and my hope that you will are critical.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

*

The other question I would like to ask you on this subject concerns 

executive privilege. You are a highly skilled lawyer. Executive privilege was testified to before us for years as something absolute. The 

President could tell us or not. as he chose. Of course, you know what 

happened with Richard Nixon.

The courts have now said that executive privilege is subject to 

judicial review, tha t it does not automatically prevail against the 

assertion of a congressional subpena.

Do you and—if you can tell us—does the President accept that as 

what will determine his action; because conceivably a President can 

defy tha t and ask the Supreme Court how many battalions it has to 

enforce its mandate ?

Mr. Vance. I have not discussed this subject with the President-elect 

and therefore I cannot speak for the President-elect.

With respect to the question of executive privilege, I thin k it is an 

action which should be taken s par ing ly; but there may be cases where 

executive privilege should be involved.

Let me say, for example, I think on questions of people being asked 

what the ir personal views are, clearly they ought to be required to 

give the ir personal views when they are before the Congress. I think 

it is a different question, though, when people who are junior are asked,

“What was your recommendation?” I thin k tha t presents a different

set of circumstances because, when you get into the question of what «

were recommendations rat her than personal views, that tends to

inhibit the process of free and full discussion.

I ran into this question when the issue was raised when I was in the 

Pentagon. At tha t point we had a debate with the congressional com- *

mitte involved, the Armed Services Committee, as to whether or not 

we should do this. We took the position afte r talking to President 

Kennedy, tha t we should not. So, I draw tha t distinction.

But in sum, I am saying that I thin k executive privileges should be 

used very sparingly, it is the Pres iden t’s privilege and he is the one 

who decides when it is used.

Senator J avits. My time is up. but just to complete that question.

Should he be guided by the decisions of the courts, which we now 

have ?

Mr. Vance. I think the answer is “Yes.”

Senator J avits. Than k you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator McGovern.
15

Senator McGovern. Mr. Vance, I share the views of my colleagues 

about your fine qualities as a person and your integrity.

Mr. Vance. Thank you.

MR . VAN CE’S INVO LV EM EN T W IT H VIET NA M AND CAMBODIA POLIC Y

Senator McGovern. Fou r years ago we were considering the nomination of Mr. Kissinger as Secretary of State. I had enjoyed, as did 

the other members of the committee, a fine personal relationship with 

him and I especially admired his efforts in the Middle East. But 

1 voted against his confirmation as Secretary of State. I think mine 

was the only dissenting vote. I did tha t for reasons I outlined to him 

the nig ht before on the grounds that I felt some protest should be 

registered, even if nothing more than a moral and symbolic protest, 

against his long involvement with our policy in Vietnam and 

Cambodia.

Since you were also involved in th at policy, I wonder that, if I was 

justified in tha t vote 4 years ago, why I should vote for your confirmation today ?

Mr. Vance. Let me speak a bit about Vietnam. Let me say that in 

the ligh t of hindsight I believe it was a mistake to intervene in Vietnam. Second, let me say tha t I know that I made more than my share 

of mistakes. I think, however, that we have learned a number of 

lessons as a result of the Vietnam experience and hopefully I am the 

wiser for these. Some of the lessons I thin k we learned are—well, 

let me tick them off because I have thought considerably about this. 

I think we erred in trying to prop up a series of regimes th at lacked 

popular support. I think we erred in not realizing tha t we could not 

create Western-type institutions in other nations with different 

cultures.

Third, I think we failed to have the clear and lasting support of 

our allies in connection with that undertaking.

Fourth, I think we did not understand the limitations of military 

power against a guerrilla force in that kind of environment.

These are some of the lessons th at I think we have learned. I must 

say that I think the motivation in the initial involvement was not one 

based upon evil motives. I think it was based upon misjudgments and 

mistakes as we went along.

Senator McGovern. I agree with that.

Mr. Vance. I think I have learned, as have others, from some of 

those tragic events.

Senator McGovern. You said in reply to Senator Jav its’ question 

about how you were going to deal with this committee tha t you would 

never be a part of any deception o,r any effort to mislead this 

committee.

WAS CONGRESS MISLED ABOUT GU LF OF TONK IN ?

Whenever I am asked about the vote which T most regret as a 

Senator, I say the Gulf of Tonkin vote. I thin k tha t was a mistaken 

vote. But, in all fairness to the all but two Senators who voted for 

tha t resolution, we were deceived by the administration as to what 

happened in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. There is strong evidence 

now tha t this whole matter was fabricated by the administration.
1G

In looking back on tha t incident, do yon feel the Congress was 

misled at the time we supported the Gulf of Tonkin resolution?

Mr. Vance. I do not believe so. I do not believe it was fabricated.

On the basis of the information we had at tha t time and on which 

we had to act. those appeared to be the facts.

Certainly I can tell us as far as I was concerned, and I believe as far 

as Bob McNamara was concerned, we accepted and believed those 

facts as true facts.

Senator McGovern. Are you saying, Mr. Vaince, tha t there was an 

unprovoked attack bv the North Vietnamese against the American 

destroyers? This is what the Congress was told and on th at basis we w

supported the resolution.

Mr. Vance. I said it appeared to be; when we had the information, 

tha t appea red to be the case. •

Now one can argue as to whether or not the sending of tha t reconnaissance mission up there did not itself act as a provocation. It was 

not intended to act as a provocation.

U .S . D EN IA L OF V IE T N A M ’S ADM IS SI ON TO T H E U N IT E D N A TIO N S

Senator McGovern. We obviously cannot change that situation. B ut 

there are certain things about our involvement in Vietnam that we 

can change. One is our response to the application of Vietnam for 

admission to the United Nations. I was there as an American delegate 

last fall and it was very embarrassing to see a little country apply for 

admission to the United Nations and then have a powerful country 

like the United States exercise a veto. Traditionally that has not been 

the American policy. We used to condemn the Soviets when they 

vetoed the admission of countries because they did not approve of certain of their policies. As a matter of fact, we went on record as supporting the Vandenberg resolution in 1948 saying the veto power 

should not be used for the purpose of denying admission to another 

country. It does not mean tha t w’e have to agree with them. But it 

does mean that these are bilateral differences that ought not be inflicted 

upon the United Nations.

I am wondering whether you can commit the new administration on 

this point and what your personal inclination would be on the question 

of whether we ought to use the veto power, as we have in the past, to w

deny Vietnam’s admission.

Mr. Vance. Let me answer your question by first giving a little background so that you will see how I get to where I finally end up. <

First, I believe th at moving toward normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam is in the interest of both 

countrys.

Second. I acknowledge the fact tha t there is an impediment at this 

point with respect to the question of a full accounting of those missing in action. I have noted from the report of the Montgomery committee th at they have stated t hat they presume there are no Americans 

who are still captive. However, they did recommend that we pursue 

the m atter with the Vietnamese, the Laotians, and the Cambodians.

My personal view is th at we can expect to do so. With respect to the 

question of aid, I also note tha t the Montgomery committee recommends that, consideration be given to humanitarian assistance, not 

reparations. We will consider this recommendation.
17

Now, specifically on the question of admission, I would hope that 

this would not arise until we are able to get to work with the Vietnamese on the question of our bilateral relations and trying to move them 

toward normalization.

NORMALIZATION OP RELATIONS WITH CUBA

Senator McGovern. On that same general principle, in tryi ng to 

normalize relations with Vietnam, would not the same consideration 

prevail with reference to Cuba, Mr. Vance? Here we are in a situation where we are pursuing tra de and detente, better relations with the 

two most powerful Communist countries, Communist China and the 

Soviet Union. Why should we not have the same kind of policy toward Cuba? Does the boycott, the embargo, the diplomatic isolation 

of this little country make any sense in light of present realities?

Mr. Vance. I think the boycott has been obviously in effect. With 

respect to the basic question, I think if Cuba is willing to live within 

the international system, then we ought to seek ways to find whether 

we can eliminate the impediments which exist between us and try to 

move toward normalization.

W.'vSHINGTON TOST ARTICLES ON MAJOR EOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS

Senator McGovern. My time is up, Mr. Secretary. I want to urge 

you, if you have not already done so, to look at the lead articles in 

the last three issues of the Sunday “Outlook’’ section of the Washington Post; one by Mr. Greider on December 26; one by Mr. William Shawcross on Jan uar y 2; and one by Lowenthal on J anu ary 9. 

These deal with three major foreign policy concerns.

I would like to make those three articles a part of the record. Mr. 

Chairman.

The Chairman. Without objection, that will be done. [See 

appendix.]

The Chairman. Senator Percy.

NONPA RTISAN SHIP OF COMMITTEE

Senator Percy. Mr. Vance, T would like to join mv colleagues in 

welcoming you. Perhaps this is the most placid and easy-going session 

you will have before this committee. I think, no matter how much we 

might differ on certain crucial issues as you go down the p ath, we can 

verify th at this committee will be totally nonpartisan. In my years of 

service on it under Republican Presidents I have never, ever seen my 

colleagues on the other side of the aisle take a position that was partisan 

in nature. They had differences of opinion which were genuine in 

nature. I thin k we can reassure you of that.

EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE DIFFERENCES

Second, I thin k we are all very concerned about the fact that we 

have in a sense put the world in a difficult, position in many countries 

by having a sharp difference of opinion between the executive branch 

of Government and the legislative, the Congress, on such as Vietnam, 

Turkey-Greece, the Mideast, and on Southern Africa and our policies
18

there. It is to the detriment of the United States tha t we did this. I 

certainly commend you and I coinmend President-elect Carter for 

reaching out and wanting to meet in depth with us next week for a 

full day meeting—an unusual session I believe.

The Chairman. It is tomorrow, not next week.

Senator Church. Be careful or you will miss it.

Senator Percy. I thin k it is a reaching out attempt to anticipate 

these problems. I hope we will not have that kind of confusion in the 

future.

NA TIO NA L ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAM

I have a guest this morning, Jacques Cousteau, who is right behind 

you. He is one of the world’s most eminent philosophers and marine 

experts. In our conservations this morning he characterized the world's 

problems as three: population, food, and energy. In the first two the 

United States does not have much of a problem, but we do have one 

with respect to energy. This does touch on foreign policy even though 

Mr. Schlesinger will deal heavily with it. It affects our foreign policy.

It is his estimate that we could cut our consumption by 20 percent. 

It is my feeling in going through every OPE C country th at they want 

us to conserve it. They do not want us to drain off their reserves as fast 

as we are, to bum them up and consume it, squander it in the wasteful 

way that we are. Ju st take a day like today with the cold temperatures 

all over the country. We are heating the outdoors with our lack of 

insulation. We are wasting and squandering fuel that cannot be 

replaced.

Do you place a very high priority on a national energy conservation 

program in this country, tha t we should lead the world in this respect ?

Mr. Vance. I certainly do.

I thin k one of the most important tasks we have is to come up and 

come up soon with an energy policy, an important elements of which 

would be a conservation program. I think we simply cannot continue 

the way we have, without any policy, as I see it, and with really very 

little being done on the whole conservation issue. We are just simply 

going to fail in trying to deal with this problem unless we come to 

grips with it and come to grips with it soon.

UN ILA TERA L WI THDR AW AL OF U.S. TROOPS FROM EUR OPE

Senator Percy. I was out of the room with Mr. Cousteau, unfortunately, when Senator Javit s questioned you. He is an expert on 

XATO and Europe. P erhaps he asked this question.

There always is concern with a new administration as to whether 

we are going to unilaterally withdraw troops from Europe. I have 

great reverence and respect f or Senator Mansfield and his resolution, 

but have spent, most of my time fighting it right down the line. I 

thought it would be disastrous for us to unilaterally withdraw our 

forces from Europe.

What will be the position of the Carter administration and of Secretarv of State Vance on this ?

Mr. Vance. There has been no position developed by the Carter 

administration.

I can tell you what my position is. I have stated it many times. It is 

tha t at this point we should not unilaterally withdraw any other sub-
19

stantial forces from NATO; that we must, however, at the same time 

put more steam behind the Vienna talks where we are seeking mutual 

force reductions between ourselves and the Warsaw Pact.

WITHDR AW AL OF U. S. FORCES FRO M SOUTH KOREA

Senator Percy. The question has already been asked concerning 

withdrawal of forces from South Korea. A statement was made 'by 

President-elect Carter t hat during the course of the administration he 

intended to withdraw forces from South Korea.

Having been in Jap an within the last couple of weeks I know you 

know there is concern about this.

Mr. Vance. Yes, I do.

Senator Percy. I sent to you a seven point proposal which was the 

best I could develop at the time. I do not know whether or not you 

have yet had a chance to see it.

Is this something that will be done gradually, thoughtfully, certainly with emphasis on ground forces and not air forces, where the 

North has a two-to-one supremacy over the South, and done in such a 

way as to in no way encourage Kim to move south, just as we certainly 

must use every influence we have to restrain Park from engaging in an 

activity which would somehow involve us ?

Mr. Vance. The answer is clearly yes.

First of all, Governor Carter made it clear in his campaign in a 

number of statements tha t he was talking about only ground forces, 

tha t he recognized the disparity particularly in air forces; and secondly, with respect to the withdrawal of ground forces he indicated 

tha t this would have to be over a phased basis and only after full 

and careful discussions with not only the South Koreans, but also with 

the Japanese, who have a great interest, as all of us know, in this 

question.

We have a security trea ty with South Korea. Tha t is a solemn obligation of our Nation. We will in any discussions proceed with prudence 

and caution.

Senator P ercy. Thank you very much.

W IL L U. S. PO LIC Y TOWARD NEAR EAST TIL T?

I have worked closely with Senator McGovern in his capacity as 

Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East. I was the ranking 

Republican on tha t subcommittee. D uring the Nixon administration 

there was a definite tilt toward Pa kistan and a great animosity toward 

India.

Is there going to be any tilt in the Carter administration tha t you 

know of? My own observation is tha t the Near East is making remarkable progress on its own, without the intervention of the super 

powers. Problems that existed between Iran and Afghanistan, between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, and India and Pakistan have made remarkable progress under th eir own leadership, to de-escalate the high 

tension that existed in that area.

Are we going to be til tin g in any direction, or are we going to use 

our good offices to deal even-liandedlv in an effort to cooperate and 

support the initiative which I think they are quite competent of tak ­

ing themselves to resolve those problems?
20

Mr. Vance. Let me say that I agree. I think considerable progress 

has been made recently in lessening the tensions between those two 

countries. Although we have not yet had the chance to consider this 

as an incoming government, my own position is one which would favor 

even-handedness.

RESTORATION OF WORD “ DE TE NT E”

Senator P ercy. Will the word “detente” be restored to full standing 

and grace? It is a French derivative and means lessening of tension. 

Mr. Brezhnev has said he sees no alternative to detente, no acceptable 

alternative. I don’t happen to think there is either.

Can we use it without offending anyone now or do you prefer some 

other terminology?

Mr. Vance. No, I certainly do not. I said the other day that as f ar 

as I was concerned the word was back in the vocabulary. I think we 

have to have a clear definition, as I indicated earlier, in this session as 

to what is expected of each side under a policy of detente. But I fully 

support the proposition tha t we must seek ways to reduce tensions, not 

only in the area of strategic arms, but in other areas, including trade, 

cultural exchanges, et cetera.

QUEST ION OF SOVIET MILITAR Y SUPERIO RIT Y

Senator Percy. Within the confines of security can you give the 

public in this open hearing your assessment as to whether or not the 

Soviet Union has at this time military superiority over the United 

States or whether they plan to achieve military superiority over the 

United States?

Mr. Vance. Let me answer the first paid of your question first.

I thin k in certain areas we are superior to them: in other areas they 

are superior to us. I think overall there is a rough parity between the 

two countries.

With respect to the question on intention, I have not had the benefit 

of seeing any intelligence estimates. The whole business of intention 

is a very “iffy” kind of thing anyway.

Senator P ercy. My time is up. I hope I can remain for at least a 

brief second round.

The Chairman. Senator Zorinskv.

Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Air. Secretary, I have a couple of items here I would like to ask 

about.

CONTRIB UTION OF U. S. AL LIE S TO COLLECTIVE SEC URITY

Since World War IT the collective security has been a basic p rinciple of U.S. foreign policy and effective arrangements depend upon 

the contribution of our allies.

TTow can we be sure that the members of security alliances in which 

the United States participates share more equitably the burdens and 

responsibilities in keeping with their capabilities?

Mr. Vance. This is a verv difficult problem with which we have been 

wrestling over the years. We were concerned with this problem when 

I was with the Government in the 1960’s and I think people have been 

continuingto wrestle with it ever since.
21

I am not sure tha t we are ever going to find a perfect Way of dealing 

with the problem.

One of the ways th at I think might be helpful is if we could find, 

insofar as NATO is concerned, a way of making more progress in the 

area of standardization of weapons systems. This, I think, could both 

help in reducing costs and help in terms of the atmosphere, in terms 

of getting others to carry their fair share of the burden.

I don’t promise any clear and simple answer to the problem because 

I think it is a very, very difficult one. It depends upon political prob- 

, lems, which vary in each of the nations. When you get a country like

Great Britain which has the terrific financial and economic problems 

they now have and are having to cut back, these factors are obviously 

going to have an effect. There are these kinds of extraneous factors 

« which are brought into play and they are terribly difficult to control

and deal with.

Senator Zorinsky. In other words, Mr. Vance, what you are saying 

is it should be parallel to the economic wherewithal at a given poi nt 

in history as to what the nations can and cannot afford to do?

Mr. Vance. I thin k what we ought to try to do is to set equitable 

shares and have people try to live up to their equitable shares. But I 

thin k the practicalities of the economic situations are going to affect 

the ultimate result.

SPENDING IMPACT OF U.S . FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS

Senator Zorinsky. Speaking of expenditures, foreign policy comprises a relatively small part of the Federal budget. But it has a great 

impact as it results in substantial spending in other budgetary areas. 

For example, we are told tha t certain m ilitary force levels and weapons systems are required to support commitments we make through 

foreign policy. Are the IT.S. foreign policy commitments, in your est imation, in tune with the reality of our capabilities, our national prio rities, and are they consistent in your estimation, with our current 

national interests ?

Mr. Vance. Let me give you what I think is in my judgment, u nfortunately, an unsatisfactory answer.

* I have not had a chance to review all of these factors to arrive at the

proper kind of answer for you and I apologize because of that.

Inso far as our foreign policy commitments are. concerned, I think 

that we can spend whatever is required to carry out the foreign policy

» commitment. The question is. are those foreign policy commitments

the righ t commitments. T hat is what I am not prepared to say at this 

point because I simply do not know and will not until I have had a 

chance, along with others in the new administration to review this 

and come to a conclusion.

AGRICULTURE AS BARGAINING TOOL

Senator Zorinsky. Mr. Secretary, would you hesitate at all to use 

agriculture as a bargainin g tool or weapon, so to speak, concerning 

our relations with foreign countries?

Mr. Vance. I will give you my personal views on this. I have a personal and moral concern on the use of food for a ba rgaining weapon.

Senator Zorinsky. I am glad to hear that.
22

Tha nk you , Mr. Vance.

Tha nk you, Mr. C hairm an.

Th e Chairm an. Se na tor D an fo rth .

COMMENDATION OF MR. VANCE

Se na tor Danforth. Mr. Vance, I have n ot know you fo r 20 years as 

has the ch airm an of this com mittee, bu t I have ha d the privi leg e of 

wo rking w ith y ou fo r the last -V/a years on a fairl v regu lar bas is and 

1 w ish to share in the oth er fine com ments mad e abo ut you.

I cannot imagi ne a nomination which w ould be be tte r fo r Se cretary 

of State . You have an enormous ab ility an d dedic ation to princ ipl e.

Mr. Vance. Th an k you.

ENFORCEMENT OF BASKET III PART OF IIELSINSKI AGREEMENT

Se na tor Danforth. I wou ld like to ask some question s abo ut some 

comments th at were made du ring the camp aig n so as to tr y to de termine w ha t the im plications of those sta tem ents would be for Am erica's 

foreign policy in the futur e.

In the second debat e Presiden t-e lec t Car ter said in the case of the 

He lsinki agreem ent ,

It may ha ve been a good agreem en t a t th e beginning, bu t we have faile d to 

enf orc e t he so-ca lled B as ke t- Il l pa rt, wh ich in sures the righ t of people to m igr ate , 

to j oin th ei r fam ilie s, to be free to spe ak out.

W ha t plan s does the new a dm inist ratio n hav e to enforce the Basket111 part of the H els ink i a greement ?

Mr. Vance. On the Baske t I I I question there will be a conference 

in Bel gr ad e th is sum mer, at which tim e the follow-on gr ou p will be 

meeting. We h ave a go od deal of w ork t o do betw een us, the executive 

branch an d the Congress, in wo rking ou t wha t the pro posal s are and 

wh at the item s are t hat we w an t to pu t on the age nda with r esp ect to 

Baske t I II .

As you kno w, Se na tor Dan fo rth, th ere is now a com mittee which 

ha s been cre ate d which consists of six Mem bers of the Senate, as I 

rec all it, an d six Mem bers of the House. Th ey hav e rec ently made 

a tr ip to Eur op e and have pr ep ar ed a repo rt, which I have no t yet 

ha d tim e to rea d, in w hic h they ma ke rec om menda tion s in th is area.

Se na tor Case. Would the Se na tor pe rm it an inter ve ntion at this 

po in t ?

Se na tor D anforth. Of course.

Se na tor Case. One of th e issues, a rel ati ve ly mi nor th in g which 

I would no t have brou gh t up by its elf, th at is inv olved in th at commission or c ommittee is the que stio n of p artic ip atio n by the executive 

bra nch. Th ere is a pro vision also, in ad dit ion to the congressio nal mem ­

bers, fo r exe cutive br an ch mem bers , an d they have no t ye t been 

ap po int ed. I wo nder if on th at score you have any thou gh ts at thi s 

tim e?

Mr. Vance. I do no t have any at th is time. I have he ar d th at th at 

is th e case an d I w ant to find out more about why it is, wha t the p roblem is, why th at has not been done.

Hav in g sa id th at , Se nator , in ge ne ral let me say th at I th in k th at 

Baske t I I I is p art of an agree me nt rea ched by the natio ns to the 

He lsink i Con ference. I t exists as a com mitment, even thou gh no t a
23

treaty commitment, and it is something we should not let lie fallow, 

but should pursue.

Senator Danforth. However, food, as you pointed out to Senator 

Zorinsky, would not be used as a means fo r enforcing Basket I II .

Is that correct?

Mr. Vance. As f ar as I am personally concerned, I have problems 

with that. But I do not know what the Government position will be.

SUPPLYING ARMS TO EGYPT

Senator Danforth. During the campaign President-elect Carter 

stated tha t he was opposed to supplying arms to Egypt. Do you agree 

with tha t position ?

« Mr. Vance. The only request that I know th at we have gotten from

Egypt is for the C-130’s, which have already been given.

With respect to the question of supplying arms to the Middle East, 

I think we have to look at several criteria, if and when we do get 

requests:

First, what are the security requirements of the country which is 

requesting those particula r arms; second, will the provision of those 

arms upset the balance in the Middle Ea st; and third, what will the 

action to be taken do with respect to the question of moving the parties 

toward a peaceful settlement?

We are irrevocably committed to the proposition tha t insofar as 

Israel is concerned we will supply the arms necessary for her security. 

Tha t is a historic commitment which we have and we will stand behind 

that.

With respect to Saudi Arabia and to Jordan, we have a longstanding bilateral relationship under which we have provided arms 

to them from time to time. Again, I thin k you are going to have to 

iudge any future requests against the kind of criteria I am talking 

about.

Senator Danforth. You would not at this time rule out supplying 

arms to Egypt?

Mr. Vance. I don’t rule it out.

M DENIA L OF HU M A N FREEDO M IN EASTE RN EUROPE AND SOVIET UN IO N

Senator Danforth. In a speech before B ’nai B’rith in Washington 

on September 8, the President-elect said,

* We also regret our Government’s continuing failu re to oppose the denial of

human freedom in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Republican Administration with the Sonnenfeld statem ent has shown a lack of sensitivity to the 

craving of Eastern European people for g reater independence. Th at is unacceptable.

Wha t will the new administration do with respect to satisfying the 

cravings of Eastern European people for greater independence?

Mr. Vance. We have not reached th at point yet, and I simply cannot give you an answer.

ARAP, BOYCOTT OF U. S. BU SIN ESSES

Senator Danforth. W hat is the position of the new administration 

with respect to preventing or slowing down the boycott of American 

businesses by Arab countries?
24

Mr. Vance. Again, there are no positions of the administration at 

this point because we simply cannot properly have a definitive position before the inauguration.

Let me speak on the question of the boycott, however. Governor 

Carter has made clear his moral repugnance at boycotts related to 

discrimination on the basis of race and religion. I share tha t view. 

Governor Carter has stated tha t he pledged full enforcement o f existing legislation, including the amendments made to the Tax Reform 

Act. But with regard to any new proposals, I, and I am sure the new 

administration when it comes in, would like time to study them in the 

context of our overall Middle Eas t objectives.

POSSIBILITY OF LI MIT ED NUCLE AR WAR

Senator Danforth. Do you believe that there can be such a thing 

as a limited nuclear war with tactical nuclear weapons?

Mr. Vance. I doubt it.

Senator Danforth. Would you base a foreign policy and a defense 

policy on tha t doubt?

Mr. Vance. That is an extremely complex question. I am not quite 

sure what you mean by, “Would you base a foreign policy on it? ”’

Perhaps you could elucidate?

Senator Danforth. For example, for the defense of Europe or 

South Korea, would you favor now, as far as setting up our defense 

posture, relying on tactical nuclear weapons?

Mr. Vance. The position which I have personally stated on this is 

tha t a t this point I would not withdraw any tactical nuclear weapons 

from Europe. The reason for tha t is th at this is one of the elements 

which is part of the bargaining which is going on in connection with 

the mutual balanced force reduction talks. I think at this point to 

talk about withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons just does not make 

sense.

Senator Case. Would you permit just a word on that?

Senator Danforth. Please.

Senator Case. That does not exclude consideration of the question 

of security of the weapons that, are already there?

Mr. Vance. Not a bit. It does not exclude that at all because that is 

an exceedingly important question. Senator Case.

PI CKIN G NE W AMBASSADORS

Senator Danforth. Just one more question in the last minute, Mr. 

Vance.

In Louisville, in 1975. Governor Carter said this :

When I go into an embassy in South America or Central America or Europe 

and see sit tin g as our ambassador, our representativ e there, a fat , bloated, ignorant, rich, major con trib utor to a preside ntial campaign, who cannot even 

speak the language of the country in which he serves, and who knows even 

less abo ut our own country and our consciousness and our ideals and our motivation, it is an insult to me and to the people of America and to the people of 

that coun try.

Can I assume from this tha t our new cron of ambassadors will speak 

the language of the country and will be skinny?

[General laughter.]
Jo

Air. Vance. I would hope so.

Seriously, though, let me say that with respect to ambassadors, I 

think we ought to pick the best possible people, regardless of their 

background, and whether they come from the Foreign Service or outside the Foreign Service. The current ratios are, I think, about 70 to 

30; tha t is, 70 percent from the Foreign Service and 30 percent from 

outside. Whether that, would remain the ratio, or whether it would 

be something different, a lesser ratio, I cannot even guess at this point 

because it will depend upon the relative individuals who come before 

Governor Carter and me.

In making those determinations, what we are committed to is having the best possible people. Certainly one of the very important elements will be their ability to speak the language. It should not be 

totally overriding, though, if we had somebody who for many other 

reasons was ideal for the post, particularly with some of the languages 

which are so difficult to speak, such as Russian.

The Chairman. Ts that all. Senator D anforth.

Senator Danforth. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Matsunaga.

Senator Matsunaga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Air. Vance, I. too, wish to join my colleagues in congratulating you 

upon your nomination.

EURO PE -A SI A O RIE NTA TIO N OF U .S . FO RE IG N PO LI CY

As you no doubt will agree, and understandably so, American foreign policy has been European-oriented over the years. As I say, this 

is understandable. But even here in America we find generally tha t 

the populus is European oriented.

I will give an example. When Mr. Nixon made that history-making 

trip to Peking, for a while every time I would go to a social function 

some friendly stran ger would come up to me and ask me, “Are you 

Chinese?” Of course, I was being asked the question so frequently 

tha t I developed a stock answer. Every time I was asked, “Are you 

Chinese,” I would say, “No, I ’m sorry, but I am not. But I had an 

uncle who was a Peking Tom.”

When I made tha t crack over in Dayton, Ohio, afte r Mayor McGuinness—I believe his name was McGuinness—who is a black person, introduced me; lie was sitting next to me—when T said, “No, I 

am no t; but I had an uncle who was a Peking Tom,” lie looked up at 

me and said, “An Uncle Tom, eh ?’

Yesterday, in our executive session, I expressed some concern over 

the complete absence of any matter on the agenda pertaining to a 

U.S.-Japan relationship, which indicated to me a continuance of the 

European-oriented American policy. Of course, there has been some 

indication, as was recently announced by President-elect Jimmy Carter, tha t he intended to send the Vice President to the Fa r East and 

that he himself intended to attend an international trade conference 

in Japan. But the President himself will be relying on your advice as 

Secretary of State.

I would like to know what your views are in relation to this EuropeAsia orientation of our policy.

Air. Vance. T think whatever may have been the case in the past 

with respect to orientation, there can be no question tha t the Pacific
26

and the countries in the Pacific and other parts of the world, such as 

Africa, Latin America, are of fundamental importance in connection 

with our foreign policy.

Certainly, more specifically with respect to Jap an, it is really the 

cornerstone of our policy in the Pacific area. I can assure you, despite 

the fact that by error it was left ofi th at tentative agenda which we 

had and is now on the agenda, that our relationships with the Japanese 

will be of highest priority. We have all kinds of important reasons for 

that: our trade relationships; the position tha t Japan plays in that 

part of the world; its importance as one of the leading industrial nations; and many other critical reasons.

So, insofar as my own views are concerned, I consider Japan to be 

one of the core allies, one of the key countries, and will expect it to 

be treated as such in connection w ith our foreign policy.

Senator Matsunaga. Excuse me for not having looked into your 

biography as much as I should have. Have you personally spent any 

time in Asia?

Mr. V ance. Yes; I have been there several times, including China.

Senator ALvtsunaga. Will you have any specialists, someone who has 

spent considerable time there and who understands the people out 

there advising you?

Mr. Vance. Yes.

We will have not only th e people in the Department, but I intend 

to have consultants as well in that area, as I am going to do with 

respect to other areas, such as the Soviet Union.

Senator Matsunaga. I may be out of line, here, but if you cannot 

so state publicly, would you later give me the names of some of these 

persons ?

Mr. Vance. Yes, indeed. I would be glad to.

ISSU E OF TWO CIII NAS

Senator Matsunaga. With reference to the thorny issue of the two 

Chinas, what do you believe our policy should be, especially with 

relation to Taiwan, more commonly known as the Republic of China, 

vis-a-vis the People’s Republic of China ?

Mr. Vance. First. I believe tha t our policy with respect to the People’s Republic of China should be one based on the guiding principles bilate rally and which are set forth in the Shanghai communique.

T myself believe that our goal should be normalization of relations 

with the People’s Republic of China.

As to the pace and mode of achieving tha t goal, insofar as I am 

concerned, that requires further thought and study, and it is already 

in process within our national security system.

With respect to the question of Taiwan, one of the factors I think 

we have to take into consideration in dealing with the question of pace 

and mode is the security of the people of Taiwan.

DE PARTME NT OF PEACE

Senator Matsunaga. One of my fondest hopes ever since coming to 

Congress 14 years ago has been the establishment of a Department of 

Peace at the Cabinet level The biggest opposition has come from the 

Department of State.
27

I would like, as a Member of th is Congress and as a citizen of this 

great country of ours to see the United States become the first nation in 

the world to have within its governmental structure a department at 

Cabinet level solely dedicated to the pursuit of peace. If we do this I 

think we can trul y establish ourselves as the leading nation of the 

world once again.

I would like to know your views on this.

Mr. Vance. I tried to indicate my views at the outset when I said 

tha t I thought the first principle—in talking about what our foreign 

policy principles should be—is the maintenance of peace. So it comes to 

the top of my list.

Now, as to whether or not one needs a separate department for that, 

1 would like to meet with you, to read what you have written on this, 

and to discuss it seriously with you. I t seems to me that this ought 

to be the main business of the State Department, the maintenance of 

peace.

Senator Matsunaga. I might say that just before Mr. Nixon left 

office he indicated support of the measure. Of course, T do hope tha t 

that is no indication of the future of the bill which I will be pursuing.

Thank you very much. I see my time is up.

The Chairman. Senator Clark.

Senator Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CO MM ENDATIO N OF MR . VAN CE

Mr. Vance, I want to join with the others in praising both your 

background and your experience. I particularly want to compliment 

you on the very fundamental policy initiatives you described in answer to Senator Church’s questions, most specifically on the attitude 

toward covert activities, the idea of a more open foreign policy, 

basic honesty, better American-Soviet relations. Certainly if you are 

able to live up to most of these goals, this committee, this Congress, 

and this country are going to be very deeply indebted to you and you 

will certainly have our support.

U. S. PO LIC Y TOWARD AFRICA

You spoke at that time generally about the principles of American 

foreign policy. I would like to ask you about the application of those 

principles in the specific case of the ILS. policy toward Africa.

It is my general impression of recent African history tha t during the 

period, let us say the first 25 years afte r World Wa r IT. from 1945 to 

1970, that we were greatly admired in tha t continent. They were gaining their own independence. We had ourselves been a colony and 

gained our independence. So we were looked at. I think, as the chief 

force in the world for independence, liberty, and equality.

Then we got involved in the Vietnam war—let’s say preoccupied 

with it as far as Africa was concerned. More importantly, in 1970 

we began to follow a different policy which we now all agree was the 

policy known as National Security Study Memorandum 39. adopted 

by President Nixon and his Security Council adviser, Henry Kissinger. T hat was a policy which was largely one of quiet cooperation 

with the white minority regimes in southern Africa and a more 

isolated attitude toward those who were opposed to those regimes.
28

We seem to hav e cha nge d th at policy, thou gh we followe d it for 

about 7i/2

 yea rs. We seem to have changed it abo ut 7L mo nth s ago— 

the so-called L usaka policy.

I have foun d in my tra vels in Africa th at we hav e lost mo st of the 

cre dibility th at we had in the imme dia te po stw ar period, these 25 

years fro m 1945 to 1975. In oth er wor ds, it h as in 7^/5 mo nth s of wise 

policy been ha rd to offset 7% ye ars of very unwise policy. We do n't 

hav e very m uch credib ilit y th ere.

Yet, each of the head s of sta te, or th e people th at I have tal ked 

to, look toward the Ca rte r ad minist ratio n, the new ad ministratio n, 

with enormo us hope th at thes e principles we pro mo te in the wor ld, 

th at we stan d for—po litical lib er ty an d equality —are going to be 

res tored in our policy tow ard Afri ca.

My que stio n is what is there in yo ur attit ud e, in yo ur new ad ­

minist ratio n, to give the m some hope, pa rti cu la rly in the cases of 

Rhode sia, Namibia , and So uth A fr ic a its elf t hat th ese polic ies will be 

followed?

Can you be somewhat specific about yo ur own at tit ud es an d ideas 

abo ut how these gen eral princ iples will be ap plied to thes e three 

cases ?

Mr. V ance. Fir st , let me go to So uthe rn Rhodesia.

W ith respec t to So uth ern Rhodesia, my own perso nal view is th at 

we mu st firm ly support major ity ru le: and to assist in he lping this 

come into b eing as rapidly and peacefu lly as possible, ho pefully with 

assu rances fo r th e rights of the minority.

I believe we sho uld s up po rt the cu rre nt n egotiations th at are being 

carried cu t by Iv or Ri chard s on behalf of the Brit ish, whe re lie is 

lau nc hing his new initiatives and is disc ussing them wi th the variou s 

leader s throug ho ut Africa—th e fron tline pre sid ents, th e na tio na lis t 

leaders, as well as Mr. Smith an d Mr. V ors ter.

I th in k t hat it would not be ap pr op riate fo r me to go into th e det ails 

in th is session of the subject s or the points conta ine d in th at new 

initiative. I th in k we ought to give every su pp ort and he lp th at we 

can to th e B ritis h in th is area.

W ith respect to Sou th A fri ca , I believe th at th e new administ ratio n 

should exp ress by word and actio n its opp osition to ap arth eid and 

su pp ort equal politica l, social, and economic righ ts f or a ll. I thi nk we 

are g oin g to have to review our cu rre nt policy in order to insure t hat 

it is co nsistent w ith ou r opposition to ap artheid .

I believe th at it may be possible fo r Am erican business op erating 

in So uth Africa to help in m oving the s itu ati on in a con struct ive w ay 

and I th in k we ou ght to meet and discuss th is wi th th e Am eric an 

business com munity .

W ith respec t to Na mibia , it is my pos itio n th at we sho uld firmly 

supp ort independe nce fo r Namibia , an d I hop e th at it can be b roug ht 

abo ut at the e arlie st tim e by peaceful means. It is a difficult pr ob lem; 

I reco gniz e th at. All of thes e are difficult problems an d I don’t wan t 

to m inimize in any way the difficulties inv olved.

W ith r espect to the current situatio n in the discussions on the N am ibian questio n, some pro gre ss was made, bu t it looks at the mom ent 

as if th ere is not much progres s tak in g place.

I would hope t hat we m ay be able to deve lop way s w hich might help 

to contr ibu te t o the so lution o f th at proble m.
29

Senator Clark. If I might ask more specifically with regard to 

South Africa, since the Nationalist Party came to power almost 30 

years ago there was established, as you know, a very strong apartheid 

system. We have from time to time vocally expressed our opposition 

to that. But you indicated tha t the new administration's policy would 

l)e to vocally and in action reflect our disapproval of tha t apartheid 

regime. If tha t apartheid regime does not bring about some kind of 

significant change in some reasonable time, is it fa ir to assume that our 

relationship with them will become increasingly isolated?

Air. Vance. I am not sure it is appropriate for me to respond to that 

at this point. I would prefer to defer it.

Senator Clark. Could you say anything about your own attitude 

toward an organization of recognition for Angola ?

Air. AAnce. Again, there like elsewhere I would hope we could find 

ways to move toward normalization. I basically am a person who 

believes that the establishment of relations with other countries so that 

there is contact between them is, in general, a very positive th ing ami 

an objective that one should seek.

Senator Clark. I see I have 1 minute left.

REP EA L OF BYR D A M EN D M EN T

Today many of us in both the House and the Senate are introducing 

a bill to repeal the Byrd amendment. AVe think tha t will extend the 

right signal in terms of the negotiations tha t are taking place in 

Geneva. lia s the new administration decided, or do you intend to support 

the repeal of the Byrd amendment ?

Air. Vance. I would support it.

Senator Clark. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Biden.

U .S . PO LI CY CONCER NIN G SIT U A TIO N IN SO UTH AF RI CA

Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Air. Chairman.

I would hope that at some future time that you feel appropriate, 

Air. Secretary, you would be able to discuss in more detail the situation 

in southern Africa, and particularly whether or not it should be 

administration policy to ‘‘cooT’ our relations with South Africa—I 

strongly feel it should be—in the event tha t South Africa does not 

make some significant departure from its present apartheid policy.

Air. Vance. I would be delighted to do tha t at some date afte r the 

20th.

COM M EN DATI ON OF M R. VA NC E

Senator Biden. Needless to say, I commend President-elect Carter 

for nominating you as Secretary of State. I wish to commend you for 

taking the time to make yourself available, not only today, but prior 

to this committee’s hearing, not only to me but I suspect also to most of 

rhe members of the committee. I would like you to know that in spite 

of the fact tha t we are in a new Congress and I have rapidly risen in 

seniority, I still get to ask questions last. I think age is really the active 

criterion. [General laughter.]

81 -S 94 — 77------3
30

QUESTIO N OF STEM MING NUCLE AR PRO LIFERA TIO N

There are two things I wish to discuss if I may. 1 will be brief. One 

subject is the area of nuclear proliferation. Usually when that subject is discussed—and it has been discussed by 

members of past administrations and witnesses in this room who are now prospective members of the new administration in the Aims Control Subcommittee, of which I am a member, we always got around to talking about the Nonproliferation 1 reaty. Quite 1 ra nk h, I am not sure tha t is the central issue on the question ol whether that wiil stem 

nuclear proliferation. Mine is more of a policy question. 1 have been new in coming to this, since I am basically new around here, but I ha\ e the strong belief that we are really not going to do much about nucleai proliferation until the President of the 1 nited States, decides in a sin­ gular manner that it is going to be one of the top priorities in his or 

her administration. I guess the question 1 have is, will you encourage the I resident ol 1 he United States to make this one of the top priorities, the question of 

proliferation and what we do about it. Will this be one of the priorities 

of your incoming administratio n'

Mr. Vance. The answer is unequivocally “Yes.”

Senator Biden. T am delighted to hear it.

Mr. Vance. You will note that the first major speech that the Presi­ dent-elect made in the foreign affairs field. 1 think during his cam­ paign, was in the area of nuclear proliferation and the problems of nuclear energy. Specifically with respect to our department, this is a subject in which I have been very interested over the years, I have par­ ticipated in a number of conferences and have chaired one this past 

vear in this partic ular area. Inso far as the emphasis to be given in the Department, I am in the process of adding to the responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Security Affairs the responsibility for arms transfers and for nuclear proliferation. We will then have centered at the Under Secretary level the questions of security assistance, military assistance, arms tran s­ fers. and nuclear proliferation. The purpose of that was to put to­ gether these interrelated issues and to have a focus for them in the Government at a level where they are going to get the kind of attention which they deserve. 1 am convinced, having talked to Governor Carter about this on many, manv occasions, tha t this is of the highest priority as fa r as he 

is concerned.

Senator Biden. I am delighted to hear that. I have several specific questions, but it might be more appropriate 

to leave those for a later hearing. However, I do wish to commend you in your answer and hoi>e that both multilateral and bilateral negotiations will be initiated regarding that issue. What we have been doing in th at area has been ridiculous.

ROLE OF U.S. AMBASSADORS REGARDING CIA ACTIV ITIES

At any rate, to shift the field completely, I, along with Senator Case, am a member of the Intelligence Committee. One of the ouestions tha t has come up in this committee and in that committee is the ques­ tion of the role of the U.S. ambassadors in those countries and how 

much and to what event they should be informed.
As you pro bably know, the U.S . Congress pas sed leg islation, the 

essence of which is, and I quote, ‘‘Und er the dir ection of th e Presiden t 

the Am bas sad or shall have the res ponsibility fo r the d irection, c oo rdinatio n, and the sup erv ision of all U.S. Go vernme nt offices an d employees in t hat co un try , except f or person nel u nd er the com mand of tho 

U.S. M ilitary Co mm and er,’’ and it goes on. But th at is, I th in k, the 

governi ng section.

Th ere are othe r com mittees th at we are on and th er e are no minating sessions going on righ t now which nec essitated my being l ate , but 

I un derst and th at you m entioned, in rega rd to some com ment made by 

Se na tor C hurch on covert act ivities, th at you thou gh t the y sho uld not 

be the order of the day but done o nly in extre me circumstance s w hen 

national sec urity was at stak e. In l ig ht of tha t and in lig ht of the fac t 

th at I th in k there has been and could be demo nstra ted a failu re to 

fully imp lem ent the in tent of th e congressio nal leg islation, I am wonde rin g wh eth er or not you would comment on how you view the- role of 

the U.S . am bas sad ors abroa d with rega rd t o the activ ities o f the CIA 

in pa rti cu lar.

Mr. V ance. I thi nk the A mb ass ador is a nd should be the indiv idu al 

who has res ponsibi lity fo r ev erything in th at country , includ ing the 

activ itie s of the Agency, and t hat he s hould have a vailable to hi m any 

and a ll inform ati on t h at he requests.

Se na tor Bide n. I am delig hte d with th at answer. In th at rega rd it 

seems to me. as I said ea rli er, th at there is a c lea r ind ica tio n th at th is 

leg islation and the intention jus t expre sed have not been nu t into 

effect. I am not sure it is app ro pr iate at th is m om en t; I th in k it is. Mr. 

Ch air ma n, bu t I hop e you will correc t me if it is not. I wou ld like to 

ask th at yo u look int o wh eth er or not there have lieen policy guide lines 

put forw ard and wh eth er or not you would re po rt ba ck t o th is com mittee at a relativ ely early date to insure us th at th e leg islati ve inten t is 

being imp lem ented by your de pa rtm en t.

Mr. Vance. I wou ld be delig hte d to.

Se nator Biden. I would a pprec iat e t hat very m uch.

I notice th at one of t he most distinguis hed mem bers o f t he com mittee came in, Se na tor Hum ph rey. I know th at he has no t asked any 

questions and I will yie ld the rem ain de r of my tim e to Se na tor 

Hu mp hrey.

Se nator Church [p residi ng ]. Se na tor H um ph rey.

Se nator H um phr ey. Mr. Secre tar y-desig nate, we ha d a. good visit 

yeste rda y and I th in k much of w hat I wished t o discuss with you was 

discussed in ou r session yeste rday aftern oon. I have are as of intere st 

because of my responsibilities in th is com mittee th at I wan t to concentr ate on f or just a fe w m inut es.

AID administration’s NE ED OF REH A BIL IT A TIO N

The A ID ad min istra tio n needs reha bilitation if we are go ing to 

keep a bilateral prog ram . It needs ref res hm ent in ter ms o f sp irit and 

I th in k a very caref ul exam ina tion of pers onnel. Th e A ID prog ram 

is still a part of ou r ove rall natio nal sec urity prog ram . I am af ra id 

that, in rece nt yea rs, des pite the e fforts of Mr. Par ker —and I th in k he. 

tri ed t o do a very good job— the AID a dm inist ratio n as such ha s been 

grippe d with a certa in degree of political arteriosc lerosi s. I would 

tr ust that we might ge t th e system rej uvenate d a bi t. I wa nt you to give 

it per son al attention, if I may res pectf ull y reques t th at .
32

You indicated to us yesterday your choices in a new administrator 

for AID. What we need is someone who really is a tough administrator and who will see that this problem is really followed through. I his 

is something we will discuss when the AID program comes before us.

I believe we do not have to reauthorize this year. I think we only had 

a 2-year authorization. Am I correct in that? Let’s see—I th ink we do 

have to reauthorize this year.

Mr. Vance. Yes. I think that is right.

Senator H umphrey. So we will be expecting you to review the administrative structure of AID. #

I have been told that the personnel continues to get older, that there 

has been no new flow because they have been cutting back on personnel 

on the basis of attrition, and when they needed extra people, they went 

out into the field and brought back the retirees. I think the time is at »

hand to try to get some new thought, new interest in this program. We 

have laid down certain guidelines; we have laid down new directions 

in the AID program afte r very careful examination by this committee. It started out with Senator Aiken and me rewriting the AID bill 

several years ago. We then rewrote the entire AID bill as a committee bill. So we have laid down pretty well what we think ought to be 

in that program.

AR MS TRANSF ER IS SU E

The second item of interest is the arms transfer issue. This is a $10- 

to $12-billion industry lig ht now in the United States and any effort 

to curb it runs into tremendous lobbying efforts on the pa rt of manufacturers and distributors of armaments. We ran into th at here as we 

were trying to write a bill. We run into it any time we review arms 

sales.

Yesterday you may recall we spoke of the necessity of having closer 

cooperation before the decision is made as to arms sales, before the 

letters of offer are made and then made available to this committee.

I am interested in what the new administration's arms sales policy 

will be, for example, towards a country like Ir an, a friendly country.

I want to make clear that I understand the importance of Iran in the 

politics of the modern world. I have no hostility. To the contrary, I 

sense, a friendliness towards Iran. •

But we have been tying in the most sophisticated type of weaponry 

in that country, as you may know, Mr. Secretary.

Air. Vance. Yes.

Senator Humphrey. It is weaponry which our own technical per- *'

sonnel find difficult to operate. Much of it has not even been fully tested 

by our own military.

The National Security Council was to have made a review, if I recollect, of our arms sales policy in the Persian Gulf. Are you familiar 

with th at review ?

Mr. Vance. I am familiar with the fact tha t it was ordered.

Senator Humphrey. I hope it will be given prio rity attention because it is my judgment tha t before we approve or act on any other 

major arms transfers or sales we should have t ha t review before us.

This was a very high level policy review of the National Security 

Council.
33

I notice th at the Iran ians are having some difficulty. Their oil production is down; oil sales are down; the cost of weaponry goes up, 

even though we understand that they can pay for it. But over the 

long run 1 think it is a fact tha t our military sales to Iran have had 

a very decided effect on the price of petroleum from Iran. In other 

words, we create our own inflation by our arms sales.

I want a very careful review. We need a very, very careful and 

prudent review of arms sales policy in the Persian Gulf. We had 

some difficulty over the Saudi Arabian sales over there.

« Again, it is not a question of whether sales should be made, but

of what types of weapons, their capacity, and their ability to handle 

Ibis weaponry. To pay for it is perhaps a secondary item because they 

have control over oil, which makes it possible, obviously, for them to 

« pay. We are gratefu l of course, to the Saudi Arabians for their moderate and cooperative attitude on oil prices.

NUCLE AR TESTIN G

Finally, Mr. Secretary, arms control, which is part of this committee’s jurisdiction, is an important matter. You have heard about 

our concern on nuclear proliferation. I think the issue is broader than 

that. The whole subject of arms control gets down into our relationships with the Soviet Union, our nuclear testing.

Have you, as an individual, or has the incoming administration 

as a policy matter, come to any decision on nuclear testing, on lowering the threshold, for example, or banning all nuclear tests?

Would you address yourself to that?

Mr. Vance. Yes. I would be glad to address myself to that.

During the Presidential campaign, Governor Carter indicated tha t 

he was in favor of seeking to negotiate with the Soviet Union a comprehensive test ban for an approximate period initially of 5 years. I 

support tha t and would certainly expect th at this proposal would be 

one of the major initiatives that would be put in the hands of the 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, together with other elements of Government concerned, to do the necessary work in preparation for consideration of that matter.

• So, I think the answer is a verv clear one on that: Yes: that is 

a matter where already the President-elect has indicated his very 

strong convictions, which I share.

* R E LA TIO N SH IP BETW EEN AR MS TR AN SF ER S AN D AR M S CONTRO L

Senator H umphrey. Do I understand that you feel there is a direct 

relationship between arms transfers, in terms of military sales, and 

arms control ?

Mr. Vance. I do.

Senator Humphrey. The focus has to be, then, does it not, in the 

State Department, where the agencies of Government, in this instance 

the Pantagon, on the matter of arms transfers must recognize that the 

legislative authority rests in this committee? The administrative authority rests in the State Department, is that correct ?

Mr. Vance. That is correct. That is why T am in the process of 

implementing the reorganization of responsibility within the Depart-
34

ment, to bring the focus into one place so it can be more effectively 

discharged.

FOCA L PO IN T FOR IN TE RN AT IONA L ECO NOMIC POLICY

Senator Humphrey. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I know that you have 

commented upon international economic policy. Senator Church and 

others might have questioned you about this.

I happen to believe, and 1 have so told the President-elect Carter in 

my visits with him, that I consider international economic policy the 

highest priority. It is the new arena of diplomacy and has taken on 

proportions that are far beyond anything we have known in the past.

We have had increasing evidence of conflict between Treasury and 

State on economic policy. I wonder, has the administration finally 

resolved where the focal point for projection of the formulation of 

and the production of international economic policy will be?

Mr. Vance. Yes. I think we have worked out a very satisfactory 

arrangement for that. We are putting together what is called an 

economic working group. The principals in it consist of the Secretary 

of Treasury, Secretary of State, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chief of the Council of Economic Advisers, and 

two representatives from the White House—one from the National 

Security staff and one from the domestic side.

This group will deal with all problems of both domestic and international import, because the two simply cannot be separated any more.

Senator Humphrey. I agree.

Mr. Vance. The working relationships between all of us who are 

involved in this I think are very good. I am encouraged tha t we can 

make some real progress.

Senator Humphrey. But will the State Department be the coordinator and the central force in this? I mean, it is wonderful to have 

these coordinating groups. They all meet together and coordinate and 

then they go their own separate ways. We have seen this in the past. 

Who is. going to speak, outside of the President, in terms of the international economic policy?

Mr. Vance. I would think it would be the President, me, and the 

Secretary o f the Treasury—depending upon the particular forum, on 

where the discussions are going on.

Senator H umphrey. Will there have been an agreed-upon policy for 

the spokesmen to speak ?

Mi-. Vance. There will. Unquestionably.

Senator Humphrey. We have not had that lately.

Senator Case. I am glad the Senator is emphasizing this because 

there is no question that for the future, if we have to say one thing is 

more important than another, T th ink our economic relations with the 

lest of the world are probably the most, important, and that the 

Department of State has to be, I think, paramount in its involvement 

in this area. This is not a question of banking, primarily. It is a 

question of great international relationships.

I beg my colleague's pardon for interrupting, but I wanted to 

underscore his statement. This is reflected, in a sense, in this committee's determination to maintain its own interest in the matter as 

a matter of foreign relations.
35

Air. Vance. May I just say a word on that ?

Senator Humphrey. Please.

Mr. Vance. I agree fully with this, and tha t is why I am terribly 

pleased that Richard Cooper, Professor Cooper, has agreed to serve 

as the Under Secretary f or Economic Affairs in the State Department. 

I le is enormously experienced and talented in this area. Others in the 

Government wanted him to come to help them; but in a cooperative 

way we said, “Where can this best fit and contribute most?” Everybody agreed that State was where he was most needed, and that is 

where he is going.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Chairman, might T say that my tardiness 

was due to the fact that Congressman Bergland was up for Secretary 

of Agriculture and he happens to lie from Minnesota. We are a great 

agricultural State and have a great interest in agricultural policy, 

including international agricultural policy. I wanted to spend some 

time there to make sure that he was received with all of the accolades 

which he richly deserves.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Vance. Thank you.

Senator Church. Are you finished, Senator Humphrey ?

Senator H umphrey. Yes.

Senator Church. Thank you very much, Senator.

committee’s authority to inquire into foreign economic policy

Mr. Vance, you have two Under Secretaries that have been established by law—an Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs a nd 

an Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Would you agree 

with me that these are the two sides of the foreign policy coin?

Air. Vance. Yes; they are. But I would not downgrade the importance of the Under Secretary of State for Security Affairs, which 

now includes not only security affairs, but also arms transfers and 

proliferation matters.

Senator Church. So we should view it as a triangle, then, because 

I think that the national security aspect is equally important and 

I had lumped it within the political.

Air. Vance. Yes.

Senator Church. If you view it as a triangle, does it not follow that 

this committee could not discharge its responsibility to help shape and 

nionitor the foreign policy of the United States if it had no au thority to inquire into economics abroad?

Air. Vance. I'm sorry, but I did not understand your question.

Senator Church. Aly question is would you not agree that if this 

committee, which is charged with monitoring and helping to shape 

foreign policy, could not do its job if it lacked the authority to inquire 

ip.to foreign economic policy questions?

You agree with that ?

Senator Percy. Senator Church, would you yield on tha t point?

Senator Church. Yes, Senator Percy.

Senator P ercy. This is of great importance to this committee. This 

committee helped, and I introduced legislation, to create a full time 

Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, not conceiving tha t we
36

could conduct ou r affairs in this coun try or abroa d wi tho ut th at kind 

of attenti on .

Is it no t true th at inc rea sin gly economics will be im po rta nt to the 

State De pa rtm en t?

Air. Vance. No doubt about it.

Se na tor P ercy. We are becoming a have-no t Nation. Th e oil compan ies hav e testified in th is room th at they can no lon ger deal on 

prici ng , even, if all is done by Governments. Ca rtels are bei ng created 

in ba ux ite and oth er raw mate ria ls on which we are depen den t. It is 

a m atter of foreig n policy, not ju st a finan cial opera tion.

In you r jud gm en t is it not im po rta nt t ha t the tw o be bound i nteg rally tog eth er?

Mr. Vance. Yes.

Se na tor P ercy. Th an k you, sir.

Se na tor Chur ch. W e are now about rea dy fo r the second round. I 

notice it is 20 min utes af te r 12, b ut I do want to acco mmodate Senato rs who have waited.

If i t is all righ t, we will now proc eed w ith the second rou nd of question s an d I will recognize Se na tor Case.

Se na tor Case. Than k yo u, Air. C hairm an.

questions for ti ie record

I hav e no questions to ask on the second round except to say th at I 

should like to have a cou ple of questio ns answered for th e record wh ich 

I sha ll sub mit to your lat er. [See appendix.]

Air. V ance. Of course.

Se na tor C hur ch. Th an k you, Se na tor Case.

Se na tor Pell.

Se na tor H umphrey. Air. S ecret ary , Air. C hairm an, please excuse me. 

We hav e a Democratic conference and I am supposed to be the re, so 

I am going to leave you now. I fe ar it may look like I am being dis ­

courteo us, bu t I assu re you I am not. I wish I could stay.

Se na tor Chur ch. I might say th at because of the De mo cra tic conferenc e s cheduled to tak e place at 12:30, we must recess af te r the questio ning o f Air. V ance has been com pleted. T he com mittee will ad journ 

un til 2 o’clock this after no on when we will he ar the othe r witnesses 

who are sch eduled to testi fy .

We will recess a fter we have co mplete d th e questioning of Air. Vance,

Se na tor Pell.

Se na tor P ell. T ha nk you, Air. Ch airma n.

PROPER SCOPE OF EXECU TIVE AGR EEMENTS

W ha t wou ld be yo ur view. Air. Van ce, as to the pr op er scope of executive ag ree ments as ag ains t trea tie s?

Th e cu rre nt S ta te Dep ar tm en t view, sta ted by the legal adv iser, is 

th at th e Presiden t has indepe nd en t constitu tio nal au th or ity to enter 

into inter natio na l agreem ents, an d th at the choice of the instr um en ­

talit y, wh eth er by executive agreeme nt or by trea ty , lies exclusively 

with, the Preside nt.

Will th e new ad minist ratio n adhere to this pra ctice, or alter it? As 

you know , i t is a bone of some c onten tio n with us.
Mr. V ance. I realize it is a bone of contention. I have not looked 

into it from the legal standpoint. But I gather there are constitutional 

issues involved in this question on which I would like to inform 

myself before attempting to answer tha t question.

I would hope that this kind of question will not come up often and 

tha t with frequent and more steady cooperation we can avoid that kind 

of confrontation.

Senator Pell. Thank you.

I have several very short and specific questions.

BUREA U OF OCEAN AFFAIRS

Until recently the Bureau of Ocean Affairs had a very short shr ift 

in the Department. The post of Assistant Secretary was not filled. 

Then it was filled by a lady who held t hat total function was one re ­

lated to energy. Then it was not filled again for many months.

The present Assistant Secretary, Mr. Irving, is doing an excellent 

job. I understand he will be replaced by Congresswoman Mink. IIow 

do you see this Bureau moving ahead and securing its righ tful place 

in the Department, representing, as it does, 70 percent of the earth's 

surface, as opposed to other geographic bureaus, which combined 

represent 30 percent? It ought to be treated at least like geographic 

bureaus.

Mr. Vance. I thin k it should be treated like the geographical 

bureaus. To tha t end I have asked tha t the Under Secretary for 

Security Affairs and Proliferation Affairs act as the Dutch uncle and 

make sure that the problems of that bureau get up and-----

Senator Pell. You mean Dutch aunt, don’t you ?

Mr. Vance. Yes, Dutch aunt. [General laughter.]

And that they get the kind of daily consideration they need. Of 

course, the Assistant Secretary has access to me at any time tha t she 

wants. But on a day-to-day basis, it should get the kind of day-in and 

day-out supervision and help, and for this I think it is better to have 

this Dutch aunt.

Senator Pell. Will you give the new Chief of the Bureau supervision over the law of the sea negotiations; or do you consider th at as 

a separate function ?

Mr. Vance. I have not yet decided that.

PO ISO NI NG OF U. S. EMB ASSY IN MOSCOW

Senator P ell. Considering the poisoning of our Embassy in Moscow 

by the Russian microwaves, have you followed this and what can be 

done about it ?

Mr. Vance. I read a memorandum on th at this morning. I gather 

this subject is one of discussion with the Soviet Union at this point. I 

think we ought to see what response we get to that. However, it is 

a subject with which I have real concern, because it is a question of 

health of individuals working for the U.S. Government. I will make 

sure it gets the proper supervision and attention.

Senator P ell. That is why I asked the question. T recognize the 

nature of the things going on, but T felt it would be good for the 

Service to know we are concerned and interested.

Mr. Vance. Yes.
38

POLICY OF NOT NE GOTIA TIN G W IT H TERRORISTS

Senator P ell. Finally, the D epartment has a policy of not negotiating with terrorists in the event that they capture an American 

diplomat, or negotiating at all. Many people consider this policy to 

be rigid.

What is your own view of this policy ?

Mr. Vance. Again, we have set up a review in the NSC of the 

question of terrorism and what our policy should be. We have set a 

timetable for the development of the papers on that. I t is an im portant 

subject and done where, 1 think, we ought to have a policy.

SH OO T-T O-KILL POL ICY REGARDING TERRORISM

Senator Pell. Following up on that though, my understanding is 

that it is being increasingly realized th at when terrorists succeed, and 

yet one or two of them are captured, that then provides the grounds 

for another terrorist incident to get those people in turn, out of jail. 

Therefore nations should probably shoot to kill rather than arresting 

and holding.

Wouldn’t this be a pretty good policy for all nations to follow, to 

avoid the bail-outs of captives which provides an excuse to hijack 

another plane and risk more innocent people ?

Mr. Vance. I am not sure in all circumstances that it is.

Senator Pell. But it is perhaps a direction that ought to be considered ?

Mr. Vance. It is one we would take a look at.

Senator P ell. Thank you, Mr. Vance.

Senator Church. Senator Javits.

Senator J avits. If you would please allow me 5 minutes.

Senator Church. Surely.

Senator J avits. I just have two questions. We will, I am sure, be 

seeing a lot of you.

OBSERVANCE OF WAR POWERS ACT

One is a line of questioning I pursued before. A fter all, the end of 

foreign policy is to keep the peace, and the failure of foreign policy 

is to resort to war. Therefore, I call your attention to what you already 

know, the War Powers Act, a totally new law since you were previously on the scene here.

Mr. Vance. Yes.

Senator J avits. Section II I reads as follows—

The P re si dent in ev ery possibl e in st an ce sh all co ns ul t w ith Con gress be fore 

in tr oduci ng U ni ted Sta te s Ar med For ce s in to host ilitie s or si tu ati ons whe re 

im m in en t in vo lv em en t in host ilitie s is cl ea rly in di ca te d by th e ci rc um stan ce s, 

an d a fte r e ve ry su ch in trod uc tion sh al l co ns ul t re gula rl y w ith th e Con gress un til 

th e U.S. Ar med For ce s are no lo ng er en ga ge d in ho st ilitie s, or ha ve l>een rem ov ed 

from s uc h si tu at io n.

Do you or the new administration see any problem with the goodfaith observance of that law ?

Mr. Vance. I do not.

Senator J avits. Do you challenge it under the Constitution as to 

the President’s power?

Mr. Vance. No.
39

Senator J avits. Would you, therefore, undertake to confer with this 

committee as to what methodology and guidelines have already been 

worked out with the S tate Department and what the new administration would like to work out in respect of the implementation of this 

generally regarded very critical aspect of the new policy of our 

country ?

Mr. Vance. I will.

U. S. ATTIT UDE TOWARD AGGRESSIVE ACTIO N TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA

Senator J avits. The other thing concerns the line of questioning 

which Senator Dan forth had for you, that is, th e question of what 

Governor Carter had promised or said in the campaign.

We are not playing with tha t as a minority, but it is important 

because it is not just campaign rhetoric. He is an honest and sincere 

man and now he will be the President. What he said will count very 

heavily. So, if it is going to stand, we ought to know; if it is going 

to change—and I hope he will feel very free to change or further 

define these—then we ought to know that, too.

There are two additions to what Senator Danforth asked and I 

will name them both because I want to economize on time. One is 

Yugoslavia, that is, our attitude toward any aggressive action toward 

Yugoslavia. I have just been there and my reports have been going 

through the mill. It is my profound conviction tha t if the nationalities 

stay together, we will not face that danger of some application of 

the Brezhnev doctrine to Yugoslavia. But if they should fall apa rt— 

our great effort, in my judgment, should be to keep them together— 

but if they fall apart, we may be in great danger.

If you want to answer that now, OK. If not, I certainly hope that 

at the earliest time the new administration’s policy may lie stated 

about whether it is or is not, what Governor Carter said in the debates— 

tha t is one.

PA NA MA CAN AL SIT UA TIO N

The other question concerns the Panama Canal, the same proposition. I personally happen to believe in the Kissinger-Tack principles. 

You know as well as I do that this is the dominant political question 

in Latin America as far as the United States is concerned.

By the way, L atin America has not been mentioned here this morning. That is what they always complain about, tha t we are always 

talking about every other place but our nearest neighbor, Latin 

America.

So, his spelling out what he meant when he said tha t he is going to 

see to our sovereign right there, whatever th at may mean and however 

his language was, I would strongly urge the Secretary-designate tha t 

this be clarified.

Mr. Vance. Let me speak to the latter.

I think we have not discussed the former adequately enough to give 

you a definitive answer.

With respect to the Panam a Canal situation, as I have stated publicly on several occasions, I believe this to be one of the most important and pressing issues which the new administration will face. 

This is, as you indicated, being watched with great care and interest,
40

not, only in Panama, but in Latin America, and indeed in the whole 

Third World.

It is my view that we should reopen the negotiations at a very early 

point and seek to resolve the remaining issues promptly. I think this 

is important both from the standpoint of security and access to the 

canal, and to the situation in Panama. Also, it is of great symbolic 

importance to the Third World and to how we will be viewed in the 

upcoming discussions in the so-called North-South dialog we will 

be entering into in several other fora.

Senator J avits. Every word you have just uttered is going to be 

weighed. So, I must ask you just one other (piestion to make it crystal 

clear.

Does that mean that you are going to open up the negotiations so 

tha t the Tack-Kissinger principles are up for renogatiation, or tha t 

you accept what has been done, to wit the Tack-Kissinger principles, 

and that you are going ahead to negotiate within a context which the 

United States has already agreed to ?

Mr. V ance. I cannot, state what the position is going to be. I can 

only state my own position, and I have publicly stated it; tha t is, I 

accept the Tack-Kissinger principles. I cannot speak for the new 

administration.

Senator J avits. Good. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Church. Senator Percy.

Senator Percy. Mr. Secretary-designate, I should first like to ask 

about the Middle East.

On November 17. 1976, Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon urged the Israeli 

Government to hold talks with the Palestinians.

Mr. Vance. To do what?

RE CO MMEN DE D IS RAEL I GOVER NM EN T TALK S W IT H PA LE STIN IA N S

Senator Percy. lie urged the Israeli Government to hold talks 

with the Palestinians concerning a Middle Eas t settlement. I would 

like to couple tha t with a comment that out of a recent meeting of the 

PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization] and nonofficial Israeli 

personalities came a report tha t the PLO is now prepared to recognize Israel's sovereignty in exchange for a Palestinian state in Israeli 

administered territory.

There are two questions: Would you care to comment on General 

Sharon’s recommendation to the Israeli Government that it hold talks 

with the Palestinians, possibly in Geneva? Second, are you able to 

give us any information as to the readability of the report that talks 

have already taken place between the PLO and Israel nonofficial 

personalities?

Mr. Vance. The answer is I cannot give you information with 

respect to the latter. With respect to the other questions you have 

asked, let me state I think it is clear that the legitimate interests of the 

Palestinian people must be dealt with in any ultimate solution of the 

Middle East problem. However, I would also note th at so long as the 

PLO refuses to recognize Israel’s right to exist, the recognition of the 

PLO is something I would not recommend.

Senator P ercy. Identical to the position that T took publicly 2 years 

ago, I certainly concur with you. I think initiative must come from
41

tlie PLO. They must be realistic, as every other Arab country now 

has become. Privately, some of them even openly, will now recognize 

the right of Israel to exist. With that assurance 1 think some progress 

can be made.

N E W PE AC E IN IT IA T IV E IN MI DD LE EA ST

Did you say the time is running out and tha t possibly the climate 

is now ripe to move ahead and take an initiative in seeking peace in 

the Middle East? In asking that question, I would like, Mr. Cha irman, to put on the record once again my tremendous admiration for 

what Secretary Kissinger has accomplished over a period of years 

in this area, to really find a basis for peace and to put us into a position to enable us to be a factor, the factor as both sides see it now, in 

trying to bring peace about. They did need some third force to inte rvene, and we have put ourselves in tha t position and are looked to by 

both sides as the only ones capable of helping to bring peace.

Do you feel tha t the time is right now to move ahead and take a 

new initiative and put this very high on our agenda?

Mr. Vance. There is no question th at it must be very, very high on 

our agenda. Recent statements by various Arab leaders and by Prime 

Minister Rabin all indicate interest in progress in the Middle East. 

As we all know, that is a very difficult and thorny path to walk. But 

clearly ft must be at the top of our agenda, and one to which we must 

address ourselves immediately.

POLI TIC AL CONDIT IO N IN ISRA EL

Senator P ercy. Some time ago—I think it was early 1974—in talking with most of the leaders of the Arab world—I guess all of them— 

they constantly pointed out that one of the greatest deterrents to 

peace and the ability to work out peace was the political weakness 

of Prime Minister Rabin. Not one of them spoke against him. They 

simply said he could not deliver because of the divided political 

conditions, which realistically we many times have in this country. 

Tie is in even more weakened condition right now.

Is the political condition in Israel going to hold up until they have 

elections and move ahead with finding a basis for a stable and lasting peace? What is our timetable? Can we, for instance, look forward 

to some successful negotiations this year ?

Mr. Vance. I cannot give you a timetable. There is no question 

but that the political situation in Israel is a complicating factor. I 

do not think, however, that the fact that there will not be elections 

until May means t hat no progress can be made in beginning to explore the possibilities during that interim period.

Senator P ercy. Thank you.

PO SSIB IL IT Y OF OI L TRIC E IN CR EA SE

I would like your comments on oil and OPEC.

It looks as though with a little more movement toward economics 

rather than politics tha t market factors may start to take hold, if 

von truly believe them. There is a split in OPE C on the issue of 

pricing.
42

Wh at are the prospects for continued Saudi and United Arab 

Emirates leadership in holding price increases down? I think they 

fully recognize tha t an increase at this time might have a disastrous 

setback for economic recovery and would be a disastrous burden on 

thir d world developing countries and would add to world inflation, 

which would hurt all of the OPEC countries.

Is there a possibility that those facts of life will become apparent 

to other OPE C countries and that we will not face again in July 

this thre at of what I consider to be a disastrous possible price 

increase ?

Mr. Vance. I don't know what they are going to do in July. It 

would be a pure guess on my pa rt to try to answer that question.

I was encouraged to see the action taken by the Saudis and by 

the Emirates. I think it was a very wise action in light of what the 

implications would have been for the economic situation, particularly in Europe.

I think one of the important facts that is going to bear on all of 

this is what we do here, with respect to an energy policy. We have 

to get at that. That may have an effect upon what happens in the 

Middle East.

Senator P ercy. I could not agree with you more on that.

LI NK AG E BETW EEN MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND OIL PRICIN G

Do you see also that if we move aggressively ahead with an energy 

policy in this country, with a high priority on conservation and alternate energy sources, with which all oil-producting countries are in a 

sense in agreement—many of them would like to keep their oil in the 

ground since it will some day be worth $100 a barrel to them, rathe r 

than, as one of them said giving it away today at $11.51—do you see 

also a linkage, however, th at if we can move ahead with peace in the 

Middle East, it will have a material effect and strengthen the hands 

of those who want to provide stability of pricing in July for the forthcoming OPE C meeting?

Mr. Vance. I don’t know. All I can say is we have made no commitments in connection with any discussions; but the Saudi Minister of 

Petroleum has indicated that in his mind there may be some linkage. 

Put there was absolutely no commitment by either the incoming or outgoing administration.

Senator P ercy. If we could see progress and could see an initiative 

undertaken by the United States for peace in the Middle East through 

Geneva or whatever format by July, and see an initiative, a prospect 

and a hope for it, and also see some prospect for hope to br ing together 

north-south and the conflict that we have with them, and see that we 

can somehow work together toward a common objective, would this 

in tu rn help stabilize that situation to a degree—at least not hurt it?

Mr. Vance. At least it would not hurt.

U.S ., JA PA NES E AND GERMAN CONSU LTA TIVE EFFO RT TOWARD 

ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Senator Percy. There has been some discussion in economic policy 

circles of tryi ng to orchestrate a general economic recovery through a 

consultative effort between Jap an, the United States, and Germany, to 

get the economic engines of these three powerful countries going.
43

Do you feel such an effort is realistic, and in general, what importance do you place on the coordination of policy, economic policy, 

between the United States, Jap an, and Germany on other leading 

countries? Would you foresee a continued need for economic 

sum mitry?

Air. Vance. I would.

I think it is essential that there be coordination among the various 

countries which have been involved in economic summits before. 

With respect specifically to the economic stimulus package to which 

you have referred, there has not been time for anybody in the new 

administration to discuss this with either Germany or Japan. But 

obviously this wdll be a subject of discussion.

Senator Percy. I have just two questions. Aly time is up, Air. 

Chairman, and I will wait until a fter Senator D anforth and you have 

asked yours.

Senator Church. I have no further questions.

Senator Danforth. I have but one question; please feel free to 

proceed.

Senator Percy.' Ko. You go ahead.

Senator Church. All right, Senator Danforth.

ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES SPONSORED BY SOUT H KOREAN GOVERNMENT

Senator Danforth. Air. Vance, there have been serious allegations 

of illegal activities sponsored by the South Korean Government within 

the United States, including bribes within the Congress. If those allegations are true, what significance would tha t have for American 

policy toward South Korea?

Air. Vance. Clearly tha t cannot help but erode support in the 

United States for South Korea.

Senator Danforth. Would it have any effect with respect to our 

obligation to defend South Korea?

Air. Vance. No. A security trea ty is a security treaty.

Senator Danforth. The decision on whether or not to withdraw 

ground troops from South Korea would be based on factors other 

than this development?

Air. Vance. I think the answ’er to tha t question is “yes.” I t would 

have to be.

Senator Danforth. Do you see how’ the United States can present 

itself as being a standard of morality in the world without having 

some kind of reaction to this factor?

Air. Vance. I think it is likely tha t some sort of reaction will have 

to be made with respect to that. On the other hand, no one is blameless in these matters and I suppose it has to be weighed very carefully 

when you decide what the action is t hat is going to be taken.

Senator Danforth. It is very difficult to talk morality in terms of 

foreign policy.

Air. Vance. It is.

Senator Danforth. As you pointed out, I think in answer to a question by Senator Pell, we do have certain strategic interests, military 

interests, defense interests, and we have to weigh those very, very carefully. South Korea, I take it, is im portant on its own terms and also 

because of the perception in Jap an of our relationship with South 

Korea. However, it is difficult to imagine, is it not, a more obvious
44

case in which the Un ite d State s sho uld say som ething, th an with respe ct to the co rru pti on which exis ts ap pa rently not only with in South 

Ko rea , bu t whi ch has sprea d from South Korea int o the very cap ital 

of our co untry.

Mr. Vance. Th ere is no question th at the re has to be. w hen the fac ts 

are determined and if they are determined—as you ind ica te, the y are 

allegations—th at this is tlie case. Th is is a very str on g con dem nation.

Th e que stio n I thou gh t you were ask ing was wh at do you do the n 

wi th resp ect to the security side of the equation.

Se na tor D anfortit. Ye s; is th ere a rel ati onship betw een th ei r action 

an d ou r policy, oth er than , say, a ver bal con dem nation which wou ld 

be fo rth co ming from us ?

Mr. Vance. I think this is a m at ter we are going to have to look at 

very, v ery care fully . I th in k I ha ve answered it as best I can —the first 

question yo u p ut to me.

Se na tor Churc h. Than k you, S en ato r D an forth .

Se na tor Pe rcy .

U .S . RO LE IN IN TE R N A T IO N A L FIN A N C IA L IN ST IT U T IO N S

Se na tor P ercy. My final questio n is on the economic area.

We are, alo ng with m any othe r developed countries, abs olutely committed to a gen era l concept th at we have an oblig ation and a du ty to 

dev elo pin g und erdeve loped countrie s overseas. I am very distressed 

th at , fo r instanc e, we are as a N ati on now $55 m illion in arrears on o ur 

ple dged contr ibu tio n to the In tern atio na l Dev elopment Associa tion, 

the s oft lo an window of the W orld B ank . D o you see an inc rea sing role 

fo r the U ni ted State s in existing internationa l finance insti tutio ns in 

relatio nship to our bilatera l program s? W ha t kind of fac tors should 

be consid ered in de ter mi nin g this ?

Mr. Vance. Ye s; I do.

I th in k th is is of f undame nta l importance . I th in k we must pay up 

our back obligations and I th in k we mu st increase the amoun t which 

we are pu ttin g into the intern ationa l finan cial institut ion s. I believe 

they sho uld be the basic source of ca pital going into the dev eloping 

cou ntries.

E M PH A SIS ON GR OW ING NE ED S OF LDC*S

Se na tor P ercy. Hav ing been i n Ja pan and Eu rope I have met with 

most of the m ajor indu str ialis ts in this country in the past 2 mon ths. 

T am re ally ve ry concerned a bou t w here we are go ing to get this stimulus. I am no t so sure tax is g oing to do it entirely.

Is there any po ssibility in yo ur mind th at we not only m ora lly would 

be doing the rig ht thing, bu t th at w’e migh t rea lly be pr ov iding a 

stimu lus to economic recovery a nd to get the en gines g oin g again i f we 

could place an emphasis upo n the grow ing needs of the LD C’s?

Mr. Vance. I th in k the answer is “yes.”

Se na tor P ercy. We sho uld wo rk with OPE C countrie s who have 

cash ru nn in g out the ir ears. We sh ould work w ith them an d find ways 

to prov ide ou r bac kup , our techno logy, our know-howT, o ur goods, fina nc ing; use th eir financ ing to k ind of he lp stimu late the kin d of economic reco very th at certa in countrie s, such as Sa ud i Arabia. Ku wait 

and o the rs, w an t to see happen. Th ey do not wa nt to see th e condition
45

of a million unemployed in Jap an and a million unemployed in France, 

England on its back, and the United States with 8 million unemployed. Is this not a way to act not only in our own interest, but to do 

both the right thin g and help economic recovery worldwide?

Mr. Vance. The answer is “yes.’’ I th ink one of the major problems 

to be faced, and one to be faced very promptly, is w hat we do about 

the question of debt restructure. It is a very important and difficult 

question tha t is going to come up as early as March or April.

Senator Percy. Well, our expert on tha t is our own colleague now, 

* Senator Moynihan.

E FF ECT OF CURRENT PO LIT IC A L UPH EA V A L IN PEO PLE’S REPU BLIC OF 

C H IN A

With respect to East Asia, do you expect the current political upheaval in the People’s Republic of China to slow the progress of the 

normalization of Sino-American relations?

Mr. Vance. There are no indications that it will. It is the stated 

principle of the Chinese tha t they adhere to the principles of the 

Shanghai communique insofar as our bilateral relations are concerned, 

and to the principles previously enunciated by Chairman Mao before 

his death.

DI SC US SIONS W IT H SO VIET U N IO N AB OU T L IM IT IN G MID DL E EA ST AR MS

Senator P ercy. Would you care to answer in executive session some 

time in the future, or now, whether you have any thoughts in mind of 

talking with the Soviet Union about the possibility of limitations 

on the quantities and sophistication of arms that both countries send 

to the Middle East ?

Mr. Vance. I would be perfectly willing to answer that in open 

session.

I think this is one of the questions we clearly should talk with them 

about. As you know, a number of the private nonprofit scientific 

groups in both countries have discussed this matter on a number of 

occasions. The answer that has always been given up to now is tha t 

such limitations must depend upon a political settlement in the Middle 

East. But it is clearly a very important question and cuts across the 

problem of arms transfers generally.

Senator P ercy. I was not here when Senator Clark asked his ques- 

, tions on southern Africa. We were both down there. I presume he

covered Rhodesia thoroughly.

Mr. Vance. lie did.

U .S . ROLE IN N A M IB IA

Senator Percy. In your judgment, is there a real role for the 

United States to play in Namibia in seeing that we do try to end the 

trusteeship now tha t South Africa has imposed upon them over the 

objections of every nation on earth, and move them toward independence, even if it includes the SWAPO—Southwest Africa People's 

Organization—about which Vorster is not very enthusiastic? But he 

says tha t if they want SWA PO involved, they have no objection. Can 

we play a real role? In essence, should we place this fairly high in

S l- 894— 77-
46

priority to bring about a resolution of tha t agonizing and threedecade-old problem ?

Mr. Vance. I talked to Senator Clark about this issue. I indicated 

to him that I thought it might be possible for us to play a role in this 

area and tha t our objectives should be to encourage the independence 

of Namibia by peaceful means at the earliest possible opportunity. I 

reviewed the fact that the negotiations had seemed to come to a standstill at this point, but that perhaps there were ways that might be 

found to start them going again.

U .S . OB JE CT IV E W IT H JA PA N E SE CO NCE RNIN G 2 0 0 -M IL E L IM IT

Senator Percy. Finally, I am sure tha t Senator Pell went into the 

law o f the sea. In Jap an two deep issues were involved—South Korea 

and our position there, and the law of the sea and its deep effect upon 

them. They are really very dependent upon fish.

Is it your statement that we are going to sit down with the Japanese, 

that we will be equitable and not arbitrary about this and draw the 

line and say, “Get out of the 200-mile limit when it becomes effective 

that we will work out with them what our end objective is, to preserve 

supplies? That is what we are trying to do. We are not trying to 

hold it to ourselves. We are trying to stop the depletion tha t is now 

going on, such as in whales.

It is happening in all of the sea. Is it our objective to sit down with 

our friends in Jap an in an understanding way and work this out ?

Mr. Vance. Yes. and with the Canadians as well.

Senator Percy. Fine.

COM M EN DATI ON OF MR. VA NC E

1 would like to say, Mr. Chairman, tha t without equivocation I 

intend to cast an enthusiastic vote for confirmation of Mr. Vance. This 

is not only based on my years of working relationship, but I think his 

simply magnificient response to our questions here this morning. I 

have looked over carefully your confidential financial statement. I 

think it is impeccable. 1 have only one question with respect to one 

aspect of it. I would like to ask th at in private. If we could meet afte r 

this session, I can dispose of it.

Mr. Vance. Of course.

Senator Church. I do not sense, Mr. Vance, that your nomination 

is in deep trouble. [General laughter.]

PR IC E OF U .S . insistence on right to intervene

1 do think, however, tha t you said something quite quietly that 

touched me to the core.

In your colloquy with Senator Danforth and your response to how 

we trea t the delicate problem that is presented to us by the charges 

of illegal, improper, and corrupt activities by the South Korean Government in this city, you very quietly said, “After all, none of us are 

blameless.” I thought tha t underscored in a very vivid way the price 

we pay for our own insistence upon our righ t to intervene in the 

affairs of other countries in these very ways. We paid for it in the 

use of the same methods in our own politics during the Watergate
47

period. We paid for it in the transgressions and the disregard for the 

law and the arrogance of power that was so clear in our investigation 

of the CIA and the FB I. We now pay for it as the chickens come 

home to roost in this country, as other governments begin to penetrate 

our own country and serious questions arise as to the activities of 

the secret police of foreign governments in this country in connection 

with certain murders tha t have occurred in recent months.

So, it is a fearful price tha t we pay—and we pay, and we pay, and 

we pay.

* Ton have already discovered, i f you did not know it beforehand, 

that this forum is used for two purposes by members of this committee. 

One is to ask questions and the other is to oiler the answers to those 

questions. [General laughter.]

• Tomorrow you will give us an opportunity as members of this 

committee to gather with the members of the House International 

Delations Committee to meet with you for the purpose of offering 

our answers. You are going o spend all day, together with the Pres ident-elect, listening to us.

So, I will hold my ammunition until tomorrow, Mr. Vance. I will 

keep my powder dry.

Thank you so much for coming.

We appreciate your time and your answers.

Mr. Vance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Church. These hearings will continue at 2 o’clock this 

afternoon.

| Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 

at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFT ER NOON SE SS IO N

Senator Church [presiding]. This hearing will come to order.

T E N -M IN U T E RU LE

During the afternoon session this committee will adhere to the 

same 10-minute rule by the Senators in their questioning, and the wit-

• nesses who are scheduled to be heard this afternoon should limit their 

presentations to 10 minutes so that we can complete the list of witnesses scheduled to be heard.

The first witness is Mr. Edw ard Korry, former Ambassador to

* E th io pia an d to Ch ile.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD KORRY, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO 

ETHIO PIA AND TO CHILE

Ambassador Korry. Mr. Chairman, before I begin, I would like 

to say tha t there are matters I wish to raise in this statement that are 

of a delicate nature because in pa rt they refer to proceedings in front 

of a grand jury and under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department. 

They also refer to foreign countries.

I would prefer to read the statement as I wrote it, with certain 

omissions. So that there is no mistake, I would like to further explain 

that when I asked previously if there were any ground rules, the
48

answer I received from the staff was “No,” there were none. I did not

realize there was a 10-minute limitation, and this may run 20 minutes.

Senator Church. Mr. Korry, if it runs 20 minutes, that is fine. Our 

purpose is not to limit you, but try to get all of the witnesses heard.

Ambassador Korry. Thank you very much.

I shall begin today, Mr. Chairman, with reference to my years in 

Chile as U.S. Ambassador because Mr. Vance was directly and indirectly involved in my experiences of the past 10 years—in many 

different ways, as I shall specifically demonstrate—and because they 

concern four areas of public interest which I hold to be pertinent to 

the nominee’s qualifications and suitability for the highest Cabinet 

po st:

First. Morality in our foreign policy, a subject repeatedly stressed 

the past year by Mr. Vance and by President-elect Carter, who in- •

voked the word “Chile” more times—seven—in his debate on foreign 

affairs with President Ford, than any other issue;

Second. The potential for improper pressures on the new Secretary 

of State by private interests and by foreign powers if the matters I 

intend to p ut on the record today were to continue to be concealed from 

this Senate committee and the public;

Third. The accountability of all those paid by the public for their 

actions as Government servants, including Mr. Vance;

Fourth. The future policies of the U nited States toward the Soviet 

Union, the so-called Euro-Communist regimes which may soon emerge, 

the Third World, and related areas of domestic policy.

I come here as one who recalls with pride the unanimous affirmative recommendations accorded me by the Foreign Relations Committee in 1973 and 1967. I come as one unattached to any political 

party and who is proud tha t he could serve the Presidency of this 

country under both a Kennedy and a Nixon without ever giving a cent 

in political contributions to either. The organization of which I am 

still a member is the Council of Foreign Relations, of which David 

Rockefeller is the president and Mr. Vance a director.

I come here too as one who has unswervingly refused the repeated 

efforts, star ting in 1973, of the Ambassadors in Washington and at 

the United Nations of the present military regime in Chile, to meet 

with me—as one who spurned all invitations from that Government’s ♦

consulates and embassies because, as I stated on national television 

and to university audiences in 1974, it was a harsh dictatorship and 

fascist in character.

I come here, too, as one who has campaigned—successfully I *

might add—this past year to gain the attention of, and action by, the 

Attorney General and the Justice Department—and more recently a 

grand jury—and as one who shall be pursuing in the courts in the 

near future some of the outstanding matters to which I shall allude 

today.

PO TEN TIA L FO R IM PR OPE R PR ES SU RE S ON N EW SE CR ET AR Y OF STAT E

If I may illustrate the second point of the four I listed as matters 

of public interest—“the potential for improper pressures”—let me give 

here a few pertinent examples of what I have in mind.
49

I wrote Attorney General Levi on March 25, 1976, to request that 

the Justice Department investigate the crimes which 1 alleged were 

being concealed from the public on the pretext tha t all 6% hours of 

my sworn testimony of February 24, 1976, and the supportive documents, given to an executive hearing of the Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence were unpublishable for reasons of national security.

I had given tha t testimony and the documents only afte r being 

assured repeatedly by the committee's staff and counsel a year ago that 

it all would be made public afte r my review for deletion of the few 

*. sentences concerning national security. In May the Attorney General

referred my complaint to the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, and in June I made these three specific charges in a sworn 

deposition of 62 pages to two attorneys of the criminal division who 

» came to my home :

One, tha t high officials of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon 

administrations-----

Senator Church. Excuse me, please. Do you have a copy of your 

statement which I might use to follow you ?

Ambassador Korry. Yes, sir. I do.

Senator Church. Thank you.

Ambassador Korry. One, th at high officials of the Kennedy, J ohnson, and Nixon administrations and of the IT T Co. and possibly other 

firms, had committed perjury in their testimony concerning Chile 

before Senate committees;

Two, that IT T had defrauded the public of some $90 million—the 

exact amount was some $94 million—by concealing evidence and by 

lying in order to win payment of the insurance against expropriation 

of its Chilean properties which it held with the Government agency,

o pi c;

Three, that certain Senators, their staffs and counsels, had conspired 

to obstruct justice in the above-cited matters and had conspired to 

deprive me of my inalienable civil rights as an American.

A Federal grand jury in Washington is actively pursuing the first 

two (‘barges as a direct result of my appeal to the impeccable Air. Le vi; 

unless the incoming administration maneuvers to quash prosecution 

by the Justice Department on some pretext or another, unless a politi-

• cal process supersedes a legal process, I have good reason to anticipate 

that indictments will be handed down.

I raise these matters today not merely because I believe it imperative 

that the public finally have (he tru th about Chile, but because it is far

* more important that they perceive what the “mess in Washington”— 

to use President-elect Carter's words—is all about, how their Government. really works. I want the Senate and the public to hear the details 

of what in a different context Grover Cleveland referred to as “the 

cohesive ties of public plunder'' or what some more charitable observers in today's context might term, “the cohesive ties of public blunder— 

the brazen abuse of public power, of public trust, of public confidence.”

Since Mr. Vance, as I shall illustrate, has played a not unimportant 

role in the fashioning of some of these ties and since he has also contribu ted to the concealment of them, I shall now raise some of the 

ouestions which convinced me that my only recourse was the Attorney 

General and the Justice Department.
50

For example, how does it come about that a Senate committee cloaks 

my testimony in the mantle of national security as soon as I submit 

documents to it on March 23, 1976, to prove my charges, yet Harold 

Geneen, IT T’s chairman of the board, immediately discovers enough 

about my evidence to change his sworn testimony before a Senate 

committee in 1973—to wit, his denial that ITT delivered $350,000 to 

the opponents of Salvador Allende in 1970 to prevent the accession 

of power of the Chilean president-elect ?

How does it happen th at Mr. Geneen only discovers the falseness of 

his testimony of 3 years earlier, and announces a few weeks later, this 

discovery to IT T’s annual shareholders’ meeting in Phoenix, Ariz., 

that such a payment was in fact probably made ?

How does it come about tha t I TT could engage as a lobbyist in 1972 

Mr. Fred Dutton, one of President Kennedy’s top White House assistants, and that Mr. Dutton, inter alia, whispered around these precincts 

information designed to discredit me and to exculpate IT T ?

How does it happen tha t Senators and their stall's can suppress for 

years the evidence t ha t IT T had been integrated in White House 

covert political operations in various countries for many years—that 

in fact, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, as the overseer of the 

so-called special group in the White House and his successors in the 

Johnson administration coordinated their covert political planning 

with those of the members of the business group for Latin America, 

a group established by David Rockefeller in 1963 at the specific request of President John F. Kennedy—that, in fact, A ttorney General 

Robert F. Kennedy thereby legitimized the bribery of foreign officials, 

the funnelling of funds to foreign political parties and similar practices by some multinationals for which all m ultinationals are now held 

responsible, as the practitioners of original sin ?

Another example, the Anaconda Copper Co. won a judgment in 

1975 against the taxpayer for $154 million in payment of its Government insurance policy against expropriation in Chile. I intend to prove, 

by the way, tha t ITT should be held liable fo r th at payment, not the 

American public, and for another $67 million as well paid to Kennecott Copper.

But now I wish to ask only how does it come about tha t Anaconda 

was represented in the secret 1975 proceedings for this enormous claim 

by Louis Oberdorfer, Deputy to Attorney General Robert Kennedy ? 

And, even more intriguing, how does it come about that Ralph Dungan, one of President Kennedy’s top assistants in the White House 

and the man who oversaw for both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson 

the massive undertaking by CIA , AID , and various private companies 

and organizations to prevent Allende from being elected in 1964, and 

the man who, upon Allende’s defeat, was immediately sent to Chile 

in October 1964, to be the U.S. Ambassador to the government of 

Eduardo Frei, and the man who then arranged for a commitment of 

almost $2 billion—billion—of taxpayer money to 9 million Chileans 

in just 3 years including $600 million ill very questionable guarantees 

to IT T, Anaconda, and other companies, Kennecott among them—onefourth the worldwide total of such U.S. guarantees by 1967—how does 

it come about tha t he shows up as a character witness fo r Anaconda in 

those secret proceedings, and for a company he repeatedly told me 

was run by—his words—“mean bastards’’, and for a company for
51

which 1 refused to appear as a witness despite intense, unpleasant 

pressures by Mr. Obedorfer, the former Deputy Attorney General, 

when I insisted on being a witness for the public ?

EXAMPLES OF POTENTIAL FOR IMPROPER PRESSURES

How does it come about, Mr. Chairman, that the only portion of my 

secret testimony to the select committee on February 24, 1976, which 

I considered to fall into an area of national security and which I deleted from the version destined for the public—the name of a cabinet 

minister of Chile throu gh whom CIA funds were funnelled—tha t 

this fact, along with other portions of my testimony were immediately 

made known to Gabriel Valdes, the former Foreign Minister of Chile 

and now a high U.N. official in charge of dispensing huge amounts 

of public funds—mostly U.S. taxpayer funds—to Latin America, and 

tha t he, in turn, immediately reported on these matters to the Christian Democratic P art y leadership in Santiago, Chile, as well as other 

groups ?

I am particularly incensed, Mr. Chairman, because I had earned the 

undying enmity of Mr. Valdes in 1969, when a trusted emissary of his, 

one Armando Urribe, then the Minister Counselor of the Chilean Em ­

bassy in Washington and later Allende’s Ambassador to Peking, spent 

5 unsuccessful hours in my home seeking futilely to convince me to 

have the United States support Mr. Valdes' bid for the Presidency of 

Chile. Dean Rusk, when he was Secretary of State, by the way, told 

me when I went to Chile for the first time tha t Mr. Valdes was one 

of the slipperiest men in he world. That is his quote.

1 should add here that Mr. Allende’s campaign manager asked me 

for $1 million in 1970, th at the man Valdes was seeking to supplant, 

Mr. Tomic, the candidate of the Christian Democrats, through his 

campaign manager asked me for $1 million in 1970, that the rightist 

candidate, Mr. Alessandri, thro ugh an unceasing campaign via multinationals, Chilean politicians and even the CIA, hammered on me for 

more than 2 years in futile search of U.S. support.

The culmination of th is conservative effort was a proposal made to 

the State Department on April 10, 1970, by the board chairman of 

Anaconda, Mr. J. Parkinson, and by the president of the aforementioned multinational group chaired by David Rockefeller, Mr. Jose 

de Cubas, and now known as the Council of the Americas. They asked 

the United States to join the multinationals, as in the KennedyJohnson era, to defeat Allende and, in this case, to support the Conservative candidate, Mr. Alessandri.

These men offered $500,000 to the proposed common k itty at that 

lime. On April 28, 1970, immediately a fter being informed by a State 

Department pouched secret memorandum of conversation on this 

secret proposition, I sent a blistering cable of opposition. That cable, 

in turn, prompted the State Department, in an official letter, to “applaud the destruction you wrought on the Anaconda presentation.’’

Mr. Geneen of IT T was then a member of the executive committee 

of the Council for Latin America. ITT had on its board Mr. John 

McCone, the Director of the CIA under Presidents Kennedy and 

Johnson. Mr. McCone also served as a consultant to his successor and 

good friend Mr. Richard Helms, the Director of our intelligence com-
52

mun ity un de r Presidents John son and Nixon. IT T immedia tely 

launch ed its own cam paign in the s pr in g of 1970 to win W hite House 

su pp ort fo r a majo r covert camp aig n on behalf of Mr. Aless andri.

I was sub jected to the most inte nse , incessant pre ssu res fro m the 

CIA a nd i ts Chilean allie s to have the Un ite d State s c omm it its covert 

su pp ort to th ei r can didate. I ref used even thou gh I ab horre d the 

Marxist- Le nin ist forces rep res ented by Allen de and even thou gh I 

ha d excellent—indeed unchalleng ed—g roun ds fo r know ing th at Allende inten ded to trea t the United State s as “public enem y No. 1” 

as he ha d sta ted in his cam paign.

By the way, long af te r the disc losures abo ut CIA acti ons in Chile 

came out, Mr. Helms, Mr. Colby and I)r. Kissinger all said th at the 

reason Allen de won was th at I ha d blocked th e covert fu nd ing of Mr. 

Aless andri. Tha t is absolute hog was h.

I pe rm itted a tota l of CI A and C hil e expendit ure s in the 1970 P re side ntial elec tion prog ram of $125,000—the only new prog ram bein g 

$390,000 fo r an anti-C om mu nist prop ag an da camp aig n which was 

em barra ssing ly stale and sel f-d am aging . The rem ain ing money s were 

spe nt on prog ram s in itiated at the dir ection of my predecesso r, Mr. 

Du ngan. The total sum, $425,000, was a derisory am ount when compared to the tens of million s spe nt thro ug h the CIA , thro ug h AID — 

in co ntr adict ion of its leg islative au thor ity —th roug h the Rom an 

Catho lic str uc ture in Chi le in way s th at tra nsgre sse d the Am erican 

co nstitution al sep ara tio n of churc h and sta te and thro ug h othe r entities to de fea t Allend e in 1963-64.

So that t here is no mistake abou t wh at I am statin g, the documen ted 

fact is th at many millions in t ax pa ye r fund s were cha nneled to Jesuitled organiz ati ons in Chile at the u rg in g of the W hit e House a nd these 

tran sfer s in AID , CIA and forei gn funds were made kno win gly in 

response to wr itten appeals fro m Rom an Catho lic prela tes in Chile 

who said the y needed the money “to oppose laicism, Pr ote sta ntism 

an d Com munism”—laicism being a refe rence to the lar ge Radical 

Par ty o f Chile, an anticlerica l bu t cen trist and dem ocr atic p ar ty th en; 

Pr otestantism beinjj a refe rence to the swa rm of Am erican missionaries ar rivi ng in Chile and ga ining ten s of tho usands of adhe rents ; 

and C ommunism bein g a re ferenc e to the forces re pre sen ted by Allende.

It was the rea ctio n of the Radic al Par ty to such W hite HouseCa tholi c Ch urc h links th at led to th at pa rty's lea dersh ip ma kin g a 

secret deal with the C ommunist Part y of Chi le in 1967, to its fund ing 

th er ea fter from the Sovie t Un ion and to the election of Allend e in 

1970. Allen de won by 1.3 perce nt and th at Ra dic al P art y delivered 

more th an 5 percen t.

You sho uld also be aware t hat upo n arriv al in Chile I b roke, on my 

own au th or ity and initiative, the political relatio ns hip with the 

chu rch by refusin g to call upon the cardinal of Chile fo r 3 y ears and 

by c ut ting off conta ct in th at peri od with the key Jesuits.

In the years 1963-67, Mr. Vance was the De pu ty Se cretary of De ­

fense. de pu ty to Mr. M acNam ara; a man who, I can sta te from pe rsonal knowledge, knew a gr ea t deal abo ut the matters I have just 

discussed and will raise h ere.

U. S. EFFORT TO REACH MODUS VIVENDI WITH AEEENDE

I brief ed both Mr. MacNa ma ra an d Mr. Van ce in the yea rs fo llow ing my de pa rtu re fro m Ch ile on critic al aspects of U.S . policy,
53

the most im po rtan t of wh ich —docum ented. I migh t add, in hu ndred s 

of St ate De pa rtm en t cables and oth er official pa pe rs—was the unpreced ented. un cea sing effort mad e by th e Un ite d State s, at my ur ging 

and initiative, to reach alm ost any kin d of modus vivend i wi th 

Allende.

Th e cul mination of th is 7 month effort was the offer mad e to Allende in mid-1971 to have the U.S . Treasur y gu aran ty bon ds which 

Al len de’s gover nm ent would issue—bon ds whi ch wou ld otherw ise 

have been worthless, bon ds which Allen de’s government would issue 

for 25 year ter m at low int ere st in pa ym ent equal to sligh tly more 

th an t ha t portion of A naconda, Kennecott and IT T prop ert ies which 

the taxp ay er ha d insure d. In other words, I was pro po sin g wi th the 

su pp ort of the Se cre tar y of State , Mr. Roger s, of As sistan t Secreta ry of State , Ch arles Meyer and of Hen ry Ki ssing er—and wi thou t 

the knowledge of Mr. Nixon—a way fo r Allend e to nationalize these 

major Am erican corpo rat ion s at very low cost, at a fra cti on of the 

book value , so th at the Am erican taxp ay ers wou ld not be left holding 

the bag fo r the lar ge paym ents the y now are making to the co rporations.

At the same tim e I offered the Allend e gov ern me nt, if it would 

negotiate in good f ai th , on behalf of t he S tate D ep artm ent the fu rthe r 

ind uce me nt of loa ns an d cre dits from Exp or t-Im po rt Ba nk and 

United State s su pp ort fo r loan s fro m such inter na tio na l insti tutio ns 

as the W orld Ba nk and the In ter-A merican Dev elopme nt Bank. 

(M ayor Beam e an d Go verno r Carey —Air. Va nce’s good fri en d—of 

New Yo rk s ought exa ctly the same deal from Pr esiden t Fo rd in 1976 

an d were t ur ne d down flatly yet we pro posed it to a gov ern me nt contro lle d by M arx ist -Le ninist.)

On ly when Allen de rejected this offer in Septe mb er 1971—spurne d 

it on the gro unds th at any comprom ise with “imp eri ali sm ” would 

weaken his re volution —only whe n he th en trade d the d uplicitous ways 

to t he Sovie t U nio n, only th en did any appre cia ble money—as y ou r investigation, Mr. Ch air man, show ed—begin to flow into Chile throug h 

the CIA to keep aliv e the Chr ist ian Demo cra tic Par ty , the Nac ional 

Par ty , segm ents of the Ra dic al Par ty an d th ei r pre ss outlets.

• QUESTIONS FOR MR. VANCE

Now my questions fo r M r. V ance are th e fo llo win g:

Di d he not know in 1975, if not much earlier, of the fac t of our

• unp rec ede nted offer to Allen de? Mr. MacNa ma ra knew, and I know 

Mr. Vance knew.

Di d he not know a great, deal of the histo ric al basis fo r the Un ite d 

States fea rs of Allen de—th at he rep res ented , in the words of Pre si ­

den t Kennedy , “a second Sovie t bri dgehead in the hem ispher e” and 

did he not know of the cov ert actions lau nched by the W hit e House 

to p rev ent A llende’s accession to po wer in 1964 ?

Di d he not know , as a form er De pu ty Defense Secre tar y, as a 

form er Secre tar y of the Ar my and as one who ha d reache d the very 

apex of the fo rei gn policy e stablishm ent , that th e J oin t C hie fs of Staff 

ha d immedia tely upon A lle nde’s election in 1970 issued a repo rt sou nding th ei r ala rm as to the likely s tra teg ic consequences—t ha t, c on tra ry 

to m y view (th ey were c orrect a nd I w ron g) Allend e would offer m odern ize d facil ities to the Soviet Navy th us striki ng at a pa rtic ul ar ly
54

vulnerable South Pacific underbelly, an area which the latest version 

of the Soviet nuclear submarines wished to prowl, an area of not only 

vital concern to the United States and its Pacific allies but to the People's Republic of China. Indeed, it was Allende’s close ties to the Soviet 

I 'nion—his efforts to persuade the Chilean military to accept incredible 

amounts of Soviet weaponry offered by Moscow—that contributed to 

the Chinese decision to have normal relations with the present military 

junta in Santiago, to offer it $58 million in credits and to ask Allende’s 

Ambassador, the aforementioned Mr. Armando Urribe, to leave the 

country immediately after Allende’s downfall.

Now why would Mr. Vance, with his insider's knowledge, prefer 

for the United States to be depicted throughout the world as a Nazilike bullyboy acting through a runaway CIA against an “innocent" 

Social Democrat, Mr. Allende, rather than have the full truth on the 

record ? Why would he prefer this blackening of his country, this 

damage to its interests, this echoing of a line of propaganda first 

emitted by Moscow radio?

I shall suggest the answers as I proceed.

Let us first consider Brazil.

Did Mr. Vance, as the second highest defense official in the land, not 

know of President Johnson’s order in early 1964 to assemble a task 

force of naval and airborne units to intervene in Brazil’s internal 

affairs? Was he unaware that this task force headed south even as the 

leftist government of Brazil led by the late Joao Goulart was being 

overthrown by a military government ?

Even more interesting, would Mr. Vance claim ignorance of the 

efforts made, with the knowledge and collusion of the CIA, by American members of the Business Group for Latin America—the same 

group headed by David Rockefeller which played such a key role in 

stopping Allende in Chile th at same 1964—to support the overthrow 

of Goulart. and its replacement by the military ? In the event that 

anyone in this room doubts the accuracy of these statements, they can 

turn to the documents recently declassified at the Lyndon B. Johnson 

Library in Austin, Tex., and to two volumes I brought along.

“ t h e a l l ia n c e t h a t f a il e d”

Fir st, I read from a book co-authored by Jerome B. Levinson, the 

Chief Counsel of the Senate Committee on Multinationals chaired by 

Senator Frank Church of Idaho, and by Juan de Onis, a correspondent 

then and now of the New York Times in South America. Mr. Levinson 

was Deputy Director of A ID in Brazil in 1964, an official who boasts 

today as then of his hyperactive quest of truth.

I quote from pages 88 and 89 of his book entitled “The Alliance 

That Failed.” There will be asterisks in this. The full text is in my 

full statement.

This is entitled “Brazil: Round two.”

“President G oulart’s failure to implement an economic stabilization 

agreement concluded between Brazil’s finance minister and David Bell 

in 1963 had led the United States to suspend virtually all economic 

assistance to the Brazilian federal government. * * * By early 1964 

the U.S. Government was deeply concerned about reports of growing 

Communist influence in Goulart’s government and the labor unions 

that were his base of support.
55

“During the week before the military moved to oust Goul aid, two 

huge, civic marches for ‘God, nation, and family’ took place in Sao 

Paulo and Belo Horizonte, the, capitals of the states where the insurrection began. United States businessmen resident in Brazil, who were 

in close contact with the CIA representatives there, helped to organize 

and finance these demonstrations.

“On March 25, the day of the Sao Paulo civic march, a complaint 

within the Brazilian Marine Corps over the alleged inadequacy of 

food escalated into a mutiny led by a young corporal. (The press 

luridly paralleled this event with the Potemkin mutiny in Russia in 

1917.) Goulart refused demands of Navy officers that the mutineers 

be severely punished, and on the night of March 29, at a meeting of the 

Association of Brazilian Army Sergeants, he delivered a speech that 

seemed to be pitting the sergeants against their officers. On the morning 

of March 31 the liberal newspaper Correio da Manila ran an editorial entitled ‘Fora !’ (‘Ou t!’), which signaled that the end was near. 

In the state of Minas Gerais, General Olympio Mourao Filho and 

Governor Jose Magalhaes Pinto went on the radio to announce tha t 

the revolution to save Brazil from communism had begun.

“It turned out to be virtually bloodless. At the president’s residence 

in Rio, Santiago Dantas, Gou lart’s former finance minister, told Goulart th at the United States had promised the Brazilian conspirators to 

support a ‘free government’ established in opposition to the Goulart 

regime. This opposition government-in-arms was to have been set up in 

Sao Paulo if Goulart had managed to hang on in Rio.

“Sao Paulo businessmen have confirmed th at early in 1964 Ambassador Lincoln Gordon was told of the plan to establish this government and was asked whether the United States would assist the Sao 

Paulo rebels."’

Gordon replied he would put the issue to Washington.

Then Mr. Levinson has a very intriguin g footnote in view of his 

later actions and statements. “Whether this assistance, was in fact 

promised or merely represented by the conspirators as promised is not 

clear. In any case, Goulart’s government fell with surprisingly little 

resistance. It did not need an external push."’

Why would Mr. Levinson be so ready to attest to the failure of Goulart and yet rewrite history totally to exculpate Mr. Allende in the 

same circumstances ?

In any case, it was at this time when Mr. Levinson described, of 

course, tha t the Defense Department was assembling the task force 

and moving it southward to be on hand in case the ouster of Goulart 

had not been bloodless and in the event leftists had opposed the 

ouster.

196 7 HISTORY OF COUNCIL FOR LATIN AMERICA

Now I quote from the second document. This is not a public document and it took a great deal of trouble to get my hands on. I t is a history of the Council for Latin America prepared for but not distributed 

by the Council in 1967. I t is entitled “More Than Profits, the Story of 

Business Civic Action in Latin America” ; its auth or is a former CIA 

agent who was then working as a top official for the Council.

I quote from pages 72,73, and 74.

A redoubtable hard core of Bra zilian businessmen went into the opposition to 

Goulart and Communism. They organized themselves into the innocuous sound-
56

in g In sti tu te of So cia l R es ea rc h an d St ud ie s (I P E S ) an d pl ay ed var io us ro les in 

th e re si st an ce a cc or di ng to t heir r es pe ctiv e si tu at io ns an d te m pe ra m en ts.

In Rio de Ja ne ir o, the bu sine ssmen mem be rs of IP ES-R io as su m ed th e po litica l ge ne ra ls hi p of t he de moc ra tic forc es. Th ey ra n th e intelli ge nc e op er at io ns th at 

sp ot ted fo rthc om in g Com mun ist mov es. Th ey gave aid an d co m fo rt to m ilitar y 

me n whom G ou la rt drov e in to ea rly re tire m en t. They ba ile d out op po sitio n pu blish er s an d br oa dc as te rs wh ose en te rp ri se s we re deep in de bt. Th ey pr ep ar t'd 

d ra ft law s, spe eches, st ra te gy an d ta ct ic s by wh ich the de moc ra tic dep ut ie s in 

th e F ed er al Co ng res s blo cke d mov e a ft e r mo ve of a G ou la rt adm in is trat io n bent 

on th e se iz ur e of to ta l powe r. Th ey en co ur ag ed the m ou nt ing pro te st mo vement 

of th e B ra zil ia n women wh ich wa s to pl ay such a de cis ive p art in co nv incing th e 

ca utiou s ar m ed forces th at pu blic o pinion did w an t them to th ro w th e R ed ra sc al s 

ou t. The mem be rs of II’ES in Rio di d all th is subtly, suav ely, dipl om at ical ly , *

al w ay s leav in g the do or ope n fo r G oul ar t to re -e nt er th e list s of legi tim ac y an d 

co nst itutional ity, ne ve r bre ak in g off neg ot ia tion s with th e go ve rn m en t until th e 

go ve rn m en t ma de it ab so lu tely im po ssible to ta lk an d ha d to be ov er th ro w n if 

B ra zi li an li be rt y was to be k ep t ali ve. 

e

IP E S in Sa o Pau lo follo we d a diffe re nt but co mplem en tary lin e. IP ES-S ao 

Pau lo fr an kly ra ised a w ar ch es t to tigh t Gou lart. W ith som e $50,000 a mo nth 

it su pp or ted a st af f of 65 po litica l ac tion sp ec ia lists wh o tr ai ned an d su pe rv ised 

an ti-C om m un ist acti vit is ts in th e la bor an d st ud en t mo veme nts , gu ided th e wo rk 

of th e de m oc ra tic women, pre pa re d pro pa ga nd a leaf lets an d pen et ra te d Com ­

m un is t or ga ni za tion s.

* * * Alm os t w ithout ex ception , fo re ig n bu sin essm en in Ri o de Ja neir o 

re m ai ne d st ub bo rn ly aloo f from IP E S , ar guin g th at it was too “p olitica l” fo r 

co mfo rt. * * * In so be re r an d more se lf-p ro tect iv e Sao P au lo, th e fo re ig n att it u d e 

was quite differ en t. W hile som e su bst anti al foreign ente rp ri se s sh ar ed th eir 

Ri o co lle ag ue s’ co nc erns an d, incr ed ibly eno ugh, ca lle d IP E S “s ub ve rs iv e” a 

gre at m an y co mpa nies sa w m att ers mor e clea rly . Th ey fo rm ed th e Fund fo r 

So cia l Ac tio n wh ose m or al su pp or t to th e B ra zi lian s of IP E S was fu lly va lu ab le 

as it s siza ble fina nc ial co ntr ib ution s to IP E S ac tio n pr og rams. The Fund fo rm ul a 

also sh ow ed so ph is tica tion ? sin ce Fun d mo ney sim ply w en t to IP E S , fo re ig ne rs 

could no t be prov ed to ha ve su po rted specific B ra zi lian acti vit ie s no r cou ld 

B ra zi lian ac ti vis ts be specifically ta rr e d w ith th e br us h of fo re ig n as sistan ce .

PREC EDENTS FDR 19 7 3 ALLEND E OUSTER SUGGESTED

Now I put it to you, Mr. Chairman, is there not a direct link between 

these actions of 1964 and those taken by the Nixon-Mitchell team in 

Ihe White House in 1970 to engage the CIA in the grotesque, mad plot 

with the Chilean military behind my back and behind the State Department's? Was there not an almost mirror image of w hat occurred 

in the overthrow of Goulart in Brazil in 1964 and what occurred in 

Chile in 1973 when Allende was ousted? Even the naval mutiny inci- •

dent described by Mr. Levinson is almost an exact replica. And for 

the record, I think it was not—not—the CIA (and I may lie wrong 

since I left Chile 2 years earlier) but I have good reason to believe 

that Brazilians and other Latin Americans were advising the Chilean •

generals who were responsible for this repetition of history.

Mr. Vance is a lawyer. He understands the meaning of precedent.

Is there not a precedent—indeed many precedents—provided by the 

administrations he served at a very high, complicit level for the crimes 

committed by the Nixon-Mitchell team ? Even in the despicable Watergate episode? Even then, how would he dispute Mr. Ken Kesey, the 

author of “One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest,’’ who said on public 

television recently th at Mr. Nixon was a “ritualistic sacrifice" ? Didn't 

Mr. Kesey have in mind the svstem of old boy networks—of say, a 

Mr. Geneen, Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms, the brothers Bundy, Mr. Rockefeller, and even a Mr. Vance (and I want to emphasize here that I am 

not accusing the nominee or Mr. Rockefeller or the Bundys of any
57

prosecutable crime). I am only referring to linkages designed to be 

self-serving, self-perpetuating, and self-protective linkages which gave 

us Vietnam in the 1960’s, assassination plots, and the dark legacies of 

all manner of covert operations.

OTH ER CO UN TR IES ’ KNOW LED GE OF CHIL EA N STORY

The Soviet Union knows in detail almost the entire story of Chile 

as it really happened, not the case study on Chile issued by the staff 

of the select committee on December 4, 1975. Indeed, the Soviet Union 

advised Allende in early 1973—and promptly informed our Government—to come to terms with Nixon rath er than plunge recklessly 

toward certain economic and political disaster, r ather than count upon 

the $500,000,000 in hard currency which Allende had personally 

sought in Moscow from Mr. Brezhnev. The Soviets, as 1, did not wish 

to envenom relations with the United States over Chile; it preferred, 

as 1, to seek ways to diminish tensions between our two countries.

Castro, like his Soviet friends, also is aware of what occurred in 

Chile in 1963-73 an d why Latin America had such a fatal fascination 

for the Kemiedys, why it led them into assassination plots and other 

weird doings. So do im portant members of the Italian Communist and 

Socialist parties as do a great many statesmen and diplomats in 

Western Europe.

Let me in sert here a curious thing, Mr. Chairman. The only time 

in Chile anyone suggested the assassination to me was a Western 

European ambassador which 1 promptly reported as you know from 

my secret testimony to the State Department as a maniac idea and 

it was 1 wlio turneu m to me lameducK Fret government the name of 

tlie assassin most likely to kill Allende and who after his capture tried 

to kill Allende 2 years later, Major Arturo Marshall.

Why then should the U.S. public not know ? Even more to the point 

today m this room, what conclusions will the U.S.S.R. draw about the 

Tin ted States, about its Secretary of State, as a result of this strange, 

perverse betrayal of truth, th is traducing of o ur press, of our public, 

of our Senate ? Is it any wonder tiiat the Kremlin and other governing 

groups take an increasingly cynical view of Washington and of this 

country ?

Is it not like tha t of Sparta in the decline of Athens? Is it any 

wonder th at they heap praise on say, Mr. Don Kendall, the man who 

helped to persuade Mr. Nixon to engage in the 1970 military plot in 

Chile, a member with Mr. Geneen of the Executive Committee of the 

Council fo r L atin America in 1970, and today the principal multinational spokesman in this country for ‘‘detente” ? To take the connection 

one step further, is it proper for Mr. Kendall to engage as his firm’s 

vice president Mr. Deke DeLoach, the former deputy to J. Edgar 

Hoover, a man whose mind is chock-ablock with the secrets gleaned 

about Congressmen, Senators, bureaucrats and other Americans as a 

result of the work of the F BI ?

What, may I ask, can the Japanese and West German Governments, 

for example, conclude about this Government and this nominee when 

it learns tha t the bribery of Allende and of his government by IT T 

and other multinationals was deliberately concealed from the Senate 

and the public but, as soon as I testified to it in secret the same men
58

rushed into print the leaks about the Lockheed bribery so devastating 

potentially to the tranquility of these two allied democracies?

MR. KORRY*S APPEALS FOR SUPPORT

I appealed to Mr. Vance on December 26, 1975. He was one of seven 

distinguished Americans to whom I wrote for support. In my letter, 

while I attach as an appendix to this statement, I explained that 

the Senate select committee had issued two reports—on assassination 

and on Chile—in which my name is invoked often in ways tha t gravely, ..

and I believe dishonesty, unfairly and criminally impugn my integrity, 

morality and honor without having given me a single opportunity to 

testi fy.

I attached to these seven appeals my correspondence with the com- *

mittee’s counsel. I also gave the details of two chilling events of that 

week just before Christmas. One was the prediction from a very knowledgeable Washington democrat, an attorney whose advice I had sought 

on how to get in to testify. TIis reply, afte r scouting this place, was that 

T would know anguish beyond anything I had ever experienced if I 

persisted in my efforts to vindicate myself. He was correct. He said that 

the staffs of the select committee and of Hie Committee on Multinationals would be verv vindictive if T did not abandon my efforts to get 

the truth before the Senate and the public.

MR. KORRY’s APPEARANCE BEFORE MULTINA TION AL SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator Church. Really, Mr. Korry, the record is clear on all this.

You did appear before the Multinational Subcommittee.

Mr. Korry. I beg your pardon. I only appeared after the issue of the 

two reportsSenator Church. You appeared before the Multinational Subcommittee.

Mr. Korry. 1 did not, sir.

Senator Church. You did.

Mr. Korry. I beg your pardonSenator Church. I don’t care when it was. You appeared in public. *

Mr. Korry. After the two reports were issued. That is what I objected to. I was called on December 4 and the two reports were issued.

Senator Church. Mr. Korrv. T beg your pardon. When the subcommittee was investigating the ITT case in 1973 you did appear before 

the subcommittee. We issued our report on the IT T following those 

hearings. You did appear and had an opportunity to testify in public.

You repeatedly asked to tell your case to the public. You then invoked a relationship of confidentiality.

Mr- Korry. I did not, sir.

Senator Church. The record is there.

Mr. Korry. I beg your pardon, sir.

Senator Church. You have your own idea of the record and your 

own charges which impugn everybody's integrity with whom you 

have, had any contact in either the legislative branch or the executive 

branch.

Mr. Korry. Not until they impugned mine, sir.
59

Senator Church. Nobody impugned your integrity. You were given 

a full opportunity to appear and testify. You refused to appear and 

testify at that time in public or to respond to questions. 1 can read 

you right from the record.

Air. Korry. 1 wish you would.

Senator Church. \Vell,I will.

Air. Korry. But may I say one thing. I testified under oath that 

your counsel tried to suoorn my testimony.

Senator Church. Oh, well, Air. Korry.

Air. Korry. 1 brought those charges to the attention of the Criminal 

Division of the Justice Department.

Senator Church. We are not interested in your charges. You can 

bring anything to the attention of the Justice Department that you 

wish. B ut the Subcommittee on Alultinational Corporations and the 

Intelligence Committee, both over which I preside, turned over all 

the inform ation on the IT T hearings because we felt that there was 

a basis and we turned over all the information that the Justice Departm ent requested in the Intelligence Committee over to the Justice 

Department for the purposes of the grand jury to which you refer. 

I don't know what your connection with that was and 1 don’t care, 

but I do know tha t the committees over which 1 presided have done 

their duty and all of the information that we have that suggested the 

possibility of p erjury was turned over to the Justice Department.

Now you have already testified for 50 minutes from your 20-minute 

statement and we are about halfway through.

Air. Korry. I have 12 more pages.

Senator Church. You have been given a great deal of latitude by 

this committee and by those committees tha t 1 have chaired in the 

past.

Air. Korry. Y es.

Senator Church. You have been deprived of nothing. You have 

been deprived of no rights at all.

Air. Korry. Air. Chairman-----

MR. KO RR Y’s IN D IC T M E N T S OF IN TEG R IT Y QU ES TI ONED

Senator Church. I must say that your indictments of the integrity 

of the committee and those that you have named in your report simply 

have no basis in the record at all. They just cannot be substantiated, 

and I don't see anything to be gained by this kind of onslaught against 

the committee and against the executive branch and every other part 

of the Government with which you have been connected.

Now you have charged this committee or the Intelligence Committee and the Subcommittee on Alultinational Corporations with a 

coverup. You said we were attempting to cover up the role of the 

Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the area of intervention with 

Allende in Chile. There is just no basis for that.

Air. Korry. I assume we will make public secret testimony of 

February 26,1976.

Senator Church. I will on the very subject of coverup. For example, 

on page 156 of the report issued by the Senate select committee, the 

study relating to Chile, the committee says :

Covert American activity was a factor in almost every major election in Chile 

in the decade between 1963 and 1973. In seve ral instances the United States
60

in te rv en tion w as ma ssive. The 1964 pre si den tial elec tio n w as th e mos t pr om inen t ex am pl e in a larg e-sc ale elec tio n pr oj ec t. Th e C en tr al In te llig en ce Agency 

sp en t mor e th an $2.6 mi llion in th e se le ctio n of a C hri st ia n D em oc ra t to the 

pr es iden cy o f M ar xis t Sa lv ad or e Allen de.

That all lias to do with the 1964 election. We did our best to get the 

facts out. We did our level best. It just does not happen tha t you are 

the only honest men in this country.

Mr. Korry. I am not saying I am the only honest man.

Senator Church. You are impugning the integrity of this committee and you have done it again and again and again in statements 

that are not supportable in the record. I just don’t think that that is 

justified. I think you have a persecution complex.

Mr. Korry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I assume t hat when I take 

these matters to the courts tha t you will be willing to testify under 

oath.

Sentaor Church. Mr. Korrv, all of the evidence-----

Mr. Korry. You have immunity and I do not.

Senator Church. All of the evidence tha t these committees took 

has been turned over to the grand jury. I will respond to any inquiry 

from the grand jury just as you will or any other citizen.

Mr. Korry. And T assume you will testify in civil court.

Senator Church. This is ridiculous. We will let the Justice D epartment bring such charges.

Mr. Korry. I am bringing charges in civil court.

Senator Church. Very well.

Mr. Korry. I assume you will yield your immunity.

Senator Church. Mr. Korry, I am not going to get into that.

Mr. Korry. Let me continue w’dh my statement.

Senator Church. I am not going to engage in a contest of this sort 

because the charges are completely baseless.

Mr. Korry. The second was a telephone call-----

Senator Church. What does this have to do with Mr. Vance?

Mr. Korry. I will get to i t; it is the next sentence.

APPEAL S FOR SUP POR T BY MR. KORRY

The second was a telephone call a few minutes later from Jack 

Anderson. He said that sources on the select committee staff had tipped 

him tha t same weekend to mv supposed ties to ITT, a scurrilous invention which this one time Mr. Anderson had the prudence to ask me 

about before rushing into print.

In my covering note to Mr. Vance I said I was not only addressing 

him as one who had known me fairly well in various capacities but 

as the president of the Bar Association of the City of New York. Mr. 

Vance never acknowledged m y letter. Air. George Ball, on the other 

hand, informed me he had spoken to Senator Church, the chairman of 

the Select and Multinational Committees. Mr. Elie Abel, the distinguished journalist who is the dean of the Columbia University School 

of Journalism, telephoned A. M. Rosenthal, the then managing editor 

of the New York Times, and James Greenfield, the then foreign editor 

of the Times. As a result of this latter intervention, Mr. Greenfield 

invited me to lunch on, appropriately enough, Friday , February 13, 

at the Century Club in New York. During that lunch Mr. Greenfield 

told me and others who passed by his table and paid him homage th at
61

I had been the victim of an assault on my civil rights and that the 

Times intended to do a story about it.

Mr. Vance, also a member of the Century and a director of the New 

York Times, approached our table at th e end of our lunch and greeted 

us both in very friendly fashion. When he discovered that it was my 

treatm ent by the select committee tha t was under discussion he said, 

and this is verbatim, “The trouble with you, E d, is th at you do not 

know the difference between a political process and a legal process.*’ 

I retorted immediately to the effect that the trouble with him was that 

he did not understand tha t such an interpretatio n by an eminent 

lawyer had led to the crimes committed by so many lawyers in the 

Watergate, and related matters. Tha t was the end of that conversation.

The Times did, in fact, dispatch a reporter full time to my story 

in late February. John Burns, a recent Times recruit a fter 5 years of 

service in China for a Canadian newspaper, concluded a fter several 

days that the Times should do a major story not only about the lesser 

civil rights complaint but about the far more important objective 

facts of what had occurred in Chile. At tha t point Mr. Burns was 

suddenly offered by Mr. Greenfield the assignment of Times correspondent in South Africa. He accepted.

Before his departure for that post, however, Mr. Burns called me 

in May to say—as I can corroborate—that he had written a very 

lengthy story, that it would probably be published very shortly, tha t 

I had been badly mistreated and that he wished me to know of his 

sympathy. To this date his eight column story has never seen the ligh t 

of day nor any part of it. Indeed, it was only when, by fortuitous circumstance, a young, persistent, vigorous, courageous reporter from 

the Wilmington (Delaware) News Journa l, Joe Trento, telephoned in 

November to inquire into certain CIA actions he was investigating on 

a fund for investigative reporting, an organization of which Mr. 

Woodward and Mr. Bernstein are directors, that a chain of events 

began which led both th e Times and the Washington Post to give their 

audiences, for the first time, the slightest inkling of my efforts to get 

on the record th e provable, documented facts about Chile.

On November 28 and December 19 the News Jo urnal published a 

total of five full pages in two stories by Mr. Trento, including two 

front page banner headlines. Even more remarkable considering t hat 

a major focus was on IT T and its alleged fraud and perjury is the 

fact that this newspaper is owned by the Dupont family. Apparently 

it has an independence which the Times cannot match.

Following the hand delivery to Mr. Rosenthal at the Times of the 

second of these two News-Journal stories, Mr. Seymour Hersh, the 

Times’ so-called expert on intelligence matters, telephoned to ask 

and to receive permission to interview me at my home that night, December 21. His interview of 4 hours—until almost 2 a.m.—led to the 

publication by Mr. Hersh of extraordinarily selective and minimal portions of the interview and of the documents I provided him. He suppressed totally most of the critical elements.

QUESTIO N S FOR M R. VA NC E

Now the questions I have fo r Mr. Vance are these :

What did he mean by the distinction he made between a political 

and a legal process ? Does he really feel th at a Senate committee can or 

81 -8 94 — 77-------5
62

sho uld lie to the A merica n p ublic because of the in tellectual d isho nesty 

of its staff and counsel? Or even of some of its mem bers? Does lie 

mean t hat a S ena te comm ittee had the ri gh t to issue r eports im pu gn ing 

a key witness witho ut even addre ssing to him —I am ta lk in g abo ut 

the Select Com mittee—a sing le que stio n abou t the discreditin g material con cer ning th at witn ess which they inserted into th ei r repo rts ?

Would Mr. Van ce arg ue th at pa rti sans hip excuses any action in 

the Congress—-the doctrine so disgrac efu lly carried out by Mr. Nixo n 

an d his friends? Would he argue th at Senate staff and counsel are 

totally una ccountable even if they vio late every precep t of the Bil l 

of R ights, of justice, of simple decency? Why then no t th e CIA o r the 

FB I?

Is Mr. Van ce awa re, by the way , th at his fre nd , Mr. F. A. O. 

Schw artz, c hie f counsel of the select committee, has brag ged o f h is success in con vincing newsm en not to publish any of my alle gat ion s on 

the gro unds tha t I was me nta lly u nbalanced? At a time , inc ide nta lly, 

th at Mr. Ba ll took me to Eu rope as his depu ty and th at the Young 

Men's Ch ris tia n Associa tion hired me as con sultan t and various oth er 

acti vities.

Is Mr. Vance a war e th at a staff m ember of th e S ena te Select Comm ittee, still serving the Senate on th e Ov ers igh t Com mittee, offered a 

new sman recent ly an im prop er me ans to lear n the names o f American 

new sperson s who had worked fo r the CIA if th at newsman would 

only desist fro m writ ing abo ut the cov erup by the Senat e Select 

Com mittee ?

Is not Air. Vance aware, as I believ e he is. that Air. F . A. O. Sc hwartz 

ad mi tte d to a meetin g of the ba r asso ciation of th e city of New York 

on Novemb er 16,1976, th at I should hav e been called as a witn ess prior 

to the issuance of th e two repo rts by the com mittee in November and 

Dec ember of 1975?

Is Air. Van ce not aware th at Se na tor Ch urc h claimed in a public 

he aring on Decembe r 4,197 5, t hat the only reason I had no t been called 

as a witness was th at the staff ha d concluded, as I had alw ays ma intained, th at I ha d “no knowledge of the so-called trac k I I ” (the 

plo t ha tch ed by Nixon, the CIA an d dis sid ent Chilea n gen erals in 

1970) ? As th e recent p res ide nt o f a b ar asso ciation-----

MR . K0R RY S LACK OF OP PORTUN ITY TO PRESENT CASE QUES TION ED

Se na tor Ciiu rc ii. Th at is wh at we were inv est iga ting.

Air. K orry. Th at is no t tru e.

Se na tor Chur ch. It is tru e. T hat is prec isely wh at we were investiga ting in connectio n wi th th e assassination question and th at is 

wh at we de alt with in the ass ass ina tion repo rt and you ha d no thing 

to give us on th at .

Mr. Korry. I beg yo ur pa rdo n. Air. Chairma n, I beg y ou r par don. 

Air. T reviton has admi tte d------

Se na tor Church. I am no t going to get into an arg um ent, bu t the 

fact is th at we did. We interv iew ed you in pr ivate an d you di dn ’t 

have any knowledge on th is th in g t h at we were looking at. A nd tha t is 

why we di dn 't call you in public . Lat er yo u came as a publi c witness. 

You sub mitted a 29-page sta teme nt which was all published in the 

public record of the committee. To say th at you have been dep rived 

of yo ur o pp ortunity to p res ent y ou r case is ju st simp ly no t true.
63

Mr. Korry. I ju st want to say two things. Mr. Treviton lias admitted 

that he conveniently forgot the mention of my meeting with Mr. Nixon 

on the week of track IT in the Oval Office and tha t is not in his report 

and that is why I could not get a summary of his report for 8 months. 

I, too, was forewarned hv the staff director of your committee— 

without your knowledge probably—Mr. Miller, t ha t I had 10 minutes 

to speak, no longer, and keep i t tha t way when I appeared that day. 

Now tha t is not a proper time in which to answer two reports in 

which my name has been repeatedly dragged through the mud.

Now I will go on if I may.

QUESTIONS FOR ZMR. VANCE

As the recent president of a bar association which has the most 

active civil rights committee, does Mr. Vance believe it normal, proper, 

or even legal for a Senate committee to issue extremely damaging information about someone without even allowing tha t person to be 

questioned first under oatli? Does not such a process smack of the 

Moscow trials?

Even more pertinent to someone who spent 20 years in news work, 

was Mr. Vance not fully cognizant of the effects of his statement February 13 on Mr. Greenfield? Did he not take into account that Mr. 

Greenfield had also served in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations as a very well informed individual positioned in a place to hear 

of covert as well as overt operations? Is it not a fact that Mr. Greenfield wrote Vietnam speeches for Mr. MacNamara early in the war? 

Did he not serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

and Assistant Secretary in th e Kennedy and Johnson administrations?

I shall skip in my prepared statement to another point.

BETRAYAL OF FIRST AMEND MEN T

In the event tha t anyone in this room takes lightly what I am rais ­

ing here, it is another of those “cohesive ties” to wliich I referred 

earlier. I have in mind why and how it came about that Congressman 

Harring ton, a Kennedy Democrat from Massachusetts, arran ged 

through Mr. Jerry Levinson of the Multinational Committee to leak 

to Levinson’s good friend, Mr. Seymour Ile rsh o f the Times, his account of the egregious testimony of early 1974 by Mr. W illiam Colby 

on the so-called U.S. “destabilization” effort in Chile. I have in mind 

how Hersh and the Times did me grea t damage in his first stories 

by writing, without even attem pting to contact me, a series of falsehoods which the public record of Senate proceedings of 1973 showed 

to be outright lies. Moreover, in his first story he indicated t ha t I was 

Ambassador to Chile when Allende fell in 1973 even though I had 

departed Chile 2 years earlier.

A very few despicable newsmen have, than ks to the protective 

silence of men such as the nominee, been able to engage in a most 

sinister form of bribery by Senate employees—by people paid by the 

taxpayers. These Senate men have indulged in what the CIA is taug ht 

as the so-called control process by which an agent is recruited, molded, 

and exploited. Newsmen such as Mr. Ilersh and Mr. Larr y Stern of the 

Washington Post could be fed a steady stream of official secrets—in 

effect, the information which would increase the ir standing, their 

salaries, their notoriety, and their natural ideological convictions and,
C4

in re tu rn , th ey would rema in silent about evidence or allegati ons which 

might incri mi nate th ei r inform an ts or dama ge th ei r po litica l and 

other intere sts. In r etur n the y also p ut into pri nt the t he most dama ging possible inf ormation about me.

Th e courts allow me to seek red res s fo r such con duct an d I shal l h ut 

as one who was an organiz er fo r th e Am erican Ne ws paper Gu ild at 

the Uni te d Press in 15)46, as a repo rter and ed ito r fo r two decades, I 

want you, gentlem en, and the nom inee to un de rstand t he d ep th o f m y 

rev ulsion at th is be tra ya l of th e firs t ame ndm ent, th is sully ing an d 

des poilin g of a pro fession which enjoys a freedo m fro m which all 

other p oli tical free dom s flow.

F IN A L R E LA TIO N SH IP W IT H AIR. VA NC E

One final relati on ship with Mr. Van ce which I sha ll pla ce on the 

record and whi ch pe rta ins to morality and res ponsibi lity in public 

life . Th is is when I was preside nt of the Un ite d Na tio ns A ssociat ion 

an d he was a mem ber of the equ iva len t of its executive com mittee 

gov ern me nt.

CO NCL USI ON

I will conclude now by sayin g th at I was rea dy to acco unt to the 

select com mittee fo r all my actions in Chile. I ndeed I h ad th e m istake n 

con viction th at I could only rend er such a com plete acc ounting to a 

Senate com mittee op erating in the equiv ale nt of a po st- Wate rgate 

mo ral ity . Tha t conviction came in pa rt fro m my sense of gr atitu de to 

a murd ere d President I had che rish ed, to a P reside nt wh o had plucked 

me fro m well deserve d obscu rity a nd e nabled me t o repa y some of the 

eno rmous debt I felt to this co un try fo r the op po rtu nitie s it had affo rded me, to a m an wi th whose end s in Chile and in Lat in Ame rica— 

the streng then ing of pro gre ssive dem ocr atic forc es such as those re pres ent ed by Ed ua rd o Fre i—I agreed whole hea rtedly . Eq ua lly im po rta nt to me the n was th at I no t eliminate fro m the po litica l scene of 

Chile a man such as Fr ei by pr ov iding a fu ll repo rt o f his a ctions, or 

of his par ty ’s or of his frien ds, in the years 1963-1973 or even more 

recent ly.

No one is witho ut his flaws, certa inly n ot I, a nd certa inly n ot pr eside nts who mu st make very com plex and delicat e decisions in orde r to 

pre ser ve democracy. I sti ll believe th at the kind of dem ocracy th at 

Fre i rep res ented in Chile was th e kind of system th at t he overw helming m ajor ity of Ame ricans believed in—a ratio na l, moderate, prog res s 

in an atm osp her e, above all of p olitical free dom where every in divi dual cou nts, where jus tice fo r all is gu ara nteed equ ally —for a Mr. 

Gen een as well as the urba n impoverished who ma y hav e to steal to 

survive, fo r a Air. McCone as well as, sa y, an i nd us trial spy , f or a Mr. 

Vance as well as the ta xp ay er whose int ere sts he ag ain wishes to 

rep res ent.

I have covered the fo ur areas of public in ter est I li ste d at the outset.

I f no thing else. I hope t h at my sta tem ent to da y will serve to sharpe n 

Air. Ahmce’s aw areness and responsiv eness to the ri gh ts of every A merican, th at it w ill also enc ourag e every Am erican t o defend his inalienable rig hts, to use his wondrou s capacit y to th in k an d to act to hold 

off the frig hten in g encro achin g pow er of tho se in AVashington who 

occasiona lly, if not often, put pa rti sa ns hi p above all else, th at it m ay
arouse the interest of Americans, particularly the media, in history 

tha t they will comprehend what George Kenyon means when he speaks 

of the fatal American disease—historical amnesia; that they will understand, as I hope Mr. Vance will, tha t no nation can survive as a 

democracy, let alone prosper, if its actions derive from lies, myths, 

self-delusion and self-demeaning hypocrisy if its highest representatives and bureaucrats have to perpetuate those such tilings to survive. 

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Kony's prepared statement follow s:]

Prepared Statement of E dward M. Korry

I shall begin today, Mr. Chairman, with references to my years in Chile as VS 

Ambassador because Mr. Vance was dire ctly and indirectly involved in my experiences of the past ten years—in many differen t ways, as I shall, specifically 

dem onstrate—and because they concern four are as of public intere st which I 

hold to be pertin ent to th e nominee's qualificatio ns and sui tability for the highest 

Cabinet po st:

Fir st, morality in our foreign policy, a subject repeatedly stressed the past 

yea r by Mr. Vane and by President-elect C arter who revoked “Chile” more tim es— 

seven—in his deba te on foreign affa irs with Pre sident Ford, tha n any other 

issue.

Second, the potential for improper pressures on the new Secretary of State 

by private intere sts and by foreign powers if the ma tte rs I intend to put on 

the record today were to continue to be concealed from the Senate Committee 

and the public.

Third, the accoun tability of all those paid by the public for their actio ns as 

government servants.

Fou rth, the future policies of the United States towards the Soviet Union, the 

“Eurocom munist” regimes which may soon emerge, the Third World and rela ted 

are as of domestic policy.

I come here as one who recalls with prid e the unanimous affirmative recommendatio ns accorded me by the Foreign Relations Committee in 1963 and in 

1967. I come as one unattach ed to any political par ty and who is proud th at he 

could serve the presidency of this country und er both a Kennedy and a Nixon 

withou t ever giving a cent in politic al con tributions to either.

I come here too as one who has unswervingly refused the repe ated efforts, 

sta rting in 1973, of the Ambassadors in Wash ington and at the United Natio ns 

of the present military regime in Chile, to meet with me—as one who spurned all 

invitations from th at go vernment’s c onsulates and embassies because, as I stated 

on nation al television and to university audiences in 1974, it was a harsh dictat orship and fascist in chara cter. I come here too a s one who h as campaigned— 

successfully I mig ht add—thi s past year to gain the attention of, and action by, 

the Attorney General and the Justice Departme nt—and more recently a Grand 

Ju ry —and as one who shall be pursu ing in the courts in the nea r future some of 

the outstan ding matters to which I sh all refer today.

If I may illustra te the second point of the four I liste d as ma tters of public 

intere st—“th e potential for improper pressures”—let me give here a few pertinen t examples of wh at I have in mind.

I wrote Attorney General Levi on March 25, 1976, to request that the Justice 

Department investigate the crimes which I alleged were being concealed from the 

public on the prete xt th at all six and a half hours of my sworn testimony of February 24, 1976, and supp ortive documents, given to an executive hearing of the 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence were unpublishable for reaso ns of 

“national secu rity.” I had given th at testim ony and the documents only after 

being assu red repeatedly by Comm ittee’s Staff and Counsel th at it all would be 

made public a fter my review for deletion of the few sentences concerning national 

security. In May, the Attorney General referred my complaint to the Criminal 

Division of the Justi ce Dep artm ent, and in Jun e I made these three specific 

charges in a sworn deposition of 62 pages to two attorn eys of the Crim inal Division who came to my hom e:

One. t ha t high officials of the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon Adm inistrations, 

and of the ITT Company and possibly other firms, had comm itted p erjury in their 

testim ony concerning Chile before Senate Committees ;
66

Tw o, th a t IT T had de fr au ded th e pu blic of som e $90,000,000 by co nc ea lin g ev ide nc e and by ly in g in ord er to win pay ment, of th e in su ra nc e again st ex pro pri ation of it s Chi le an pr op er ties which it he ld w ith th e go ve rnmen t ag en cy , O1I C.

Thr ee , th a t cert ain Se na to rs, th eir s ta ffs an d Co un sels had c on sp ired to o bst ru ct 

ju st ic e in th e a bo ve c ited m att ers an d ha d co ns pi re d to de prive me of my in ali enab le ci vil ri ghts a s an A meri can.

A F edera l G ra nd Ju ry i n W as hi ng to n is a ct iv el y pu rs ui ng th e first tw o ch ar ges 

as a dir ect re su lt of my ap pe al to th e im pe cc ab le Mr. Lev i, un less th e inco ming 

A dm in is tr at io n m an eu ve rs to qu as h pr os ec ut io n by th e Ju st ic e D ep ar tm en t on 

som e pre te xt or a noth er , I ha ve g ood reas on to a nti cip ate t h a t in di ct m en ts will be 

han de d dow n.

I ra is e th es e m att ers t od ay not m er ely be ca us e I belie ve it im per at iv e th a t th e 

pu blic fin all y ha ve th e tr u th abou t Ch ile , b u t be ca us e it is fa r more im port ant 

th a t th ey pe rc ei ve w hat th e “m ess in W as hin gt on, ” to use Pre si de nt -e le ct C ar ­

te r's words, is all ab ou t, how th eir go ve rn m en t re al ly w o rk s; I w an t th e Sen at e 

and th e p ub lic to h ear th e det ai ls o f w hat i s a di ff er en t co nt ex t Grove r Cl ev elan d 

re fe rr ed to as “the c oh esive ties of pu bl ic p lu nder” or w hat som e more ch ari ta b le <

ob se rv er s in to day’s c on te xt m ig ht te rm “t he co he siv e ties of pu blic blu nder —th e 

br az en ab us e of pu blic powe r, of pu blic tr u st, of pu blic confi dence”. Si nc e Mr.

Vance, as I sh all i ll u str ate , has p laye d a no t unim port ant rol e in th e fa sh io nin g of 

th es e ties an d sinc e he has also cont ri but ed to th e co nc ea lm en t of them , I sh al l 

no w ra is e som e of th e qu es tion s which co nv ince d me th at my only re co ur se w as 

th e A ttor ne y G en er al a nd the Ju sti ce Dep ar tm en t.

F or ex am ple, ho w do es it c om e ab out th a t a Sen at e Com mittee cloa ks my te sti ­

mony in th e m antl e o f “n ati onal se curi ty ” a s soo n as I su bm it do cu men ts to it on 

M arch 23, 1976, to pr ov e my ch ar ge s, yet H ar old Ge neen, IT T ’s C hai rm an of th e 

Boa rd , im m ed ia te ly disc ov ers enou gh ab out my ev iden ce to ch an ge his sw orn 

te stim on y be fo re a Sen at e Com mitt ee in 1973— to w it, his den ia l th a t IT T de liv ­

er ed $350,000 to th e op po ne nts of Sal vad or Alle nd e in 1970 to pre ve nt th e ac ce ssio n to p ow er o f th e Chilean p re si de nt -e le ct ? Ho w does it h ap pe n th a t Mr. Ge neen 

on ly d isco ve rs t he f al se ne ss of his t es tim on y of t hre e y ea rs ea rl ie r, and a nn ou nc es 

a few we ek s la te r, on Ma y 12, 1976, th is disc ov er y to IT T 's annual sh are hold er s’ 

m ee tin g— th a t su ch a pay m en t w as in fa ct "p ro ba bl y” mad e? Ho w do es it come 

ab ou t th a t IT T could en ga ge as a lo bb yi st in 1972 Mr. Fre d Dut to n, on e of P re siden t Ken ne dy ’s to p W hi te Hou se ass is ta nts , an d th a t Mr. Dut to n, in te r al ia , 

whi sp er ed aro und th es e pre ci nc ts in fo rm at io n de sig ne d to dis cr ed it me an d to 

ex cu lp at e IT T ? Ho w do es it ha pp en th a t S en at ors an d th eir staf fs ca n su pp re ss 

fo r yea rs t he ev iden ce t h a t IT T had bee n in te gra te d in W hi te Hou se c ov er t politica l op er at io ns in var io us co unt ri es fo r man y years —t h a t in fa ct . A ttorn ey Ge nera l R ob er t F. Ken ne dy as th e ov er se er of th e so ca lle d “s pe cial gr ou p” in th e 

W hi te Hou se a nd his su cc es so rs in th e Jo hn so n A dm in is tr at io n co or di na te d th eir 

co ve rt politica l pl an ni ng w ith th os e of m em be rs of th e Bus ines s Gro up fo r L ati n 

America, a gr ou p es ta bl is he d by Dav id Roc ke fe ller in 1963 a t th e spe cific re qu es t 

of P re si dent Jo hn F. Ken ne dy —t h at, i n fa ct. A ttor ne y G en eral Rob er t F. Ken ne dy 

th er eb y le gi tim iz ed th e br ib er y of f or eign officia ls, th e fu nn el ling of fu nds to fo reign politica l part ie s an d si m il ar pra ct ic es by som e m ult in at io nal s fo r which all •

m ult in ati onals a re no w hel d re sp on sibl e as th e pra ct it io ners of ori gin al sin?

A no th er ex am pl e, th e Ana co nd a Co pp er Co mp any wo n a ju dgm en t in 1975 

again st th e ta x p ay er fo r $154,000,000 in pa ym en t of its go ve rn m en t in su ra nce 

polic y ag ain st expro pri at io n in Ch ile. (I in te nd to pro ve, by th e way , th a t IT T 

shou ld be he ld liab le fo r th is pa ym en t, not th e American pu bli c, an d fo r an ot her 

$67,000,000 a s well pai d to K en ne co tt Co pp er.) B ut now I wi sh to as k on ly how 

do es it come abou t th a t Ana co nd a w as re pre se nte d in th e se cr et 1975 proc ee din gs fo r th is en or m ou s claim by Lo uis Obe rd or fe r, de pu ty to A ttorn ey Gen eral 

Rob er t K en ne dy ? An d ev en mor e in tr ig uin g, how does it com e about th a t Ralph 

Dun ga n, on e of P re si den t K en ne dy ’s to p ass is ta n ts in th e W hi te Hou se an d the 

man wh o ov er sa w fo r bo th P re si dents Ken ne dy an d Jo hn so n th e m as sive under ­

ta kin g by CIA an d va riou s pri vate co m pa ni es an d org an iz at io ns to pr ev en t 

Al len de fr om be ing elec ted in 1964, and th e man who, upon Alle nd e's de fe at , 

w as im m ed ia te ly se nt to Ch ile in Octo be r 1964 to be th e US A m ba ss ad or to th e 

go ve rn m en t of Edu ar do Fre i, an d th e m an wh o th en arr anged fo r a co mmitm en t of al m os t tw o billion doll ar s of t axpayer mo ney to th e ni ne m ill io n Chilean s 

in ju st th re e ye ar s in cl ud in g $600,000,000 in ve ry qu es tion ab le g u ara n ti es to 

IT T, K en ne co tt, Ana cond a an d oth er co mpa ni es —one fo urt h th e wor ld-w ide to ta l 

of such US guara nti es by 1967— how do es it com e ab out th a t he sh ow s up as a 

chara cte r w itne ss fo r Ana co nd a in th os e se cr et proc ee ding s? F o r a co mpa ny he
C7

repeatedly told me was run by “mean basta rds” and for a company for which 

I refused to appear as a witness despite intense, unpleasant pressures by Mr. 

Oberdorfer, the form er deputy Attorney General, when I insisted on being a 

witness for the public.

How does it come about, Mr. Chairman, th at the only portion of my secret 

testimony to the Select Committee on Febru ary 24, 1976, which I considered 

to fall into an are a of “nation al security” and which I deleted from the version 

destined for the public—the name of a cabinet min ister of Chile thro ugh whom 

CIA fund s were funn elled—th at this fact, along with other portions of my testi ­

mony were immediately made known to Gabriel Valdes, the form er Foreign 

Minister of Chile and now a high UN official in charge of dispensing huge

• amounts of public fund s—mostly US tax pay er fund s—to Latin America, and 

th at he, in turn, immediately repo rted on these matt ers to the Christian Democratic party lead ersh ip in Santiago, Chile as well as other groups? (I am pa rticu larly incensed. Mr. Chairman, because I had earned the undying enmity of 

Mr. Valdes in 1969 when a trusted emissary of his, one Armando Urribe, then

• the Minister Counselor of the Chilean Embassy in Washington and later Allende’s 

Ambassador to Peking, spent five unsuccessful hours in my home seeking 

futilely to convince me to have the US support Mr. Valdes’ bid for th e Presidency 

of Ch ile: I should add here th at Mr. Allende’s campaign man ager asked me 

for $1,000,000, th at the man Valdes was seeking to supplant, Mr. Tomic, the 

candidate of the Christian Democrats, thro ugh his campaign man ager asked 

me for $1,000,000 in 1970, th at the rig hti st candidate , through an unceasing 

campaign via multinationals. Chilean politicians, and even the CIA, hamm ered 

on me for more than two years in futile search of US support.)

The culm ination of this conservative effort was a proposal made to the 

Sta te Departm ent on April 10, 1970, by the Board Chairman of Anaconda, Mr. J. 

Parkinson, and by the Pre sid ent Mr. Jose de Cubas, of the afore-m entioned 

multinatio nal group cha ired by David Rockefeller, then renamed the Council 

for Latin America and now known as the Council of the Americas. They asked 

the US to join the multinatio nals, as in the Kennedy-Johnson era. to defeat 

Allende and, in thi s case, to supp ort the conservative candidate , Mr. Alessandri. 

These men offered $500,000 to the proposed common kitty at th at time. On 

April 28. 1970, immediately after being informed by a State Departm ent pouched 

Memorandum of Conversation on this secret proposition, I sent a blistering cable 

of opposition. Th at cable, in turn, prompted the Sta te Depa rtment, in an official 

letter, to “applaud the destruction you wrought on the Anaconda presentati on”.

Mr. Geneen of I TT was then a member of the Executive Committee of the Council for Latin America. ITT had on its Boa rd Mr. John McCone, the director of 

the CIA under Pre sidents Kennedy and Joh nso n; Mr. McCone also served as a 

consultant to his successor and good friend, Mr. Richard Helms, the dire ctor 

of our intelligence community under Presidents Johnson and Nixon. ITT immediately launched its own campaign in the spring of 1970 to win White 

House supp ort for a major covert campaign on beha lf of Mr. Alessandri and I 

was subjected to the most intense, ince ssan t pressures from the CIA and its

• Chilean allies to have the US commit its covert supp ort to their candidate . I 

refused. I permitted a total CIA expenditure in Chile in the 1970 presiden tial 

program of $435,000—the only new prog ram being $390,000 for an anti-com munist propaganda campaign which was embarrassing ly stale and self-damaging.

„ The remaining monies were spent on programs initiated at the direction of my

predecessor. Mr. Dungan. T he total sum—$425,000—was a derisory amount when 

compared to th e tens of millions spent through the CIA, through AID—in con tradiction of its legislative authority —throu gh the Roman Catholic str uctur e in 

Chile—in ways that tran sgressed the American constitu tional sepa ration of 

church and state—and thro ugh other entities to defeat Allende in 1963-64. So 

that there is no mistake about what I am stating.

So t ha t there is no mis take about wh at I am stating, the documented fact is 

th at many millions in tax payer funds were channeled to Jesuit-led orga nizations 

in Chile at the urging of the White House, and these tra nsfer s in ATD, CIA and 

foreign funds were made knowingly in response to written appeals from Roman 

Catholic prelates in Chile who said they needed the money “to oppose laicism. 

Protestantism and Communism”—laicism being a reference to the larg e Radical 

Part.v of Chile, an anti-clerical but cen trist and democratic party th en; Pro testantism being a reference to the swarm of American missionaries arriving in 

Chile and gaining tens of thousand s of adheren ts; and communism being a 

reference to the forces repre sented by Allende. It was the reaction of t he Radical
68

Pa rty to such White House-Catholic Church links th at led to that party 's 

lead ership making a secret deal with the Communist Party of Chile in 1967, 

to its funding the rea fter from the Soviet Union and to the election of Allende 

in 1970. Allende won by 1.3 percent and th at Radical Pa rty delivered more than 

5 percent. You should also be awa re th at upon arr iva l in Chile I broke, on my 

own autho rity and initiative, the political relationship with the Church by 

refusing to call upon the Cardinal of Chile for thre e years and by cutting off 

contact in t ha t period with the key Jesuits.

In the yea rs 1963-67 Mr. Vance was the deputy Secretary of Defense, deputy 

to Mr. MacNamara, a man who, I can state from personal knowledge, knew a 

gre at deal about the matters I have ju st discussed and will raise here. I briefed 

both Mr. MacNamara and Mr. Vance in the years following my departure from 

Chile on critic al aspects of US policy, the most imp orta nt of which—documented,

I might add, in hund reds of State Dep artm ents cables a nd other official pap ers— 

was the unprecedented, unceasing effort made by the United State s, at my urging 

and initiative, to reach almost any kind of modus vivendi with Allende. The 

culm ination of this seven months effort was the offer made to Allende in mid1971 to have the US Treasury gua ran ty bonds which Allende’s government would 

issue—bonds which would otherw ise have been worthless, bonds which Allende’s 

government would issue for 25 y ear term at low intere st in payment equal to 

slightly more tha n th at portion of Anaconda, Kennecott and ITT properties 

which the taxpay er had insured. In other words, I was proposing with the 

supp ort of the Secretary of Sta te Mr. Rogers, of Assistant Secretary of State 

Charles Meyer and of Henry Kissinger—and withou t the knowledge of Mr. 

Nixon’—a way for Allende to nationalize these major American corporations 

at very low cost, at a frac tion of the book value, so th at the American tax ­

payer would not be lef t holding the bag for the large payments they 

now a re making to the corporations. At the same time, I offered the Allende government, on behalf of the Sta te Department, the further inducem ent of loans and 

credits from Export-Import Bank and US support for loans from such intern ation al institu tions as the World Bank and the Inter American Development Bank. 

(Mayor Beame and Governor Carey—Mr. Vance’s good friend —of New York 

sought exactly the same deal from President Ford in 1976 and w ere turn ed down 

flatly yet we proposed it to a government controlled by M arxist-Deninists.) Only 

when Allende rejected this offer in September 1971—spurned it on the grounds 

th at any compromise with “imp erialism” would weaken his revolution— 

only when he then traded the duplicitous ways to the Soviet Union, 

only then did any appreciable money begin to flow into Chile through 

the CIA to keep alive the Christian Democratic Party , the Nacional Party , segments of the Radical Party , and their press outlets. Now my questions for Mr. 

Vance are the following:

Did he not know in 1975, if not much earlier, of the fac t of our unprecedented 

offer to Allende?

Did he not know a gre at deal of the historical basis for US fea rs of Allende— 

th at he represented, in the words of President Kennedy, “a second Soviet bridgehead in the hemisphere”—and did he not know of the covert actions launched 

by the White House to prevent Allende’s accession to power in 1964?

Did he not know, as a form er Deputy Defense Secretary , as a form er Secretary of the Army and as one who had reached the very apex of the foreign 

policy Establis hment, th at the Joint Chiefs of Staff had immediately upon Allende’s election in 1970 issued a rep ort sounding their ala rm as to the likely 

strate gic consequences—th at, con trary to my view (the y were corre ct and I 

wrong) Allende would offer modernized facilitie s to the Soviet Navy thus str iking at a particularly vulnerable South Pacific underbelly—an are a which the 

latest version of Soviet nuclear submarines wished to prowl, an are a of not only 

vita l concern to the United States and its Pacific allies hu t to the Peoples Republic of China. Indeed, it was Allende’s close ties to the Soviet Union—his efforts 

to persuade the Chilean milita ry to accept incredible amounts of Soviet weaponry offered by Moscow—that contributed to the Chinese decision to have 

norm al relatio ns with the present militar y jun ta in Santiago, to offer it $58,- 

000.000 in credits, and to ask Allende’s Ambassador, the aforementioned Mr. 

Armando Urribe. to leave the country immediately.

Now, why would Mr. Vance, with his insider’s knowledge, pre fer for the United 

States to he depicted throughout the world as a Nazi-like bullyboy acting through 

a run away CIA aga inst an “innocent” Social Democrat, Mr. Allende, rather 

tha n have the full tru th on the reco rd? Why would he pre fer this blackening of
his country, this damage to its interests, this echoing of a line of propaganda 

first emitted by Moscow Radio?

I shall suggest the answers as I proceed.

Let us first consider Brazil.

Did Mr. Vance, as the second highest defense official in the land, not know 

of President Johnson’s order in early 1964 to assemble a task force of naval and 

airborne units to intervene in Brazil’s internal affairs? Was he unaware that 

this task force headed south even as the leftist government of Brazil led by 

the late Joano Goulart was being overthrown by a military government? Even 

more interesting, would Mr. Vance claim ignorance of the efforts made, with 

the knowledge and collusion of the CIA, by American members of the Business 

Group for Latin America—the group headed by David Rockefeller which played 

such a key role in stopping Allende in Chile that same 1964—to support the 

overthrow of Goulart and its replacement by the military? In the event tha t 

anyone in this room doubts the accuracy of these statements they can turn to 

the documents recently declassified a t the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, 

Texas, and to two volumes I brought along.

First, I read from a book co-authored by Jerome B. Levinson, the chief Counsel 

of the Senate Committee on Multinationals chaired by Senator Frank Church 

of Idaho, and by Juan de Onis, a correspondent then and now of the New York 

Times in South America. Mr. Levinson was deputy Director of AID in Brazil 

in 1964, an official who boasts of his hyper-active quest of tr uth :

I quote from pages 88, 89 of his book entitled “The Alliance That Failed.’’ 

Brazil: Round two

President Goulart's failure to implement an economic stabilization agreement 

concluded between Brazil's finance minister and David Bell in 1963 had led the 

United States to suspend virtually all economic assistance to the Brazilian federal government. Adopting an “islands of sanity” strategy, the U.S. mission made 

loans instead to the major state governments t hat appeared to offer a political 

counterpoise to Goulart’s increasingly reckless populism. In general these loans 

were technically sound, but through them the U.S. assistance program under 

the Alliance served U.S. political and security interests in Brazil. By early 1964 

the U.S. government was deeplj’ concerned about reports of growing communist 

influence in Goulart’s government and the labor unions tha t were his base of 

support. During the week before the military moved to oust Goulart, two huge civic 

marches for “God, nation, and family” took place in Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte, the capitals of the states where the insurrection began. U.S. businessmen 

resident in Brazil, who were in close contact w ith the CIA representatives there, 

helped to organize and finance these demonstrations.

On March 25, the day of the Sao Paulo civic march, a complaint within the 

Brazilian Marine Corps over the alleged inadequacy of food escalated into a 

mutiny led by a young corporal. (The press luridly paralleled this event with 

the Potemkin mutiny in Russia in 1917.) Goulart refused demands of Navy 

officers that the mutineers be severely punished, and on the night of March 29, 

at a meeting of the Association of Brazilian Army Sergeants, he delivered a 

speech that seemed to be pitting the sergeants against their officers. On the 

morning of March 31 the liberal newspaper Correio da Manha ran an editorial 

entitled “Fora!" (“Out!”), which signaled tha t the end was near. In the state of 

Minas Gerais, General Olympio Mourao Filho and Governor Jose Magalliaes 

Pinto went on the radio to announce that the revolution to save Brazil from 

communism had begun.

It turned out to be virtually bloodless. At the president’s residence in Rio, 

Santiago Dantas, Goulart’s former finance minister, told Goulart that the United 

States had promised the Brazilian conspirators to support a “free government” 

established in opposition to the Goulart regime.8

 This opposition government-inann s was to have been set up in Sao Paulo if Goulart had managed to hang on 

in Rio.

Sao Paulo businessmen have confirmed tha t early in 1964 Ambassador Lincoln 

Gordon was told of the plan to establish this government and was asked whether 

the United States would assist the Sao Paulo rebels.

8

 Intervie w in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil. August 1968, with a former aide and close friend 

of Da ntas who has asked not to be identified.
70

It was at this time, of course, that the Defense Departme nt was assembling 

the task force an d moving it southward to be on hand in case the ous ter of Goulart 

had not been bloodless and in the event leftists had opposed the ouster.

Now I quote from tlie second document, a histo ry of the Council for Latin 

America prepared for but not distrib uted by the Council in 1967. It is entitled 

'•More Than Profits, The Story of Business Civic Action in Latin Am eri ca"; its 

author is a former CIA agent who worked as a top official for the Council.

I quote from pages 72, 73, 74 :

“Goulart and his crew were taking the piecemeal but systematic ‘two steps 

forward and one step back ward ’ approach to the Communization of Brazil. The 

country was simply too huge and too diffuse for them to swallow at one gulp.

And the opposition to Communism among politicians, soldiers, women, workers 

e

and businessmen had to be broken before a take-over was possible.

“The Communists did succeed in splitting the business community in Brazil.

There were multi-millionaire ind ustriali sts who helped to finance the Pa rty and 

its political cam paigns; they saw in the Party an ins trument for personal 

vengeance on the ir competitors for economic power and social sta tus . Other very »

wealthy business men became Communists ou t of a bored, perv erse desire for 

adventure. Some p aid various forms of blackmail to the Communist appar atus, 

hoping thu s to be spared. Some simply sat out Bra zil’s c ivilian civil war, in uneasy comfort at home or in esca pist fleshpots abroad.

“A redoubtable hard core of Bra zili an businessmen went into the opposition 

to Goulart and Communism. They organized themselves into the innocuous sounding Insti tute of Social Research and Stud ies (I l’ES ), and played various roles 

in the resistance according to their respectiv e situ atio ns and temperaments.

“In Rio de Jane iro, which rema ined the rea l political cap ital of the country 

despite the official investiture of Brasilia, the businessmen-members of IPESItio assum ed the political generalship of the democratic forces. They ran the intelligence operations th at spotted forthcoming Communist moves unde r the direc ­

tion of General Golberty de Couto e Silva, who was later to become the chief of 

President Castelo Bran co’s equivale nt of the FBI. They gave aid and comfort 

to militar y men whom Goulart drove into early retir em en t; and helped them to 

keep their influence in the ranks alive. They bailed out opposition publishers 

and broadc aste rs whose ente rprises were deep in debt to government credit institution s and who were threatene d wi th foreclosure if they did not change the ir 

editorial line to conform to that of the Communists. They prepared dr af t laws, 

speeches, strategy and tac tics by which the democratic deputies in the Federal 

Congress blocked move after move of a Goulart administration bent on the seizure 

of total power. They encouraged the mounting p rote st movement of the Brazilian 

women, w hich was to play such a decisive p art in convincing the cautious armed 

forces th at public opinion did wan t them to throw the Red rasc als out. The members of IPES in Rio did all this subtly, suavely, diplom atically, always leaving 

the door open for Goulart to re-enter the lis ts of legitimacy and co nstitutionality, 

never brea king off negotiations with the government until the government made 

it absolutely impossilde to talk and had to be overthrow n if Bra zili an liberty 

was to be ke pt alive. *

“IPE S in Sao Paulo followed a differen t but complementary line. The vast indu str ial complex of Sao Paulo is always more or less against the Brazilian national g overn ment; I’aulista s want to get on, unfettered, with the practica l business of production and they wish th at the politicians would simply go away and 

leave them alone. Consequently. IPES-Sa o Paulo frankl y raised a war chest to 

tight Goulart. With some $50,000 a month, it supported a staff of 65 political action specialists who tra ine d and supervised anti-Comm unist activists in the 

labor and student movements, guided the work of the democratic women, prepared propaganda leaflets and pen etrated Communist organizations. IPES-Sao 

Paulo subsidized magazines which provided a forum for influential democratic 

intelle ctuals whose views the Communists refused to publish, produced films on 

the dangers of t ota litarianism of any stripe and on the responsibilities of citizens 

in a democracy and carefully policed the Brazilian business community to m inimize anachronistic business prac tices th at could provide grist to the Red prop agand a mill.

“Almost witho ut excep tion: foreign business in Rio de Janeiro remained stubhorn ly aloof from IPES, arguing tha t it was too ‘politcial’ for comfort, d eaf to th e 

contention th at th e s trug gle aga inst totalitarian ism w as a m atter of political and 

economic life and death, quite dis tinct from self-seeking support of one faction 

or anoth er in a system of live and let live. The highly politicized ai r of Rio, its
71

Viennese attitude of ‘the situation is hopeless hut not serious’ and the foreign 

businessmen's rigid taboo on ‘polities’ all contributed to tlie confusion. In soberer 

and more self-protective Sao Paulo, the foreign attitude was quite different. 

While some substantial foreign enterprises shared their Rio colleagues’ concerns 

and, incredibly enough called IPES ‘subversive,’ a great many companies saw 

matters more clearly. They formed the Fund for Social Action whose moral support to the Brazilians of IPES was fully as valuable as its sizeable financial contributions to IPES action programs. The Fund formula also showed sophistication : since Fund money simply went to IPES, foreigners could not be proved to 

have supported specific Brazilian activities nor could Brazilian activists he 

specifically tarr ed with the brush of foreign assistance.

“An object lesson in how safe the action of a reasonably united business community against Communists not yet entrenched could be was provided in Brazil.’’

Now I put it to you, Mr. Chairman, is there not a direct link between these 

actions of 1964 and those taken by the Nixon-Mitchell team in the White House 

in 1970 to engage the CIA in tlie grotesque, mad plot with the Chilean military 

behind my back and behind the State Department’s? Was there not an almost 

mirror image of what occurred in the overthrow of Goulart in Brazil in 1964 

[and what occurred] in Chile in 1973 when Allende was ousted? Even th e naval 

mutiny incident described by Mr. Levinson is almost an exact replica. And for 

tlie record, I think it was not the CIA—and I may be wrong since I left Chile 

two years earlier—but I have good reasons to believe that Brazilians and other 

Latin Americans were advising the Chilean Generals who were responsible for 

this repetition of history.

Mr. Vance is a lawyer. He understands the meaning of precedent. Is there not 

a precedent—indeed many precedents—provided by the Administrations he served 

at a very high, complicit level for the crimes committed by the Nixon-Mitchell 

team? Even in the despicable Watergate episode? How would he dispute Mr. 

Ken Kesey, the author of “One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest,” who said on public 

television recently tha t Mr. Nixon was a “ritualistic sacrifice?” Didn’t Mr. Kesey 

have in mind the system of old hoy networks—of say, a Mr. Geneen, Mr. McCone. 

Mr. Helms, the brothers Bundy, Mr. Rockefeller and even a Mr. Vance—(and I 

want to emphasize here tha t I am not here accusing the nominee or Mr. Rockefeller or the Bundys of any prosecutable crime) but I am only referring to linkages designed to be self-serving, self-protective and self-perpetuating, linkages 

which gave us Vietnam in the 1960s, assassination plots and the dark legacies of 

all manner of covert operation.

The Soviet Union knows in detail almost the entire story of Chile as it really 

occurred. Indeed, it advised Allende in early 1973—and promptly informed our 

government—to come to terms with Nixon rather than plunge recklessly towards 

certain economic and political disaster, rather than count upon the $500,000,000 

in hard currency which Allende had personally sought from Mr. Brezhnev. The 

Soviets, as I, did not wish to envenom relations with the United States over 

Chile; it preferred, as I, to seek ways to diminish tensions between our two 

countries.

Castro, like his Soviet friends, also is aware of w hat occurred in Chile in 1963- 

1973 and why Latin America had such a fata l fascination for the Kennedys, why 

it led them into assassination plots and other weird doings. So do important 

members of the Italian Communist and Socialist parties as do a great many 

statesmen and diplomats in Western Europe. Why then should the US public 

not know? Even more to the point today in this room, what conclusions will 

tlie USSR draw about the US, about its Secretary of State, as a result of this 

strange, perverse betrayal of tru th, this traducing of our press, of our public, of 

our Senate? Is it any wonder that the Kremlin and other governing groups 

take an increasingly cynical view of Washington and of this country?

Is it any wonder that they heap praise on say, Mr. Don Kendall, the man who 

helped to persuade Mr. Nixon to engage in the 1970 military plot in Chile, a 

member with Mr. Geneen of the Executive Committee of the Council for Latin 

America in 1970. and today the principal multinational spokesman in this country for “detente” ? To ta ke the connection one step further, is it proper for Mr. 

Kendall to engage as his firm’s Vice President, Mr. Deke DeLoach, the former 

deputy to J. Edgar Hoover, a man whose mind is chockahlock w ith the secrets 

gleaned about Congressmen, Senators and other Americans as a result of the 

work of the FBI ?

What, may I ask, can the Japanese and West German governments, for example, conclude about this government and this nominee when it learns tha t
the bribery of Allende and of bis government by ITT and other multinationals 

was deliverately concealed from the Senate and the public, but, as soon as I 

testified to it in secret, the same men rushed into print the leaks about the Lockheed bribery so devastating potentially to the tranquility of these two allied 

democracies?

I appealed to Mr. Vance on December 26, 1975. He was one of seven distinguished Americans to whom I wrote for support. In my letter, which I attach 

as an appendix to this statement, I explained tha t the Senate Select Committee 

had issued two reports—on Assassination and on Chile—“in which my name 

is invoked often in way tha t gravely, and I believe, dishonestly, unfairly and 

criminally impugn my integrity, mortality and honor without giving me a single 

opportunity to testify.”

I attached to these seven appeals my correspondence with the Committee’s 

Counsel. I also gave the details of two chilling events of that week. One was 

the prediction from a very knowledgahle Washington Democrat, an attorney 

whose advice I had sought on how to get in to testify. His reply, a fter scouting 

this place, was tha t I would know “anguish beyond anything” I had ever experienced if I persisted in my efforts to vindicate myself. He was correct. He said 

tha t the staffs of the Select Committee and of the Committee on Multinationals 

would be “very vindictive” if I did not abandon my efforts to get the truth before 

the Senate and the public. The second was a telephone call, a few minutes later, 

from Jack Anderson. He said tha t sources on the Select Committee staff had 

tipped him that same weekend to my supposed ties to ITT, a scurrilous invention which this one time Mr. Anderson had the prudence to ask me about before 

rushing into print.

In my covering note to Mr. Vance, I said I was not only addressing him as 

one who had known me fairly well in various capacities, but as the President of 

the Bar Association of the City of New York. Mr. Vance never acknowledged 

my letter. Mr. George Ball, on the other hand, informed me he had spoken to 

Senator Church, the Chairman of the Select and Multinational Committees. Mr. 

Elie Abel, the distinguished journalist who is the Dean of the Columbia University School of Journalism, telephoned A. M. Rosenthal, the then managing editor 

of the New York Times, and James Greenfield, the then foreign editor of the 

Times. As a result of this latter intervention, Mr. Greenfield invited me to lunch 

on, appropriately enough, Friday, February 13th, at the Century Club in New 

York. During tha t lunch. Mr. Greenfield told me and others possibly I had been 

the victim of an assau lt on my civil rights and tha t the Times intended to do a 

story about it.

Mr. Vance, also a member of the Century and a Director of the New York 

Times approached our table at the end of our lunch and greeted us both in very 

friendly fashion. When he discovered tha t it was my treatment by the Select 

Committee tha t was under discussion, he said—and this is verbatim—“the 

trouble with you. Ed, is that you do not know the difference between a political 

process and a legal process.” I retorted immediately tha t the trouble with him 

was that he did not understand th at such an interpretation by an eminent lawyer 

had led to the crimes committed by so many lawyers in the Watergate and related matters. That was the end of the conversation.

The Times did. in fact, dispatch a reporter full time to my story in late 

February. John Burns, a recent Times recru it aft er five years of service in 

China for a Canadian newspaper, concluded after several days tha t the Times 

should do a major story not only about the lesser civil rights complaint but 

about the fa r more important objective facts of what had occurred in Chile. 

At that point, Mr. Burns was suddenly offered by Mr. Greenfield the assignment of Times correspondent in South Africa. He accepted. Before his departure 

for tha t post, however. Mr. Burns called me in May to say—as I can corroborate —that he had written a very lengthy story, tha t it would probably be published very shortly, tha t T had been badly mistreated and tha t he wished me to 

know of his sympathy. To this date, his eight column story has never seen the 

light of day nor any part of it. Indeed, it was only when, by fortutitons circumstance. a young persistent, vigorous, courageous reporter from the Wilmington (Delaware) News Journal. Joe Trento, telephoned in November to inquire 

into certain CIA actions he was investigating that a chain of events began which 

led both the Times and the Washington Post to give their audiences, for the 

first time, the slightest inkling of my efforts on the record the provable, documented facts about Chile.

On November 28 and December 19, the News Journal published a total of five 

full pages in two stories by Mr. Trento, including two front-page banner head-
lines. Even more remarkable considering that a major focus was on ITT and 

its alleged fr aud and perjury is the fact that this newspaper is owned by tbe 

Dupont family. Apparently it has an independence which the Times cannot 

match. Following the hand delivery to Mr. Rosenthal at the Times of the second 

of these two News-Journal stories Mr. Seymour Hersh, the Times’ socalled 

expert on intelligence matter, telephoned to ask and to receive permission to 

interview me at my home tha t night, December 21st. His interview of four 

hours—until almost two a.m.—led to the publication by Mr. Hersh of extraordinarily selective and minimal portions of the interview and of the documents 

I provided him. He suppressed totally most of the critical elements.

Now, the questions I have for Mr. Vance are these:

What did he mean by the distinction he made between a political and a legal 

process? Does he really feel that a Senate Committee can or should lie to the 

American public because of the intellectual dishonesty of its staff and Counsel? 

Or of some of its members? Does he mean that a Senate Committee had the 

right to issue reports impugning a key witness without even addressing to him 

a single question about the discrediting material concerning that witness which 

they inserted into their reports? Would Mr. Vance argue tha t partisanship excuses any action in the Congress—the doctrine so disgracefully carried out by 

Mr. Nixon and his friends? Would he argue that Senate staff and Counsel are 

totally unaccountable even if they violate every precept of the Bill of Rights, 

of justice, of simple decency? Why then not the FBI or the CIA? Is Mr. Vance 

aware, by the way. that his friend, Mr. F. A. O. Schwarz. Chief Counsel of the 

Select Committee, has bragged of his success in convincing newsmen not to publish any of my allegations on the grounds tha t I was mentally unbalanced? Is 

Mr. Vance aware tha t a staff member of the Senate Select Committee, still serving the Senate on the Oversight Committee, offered a newsman recently an improper means to learn the names of American newspersons who had worked 

for the CIA if tha t newsman would only desist from writing about the coverup 

by the Select Committee? Is not Mr. Vance aware, as I believe he is, tha t Mr. 

F. A. O. Schwarz admitted to meeting of the Bar Association of the City of New 

York on November 1G, 1970 tha t I should have been called as a witness prior to 

tbe issuance of the two reports by the Committee in November and December of 

1975? Is Mr. Vance not aware tha t Senator Church claimed in a public hearing 

on December 4,1975 tha t “the only reason” I had not been called as a witness was 

tha t the staff had concluded, as I had always maintained, that I had “no knowledge of the socalled Track II ” (the plot hatched by Nixon, the CIA and dissident Chilean generals in 1970) ? As the recent President of a Bar Association 

which has the most active Civil Rights Committee, does Mr. Vance believe it 

normal, proper or even legal for a Senate Committee to issue extremely damaging information about someone without even allowing tha t person to be questioned first under oath? Does not such a process smack of the Moscow trials?

Even more pertinent to someone who spent 20 years in news work, was Mr. 

Vance not fully cognizant of the effects of his statement, as a Times director 

February 13 on Mr. Greenfield? Did he not take into account th at Mr. Greenfield 

has also served in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations as a very wellinformed individual positioned in a place to hear of covert as well as overt 

operations? Is it not a fact that Mr. Greenfield wrote Vietnam speeches for Mr. 

McNamara early in the war? Did he not serve as deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Public Affairs and Assistant Secretary in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations? Did he not, upon leaving government, work for a period with Continental Air which had major operations in Vietnam? What other conversations 

did Mr. Vance, a director of the Times, have with Mr. Greenfield or other editors, 

on this subject?

In the event tha t anyone in this room takes lightly what I am raising here, 

it is another of those “cohesive ties” to which I referred earlier. I have in mind 

why and how it came about tha t Congressman Harrington, a Kennedy Democrat 

from Massachusetts, arranged through Mr. Jerry Levinson of the Multinational 

Committee to leak to Levinson’s good friend, Mr. Seymour Hersh of the Times, 

his account of the egregious testimony of early 1974 by Mr. William Colby on the 

socalled U.S. "destabilization” effort in Chile. I have in mind how Hersh and 

the Times did me great damage in his first stories by writing, without even a ttempting to contact me, a series of falsehoods which the public record of Senate 

proceedings of 1973 showed to be outright lies. Moreover, in his first story, as 

tbe Washington Post said yesterday, he indicated tha t I was Ambassador to 

Chile when Allende fell in 1973 even though I had departed Chile two years 

earlier.
74

A very few despicable newsmen have, thanks to the protective silence of such 

men as the nominee, been able to engage in a most sinister form of bribery by 

Senate employes—by people paid by the taxpayer. These Senate men have indulged in what the CIA is taught as the socalled control process by which an 

agent is recruited, molded and exploited. Newsmen such as Mr. Ilersli of the 

Times and Mr. Larry Stern of the Washington Post could be fed a steady stream 

of official secrets—in effect, the information which would increase their standing, 

their salaries, their notoriety and their natural ideological convictions—and, in 

return, they would remain silent about evidence which might incriminate their 

informants or damage their political and other interests. In return they also 

put into print the most damaging possible information about me. The courts 

allow me to seek redress for such conduct, and I shall—but as one who was an 

organizer for the American Newspaper Guild at the United Press in 1946. and 

as a reporter and editor for two decades, I want you, Gentlemen, and the nominee to understand the depth of my revulsion a t this betrayal of the F irst Amendment, this sullying and despoiling of a profession which enjoys a freedom from 

which all other political freedoms flow.

One final relationship with Mr. Vance which I wish to place on the record, and 

which pertains to morality and responsibility in public life. I was President of 

the Association of American Publishers (AAP) in early 1973 when the then 

l’resident of the United Nations Association (UNA) Mr. Porter McKeever, now 

an assistant to John D. Rockefeller, launched a campaign to persuade me to be 

his successor. I brought to Mr. McKeever’s attention my impending appearance 

as a witness before the Subcommittee on Multinationals of this Committee; Mr. 

McKeever instructed the head of the UNA’s Washington office to attend that 

March, 1973 hearing; he took other soundings. In April, he confirmed the offer 

and pressed for my acceptance.

Mr. Vance was a member of the UNA’s Board of Governors—the Association's 

Executive Committee—and also the head of its Policy Studies; moreover, as 

attorney for United Artists, he was close to the former Chairman of UNA’s 

Board, Mr. Robert Benjamin of New York who with Mr. Arth ur Krim, heads 

United Artists and who had until recently been the highest donor to the UNA. 

Although the Association's new Chairman, Mr. Joseph Segel, then the head of the 

Franklin Mint, offered all manner of financial inducements to persuade me to 

leave the publishers for the UNA, I decided to consult Mr. Vance in New York. 

Mr. Vance encouraged me to accept the post and in answer to my specific question, agreed to remain as a Governor in charge of Policy Studies for at least one 

more year. He turned up at the luncheon given by the Governors and its overall 

Chairman, former Chief Justice Warren, which welcomed me to the UNA and 

which had just approved the terms of my generous three year contract with 

the U.N.A. personally underwritten by Mr. Segel as well, and the text of the 

announcement which would be made to the press.

Soon af ter starting work at the UNA, I discovered the following:

Contrary to the “SO.OOO individual members” the UNA declared it had in its 

press release announcing my appointment, there were barely 30,000 and the organization was financially dependent on the generosity of Mr. Segel for its 

survival.

Mr. Segel with the knowledge of my predecessor, had arranged to give the 

United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Scali, .$50,000 for his exlenses, and although a loophole in the State Department’s regulations had permitted such a transfer, the funds were being spent, I discovered, contrary to the 

intent of all regulations—that is. for regular entertainme nt of foreign diplomats 

at large dinners at the Waldorf Towers. Indeed, an officer of the UNA, Mrs. Jean 

Picker, had expressed her outrage over the entire transaction to my predecessor, 

and Mrs. Picker, it should be noted, is very close to Mr. Benjamin.

Not a single Black held a substantive permanent position on the staff of some 

60 at the UNA, the one Black doing substantive work had a consultancy but 

prior to my arriv al had been informed he was terminated.

The women holding substantive jobs on the staff, as they pointed out in a 

petition shortly after my arrival, were paid, as a matter of UNA policy, considerably less for the same work by males.

The UNA had misled, to say the least, in an unethical manner, the Ford 

Foundation in order to receive a matching fund grant of a substantial amount.

The UNA’s Vice President in charge of Financial and related matters raised 

the bulk of the Association’s funds at two annual dinners—in New York and 

Washington—by selling high cost tables to businessmen around the country
with the bait th at they would “get close to a future Secretary of State ”—a 

specific refer ence to Mr. Vance which, if nothing else, was as prescient a sales 

pitch as it was effective.

The IRS was being deliberately defrauded by seve ral members of the UNA 

staff.

Both Mr. Segel and Mr. Benjamin hoped, according to the UNA’s financial 

Vice President that their generous devotion to the UNA would lead to t he ir being 

name d t o the U.S. delegation to the U nited Nations and thu s earn, they believed, 

the perm anent honorific of “Ambassador”. Both in fac t won the ir appointments 

after my d epa rture in 1974 from the UNA.

I shall not review here all I sought to do to correct this situatio n, reminiscent 

of what I encountered in Chile on a rrival th ere in 1967.

I hired a Black very soon ; I equalized female pay ; I slashed staff and expe nses; I sent our financial man to the Administrative Counselor of the U.S. 

Embassy at the UN to explain why I demanded expense chits for the $50,000 

which the UNA, could a t least defend.

My greatest problem, however, was what to do about the members of the UNA 

cha pters around the country. To Chief Justice Warren in Washington and to 

Mr. Vance in New York, I explained the sparse membership, their advanced 

average age, their net cost to the Association and other disadvan tages, Mr. Warren urged th at I not forget these “lit tle men and women of fa ith ”, th at I do 

everything possible to invigorate and rejuvena te this popular suppo rt. Mr. 

Vance echoed the view of my predecessor who described the membership as 

“lit tle old men in tenn is shoes” and urged me to divest the UNA of such nuisances 

so th at it could concentrate on significant work.

I pledged to Jus tice Wa rren th at I would follow his advice and I reconciled 

th at promise with Mr. Vance’s elitism by devising a strategy based on a kind 

of federalism and on a new popular newspaper entitled The Interdep endent, 

which I launched and whose style and content aroused much criticism from 

Mr. Segel; he felt the UNA should he a press agent for the UN. The paper, like 

some of my cleansing of ope rati ng base annoyed Mr. Benjamin. I departed the 

UNA soon therea fter, and renounced almost $100,000 due on my contract so tha t 

I would not he blamed for the weak ening or demise of th at shaky organization. 

Soon the rea fter, at his reque st, I briefed Mr. Vance on the UNA’s intern al oi>- 

erations. He pleaded total ignorance.

So much for the facts. I shall put no questions nor dra w any conclusions. As 

an ironic postscript, however, I att ach as an appen dix a hand-writte n note by 

one Theodore C. Sorenson following the issuance of Volume I, No. 1 of The 

Inte rdependent.

I "was read y to account to the Select Committee for all my actions in Chile. 

Indeed I had t he mistake n conviction th at I could only render such a complete 

accounting to a Senate comm ittee operating in the equivalent of a Post-Watergate morality. Th at conviction came in pa rt from my sense of grati tud e to a 

murdered President I had cherished, to a Pre sident who had plucked me from 

well deserved obscurity and enabled me to repay some of the enormous debt 

I felt to this country for the opportunities it had afforded me, to a man with 

whose ends in Chile and in Latin America—the strengthen ing of progressive 

democratic forces such as those represented by Edu ardo Frei—I agre e wholeheartedly. Equally important to me then was th at I not elim inate from the 

political scene of Chile a man such as Frei by providing a full report of his 

action s, or of his pa rty ’s or of his friends, in the years 1963-1973 or even more 

recently.

No one is withou t his flaws, certainly not I, and certainly not presidents who 

must make very complex and delicate decisions in orde r to preserve democracy. 

I still believe th at the kind of democracy that Frei represen ted in Chile was th e 

kind of system th at the overw helming ma jority of Americans believe in—a 

ration al, moderate, progress in an atmosphere, above all of political freedom 

where every individ ual counts, where justice for all is guaranteed equally— 

for a Mr. Geneen as well as the urban impoverished who may have to steal to 

survive, for a Mr. McCone as well as. say an ind ustrial spy, for a Mr. Vance as 

well as the tax payer whose intere sts he aga in wishes to represent.

I have covered the fou r areas of public intere st I listed at the outset.

If nothing else, I hope th at my statem ent today will serve to sharpen Mr. 

Vance’s awa rene ss and responsiveness to the righ ts of every American, that it will 

also encourage every Americans to defend his inaliena ble righ ts, to use his wondrou s capacity to think and to act to hold off the frig htening power of the state,
th at it may arouse the intere st of Americans, par ticu larly the media, in history 

th at they will comprehend wh at George Kennan means when he speaks of the 

fatal American disease-—historical am ne sia ; that they will understand, as I 

hope Mr. Vance will, th at no nation can survive as a democracy, let alone prosper, 

if its actions derive from lies, myths, self-dillusion and self-demeaning hypocrisy 

if its highest represen tatives and bureau crats have to perpetuate those such 

things to to survive.

Thank you very much.

Appendix

Briarcliff Manor, N.Y., December 26,1975.

Forgive the photocopy. I am reduced to this inele gant means of communication by the circum stances herein described. Until now I refrain ed from writin g 

friends or acqu ainta nces because I pre ferred not to involve others in my problems and because I believed in our system—because I assumed for the past full 

year tha t, if nothing else, post-Wa tergate morality would guara nty me an opportunity to he heard at least once by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

Activities before it issued its reports, two reiiorts in which my name is invoked 

often in ways that gravely and. I believe, dishonestly, unfairly and crimin ally 

impugn my integ rity, morality and honor. The fac t is that I was denied such an 

elemental opportunity to defend and absolve myself. Moreover, the Committee 

deliberate ly suppressed everything, including official cables, I submitted to it. 

The three enclosures to th is lett er speak for themselves.

1. My lette r of December 19. 1975, to F. A. O. Schwartz, Chief Counsel of the 

Committee, and the alarming postscripts to my straight-forward appeal to this 

New York attorney.

2. My oral statement to the Committee December 4, when I appeared as its 

very las t witness after its two Reports had been issued (and at an hour, five 

p.m., designed to reduce the chances for publicizing my sta tem ents).

3. My October 23. 1975, lette r to Senator Church which I sent upon learning 

th at the first Committee Report (Assassination with a Chilean cha pter) would 

be issued before I could app ear at a public hea ring scheduled for 

November 4. (When Senator Church received the lette r October 28, 

th at hearing was can celled; when no new date was set, I wrote a lette r to the 

Editor, published in the New York Times November 14, complaining th at S enator 

Church, as well as the President, and the CIA, was seeking to bar my public 

tes tim ony; subsequently, the December 4 hearing was scheduled but I appeared 

after the issuance of the second Report—on Chile.)

I have been advised by one or two loyal friends th at I am foolhardy to pursue thi s matter , that I will “lose everything”, that frie nds with standing in the 

Democratic party will not budge from partis anship for some unrewarding cause 

involving one individual’s rights, th at lawy ers of n atio nal renown will let sleeping principles lie, th at historians ar e not inte rested in the defense of issues 

which are not popular in academ ia, th at corporate directors are concerned only 

to escape culpability for the action s of their own multinational, that foundation 

overseers are devoted to one or ano ther theo ry for organizing society but ave rt 

their eyes from the reality of society, even those of the ir own privileged orga nization s.

Perhap s, as the Senate staff seeks to convince me by intimidation , I shall be 

hu rt fa r worse by seeking to defend myself, by not accepting the argument 

th at I was not “really damaged” by their Reports, tha t I can cause too much 

embarrass men t by poking in the ashes of their blaze. If this cynical view were 

valid, we live in, and you suppo rt, a society so corrupted intellectually and 

morally th at it justifies the marauding contempt for politics, politician s and 

public figures which so endangers our na tional structur e today.

Sincerely,

Edward M. Korry.

postscripts

1. Early December 19. a Frid ay, I telephoned F.A.O. Schwarz, chief counsel 

to the Senate Select Committee, to apprise him of some of the details of m.v 

experience with his Committee and to appeal to his professional ethics as a basis 

for corrective action. (Schwarz had reminded me at the end of the December
/ /

4th trav esty th at I had convoked him and o ther MIT Fellows w ith experience as 

legal advisers in Africa to a session in Washington in 1966 to gain the benefit 

of the ir insights for the Report on A frica which President Johnson had commissioned me to do.)

2. Early Monday, December 22nd, a prom inent Wash ington attorney, a friend 

of mine with excellent Democratic credentials, telephoned to say th at if I did 

not abandon my efforts to vindicate myself, the staff of the Senate Select Committee and of the Senate Subcommittee on Multinationals (which Senator 

Church also cha irs) would be “very vindictive” and would cause me “anguish 

beyond anything” I had yet experienced.

3. No sooner did he ring off than the colum nist Jac k Anderson telephoned to 

question me about a scurrilous allegation of my connections w ith IT T ; Anderson 

said his sources on Friday afternoon, December 19th, was the staff of the Senate 

Select Committee and t ha t the staff had also made a number of other allegations, 

no less vicious.

4. The State Department informed me December 24th that Senator Church's 

Committee had refused to furnish a copy, per my request, of the summary of 

the interview with me by Tre verton las t July on the grounds it never divulged 

unsworn statem ents—a rule written to protect witnesses, not to prevent them 

from seeing their statements. (Moreover, the press had repo rted that week that 

Schw artz had even shown Mrs. Judit h Campbell Exner the FB I rei>orts on h e r!)

A tremendous mass of reading materi al on foreign affairs crosses my desk 

weekly, and I rarely had time or desire to do more than I can the ir usually 

ponderous pages. Unfortunately Vista generally received th at fate. But your new 

publication was so refreshing, provocative, concisely written and readable that I 

read it from cover to cover, learned a good deal and even raised my hopes about 

the usefulness of the UN—and the UNA. Congratulations and keep it up. 

Sincerely,

Theodore C. Sorensen.

UNF AIRNESS OF CASTIGATION OF COMMITTEES

Senator Church. The testimony took an hour during which you attacked Air. Vance and this committee and the executive branch and 

members of the press. If I took the same view of the world tha t you 

do, I would charge you with a conspiracy to lie to this committee for 

saying you would take only 20 minutes. I think you have been very unfair in castigation of the committee.

I have no knowledge of other charges that you made in connection 

with the press and so forth , but I do know about when you were before the multinational subcommittee in 1973. Tha t was the first time 

you had an opportunity to testify. You were asked to divulge whatever you knew about the Chilean affair. We were charged then with 

just looking at the tip of the iceberg. We learned later than there was 

much more involved than we had any knowledge of at the time and we 

were tryi ng to get information at the time. You came as a witness at 

tha t time. I will just quote from the record of tha t hearing in 1973.

Senator Percy said to you at tha t tim e:

Mr. Ambassador, any time you do get into an area where you can be more 

cand id with this committee in executive session, under the rules of the executive session, will you just simply so indicate. I have no desire to put you in a 

position where you are failing to be candid with us or in a position where you 

are doing what you consider damage to the foreign policy of the United State s. 

I will accept you simply sta tin g “I would like to answer t ha t question in executive session.”

Then he went on a little later to again sa y:

I want to give you every opportunity to respond in one of two ways, either 

saying that you are going to refu se specifically to answer the question or simply 

indicating t ha t you feel you should answer it in executive session.

81-894— 77------6
78

At tha t time we didn’t go into executive session and you spoke of 

your confidential relation with your superiors as reason for not responding to the committee’s questions. Then there was the exchange 

between you and Mr. Levinson who you put on the line. Mr. Levinson 

said, “Well, I am just trying to get for the record so we are clear as to 

the basis on which you are refusing to disclose information.”

You replied, “I am not playing with words, I am talking about the 

nature of the relationships between ambassadors and their governments.”

Mr. Levinson then said, “Is this a matter of moral principle? ” .

You said, “That is right ; with me it is very deeply so.”

Mr. Levinson said, “So you do not claim a legal justification for 

this ?”

This being a refusal to answer the questions. *

You replied, “I am told tha t there is a legal justification but tha t 

is not what I am invoking.”

Mr. Levinson said, “Are you prepared to disclose this information in 

executive session?”

You said, “No, I am not.”

Now whatever your reasons may have been then or whatever your 

reasons are now, surely every opportunity was afforded you by the 

committee to state your case at that time. When it came to the intelligence committee, we did our job as best we could. We tried to get all 

the facts out as best we could assemble them, as honestly and as objectively as we could report them. You had an opportunity to testify 

in executive session. Our staff people said at the time that we were 

looking into an aspect of the Chilean affair over which you said then 

and say now you had no knowledge. Therefore, you were not called 

in to a public session.

Then later you appeared in public session. The 10-minute rule was 

applied to all witnesses at tha t time but your 29-page written statement was incorporated as a p art of the public record. So I think th at 

charges of coverup and conspiracy and the rest simply are not borne 

out by the public record. I think if the press wants to take enough time 

to look at the record they will find th at there was substantial opportunity.

I have no questions to ask. *

Mr. Ivorry. I would like to simply say one small thing in answer. 

Ambassador Dungan who had knowledge of track I I and Ambassador 

Davis who succeeded me both were called by your committee while 

I was excluded. When you said I had no knowledge of track II, the *

fact is tha t the chain of command between the White House and the 

CIA certainly involved my meeting with Mr. Nixon in the White 

House a week before track II had its culmination.

Now what I am saying, so there is no mistake about it, is that Mr.

Treviton or at least the summary of the interview which he showed 

to me 8 months la ter suppressed tha t vital fact. Tha t is No. 1.

No. 2, the reason tha t I gave you the answers t hat I gave you in 

1973 is contained on page 102 of volume 7 of the Select Committee 

Deport of Public Hearings of December 4, 1975. I n the appendix my 

letter to you, pa ragraph 3 on tha t page, says your counsel Mr. Levinson and I have met in Dieseldorf, Germany. I have sworn under oath 

subject to the laws of p erjury tha t on more than one occasion before—
79

and I don’t say with your knowledge, sir, I want to be clear about 

tha t—but before I ever appeared on two occasions to testify in front 

of the Multinational Committee, Mr. Levinson offered the kind of 

deal tha t frightened him; tha t is, first, I spell it out in tha t letter, 

and second, tha t if I wmuld only help him to get—is the verb he 

used—Dr. Henry Kissinger he would handle the business about the 

Kennedy and Johnson years. I told him that in good conscience I 

could not do that.

Thank you, sir.

Senator Church. Well, Mr. Korry, you presented your testimony.

Mr. Korry. Thank you.

Senator Church. You have been given a full opportunity.

Mr. Korry. I have, and I tha nk you for that, sir.

Senator Church. Very well.

Our next witness is Manuel D. Fierro. Welcome to the committee.

STATEMENT OE MANUEL D. FIER RO, PRES IDENT, NATIONAL 

CONGRESS OF HISP ANIC AMERICAN CITIZENS

Mr. Fierro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, our profound thanks to you and your colleagues for 

providing us with this opportunity to appear before you to express 

some thoughts on the nomination of Mr. Vance to be Secretary of 

State. I appear here in my capacity as president of El Congreso—the 

National Congress of Hispanic American Citizens, an organization 

which represents the elected leadership of a diversity of groups which 

speak for 16 million Americans of Hispanic origin.

I also come before you as a member of the Board of Trustees of the 

Council on Hemispheric Affairs, an organization of prominent Americans who are concerned with U.S.-Latin American relations and who 

come from congressional, labor, agricultural, business, professional, 

and academic backgrounds. Both El Congreso and COHA are deeply 

concerned about the future of the inter-American relationship. Both 

are also apprehensive over recent American policies, and the quality 

of leadership wThich has formulated and guided these policies.

I am here to neither support or oppose Mr. Vance’s candidacy. We 

want to see what steps he will take regarding Latin America before 

we will come forth with judgments rega rding his qualifications. I 

hope to use my few minutes of time to urge upon Mr. Vance some of 

our perceptions rega rding regional affairs and implore him, as he 

stands before this committee, to understand our passion and our convictions regarding these matters. We are here to establish a proprietary stake in the fate of the hemisphere.

LACK OF ADEQUATE CONSTITUENCY FOR LAT IN AMERICA

We are here to let Mr. Vance know tha t we are vitally interested 

in every aspect of U.S.-Latin American policy. Speaking as an Hispanic leader, I must admit th at our peoples in the past have been delinquent in establishing a proper sense of identification with our 

brothers and sisters to the south of us. We were too preoccupied with 

our own domestic sense of survival to realize as black Americans, 

Iris h Americans, Italian Americans, Jewish Americans, and Greek
80

Am eri can s—among m any othe r eth nic g rou ps—hav e realize d, th at an 

iden tit y with one’s ances tral roots aug ments one’s self-este em and 

collective power r at he r th an dim inishe s it.

We hav e suffered fro m th is o ve rsi gh t an d we also ad mit th at Lat in 

Am erica ha s as well. We intend to rectify this. Because of ou r past 

neglect, Lat in Am erican affairs in th is country nev er have had an 

adequ ate con stituen cy wh ich could mon ito r an d help to control the 

initiatives being pu t fo rth by reg ion al policymakers in Wash ing ton . 

We look u po n Am eric an com plicity in such matter s as the overthro w 

of the constituti onal gov ern me nt of G uatem ala in 1954, the Br az ilian 

governm ent in 1964, the Do minic an int erv entio n of 1965 and the 

tra gic demise of the co nstitution al gover nm ent of Chile in 1973 as 

evidence of t he pric e th at a na tio n, an d the victim s of the policies of 

th at nati on , pa y wh en suc h a co nstituenc y is lacking.

As these acts were taki ng plac e behin d a v eil of secrecy an d deceptio n, ou r Hisp an ic community , like th e rest of the Na tion, was barely 

aware of wh at was happ ening . We di dn ’t pe rm it a sense of na tu ra l 

kinship to develop, or respect the processes of hist ory w hic h linked ou r 

fate with those of ou r kinsmen . Re grett ably, ou r con duct deceived 

people into th inki ng th at we were ashame d to be of Lat in Am erican 

descent.

IIOW LAT IN AMERICA HAS BEEN TREATED

For us, all of t his is now ancie nt his tor y. We wan t Air. Van ce and 

mem bers of th is committee to know t hat we are horrified by t he rape 

which histo ric all y, an d up to the prese nt mom ent, h as been pract ice d 

on Lat in Am erica. An d we wan t Mr. Van ce to also rea lize certa in 

things th at we now know as fac ts. We are aw are t hat caree r forei gn 

service officers look upon a tran sf er to the Inter-A merican Bu rea u 

as bein g tan tamou nt to a sentence in Sibe ria. W e look w ith alarm upon 

the f ac t th at the Inter -A merica n Bu rea u histo ric all y has h ad th e least 

prestig e of any of the are a burea us and th at i t has one of th e hig hest 

turnov ers in the ass istant se cre tary category.

We re alize th at the pos itio n of A ssistan t Se cretary of I nter -A mer ican Af fai rs o ften ha s been difficult to fill because p ros pective can did ate s 

are rep elled b y the lack of p oss ibilities of d oin g a really effective job 

in the Bu rea u. We wo rry ove r th e low mo rale with in th e Bu rea u, 

the me dio crity of its lea dersh ip an d the ina deq uac y of its staffing 

at all levels.

We also tak e note th at the Bu reau has a long histor y of bringi ng 

in am bit iou s academ icia ns fro m pre stigio us in stitu tio ns who look 

upon t hei r tim e spen t in W ashing ton as an opp or tu ni ty to ceaselessly 

advance th ei r own careers, ra th er th an ade quately serve the needs of 

th e despera tel y poor who ma ke up th e bu lk of th e po pu lat ion s of 

Lat in Am erica. I t also fills us with despair th at perio dic all y the 

reg ion is wor ked over by men of ap pa re nt good will who peddle 

vario us va rie tie s of snake oil by pi ck ing up some o f th e la test reform ist 

lan guage whi ch is in th e air . An exa mple of th is is th e rec ent body 

of Am erican citizen s who have m ade high ly p ublicize d recommendations about reform ing th e very contr overs ial policies of which ma ny 

of them have been the architects .

Rat he r th an wi th a sensitive concern , Latin Ame rica has been tr ea ted 

wi th an ai r of condescension an d in a sp irit of patro nizatio n. Mr.
81

Kissinger speaks of a partnership with Latin America and a special 

relationship. Aside from the language, we seriously ask what good 

has this so-called special relationship ever done for Latin America.

HISTORIC TRANSFORMATIONS W HICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN LATIN AMERICA

We believe th at in recent years Latin American policymakers and 

their superiors simply have not been aware of the historic trans form ations which have taken place in the region. We are no longer dealing 

with so-called banana republics or sombrero states. We are no longer 

witnessing military governments which have taken power as constitutional guarantors and are merely acting as caretakers of the democratic 

tradition until power can be turned over to another generation of 

civilian leaders. We also repudiate the academic notion that has been 

imported into the Bureau that the military is a reliable engine 

of constructive change in Latin America.

We look upon the Southern Cone—Para guay , Chile, Uruguay, 

Brazil, Argentina—and the despotic states of Central America, and 

we ask ourselves the question: are these the states to which the United 

States wants to extend the hand of friendship ? These are deadly and 

venomous societies which should be quarantined rather than admitted 

into our inner circle. Every one of these regimes are absolutist societies 

that do not allow the most elemental rights to the ir own populations. 

We should identify with the suppressed populations and not their 

oppressors.

In the past year the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and the religious communities in this country have stood almost alone as a strong 

symbol of what our Nation should stand for when it comes to interAmerican relations. Point me out a single Latin American who believes 

in basic human rights and representative institutions, who admires 

or identifies with the present policies or personnel of the Inter-American Bureau. As we go down the line of the B ureau’s highest officials, 

we are hard put to find a single member who seems to be consonant 

with the basic aspirations of the people of Latin America or is 

responsive to the highest ideals of this Nation.

U.S. HIS PANIC COM MUNITY IS NO LONGER A SLEEPING GIANT

We want Mr. Vance to realize that the Hispanic community in the 

United States is a sleeping g iant no more. I t is now awake, and very 

much awake. You will realize it is awake if uninspired choices are 

made in staffing Bureau positions. We will be a t every confirmation 

hearing. And if ambassadorial positions in the region are given as 

payoffs to political mediocrities or career hacks, you will see us at the 

door of this chamber every time.

But loudest of all, you will hear from us if you attempt to foist 

upon this Nation an unacceptable choice as Assistant Secretary of 

State for Inter-American affairs. We don’t want people in this position who have had anything to do with lying to congressional committes, helping to overthrow legitimate governments, or plotting to 

kill foreign leaders. Nor do we believe that being a business executive 

or a corporation lawyer are necessarily suitable backgrounds for this 

position. We want a person from the outside who has convictions as
82

well as other talents. Convictions are what is essential, not technocratic 

skills. Those skills have long been around in the Bureau. A nd we ask 

you: what have they done for Latin America ?

ED TORRES AS ASS ISTANT SECRETARY SUGGESTED

A number of my fellow trustees of the Council on Hemispheric 

Affairs are active candidates for the position of assistant secretaryship. They are all able men. Speaking f or myself and the leadership 

of El Congresso, and speaking for 16 million U.S. Hispanics in this 

country, there is but one outstanding candidate, and his name is Esteban Torres. Ed Torres, a high official in the International Affairs 

Department of the United Auto Workers, is one of the leading finalists 

for the assistant secretary position. We publicly beseech Mr. Vance 

to respond honorably to the telegram sent by President-elect Carter 

to all designated cabinet officers last Saturday that Hispanics be 

placed in policy positions at the highest level.

In closing, we entreat Mr. Vance, before this committee, to realize 

tha t the decision th at he makes within the next few days will have 

epochal impact upon our community and upon regional policy. We 

hope for the good of us all that he chooses wisely.

PAST IN SUFF IC IE NT AT TE NT ION TO OUR HEM IS PH ERE

Senator Church. Thank you very much, Mr. Fierro, for your 

statement. I agree with you tha t we have been prone in the past to 

give insufficient attention to the nations in our own hemisphere. We 

often look too high for things close by.

Mr. Fierro. That is right.

Senator Church. And we had better come to appreciate that our 

first concern should lie with our own neighbors in our own hemisphere.

Mr. Fierro. That is right.

Senator Ciiurcii. I thin k that we both take heart from the expressed concern tha t Mr. Vance made known today and his response 

to the questions of members of this committee about the character 

of some of the governments that we have assisted in the past, a much 

more and a very refreshing reaffirmation of human rights as a central 

objective of American policy abroad. I just know that you would agree 

with those positions and I thin k th at they may herald a better day for 

our relations with the Latin American countries. I hope so.

Mr. Fierro. Well, I certainly hope so and I think that one of the 

concerns that we have now is simply that all the high level positions 

in the State Department have been filled with the exception of the 

Inter-American Affairs position of assistant secretaryship.

Senator Church. Yes.

RESOURCE OF HIS PA N IC CO MMU NITY

Mr. Fierro. Additionally, when you have two Hispanics in tha t 

whole State Department above a GS-14 tha t have never utilized the 

resource of our Hispanic resource in this country to deal with Latin 

America, I think that is a crying shame that this country and the 

State Department never recognized those resources available.

Senator Church. I agree with you th at the large number of American citizens of the Spanish origin and of Latin American origin,
83

we have a grea t resource that we should be using to a far greater 

degree than has been the case in the past in the State Department. 

Senator Church. Thank you very much.

Mr. F ierro. Thank you.

Mr. Fierro. Than k you very much, Mr. Church.

Senator Church. Our next witness is Mr. Eric Lerner, a representative of Fusion En ergy Foundation of New York.

STATEMENT OE EKIC LERNER, REPRESENTATIVE OF FUSION 

ENERGY FOUNDATION

Mr. Lerner. I am testifying here today on behalf of the Fusion 

Energy Foundation to urge the Senate not to confirm the nomination 

of Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State. Mr. Vance is unfit to carry 

responsibility of the foreign policy of the United States: his record 

proves that lie holds views and loyalties diametrically opposed to the 

actual interests of the Unite d States.

A C H IE V IN G FU N D A M EN T A L IN TERESTS OF U .S . FO RE IG N REL ATI ONS

If we are to competently judges whether a man is suited to hold the 

position of Secretary of State, we must first identify the fundamental 

interests that this counry must pursue in is foreign relations and 

then ask whether the nominee is qualified to uphold these interests.

From the founding of this country our fundamental interest has been 

our development as an industrial Nation and the peace and political 

democracy necessary fo r tha t development. At present these interests 

can only be carried out within a framework of a new world economic 

order based on rapid development and based on the achievement within 

the next decade of a global economy based on thermonuclear fusion 

power.

A look at the world economy today will explain why this is the case. 

The world economy most emphatically, including our own country, is 

at the moment being strangled by an obsolete international monetary 

system, a system based on the IM F and the New York banks. It is 

being strangled by $3 trillion to $5 trillion in debt owed to these 

institutions and hundreds of billions of dollars of debt service that are 

being diverted from productive use. In the Third World and in Europe 

this diversion of productive resources means mass misery and starv ation ; in the United States it means a stagnating economy instead of an 

export, led boom.

The first aim of American foreign policy must be to end this dangerous crisis. To do so our Nation need merely accept the proposals 

already put forward by European and developing sector nations, proposals enunciated at the Colombo, Sri Lanka meeting of the NonAligned countries last August and repeated elsewhere.

If Cyrus Vance is interested in dealing with the debt question, then 

he need merely accept these proposals to sweep away the current bankrup t monetary system with the general debt moratorium and to establish a new financial system based on an international development 

bank which would finance at low interest major development projects, 

agriculture and urban, throughout the Thi rd World. These development program would involve three-way deals—the Thi rd World, the 

advanced capitalist nations and the Comecon states in massively 

expanded trade.
84

Such an essential program of economic development, which would 

end unemployment and stagnation within the U.S. in a matter of 

months, would be purely utopian unless i t was coupled with an inte rnational crash program fo r the development of thermonuclear fusion 

power. The rates of expansion of the world economy generated by renewed economic development will rapidly exhaust all presently available energy supplies—only the development of fusion by the mid to 

late 1980’s, a goal entirely possible through international collaboration, 

will enable us to confidently exhaust these existing resources to fuel 

development today.

MR. VANCE ’S RECORD AND VIEWS

Now in ligh t of those fundamental interests let us look at Mr. Vance. 

Mr. Vance has through out his career acted in behalf of the interests 

and policies of the New York banks, especially those connected with 

the Rockefeller family interests and policies which are exactly the 

opposite of the United States. They say the debt must be paid even if 

this means massive misery, the destruction of population, even if this 

means the forcible overthrow of governments and replacement by 

dictatorships, even if this sets the United States on a course toward 

war.

Tha t Nlr. Vance represents these private interests and not those of 

this Nation is evidenced both by his associations and by his governmental record. Outside of government Mr. Vance has held several high 

ranking positions within organizations ru n by the Rockefeller family, 

organizations advocating the policies of the New York banks—a distinction shared with other members of the proposed Carter cabinet. If 

confirmed, he would act as p art of a team capable of imposing these 

private interests on the policies of the U.S. Government.

Mr. Vance’s views on international economic policy can be gathered 

from his membership on the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller 

Foundation, a position shared with Michael Blumenthal, Theodore 

Iles burg and Lane Kirkland.

The Rockefeller Foundation, through funded projects, has consistently fostered the myth tha t populations must be reduced and that 

economic growth is impossible. The studies funded by the Rockefeller 

Foundation advocate the reduction of Third World imports of capital 

goods for development and the substitution of labor intensive production methods. These are precisely the destructive policies which would 

free the maximum foreign exchange resources for repaym ent of debt.

Vance’s opinions of the value of democratic forms of government 

can be accurately judged from his membership in the Trilater al Commission, a private international body of bankers and politicians chaired 

by David Rockefeller. Mr. Vance’s colleagues on the Trilateral Commission include Mr. Carter, Senator Mondale, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 

Mr. Blumenthal and Harold Brown, as well as several designees for 

State Dep artment offices: Wa rren Christopher, R ichard Cooper, Lucy 

Wilson Benson, Anthony Lake and Richard Holbrooke.

The Trilate ral Commission recently sponsored a study entitled “On 

the Governabilitv of the Democracies” which concluded t ha t democratic forms of Government were outmoded. Mr. Brzezinski, who 

served until recently as director of the Trilateral Commission, has 

new been appointed as the President-elect’s closest adviser and has
85

fre qu en tly ela borat ed the Com mission ’s view on th is m atter, ad vo cating fo r the United State s, an d I quote, “a sym bolic presi dency wh ere 

func tio nally necessary ex pe rts replace pa rties an d go vernm ental 

bodies. Th e Pr es id en t will no lon ger be able to ad ju st and in terrelate 

all t he fu nc tio na lly specialized inter ests th at w ill evolve and the rep re ­

senta tio n in th e leg islati ve proc ess will becom e fa r more ab str ac ted.”

W ith Mr. Brzez ins ki an d Mr. Van ce wo rking toge ther on foreign 

policy, an d wi th th e othe r key Ca binet posts he ld by mem bers of t he 

T rila te ra l Com mission, the se men will have th e op po rtun ity to put 

th ei r the ori es of tec hn oc ratic Go vernme nt into practic e if t he Senate 

allo ws the m by confirming the m, an d I should ad d th at th e concern 

of th e Go vernm ent of the Uni ted St ates domi nated b y the T rila te ra l 

Com mission h as now been expressed b y such dive rgen t po litica l te nd ­

encies as Pra vd a an d th is morning by one of yo ur colleagues, Se na ­

to r G old wa ter, at th e H ar ol d B rown hea rin gs.

Mr. V anc e’s att itu de s o n th e v ita l issues of war an d pe ace a re e qually 

well indic ate d b y his vice ch air man sh ip of the Co uncil o n F or eign Relat ion s, chair ed by Da vid Rocke feller. Th e members of thi s body in ­

clu de the m en ju st mentioned a s well as Jo se ph Calif ano an d T heodore 

Sor enson. Th e C FR pu blica tio n Fo re ig n Af fai rs in rec ent issues ha s 

been pu bli ciz ing th e view s of th e Comm ittee on the Pr es en t Dan ge r 

(C PD ) whose bas ic the sis is th at the Uni te d State s must p re pa re f or 

war wi th t he Sovie t Un ion .

Now of course Mr. Vance ma y say th at the se associatio ns are no t 

sufficient evidence, th at he oppo ses th e policies of th e CP D an d is a 

sinc ere up ho lder of peace. Ho we ver , his rec ord in Governm ent confirm s th at he is all too willing—no m at te r wha t h e says—to c ar ry ou t 

in practic e the wa r-like policies his asso ciates adv ocate. Twice Mr. 

Vance was the key f igure in efforts to ov ert hrow allied go vernm ents by 

arm ed force. I sho uld say at least twice.

In 1963 a CIA s up po rte d m ilitar y cou p att em pted to o verthrow th e 

Do mi nic an Re publi c’s elected Go vernm ent of J uan Bosch.

In 1967 Mr. Vance coordina ted in be ha lf of th e Defense D ep ar tmen t’s U.S . liason w ith th e NA TO p lan “ Ope ratio n P rome theus.” Th e 

Prom eth eus plan was a bl ue pr in t fo r th e est ablishm ent of a m ili ta ry 

dictator sh ip in Greece. I n Apr il of 1967 the Greek mi lit ary, wi th active 

collaboration of U.S. int ellige nce agencies, coord ina ted b y Mr. Vance 

ca rri ed ou t Op erati on Prom eth eus, ov ert hrew the Gre ek Governm ent 

an d i nstalle d th e plan ned dictatorsh ip.

Th ere is also ev idence th at M r. Vance was involved in U.S. par tici pa ­

tio n in th e B razilia n coup o f 1964.

Now Mr. Van ce may wel l say th at he ha s rep ented fro m all the se 

pre vio us wro ngdoing s, he has rep ented fro m his pre vio us mista kes in 

Vietn am , bu t the Sen ate should bew are t h at Mr. Vance h as ex plicitly 

stat ed t h at he still s up po rts t he policies an d inter ests th at force d h im 

in t he dir ection o f such warlik e actions.

I f M r. Van ce is intent, as he said it is— and cle arl y his associatio ns 

indicate the m to be—i f h e is i nten t on im posin g an au ste rit y reg im e of 

conse rva tion of e nergy on the wo rld , he can do th at only bv repe ate d 

m ilitar y coups an d by policy th at will lead to general co nfro ntation 

with the S oviet Union .

On those g rounds he should n ot be confirmed.

[Mr. L er ne r’s pre pa red s tat em ent f ollo ws:]
Prepared Statem ent of Eric Lerner, Representative of ti ie F usion E nergy

F oundation

I am test ifying here today on. behalf of the Fusion Energy Foundation to urge 

the Senate not to confirm the nomination of Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State. 

Mr. Vance is unfit to car ry respo nsibility for th e foreign policy of the United 

Sta te s: h is record proves th at he holds views and loyalties diametrically opposed 

to th e ac tual in terests of the United States.

To competently judge wheth er a man is suited to hold the position of S ecretary 

of State, we m ust first identify the fundam ental interests th at this country must 

pursue in its foreign relations, and then ask whether the nominee is qualified 

to uphold these interests.

From the founding of this country, our fundame ntal interests have been development as an industrial nation nad the preservation of the peace and political 

democracy essential to th at development. Presently these intere sts can only be 

served by a policy aimed at the esta blishment of a New W orld Economic Order, 

an economic order premised on the most rap id global development, and on the 

transi tion to a global economy based on thermonuclear fusion power within the 

next decade.

A look at the world economic situation today illu strate s why this is the case. 

The world economy most emphatically including our own economy, is being 

stra ngled by an obsolete int ern ational monetary system —the system of the 

Inter natio nal Monetary Fun d and of the gia nt New York banks. Under this 

system, hundreds of billions of dollars are diverted annually from productive 

purposes to the payment of debt service on three to five trillion dollars in debt 

owed, primarily, to th e IMF and the New York banks. The nations of Euro pe and 

the underdeveloped sector, burdened with this debt, are massively cuttin g back 

on their imports, devasta ting world tra de and c reating mass misery and sta rvation through out the Third World. As a res ult of this debt, the U.S. economy, 

instead of booming through the expa nsion of its exp ort trade, is stagnating.

The first aim of American foreig n policy must be to end this dangerous crisis. 

To do so, our nation need merely accept the proposals alread y pu t forward by 

European and developing sector nations, proposals enunciated by the Colombo, Sri 

Lanka meeting of the Non-Aligned c ountries last August and repeate d elsewhere. 

These proposals advocate sweeping asid e the curre nt bankrup t internatio nal 

monetary system by the declaration of general debt morato ria and the establishment of a new financial and economic system based on development. This new 

system involves principally the setting up of an Intern ational Development Bank 

to fund major agricultura l and urban development projects at low intere st for 

the developing sector. These programs are to be carried out thro ugh treaties 

massively expanding three-way development and tra de cooperation among the 

developing countries, the developed capital ist nations and the Comecon nations.

Such an essential program of economic development, which would end unemploym ent and stag nation with in the U.S. in a matt er of months, would be purely 

utopian unless it was coupled with an intern ational crash program for the development of tlieromonuclear fusion power. The rates of expa nsion of the world 

economy generated by renewed economic development will rapidly exh aust all 

presently available energy supplies—only the development of fusion by the mid 

to late IfiSO’s, a goal entirely possible thro ugh intern ational collaboration, will 

enable us to confidently exh aus t these existing resources to fuel development 

today.

This foreign policy is not only in the best tradition of the American commitment to economic and technical progress, it is the only path tow ard s enduring 

peace. The policy of global economic development and three-way trad e, embodies 

the real common interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, and if 

carried out would remove all potential causes of w ate r between these countries. It 

is th e most effective way of encouraging political democracy both here and 

through out the world: Dic tatorship s are needed only to force populations to 

cut consumption to pay foreign debt, but political democracies are the necessary 

form to most effectively encourage rap id economic and technological growth.

Mr. Vance has throug hou t his car eer acted in beh alf of the inte rested and 

policies of the New York banks, especially those connected with the Rockefeller 

family intere sts and policies which are exactly the opposite of the United States. 

The banking intere sts th at Mr. Vance has labored for fav or the collection of 

the ir debt over all other considera tions, and the mainten ance of the financial 

and political power which goes with th at debt. The debt must be paid, even 

if economic development is aborted and whole populations decimated. The debt
87

must be paid, even if tliis means the forcible overthrow of allied governments 

and their replacement with dictatorships. The debt must be paid, even if this sets 

the United States on a course toward general war. In contrast to the policies 

of development, democracy and peace which this country must carry out, Mr. 

Vance and those whose interests he defends stand for genocide, dictatorship 

and war.

Mr. Vance’s record of service in previous governmental administrations has 

earned him a reputation in Europe. Italian and German newspapers have characterized him as they watch closely and with concern the naming of Mr. Carter’s 

cabinet. The London Times greeted his appointment as an indication tha t “the 

Vietnam Warliawks” were being rehabilitated for this administration. Tha t

, newspaper referred to Vance’s call for paratroopers in the 1967 Detroit riot as

“a desperately dangerous move.” The West German Fra nkf urter Rundschau 

has also questioned Vance’s commitment to peace: “Vance was McNamara's 

deputy during the worst years of the Vietnam war, but later he won the reputation of a clever mediator . . .”

• Tha t Mr. Vance represents these private interests and not those of this nation 

is evidenced both by his associations and by his governmental record. Outside of 

government Mr. Vance has held several high rankin g positions within organizations run by the Rockefeller family, organizations advocating the policies of the 

New York banks—a distinction shared with other members of the proposed 

Carter cabinet. If confirmed, he would act as part of a team capable of imposing these private interests on the policies of the U.S. government.

Mr. Vance’s views on international economic policy can be gathered from his 

membership on the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, a position 

shared with Michael Blumenthal, Theodore Hesburg and Lane Kirkland.

The Rockefeller Foundation, through funded projects, has consistently fostered 

the myth tha t populations must be reduced and that economic growth is impossible. The studies funded by the Rockefeller Foundation advocate the reduction 

of Third World imports of capital goods for development and the substitution 

of labor intensive production methods. These are precisely the destructive policies 

which would free the maximum foreign exchange resources for repayment of 

debt.

Vance’s opinions on the value of democratic forms of government can be accurately judged from his membership in the Trilateral Commission, a private international body of bankers and politicians chaired by David Rockefeller. Mr. 

Vance’s colleagues on the Trilateral Commission, including Mr. Carter, Senator 

Mondale, Zbignew Brzezinski, Mr. Blumenthal and Harold Brown, as well as 

several designees for State Departm ent offices: Warren Christopher, Richard 

Cooper, Lucy Wilson Benson, Anthony Lake and Richard Holbrooke.

The Trilateral Commission recently sponsored a study entitled “On the Governability of the Democracies” which concluded that democratic forms of government were outmoded. Mr. Brzezinski, who served until recently as director of the 

Trilateral Commission, has frequently elaborated the Commission’s view on this 

matter, advocating for the United States “a symliolic presidency where func-

« tionally necessary experts replace parties and governmental bodies. The president

will no longer be able to adjust and interrelate all the functionally specialized 

interests tha t will evolve and the representation in the legislative process will 

become far more abstracted.”

With Mr. Brzezinski and Mr. Vance working together on foreign policy, and

• with the other key cabinet posts held by members of the Trilateral Commission, 

these men will have the opportunity to put th eir theories of technocratic government into practice, if the Senate agrees to confirm them. The Carter administration’s reliance on the Trilateral Commission has not been ignored. The Soviet 

Union has commented on both Vance’s membership in the Commission and on 

the goals of the Commission in its party paper, Pravda. “The people who are 

taking the highest posts in foreign policy, military questions and finance are from 

this (Trilateral) commission,” Pravda said, calling the Commission “a club of 

strong men” formed “under the sponsor of David Rockefeller.” The new administration will evidently look to “trilateral policies for a way out of the crisis 

at the expense of its partners, deepening even furthe r the disagreements in the 

corners of the triangle (a reference to Japan, North America and Western 

Euro pe)”.

Mr. Vance’s attitudes on the vital issues of war and peace are equally wellindicated by his vice-chairmanship of the Council on Foreign Relations, chaired 

by David Rockefeller. The members of this body include the men just mentioned 

as well as Joseph Califano and Theodore Sorenson. The CFR publication For-
88

eign Affairs in recent issues has been publicizing the views of the Committee on 

the Present Danger, whose basic thesis is tha t the United States must prepare 

for wa r with the Soviet Union in the near future.

Of course Mr. Vance may say th at these associations are not sufficient evidence, 

that he opposes the policies of the CPD and is a sincere upholder of peace. However, his record in government confirms t ha t he is all too willing to carry out in 

practice the warlike policies his associates advocate. Twice Mr. Vance was the 

key figure in efforts to overthrow allied governments by armed force. In 1963, a 

CIA-supported military coup attempted to overthrow the Dominican Republic’s 

elected government of Juan Bosch. Two years later, the coup attem pt was massively resisted by the population of that country and a civil war broke out. Mr.

Vance, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, supervised the dispatch of warships

and U.S. Marines to the Dominican Republic, under the pretext of evacuating •

American citizens—an intervention which prevented the victory of pro-Bosch

forces in tha t civil war. Vance, the acting “mediator,” imposed on the country's

provisional president Balaguer, a vice president under the Trujillio dictatorship,

who murdered or imprisoned his opposition and who remains in power today.

In 1967, Mr. Vance coordinated in behalf of the Defense Department’s U.S. *

liaison, with the NATO plan “Operation Prometheus.” The Prometheus plan was 

a blueprint for the establishment of a m ilitary dictatorship in Greece. In April of 

1967, the Greek military, with active collaboration of U.S. Intelligence agencies, 

coordinated by Mr. Vance carried out Operation Prometheus, overthrew the Greek 

government and installed the planned dictatorship.

Mr. Vance’s role in the Vietnam war is well-known. Throughout his tenure in 

the Defense Department, Vance acted as a consistent advocate of escalation of 

warfare in Vietnam and an opponent of any moves toward peace.

The question the Senate must ask is : can a man with such associations and 

such a record as Cyrus Vance be trusted to act in the interest of the United 

States? The only reasonable answer is no.

In tha t testimony has been presented here demonstrating Mr. Vance's unsuitability for the office of Secretary of State, the committee should prove for 

itself by asking him the following questions :

(1) Do you, Mr. Vance, agree with the opinions expressed by Mr. Zbigniew 

Brezinslci, designated National Security Advisor to the President, and the 

Trilateral Commission, th at democratic forms of government are outmoded and 

must be replaced by technocratic dictatorships?

(2) Do you, Mr. Vance, believe tha t the U.S. must enforce the retainment of 

underdeveloped countries debt at any cost or would you agree to general debt 

moratoria?

(3) Could you explain how your long time association with the Rockefeller 

financial interests—Council on Foreign Relations the Trilateral Commission— 

would not affect your ability to best judge the interests of the United States 

government which would be general debt moratoria for the underdeveloped 

countries and advancement of U.S. participation in multilateral trade deals, and 

not the interests of those banks ?

Senator Ciiurcii. Thank you very much, Mr. Lerner, for your »

testimony.

Mr. Lerner. Do you have any questions ?

Senator Church. I don't believe I have.

Mr. E. Stanley Rittenhouse, legislative aide for the Liberty Lobby. *

STATEMENT OF E. STANLEY RITTENHOUSE, LEGISLATIVE AIDE,

LIBERT Y LOBBY

Mr. Rittenhouse. Mr. Chairman, you will have to forgive me for 

my laryngitis but. tha t is the expense of winter here.

I certainly do appreciate the opportunity of coming and testifying before the committee r egarding the nomination of Cyrus Vance.

If the Senate were to confirm the nomination of Cyrus R. Vance to 

be Secretary of State, he would take the following oath of office:

I, Cyrus R. Vance, do solemnly swear tha t I will support and defend the 

Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
89

th a t I will hea r tr u e fa it h an d alle gi an ce to th e sa m e; th a t I ta ke th is ob liga ­

tion free ly , w ithout m enta l re se rv at io n or pu rp os e of ev asi o n ; an d th a t 1 will 

well an d fa it h fu ll y dis ch ar ge th e duties of th e office on wh ich I am ab out to 

en ter. So h elp me God.

DISSOL VING OF U .S . N ATIO N AL SO VE RE IG NT Y SUGGEST ED

To violate the allegiance owed to one's sovereign or state is a betrayal 

on one’s country. To favor a one-world government is to do so a t the 

expense of America’s sovereignty. It is impossible to maintain our 

« national sovereignty and be a member of a one-world government al

the same time. When a soldier takes up arms, for example, in defense 

of his country, he is defending its sovereignty.

To quote The Spotlight (December 20,1970) :

Va nce is a B ilde rb er g part ic ip ant, a m em be r of th e Co un cil on Fo re ig n Rel ation s (h e is eit h er no w or has been th e fo llow in g: Vic e C ha irm an of th e Boa rd 

of th e CF R, mem be r of th e Exe cu tive Com m itt ee an d a D ir ecto r) , a m em be r of 

th e T ri la te ra l Co mmiss ion an d of th e boa rd of dir ec to rs fo r th e Roc ke fe ller 

Fo un da tion .

The ab ov e org an iz at io ns are he av ily influ en ce d by th e Roc ke fe lle rs an d 

jo in tly pr om ot e an in te rn ati o n al so cialism. T heir goal, as of te n art ic ula te d 

th ro ug h th e CFR . is a co nc en tr at io n of po wer th a t wo uld re su lt in a world 

go ve rnmen t. The ov er la p of m em be rshi p is re vea li ng; C art er hi m se lf is a me mbe r o f t he T ri la te ra l Co mm iss ion .

You might ask. what are the goals of (he CFR ?

To quote the CFR on its goal: “The United States must strive to 

build a new international order including states labeling themselves 

socialist to ma intain and gradually increase the authority of the UN.”

I might point out that Nelson Rockefeller has pointed out that we 

need a new world order. All this must be accomplished at (lie 

expense of our sovereignty.

The October 1976 issue of Foreign Affairs, a CFR publication, says 

regarding trilate ralism :

I t is tim e th ere fo re to co ns id er th e cr ea tion of a ne w in st it uti on, patt ern ed 

in st ea d aft e r th e H um an R ig hts Co mm iss ion of th e Co un cil of Eu ro pe , wor ki ng 

unde r a ch art er si m il ar to th e Eur op ea n Con ve ntio n on H um an R ig ht s, w ith 

guara nte ed acce ss an d su bp oe na po wer an d reco gn ized st andin g in bo th nati onal 

an d in te rn ati onal court s of law . an d w ith th e po wer to reco mmen d sa nc tion s 

which go ve rn m en ts wo uld undert ake to en fo rc e again st eit h er le ss er officia ls 

k ac ting on th eir own, or co lle ctively, again st vio la to r go ve rnmen ts. Such an

in st it uti on wou ld be outs id e th e fr am ew or k of th e U ni te d Nations , bu t it s ex ­

pr es s pu rp os e wou ld be to m ak e effecti ve th e ba sic pr in ci pl es of th e U ni ve rs al 

D ec la ra io n (a noth er on e-world do cu m en t) . I t wou ld be open to an y sta te w ill ing 

to in cu r th e ra th e r fa r- re achin g obl ig atio ns of m em be rship.

It, should be pointed out (hat the far-reaching obligations of membership referred to above, of course, mandate dissolving national 

sovereignty.

Colonel Curtis B. Dali. Liberty Lobby's chairman, testified during 

(h e confirmation hearings on Nelson Rockefeller t h at:

F or al l of hi s m atu re ye ar s, Ne lso n Roc ke fe ller has been a co ns ta nt an d ded ica te d pr om ot er of a on e-world so ci al ist go ve rn m en t a t th e ex pe ns e of th e sover ei gn ty of th es e U ni te d S ta te s . . . Fa ce d as we a re to day w ith a life an d dea th 

st ru gg le , we sh ou ld bear in mind th a t no one gr ou p in th is co un try sinc e th e 

tu rn of th e ce ntu ry has ca us ed mor e da m ag e in di ver s are as an d mor e de ba se ­

m en t of ou r cult ure and sh in in g heri ta ge th an th e Roc ke fe ller grou p.

Mr. Vance is part of tha t group. Remember, he is on the board of 

directors for the Rockefeller Foundation.

81 -8 94 — 77------ 7
90

MR. VANCE 'S FAVORING OF DETEN TE

These groups all favor trade and aid with the enemy. Mr. Vance, as 

does Mr. Rockefeller, wants close ties with the Soviets. ITe testified to 

that effect today. Mr. Kissinger called it detente.

“The very survival of the United States is threatened by the Soviet 

military buildup,” states Navy Secretary J. William Middendorf II.

Quoting former Defense Secretary Melvin R. L aird:

The fa cts ar e th at, in re ce nt mon ths, th e USS R—se cr et ly an d op enly— ha s re ­

pe at ed ly co mm itt ed de libe ra te ac ts th a t mock det en te an d th re ate n the fr ee »

world . . . Cl ea rly , we m ust shed any ling er in g ill us io ns we may ha ve th a t th e 

Rus sian s ha ve ab an do ne d th eir det er m in at io n to un de rm in e W es te rn demo cracy 

an d im po se t h eir s ys tem up on th e world.

But Vance still has these lingering illusions as witness his advocacy 

of detente.

Only today Vance was asked by a Spotlight reporter, Mark Ixtckman, whether he agreed with Il enry Kissinger's recent statement th at 

the Soviet Union is not striving for military superiority over the 

United States and Mr. Vance said, yes, he did agree with Mr. Kissinger's statement. Now tha t runs completely contrary to the latest CIA 

report stating that the military of the Soviet Union does want to gain 

superiority.

1 quote the Washington Sta r of January 2, 15)77: “The annual estimate of annual military intentions finds that the Kremlin is seeking 

to obtain superiority over U.S. military forces.” Evidently Vance does 

not believe that CIA report.

I would also like to quote Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp when he 

warned his fellow Americans:

The American people ne ed to he in fo rm ed of th e un pr ec ed en te d So vie t bu ildu p 

of m il it ary ca pa bi lit y. The y ne ed to under st an d th a t (he So viets in te nd to use 

det en te to fa cil it ate p ro gr es s to w ard u lt im ate dom in an ce of th e W est.

The American peop le m us t be ja rre d out of th eir eu phoria an d mad e to re al iz e 

(h at ou r wa y of life is th re at en ed . The do wnw ar d tr en d of our de fens e po stur e 

m us t he reve rsed . We ha ve th e ab ility and th e tech no logy to de fend ou rselve s— 

hu t we m us t als o ha ve th e w il l! We m ust wak e up an d ge t on w ith th e jo b if 

we a re to su rv iv e as a fr ee n at io n !

Alexandr Sholzhenitsyn declared:

I w oul dn' t he su rp rise d a t th e su dd en an d im m in en t fa ll of th e W es t . . . Th e *

sit u ati o n is su ch—th e So viet Uni on ’s eco nomy is on such a w ar fo ot in g—th a t 

ev en if it w er e th e un an im ou s op inion of all of th e mem be rs of th e Pol itbu ro no t 

to si ar t a w ar , th is w ou ld no long er he in t heir pow er.

I fully concur with Alexandr Solizhenitsyn. In fact, I personally 

believe that we are being blackmailed by the Soviet military this very 

moment.

Mr. Vance is a promoter of detente. But detente is nothing more 

than surrender on the installment plan. Detente to the Communists 

is just another word. This year it is detente; last year it was peaceful 

coexistence; next year it will be something else.

I might point out the American people are getting fed up with detente. I refer to when President Ford said, “We will not use the word 

detente” prior to the election. In other words, they all know what they 

ought to be. It is too bad after the election they don't follow through.

Theodore Roosevelt's comment on internationalists who profess to 

love all nations as their own :
91

Th e American who lov es oth er co unt ri es as he love s hi s own is lik e th e ma n 

wh o lov es oth er women as he lov es hi s wife . I do no t re gar d him as hig h-m in ded ; 

I re ga rd him as ro tten . We ha ve no roo m in th is co unt ry fo r 50 -50 American s. 

He who is no t w ith us ab so lu te ly is again st us an d sh ou ld he tr eate d as an alie n 

an d se nt out o f t he c ou nt ry .

All I can ad d to th at is amen.

As yon may know, Mr. Vanc e worked under Mr. Mc Nama ra, the 

form er Se cre tar y of Defense, and of course he was instr um en tal in 

mu zzling th e mili tary from speakin g out ag ain st the enem y, the 

Com mun ists.

e Now Lloy d Sh ea rer said, “There is littl e dou bt th at M cNam ara h as

influenced Van ce more th an any other ind ivi dual in governm ent.”

Will he favo r a policy of dis arm am ent as did Mc Namara? Will lie 

favor tr ad in g wi th the enemy, givin g them technological, financia l,

• and military aid and comf ort as his previo us reco rd ind icates? Will 

Vance continu e Kissin ge r’s policy of m erg ing A merica and her p eople 

into the goal and pro gram s of th e Soviet Un ion ?

Na tio na lly syndica ted colu mnist Pa ul Scott has repo rte d:

Befor e th e Sen at e For ei gn R el at io ns Com mitt ee ac ts . . . on th e no m in at io n of 

Cyr us Va nc e as th e ne w Sec re ta ry of Sta te , th e la w m ak ers shou ld th or ou gh ly 

qu es tion hi m abou t hi s co nn ec tio n w ith tw o in te rn ati onal gr ou ps th a t fa vo r th e 

es ta blish m en t o f a loo sely knit te d w orld go ve rnmen t.

Th e firs t is hi s mem be rshi p in th e re ce nt ly fo rm ed in te rn ati onal ci tize ns’ ac ­

tion org an iz at io n ca lle d “N ew D irec tion s,” th e br ai n- ch ild of Rob er t S. McN am ar a, P re si dent of th e W or ld Ban k, wh o w as Sec re ta ry of Defen se in th e Ken ­

ne dy an d Jo hn so n A dm in is tr at io ns an d Van ce ’s fo rm er boss.

The pu blicly st ate d go al of th e or ga niz at io n is to ga lv an iz e ci tize n su pp or t 

and pre ss ure s in te rn ati o n all y to fo rm ula te po pu la tion co ntro l, food, en ergy an d 

de te nt e w it h t he S ovi et Un ion (e m ph as is a dded).

W ith all of the above in mind, can Mr. Van ce tak e the o afh of office 

“wit hout me nta l res erv ation or purpo se of eva sion” ? If he fake s this 

oath and is a. B ild erbe rger. he is a liar fo r one contr adict s the other, 

and 1 am re fe rrin g fo the sov ere ign ty issue. E ither he reno unces tri - 

latera lism and the goals of the Bi lderbe rgers and the CF R, or he 

sho uld refuse to tak e the oath of office. It is one or the othe r; he cannot, serve both masters, and rem ember the oath states th at . “I will 

affirm or I will su pp ort and defend fhe Co nstitu tion of the Un ite d 

State s ag ain st all enemies, foreign and domestic.’’

* It is e ith er nationalism or a one wo rld ; if is as simple as th at.

MR. VA NC E/S AP PR OA CH TO VIE TNAM WAR

Mr. Vance ’s approa ch to the Vietn am war was to be a no-win warmon ger with a mis erable record when it came to taking p ositive step s 

to end the w ar th ro ug h victory. Instea d of adv ocating victory, a solu- 

< ion th at would have taken G to 8 weeks, he elected to dr ag it out with 

a no-win, acco mmodate-the-e nem y policy res ultin g in the death of 

more tha n 55,000 Ame rican men and more t ha n 250.000 wounde d and/ 

or maimed for life. T might point out on the issue of v ictory in Vietnam . when I was ru nn in g for Congres s in 19G8 up in Penn sylva nia. T 

had two colonels come to me on sep ara te occasions who had just come 

from V ietn am and sai d, “"Will you please m ake th is an issue.” H e said . 

“We c an end t he war in G t o 8 weeks if we but bomb four po we rplan ts 

and block t he ha rbor .” An d he said. “We can do if with nor mal weap-
92

oils. AVe would not need nuclear weapons and we could do it with no 

loss of civilian life.”

Since that time I have heard Adm. John McCain say that we 

could have won that war in 4 weeks and lie was Admiral of the Pacific 

Fleet with more than a million men under him. Senator Barry Goldwater and others have said the same thing. It will take eternity for Mr. 

Vance to wash the blood off his hands.

You see, Mr. Vance betrayed the tru st o f (hose fighting men in their 

Government leaders and thus perfidy was very much an issue of the 

Vietnam war.

“no” vote urg ed

Instead of confirming a Rockefeller internationalist and an Americalaster as Mr. Vance is, we need an American nationalist, an Americafirster. B ut we will never get such a leader if the appointee is a participant in trilateral commission meetings, Bilderberg conferences, 

and holds high positions in the CFR.

It is a travesty and a fraud to consider this man’s qualifications 

without considering the truth about whom lie is meant to serve. The 

American public is rapidly becoming aware of the reality behind the 

fraud of our so-called foreign policy. AVe demand a foreign policy 

that serves the interests of the people of the United States and one that 

puts America first and not the one th at takes (he money and the blood 

of the people to serve the interests of the parasitical super-rich internationalists who know no loyalty except to their own pocketbooks.

Liberty lobby urges a “no” vote on Cyrus Vance.

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear today and present 

our views.

[Mr. Rittenhouse's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of E. Stanley Kitten house. Legislative Aide. 

Liberty L obby

Mr. C ha irm an an d mem be rs of th e co mmitt ee . T am E. St an le y Rittenh ou se , 

Leg isla tive A ide fo r Lib er ty Lob by. I appre cia te th is oppo rtun ity to appea r toda y 

an d pr es en t th e vie ws of Lib er ty Lo bb y’s nea rly 25,000-m ember B oa rd of Policy, 

as well as tlie ap pro xi m at el y q u art er of a mill ion re ad er s of our we ekly ne wspa pe r. The Sp otlig ht.

If you ge ntle m en we re to confi rm th e no m in atio n of Cyrus R. Van ce to be 

Sec re ta ry o f Sta te . In* w ou ld ta ke the fol lowing oa th of office :

I. Cyr us R. Vance, do solemnly sw ea r (o r aff irm ) th a t I will su pp or t an d 

de fend th e C on stitut io n of th e U ni ted S ta te s ag ai nst all en em ies, fo re ig n an d 

dom es tic: th a t I wi ll bea r tr u e fa it h and alle gian ce to th e sa m e: th a t I ta k e th is 

ob lig at io n free ly, w ith ou t m en ta l re se rv at io n or pu rp os e of ev asi o n ; an d th a t I 

will we ll an d fa it hfu ll y dis ch ar ge th e duties of th e office on which I am ab out to 

en te r. So he lp m e God.

To vi ol at e th e a lleg ianc e ow ed to on e's sove reign or st ate is a b etr ay al of on e's 

co un try. To f avor a on e-w orl d go ve rn m en t is to do so a t th e e xp en se of America's 

so ve re ig nt y. It is im po ssible to m ain ta in ou r nat io nal so ve re ignty an d be a me mber of a on e-world go ve rn m en t a t th e sa m e tim e. W hen a so ld ie r ta kes up ar m s 

in d efen se o f h is cou nt ry , he is d ef en di ng its sov ereig nty.

To q uo te T he Spo tli gh t (Dec. 20 ,197 6) :

Van ce is a Bilde rb er g part ic ip ant, a mem be r of th e Co un cil on For ei gn R el atio ns ( lie is e it h er now or has been th e fo llo w ing: Vice C ha irm an of th e Boa rd o f 

th e CFR . mem be r o f th e Exe cu tive Com m itt ee an d a D ir ecto r) , a mem be r of th e 

T ri la te ra l Co mm ission an d of th e bo ard of di re ct ors fo r th e Roc ke fe ller Fou ndation.

Th e ab ov e or ga ni za tion s are he av ily influ en ce d by th e Roc ke fe ller s an d jo in tly 

pr om ote an in te rn ati onal sociali sm . T heir goal, as of te n art ic u la te d th ro ug h th e
CFR, is a concentration of power th at would res ult in a world government. The 

overlap of membership is rev ealin g; C arte r himself is a member of th e T ril ateral 

Commission.

There are generally two levels of command for these groups: a “boa rd of 

directors,’’ the ruling body dominated by such intern ational financiers as the 

Rockefellers and Rothschilds, and the “officers” who direct day-to-day operations. The officers serve as a cover for the board, and it is the second level of the 

world government advocates who end up out in the open as top government 

leaders. Cyrus Vance fa lls into this second level category.

It was the same Cyrus Vance who met in utmost secrecy with a dozen or so 

second-echelon government officials in the late 1960’s. This secret “non-group” 

included such notable lef tists as Walt Rostow, Averell Harrim an and Robert 

Strange McNamara.

At this time Vance was on the negotiating team with Harrim an laying the 

groundwork for the su rrender to th e communist N orth Vietnamese. Today, Vance 

is still advocating “world detente.”

To quote the CFR on its goal: “The U.S. must strive to build a new international orde r including sta tes labeling themselves ‘socialist’ to mainta in and 

gradually increase the au tho rity of the UN.”

The October 1976 issue of Foreign Affairs, a CFR publication, says regarding 

Tr ila teralis m:

It is time therefo re to consider the creation of a new institution, pattern ed 

instead after the Hum an Rig hts Commission of the Council of Europe, working 

under a chart er sim ilar to the European Convention on Human Rights, with 

guaranteed access and subpoena power and recognized stan ding in both national 

and intern ational courts of law, and with the power to recommend sanctions 

which governments would und erta ke to enforce aga inst eith er lesser officials 

acting on the ir own, or collectively, aga inst violato r governments. Such an 

ins titu tion would be outside the framework of the United Nations, b ut its express 

purpose would be to make effective the basic principles of the Universal Declaration (another one-worhl document). It would be open to any state willing 

to inc ur the rather far-rea ching obligations of membership.

It should be pointed out th at the “far- reac hing obligations of membership” 

referred to above of course mandate dissolving national sovereignty.

One becomes a member or par ticipa nt of all of the above organizations by 

invitation only. They all advocate and put forth gre at effort to bring about a 

world government. Mr. Vance is pa rt of th at effort. The seed money for these 

groups has come from the Rockefeller crowd.

Col. C urtis B. Dali, Liberty Lobby’s cha irma n, testified during the confirmation 

hearings on Nelson Rockefeller th at “for all of his ma tur e years, Nelson Rockefeller has been a constant and dedicated promoter of a one-world socialist government at the expense of the sovereignty of these United States . . . Faced as we 

are today with a life and death struggle, we should bear in mind that no one 

group in this country since the turn of the century has caused more damage in 

divers are as and more debasement of our culture and shining heritage tha n the 

Rockefeller group.”

Mr. Vance is pa rt of th at group.

These groups all favo r tra de and aid with the enemy. Mr. Vance, as does 

Mr. Rockefeller, wan ts close ties with the Soviets. Mr. Kissinger calls it 

detente.

“The very survival of the United States is threatene d by the Soviet military 

buildup,” states Navy Secre tary J. William Middendorf II.

“The facts are that, in recent months, the USSR—secretly and openly—has 

repeatedly committed delibera te acts that mock detente and thr eaten the free 

world . . . Clearly, we must shed any linge ring illusions we may have that 

the Russians have aband oned the ir dete rmination to undermine Western democracy and imposed their system upon the world,” observes former Defense Secret ary Melvin R. Laird . Bu t Vance still lias these “lingering illusio ns” as witness his advocacy of detente.

Admiral U.S. Grand Sharp has warned his fellow A merica ns:

“The American people need to be informed of the unprecedented Soviet buildup 

of military capab ility. They need to understand that the Soviets inte nd to use 

detente to facilita te progress toward ultimate dominance of th e West.

“The American people must be jar red out of their euphoria and made to 

realiz e that our way of life is threatened. The downward trend of our defense 

posture must be reversed. We have the ability and the technology to defend
94

ou rs elve s— but we m us t also ha ve th e w ill! We m us t wak e up an d get on with 

th e jo b if we a re to s ur vi ve a s a fr ee n at io n !”

A le xa nd r So lzhe ni tsyn d ecla re d :

“I w ou ld n’t be su rp rise d a t the su dd en an d im m in en t fa ll of th e West . . .

The si tu ati on is su ch —th e So viet Uni on 's econom y is on su ch a w ar fo oting— 

th a t even if it were th e un an im ou s op inion of all th e mem be rs of th e Pol itb ur o 

no t to s ta rt a w ar , t h is wo uld no long er be in th eir p ow er .'’

Mr. Va nc e will be a co nt in ua tion of Mr . Kissing er . The two ar e clo sely lin ke d 

w ith th e Roc ke felle rs, are mem be rs of th e one-w orld org an iz at io ns , am i pu rsue 

id en tica l po lic ies re ga rd in g fo re ig n aff ai rs . The Pan am a Can al si tu ati on is a 

clas sic ex am ple.

Mr. Va nce is a pr om ot er of det en te . B ut det en te is no th in g more th an 

su rr ender on th e in st al lm en t plan . D et en te to th e co mm un ists is ju st anoth er »

wo rd. T hi s ye ar it is dete nte ; la st year it was pe ac eful co ex iste nc e; nex t ye ar 

it w ill be so m ethi ng else.

Th eo do re Roo seve lt's co mmen t on in te rn ati onali st s who pr of es s to lov e all 

na tion s as t heir o w n :

“T he American wh o love s oth er co untr ie s as he lov es hi s own is lik e th e man *

who lov es oth er women as he lov es his wife. I do no t re ga rd him as hig h- minde d ;

I re gar d his as ro tten . W e ha ve no room in th is co un try fo r 50 -50 American s.

He wh o is no t w ith us ab so lu te ly is again st us an d sh ou ld he tr eate d as an 

alie n an d se nt o ut o f t he c oun tr y.’’

Ada m Yarmol iusk y, who se p are nts had been mixed up in co m m un ist and com ­

m uni st -f ro nt ac tivi ties sin ce th e 1920’s, as we ll as his own avow ed co mmun ist 

as so ciatio ns , stro ng ly reco mmen de d Va nc e as a negati ato r in de al in g w ith th e 

N or th Vietnam es e co mmun ist s. Mr. Y ar mol insk y ob served, “H e’s an ex ce lle nt 

ne gotiat or . . . ” A nd t h a t has been o ur p ro bl em o ver th e y ear s— we h av e ne go tiat ed 

aw ay our po sitio n an d our st re ngth . Thi s was th e same Ada m Yarmolinsk y 

who te am ed w ith fo rm er D efen se S ecr et ar y Rob er t Str an ge M cN am ar a to mu zzle 

th e m il it ary from pu blicly sp ea ki ng out ag ain st th e enem y.

Lloy d She ar er , ed itor of Par ade, po in te d ou t re gar din g Van ce 's fo rm er boss ,

“T he re is li tt le do ub t th a t M cN am ar a has influ en ce d Va nce mor e th an an y 

ot her indiv id ual in g ov er nm en t.”

W ill h e fa vor a policy of d is ar m am en t as di d M cN am ar a? W ill lie fa vor tr adin g 

w ith th e en em y, giving t he m tec hn olog ical, fina nc ia l and m il it ary ai d an d co mfo rt 

as h is p re vi ou s reco rd in di ca te s? W ill Va nce c on tin ue K issi ng er 's p olicy o f m erging 

America an d her peopl e in to th e go al an d pr og ra m s of th e So viet Un ion ?

N at io na lly sy nd ic at ed co lu m ni st P au l Sc ot t has re por te d :

“B ef or e th e Sen at e For ei gn R el at io ns Co mmitt ee acts . . . on th e no m in atio n 

of C yr us Va nce as t he ne w Sec re ta ry of Sta te , th e la w m ak er s sh ou ld th or ou gh ly 

qu es tion him ab ou t his co nn ec tio ns w it h tw o in te rn ati onal gr ou ps th a t fa vor the 

es ta bl is hm en t o f a lo osely knit te d w or ld gov ernm en t.

“T he fi rs t is hi s mem be rshi p in th e re ce nt ly fo rm ed in te rn ati o n al citiz en s 

ac tion or ga ni za tion ca lle d ‘NEW D IR EC TIO N S,’ th e br ai n- ch ild of Rob er t S.

M cN am ara, Pre si dent of th e W or ld Ban k, who was Sec re ta ry of Defen se in th e 

Ken ne dy an d Jo hn so n A dm in is tr at io ns an d Va nc e’s fo rm er boss.

“T he pu blicly st at ed go al of th e or gan iz at io n is to ga lv an iz e citiz en su pp or t •

an d pre ss ure s in te rn ati onall y to fo rm ula te po pu lation co ntro l, foo d, en ergy an d 

de te nt e w it h the S ovi et Un ion (e m ph as is a dded). ”

I t h as be en re po rt ed th a t Mr. Va nce fa vo rs th e same dis ar m am en t m ea su re s 

as ad vo ca te d by Moscow. (S ALT I I ta lk s are an in st ru m ent us ed by th e So viets <

to cu rb ou r ar m am en t pro gr am w hile th ey in cr ea se th eir s. ) The differen ce is 

th a t Moscow us es th is to entr ap na iv e, ill-i nfor med an d blind Am er ic an le ad er s 

so th a t we will di sa rm ou rselve s while they , th e enem y, ev er in cr ea se th eir arm am en t and m il it ary su per io ri ty ov er us. Thi s has been re ce nt ly re port ed in the 

la te st CI A re port which st ate s th a t th e si tu at io n is ve ry ’’gri m .”

Con ce rn ing he CIA re por t, th e W as hi ng to n S ta r (J an . 2, 1977) ob served, "T he 

annual est im at e of So viet m il it ary in te ntions fin ds th a t th e K re m lin is seek ing 

to a tt a in s up er io ri ty o ve r U.S. m il it ary f or ce s . . . ”

Lib er ty Lobby ha s been so un di ng th e al ar m fo r mor e th an 20 yea rs an d now 

th e la te st CIA re port co nfirm s our fe ar s. I t is now ev id en t th a t th e la te Sen.

Jo se ph M cC ar th y was ri ght. Who kn ow s w hat pr ic e th e fu tu re gen er at io ns will 

be fo rc ed to p ay due to our yi el ding to th e co mm un ist pro pag an da an d dis re gar ding S en at or M cC ar th y's w ar ni ng s? Why add to th a t pr ic e an d mak e th e bu rd en 

even g re ate r fo r ou r fu tu re gen er at io ns to bea r by co nt in uin g to bu ild up th e 

So viet c om mun ists v ia M r. Va nc e’s policies?
95

With all of the above in mind, can Mr. Vance take the oath of office “without 

mental reservation or purpose of evasion”? If he takes this oath and is a Bilderberger, he is a li ar for one contradicts the other. Either lie renounces Trilateralism 

and the goals of the Bilderhergers and the CFR. or he should refuse to tak e the 

oath of office. It is one or the other . .. he cannot serve both mas ters!!!

Mr. Vance’s approach to the Vietnam Wa r was to he a no-win war-monger 

with a miserable record when it came to taking positive steps to end the war 

through victory. Instead of advocating victory, a solution that would have taken 

six to eight weeks (as pointed out to me by two colonels who had just retu rned. 

Admiral John McCain, Sen. Barry Goldwater and oth ers ), he elected to drag it 

out with a no-win, accommodate-the-enemy policy resu lting in the death of more 

- than 55,000 American men and more tha n 250,000 wounded and/o r maimed for

life. It will tak e eternity for Mr. Vance to wash the blood off his hands. He 

betrayed the trus t of those lighting men in their government lead ers and thus 

perfidy was very much an issue of the Vietnam War.

A

Instead of confirming a Rockefeller intern ationalist and an American-laster

as Mr. Vance is (as indicate d above), we need an American nationalist, an 

America-firster. But we will never get such a leader if the appointee is a 

partic ipant in Tr ila ter al Commission meetings, Bihlerberg Conferences and 

holds high positions in the CFR.

Yes. Mr. Vance is an agent of the world financial oligarchy with particular 

ties with Rockefeller forces who run our foreign policy for the ir priv ate 

financial end and not the best inte rests of America. Liberty Lobby would not 

supp ort him because he was a right-winger nor oppose Vance because he was a 

left-winger but we oppose him because he is a money-winger, a Rockefeller 

money-winger. We trus t that sincere libera ls will uni te with us in opposing this 

hypocrite because the only intere st he has is to serve his mas ters in Wall Street 

and to continue the process of milking the American taxpay er for the benefit 

of the super-rich internatio nalists .

It is a traves ty and a fra ud to consider this man’s qualifications without considering the tru th about whom he is meant to serve. The American public is 

rapidly becoming awa re of he reality behind the fra ud of our so-called foreign 

policy. We demand a foreig n policy that serves the intere sts of the people of the 

U.S. and not a policy that takes the money and the blood of the people to serve the 

inte rests of the para sitical super-rich inte rna tionalists wTho know no loyalty except 

to their own pocketbooks.

Liberty Lobby urges a “No” vote on Cyrus Vance.

Than k you again for this opportunity to app ear today and present our views

Senator Church. Certainly, Mr. Rittenliouse.

I have no questions.

Our next witness is Air. Richard Cohen, of the National Committee 

of the U.S. Labor Party.

* STATEMENT OF RICHARD COHEN, NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE

U.S. LABOR PARTY

« Mr. Cohen. The statement T have submitted is simply relative as a

pedigree as to the background of Mr. Vance and the statement that I 

will give now will be extremely brief and to the point.

POLIC IES MR. VANCE AFFORDS US

It has been documented by several w itnesses and I believe it is well 

documented on the public record what Mr. Vance’s affiliations are. 

He is a member of the Trilateral Commission and New’ York Times 

and many other organizations th at cross penetrate with the Trilateral 

Commission. The Trilateral policy was formulated in late 1973 and 

following tha t clearly intersects with the interests of one interest 

group, namely the New York banks and investment houses, and Mr. 

Vance's long career has demonstrated tha t in fact is his interest.
96

Now if wc place on the political map of today the interests of those 

institutions above all else two things, either one of two things, will 

occur. Eit her at maximum that if Mr. Vance’s policies are followed 

out, the Trilateral policies, it will lead to an early thermonuclear confrontation and very probably a thermonuclear war with the Soviet 

Union. At minimum, the rest of the world outside of the United States 

facing tha t prospect will aline itself around the new international 

monetary system which will evoke greatest levels of prosperity, unheralding levels of prosperity, and industrial growth and development 

in those sectors while the 17.S sector will remain in a rapidly de- *

pressed state.

And at that point the American citizenry and various industrial 

forces will be forced to recognize the situation tha t they are in and M

accommodate to the new world system.

Now I would like to point out one significant fact which 1 think 

has been covered generally in the press coverage and varied statements 

by political figures over the past periods as to the recent OPEC meeting and t hat is beyond the Saudi agreement to limit its price rise. I t 

has also announced that it will initiate an unheralded expansion in 

the production of oil in tha t country and I believe the emirates will 

follow suit.

Now is the advanced sector is in a generally depressed state, that 

is indu strial production is not increasing, one must immediately ask 

what is the Saudi motive, what is the emirate motive? Who do they 

intend to sell this oil to ?

Well, it is extremely clear over the immediately preceding period 

tha t the Saudis have been engaged with several European nations and 

companies in deals, oil for technology deals which form the infrastructure of a new world economy, the most prominent deal being the 

Libya F iat operation which involves a trilateral arrangement with the 

Soviet Union in terms of increased trade.

Now as that unfolds, one must take into account what occurred over 

the past 2 weeks and tha t is the Italian intention and action which followed to peg the price of th eir gold to the market price which gives 

them an increased amount of capital for investment and it is t ant amount to a debt moritorium.

Similarly the Soviet Union has announced for the first time last 

October that it has put the ruble, the transfer ruble out to the West 

as a potential currency, a rollback ruble system.

Now as the developments occur and industrial forces outside of the «

United States recognize the intention of the Carter government and 

of their advances, it is very clear tha t this initial motion will soon 

evolve into a. new international monetary system. At this point there 

are essentially two international monetary systems operating and competing with each other. If that does not occur, then the demands of the 

New York bank and invest ment houses to secure the present LDC, out - 

standing L1)C debt, either directly or indirectly will rapidly lead to 

changes of governments in the Third World sector and in the Western 

European sector which will be viewed by the Soviet Union as a crushing defeat or penetration of their forward, political forward defense 

structure, and at tha t point we will sit at the brink of thermonuclear 

destruction.
97

NOT END ORSING MR . VANCE URGED

These are the policies that Mr. Vance affords us. Now the committee has a decision to make. I t will rest on the committee whether Mr. 

Vance is selected as the Secretary of State. He will follow these policies. These policies will lead to either one of two things, early thermonuclear destruction or a depreciation in the United States while the 

entire globe enjoys the greatest levels of prosperity.

I urge the committee not to endorse Cyrus Vance for the position of 

Secretary of State.

[Mr. Cohen’s prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statem ent of Richard Coh en, National Committee of th e

U.S. Labor P arty

Vance is a ranking member of the UN Association Committee, the Rockefeller 

Foundation-funded counter organization to the Committee on the Present Danger. 

As retired General Ridgeway, a member of both groups, has said, “There is fundamentally no difference between the two organizations.”

While the CPD and its members, like Eugene Rostow and Carter advisor James 

Rodney Schlesinger, vocally advocate a policy of massive arms buildup in preparation for military conflict, the UN Association Committee advocates a sounding 

out of the Soviets’ position with a “Let’s negotiate” line on the Strategic Arms 

Limitation Talks and the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks—within the 

context of a massive arms buildup in preparation for a military confrontation. 

Vance’s only role in foreign policy will be to wave the carrot of peaceful negotiation in front of the Soviets' nose, while war-monger Schlesinger, prepares to 

press the thermonuclear button.

Vance is nevertheless well-practiced in the art of “Utopian” war-making 

and diplomacy, having served as President John F. Kennedy’s Secretary of the 

Army and later, under President Johnson, as the traveling troubleshooter assigned to such international hotspots as Greece during the 1967 NATO coup 

d’etat, Cyprus, South Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and South 

Korea. In fact, Vance was Wall Street’s commanding officer in charge of the 

1967 coup in Greece, which was code-named Operation Prometheus. With fellow 

Democrat Averell Harriman, Vance was the chief U.S. negotiator during the 

1968-69 Paris Peace Conference on Vietnam, which he sabotaged with inflexible 

demands.

As the special advisor to the Carter campaign staff and member of the Democratic Party National Committee’s Foreign Policy Task Force; Vance served as 

the primary conduit for the policies worked out at planning sessions of the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations, of which he is a 

member. Vance is counted among Rockefeller’s top international policy formulators. As a member of the Board of Directors of the New York Times, Vance sees to 

it tha t these policy formulations are transformed into Rockefeller's version of 

the news and the appropriate psychological warfare campaigns against the U.S. 

population.

His international activities interface closely with his positions as a member 

of the Board of Directors of the Rockefeller Foundation and as a partner in the 

Wall Street law firm of Simpson, Thatcher and Bartlett. The firm represents the 

Wall Street investment concern of Goldman Sachs which houses such criminals as 

Henry Fowler, a founding member of the Committee on the Present Danger, and 

Ray Cline of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Representing 

the genocide side of Carter’s policy of war and fascism, the firm’s other major 

client is the Lehman Brothers investment house. Lehman partn er George Ball 

is a public advocate of Third World triage policies, endorsing William Paddock’s 

program for the elimination of 30 million Mexican citizens.

Senator Church. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.

Is Mr. Abram Eisenman here? Well, i f not, tha t concludes our list 

of witnesses.

We have a letter from Mr. Joseph Leib which will be included in 

the record as part of this proceedings. [See Appendix.]

Sl -8 94 — 77----- 8
98

Senator Church. That concludes the hearings of the committee this 

afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m. the committee adjourned subject to the 

call of the Chair.]

*

*
AP PE ND IX

Mr. Vance’s Respo ns es to Addit ional Que st ions for th e Record F rom

Senator Case

Question 1. There have been indic ation s th at the Cuban government is intere sted in normalization of relation s with the U.S. Do you think th at the atmosph ere for such efforts might be improved if the Castro government relea sed Huber Matos and let him rejoin his family in the 

United States? Answer. Yes, the release of Mr. Matos would help the process of n ormalization of relations with Cuba. The Cuban Government holds a number of other political prisoners including some American citizens. The release of these political priso ners as a gesture of goodwill and as a huma nitarian act would be one indic ation that Cuba is seriously interested in sta rting a dialogue with the United State s.

Question 2. Wh at is your view on whether the Helsinki Accord gives the U.S. a standing to raise human rights m att ers w ith the Soviet Union, especially those involving reunification of families by emigration to non-signatories such as Israel 

as w’ell as to signatory n ations? Answer. The questio n of whethe r the Helsinki Accord gives the U.S. standing to raise human rights ma tte rs with the Soviet Union involving emigration to non-signatories is a complex legal issue which I have not been able to consider. Reunification of families clearly fall s und er the provisions of Basket III. I can sta te now th at the Carter Adm inistration will vigorously pursue human righ ts ma tters with the Soviet Union which come under the terms of th e Helsinki Accord. We will also discuss other human rights problems with the Soviets which are of 

concern to American citizens.

Question 3. How broadly do you inter pret Principle VII of the Helsinki Ac­ cord, “Respect for hum an rights, and fundam ental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.” Does th is principle give signa­ tory natio ns the righ t to r aise questions concerning alleged violations of rights of 

minority groups? Answer. Princip le VII—“respect for hum an rights, and fundam ental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief” can be interpre ted very broadly. Th at is how I see it. The real problem, however, is encouraging the oth er signatory nations—who may not sha re the same tradit ion al respect for these rights—to int erp ret it as we might. It would seem to me th at signing the Fin al Act—including P rinciple V II—imposes an obligation on all signatory states to expect th at other signatories, including the United States, m ight raise questions about any and all violations of human rights and fundam ental freedoms.

Question Mr. Vance, President-elect Carter addressed the Platform Com­ mittee of the Democratic Pa rty last June. On the subject of the Middle East he said, and I quote, “This country (the U.S.A.) should never atte mpt to impose a settlement on Israel, nor should we force Isr ae l to make t erritorial concessions which are detrimental to her security. We should attem pt to promote direct nego tiatio ns between Isr ael and her neighbors. Isr ae l must be allowed to live ■within defensible borders.” Do you subscribe to th is statement, and will you work to bring the Arab sta tes into a situation where they would nego tiate directly with 

Isr ael? Answer. I fully agree th at a settlement of local conflicts imposed by outside powers a gainst the will of one or both of the sides to the dispute will have little chance of succeeding. To be durable, a Middle Ea st settlement must be rega rded by all partie s as one in which they have a sufficient vested intere st to wa nt to keep the arrang ement intact. Similarly, thi s is the compelling argument for negotiations between the parties, since thro ugh the give and tak e of negotiations the parties build up a stake in and acceptance of the resulting agreem ent. There have been ne gotiations between the parties in the past few years, in p ar t through
100

the good offices of the United States and in part around the negotiating table.

I would expect such negotiations to continue according to whatever pattern 

promised the best prospects for success and was agreed to by the parties themselves. The parties to the Middle E ast dispute, in accepting United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 338, have accepted the principle of negotiations between 

them. They have, moreover, in the recent past emphasized their desire to have 

sucli negotiations take place and the United States will continue its efforts to 

help get this process started.

By the same token, we have no intention of forcing Israel to make territoria l 

concessions that are detrimental to her security. Security Council Resolution 242 

has set forth the principles upon which such negotiations should be based, and 

has been accepted as such by the parties. It is true tha t the parties have differing 

interpretations of Resolution 242, and the ultimate objective of negotiations is 

to achieve a peace settlement that reconciles those differences.

Question 5. Last year the United States sold billions of dollars worth of arms 

to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. We even began a supply relationship with Egypt a

by selling her six C-130 cargo planes. She has now indicated she wants 14 more.

And there has been talk about increasing the volume of arms to Egypt this year 

to include such offensive weaponry as F-5 fighter aircraft, Sidewinder air-toair missiles, TOW anti-tank missiles and advanced radar equipment.

In an address in April, President-elect Carter said: “I do not believe arms 

sales buy lasting friends. I am concerned with the way in which our country, as 

well as the Soviet Union. Britain and France, have poured arms into certain 

Arab countries far beyond their legitimate needs for defense—5 or 6 times more 

than Israe l receives. This headlong rush for weapons increases the chance of 

war. It postpones peace negotiations. It defers development. It erodes security.

“That is why it would not he wise at this time to supply strike weapons to 

Egypt, despite that nation’s recent signs of friendship for the United States.

With its vast population and deep poverty, Egypt needs housing and jobs and 

health care far more than offensive weapons such as tanks and planes and 

missiles.”

Mr. Vance, what is your position on supplying arms to the Arab states? Will 

the new Administration place high priority on developing and executing a 

coherent arms sale policy throughout the Middle East and, indeed, throughout 

the world?

Answer. I have stated previously we must examine arms requests from Middle 

East states in a broader context, and look at three basic questions:

Are the arms necessary to meet the legitimate security requirements of 

the requesting country ?

Will the arms requested upset the critically important military balance in 

the region ?

How will the sale affect movement toward a peace settlement?

I can assure you tha t the new Administration places the highest priority on 

developing a sound and coherent arms transfer policy throughout the world, and 

particularly to troubled areas such as the Middle East. We will also be consider- «

ing new procedures and organizational arrangements for effectively implementing such a policy.

J anuary 10, 1977.

Hon. John Sparkman, •

Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman : I would like the opportunity to testify against the 

nomination of Mr. Cyrus S. Vance as Secretary of State.
101

If your Committee is interested I would like to present documentary evidence 

tha t Mr. Vance while he was Secretary of the Army not only refused hut used 

his offices to prevent an investigation of serious charges presented to him by 

a high ranking member of the Senate regarding a fraud ulent Army discharge, 

plus the removal of important documents from the tile which Secretary of War 

Stimson stated was once in the files, and Mr. Vance’s cover up of the mysterious 

death, if not murder of a soldier involved in the case.

Thank you for your consideration.

Respectfully yours,

J os eph L ei b.

[From the Congressional Record]

* Prop osin g T ha t a Civ il ia n Con gress ion al Medal B e Awarded J os ep h Leib for

Spon soring Legisl ation T hat Saved th e Gove rnm ent Over $36,000,000,000

Mr. Speaker, there have been a number of articles in the Congressional Record 

and in the Nation's newspapers relative to the distinguished service rendered by 

Joseph Leib in behalf of the United States Government, particularly in sponsoring legislation tha t ultimately saved the taxpayers over $36,000,000,000.

Leib has labored tirelessly and without compensation for many humanitarian 

causes and as Robert St. John, noted radio commentator said, over NBC on 

December 8, 1043, "This young man has never received the recognition that he 

deserves.”

We in America have always lived under the philosophy of giving credit where 

credit is due.

In this connection I believe that our Government has not rendered full justice 

in this case, and therefore, I respectfully propose for consideration awarding 

a civilian Congressional Medal to Joseph Leib, 3908 North Fourth Street, Arlington, Va., for distinguished and meritorious service to the United States Government beyond the call of duty.

Mr. Speaker, several articles have been published in the Congressional Record 

giving an authoritative as well as a comprehensive account of the incidents 

behind this case, which I believe corroborate the reasons for the above-mentioned 

proposal.

On April 25, 1950, Representative W. Kingsland Macy, of New York covered 

the m atter in detail which appeared in the Record under the title: “This Nation 

should honor Leib for the crusade that saved the Government over $36,000,000,- 

000.”

Senator Styles Bridges, of New Hampshire, on May 10, 1943, placed in the 

Record a statement regarding the activities of Mr. Leib “which contributed to the 

war effort.”

And in the Record of January 27, 1947, Representative Raymond S. Springer 

of Indiana, discussed the history and origin of the Truman committee and its 

relation to Mr. Leib.

The indexes of the Congressional Record list many other exjilanatory articles 

far too numerous to mention here.

• Proper recognition for Mr. Leib’s unselfish and splendid public service has 

long been overdue and it is respectfully hoped that action will be taken by the 

Congress.to award one who has contributed so much to this Nation, not only in 

playing such a vital role in presenting legislation that saved the American tax-

« payers such a fabulous sum of money—but also for his untiring efforts in correcting defective production methods of planes for the Armed Forces and his work in 

airc raft accident prevention during the recent world war.

This activity alone saved many lives—for which every American should be 

duly grateful.
102

82d CONGRESS 

1st Session H. J. RES. 6 6

IN TH E HOUSE OE RE PR ES EN TA TI VE S 

J anuary 4,1951

LIr. Saylor introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services

JOINT RESOLUTION

To authorize the presentation of a civilian Medal of Honor to 

Joseph Leib.

2 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives

2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That the President is authorized to present, in the name of

4 Congress, a Medal of Honor to Joseph Leib, 3908 Nor th

5 Fourth Street, Arlington, Virginia, in recognition of his un6 selfish and patriotic work in the passage of certain legislation

7 that ultimately saved the United States Government over

8 $36,000,000,000, and for his tireless efforts that brought

9 about the revamping of the wartim e Army Air Corps Safety

10 Bureau, and for his undaunted fight that corrected defective

11 production methods of airplanes for the Armed Forces during

12 World War II .

T h is N ation Should H onor L eib for H is Crusade T ha t Saved th e Government

Over $36,000,000,000

EX TENSIO N OF REM ARKS OF H O N . W . K IN G SLA N D MA CY OF N EW YO RK IN T H E H OU SE 

OF REPRES EN TA TI VES , TU ES DAY, A PR IL 2 5 , 1 9 5 0

Mr. Macy. Mr. Speaker, it is unbelievable th at this gre at Nation has done 

nothing officially to honor a young man whose efforts brought about measures 

th at saved the American taxpay ers a n estimated $36,000,000,000.
It is a story th at every citize n should know, but, unfortuna tely, because of 

greediness and jealousy the incidents behind the na rra tio n have never been 

fully or properly publicized.

On April 12, 1945, the Washington Star carried an Associated Press dispatc h 

sta tin g th at the W ar Department ha d officially reported to Congress th at because 

of the Renegotiation Act the Government had saved over $36,000,000,000 in rebates of excessive wa r-co ntra ct profits.

Here are some intere stin g fa cts behind th is untold story :

Late in December 1940, Ray Henle, ace radio comm entator, while he was the 

Washington correspondent for the Pittsbur gh Post-Gazette, sent a telegram to 

his edito rs regarding a cer tain sensational war-frau d case.

Mr. Henle sent this telegram after he had a discussion with Joseph Leib freelance writer, in W ashington, D.C.

With the assistance of Sam O’Neal, who at th at time was the Washington 

correspondent for the St. Louis Star-Times, later publicity director of the Democratic National Committee, the m atter was brough t to the atte nti on of the De partment of Justice.

On Ja nu ary 4, 1941, they made t heir first call upon the Attorney General. Robert Jackson, now a member of the Supreme Cou rt; Wendell Berge, then Assistan t Attorney Ge ne ral; and other Department officials.

This was followed up with other calls to the Dep artm ent on January 9, 14, 

15, 16, and 23, 1941. Nevertheless, the Jus tice Departme nt refused to take any 

action on the case at th at time.

When these nego tiatio ns proved fruitle ss Lieb sent the following lette r to 

every Member of the United States Senate in the hope of bringing the case 

out into the open. The message re ad:

“J anuary 6. 1941. “My Dear Member of Congress : Several days ago I conferred with De partment of Justice officials relative to profiteerin g and fra uds in defense and war 

contrac ts. The Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Star-Times assisted 

me in presenting amazing evidence in connection with this matter .

“It is becoming increasin gly evident th at the Congress should set up an 

investigating committee to watch over possible fra uds against the Government, 

and I trus t th at you will give this suggestion your careful consideration and 

attention .

“Should you care for furth er information, please advise. With many than ks. 

“Very truly yours,

“J oseph Lieb.”

Then Lieb followed this lette r up with personal calls upon a number of 

Senators, including Ha rry S. Trum an, now President of the United State s.

Dive weeks lat er—and this is imp ortant—on Febru ary 13, 1941, Senator 

Tru man introduce d his resolution calling for the creation of a defense investigating committee. This measure was approved by the Senate on April 1, 1941. 

Mr. Truman immediately became chairma n of the comm ittee that was soon to 

skyrocke t him into nation al fame —into the Vice Presidency and then into the 

White House itself.

With fea r that the statute of limitations would run out on wa r frau ds, 

Lieb got a bill introduced, H.R. 4916, Seventy-seventh Congress, first session, 

which called for the suspension during time of wa r or nation al emergency the 

running of any Statu te of Lim itations on prosecutions for Fed eral offenses. 

This bill was introduced on May 29, 1941.

He pleaded with seve ral Members of the House Jud iciary Committee, and 

finally on November 26, 1941 the long delay ed hea ring was held. The only 

witnesses were Congresswoman Jeanette Rankin, who introduced the bill, Mr. 

Lieb. and Mr. Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant Attorney General. The 

Justice Department opposed this piece of legislation complaining that it W’as 

to broad, but on Janu ary 28, 1942, after much agitation they subm itted to 

Congress, H.R. 6484, applicable only to cer tain offenses. It became law on 

August 24, 1942, w ith the able assistance of Walker Stone, chief editorial wr ite r 

for the Scripps-Howard newspapers.

Anticipating the passage of the bill the Departme nt of Justice created a warfra ud unit and Fed eral grand jur ies began holding hearings.

Mr. Lieb contin ued his campaign demanding review of wa r contracts. The 

exposure of a number of cases caused the Congress to ins ert a clause in the 

supplemental nation al defense appropriation bill of April 4, 1942 permittin g 

the renegotiation of war contracts.
104

Thus, came the savings of billions of dollars on taxpayers money.

Some of this story has already been told in previous pages of the Congressional 

Record, and Mr. Speaker, I would like at this time to repeat parts of this story 

by other Members of the Congress as follows:

J O S E P n LI EB

(Extension of remarks of Hon. Styles Bridges, of New Hampshire, in the Senate 

of the United States, Monday, May 10 (legislative day of Monday, May 3),

1943)

Mr. Bridges. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the

Appendix of the Record, a statement regarding the activities of Joseph Lieb 

which have contributed to the war effort.

Among Joseph Lieb’s contributions to the war are work on four important 

and significant pieces of legislation, now enacted into law.

1. Ilis work in connection with legislation dealing with war profiteering and 

fraud. On Ja nuary 4, 1941, accompanied by a St. Louis newspaperman, he called x.

upon Attorney General Robert Jackson, Wendell Berge. Assistant Attorney 

General and other Justice Department officials relative to the prosecution of 

a certain highly connected war profiteer. Other calls to the Department were 

made on Janu ary 9, 14, 15, 16, and 23. The story and background of this case has 

never been told and must remain anonymous until afte r the war. But it was 

this episode that inspired Lieb to carry on a zealous campaign against war 

profiteering and fraud. Because of this case he urged the necessity for the 

suspension of the statutes of limitations covering such matters.

Over a period of time Lieb demanded the appointment of a congressional 

defense investigation committee.

On February 13, 1941, Senator Truman introduced a resolution to set up a 

defense investigating committee. This measure was approved on April 1.

On March 31, 1941, Representatives May and Vinson introduced their joint 

resolutions setting up a committee to investigate war profiteers. This resolution 

has a direct bearing to the previous mentioned Justice Department interviews.

This is all th at can be said at this time.

It was the sensational disclosures brought out by the House investigating 

committees that brought on the demand for the renegotiation of war contracts.

But renegotiation action did not come until April 4,1942, when a clause permitting 

such action was inserted in the supplemental national defense appropriation 

bill of that year.

Unfortunately, none of these committees possessed punitive power other 

than to expose and publicly reprimand. They held no other authority. Prior 

to the introduction of these committee resolutions Lieb pleaded for the suspension of the fraud statutes. In correspondence with many public officials 

he pointed out the fac t tha t these statu tes must be suspended to protect the Government's interest in the prosecution of war frauds. When the Truman and House 

investigating committees were set up he reminded Members of Congress tha t 

these committees were in many instances operating to the disadvantage of the «

Government insofar as the time elements of the statutes were concerned.

Several months later, on May 26. 1941, a bill was introduced to suspend the 

statutes. Because of this the Justice Department on February 5. 1942. created a 

a special frauds unit, and Federal grand juries began hearings on July 15. 1942.

Approximately $36,000,000,000 have been saved because of this action. (Part of *

this story was related in the Congressional Record on November 12, 1942.)

ORI GI N OF T H E TR U M AN COM M IT TEE

(Extension of remarks of Hon. Raymond S. Springer, of Indiana, in the House 

of Representatives, Monday, Janu ary 27, 1947)

Mr. Springer. Mr. Speaker, la st week the upper Chamber of Congress debated 

at great length the question of whether or not the famous Senate War Investigating Committee should be continued. After the debate came to a close 

the Senate deemed it advisable to grant this committee an additional year in 

order to complete its investigation of the war period.

This committee has been in the public eye for several years, yet very few 

people know of the incidents tha t occurred behind the scene to inspire its 

creation.
It was this committee originally headed by Harry S. Truman that sent him 

skyrocketing into the Vice Presidency of the United States and then into the 

White House itself. In this connection, i t would seem apropos to state for the first time the genesis 

of this committee. The story dates back to late in December 1940, when sensational information concerning a highly placed defense-contract profiteer came to the attention 

of Joseph Lieb, free-lance writer of Washington, D.C. Lieb took this matte r up with Sam O’Neal, who was a t that time Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Star-Times—now publicity director of the Demo­ cratic National Committee—and they decided to bring the information to the attention of the Department of Justice. On January 4, 1941, they made tlieir first call upon the then Attorney General Robert Jackson, Wendell Berge, Assist­ ant Attorney General, and other officials. They made other calls on Janu ary 9, 14, 15, 16, aiid 23, 1941. However, the Justice Department refused to take action 

on this case. Nevertheless, Lieb sent the following letter to every Member of the Senate 

in the hope of bringing the case out into the open. The message r ea d: “January 6, 1941.

“My Dear Member of Congress : Several days ago I confered with Department 

of Justice officials relative to profiteering and frauds in defense and war conin presenting amazing evidence in connection with this matter. tracts. The Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Star-Times assisted me “It is becoming increasingly evident tha t the Congress should set up an inves­ tigating committee to watch over possible frauds against the Government and I trust that you will give this suggestion your careful consideration and attention. “Should you care for further information, please advise. With many thanks. 

“Very truly yours, “Joseph Lieb.”

This letter was followed up with personal calls upon a number of Senators, 

including Mr. Truman. Then, on February 13. 1941. Senator Truman introduced his resolution calling for the creation of a defense investigating committee, and the measure was offi­ cially approved on April 1, 1941. Senator Truman immediately became chairman of the committee. Fearing tha t the statute of limitations would run on the above-mentioned case, Lieb got a bill introduced, 11.R. 4916, Seventy-seventh Congress, first session, which demanded the suspending during time of war or national emer­ gency the running of any statute of limitations on prosecutions for Federal 

offenses. This measure was introduced on May 29, 1941. Finally on November 26. 1941. a long-delayed hearing was held by the House Judiciary Subcommittee and the only witnesses were Congresswoman Jeanette Rankin, who introduced the bill, Mr. Lieb, and Mr. Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant Attorney General. The Justice Department opposed this piece of leg­ islation because it was too broad, but on Janu ary 28, 1942, afte r much agitation they sent to the Congress II.R. 6484. a bill to suspend during the present war the running of statutes of limitations applicable to certain offenses. This became law on August 24, 1942, and it was during this period tha t the Justice Department 

set up a war-fraud unit. From the exposure of a number of war contracts came 

the demand for the Renegotiation Act and the subsequent saving of untold 

billions of dollars.

[From th e Ra mpa rt, April 1973]

What Can You Say After 30 Years?

(By Sgt. Skip Olson)

Tie walks with a slight stoop now. The great shock of white hair bobs gently with each short, deliberate step, quite unlike the gait of 30 years before when, as a 

young man with purpose, he stalked the halls of congress. For Joseph Lieb. now 63 and living in Arlington, Va., those many trips to Capitol Hill proved most fruitful. Through his efforts, the U.S. Government realized a savings of more than $36 billion in rebates of excessive war-control profits during the early 1940's. He also convinced then Senator Harry S. Truman to introduce his resolution calling for the creation of the now-famous Senate War
106

Inv estigating Committee th at sky-rocketed the Missouri Senator into national 

prominence and ultimately, the White House.

Now, after more than 30 years, Joseph Lieb has received official recognition. 

On the evening of April 23, Brig. Gen. James M. Fogle, commander of the 20th 

NORAD Region Air Division, presented Mr. Lieb an engraved relief reproduction 

of the Aerospace Defense Command emblem, in recognition of his efforts.

“It’s like a dream come true for me,” Lieb said. “I’ve waited a long time.”

Indeed he had. Late in 1940, while working in Washington as a free-lance 

writer, Mr. Lieb contacted several Washington correspondents a bout information 

he had uncovered concerning defense contract profiteering. Together they brought 

these fac ts to the attention of the Justice Department, which, after numerous 

visits, refused to take any action.

Undaunted, Leib then sent his information to every member of the Senate, 

followed by personal calls upon a number of them.

One of those visited was a relatively unknown senator from the sta te of Missouri, Ha rry S. Truman. On Feb. 13, 1941, Senator Truman introduced a resolution calling for the creation of a defense investiga ting committee. The measure 

was approved on April 1, 1941, and Mr. Truman immediately became chairman of 

the committee. Soon afte r, on March 31, 1941, two represen tatives introduced a 

join t resolution settin g up a House committee to investigate war profiteers.

Fearing that the statute of limitations would prevent the prosecution of war 

frauds, Lieb managed to get a bill intro duce d in the House calling for the suspension during time of w ar or national emergency, the runn ing of any sta tut e of 

limitations on prosecutions for Fede ral offenses.

Opposed by the Justice Departm ent as being too broad, the bill was, in committee, made applicable only to ce rtain offenses and was subm itted to congress on 

Jan . 28,1942. I t became law on Aug. 24.1942.

Anticipa ting passage of the bill, Justic e Departmen t imm ediately created a warfra ud un it an d Federal grand juries began holding hearings.

Mr. Lieb’s efforts led to the exposure of numerous fraud cases, prompting Congress to ins ert a clause in the supplement national defense appropriation bill of 

1942 perm itting the renegotiation of war contracts. This led to the savings of billions of taxpay ers dollars.

He is also credited with bringing about the revamping of the wartime Army 

Air Corps Safety Bureau and correcting defective production methods of World 

Wa r I I aircra ft.

And how does Lieb feel about finally receiving official recognition? “I feel that 

I have contributed,” he said, “I didn’t do it for reward, I was satisfied with the 

knowledge that I had saved lives and money.”

Numerous resolutions to recognize Leib have been introduced in Congress, and 

the Congressional Record is well endowed with accounts of his crusade. “The 

recognition I receive through the Congressional Record was quite enough,” he 

said, “and during the investigations th ere were the headlines.”

When asked why it took so long for and official recognition to be c onferred upon 

him, he state d with a wry smile, “Well, there was a lot of jealo usy.”

Mr. Lieb contends that, in his memoirs, Presiden t Truman recalls his airlin es 

inve stigation as his g reatest accomplishment.

“Harr y Truman was ready to give up his seat during the investigations, but I 

talk ed him into runn ing for re-election.” Lieb said, pulling from his briefcase 

a tatt ere d, yellow newspaper t ha t confirms this claim.

To para phras e Shakespeare, “All the world’s a stage, and each man, in his lifetime plays but a small p art.” Joseph Lieb’s par t has been ju st a b it larger.

[From the Congressional Record, May 10,1 943]

J oseph Leib

extension of remarks of hon. styles bridges of new Ham pshir e, in th e senate

of th e united states

Mr. Bridges. Mr. Presiden t, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the 

Appendix of the Record a statem ent rega rding the activities of Joseph Leib 

which ha ve contributed to the war effort.

Among Joseph’s Leib’s c ontributions to the wa r are work on four important 

and significant pieces of legislation, now enacted into law.

1. His work in connection with legislation dealing with wa r profiteering and 

frau d. On J anuar y 4, 1941, accompanied by a St. Louis newspaperman, he called
107

upon Attorney General Robert Jackson, Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney 

General and other Justice Department officials relative to the prosecution of a 

certain highly connected war profiteer. Other calls to the Department were made 

on January 9, 14,15,16, and 23. The story and background of this case has never 

been told and must remain anonymous until aft er the war. But it was this 

episode t hat inspired Leib to carry on a zealous campaign against war profiteering and fraud. Because of this case he urged the necessity for the suspension of 

the statutes of limitations covering such matters.

Over a period of time Leib demanded the appointment of a congressional 

defense investigation committee.

On February 13, 1941, Senator Truman introduced a resolution to set up a 

s

defense investigating committee. This measure was approved on April 1.

On March 31, 1941, Representatives May and Vinson introduced their joint 

resolutions setting up a committee to investigate war profiteers. This resolution 

has a direct bearing to the previous mentioned Justic e Department interviews. 

This is all that can be said at this time.

• It was the sensational disclosures brought out by the House investigating 

committees tha t brought on the demand for the renegotiation of war contracts. 

But renegotiation action did not come until April 4, 1942, when a clause permitting such action was inserted in the supplemental national defense appropriation bill of tha t year.

Unfortunately, none of these committees possessed punitive power other than 

to expose and publicly reprimand. They held no other authority. Prior to the 

introduction of these committee resolutions Leib pleaded for the suspension 

of the fraud statutes. In correspondence with many public officials he pointed out 

the fact tha t these statutes must be suspended to protect the Government’s 

interest in the prosecution of w ar frauds. When the Truman and House investigating committees were set up he reminded Members of Congress that these 

committees were in many instances operating to the disadvantage of the 

Government insofar as the time elements of the statutes were concerned.

Several months later, on May 26, 1941, a bill was introduced to suspend the 

statutes. Because of this the Justice Department on February 5, 1942, created a 

Special Frauds Unit and Federal grand juries began hearings on July 15, 1942.

Approximately $36,000,000,000 have been saved because of this action. (P art 

of this story was related in the Congressional Record on November 12, 1942.)

2. Suspension of the statute of limitation on ant itrust laws. This bill was 

intended to protect the little businessman from being destroyed through a combination on the pa rt of selfish industrial tycoons who might attem pt to take 

advantage of the w ar situation and resort to monopolistic tactics in restrai nt of 

trade. Power to prosecute such conspiracies are now possible.

3. Higher pay for servicemen. In July 1941 Leib conducted a survey among 

military attaches residing in leading Washington embassies concerning the respective pay of their soldiers. The result of this poll showed that the servicemen 

in the forces of the United S tates were receiving less than the soldiers of Canada 

and Australia. On August 12, 1941, Representative Ploeser passed this corre-

• spondence around on the floor of the House of Representatives and it was read 

during the intensive debate on the extension of the 1-year draft law. On August 13. 

1941, full contents of the survey was inserted in the Congressional Record, but 

unfortunately the House took no action on the pay of the soldiers at that time.

w Leib took the matter up with a number of Senators. Finally a bill was introduced

by Senator Edwin Johnson, first on September 3, then on October 27, 1941, and 

soon after the increase in pay was granted making American soldiers th e highest 

paid in the world.

4. Investigation of service air crashes. On February 3, 1942, Leib appeared 

before the Senate Military Affairs Committee requesting an investigation of 

Army plane crashes. Five weeks l ate r the Army Air Corps (April 23, 1942) announced tha t it was creating a Flying Safety Bureau. Leib, still not satisfied, 

again appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee demanding a thorough investigation. As a result General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, and other 

War Department officials were called upon to testify. Then Leib took the matter 

up with members of the Truman committee. They started to investigate. Leib 

furnished starting information relative to the alarming number of accidents. 

Today in the hands of the Truman committee rests the most sensational scandal 

of this war, greater and more ominous than the Carnegie steel fraud, more 

treacherous than the Anaconda wire indictment. Thousands of lives may be saved 

because of Leib’s investigation, and untold millions of dollars may be saved in 

equipment.
108

[F ro m th e Con gr es sion al R ecord, Ja n. 27, 1947]

Origin of the Truman Committee

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF IION. RAYMOND S. SPRINGER OF INDIA NA,

IN T H E HOUSE OF RE PR ES EN TA TI VES

Mr. Springer. Mr. Speaker, last week tlie upper Chamber of Congress debated at great length the question of whether or not the famous Senate War 

Investigating Committee should be continued. After the debate came to a close, 

the Senate deemed it advisable to grant this committee an additional year in 

order to complete its investigation of the war period.

This committee has been in the public eye for several years, yet very few people 

know of the incidents tha t occurred behind the scene to inspire its creation.

It was this committee originally headed by Harry S. Truman tha t sent him 

skyrocketed into the Vice Presidency of the United States and then into the 

White House itself.

In this connection, it would seem apropos to state for the first time the genesis 

of this committee.

The story dates back to late in December 1940, when sensational information 

concerning a highly placed defense-contract profiteer, came to the attention of 

Joseph Lieb, free-lance writer of Washington, D.C.

Lieb took this mattter up with Sam O’Neal, who was a t tha t time Washington 

correspondent of the St. Louis Star-Times—now publicity director of the Democratic National Committee—and they decided to bring the information to the 

attention of the Department of Justice. On Janu ary 4, 1941, they made their 

first call upon the then Attorney General Robert Jackson, Wendell Ilerge. Assista nt Attorney General, and other officials. They made other calls on January 9, 

14,15, 1G, and 23, 1941. However, the Justic e Department refused to take action 

on this case.

Nevertliless, Lieb sent the following letter to every Member of the Senate in 

the hope of bringing the case out into the open. The message re ad :

J anuary G, 1941.

My Dear Member of Congress : Several days ago I confered with the Department of Justic e officials relative to profiteering and frauds in defense and war 

contracts. The Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Star-Times assisted me 

in presenting amazing evidence in connection with this matter.

“It is becoming increasingly evident th at the Congress should set up an investigating committee to watch over possible frauds against the Government and I 

trust that you will give this suggestion your careful consideration and attention.

“Should you care for further information, please advise. With many thanks. 

“Very truly yours,

“Joseph Lieb,”

This letter was followed up with personal calls upon a number of Senators, 

including Mr. Truman.

Then, on February 13, 1941, Senator Truman introduced his resolution calling 

for the creation of a defense investigating committee, and the measure was 

officially approved on April 1, 1941. Senator Truman immediately became chairinn n of the committee.

Pa rt of this story was told in the Congressional Record by Senator Styles 

Bridges on May 10,1943, page A2336.

Fearing that the statute of limitations would run on the above-mentioned case, 

Lieb got a bill introduced. H.R. 491G, Seventy-seventh Congress, first session, 

which demanded the suspending during time of war or national emergency the 

running of any statute of limitations on prosecutions for Federal offenses. This 

measure was introduced on May 29.1941.

Finally on November 26, 1941, a long-delayed hearing was held by the House 

Judiciary Subcommittee and the only witnesses were Congresswoman Jeannette 

Rankin, who introduced the bill. Mr. Lieb, and Mr. Alexander Holtzoff. Special 

Assistant Attorney General. The Justice Department opposed this piece of legislation because it was too broad, but on Janua ry 2S. 1942. afte r much agitation they 

sent to the Congress H.R. 64S4. a bill to suspend during the present war the running of statutes of limitations applicable to certain offenses. This became law on 

August 24,1942. and it was during this period th at the Justice Department set up 

a war-fraud unit. From the exposure of a number of war contracts came the 

demand for the Renegotiation Act and the subsequent saving of untold billions 

of dollars.
Unfortunately, all the details surrounding this matter cannot be made public 

at this time. Who the defense contract profiteer was, why the Justice Department 

refused to take action and other incidents tha t took place will be revealed at a 

later date. When it does break, one thing is sure, it certainly will make interesting 

reading.

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 26, 1976]

Car te r C ho ose s t h e P a in f u l P ast

(By William Greider*)

A round town, people are making bad jokes about Jimmy C arter's new Cabinet, 

for his selections have a grotesque symmetry with the past—that patch of bloody 

history called Vietnam, the nightmare everyone wanted to forget.

Carter, said one wit, has chosen the “junior varsity” from the New Frontier, 

only now they get startin g positions.

His campaign slogan aske d: “Why not the best?” But his Cabinet selections 

reply : “Why not the best and the brightest?”

Carter has brought back the "whiz kids” from McNamara's Pentagon to run the 

government. What shall we call them? The “whiz men?”

The last laugh, of course, is on those who thought Carter might have the nerve 

or the political vision to break cleanly from the past. Instead, he has revived it.

In some circles, dredging up these ugly memories on the threshold of a new 

administration may be regarded as bad taste, like the drunken wedding guest 

who tells dirty stories at the rehearsal dinner. What’s past is past. Do not disturb the dead.

The relevance is this: at least six of Carter’s top appointments were there 

when the big lies were told in the Sixties. None of them spoke up, at least not so 

they could be heard by the public. Will anyone believe them now that they are 

back in government, running Carter’s foreign policy and defense strategy? It 

is a dangerous legacy this new President has embraced.

Moreover, Carter has chosen his team with few exceptions, from a very small 

universe of Americans. Most of them know each other well, because they have 

often met in corporate boardrooms, doing business, serving government. The 

public squabbling over adequate representation for women and blacks has obscured this reality—corporate America is the best represented of all. If this 

is Carter's idea of populism, what on earth would elitism be like?

DRAFTSM EN , NO T ARCHIT ECTS

Let's stipulate that these are all good people. Capable, experienced, energetic, 

pragmatic, also deeply moral, all the adjectives which are attached to these 

names when they are profiled in newspapers, all accurate, no doubt. It is also 

important to note tha t all of these people changed their minds about Vietnam, 

sooner or later, acknowledged mistakes, sought to learn the lessons.

It would be extra ordinary if they had not. Most everyone in America lias 

changed his or her thinking about that tragic chapter—a principal source of 

the public distrust which now overlays politics and government.

These men whom Carter is returning to government were not truly architects 

of the Kennedy-Johnson Vietnam policy, more like senior draftsmen and cheerleaders, but neither did they protest until it was too late.

In the spring of 1965, with 40,000 troops in Vietnam and the bombing called 

“Rolling Thunder” already under way, the nation’s campuses began to stir 

in protest. Like many other academics, Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University began appearing at the first “teach-ins” sponsored by war critics. But 

Brzezinski went to defend the war and its purposes.

Brzezinski, like so many proponents of the war, was cautious and discrete in 

discussing the appropriate strategies and promises of success. But he left no 

doubt about why U.S. involvement was necessary. His thoughts were recorded 

during a TV appearance in May, 1965, opposite Prof. Hans Morgentliau, one 

of the early critics.

“We live in a world.” Brzezinski explained, “in which there will be many 

local conflicts, in which all the major powers will exercise self-restraint, because

♦Greider is a reporter with The Wash ington P ost ’s na tional news staff.
110

they have to exercise self-restraint in the nuclear age . . . It will be a sign of the maturity of the American people and of the growing wisdom of the American people if we adjust ourselves to the notion that in our age there is a twilight zone between war and peace and that this twilight zone of limited wars is 

going to he very much a feature of our lifetime.” The “twilight zone of limited wars” was a favorite theme of strategic thinkers in the Sixties, Cold War bravado which Brzezinski disparages in his current writings. He served in the State Department under President Johnson and was known as a “hawk,” though his specialty was Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Later, he became known as an advocate of negotiated settlement and a mild critic of Nixon’s war policy. But his deepest scorn was reserved for the “self-flagellating intellectuals” who were so noisily against the war. Now Brzezinski is scheduled to be the next President’s national security adviser in »

the White House, Henry Kissinger’s old job. Cyrus R. Vance, Carter’s choice for Secretary of State, shared tha t Cold War mindset when he was Deputy Secretary of Defense in the middle Sixties under Robert McNamara. Vance was one of those administration spokesmen who <

came forward in August, 1964, to claim that the Gulf of Tonkin incident was an unprovoked attack by the enemy, requiring retaliatory bombing raids. “The United States is prepared to take any action which will be required by the circumstances,” Vance declared, “but we hope tha t the firmness of the action which we have taken will indicate to the Communists tha t it would be 

unwise for them to take any further aggressive acts.” The official version of Tonkin was later discredited, of course, but the Tonkin Resolution rushed through Congress became the Johnson administration’s legal prop for escalating the war. Vance’s words in 1964 reflect w hat became the basic U.S. strategy—hit the enemy a sharp lick and see whether he is ready to talk peace. Hanoi and the Vietcong did not cooperate with this approach, so the blows got heavier and heavier until there were 500,000 American troops in the 

fight and massive bombing of Laos and Vietnam. To what end? Cyrus Vance, like so many other loyal spokesmen in that era, answered this question in the starkest terms—the very survival of the United States depended upon prevailing in Indochina. In a speech to defense contractors in October, 1965, Vance said tha t Vietnam was a test care for American resolu­ tion and he cited a recent speech by Lin Piao, Communist China’s minister of 

defense, as evidence: “Just as communism in China, says Lin Piao, succeeded by capturing and then encircling and defeating the cities, so the global communist movement will ultimately succeed first by capturing Asia, Africa and Latin America, thereby encircling North America and Western Europe and then decisively defeating 

the United States and its Western allies . . . “And where is all this to begin, he asks. It has already begun, he replies. And the place in which it has begun is Vietnam. Vietnam, says Lin Piao, is now the 

focus of the revolutionary movement against the United States.” In time, tha t long-range threat came to seem less compelling than the im­ mediate damage which the war was doing, at home and abroad. Vance was one of the designated “wise men” who privately advised President Johnson after the Tet offensive of 1968 tha t further escalation would not work. Harold Brown, the next Secretary of Defense, was in charge of the bombing. As Secretary of the Air Force, another “whiz kid” from the McNamara stable. Brown was one of those technocrats who reduced the war to bloodless statistics ♦

and progress charts which showed tha t things were going better and better. “Air power,” he declared in May of 1966, “has enabled us to consistently defeat enemy units with considerably less than half the men required by the often-quoted 10-to-l ratio thought necessary by some to deal with guerrilla 

forces and relatively small regula r units in jungle warfare.” One week, Secretary Brown reported tha t 7,000 trucks, 3.000 railway cars, 5,000 bridges, 5.000 barges and boats had been destroyed by bombs so f ar that 

year. In September alone, roads were cut a t 600 points. “This,” he said, “is a serious degradation of the North Vietnamese logistical 

net.”

TH E LANGUAG E OF “ MAN AGERS”

In a way, it is the language these men used which is the most chilling memory. They did not make blood-curdling declarations and wave the bloody shirt. They spoke in cold, complicated sentences, studded with encouraging statistics. The way in which they talked about the w ar allowed them to remain a long distance 

from the actual suffering.
I ll

“As a ma tter of fact, I saw the figures yesterd ay,” Vance was saving in April, 

1966. “In the month of March, the re were 2,336 defectors, both North Vietnamese 

and Vietcong. This is the highest month recorded since the records have been 

kept and, indeed, even last week the number of defectors was 646, the second 

highest week on record . . . One other fac tor which is interesting, insofa r as 

defections are concerned, is the fac t th at recently about 25 per cent of the 

defectors have been officers.”

And here is Vance on TV extolling the M-16 rifle :

“It fires a 22-caliber high-velocity bullet. The velocity of th at bullet is about 

a thousand feet per second more than th at [Soviet-made] AK-56 which is lying 

the re on the floor. Therefore, the leth ality of each of the two is about the same. 

That weapon has an effective range out to abo ut 400 yards. The M-16 has an

* effective range out to about the same range. The M-16, however, is much more 

acc urate from 100 yards out to a bou t 400 ya rds tha n is th at weapon. In addition, 

the M-16 is a much ligh ter weapon. Th at weapon weighs about 9 pounds. The 

M-16 weighs about 6 pounds. And even more important tha n that is the am-

* munition. You can carry thr ee times the amount of amm unition with the M-16 

tha n you can w ith a weapon lik e th at . . .”

These people were very good on details, the mechanics of warfare. As Pre sidentelect Carter said, th ey a re known a s “good managers.”

TO FOK ESIGHT KO HON OS

Carter will have others in his Cabinet who shared, in one way or another, the 

experience of those Cold War miscalculations.

Theodore C. Sorensen, Joh n F. Kennedy’s aide, is credited with ghost-writing 

much of the sti rri ng rhetoric which set the tone for the conflicts of that decade, 

the public wars and the secre t o ne s: “. .. we s hall pay any price, bea r any burden, 

meet any hardship, supp ort any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and 

the success of liberty.”

Those words have p eculiar reverberations today, now th at we know about the 

CIA's assassination plots a nd oth er secret actions to sup port friends and oppose 

foes. Now Sorensen will become directo r of th e agency, responsible for continuing 

its reform.

Joseph A. Califano Jr., the new Secretary of Health, Edu cation and Welfare, 

went from McNamara’s Pentago n s taff to the White House and was rega rded as a 

“whiz kid” in both places. His prin cipa l work as an LB J assis tan t was orchestra tin g domestic programs and legislation. If he had any misgivings about Vietnam, he kep t them private un til af ter he left office.

In 1965, when pro tests were hea ting up across America, Califano accepted for 

the President an 8-foot petition with 2,500 signa tures from studen ts and faculty 

at American University . “Of course, we recognize the rig ht to dissent,” Califano 

said. “Th at’s w hat our boys in Vietnam are fighting for. But this shows th at the 

overwhelming ma jority of American college studen ts and the American public 

sta nd fully behind th e President in his policy in V ietnam.”

Even in ea rly 1968, C alifano w as still insisting t ha t the bloated war budget was

* not stopping the domestic programs launched under the Gre at Society. Vietnam, 

he repeated, is “one of the gre ate st tests of will the American people have ever 

faced .”

Charles Schultze, an economist who will be chairman of Ca rte r’s Council of 

Economic Advisers, was LB J’s budget director when the Vietnam wa r costs 

esca lated off the ch arts. For mon ths in 1966, influential members of Congress kept 

insisting th at the John son administration was understating the tru e cost of the 

U.S. involvement by $10 to $12 billion. The adm inistration kept denying it.

The congressional skeptics, it turned out, were right. The Johnson adminis tration had to ask for a tax increas e to pay for the war. Schultze, however, may 

have been a victim, not a culprit. As thi s history has been recon structed, it 

appears th at Schultze and oth er economic advisers were misled by the Pentagon 

and th e White House, the same way Congress and th e general public were misled.

People do grow wiser, they change their minds about imp ortant questions. If 

the Senate does i ts job, these men will be questioned closely a t the ir confirmation 

hearing s on how their views h ave evolved in t he last decade.

In the meantime, we know th at none of the Democratic politicians who had the 

vision or the courage to see thro ugh the Cold W ar rhetoric, to oppose U.S. entry 

into the civil conflict of Vietnam, has been chosen by Carter for top places in the 

new adm inistration. For esight is rarely honored in politics, especially by other 

politicians who lacked it.
112

The men who will he in charge again were, for the most part, schooled in a generation of lead ers who looked backward , obsessed with the experience of World Wa r II and counting on history to repeat itself. They looked a t Saigon in 3904 and though t it was Munich in 1938. Perhaps the ir vision is clearer now. 

If it isn't, this country is in deep trouble.

ROOTS IN CORPORATE AMER ICA

Where did Carter find these people? Wh at do they represen t in American society? The general answ er is that, his campaign rhetoric notw ithstanding. Carter has restored orthodox liberalism to power. More specifically, he has in­ sured th at the business of America remains business, especially the business of multinatio nal corporations. Liberals and conservatives have always agreed on 

that. From all of the talented and experienced people in America, Carter has chosen three directors of IBM (Vance, Brown and Patric ia Harris, the HUD secretary- designate) to serve in his Cabinet. He would have also chosen an IBM vice president, but she declined the job. Ili s Cabinet includes a dire ctor of Pan American Airways (Vance), a director of the E quitable Life Assurance Society (Michael W. Blumenthal, the Trea sury secr etary-d esig nate), a d irec tor of W estern Elec tric and R. J. Reynolds (Ju anita Kreps, the Commerce s ecretary-d esig nate), a director of Chase Manha ttan Bank 

(H ar ris). His cabinet includes six lawyers (Vance, Califano, Ha rris, Sorensen, Brock Adams, the Tra nsp ortatio n secretary -designate, and Griffin Bell. Attorney Gen­ eral-designate) whose law firms represent an impressive array of major enter­ prise. To name a few: American Electric Power Co.. Occidental Petroleum, Northwestern Industries, Colonial Penn Insurance, Gulf & Western, Warner 

Communications, Revlon. This is not unique or even unusual in Democratic adm inistrations. The Dem­ ocratic Pa rty traditiona lly harang ues big business during campaigns, but then tur ns to W all Street and corporate boardrooms in sea rch of ad ministrative talent. Carter may have taken this practice a bit furth er tha n his predecessors. Two of his lawyers, for instance, are from law firms which have represented General Motors (Bell and Sorensen) and two are from firms which represent 

Coca-Cola (Bell a nd Califano). The Coca-Cola connection demonstrates what a small world Carter has selected from. Ca rte r’s good friend in Atlanta is J. Pau l Austin, chairman of the board of Coke. Coke is represented in Atlanta by Griffin Bell’s law firm. Austin serves on the board of Cal Tech. The presiden t of Cal Tech is the new Secreta ry of Defense. The new deputy secretary of defense is the former president of Coke. Coke's 

lawyer in Washington is the new Secretary of HEW. If t ha t leaves you a bit dizzy, drink a Dr. Pepper and consider the Carter ad­ minis tration’s connections with important institu tions of the news media. The Secretary of State-designate is a dire ctor of The New York Times. The Secretary of HEW -designate is a lawyer for The Washington Post. The Secretary of Defense-designate is a di rector of The Los Angeles Times. The most interesting linkage among these people is neither soft drin ks nor newspaper. It is Rockefeller philanthropy. The connection is so compelling in the foreign-policy sphere th at a cynic migh t suggest t ha t this transition is not so much 

from For d to Carter, b ut from Nelson to David. Henry Kissinger, the principal a rch ite ct of foreign policy under eight years of Republican presidents, had a special patron in Nelson Rockefeller. But Brzezin­ ski’s is David Rockefeller, Nelson’s younger brother, the board chairman of Chase Ma nhattan Bank. Together. Brzezinski and Rockefeller organized an organiza­ tion called the Tr ila ter al Commission, including public officials, academics and business leaders, to chart a new i»ost-Cold War foreign policy. The President-elect is a member. So is the Vice President-elect. So ar e four of Ca rter's top app oin tees: Brzezinski, Vance, Brown and Rep. Andrew Young, the United Nations ambassador-designate. Two Cabinet appointees also serve on the execu tive committee of th e R ocke feller Foundation (Vance and Blu menthal), not to mention directors of the Chase Ma nhattan and IBM, two corporations where Rockefeller money is still imp orta nt. This is the same small circle of Americans which has made foreign policy for the government over the las t generation. The Carter appointees are direct descend ants of John Fos ter Dulles and Dean Rusk, two other modern Secretaries of State who came from the Rockefeller Founda­ tion. It is hard to believe that they will turn on their ancestors.

<r

4B>

*
113

All of the business connections will be severed, of course, when these people 

ente r government. Citing all of the corporate rela tionship s does not imply th at 

any of these people will continue to represent those institu tions rather than 

the public when they are in public office. B ut it does give some clues as to where 

they came from and how they may view the world and the nation, not to mention 

how Carter him self views things. The country is much smaller, i t seems, than the vision which Carter sold during 

the campaign. Perhaps Ca rte r’s own vision is smaller, too.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 2, 1977]

T he Untold Story of Camb odia' s Agony

(By William Shawcross*)

« Little is hea rd of Cambodia these days—an d most of th at is unpleasant. Cambodia is crushed under the Communist Khmer Rouge, who overthrew the proWestern regime of Lon Nol in April, 1975. Officials and officers of the old regime 

have been clubbed to death. Refugees stumble over the borders into Tha ilan d 

and Vietnam with other tale s of horror.

How did this come about?

When R ichard Nixon entered the White House in 1969, Cambodia was at peace. 

The unpredictable, au toc ratic Prince Norodom Sihanouk its ruler for 17 years, had 

managed to keep his serene, verdan t country out of the war that had wracked 

neighboring Vietnam by allowing the North Vietnamese to use Cambodian territory as a supply route and for sanctuaries ju st across the frontiers of South 

Vietnam. By August, 1974, when Nixon resigned hundreds of thou sands of Cambodians had been killed and much of the country was destroyed.

Under orders from Nixon and his n ational secu rity adv iser Henry A. Kissinger, 

U.S. B-52s had begun bombing the Cambodian border san ctuarie s secretly in 

March, 1969. The raids, which Sihanouk had to accept, pushed the Communists 

deeper into Cambodia and exacerbated the political tensions in the capital, 

Phnom Penh. In March, 1970, Sihanouk, in Moscow on a diplomatic mission, was 

overthrown by his defense minister, Lon Nol.

Within a month, North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge troops were moving out 

of the border sanctuaries tow ard Phnom Penh. In Washington, both the State 

Department and the CIA were w ary of deepening the U.S. involvement. “It would 

be very risky to try and solve the North Vietnamese problem in Cambodia by 

force,” wrote Assistant Secretary of Sta te Marshall Green in a memorandum to 

Kissinger and Secretary of Sta te William P. Rogers. A detailed analysis by the 

CIA’s Office of National Estimates warned th at “an expanded allied effort could 

seriously handicap the Communists . . . but, however successful, it probably would 

not prevent them from continuing the struggle in some form.”

The CIA analysis never reached the White House. CIA D irector Richard Helms 

refused to p ass it on. Helms already knew that Nixon and Kissinger had decided

* to invade Cambodia—and wanted no advice against it.

On April 29-30,1970, some 30,000 American and South Vietnamese troops drove 

across the Cambodian border. The U.S. mission in Phnom Penh learned of it from 

the Voice of America bro adc ast of Nixon’s televised speech. The charye, Lloyd

4 Rives, took the news to stunned Lon Nol. Rives was ordered by Washington to fake

a telegram from Lon Nol requestin g the invasion. He dra fted one and took it to 

Lon Nol, who signed it.

“str ok ing ” lon nol

Lon Nol was an unlikely war leader. At moments of crisis, a stra in of mysticism, 

never far from the surface, would overwhelm him. He took to directing battles 

from the seclusion of his palace, issuing orders dictate d by his inner eye.

Not that there was any thing wrong with Lon Nol’s imagination. lie once announced th at anyone sellin g rabbits would be tried for treason. He claimed to 

have discovered a Communist plot to str ap bombs to the anim als and release 

them n ear milita ry installa tion s.

•Shawcross has been a correspondent in Indochina and Washington for the Sunday Times of London, from which this account is excerpted. He is now writ ing a book on the lessons of the Cambodian war.

81-894— 77----- 9
His gra sp of strategy, on the other hand, was shaky. One of his ideas for the 

defense of Phnom Penh was to have helicopters sprinkle sacred sand round the 

city. It didn’t work. But then, neither did Lon Nol. He was quite as vain and 

autocratic as the man he had deposed. He was also, unfortu nately, much less able.

As the leader of a beleaguered country—facing an external army, a swelling 

corps of domestic insurgents and such u npopularity in the countryside that, after 

his coup, outraged peasants had actually eaten one of his brothers—Lon Nol 

was not, in other words, an ideal choice. Yet in the first week of May, while 

American opinion reeled from the invasion only days before. Nixon sent Col. 

Alexande r Haig to Phnom Penh to assess not whethe r this improbable figure should be aided, but how.

Haig's visit was cruc ial: It established the relationship to come between the 

White House and Lon Nol, between the White House and the U.S. mission, 

between the White House and reality. Efficient, hardline, unquestioningly loyal, 

Haig was then Kissinger’s assistant. The Phnom Penh trip was the first solo 

mission of importance. He did not like Lloyd Rives.

Rives angered Haig by resisting a plan to install in his mission a military 

communications system—the techn icians to be outside Rives’ control. And Rives’ 

unconcealed doubts about the course of events undercu t Haig’s gung-ho 

enthusiasm .

Haig would not even let Rives go with him to Lon Nol. But the State Dep artment later learne d what had happened. Haig found Lon Nol in an emotional state. 

Repeatedly. Ila ig h ad to assure him th at the United States would supply all he 

needed to drive out the Communists. Repeatedly, Lon Nol was told he had the 

full support of Presiden t Nixon. Finally, according to several accounts, Ilai g 

told Lon Nol that he could bypass the U.S. mission and deal directly with the 

White House.

Haig's was the first of what became known as “stroking missions.” Over and 

over, in the nex t five years, the White House would ignore the realitie s on the 

ground—and the U.S. mission's perceptions of them—an d send Haig, Spiro 

Agnew, Joh n Connally and other barons to “stroke” Lon Nol, convince him of 

his “successes” and of his unrem ittin g supp ort in Nixon’s White House.

On Haig’s return , the White House authorized materi als and equipment for 

Phnom Penh (evading congressional control). And a few days late r, in midMay, 1970, Kissinger asked Jon ath an (Fred ) Ladd, a retired Green Beret, to 

head a small U.S. “po litica l-military” group to be inserted into the Phnom Penh 

mission.

It is at times uncanny how the Cambodian tragedy mir rors th at of Vietn am : 

just such a “political-m ilita ry” group h ad been th e initial U.S. commitment there, 

too. Ladd, who had known Haig in Korea, had served in Vietnam—an experience 

which had persuaded him of the fut ility of U.S. involvement in Asia. But Kissinger assure d him th at Cambodia was not to be another Vietnam.

Ladd began with cautious optimism. lie thought th at the mediocrity and corruption of many of Lon Nol’s officers might be outweighed by the enthusiasm of 

the average Cambodian for fighting Vietnamese. But inside barely a month, by 

the end of June, when the U.S. troops in the invasion force withdrew from 

Cambodia, it was clear that Lon Nol’s forces could not cope with the w ar that the 

invasion had spread.

The White House decided th at South Vietnamese troops and U.S. airpower 

had to continue to batte r Cambodia. Nixon claimed th at U.S. planes would be 

used only “to interd ict” the Communist supply lines to Vietnam—that, in other 

words, they would obey the new congressional injunctio n against war in Cambodia. In fact, U.S. bombers were used in supp ort of Lon Nol’s forces over much 

of Cambodia.

A CAREER RU IN ED

The corollary of W hite House enthusiasm for the wa r was the eras ing of the 

already blurred line between intelligence and policy.

Richard Helms of the CIA had grasped this fairly swifty. Out in Phnom 

Penh, Lloyd Rives was slower to catc h on. The visit of Vice Pre sident Agnew 

in August, 1970, virtually ruined Rives’ career.

Agnew brou ght for the Cambodian lead ers a set of world maps, some silver 

cocktail glasses and a pair of leath er-covered In and Out trays. In return , he 

was given finely worked tra dit ion al Cambodian silver. (He forgot it when he 

flew out.)

Everywhere in Phnom Penh, Agnew was surrounded by a squad of U.S. Secret 

Service men toting submachine guns. When one sat with his gun openly trained
115

on the Cambodian head of sta te’s back, Rives protested. The Secret Service 

complained to the White House. Fi rst Haig, now Agnew. The White House 

ordered Rives’ dismissal.

Rives’ colleagues protected hi m : lie was simply shun ted for two yea rs into 

the b ackw ater of African research. Rut since his colleagues were convinced that 

Rives’ skepticism had been the real cause of his downfall, the lesson went home: 

it did not pay to speak your mind on Cambodia.

Rives’s replacement, in September, 1970, was Emory (Coby) Swank, who came 

with the title of ambassador. Swank, a slight and—like Rives—cautious man, was 

a line Kremlinologist who also had Asian experience.

Swank was in Cambodia for three years. The political, military, economic and 

social disintegration over which he presided was not quite total.

Already, by the end of 1970, as Swank settled into the job, all roads out of 

Plinom Penh were wholly, or partially, cut. The Communists controlled about 

half the country. In the o ther half, the economy was paralyzed o r destroyed.

Even agriculture was collapsing. Under Sihanouk, Cambodia had been comfortably self-sufficient. Now massive U.S. economic aid was needed. (In ano ther 

two years, Cambodia—once an exporter of rice—would be dependent even for 

its basic food upon im ports from the United States.)

But as the fabric of society crumbled, U.S. enthusiasm for the venture ap ­

peare d to increase. It was a para dox t ha t Nixon himself explained. In November, 

two months after Swank’s arriv al, Nixon claimed for the first time that the w ar 

in Cambodia was “a vital element in th e continued success of Vietnamization.”

In December. Nixon sa id : “The Cambodians, a people, 7 million only, neutralist s previously, untrain ed, are tying down 40,000 North Vietnamese r egu lars.”

Nixon went o n : “If those North Vietnamese weren’t in Cambodia . . . they’d 

be over killing Americans . . . the dollars we send to Cambodia saves [sic] 

American lives and enables us to bring Americans home.”

FU EL ING GRAFT

By th e beginning of 1971, Fred Lad d’s modest role was swept aside. The Pe ntagon now had White House permission to send a general to run wh at was blandly 

called a Military Equipment Delivery Team. The Cambodian army, it was decided, needed fa r more equipment and support tha n Ladd had envisaged.

As in Saigon, U.S. a id fueled ever-increasing gr aft in Phnom Penh—until Lon 

Nol forfeited even the support of those middle-class urb an Khmers who had 

been happiest to see Sihanouk leave.

Under a U.S.-sponsored commodity import program, cars, motorcycles and 

domestic appliances flooded into Phnom Penh. To buy these, Lon Nol’s officers 

would pad out their under-strengtli units with phantom troops, whose wages 

they pocketed. “Every impo rted motorbike cost the army a squad, every car a 

platoon,” one U.S. diplomat calculated.

Even those officers competent in battle tended to find their orders contradicted by the mystic ma rshal himself. By mid-1971, a stroke had left Lon Nol 

more auto cra tic and parano id t han ever.

The steady slaughter of Lon Nol’s troops thus reflected his arm y’s incompetence as much as its enemy’s skill. Younger and younger boys had to be draft ed 

to fill the ranks.

In September, 1971, Lon Nol la unched Operation Chenla Two to re-open Route 

6 north of Phnom Penh. The Communist duly allowed his forces to surge up the 

road and even to lift the siege of the nex t town, Kampong Thom.

Rejoicing in Phnom Penh was premature. At the end of October, the Communists once more cut Route 6 south of Kampong Thom.

Deprived of supplies and reinforcements, Lon Nol’s troops fled back across 

country to Phnom Penh with enormous losses. The victors at Chenla Two, for 

the first time, were not the North Vietnamese, but the troops of the Khmer 

Rouge.

Chenla Two was the clea rest dem onstratio n th at Lon Nol’s forces were no 

match for the ir adversa ries. And the Communists w’ere by now clearly able to 

use almost the whole country as a base—ju st what the 1970 invasion had been 

supposed to prevent.

Within the Phnom Pen h embassy, and the agencies in Washington, were men 

who realized this. But, as in Vietnam, their pessimism was swamped by the 

enthusiasm of the military. And they knew the White House did not want 

unpalatable facts .
116

William Harben was one of the disillusioned. Tall, gray-liaired, gaunt, Harben 

was political counselor in Phnom Penh from Jan uar y, 1971. He found, for example, th at if he or his colleagues reported cases of m ilita ry corruption, the general 

in charge of the Military Equipment Delivery Team would dismiss their facts as 

‘•propaganda” or contend that they came with in the sole purview of his military, 

arguing th at • this is Cambodia’s society and we are not here to reform it.

lla rben was no sentimentalist. (In partic ula r, he distrusted Sihanouk .) He 

merely reasoned tha t America's unconditional suppo rt for Lon Nol itse lf constituted total involvement in Cambodian affairs. (And surely Harben was right. 

How could anyone pump into a small, rural Asian economy such staggering 

sums as .$273 million in military and economic aid—the bill in fiscal year 1971— 

and then plead non-involvement?)

But while Swank was ambassador, non-involvement—ordered by Washington—was the excuse while Lon Nol suspended the assembly, rigged the elections 

—and tottered twoards m ilita ry and political collapse.

In .January, 1973, Harben sent a memorandum to Swank. In the past year, he 

pointed out, the embassy had trie d to call Washington’s a tten tion to “alarm ing 

trends” in Cambodia. (That was a euphemism for the deepening military and 

political debacle.) But, Harben continued “we have received indirect guidance 

th at Washington did not wan t to receive negative assessments lest they leak 

to hostile jou rna lists and for other political reasons.” (That was a euphemism 

for Nixon's relection campaign.)

Harben pointed to the risk tha t, when the situation got still worse, “certa in 

quarters in Washington which bear the most responsibility may absolve themselves by claiming that embassy repo rting failed to ale rt them.”

Even Harben underestimated the gap which the White House had fostered 

between perception and reality. When he left Phnom Penh, in spring, 1973. his 

post as political counselor was merged with that of military counselor. As soon 

as he got hack to the State Depa rtment, though, Harben wrote a memorandum 

suggesting that the Lon Nol side would probably lose th e war and th at a refugee 

program be discreetly planned. Ili s colleagues advised him, for his own sake, 

to tea r it up. "You can’t mention defeat around here,” he was told.

“Anywhere else you would go to prison for falsifying the facts.” Harben says 

now, “In the diplomatic service you get promoted for loya lty.” Harben retired 

in January, 1975.

PE A C E ----BU T NO PE AC E

In January , 197.3, Nixon and Kissinger finally reached a political settlement 

with Han oi: U.S. troops and prisoners were extricated, while South Vietnam 's 

President Thieu remained in office. Nixon called it “peace with honor.”

Article 20 of the peace agreement specified that foreign coun tries “shall put 

an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos.”

So, for a brief moment, things looked optimistic for Cambodia. It was. aft er 

all. a sideshow for the Americans. During the Vietnam talks, Kissinger had 

made his only, brief visit to Cambodia.

When the Vietnam agreement was signed. Kissinger ann oun ced : “We can 

say about Cambodia that it is our expectation that a de facto cease-fire will 

come into being over a period rele vant to the execution of this agreement.” Given 

th at the core of the agreement was U.S. withdrawa l from Vietnam, Kissinger 

seemed to be predicting a paralle l disengagement in Cambodia.

The outside world did not see a secret State Departm ent evalu ation of the 

newly signed agreement, pointing out th at the obligation of America and North 

Vietnam to withdraw fully from Cambodia was purely in princ ipl e; actual 

withdr awal would depend “upon the timin g of agreements among the contending parties .”

Kissinger had some grounds for optimism. He had secretly warned Hanoi 

that it could not expect U.S. reconstructio n aid—which had been guaranteed 

under Article 21 of the peace agreement—unless it forced a ceasefire in Cambodia. Hanoi, as we shall see, did then cut Khmer Rouge arms supplies. But 

Kissinger failed to see that, as th at happened, Hanoi’s influence over the Khmer 

Rouge would dwindle. More important, he took no steps either to establish 

his “de facto cease-fire” or to ini tia te more formal Cambodian peace talks.

On Jan . 28. the day after the agreement, Lon Nol announced that his troops 

would suspend all offensive operations to allow “the North Vietnamese and 

Vietcong to leave our territor y in the sho rtest possible time.” There were flaws 

in the offer: Far from conducting offensive operations. Lon Nol's troops were 

everyw here on the defensive, and by now his main adversarie s were native
117

Khmer Rouge rather than Vietnamese. Rut it was a sta rt. And on Jan. 30, 

the W hite House stopped the bombing.

The next day, Sihanouk replied. The Khmer Rouge, he said, were reev alua ting 

their policy. “If the United States is prepared to act in a friendly man ner with 

an independent and nonaligned Cambodia, we are prepared for a rapid recomciliation with Washington.” And, though Lon Nol dismissed the stateme nt, the 

insurgents did slacken, though not cease operations.

But what happened now? Clearly, some initiative was needed. And, by good 

fortune, Kissinger was going to Hanoi and Peking. Sihanouk said that he hoped 

to see him then. But, on Feb. 3, the White House replied th at Kissinger had “no 

plans to see the prince during the trip.”

Rebuffed, Sihanouk withdrew his offer on Feb. 7. After a lull, the conflict on 

the ground had alre ady been reasserting itself and now the battle began in 

earn est once more. On Feb. 8, tHe American bombing resumed.

IGNO RING SI HA NOUK

It would be comforting to find in the grim events that followed some commensurate motive, some inexorable requirement of high strategy . None appears.

The only explana tion came from the American ambassador, Emory Swank : 

that, given the weakness of the U.S. ally, Lon Nol. the initiation of peace moves 

“would to H enry Kissinger have been leading from weakness.”

At the same time, Cambodia was still considered only peripheral to Vietnam, 

where President Nguyen Van Thieu was demanding that Lon Lol be upheld.

There was a difference to the renewed American bombing. From now on. the 

targ etin g for the raids was to he done by Swank’s embassy—although, by explicit 

act of Congress, the embassy was forbidden to give m ilitary advice. The embassy's 

role was concealed from Swank’s superior, Secretary of State Rogers.

So began the most des truc tive phase of the war. Asked to explain the legal 

basis of the ra ids now th at there were no U.S. troops to protect, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of State William Sullivan replied: “It's interestin g you should ask 

that. I've got a couple of lawyers working on it. For now, I'd say the justification 

is the reelection of the President.” Meanwhile, the man with, arguably, the 

best hope of ending the wa r sa t rebuffed, in Peking.

Yet Sihanouk had few illusions about h is rela tionship w ith his form er enemies 

and present allies, the Khmer Rouge. Powe r in Cambodia lay with them, the 

combatants. Sihanouk was useful because of his unrivale d popularity in the 

countryside and for the legitimacy he conferred in the outside world.

For Sihanouk, too, th e alliance was only tactical. Priv ately, he would say that, 

though he would one day ret urn to Cambodia, he wante d to do so in his own right, 

not under Communist control.

In this ambiguous position, Sihanouk’s stre ngth was the support of th e Chinese 

premier, Chou En-lai. Chou’s commitment was open. Sihanouk was accorded the 

honors due to a head of sta te—his was the first government-in-exile the Chinese 

had ever allowed in Peking.

In the search for peace in Cambodia, Sihanouk had two perceptions, which he 

9

tried to press upon Wash ington through every intermediary he could find.

The first was th at nego tiatio ns should be between his exile government and 

Washington. He saw no cause to deal with Lon Nol when it was only U.S. aid 

that propped him up. Secondly, Sihanouk trie d to convey tha t the Khmer Rouge 

< were not the cre atures of Hanoi. (This was certainly correct. Most North Vietnamese front-line units had been with draw n from Cambodia by inid-1972: the 

rest of their dire ct support was with drawn in early 1973. To Khmer Rouge fury, 

Hanoi then began, in pursu it of Article 21, to restrict even the supply of arms 

and ammunition.)

But Washington contin ued ignoring Sihanouk. For years, Sihanouk and the 

State Departm ent had got on each oth er’s nerves, and Kissinger rega rded him 

with contempt. And the contempt was self-fulfilling: the longer Sihanouk was 

ignored by Washington, the less autho rity he had over his uneasy allies, the 

Khmer Rouge, or in Peking.

Faced with this dilemma, Washington constructed its policy: Lon Nol and the 

Khmer Rouge (with Sihanouk if they wanted him) should nego tiate between 

themselves.

TH E BLOODY “ BOX”

The tru th was that the U.S. commitment to Lon Nol remained unremitting— 

though the price was continued war. Yet the hopelessness of Lon Nol’s position
was known. In early February, 1973, barely a month after the peace agreement, 

the Phnom Penh embassy actually had to be ordered by Washington to say, if 

asked by th e press, th at Lon Nol had the supp ort of the majority of the people.

One of Lon Nol’s erstw hile colleagues destroyed that illusion. Prince Sirik 

Matak—a leader in the coup aga inst Sihanouk and sometimes prime minister 

but now und er house arrest—said publicly that, in a free election. Sihanouk 

would win. “I und erstand America’s att itu de in not wanting to interf ere in our 

intern al affa irs,” Matak said. “But if the U.S. continues to support such a regime, 

which is not supported by the people, you help the Communists.”

In April, 1973, U.S. Senate inve stigators concluded that “the political, militar y 

and economic performance of the Lon Nol government hail reached an all-tim e 

low . . Nonetheless, to Harben’s intense dismay, reform proposals by In Tam, 

an honest politician who Harben thought should replace Lon Nol, were tota lly 

ignored by Washington.

Marginal reforms were ordered by Haig, but Kissinger discounted the problems. 

“We can't go arou nd bashing our allies,” he said privately. “If you replace a 

government, then you are responsible for its successor and we've ju st been 

through th at in Vietnam. We didn’t go thro ugh the agony of getting out of Vietnam in order to get re-involved in So utheast Asia.”

But through the spring and into the summ er of 1973 the United States was 

involved in Cambodia, and to terrible effect. The daily B-52 targeting was done 

by Thomas Enders, Swank's deputy in the Phnom Penh embassy.

Enders took his targets from 1 :50,000 scale maps—little more tha n an inch to 

the mile—which were several yea rs out of date. T he embassy had no maps showing relocated villages. Not th at they would have made much difference. William 

Harben now did what someone might have considered a t the star t of the bombing: 

He cut out, to scale, the pa ttern of a “box” of B-52 bombs—and found that there 

was virtually nowhere he could place it on the map of populous central Cambodia 

without “boxing” a populated area.

“I began to get reports of wholesale carn age,” Harben recalls. “One night a 

mass of pea san ts from a village nea r Saang went out on a fun era l procession. 

They walked str aig ht into a ‘box.’ Hun dred s were slaughtered .”

The destructio n might have continued indefinitely, h|ad not the Senate 

inve stigators finally discovered Enders’ role in it, by accidentally picking up the 

targ eting instructio ns on a tra nsistor radio. Outrage at this, allie d to the 

weakening of Nixon as the Waterg ate inqu iries gath ered momentum, finally 

emboldened Congress to demand a halt to the bombing. Nixon and Kissinger 

fought any such move, claiming that it would undercut their “delicate negotiations” for peace.

Ambassador Swank puts th at claim in perspective. The only possibility of peace 

in 1973 would have been, Swank says, “if we had taken the dramatic step of drastically reducing our supp ort for the Phnom Penh government. It was one of the 

possibilities I suggested. The Chinese and North Vietnamese might have taken 

it as a step toward a negotiated se ttlem ent. But to Henry Kissinger i t would have 

been leading from weakness.”

As a final assessment of those “delicate negotiatio ns,” it is worth examining 

the after ma th of a banquet in Peking.

TH E FREN CH CONNECTION

Etie nne Manac’h is one of those to emerge with credit from the Cambodian 

story. A Breton, and a career diplomat of exceptional ability, Manac’h was French 

ambassador in Peking from 1970. lie was an uncompromising figure. In the early 

1950s, th e Communists had expelled him from Czechoslovakia when he made too 

plain his dislike of their brutality.

Thence, for 20 years, he had dealt with Asian affairs. In 1968, h e played an 

imp ortant p ar t in setting up the first secre t talk s between Washington and Hanoi 

and, in Peking, he won the respe ct not only of the whole diplom atic corps but 

of Chou En dai himself. Most important in the present context, Manac’h cared 

deeply abo ut Cambodia and its suffering. lie had helped to negotiate its independence back in 1953; he was a frie nd of Sihanouk; and he shared Chou’s 

perception th at the best hope of peace lay in Sihanouk’s restoration .

Manac'h’s involvement was confirmed at a banquet on April 12, 1973. Chou held 

it to welcome Sihanouk back from the only trip the Khmer Rouge had allowed 

him to make to their “libe rated” areas. Sihanouk had returned depressed by 

the Khmer Rouge’s harshness and also angry at what he saw as Hanoi’s betra yal 

over arm s supplies.
119

So. as the toasts were being drunk, Chou and Manac’h turn ed aside together. 

3 he longer the war in Cambodia continued, Chou said, the more extreme and 

harsh would be the consequences of the inevitable Communist victory. Would the 

French government try to convey th is to Kissinger?

French officials say this was done but th at American officials, including Kissinger, were unimpressed.

In the Phnom Penh embassy the mood was by now resigned. One U.S. diplom at 

recalls: "By mid-1973 we felt th at Washington did not give a damn, that the 

policy was set in cement a nd we would go down with Lon Nol if necessary. Wash ­

ington very rare ly aske d ou r advice.”

Kissinger’s public Cambodian effort th at summer, in fact, was fighting the 

, congressional decision to end the bombing. At last, und er a compromise between

Congress and t he White House, it was agreed the bombing should end on Aug. 15. 

(The adm inistra tion even went to cou rt to block and attem pt to end it earlier .)

In the last few days, th e ra ids were intensified.

So, at 11 a.m. on Aug. 15, the las t American bomb load was dropped on Cam-

• bodia. As th e airc ra ft wheeled away, it lef t behind a devasta ted country. Since 

March, 1969, more t han a half million tons of bombs ha d been dropped on it, almost 

half of them since Nixon and Kissinger had declared their "peace with honor” 

eight months before. Cambodian society ha d been destroyed.

All th at remained was Lon Nol’s dwindling ter ritory , by now less than a third 

of the country, with over half of the population crammed into it. Beyond were 

the embittered surv ivors of the Khmer Rouge, p erhaps half of them killed under 

the bombs dropped by the ally of the ir enemy in Phnom Penh—but still a disciplined army, an d by now bent upon a ferocious revenge.

SHO OTING THE DOVE

In the 14 months between the end of th e bombing in August, 1973, and October, 

1974, Kisinger made not one effort to end the war and disregarded Cambodia. 

’This would be ha rd to believe, were it not for evidence subm itted by the State 

Departm ent to Congress. Kissinger, or course, had o ther concerns in thi s pe rio d: 

the Middle Ea st war, the oil price crisis, the impending impeachment of Nixon. 

Yet Kissinger—his amb ition to supplant Rogers as Secretary of State now 

achieved—still found time to punish one of those who had disagreed with him 

over the fate of Cambodia. Kissinger wrecked Ambassador Swank’s career.

Swank’s tou r of duty in Phnom Penh ended a few weeks after the bombing 

did. He left a saddened man. So long as U.S. troops had been in Vietnam. Swank 

had supported U.S. policy. Bu t by the summer of 1973, he had come to think 

any settleme nt bette r than the continuing slaughter. "Cambodia is Indoch ina’s 

most useless wa r,” he said at his fare well press conference.

Kissinger did not forgive Swank’s doubts. Back in 1970, The New York Times 

had described Swank as “th e acknowledged lead er of the group of Soviet specialists in the Fore ign Service . . . a leading candidate for the Moscow post.” 

Kissinger now had Swank appointed political adviser to the commander of 

the North A tlan tic Fleet, based in Norfolk. After two yea rs there, Swank asked 

whethe r he m ight expect a proper assignment. 1-Ie was told the re was nothing in 

mind for him. So, at the age of 53, this “leading can didate for the Moscow post” 

retired.

In April, 1974, afte r a six-month hiatu s, a new’ ambassador, John Gunther Dean,

• w’as sent. Dean came to Phnom Penh from Laos where, after helping to thwart a 

right-wing coup in 1973, he had established a coalition government. And he had 

hopes of achieving a sim ilar settlement in Cambodia—unt il his briefing from 

Kissinger.

“Henry,” one of Dea n's colleagues later reflected, “shot the dove off his 

shoulder. ‘Your job,’ Kissing er told him, ‘is to improve the militar y situation 

to enable us to negotiate from stren gth. I don't wa nt to hear about Laos-type 

compromises.’ ”

Dean did his best. There was a lot to do. Lon Nol’s troops were by now 

reduced to little more than defense of the shrinking perime ters around Phnom 

Penh and a few provincial capitals. For this purpose, young children were 

plucked off the stre ets, encased in baggy, U.S.-supplied uniforms and sent to die 

in nearby fields. The sta te of Phnom Penh’s hosp itals was such, however, th at 

those who died, it could be said, were the lucky ones. Meanwhile, cognac and 

champagne were imported under the U.S. aid program.

At first. Dean flew about the country, puttin g the more blatan t luxuries on a 

“negative ” imp ort list, while exho rting Lon Nol’s commanders with cases of 

champagne. “If you don’t han g together, you’ll hang separa tely,” Dean said.
But Dean was realistic ; soon he suggested in a cable th at Kissing er conta ct 

the Khmer Itouge commander-in-chief, Kliieu Samphan, who was the n traveling 

in Europe. Kissinger refused. Deau persisted, couching his argument in term s 

he thought Kissinger might respect. “Wh at do we have to lose?” he wrote. “Whatever happens it will make us look good in Congress and in th e eyes o f the world.” 

Kissinger was ad am an t: No.

By June, 1974. Dean had realized that, whateve r marginal reforms might be 

made in Lon Nol’s army, its position would never greatly improve. Even to maintai n the balance would need massive aid. Dean therefo re sent Kissinger ano ther 

long paper, arguin g: “Time is a gainst us.” The United States should opt, he said, 

for what became known as “a controlled solution.” More bluntly, Dean’s colleagues say he wanted a negotiated s urrender that would allow the K hmer Rouge 

to en ter Phnom Penh without furth er bloodshed.

On Aug. 9, Nixon finally resigned. In the turmoil, Dean’s paper was understan dably lost from view.

But dean was pe rsistent. At the end of August, he came to W ashington himself 

to see if a new Pre sident would bring new attitudes . Gerald Ford did not. 

Kissinger was confirmed in his job, and Dean largely was ted his time. Only as 

he was about to return to Cambodia did he at las t see Kissinger, who merely 

said th at he accepted the principle of a nego tiated settle ment. How actively he 

pursued it is unclear. Kissinger has since hinted th at he trie d hard. But at the 

time, Dean’s constant cables about the need for a settlem ent irrit ated him. He 

complained about "Professor Dean’s lectures.” But Dean had the supp ort of 

Philip Habib, the new a ssi sta nt sec reta ry for East Asia.

FA IL URE AT T H E SU M M IT

By now, Cambodia’s condition was probably term inal. Bu t Etienn e Manac’h 

in Peking and the French government did make one last effort. As it happened, 

President Giscard d’Estain g messed it up—though Kissinger seems to have 

helped.

Through 1974 it had become clear to Sihanouk, and to M anac’h, th at Sihanouk’s 

chances of retu rning home in his own right were steadily diminishing. In April, 

the Chinese government had given a trium phant reception to Khieu Samphan, 

the Khmer Rouge commander, after which they had promised him more weapons.

China’s attitud e was, predic tably, shifting. So long as Hanoi continued to deny 

arms to the Khmer Rouge, Peking w as willing to t ry for a sett lem ent t ha t would 

restore Sihanouk. But once the Khm er Rouge were in sight of armed victory, 

Sihanouk lost credibility. Peking would look p rincipally to the milita ry men.

Manac’h saw one last possibility of imposing an end to the war. If Lon Nol 

and his closest associates could be removed and Sihanouk return ed to popular 

acclaim in Phnom Penh, Sihanouk could regain the power base he now lacked. 

He would be back in the city, with the army and civil service und er his control. 

He could at once bring members of the Phnom Penh opposition into the government and decla re a cease-fire. The Khmer Rouge would be inf uri ate d at being 

finessed in this w ay ; but Manac’h believed they would have to accept the fait

accompli.

A lot depended on Washington’s concurrence. But. first, the Chinese attitude 

was vita l. French officials recalled th at late in 1973. Chou En-lai had told Pre sident Pompidou that China wanted a neutr al coalition government in Cambodia, 

run by Sihanouk.

Now. at the end of November. 1974, Manac’h sought reassurance from the 

Chinese foreign minister. Chiao Kuan-hua. that Peking's policy had not shifted. 

China was still intere sted in such a settlement, Chiao said —but its attitu de 

migh t soon change.

So, on Dec. 2. the French government informed Washington th at Pompidou’s 

successor. Giscard. wanted to discuss Cambodia at his summit with Ford, to be 

held on M artinique in mid-December.

At Martinique. Kissing er and Ford appeared interested in the plan. But the 

summit communique was a disaster. By its nature, the plan had to be kept 

secret from the Khmer Rouge. Not only did the communique reveal these supposedly secret discussions about Cambodia, however. It went on to say th at 

Giscard and Ford had agreed th at the Communists and Lon Nol should negotia te together. This was the exact opposite of French policy. It was jus t what 

Sihanouk and the Chinese had foug ht against. It was the U.S. policy. It never 

had the slightest chance of success.
121

A chastened Giseard was forced to apologize publicly for the error, while 

Paris instructed its embassies to deny “without hesitation'’ tha t French policy 

had changed.

In Peking, Sihanouk denounced France’s “inadmissible interference” in Cambodian affairs. Manac'h was left the unenviable task of persuading incredulous 

Chinese officials that a genuine mistake had been made.

On the French side this was tr ue; Giseard had taken no Asian expert to Martinique. But its hard to believe that Kissinger did not understand the implications of the communique. His staff had drafted it.

Despite the furor, however, two French officials flew to Washington ju st before 

Christmas to discuss the proposal with Kissinger. But now Kissinger began to 

impose conditions. lie insisted that he must have guarantees which, he said,

4 could not be obtained either by the French embassy or the U.S. liaison office in

Peking. Paris must send an emissary to Peking.

The Chinese asked why it was necessary. French officials though Peking was 

understandably worried at the publicity. In any event, the Chinese did not repond 

9

to the French visa request. The initiative had been lost.

And now, at last, the North Vietnamese began to let through the weapons the 

Khmer Rouge needed. The Communists began to fire rockets indiscriminately into 

the civilian areas of Phnom Penh, and for the first time they had mines to block 

the Mekong River, the lifeline of Phnom Penh.

DEA TH OF A NAT ION

Phnom Penh fell in April, 1975. On April 1, when the collapse was clearly only 

days away, Lon Nol finally relinquished power and tied to America. Almost every 

Western embassy in Phnom Penh had, for weeks been trying to persuade him 

to leave, in the hope that a last-minute settlement could then be reached. Rut 

Ambassador Dean had been forbidden by Kissinger to support this.

Through the final two weeks, Phnom Penh’s position worsened daily. The town 

was being rocketed, food supplies were diminishing, medicines had almost 

vanished.

On April 11, after Sihanouk had made contact, through the French, with the 

U.S. mission in Peking, Kissinger at last authorized an overture to him. At 5 p.m. 

that day, John Holdridge, an official from the U.S. mission, met with Sihanouk's 

chief aide. He explained tha t the White House had decided tha t only Sihanouk 

could end the crisis. Would he please ask the Chinese for an airc raft to fly 

him to Phnom Penh? The United States would guarantee to remain there until 

he arrived. All the conditions which Kissinger had insisted upon at the time 

of the Martinique plan were suddenly waived.

But at 5 :30 the next morning, April 12, Holdridge told Sihanouk’s aide tha t 

the defense of Phnom Penh was in fact degenerating so fast tha t the U.S. embassy 

was being closed at once.

A few hours later, Dean shepherded his staff and those Cambodian leaders 

who were prepared to flee (many were not) into U.S. military helicopters. Dean, 

like many of his staff, was weeping; under his arm he carried, wrapped in plastic, 

► the Stars and Stripes that had flown above the embassy.

For the Cambodian politicians who stayed behind, knowing what awaited 

them, the best epitaph is perhaps the letter that one. Sirik Matak—one-time prime 

minister under Lon Nol—sent in reply to Dean’s offer of a helicopter seat:

“Dear Excellency and Frien d: I thank you sincerely for your letter and your 

offer to transport me to freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion. 

As for you, and in particula r your great country, I never believed for a moment 

tha t you would have the sentiment of abandoning a people which have chosen 

liberty. You have refused us protection and we can do nothing about it. You 

leave and it is my wish tha t you and your country will find happiness under the 

sky. But mark it well tha t if I shall die here on the spot and in the country I love, 

it is too bad because we are all born and must die one day. I have only committed 

the mistake of believing in Americans. Please accept, Excellency, my dear friend, 

my faithfu l and friendly sentiments.”

After the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh. Sirik Matak was shot. Few Cambodians escaped. Only 4,000 or so got to America. A handful were given jobs as 

domestic servants in Washington.

As he left Cambodia, John Dean’s friends wondered whether he would write 

a book about his experiences there. He was appointed ambassador in Copenhagen.
122

For everyone who actually saw what happened when the concerns of a superpower impinged upon a small Asian country, it is the comment of one of Dean’s 

assistants as he fled from Phnom Penh tha t echoes in the mind: “One day 

Henry Kissinger will retire, and he will write his memoirs. And you will buy 

them and I will buy them. And I will write a footnote on every page.”

Yet Kissinger himself has dismissed Cambodia. It was, he has said, “hear tbreaking”—while pointing out tha t it saved American lives. And he declined 

to help in the preparation of this account. But lie has made his position clear. 

Pointing to North Vietnam’s earlier abuse of Cambodian neutrality, Kissinger 

has said of the American intervention: “I may have a lack of imagination, but I 

fail to see the moral issue involved.”

[From the Washington Post, Jan . 9, 1977]

E nding th e F eud Wit h Castro's Cuba

(By Abraham F. Lowenthal*)

Cuba is eager to resume commercial and political relations with the United 

States. Provided the Carter administration shares tha t aim, Cuba seems willing 

to reassure the new U.S. government on several issues of obvious concern to 

Washington; Cuba’s policy in Africa, Cuba’s relation to Puerto Rico’s independence movement and the principle of compensation for U.S. properties expropriated by Cuba.

Although Fidel Castro recently served six-months notice of his decision to 

suspend the anti-hijacking agreement unless the new administration acts decisively to curb anti-Cuban terrorism, that announcement was aimed not to convey hostility but to help bring about improved relations.

Prospective members of the Carter administration, for their part, are interested in Caribbean detente, and want to sta rt a constructive dialogue with 

Cuba—soon.

I draw these conclusions after dozens of conversations over the past 18 months 

in both the United States and Cuba. On two trips to Cuba I talked with highranking government and party officials, among them Vice President Carlos 

Rafael Rodriguez, Castro’s chief foreign policy adviser. These interviews were 

supplemented by exchanges through the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, 

even within the past few weeks. I have also consulted with many American 

foreign policy specialists, in and out of government, including members and 

staff of the influential Commission on United States-Latin American Relations 

(the “Linowitz Commission”) as well as advisers of the incoming administration.

NEAR YE T FAR

Even in a pokey little propeller plane, Havana is less than two hours from 

Miami. Varadero, the beach resort, is but 140 miles from the Florida coast, as 

close as Lynchburg. Va., is to Washington. South Florida disc jockeys can be 4

heard day and night on Cuban radios.

Yet Cuba is very distant. Less than 1,000 U.S. citizens visited Cuba in 1975, 

about as many as land in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on an average winter morning.

American goods are gone from Cuban shelves. American citizens are so r are in g

Havana’s streets tha t Cubans assume a foreigner is anything but a “gringo”—

Russian. German, Italian. Canadian, even Bulgarian.

One obvious result of Cuba’s revolution has been to end the historic U.S. domination of every sphere of Cuban life. Trade with the United States used to account for over 65 per cent of Cuba’s foreign commerce. American corporations 

owned more than $1 billion worth of property in Cuba, including over one-third 

of the island’s sugar production, much of its industry and commerce, the major 

public utilities and almost all the big hotels and casinos.

Politically, the U.S. ambassador was considered almost as powerful as Cuba’s 

president, sometimes more so. Culturally, American trends in dress, the a rts and 

music set the tone for the middle and upper classes. As one observer put it, Cuba 

was “no more independent than Long Island.”

•Lowenthal, former director of studies at the Council of Foreign Relations in New 

York, heads the new Latin-American program at the Woodrow Wilson Intern ational Center for Scholars in Washington.
Clea r traces of the form er Yankee presence ar e still noticeable in Hava na. 

Cuban children play Iteisbol; a U.S.-style friend chicken sta nd at trac t customers on Hava na’s w at er fron t; Cubans still say “OK” and hum American tunes, 

and some even watch “The Godfather” and Marilyn Monroe movies. The major 

downtown departm ent store is still the “Ten-Cent,” with no apparen t ad justment for inflation.

But Cuba today has unquestionably escaped the American orbit. Now Cubans 

are proud of the ir political distance from Washington and have no desire to return to the kind of rela tion ship Cuba enjoyed—or suffered—before 1959. They 

are self-confident about Cuba’s ability to endure U.S. hostility for ano ther generation, if need he; the worst yea rs of the blockade, isolation and shortages are 

past. Cuba demands mu tual respect and reciprocal advanta ges as the basis for 

any renewed conta ct; Cuban officials believe their cou nterpa rts in Washington 

are by now ready for discussion on th at basis.

My second v isit to Cuba las t A ugust illustra tes how Cuba is actively exploring 

the prospect for improving relatio ns with th e United States.

Eig ht of us were invited by Cuba’s Foreign Ministry to make the trip together. We a re all U.S. foreign affairs specialists with a var iety of establishmen t 

cred entials. Fou r had more senior-executive branch experience in foreign policymaking tha n any American to visit Cuba since Castro’s triu m ph : William 

Donaldson, form er undersecreta ry of stat e; Benjamin Bead, the Sta te Depar tment’s executive sec reta ry for seve ral years and now president of the German 

Marshall Fun d her e; Albert Fishlow, a deputy assis tant secreta ry of sta te until 

March, 1976, and William Watts, staff s ecre tary of the National Security Council 

until he quit in 1970 over the Cambodian invasion. Together we were given a 

red-carp et introduction to Cu ba : briefings, interviews, sightseeing, fishing trips 

and a couple of days at implausibly bea utiful Varad ero beach.

The substan tive liigli-point of our vis it was our wide-ranging, tliree-hour discussion with Vice Pre sid ent Rodriguez. It had the ear ma rks of a quasi-diplomatic 

ex ercis e: care ful preparatio n, considerable formality and copious notetak ing on 

both sides.

HA VA NA ’S RAT IONA LE

Why does Cuba want renewed rela tions af ter all these yea rs? Cuban officials 

stre ss the concrete. They see the United States as still a na tural ma rke t for 

Cuba's exports—sugar, cigars and nickel principa lly—as well as the primary 

potential source for a renewed tourist flow. More significant, Cubans would like 

to look to us for many im po rts : agricultural commodities, farm ma chine ry; food 

processing, textile man ufacturing , construction and port equip me nt; cars and 

automotive equip me nt; computers and computer technology, and general knowhow in agriculture an d industry.

Beyond these reasons, inta ngible factors are undoubtedly important, though 

mostly unstated . Washington’s recognition would signify the ultimate acceptance 

of the Cuban Revolution and of i ts irreversibility—the final trib ute, after all, by 

Goliath to little David.

Relations with the United States, too, would doubtless help expan d Cuba’s 

options in world affairs. Th at is a point no Cuban official makes directly, but 

Rodriguez may well have been hin ting at it when he told us th at Angola's 

intere sts would be well served by establishing relatio ns with the United States.

Cuban officials sense a re ciprocal in ter est in raproclicmcnt within U.S. business 

circles, in the American foreign policy community, in and around Congress and 

even within the Sta te Dep artm ent. They attri ub te this tendency in pa rt to in ternational trends, to the dispersion of power away from the bipolar extremes and 

to the corresponding decline of America’s hegemonic presum ption. They think 

American foreign policy m akers are adjus ting to many intern ational changes and 

are probably read y by now to r id the United States of an obviously anachronistic 

and ineffectual policy toward Cuba. Influenced—probably overly so—by the stea dy 

stream of business executives inq uiring about trade, Cuban officials also believe 

that economic inte rests here ar e pressuring f or rappro cheme nt.

Cuban officials see no insurm ountable obstacles to improved relations, though 

they recognize th at concessions on both sides will be necessary. To .begin, Cuban 

officials emphasize, each side mu st accept the fact th at the other is different in 

some fund ame ntal respects, and th at neither side will soon change its essence. 

Even with the change of adm inistration in W ashingtonton, Cuban officials do n ot 

expect th e United States to become sympathetic toward socialism or toward Cuba. 

Conversely, Cubans expect the United States to und erstand th at Cuba is “no 

banana republic,” but rather a socialist revolutionary natio n, firmly allied with
124

the Soviet Union and committed to a foreign policy supporting national l iberati on

movements.

Cuba antic ipates tangling w ith the United Sta tes on issues rang ing from Angola 

to Zionism, from agricultural commodities to technology transfer. But Cubans 

feel the two countrie s could resolve many concrete disputes and could fac ilitat e 

mutually fru itful exchanges—commercial, cultu ral and political—even while 

agree ing to disagree on some issues, much as is tru e in relations between the 

United Sta tes and the Soviet Union.

Once Washington accepts the notion th at Cuba and the United States are 

bound to clash on some issues, Cuban officials think the conflicts between the 

two countries need not be unacceptably inten se. Rodriguez and other officials 

seemed eager to reassure us they are w’ell aw are of the issues of grea test concern 

to the United States and thin k mutually acceptable accommodations are possible. W

Cuba’s intervention in Angola, for insta nce, is portra yed as unique. Cuban is 

“no Joan of Arc, hearing voices,” Rodriguez told us, and Cuba does not seek or 

expect to find sim ilar circumstances elsew’liere.

What actually happened in Angola in 1975—or even w’ha t is happening there •

now—is very difficult to determine. But Cuban officials take great pains to 

distinguish Angola from other situ ations in southern Africa—because of Cuba’s 

long association with Neto’s MPLA, because the MPLA was the closest thing to 

an established government in 1975 and particular ly because of South Africa's 

military intervention, which Cuban officials insist preceded Cuba’s combat 

involvement.

Those countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia which had at first been 

disturbed by Cuba’s Angolan venture, Cuban officials argue, have by now come 

to appreciate wh at Cuba did and to und erstand its limits. The Cubans expect 

American opinion eventually to concur, p articu larly as Cuba’s troops s ta rt coming 

home.

NO A in FOR TE RR OR ISTS

The pertin ent point, Cubans stress, is th at Cuba will not send its combat 

forces anyw here except in response to foreig n military inte rvention and that 

Cuba will not intervene aga inst estab lished governments. U.S. officials confirm 

th at Cuba is no longer “exporting revolution,” nor is Cuba still promising that the 

Andes will become ano ther Sierra M ae stra; those dream s app arently died with 

Che Guevara, if not before.

Officials in Havana vehemently affirm Cuba’s longstanding commitment to 

work for Pue rto Rico’s self-determination. Because the Cuban stan ce in theory 

is not inconsistent with the official U.S. position—both governments claim to 

support the right of self-determination for Puerto Ricans—the real question 

is what Cuba will do to tra nslat e into practic e its solidarity with the Puerto 

Rican indc pendistai.

On this point, too, Cuban officials seemed to me to convey the impression 

th at agreeme nt with the United States can probably be reached, at least as 

long as Washington does not attem pt unilaterally to impose a pa rticu lar sta tus 

on the island.

Cuban aid for terrorist activities is rule d out entirely by Hav ana, as is any 

activity “which can be considered illegitimate under intern ationa l law.” More 

important. Rodriguez indicated th at Cuba recognizes reasonable political limits 

on what it should do regarding the Puert o Rican issue. Rodriguez made it 

clea r he under stands th at overt, dra matic gestures of supp ort for Pue rto Rican w

independence might well be regarded as provocative by the United States, and 

he implied th at renewed relations would cause both sides to tone down their 

rhetoric.

TII E EXPROPRIATION ISSU E

Cuban officials understand th at commercial relations with the United States 

will probably depend in pa rt on Cuba’s acceptance of the principle of compensatio n for the expropriated U.S.-owned properties. Although Rodriguez quickly 

conceded th at at least some of the specific companies’ claims are well founded, 

and th at some fund s are therefo re owed by Cuba, lie also reiterated Cuba’s view 

that the United States owes indemnities for damages done by the T'.S. embargo, by the Bay of Pigs invasion and by other hostile U.S. actions, including 

sabotage of Cuban facilities by the CTA.

Were a settleme nt to take nlace today simply taking into account the claims 

of each side, Rodriguez argued, the overall balan ce would be favorable to Cuba.

He did not seem to rule out, however, th at the result of detailed negotiations
125

in a general political context might be agreement on a final balance favorable 

to the United States.

His clearest definition of an acceptable basis for U.S. Cuban rela tions stre ssed 

simply th at any claims settlem ent must avoid compensation by Cuba dire ctly 

to the companies involved, a condition easily satisfied by allowing the United 

States government to ac t as an intermediary, adding up the individ ual private 

and corporate claims and negotiating a settlem ent on the cla imants’ behalf.

Although Cuban officials seem to have few fixed ideas rega rding the process 

by which rapprochmcnt might take place, they insist that the next step must 

be some visible sign th at the U.S. government will end its hostile policy toward 

Cuba. Usually, Cubans pu t this point more con cre tely; no negotiatio ns can begin 

until the United States ends its commercial embargo of Cuba, at lea st in “its

* sub stantial aspects” (according to one of Castro ’s own formulati ons).

Cuban officials at every rank repeat time an d again Fidel’s statement that Cuba 

will not negotiate und er unequal conditions, with a “dagger at its throat.”

Castro’s speech of Oct. 15, announcing th at the 1973 anti-hijack ing agreeme nt

* would be allowed to lapse (a fter the six-month notification period provided for 

in the tre aty) unless the United States takes effective steps to c ounter the wave 

of anti-Cuban ter ror car ried out in pa rt by refugees based in Miami, should be 

understood within thi s context. Beyond its desire to protect its citizens and 

property, Cuba wants Washington to take a visible conciliatory step.

1 nderstanding, however, th at the United States will face domestic political 

problems in making a symbolic gesture, Cuba seems to be trying to make it 

easier for the United Sta tes to find a suitable mode by suggesting th at Washington should act first to combat anti-Cuban terrorism. By asking the U.S. government simply to comply with its alre ady establish ed duties under nation al and 

intern ational law, Castro has handed the new American adm inistration a vir ­

tually costless oppo rtunity, should it want one, to tak e a step toward rapprochement.

By respecting the six-month notification provision, moreover, Castro has skillfully triggere d an “action-forcing” device to brin g the Cuban issue before the 

top policy-makers w ithin the administration’s first 100 days.

If Washington’s new officials are prepared visibly to act aga inst anti-C uban 

terrorism and to signify Washington’s int en t to lif t the commercial embargo, 

beginning perhap s with the ban on the sale of food and medicine, Hav ana seems 

set to respond. One such quid pro quo, for example, migh t be the release and 

rep atriation of the eight or nine U.S. citizens—alleged CIA agents—still imprisoned in Cuba on political charges.

Afte r prelim inary gestures. Cuban officials are prepared to consider various 

ways of going furth er. One approach, following the China model, would be to 

incre ase c ult ural exchanges and to renew commerce first, leaving diplomatic r ela ­

tions for a la te r stage. Another approach would be to follow some in itial signals 

of intent with an immedia te decision to exchange ambassadors, leaving it to the 

diplom ats to neg otia te subsequently on all outstan ding issues—financial claims, 

the st atu s of th e Guantanamo Base, hum an rights, term s of tra de and credit, etc. 

Cuban officials seem pre pared to proceed in eith er fashion, or through some in termediate formula.

AN OPPORTUNITY

American policy tow ard Cuba is fa r from the most urgent issue which the

* Carter administration has to face.

Tf the new Administration sees the issue as mainly a bilate ral one, i t is likely 

to favor an even tual esta blishment of rela tions—vi rtually no one in the foreign 

policy-making community regards the c urrent policy toward Cuba as meaningful 

or successful—but to assign the matt er very low priority, to be dea lt with only 

after many other international problems are on track.

Tf it reg ard s the issue as primarily an item in U.S.-Soviet relations, it is also 

likely to shelve the m atter for a while, u ntil talk s with the Soviet Union on many 

other subie^ts are well advanced.

My interviews suggest, how’ever, th at the new A dministration could well grasn 

the Cuban issue as one of several opportunities to recast America's approach 

toward the Third World. The President-elect and some of his key adv isers have 

suggested their desire to replace the image of “the United States in opposition” 

to the Third World w ith a serious American effort to build co nstructive rela tion s 

with developing countrie s in Africa. Asia and Latin America.

A quick and clea r gesture to establish relatio ns with Cuba, together with an 

immediate initiative on the Panam a Canal issue, would help signal the new
administration’s desire to end Cold War policies and practices, and to concentra te instead on the problems of the 1970s and 1980s. It would help the administration outline a consistent, understandable foreign policy to the American people, 

a policy opposing unilateral blockades and embargoes by anyone, accepting political diversity everywhere and pressing effectively for the protection of fundamental human rights in all countries.

Finally, the establishment of mutually respectful relations with Cuba would 

help the'administration prepare itself to deal with mounting challenges across 

the Caribbean. Hard political and economic choices ar e being posed in Jamaica, 

Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and elsewhere. To protect its 

interest in this border region, the United States will have to come to terms with 

Cuba, by far the largest and most influential of the Caribbean states. There is no 

need to wait.

o