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OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 

UNITED STATES (CFIUS) AND OTHER 

EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL 

SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 13, 2023 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 118–44 

( 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

PATRICK MCHENRY, North Carolina, Chairman 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

ANDY BARR, Kentucky 

ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas 

FRENCH HILL, Arkansas, Vice Chairman 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia 

WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio 

JOHN ROSE, Tennessee 

BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin 

WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina 

RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina 

DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin 

ANDREW GARBARINO, New York 

YOUNG KIM, California 

BYRON DONALDS, Florida 

MIKE FLOOD, Nebraska 

MIKE LAWLER, New York 

ZACH NUNN, Iowa 

MONICA DE LA CRUZ, Texas 

ERIN HOUCHIN, Indiana 

ANDY OGLES, Tennessee 

MAXINE WATERS, California, Ranking 

Member 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

SEAN CASTEN, Illinois 

AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts 

STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada 

RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan 

RITCHIE TORRES, New York 

SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas 

NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia 

WILEY NICKEL, North Carolina 

BRITTANY PETTERSEN, Colorado 

MATT HOFFMANN, Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

September 13, 2023 .......................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

September 13, 2023 .......................................................................................... 49 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2023 

Rosen, Hon. Paul, Assistant Secretary, Investment Security, U.S. Department 

of the Treasury ..................................................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Rosen, Hon. Paul .............................................................................................. 50 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Lucas, Hon. Frank: 

Letter to Chairman McHenry and Ranking Member Waters in support 

of H.R. 3378, dated September 20, 2023 ..................................................... 53 

Luetkemeyer, Hon. Blaine: 

Wall Street Journal article, ‘‘A DuPont China Deal Reveals Cracks in 

U.S. National-Security Screening,’’ dated August 12, 2023 ...................... 54 

Rosen, Hon. Paul: 

Responses to questions for the record from Representative Fitzgerald ....... 62 

Responses to questions for the record from Representative Lawler ............ 65 

Responses to questions for the record from Representative Lucas .............. 64 

Responses to questions for the record from Representative Meuser ............ 67 

Responses to questions for the record from Representative Waters ............ 69 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 

UNITED STATES (CFIUS) AND OTHER 

EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL 

SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES 

Wednesday, September 13, 2023 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in room 

2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Patrick McHenry 

[chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives McHenry, Sessions, Posey, 

Luetkemeyer, Huizenga, Wagner, Barr, Williams of Texas, Hill, 

Loudermilk, Davidson, Rose, Steil, Timmons, Norman, Meuser, 

Fitzgerald, Garbarino, Kim, Donalds, Flood, Lawler, Nunn, De La 

Cruz, Houchin, Ogles; Waters, Velazquez, Sherman, Meeks, Lynch, 

Green, Cleaver, Himes, Foster, Beatty, Vargas, Gottheimer, Gonzalez, Casten, Pressley, Horsford, Tlaib, Garcia, Nickel, and 

Pettersen. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The Financial Services Committee will 

come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess of 

the committee at any time. 

Today’s hearing is entitled, ‘‘Oversight of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) and Other Efforts 

to Strengthen National Security in the United States.’’ 

There are a few housekeeping items before we begin. The hearing notice for this hearing identified two panels, and the only witness in the first panel, Assistant Secretary Rosen, will testify this 

morning in an unclassified setting in this hearing room. And there 

will be a second witness panel that we anticipate will occur after 

the first series of votes to discuss the classified portions of the 

CFIUS report. 

So, we are going to do this in two different settings, two different 

rooms, two different panels, but one hearing. However, pursuant to 

clause 2(g)(2) of House Rule XI, the committee must take a vote to 

move into a classified session to discuss testimony that has the potential to endanger national security. We will take that vote now 

in order to expedite the hearing later this afternoon. 

With that, pursuant to House Rule XI, clause 2(g)(2), I move that 

when we return from the first series of Floor votes this afternoon, 

the remainder of the hearing will be closed to all persons other 
2 

than Members of the House, staff of the committee with TS/SCI 

clearances, the official reporter, and the witnesses and their counsels and representatives with appropriate TS/SCI clearances. We 

will close that portion of the hearing because the testimony we expect to receive may include material designated as classified, the 

disclosure of which would endanger national security. 

The question is on closing the remainder of the hearing to the 

public. The clerk will call the roll. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hill? 

Mr. HILL. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Hill votes aye. 

Mr. Lucas? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Sessions? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Posey? 

Mr. POSEY. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Posey votes aye. 

Mr. Luetkemeyer? 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Luetkemeyer votes aye. 

Mr. Huizenga? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mrs. Wagner? 

Mrs. WAGNER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mrs. Wagner votes aye. 

Mr. Barr? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Williams? 

Mr. WILLIAMS OF TEXAS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Williams votes aye. 

Mr. Emmer? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Loudermilk? 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Loudermilk votes aye. 

Mr. Mooney? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Davidson? 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Davidson votes aye. 

Mr. Rose? 

Mr. ROSE. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Rose votes aye. 

Mr. Steil? 

Mr. STEIL. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Steil votes aye. 

Mr. Timmons? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Norman? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Meuser? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Fitzgerald? 
3 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Garbarino? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mrs. Kim? 

Mrs. KIM. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mrs. Kim votes aye. 

Mr. Donalds? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Flood? 

Mr. FLOOD. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Flood votes aye. 

Mr. Lawler? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Nunn? 

Mr. NUNN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Nunn votes aye 

The CLERK. Ms. De La Cruz? 

Ms. DE LA CRUZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. De La Cruz votes aye. 

Mrs. Houchin? 

Mrs. HOUCHIN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mrs. Houchin votes aye. 

Mr. Ogles? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters? 

Ms. WATERS. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Waters votes aye. 

Ms. Velazquez? 

Ms. VELAZQUEZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Velazquez votes aye. 

Mr. Sherman? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Sherman votes aye. 

Mr. Meeks? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Scott? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Lynch? 

Mr. LYNCH. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Lynch votes aye. 

Mr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Green votes aye. 

Mr. Cleaver? 

Mr. CLEAVER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Cleaver votes aye. 

Mr. Himes? 

Mr. HIMES. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Himes votes aye. 

Mr. Foster? 

Mr. FOSTER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Foster votes aye. 

Mrs. Beatty? 

Mrs. BEATTY. Aye. 
4 

The CLERK. Mrs. Beatty votes aye. 

Mr. Vargas? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Gottheimer? 

Mr. GOTTHEIMER. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gottheimer votes aye. 

Mr. Gonzalez? 

Mr. GONZALEZ. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Gonzalez votes aye. 

Mr. Casten? 

Mr. CASTEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Casten votes aye. 

Ms. Pressley? 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Pressley votes aye. 

Mr. Horsford? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Tlaib? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Torres? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Garcia? 

Ms. GARCIA. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Garcia votes aye. 

Ms. Williams? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Mr. Nickel? 

[No response.] 

The CLERK. Ms. Pettersen? 

Ms. PETTERSEN. Aye. 

The CLERK. Ms. Pettersen votes aye. 

Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman MCHENRY. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman votes aye. 

Mr. SESSIONS. Am I recorded? 

The CLERK. Mr. Sessions, you are not recorded. 

Mr. SESSION. Please register me as an ‘‘aye’’ vote. 

The CLERK. Mr. Sessions is recorded as aye. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Mr. Huizenga? 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be recorded as an 

aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Huizenga is recorded as aye. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Mr. Barr? 

Mr. BARR. Aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Barr is recorded as aye. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Are there any other Members who wish to 

record their vote? 

Mr. OGLES. Mr. Ogles as aye. 

The CLERK. Mr. Ogles is recorded as aye. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Any other Members not recorded who wish 

to be recorded or wish to change their vote? 

[No response.] 

Chairman MCHENRY. If not, the clerk will report. 

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, on this vote, the ayes are 34. 
5 

Chairman MCHENRY. A majority having voted in the affirmative, 

we will move into a classified session later this afternoon after the 

first series of votes on the House Floor. Room HVC 301 of the Capitol Visitor Center has been prepared for the closed portion of this 

hearing. If there is no first vote series at 1:30, the Chair will announce the exact timing of that closed portion at a later time in 

this hearing. 

I now recognize myself for 4 minutes to give an opening statement. 

Today, we will conduct oversight of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, and examine efforts to 

strengthen our national security. Thank you, Assistant Secretary 

Rosen, for being here, and I look forward to your testimony. 

CFIUS operates under a dual mandate: to address national security risks in foreign investments; and to maintain the United 

States’ commitment to an open investment climate. Five years ago, 

Congress enacted the most far-reaching changes to CFIUS in a 

generation. This legislation, the Foreign Investment Risk Review 

Modernization Act, or FIRRMA, extended CFIUS’s jurisdiction to 

certain non-controlling investments as well as real estate transactions to sensitive U.S. Government sites. FIRRMA also made 

operational updates so that CFIUS officials could complete investment reviews more effectively. This included creating the position 

that you now occupy, Mr. Rosen. These efforts were carefully tailored to legitimate national security risks. 

Yet, at the same time, FIRRMA underscored the United States’ 

longstanding embrace of foreign investment. In addition to reforming how we look at inbound transactions, Congress also strengthened national security through a major outbound policy, the Export 

Control Reform Act (ECRA). This was the first long-term reauthorization of export controls in nearly 4 decades. 

This legislation, which passed with FIRRMA, now serves as a 

legal basis for our export controls against adversaries like China 

and Russia. Like all previous CFIUS laws, FIRRMA recognized 

that an outside investor may pose a risk to the country receiving 

the investment. That is common sense, but now the Biden Administration is proposing to use CFIUS to regulate Americans’ investments into China. That is nonsense. 

Congress has repeatedly dismissed this idea, and for good reason. 

If you oppose Beijing’s state-owned enterprises, you want more 

Western investment into China, not less. And if you are concerned 

about Chinese technology companies, you want more Americans in 

control of them, not fewer. And if you want to expand the reach of 

U.S. sanctions and export control laws, you want Americans in Chinese boardrooms who are required to comply with these laws, not 

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cronies and not Saudi princes. 

This is precisely why Xi Jinping has been attacking Western influence in Chinese companies. The Biden Administration’s outbound 

investment proposal will only help him achieve that goal more 

quickly. That is not in the U.S.’s interest. And that is not in global 

economic interests. 

Since it was first floated a few years ago, the premise of an outbound CFIUS has lacked the basic facts necessary to warrant such 

a move. If you hear of loopholes and gaps, there is not a single 
6 

real-world example. In May, I sent a letter to Secretary Yellen asking for data to justify outbound restrictions. Not one of my questions was answered, and that is because there is no data. 

Mr. Rosen, you have an unenviable job. Now that outbound regulations have been announced through Executive Order, Treasury 

must seek to avoid a disaster in its implementation, and I think 

you are the right person to do this and make the best out of a really tough situation. You know as well as I do that we must use 

time-tested tools to get tough on China, not novel concepts. We 

need clear rules of the road and action based on data and facts, not 

political gamesmanship. 

And as I have said all along, to outcompete China, we cannot become more like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). We must double down on our commitment to free people and free markets. That 

is the smart, balanced approach that is bipartisan and time-tested. 

Taking concrete action is the toughest approach to countering the 

generational threat posed by the CCP. I look forward to hearing 

from you today, Mr. Rosen, about how we can work together to 

achieve our shared goals. 

The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the committee, 

Ms. Waters, for 4 minutes. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. My 

Democratic colleagues and I have long worked in a bipartisan way 

to protect our national security interests by closely monitoring foreign investment. We all agree that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, is a critical tool towards 

that end. That is why I am disappointed that once again extreme 

MAGA Republicans are trying to shut down the government. If 

they are successful, everyone in this country will be at the greatest 

security risk. 

I am so deeply concerned about the legislation that extremist Republicans here in Congress and in States like Florida and South 

Dakota are jamming through to protect certain groups of people 

with no connection to actual security risk from purchasing land. 

Let me be clear: This approach would do nothing for national security, would waste valuable resources, and, in many cases, is simply 

racist. CFIUS and its resources should be focused on actual legitimate threats to our nation’s security, not on barring individuals 

from economic opportunities on the sole basis of their national origin. 

Next, I want to discuss outbound investments and whether 

American investments are being used to prop up U.S. adversaries. 

I have applauded the Biden Administration’s latest actions on this 

issue. For years, committee Democrats and I have sounded the 

alarm on how private equity and venture capital funds are being 

used to finance military and adversarial technology in the People’s 

Republic of China. The President’s Executive Order is a good first 

step, but more can be done. For instance, an outbound screening 

framework could also address U.S. companies’ supply chain resiliency, how workers are treated overseas, and climate risk, all of 

which deeply affect our economy and security. 

In addition, the Administration could review certain passive 

forms of investment, such as mutual funds and index investments, 

so Americans know whether and how their hard-earned savings 
7 

support adversarial nations. We also need to review the investments that private equity and venture capital firms are making in 

China-based companies because they may also pose ongoing 

threats. I hope my Republican colleagues agree that if we are truly 

to confront our adversaries, we need to ensure that CFIUS agencies 

are adequately funded and that trillions of dollars in American capital markets are not working against our interests. 

Lastly, I want to be clear that as we discuss national security, 

CFIUS is only one of many areas we should be concerned about. 

Not only are we weeks away from an extreme MAGA Republican 

shutdown that will pose grave harm to our nation’s security, but 

Republicans are leading the charge to halt supplemental aid to 

support Ukraine in its fight against Putin’s unlawful invasion. If 

they succeed, this will cause immeasurable harm to U.S. national 

security interests and democratic values and only embolden countries like China. So, I urge my colleagues to reverse course immediately before it is too late. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from Missouri, Mr. Luetkemeyer, who is also the Chair of our Subcommittee on National Security, Illicit Finance, and International 

Financial Institutions, for 1 minute. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today, the Communist Chinese Party poses the most significant strategic threat to 

the United States, both economically and militarily. For years, 

based on wishful thinking, Americans have been told that the rise 

of China would be peaceful, through trade and increased business, 

and that American interests could coexist with the CCP. As demonstrated by the Chinese spy balloon, which flew directly over my 

district in Missouri, Americans now know otherwise. Under Xi 

Jinping, the CCP seeks to undermine the United States at every 

turn. As we work to maintain our strategic advantages over the 

CCP, CFIUS plays a critical role in ensuring those foreign direct 

investments don’t end up putting sensitive U.S. technology, data, 

or real estate into hostile hands. 

To that end, I am concerned about the integrity of the CFIUS 

process as it is being eroded, and that the cracks in our national 

security screening process are getting worse at a time when they 

should be getting better and tougher. We must ensure that CFIUS 

resources are focused on identifying and stopping investments that 

are dangerous to our national security, especially by the CCP 

switching roles, and I look forward to discussing that with you 

today. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The Chair now recognizes the ranking 

member of the Subcommittee on National Security, Illicit Finance, 

and International Financial Institutions, Mrs. Beatty, for 1 minute. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

Ranking Member Waters, for holding this hearing to conduct oversight of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 

States, or CFIUS. 

I want to highlight three points. First, we must ensure that the 

agencies that make up CFIUS remain fully funded with sufficient 

resources to carry out their vital work. Second, we must make sure 

that CFIUS remains a narrowly-focused tool that protects the 

United States from legitimate threats to national security. And 
8 

third, I want to take this time to re-emphasize the points made by 

Ranking Member Waters about the unquestionable importance of 

CFIUS as a critical tool in our national security toolbox. I look forward to hearing from you, Assistant Secretary Rosen, about not 

only the work of this committee, but about protecting our national 

security. I yield back. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The gentlelady yields back. 

Today, we welcome the testimony of the Honorable Paul Rosen, 

Assistant Secretary for Investment Security at the Department of 

the Treasury. Assistant Secretary Rosen, we thank you for taking 

the time to be here. We will recognize you for 5 minutes for an oral 

presentation of your testimony, and without objection, your written 

testimony will be made a part of the record. Assistant Secretary 

Rosen, you are now recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAUL ROSEN, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, INVESTMENT SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

THE TREASURY 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you, and good morning, Chairman McHenry, 

Ranking Member Waters, and members of the committee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to provide an update on the work of the 

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS. 

CFIUS, as many have mentioned here this morning, is a critical 

national security tool that conducts reviews of foreign investment 

for national security risks. The Secretary of the Treasury is the 

Chair of the Committee, which is comprised of the heads of nine 

Executive Branch departments and offices, with additional offices 

playing critical roles as national security demands. As Assistant 

Secretary, I lead and help execute the Secretary’s role as Chair in 

that regard. Whenever necessary, the Committee takes action to 

address national security risks, while maintaining the status of the 

United States as the world’s top destination for foreign direct investment. 

The Committee protects national security by screening foreign direct investment from any country, and, by law, we analyze the 

facts and circumstances of each transaction on a case-by-case. Our 

risk analysis is robust and it is focused on three factors: first, the 

potential threat emanating from the foreign investor; second, the 

national security vulnerabilities presented by the U.S. business; 

and third, the consequence of the transaction to national security. 

For example, if the Committee learned that an investor with ties 

to a hostile foreign actor was going to gain a controlling stake in 

a critical government contractor, the committee would almost certainly take action to address that national security risk. A few 

risks, however, are black and white. 

It is for this reason that our case-by-case assessment and due 

diligence is so important. When we identify risks, our mandate is 

to resolve them, whether by mitigating through enforceable restrictions on the parties, or, as a last resort, by recommending that the 

President block or unwind a transaction. As designed by Congress, 

the Committee does not implement a blanket country or sector-bysector prohibition. Through our case-by-case approach, we actually 

gain greater insight and the ability to address actors and activities 

of concern. 
9 

Over the years, as the national security threat environment has 

evolved, so has CFIUS. Most recently, Congress enhanced our authorities with the bipartisan Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, as was mentioned. The Committee has dedicated 

substantial time and resources to the successful implementation of 

FIRRMA and the efficient processing of a caseload that is at an alltime high. Prior to the enactment, the Committee processed 237 

transaction filings in 2017, and 5 years later, we have nearly doubled to 440 case filings last year. 

Among other things, FIRRMA provided the Committee with important authorities over certain non-controlling but non-passive investments into sectors of particular importance, which had previously fallen outside the Committee’s jurisdiction. It also provided 

the ability to review certain transactions involving real estate in 

close proximity to sensitive facilities such as military bases. 

We appreciate the continued bipartisan congressional support for 

our mission, which has enabled our office to continue growing 

across all functions. Since I was confirmed, I have sought to ensure 

that CFIUS is marshaling all available tools to support our national security mission. For example, when CFIUS reviews a transaction that raises national security concerns, we can and do mitigate those transactions by requiring certain measures to be taken. 

These measures are typically formalized in what is called a national security agreement or a mitigation agreement, which places 

requirements and conditions on the parties that are enforceable. 

And we do not stop in our mission after a mitigation agreement 

is signed, and the parties should not stop either. In monitoring the 

parties’ compliance, we routinely conduct site visits, collect documents and information, and engage with third-party monitors and 

auditors to ensure that agreements are upheld. While preventing 

violations from occurring is our primary focus, the availability of 

robust remediation and enforcement tools is necessary because of 

the potential harm a breach could have on national security. 

As I conclude my remarks, you have my commitment that the 

Committee will continue to use every available tool to protect national security in the United States. Five years after the passage 

of FIRRMA, we continue to assess what additional tools or authorities may be necessary to protect national security, and I look forward to working with the committee on these efforts. And while I 

am mindful of the strict confidentiality obligations that Congress 

imposed on aspects of our work, I look forward to answering what 

questions I can in the open setting, and I understand that there 

will be a follow-up in a classified and closed-door setting to address 

additional matters. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Assistant Secretary Rosen can be 

found on page 50 of the appendix.] 

Chairman MCHENRY. Thank you. We will now move to Member 

questions, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Secretary Rosen, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 

(OFAC) has years of experience managing restrictions related to 

outbound investment and other financial transactions, correct? 

Mr. ROSEN. Correct. 
10 

Chairman MCHENRY. And that is the case even when it is not 

qualified as a blocking transaction or a blocking sanction. For instance, OFAC administers outbound investments, and prohibitions 

against Chinese military companies, and does that well. It manages those restrictions for Russian energy entities, and it does that 

well. Does the Office of Investment Security have that kind of experience? 

Mr. ROSEN. I’m sorry. Is your question, do we have the same experience as OFAC, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman MCHENRY. Right. 

Mr. ROSEN. We have different experience and different authorities, sir. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Right. We have an agency, OFAC, that 

does this well. Yet, we are trying to build a regime with an entity 

that doesn’t have that kind of experience. Is that a fair assumption? Isn’t what you are trying to stand up the kind of capacity that 

OFAC has? 

Mr. ROSEN. It is similar but also has differences in many regards. One of the similarities, as you know, is standing up this Executive Order under the International Emergency Economic Powers 

Act (IEEPA), which is obviously the same authority that OFAC operates under, but the way the Executive Order is written is a bit 

different. 

Chairman MCHENRY. So, why not just do it through OFAC? We 

have done this for generations, so why not use OFAC? 

Mr. ROSEN. We believe that the Office of Investment Security has 

learned important lessons from operating CFIUS. In terms of the 

Executive Order and what it requires, it sets up a notification and 

prohibition regime, and OFAC, while not under my jurisdiction, as 

you point out, is more of sort of a blocking and sectoral-based program. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Okay. Thank you for the answer. Mr. 

Rosen, let’s just drill into this, because the specifics of implementation are going to matter. They are going to affect industries more 

broadly than just what the Executive Order says, so just let’s get 

into specifics. We have a big discussion on the Senate side about 

our artificial intelligence. What are the specific differences between 

an artificial intelligence that helps a drone operator identify a military target on an image and an artificial intelligence that helps a 

doctor identify cancer on an MRI? 

Mr. ROSEN. Mr. Chairman, it is a good question, and the way the 

Executive Order approaches artificial intelligence is, as you know, 

it identifies it as one of the categories of concern for U.S. investments. We are in the midst of a rulemaking process. We are working to collect information so that we can strike the right balance, 

because what we want to get at is the People’s Republic of China’s 

(PRC’s) use of artificial intelligence for military modernization. We 

understand it is a—— 

Chairman MCHENRY. But that is done through companies, and 

OFAC has a regime where we identify companies and people and 

we target companies and people. And then, we are setting up a regime where we are trying to identify through technology, companies and people who target them. It seems redundant to me, sitting 

on Capitol Hill and having been through the FIRRMA reauthoriza-
11 

tion process, of which you have done a good job of implementing 

huge facets. And so, in technical terms, how can you hold these 

things to be mutually exclusive when you use artificial intelligence 

in one company one way and in another company in another way? 

It is difficult, right? So, setting up this new expertise with this new 

approach as a result of the Executive Order could be tricky and 

cumbersome and time-consuming, when we should be using the 

time-tested tools of OFAC. 

Mr. ROSEN. Mr. Chairman, these are all important questions 

that you raise, and all questions that we have grappled with 

through implementation and working on the Executive Order. One 

of the important distinctions in this Executive Order that what we 

want to get at is, in addition to the issues that you identified in 

terms of companies we know about, we want to get at the development of these technologies before they are on an export control list, 

before they are on a sanctions list. We don’t want the PRC and 

American investments to help fund the development of the next 

generation of military technology for the PRC. That is what we are 

trying to get at. 

Chairman MCHENRY. Right. So rather than using a CFIUS process that is cumbersome already for inbound investment, we have 

a capacity problem, and that is not specific to budgets. It is not 

specific to this Administration. We have a capacity problem given 

the amount of investment, and this is what I will just raise. Why 

not use the time-tested tools of OFAC and enhance that with budget capacity and everything else? That has been our approach. That 

is what our approach was as a matter of export controls and a reauthorization of FIRRMA, and I think that is what we should return to. That is my clear message I am sending to you. 

And with that, I will go to the ranking member for her time for 

questioning. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. Mr. Rosen, I think that we 

all have so many questions and so many concerns on this issue, 

and there are many that I could talk about. But I thought I would 

bring up one that I and Chairman Brown of the Senate Banking 

Committee sent Secretary Yellen regarding the announced merger 

of the PGA Tour, the DP World Tour, and LIV Golf. This transaction largely benefits Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund and, 

thus, its government. 

And as you and Secretary Yellen know, Saudi Arabia has a repressive government known for killing dissent, jailing dissidents, 

and enacting draconian punishments. Under Section 721 of the Defense Production Act, CFIUS has jurisdiction over transactions that 

result in foreign government control, transactions involving companies that maintain or collect sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens, and certain real estate transactions, among others. I am asking now whether CFIUS assessed the nature of this merger to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the transaction. And if so, 

did you resolve any national security risks related to the transaction, and what did Mohammed bin Salman have to do with this 

merger? 

Mr. ROSEN. Ranking Member Waters, thank you for raising this 

issue. I know this is an important issue for you and for many others. As you point out, we do have tools at CFIUS thanks to Con-
12 

gress’ bipartisan effort to get, at on a case-by case basis, risks, particularly as they relate to foreign government control transactions, 

and sensitive personal data, as you have mentioned. Those are all 

critical components of how we assess and look at a review. 

Of course, CFIUS and FIRRMA impose strict confidentiality. And 

so, while I can’t get into any specific transaction in this open setting, I want to reiterate our commitment to making sure that this 

committee knows that we look at issues that pose risks on a caseby-case basis, particularly as it relates to data and some of the 

issues that you raised. And I would reserve the balance of the discussion for the closed-door setting. 

Ms. WATERS. Thank you. Let me just ask, did the brutal murder 

of Jamal Khashoggi by Mohammed bin Salman, at his direction— 

was that taken into consideration at all? He was an American citizen. 

Mr. ROSEN. Again, I can’t address any particular case in this context. As I laid out in my opening, we do engage in a very robust 

analysis that looks at the threat posed by the foreign acquiror and 

the vulnerability to the U.S. business to assess a national security 

risk. 

Ms. WATERS. Does the Saudi Government benefit from this merger? That is one of the issues that certainly must be considered by 

us when we allow for these kinds of investments. Does the Saudi 

Government benefit from the merger? 

Mr. ROSEN. Again, as a matter of statute, I am unable to address 

any particular case, but I would welcome a further discussion as 

permitted in a closed-door setting. 

Ms. WATERS. Let me just say that I really do appreciate the work 

that you and the President have done on this issue of foreign investments, but I want you to know that we have to be tougher. We 

have to be a lot tougher. There is information that I cannot disclose 

in this hearing where I believe that our adversaries are continuing 

to have investments and purchases that I think are not in the best 

interest of this country. So, even though I consider what you have 

done to be very good, we have to be tougher and we have to be 

more focused because I think that our country, our democracy, et 

cetera, is at stake unless we really, really bear down on the investments from adversaries and others. So, I thank you for being here 

today, but my message is, get tougher. I yield back. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The ranking member yields back. We will 

now go to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Sessions, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Rosen, 

welcome to the committee. We are delighted that you are here. 

Mr. Rosen does CFIUS have jurisdiction and review over what I 

might call real estate purchases that take place in agricultural 

lands? 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you, Congressman. CFIUS has three primary 

aspects of jurisdiction, and we do have jurisdiction over certain real 

estate transactions that involve agricultural land, and they occur 

in two primary ways. One is the acquisition by a foreign person of 

a U.S. business, and that acquisition results in control, broadly 

speaking, of that U.S. business, whether that is an agricultural 

business or otherwise. The other way that we get at a jurisdiction 

of this kind of activity is through the real estate jurisdiction that 
13 

in FIRRMA, Congress provided to CFIUS, which provides jurisdiction for pure real estate transactions unrelated to a business in 

close proximity to a sensitive facility. And we work closely with our 

counterparts at the Department of Defense (DOD) to assess what 

is a sensitive facility. We have recently updated our regulations to 

expand the list of sensitive facilities and now have some 875,000 

square miles of coverage in the United States for pure real estate 

jurisdiction. 

Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Rosen, is that related to individuals, because 

they are not a United States citizen, or is that directly related to 

where there is a government entity behind that transaction? 

Mr. ROSEN. On the control side that I mentioned, we look very 

closely at who the foreign acquirer is, who is doing the buying. 

What are their connections? What do we know about them from a 

threat perspective working with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and others. And in that context, we look very closely 

on a case-by-case basis to determine what are they getting and 

what are they going to have access to. Who are their commercial 

relationships with? What do we know about them, who sits on their 

board, et cetera. So, we very much look at the identity of the purchaser in that context. 

In the real estate context, we are looking at that, but what we 

are also looking very closely at is the proximity question, and we 

work very closely with our partners to assess, is this a proximity 

concern, what is the threat based on that analysis that I talked 

about, sir. 

Mr. SESSIONS. And certainly, the control of the money. Mr. 

Rosen, I have a bill with Congressman Ronny Jackson, where we 

have proposed that the Secretary of Agriculture sit on your Committee, your board that offers this analysis. How do you receive 

your information from the Agriculture Secretary? 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you for raising this because the United States 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) is one of our key partners that 

I talked about. While not a member, we have a process in place to 

ensure that we work closely with them, and it is important to unpack that a bit. We share visibility to USDA with all of the filings 

that we get so we can ensure, from USDA’s prospective, where 

there is a food security issue, where there is an agricultural-related 

issue where they need to play a part and an active role. And looking at all the filings, when they do say, look, this filing has agriculture implications, we bring them in just as if they were a full 

member of the Committee, where they would be responsible for the 

risk-based analysis as well as providing certifications at the Secretary and Deputy Secretary level, so—— 

Mr. SESSIONS. Thank you. According to United States Department of Agriculture, 37.6 million acres today of U.S. agricultural 

land is owned by foreign investors. That is nearly 3 percent of all 

privately-held land in the United States. Have you done a good review of that, and do you believe that your purview takes that into 

account, and have you issued a report or how would you issue a 

report on those 37.6 six million acres of which the Agriculture Department speaks? 

Mr. ROSEN. We would be happy to work with USDA and look at 

that question. We do through the—— 
14 

Mr. SESSIONS. See, this is my point, Mr. Rosen. If the Secretary 

of Agriculture were a regular part of your interaction and they had 

a person who looked at that, you would be able to tell me, ‘‘Congressman Sessions, we have looked at that 37.6 million acres because we have been working with and they are a part of our team.’’ 

Now, you are telling me you will be glad to look at it, and this is, 

I think, the concern that many of us on our side, meaning Members 

of Congress, have about the sensitivity we have about this as opposed to looking forward. 

I hope that you will take my comments as I intended them and 

that you will respond back to me, and I will accept your fair answer. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman MCHENRY. And if the witness will respond in writing 

to the gentleman’s request. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is now recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Some have argued, and I fear the Chair was making this argument that somehow if we invest in China and Americans are on their boards, that we will have political influence in 

Beijing. As the former Chair of the Asia Subcommittee, I am here 

to say that is simply not the case. The Chinese Communist Party 

is not going to listen to business lobbyists. The Chinese Communist 

Party does not need political action committee (PAC) contributions 

in order to run in the next election. 

Since the beginning of this century when we granted Most Favored Nation status to China, we were told that if we share our 

economy with them gratuitously, they will share our values. That 

is simply not the case. The problem is that we have this enormous 

trade deficit with China. We have that because we do not have adequate tariffs. We have that because Walmart makes a lot of money 

importing from China, et cetera. And every year, we ship them 

$300 billion to $400 billion. That is close to $4 trillion every decade, 

and that money is sitting there. It is going to do something, and 

almost everything it can do is bad. 

But we add to that our investment policy, which is closer to the 

jurisdiction of this committee. Half of the foreign initial public offerings (IPOs) here on Wall Street are from China. We send our investment dollars to China. I am looking to work with others to prohibit American index funds from investing in Chinese companies 

because the risks for investing in China should not be handled by 

paint-by-the-numbers index investing where you just automatically 

invest in companies. 

But even greater is the capital gains allowance. We provide an 

incentive for investors. We tax investors lower than we tax secretaries and nurses, and we do it because we want to encourage investors to build economies and create jobs by making investments 

in economies, and we provide that incentive to those who build the 

Chinese economy and provide jobs in China. So, we have this 

undefendable incentive for investing in China. 

Now, once the Chinese have this money, it is said, well, we don’t 

want them to buy American farmland. Well, they can buy farmland 

in Ethiopia and upset our Africa policy. They can buy farmland in 

Russia and fund Putin’s war. They can buy U.S. Treasuries, and 

numerous articles have been talking about how Chinese ownership 
15 

of Treasuries is a problem. They can buy our companies. They can 

buy influence in Europe, or they can repatriate the money and 

spend it on AI technology. Once we incentivize investment in 

China, once we roll over and run a huge trade deficit with China, 

they have these funds, and perhaps the most benign thing they 

could do is buy American farmland. When they buy American 

farmland from an American, that American puts the money in a 

U.S. bank where it is available to build the American economy. It 

puts the money in the U.S. stock market where it is there to build 

the U.S. economy, and if we do have a fight with China, we can 

simply seize the farmland, just as they will take hostage all of our 

investments in China. 

My question is regarding investment in China. The argument is 

we want to choke off investment to strategic sectors, but money is 

fungible. How much do we accomplish by saying to an American, 

don’t invest in an AI company in China, invest in a furniture factory in China, and then the Chinese investor, who would otherwise 

get the best return for investing in the furniture company, invests 

in AI? If we fund the non-strategic part of investment in China, 

won’t they have all the capital they need to invest in the strategic 

party? 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you, Congressman, for the question and your 

interest on this important issue with regard to outbound investment to China. As this committee knows well, the President issued 

an Executive Order, and what underpins that Executive Order is 

the national security concern emanating from American investments that come with certain intangibles: branding, expertise, and 

the like. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So, the concern is that if you incentivize an American to want to see an AI company in China do well, that American 

may provide the technology and the expertise, not just the capital? 

Mr. ROSEN. That is one of the bases upon which we are concerned. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman MCHENRY. The gentleman’s time has expired. I will 

now go to the Vice Chair of the committee, Mr. Hill of Arkansas, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HILL. I thank the Chair. Mr. Rosen, thank you for being here 

and representing the Treasury Department in front of this committee. We enjoy our engagement with your Department, and particularly on something important like this And you have seen 

strong bipartisan interest in the work of CFIUS, and that we are, 

on both sides of the aisle, laser-focused on making sure that it 

works well, and is effective in protecting against national security 

risk potentially posed by foreign investors. 

Mr. Rosen, your appearance today is ostensibly to talk about the 

Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), and 

we are glad to have you here. It has been 5 years since it was enacted. It is hard to believe that 5 years has gone by. But also, the 

Biden Administration issued Executive Order 14083, ensuring robust consideration of evolving national security risk by CFIUS. Notably, the Executive Order doesn’t change the committee’s existing 

legal jurisdiction over the regulatory process, but it provides guid-
16 

ance on the national security risk factors that CFIUS should consider. Is that your understanding of that Executive Order? 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes, Congressman. The guidance coming out of that 

order sharpens CFIUS’s focus. It is also important from a public 

messaging standpoint so the community understands the things 

about which we are quite concerned. 

Mr. HILL. Good, and the risk factors include supply chain security and resiliency for eight specific industries, including artificial 

intelligence and quantum computing, but it also goes on to include 

clean energy and climate adaptation technologies. Is that right? 

Mr. ROSEN. I believe there is a mention of that in the Executive 

Order, Congressman. 

Mr. HILL. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, I think, shows the whole 

world just how dangerous it could be for countries to make their 

essential energy dependent on a single country or a single source, 

and the failure to take an all-of-the-above approach to a diverse energy production portfolio or diverse geography threatens countries, 

and we have seen that in Europe in spades with the dependency 

on Russian gas, for example. 

But I feel the same way about our own energy security here in 

the United States. We passed H.R. 1 with an idea that we want 

to have an all-of-the-above energy strategy for decades ahead as we 

move to a less carbon-dependent world. So, Treasury and CFIUS 

thinking about national security risk factors as it relates to clean 

energy and adaption technology—what does that have to do with 

national security from a CFIUS point of view? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, thank you for the question on these 

factors, and as you pointed out at the top, Congress gave CFIUS 

broad authority to assess, through its analysis, what has an impact 

on national security. We look at all factors that may have relevance 

to national security, so in FIRRMA—— 

Mr. HILL. Would you agree that if we had foreign investment in 

this country that was only interested in renewables, but we had no 

battery storage for any renewables, and that we dislocate our baseload power, that would be a national security risk as well, right? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, we have the benefit of looking at the 

facts and circumstances presented by each transaction, and we 

don’t get into—— 

Mr. HILL. Could TotalEnergies build a new refinery in the 

United States? Would you approve that? 

Mr. ROSEN. I’m sorry. I didn’t hear—— 

Mr. HILL. TotalEnergies, the French energy company, would they 

be able to build a refinery? Would you approve a refinery in the 

United States? 

Mr. ROSEN. Again, Congressman, it is important—— 

Mr. HILL. I know it is. I am being rhetorical. I know I am not 

going to get the answer I am seeking, I understand, and I respect 

you for that. But you have to understand that Chairman McHenry 

and I write frequently to the Office of International Affairs at 

Treasury about making sure that an all-of-the-above energy policy 

is critical to the U.S. for our own domestic needs, but also for projecting America’s influence around the world. For example, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) does not 

finance nuclear. That is not smart, and they are very reluctant to 
17 

finance the Romanians’ or the Bulgarians’ efforts to develop natural gas in their own Black Sea. I think that is shortsighted, and 

I think that is shortsighted at the World Bank and at the other 

international lending organizations. Do you agree that energy security is national security? 

Mr. ROSEN. Certainly, energy security can be national security, 

but, again, we focus on the facts of a specific threat—— 

Mr. HILL. I understand that CFIUS also considers foreign investments that might expose personal data. I know that is in the Executive Order as well. Can you tell us how you are protecting health 

and biological data in your work? 

Mr. ROSEN. We are focusing on this very closely. The PRC has 

a demonstrated intent and capability to get access to troves of 

American personal data for espionage and other purposes. And any 

time a situation comes up in a case that presents potential exposure and other tools are not available to deal with it, CFIUS looks 

very closely at that, and—— 

Mr. HILL. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. With that, we will go to the gentleman from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 

Rosen, for your willingness to testify before the committee and help 

us with our work. 

This past August, Executive Order 14105 was also released. This 

Executive Order directs the Treasury to draft regulations that require disclosure of or prohibit certain outbound foreign investments 

into mainland China, to Hong Kong, or to Macau. Some argue that 

the scope of this Executive Order is too narrow. They actually point 

out that it only covers certain aspects of advanced computing, 

quantum information technologies, and AI, and that other activity, 

including financial investment, might not be covered. 

So, I would like to just get your assessment and your view of how 

efficiently Executive Order 14105 would address U.S. policymakers’ 

concerns about U.S. investments in Chinese technology and their 

capabilities, and if there are gaps, and I realize any Executive 

Order cannot be full spectrum over every concern, but if there are 

any gaps that you recognize that might be covered, just to give 

Congress an idea of what direction we might be looking at. Thank 

you. 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you, Congressman, and thank you for raising 

the important issue of outbound investment. As you point out, this 

is the President’s Executive Order, and really what underpins the 

Executive Order is a concern that is squarely rooted in national security, that the PRC in this case can use not just American investment dollars, but the know-how, expertise, and branding that 

comes with those dollars, to help make their surveillance capabilities, their military applications, and intelligence more successful, 

more quickly, in a way that directly threatens American national 

security. 

So, we share concerns about supply chain resilience and supply 

dependence on China, but the purpose of this Executive Order is 

to focus on a narrow set of national security objectives with the 

clear mandate by the President to revisit on an annual basis to as-
18 

sess, to your point, what gaps may exist, and how we can improve 

it. And I think also, the benefit of the notification scheme is to collect more information and more data, as one of the issues that the 

chairman pointed out. And that is what underpins this Executive 

Order. 

Mr. LYNCH. And I know we are going to revisit this over and over 

again, but any advice in terms of direction where you think Congress should be looking next? 

Mr. ROSEN. We think that the right policy balance was struck in 

this Executive Order. We think that we are going to learn more 

over time. We think these three sectors are critical to the modernization of the PRC’s military and intelligence state apparatus, 

and that is why we started with that focus. But of course, as we 

learn more, we would look forward to working with this committee 

to enhance the order and any follow-on legislation. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Congress also passed the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, as you mentioned earlier in 

your testimony, which was intended to strengthen and modernize 

CFIUS and enhance its ability to address concerns involving nonpassive, non-controlling investments in technology, critical infrastructure, and personal data business and real estate transactions 

in close proximity to military installations or are a part of maritime ports or airports. What is Treasury’s approach to protecting 

U.S. critical technologies in ways that promote U.S. competitiveness? You have this balance here, but how do we balance those 

needs for security, but also, we are trying to promote U.S. competitiveness in those areas when we have these outstanding concerns 

about China’s investment in U.S. industrial policies related to tactics that acquire sensitive U.S. capabilities? 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you for that, Congressman. You raise a very 

important issue because, the wisdom of FIRRMA and what this 

Congress did in its enactment is to make clear that we need to look 

at transactions on a case-by-case basis, and we need to act as a 

scalpel as opposed to a sledgehammer to make sure that we are 

doing what we can to attract all sorts of investment, and addressing the particular and acute national security risks that arise, and 

then either mitigating those risks or, if they are unmitigable, referring to the President for a block. And I think the way Congress set 

up FIRRMA gives us the ability to be tactical in that regard. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Rosen. Mr. Chairman, I 

yield back. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Posey, is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Chairman Luetkemeyer. Mr. Rosen, why 

did the Biden Administration file an amicus brief saying that the 

current Florida law prohibiting anyone domiciled in China from 

purchasing agricultural land in Florida is discriminatory? 

Mr. ROSEN. I’m sorry, Congressman. I am having a hard time 

hearing you. Could you repeat the question, please? 

Mr. POSEY. Why did the Biden Administration file an amicus 

brief saying that the current Florida law prohibiting anyone domiciled in China from purchasing agricultural land in the State is discriminatory? 
19 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, thank you for that question. In terms 

of litigation, I would respectfully refer you to the Department of 

Justice in that regard, but I would be happy to sort of talk about 

how we deal with threats from certain countries on a case-by-case 

basis, which was the—— 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. The last time CFIUS was in committee, I 

asked him how many Americans own land in China, and if there 

were any, how much they owned. That was months ago. They said 

they didn’t know and would get back to me. You have had a few 

months to get up-to-date on that. Would you please tell me? 

Mr. ROSEN. This is the first time I have heard about that question, so I can commit to you that I will take that back and I will 

be happy to get back to you with an answer, sir. 

Mr. POSEY. Do you believe there are any benefits to letting people domiciled in China own agricultural land in this country? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, it is an important issue, and I know 

one that this Congress is looking closely at. Again, the wisdom of 

FIRRMA and my mandate, as Congress has prescribed, is to look 

at the particular facts and circumstances of a transaction. And I 

can tell you that what we know about the conduct of our adversaries, including the PRC, we take a very close look at in connection with any—— 

Mr. POSEY. But can you give me one benefit to China buying up 

land in our country? 

Mr. ROSEN. Again, Congressman, it is an important issue. My job 

is to look at the—— 

Mr. POSEY. So, you can’t. Okay. Thank you. That is okay. I will 

take that. On September 21, 2022, the Senate, in a 96-to-0 vote, 

approved an amendment declaring that China is not a developing 

country and should not be treated as such by the international 

community, yet China continues to get loans from the World Bank 

and the Asian Development Bank in spite of carrying on a questionable program of foreign investments in other countries. Do you 

know if the Administration will support Senator Barrasso’s bill to 

help end such loans to China? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, when we look at a threat, as the analysis requires, we look very closely at the intent and capability of 

our adversaries. In the case of the PRC, what we see is very concerning, but we look at that on a case-by-case basis. 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Will the Administration work with Congress so 

that Members can get summary reports of foreign ownership by 

country for sectors of the economy based on their survey completed 

on June 30th, without violating any confidentiality? 

Mr. ROSEN. I’m sorry. You cut out, sir. I didn’t hear the full question. 

Mr. POSEY. Will the Administration work with Congress so that 

Members can get summary reports of foreign ownership by country 

for sectors of the economy based on their survey completed on June 

30th? 

Mr. ROSEN. I would be happy to work with this committee on 

questions or follow-up that you have. We put together an annual 

report that answers questions that Congress has asked. If there is 

more data or information that we can be helpful with, we would 

be happy to follow up with you on that. 
20 

Mr. POSEY. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. Green, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the ranking 

member as well, and, of course, I thank the witness for appearing 

today. Is it fair, sir, to conclude from your testimony that you believe CFIUS has sufficient authority to address national security 

concerns posed by foreign persons and foreign entities investing in 

the United States? I think you have spoken well. I think you have 

been very clear. Is it fair to conclude that you believe that you have 

sufficient authority? 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you, Congressman, and thank you for the 

question and your attention to these important matters. I do think, 

thanks to the good work of this committee and Congress, we have 

a robust set of authorities that I outlined earlier, control jurisdiction, but also what was expanded upon in FIRRMA, non-controlling, non-passive investments and certain real estate jurisdiction. 

Those are important authorities. We are always looking at our 

docket, we are looking at what is happening, and we are always 

assessing and reassessing where we may be able to improve, but 

I think the Committee has a strong set of authorities to be able to 

protect national security. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. I mention this because the legislature in 

my State proposed restrictions that would be directed toward specific persons, and it created quite a stir, because the people who 

pass these laws don’t have to interact with the people who can suffer from some of the consequences that may not be intended, persons of Chinese ancestry, for example. When you start using specificities of this type, there are people in this country who suffer. 

They suffer in terms of how people approach them generally, but 

they also suffer in the sense of consternation as to what they will 

do with land that they currently hold, or will they be able to purchase additional property. 

I think that allowing 50 States to enact laws regulating land purchases by foreign-born persons puts our entire country at risk of retaliation because of actions taken by a single State legislature. We 

have had one legislature conclude that no one who is a noncitizen 

can purchase real estate. Fifty legislatures acting independently on 

issues that can have foreign policy implications, in my opinion, is 

a very dangerous thing for us to allow. We cannot allow persons 

whose motives may be less than honorable to pass laws that can 

impact the entirety of our country in just one State. This is why 

I and the Honorable Judy Chu introduced H.R. 3697, a preemption 

bill that will prevent States from acting in what appears to be an 

arbitrary and capricious fashion. I will not speak for her, but I am 

honored that she would support the legislation. 

I believe that we have a duty and an obligation to allow CFIUS, 

at the executive level, to deal with these issues because you have 

a broader view. You have a better understanding of the geopolitical 

implications of allowing one State to make a decision that can impact the entirety of the people in the United States of America. I 

am grateful that you believe you have the authority, and I am 

grateful that you are flexing your muscles, and I would concur with 
21 

the ranking member; if you can flex even more, I think we will 

have a better result. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. The gentleman yields back. With that, I recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Thank you, Mr. Rosen, for being here today. I would like to start 

out my discussion this morning with you by letting you know I sit 

on the China Select Committee as well, and we had an interesting 

discussion the other day with two dissidents who were at the 

Tiananmen Square protests years ago. One wound up in jail for 7 

years, and another one for 16 years. And we asked those gentlemen 

the question: What can we, the United States, do for the Chinese 

people, because our argument is not with the Chinese people. It is 

with the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party. 

And five words is what we got back: ‘‘Quit helping the Chinese 

Government.’’ You could have heard a pin drop. That is what our 

mission should be, to stop helping the Chinese Government. 

I made that comment to, I think, our Deputy Secretary of Commerce the other day in our hearing. She had no idea what I was 

talking about because they don’t understand, and Mr. Sherman 

was very articulate about this, and Ranking Member Waters also 

made comments to the fact that we have to stop investing in and 

helping China. 

To that end, let me begin my discussion this morning, Mr. Rosen, 

with a comment that was made in August 2023. The Wall Street 

Journal published a troubling article exposing the internal divisions and flaws in the CFIUS review process that ultimately gave 

the Chinese Communist Party access to sensitive technology that 

Defense Secretary Austin warned could fuel cutting-edge weapons 

systems. 

And with that, I ask unanimous consent to submit a copy of that 

article for the record. 

Specifically, the article covered the DuPont sale of a sustainable 

materials business to a Chinese company which CFIUS approved 

despite intense opposition from the DOD and the intelligence community due to national security concerns. My question, Mr. Rosen, 

is why were DOD’s and intelligence agencies’ warnings essentially 

ignored? Are the Treasury and Commerce Departments better 

equipped to assess national security risks than DOD? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, thank you for that question and raising the issue of compliance as a general matter with our national 

security agreements. When I came into this job, I made monitoring 

and compliance one of my top priorities, monitoring national security agreements. And that is because the agreements that we set 

in place are only as good as those that can be complied with. And 

that is why, for the first time ever, within about 100 days, we 

issued our first-ever penalty and enforcement guidelines to make 

clear to the public, but also to establish—— 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Was there a penalty on this particular entity, 

because that is my next question. 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes. As I have talked about earlier, I can’t get into 

any particular matter by statute in this open setting. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. This is already in a Wall Street Journal article here. This is common knowledge at this point. And I understand that you reached an agreement with the Chinese purchaser 
22 

to set up a separate entity in which the information will be held, 

and everybody thought this would all work, and within less than 

a month, the Chinese had the information. It has slipped through 

the cracks, and off they went. The question then is, did anybody 

at CFIUS get fired over this, because where is the accountability? 

Where is the ability for CFIUS to hold people accountable for these 

sorts of things? You made a deal, and you just said this. Is somebody going to be held accountable for this deal here? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, again, thank you for raising the important issue of compliance and monitoring. What I would say is 

Congress prescribed a very specific and robust analysis to assess 

national security consequences to transactions. Congress also made 

nine members a part of CFIUS, and we engage in a very robust 

risk analysis in every single case, putting aside any particular 

transaction. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Along that line, Mr. Rosen, I would hope that 

you learned your lesson from this situation. Number one, don’t 

trust anything that the Chinese Government is involved in or may 

be even touching. But you mentioned a while ago in your testimony 

that there are three separate threats that you look at, and one of 

them is the potential threat emanating from a foreign investor. 

Well, the Chinese Government has a plan, a 100-year plan to 

take over the world, and it includes taking over the United States. 

That is an imminent threat, I would think. Look at all of the actions that they have taken over the last 25, 30 years, and what 

they are doing right now is even more concerning, and yet we don’t 

look at that as an imminent threat, and say, no, no, no, no, no. To 

me, if I was in your shoes, if it had the word, ‘‘China,’’ in any sort 

of proposal, it would be an automatic no, absolutely, positively. Do 

we now want to help China in any way whatsoever? Imagine, for 

instance, if instead of, ‘‘China,’’ that you are talking about, it was, 

‘‘Nazi Germany.’’ Would you be approving it then? I think not. Why 

would we be helping our enemy? That is the question, and remember what those folks said, quit helping the Chinese Government. 

With that, I yield back. 

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, is now recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. CLEAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the ranking member for this hearing, particularly because all around the 

country—certainly, I can speak for my congressional district, although I think it is of significance all around the country—it has 

been, I think, crystal clear for some time now that foreign actors 

are using social media to sow discord and even present divisive information, trying to get us fighting with one another, and it is 

reaching a large swath of America. And my concern is that there 

are many people in our country, me included, who would consider 

this to be a significant threat to our national security. So, I am 

wondering what foreign investment and U.S. telecommunications, 

such as Twitter or Facebook, or X, Y, Z, whatever they call it in 

this alphabet deal, would that trigger a CFIUS review? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, thank you for the question, and this 

important topic and raising it. As I mentioned earlier, there are 

sort of various aspects that we can get jurisdiction. One is, irrespective of the U.S. business that has been invested in, if there is 
23 

a controlling investment by a foreign person into a U.S. business, 

that will give CFIUS jurisdiction. 

The second way, as it relates to your hypothetical, is in the authorities that Congress granted us in FIRRMA in 2018, expanding 

our jurisdiction to encompass certain non-controlling investments 

into critical infrastructure, critical technology, or companies that 

would have certain amounts of sensitive personal data. And so 

again, it would depend on the facts and circumstances of the transaction. But Congress was very clear in expanding our jurisdiction 

to direct us to look at those kinds of investments that would give 

us jurisdiction. 

Mr. CLEAVER. I am not sure a lot of research has been done, but 

I did stumble across something from Oxford University, which reported through research that there are over 70 countries in the 

world right now that are engaged in manipulating social media, 

and almost any meeting I go to, there are parents who are talking 

about social media in another realm. But it is becoming at least 

clear to me, and I think everyone, probably even you, that this is 

something that deserves our strong attention. 

And I am wondering if international companies have made and 

are continuing to make significant investments in the U.S. 

healthcare sector? I don’t think we need to become an isolate in the 

world, but they create jobs, and research leads to significant discoveries that can prolong life in the country, and so forth. I am not 

against that, but I am concerned about the security issues. What 

happens with these acquisitions of U.S. healthcare companies? 

Does that fall under the scope of being a potential national security 

concern? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, first of all, the issue around 

healthcare companies can raise a whole host of issues. One that 

comes to mind is sensitive personal data and access to Americans’ 

sensitive personal data. We know certain adversaries are trying to 

exploit that data for their own purposes, against the interests of 

the United States. And it would depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular transaction. But certainly, investments into healthcare companies, when we have jurisdiction, would 

be something that we would look at to assess whether national security risk—— 

Mr. CLEAVER. But can you look at it without—I yield back. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Huizenga, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate Mr. 

Rosen for being here today. 

In 2013, China, the largest automaker at that time, was given 

U.S. Government approval to buy a company, a Michigan-based 

company called A123. That was a battery company back then. Are 

you familiar at all with that case or that name? 

Mr. ROSEN. Not sitting here today, Congressman, no. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. No. Okay. I would encourage you to take a look 

at that. In fact, I was pulled into a classified briefing on that and 

a CFIUS review of that. Earlier this year in a hearing before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which I also serve on, I had 

the opportunity to revisit that A123 deal with Under Secretary of 

Commerce Alan Estevez. In response to my questions, the Under 
24 

Secretary noted that the A123 approval was, and I am going to 

quote him, ‘‘probably not the best decision that CFIUS made.’’ I 

would agree, and at the time, I was very critical of the deal, especially after the classified briefing that I and a few others had received. And I think the conclusion then and now is that American 

taxpayers should not be funding technology that will in turn be 

used in competition against American enterprises. 

Fast forward a decade, and here we are, and it seems that we 

are still struggling with many of the issues that the A123 deal 

brought to light. And in August of this year, another battery 

maker, Gotion, whose parent company is backed by the CCP, acquired 270 acres in Green Charter Township in the middle of the 

Lower Peninsula in my home State of Michigan. And at the time, 

unofficial reports stated that Treasury concluded that the Gotion 

deal to purchase the land was not a covered transaction, which 

they define as a, ‘‘purposed or pending transaction with any foreign 

person which could result in the control of a U.S. business by a foreign person.’’ Mr. Rosen, are you familiar at all with the Gotion 

deal that is happening in Michigan? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, I am happy to sort of get into what 

I can in this setting, and reserve the balance for the closed-door 

setting. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Yes, but you are familiar with it? 

Mr. ROSEN. I have read public reports. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Okay. And are you aware that some have expressed concern about the proximity of Gotion’s land purchase to 

military installations in Michigan? 

Mr. ROSEN. I am generally aware of the public reporting on the 

matter. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Okay. Does CFIUS have the ability to review foreign purchases of land that pose a surveillance risk to U.S. Government sites? 

Mr. ROSEN. As a general matter, Congress gave CFIUS real estate jurisdiction for transactions in close proximity to sensitive facilities, and that is as identified by the Department of Defense and 

other committee members. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. So, that is a, yes. Okay. Do you believe CFIUS 

should have formally reviewed the Gotion deal? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, what I want to do in this setting, and 

again, I will reserve for future settings to talk about any particular 

transactions, but it is important to—— 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Okay. Well, let’s be more general. Should CFIUS 

be able to review deals like this that have been described? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, what I would say on this important 

issue, and I know it is important to you, and it is important to me 

as well, is that CFIUS has certain jurisdiction in close proximity. 

There are also certain areas that Congress was very deliberate not 

to provide CFIUS with jurisdiction over, for example, greenfield investments, licensing arrangements, and the like. And what I am 

trying to do is execute Congress’s mandate from a jurisdictional aspect. I share your concerns deeply about PRC access and control to 

our critical technologies, and it is something that we are very focused on. And I would be happy to follow up—— 
25 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Very briefly, do you believe that it is sufficiently 

tight enough, that you have enough authority, that the parameters 

are tight enough that you can review deals like this Gotion deal? 

Mr. ROSEN. What I would say is I believe that the authorities 

that Congress gave us are strong, and they are robust, but it is not 

unlimited as Congress designed it. 

Mr. HUIZENGA. Okay. I am going to close with this in my last few 

seconds. Michiganders and Americans, frankly, rightly are concerned about the CCP buying up land and utilizing taxpayer dollars in our States and elsewhere. And if CFIUS cannot learn from 

past mistakes or fully understand the adversarial nature of the 

CCP, I believe CFIUS needs to be modernized even further, and we 

need to review that and meet our current national security risks 

and the challenges that we face today. And as you noted, we are 

going to be going into an executive classified session later on today, 

and I will have some follow-up questions on this specific topic that 

I will hold for now. With that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity, and I yield back. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. The gentleman yields back. I now recognize 

the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Foster, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you. As you look at the balance you have to 

do, I think it is important that we recognize the tremendous benefit 

that the U.S. consumer realizes from the integration of our economies, with not only China, but with less-developed countries 

throughout the world. And anyone who says we should make everything in the United States, I invite them to come up with a business plan to make a microwave oven that will retail for $42, manufactured in the U.S. with highly-paid labor, okay? We just have to 

be realistic about this. 

On the other hand, putting pressure on the system towards 

friend shoring of these industries, I think is the right direction. 

You are an important part of that. Now, you have to evaluate these 

purchases or investments, both for the nature of the foreign government involved and also for the national security relevance of 

these, and this is really tough, and when you get into dual use 

technologies, for example, things like drones, which can be used to 

deliver groceries or deliver hand grenades. And it gets even tougher when you talk about technologies you mentioned, like quantum 

computing. 

Now, how do you actually get the expertise you need to understand whether a given quantum computing investment is just sort 

of an abstract theoretical thing versus something that actually 

might be of near-term use, and do you have trouble getting the expertise you need? 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes. Congressman, it is an excellent question and 

topic. And it is one that, as Congress set it up, CFIUS is well-suited to address because with our nine permanent members, in addition to access to other Executive Branch agencies, we have access 

to subject matter experts across the agencies to help us understand 

whether a product is dual use. Does the business even know it is 

dual use, but maybe somebody at DOD has identified a dual use. 

And so we leverage across the Federal Government the subject 

matter experts to make those determinations. And it is critical in 

our analysis to understand what those uses are and also to under-
26 

stand, as you point out, the balance. What are the commercial benefits of the technology? How are those used? And that goes into 

both our risk-based assessment about what the risk is but also 

what the right outcome in the matter is. 

Mr. FOSTER. Yes. And just what was previously mentioned about Gotion, for example, they just announced a $2-billion battery factory that they are going to be making as an investment in Illinois. 

And it is my understanding that it will be pretty much a copy of 

technology that they already use, and there won’t be, I don’t believe, a big national security downside of this. Also, we have to acknowledge the huge benefits that we get when we get foreign investment from any location. You know, when any individual or 

company comes in and buys farmland anywhere in the United 

States, as Representative Sherman mentioned, the American who 

sells that land gets to put that money in the bank or into other investments that will grow the U.S. economy. So, I think we have to 

look at this in a more balanced way than we are seeing right here. 

Now, back to the issue of getting the technical expertise, because 

in issues like the attempts that the previous Administration made 

in trying to shut down certain kinds of scientific collaboration, 

they, frankly, sort of covered themselves in shame by not having 

the technical expertise that was necessary to understand what was 

truly a national security risk and something which someone without the expertise thought sounded bad. Are you getting the responsiveness that you need and the expertise that you need from the 

agencies, or do you need a bigger carrot or a bigger stick to get 

more responsive, high-quality analysis of that? 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes, Congressman, I think one of the benefits of having nine members is not only do we have nine active members, but 

they are all quite active. We have full engagement from the committee, which is important. We can leverage the expertise across 

the members. We can get experts, for example, at the Office of 

Science and Technology Policy or the Department of Defense or the 

Department of Commerce. So, we are able to dig into these issues, 

which provides us with very important facts and analysis for us to 

come up with that determination, which very much relies on that. 

Mr. FOSTER. I see that as being a satisfactory relationship. You 

do get the responsiveness you need because there is always a danger if it is not the agency’s main line of business to say, okay, this 

is sort of a noise, we have to respond to it, but we are not going 

to put our best people on it fast. You are pretty satisfied with that? 

Mr. ROSEN. I am quite satisfied, and that is in part because of 

the relationships that we have. There are Assistant Secretaries at 

the various agencies that I engage with on a regular basis to make 

sure we—— 

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you. That’s good to hear. I yield back. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. The gentleman’s time has expired. We will 

now go to the gentlelady from Missouri, Mrs. Wagner, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Assistant Secretary 

Rosen, thank you for being here today. Congress enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) and the 

Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) in 2018, which I supported, to 

ensure that our export and investment control regimes were fit for 
27 

the challenge of safeguarding against predatory Chinese investment and business practices. These laws reflect the most comprehensive updates to CFIUS and the first, I think, long-term reauthorization of U.S. export controls in decades. Congress crafted 

these reforms to improve CFIUS’s ability to, I would say, connect 

the dots when investigating and mitigating the serious national security risks posed by countries like China. Mr. Rosen, how would 

you describe China’s strategy when it comes to its investments in 

the United States, and how have the 2018 reforms helped CFIUS 

better approach transactions involving China and other strategic 

competitors? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congresswoman, thank you very much for that question. What we see is what the intelligence community sees. It is 

what the FBI has talked about. We see a PRC with a demonstrated 

intent and capability to use any and all means, legal and illegal, 

seen and unseen, to gather U.S. critical technology and anything 

else that it deems is in the national interest. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Any and all, legal and illegal, these are strong 

words. Since these laws were implemented, sir, have you seen Chinese companies restructuring their transactions in an attempt to 

prevent CFIUS from using its new authorities under FIRRMA and 

ECRA? 

Mr. ROSEN. I want to be careful and reserve part of the threat 

discussion for the classified session. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Yes. 

Mr. ROSEN. But what I would say is that we are working very 

hard to stay on offense. That means understanding what our adversaries are doing, how they are doing it, how they are trying to 

evade our jurisdiction, and how we can stay ahead of it. And that 

is a good portion of how I spend my day, trying to think creatively, 

which this committee and Congress plays a critical role in, in terms 

of coming back and regularly reassessing our authorities, regularly 

reassessing where we can be stronger. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Are CFIUS’s current authorities sufficient to catch 

and address attempts to skirt its review? 

Mr. ROSEN. I think our authorities are well-calibrated to address 

the threat that Congress has identified and that we are working 

to address and assess. That said, we are constantly looking to assess whether we can enhance our authorities through regulations 

under the umbrella of FIRRMA or even whether we need statutory 

changes. 

Mrs. WAGNER. You need to keep us informed regarding this because it is extremely important to our national security and our future. Assistant Secretary Rosen, according to the CFIUS annual report, there were 8 covered transactions involving China and critical 

technologies in 2022, although it is unclear whether this includes 

re-filings. Has CFIUS approved any investment giving China access to critical technologies? 

Mr. ROSEN. What I would say, Congresswoman, is that CFIUS 

will never approve a transaction unless it resolves any and all national security risks that it identifies, critical technology and the 

PRC being very high on our list. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Good. Again, Assistant Secretary Rosen, when assessing national security risks, CFIUS seeks to know who the ulti-
28 

mate owner or parent company might be. Does it prove more challenging to determine these facts when a Chinese investor is involved? 

Mr. ROSEN. It can be. Ultimate beneficial ownership is a very important topic, as you point out. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Yes. 

Mr. ROSEN. It is critical to our work. We have ways to get at that 

information. We have access to databases, public and private. We 

also have a system set up where the parties are very incentivized 

to provide us any and all of the information that we need, and we 

have the ability to test that as well. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Is it as challenging when a Russian investor is involved, sir? 

Mr. ROSEN. Any time you have a foreign investor with the demonstrated intent and capability to get access to critical technology 

in any and all ways, we want to be very careful. We want to be 

very circumspect, and we are. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Lastly, if a foreign investor connected to adversaries like Russia, China, or Iran seized control of the U.S. business in the agriculture sector, do your current authorities allow you 

to review these deals for national security risks? 

Mr. ROSEN. The short answer is, yes. When a foreign person 

seeks to get control of a U.S. business, that triggers CFIUS jurisdiction. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. LUETKEMEYER. The gentlelady yields back. With that, we go 

to the gentlelady from Ohio, Mrs. Beatty, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our ranking 

member, and thank you, Mr. Rosen. We have kind of taken you all 

over the issues here, on this issue, so I want to try to get in two 

questions, one on the outreach to the business community. Can you 

tell me more about that, because I am always concerned about 

whether we are doing sufficient outreach to the business community to ensure education, awareness, compliance, and Federal regulations in the process. To what extent have firms indicated confusions over CFIUS procedures and determinations, and what kind 

of outreach to the business community have Treasury and your 

partner agencies done? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congresswoman, thank you for that question. We 

spent a lot of time talking about risk, but this is also a very important component to what Congress has set up and required us to do. 

These regulations, these laws, are cumbersome, and they are confusing, but intentionally so to make sure that we act as a scalpel 

to address the risk. So, we spend a lot of time engaging with the 

business community, engaging with our international partners, 

educating on not just sort of the nuances of the regulatory framework, but also on the risk factors that are important. 

And that is why the President’s Executive Order from last year 

was one of the reasons why it was important. Messaging to the 

public about the ideas, the issues that we are concerned about, critical technology and the like, how we view these risk factors is important so that businesses can continue to operate, they can continue to invest, and they can continue to do so with a real-time understanding of issues that may get CFIUS’s attention. 
29 

Mrs. BEATTY. It is interesting that you mentioned the Executive 

Order, which almost a year ago to date, if you are talking about 

the Executive Order, I think it was 14083, which expanded the national security factors considered by CFIUS. Can you tell me if the 

new factors were included: the examination of transactions; effects 

on the resilience of United States critical supply chains; and the 

technological leadership or aggregate industry investment trends, 

cybersecurity risk, or risk to the United States’ person-sensitive 

data? 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes. That Executive Order added factors that Congress started a very good list at Section 721(f) of our authorizing 

statute. That Executive Order added to that but also highlighted 

and sharpened CFIUS’s focus on some of these very important 

issues, for example, cybersecurity and data, a real area where we 

see more and more transactions presenting risk as it relates to U.S. 

personal data, which we try very hard to keep safe and out of the 

hands of our adversaries and those that would do us harm. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Are there any specific ways that you can tell us 

that the Executive Order has had an effect on the reviews and 

practice? 

Mr. ROSEN. Of course, Congress gave CFIUS the ability to look 

at any factor that CFIUS deems and deemed appropriate. I think 

one of the various benefits of the Executive Order was to sharpen 

the committee’s focus on some of these issues about emerging 

threats and emerging technologies. It is also to be able to show and 

tell to the public the issues that we are concerned about, and so 

we spend time talking about it, but we make sure that we look at 

the factors, again, on a case-by-case basis, as it may raise national 

security risk. 

Mrs. BEATTY. And lastly, and maybe in part you have answered 

this, but can you tell us if there are any ways that CFIUS has improved coordination with the allies and partners in information 

sharing or in the investment screening efforts mandated by 

FIRRMA? 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes, Congresswoman, that’s another very important 

area. We have an entire office dedicated to this kind of international engagement. Since FIRRMA has been enacted, we have 

helped other countries stand up their own versions of inbound 

screening, over a dozen of them. We engage in regular interactions, 

technical exchanges, tabletops, and, of course, we have used the accepted foreign state status that Congress provided in FIRRMA, to 

bring, as of last year, all of our Five Eye partners into that structure. And we have regular and active engagement because we recognize that the more that we do here in the United States—we 

want to prevent spillover, backfill of these issues to our allies, and 

as a result, we engage very closely with them. 

Mrs. BEATTY. Thank you so much, and I yield back. 

Mr. BARR. [presiding]. The gentlelady’s time has expired. I now 

recognize myself for 5 minutes. Assistant Secretary Rosen, you are 

doing a good job. I appreciate the work that you and your team are 

doing at CFIUS to screen malign investment, particularly from 

China, but as an author of the Foreign Investment Risk Review 

Modernization Act, I wouldn’t be doing my job if I didn’t offer some 
30 

constructive feedback, both in terms of CFIUS being under-inclusive in its screening and also over-inclusive. 

Let me start with under-inclusive. Grand Forks Air Base: It is 

disturbing that it took the Air Force commander and Congress to 

motivate CFIUS to list Grand Forks Air Base in North Dakota in 

its regulations and that such a glaring threat to U.S. national security wasn’t immediately on CFIUS’s radar. I do understand that 

CFIUS has now expanded the list of sensitive sites, but I am worried that CFIUS could be focused on the wrong activities, targeting 

benign foreign investment, but missing such a glaring major national security threat on our home soil. Why did it take the Air 

Force and Congress to apply pressure for CFIUS to begin investigating this real estate sale, acknowledging that, ultimately, 

CFIUS did block the transaction? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, thank you. I appreciate the exchanges 

that we have had on this important issue. Your leadership on 

FIRRMA has been instrumental. I think you raise important 

issues, and what I would say is Congress set up a system for establishing jurisdiction in close proximity to sensitive facilities. We 

have developed a list-based approach, as you have identified, and 

we rely on our partners to provide us with updates to what are sensitive facilities. There is active engagement, and that engagement 

has become more active recently, and we are in close contact with 

our partners at the Department of Defense and elsewhere to make 

sure that we are going to and do regularly update the list, relying, 

of course, on their expertise to do so. 

Mr. BARR. Thank you, and I look forward to talking about the 

list of sensitive sites in the classified setting. 

In terms of the other category of maybe being a little bit overinclusive, as you know, Congress authorized CFIUS to exempt certain categories of foreign persons known as accepted investors from 

the expanded jurisdiction and mandatory filing requirements. To 

qualify as an accepted investor, that person must, among other 

things, be associated with an accepted foreign state, such as Five 

Eyes nations, and the practical utility of the program has been, we 

think, limited by some onerous eligibility criteria. 

For example, not only must investors be organized under the 

laws of and have their principal place of business in an accepted 

foreign state, but an investor must also be able to demonstrate, 

with respect to itself and its parents, that the majority of its voting 

and economic interests are held by nationals or entities of an accepted foreign state or the United States, and that any individual 

or entity holding more than 10 percent voting or economic interest 

is a national or an entity of an accepted State. 

This requirement poses challenges for publicly-traded companies, 

which typically have little visibility into the identity and nationality of under-5-percent individual shareholders. The question is, 

how many, if any, investors have qualified for the accepted investor 

status? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, the accepted foreign state framework 

that you put into place in FIRRMA has been very important. We 

have been working to implement that. In terms of specific numbers, I would be happy to look at the annual report and look at our 

data and provide updates. I do think, however, that looking not 
31 

just at who the investor is, but issues behind that are important 

to our analysis to assess risk. But if you see an issue in this area, 

I am happy to look at it and work with you and continue to work 

with you to make sure that we are addressing the national security 

risk while also achieving Congress’ intent with accepted foreign 

status. 

Mr. BARR. You have a tough job, because we want to invite the 

benign investment, but also screen out some of this more malign 

investment like we saw at Grand Forks. 

Final question: On the Executive Order on investments in national security technologies and products in countries of concern, 

can you describe the role of the Office of Investment Security in 

CFIUS in the implementation of that Executive Order? And this is 

a bit of a follow-up to the chairman’s questioning because we do believe that OFAC should be the primary point on outbound investment. 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes, Congressman. Thank you. The way that I lead 

the Office of Investment Security, the primary function of which is 

CFIUS and leading that effort, it is envisioned that the implementation of this Executive Order will reside outside of CFIUS, but 

within the Office of Investment Security, working closely with our 

partners in the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), given the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorities. But that is the answer to your structural question. 

Mr. BARR. What we need is clarity for investors—green light/red 

light—not a bureaucratic black hole. With that, my time has expired. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Casten, is now recognized. 

Mr. CASTEN. Thank you, Mr. Barr. And thank you, Mr. Rosen, 

for your time today. 

There was a report in January of this year that CFIUS was reviewing Binance’s proposed $1-billion acquisition of Voyager. 

Binance has since withdrawn that proposal, but the reporting said 

that CFIUS was reviewing it on the basis of national security concerns. Are you able in this format to give us any color on why you 

were reviewing it and what concerns you had with that transaction? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, the short answer to your question is 

I would reserve that for the closed-door setting. 

Mr. CASTEN. Okay. Maybe we can follow up on that offline then 

or some other more appropriate setting. I asked the question really 

to make a larger point that last year there were reports that North 

Korean hackers stole more than $1.7 billion of cryptocurrency. I 

think over the last 5 years, it has been something like $5 billion. 

There have been public reports from U.S. intelligence officials that 

more than half of North Korea’s nuclear missile program has been 

funded by cybercrime and crypto theft. It is, of course, that we 

know that there is similar crypto theft and money laundering 

crypto networks that are driving Chinese production of fentanyl 

compounds. And we know that Iran has been using crypto to get 

around some of their sanctions. 

The Wall Street Journal reported that Binance has actually been 

assisting Russia in evading sanctions. Recognizing this isn’t all of 

it, but the public reporting is that the crypto market has at least 
32 

$20 billion in illicit transactions. My question for you in your capacity is, if we know that North Korea is stealing billions of dollars’ 

worth of crypto and using Chinese money laundering networks in 

order to fund their nuclear program, is it safe to say that poses a 

threat to national security? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, these issues around crypto and the actors that you identified are very concerning and ones that we similarly take very seriously. We would look at these kinds of issues 

in the context of a particular transaction. For example, one of the 

things that we look at is third-party risk, right? You mentioned 

hacking activity. We may be concerned about a foreign acquirer 

that may on paper not pose a particular concern, but we know that 

certain entities are trying to hack them and steal intellectual property or crypto and the like. So, I think we really need to look at 

this through a lens of the facts and circumstances of the particular 

case, but this issue of third-party risk and who the investors are 

and where it is coming from are issues that are very much on our 

radar. 

Mr. CASTEN. Yes. I have been only half joking to some friends recently that as long as we have anonymized wallets, all blockchain 

really is, is a lousy accounting technology because you can’t track 

the record of transactions. 

In April of this year, the Treasury Department released a report, 

‘‘Illicit Finance Risk Assessment of Decentralized Finance,’’ and 

they specifically flagged that there are loopholes within the Bank 

Secrecy Act (BSA) that need to be closed to the extent that they 

allow these distributed finance blockchain crypto companies to fall 

outside of the scope of the BSA’s definition of financial institutions 

to facilitate money laundering and other things we would like to 

protect against. I guess what I am curious about is, do you agree 

that we need to strengthen the Bank Secrecy Act and fix those 

loopholes so that we can prevent our adversaries from laundering 

money, evading sanctions, and potentially funding terrorism? 

Mr. ROSEN. These issues, Congressman, are very serious and 

ones that I know my colleagues at Treasury take very seriously. 

The BSA, of course, as you know, is administered by the Financial 

Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which is outside of my direct domain. I know these are issues that they are concerned about 

and they are focused on, and I would be happy to talk to them 

about following up with you. 

Mr. CASTEN. Okay. I want to make sure that you all and all the 

agencies have the tools to address it. And I tee that up to thank 

my colleagues in the Senate, Senator Warren and Senator Marshall, who have just introduced a bill, which we will be co-introducing in the House shortly, to close those gaps in the Bank Secrecy Act to make sure that we don’t allow people to use crypto to 

skirt anti-money laundering rules so that we can have a robust national security presence. I would welcome any support or guidance 

you have on that, and I would invite all of my colleagues on this 

committee to join me in that effort to see if we can make this bipartisan and bicameral, and close that barn door that we know is 

open. Thank you very much, and I yield back. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. [presiding]. The gentleman yields back. The 

gentleman from Texas, Mr. Williams, is recognized for 5 minutes. 
33 

Mr. WILLIAMS OF TEXAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Mr. Rosen, for being here today. 

The United States’ agricultural sector plays a vital role in our 

national security, and this sector contributes significantly to our 

economic stability, and is responsible for our nation’s food security. 

As we have talked about today, the increase in foreign investors 

purchasing farm lands to try and gain control of U.S. businesses 

in the agricultural sector is a growing threat. In my home State of 

Texas, foreign entities control more than 4.7 million acres of land, 

and that is a concern that my constituents have, and should any 

hostile nation want to cause permanent harm to our food supply 

chains, this avenue provides them with the means to achieve it. 

CFIUS has jurisdiction over real estate purchases, we have 

talked about that, and leases near military bases and sensitive government sites. Any acquisition of land in the U.S., particularly near 

military installations, must be handled with caution and genuine 

oversight. Could you elaborate on the current process CFIUS uses 

to review these deals, and how does your committee determine if 

a foreign purchase of agricultural land is a national security risk? 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you, Congressman. This is a vital issue. 

Issues, as you point out, like food security and our supply chain, 

agricultural security and the like, are very important issues that 

we take very seriously, and let me unpack that. There are a couple 

of ways that we get a jurisdiction in these challenges. One is 

through our control jurisdiction. Any foreign person acquiring control, broadly speaking, not defined as 51 percent, for example, of 

a U.S. business and agricultural business, for example, would provide us with jurisdiction to review the matter. 

As you point out, our added real estate jurisdiction that Congress 

provided us would also give us jurisdiction to review pure real estate transactions within close proximity, sometimes up to 100 miles 

of an Air Force base, and we have 875,000 square miles of coverage 

in that regard. And what we would do when we do have jurisdiction is look to our partners at the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

to provide us insights and expertise to help us assess the transaction in terms of assessing who is doing the buying? What is the 

threat from that individual or entity? What are they buying in agricultural business, farmland, et cetera, and what is the specific 

impact to national security? That is the analysis that Congress requires us to go through, and we would look very closely to our partners across the committee, including at USDA, to help assess that, 

and we have done just that. 

Mr. WILLIAMS OF TEXAS. That is good, the harder, the better. 

There is no question that China is a hostile nation towards the 

United States and that their goal is to weaken our country in any 

way possible, and the interference and aggression coming from the 

Chinese Communist Party poses a significant threat to U.S. financial systems. 

Our lack of information on China’s economy and the CCP’s continued abuse of the system in place has jeopardized our national 

economic security. There is a huge cloud of uncertainty surrounding the Chinese financial sector, their investments, and their 

industry practices. So this Congress, I have championed legislation 

to address these threats by requiring an analysis on the risks pre-
34 

sented by the Chinese financial sector along with a report providing recommendations on strengthening internal cooperation to 

monitor and mitigate these risks. We must hold China accountable 

for their abuse of the financial sector. I think we all agree with 

that. The question would be, has CFIUS ever had to recommend 

the prohibition or mitigation of a real estate purchase or lease by 

a Chinese investor? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, it is a good question, and I would 

want to look at some statistics, but I am quite confident that various instances of a controlled transaction or a real estate transaction, we have had experience in terms of mitigating. I am not 

sure if you said mitigate or refer? 

Mr. WILLIAMS OF TEXAS. Either/or. 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes. I am quite certain, although I would want to 

confirm. 

Mr. WILLIAMS OF TEXAS. Will you look at that and get back to 

us? 

Mr. ROSEN. Of course. 

Mr. WILLIAMS OF TEXAS. In the time I have remaining, can you 

quickly highlight the kinds of mitigation measures CFIUS would 

consider for a semiconductor deal involving the Chinese? 

Mr. ROSEN. PRC investment into a U.S. semiconductor company, 

while I don’t have the facts in front of me, would likely raise a lot 

of questions and analysis in CFIUS. The kinds of things that we 

would look at from the threat perspective is, who is doing the buying? You obviously said it is a PRC entity, so we would look at the 

intent and capability of the actor. It would be very concerning. 

Mr. WILLIAMS OF TEXAS. I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. The gentleman’s time has expired. I now recognize the gentlewoman from Massachusetts, Ms. Pressley, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Rosen, for joining us for this 

hearing. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 

States certainly plays an important role for our national security 

by sounding the alarm on foreign control of critical technologies 

and industries. I want to build upon and follow up on Ranking 

Member Waters’ question line regarding the Committee’s review of 

a country with many human rights abuses, yet seems to have 

evaded significant scrutiny, and that is Saudi Arabia. 

Saudi Arabia has a sovereign wealth fund called the Public Investment Fund, which has more than $35 billion in American companies like Amazon, Walmart, Rideshare, and the food delivery 

company, Uber Technologies, as well as the major ticketing platform, Live Nation Entertainment. Recently, the Saudi-backed LIV 

Golf announced a merger with the PGA. Mr. Rosen, I certainly do 

appreciate that much of the work is classified, but what can you 

share about the Committee on Foreign Investment’s posture towards Saudi Arabia, these investments, and reviewing the potential national security risks that are associated with them? 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question and for 

your focus on this issue. As a general matter, I would like to respond with a couple of points. One is that CFIUS was enacted not 

to be country-specific, but to look at the specific transaction in 

terms of who is doing the purchasing and what we know about 
35 

them. But Congress, in its wisdom, singled out foreign governmentcontrolled investments to pay special attention to and to create additional requirements when it is a foreign government entity or foreign government-controlled entity doing the buying, and we look 

very closely at those transactions when we have jurisdiction. 

And the other point that I would make, which is really essential 

in our analysis, which Congress requires, is what is being purchased? What are we worried about? Are we worried about U.S. 

person-sensitive personal data, for example? Are we worried about 

the transfer of technology, like critical technology? Are we worried 

about access to critical infrastructure or a sensitive facility? These 

are the kinds of factors that we look at in any analysis, but I think 

it is important to highlight the foreign government control piece of 

this as well. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Right. I appreciate that. I asked the question just 

because I did think that the jurisdiction was clear and was there 

and really just seeking transparency. None of us want to be caught 

flatfooted here, so I appreciate your response. 

But I do just want to double down on the fact that Saudi Arabia 

is an oppressive regime. And in fact, just a few weeks ago, human 

rights watchdogs reported that Saudi Arabia killed hundreds of 

Ethiopian migrants and asylum seekers who tried to cross the 

Yemen-Saudi border between March 2022 and June 2023. Additionally, a report by the U.S. intelligence community concluded that 

the Crown Prince, who oversees these investments, approved of the 

operation to murder Washington Post journalist, Jamal Khashoggi. 

In light of these human rights abuses, Saudi investments in U.S. 

companies, especially those in critical or sensitive industries, clearly warrant greater scrutiny. For example, building upon the question line of Congressman Cleaver, Saudis hold a significant stake 

in Twitter, or whatever Elon Musk is calling it now, and Twitter 

is within your jurisdiction to review as a global social media giant 

that has sensitive personal data on Americans, and is a major communication platform for government officials, including the President and your agency and the Department of the Treasury. Do you 

agree? 

Mr. ROSEN. I would agree that we have jurisdiction to review foreign investment, controlling investment into a U.S. business, Congresswoman. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Very good. Bearing that in mind, has the Committee on Foreign Investment reviewed any investments by Saudi 

Arabian companies and nationals into Twitter, specifically? 

Mr. ROSEN. I understand your question, Congresswoman, and 

these issues are important. They present complex issues and they 

require a specific case-by-case analysis. Of course, FIRRMA put in 

place strict confidentiality requirements, so whatever we can get 

into in a classified and closed setting, I would respectfully defer to 

that. 

Ms. PRESSLEY. Fair enough. In the end, Saudi Arabia should not 

be able to sanitize its image by sports washing, nor should it be 

able to gain sensitive data by investing in American companies. We 

need a review of these investments, and I hope the Committee on 

Foreign Investment will scrutinize the Saudi Arabian Government 

like the human rights abuser that it is. Thank you. I yield back. 
36 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. The gentlewoman yields back. I now recognize 

myself for 5 minutes for the purpose of asking questions. 

Mr. Rosen, thank you for being here today and for your long career in national security. It is a very important topic. Understanding some of the sensitive nature, any questions that I ask 

that the answer may not be suitable for a public setting, I understand. Please just let me know and we can address them later 

today. 

I first want to ask you about the CFIUS June 2023 report on 

Committee activities in the prior year. That would be the activities 

of 2022. As you know, Section 7(c) of the Foreign Investment and 

National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) requires an annual report 

on foreign direct investments in the United States by entities from 

foreign countries that comply with any boycott of the State of 

Israel. In 2022, the Committee identified 16 transactions involving 

investors that comply with a boycott of Israel, including one transaction involving investors from Iran. Can you elaborate on the nature of these transactions at a level that is suitable for a public setting? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, thank you for the question. I think 

putting in place these requirements for the annual report were 

very important. We take a lot of time, we look at a lot of data, and 

it is important for us, and we appreciate that. Specifically, I am not 

prepared to address that here, but would be happy to follow up 

with you. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. We will address that later this afternoon. At a high level, is there any idea that, and maybe we need 

to do all of this in this setting, but at a very high level, did any 

of these raise significant national security concerns? 

Mr. ROSEN. What I can tell you is that whether they were in connection with these transactions or other transactions, we would 

take a very robust review of, again, the purchaser, the threat in 

connection with that purchaser and what is being acquired, what 

is the U.S. business. So, we would very much scrutinize any such 

transaction, looking at those issues that Congress has prescribed, 

and, again, I will be happy to follow up in a closed-door setting. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. Thank you. And my last question on this 

topic is, in this section of the report, you mentioned that CFIUS 

could not independently verify the dollar value of 3 of the 16 transactions, meaning the total value of 7(c) transactions exceeds that 

which was reported, I assume. What particular barriers did CFIUS 

encounter that prevented CFIUS from independently verifying the 

dollar values of those transactions? 

Mr. ROSEN. As a general matter, sometimes we will run into a 

transaction that presents a sort of odd restructuring, for example, 

and it may not be your typical merger or acquisition transaction, 

and in some cases, it could be that. In some cases, it could be that 

the information wasn’t available. But again, with regard to these 

particular transactions, we would be happy to address that in a 

closed setting, and if we can’t, we would be happy to get back to 

you. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. Thank you very much. One of the most 

difficult aspects of policymaking is balancing free and open investment ideals with national security concerns. CFIUS has the au-
37 

thority to lighten certain regulatory burdens on investments from 

certain friendly countries. For now, CFIUS only extends these relaxed standards to the so-called Five Eyes countries, countries 

which directly partner with the U.S. on matters of national security and intelligence. And as much as you can, can you explain the 

specifics of how these standards are relaxed for investors from Five 

Eyes partners? 

Mr. ROSEN. Yes, and thanks to Congress for giving us the tools 

to be able to execute on that. As a general matter, when a country 

is an accepted foreign state, what that does is relieve investors 

from that country if they meet certain qualifications and criteria 

from certain aspects of CFIUS, for example, the expanded jurisdiction that Congress, importantly, provided over certain non-controlling investments into critical technology, critical infrastructure, 

sensitive personal data companies. If you qualify as both an accepted investor from an accepted foreign state, you might be exempt 

from that, for example. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. I have the feeling my remaining questions would probably be more suitable for the security environment. So at this point, I will yield back the balance of my time and 

recognize the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Garcia, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GARCIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to Assistant Secretary Rosen for being here and offering his testimony 

today, and I look forward to the afternoon session with him also. 

Foreign direct investment has played a key role in the Texas 

economy for nearly 2 decades. As of this year, over 1,700 foreign 

corporations are doing business in the State, and that is no surprise since the Houston area, which is the area I represent, is also 

one of the most diverse regions in our country. It is home to many 

first- and second-generation immigrants and their families representing regions from all around the world. In Houston alone, over 

5,000 companies are engaged in international business, and approximately 1,000 Houston firms report foreign ownership. Additionally, Houston recently ranked fifth in best cities for international business according to the Financial Times. All of this has 

created more than 110,000 jobs in Texas since 2015. 

As the interagency committee that reviews these types of foreign 

investments, your agency plays a critical role both by protecting 

our national security and by facilitating the approval of these 

major investments. National security is critical. That has to be our 

top priority. The challenge for CFIUS is ensuring its effective exercises in oversight of bad actors without discouraging the foreign investment that creates these jobs and boosts our economy, as it does 

in Texas. 

My first question really is much of the concern of others with regard to real estate transactions. The Port of Houston and the Houston Ship Channel in Texas is home to multiple strategic seaports. 

Houston is also home to a large hub airport, a world-renowned 

medical center, and, as I noted earlier, an area of much investment. Certain real estate transactions by foreign entities in proximity to ports are also reviewable by your organization. Does 

CFIUS’s review authority for real estate require additional clarification from Congress? I ask this question because last year, there 

was legislation in Texas, Senate Bill 147, that would totally ban 
38 

land sales to dual citizens and businesses associated with adversarial nations including China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Is 

State action like this harmful, helpful, or a distraction to your mission, or does Congress need to step in and further clarify any of the 

authority that you might have with regard to real estate transactions? 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question and for 

raising this important issue of real estate jurisdiction. It is quite 

important, and Congress recognized that importance in 2018 when 

it granted CFIUS this real estate jurisdiction for the first time because it wanted us to have jurisdiction of installations and facilities 

in close proximity to sensitive facilities. Since that time, to execute 

on that mission, what we have done is work with our partners at 

the Department of Defense and elsewhere to essentially create a 

list and assess what facilities around the country should sit on this 

list. They can have jurisdiction of up to about 100 miles of jurisdiction from a particular facility to get at things like surveillance, espionage, and others. And I think that the authorities are well-suited to address those risks in that regard, but we also need to stay 

on top of it. 

Just recently, we updated our list of sensitive facilities to respond to the evolving nature of the facilities, how they change, and 

to make sure that we are regularly assessing which sensitive facilities we should have on the list to make sure that we have jurisdiction when we need to from a national security perspective. 

Ms. GARCIA. Right, but my question was specifically with regard 

to any State legislative action. Is this helpful, harmful, or a distraction, or are we just going to sit back and let the States continue 

to file pieces of legislation like this? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congresswoman, what I would say is my role is to 

address the national security risk at the Federal level, irrespective 

of what occurs in the States, and I can commit to you and the committee that we will continue to do that. We will continue to assess 

the national security risk from a real estate perspective, from a 

controlling jurisdiction perspective, and from a non-controlling perspective. And that is what I am focused on, to make sure that we 

are not allowing any transactions over which we have jurisdiction 

proceed unless we have resolved any and all national security 

risks. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. GRACIA. I yield back. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. I now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 

Davidson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Thank you. Assistant Secretary Rosen, I appreciate you being here, and I also look forward to part two of this, 

but in this public setting, hopefully I can stay focused on things 

you can answer here. If not, obviously, we will cover them later. 

But looking through your 2023 annual report to Congress, some 

interesting observations of roughly 50 percent, on average over 

since 2018 of the notices and declarations wind up with investigations, and of those, a fair number, once there is an investigation, 

actually, almost half of those, 41 percent of those actually end up 

being withdrawn for some factor. So, how do you assess what you 

do follow up and do the investigation on, and then what is behind 
39 

that number of the percentage that just says, yes, we will withdraw? What is going on there? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, it is a good question and I appreciate 

any time somebody digs into the data in the annual report. They 

are important data points that Congress has prescribed. What I 

can share is that I am quite proud that nearly 60 percent of the 

transactions we review clear in the 30-day declaration period or the 

45-day initial review period. It is true that many matters go into 

investigation and some withdraw. The matters that go into investigation are when we cannot determine that a clearance is appropriate at the 45-day mark. That may be because an agency needs 

some additional time to conduct a risk analysis. That may be because we have identified a risk and that we may need to do more 

work in that regard. And so, we work very closely as a committee 

to make that investigation assessment, is the first part of your 

question. 

The second, with regard to withdraws, they can occur in a number of circumstances. The parties may decide that they need more 

time to assess what CFIUS is considering, for example. And one of 

the things in that data, which is important, is you will see a larger 

number of withdraws than you will of re-files because oftentimes, 

when we assess that there is a risk or a concern and we are prepared to refer a matter to the President, the parties will just voluntarily withdraw and abandon the transaction, or voluntary withdraw and divest the transaction short of a Presidential referral, so 

there is more to unpack in those numbers. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Yes, thanks. And no Presidential referrals in 

2021 or 2022, and as far as I know, none in 2023. Anything to see 

there? 

Mr. ROSEN. Only to reiterate my last point, which is that does 

not mean that CFIUS has assessed that a transaction cannot proceed or needs to be unwound from a national security perspective, 

because rather than face a public Presidential order of divestment, 

many times the parties will voluntary withdraw and go away. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Okay. Thanks for that clarification. One of the 

things that complements this was beneficial ownership reporting, 

and, frankly, that focuses on companies that really have 20 employees or fewer, and there is some concern that they are shell companies. Ultimately, everyone has to report at least once, but for the 

companies that a lot of the scrutiny is on with a handful of employees, what is the status of the rulemaking for that? When will this 

take effect, because talking to my constituents, whether they are 

big businesses or small businesses, or, frankly, even CPA firms, 

they don’t really know much about this? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, the issue of ultimate beneficial ownership is critical to CFIUS’s work. I know it is critical to our partners 

and other regulatory agencies, including FinCEN, which is working 

on this rule, of course, within Treasury. Beneficial ownership is a 

very important part of what we do. We need to assess who the ultimate owner is of the foreign acquirer so that we can fully and adequately address any potential risk, and we have the means to do 

that. On your specific question about the rule and the timing, that 

is not something that is within my domain, but I am happy to talk 

to my colleagues at FinCEN and see if we can get back to you. 
40 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Yes, so you are doing it now, even in the absence 

of this new reporting requirement, I guess, is part of the point that 

I wanted to make. And many of the members of the committee, certainly me, felt there was a smarter, better way to do it, in the ultimate way that it became law. And we would certainly be open to 

modifying it because I think you have some of the smallest, leastsophisticated businesses that will ultimately be subjected to jail 

time and massive fines, not that they will be targeted, but they 

could be. 

And I think the last thing I would just like to bring up is sensitive real estate. I think we will probably go deeper in there. It 

is not like China comes and says, hey, I am from China, I want 

to buy this sensitive property. How do you begin those review processes? 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. The gentleman’s time has expired. If you could 

respond in writing, for the record. 

Mr. DAVIDSON. Yes, I think in-depth will probably be in part two, 

but thank you, my time has expired, and I yield back. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. The gentleman yields back. The gentlewoman 

from Michigan, Ms. Tlaib, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. TLAIB. Thank you so much. Assistant Secretary Rosen, thank 

you for being with us this afternoon. 

We all know, and I think in your testimony you talked about the 

expanded criteria factors that have been now been taken into consideration since 2022 with the President’s action. And one of the 

things that kind of stood out for me is that from 2017 to now, was 

it double or triple the caseload? Is that correct? Can you talk 

about—— 

Mr. ROSEN. Nearly double. In 2017, we had a number of transactions, I can get you the exact number, in the 200s or so. And just 

last year, in 2022, we had 440 filings, the most ever, in part due 

to our expanded jurisdiction. 

Ms. TLAIB. Assistant Secretary, I don’t know if you would have 

the capacity, if you have the same number of folks on your team 

working in this area. Again, because of the criteria expansion, 

which is necessary for national security, how do you prioritize the 

caseload? I’m sorry, I am a social worker at heart, so I say, ‘‘caseload.’’ How do you prioritize what you are going to work on first 

and what is a priority, especially with—— 

Mr. ROSEN. Well, we too call it a docket and cases—— 

Ms. TLAIB. Docket, there you go. 

Mr. ROSEN. ——and all the rest. As a former DOJ prosecutor, I 

am familiar with the dockets. But what I would say is the resources that Congress has provided have been instrumental in 

making sure that we can implement FIRRMA, building out our 

non-notified capacity, to identify transactions that were not 

brought voluntarily to the Committee to building out our monitoring enforcement and compliance functions, for example, building 

out our staffing to address it, which we continue to do. And we are 

continuing to grow to address our broader case docket but also the 

broader priorities. 

We talked about accepted foreign state status, working with our 

allies. We have talked today about engaging with stakeholders, 

working with stakeholders. We need the capacity to be able to do 
41 

all of this. So, as we continue to grow, we do need to prioritize the 

threats to national security. And that is the genius behind 

FIRRMA, that the case-by-case review and looking at specific risks 

arising from transactions, I think gave us strong authorities to respond. 

Ms. TLAIB. Assistant Secretary, under the expanded jurisdiction, 

your authority now includes non-controlling investment in U.S. 

companies that maintain or collect U.S. citizens’ sensitive personal 

data. That can have an adverse effect on national security, correct? 

Mr. ROSEN. Correct. 

Ms. TLAIB. We know that the companies have a tremendous 

amount of control in collecting this data, and this is where I am 

mostly interested in protecting our residents’ privacy and so forth. 

Is it enough to engage in what they call one-off bands or interventions and investments, which may pose security risks regarding 

that particular factor? 

Mr. ROSEN. When we look at bad factors, Congresswoman, which 

I agree is a very important factor, what we are looking at there is, 

what is the vulnerability of the U.S. business? 

Ms. TLAIB. Like getting hacked into? 

Mr. ROSEN. Or who is going to get access, who is the individual 

or entity or government that is going to get access to that information? What do we know about their intent and capability to exploit 

that data for an adverse national security impact on the United 

States? 

Ms. TLAIB. Okay. Yes, literally, that data is going to be moved 

to another company that the constituent resident didn’t get a right 

to say whether or not that information can continue. Anyway, 

would the national security risks facing the U.S. from foreign direct 

investment be reduced if there were stronger personal data privacy 

or security protections in place, for example, if residents or U.S. 

consumers or users had a say in how their data was collected, sold, 

and stored by private companies? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congresswoman, it is an important issue. What I 

think is relevant to the discussion here is that Congress established CFIUS to be a tool of last resort. One of the things that the 

President has defined in order to act under CFIUS is that there are 

no other laws or adequate authorities to address the risk identified—— 

Ms. TLAIB. So, you are familiar with the European Union’s, what 

they call the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)? It is considered one of the strongest and the world’s strongest data protection rules. Do you agree? Are you familiar with their rules? 

Mr. ROSEN. I am generally familiar with the GDPR. 

Ms. TLAIB. Yes. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

Ms. TLAIB. Okay. I will send you the data because I really want 

your input about what the European Union is doing. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. The gentlewoman yields back. The gentleman 

from Tennessee, Mr. Rose, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROSE. Thank you, and thanks, Assistant Secretary Rosen, for 

being here with us. 

Mr. Rosen, it is my understanding that the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI) is only a non-voting ex-officio member of the 
42 

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. Could you 

comment on the current role that the DNI plays, and specifically, 

does she have sufficient time to be able to review some of the 

transactions that come before CFIUS? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, thank you for that question and for 

raising the important role of the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI) in our work. They are indeed a critical partner 

in our work, and they are a non-voting member, as I understand, 

and as prescribed by Congress, but that does not mean that they 

are not a very active participant and important player in our work. 

What they do is they provide a threat assessment in connection 

with every single transaction that is covered under our jurisdiction, 

and provide us critical intelligence so that we can assess the threat 

posed by the foreign acquirer. 

Mr. ROSE. And would it be helpful for the DNI to play a more 

active role in the CFIUS process? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, they do play quite an active role in the 

intelligence function that they play. And I think, and I don’t want 

to get inside of Congress’ head here, but my understanding is that 

given the intelligence nature of what they do, their role is to be objective intelligence providers in connection with transactions as opposed to sort of weighing in on policy. 

Mr. ROSE. How does CFIUS coordinate its activities with other 

U.S. Government agencies that have a role in protecting national 

security, such as the Department of Defense and the Department 

of Homeland Security? 

Mr. ROSEN. We are synced up very closely, Congressman. Each 

agency has dedicated teams. I have dedicated Assistant Secretary 

counterparts that we meet with regularly, that we review cases 

with regularly, and that we correspond with and talk to on the 

phone, but it is not just at my level; it is at all levels that regular 

meetings and engagements on our robust case docket do occur. 

Mr. ROSE. The President has the ultimate authority to prohibit 

or suspend a covered transaction if the President feels there is 

credible evidence that the transaction would threaten to impair national security and could not be addressed using authorities and 

other laws. Mr. Rosen, what controls, if any, are in place to ensure 

that a President with conflicts of interest could not allow a transaction to go through that would benefit himself or his family, even 

if it threatens our security interests? 

Mr. ROSEN. In terms of what controls may be on the President, 

I may refer you to the Department of Justice or somewhere else for 

that. What I can tell you is that within CFIUS, we have a very robust, fact-intensive process where we look at the facts, we look at 

the law, and we look at the intelligence, and we have a number of 

national security professionals who help inform that. And then, if 

we determine that a case can only be resolved by referral to the 

President, we get together again as a Committee to assess the facts 

and the law and the threat. 

Mr. ROSE. But it is safe to say that oversight of the President’s 

ultimate authority would rest with Congress or outside of CFIUS. 

Is that a fair statement? 
43 

Mr. ROSEN. I may not want to get into the separation of powers 

issue, but I will say that I think there is a very robust, objective 

analysis that goes into any referral to the President. 

Mr. ROSE. In what ways has CFIUS improved coordination with 

our allies and partners in information sharing and in investment 

screening efforts as mandated by FIRRMA? 

Mr. ROSEN. The short answer is, a lot and very closely. We have 

helped our allies and partners stand up more than a dozen of their 

own inbound screen regimes since FIRRMA has come into place. 

We have regularly engaged with them. We provide feedback, we 

provide technical assistance, and when appropriate, we do share information as permitted through the intelligence process. We also 

engage in informal discussions with them. And we have a whole 

team within the Office of Investment Security that is charged with 

not just maintaining those relationships, but growing them and 

making sure that our allies and partners not just have tools and 

laws on the books, but that they are executing against those laws. 

We want to see action and activity associated with those laws to 

protect the national security of not just the United States, but our 

allies and partners as well. 

Mr. ROSE. FIRRMA authorizes CFIUS to impose filing fees on 

transactions to cover the Committee’s funding needs. Have these 

fees been sufficient to cover your actual costs? I have 8 seconds left. 

Mr. ROSEN. I don’t have that particular analysis in front of me, 

but I would be happy to look at that, Congressman. 

Mr. ROSE. Thanks. If you could respond for the record, I would 

appreciate it. I yield back. 

Mr. TIMMONS. [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman from North 

Carolina, Mr. Nickel, is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NICKEL. Thank you so much. Thanks for being here, Mr. 

Rosen. Safeguarding our nation’s interests and preserving the integrity of our democratic principles are among my top priorities in 

Congress. I understand the need to address the potential implications of foreign entities acquiring farmland, particularly those from 

countries like China. While it is essential to inspect foreign land 

purchases to ensure they pose no threats to our national security, 

it is equally important to approach any potential legislation with 

care and consideration. 

Before I begin, I want to just draw a clear distinction that I 

think is important for my role and my approach to this issue. 

While we discuss our concerns about the actions of the Chinese 

Government and the Chinese Communist Party and specific corporations, these concerns should in no way reflect upon the hardworking, dedicated, and patriotic Chinese-American citizens who 

contribute daily to the fabric of our country. Our dialogue here 

today and every day should be guided by facts, by the desire to secure our national interests, and by a deep respect for every individual, regardless of their national origin. 

The rising tide of anti-Asian discrimination is very troubling for 

me, and touches many of the people that I represent in North Carolina’s 13th District, and we owe it to the Chinese-American community in the United States to be very precise in our language, fair 

in our judgments, and unyielding in our commitment against any 

form of racial discrimination or ethnic discrimination. But we cer-
44 

tainly have some concerns about farmland, and I want to get into 

that. I have a few questions. But first, I saw on your bio that you 

went to the University of Colorado? 

Mr. ROSEN. Undergraduate at the University of Colorado, yes. 

Mr. NICKEL. Have you been following the football team? 

Mr. ROSEN. It’s hard not to. 

Mr. NICKEL. Did you think at the beginning of the season they 

would be 2–0 right now? 

Mr. ROSEN. We are all very excited about the progress there. 

Mr. NICKEL. It has been a real story, but back to the questions. 

Given the rising trend of foreign entities, particularly from China, 

investing in U.S. farmland, can you tell me more about the measures the Treasury is considering to ensure that these investments 

don’t compromise our food security and our national interests? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, thank you for raising this issue, which 

is quite important, particularly this issue of food security, agricultural businesses, when they have national security impacts. And 

the Committee has various tools to be able to address these issues, 

as prescribed by Congress. Of course, our jurisdiction is not unlimited, as prescribed by Congress, but the ways that we get at these 

issues are through our controlled jurisdiction, and a foreign person 

acquiring control of a U.S. business, like an agricultural business, 

would give us jurisdiction to review a particular transaction. 

As we have talked about here today, the jurisdiction that Congress provided in FIRRMA to give us enhanced or new real estate 

jurisdiction over pure real estate transactions in close proximity to 

a sensitive facility—close proximity can mean upwards of about 

100 miles—so we have jurisdiction, in that regard, over some 

875,000 square miles of coverage in the United States. And what 

we do, in either case, is look at the nature and facts of the transaction because we need to address specific national security risks. 

So, we look at what entity or individual is doing the purchasing, 

and then what is being purchased and what is the potential exposure from a national security perspective. For example, food security, critical food supply chains, and the like would be things that 

we would look very closely at and circumstances where we have jurisdiction to do so, and it is an issue that we take seriously. I know 

it is an issue that this Congress and this committee is spending a 

lot of time on, and it is an important one. 

Mr. NICKEL. Thanks. Users of the USDA’s Agricultural Foreign 

Investment Disclosure Act data have noticed inaccuracies and 

underreporting under current disclosure requirements, and limited 

information is available on data covering land held by certain countries that provide tax-neutral jurisdictions for private equity firms 

like the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. Why is 

this data limited or incomplete, and how is this impacting our national security? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, it is an important question. I think for 

some of it, I would refer you to USDA. But what I would say is 

ensuring that we have a robust information collection process to 

understand what the scope is of these transactions that are occurring. What is the nature of these transactions? What is being purchased? And I understand there is some discussion about reporting 

requirements and making sure that businesses are reporting trans-
45 

actions. The more information that we can get to assess whether 

it is a transaction that is covered by CFIUS and whether there is 

a potential national security risk, is very important to our mission. 

Mr. NICKEL. Thank you so much. I yield back. 

Mr. TIMMONS. Thank you. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Assistant Secretary Rosen, thank you for being here. On September 15, 2022, Executive Order 14083, aimed at strengthening 

CFIUS’s ability to assess and respond to evolving national security 

risks and foreign investment, explicitly acknowledged that certain 

countries employ foreign investments as a means to gain access to 

sensitive data and advanced technologies, which poses a national 

security threat to the United States. Furthermore, this Executive 

Order established a clear link between the roles, activities, and capabilities of CFIUS and broader national security priorities such as 

safeguarding U.S. technological leadership and sharing the protection of American sensitive data and bolstering the resilience of the 

U.S. supply chain. 

One of the Executive Order’s goals is to harmonize and reinforce 

the various tools and objectives within the United States’ cybersecurity strategy, thereby fortifying the nation’s ability to respond effectively to evolving threats. More so than ever, and I think everyone agrees, it is clear that cybersecurity is indeed national security. 

Mr. Rosen, along those lines, how has that directive affected 

CFIUS’s work and protocols, specifically in relation to cybersecurity 

efforts? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, thank you. Issues around cybersecurity and data security and the like are very important and issues 

that we see emanate more and more, particularly in today’s age 

where we have technology and data flowing back and forth between 

businesses. And the President’s Executive Order was important for 

a number of reasons, but chief among them was highlighting these 

issues like cybersecurity. And while CFIUS has the authority to 

look at all sorts of factors, ensuring that CFIUS is laser-focused on 

cybersecurity and data has been critical. 

What does that mean in our day-to-day work? What that means 

is what we are looking at is access to sensitive personal data that 

an adversary or concerning foreign acquirer may get, and making 

sure that we are addressing that either through mitigation or 

blocking a transaction. But we are also worried about broader cybersecurity issues like a foreign adversary getting access to offensive cyber capabilities that a U.S. business may have. And so, we 

are thinking about this issue of cybersecurity and data quite broadly, as I know, this committee and Congress have been doing. 

Mr. TIMMONS. Thank you for that. How does the Executive Order 

interact with congressional forums such as FIRRMA and ECRA? 

Mr. ROSEN. The Executive Order is guidance to the Committee 

on Foreign Investment in the United States, and, importantly, it is 

the first time that there has been such guidance issued to CFIUS. 

Of course, we operate under our statutory mandate of FIRRMA. 

That is what determines what our jurisdiction is, that is what determines what analysis we go through, and that is what determines what our sort of broader authorities are, and so they interplay together in an important way. 
46 

Mr. TIMMONS. And after the Executive Order, has CFIUS placed 

an increased emphasis on cybersecurity? 

Mr. ROSEN. What I would say is, it has sharpened our focus on 

these kinds of issues like cybersecurity. We had been looking for 

a long time at issues like cybersecurity and data but not just as 

it sort of sharpened CFIUS’s focus, but also plan outward-facing 

role to the investment community, to transaction parties to understand that if they are engaged in a transaction, they should be 

looking at these issues as well. Cybersecurity, data security, what 

are the capabilities of the U.S. business? So, it was important from 

both directions. 

Mr. TIMMONS. In the time after the Executive Order, or just in 

the last few years in general, what cyber risks has CFIUS found 

to be most prevalent during your reviews? 

Mr. ROSEN. Congressman, again, it is a good question and it is 

an evolving one. It is part of our effort to be nimble and stay on 

offense and stay attuned to emerging threats as they present themselves. And the kinds of cybersecurity issues that we are focused 

on, I mentioned a moment ago, but they include cybersecurity tools, 

offensive tools as well as defensive tools. Understanding how our 

adversaries could acquire those tools and use them against us is 

part of our analysis. 

Now, of course, we are also focused on third-party risk as it relates to cybersecurity, so we may have an acquirer that is buying 

something and we may not have a particular concern about the 

acquirer, but we may have information that there is third-party 

risk because the acquirer has been hacked multiple times, they 

don’t have an adequate cybersecurity program in place, and that is 

one of the issues that we focus on sometimes in mitigation. So, this 

issue around cybersecurity has a whole host of implications, and 

there are various ways that the Committee can get at that. 

Mr. TIMMONS. Sure. Thank you for that. The gentleman from 

Wisconsin, Mr. Steil, is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. STEIL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 

very much for being here, Assistant Secretary Rosen. When we 

think about CFIUS, in many ways, we are making sure that we are 

safeguarding the United States and balancing that with not being 

overburdening in an unnecessary way on the economy. There are 

a couple of things I want to dig into here on the homestretch of this 

first part of the panel. The number of cases requiring mitigation 

has jumped nearly 70 percent, even in the past 2 years or so. Why 

are we seeing such an increase in the number of transactions requiring mitigation, in your opinion? 

Mr. ROSEN. Thank you, Congressman, and thank you for highlighting this issue. There are a number of reasons we are seeing 

more mitigation. We are seeing a range of threats that are evolving. We are seeing a range of vulnerabilities that are evolving. 

Data and cybersecurity, as we just talked about, is an increasing 

challenge. When we think about the types of transactions that 

occur that don’t involve sensitive personal data, those are a meaningful number, for example, and oftentimes, we believe that we 

need to mitigate those types of transactions, and the nature of the 

transactions are evolving. And the other aspect is we are refining 

our approach. We are taking a very, very close look at these trans-
47 

actions, and we are not clearing them without mitigation or referral when necessary. 

Mr. STEIL. How do you monitor that mitigation? Are people in 

compliance with the mitigation agreements you strike? 

Mr. ROSEN. We have a good solid track record of compliance, but 

we also have a growing amount of enforcement and compliance personnel. One of the first things I did when I came into this job is 

put out the first-ever penalty and enforcement guidelines from 

CFIUS, both to establish a framework for how we would look at 

breaches to national security agreements, but also to send the message that we are going to actively be looking at this. So, any time 

there is a breach of a national security agreement or a violation of 

our authorities, we conduct an analysis to assess what, if any, enforcement action we should take. 

Mr. STEIL. And do you believe you have the resources necessary 

to conduct that review and enforcement? 

Mr. ROSEN. We are fortunate to have bipartisan support from a 

resource perspective. It is a resource-intensive issue, and we want 

to make sure that we maintain robust resources to do that, and it 

is an area that we are growing in right now. 

Mr. STEIL. I appreciate that. Let me shift gears slightly here, 

and, in particular, talking about the jurisdictions where we are seeing these filings, we have seen pretty significant increases from 

places like Singapore, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, et cetera. And obviously, those are small-populated countries 

but significant in business filings. To what extent is CFIUS concerned about the use of third-party countries to evade intensive 

scrutiny, and how do you approach that? 

Mr. ROSEN. It is a good question. Ultimate beneficial ownership 

is the key to much of our work in assessing and getting behind the 

veil of who is doing the purchasing. And in each transaction, we 

will peel that onion as far as we need to go to make sure we understand who is behind each transaction. For a Cayman Islands entity, we are often looking at beneficial ownership that is not the Cayman Islands, right? So before we make a decision, before we finalize our risk assessment, before we figure out where we are going 

to take a transaction, peeling that onion is critical to our work, and 

we won’t do anything until we do it. 

Mr. STEIL. As you are looking at that beneficial ownership structure, you are peeling the onion, as you say, and I assume you are 

working with our allies to conduct that review? Can you comment 

on how that coordination with our allies operates, in your opinion? 

Mr. ROSEN. In terms of the ultimate beneficial ownership, we are 

relying on multiple databases, commercial and private. We are relying on certifications under penalty of perjury from the parties, 

and when necessary, yes, we are engaging with our allies, as appropriate, to share intelligence and to consult them, consistent with 

our confidentiality obligations and otherwise. But engagement with 

our allies in this aspect of our work and, more broadly, is also a 

key piece of what we do. 

Mr. STEIL. But is that a substantial piece of the work engagement with our allies? Is that an area where we think there should 

be additional effort put forth by policymakers? 
48 

Mr. ROSEN. Absolutely. One of the things that Congress wanted 

us rightfully to do is help stand up other regimes so that as we get 

tougher, our adversaries just don’t go to our allies and partners to 

get the same critical technology. 

Mr. STEIL. Thank you very much. Thanks for being here today. 

I yield back. 

Mr. TIMMONS. The gentleman yields back. I would like to thank 

our witness for his testimony today. 

The Chair notes that some Members may have additional questions for this witness, which they may wish to submit in writing. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions to this witness 

and to place his responses in the record. Also, without objection, 

Members will have 5 legislative days to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in the record. 

Pursuant to our earlier vote, we will close the remaining portion 

of this hearing to Members and designated staff identified earlier. 

The second panel will be conducted at HVC 301 of the Capitol Visitor Center immediately following the first series of Floor votes. 

The committee stands in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed 

session.] 
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