### NUM BER 13-08- 457- CV 

## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS C O R P U S C H R IS T I - 

## EDI NBURG
BA RB A RA

O’N EA L, A pp ellan t,
v . TH OM AS F ORE HA ND , A pp ellee.

On ap pe al f rom th e 3 6th D istrict Co urt of L iv e Oa k C ou nty , T exas . 

## ME MOR A N D U M OP I N I ON B efo re C h ie f Ju st ic e Va ld ez a n d J u st ic es G arza a n d V el a

M em o ra n d u m Op in io n b y J u st ic e Ve la This i s a n ap p e a l from a j udg ment ent er ed by the tr ial co urt i n fav or

of appel lee T hom as Foreh an d an d ag ai ns t hi s for me r w i fe, a pp el l an t, B ar ba r a O’ N ea l , i n a s uit in v olv ing thei r 1991 di v or ce decree. By fiv e i ss ues, O’ Nea l compl ain s t hat s he w as dep riv ed o f

her rig ht to a jury

trial, that th e evidence did not supp ort the trial court’s2

findi ng s, and t hat t he tr ial co urt i mprop er ly aw ar ded at tor ney ’s fees. W e aff ir m. I. B A CKGRO UND On A ug ust21, 1991, the j udg e of the 36th Di str ic t C our t i n Li v e Oak

C ounty ente re d a div or ce decree ending the marr iag e of O’N eal and Thomas. The decree, a g re ed upon by the par ti es, prov ide d f or

potenti al future conv ey ances to O’ Nea l of post -d iv or ce w or ki ng int er est s a nd ov er ri din g roy alt y inter est s acq uired byT homas if: (1 ) Thomas did not pay
m o n e y fo r t h e in t e re s ta c qu ir e d ; (2 ) T h o m a s p a id le s s fo r th e in t e re s tt h a n h e wo u ld h a ve if the inte rest had bee n acquired by a third party; or (3) Tho ma s acquired the interest throug h personal se rv ic es re nder ed by hi m, i n w hol e or

i n par t. On M ay 19, 2006, O’ Nea l filed an or ig ina l peti ti on in t he 156t h D is tr ic t C our t urg ing brea ch of

co ntract , conversion and b reach o f f iduciary du ty claims base d upo n T hom as’s all eg ed r efusal to c omply w it h c ertai n por

ti ons of t he div or ce decree w it h re spec t to po stdiv or ce w or ki ng int er est s and ov er ri din g ro y alt y int er est s acq uired after the p arti es’ di v or ce. Spe cif ically , O’Neal urged tha t the p arties en tered into a m arital prop erty cont ract w here in Thomas “ ag re ed th at w it h r espec t t o w or ki ng i nterest s and/or ov er ri din g ro y alt ies w hic h he
w oul d ac q uire. .
. for l ess than full and adeq uate cons ide ra ti on pos t d ivor ce, the par ti es
w oul d ow n eq ual i nterest s a s t hei r separate p ro per ty .” Sh e arg ued that she is ow ed oneha l f of an ap po rti on ed s ha r e of th e ov er r i di ng r oy al ty i nt eres ts r ec ei v ed by Nueces Oil throug h s ev er al ass ig nments thatoc cur re d after thei r div or ce. Pr ior to tr ial , t he par

ti es ag re ed to co nsol ida te t he c ase in the 3 6th Di str ic t Cour t, the court where the d iv orce actio n had bee n f iled. O’Neal ha d previously requested a jury

trial. Thomas obj ect ed, tak ing the posi ti on th at a jur y w oul d notbe p ro per

bec ause the s uitw as one t o enforc e the div or ce decree and a jur y tr ial is not proper under sec ti on 9.005 of theSect i on 9

. 005 st at es: “ A par t y m ay not dem and a j ur y t r i al i f t he pr ocedur es t o enf or ce a de cr ee o f 1 d i v o rc e o r a n n u l m e n t p ro v i d e d b y th i s s u b c h a p te r a re in v o k e d ”. T EX
. F AM
. C OD E A NN
. § 9

. 00 5 (V ern on 20 06 ). 3 Tex as Fami ly

C ode. See T EX
. F AM
. C OD E A NN . § 9.0 05 (Ve rnon 200 6). The 36th Distri ct 1 Cou rtente re d an or der dete rmi nin g thatO’N eal ’s suitw as a clai m for enfor cementof the div or ce decree and the t ri al cour t remov ed th e c ase from the jur y doc ket

. Af ter a no n -j u ry

trial, the trial court en tered judgmen t in favor of T hom as. T here af ter, the trial court ente red f indings of fact an d con clusions o f law

. Th e trial court found that: 1) the div or ce decree prov ide d that Thomas ag re ed that if he acq uired any w or ki ng i nterest a n d/or ov er ri din g roy alt y

i nter est s a fter t he ent ry of the decree for les s t han ade q uate cons ide ra ti on, e it her personal ly

or throug h any company

i n w hic h he had any

i nter est , t hen one -h alf of the int er estac q uired w oul d be ass ig ned, tr ansfer re d or hel d i n tr ustfor O ’N eal ; 2 ) T h o m a s wa s a p a rt o wn e r o f Nu e c e s O il Co m p a n y; 3) N ueces Oi l acq uired either w or ki ng i nter est s o r ov er ri din g roy alt y i nter est s in oil and g as lea ses after the decree; 4) T h e r e w a s n o e v i d e n c e t h a ta n y w o r k i n g i n t e r e s t s o r

o v e r r i d i n g ro y a l ty int er est s a cq uired byNueces Oil after the div or ce w er e acq uired for less than adeq uate cons ide ra ti on; 5) Th om as pe rforme d pe rsona l serv ices to Nuece s Oil; 6) Th ere w as no ev iden ce tha t an y of his person al serv ices w ere cons ide ra ti on for the acq uis it ion of anyw or ki ng i nter est s o r ov er ri din g roy alt y int er est s a cq uired by

N ueces Oi l after the e ntr y of the d iv or ce decree. II. I SSUE O NE A . Factual Bac kground O’ Nea l compl ain s i n h e r f irs t i ss ue th at t he tr ial co urt er re d by deny ing her
cons ti tuti onal r ig ht t o s ubmither cl aims to a j ur

y . Pr ior to tr ial , Thom a s o bje ct ed to4

O’ Nea l’ s req uestfor j ur y tr ial bec ause sec ti on 9. 005 of the Tex as Fami ly C ode precl uded her f ro m demandi ng a jur

y tr ial

. Id. The tr ial co ur

t hea rd arg uments on Thomas ’s moti on,
re q uest ed addi ti onal br iefin g , t ook the mat ter under adv is ement, and l ater

dete rmi ned t hat the a ction ple aded w as one for enforc ement of a d iv or ce decree u nder the family

co de. See id

. Pr ior

to the c our

t’ s r uli ng , couns el for O’ Nea l had filed an ag re ed moti on req uest ing that her ca se be c onsol ida ted i n the 36th D is tr ic t C our t, the c our

t w her e the dec re e of div or ce w as entered bec ause “s ect ion 9.00 1, Tex as Fami ly C ode, sta te s t h a t

s uit s i nv olv ing
a prior decre e of

div orce be f iled in the court tha t rende red the judgmen t.” W hen the case
w as ca ll e d f o r a non-jury trial, coun sel ma de n o objection to proce edin g w ithou t a jury pr esent

. B

. Prese rv at io n and St and ard o f Rev iew W e rev iew

the tr ial court ’s denial of a jur y tri al for an abuse of dis creti on. Mercede sBenz C re dit C or p. v . R hyne , 925 S .W .2d 6 64, 6 66 (Te x . 199 6). I n con duct ing an abu se of di sc re ti on re v iew , w e ex amine the e nti re r ecord. Id. W e f ind an a buse of discretion o nly
w hen t he tr ial co ur

t’ s deci si on is ar bit ra ry , unreason abl e, an d w it hout re ferenc e to g uid ing principles. I d. ; Dow

ner v. Aqu am arine Op erato rs, Inc. , 7 0 1 S

. W

. 2 d 2 3 8 , 2 4 1 -4 2 (T e x. 1985)

. A par ty is re q uired to ac t affirmat iv ely i n order to pr eser

v e the r ig ht t o c omplai n on appeal thathe w as deni ed hi s p er fected righ t to a t ri al by j ur y . Sun we st Reliance A c q u i s it io n s G r o u p , In c
. v . Pr o v ide n t Na t ' l A s s u r a n c e C o. , 8 7 5 S

. W

. 2 d 3 8 5 , 3 8 7 (T e x. App.–D all as 1993, no w ri t)

. If a tri al cour t proc eeds to tr ial w it hout a jur y , the party

must , in or der to pr eser

v e any er ro r by the tr ial co ur

t, “e it her obj ecton t he rec or d to the t ri al5

cour t' s a cti on or

i ndi cat e aff ir mati v ely in the re cord it int ends to s tand on i ts per fected r ig ht to a jury trial.” Id. T his is b ecau se “the rig ht in a civ il case is not self-ex ecut ing: to inv oke and per fect t h e r i g h t t o a j u r

y t r i a l i n a c i v i l c a s e a p a rt y mu s t fi rs t c o mp l y w i t h the
re q uirements of ru le 216;” onc e per fected, the r ight to a j ur y tr ial st il l maybe w aiv ed
ex pr ess ly

or by a pa rt y 's fail ur e to act

. Id . at387- 88. C. A nal ysis T he reco rd bef ore us do es no t show that O’Neal o bjecte d to the ca se going forward
w it hout a j ur

y or thatsh e i ndi cat ed in anyw ay to the tr ial courtthat she i ntended to sta nd on her r ig ht t o a j ur

y tr ial

. It w as Thomas w ho or ig ina ll y co mplai ned t o the tr ial co urt abo ut the p ro pr iet y

of a j ur y tr ial

. Thomas’ s obj ect ion w as heard on Oct ober 25, 2006. The nonjur y tr ial w as hel d on Ma rc h 27, 2008. Beca use O’ Nea l did not infor m the tr ial co urt of her int ent t o s tand on her

r ig ht t o a j ur

y tr ial , er ro r, i f any , has not been preser v ed. T EX
. R. A PP
. 33. 1(a). Regardless, even if O’Neal had preserved error, w e do not be liev e the trial court abuse d its disc re ti on. The ag re ed moti on, p re par ed by O’ Nea l’ s c ounse l, sh ow ed th at s he
w as inv oki ng th e prov is ion s o f the famil y co de. Therefor e, s he w as pr ecl uded fro m demandi ng a j ur

y tr ial

. See T EX
. F AM
. C OD E A NN . § 9.005. Fu rt h e r, the r ecord does not ref lect an y

act by the trial court d uring th e course of the trial tha t app eare d eith er arbitrary
or unr eason abl e. O’ Nea l’ s first is sue is ov er ru led

. III . I SSUES T WO T HROUG H F OUR A . Factual Bac kground Thomas F or ehand i s a n ow ner of Nue ces Oil Company . O’ Nea l w as an ow ner , but sol d her inte re st in the company in July 1992. At the ti me of tr ial , Thomas ow ned a one-T hom as de scr i bed a f ar m out agr eem ent as one “ when y ou o wn a l easeho l d, as oppose d t o owni ng 2 m in e r a ls a n d r o ya ltie s . Y o u o w n a le a s e h o ld th a t yo u a c q u ir e d f r o m s o m e o n e th a t h o ld s th e m in e r a l a n d o il r o ya ltie s . A n d yo u w a n t t o tu r n th a t le a s e h o ld

— p u s h it o f ft o — a p o r tio n o v e r to a c o m p a n y to g e t s o m e w e lls d ril l e d .” 6 third inte rest in Nuece s Oil, his son, Mikal, owned one -third and his dau ghter, Robin, also
ow ned o n e - t h i r d

. A t t r i a l , O ’ N e a l , Th o ma s , a n d M i k a l t e s t i fi e d a s w i t n e s s e s
. O’ Nea l int ro duced p o rt io n s o f the v ide o depos it ion s o f Mi kal and Thomas. O’ Nea l’ s c ounse l te s t if ie d re ga rd in g a t t o rn e y’s fe e s
. T h o m a s ’s a t t o rn e y a ls o t e s t if ie d re ga rd in g h is a ttorn ey’s fees. The di sput e made the basi s of O’ Nea l’ s sui t ar is es from tw o 1992 lea ses
. Thomas testif ied th at Nue ces Oil acquired the tw o lease s in 1992 , referred to as the Herring leases. The cons ide ra ti o n f or

the Her ri ng l eases w as a one- si x th roy alt y , c ust omary ter ms and obl ig ati ons of an oi l and g as lea se and a cas h bonus

. Thomas te sti fied th at i n ear ly 2004- 2005 N ueces Oi l entered int o farmout ag re ements w it h AM PAK Oi l Compan y and OGG P 2 Par tners. Mi kal tes ti fied th at t o d e velo p t hese prospec ts, AM PAK and O GGP each entered int o a far mout ag re ement w it h N ueces Oi l that cov er ed i ts 2 2 % le a se h o ld est ate i n the Herring lease . AMPAK an d OGGP drilled comm ercially produ ctiv e w ells. Nu e c e s Oil
a s s i g n e d e a c h a n i n t e r e s t i n t h e n e tr e v e n u e a n d r e s e r v e d a n o v e r r i d i n g ro y a l t y t o i t s e l f. Mi kal st ated that Nue ces Oi l re cei v ed one hundr ed doll ars an acre to e x ecut e the farmout ag re ements

. Acc or din g to Mi kal , hi s father di d notper

form any personal s er

v ic es w it h respe ct to the agreeme nt. In f act, h e said th at he w as un aware of any persona l serv ice perf orme d by Tho ma s. O’ Nea l te st if ie d tha t s he had not b een as si g ned ov er ri din g roy alt y i nter esti n the7

w ell s i n i ss ue. B. S TA NDA RD OF R EVI EW In he r sec ond, thi rd , a n d f o urth i ss ues, O’ Nea l arg ues that she est abl is hed her ent itlem ent to a sha re of the inte rests earn ed a s a ma ttero f l a w, o r that th e trial court’s f indings tha t she was entitled to not hing w ere against th e great w eight and prepo nde rance of the ev ide nce. Findings of

fact in a case tried to the court ha v e the sa m e f o rc e a n d dignity as a jur y 's v er dic t upo n j ur

y q uest ion s. Ande rson v. City of Seve n Poin ts, 806 S.W .2d 791, 79 4 (Tex . 199 1) ; Ashcra ft v. Looka doo, 952 S.W .2d 907 , 910 (Te x . App .–Dalla s 1 9 9 7 , wri t den ied) (en ba nc). F a c t f in d in gs are no t conclu siv e w hen a com plete reporte r's record
a p pears i n the r ecord. Mi ddleton v. Kawasak

i Steel C or p., 687 S.W .2d 42, 44 (T e x. App.–H oust on [1 4th D is t.] ), writ r ef' d n.r .e., 6 9 9 S

. W. 2 d 1 9 9 ( T e x . 1 9 8 5 ) ( p e r c u r i a m )

. We
re v iew a t ri al cour

t' s fact findi ng s for leg al and factual suffici ency of the ev ide nce. O r t i z v . Jones , 917 S.W .2d 770, 772 (Tex . 1996). W e rev iew the conc lus ion s d ra w n from t he facts to deter mine thei r cor re ctn ess
. As hcr aft, 952 S.W .2d at 910. The st andard of r ev iew for claims of legal and factu al suf

f iciency of the evidence g overn non-jury trials on the merits. IKB Indus . (

Ni ger ia) Ltd. v. Pr

o- Lin e C or

p. , 938 S.W .2d 440 , 445 (Tex. 1997 ). W hen a par

ty at ta ck s t he l eg al suffici ency of an adv erse findi ng on a n i ss ue on
w hich it has th e bu rden of proof , the party mu st dem onst rate on app eal th at th e evidence est abl is hes, as a mat ter of law , al l v it al f a cts i n s uppor t of the is sue. Dow

Chem . Co. v. Francis, 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d 2 3 7 , 2 4 1 (T e x. 2 0 0 1 ). “ T h e f in a l t e s tfo r l e ga l s u f f ic ie n c y m u s ta lwa ys be w het her the evidence at trial w ould ena ble reaso nab le and fair-mind ed p eop le to reach8

the v erdict un der revi ew.” C it y o f Ke ller

v. Wils on, 168 S.W .3d 8 02, 8 27 ( Tex . 200 5)

. In maki ng thi s d eter minat ion , w e must c re ditfav or abl e ev ide nce if a reason abl e fact finder coul d, an d di sr eg ar d c ontrar y ev ide nce unl ess a reason abl e fact finder co uld not. Id. W hen a par

ty att ack s the f act ual suff ic ien cy of an adv erse findin g on an iss ue on
w hich it has th e bu rden of p roof , the p arty mu st dem onst rate on app eal th at th e ad v erse findi ng i s a g ain st the g re at w eig ht an d pre ponderance of the ev ide nce. Francis, 46 S.W .3d at 242 . W e set aside a verdict only if t he evidence is so weak or if t he f inding is
so ag ain st the g re at w eig ht an d preponderance of the ev ide nce that itis cl ear ly w ro ng and unj ust

. Id. ; see Pool v. For d Motor C o., 715 S.W .2d 629, 63 5 ( Tex . 198 6) ; Cai n v . Ba in, 709 S.W .2d 175 , 176 (Tex. 1986 ). C. A nal ysis 1. Issu es T w o and T hree By her se cond and third iss ues, O’N eal urg es that the t ri al cour t er re d i n fail ing to find th at: ( 1) Thomas d id not p ay money for t he w or ki ng and/ or

ov er ri din g roy alt y

i nterest s Nue ces Oi l acq uired; a nd ( 2) Thomas prov ide d pers onal serv ic es that re sul ted i n N ueces Oi l acq uir ing w or ki ng and/ or ov er ri din g ro y alt y

i nter est s. Ac cordin g to O’ Nea l, the thr ee condi ti ons th a t wou ld cons ti tute “l ess than full co nsi der ati on” under the decree are tha t Thomas: (1 ) did not pay money for i ntere st s o a cqu ired; ( 2) pai d a s um l ess than the int er estco uld hav e been acq uired by a t hird par

ty ; or ( 3) he a cqu ire d t he i nter estfor personal se rv ic es he render ed. At the end of t ri al, couns el for O’ Nea l conc eded that ther e w as no ev ide nce that Thomas pai d a l ess er su m than “c oul d hav e been acq uired by a th ird party ,” and9

abandoned thattheo ry
. Cou nsel for O’ Nea l sta ted at tr ial that the sc enar io he w as re ly ing upon w as that Thomas w as re q uired to pay O’ Nea l becau se his in te re st had be en acq uired bec ause of the personal serv ic es he r ender ed. The tr ial co urt found t hat Thomas had re nder ed personal se rv ic es to N ueces Oi l, but ther e w as no ev ide nce that the p ersonal ser

v ic es w er e in cons ide ra ti on for int er est s acq uired by Nue ces Oi l. The tr ial court m ade no f inding w ith regard to w het her T hom as ha d pa id mo ney fo r the inte rest Nue ces Oi l acq uired. The ev ide nce at t ri al w as that Nue ces Oi l, not Thomas, h ad ac q uired an ov er ri din g ro y alt y i nterest

. The is sue before t he tr ial co urt w as not w hether Thomas, hims elf, did or did not pay

money
. R eg ar dle ss , t he ev ide nce at t ri al w as that onl y N ueces Oi l acq uired
an o v erriding royalty

interest. In fact, the re was n o evidence that Th om as individuallypaid any money for t he i nterestN ueces Oi l acq uired. The tes ti mony at tr ial w as that Nue ces Oi l, not Thomas, a cq uired th e l eases f or consi der ati on and proper ly reser v ed to i tse lf an
ov er ri din g roy alt y

after the w ell s prov ed to be commer ci all y produc ti v e and an as si g nment had bee n made. W e ov er ru le is sue tw o. In he r thi rd i ss ue, O ’N eal arg ues that the g re at w eig ht and pr eponderance of the evi de nc e es ta bl i s he d th at Tho ma s prov i de d pe rs on al s er v i c es r es ul ti ng i n N ue ces Oil acq uir ing a w or ki ng and or ov er ri din g roy alty

i nter estpos t- div or ce. At trial, T hom as w as asked if he “prov ided a lot of perso nal serv ices to sell the se dea ls” to AMPAK. He replied t hat h e provided no person al serv ices, be cause he w as in law school at the time. Mi kal tes ti fied th at hi s father ’s personal se rv ic es “d id not c ome i nto p la y” i n a rr a n gi n g t h e fa rm o u ta gr e e m e n t

. F ro m t h is t e s t im o n y, t h e t ri a l co u rt c o u ld h a ve deter mined that no personal serv ic es of Thomas w er e r eq uired i n ar ra ng ing the farmout10

ag re ement fro m w hic h the ov er ri din g roy alt y i nter est s w er e g ener ated. O’Neal po ints to te stimo ny at Mikal’s depo sition w here Mikal testif ied tha t he co uld not make a decision in Nueces Oil Comp any alone . W ith regard to AMPAK , Mikal said that hi s f ather

“w as in the loop. ” Assumi ng this ev ide nce coul d be cons tr ued to m ean t hat Thomas g ener all y

prov ide d pe rsonal s er v ic es to N ueces Oi l, there w as, how ev er , no ev ide nce that the s er

v ic es w er e c onsi der ati on for the reser v ati on of the ov er ri din g roy alt y int er est s i nv olv ed i n thi s c ase. The tr ial co urt hea rd the ev ide nce before i t and w as in the bestpos it ion to jud g e the credi bil it y of the w it ness es. O ’N eal di d notes tabl is h as a mat ter of law thatThomas p aid no mone y for t he mi ner al int er est s a cq uired by N ueces Oi l or

that his personal se rv ic es re sul ted i n N ueces Oi l acq uir ing the int er est s a t iss ue. The tr ial
cour t’ s fin din g s w er e not a g ain st the g re at w eig ht an d preponderance of the ev ide nce. W e ov er ru le is sues tw o and thr ee. 2. Iss ue Four O’ Nea l arg ues by

her four th is sue that the tr ial courterr ed becaus e she es tabl is hed
as a matt er

of law that Nue ces Oi l prov ide d personal se rv ic es that re sul ted i n i t obt ain ing
w orking and/o r ov erriding royalty interests a nd th at th e t ri al court’s failure to so f ind is against th e great w eight and prepo nde rance of the evidence. O’Neal claims tha t it is undi sput ed th at t he oi l company prov ide d personal s e rv ic es. I n g ener al, a c or por ati on canno t per

form personal se rv ic es. Tex. Int’ l Prods. v. M ustex, Inc ., 368 S. W .2d 2 7, 30 (Tex . Ap p.–F ort W orth 19 63, n o w ri t)

. Reg ar dle ss , t he i ss ue in th is case w as w hether Thomas perf o rm e d personal se rv ic es, not Nue ces Oi l. The pe rt ine nt prov is ion of the div or ce decree s tated “

. . . a n d /o r if s uch int er esti s a cq uired for personal se rv ic es rend ered by him , i n wh ole or in part. ” (emp hasis ad ded ). It does no t app ear tha t this11

is sue w as ra is ed by

O’ Nea l or

co nsi der ed by

the tr ial court

. Therefor e, it is w aiv ed T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 33.1. W e ov er ru le O’ Nea l’ s four th i ss ue. V. A TTO R N EY ’ S F EES O’Neal argues by her fif th issue that the at torne y ’s fe es awarded to Th om as w ere improper bec ause no s tatut e or

co ntr actal low s s uch re cov er y . She al so arg ues that the trial court erred in ref using to ma ke ad dition al f indings of fact w ith regard to the atto rney’s fee is sue as w ell as othe r poi nts i n the ca se. After hear ing ev ide nce by the par ti es, the tr ial co urt aw ar ded Thomas $29,425 .00 in attor ney ’s fees. The tr ial cour t did not make s peci fic fin din g s o f f actor co ncl usi ons of law w it h r espec t t o the att or ney ’s fee aw ar d, ex cep t to s ta te that Thomas sh oul d be awarded att orne y ’s fe es pu rsuan t to “app ropriate civ il statute s and the Fam ily Code. ” After the t ri al cour

t fil es or ig ina l findi ng s o f fact and conc lus ion s o f law , any par ty may re q uest spec ified addi ti onal or amended find ing s. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 29 8. T he trial cou rt shall f ile any add itiona l fin dings and conclusio ns tha t are appropr iat e w it hin ten day s a fter
a r eq uesti s fil ed. Id

. If t h e re c o rd sh o ws t h a tt h e co m p la in in g p a rt y d id n o tsu f fe r i n ju ry, the trial court's fa ilure to ma ke such add itiona l fin dings doe s not require reversal. Johns ton v

. McKi nney Am ., Inc ., 9 S.W .3d 271, 277 ( Tex . Ap p.–H oust on [1 4th D is t.] 1999, pet. deni ed) ; s e e T

a m e z v . T a m e z, 822 S.W .2d 6 88, 6 92 ( Tex . Ap p.–C or pus Chr is ti 1991,
w ri t den ied ). To obt ain a rev ersal , app ell ant mus t s h o w f ro m the re cord tha t t he tr ial
cour t' s refusal to fil e addi ti onal findi ng s o f f act and conc lus ion s o f law , as r eq uest ed, w as re asona bly

ca lc ula ted t o c ause and di d c ause re ndi ti on of an imp ro p e r jud g ment. D o n c a s te r

v . He r n a i z, 161 S.W .3d 594 , 608 (Tex. App. –Sa n A n t o n io 200 5, no pet. );12

T a m e z, 822 S.W .2d a t 693

. If the t ri al cour t' s refusal to mak e addi ti onal findi ng s does not pr ev ent an adequa te pres entat ion on appeal , t her e i s n o r ev ersi ble er ro r. Donca ster, 161 S.W .3d a t 608. The is sue is w hether the ci rc umstan ces ar e s uch that appel lan t i s for ced to g uess at the reason s for the tr ial co urt' s d eci si on. Id. Here, w hil e O’ Nea l filed doc uments requ e st in g a d d it io n a l f inding s, she did not actu ally specif y the f indings she w ant ed the tr ial court to ma ke. Her req uest looked more li ke pr opose d j ur

y i ss ues. R eg ar dle ss , t he trial co urt’ s fin din g w as that Thomas w as awarded att orne y ’s fe es pu rsuan t to the fam ily code and oth er app ropriate civ il statute s. The family

co de ex pr ess ly

prov ide s f o r a n aw ar d of atto rn ey 's fees i n proceed ing s t o enforc e the dec re e. T EX
. F AM
. C OD E A NN . § 9.014 (V e rnon 2006) ; In r e M ar ri age of Ma lac ar a, 223 S.W .3d 600 , 603 (Te x . App .–A ma rill o 200 7, no pet .). O’Neal argued in th is Cou rtthat

the fees w er e not authori z ed under the famil y co de or under co ntr actl aw

and br iefed t hose is sues on a ppeal

. She al so thoroug hly bri efed w hy

she beli ev ed Thomas
w as not e nti tl ed to att or ney ’s fees as sa nct ion s. W e rev iew

the tr ial court 's aw ar d of attor ney 's f ees for an abuse of dis creti on. See Cha vez v. C havez , 12 S.W .3d 5 63, 5 66 ( Tex . App.–San Anton io 1999, no pet .) ( inv olv ing the rev iew

of aw ard of

atto rney's fees in an enforcem ent p ro c eed ing i s und er an ab use of di sc re ti o n st a n d ar d) ; Schn eide r v. Schneid er, 5 S.W .3d 925 , 930 (Tex. App. –Au stin 1 9 9 9 , n o p e t

. ) ( s a m e ). A t ri a l c o u rt a b u s e s it s d is c re t io n wh e n ita c t s a rb it ra ri ly,
unr eason abl y , or

w it hout re ferenc e to any g uid ing pri nci ple s. In his ans w er , Thomas
re q uest ed at tor ney ’s fees und er the family

co de, a lt houg h he ple aded for fees und er

theT h o m a s i m p r o p e r ly p le a d e d f o r a tt o r n e y’s f e e s u n d e r s e c tio n s 1 0 6 .0 0 1 a n d 1 0 6 .0 0 2 o fth e f a m ily 3 c o d e
. T EX
. F AM
. C OD E A NN
. §§ 106. 001-

. 002 ( Ver non 2008)

. T hese sect i ons deal wi t h at t or ney ’ s f ees a nd c o s ts i n s u i ts i n v o l v i n g th e p a re n t-c h i l d re l a ti o n s h i p
. 13 w rong se ction of

t he code

. He also plea ded gen erallyf or a ttorn ey’s fees. T he trial cou rt

3 had author it y

under sec ti on 9.014 to aw ar d attor ney ’s f ees in thi s a cti on. See T EX
. F AM
. C OD E A NN . § 9.0 14. A general request for atto rney's fees in th e prayer of the ple adin g is it sel f suff ic ien t t o aut hor iz e the aw ar d of atto rn ey 's fees. Tull v. Tull , 159 S.W .3d 7 58, 7 62 (Tex . Ap p.–D all as 2005, no pet .)

. The tr ial co urt di d not er r in faili ng to make a ddi ti onal fact f indings. How ever, ev en if the trial court did err, the error w as h a rmless be cause O’Neal w as ab le to ad equate ly presen t her issues to this Court. Accordin gly , the trial court did not abuse its di sc re ti on in aw ar din g attor ney ’s f ees. W e ov er ru le O’ Nea l’ s fifth i ss ue. VI. C ONCL US I ON The ju dg ment of the tr ial co urt i s a ff ir med.

RO SE VELA J u s t i c e

Me moran dum Opi nio n del iv er ed and filed thi s 2 nd day

of Jul y , 200 9.