```

[Senate Hearing 115-879]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                        S. Hrg. 115-879

 HAWAII FALSE MISSILE ALERT: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT?

=======================================================================

                             FIELD HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                      SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                             APRIL 5, 2018
                               __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                             Transportation
                             
                             
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                             

                Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov
                
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
57-801 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2025                   

       SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                     ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                   JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi            BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
TED CRUZ, Texas                      AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DEAN HELLER, Nevada                  TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma               GARY PETERS, Michigan
MIKE LEE, Utah                       TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado               CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada
TODD YOUNG, Indiana                  JON TESTER, Montana
                       Nick Rossi, Staff Director
                 Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
                    Jason Van Beek, General Counsel
                 Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
              Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
                      Renae Black, Senior Counsel

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hearing held on April 5, 2018....................................     1
Statement of Senator Schatz......................................     1

                               Witnesses

Hon. Mazie Hirono, U.S. Senator from Hawaii......................     2
Hon. Colleen Hanabusa, U.S. Representative from Hawaii...........     3
Hon. Tulsi Gabbard, U.S. Representative from Hawaii..............     5
Hon. Jessica Rosenworcel, Commissioner, Federal Communications 
  Commission.....................................................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................     8
Rear Admiral Patrick A. Piercey, United States Pacific Command, 
  U.S. Department of Defense.....................................    17
    Prepared statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., U.S. Navy 
      Commander, U.S. Pacific Command............................    18
Nicole McGinnis, Deputy Chief, Public Safety and Homeland 
  Security Bureau, Federal Communications Commission.............    21
    Prepared statement...........................................    22
Antwane Johnson, Director, Continuity Communications Division, 
  Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of 
  Homeland Security..............................................    24
    Prepared statement...........................................    26
Major General Arthur J. Logan, Adjutant General and Director, 
  Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, State of Hawaii, Department 
  of Defense.....................................................    40
    Prepared statement...........................................    42
Chris Leonard, President and Legislative Chair, Hawaii 
  Association of Broadcasters, Inc...............................    43
    Prepared statement...........................................    45

 
 HAWAII FALSE MISSILE ALERT: WHAT HAPPENED AND WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT?

                              ----------                              

                        THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 2018

                                       U.S. Senate,
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                      Honolulu, HI.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. HST, 
at 1601 East-West Road, East-West Center, Keoni Auditorium, 
Hon. Brian Schatz, presiding.
    Present: Senator Schatz [presiding], Senator Hirono.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN SCHATZ, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

    Senator Schatz. Good morning. On behalf of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, I would like to welcome everyone to today's 
hearing on Hawaii's Emergency Alert System. I want to thank 
Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson for working with me to 
convene this hearing, and to the FCC, especially Chairman Pai 
and Commissioner Rosenworcel for their support, including the 
resources that they've devoted to the FCC's investigation.
    I also want to thank each of the witnesses who are here 
today to testify, and the members of our delegation--Senator 
Hirono, Congresswoman Hanabusa, and Congresswoman Gabbard--for 
being here and for our partnership in the aftermath of the 
false alarm; and, of course, finally, to the East-West Center 
for hosting this hearing.
    What happened in Hawaii on January 13 raised some basic 
policy questions. Right now, any city, county, or state can 
choose to participate in the Emergency Alert System, and when 
they do, they get the technical capacity to get the word out, 
but that does not make them experts to know when a missile is 
coming. That ability rests with the Department of Defense. And 
it is increasingly clear that if--that we are not going to get 
all 50 states and 3,007 counties to voluntarily participate in 
such a program. But even if we did, it is possible, even 
likely, that we will have another mistaken missile alert as a 
result of human error or a security breach.
    Local officials have the lead on disaster response and 
recovery, but if the Federal Government knows a missile is 
coming, they should have the responsibility to inform the 
public. In other words, a missile attack is not a local 
question. The people who know first should be the people who 
tell the rest of us.
    Now, I understand that when it comes to natural disasters, 
we take a different approach, but it's clear that a missile 
threat is fundamentally different from tsunamis, hurricanes, or 
other threats that we routinely face. Congress needs to decide 
who should be responsible for notifying the public of a missile 
attack. It is my judgment that there is nothing more Federal 
than an incoming ICBM.
    The false alarm in Hawaii also highlighted some of the 
weaknesses in the State's Emergency Alert System, which had a 
poorly designed user interface and did not have a verification 
system to prevent mistakes. The incident made clear the need 
for Federal standards in the system and raised basic questions 
about who should be doing this kind of thing.
    And that's why in January, I joined with Senators Harris, 
Gardner, and Hirono, and others to introduce the ALERT Act. 
This bill gives the Federal Government the primary 
responsibility of notifying the public of a missile threat. The 
bill would also strengthen the way states and counties use 
IPAWS, the FEMA platform used by emergency management 
professionals to issue warnings. The ALERT Act is now in the 
DHS authorization bill, which has been passed by the Senate 
Homeland Security Committee, and is pending a vote in the full 
Senate.
    The false missile alert also made clear the need for 
improvements to the distribution side of our Emergency Alert 
System. So I'm also preparing a companion bill to the ALERT Act 
called the READI Act. The READI Act would take steps to update 
the broadcast and mobile phone systems that actually deliver 
the emergency warnings initiated by government entities. The 
READI Act would close gaps in these systems so that they don't 
fall behind as technology advances. It would also require the 
FCC to set best practices and update the process for creating 
and approving the State plans that organize these emergency 
response systems and the networks that deliver the alerts. On 
the State level, steps have been taken by HI-EMA and others to 
address some of the issues that caused the false alarm, but 
questions remain about what happened on that day.
    We intend for this hearing to be constructive and clear-
eyed. We will not shy away from necessary accountability during 
this oversight process, but we also need to clarify what to do 
next in order to keep everyone safe, and most importantly, to 
ensure that we can all have confidence when future alerts 
occur.
    I'll now turn it over to my colleague in the Senate, 
Senator Hirono, for her opening remarks.

                STATEMENT OF HON. MAZIE HIRONO, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

    Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Schatz and 
all of you, for convening this important field hearing to 
assess how the Hawaii Emergency Alert System failed on January 
13, 2018, and what specific remedies exist to fix the system so 
that this never happens again. This hearing presents a good 
opportunity to bring State and Federal officials together to 
work to regain the public's trust after such a traumatizing 
event.
    It bears repeating that it took the Hawaii Emergency 
Management Agency 38 minutes from the initial emergency alert 
being sent for them to officially notify the public that there 
was no inbound missile, that it was a false alarm, and that the 
alert had been sent in error. While the relief was palpable, it 
gave way to real visceral anger, anger that there was a false 
alarm, anger that it took 38 minutes to alert the public, anger 
that we faced a missile threat in the first place.
    The fact that the people of Hawaii and the hundreds of 
thousands of visitors in the State that day immediately 
presumed the missile originated from North Korea speaks to the 
broader concern about the potential for conflict and the threat 
that North Korea poses to Hawaii and the Nation. And this 
threat is real, and people across Hawaii and our country need 
to have confidence in the government to provide accurate 
information about potential threats. It's one of the reasons 
why today's hearing and discussion is important.
    Our congressional delegation is of one mind in getting to 
the bottom of what happened and making sure that it never 
happens again. With each of us sitting on different committees 
of jurisdiction, we've been able to engage with a full range of 
stakeholders on this important issue.
    Over the past 3 months, I have focused on clarifying what 
role the Federal Government can play in supporting State level 
emergency preparedness and response and what it can do to 
prevent the incident, this kind of incident, from occurring 
again.
    Through my work on the Armed Services Committee and in 
conversations with senior officials, like Secretary of Defense 
Mattis, then Secretary of State Tillerson, and Admiral Harris, 
of PACOM, I've emphasized the critical role of diplomacy in 
deescalating tensions with North Korea so that we can prevent a 
missile strike from coming our way in the first place.
    I've also engaged with the Secretary of Department of 
Homeland Security Nielsen about how to strengthen Federal-State 
cooperation on emergency alerts and secure the commitment from 
the Department's Inspector General's Office to examine the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency's oversight of the 
Emergency Alert System, and our entire Nation will benefit if 
key Federal agencies work with states to close gaps in training 
and communication, institute best practices, and ensure that 
our states and local governments have the appropriate resources 
to prevent an incident like this from happening again.
    Once again, mahalo to Senator Schatz for convening this 
hearing today, and to all of our witnesses for coming together 
to address this important issue. It will take all of us working 
together to ensure that we've learned the right lessons from 
this incident and that longstanding improvements have been made 
to the Emergency Alert System.
    Mahalo.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    Congresswoman Hanabusa.

              STATEMENT OF HON. COLLEEN HANABUSA, 
                U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII

    Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Senator Schatz. I do want to say 
again the appreciation for you and the convening of this 
hearing, and for the Senate for taking the lead on this. It is 
very important for the people of Hawaii.
    Let us understand why we are all here. It really is the 
public confidence of the people. We have elected officials, but 
as government itself, the most important thing we have to do is 
to ensure that the public believes that we know what we're 
doing, and it is a situation like this that causes them pause, 
causes them to question, but more critically than all of that 
is when they wonder whether we even know what we're doing or 
what did we do.
    This hearing is so important because we need to assuage all 
those fears and those questions, the anger, as Senator Hirono 
pointed out. There was a lot of anger, but imagine the anxiety 
that many of them went through. That father, that image that 
flashed across the whole Nation of him placing his child in a 
storm drain. What--what do we do now to say, ``Look, we have 
learned''? And that's what this is about. It is about what we 
have learned. And it also is about, How do we begin to address 
so that it will not happen again, not of this type of situation 
where people are saying, ``Why did it take 38 minutes?'' or, 
``Why is it that we couldn't have been told immediately?''
    It is not the intent of all of us to point fingers or to 
say this person was wrong or that person was wrong or this 
government entity failed, but it is to say, How do we now come 
back to all of you and say to the public that we are addressing 
the major mishaps? Part of addressing the major mishaps is not 
simply identifying what happened, it is giving people the sense 
of security that we really do know what we're doing.
    I share the sentiment that Senator Schatz initially stated, 
which is that maybe when it comes to natural disasters, or 
disasters period, or warning, or HI-EMA's jurisdiction, maybe 
it is time for us to draw the distinction between that which is 
a, quote, natural disaster--hurricanes, basically tsunamis, 
floods--maybe that's one category, but when it comes to 
ballistic missiles, maybe that should be a separate category.
    And I still recall that day. What caused so many people 
pause was when that banner went up on one of the television 
stations that says, ``PACOM confirms.'' That I think set a 
different tone for everything that was happening. And we have 
subsequently learned that PACOM is part of this system. So the 
sirens went off in Pearl Harbor. The Pearl Harbor workers also 
ran off the base and drove off the base. So the question 
becomes, Why? And who should address it?
    Representative Gabbard and I have asked the House Armed 
Services Committee to look into that because we do believe that 
there is a role that the military has to play, and the role 
that the military has to play is one of really assuring the 
people across the United States, but especially in Hawaii, when 
we look at PACOM, that in fact it is a true situation versus, 
quote, a drill.
    So this hearing, I hope, will help all of you understand 
and get the people at least some sense of public confidence 
again that government can do this right and government is 
asking the right questions.
    So again, Senator Schatz, thank you so very much, and 
Senator Hirono as well, for the Senate's leadership in this 
matter.
    Mahalo.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    Congresswoman Gabbard.

               STATEMENT OF HON. TULSI GABBARD, 
                U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM HAWAII

    Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Senator Schatz and your Committee, 
for convening this very important hearing today. It's important 
that these conversations not only happen in Washington, but 
that they happen here in Hawaii.
    Mahalo to our witnesses for coming and joining us today. 
And thanks to the East-West Center for hosting us.
    What happened on January 13 was a wake-up call for everyone 
here in Hawaii and to leaders across the country, really 
showing barely the stark reality of what the chaos of a nuclear 
strike on Hawaii would be like. We saw many of those powerful 
images, and I still hear from constituents across the state now 
about what they did during those minutes following that false 
missile alert, the tough choices that they were having to make 
about how they would spend those last--what they thought were 
those last remaining minutes of their lives.
    They remain frustrated with a lack of clear answers and 
really clear direction on, What do we do? What do people do in 
this situation? I look forward to the conversations this 
morning to be able to help provide those answers.
    I've heard from many of my colleagues in Congress who have 
watched closely what happened here in Hawaii, and causing them 
now to ask questions within their own states, within their own 
communities, about their level of preparedness, and their 
actions that they can take now to make sure that something like 
this does not happen there.
    Along with Congresswoman Hanabusa, I have introduced two 
bills in the House of Representatives to help deal with some of 
these issues. The first is the Civil Defense Accountability 
Act, which is really focused and centered around transparency 
and accountability, requiring public reporting from the Federal 
agencies involved, including FEMA, the Department of Defense, 
and the FCC, to make sure that the lessons learned here in 
Hawaii are shared in communities and states across the country, 
and requiring the Department of Homeland Security to review the 
current notification protocols for these ballistic missile 
threats, studying the best practices regarding civil defense 
emergencies, to prevent a similar catastrophic mistake from 
happening again.
    The second bill is the Civil Defense Preparedness Act, 
which would expand existing Department of Homeland Security 
terrorism and catastrophic event grant programs to include 
improving nuclear, biological, and chemical attack 
preparedness. Like I said, this event has really laid bare the 
lack of preparedness and the lack of response plans in place 
and the need for resources to our communities and our states to 
be able to harden the infrastructure and to put these plans in 
place. The grants could be used for things like training, 
protective equipment, building reinforcements, and other 
community preparedness measures to ensure that our local and 
State governments have the support that they need.
    One glaring problem that came to light was that many cell 
phones and wireless phones did not receive the wireless 
emergency alert. Different people in different parts of the 
state, for one reason or another, did not even know that this 
false missile alert had gone out. This is something that needs 
to be resolved. It also again became very clear the lack of 
response plans in place both at the leadership level as well as 
within the community on what would happen if this were not a 
false missile alert, if the alert were real, and we were facing 
a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack.
    What Hawaii went through in January can never happen again. 
We must take the corrective actions necessary to make sure that 
a false alert never goes on, but we also have to make sure that 
we are prepared in the event of a real attack. We have to 
improve our emergency alert dissemination to fit with the 
changing technological environment and ensure that everyone is 
reached and fully informed. We will continue to work to 
strengthen our missile defense systems, but most importantly, 
we have to do all that we can to deal with this underlying 
threat and the fact that we are facing this threat at all. We 
need to exhaust all diplomatic efforts to continue to work 
toward denuclearizing North Korea, bring about peace, and 
prevent an all-out catastrophic war.
    Thank you, Senator Schatz. Thank you to our witnesses. I 
look forward to our conversation.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Congresswoman Gabbard.
    We will start with our first panel. We're going to have 5 
minutes of testimony and 5-minute rounds of questions from each 
of the members of the delegation. And we want to thank Jessica 
Rosenworcel, FCC Commissioner, for being here.
    Ms. Rosenworcel.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JESSICA ROSENWORCEL, COMMISSIONER, FEDERAL 
                   COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

    Ms. Rosenworcel. Good morning to the members of the Senate 
Commerce Committee in absentia, and in particular to Senator 
Schatz, whose leadership has brought us all here today.
    Years ago, I had the privilege of serving as Counsel to the 
late Senator Inouye, who was then the Chairman of this 
Committee, so it's a special treat to be back here in the Aloha 
state.
    I'm also so glad that Senator Hirono, Representative 
Hanabusa, and Representative Gabbard are here to join this 
important discussion.
    Back in Washington, I serve as a Commissioner at the 
Federal Communications Commission. Every day I see how 
communications technology is changing every aspect of civic and 
commercial life. And when it comes to the most critical aspect 
of our communications, emergency alerts, I know that we bear a 
special responsibility.
    The FCC sets technical requirements for both the Emergency 
Alert System and Wireless Emergency Alerts. And our work then 
informs the work of others across government, including the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. But the bottom line for 
every entity involved in emergency alerts is that the public 
needs confidence in the systems that warn us when the 
unthinkable occurs.
    Now, as we all know, on January 13, the people of Hawaii 
woke to ominous messages flashing on their mobile phones, 
booming in from radio stations, and lighting up their 
television screens. These messages commanded all who saw and 
heard them to seek immediate shelter due to a ballistic missile 
threat, and they included those haunting words, ``This is not a 
drill.''
    Now, from my experience working for Hawaii, I know that the 
people of this state are resilient, I know that they are keenly 
aware of old and new global threats to security, especially in 
the Pacific. So when this incident occurred, I reached out to 
some of my former colleagues, and they had only harrowing 
stories to tell. I still can't quite imagine it, being told you 
only have minutes left to live, and knowing that everything you 
hold dear could be destroyed. When the threat was over, I am 
sure that the people of Hawaii held their children a little bit 
closer. I know I did the same that night.
    After the false missile alert, the Chairman of the FCC 
swiftly called for an investigation, and this was the right 
thing to do. The agency's staff got to work, as did officials 
in Hawaii, who conducted their own investigation. Those 
investigations have revealed that this false alert could have 
been avoided, and its effects could have been mitigated.
    There were serious failures at the point of alert 
origination, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency. These 
errors were both human and operational. There appears to have 
been a miscommunication between personnel that fateful morning. 
There was an apparent deviation from the script of the agency's 
drill procedure. There was a human failure to recognize that a 
drill was even being conducted. These problems were compounded 
by a lack of secondary checks to prevent one person from 
mistakenly sending an alert to the entire state. And there were 
also no software checks to differentiate between a testing 
environment and a live environment. And to make matters worse, 
it took a full 38 minutes to issue an alert correction, and 
there were no pre-existing systems to do so.
    None of this is acceptable. We need to do better. This is 
true here in this state and across the country because false 
alerts have happened elsewhere, including in the last year in 
Polk County, Iowa, and Riverside County, California. In short, 
it can happen anywhere.
    So what can we do about it? We need ideas to fix these 
problems, so here are some of mine.
    For starters, the FCC has conducted an investigation. It 
now has a final report. It needs to make that report public as 
soon as possible.
    Next, State Emergency Alert System plans are filed with the 
FCC, and they're subject to annual confirmation. It's time to 
make that process a meaningful one by making sure every plan is 
up to date. The Hawaii plan filed with the FCC was over a 
decade old. The FCC should prevent this from happening by 
serving as a convening force to develop a checklist of best 
practices, including security protocols, at the local, State, 
and Federal level, and then support their inclusion in up-to-
date annual EAS filings.
    Second, the FCC does not now have a reporting system for 
false alerts. I think we should have one. And I think if we 
did, we'd be able to study what happens, learn from it, and 
prevent it from happening again.
    I also think the FCC needs to be mindful of future alert 
capabilities from embedded multimedia to many-to-one 
communications that allow for public feedback and to explore 
how to make those viable in the marketplace.
    Finally, and I'm stepping out of my jurisdiction here, I do 
think we need to address failures at the alert origination 
point. To this end, I know the recently introduced ALERT Act 
proposes improvements, including clear lines of responsibility, 
specifically when it comes to missile threats.
    So let me close by thanking you for having me at this 
hearing. I'm happy to answer any questions you might have.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenworcel follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Jessica Rosenworcel, Commissioner, 
                   Federal Communications Commission
    Good morning, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, Members of the 
Committee and in particular, Senator Schatz. Years ago I had the 
privilege of serving as counsel to the late Senator Daniel Inouye, who 
was then Chairman of this Committee. It is a special treat to be back 
in the Aloha state. I am glad that Senator Schatz has convened this 
hearing and that Senator Hirono, Representative Hanabusa, and 
Representative Gabbard are here to join the discussion.
    In Washington, I serve as a Commissioner at the Federal 
Communications Commission. I have a front row seat at the digital 
revolution. Every day I see how technology is changing every aspect of 
civic and commercial life. Every day I am reminded that the future 
belongs to the connected. And when it comes to the most critical aspect 
of our communications--those involving emergency alerts--I know that we 
bear a special responsibility. The agency sets technical requirements 
for both the Emergency Alert System and Wireless Emergency Alerts. This 
informs the work of others across government, including the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency. But the bottom line for every entity 
involved is that the public needs confidence in the systems that warn 
us when the unthinkable occurs.
    As we all know, on January 13 the people of Hawaii woke to ominous 
messages flashing on their mobile phones, streaming in from social 
media, booming from radio stations, and lighting up their television 
screens. These messages commanded all who saw and heard them to seek 
immediate shelter due to a ballistic missile threat. They included the 
haunting words: ``This is not a drill.''
    From my experience working for the people of this state, I know 
that Hawaiians are resilient. I know that they are keenly aware of old 
and new global threats to security, including in the Pacific. So when 
this incident occurred, I reached out to friends and former colleagues 
in Hawaii to understand what happened. They had only harrowing stories 
to tell. I still can't quite imagine it--being told you have only 
minutes left to live and knowing everything you hold dear could be 
destroyed. When the threat was over I am sure that people in Hawaii 
held their children a little bit closer. I know I did the same that 
night.
    After the false missile alert, the Chairman of the FCC swiftly 
called for an investigation. It was the right thing to do. The agency 
staff got to work, as did officials in Hawaii who conducted their own 
investigation.
    These investigations have revealed that this false alert could have 
been avoided and its effects could have been mitigated.
    There were serious failures at the point of alert origination--the 
Hawaii Emergency Management Agency. These errors were human and 
operational. There appears to have been a miscommunication between 
personnel that fateful morning; there was an apparent deviation from 
the script of the agency's drill procedure; there was a human failure 
to recognize that a drill was being conducted. These problems were 
compounded by a lack of safeguards to ensure that a false alert would 
not be transmitted. There were no secondary checks to prevent one 
person from mistakenly sending an alert to the entire state. There were 
no software checks to differentiate between testing and live alert 
environments. To make matters worse, it took a full 38 minutes to issue 
an alert correction--and there were no preexisting systems to do so.
    None of this is acceptable.
    We need to do better. This is true in Hawaii and across the country 
because false alerts have happened elsewhere--including in Polk County, 
Iowa and Riverside County, California during the past year. In short, 
it can happen anywhere.
    So what can we do about it? We need ideas to fix these problems. 
Here are mine.
    First, state Emergency Alert System plans are filed with the FCC. 
They are subject to annual confirmation. We should make this process a 
meaningful one by making sure every plan is up to date. The Hawaii plan 
was over a decade old. The FCC can help prevent this from happening by 
serving as a convening force to report current best practices--
including security protocols--at the local, state, and Federal level 
and then support their inclusion in annual filings.
    Second, the FCC should know when false alerts occur. The FCC should 
have a reporting system for false alerts--to learn when and where they 
happen and to prevent them from happening again.
    Third, the FCC should explore future alert capabilities, from 
embedded multimedia to many-to-one communications enabling public 
feedback. The agency also should also explore the viability of offering 
alerts to audio and video streaming services.
    Fourth--and I'm stepping out of my jurisdiction here--we need to 
address failures at the alert origination point. To this end, the 
Authenticating Local Emergencies and Real Threats (ALERT) Act of 2018 
proposes important improvements, including clear lines of 
responsibility when it comes to missile threats.
    Let me close by thanking you for having me at this hearing. I look 
forward to answering any questions you may have.

    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Commissioner Rosenworcel.
    I'll start with the first thing you talked about, the FCC 
oversees this process in which states submit their plans. And 
you said it's subject to annual confirmation. Is that just to 
check to see that something is on file? In other words, it 
sounds, from your language, that there's not a ton of analysis 
that goes on, you're just checking to see that it has been 
submitted and it is complete. Is that correct?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. You're right.
    Senator Schatz. OK. So it seems to me that the FCC has a 
real opportunity to drive change here. And in the development 
of the specifications for the EAS plan and the WEA plan, that 
form can follow function--right?--that you can really develop 
best practices by requiring something meaningful in the specs, 
and I'm wondering if that's the direction that the Commission 
is going right now.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I think that's a terrific idea, Senator. 
It's certainly the direction I would like to see the agency go. 
We're already requiring states to file these plans with us. We 
should make that process a meaningful one. We can convene all 
sorts of authorities, identify best practices, create a 
checklist of those best practices, and induce states to follow 
them through this filing process. I think that would help make 
all of us safer going forward.
    Senator Schatz. Do you have the capacity within the FCC to 
provide this kind of technical expertise?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I believe we do. I've got to urge my 
colleagues to agree with me.
    Senator Schatz. OK. Thank you. I wanted to ask about the 
problem that we found, as Members of Congress, as leaders in 
the government, both State, Federal, and county, jammed phone 
lines. Actually, members of the media as well, people trying to 
call in to Hawaii News Now or KSSK, or I was trying to call 
into PACOM, and phone lines were jammed. And it seems to me 
that this is a absolutely solvable problem, and I'm wondering 
if you can shed some light on that.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Sure. Most of our networks are built to 
withstand capacity about 99 percent of the time. The problem is 
when they are overloaded. Sometimes you can anticipate an 
overload if there's a concert or a protest at a big event, and 
networks can be adjusted with cellular service on wheels and 
the like in order to take care of that excess capacity. But in 
an emergency like this, you can't plan for it.
    Federal, State, and local officials, though, are eligible 
for the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service and 
Wireless Priority Service programs. And I think as we review 
what happened here in Hawaii, we should ask whether or not our 
State authorities are taking advantage of those programs, which 
help them get priority when networks are jammed.
    Senator Schatz. I think this is a really important point, 
and I would like this to be a takeaway probably for HI-EMA, 
that the GETS card is available to government leaders. Many of 
us didn't know that it existed. And so someone has got to 
coordinate a process of determining who are the key leaders 
that need--not everybody can get one of these cards. But 
certainly the radio station of record, all four television 
stations, your newspapers, Civil Beat, all of our media 
partners, anybody at a high level of government and who has a 
role in communicating to the public ought to be in possession 
of a card that allows you to supersede anyone else's phone 
call. That is no small thing because I think that 38 minutes 
would have been a lot briefer had any of us had access to each 
other.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Yes.
    Senator Schatz. I want to talk a little bit about the 
nature of these alerts. As we increasingly have cord cutters 
and people who are watching--I'm sure they're watching 
television in the sense that they're watching a show on a 
screen, but they're not watching necessarily broadcast 
television. So if you're on Hulu, Amazon, Netflix, you don't 
get the alert over the screen. That's one question I have for 
you. And then the second question has to do with whether or not 
these things should be repeating and whether or not we want to 
draw a distinction. In other words, if there's an incoming 
ICBM, that thing--that alert should not run once, that should 
be running constantly as a ticker, and, frankly, no one should 
have any discretion to take it off the screen until we get an 
``all clear,'' but if it's a flash flood on Kauai, you could 
probably tell folks, you know, once every 5 minutes.
    And so I wondering whether we can get to a more granular 
place with all of that.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. OK. Your first question. You know, 
yesterday we were at Hawaii's Pacific University, and as I 
looked at the students there, I thought, they're not watching 
video the way I did when I was in school. They watch on 
whatever screen is handy whenever they want. And I don't think 
our Wireless Emergency Alert System or existing Emergency Alert 
System for traditional media is really well calibrated to that 
new watching reality. I don't think it's yet time to create new 
obligations, but I think it is incumbent on the FCC to continue 
to monitor those and continue to ask questions about them 
because we need to make sure emergency information reaches 
people where they are.
    And then with respect to persistent alerts, this is a 
really important point. In January of this year, with respect 
to wireless emergency alerts, the FCC changed its policies to 
make sure that any wireless emergency alert is available for 24 
hours, and that's good because it speaks exactly to the problem 
you described. But I see a gap with respect to traditional 
media and broadcast and cable emergency alerts because those 
can be on once, and if you didn't turn on the television when 
they were on, you might have missed the most important 
information that you need to receive.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
    Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you.
    Can I--I have something to clarify, Commissioner. I think 
you said that the FCC sets the technical requirements for WIAs 
and some other communication networks?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. For wireless emergency alerts, which are 
associated with your mobile devices, the Emergency Alert 
System, which is an outgrowth of the traditional Emergency 
Broadcast System.
    Senator Hirono. So when you were--when you were talking 
just now about the new watching reality----
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Yes.
    Senator Hirono.--and people have all kinds of devices and 
platforms and whatever else, as you reviewed what happened in 
Hawaii and the complexities of how people get their information 
and under what circumstances and what tools, have you also 
begun to check on what is happening in terms of the 
capabilities of other states to issue appropriate warnings? 
Because I--the sense I have is that there is no state that is 
prepared to respond to a ballistic missile threat. And Hawaii 
did seek to institute such a system. But where are the other 
states with regard to their ability to alert their people to a 
missile strike?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I don't have specific information, but I 
can tell you that my suspicion is the same as yours. I do not 
believe other states are prepared. That's why I think the 
legislation that's been introduced to make sure that ballistic 
missile threats are alerted at the Federal level is so 
important.
    Senator Hirono. So if the responsibility for the alert goes 
to the Federal Government, then do we need to institute a whole 
new kind of a system of whatever the infrastructure is? Or how 
do you see this happening?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I think that's an important conversation 
to have with the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, which oversees the IPAWS 
system that generally gets those Federal alerts out, both 
through traditional media and mobile devices.
    Senator Hirono. So I think this is definitely a 
conversation that involves a lot of different Federal 
departments as well as the states because we would like to 
have--I would like to see a system where you don't necessarily 
have to create a whole new kind of infrastructure for alerts 
because in Hawaii, yes, we do have a system for tsunami and 
hurricane alerts and other natural disasters. So if we can 
possibly make sure that the system would be in place or the 
infrastructure would be in place, that makes sense to me.
    In January, the FCC released a preliminary report from the 
FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, which found 
that a combination of human error and inadequate safeguards 
contributed to the transmission of a false alert, and the 
preliminary report recommended that the FCC partner with FEMA 
to help implement best practices at the local, State, and 
Federal level in an effort to improve our Emergency Alert 
Systems across the board. Can you update us on how the 
stakeholder engagement effort led by the FCC and FEMA is coming 
along?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I have not been a part of those 
conversations, though I believe it's absolutely paramount that 
they occur. So I think that I would have to defer to the FCC 
Chairman, who has probably been leading them at this point.
    Senator Hirono. So is this something that you can pursue or 
put to----
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Absolutely. I would be----
    Senator Hirono.--the FCC Chair? And then can this 
Committee----
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Yes. I would be happy to make sure that I 
can get that information for you and follow up.
    Senator Hirono.--receive a response? Now, there is also a 
proposal, I think there's an--from the FCC to create a 
reporting system for false alerts. Is that correct?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I believe that the FCC should have a 
recording system for false alerts. We do not have one now. I 
think if you don't study your errors, you will--you risk the 
likelihood you will repeat them.
    Senator Hirono. So I think it's important that you do get 
the information about false alerts when they--after they've 
occurred, I guess. Do you think it's also important for FCC to 
know when false alerts occur in real time?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I think we're going to have to identify 
what's the appropriate reporting practice because if there is a 
false alert, I think the priority needs to be to make sure that 
the individuals who received it get accurate information. I 
don't want it to be a bureaucratic hassle associated with 
reporting obligations to the FCC.
    Senator Hirono. Yes.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. But I do think we need to develop a record 
when these happen because if we identify patterns of behavior 
that are causing them to happen, we can take steps to make sure 
they do not happen again.
    Senator Hirono. So I recall that I was here when 9/11 
occurred, and there were huge problems with interoperability of 
the police department, the first responders, all of that. And I 
don't even know if we have resolved those issues. I don't think 
we've still gotten that down. And so here we are with this 
potential missile attack, and you have all these different 
first responders, you have different Federal agencies, and I 
think that what Senator Schatz pointed out about our ability to 
communicate with each other, I just--I think that is quite the 
challenge to figure that out and to make sure that we are able 
to communicate with each other. As I said, after 9/11, I'm not 
sure that we've still resolved that issue.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I think you're absolutely right. I will 
point out that there--since 2012 law passed by Congress, there 
is now a process in place to make sure that all first 
responders use the same 700 megahertz spectrum.
    Senator Hirono. Yes.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. And as a result, they will have common 
interfaces and be able to talk to one another in ways they were 
not able to on that fateful day.
    Senator Hirono. And do you think we should have that kind 
of capability with regard to missile attacks?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I just think we need a level of 
coordination in order to ensure that people stay safe and they 
get the information they need.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Schatz. Congresswoman Hanabusa.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
    Commissioner, welcome. I would like you to take a message 
back to the Chair, Ajit Pai. He was very accommodating when 
this happened and we put in a call, and he spent time on the 
phone answering our questions. So please thank him.
    I do have a follow up on something that you said about the 
reporting of the false alerts. You mentioned the fact that it 
has occurred in Polk County, Iowa, and Riverside, California. 
Were there ICBM false alerts?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. No.
    Ms. Hanabusa. They weren't?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. They were not.
    Ms. Hanabusa. OK. So what kind of false alerts were they?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. You know, I found them in news reports 
because right after this occurred, I thought it would be 
prudent to try to identify other places where this was 
happening. One involved direction to shelter in place. Another 
involved an emergency evacuation that was not necessary. I'm 
confident there are other places. I think we have to develop a 
way to study them comprehensively.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So along those lines, do you know how long it 
took to either retract or repeal those false alerts?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I don't have that information for you 
right here right now. I could look for it for you, though.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Because I--the Senator--I mean the 
Representative from Riverside has never brought up that he had 
one, so I was just curious.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. No.
    Ms. Hanabusa. I'll go back and ask him.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. All right.
    Ms. Hanabusa. The other thing that you said that I was 
curious about was the fact that Hawaii's plan is over a decade 
old. So if Hawaii's plan is over a decade old, as you know, 
this whole issue of the ICBMs or ballistic missile alerts is 
sort of recent. I don't think we're going back to the Cold War, 
but basically that's what they did. So are we correct that 
there has never been even a small update to say, ``And, by the 
way, we're going to do a missile alert as part of our plan''?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Not to my knowledge.
    Ms. Hanabusa. And what was the purpose of these plans?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Well, the purpose of these plans was 
compliance with the FCC's Emergency Alert System obligations, 
which apply to more traditional media, like broadcast and 
radio. The act of filing them should be something more than 
bureaucratic, though. The agency should be compelling State 
actors in emergencies to come together, develop an up-to-date 
modern plan, and then make those plans publicly available. We 
can help states identify best practices and make those plans 
much more effective in the event that something unthinkable 
really does occur.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So am I correct then in assuming that the FCC 
or Department of Homeland Security, nobody has like a template 
that says, ``Have you done this?'' or, ``Do you have any kind 
of response in this case?'' There's nothing like that?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. We have some categories, but it is not as 
instructive, as you've just described. I think there would be a 
lot of benefits in trying to develop that kind of checklist of 
best practices.
    Ms. Hanabusa. And as we spoke about this earlier, yes, 
there are different kinds of disasters, and, of course 
ballistic missile attack is, in my opinion, a separate 
category. So would this type of alert system identify all these 
different kinds of disasters and what is it that a particular 
state or subcounty or whoever it is that's responding to this 
is doing?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I think what we're starting to recognize 
is that ballistic missile attacks are a completely different 
category in the panic that ensues and also in the damage that 
could occur, and we might need to treat those differently. So 
for all of you who have introduced legislation or supported 
legislation to do so, I think that's a really good idea.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So back to this report, I'm just curious, 
because I can't imagine that our report is a decade old, whose 
responsibility is it to file that report?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. You know, it's generally the State 
Emergency Communications Committee, and that is done 
differently in different states, but, again, the process of 
filing it just shouldn't be bureaucratic. The agency shouldn't 
just take them online and put them on a dusty shelf; we should 
be making that process meaningful and we should be helping 
states along the way by identifying current best practices that 
make those plans effective.
    Ms. Hanabusa. And in the time I have left, I would like for 
you to address, Do you believe, for example, that if there was 
a lead taken by DoD or Homeland Security on the issue of a 
ballistic missile attack, that somehow that there would be 
difficulties in interfacing that with the existing system on 
all of the alerts that we have? Would it be possibly two 
separate entities that would be triggering the actual alert?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. It is essential for something like a 
ballistic missile attack that we coordinate. Anything less is 
unacceptable.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So you don't see a problem with that.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. We're going to have to find a way to do 
it.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. And the other, just quickly, you 
did say that you want a process where no one can take off a 
message----
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Yes.
    Ms. Hanabusa.--if it's put on? I guess the other time is--
you know what the problem in Hawaii was, they tried to contact 
FEMA, which they didn't have to contact, and as a result, 
that's one of the explanations for the 38-minute delay.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. That's right. That's exactly right.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So you anticipate, I assume, that if it's 
false, that there will be a quick way to withdraw it.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Well, the idea of filing a plan is any 
plan should include, What are your procedures if a false alert 
goes out? Know immediately how fast you can correct that alert, 
and what forms of social media you might use to make sure that 
you bolster that information and it gets out there. So any 
proper plan should include that. And if there's a takeaway from 
the experience we just had, it's very clear that that is a 
necessary element of any plan that's filed.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Commissioner.
    Thank you, Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. Congresswoman Gabbard.
    Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
    Thank you for your testimony. A follow-up again to the 
decade-old EAS plan. You know, you talked about the annual 
confirmation that's required. Was the situation here that 
Hawaii just submitted the same decade-old plan every year, and 
that was confirmed by the FCC's receipt, or was it that there 
was no updated plan or plan submitted at all?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I think it was just an annual obligation 
to just say, ``Yes, this is our plan, and it continues.'' I 
would describe that as benign neglect.
    Ms. Gabbard. And right now, that is all that's required by 
the FCC's annual confirmation, is that a plan exists.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Exactly.
    Ms. Gabbard. What kind of oversight would you recommend to 
make sure that these plans are current and up to date?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. Well, the FCC is a terrific convening 
force. We could set up a blue ribbon panel. We could have 
experts from multiple states, including states that have 
experienced false alerts, come together and say these are the 
key elements of an effective plan. We could assess them, 
identify a checklist of best practices, and then encourage 
every state that files with us to comply with them. And over 
time, to the extent they don't, we should incentivize them to 
do so. We can also work with our colleagues at FEMA, which 
oversees the IPAWS process, which sends out alerts, to make 
sure that they have comparable memoranda of understanding or 
work with their State actors to make sure we are all growing in 
the same direction and making those plans up to date and 
effective.
    Ms. Gabbard. And is there currently any form of recourse or 
accountability measure that the FCC has if a state is not in 
compliance?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. No, I don't believe so.
    Ms. Gabbard. With regard to the Wireless Emergency Alert 
System, I think what came to light was that wireless providers 
are not required or obligated to participate, so it's a 
voluntary program where a wireless carrier can either 
participate in whole or in part. Why is this not an obligation? 
Why is this optional?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. The Warning Alert and Response Network Act 
makes it voluntary.
    Ms. Gabbard. OK.
    Ms. Rosenworcel. So to change that would require a change 
in law.
    Ms. Gabbard. And I wrote a letter to Chairman Pai about 
tracking--right?--how do we know how many of these carriers 
participate in whole versus in part? And he sent a reply 
basically saying that it is tracked which carriers participate 
and whether it's in whole or in part, but for those who 
participate in part, there is no current mechanism to track 
what geographic areas may or may not be covered.
    So for us here in Hawaii, Chairman Pai confirmed that the 
FCC is not aware of any eligible wireless provider that is--has 
elected not to participate, but those who have chosen to 
participate in part, there is no current collection of 
information with regards to what geographic areas are covered 
or not.
    Can you comment on what I see is a big problem in that our 
residents don't know if their carriers are covering them where 
they live or work?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I agree with you, that's a problem. I 
think we need to figure out where coverage exists and does not. 
There are three ways I think you could do that.
    Like I mentioned at the outset, you could change the 
Warning Alert and Response Network Act, which makes this wholly 
voluntary.
    Second, you could follow up with the FCC and ask us, in 
light of your earlier correspondence, to reach out to every 
carrier that serves in Hawaii and ask, ``Please tell us, where 
do you serve and not serve? Are there certain islands, for 
instance, where residents are likely to be left behind?''
    And then, third, you could also write the carriers directly 
because I'm confident that they do have this information, and I 
think it's important for emergency planning purposes that 
Federal and State officials who represent the state have it.
    Ms. Gabbard. Yes, absolutely. We talked a little bit 
earlier about streaming services and the changing technology 
and how people are getting access to media. While this is a big 
shift in change that needs to be addressed, has--do you know if 
the FCC has started kind of studying this and how this 
technology could be used to get these emergency alerts out 
there?
    Ms. Rosenworcel. I think it's important for the FCC not 
just to think about the present, but to think about the future 
and how we interact with media and how we make sure everyone 
gets the information they need. There's a lot more we could do 
with multimedia alerts, so that the alert that comes to your 
phone might, for instance, have a picture of an area that's 
dangerous or a suspect for whom public safety officials want to 
know some information. We can also do new activities with many-
to-one communications, which allows feedback from the public 
that receives emergency alerts. And we should be exploring how 
the ways that we're consuming media are different today and how 
we make sure people get information over those new means.
    Whether or not we have the authority, I think we have the 
responsibility to explore what these alerts should look like in 
the future so that we can inform all of you if we need changes 
in the law to make that happen.
    Ms. Gabbard. Great. Thank you so much.
    Senator Schatz. I want to thank Ms. Rosenworcel for her 
testimony and bring in the second panel. And I will introduce 
them as they are walking up and our staff is putting the 
information in front of their seats.
    We have Rear Admiral Patrick Piercey of U.S. Pacific 
Command, United States Department of Defense; we have Ms. 
Nicole McGinnis, Deputy Chief, Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau of the FCC; and Mr. Antwane Johnson, Director, 
Continuity Communications Division, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.
    And we'll start on my left with Rear Admiral Piercey.

  STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL PATRICK A. PIERCEY, UNITED STATES 
          PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Admiral Piercey. Senator Schatz and distinguished members 
of the Hawaii delegation, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today. As part of the Hawaii ohana, we at 
PACOM share the concerns raised by the false ballistic missile 
alert broadcast by the State of Hawaii on an otherwise quiet 
Saturday morning in these tranquil islands.
    PACOM works hand-in-hand with Federal and State agencies 
both in times of calm and in times of crisis to defend our 
homeland and our citizens. This is PACOM's enduring 
responsibility and Admiral Harris' Number One priority.
    While the false alert broadcast by the State of Hawaii was 
unfortunate, the event also served to underscore the 
complexities facing not only the State of Hawaii, but also all 
50 states when it comes to alerting the public of a possible 
North Korean missile attack and also provide--however, also 
provided a valuable learning opportunity.
    Other states can look to the proactive leadership and 
engaged approach the State of Hawaii has demonstrated to 
prepare for the new normal, specifically, living under the 
threat of a North Korean missile attack. This event is likely 
to strengthen its capability to notify the public in any future 
emergency situation.
    Perhaps as importantly, this event provides an opportunity 
to collectively assess and refine our internal notification and 
coordination processes in civil defense scenarios to ensure 
command and component preparedness. To this end, PACOM will 
continue to maintain a close relationship with the State of 
Hawaii. PACOM will again participate in a triannual Defense 
Support of Civil Authorities Executive Steering Board designed 
to facilitate, coordinate, align, and prioritize support of 
DSCA efforts.
    With reference to the 13 January incident, USPACOM's review 
of actions validated the fact that this alert was not generated 
through DoD channels. It was, in fact, a false alarm generated 
by the State of Hawaii. USPACOM assisted the State of Hawaii by 
validating that this alert was false and communicating the same 
to the military components in Hawaii.
    As the State of Hawaii has no means to independently detect 
a missile launch, the proper sequencing of ballistic missile 
notification to the State of Hawaii authorities is from FEMA to 
HI-EMA. Simultaneously, USPACOM validates the occurrence of a 
launch to HI-EMA and notifies other DoD command centers in the 
Pacific via classified conference call.
    PACOM remains in close coordination with HI-EMA, FEMA 
Region IX, U.S. Northern Command, and Department of Defense 
stakeholders to gather lessons learned, identify areas 
requiring improvement, and refine notification processes.
    Of the things that went well, perhaps most importantly, the 
event validated the importance of the existing missile 
notification coordination between civil and military 
authorities. Emergency management spanning the spectrum of 
State and local governments and communities is a core mission 
of the State of Hawaii, and PACOM will continue to work in 
close coordination to ensure the effective synchronization, 
integration, and coordination of disaster prevention, 
protection, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts. This 
coordination has taken place since 2009 and has been used 
during every ballistic missile event.
    PACOM learned from this experience as well. In response to 
HI-EMA's false alert, missile alert, PACOM has taken action to 
ensure senior leaders maintain the ability to contact the PACOM 
Joint Operations Center, the JOC, regardless of call volume. 
PACOM is also coordinating with HI-EMA and has added the JOC to 
their AlertSense system distribution, which transmits emergency 
alerts via unclassified e-mail. Additionally, to facilitate 
expediency of information flow, HI-EMA was added as a 
participant to the classified USPACOM conference call, allowing 
for near simultaneous validation and redundant notification 
from the initial report that HI-EMA receives from FEMA.
    PACOM stands ready today to provide defense support to 
civil authorities, emergency management drills, alerts, 
exercises, and response operations within the Hawaiian Islands. 
Moving forward, we will continue to exercise missile 
notification procedures with HI-EMA and will continue to 
support Nation State Threat planning for ballistic missile 
notification and response, to include integration with FEMA's 
National Warning System.
    Thank you for your enduring support to PACOM's team and our 
families who live and work in the Indo-Pacific.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Harris follows:]

Prepared Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., U.S. Navy Commander, 
                          U.S. Pacific Command
    Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished members of 
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to submit this written 
statement and also allowing Rear Admiral Patrick Piercey, U.S. Pacific 
Command's (USPACOM) Director of Operations (J3), to appear on my behalf 
before you today as a subject matter expert. During my time at USPACOM, 
I have had the tremendous honor of serving with the almost 400,000 
Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, Coast Guardsmen, and Department of 
Defense (DoD) civilians standing watch for America's largest and most 
diverse geographic combatant command. I am grateful for these men and 
women, and to their families, for their hard work and devotion to duty. 
I'm humbled to serve alongside them.
    Since its inception in 1947, USPACOM and the joint military forces 
assigned to it protect the U.S., its territories, its people, and its 
interests throughout the Indo-Pacific region. To accomplish this, 
USPACOM works hand-in-hand with the other U.S. government agencies in 
this region to defend our homeland and our citizens. This is USPACOM's 
enduring responsibility and my #1 priority. The path to security is 
based on our commitments to mutual interests and partnerships, 
continuous military presence, and global readiness.
    While it is unfortunate that the State of Hawaii erred in 
broadcasting a ballistic missile threat notification on Saturday, 13 
January 2018, the event also provided a valuable learning opportunity. 
Other states can look to the proactive leadership and engaged approach 
the State of Hawaii has demonstrated to prepare for the new normal--
specifically, living under threat of a North Korean missile attack. 
Perhaps more importantly, this event provides an opportunity to 
collectively assess and refine our internal notification/coordination 
processes in civil defense scenarios to ensure command and component 
preparedness. To this end, USPACOM will continue to maintain a close 
relationship with the State of Hawaii. USPACOM will again participate 
in the triannual Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Executive 
Steering Board (ESB) designed to facilitate, coordinate, align and 
prioritize support of DSCA efforts.
    With reference to the 13 January 2018 incident, USPACOM's review of 
actions validated the fact that this alert was not generated through 
DoD channels. It was, in fact, a false alarm generated by the State of 
Hawaii. USPACOM assisted the State of Hawaii by validating that this 
alert was false and communicating the same to the military components 
in Hawaii. A timeline of the incident is as follows:

   0807: An employee of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency 
        (HI-EMA) broadcasted the following emergency alert through the 
        Emergency Alert System (EAS) and Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) 
        system across the state of Hawaii:
                            Emergency Alert
              BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII.
                        SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER.
                          THIS IS NOT A DRILL.
   0810: State Adjutant General, Major Gen. Joe Logan, 
        contacted USPACOM to confirm there was no missile launch.

   0812: HI-EMA initiated cancellation messages.

   0813: The state issued an internal cancellation of the 
        warning to prevent the false alert message from being broadcast 
        further.

   0820: HI-EMA tweeted ``NO missile threat to Hawaii.''

   0823: HI-EMA posted ``NO missile threat to Hawaii. False 
        alarm. We're currently investigating'' on Facebook.

   0823: Following confirmation with USPACOM Joint Operations 
        Center (JOC) Director that there was no threat, USPACOM sent an 
        on-the-record statement via e-mail to Hawaii and national 
        media: ``USPACOM has detected no ballistic missile threat to 
        Hawaii. Earlier message was sent in error. State of Hawaii will 
        send out a correction message as soon as possible.'' A similar 
        message was posted to USPACOM social media within minutes.

   0824: Hawaii Governor David Ige retweeted HI-EMA's 0820 
        tweet, noting: ``There is NO missile threat.''

   0825: Commander Navy Region Hawaii issued a radio broadcast 
        to all ships in port stating the alert was a ``false alarm.''

   0830: Hawaii Governor David Ige posted: ``NO missile threat 
        to Hawaii'' on Facebook.

   0835: HI-EMA initiated cancellation messages to the public.

   0835: Governor Ige shared HI-EMA's Facebook post: ``NO 
        missile threat to Hawaii. False alarm. We're currently 
        investigating.''

   0845: HI-EMA broadcasted EAS and WEA messages confirming the 
        initial notification was a ``False Alarm'' and ``There is no 
        missile threat or danger to the State of Hawaii.''

    Overall, 38 minutes transpired (0807 to 0845) before HI-EMA 
retracted the false emergency alert of a ballistic missile inbound to 
Hawaii by the same communication channels as the original alert (EAS 
and WEA).
    As the State of Hawaii has no means to independently detect a 
missile launch, the proper sequencing of ballistic missile notification 
to State of Hawaii authorities is from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) to HI-EMA. Simultaneously, USPACOM validates the 
occurrence of a launch to HI-EMA and notifies other DoD command centers 
in the Pacific via a classified conference call.
    USPACOM remains in close coordination with HI-EMA, FEMA Region IX, 
U.S. Northern Command, and DoD stakeholders to gather lessons learned, 
identify areas requiring improvement and refine notification processes.
    Of the things that went well, perhaps most importantly, the event 
validated the importance of coordination between civil and military 
authorities. Emergency management spanning the spectrum of state and 
local governments and communities is a core mission of the State of 
Hawaii, and USPACOM will continue to work in close coordination to 
ensure the effective synchronization, integration, and coordination of 
disaster prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery 
efforts. This coordination has taken place since 2009 and has been used 
during every ballistic-missile event.
    USPACOM learned from this experience as well. For example, we 
discovered that the USPACOM JOC, as configured at the time of the 
event, was unable to receive unclassified Short Message Service texts 
and, as such, did not directly receive the erroneous missile warning or 
the following cancellation messages on 13 January.
    USPACOM also identified an inefficiency in the reporting process 
which, in addition to the notification requirements maintained by the 
USPACOM JOC, required a separate unclassified phone call to HI-EMA 
designed to provide validation to the notification report HI-EMA 
receives from FEMA.
    Additionally, the event highlighted the importance of maintaining 
an independent and dedicated unclassified line into the JOC for senior 
USPACOM leaders to communicate in the event of an emergency, regardless 
of call volume.
    In response to the HI-EMA's false missile alert, the following 
USPACOM actions have been implemented:

   Two unclassified dedicated conference calls (Commander's 
        Conference Call and Director's Conference Call) have been 
        established to ensure USPACOM senior leaders maintain the 
        ability to contact the JOC regardless of call volume.

   The first dedicated unclassified conference call is the 
        Commander's Conference Call which uses a USPACOM Bridge 
        (managed by the USPACOM Command, Control, Communications and 
        Cyber Director) and is limited to senior USPACOM personnel, to 
        include the Commander, Deputy Commander, their designated 
        principals, and the JOC Director (Conference Manager).

   The second dedicated unclassified conference call is the 
        Director's Conference Call which allows for a greater number of 
        conference participants and is managed by the JOC Operations 
        Officer (Conference Manager).

   To ensure the USPACOM JOC has the ability to receive HI-EMA 
        alerts, USPACOM has coordinated with HI-EMA to add the JOC to 
        their AlertSense system distribution which transmits emergency 
        alert via unclassified e-mail. The e-mail messages have the 
        same content as the cell phone alerts and display on the 
        unclassified consoles of the JOC watchstanders.

   To facilitate expediency of information flow, HI-EMA was 
        added as a participant to the classified USPACOM conference 
        call, the Pacific Missile Defense Event Conference, allowing 
        for near-simultaneous validation and redundant notification 
        from the initial report that HI-EMA receives from FEMA.

    While the false ballistic missile threat notification event was 
unfortunate, it served to underscore the complexities facing not only 
the State of Hawaii, but all 50 states, when it comes to alerting the 
public of a possible ballistic missile attack. The State of Hawaii has 
taken a proactive approach in this regard, and this event is likely to 
strengthen its capability to notify the public in any future emergency 
situation.
    USPACOM stands ready today to provide DSCA for emergency management 
drills, alerts, exercises and response operations within the Hawaiian 
Islands. Moving forward, we will continue to exercise missile 
notification procedures with HI-EMA and will continue to support Nation 
State Threat planning for ballistic missile notification and response, 
to include integration with FEMA's National Warning System.
    Thank you for your enduring support to the USPACOM team and our 
families who live and work in the Indo-Pacific.

    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    Ms. McGinnis.

          STATEMENT OF NICOLE McGINNIS, DEPUTY CHIEF,

          PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU,

               FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

    Ms. McGinnis. Good morning, Senator Schatz and members of 
the Hawaii congressional delegation, and thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today.
    The false alert warning of an imminent ballistic missile 
attack issued on January 13 by the State of Hawaii was 
unacceptable. But as unfortunate as this incident was, alert 
messaging remains an essential tool for protecting the lives of 
all Americans. The Commission is committed to doing everything 
within our legal authority and in coordination with our 
Federal, State, and local partners, to ensure that our Nation's 
alert messaging tools are available and used properly when they 
are needed most.
    The Commission acted swiftly in the wake of this incident 
to open an investigation into this matter. As part of its 
investigation, the Bureau has coordinated with the Hawaii 
Emergency Management Agency, or HI-EMA; with the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, FEMA; as well as with industry; 
and has conducted several interviews with stakeholders.
    The Bureau expects to release its final report in the near 
future. The final report will provide an analysis of the facts 
gathered from our independent investigation, and incorporates 
facts developed in a separate report that's been prepared by 
HI-EMA. We expect that the final report will confirm the 
Bureau's preliminary findings. The false alert in Hawaii and 
HI-EMA's delay in correcting it was due to a combination of 
human error and their lack of effective operating procedures 
and safeguards.
    In my testimony today, I'd like to highlight a few of the 
report's anticipated key findings and lessons learned.
    First, human error occurred on many levels. For example, 
one error was the use of an incorrect drill recording that 
erroneously contained language from the EAS message for a live 
ballistic missile alert. This contributed to the additional 
error made by the employee responsible for issuing the alert, 
who has stated that he mistakenly believed that the alert was 
real.
    Another error was the miscommunication between the outgoing 
and incoming shift supervisors as to which shift would be 
conducting the test. The day shift supervisor mistakenly 
believed that the midnight shift would be conducting the test, 
resulting in the drill being conducted by the day shift without 
supervision.
    Second, the procedures to prevent or correct the false 
alert were not adequate. For example, HI-EMA lacked procedures 
to present--prevent a single person from mistakenly issuing a 
live ballistic missile alert. Given that the employee issuing 
the alert was the only one under the mistaken impression that 
the event was real, requiring signoff of a second warning 
officer would have prevented this false alert.
    The checklist used during the January 13 exercise also 
lacked any protocol for correcting a false alert with an ``all 
clear'' or similar message to the public. In addition, the 
software failed to adequately distinguish between test 
environments and live alerting environments. Clear protocols 
for not just cancellation, but for prompt correction of a false 
alert over the same systems used to issue the alert would have 
reduced the public panic that ensued in the extensive time 
following the false alert.
    The report will also examine the performance of the 
Emergency Alert System, or EAS, and Wireless Emergency Alert, 
or WEA, system participants. As the report will explain in 
greater detail, these technical systems generally broadcast the 
alerts as designed. Where the alert was not transmitted by the 
EAS, we understand that those protocols are being addressed to 
ensure transmission in the future.
    With respect to WEA, we have heard issues regarding whether 
some consumer devices appropriately received and displayed the 
alerts. While there are multiple reasons why this could have 
been the case that are not system failures, for example, if the 
consumer was on a 3G call or data session during the relatively 
short active duration of the alert, we are continuing to study 
this issue.
    The most important outcome of this investigation, however, 
is the identification of lessons learned and best practices to 
prevent this type of mistake from occurring in the future. The 
final report will offer recommendations to State, local, 
Tribal, and Territorial emergency alert originators and 
managers to minimize the risk of similar incidents occurring in 
the future. HI-EMA has already implemented or has--or is in the 
process of implementing many of these.
    I would like to highlight a few of the key recommendations, 
which will include conducting regular internal tests in a 
controlled and closed environment, such as FEMA's Integrate 
Public--Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, or IPAWS, 
Test Lab; requiring more than one credentialed person to 
validate message content prior to the transmission of high-
impact alerts; implementing specific upgrades to alerting 
software to separate live from test alerting environments; 
developing and memorializing standard operating procedures for 
responding to false alerts, including issuing corrections using 
the same system that was sent to issue the false alert; and 
consulting with State Emergency Communications Committees on a 
regular basis at least annually to ensure that EAS procedures 
are mutually understood, agreed upon, and documented in the 
State EAS plan.
    The Bureau intends to follow up on these recommendations by 
engaging in additional outreach in coordination with our 
partners at FEMA to encourage the use of these best practices, 
including a planned webinar and roundtable.
    Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before 
you today and look forward to any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. McGinnis follows:]

Prepared Statement of Nicole McGinnis, Deputy Chief, Public Safety and 
      Homeland Security Bureau, Federal Communications Commission
    Good morning Senator Schatz and members of the Hawaii Congressional 
delegation, and thank you for the opportunity to testify before you 
today.
    The false alert warning of an imminent ballistic missile attack 
issued on January 13 by the State of Hawaii was unacceptable. It 
resulted in widespread panic, which was exacerbated by a delay of 
nearly 40 minutes before a correction was issued through proper 
alerting channels. False alerts like this one can shake the public's 
trust in alert messaging, and ultimately jeopardize the public's safety 
in times of real emergency.
    But as unfortunate as this incident was, alert messaging remains an 
essential tool for protecting the lives of all Americans. The 
Commission is committed to doing everything within its legal authority, 
and in coordination with our federal, state, and local partners, to 
ensure that our Nation's alert messaging tools are available and used 
properly when they are needed most.
    The Commission acted swiftly in the wake of this incident in Hawaii 
to open an investigation into the matter. Since this Committee's 
hearing on January 25, the Bureau presented its preliminary findings to 
the Commission on January 30 and submitted that presentation to this 
Committee for the record. As part of its investigation, the Bureau has 
coordinated with the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (HI-EMA), the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and industry and has 
conducted many interviews with stakeholders.
    The Bureau is finalizing its final report and expects to release it 
in the near future. We would be pleased to submit that report in its 
entirety to the Committee upon its release. The final report will 
provide an analysis of the facts gathered from our independent 
investigation and will incorporate facts developed in a separate report 
prepared by HI-EMA. We expect that the final report will confirm the 
Bureau's preliminary findings: The false alert in Hawaii and HI-EMA's 
delay in correcting it was due to a combination of human error and the 
lack of effective operating procedures and safeguards.
    In my testimony today, I'd like to highlight some of the final 
report's anticipated key findings and lessons learned.
    First, human error occurred on many levels. For example, one error 
was the use of a recording to initiate the drill that contained the 
text of an EAS message for a live ballistic missile alert, including 
the language, ``THIS IS NOT A DRILL.'' While the recorded message also 
contained the language ``EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE,'' the employee 
tasked with issuing the alert submitted a written statement to HI-EMA 
stating that he mistakenly believed the exercise was, in fact, a real 
event. This failure to hear and/or properly understand the instructions 
indicating the exercise was a test was clear human error. Another error 
was the result of miscommunication between the outgoing and incoming 
shift supervisors as to which shift would perform the test during the 
shift change. The midnight shift supervisor did not provide the day 
supervisor with written notice of the test, and only mentioned it to 
the day supervisor minutes before the drill was conducted. The day 
shift supervisor assumed that the drill would be run by the midnight 
shift, and did not understand that the drill would involve the day 
shift. Because of this miscommunication, the day shift supervisor was 
not in the watch center at the time of the drill, and it was conducted 
without supervision.
    Second, the procedures to prevent or correct the false alarm were 
not adequate. For example, HI-EMA lacked procedures to prevent a single 
person from mistakenly issuing a live missile alert. Given that the 
employee issuing the alert was the only one under the mistaken 
impression that the event was real, requiring sign off of a second 
warning officer would have prevented the false alert. Equally 
significant, the checklist used during the January 13 exercise lacked 
any protocol for correcting a false alert with an ``all clear'' or 
similar message to the public. Clear protocols for not just 
cancellation, but also for prompt correction of a false alert over the 
same systems used to issue the alert would have reduced the public 
panic that ensued in the extensive time following the false alert.
    The final report will also detail the Bureau's findings with 
respect to the how the emergency alert system (EAS) participants and 
participating wireless emergency alert (WEA) providers transmitted the 
message. The majority of EAS participants received the alert within 
seconds and retransmitted it. From a technical perspective, this was 
exactly as the system is designed to work. Those that did not relay the 
alert did not have their equipment set to ``auto-forward'' the message, 
which we understand is being addressed and that such messages will now 
be auto-forwarded going forward. The four nationwide wireless carriers 
offering service in Hawaii also received and transmitted the WEA alert 
within seconds. Neither EAS nor WEA is designed such that a carrier or 
participant would have the discretion to question whether an alert was 
erroneous. Although reports suggest that some consumers did not receive 
the alert, there are several reasons why this might have been the case, 
including lack of access to a wireless signal or having the device 
powered off during the time the alert was sent and cancelled, which 
would have impacted the receipt of the message. In addition, some 
handsets are not WEA capable, and consumers may also opt out of non-
Presidential alerts. None of these are flaws in the operation of the 
system.
    The most important outcome of this investigation, however, is the 
identification of lessons learned and best practices to prevent this 
type of a mistake from occurring in the future.
    In this respect, the final report will offer recommendations to 
state, local, Tribal, and territorial emergency alert originators and 
managers to minimize the risk of similar incidents occurring in the 
future. HI-EMA is already implementing or has implemented many of these 
anticipated recommendations. Among others, these recommendations will 
include:

   Conducting regular internal tests in a controlled and closed 
        environment, such as the FEMA's Integrated Public Alert and 
        Warning System (IPAWS) Test Lab. This will enable staff to 
        maintain proficiency with alerting tools and to exercise plans 
        and procedures in a manner that does not affect the public;

   Requiring more than one credentialed person to validate 
        message content prior to transmission of high-impact alerts 
        that affect a significant percentage of the population;

   Implementing specific upgrades to alerting software to 
        separate live environments from test environments, including 
        clearer prompting language distinguishing live and test 
        messages;

   Developing and memorializing standard operating procedures 
        for responding to false alerts within their jurisdictions, 
        including specifying that corrections to false alerts must be 
        issued over the same systems used to issue the false alert, 
        including the EAS and WEA, as well as other available means; 
        and

   Consulting with state emergency communications committees 
        (SECCs) on a regular basis--at least annually--to ensure that 
        EAS procedures, including initiation and cancellation of actual 
        alerts and tests, are mutually understood, agreed upon, and 
        documented in the State EAS Plan.

    The final report will also make recommendations addressing the 
incorporation of social media within standard operating procedures, 
notifying the media of false alerts, establishing redundant lines of 
communications, and use of priority communications tools.
    The Bureau intends to follow up on these recommendations by 
engaging in additional outreach, in coordination with our partners at 
FEMA, to encourage the use of these best practices, including a planned 
webinar and roundtable.
    Finally, the Commission continues to work to improve EAS and WEA. 
For example, the Commission recently adopted new rules that require 
State EAS Plans be updated annually and be filed in a streamlined 
electronic database, the Alert Reporting System. By replacing paper-
based filing requirements and coordinating State EAS Plan information 
in this manner, administering the EAS at the state level will be more 
clear and consistent. We hope to release that item soon.
    Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today 
and look forward to any questions you may have.

    Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Johnson, with FEMA.

      STATEMENT OF ANTWANE JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, CONTINUITY 
   COMMUNICATIONS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. 
                DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Johnson. Thank you. Senator Schatz and distinguished 
members of the Hawaii congressional delegation, good morning. 
My name is Antwane Johnson, and I am the Director of Continuity 
Communications at FEMA.
    On behalf of Secretary Nielsen and Administrator Long, 
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to 
discuss the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, also 
known as IPAWS, and how it is used to save lives across the 
country.
    An effective and timely public alert and warning system is 
critical to communicating threats to public safety and 
providing people with guidance during times of crisis. At FEMA, 
we manage IPAWS--IPAWS and its two main components: warnings 
and communications from the President in the event of a 
catastrophic national emergency through the National Public 
Warning System, and geotargeted alerts sent from Federal, 
State, local, Tribal, and Territorial officials during 
emergencies, such as those issued last year during the 
hurricanes and wildfires.
    IPAWS allows these alerting authorities to send emergency 
messages to people in their geographic jurisdiction by 
Emergency Alert System broadcasts through radio and TV, 
Wireless Emergency Alerts to cell phones, and other Internet-
connected services. Today, IPAWS supports more than 1,000 
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and Territorial users; 
connections to more than 26,000 radio, TV, and cable 
connections; 63 cellular carrier gateways reaching millions of 
cell phones; as well as 73 Internet vendors that tap into the 
alert feed. And we established a connection with--between IPAWS 
and Canada's multiagency situational awareness system for the 
exchange and sharing of disaster information.
    Since inception of the system in 2012, there have been 
nearly 3 million messages disseminated through IPAWS. These 
messages, which cover everything from a natural disaster to 
active shooter to missing children and planned power outages, 
help communicate critical lifesaving information to the public. 
For example, in September 2016, New York City sent a Wireless 
Emergency Alert with an electronic ``Wanted'' poster to 
identify a suspect in connection with bombings in Manhattan and 
New Jersey. The suspect was captured within hours.
    Last year, Wireless Emergency Alerts were used by officials 
to issue warnings and evacuation orders across Texas, Florida, 
and California, in response to hurricanes and wildfires.
    Significantly, since 2012, 53 kidnapped children have been 
reunited with their loved ones after AMBER Alerts were issued 
through the system and members of the community helped law 
enforcement locate perpetrators.
    In addition to managing the IPAWS program, FEMA helps train 
users and create guidance for alerting authorities and software 
tool vendors. It is important to note that while FEMA manages 
the IPAWS system, we rely on our State and local partners to 
originate communications to their jurisdictions, as they are 
the boots on the ground that are best able to communicate the 
threats they face and provide specific protective action 
information related to their area.
    Following direction from Congress and the IPAWS 
Modernization Act of 2015, FEMA has established a subcommittee 
to the National Advisory Council. The subcommittee includes 
members from State, local, and Tribal governments and 
communications service providers; organizations representing 
individuals with disabilities or limited English proficiency; 
and others.
    This committee is consulting with IPAWS users and experts 
to consider new and developing technologies that may be 
beneficial to IPAWS and the Nation. The subcommittee will 
develop recommendations on matters related to common alert and 
warning protocols, standards, terminology, and operating 
procedures. Through this subcommittee, we are looking at recent 
uses of the system, including use during the 2017 natural 
disasters, as well as the false alert in Hawaii. To identify 
lessons learned and best practices to fold into these 
recommendations, the IPAWS subcommittee report will be 
available by spring 2019.
    FEMA continues to assist State and local agencies with 
their specific training requirements. In the last year, FEMA 
assisted multiple State and local agencies with IPAWS-specific 
training, testing, and exercise requirements during 115 
separate engagements. Two of those trainings were with Hawaii 
Emergency Management Agency prior to the false missile alert.
    Additionally, FEMA IPAWS is also working with the Emergency 
Management Institute, National Exercise Division, and Director 
of the FEMA National Incident Management System program to 
incorporate public alert and warning training, tests, and 
exercises, into the NIMS program.
    This month, FEMA will launch an online collaborative forum 
to enable alerting authorities and software developers to share 
best practices, operating procedures, and safeguards, and 
alerting concepts for their communities.
    FEMA is assisting states with guidance on the type of 
alerts a state may wish to include in their State warning 
plans, and alert and warning template tailoring according to 
each state's specific needs.
    This month, FEMA will issue recommendations to vendors to 
address functionality issues to clearly illustrate when 
alerting originators are in the test or lab environment.
    I look forward to continuing to work with Congress and 
provide updates as we move forward with recommendations to 
continue to modernize the system and our processes. I am 
grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today. And I 
am happy to respond to any questions the Subcommittee may have 
at this time.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

            Prepared Statement of Antwane Johnson, Director,
    Continuity Communications, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
                  U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Introduction
    Good morning Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of 
the Committee. My name is Antwane Johnson, and I am the Director of 
Continuity Communications within the National Continuity Programs 
Directorate (NCP) at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On 
behalf of FEMA Administrator Brock Long and John Veatch, the Assistant 
Administrator for NCP, I appreciate the opportunity to speak today on 
the importance of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System 
(IPAWS), how the system was used during the events of January 13, 2018, 
and the steps we are taking to improve the system.
What is IPAWS?
    An effective, timely, and far-reaching public alert and warning 
system is critical to communicating threats to public safety and 
providing people with guidance during times of crisis.
    Executive Order 13407 and The IPAWS Modernization Act of 2015 
define FEMA's responsibility to provide a public alert and warning 
system. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act directs FEMA to provide technical assistance to state, local, 
tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments to ensure that timely and 
effective disaster warning is provided. In accordance with these 
statutes, IPAWS was created to enhance and extend a national 
infrastructure and capability to SLTT officials for public alert and 
warning.
    IPAWS is a national warning infrastructure that provides a single 
interface for public safety officials to alert and warn the public 
about emergencies. There are two main system components:

        (1) IPAWS supports warnings and communications from the 
        President in the event of a catastrophic national emergency. 
        The President can reach the American people through the 
        National Public Warning System, where the message is 
        transmitted through FEMA Primary Entry Point (PEP) radio 
        stations and Emergency Alert System (EAS) radio television, and 
        cable stations.

        (2) IPAWS also supports geo-targeted alerts sent from federal, 
        local, state, tribal, and territorial officials during 
        emergencies, such as those issued last year by Florida and 
        Texas, in anticipation of hurricanes Harvey, and Irma.

    These federal, local, state, tribal, or territorial alerting 
authorities can, via the ``IPAWS OPEN'' gateway, send emergency 
messages to people in their geographic jurisdiction by radio and TV 
Emergency Alert System (EAS) broadcasts, Wireless Emergency Alerts 
(WEA) to cell phones, broadcasts from National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) Weather Radios, and other IPAWS internet-
connected services. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) 
conducted research to improve geo-targeting capabilities and public 
response to alerts and warnings, through funding provided by the 
Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration. Today, IPAWS supports more than 26,000 radio, TV, and 
cable EAS connections, 63 cellular carrier gateways reaching millions 
of cell phones, connections to NOAA dissemination systems, and 73 
Internet application vendors that tap into the IPAWS alert feed.
    States determine who their state alerting authorities are, and 
validate requests from potential local alerting authorities to gain 
access to the IPAWS. A profile is created in the system for each 
validated authority describing the geographic jurisdiction, types of 
alerts, and which alert dissemination systems will be used by the 
authority. Following completion of required FEMA-developed training by 
the authority, access to send alerts directly through IPAWS to people 
is turned on. This training provides skills to draft effective and 
accessible warning messages, and best practices in effective use of the 
Common Alerting Protocol. In addition to the initial training, in June 
2014 FEMA released an advanced course to further develop these skills 
among alerting authorities. Messages that match the authorities profile 
pass automatically through the system to EAS, WEA, and the other alert 
dissemination systems to population's TV, radio, and cell phones.
    IPAWS supports ``broadcast'' type alert and warning services. 
Unlike subscription based-alert services, warnings are sent to all 
people located in a specified area, both residents and visitors.
    FEMA is responsible for development, operation, integration, and 
maintenance of IPAWS infrastructure, which includes the EAS, WEA, NOAA, 
and IPAWS Alerts Feed components plus any future connections. IPAWS was 
designed so it can easily adapt to technological advances.
    As of March 2018, there are 1,075 total IPAWS public alerting 
authorities. Since its inception in 2011, more than 2.7 million alert 
messages have been processed by IPAWS.
    Authorities have used IPAWS connections to successfully alert 
people of a wide variety of threats to public safety. This includes, 
but is not limited to: natural disasters, gas plant explosions and 
evacuations, armed robbers, active shooters, dangerous water 
advisories, 911 service outages, and electrical power outages.
AMBER Alerts
    In 2003, President George W. Bush signed the Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act 
of 2003 (Public Law 108-21). This act established the national 
coordination of state and local programs, including the development of 
guidance for issuance and dissemination of AMBER alerts.
    The National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) is 
responsible for America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) 
plan, which allows broadcasters and transportation authorities to 
immediately distribute information about recent child abductions to the 
public and enables the entire community to assist in the search for and 
safe recovery of the child.
    The AMBER Alert program is a voluntary partnership among law 
enforcement agencies, broadcasters, transportation agencies, and the 
wireless industry to activate an urgent Wireless Emergency Alert in the 
most serious cases of child abduction.
    Since the AMBER alert program's inception, 53 children across the 
country have been safely returned to their families as a direct result 
of these WEAs.
IPAWS Use during Recent Hurricanes, Wildfires, and Mudslides
    For the three major hurricanes in 2017--Harvey, Irma, and Maria--
nearly 700 emergency messages were sent via IPAWS by both the National 
Weather Service and state and local alerting authorities.
    Prior to Hurricane Irma, state and local alerting authorities 
issued a series of timely WEA and EAS alerts to advise the public to 
take appropriate protective measures. The Florida Division of Emergency 
Management (FDEM) issued several evacuation alerts that facilitated the 
safe and timely evacuation of nearly 6.5 million residents and 
visitors. FDEM issued IPAWS alerts on behalf of counties that were 
unable to issue an alert because they were not an authorized alerting 
authority, demonstrating state-local coordination.
    For Hurricane Maria, FEMA IPAWS developed an innovative arrangement 
with SirusXM to deploy satellite radios to Puerto Rico. Extensive 
efforts by the IPAWS project management office successfully kept PEP 
stations broadcasting in Puerto Rico to provide critical response and 
recovery information to the island's residents. These efforts included 
coordination of fueling where power was unavailable, and providing 
technical assistance to ensure the PEP stations remained up and 
running. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, FEMA IPAWS had primed the backup 
generator for the PEP station two years ago and had replaced the fuel 
tank generator and fuel distribution systems in June 2017. This 
continued maintenance allowed for radio broadcasts and alerts to be 
sent to residents in the U.S. Virgin Islands through this station while 
the power was out following Hurricane Irma.
    In October 2017, WEAs were issued to warn California residents 
about the wildfire danger. This event highlighted a few strengths as 
well as areas for improvement. Strengths include some local authorities 
using a variety of warning and communications methods to reach as many 
people as possible, including WEAs, police sirens, opt in reverse 911 
and text alerts, door-to-door notifications and social media. Areas for 
improvement include the regular testing of IPAWS to ensure the system, 
and user access, is operational and working correctly. One alerting 
authority's user access was recently updated and was not tested prior 
to attempted use during the wildfires, at which time it was discovered 
to have not worked. It has since been fixed.
    During the January 2018 flooding and mudslides in Southern 
California, 10 WEAs were sent: five by the National Weather Service, 
three by Santa Barbara County, and two by the City of Los Angeles.
Implementation of IPAWS Modernization Act
    The IPAWS Modernization Act of 2015 (PL 114-143) directs FEMA to 
implement and modernize the IPAWS and to establish an IPAWS 
subcommittee under the National Advisory Council (NAC). This council 
advises the Administrator on all aspects of emergency management to 
ensure input from and coordination with state, local, tribal, and 
territorial governments, non-profit organizations, and the private 
sector communities on the development and revision of plans and 
strategies.
    Additionally, the law directs the IPAWS subcommittee to consult 
with users and experts to consider new and developing technologies that 
may be beneficial to the public alert and warning system; develop 
recommendations for IPAWS and submit a recommendation report to the NAC 
for approval. The recommendations will be on matters related to common 
alerting and warning protocols, standards, terminology, and operating 
procedures. The subcommittee will also make recommendations to the NAC 
on having the capability to adapt the distribution and content of 
communications based on locality, risks, or user preferences. As 
outlined in the law, the subcommittee will terminate no later than 
April 2019.
    FEMA announced the IPAWS subcommittee membership in July 2017. 
Membership includes participants from: state, local, and tribal 
governments and emergency management agencies; communications service 
providers; third-party service bureaus; commercial mobile radio service 
industry; satellite industry; organizations representing individuals 
with access and functional needs and limited English proficiency; 
privacy advocates; and senior Federal leaders. The subcommittee members 
are divided into four working groups, focused on: alert writers and 
alerting authorities; public needs; stakeholder engagement and 
coordination; and future technologies.
    As of January 2018, the working groups have held 45 webinars, with 
48 guest speakers presenting to subcommittee members. These guest 
speakers include educators and researchers, state and local alerting 
authorities, and private sector partners to help inform the 
recommendations.
    The subcommittee will continue developing and refining 
recommendations in the coming months, in order to present draft 
recommendations to the NAC in fall 2018. The subcommittee will also 
take into consideration recent uses, including best practices and 
lessons learned, when developing the recommendations. Once a draft is 
complete, the subcommittee will work with NAC to develop the final 
approved recommendations to present to the FEMA Administrator, the head 
of each agency represented on the subcommittee, this committee, the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the 
House committees on Homeland Security and on Transportation and 
Infrastructure.
Hawaii False Missile Alert and Next Steps
    On January 13, 2018, at 8:07 am local time, the Hawaii Emergency 
Management Agency (HI-EMA) mistakenly issued an alert through FEMA's 
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System-Open Platform for Emergency 
Networks (IPAWS-OPEN) to residents of Hawaii notifying them of an 
inbound ballistic missile threat. The alert was issued as an IPAWS WEA 
displayed on cell phones and via EAS on television and radio. The live 
EAS and WEA messages used the event code Civil Defense Warning (CDW). 
The WEA message read:

``BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER. 
THIS IS NOT A DRILL''

    HI-EMA canceled the WEA cell broadcast at 8:13 am local time, 
thereby preventing additional cell phones from receiving the alert. 
FEMA was contacted by HI-EMA at 8:30 am local time to seek confirmation 
to use the Civil Emergency Message (CEM) event code to issue a follow-
up message. At 8:45 am local time (approximately 38 minutes after the 
erroneous alert was sent), HI-EMA issued a second IPAWS message to 
inform the public there was no missile threat. The second WEA message 
stated:
``There is no missile threat or danger to the State of Hawaii. Repeat. 
        False Alarm''
    The alert issued on January 13 brought to light gaps in existing 
alerting plans, protocols, and procedures, including those for 
responding to an erroneous public alert. These gaps exist at multiple 
levels. Standard operating procedures for the release of alerts need to 
include additional review steps to ensure the accuracy of a public 
alert. Additionally, all plans, protocols, and procedures need to 
include clear guidance and steps for rectifying an erroneous alert if 
one is sent.
    FEMA continues to assist state and local agencies with their 
specific training requirements and has assisted multiple state and 
local agencies with IPAWS-specific training, testing, and exercise 
requirements during 115 separate engagements. Two of those trainings 
were with HI-EMA.
    FEMA is taking steps to review and improve public alert and warning 
guidance, planning, training, practice, and exercises, and incorporate 
them across FEMA programs and into the National Incident Management 
System.
    To help share the lessons learned from the Hawaii missile alert and 
other recent events (including the use of IPAWS during the 2017 
hurricane season and recent California wildfires), FEMA is highlighting 
best practices to help guide alerting authorities as they review and 
update their policies and procedures. To facilitate dissemination 
within the emergency management community, FEMA will launch an online 
collaborative forum in the spring of 2018 to enable alerting 
authorities and software developers to share best practices, 
experiences, operating procedures, and lessons learned.
    FEMA has also issued recommendations to Alert Origination Software 
Providers (AOSP) that go beyond recommendations provided to AOSPs in 
2015. In particular, FEMA recommends that vendors providing alert 
origination software ensure critical capabilities be included in their 
products to make alert and warning more effective and include steps to 
mitigate alerting errors.
    The success of IPAWS depends on public confidence in the 
reliability of the system to issue timely, accurate, and actionable 
information. While alerting authorities have their own public outreach 
strategies, FEMA conducts a series of awareness programs to ensure the 
American people understand the functions of IPAWS and how to respond to 
alerts and warnings from public safety officials. Project Management 
Office (PMO) efforts have included releasing Public Service 
Announcements (PSAs) on radio and television, providing a 15-minute 
online course ``IPAWS and the American People,'' and incorporating 
IPAWS and WEA information on Ready.gov.
    The PSAs educate the public on what a WEA is and how to recognize a 
message when received, advise the public to heed the warning and take 
the prescribed protective action in the message, and direct viewers to 
learn more about life-saving alerts on www.fema.gov/ipaws and 
www.ready.gov/alerts. Public safety officials are encouraged to work 
with local broadcasters to make the WEA PSAs a part of local public 
education campaigns.
    IPAWS will also continue to make State, local, tribal, and 
territorial emergency managers aware of the ``IPAWS Lab.'' This lab, 
located at the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Indian Head, Maryland, 
provides alerting authorities with test and evaluation, operational 
assessments, IPAWS demonstrations, and expert technical support. The 
lab provides an interactive and closed IPAWS testing environment, and 
allows users the opportunity to practice and train to increase 
familiarity and confidence using IPAWS.
    In accordance with new WEA rules established by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) in 2016, IPAWS is working with wireless 
carriers and alerting software vendors to enhance WEA capabilities 
based on research conducted by S&T. This includes creating room for 
more detailed information in messages, allowing links to instructions 
and images, Spanish language support, and dedicated test message type 
for use by SLTT alerting authorities.
    The IPAWS PMO continues to collaborate with our alerting authority 
partners to look for opportunities to incorporate best practices and 
lessons learned into program guidance and training.
Conclusion
    Every day I am grateful for the opportunity to work with a program 
dedicated to helping alert and provide guidance to people during times 
of crisis. Thank you for your interest in the program and we look 
forward to collaborating with this subcommittee on ways the program can 
improve. I am happy to take any questions you have at this time.

    Senator Schatz. Well, thank all the testifiers.
    My first question is for Ms. McGinnis.
    When can we expect the report?
    Ms. McGinnis. In the near future.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Schatz. Are we talking about days or weeks?
    Ms. McGinnis. Well, we wanted to take some time to 
benefit----
    Voice. Turn it on.
    Ms. McGinnis. Thank you. I apologize.
    Just to repeat, we wanted to take some time to benefit from 
this hearing today to have that opportunity to fold that into 
the report. So----
    Senator Schatz. But you're almost done.
    Ms. McGinnis. Correct.
    Senator Schatz. OK.
    Ms. McGinnis. We are almost done, but we want to make sure 
that it's thorough, and we're listening very closely to the 
testimony and information shared today.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    The next question is for Admiral Piercey.
    The sirens went off at the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. 
Is that correct?
    Admiral Piercey. Yes, sir.
    Senator Schatz. And did they go off on any other bases or 
installations?
    Admiral Piercey. They--they also went off the--in the 
Wahiawa complex.
    Senator Schatz. Now, does HI-EMA have the ability to set 
off a siren on a base or an installation, or was that a--was 
that in response to the HI-EMA errant missile notification, and 
then someone, a Department of Defense personnel, pressed the 
button to set off the sirens?
    Admiral Piercey. Well, the latter is correct, sir. So in 
response to the false alert, the command duty officer, a 
command duty officer, activated the sirens for both the Wahiawa 
complex and also the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam area.
    Senator Schatz. So if we're able to enact our legislation, 
all of our legislation, this would be moot, but in the 
meantime, I'm assuming you're doing after-action analysis to 
make sure that your people are not responding to any errant 
information coming from the HI-EMA side.
    Admiral Piercey. So, yes, sir, that's correct. We conducted 
an informal after-action analysis review, and we determined 
that we do have procedures in place to ensure there's 
appropriate backup. In this particular case, the Command Duty 
Officer did not go through the normal process to--to validate 
with another Command Duty Officer that this was an actual 
alert.
    Senator Schatz. OK. Could you follow up for the members and 
for the Committee, and especially for the other members of the 
delegation and members of the Armed Services Committee, to 
understand exactly how you're changing your procedures and your 
training to make sure that something like that doesn't happen 
again?
    Admiral Piercey. Sure.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    Mr. Johnson, you know, I want to talk a little bit about 
the way FEMA highlights best practices. And I think when it 
comes to natural disasters, you have so many reps, if you will, 
you have so many iterations and so many years of experience 
that if you're doing, you know, flood notification, wildfire 
notification, tsunami, hurricane, that merely highlighting a 
best practice is a useful way to do this because it's highly 
localized stuff.
    But we have a voluntary program for missile alert 
notification. We have one state, zero territory, zero counties 
participating. You've got 3,017 counties. I doubt any other 
state is going to be rushing in to voluntarily participate in 
this program.
    And so you have a couple of problems. First, no one wants 
to voluntarily participate in this program at this point. 
Second of all, to the extent that FEMA provides a service under 
normal circumstances in highlighting what states and counties 
are doing right, there are no examples of what states and 
counties are doing right. There are no best practices at this 
point. The FCC is leaning into this, FEMA is considering this, 
but, frankly, the way you're configured is to simply look at 
what other places are doing and saying this works, this maybe 
is not so good, but you have literally no examples for other 
states or counties to consider best practices.
    So I'm wondering how you view missile alert notifications 
as possibly different from any other category, not merely as it 
relates to the ALERT Act and who should be primarily 
responsible, that's another public policy question, but how do 
we get best practices if what your job is under normal 
circumstances to see what other states and counties are doing, 
and then say ``Attaboy'' or ``Attagirl''? But there are 
literally no examples. So how is any state going to be able to 
follow any example if there are zero examples to be followed?
    Mr. Johnson. Great. Thank you for that question. Today, in 
terms of voluntary participation in the IPAWS program, all 50 
states are voluntarily participating with IPAWS----
    Senator Schatz. I know that. I'm saying there are zero 
participants in a missile alert notification program. And I get 
that you can--you can sort of, in a broad sense, show what 
states and counties are doing using IPAWS.
    Mr. Johnson. Mm-hmm.
    Senator Schatz. But I'm talking about a missile 
notification, which clearly we've learned from experience that 
there are different procedures, there are different protocols, 
there's more coordination, and it's, frankly, higher stakes.
    So I get that 50 states are participating in IPAWS. I love 
IPAWS. It works great for what it works for. It doesn't appear 
to be working for something which is essentially notifying the 
public of a war.
    Mr. Johnson. Correct. And thank you so much for your 
question, Senator. I think that when we look at the history of 
alerting in the country and what's been done for the last 60-
plus years, both on the technology side as well as what's been 
done in the social sciences arena with studies by the National 
Academies of Science and others, there's a great deal of room 
for improvement in terms of how we do things. But I would say 
that there are a number of best practices that have evolved 
over the last few years in terms of how states plan and 
organize similar to--and organize their activities as it 
relates to alert and warning.
    Now, it is true that with the accidental warning, ballistic 
missile warning, that took place here in Hawaii, it did prompt 
a number of other states to contact our office because, you're 
right, they were not preparing or planning for a ballistic 
missile warning having to be issued by the state or anyone 
else.
    Senator Schatz. Well, to put a fine point on it, they call 
FEMA and say, ``I didn't know that was on us.''
    Mr. Johnson. Right. So there is some level of coordination 
and there is some degree of misunderstanding as to how the 
process works. We at FEMA are going back and revisiting that 
and working with the State and local governments so that they 
clearly understand what those responsibilities, those roles, 
are when it comes to a ballistic missile warning or any other 
type threat to public safety.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you. What I'm getting from our 
witnesses is that this is--it's a lot more complicated than 
meets the eye because there are a number of Federal agencies, 
State agencies, and local authorities that are involved. And so 
to me, this really underscores how important it is that we not 
create an environment where a missile strike comes our way to 
Hawaii, or anyplace else for that matter, because it is rather 
astounding to contemplate what might happen if there was an 
actual missile strike.
    Yes, we want to have the warning systems. At least the 
warning systems should be accurate, at least. But what happens 
after a missile strike would be, I would say, devastation and 
chaos. And so, you know, I want to underscore some of the 
things that I said as well as Congresswoman Gabbard, that we 
really need to shore up our capability, diplomatic 
capabilities.
    Now, for the Admiral then, it was sort of alarming that the 
alarms went off at Joint Base Pearl Harbor and that you had a 
person there that did not follow the appropriate protocols to 
verify. So I take it that this has led to all of you reviewing 
what it is that you folks do and how you interface with the 
local governments and our local alert systems.
    Admiral Piercey. Yes, ma'am. As I mentioned before, we took 
the opportunity as we went through this process, one, to 
validate that we did not initiate the false alert. And then, 
second, we took a look at our own internal process to see where 
we could make some improvements because clearly we share with 
you the concern that we have to have the public's trust and 
confidence----
    Senator Hirono. Yes.
    Admiral Piercey.--to do our number one mission.
    Senator Hirono. So that alarm should never have gone off at 
Joint Base Pearl Harbor.
    Admiral Piercey. Oh, I would like to say we would always 
want to go with never, but I would offer this, that based upon 
where many acted upon a false alert, and it said this was not a 
drill, we enable our commanders, in this particular case, the 
command duty officer, to make a decision given the indications 
that he received, and based upon that, he took action, 
initiative, in this case, to activate the alerts. The process 
was then corrected. It took some time to reverse that process 
to turn the alarms off and say this was a false alert.
    But what I have to face from a readiness side is, as a 
military officer, is I have to create conditions that enable my 
leaders to make decisions. In this case, I will say that the 
particular individual did not make the right decision. However, 
and the process had backup, and we did not follow that process. 
But at the same time, I can't squash initiative because I need 
that in cases where things aren't exactly always by the book.
    So I would like--I want this--there to be no accidents or 
incidents or mistakes, but part of the readiness part here is I 
have to recognize that we have to create the conditions so 
that----
    Senator Hirono. Excuse me, I'm running out of time, but I 
thought that Admiral Harris had determined quite early on that 
Northern Command had never issued such a missile alert, and 
that was a verification that should have occurred. But I'm 
assuming that you've corrected that situation.
    Admiral Piercey. Senator, the alert was based upon the text 
alert that the command duty officer had received, the 
individual.
    Senator Hirono. Yes, but they--it was supposed to have come 
out of Northern Command to begin with, and that never emanated 
from Northern Command.
    Turning to Mr. Johnson, as we talk about how all of the 
states can update their plans, their Emergency Alert System 
plans, and that we have not done so, and I would probably not 
be wrong to assume that a lot of other states have not done so, 
so we're all sitting here talking about, How can we enable them 
to understand what the best practices are? And the 
Commissioner, FCC Commissioner, said that they could convene 
different groups to come.
    But, you know, I notice in your testimony that as a result 
of what happened in Hawaii, that FEMA is highlighting best 
practices to help guide alerting authorities. So what are the 
best practices that you have already identified? Or are you 
still working on identifying best practices that could be sent 
out to the states to enable them to, for example, update their 
plans?
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Senator Hirono. There--there are a 
number of initiatives that were taken within FEMA, one of which 
that I'll mention is a number of Nation State Threat meetings 
that are taking place to sort through internal procedures and 
protocols and how we will respond to that type of threat as a 
nation.
    But, second, we are looking at things like testing and 
training. We want to make sure that there is adequate training, 
not only that's provided by the Federal Government, meaning 
FEMA, throughout--through the Emergency Management Institute, 
but we're also looking at the type of training that the 
software vendors who are providing these tools to State and 
locals that they provide, and assuring that it's consistent and 
that they're providing adequate support 24/7 and respond to 
questions that the state may have on the use of their tool.
    For example, there was somewhat of a delay in contacting 
FEMA during the course of that errant message that went out on 
the thirteenth. Had the vendor that they were using at the time 
had a 24/7 more robust training help desk capability, that 
question could have been answered very quickly without 
additional guidance or seeking FEMA guidance on that matter. So 
we're looking at testing and training.
    We're standing up this collaborative environment on Monday. 
I just got the word back from my office that Monday we will 
launch an environment that will allow State and local 
government as well as the private sector, you know, technology 
providers, to collaborate on best practices, and as a whole of 
community, come up with appropriate practices that can be 
applied by each of the states that have a responsibility or 
role in this area. So that's one of the others.
    We are working with the FCC in the review of State plans, 
ensuring that they not only address the Emergency Alert System 
and how that whole daisy chain plays out, but we're also 
looking at all of the emerging technologies, like the inclusion 
of Wireless Emergency Alerts or the inclusion of ATSC 3.0 
nanotechnology, which is the next generation of over-the-air 
broadcasts, to be able to disseminate information, not only 
through the scroll or the audio message that appears on your 
screen, but other rich media as well, and to be able to provide 
that information in multiple languages, so to speak.
    Senator Hirono. So I appreciate that you are taking 
concrete steps in conjunction with the FCC. So at some point, 
is there a report that comes--that is made available to 
everyone of the various steps and the best practices that you 
all have identified?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes.
    Senator Hirono. Is there a report that's coming at some 
point?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. And so--and later in the spring, FEMA 
will release its after-action report that will contain a number 
of best practices as well as specific actions that FEMA has 
taken in response to the January 13th event. We will make that 
report available to the Committee and others within the 
community. And so it will be fairly comprehensive, but will 
include things that are not necessarily knee-jerk reactions to 
an event like the one of January 13th, but will be more 
systematic in addressing some of the issues that surfaced as a 
result of that false missile alert----
    Senator Hirono. Thank you.
    Mr. Johnson.--training, education, and all of the other 
things that we've talked about in short form this morning.
    Senator Hirono. Well, keep doing what you're doing. I look 
forward to the report.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
    Senator Schatz. Congresswoman Hanabusa.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, I heard you say two different things, so let me 
try to clarify it. First you said that part of readiness, you 
have empowered whoever--whatever level that commander was. And 
given the fact that he, I guess, believed--he got the alert 
that it was a proper alert, he then triggered whatever he 
triggers, the sirens in both Pearl as well as in Wahiawa, which 
are you talking about Schofield or someplace else in Wahiawa?
    Admiral Piercey. The NCTAMS PAC facility at Wahiawa, ma'am.
    Ms. Hanabusa. OK. So then you said that he didn't follow 
proper protocol. So first you're saying he's empowered to take 
action, which he apparently did. So let me ask you a follow up 
on that. Is HI-EMA's, I guess, notification, is that considered 
proper notification as far as PACOM is concerned?
    Admiral Piercey. Proper notification would go through our--
through military channels.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So are you--so are you now saying that the 
whoever it was, the Commander, who triggered the, quote/
unquote, the alert at Pearl Harbor did not have and did not 
follow protocol because he triggered it and it should not--or 
the notification did not come through proper military channels, 
or are you saying HI-EMA's notification is considered part of 
proper military channels?
    Admiral Piercey. So, ma'am, let me sort of step back to 
this and go through the process again. So through the normal 
alert process, you know, so we at--at PACOM, we have the 
ability to validate an event, and then we, through----
    Ms. Hanabusa. I understand that, Admiral.
    Admiral Piercey. Right. So I--ma'am, I have to sort of----
    Ms. Hanabusa. I want to know, is HI-EMA's notification 
considered proper or not?
    Admiral Piercey. I would consider under normal 
circumstances, HI-EMA's alerting notification to be an 
indicator of a ballistic missile attack in this particular 
case. Under normal circumstances, where it was not sent as a 
false alert, I would expect people to take that as notification 
that they then need to take certain actions because of the 
alert.
    Our processes are written in a way that normally through 
the process, since he did not receive this notification through 
his normal chain of command, he is required to validate that by 
going back to the next level up, the Command Duty Officer at 
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, and then based upon that, then 
activate the alarm. He took it on his own initiative, based 
upon what he saw in the alert, to then activate the alarm.
    So from that mistake, then we had to go back through and 
then go through the process to have the alarms or the sirens 
turned off as we went back to the process of----
    Ms. Hanabusa. Admiral, I guess my concern is, Why would 
PACOM, a branch of DoD, which, of course, has the entity 
NORTHCOM, who would really be the one who would get the 
notification properly, why would you rely on or consider the 
HI-EMA as a valid source versus looking whether or not you've 
got something from DoD versus HI-EMA?
    Admiral Piercey. Because the notification to HI-EMA through 
the normal reporting process would be they're part of our 
secure conference call, and also through another reporting 
procedure, it goes in through FEMA, and then FEMA notifies HI-
EMA. So there are two paths in terms of coming into HI-EMA for 
notification.
    Ms. Hanabusa. And I guess the problem that I see with what 
you just said is that's a lot of steps. And as you know, when 
they tried to validate with FEMA as to whether or not this is 
true or not, we had another delay, and you have a situation 
where if anybody should know that this is a valid ballistic 
missile coming into Hawaii, it should be you, it should be your 
process.
    So I would, I hope--and I want to ask you as part of what 
you're doing, Have you taken HI-EMA out of this process as 
opposed--as when it comes to your notification internally? 
Simply because one of the banners was, ``PACOM confirms,'' 
because your sirens went off. I believe that the people would 
feel a lot safer and have more public confidence if HI-EMA was 
out, and if you, PACOM, or someone within DoD is the one who 
sets it off, that's something else. So have you taken HI-EMA 
out as a proper notification step so that we can at least get 
to the people who know, which is DoD?
    Admiral Piercey. The answer to that is no, we have not 
taken HI-EMA out of the process. We've paused pending the 
implementation of the corrective actions from the various 
studies, as HI-EMA has implemented their changes to their 
processes, and at the request of the state, we have paused 
conducting exercises. I would offer that PACOM has a very close 
relationship with--with--with many organizations, clearly the 
State of Hawaii, and that we believe that continued close--
working closely together, coordinating closely together, 
building that trust, continues to be critical. And so--so, 
therefore, Admiral Harris has not taken action nor has been 
direction that we should eliminate our relationship with the 
State of Hawaii through the HI-EMA.
    Ms. Hanabusa. But you have put it on pause, right? You've 
put it on pause is what you testified.
    Admiral Piercey. We've paused--what we've paused is the 
conduct of--the conduct of exercises. However, our current 
procedures exist that if in the event of an actual launch, we 
would, through two conference calls, one conference call 
through FEMA, and the other conference through HI-EMA, they 
would give--we would notify them once we validated the fact of 
an actual launch. From our perspective, it's a parallel 
reporting method that also----
    Ms. Hanabusa. I understand, Admiral. Let me just tell you 
this: a ballistic missile into Hawaii is an act of war, and I 
don't think you should be delaying notification by doing a 
parallel path or whatever else. If you know it is, you should 
act accordingly.
    And with that, thank you very much.
    And thank you, Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. Representative Gabbard.
    Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
    You know, I think you're getting the point here of the 
delineation between any of a number of the natural disasters 
that our EAS system is set up to notify our residents about, 
the difference between that and what is an act of war and 
attack on the homeland. And the reason, you know, Senator 
Schatz's legislation I think gets to the heart of this issue in 
treating this differently, understanding that time is of the 
essence, when we have mere minutes from the point that a 
missile is launched to point of impact, and that every second 
in that period counts.
    Mr. Johnson, you know, the President has sole 
responsibility to determine when EAS will be activated at a 
national level, and that responsibility has been delegated to 
the Director of FEMA. When was the last time this occurred?
    Mr. Johnson. The activation of the Emergency Alert System 
in response to a national type of event has never been 
activated and has never been carried out. We have, however, 
tested our national capabilities both in 2011 as well as 2016 
and 2017. And you are correct, at the direction of the 
President, if we were under attack or there was a national 
emergency, we would, at the direction of the President, 
activate these capabilities. But until that direction is 
provided by the President, we would not activate those systems 
under any conditions.
    Ms. Gabbard. So this delegation of authority to the FEMA 
Director really isn't a whole delegation because the FEMA 
Director would still wait for the President to take action, is 
that correct?
    Mr. Johnson. Right. So there are two things at play here. 
One is, of course, the Executive Order that was issued by 
President Bush in 2006, as well as the 1995 statement of 
requirements that were issued by President then Clinton. It 
establishes protocols, one, to allow what--it establishes 
protocols that would cause FEMA to respond at the request of 
the President to activate the system, but it also goes on 
further to state that once the system has been activated or 
directed to be activated by the President, then the Director of 
FEMA can use the system for follow-on information, and that 
would typically be during the response-and-recovery phase of an 
event.
    Ms. Gabbard. OK. Thanks. Sorry. I don't have much time. I 
guess the point here is that when our country has been attacked 
by a foreign nation state, all of this seems like far too many 
layers for our residents to be notified that we are under 
attack, especially those, in the instance of Hawaii, who are in 
the impact zone.
    So I guess the question for Admiral Piercey is, Why 
shouldn't the DoD, being that first point of verification that 
North Korea has launched a missile, as you go through your 
process every time to see what the direction and where the 
potential impact zone is, as that first point of verification, 
why shouldn't the DoD be responsible for sending out the 
notification, especially given with the existing notification 
system, State and local governments already have the authority 
to send out these messages? It doesn't seem like it would be 
too much to authorize DoD and PACOM directly to be able to do 
so.
    Admiral Piercey. Yes, ma'am. I would offer that we are the 
first point of verification.
    Ms. Gabbard. Correct.
    Admiral Piercey. And through that process, it then goes 
through the established--the existing channels that exist 
through both FEMA and HI-EMA. I would offer that if you're 
proposing that we are actually the ones that drop down the menu 
and do the notification, if that's what the proposal, the 
legislation, is, I would offer that the existing process in 
terms of that covers--a notification process that covers the 
entire range both from the very high end, as we have discussed 
today, through--you know, through the other ones that--that 
allow both states, localities, and municipalities to exercise 
some level of management and oversight to see to, 
responsibility for, those systems that--that that--the existing 
process supports that. Ultimately, we recognize, we accept, the 
fact that we need to verify. We have that process in place.
    Ms. Gabbard. Right.
    Admiral Piercey. And through--but if we go through our 
process, we have verified this, and then through the existing--
through FEMA, through the Federal process, and through the 
State process, those at the Federal level and the State level, 
they take the action for notification.
    Ms. Gabbard. So I guess that's--that's the question here, 
Admiral Piercey, is, Why do we need these extra layers? Because 
we recognize obviously that PACOM and NORTHCOM have the direct 
verification and the first line of verification. Why not cut 
out the extra layers and empower you to click the dropdown 
option and send out that alert so that people are getting it 
directly from the verification source rather than questioning, 
whether it be at FEMA or the local level or the county level or 
the State level, that someone may have made a mistake along the 
way and wondering if this is, in fact, real or not?
    Admiral Piercey. I would offer again that there are 
existing agencies that have that authority and responsibility.
    Ms. Gabbard. I think this is the reason why we're gathered 
here, though, is there's a problem with the existing process. 
So, you know, this is an important follow-up response that I 
think we need from PACOM, is, Why not? You say there's an 
existing process, but why not improve that process by creating 
that direct line of communication between your command and the 
people of Hawaii?
    Admiral Piercey. And I would offer that the existing lines 
of communication with the existing system supports that.
    Ms. Gabbard. OK. Thank you. We'll look forward to follow up 
on this.
    Senator Schatz. I'm just going to follow up with a comment, 
and if the other Members have any follow-up questions, they're 
welcome to ask them.
    You know, I don't think this is quite as complicated as it 
sounds. We just want the origination of a notification of a 
missile alert to start with the people who know and then drop 
down to the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA. It's not 
that HI-EMA shouldn't have a role, just like it's not that HPD 
shouldn't have a role, it's not that the Sheriff's Department 
shouldn't have a role, it's not that the Red Cross shouldn't 
have a role, it's just that the information should flow from 
the people who know for sure and then down and out to the 
community.
    And the concerning thing, Admiral, that you said is that I 
understand, actually like, that you said we want to authorize 
our people in terms of organizational culture to exercise 
initiative and err on the side of readiness, right? That 
totally makes sense to me. And that can be in conflict with a 
procedure. And so somebody made a mistake, and yet you're sort 
of--you're accounting for the fact that people may make 
mistakes because you're asking them to exercise their 
initiative. Frankly, in contrast to what happened in the HI-EMA 
headquarters, where everyone was frozen in time, worried about 
making a mistake and worried about noncompliance with Federal 
procedures when they should be worrying about notifying their 
neighbors that they're not going to perish.
    So I don't mind that someone was authorized to exercise 
discretion, but I do think it's important what all of my 
colleagues have said, is that we now have a convoluted process, 
and we have a convoluted process that, based on results, is a 
failure. And we don't have to reconfigure something very fancy, 
we just want to say people who know whether there's a missile 
in the air tell people who can operate IPAWS on a nationwide 
level.
    Because the other part of this--right?--is that the FEMA 
model is there's a flood in San Mateo County, San Mateo County 
should be informed; there's a hurricane in the Western Pacific, 
you know, people should be informed. If we are at war, there is 
no reason not to inform every American citizen.
    The idea that there should be a regional alert about an 
incoming ICBM is preposterous. Imagine that there's an ICBM and 
it's tracking to--I don't even want to name a state--a state on 
the mainland, do you think it's appropriate for only those 
states that have enlisted in a missile notification program to 
have the capacity to get the word out? Do you think it's--what 
about an adjacent county that didn't sign up? What about an 
adjacent state? And we don't know, by the way, if we're at war, 
how many additional warheads are on the way.
    This is Federal by its very definition. We have robust 
conversations with our Republican colleagues about the role of 
the Federal Government versus local government, but, gosh, I 
can't find even my most Libertarian colleague who thinks that 
this is something that the local government should handle. So 
it's not that the local government shouldn't have a role, it's 
just that they're downstream from the decisionmaking process. 
And I think that's what we're all looking to accomplish.
    Do the other Members have any follow-up questions?
    Ms. Hanabusa. I have a comment.
    Senator Schatz. Representative Hanabusa.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Admiral, what we're here to do, all of us, is 
to try to build back public confidence. So I understand what 
you're saying, I understand readiness, and I understand the 
ability to empower. However, what we're saying is if you are--
put yourself in the shoes of someone out there. Who do they 
want to believe? That's the issue. And actually, you can go 
back, and I'm sure--Admiral Harris and I have had this 
conversation, you can go back and tell the admiral--you should 
be proud of the fact that we are saying people would believe 
the military because it is, in their minds, an act of war.
    FEMA has to wait for the President, everyone else. The FCC 
doesn't have the authority to trigger anything. This is a 
situation where we want our people to know that if it comes 
over, and it should be throughout the United States, I agree 
with Senator Schatz, that, in fact, it comes from the best 
source that we have, not--and every time you have another 
person in there, you have a potential error. I'm not going to 
say that you will be absolutely perfect, but I'll tell you 
what, January 13 should not have happened if it's you, I would 
like to think, because you wouldn't be out there triggering an 
alert because there is no alert to trigger. So that is, I 
think, the basis of what we are saying.
    And I think that the military should view it as a 
compliment, that we're saying, hey, people believe in you. 
People want to see that whoever makes that decision doesn't 
have all these other things that they've got to think about. 
You have the defense of this country and Hawaii, of course, 
very important to us. That's the priority.
    Thank you.
    Senator Schatz. Well, thank the----
    Senator Hirono. Can I just add?
    Senator Schatz. Sure. Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. As we sit here and have this really robust 
discussion, is there some kind of a technical problem with the 
military, the DoD and PACOM, pressing the button that sends the 
alert to everybody in our state? Is there some technical 
problem with you folks having that initial responsibility? 
Because, yes, as we're sitting here, we recognize that a 
missile alert, an attack, is an act of war and that this is not 
a localized weather condition or anything. So is there some 
way--is there a problem with you folks being able to press the 
alert button from your end?
    Admiral Piercey. There's not--right now it's not 
technically supported, but I could imagine that could be 
technically supported.
    Senator Hirono. We can figure out, can't we?
    Admiral Piercey. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Hirono. OK. Thank you.
    Senator Schatz. Well, thank the testifiers and bring in the 
new panel. Our third and final panel has Major General Joe 
Logan, Adjutant General, Hawaii--for the State of Hawaii and 
Hawaii Emergency Management Agency; and Mr. Chris Leonard, 
President and Legislative Chair for the Hawaii Association of 
Broadcasters.
    General Logan, please proceed.

          STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL ARTHUR J. LOGAN,

                ADJUTANT GENERAL, AND DIRECTOR,

              HAWAII EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY,

             STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    General Logan. Good morning, aloha, Senator Schatz--Senator 
Hirono had to step out--but Representative Hanabusa, 
Representative Gabbard. Thank you for the opportunity this 
morning. I am Major General Joe Logan, the Adjutant General of 
the State of Hawaii. I am also the Homeland Security Advisor to 
the Governor and the Director of Hawaii Emergency Management 
Agency.
    I provided my testimony this morning regarding Hawaii's 
State warning systems and the steps that we are taking to 
ensure accurate and timely emergency notification to the 
public. You have my written testimony, and I will take just a 
few minutes for this opening statement.
    On January 13, 2018, the people of Hawaii and our visitors, 
including loved ones far away, suffered an unnecessary fear of 
a missile strike resulting from human error and a series of HI-
EMA leadership failures. We've apologized for this incident, 
especially for the 30-minute delay in correcting the message 
error and providing accurate information to the majority of the 
public.
    Most important, we have been taking--we have taken 
immediate steps to guard against a false alert being sent and 
to ensure that such a delay will not happen again. While 
inexcusable, the false alert revealed systemic issues and 
provides opportunities to undertake corrective actions, thereby 
generating enduring solutions and rebuilding trust in Hawaii's 
Emergency Management Agency.
    As you may already know, shortly after the incident, 
Governor Ige suspended all activities surrounding the ballistic 
missile alert campaign plan, including the additional wailing 
siren tone testing and the ballistic missile checklist 
rehearsal at the State Warning Point. Furthermore, Governor Ige 
directed us to develop a comprehensive Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, and High Explosive Annex to our 2014 
Hawaii Catastrophic Plan prior to any further training on the 
ballistic missile alert.
    Under new management, HI-EMA has already implemented many 
recommendations from Brigadier General Retired Oliveira's 
investigative report and Brigadier General Hara's 30-day action 
plan report ordered under the Governor as Executive Order 18-
01.
    We appreciate the support we have received from our 
military and Federal partners, and we look forward to continued 
collaboration as we implement the action steps identified in 
both reports.
    HI-EMA continues to provide timely and accurate alert and 
warnings and executes its role and responsibilities to ensure 
that the State of Hawaii is able to prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from all hazards, manmade or natural. This is 
evident by the January 23, 2018, tsunami warning, which, due to 
a 7.9 magnitude earthquake off Alaska threatened Hawaii and the 
West Coast of the United States. The tsunami warning came in at 
23:40, or 11:40 p.m., Monday, and the State Warning Point 
immediately went into action. And just after midnight, the 
Governor, the HI-EMA administrator, other staff members, and I 
were at the State Emergency Operations Center connected to the 
counties and the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center awaiting 
further information and preparing to activate warning systems 
if necessary. The alert was canceled shortly after 1 a.m. I'll 
reiterate that the system does work.
    Again, mahalo for the opportunity to be here this morning, 
and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Logan follows:]

Prepared Statement of Major General Arthur J. Logan, Adjutant General, 
  and Director, Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, State of Hawaii, 
                         Department of Defense
    Aloha Chairman John Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and members of 
the Committee:

    I am Major General Arthur J. Logan, State Adjutant General, the 
Director of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (HIEMA), and the 
Homeland Security Advisor to Governor David Y. Ige.
    Mahalo for the opportunity to provide testimony to the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation regarding Hawaii's 
False Missile Alert on January 13, 2018 and what we do next.
    I am here today to provide testimony, not to focus on the events of 
January 13, 2018, as that has been covered extensively via an internal 
investigation, media coverage, media releases, and testimony at a State 
Joint Legislative Committee hearing on January 19, 2018. I would like 
to focus my testimony on the topics of what we have done, what are we 
doing in the short term and long term to improve our emergency 
management systems, and how we are regaining the trust of the people of 
Hawaii.
    Let me first state that the people of Hawaii and our visiting 
tourists, including loved ones far away, suffered unnecessary fear 
resulting from human error, exacerbated by a series of HIEMA leadership 
failures. These failures were in the domains of decision-making and 
communications evident by the time it took to correct the false alert 
message error and provide that information to the majority of the 
public. While inexcusable, the false alert revealed systemic issues and 
provides opportunities to undertake corrective actions thereby 
generating enduring solutions.
    Let me lay the ground work that set in motion the State of Hawaii 
being the first state in the Nation to identify the threat and, barring 
any Federal guidance, began a campaign plan to educate the population 
and further prepare for, and respond to, a ballistic missile threat.
    From January through November 2016, North Korea tested a nuclear 
device and fired some 20 ballistic missiles, each time improving its 
ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities. In January 2017, the 
Administrator of HIEMA and I discussed our concerns about this with the 
Governor and recommended that we plan and prepare for this threat and 
to inform the public about it.
    According to open source news reports, in 2017 North Korea launched 
15 ballistic missiles and conducted another nuclear test. This nuclear 
test of a hydrogen bomb increased the earlier assessments from 15 
kilotons to 150 kilotons.
    The experts tell us that the flight time of an ICBM from North 
Korea to the State of Hawaii is approximately 20 minutes.
    Further, we are told that it takes approximately 5 minutes after 
launch to determine the direction and likely target of the ICBM. This 
leaves Hawaii with approximately 15 minutes when we are notified that 
we are under a ballistic missile threat.
    Because time is of the essence with ballistic missile preparedness 
we began the campaign plan with development of a ballistic missile 
checklist for the State Warning Point (SWP) and a public outreach 
program, well before we completed a tangible Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, and High Explosive (CBRNE) response Annex to 
Hawaii's 2014 Catastrophic Plan.
    By law, the HIEMA is responsible for monitoring and issuing alerts 
and warnings. The SWP, a section of HIEMA, is tasked with the timely 
warning and notification to government, county warning points, 
emergency operations centers, and when directed, the public.
    Further, the State Department of Defense Public Affairs Office and 
the HIEMA Public Information Office are responsible to notify the 
public through the use of live, taped, print, and social media modes. 
These entities were trying everything humanly possible to get the word 
out to the public. The lack of adequate telecommunications capabilities 
in the Diamond Head Crater severely impacted HIEMAs ability to provide 
timely live news media feeds to the public.
    Immediate actions occurring as of January 13, 2018:

    While it took HIEMA 38 minutes to issue the ``false missile alert'' 
message via the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system, this capability 
continues to reside on the vendor HIEMA subscribes to that access 
Integrated Public Awareness Warning System (IPAWS).
    Governor Ige suspended all activities related to the Ballistic 
Missile Preparedness Campaign, including ballistic missile tone siren 
testing and SWP ballistic missile checklist rehearsals until a 
comprehensive CBRNE Annex is prepared.
    The State Emergency Communications Committee met the day after this 
incident with appropriate broadcasting media agency heads and engineers 
to discuss the communications issues and to develop a way ahead.
    HIEMA has updated its Ballistic Missile Alert Checklist, which now 
provides greater clarity and standardization for the members of the 
SWP.
    Short-and long-range recommendations and actions:

    Governor David Ige issued Executive Order 18-01, directing BG 
Kenneth Hara, Deputy Adjutant General (DAG), to review current 
emergency response systems, including notifications and warnings, and 
make recommendations for improvement. His Initial Action Plan--30 day 
Report was released to the public on February 14, 2018 and is available 
online via the Hawaii State Department of Defense website. (http://
dod.hawaii.gov/blog/news-release/fma-final-report/)
    We, at the State Department of Defense and HIEMA, are implementing 
those recommendations and have tasked the new HIEMA Administrator, 
Thomas Travis, with the responsibility to track and report to myself 
and the DAG as to the status of each recommendation.
    HIEMA continues to work with the vendor that provides access to the 
IPAWS system and they have greatly enhanced the software so that there 
are color differences between test and real world alert icons to click 
on. We are also working on two-factor authentication with the vendor, 
however, this adds a complexity layer that would only be used for very 
specific alerts, such as a missile alert.
    The HIEMA Administrator has developed an action plan based on his 
initial assessment of the organization. He has briefed me and the DAG, 
and we concur with his assessment and action plan. His priorities are 
preparing a HIEMA Strategic Plan, realigning the organizational chart 
to cross-walk strategic goals and objectives with agency branches, and 
filling vacancies to help with accountability, roles and 
responsibilities.
    HIEMA is establishing internal processes and procedures to ensure 
supervisors are monitoring the performance of its subordinates, 
tracking training, and identifying training requirements for the 
established positions.
    The State Emergency Communication Committee is working to establish 
a comprehensive mass notification system between HIEMA and the 
broadcasting companies.
    HIEMA is working with the Department of Land and Natural Resources 
on a permit to locate a Cell on Wheels (COW) device to enhance wireless 
telecommunications within the crater.
    Hawai'i continues to have an outstanding relationship with FEMA. 
During the initial campaign plan FEMA provided a wealth of knowledge to 
HIEMA to prepare its outreach to the public. In fact, the Administrator 
or FEMA scheduled a visit to Hawaii prior to the January 13, 2018 
event.
    Administrator Long, along with FEMA Regional IX Administrator 
Robert Fenton and others visited with U.S. Pacific Command, HIEMA, and 
Governor Ige, and discussed the lessons learned from Puerto Rico's 
disaster recovery. They also discussed how FEMA can better assist State 
and Local governments to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
major disasters.
    Mahalo.

    Senator Schatz. Mr. Leonard

            STATEMENT OF CHRIS LEONARD, PRESIDENT, 
               HAWAII ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS

    Mr. Leonard. Good morning, Senator Schatz, Senator Hirono, 
who is not with us right now, Congresswomen Hanabusa and 
Gabbard. My name is Chris Leonard and I am the President of the 
Hawaii Association of Broadcasters. On behalf of over 100 local 
television and radio broadcasters across the state, thank you 
for inviting me to testify today.
    I also bring the perspective today as the President and 
General Manager of New West Broadcasting Corp., a locally owned 
business that operates five radio stations on Hawaii Island, 
and as a member of the Committee tasked with updating Hawaii's 
Emergency Alert System plan.
    Broadcasters in Hawaii and across our great Nation play a 
vital role as the country's first informer sometimes of 
emergency and disaster. Local stations have proven time and 
again that they will not hesitate to put themselves in harm's 
way to deliver critical emergency information to their 
communities, whether it's the recent false missile alert, 
Tropical Storm Iselle from a few years ago on my island, or 
Category 4 Hurricane Iniki on Kauai in 1992, local broadcasters 
are there providing lifeline information to the public before, 
during, and after a crisis.
    Often local broadcasters are the only available and 
reliable communications medium available during disasters. Our 
transmission systems are not subject to outages due to network 
congestion. The robust one-to-many nature of our technology and 
the redundancy provided by multiple broadcasters who have 
invested heavily in equipment and generators ensure that we are 
uniquely situated to remain on the air. FEMA has noted in the 
past that there is no more reliable source of information 
during emergencies than local broadcasters.
    On January 13, at 8:07, the Hawaii Emergency Management 
Agency issued a civil danger warning alert that automatically 
triggered wireless phones and EAS messages on radio and 
television stations across the state. I immediately raced out 
of my house and drove to my studios, and as I was driving, I 
heard the EAS message broadcast on my stations that said the 
U.S. Pacific Command has detected a missile threat to Hawaii, a 
missile may impact on land or sea within minutes, this is not a 
drill.
    I literally watched cars pull off the road as the message 
played instructing people to seek shelter immediately if you're 
in a vehicle. I made it to my studios in about 7 minutes and 
immediately started fielding phone calls from panicked and 
confused listeners. And I, like many people, wanted to think 
that the warning couldn't be true, but the message was clear 
that this is not a drill, and as a result, it wasn't subject to 
my interpretation, nor was it subject to the interpretation of 
any other broadcasters.
    The EAS system was built to allow emergency managers 
immediate access to broadcast airwaves in times of national 
emergencies precisely because of the resiliency and reach of 
broadcasting. Broadcasters are required by Federal law to 
participate in the EAS program and to carry Presidential level 
alerts, but participation in State and local messages is 
voluntary. However, almost every broadcast station in Hawaii 
and the Nation see it as their duty to participate with their 
State plans. Thus, although the alert on January 13 was issued 
by the state, it was still carried by a majority of the 
stations across Hawaii.
    As a community member, I was troubled by the false missile 
alert and the level of responsiveness to correct it. As a 
broadcaster, I was and remain concerned about the procedural 
failings of that day. Broadcasters need to know that emergency 
messages have been thoroughly vetted and authenticated before 
they are sent to us, and emergency managers need to have 
confidence that broadcasters will disseminate those messages in 
accordance with the State plan.
    The same technology and systems that allowed emergency 
managers to immediately push out the false warning on air would 
have also allowed them to immediately push out another message 
saying it was a mistake. According to the after-action reports, 
emergency managers knew the alert was a mistake almost 
immediately after sending it, yet it took 13 minutes to 
acknowledge that mistake on Twitter and another 25 minutes 
before a corrected EAS message went sent out under a different 
header code to broadcasters and, as a result, the public. In 
many cases, broadcasters informed audiences of the error in 
much less time than the 38 minutes it took for the second EAS 
alert to be issued.
    But make no mistake about it, the EAS system and the 
technology worked as it was intended. The underlying technology 
worked on that day. It was human procedure and implementation 
that failed to ensure its accuracy.
    Currently, and it has been discussed a bit here already 
today, our State's EAS plan is significantly out of date. As 
the State Emergency Communications Committee revises its plan, 
the plan needs to thoroughly address the errors that occurred 
due to the shortfalls of the existing plan. Any new plan needs 
to, one, clearly define the roles and responsibilities of all 
EAS participants, both public and private; two, provide 
redundant communication paths to EAS participants and the 
public, both for EAS alerts and ideally for longer form 
emergency information; three, address rapid response issues and 
the ability to replay the message as needed, as the situation 
warranted on that particular day.
    On January 13, the EAS message played immediately after 
officials issued the alert. However, for residents and visitors 
that didn't hear the initial broadcast, they had no way of 
knowing of the alert. As far as they were concerned, if they 
didn't hear it, it didn't exist, and that's something that 
needs to be addressed.
    Emergency managers need the ability to repeat messages on 
an automated basis as the situation dictates, either by updated 
procedures in the State EAS plan or upgrades to the technology.
    In conclusion, the American public relies heavily on local 
radio and television broadcasting during times of emergency. On 
January 13, broadcasters fulfilled their duty and successfully 
transmitted the EAS message as intended to keep our communities 
informed. Unfortunately, we didn't receive official corrective 
information in a timely manner, and, as a result, many of our 
State's 1.4 million people and nearly 200,000 visitors were 
scared and confused for a terrifying 38 minutes, and clearly 
the public deserves better. We must update and improve our 
State EAS plan, and broadcasters stand ready and committed to 
work with all stakeholders to do so.
    And with that, I thank you for your time and look forward 
to answering any questions that you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Leonard follows:]

            Prepared Statement of Chris Leonard, President, 
                   Hawaii Association of Broadcasters
Introduction
    Good morning, Senator Schatz, Senator Hirono, Congresswomen 
Hanabusa and Gabbard and members of the committee. My name is Chris 
Leonard and I am the President of the Hawaii Association of 
Broadcasters (HAB). On behalf of over 100 local television and radio 
broadcasters across the state of Hawaii, thank you for inviting me to 
testify on ``Hawaii's False Missile Alert: What Happened and What 
Should We Do Next.'' In addition to my role at HAB, I am also the 
President and General Manager of New West Broadcasting Corp., a 
locally-owned business that operates five radio stations on Hawaii 
Island. I also serve as a member of the State Emergency Communications 
Committee (SECC) a group that is tasked with updating the State's 
Emergency Alert System (EAS) plan.
    Hawaii's radio and television broadcasters and broadcasters across 
our great nation play a vital role in emergency alerting. We are the 
country's first informers and first choice for news and emergency 
updates. Local stations are an integral part of the communities that 
they serve and have proven time and again that they will not hesitate 
to put themselves in harm's way to deliver critical emergency 
information to the public. Often times, local radio and television 
stations are the only available and reliable communications medium 
during disasters. Our transmission systems are not subject to outages 
due to network congestion. The robust ``one-to-many'' nature of our 
technology and the redundancy provided by multiple broadcasters who 
have invested heavily in equipment and generators ensure that we are 
uniquely situated to remain on-air and deliver critical information 
before, during and after natural disasters and other emergencies. The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has noted that there is no 
more reliable source of information during natural disasters than local 
broadcasters. Whether it's a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico, the 
recent catastrophic hurricanes in Puerto Rico, Tropical Storm Iselle 
from a few years ago on my Island, or Category 4 Hurricane Iniki on 
Kauai in 1992, broadcasters are there providing crucial information to 
the public. We provide information to help people prepare prior to 
disasters, to keep safe during disasters and we help our communities 
recover and rebuild in the aftermath. Local broadcasters are committed 
to help the public and were committed to help on January 13, 2018.
What happened on January 13
    On January 13 at approximately 8:07am, the Hawaii Emergency 
Management Agency issued an EAS and Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) 
alert using a Civil Danger Warning header. That alert automatically 
triggered wireless phone alerts and EAS broadcast alerts on radio and 
television stations across the state of Hawaii. The EAS messages were 
broadcast on New West Broadcasting's five stations immediately after 
they were received, as they were on most radio and television stations 
across the state.
    I raced out of my house immediately. As I was heading to my 
studios, I heard the EAS message broadcast on my stations in Hilo that 
said:

        ``The U.S. Pacific Command has detected a missile threat to 
        Hawaii. A missile may impact on land or sea within minutes . . 
        . THIS IS NOT A DRILL. If you are indoors, stay indoors, if you 
        are outdoors, seek immediate shelter in a building . . . If you 
        are driving, pull safely to the side of the road and seek 
        shelter in a building or lay on the floor. We will announce 
        when the threat has ended. . . .''

    Cars were literally pulling off the road ahead of me as the message 
played. I made it to my studio in 7 minutes and immediately started 
fielding phone calls from panicked and confused listeners.
    I, like many people, wanted to think that the warning couldn't be 
true, but the message was clear that ``THIS IS NOT A DRILL.'' It was 
not subject to my interpretation. Our stations received this message on 
a dedicated phone circuit that was installed by Hawaii's Civil Defense 
Agency. We also received copies of the message via FEMA's Integrated 
Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS) Common Alerting Protocol server. 
The EAS system was built to allow emergency managers immediate access 
to radio and television stations in times of national emergencies, 
precisely because of the resiliency and reach of broadcasting. 
Broadcasters are required by Federal law to participate in the EAS 
program and are required to auto-forward an Emergency Action 
Notification to all stations. Broadcaster participation in EAS for 
state and local messages is voluntary; however, almost every radio and 
television station in the state of Hawaii and around the country see it 
as their duty to participate in state and local emergency alerting in 
accordance with their state plans. The alert on January 13 was issued 
by the state and as such is considered a ``state level'' alert that was 
not required to be rebroadcast but was carried by the majority of radio 
and television stations across the state.
    As a community member I was troubled by the January 13 issuance of 
the false missile alert and the level of responsiveness to correct it 
post-issuance. As a broadcaster, I was and remain concerned about the 
procedural aspects of the issues that we faced on that day. The 
federal, state and local government along with various stakeholders 
(radio and television stations, wireless providers) have procedures in 
place that need to be followed. Broadcasters provide voluntary access 
to our airwaves to state and local emergency managers in times of 
emergency. We run monthly emergency management tests in compliance with 
Federal law and on a voluntary basis with the state. These tests 
instruct the public to ``tune in to this station for more 
information.'' Broadcasters take this responsibility and obligation 
seriously.
    For a threat of this level, we voluntarily provide direct access to 
our air chain. Emergency management officials can click a mouse and 
immediately be on-air on all of our stations. At the most basic level, 
broadcasters need to know that emergency messages have been thoroughly 
vetted and authenticated before they are sent to us and emergency 
managers need to have confidence that broadcasters will disseminate 
those messages in accordance with the state EAS plan. The same 
technology and systems that allowed emergency managers to push out a 
false warning immediately on-air through our stations would have also 
allowed them to push out another message saying it was a mistake. 
According to the after-action reports, emergency managers knew that the 
alert was a mistake almost immediately after sending it. It took 13 
minutes to acknowledge the mistake on Twitter and--what I found 
extraordinarily upsetting--it took approximately another 25 minutes 
before that message was sent to broadcasters to share with the nearly 
1.43 million residents of the state of Hawaii via broadcast radio and 
television. We have been telling the public for decades to tune-in to 
radio and television in times of emergencies and they have been 
conditioned to rely on that system.
Where do we go from here?
    Make no mistake about it, the EAS system and its underlying 
technology worked as intended on January 13 in alerting the public; 
however, it was human procedure and implementation that failed. 
Broadcasters distributed the missile alert messages and, in many cases, 
informed audiences of the error in much less time than the 38 minutes 
that it took for a second EAS alert to be issued by emergency 
management officials. I have referenced several times in this testimony 
the state EAS plan. According to 47 CFR 11.21, ``EAS plans contain 
guidelines which must be followed by EAS participants personnel, 
emergency officials, and National Weather Service [NWS] personnel to 
activate the EAS. . . .'' The state plans also ``contain procedures for 
State emergency management and other State officials, the NWS, and EAS 
participants personnel to transmit emergency information to the public 
during a state emergency using the EAS. . . . The State plans must 
include specific information describing how such messages will be 
aggregated and distributed to EAS Participants within the state. . . 
.'' The plans must be reviewed and approved by the Chief, Public Safety 
and Homeland Security Bureau prior to implementation to ensure that 
they are consistent with national plans, Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) regulations and EAS operation.
    Currently our state's EAS plan is out of date and is need of a 
significant rewrite to address the changes in technology and 
distribution methods that have happened since the plan's last update in 
2006. The SECC is tasked with the responsibility to rewrite this plan. 
The committee has met twice since January 13 and a rewrite of the plan 
is being worked on. The new state plan needs to thoroughly address the 
procedural errors that occurred on January 13 and address the 
shortfalls of the existing plan. It needs to clearly define the roles 
and responsibilities of all EAS participants. It needs to provide 
redundant communication paths to EAS participants and the public, both 
for EAS alerts and ideally for longer form emergency information as 
available. It must also address rapid-response issues and the ability 
to replay a message as needed. On January 13 the message played on 
radio and television stations across the state immediately after 
emergency management officials issued the alert. However for members of 
the public that didn't hear the initial broadcasts, they had no way of 
knowing of the existence of the alerts. Emergency managers need to be 
able to have messages repeated on an automated basis as the situation 
dictates, either by updated procedures in the state EAS plan or 
upgrades to the technology. It is also imperative that local 
jurisdictions have the ability to activate EAS through the ``daisy-
chain system'' from each local warning point whether they have 
connectivity to FEMA's IPAWS servers or not. It is not a question of 
if, but when local jurisdictions will be cut off from network 
connectivity. Our state needs to have a plan to address this critical 
scenario for public safety.
Conclusion
    We have spent many years training the public about where to tune-in 
during times of emergency. On January 13, broadcasters fulfilled their 
duty and successfully transmitted the EAS message as intended. 
Unfortunately, broadcasters did not receive official corrective 
information from emergency managers in a timely manner. As a result, 
many of the state's 1.4 million people were scared and confused for 
approximately 38 minutes with little information available to them. 
Broadcasters were left scrambling to try to figure out what was 
happening and to inform the public. The EAS technology worked to issue 
the first warning, however additional procedures were not in place to 
properly authenticate the warning nor to address the issuance of a 
false alert. The public deserves better. Although mistakes happen, 
proper procedures and implementation help prevent them and there should 
be plans on how to address them when they happen. We must update and 
improve our state EAS plan to fix many of the issues that we faced here 
in Hawaii on January 13. While the false missile warning happened in 
Hawaii, it presents an issue with national implications. We may face 
different disasters in different parts of the country, however the 
common thread is that emergency managers and broadcasters have a duty 
to inform the public in times of emergencies. Broadcasters are 
committed to work with all stakeholders to evaluate and greatly improve 
our public safety communications here in Hawaii and across the Nation. 
Thank you very much for your time. I am prepared to answer any 
questions that you may have.

    Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
    General Logan, I want to ask you three questions. The first 
is about the chain of command. It's HI-EMA Administrator to TAG 
to Governor, is that correct?
    General Logan. Yes.
    Senator Schatz. And is that in all cases? In other words, 
including in a case of emergency, the Governor does not--the 
HI-EMA Administrator is not a direct report to the Governor, is 
that correct?
    General Logan. No, but he could be. If I am out of state, 
he could be, yes.
    Senator Schatz. If you're out of state, it doesn't go to 
the Deputy Adjutant General, it goes to the HI-EMA 
Administrator.
    General Logan. Yes, sir.
    Senator Schatz. OK. Does that make sense? Is that the best 
way to do this?
    General Logan. I think so.
    Senator Schatz. So, you know, I met with General Hara. You 
and I have had several conversations. There's a lot of work 
going on at HI-EMA, the legislature is doing their oversight, 
and in my view, there has been an appropriate focus on policies 
and procedures, but if you kind of get into that room in those 
moments, you know, it wasn't a question of the right policy, 
you know, not being in a binder to be, you know, pulled off the 
shelf, referred to, and executed. To me, the more you hear 
about exactly what went on in that room and the confusion and 
the--like I said, the being frozen in space, the arguing among 
staffers, the shifting of blame, the lack of clarity about 
whether you needed to get clearance from FEMA, and I'll just 
add that we all know now that they didn't need clearance from 
FEMA. But I will tell you, if they did need clearance from 
FEMA, even if a statute or a rule said they needed clearance 
from FEMA, somebody ought to have violated that statute or rule 
to make sure all of us knew we weren't going to die, and that's 
the kind of initiative that you want in an emergency management 
agency.
    And so I guess the question I have for you is, How much of 
this is policy and procedure and statute, and how much of it is 
organizational culture? And what do you think is the path 
forward for HI-EMA in terms of fixing what I think is clearly a 
broken organizational culture?
    General Logan. Well, I think had, you know, myself or the 
Deputy Adjutant General been in or the Administrator been in 
HI-EMA at the time of the false alert, you would have seen that 
initiative being taken. We have--I'm allowing Mr. Travis to 
assess his organization now and see where he can--where he 
needs to be changed. And he has already come forward to me with 
his initial assessment. He has identified some key areas that 
need some--some change and some updates, some training. And so 
he is working towards that, and I'm giving that latitude to----
    Senator Schatz. I will just convey to you and to him that I 
think all of that is great, but I don't want to focus just on 
resources, which may be an issue, the physical plan, which may 
be an issue, training, staff salary, policies and procedures. 
All of that sounds like an appropriate set of priorities to 
work on, but organizational culture is tougher to talk about 
and tougher to fix, but it seems to me foundational to what 
happened on that day.
    General Logan. Yes, sir, and I agree. And one of the issues 
and concerns that we've identified quickly is the lack of a 
strategic plan in HI-EMA that would set the culture, set a 
vision and mission for what they need to do.
    Shortly after the incident, I sat down with most of the HI-
EMA members and I talked about Simon Sinek's book ``Start With 
Why,'' and why do they do what they do and why--the State 
Warning Point is so important to 1.4 million people, and they 
are the tip of the spear to keep safety and security throughout 
the State of Hawaii and to inform them timely and accurately.
    There seemed to have been a culture where that was lacking. 
In the operations piece, not in the Preparedness Branch, not in 
other branches, but in that specific Operations Branch, that 
seemed to be lacking.
    Senator Schatz. Is it true that the person who clicked on 
the erroneous missile alert button on the screen is paid around 
$40,000 a year?
    General Logan. I'm not sure what their salary is, but I 
know it's fairly low. We are looking at the position 
descriptions for the State Warning Point and trying to figure 
out what is the right and adequate pay for that. Are they 
similar to Honolulu Police Department dispatchers? Are they 
similar to other Warning Point? They have a--because they have 
a reason and expectation, as you mentioned earlier, for 
initiative and take action, we believe that should be higher, 
so we're working through that now.
    Senator Schatz. Mr. Leonard, just a quick question. When--I 
know you've been deeply engaged, thank you, as a volunteer in 
the SECC, and I'm wondering when you think a new plan will be 
ready and submitted to the FCC. And are you already working 
with FEMA and the FCC in terms of getting the expertise 
necessary to have a functional plan?
    Mr. Leonard. I can't speak to the exact date. It is in the 
works. We will have another meeting later this month. It is my 
expectation that we should have some draft language for that 
plan by that time. I've had numerous conversations with FEMA 
and with the FCC, both as a broadcaster and as a member of that 
committee, and it's much needed. It will provide quite a bit of 
guidance and hopefully will address a number of the issues that 
we faced on January 13.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    Representative Hanabusa.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
    General Logan, I want to understand some of the things you 
said. But first I want it to be clear to everyone, that as 
the--we call you the TAG, The Adjutant General--you are not 
simply in charge of the--basically the Guard Army or the Guard 
Air. You actually have other divisions, if we were to do an 
organizational chart on you. Isn't that true?
    General Logan. Yes, I have six divisions.
    Ms. Hanabusa. You have six divisions. So taking away the 
Guard Air and the Guard Army, can you name the other six 
divisions?
    General Logan. Yes. I have the Office of Homeland Security, 
I have the Youth Challenge program, I have the Office of 
Veterans Services, and HI-EMA.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So HI-EMA actually is a division under you, 
so you are responsible for HI-EMA, correct?
    General Logan. That's correct.
    Ms. Hanabusa. OK. Now, given that, given that, can you tell 
us how your time is spent? Like how much time would you say, a 
percentage of a pie, for example, is Guard duty, taking care of 
the two Guard units, Veterans, Homeland Security, Teen 
Challenge, HI-EMA?
    General Logan. Ma'am, I don't--I don't divvy up my time. I 
go based on what sometimes first come, first served, and where 
I can fit it in my schedule. Being that I have so many things, 
it's an interesting question that you ask. A fairly new TAG of 
Alaska who came on shortly after I did, she has similar hats 
that I wear, and she asked that very question, ``How do you 
divide up that time?'' and you can't. I devote as much time as 
I can to each of those divisions. But I will say I have 
leadership in each of those divisions. I have an administrator 
of HI-EMA. I have an administrator of Homeland Security. I have 
a director that runs the Youth Challenge program. I have two 
general officers who run the Army and the Air National Guard. 
And I have a deputy. So I have layers of ability to help me 
manage all of that.
    Ms. Hanabusa. OK. Then let me ask you this. You said, in 
response to Senator Schatz, that had you been there, and I 
think you were talking about basically what we call Diamond 
Head, I mean, had you been there, this would not have happened. 
Isn't that what you said?
    General Logan. No, I wouldn't say the false alert wouldn't 
have happened, I said the reaction and the initiative to get it 
quickly fixed probably would have been shorter.
    Ms. Hanabusa. OK. So tell me this: When you found out about 
the false missile alert, it was within a couple of minutes, as 
I recall.
    General Logan. Yes.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Correct? Then I assume you were in Hawaii, 
weren't you?
    General Logan. Yes.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Then I assume you probably went immediately 
to Diamond Head. Is that correct?
    General Logan. I did not go immediately. I was on Joint 
Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. We were at a family readiness group 
with the senior leadership of the National Guard and our 
spouses talking about what we can do next for our soldiers and 
airmen.
    Ms. Hanabusa. But the alert went off, right?
    General Logan. Yes.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So you knew the alert went off?
    General Logan. Yes.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So why would you have physically been 
required to respond at Diamond Head? Why couldn't you have 
taken care of it immediately from where you were?
    General Logan. Because of the congestion of the phone. I 
got an initial call out within a minute or two talking to the 
State Warning Point, understood that it was a false--a false 
alert. I then tried to get a hold of Vern Miyagi, the 
Administrator. I couldn't get in touch with him. He might have 
been trying to call. I couldn't get back into the State Warning 
Point. And from that point, I fielded numerous, some 37, phone 
calls, texts, and e-mails over that period.
    Ms. Hanabusa. When did you get into your car and go to 
Diamond Head?
    General Logan. Maybe about 10 or 12 minutes later.
    Ms. Hanabusa. 10 or 12 minutes later.
    General Logan. Yes. Because I couldn't drive and talk on 
the phone at the same time. I had two phones going, and I 
needed to----
    Ms. Hanabusa. But you could not--even in the 10 to 12 
minutes, you still couldn't clarify what was going on from 
where you were at Pearl Harbor.
    General Logan. I knew what was--I mean, I knew what was 
occurring, but I didn't know what was going on outside the 
base.
    Ms. Hanabusa. You said on January 18, as an indicator of 
how the system works----
    General Logan. Yes.
    Ms. Hanabusa.--you said that there was a tsunami, you went 
over there, you took care of it, and it shows how the system 
works. Do you remember that testimony?
    General Logan. Yes.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So tell me, how long did it take you to get 
to Diamond Head? I assume that's where you were for that system 
to work. And what was the time from the time it went out to the 
time that you decided that, you know, it's an ``all clear''?
    General Logan. The ``all clear'' message--well----
    Ms. Hanabusa. We're talking about January 18. You said the 
system works. I want to know, how can you say that? What is it 
that happened that you can sit here today and tell us the 
system works? Why did the system work on January 18 and didn't 
work on January 13?
    General Logan. Well, we didn't put out any warnings. We 
didn't put out any--we didn't sound any sirens, we didn't 
sound--we didn't put out any wireless or emergency alert system 
notifications because we didn't have to. And so the news was 
on--the media was on the stations reporting the tsunami, and as 
soon as Pacific Tsunami Warning Center gave the ``all clear,'' 
that was immediately broadcast into the television. So it 
wasn't--the public wasn't--addressed to the public yet because 
we didn't--we didn't know what the threat was to Hawaii. We 
were still waiting for the Tsunami Warning Center to let us 
know, yes, there is in fact a tsunami coming. There are buoys 
out there that have to be measured, have to be watched, and 
they make the decision.
    Ms. Hanabusa. I'm very familiar with the buoy system. I 
understand that. So that's the reason why it worked, because 
you never sounded an alarm. That's basically what you're 
saying.
    General Logan. Yes.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. Representative Gabbard.
    Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. Thank you both for being here.
    Mr. Leonard, how much of the current outdated EAS plan is 
dedicated to addressing broadcast communications, given our 
residents in Hawaii really will learn about a natural disaster 
or a threat incoming through two main sources, the EAS system 
and our local broadcasters?
    Mr. Leonard. I think part of the issue with the current 
plan is it does not thoroughly address IPAWS, which has been in 
play for a number of years now. Some of the daisy-chain 
participants are not properly identified in there, and that 
needs to be updated. And then I think the big factor, and this 
plays into the situation on January 13th, the event codes--
there's a table that has event codes for everything, and we all 
understand what a tsunami watch is or a tsunami warning is. We 
issued a CDW and CEM, a Civil Danger Warning and a Civil 
Emergency Message, and nobody really had a relationship between 
that and a ballistic missile attack. While those both were 
codes that were in the 2003 plan, which was last updated in 
2006, there was really no clarification as to what those were 
for, and at the State and local level, the participation is 
voluntary.
    It's my belief that most of our broadcasters, when we 
update the plan and we provide an updated list of codes and 
say, ``These are the things that we want you to auto-forward,'' 
most of them will do that, I would be willing to bet that 
almost all of them will do that. But we need to provide some 
guidance on that, and we need to be able to provide some 
clarity, and CDW or CEM, Civil Danger Warning, Civil Emergency 
Message, were things that weren't really fully understood.
    Thankfully, we didn't have to worry about that a whole lot 
until recently, and now this has obviously brought about a new 
discussion that we have to find some answers to and make sure 
that all of the partners, both private and public, are all on 
the same page, and that's really what the plan will help do, 
and it will solidify that.
    Ms. Gabbard. And are you fairly confident through the SECC 
and the work that you guys have been doing and are doing that 
the updated plan will include that information?
    Mr. Leonard. Yes, absolutely.
    Ms. Gabbard. Good.
    General Logan, you know, in the report that General Hara 
issued, there were obviously a number of things that were 
noted, but one of them was talking about the robust public 
outreach campaign that was conducted, I think you, HI-EMA, 
called it Ballistic Missile Preparedness Phase 1----
    General Logan. Yes.
    Ms. Gabbard.--that went through I think the majority of the 
second half of last year. And while, you know, I've seen the 
numbers, you know, 41 town halls, meeting engagements, radio 
ads, and public service announcements, and so on, you know, the 
reality was that beyond the mantra of, ``Get inside, stay 
inside, stay tuned,'' that really people didn't have any idea 
what to do beyond that, and that included individuals as well 
as some of the business owners that we saw who were just 
telling people, ``Get out of here.''
    What kind of information and what is the outreach plan to 
actually make sure that people are armed with accurate and 
factual information and know what to do?
    General Logan. That's correct. And we are working towards 
that, and that's why we are looking at one is a strategic plan 
for HI-EMA, but number two is the CBRNE annex to our 
catastrophic plan, and that would help us outline.
    I think part of the issue, what we had, is we developed the 
ballistic alert campaign plan in three phases, so you just 
mentioned. Phase 1 was a public outreach and to understand and 
speed up the notifications between PACOM/FEMA to the State 
Warning Point, and we could put out the alert to the public. So 
that was Phase 1.
    So what we did is we really started flying the plane before 
we built the whole plan. And so Phase 2 was to sit down with 
stakeholders and identify what's--what we need to do to react 
and respond--how do we respond to and recover from a ballistic 
missile or nuclear, biological, chemical attack? And then Phase 
3 is to actually write the plan out with our stakeholders. So 
we never got--we didn't get that far this--unfortunately 
because we--of certain protocols we did not have in place on 
the 13th allowed for the ballistic--the false alert to go out, 
and that took us time to--because we didn't put on the back end 
a way to correct the false alert, we couldn't turn it off 
right----
    Ms. Gabbard. And are the plans in place currently? Admiral 
Piercey mentioned, you know, DoD is ready to stand in support 
and provide DSCA support. Are the plans in place with HI-EMA, 
DoD, FEMA, DHS, to respond to a WMD attack?
    General Logan. We have the capability today to take the 
call and to send out the alert warning as intended, as it 
worked on January 13. We also have--we also have a way to turn 
it off if we sent out an accidental. We also have a way to 
get----
    Ms. Gabbard. Right. But I'm talking about in the event of 
an attack, what are the--are the response plans in place 
working----
    General Logan. Don't know yet.
    Ms. Gabbard. There are no response plans in place.
    General Logan. No, we--we're trying to gather and 
understand completely what that means. HI-EMA is working 
through its Preparedness Branch, but we are working on letting 
a contract to allow an outside agency with a little more 
expertise to come in and help us because we just don't have the 
manpower to write the annex and continue with day-to-day 
operations. So----
    Ms. Gabbard. Are you aware of DoD or FEMA, who obviously 
are much larger agencies, working through these plans in an 
interagency capacity?
    General Logan. Yes. So our outreach plan is with them also, 
to bring in all of the stakeholders from outside to help us 
draft this plan and understand what--what the impact is--
probably a bad term--but what the result would be of an actual 
missile impact and what is the response requirements for all of 
that.
    Ms. Gabbard. And you already have modeling, though, that 
you are using to identify what are the likely scenarios of 
attack, what the likely points of impact would be, and how far-
reaching they would go specific to Hawaii.
    General Logan. Yes. We have modeling that can place over 
what we may think likely targets that would understand what the 
impact is.
    Ms. Gabbard. And has that modeling been made public?
    General Logan. I don't believe so.
    Ms. Gabbard. Why not?
    General Logan. I'm not sure. I think there is modeling 
available on the FEMA website. So you can take a look at that. 
And we're using their data also. So, yes, it is out there to 
the public.
    Ms. Gabbard. OK. I'm over my time, but I think it's really 
important as you're looking at communication and preparedness 
and response that, A, the public knows and understands the 
reality of the seriousness of the threat, what the reality of 
the impact would be in event of an attack, and to better equip 
the response plans.
    One of the other things that was mentioned in General 
Hara's report was the fact that we don't have fallout shelters. 
So what is being done to change that, to fix that, given the 
reality of the threat that we're facing today? There are a 
number of things obviously that we've got to follow up on 
really. A lot of this focus has been on what led up to this 
false missile alert attack, but obviously this is a major wake-
up call to see what response plans are in place. How are 
individuals as well as the Federal Government and State 
government reacting to and responding to such an attack?
    General Logan. Absolutely. And we've corrected the error 
that created the situation of the false missile alert. That I 
won't say will never happen again, but we've put in all the 
protocols and worked with the software vendor, updated the page 
that you see and the operator would see. It's color-coded, and 
so it's much better than it was on January 13.
    The outreach program that we started identified, you know, 
a number of casualties and impact areas, the widespread. So we 
tried to get out as much information as we could to the public 
as we were briefing them on our public outreach plan if they 
were there present while we were giving it. It's also on the 
HI-EMA website, so you can look at the prepared----
    Ms. Gabbard. I think, if I recall, the projections that 
were put out, the information that was put out, you know, I 
think it had something like, you know, only 10 percent of the 
state population would die in this scenario, which, you know, 
when you look at it's 130-, 140,000----
    General Logan. Right.
    Ms. Gabbard.--people, given that projection, but it failed 
to include the fact that, as an island state, water--you know, 
the response plan, the support plan. So you can talk about the 
numbers of people who would perish in the event of the attack 
itself, but in the aftermath of that and the weeks coming, 
especially if you're dealing with a nuclear or biological 
attack, what are the realistic scenarios and the responses 
that--the plans that need to be in place to deal with that?
    General Logan. Exactly. And that's why the Governor 
postponed the continuation of our public outreach plan and the 
continuation of the checklist rehearsals inside the State 
Warning Point, even though they've updated the rehearsal 
checklist, and he has tasked us to put the plan together so we 
know how to respond to and how to recover from and what 
entities from the United States Federal, military, and other 
agencies that would descend upon the state to help us respond 
to and recover from this type of disaster.
    Ms. Gabbard. Yes.
    General Logan. And so we are leaning way forward than any 
other State and Territory, other than Guam, they are trying to 
stay up with us, because they were physically threatened by a 
North Korean leader that he was going to shoot missiles at 
Guam.
    And so in our ability to lean way ahead, we didn't do 
everything we should have done on the checklist to put in the 
proper ways to basically alert the public quicker and faster 
that it was a false alert.
    Ms. Gabbard. And I think this is the issue that our 
legislation is trying to address because this is a much bigger 
issue than just Hawaii, and it's something that the entire 
country has to deal with and the Federal Government needs to 
take the lead on. Thank you.
    General Logan. Thank you.
    Senator Schatz. Second round for Representative Hanabusa.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
    Mr. Leonard, how long have you been on the SECC?
    Mr. Leonard. The SECC had not met for a number of years. I 
was part of the group that signed off on the original plan on 
behalf of the Hawaii Association of Broadcasters back in 2003. 
And the Committee had not convened since--I can't give you an 
exact date, but it hadn't convened in a number of years.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So who convenes the Committee? Who says, 
``OK, you guys meet''?
    Mr. Leonard. It is chaired by Courtney Harrington.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So in the interim from 2003 or 2006, 
whichever one is the report, Hawaii instituted this whole issue 
with the missile alert and so forth. There is no incorporation 
in any plan of this new warning system that they've put in?
    Mr. Leonard. So IPAWS has been up and operational for a 
number of years. It is not addressed in our existing State 
plan, but it has been the operational mechanism for most of the 
EAS alerts. One of the things that we've talked about quite a 
bit as we become reliant upon new technology, IPAWS is 
wonderful, it provides greater detail, greater access, but one 
of the things that we've been concerned about as well is that 
networks go down. We saw that in the Gulf. We saw that in 
Puerto Rico. And broadcasters have been looking at fortifying 
their facilities and looking at it, providing redundant power, 
redundant equipment, redundant transmission sites in some 
cases, so that we can stay on through those situations. But the 
plan has not kept pace with the operational practice.
    Ms. Hanabusa. So you don't even have IPAWS included in the 
plan, so you don't have----
    Mr. Leonard. It's not--it's not currently included.
    Ms. Hanabusa.--you definitely haven't addressed anything 
like a false missile alert or anything like that.
    Mr. Leonard. Well, and I think what's even more important 
and beyond just a false missile alert is a rapidly changing 
situation. In this particular case, the fast-changing situation 
was that we made a mistake and issued a wrong alert. But if you 
were to look at a train derailment in the Midwest in a chemical 
car, and we say, ``OK, everybody shelter in place,'' and the 
winds shift, and now that changing situation is we need to 
evacuate everybody; or wildfires in California, it jumps a 
firebreak, I think our ability to rapidly respond or change the 
messaging for whatever reason, whether it's erroneous or 
changing scenarios, needs to very clearly be addressed in our 
plans.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
    General Logan, you know, something that you've been saying 
that bothers me is that you talk about now we're developing the 
plan. So it seems like, was getting--trying to be the first 
state to even have a ballistic missile kind of warning system, 
was that premature? Because now you're suspended it. Because 
you don't have the critical answers to what Congresswoman 
Gabbard asked you.
    OK, so what do you do? So, yes, warning is one thing, but 
what do you do? Because, you know, it makes no sense to have 
people trying to protect their children by putting them into 
storm drains or telling them to get off the road, or people 
trying to get home because they want to be with their family. 
This is the end, they want to be with their family. So you've 
got all these other things.
    So why did--why did we do what we did? You're the head of 
HI-EMA. I mean, why did--why did you do what you did without 
everything else in place?
    General Logan. If you look at my testimony and you look at 
what was happening in 2014, 2015, and 2016, North Korea was 
firing off multiple ballistic missiles. They were firing--they 
were doing underground nuclear testing. They were threatening 
the United States, Guam, and Hawaii. We, myself and the 
emergency management organization, went to the Governor and 
said, ``Sir, we believe we are--,'' we've already been 
threatened, we believe this is escalating, there are more and 
more missile tests. He fired more missiles than his 
predecessors had fired. So we felt----
    Ms. Hanabusa. But he has fired four at Japan, General. And 
we all know that the Earth is round, and we all know that 
Seattle is 500 miles closer than we are. So the question is, 
Why, when you didn't have all the necessary components in 
place, did you decide that we needed to do this? Because it 
seems like all that we had was possibly the Cold War plans that 
you kind of dusted off and said, ``OK, this is what we're going 
to do.''
    General Logan. Right. So as I explained to Representative 
Gabbard, we--we developed a campaign plan with three phases. We 
started with Phase 1--right?--based on the threat and based off 
that we needed to inform the public that we at least--we only 
have 15 minutes from the time of launch to the time that it 
would impact.
    Ms. Hanabusa. That's right.
    General Logan. That doesn't leave Hawaii residents a lot of 
time to do anything. So the shorter--the reduced amount of time 
for notification and the more time I give the citizens of the 
State of Hawaii, the residents and visitors, more time to get 
inside and stay inside, the more people will survive. So that's 
the point we did based on the----
    Ms. Hanabusa. So you made the decision, as the head of HI-
EMA, that we are--we should do this, that we should have this 
missile alert plan, even if we can't tell people what it means 
to shelter in place, or if it comes, what do you do? You 
decided that what we're going to do is we're going to have this 
alert, that that was going to be what HI-EMA was proposing to 
the Governor. So is that--is that your testimony here today?
    General Logan. That's exactly what we did. Based on the 
threat, we needed to do something, and we were going to do a 
three-phase operation, building the second part, which is, How 
do you respond to and recover from?
    Ms. Hanabusa. Did the PACOM tell you or somebody tell you 
that we are the target, Hawaii is the target? Is that why you 
decided that we needed to have this in place, even if we don't 
have really anything in place? Your testimony here today 
confirms it, we don't have anything in place.
    General Logan. I didn't mean----
    Ms. Hanabusa. We don't even have this testing anymore, 
because everything is suspended. We don't have it.
    General Logan. Because my duties and responsibilities in 
state law require that the safety of the people of the State of 
Hawaii, it is part of my responsibility as Director of 
emergency management, I felt that it was imperative that we do 
something rather than just wait for a launch and then try to 
react.
    Ms. Hanabusa. And, of course, you realize that that would 
be an act of war and that it would be something within the 
defense of Title 10 as opposed to your Title 32 status----
    General Logan. I fully understand that, but the consequence 
management relies on the State emergency management office.
    Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you very much, Senator Schatz.
    Senator Schatz. I want to thank the testifiers. I want to 
thank all three of our panels. I want to thank the good 
Commerce Committee staff, the congressional delegation and 
their staff, our community partners.
    There are several lines of inquiry and effort to be talked 
about. Obviously, we need best practices. There are lots of 
Federal public policy questions to be addressed. There are 
funding questions. There are organizational culture questions. 
But in the end, all of this comes down to restoring public 
confidence in the system.
    We have been blessed over the many years in Hawaii to be 
able to rely upon our Emergency Management Agency to inform us 
when there's a hurricane, when there is any other kind of 
weather event, and that partnership has been absolutely 
productive and certainly kept us safe.
    And so as we move forward, again, we're going to be clear-
eyed about what mistakes were made, we're going to be tough on 
these issues, but we have to focus on one thing, and one thing 
only, which is restoring the public's confidence in this alert 
system.
    So I thank everybody. This hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                  [all]
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