### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 002 -CV

Te xa s C our t R e por te r s C e r ti fic at ion Boa r d and M ic he le He nr ic ks, as Direc tor of the Court R eporte rs Ce rtification Board , Appellan ts
v. Esqu ire De position Service s, L.L.C. , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN50336 7 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
The Te x as C o u rt Reporter s Certification B oard ( the “B oard” ) set a he aringon a disciplinary

complaint ag ainst Esquire De position S ervic es, L .L .C. (“Esquire ”) a ll eg ing that Esquire provided c ourt repor

ting se rvice s during a De cembe r 2003 deposition p u rs u an t to a long- term
vo lum e dis c ount a

rr ang e me nt that viol a te d s tatut e s and ru le s g ov e rn ingTe xas c ourt re po rt ingfi rm s. Esquire sued the Boa

rd and its direc tor, Michele Henr icks, alleg ing that the Boa rd lac ked statutory authority to regulate or pr ohibit “long ter m discounts in contrac ts by court re porters a

nd court repor ting f irms” and se eking decla

ratory and injunctive re lief. The B oard and Henr icks filed a ple a to the jurisdiction, which the district court de nied. The B oard a ppeals the district c ourt’s orde rHenr icks has joined in this appea l. Esquire has f iled a mot i o n t o d i s m i s s Henric ks’s 1 inte r lo c u to r

y a p p e a l o n th e g r o u n d s th a t s h e is n o t a “ g o v e r n me n ta l u n it ” a u th o r iz e d to ta

k e an inter locutor y appea l fr om the denial of a plea to the jur isdiction. SeeTex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 5 1
. 014(a) (8) (West Supp. 2006) (authorizing interloc utory appea l from orde r g rantingor denying ple a to jurisdiction by “g overnme ntal unit” as defi n ed i n T ex as Tort Claims Act), § 1 01 .0 01 (3 ) ( Wes t 20 05 ) ( de fi nin g “ g ov e rnme nta l un it” ); se e als o Te xas A&M Un iv
. Sy s. v . Kos e og lu , 167 S
. W. 3d 374, 378 (T ex. App.

— Wac o 2005, pet. gr anted)
. We need not rea ch that question her e. B eca use Esquire ha s s u ed He n ri ck s solely in her off

icial ca pacity as direc tor of the B oard, our dispositi on of the B oard’ s appea l al s o controls the district cour t’s jurisdiction over Esquire’ s claims ag ainst Henr icks. We acc ording ly dismiss both Henric ks’s appe al and Esquire ’s motion as moot. 2 denying its plea

to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51. 014(8) ( West S upp. 2006). We reve rse the district c ourt’s orde r and dismiss Esquire’s suit for wa nt of jurisdiction. 1
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW Th e su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n o f a tr ia l c ourt

may be c ha lle ng e d thro ug h a

ple a to the jurisdictio n. See Tex as Dep’t of Parks &W ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 225-26 (T e x. 20 04 ); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The de termination of whe ther a

trial court ha s subject matter jurisdiction beg ins with t h e p l ea d i n gs . See M iranda , 13 3 S. W.3 d at 22 6. Th e ple a der h as th e ini tia l bu rd e n o f a lle g ingfa c ts that a ff ir mativ e ly demonstrate the trial court’ s j u ri s d i cti on to hear the ca use. Id. (c i t i n g Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W. 2d 44 0, 44 6 (T e x. 19 93 ))
. Whe the r the ple a de r h a s me t th is burden is a question of law that we r eview de novo. Id. We construe the ple ading s liberally and look to the pleade r’s intent. Id.

I f t he pleadings do not c ontain sufficie nt fac ts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not aff irmatively demonstrate incurable defe cts in jurisdiction, the issue3

is one of pleading sufficie ncy and the plaintiffs should be aff orded the opportunity

to amend. Id. at 22 6- 27 ; El

gin In de p. Sc h. Di

st. v . R .N. , 1 9 1 S. W. 3 d 2 6 3 , 2 7 2 ( T e x. Ap p . — A u s ti n 2 0 0 6, no pet.). I f the plea dings a ffirmatively neg ate the e x istence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be gra nted wit hout allowing the pl aintiffs an opportunity to amend. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227. A d ef en d an tmay

also cha lleng e the jurisdictional f ac t s al l ege d

b y t h e p l ai n t i ff

t h ro u gh th e p r o c e s s d e s c r ib e d in Miranda
. See M iranda , 1 3 3 S
. W
. 3 d

at 2 2 7 (c i t i n g Bland , 34 S.W .3d at 55 5) . Wh e n a

ple a to th e ju ri sd ictio n c ha lle ng e s th e e xiste nc e of fa c ts a lle g e d b y

the ple a de r t o establish the t rial cour

t’s subject matter jur isdiction, the trial court must consider r eleva nt evidence submitt ed by the par

ties. Bland , 3 4 S
. W
. 3 d

at 5 5 5
. He re , t h e B o ar d

an d He n ri ck s d i d

n o tch al l en ge the jurisdictional fac ts alleg ed by Esquire, nor did the y

introduce jurisdictional e vidence . I nstead, they challeng ed only

the suffic iency

of Esquire’ s pleading s. Thus, we take as true the fac ts alleg ed in Esquire’s plea dings a

nd construe the m liberally in favor of

jurisdiction. Id. at 226. Ad dit ion a lly , a lth ou g h th e B oa rd did no t pre se nt j ur isd ic tio na l e vid e nc e , E sq uir e did attach e vidence to its pleading s, and we may consider it in resolving the jurisdictional challeng es the Bo ar d has ra ised. Bland , 3 4 S. W. 3 d a t 5 5 5 ( “ [A ] c o u rt d e c id in g a p le a to th e ju r is d ic ti o n is not require d to look solely

to the pleading s but may consider evidenc e and must do so when ne cessa ry to resolve the jur isdictional issues raised.”)
.

P LEADINGS AND JURISDICTIONAL EVIDENCE Esquire is a nat i o nal cour t reportingfirm. I t is reg istered in Te x as and ha s eig ht office s statewide. Esquire ’s fa ctual alleg ations cente r on a dis ciplinary complaint filed aga inst it by Henr icks, in he r capa city as direc tor of the B oard. To pla ce the se alleg ations in context , it is helpful4

first to briefly

revie w the statutes g overningthe B oard’ s regulatory and d i sciplinary

power s over court re porting firms. Regulatory fram ework

Chapter 52 o f the g overnme nt code r egulates the business and pr actice of cour t
r e p o rti n g in

th e St a te o f

T e xa s , in c lu d in g e s ta

b li s h in g c e rti f

ic a ti o n , e d

u c a ti o n , an d

c o nduct require ments for c ourt repor ters and c ourt repor

ting f irms. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 52.001-.059 (West 2005). The B oard is a state ag ency , administratively attached t o the Off

ice of Court Administration of t h e T ex as J udicial Sy stem, whose statutory char g es include a dminist eringand enfor cing chapte r 52, administeringexaminations and other re quirements re lated to re p o rter
cer tification, presc ribing educational pr og rams, and “the executive func tions necessa ry to car ry out the purpose s o f this chapter under r ules adopted by

the supreme court.” Id . §§ 52.013-.0131 (We st 2 00 5) . T he su

pr e me c ourt

a pp oin ts t he B oa rd , a nd “ may a do pt r ule s c on sis te nt w iththi s chapte r,” inc luding r

ules g overningthe ce rtification and c onduct of c o u rt repor ters and the reg istration and conduc t of court re porting firms. Id . § § 5 2. 00 2, .0 11 . T he B oa rd do e s n ot h a ve its own rule- making authority
.

To prac tice cour

t r ep o rt ing, a

person must be c ertified by the supreme court. Id
. § 52.021(a) -(b) . To obtain court- report er c ertification, a person must file an a pplication with the Boa rd , p a s s an e xami n a ti o n , an d c o mp ly w it h o th e r r e q

u ir e me n ts o f th e s tatute an d r u le s . Id
. §§ 52.0211-.026. The B oard c ertifies e ach qua lified applica nt’s name to the supre me cour t, which issues the forma l cer

tification. Id
. § 52.024. Court repor ting firms must also reg ister with the B oard,5

and “[r]ules applicable to a court re porter a

re a lso applicable to a

court re port i ng firm.” Id . §§ 52.021(h)- (i), 52.0255.

The B oard is also a

uthori z ed

— an d re qu i re d

— t o t ak e d i s ci p l i n ary

ac t i on ag ainst court repor ters and court repor

ting firms. Id
. §§ 52.029, 52.0295. Section 52.0295(a) is addresse d to court repor ting f ir m s , and provide s that the Boa rd “sha ll reprimand, a ssess a re asonable fine a g ainst, or suspend, re voke, or r efuse to rene w the re g istration of a shorthand repor ting firm or affiliate off

ice for” any of twelve enumer ated g rounds t h at co n clude with “othe r suffic ient cause .” Id . § 52 .0 29 5( a ). Am on g the se dis c ipl ina ry g ro un ds is: unprofe ssional conduct, includinga pat t er n o f g iving dire ctly or indirec tly

or benef itting from be ing e mploy ed as a result of g iving any

g ift, incentive, re war d, or any thing of value to attorne y s, clients, or their r epre sentatives or a g ents, except for nominal items that do not ex cee d $100 in the ag g reg ate f or ea ch re cipient ea ch y ear . Id
. § 52.0295(a) (9). However , the leg islature has pr ovided that “nothingin Subsection (a)( 9) [the

“ un pr of e ssi on a l c on du c t” pr oh ibi tio n] sh a ll b e c on str ue d to de fi ne pr ov idi ngva lue -a dd e d b us ine ss service s, including long- t er m volume discounts, such as the pr icing of produc ts and servic es, as prohibited g ifts, incentives, or r ewa rds.” Id. § 52.0295(b). On the other hand, the leg islature has pr ohibited, as a sepa rate disciplinary

g round, “ente ring into or providing se rvice s under a pro h i b i t ed contra ct desc ribed by Section 52.034.” Id. § 52.0295(a) (10). Section 52.034 define s “prohibited contra cts” in r eleva nt part as “ any contra ctual ag ree ment, written or or al, exclusive or nonexclusive,” that “under mines the impartiality

of the c ourt repor ter,” “re quires a c ourt repor ter to provide a

n y s er v i ce n o t made ava ilable to all parties to an action,” or “g ives or appea rs to g ive an exclusive a dvantag e to any party .” Id. § 52.034(a) (1), ( 3)-( 4).The complainant must a lso e x ecute a complaint for m provided by

the B oard a

nd attach a

ny 2 “per tinent documentar

y evide n ce t o the form.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 52.027(a) (2)- (4) (West 2005). 6

Procedur ally , th e B oard’ s disciplinary proce ss is trigg ere d by

the filing of a c omplaint ag ainst a cour

t reporte r or c ourt repor

ting firm by a person with persona l knowledg e of the alleg ed viol at i o n , whi ch may

include the B oard or

a cour t of this state. Id. § 52.027(a) , (c)
. I f, af ter 2
re c e ivi nga

c omp la int , th e B oa

rd “ be lie ve s that a he ari ngon the c omp la int

is a dv isa ble ,” it i s
re qu ir e d to se t a he ari ng no t late r tha n th e 30 th d ay

a ft e r t he date the B oa

rd re c e ive d th e c omp la int
. Id. § 52.028(a)
. I mmediately afte r setti ng the hearing date, the Boa rd m ust give notice to the subjec t repor ter or f irm, stating “the cause of any contemplated disciplinary action” a nd the hea ring time and place
. Id. § 52.028(b).

At the hea

ring , the B oard sha ll apply “the g ener al rules of evidenc e applicable in a district court” in de termining whether a violation occur

red, a nd “shall produc e a written summary of the evidenc e befor e it a nd a written finding of fa cts.” Id. §§ 52.028(d), .028( g ), .029(a ), .0295(a ). I f i t f ind s a g ro un d f

or dis c ipl ine a g a ins t a

c ourt re po rt ingfi rm , th e B oard is a uth or ize d to “re primand, asse ss a re asonable fine ag ainst, or suspend, re voke, or r efuse to rene w the re g istration of” the firm. Id. § 5 2. 02 95 ; se e als o id. § 52.0321 (authorizing a dminist rative pe nalties). An
a g g ri e ve d c ourt

re po rt e r o r c ourt

re po rt ingfi rm

may a pp e a l a dis c ipl ina

ry a ction o f t

he B oa rd to district court. Id. § 52.030. This appea l shall be by trial de novo. Id.
The com plain t against Esq uire

Th e B oa rd ’s pr e se nt a c tio ns a g a ins t Es qu ir e stemfr om a n e arl ie r c omp la int

tha t a
cer tified court r eporte r, Donna Colli ns, fi l ed aga inst Esquire and one of its reporter s alleg ing that Esquire ha d committed “unprofe ssional conduct” by failing to timely disclose, prior to a D ece mberCo ll in s a ls o a d d e d an a ll e g a ti o n th a t E s q u ir e h a d s o u g h t to c ir c u mv e n t T e x as law by 3 canc elling de positions and resche duling them throug h out-of-state office s. This alleg ation was late r replicated in the complaint Henr icks filed and w as orig inally a subjec t of Esquire’ s lawsuit. The B oa rd ha s sinc e dis mis se d this a lle g a tio n, and the pa rt ie s ag re e that Esqu ir e ’s c la ims re latin g to i t are moot. 7 20 03 de po sit ion , th e e xiste nc e of a c on tr a c t un de r wh ic h Es qu ir e ha d a g re e d to pr ov ide se rv ic e s to one of the parties to a la wsuit. See Standards & Rules for Certifi cati on of Certifi ed Shorthand Re po rte rs § IV( B )( 4) (r e qu ir ing dis c los ur e of

“ e xistin g or

pa st f ina nc ia l, b us ine ss, pr of

e ssi on a l, family or social r elationships, i n cl uding c ontrac ts for cour t reportingservice s, which mig ht
rea sonably

cre ate an appea

ranc e of partiality .”). Michae l E. J arvis, Esquire’s g ener al counsel, filed
a wr itten r esponse to Collins’s complaint disputing that the disclosure require ment applied to cour t rep o rt i n g fi rms, as opposed to individual repor ters who ha d a re lationship requiring disclosure. J ar v i s w e n to n t o a s s e rt t h a t “ t h e m e r e f a c t t h a t E s qu i r e h a s p r o v i d e d c o mp e t i t i v e r a t e s t o a

p art y” did not create an a

ppear ance of par

tiality that would require disclosure under the rule. H e obser ved that the leg islature had expli citly excluded from prohibited “unprof essional conduct” “value -adde d business service s, including long -term volume disco u n t s , s uch as the pricingof produc ts and service s.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 52.0295(a )(9) , (b). J arvis also pointed out that the leg islature had re stricted the supr eme court’s powe r to adopt “r ules restric ting a dvertising or compe titive bidding by

a [reporte r o r fi rm ] ex cept to prohibit false , misleading , or dec eptive pra ctices.” See id. § 52.003.

I n response to J arvis’s letter, Colli ns amende d her complaint to alleg e that Esquire had ente red into a “ prohibited contra ct” in vio lation of section 52.034. See id. § 52.034. At a 3 preliminary

hear ing, the Boa

rd di rec ted i ts staff to file a complaint conce rning the issues Collins hadI n its pleading s, Esquire questioned whether Henr icks had be en author ized by the B oard 4 to initiate the complaint reg arding long- term vol ume discounts. On appe al, Esquire doe s not appea r to p re ss t his a lle g a tio n othe r tha

n to sta te , in a foo tno te , that alth ou g h the B oa rd is a uth or ize d to fi le disciplinary

complaints, id. § 5 2. 02 7( c ), “ it i s far fr om cl e ar that th e B oa rd is a uth or ize d to sim

ply adopt a c omplaint filed by the staff member, which in this case was a dopted from a complaint filed by a third par

ty without personal knowledg e.” 8 raised beca

use Colli ns lacke d the require d persona l know ledg e of the violations she h ad al l eged. 4 The B oard dismissed the alleg ation reg ardinguntimely disclosure, a fterwhich He nricks filed the
c omp la int that is the fo c us of

Es qu ir e ’s su it. Th e c omp la int

fi le d b y He nr ic ks c ite s e xce rp ts f ro m Jar vis ’s le tte r a

nd a lle g e s:
The disclosure signe d by the court repor ter states, “Please be advised that E s q u ire Deposition Service s has ente red into a volume- related discount fee structure with a party in this l awsuit.” I f Esquire Deposition Service s (1) neg otiated direc tly with a pa rt y lit ig ant a nd (2 ) i [t] ne g oti a te d for a ll fu tur e lit ig a tio n an d not fo r thi s sp e c if ic case o nly , this is a violation of prohibited contrac ts under Section 52.034 of the Gover nment Code. I t a ppear s that Esquire may neg otiate volume discounts in exchang e for all fut ure work whic h is not permissible and does not fall under the def inition of competitive bidding. A volume disc ount is permissible only when neg otiated on a specific c ase, but it mus t be disclosed to all par ties. Competiti ve biddi ng for de positions i n a particula r ca se ca n be acc omplished by contac ting sever al repor ting firms and a sking the m to bid

on a vo lum e of

de po sit ion s o ve r a

pe ri od of tim e . Alon g -t e rm

vo lum e discount handled in such a manner would not be a pr ohi b i t ed gift, incentive or rew ard. The complaint ref

ere nced the following statutory prohibitions and rules applicable to court re porting fi rm s:

! Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 52.0295(a )(2) (prohibiting “ dishonesty ” by court re porting firms).
! Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 52.0295(3)- (4) ( prohibiting orde ri n g, o r failing to miti g ate, employ ee c onduct that cour t reportingfirm’s off

icer s or manag ers know or should know violates cha

pter 52).9

! Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 52.0295(9) ( prohibiting “ unprofe ssional conduct”)
. ! Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 52.0295(b) ( excluding fr om “u n p rofessional conduct” unde r su bs ect ion ( a )( 9) “ pr ov idi ngva lue -a dd e d b us ine ss s e rv ic e s, inc lud inglon g -t e rm vo lum e discounts, such as the pr icing of produc ts and servic es, as pr ohibite d gi ft s , i ncentives, or rew ards.” ).
! Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 5 2. 02 95 (1 0) (p ro hib iti ng c ourt re po rt ing fi rm s f ro m e nte ri ngint o or providing service s under a “prohibited c ontrac t” under section 52.034).
! Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 52.034 (def ining “ prohibited contra cts”).
! Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 5 2
. 0 2 9 5 (12) (“other suf ficient c ause” for disciplining a cour t repor ting f irm).
! Te x. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 52 .0 21 (i ) (p ro vid ing that ru le s a pp lic a ble to a c ourt

re po rt e r a re a lso applicable to a cour

t reportingfirm).
! Sta nd

ar ds & Ru le s for Cer tif

ic ati on of C

e rti fie d S ho rth an d R e

po rte rs § I V(B )(4) (re quiring dis c los ur e of

“ e xistin g or

pa st f in a n c i a l , b u s i n e s s , p r of

e ssi on a l, f a mil y or so c ia l r e latio ns hip s, in cl u d i n g co n t ra ct s fo r c o u rt re p o rt i n g s erv i ce s , wh i ch m i gh tre as o n ab l y cre ate a n appea ranc e of par tiality ”), ( 6) (f

ailing to char g e all parties and attorney s to the action the s ame pr ice f or service s perf

ormed in an action), and (7) (f ailure to disclose a

n itemiz ation of all rates and char g es to all parties or

their attorne y s).
! Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 52.003 (prohibiting supr eme c ourt from a dopting r ules restric ting competitive bidding, subje ct to sections 52.021(i), 52.0295, 52.034, and “a ny rules re lated to ethics or prof

essional conduc t promulgated by the supreme court” ).
The B oard se t a forma l hear ing on its complaint for J anuar y 28, 2006. Esquire also emphasizes that during the same pe riod in which the B oard w as dec iding to pr os e c ute a c omp la int a g a ins t it , th e B oa rd a lso pr op os e d r

ule s to the su

pr e me c ourt

that w ou ld defin e “ p r o h ib it e d conduct r elated to c ontrac ting issues.” These pr oposed rules, which wer e attac hed to Esquire’s pe tition, i ncluded e x plicit prohibiti ons ag ainst contra ctual arrang ements under which court re porters or

court re portin g fi rm s est ablish rates a nd terms for c ourt repor

ting se rvice s thatEsquire states that the Boa rd’s de cision to adopt t hese r ules was pr ece ded by

a thre e-hour 5 pu bli c he ari ngwi th “ sig nif

ic ant p ub lic c omm e nt. ” Th e tr ans mitta l le tte r f ro m th e B oa

rd ’s c ha ir to the s upreme court summ arizes t he debate. “The primar y conce rn expressed by

those supporting the chang es was that ‘bulk’ contracting by court reporter s may cre ate an appea ranc e of partiality ,” that there was “ confusion about the e x act ty pes of c ontrac tual arr ang ements that ar e prohibited,” and that without the expl icit prohibitions, “contrac tors may continue to take adva ntag e of this unce rtainty .” “The primary

conce rn expressed by those opposing the chang es was . . . anti-compe titive effe ct,” that the contra cting prac tices in question had lowere d price s and incre ased c ompetition and were alre ady re g u l a t e d f u l l y b y s e c t i o n5 2
. 0 3 4 o f

t h e g o v e r

n m e n t c o d e , t h a tt h e p r o p o s e d

r u l e w o u l d

v i o l a te antitrust laws, and that sec tion 52.003 pr ohibited the supreme court fr om enac ting r ules on that issue. 10 extend beyond a si ng le case or proce eding , place a court repor ter on a ny list of prefe rre d providers of cour t reportingservice s after

rea chingan agree ment specify ing pr ices or other terms upon which future c ourt repor

ting se rv i ce s wi ll be provided, prohibit or re strict the discre tion of the noticing
a tto rn e y fr om u sin g the c ourt

re po rt e r o f t

he a tto rn e y ’s c ho ic e , fa il to of fe r c omp ara

ble se rv ic e s to all parties in the l itigation, or allow t he court repor ter to dea l directly

with a par

ty at intere st ex cept to provide i nvoices. The proposed rules ex clude “situations wher e fees or specia l service s may be
ne g oti a te d, pr ov ide d that the y are the same fo r a ll p art ie s and are ne g oti a te d o n a

c a se -b y -c a se ba sis ”
an d go v ern m en t al en t i t i es o b l i gat edt o o b t ai nco u rt -r ep o rt er s erv i ce s o na lo n g-t erm b as i s t h ro u gh
co mp et i t i v e b i d d i n g. To date , th e su pr e me c ourt

ha s n ot a do pte d th e B oa

rd ’s pr op os e d r

ule s. 5
E s q u i re ’s cl a i ms

I n advanc e of the formal he aringdate on the B oard’ s com plaint ag ainst Esquire, Esquire filed its suit in district c ourt ag ainst the Boa rd and Henr icks, in he r ca pacity as the B oard’ s dir e c tor . E sq

uir e ple a ds that “ [a]s it s tand s, the pr a c tic e of ne g oti a tin g lon g -t e rm vo lum e dis c ounts is not c onduct that is pr ohibited by law or any regulation of the B oard. O therwise, the re w ould not have be en the ne ed for

the B oard to submit a rule to the Te x as Supreme Court.” Esquire a lleg es that11

the B oard is ac ti n g o utside its st atutory authority by seeking(1) to prohibit contra cts “that a re not prohibited by

any curr ent statute or r

ule” a nd (2) to “e nd-run” th e s upreme court’s r ule-making authority by

a tt e mp ti n g to e n f

o r c e it s p r o p o s e d

r u le s a s if th e c o u rt h a d

a d o p te d th e m. E s quire
re qu e ste d d e c lar atio ns un de r t he Un if or m D e c lara

tor y Judg me nts Ac t ( UD JA) that “ in s e e kin g to pr oh ibi t lo ngte rm

dis c ounts in c on tr a c ts by c ou rt re po rt e rs and

c ourt re po rt ing fi rm s, the B oa

rd is actingin an ult

ra v ire s manner and outside of its statutory jurisdiction.” See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Code Ann. § § 3 7
. 0 0 1 -.011 (W est 1997 & Supp. 2006). Esquire also re quested injunctive re lief prohibiting the B oard f

rom “[p] roce edingwith that portio n of the Complaint reg ardinglong- term
vo lum e dis c ounts be c a

us e any a c tio n b y

the Board to pr oh ibi t su c h d isc ounts is ult ra v ire s and outside the scope of

its jurisdi ction.” Duringoral a

rgument, the B oard r ender ed moot Esquire’s c laims that a re pr edicated on the alleg ation that the B oard is attemptingto enforc e propose d rules that the supre me cour t has no t ado pt ed. I t ma de the jud ic ia l a dmi ssi on that th e B oa

rd la c ke d a uth or ity to e nf or c e its pr op os e d r

ule s a g a ins t E sq

uir e be c a us e the ru le s h a d n ot b e e n a pp ro ve d b y

the su pr e me c ourt , see Tex
. Go v’ t Co de Ann. § 5 2. 00 2, and that th e ru le s thus c ou ld n ot s e rv e a s a ba sis fo r i ts disciplinary

complaint ag ainst Esquire. Ac cording ly , we c onsider only the claims founde d on the
a lle g a tio n th a t th e B oa

rd c ur re ntl y la c ks statut or

y a uth or ity to r e g ulate or

pr oh ibi t lo ng -t e rm

vo lum e discount contrac ts.
AN AL YSI S

As g r o u n d s f

o r r e v e r s a l, th e B o ar d

a s s e rts th a t ( 1 ) E s qu ir e ’ s c la im is n o t r ip e , and Esquire lac ks standing, be cause it is found ed on the “conting encie s” or “ hy potheticals” that the12

B oa rd wi ll a c tua lly de te rm ine that Es qu ir e ’s pa rt ic ula r c on tr a c t vio late s se c tio n 5 2. 02 95 and , in so doing, exceed its a

uthority ; ( 2) the subject matter of Esquire’s c laim is withi n the B oard’ s exclusive jur isd ic tio n, and

the dis tr ic t c ourt accor ding ly la c ks su bje c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n unle ss a nd un til Esquire e x hausts its administ rative r emedies a nd bring s an appe al as pe rmitted by chapte r 52; and (3) the U DJ A does not c onfer additional subject-matter jurisdiction on the district c ourt and, in any event, doe s not waive sover eig n immunit y barr ing E squire’s suit. Our a naly tical starting po i n t i n case s, such as this one, involving disputes ove r wh e the r a tr ia l c ourt or

a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc y

ha s su bje c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n o ve r a

dis pute is a

rt ic le V, sec tion 8 of the Texas Consti tution. I t provides that a district c o u rt ’s jurisdiction “consists of
e xclu siv e , a

pp e llate , a

nd or ig ina l juri sd ic tio n o f a ll a c tio ns , p ro c eed ing s, and re me die s, e xce pt i n
case s where exclusive, appellate, or orig in al j u ri sdiction may be conf err ed by this Cons tituti on or other law o n s o me other c ourt, tribunal, or a dminist rative body .” Te x . Const. art. V, § 8. The le g isl a tur e ha s p ro vid e d b y statut e that di str ic t c ourt s p os se ss “the jur isd ic tio n pro vid e d by Ar tic le V, Se c tio n 8, of the Te xas Con sti tut ion ,” and “ may he ar and de te rm ine any c a us e that is c og niza

ble by courts of la

w or e quity

and may g rant any relief that could be g rante d by either c ourts of law or equity .” Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 24.007- .008 (West 2004). Thus, “[c]ourts of ge nera l jurisdiction presumab ly

have subje ct matter jurisdiction unless a c ontrary showing is made.” Subaru of Am., Inc. v . David Mc David Nissan, Inc ., 84 S.W .3d 212, 220 (Tex. 2002). B y c on tr a st, “ the re is n o p re sumpt ion that a dmi nis tr a tiv e a g e nc ie s are a uth or ize d to resolve disputes. Rathe r, they may exercise only those power s the law, in cle ar a nd express statutory lang uag e, conf

ers upon them.” Id. “Courts will not im ply additional authority

to ag encie s, nor may13

ag encie s cre ate f

or themselves a

ny excess power s.” Id. The c ourts are not divested by an age ncy of the subject-matter jurisdiction they would otherwise posse ss to ad j u d i ca te a dispute unless the leg islatur e h a s g r an te d

th e a g e n c y

e xc lu s iv e ju

r is d ic ti o n , o r

th e s o le p o w e r

to ma k e th e in itial deter mination in the dispute. Id. a t 22 1; Bex ar Metro. W ater Dist. v. City of Bulverde , 156 S.W .3d 79 , 9 0 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied). Whether an ag ency

has exclusive jurisd i ct i o n is determined by construction of the rele vant statutory scheme
. See Thomas v . Long , 20 7 S. W.3 d 3 34 , 3 40 (T e x. 20 06 ). Th e le g isl a tur e ’s int e nt t o g ra nt a n a g e nc y the so le a uth or ity to
make the ini tia l de te rm inatio n in a disp ute may be re fl e c te d in

e ith e r e xpre ss s tatut or

y langua g e to that eff ect or the over all statutory

scheme
. Id . at 340-42. We ag re e wi th the B oa

rd that the le g isl a tur e ha s g ra nte d it e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n to mak e th e in it ia l d e te r

mi n a ti o n , “ [a ]f

te r r e c e iv in g a c o mp la int an d g iv in g . . . n o ti ce and an op po rt un ity fo r a he a ri nga s p re sc ri be d b y

Se c tio n 5 2. 02 8, ” wh e the r gro un ds fo r dis c ipl ine a g a ins t
a co u rt repor

ting f irm exi st under sec tion 52.0295. SeeTex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 52.0295(a)
. Altho u gh the leg islature did not expli citly use the ter

m “exclusive” to descr ibe the B oard’ s jurisdiction over disciplinary claims ag ainst court re porting firms, such intent is appar ent from the statut or y sc he me . Ch a

pte r 5 2 c omp re hensi vely

re g ulate s th e pr a c tic e of

c ourt re po rt ingin T e xas, including e stablishing ce rtification, educ ation, and conduc t require ments for c o u rt reporters and court repor

ting firms. The Boa

rd is c harg ed with the duty to “ administer and e nforc e this chapte r” and “the executive func tions necessa ry to car ry out the purposes of this c hapter under r ules adopted by the supreme court.” Court reportingfirms are require d to reg ister with the B oard, an d “[r]ul es appli ca b l e to a cour

t reporte r ar e also a

pplicable to a c ourt repor ting f irm.” Id. §§ 52.021(h)- (i),14

.0 25 5; see id. §§ 52.013(1), .0131. The leg islature has ma ndated that the B oard “ shall repr imand,
assess a r easona

ble fine a g ainst, or suspend, re voke, or r efuse to rene w the re g istration of” a court repor ting firm if g rounds for discipline exi st under sec tion 52.0295. Id. § 52.0295(a) . To this end, the leg islature esta

blished a proc edure wher eby a per son with knowledg e of disciplin ary g rounds may file a c omplaint, and the B oard de termines (1) whether the complaint is “prope rly executed” (i .e ., c omp lie s w iththe re qu is it es of se c tio n 5 2. 02 7( a )) , ( 2) wh e the r t he “ bo ard

be lie ve s th a t a hear ing on the complaint is advisable,” a nd (3) whe ther, ba sed on the h ea ri n g, one or more of the g rounds for discipline enumer ated in section 52.0295 has been esta blished. See id. §§ 52.027, .028, .0295. A cour

t reportingfirm that is ag g rieve d by a B oard disciplinar y action may

appea l that action to district court. See id. § 52.030. We can disce rn fr om this st atutory scheme that the leg islature intended the Boa

rd to ha ve exclusive a

uthority to make these deter

minations as an initial matter. See Thomas , 207 S.W .3d at 340-42.

Esquire maintains, howeve r, that the subject matter of its suit does not fall within the B oa rd ’s e xclu siv e jur isd ic tio n o ve r c hap te r 5 2 d isc ipl ina ry c omp la int s. I t c ha

ra c te ri zes its c la ims
a s c ha lle ng e s to whe th er the B oa rd ha s statutory authori ty to r e g ulate or pr oh ibi t any“long -term volume discounts” for c ourt repor ting services, which it would distinguish from the subjec t matter
o f t he B oard’ s complaint ag ainst it reg ardingspecific potential violations. Cf. Te x as Mun. Power Agenc

y v. P ublic Util. Comm’n , 100 S.W .3d 510, 517-20 (Te x . App.— Austin 2003, p e t
. d e n i e d ) ( d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e nA P A a p p e a l o f “ a p art i c u l ar

C om m i s s i o no r d e r ” an d

U D JA claim f o r “ a d e te r mi n a ti o no f

th e Co mm is s io n ’ s g e n e r a l a u th o r it y ” th a t w o u ld

r e s o lv e a

larg er underlying c ontroversy

ref lected in other

ag ency proce eding s; the latter wa s “broader tha n the eff ectivene ss of one pa

rticular or der a

nd reque sts relief m o re expansive than the re versa l of a15

pa rt ic ula r C omm is sion d e te rm inatio n” ); see also Texas D ept. of Ins., Div. of W orkers’ Comp. v

. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. , 212 S.W .3d 870, 875 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) ( d is ti n g u is h in g b e tw e e nc o mp la int t h a t a g e n c y

a c te d u lt r a v ir e s in is s u in g a dv is o r ie s r e g ar d ing impairment deter

mination and complaints arising from specific contested- case proce eding s relating to the advisories’ a

pplication). Esquire r elies on the e stablished principl e t hat the leg islature’s deleg ation of exclusive jurisdiction to an age ncy to make an initial deter

mination in a dispute does not nece ssarily

divest courts of their subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute conce rning whether the ag ency

has ac ted beyond its deleg ated powe rs. Se e So uth weste rn Be ll Tel . Co . v . P ub lic Ut il. Comm’n , 735 S.W .2d 663, 668 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no writ) (chara cter izi ng this power as the

“ inh e re nt, or ig ina l, e qu ita ble jur isd ic tio n o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

to pr ote c t ag a ins t ag e nc y

a c tio n th a t is ult ra vir e s o f t

he a g e nc y ’s c on sti tut ion a l and statut or y po we rs ” and

ob se rv ingthat “ [i]t is indisputable that the district courts of the State posse ss such jurisdiction”). Claims pr ed i ca t ed on such ag ency

action thus are not subject to the exhaustion-of-re medies re quirements applica ble to a dispute within the age ncy ’s jurisdiction, see City of Sherman v. Public Util. Comm’n , 643 S.W .2d 68 1, 68 3, 68 6 ( Te x. 19 83 ); W esth e im e r I

nd e p. Sc h. Di

st. v . B ro c k

e tte , 5 6 7 S. W. 2 d

7 8 0 , 7 8 5 ( T e x. 1978), nor ba

rre d by the principle of

judicial non-interf

ere nce w ith ag ency

fu n c tions withi n the scope of its deleg ated a

uthority
. Br oc k

e tte , 567 S.W .2d at 785 (“ Courts g ener ally hold that administrative bodies are entitled to and should exercise the duties a nd functio n s confe rre d by statute without interfe renc e by

the cour ts. I t follows, however , that intervention by the cour t in administ rative pr oc e e din g s ma

y be permissi ble wh e n a

n a g e nc y is e xer c isi nga

uth or ity be y on d it s st a tut or ily confe rre d power s.”). Such a claim may be asse rted throug h a common-la w injunction suit, see id. at 585-86, or, where it requires c onstruction of the a g ency ’s statutory power s, t h ro u g h the UDJA.16

City of Sherman , 6 43 S.W. 2d a t 68 2, 68 3- 86 ; see T ex . Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 37.004(a) (West 1997) (a claimant “whose rig hts, status, or ot her leg al relations are aff ecte d by a statute . . . may have de termined a

ny question of construc tion or vali d i ty arisingunder [it] and obtain a decla ration of r ights, status, or other leg al re lations thereunde r”)
. Esquire c ontends that the B oard ha s exceede d its statutory authority beca use sec tion 52 .0 29 5 a nd re late d p ro vis ion s d o n ot a uth or ize the B oa

rd to re g ulate or pr oh ibi t lo ng -t e rm vo lum e disc o u n t contra cts for c ourt repor ting se rvice s. This is the same basic que stion presented in the disciplinary

proce eding

—whether

or how an y o f t h e dis ciplinary g rounds enumer ated in sec tion 5 2
. 0 2 9 5 ap p ly

to a long -term volume discount c ontrac t for cour t reportingservice s. The two proce eding s differ

only in that while the disciplina ry p roce eding s would addre ss whether the particula r Esquire c ontrac t or contra ct under ly ing the 2003 deposition violates section 52.0295, E s qu i re ’s UD J A c l ai m wo u l d d et erm i n e, i nef

fe ct , whether anylong- term volume discounts for c ourt
re po rt ingse rv ic e s c ou ld e ve r vio late the pr ov isi on . T he dis c ipl ina ry pr oc e e din g c ou ld t

hu s a dd re ss the same issues pr esente d in Esquire’s c laims. I f the B oard de cides that Esquire violat ed section 52 .0 29 5, it w ill ne c e ssa

ri ly have de te rm ine d th a t a lon g -t e rm vo lum e dis c ount c on tr a c t c ou ld v iol a te the provision. Conversely , if the B oard de cides that Esquire did not violate se ction 52.0295, it may do so on the basis that long- term vol ume discounts cate g orica lly are not prohibited by

the provision. I n these w ay s , E s qu ir e ’ s c la im s f a ll w it h in th e e xc lu s iv e s u

b je c t- matt e r

ju r is d ic ti o no f

th e B o ard. See Blue Cross Blue Shield of T ex. v . Duene

z , 201 S.W .3d 674, 676 (Tex. 2006) (empha siz ing that UDJA cannot be used to c ircumvent a g ency ’s exclusive jurisdiction over same subjec t matter).

On t he other

hand, Esquire ’s claims ar e not entire ly duplicative of the disciplinary pr oc e e din g , a s th e B oa

rd c ou ld c on c e iva

bly de te rm ine tha

t Es qu ir e’s c on tr a c t do e s n ot v iol a teTh e UD JA do e s not cr e a te or a ug me nt a tri a l c ourt ’s su

bje c t- matte r j ur isd ic tio n— it m e re ly 6 provides a r emedy

wher e subjec t-matter jurisdiction alre ady exis ts. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Code Ann. § 37.003(a) (West 1997) (“A court of r ecor d withi n its juri sdiction has powe r to dec lare r i g h t s , s t a tu s an d

o t h e r l e g a l r e l a t i o n s . . . . ” ( e mp h a s i s a d de d) ); C h en a ult v. Phillips , 91 4 S. W.2 d 1 40 , 1 41 (T e x. 19 96 ); Texas Ass’n of B us. v. Texas Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). 17 section 52.0295 without r eac hing the question of whe ther long -term volume discount c ontrac ts for court re porting service s would ever violate t hose prohibit ions. To this ex tent, Esquire’s c laims for
a de c laratio n th a t no such contra cts would eve r violate sec tion 52.0295 and injunctive relief on that basis would seek br o ad er r elief tha n might be a

vailable in the disciplinary proce eding
. See Tex as Mun. Power Agenc

y , 100 S.W. 3d a t 519. Ho we ve r, su c h cla ims , to the e xten t th e y are no t w ith in the B oard’ s exclusive jurisdiction, are not ripe.

Esquire must alleg e a justiciable controve rsy reg ardingwhether

the B oard is ac ting beyond its statutory

p o we rs i n order

for the district c ourt to have subjec t-matter jurisdiction over
e i t h e r i t s U D JA or common-law injunction claims. Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n , 141 S.W .3d 158,

6 16 3- 64 (T e x. 20 04 ); Bo nh am Sta te Ba nk v . B e ad le , 907 S.W .2d 46 5 , 467 (Tex. 1995) (citing Te x as As s’n o

f B us . , 85 2 S.W. 2d a t 44 6)
. “ To c on sti tut e a jus tic ia ble c on tr ov e rs y , th e re mus t e xist
a r e a l an d s u

b s t an t i a l c o n t r o v e r s y i n v o l v i n g g e nu i n e c o n f l i c to f t an g i b l e i n t e r e s t s an d

n o tm e r e l y a theore tical dispute.” Be ad le , 907 S.W .2d at 467 (quoting Bex ar-Me dina-Atascosa Counties W ater Control & Improve ment Dist. No. 1 v. Me dina Lake Prot. Ass’n , 640 S.W
. 2 d 7 78, 779-80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, writ ref ’d n.r.e .). Ripeness and stan d i n g ar e related doc trines of justiciabilit y : eac h is a threshold question that implicates s u b j ec t matter jurisdiction and e ach emphasizes the nece ssity of a concr ete injury for a justiciable claim to be pre sented. W aco Inde p. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson , 2 2 S
. W
. 3 d 8 4 9 , 8 5 1 (T ex . 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g Patterson v. Planned Parenthood ,18

971 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998) ). Ripeness and standing , like other justiciability doctrines, de rive in part fr om the constitutional prohibiti on ag ain s t ad v isory opinions, which in turn stems from separ ation-of- power s principles. Patterson , 971 S.W .2d at 442.

A c a se is n ot r ipe wh e n it s r e so lut ion de pe nd s u

po n c on tin g e nt o r hy

po the tic a l f

a c ts
or upon events that have not y et come to pa ss. Gibson , 22 S.W .3d at 852. I n addition to restraining courts fr om issuing unconstitutional advisory opinions, ripeness also has a prag matic, prude ntial aspec t that aims to conser ve “judicial time and resource s for real and curr ent controve rsies, rather t h an abstract, hy

pothetical, or r emote disputes.” Patterson , 9 7 1 S. W. 2 d a t 4 4 3 (quoting Ma y he w v . To wn o

f Su nn y v ale , 964 S.W .2d 922, 928 (Tex
. 1 9 9 8 )). In this reg ard, a voiding prem atu re lit ig a tio n o ve r a dmi nis tr a tiv e a c tio ns pr e ve nts c ourt s f ro m “ ‘e nta

ng lin g the mse lve s in abstrac t disag ree ments over a dminist rative policie s’ while at the sa me time servingto ‘protec t the
a g e nc ie s f

ro m ju dic ia l in te rf

e re nc e un til an a dmi nis tr a tiv e de c isi on ha s b e e n f

or ma lize d and its eff ects felt in a conc rete way by the cha lleng ing pa

rties.’” Id
. (q u o t i n g City of E l P as o v . M

ad e ro Dev . & Constr. Co. , 8 0 3 S
. W
. 2 d 3 9 6 , 3 9 8 -9 9 (T ex . Ap p . — E l P as o 1 9 9 1 , wr i td en i ed ) ( ci t i n g Ab bo tt Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967))) . These f actua l and prude ntial conce rns under lie the court’s de termination of ri p en es s , in which it considers: (1) the fitness of the issues f or judicial decision and (2 ) the har dship occa sioned to a par ty by the cour t’s denying judicia l review
. Pe rry v . D e l R io , 6 6 S
. W
. 3 d

2 3 9 , 2 5 0 (T ex . 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Ab bo tt La bs

. , 387 U.S. at 149). This Court has rec og nized that, in the context of claims reg arding the scope of ag ency authority , ripene ss may

turn on whethe r the issues prese nted are purely leg al in nature as opposed to requiringconsideration of particu l ar i zed fac ts in li g ht of ag ency expertise. Com

pa re City of W aco v. Tex as Natural

Res. Conservation Comm’n , 8 3 S.W. 3d 16 9, 17 5- 77 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tinT h e fe d era l ripeness jurisprude nce that the Texas Supreme Court has applied, see 7 Pe rry v . D e l R io , 6 6 S
. W
. 3 d

2 3 9 , 2 5 0 (T ex . 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Ab bo tt La bs

. , 387 U.S. at 149), appea rs to employ a similar ana ly sis in determining the “f itness” for judicia l resolution of issues reg arding an ag ency ’s statutory

authority , consideringwhether the issues are primarily

leg al rather than f

actua l in nature, w hether

further fac t u al d ev elopment in the ag ency would signific antly

aid the cour

t’s ability t o d ecide the issue, and whe ther the c ourt’s dec ision would be informed by the ag ency ’s specia liz ed expertise in applying the statute to concr ete f acts. Se e Ab bo tt La bs

. , 387 U.S. a t 149-50; see also National Park Hosp. Assoc. v . Dep’ t of the Interior , 538 U.S. 803, 812 (2003) (de termining that f a c ia l c ha lle ng e to r e g ulatio n, a lth ou g h “ a pure ly le g a l on e ,” wa s no t fi t fo r r e vie w b e c a us e its re so lut ion c ou ld d e pe nd

up on sp e c if ic fe a tur e s o f c on tr a c ts i mpa c te d by re g ulatio n) ; Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardne r , 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1968) (de termination of whe ther a g ency acte d within statutory power t o ad o p t regulations “for e fficie nt enforc ement” of statute should be informed by “an understandingof what ty

pes of e nforcem en t p ro b l ems are encounte red by the [ag ency], t he nee ds for va rious sorts of supervision in o rd er t o effectuate the g oals of the Ac t, and the saf eguards neede d . . . . We believe that judicial a ppraisal of

these fa ct o rs i s l i k el y to stand on a much sure r footing in the context of a specif ic application of the regulation than could be the c ase in the g ener alized challeng e made here .”). See also Ronald L . Be al, 2 Te x as Ad mi nis tra tiv e Prac tic e an d Pro c e du re§ 12.2, at 12-50 8 to 1 2- 51 (2 00 6) (s ug g e sti ngthat pr ima ry -j uri sd ic tio n p ri nc ipl e s g ov e rn wh e the r c ha lle ng e to alleg edly ultra vires a g ency

actions ca

n proce ed or must yield to ag ency proce eding ). 19 20 02 , p e t. d e nie d) (h old ingtha t U DJA c la im that a g e nc y a c te d b e y on d s tatut or

y a uth or ity “ pr e se nts a purely leg al i nquiry ” that “will not benef it from the deve lopment of additional fac ts in connection with a specific permit application”), with Be ac on Nat ’l In s. Co. v . M on te ma y or , 86 S.W .3d 260, 268 (T ex . Ap p . —

Au s t i n2 0 0 2 , p et
. d en i ed ) ( d i s t i n gu i s h i n g City of W aco and ho ldi ng that U DJA c la ims the re “ re qu ir e [d] de te rm inatio n o f s e ve ra l f a c tua l matte rs wh ic h h a ve no t be e n s uf fi c ie ntl y develope d”) ; c

f. M on te ma y or , 86 S.W .3d at 271-72 (discussing primar y jurisdiction doctrine and 7 hold i n g t h at it compelled cour t to await depa

rtment of insuranc e’s initial deter mination reg arding int e rp re tatio n o f p oli c y fo rm s wh e re inq uir y e nta ile d “ fa c t- ba se d q

ue sti on s” wh os e re so lut ion wo uld benef it from ag ency ’s expertise). W e c o n c l u d e t h a tE s qu i r e ’ s c l a i m s f a l l i n t o t h e l a t t e r

c a t e g o r y. 8 T o d et erm i n e w h et h er

t h e B o ar d

h as s t at u t o ry au t h o ri t y t o re gu l at e o r p ro h i b i tl o n gterm volume discounts f

or court repor

ting service s, a court would have to de cide whe ther anysuch20

contra cts could “unde rmine the impartiality of the c ourt repor

ter,” “g ive or a

ppear to give an exclu s ive adva

ntag e to any

party ,” or c onstitut e “dishone sty ” or “ other suff icient ca use” f or discipline. Such broad a nd somewhat subjec tive terms contemplate fac t-sp ec i fic a pplication. Whether or how suc h prohibitions would apply to “long -term volume discount c ontrac ts” for c ourt
re po rt ingse rv ic e s w ith out c on c re te fa c t s r e g a r d i n g t h e i r f e a t u r e s , t h e c i r c u m s tanc e s su

rr ound ingthe ir use, and the ir eff

ects would pre sent t h e s orts of “hy pothetical, or r emote disputes,” Patterson , 97 1 S. W.2 d at 44 3, and

“ a bs tr a c t di sa g re eme nt s ov er ad min ist rativ e po lic ie s” that th e ri pe ne ss doctrine is intended to pr event. We further observe that these statutory terms, like others in cha pter 52 , c on te mpl a te c on sid e ratio ns of po lic y and e thi c s re late d to the c ourt

re po rt ingind

us tr y and its ro le in the justice sy stem. The Boa rd (a nd ultimately , the supreme court) is statutorily empower ed and equipped t o identify

and we igh suc h deter

minations in i ts administration of chapter 52, and the leg islature ha s m an i fe s ted the intent that it do so when interpr eting and apply ing the statutory dis c ipl ina ry g ro un ds . T he se c on sid e ratio ns c on fi rm that Esqu ir e ’s su it i s n ot r ipe , to the e xten t it is not entirely

subsumed within the Boa rd’s e x clusive subject- matter jurisdiction. For these re asons, we hold that the district court erre d in overrulingthe B oard’ s plea to the jurisdiction. We need not addr ess the B oard’ s other issues. Ac cording ly , we r ever se the orde r of the district cour

t overrulingthe B oard’ s plea to the jurisdiction and r ender judgme nt dismi ssing Esquire’s c laims.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Reverse d and Dismissed Filed: Jul y

20, 2007