Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 11, 2012 / Notices 21815 

Brown (240–888–9835) to be escorted to 

the meeting room. 

Dated: March 26, 2012. 

Antonio Dias, 

Technical Advisor, Advisory Committee on 

Reactor Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2012–8666 Filed 4–10–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2012–0089; Docket Nos. 52–027 and 

52–028; License Nos. NPF–93 and NPF–94; 

EA–12–063] 

South Carolina Electric And Gas 

Company (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear 

Station Units 2 and 3); Order Modifying 

Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent 

Fuel Pool Instrumentation (Effective 

Immediately) 

I 

The Licensee identified in this Order 

holds licenses issued by the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC 

or Commission) authorizing operation 

and construction of nuclear power 

plants in accordance with the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 

Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, ‘‘Licenses, 

Certifications, and Approvals for 

Nuclear Power Plants.’’ 

II 

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 

earthquake struck off the coast of the 

Japanese island of Honshu. The 

earthquake resulted in a large tsunami, 

estimated to have exceeded 14 meters 

(45 feet) in height, that inundated the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant 

site. The earthquake and tsunami 

produced widespread devastation across 

northeastern Japan and significantly 

affected the infrastructure and industry 

in the northeastern coastal areas of 

Japan. 

When the earthquake occurred, 

Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 

were in operation and Units 4, 5, and 6 

were shut down for routine refueling 

and maintenance activities. The Unit 4 

reactor fuel was offloaded to the Unit 4 

spent fuel pool. Following the 

earthquake, the three operating units 

automatically shut down and offsite 

power was lost to the entire facility. The 

emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 

started at all six units providing 

alternating current (ac) electrical power 

to critical systems at each unit. The 

facility response to the earthquake 

appears to have been normal. 

Approximately 40 minutes following 

the earthquake and shutdown of the 

operating units, the first large tsunami 

wave inundated the site, followed by 

additional waves. The tsunami caused 

extensive damage to site facilities and 

resulted in a complete loss of all ac 

electrical power at Units 1 through 5, a 

condition known as station blackout. In 

addition, all direct current electrical 

power was lost early in the event on 

Units 1 and 2 and after some period of 

time at the other units. Unit 6 retained 

the function of one air-cooled EDG. 

Despite their actions, the operators lost 

the ability to cool the fuel in the Unit 

1 reactor after several hours, in the Unit 

2 reactor after about 70 hours, and in the 

Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours, 

resulting in damage to the nuclear fuel 

shortly after the loss of cooling 

capabilities. 

The Unit 4 spent fuel pool contained 

the highest heat load of the six units 

with the full core present in the spent 

fuel pool and the refueling gates 

installed. However, because Unit 4 had 

been shut down for more than 3 months, 

the heat load was low relative to that 

present in spent fuel pools immediately 

following shutdown for reactor 

refueling. Following the earthquake and 

tsunami, the operators in the Units 3 

and 4 control room focused their efforts 

on stabilizing the Unit 3 reactor. During 

the event, concern grew that the spent 

fuel was overheating, causing a hightemperature reaction of steam and 

zirconium fuel cladding generating 

hydrogen gas. This concern persisted 

primarily due to a lack of readily 

available and reliable information on 

water levels in the spent fuel pools. 

Helicopter water drops, water cannons, 

and cement delivery vehicles with 

articulating booms were used to refill 

the pools, which diverted resources and 

attention from other efforts. Subsequent 

analysis determined that the water level 

in the Unit 4 spent fuel pool did not 

drop below the top of the stored fuel 

and no significant fuel damage 

occurred. The lack of information on the 

condition of the spent fuel pools 

contributed to a poor understanding of 

possible radiation releases and 

adversely impacted effective 

prioritization of emergency response 

actions by decision makers. 

Following the events at the 

Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 

plant, the NRC established a senior-level 

agency task force referred to as the NearTerm Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF 

was tasked with conducting a 

systematic and methodical review of the 

NRC regulations and processes and 

determining if the agency should make 

additional improvements to these 

programs in light of the events at 

Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a result of this 

review, the NTTF developed a 

comprehensive set of recommendations, 

documented in SECY–11–0093, ‘‘NearTerm Report and Recommendations for 

Agency Actions Following the Events in 

Japan,’’ dated July 12, 2011. These 

recommendations were modified by the 

NRC staff following interactions with 

stakeholders. Documentation of the NRC 

staff’s efforts is contained in SECY–11– 

0124, ‘‘Recommended Actions To Be 

Taken Without Delay From the NearTerm Task Force Report,’’ dated 

September 9, 2011, and SECY–11–0137, 

‘‘Prioritization of Recommended 

Actions To Be Taken in Response to 

Fukushima Lessons Learned,’’ dated 

October 3, 2011. 

As directed by the Commission’s Staff 

Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for 

SECY–11–0093, the NRC staff reviewed 

the NTTF recommendations within the 

context of the NRC’s existing regulatory 

framework and considered the various 

regulatory vehicles available to the NRC 

to implement the recommendations. 

SECY–11–0124 and SECY–11–0137 

established the NRC staff’s prioritization 

of the recommendations based upon the 

potential safety enhancements. 

Current regulatory requirements and 

existing plant capabilities allow the 

NRC to conclude that a sequence of 

events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

accident is unlikely to occur in the 

United States. Therefore, continued 

operation and continued licensing 

activities do not pose an imminent 

threat to public health and safety. 

However, the NRC’s assessment of new 

insights from the events at Fukushima 

Dai-ichi leads the NRC staff to conclude 

that additional requirements must be 

imposed on Licensees and CP holders to 

increase the capability of nuclear power 

plants to mitigate beyond-design-basis 

external events. These additional 

requirements represent a substantial 

increase in the protection of public 

health and safety. The Commission has 

decided to administratively exempt this 

Order from applicable provisions of the 

Backfit Rule, 10 CFR 50.109, and the 

issue finality requirements in 10 CFR 

52.63 and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, 

Paragraph VIII. 

Additional details on an acceptable 

approach for complying with this Order 

will be contained in final interim staff 

guidance (ISG) scheduled to be issued 

by the NRC in August 2012. This 

guidance will include a template to be 

used for the plan that will be submitted 

in accordance with Section IV, 

Condition C.1 below. 

III 

Reasonable assurance of adequate 

protection of public health and safety 


wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
21816 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 11, 2012 / Notices 

1See Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 

(INPO) 11–005, ‘‘Special Report on the Nuclear 

Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 

Station,’’ Revision 0, issued November 2011, p. 36. 

and assurance of the common defense 

and security are the fundamental NRC 

regulatory objectives. Compliance with 

NRC requirements plays a critical role 

in giving the NRC confidence that 

Licensees and CP holders are 

maintaining an adequate level of public 

health and safety and common defense 

and security. While compliance with 

NRC requirements presumptively 

ensures adequate protection, new 

information may reveal that additional 

requirements are warranted. In such 

situations, the Commission may act in 

accordance with its statutory authority 

under Section 161 of the Atomic Energy 

Act of 1954, as amended, to require 

Licensees and CP holders to take action 

in order to protect health and safety and 

common defense and security. 

To protect public health and safety 

from the inadvertent release of 

radioactive materials, the NRC’s 

defense-in-depth strategy includes 

multiple layers of protection: (1) 

Prevention of accidents by virtue of the 

design, construction, and operation of 

the plant; (2) mitigation features to 

prevent radioactive releases should an 

accident occur; and (3) emergency 

preparedness programs that include 

measures such as sheltering and 

evacuation. The defense-in-depth 

strategy also provides for multiple 

physical barriers to contain the 

radioactive materials in the event of an 

accident. The barriers are the fuel 

cladding, the reactor coolant pressure 

boundary, and the containment. These 

defense-in-depth features are embodied 

in the existing regulatory requirements 

and thereby provide adequate protection 

of public health and safety. 

In the case of spent fuel pools, 

compliance with existing regulations 

and guidance presumptively provides 

reasonable assurance of the safe storage 

of spent fuel. In particular, Appendix A, 

‘‘General Design Criteria for Nuclear 

Power Plants,’’ to 10 CFR Part 50 

establishes the general design criteria 

(GDC) for nuclear power plants. All 

currently operating reactors were 

licensed to the GDC or meet the intent 

of the GDC. The GDC provide the design 

features of the spent fuel storage and 

handling systems and the protection of 

these systems from natural phenomena 

and operational events. The accidents 

considered during licensing of U.S. 

nuclear power plants typically include 

failure of the forced cooling system and 

loss of spent fuel pool inventory at a 

specified rate within the capacity of the 

makeup water system. Further, spent 

fuel pools at U.S. nuclear power plants 

rely on maintenance of an adequate 

inventory of water under accident 

conditions to provide containment, as 

well as the cooling and shielding safety 

functions. 

During the events in Fukushima, 

responders were without reliable 

instrumentation to determine water 

level in the spent fuel pool. This caused 

concerns that the pool may have boiled 

dry, resulting in fuel damage.1

Fukushima demonstrated the confusion 

and misapplication of resources that can 

result from beyond-design-basis external 

events when adequate instrumentation 

is not available. 

The spent fuel pool level 

instrumentation at U.S. nuclear power 

plants is typically narrow range and, 

therefore, only capable of monitoring 

normal and slightly off-normal 

conditions. Although the likelihood of a 

catastrophic event affecting nuclear 

power plants and the associated spent 

fuel pools in the United States remains 

very low, beyond-design-basis external 

events could challenge the ability of 

existing instrumentation to provide 

emergency responders with reliable 

information on the condition of spent 

fuel pools. Reliable and available 

indication is essential to ensure plant 

personnel can effectively prioritize 

emergency actions. 

The Commission has determined that 

the spent fuel pool instrumentation 

required by this Order represents a 

significant enhancement to the 

protection of public health and safety 

and is an appropriate response to the 

insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi 

accident. While this consideration is 

qualitative in nature, the Commission 

has long taken the position that the 

determination as to whether proposed 

backfits represent a substantial safety 

improvement may be qualitative in 

nature. Staff Requirements 

Memorandum, SECY–93–086, ‘‘Backfit 

Considerations’’ (June 30, 1993), pp. 1– 

2. However the Commission does not, at 

this time, have sufficient information to 

complete a full backfit analysis of the 

spent fuel pool instrumentation that 

would be required by this Order. The 

NRC is analyzing the insights gained 

from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 

on an accelerated timeline. 

Additionally, the NRC has considered 

the Congressional intent that the agency 

act expeditiously on Tier 1 

recommendations. 

The Commission has recognized, in 

exceptional circumstances, that some 

proposed rules may not meet the 

requirements specified in the Backfit 

Rule but nevertheless should be adopted 

by the NRC. Hence, the Commission 

advised the NRC staff that it would 

consider, on a case-by-case basis, 

whether a proposed regulatory action 

should be adopted as an ‘‘exception’’ to 

the Backfit Rule. This Order represents 

such a case. Therefore, the Commission 

has decided to administratively exempt 

this Order from the Backfit Rule and the 

issue finality requirements in 10 CFR 

52.63 and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, 

paragraph VIII for several reasons. 

The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident was 

unprecedented in terms of initiating 

cause and the particular failure 

sequence. In addition, our review of this 

event has highlighted the benefits that 

can be derived from the availability of 

more diverse instrumentation. 

Consistent with the final Aircraft Impact 

Assessment Rule, 10 CFR 50.150, 74 FR 

28112 (June 12, 2009), the Commission’s 

decision to administratively exempt this 

Order from compliance with the Backfit 

Rule is a highly exceptional action 

limited to the insights associated with 

the extraordinary underlying 

circumstances of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the NRC’s lessons 

learned. Furthermore, the extensive 

stakeholder engagement and broad 

endorsement for timely action support 

the Commission’s judgment that 

immediate action to commence 

implementation of the spent fuel 

monitoring requirements is warranted at 

this time. In addition, pursuant to 10 

CFR 2.202, the NRC finds that the 

public health, safety, and interest 

require that this Order be made 

immediately effective. 

Based upon the considerations set 

forth above, the Commission has 

determined that the Licensee must have 

a reliable means of remotely monitoring 

wide-range spent fuel pool levels to 

support effective prioritization of event 

mitigation and recovery actions in the 

event of a beyond-design-basis external 

event. These new requirements provide 

a greater capability, consistent with the 

overall defense-in-depth philosophy, 

and therefore greater assurance of 

protection of public health and safety 

from the challenges posed by beyonddesign-basis external events to power 

reactors. Accordingly, the Commission 

concludes that combined licenses 

(COLs) NPF–93 and NPF–94 shall be 

modified to include the requirements 

identified in Attachment 1 to this Order. 

IV 

Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 

161b, 161i, 161o, and 182 of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 

the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR 

2.202, and 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52, It is 

hereby ordered, effective immediately, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 11, 2012 / Notices 21817 

That COLS NPF–93 AND NPF–94 are 

modified as follows: 

A. 1. The Licensee shall, 

notwithstanding the provisions of any 

Commission regulation or license to the 

contrary, comply with the requirements 

described in Attachment 1 to this Order 

except to the extent that a more 

stringent requirement is set forth in the 

license. The Licensee shall promptly 

start implementation of the 

requirements in Attachment 1 to the 

Order and shall complete full 

implementation prior to initial fuel 

load. 

B. 1. The Licensee shall, within 

twenty (20) days of the date of this 

Order, notify the Commission (1) if it is 

unable to comply with any of the 

requirements described in Attachment 

1, (2) if compliance with any of the 

requirements is unnecessary in its 

specific circumstances, or (3) if 

implementation of any of the 

requirements would cause the Licensee 

to be in violation of the provisions of 

any Commission regulation or the 

facility license. The notification shall 

provide the Licensee’s justification for 

seeking relief from or variation of any 

specific requirement. 

2. If the Licensee considers that 

implementation of any of the 

requirements described in Attachment 1 

to this Order would adversely impact 

safe and secure operation of the facility, 

it must notify the Commission, within 

twenty (20) days of this Order, of the 

adverse impact, the basis for its 

determination that the requirement has 

an adverse impact, and either a proposal 

for achieving the same objectives 

specified in the Attachment 1 

requirement in question, or a schedule 

for modifying the facility to address the 

adverse condition. If neither approach is 

appropriate, the Licensee must 

supplement its response to Condition 

B.1 of this Order to identify the 

condition as a requirement with which 

it cannot comply, with attendant 

justifications as required in Condition 

B.1. 

C. 1. The Licensee shall, within one 

(1) year after issuance of the final ISG, 

submit to the Commission for review an 

overall integrated plan, including a 

description of how compliance with the 

requirements described in Attachment 1 

will be achieved. 

2. The Licensee shall provide an 

initial status report sixty (60) days after 

the issuance of the final ISG, and at six 

(6)-month intervals following submittal 

of the overall integrated plan, as 

required in Condition C.1, which 

delineates progress made in 

implementing the requirements of this 

Order. 

3. The Licensee shall report to the 

Commission when full compliance with 

the requirements described in 

Attachment 1 is achieved. 

The Licensee’s responses to 

Conditions B.1, B.2, C.1, C.2, and C.3, 

above, shall be submitted in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.4 and 10 CFR 52.3, as 

applicable. 

The Director, Office of New Reactors 

may, in writing, relax or rescind any of 

the above conditions upon 

demonstration by the Licensee of good 

cause. 

V 

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the 

Licensee must, and any other person 

adversely affected by this Order may, 

submit an answer to this Order, and 

may request a hearing on this Order, 

within twenty (20) days of the date of 

this Order. Where good cause is shown, 

consideration will be given to extending 

the time to answer or to request a 

hearing. A request for extension of time 

in which to submit an answer or request 

a hearing must be made in writing to the 

Director, Office of New Reactors, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555, and include a 

statement of good cause for the 

extension. The answer may consent to 

this Order. 

If a hearing is requested by the 

Licensee, or a person whose interest is 

adversely affected, the Commission will 

issue an Order designating the time and 

place of any hearings. If a hearing is 

held, the issue to be considered at such 

hearing shall be whether this Order 

should be sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR 

2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee, or any other 

person adversely affected by this Order, 

may, in addition to demanding a 

hearing, at the time the answer is filed 

or sooner, move the presiding officer to 

set aside the immediate effectiveness of 

the Order on the ground that the Order, 

including the need for immediate 

effectiveness, is not based on adequate 

evidence but on mere suspicion, 

unfounded allegations, or error. 

All documents filed in NRC 

adjudicatory proceedings, including a 

request for hearing, a petition for leave 

to intervene, any motion or other 

document filed in the proceeding prior 

to the submission of a request for 

hearing or petition to intervene, and 

documents filed by interested 

governmental entities participating 

under 10 CFR 2.315(c), must be filed in 

accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule 

(72 FR 49139, August 28, 2007). The EFiling process requires participants to 

submit and serve all adjudicatory 

documents over the internet, or in some 

cases to mail copies on electronic 

storage media. Participants may not 

submit paper copies of their filings 

unless they seek an exemption in 

accordance with the procedures 

described below. 

To comply with the procedural 

requirements of E-Filing, at least 10 

days prior to the filing deadline, the 

participant should contact the Office of 

the Secretary by email at 

hearing.docket@nrc.gov, or by telephone 

at (301) 415–1677, to request (1) a 

digital identification (ID) certificate, 

which allows the participant (or its 

counsel or representative) to digitally 

sign documents and access the ESubmittal server for any proceeding in 

which it is participating; and (2) advise 

the Secretary that the participant will be 

submitting a request or petition for 

hearing (even in instances in which the 

participant, or its counsel or 

representative, already holds an NRCissued digital ID certificate). Based upon 

this information, the Secretary will 

establish an electronic docket for the 

hearing in this proceeding if the 

Secretary has not already established an 

electronic docket. 

Information about applying for a 

digital ID certificate is available on the 

NRC’s public Web site at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/ 

apply-certificates.html. System 

requirements for accessing the ESubmittal server are detailed in the 

NRC’s ‘‘Guidance for Electronic 

Submission,’’ which is available on the 

agency’s public Web site at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. Participants may 

attempt to use other software not listed 

on the web site, but should note that the 

NRC’s E-Filing system does not support 

unlisted software, and the NRC Meta 

System Help Desk will not be able to 

offer assistance in using unlisted 

software. 

If a participant is electronically 

submitting a document to the NRC in 

accordance with the E-Filing rule, the 

participant must file the document 

using the NRC’s online, web-based 

submission form. In order to serve 

documents through the Electronic 

Information Exchange System, users 

will be required to install a web browser 

plug-in from the NRC’s Web site. 

Further information on the web-based 

submission form, including the 

installation of the Web browser plug-in, 

is available on the NRC’s public Web 

site at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html. 

Once a participant has obtained a 

digital ID certificate and a docket has 

been created, the participant can then 

submit a request for hearing or petition 

for leave to intervene. Submissions 


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21818 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 70 / Wednesday, April 11, 2012 / Notices 

should be in Portable Document Format 

(PDF) in accordance with the NRC 

guidance available on the NRC’s public 

Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/sitehelp/e-submittals.html. A filing is 

considered complete at the time the 

documents are submitted through the 

NRC’s E-Filing system. To be timely, an 

electronic filing must be submitted to 

the E-Filing system no later than 11:59 

p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. 

Upon receipt of a transmission, the EFiling system time-stamps the document 

and sends the submitter an email notice 

confirming receipt of the document. The 

E-Filing system also distributes an email 

notice that provides access to the 

document to the NRC’s Office of the 

General Counsel and any others who 

have advised the Office of the Secretary 

that they wish to participate in the 

proceeding, so that the filer need not 

serve the documents on those 

participants separately. Therefore, 

applicants and other participants (or 

their counsel or representative) must 

apply for and receive a digital ID 

certificate before a hearing request/ 

petition to intervene is filed so that they 

can obtain access to the document via 

the E-Filing system. 

A person filing electronically using 

the agency’s adjudicatory E-Filing 

system may seek assistance by 

contacting the NRC Meta System Help 

Desk through the ‘‘Contact Us’’ link 

located on the NRC Web site at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/site-help/esubmittals.html, by email at 

MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov, or by a tollfree call at 1-(866) 672–7640. The NRC 

Meta System Help Desk is available 

between 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., Eastern 

Time, Monday through Friday, 

excluding government holidays. 

Participants who believe that they 

have a good cause for not submitting 

documents electronically must file an 

exemption request, in accordance with 

10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper 

filing requesting authorization to 

continue to submit documents in paper 

format. Such filings must be submitted 

by: (1) First class mail addressed to the 

Office of the Secretary of the 

Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, Attention: Rulemaking and 

Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, 

express mail, or expedited delivery 

service to the Office of the Secretary, 

Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 

11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland 20852, Attention: Rulemaking 

and Adjudications Staff. Participants 

filing a document in this manner are 

responsible for serving the document on 

all other participants. Filing is 

considered complete by first-class mail 

as of the time of deposit in the mail, or 

by courier, express mail, or expedited 

delivery service upon depositing the 

document with the provider of the 

service. A presiding officer, having 

granted an exemption request from 

using E-Filing, may require a participant 

or party to use E-Filing if the presiding 

officer subsequently determines that the 

reason for granting the exemption from 

use of E-Filing no longer exists. 

Documents submitted in adjudicatory 

proceedings will appear in the NRC’s 

electronic hearing docket, which is 

available to the public at http:// 

ehd1.nrc.gov/ehd/, unless excluded 

pursuant to an order of the Commission, 

or the presiding officer. Participants are 

requested not to include personal 

privacy information, such as social 

security numbers, home addresses, or 

home phone numbers in their filings, 

unless an NRC regulation or other law 

requires submission of such 

information. With respect to 

copyrighted works, except for limited 

excerpts that serve the purpose of the 

adjudicatory filings and would 

constitute a Fair Use application, 

participants are requested not to include 

copyrighted materials in their 

submission. 

If a person other than the Licensee 

requests a hearing, that person shall set 

forth with particularity the manner in 

which his interest is adversely affected 

by this Order and shall address the 

criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d). 

In the absence of any request for 

hearing, or written approval of an 

extension of time in which to request a 

hearing, the provisions specified in 

Section IV above shall be final twenty 

(20) days from the date of this Order 

without further order or proceedings. If 

an extension of time for requesting a 

hearing has been approved, the 

provisions specified in Section IV shall 

be final when the extension expires if a 

hearing request has not been received. 

An answer or a request for hearing shall 

not stay the immediate effectiveness of 

this order. 

Dated this 30th day of March 2012. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Michael R. Johnson, 

Director, Office of New Reactors. 

Attachment 1—Requirements for 

Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Level 

Instrumentation at Combined License 

Holder Reactor Sites 

Attachment 2 to the March 12, 2012, 

Order Modifying Licenses with Regard 

to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool 

Instrumentation (available at the NRC’s 

Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) under 

ADAMS accession number 

ML12054A679) for Part 50 Licensees, 

requires reliable indication of the water 

level in associated spent fuel storage 

pools capable of supporting 

identification of the following pool 

water level conditions by trained 

personnel: (1) Level that is adequate to 

support operation of the normal fuel 

pool cooling system, (2) level that is 

adequate to provide substantial 

radiation shielding for a person standing 

on the spent fuel pool operating deck, 

and (3) level where fuel remains 

covered and actions to implement makeup water addition should no longer be 

deferred. 

The design bases of V.C. Summer 

Units 2 and 3 address many of these 

attributes of spent fuel pool level 

instrumentation. The NRC staff 

reviewed these design features prior to 

issuance of the combined licenses for 

these facilities and certification of the 

AP1000 design referenced therein. The 

AP1000 certified design largely 

addresses the requirements in 

Attachment 2 of the March 12, 2012 

Order by providing two safety-related 

spent fuel pool level instrument 

channels. The instruments measure the 

level from the top of the spent fuel pool 

to the top of the fuel racks to address the 

range requirements listed above. The 

safety-related classification provides for 

the following additional design features: 

• Seismic and environmental 

qualification of the instruments. 

• Independent power supplies. 

• Electrical isolation and physical 

separation between instrument 

channels. 

• Display in the control room as part 

of the post-accident monitoring 

instrumentation. 

• Routine calibration and testing. 

As such, this Order requires V.C. 

Summer Units 2 and 3 to address the 

following requirements that were not 

specified in the certified design. 

1. The spent fuel pool level 

instrumentation shall include the 

following design features: 

1.1 Arrangement: The spent fuel 

pool level instrument channels shall be 

arranged in a manner that provides 

reasonable protection of the level 

indication function against missiles that 

may result from damage to the structure 

over the spent fuel pool. This protection 

may be provided by locating the safetyrelated instruments to maintain 

instrument channel separation within 

the spent fuel pool area, and to utilize 

inherent shielding from missiles 

provided by existing recesses and 

corners in the spent fuel pool structure. 

1.2 Qualification: The level 

instrument channels shall be reliable at 


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1 15 U.S.C. 78q. 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

3 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A). 

4 17 CFR 240.19b–4(f)(1). 

temperature, humidity, and radiation 

levels consistent with the spent fuel 

pool water at saturation conditions for 

an extended period. 

1.3 Power supplies: Instrumentation 

channels shall provide for power 

connections from sources independent 

of the plant alternating current (ac) and 

direct current (dc) power distribution 

systems, such as portable generators or 

replaceable batteries. Power supply 

designs should provide for quick and 

accessible connection of sources 

independent of the plant ac and dc 

power distribution systems. Onsite 

generators used as an alternate power 

source and replaceable batteries used for 

instrument channel power shall have 

sufficient capacity to maintain the level 

indication function until offsite resource 

availability is reasonably assured. 

1.4 Accuracy: The instrument shall 

maintain its designed accuracy 

following a power interruption or 

change in power source without 

recalibration. 

1.5 Display: The display shall 

provide on-demand or continuous 

indication of spent fuel pool water level. 

2. The spent fuel pool 

instrumentation shall be maintained 

available and reliable through 

appropriate development and 

implementation of a training program. 

Personnel shall be trained in the use 

and the provision of alternate power to 

the safety-related level instrument 

channels. 

[FR Doc. 2012–8669 Filed 4–10–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

POSTAL SERVICE 

Board of Governors; Sunshine Act 

Meeting 

Board Votes To Close March 30, 2012, 

Meeting 

By telephone vote on March 30, 2012, 

members of the Board of Governors of 

the United States Postal Service met and 

voted unanimously to close to public 

observation its meeting held in 

Washington, DC, via teleconference. The 

Board determined that no earlier public 

notice was possible. 

ITEMS CONSIDERED: 

1. Strategic Issues. 

2. Financial Matters. 

GENERAL COUNSEL CERTIFICATION: The 

General Counsel of the United States 

Postal Service has certified that the 

meeting was properly closed under the 

Government in the Sunshine Act. 

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

Requests for information about the 

meeting should be addressed to the 

Secretary of the Board, Julie S. Moore, 

at (202) 268–4800. 

Julie S. Moore, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2012–8868 Filed 4–9–12; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 7710–12–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

Submission for OMB Review; 

Comment Request 

Upon Written Request, Copies Available 

From: Securities and Exchange 

Commission, Office of Investor 

Education and Advocacy, 

Washington, DC 20549–0213. 

Extension: Rule 17g–2, SEC File No. 270– 

564, OMB Control No. 3235–0628. 

Notice is hereby given that pursuant 

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Securities 

and Exchange Commission 

(‘‘Commission’’) has submitted to the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(‘‘OMB’’) a request for approval of 

extension of the previously approved 

collection of information provided for in 

Rule 17g–2 (17 CFR 240.17g–2) under 

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 

U.S.C. 78a et seq.) (‘‘Exchange Act’’). 

Rule 17g–2, ‘‘Records to be made and 

retained by nationally recognized 

statistical rating organizations,’’ 

implements the Commission’s 

recordkeeping rulemaking authority 

under Section 17(a) of the Exchange 

Act.1 The rule requires a Nationally 

Recognized Statistical Rating 

Organization (‘‘NRSRO’’) to make and 

retain certain records relating to its 

business and to retain certain other 

business records, if such records are 

made. The rule also prescribes the time 

periods and manner in which all these 

records must be retained. The 

Commission estimates that the burden 

associated with Rule 17g–2 is 2,987, 

which includes one-time reporting 

burdens for processing reports, and a 

cost of $5,933, which includes a onetime cost for recordkeeping software. 

The Commission may not conduct or 

sponsor a collection of information 

unless it displays a currently valid 

control number. No person shall be 

subject to any penalty for failing to 

comply with a collection of information 

subject to the PRA that does not display 

a valid OMB control number. 

Background documentation for this 

information collection may be viewed at 

the following Web site, http:// 

www.reginfo.gov. Comments should be 

directed to: (i) Desk Officer for the 

Securities and Exchange Commission, 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs, Office of Management and 

Budget, Room 10102, New Executive 

Office Building, Washington, DC 20503, 

or by sending an email to: 

Shagufta_Ahmed@omb.eop.gov; and (ii) 

Thomas Bayer, Director/Chief 

Information Officer, Securities and 

Exchange Commission, c/o Remi PavlikSimon, 6432 General Green Way, 

Alexandria, VA 22312 or send an email 

to: PRA_Mailbox@sec.gov. Comments 

must be submitted to OMB within 30 

days of this notice. 

Dated: April 5, 2012. 

Kevin M. O’Neill, 

Deputy Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2012–8715 Filed 4–10–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–66742; File No. SR–OCC– 

2012–05] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The 

Options Clearing Corporation; Notice 

of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness 

of Proposed Rule Relating to 

Rescinding a Policy Interpretation 

Affecting Certain Adjustments 

April 5, 2012. 

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

(‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder 2

notice is hereby given that on March 26, 

2012, The Options Clearing Corporation 

(‘‘OCC’’) filed with the Securities and 

Exchange Commission (‘‘Commission’’) 

the proposed rule change described in 

Items I, II, and III below, which items 

have been prepared primarily by OCC. 

OCC filed the proposed rule change 

pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A) 3 of the 

Act and Rule 19b–4(f)(1) 4 thereunder. 

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s 

Statement of Terms of Substance of the 

Proposed Rule Change 

The proposed rule change would 

rescind a policy interpretation adopted 

by the OCC Securities Committee 

relating to the possible reclassification 

of recurrent cash dividends for 

adjustment purposes. A conforming 

change would also be made to the 

corresponding policy applicable to 

security futures. 


wreier-aviles on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES