SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3753-14T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RICO PARKS a/k/a JAMES R. PARKS,

JAMEEL PARKS, PARKS JAMES, 

JAMEEL PARTLOW, JAMES R. PARTOW,

RICCIO J. PARK, ERIC R. PARKS,

ERIC PARK, REO PARKS, REKO PARKS,

RECO PARKS JR., RECO J. PARKS, 

RICO J. PARKS, PARKS R. JAMES, 

RECO PARKS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted June 1, 2017 – Decided July 31, 2017

Before Judges Alvarez and Manahan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment 

No. 12-06-0475.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Brian P. Keenan, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the 

brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Jenny M. Hsu, Deputy 

Attorney General, of counsel and on the 

brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-3753-14T2

PER CURIAM

Tried by a jury, defendant Rico Parks was convicted of firstdegree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2), and third-degree 

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4(d). He was sentenced on February 20, 2015, to life subject to 

the No Early Release Act's eighty-five percent parole 

ineligibility, see N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and a concurrent five-year 

term on the possession of a weapon offense. Defendant now appeals, 

contending that his videotaped confession should have been 

suppressed, and that the judge improperly included aggravating 

factors in his sentencing decision. We disagree and affirm.

During the trial, the jury heard first from William Cook, the 

uncle of the victim Thya Wilson, who was defendant's wife. Cook

lived with defendant and Wilson. He testified that on January 3, 

2012, a Tuesday, defendant left for work at his normal time around 

7:00 p.m.; the victim had not yet returned home. Cook was already 

in bed at 11:00 p.m. when he heard the victim's keys rattling, and 

heard her coming through the door and walking down the hallway. 

She went into her bedroom, to the kitchen, and then back to the 

bedroom. Although Cook did not see or speak to Wilson, he was 

certain she was in the apartment because of the sound of her keys. 

In the middle of the night, Cook awakened to the sound of 

Wilson's voice saying, "I'm sorry, I'm sorry." Cook said it 
3 A-3753-14T2

sounded as if she was crying, and as if someone was "gettin[g] hit 

with a belt about three times." Cook was cross-examined on an 

earlier statement he had made in which he acknowledged the 

possibility the sound may have originated from "upstairs over" 

him. He did not get up to investigate because he thought Wilson 

was speaking on the phone. Cook went back to sleep, awakening the 

following morning at around 8:00 a.m. when defendant asked if he 

wanted anything from the store. Defendant and Cook remained in 

the apartment all day. 

Cook noticed that Wilson's car was parked outside. When he 

looked into her bedroom he observed that it was clean, which was 

unusual for her because she normally kept it "messy," and never 

made her bed. Defendant made no efforts to reach Wilson. Cook 

tried to call Wilson four times, but only reached her voicemail. 

By Thursday morning, Cook was becoming concerned because 

ordinarily when Wilson did not return home, she would reach out 

to him. Defendant behaved normally that Thursday, except that 

Cook noticed defendant left briefly with Wilson's vehicle. They 

stayed home that night and watched television. Defendant did not 

look for Wilson on Thursday. 

On Friday morning, Cook was awakened by defendant telling him 

that Wilson was outside. When Cook went to the door, he saw his 

niece lying on the floor. 
4 A-3753-14T2

Neighbors had contacted police to report a body in the 

hallway. When they arrived, defendant identified the body as his 

wife. 

One of the residents in the building said that on Tuesday, 

January 3, 2012, around 7:45 p.m., as she was walking back into 

the building, she saw someone with a ski mask on. As she entered 

the building, she recognized that it was defendant from his voice.

Wilson's son-in-law also testified for the State. He said 

that Wilson and his wife, Wilson's daughter, were very close and 

spoke daily. He learned Wilson was missing on Wednesday from his 

wife, and after he left work in the afternoon, they went to the 

apartment. The son-in-law and his wife looked around for ten to 

fifteen minutes while defendant remained in the living room. They 

looked in the closets, under the bed, and in the bathroom. The

bedspread on Wilson's bed at the time police photographed her 

bedroom was different from the one he recalled her using. The 

son-in-law testified that it was peculiar that her bedroom was 

neat since normally she kept it "really disheveled and jumbled 

around and stuff." When he checked the bedroom closet, he could 

see nothing inside because there was a "wall of bags[.]" Defendant 

did not join them as they searched the apartment.

A representative from defendant's employer also testified. 

He said that on Tuesday, defendant called and said he was unable 
5 A-3753-14T2

to work. On Thursday, he received a call from defendant asking 

if he could pick up his check. Defendant also asked if he could 

defer returning to work until Sunday because his wife was missing 

and he needed to look for her. 

Another neighbor testified that on Thursday defendant helped 

him work on his van from 11:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. Throughout 

the day, defendant acted normally and did not mention that his 

wife was missing. When the neighbor found out about it later in 

the day, defendant did not respond to his questions. 

Investigators examined the scene with luminal spray, locating

blood traces on the victim's bedroom floor. Sergeant Frank Coon 

of the Union County Sheriff's Department, said that when he opened 

the victim's bedroom closet he smelled a foul odor he identified 

with death. He saw a "sharp instrument, a knife," on the floor 

under a dresser in the bedroom. It was part of a set found in the 

kitchen. 

A DNA forensic expert and chemist with the Union County 

Prosecutor's forensic laboratory identified blood swabs taken from 

Wilson's dresser and the floor of the bedroom as coming from the 

victim. The expert could not exclude Wilson as a contributor from 

swabs taken from the floor of the closet, but did exclude 

defendant. The knife, when tested, had traces of Wilson's blood,

as did the interior of a suitcase found in Wilson's bedroom closet. 
6 A-3753-14T2

The medical examiner testified that Wilson had died two days 

before the body was discovered on January 6, 2012. The cause of 

death was multiple blunt and sharp force injuries, and she had 

defensive wounds on her hands. 

The day the body was discovered, defendant and Cook were 

driven to the local police station to be interviewed. They were 

initially seated together in a waiting area. Defendant was then

taken to the Union County Prosecutor's Office because he had an 

outstanding child support warrant. 

When the officers began defendant's interview at that 

location, they explained that he was in custody because of the 

civil contempt warrant. Detective William Lord of the Union County 

Prosecutor's Office Homicide Unit, then said: "Okay. That's why 

you [are] here right now and we need to speak to you about something 

else that occurred earlier today." Lord reviewed defendant's 

Miranda1 rights with him, which he waived after acknowledging that 

he understood them. Defendant asked if he was being charged with 

anything else. Lord responded that there were no other charges 

at that time. Defendant agreed to speak to the detectives, and 

from the outset of the interview, complained about injuries to his 

hand. 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 

694 (1966).
7 A-3753-14T2

Lord opened the interview by stating that he was

"investigating a homicide that took place and the victim was 

[Wilson]" and that officers were "speaking with everyone who had 

any contact with her within the last couple of days." Defendant 

said that while he had worked on Monday, he did not work on 

Tuesday. When he arrived home on Tuesday morning, Wilson was not 

there. Defendant also said the last time he saw his wife was on 

Sunday, that they had argued, and Wilson was not speaking to him 

because she thought he had stolen money from her. Defendant denied 

that it was strange for him not to have seen or spoken to her 

since Sunday, given their work schedules, and because she usually 

would not "speak to [him] for a while" after they had a 

disagreement. 

Defendant mentioned that Wilson's daughter and husband had 

come by to look for Wilson on Wednesday night. Earlier that day,

defendant had knocked on Wilson's door, and asked Cook where she 

was because she was "suppose[d] to be there Wednesday, that's her 

day off." Defendant said Cook told him he had heard her crying 

on Tuesday and saying, "I'm sorry," but that he had not checked

on her. 

Defendant initially told the police that he was out Tuesday 

night. He claimed that on Tuesday morning the staffing agency 

told him there was no work so he went to downtown Elizabeth, bought 
8 A-3753-14T2

some alcohol, ran into a friend and got high, drove around in his 

friend's car, and went to a park. He did not return home until 

Wednesday morning. Cook was there at the time and when defendant 

did not see Wilson, he asked Cook where she was. Her car was 

parked by the apartment and he moved it after Cook asked him to. 

During the interview, Lord asked defendant about his hand.

Defendant said that he had injured it on Sunday lifting boxes at 

work and it was "locked up." Detective Jose Vendas of the Union 

County Prosecutor's Office Homicide Unit asked defendant if he 

would mind showing them his hands and commented that both looked 

swollen, one more than the other. A photo of defendant's swollen 

and bruised hand was introduced at trial.

After the officers inquired further about defendant's work 

schedule and the reason he had not worked after Monday, defendant 

said, "You [are] asking me the same question . . . . You [are] 

confusing -- . . . . This is harassment what you [are] doing 

now." The officers apologized and defendant said, "You ask me the 

same questions over and over again like you [are] not believing 

me." He then said he did not want to talk anymore because they 

did not believe him. 

Vendas confirmed that defendant did not want to talk anymore,

said it was not a problem, and indicated the time for the record.

Defendant then interrupted and said, "What else ya'll wanna know?" 
9 A-3753-14T2

Lord said he would not continue the interview if defendant did not 

want to and that he was "not [going to] force [defendant] to talk 

to [them.]" Defendant said that they could continue talking. 

Defendant told the officers that he sometimes slept in a 

different bed after an argument with Wilson. After discussing his 

whereabouts between Monday and Friday, the detectives informed 

defendant that the blood traces found in the apartment pointed to 

him as the perpetrator. Defendant repeatedly denied killing

Wilson. He also denied failing to look for her. 

Defendant told the officers, "[t]he way ya'll just asking me, 

like ya'll charging me." Lord responded that they had already 

explained why he was there. Defendant said that he was "basically" 

being charged and that he had known he would be charged. 

At this point in the interview, Detective Jorge Jimenez of 

the Union County Prosecutor's Office came into the room, introduced 

himself, reminded defendant that he was being video-taped and 

explained, in very frank terms, how the "system works." He said 

that he did not know whether or not defendant would be charged 

that night but that he was giving defendant an opportunity to 

apologize and acknowledge that he messed up. Defendant promptly

confessed, saying that he "f----d up," and that he was sorry. 

On Tuesday, after Wilson returned home, defendant overheard 

Wilson on the phone with someone with whom he suspected she was 
10 A-3753-14T2

having an affair. He had previously overheard Wilson's 

conversations with this individual. Defendant waited until she 

went to bed, checked to make sure she was asleep, and "thought 

about it." He walked out of the bedroom and into another room, 

then "walked [back into] the room and clobbered her." Defendant

said he "[j]ust kept punching her." Wilson fell onto her stomach 

and he "kept pounding her." "After a while she [] stopped moving."

Defendant initially stated that he just punched her with gloved 

hands, but later admitted he hit her with a "metal piece" after 

the officers pointed out that some of Wilson's injuries did not 

come from being punched.

Defendant eventually dragged Wilson's body to the bathroom, 

undressed her, bathed her, put her clothes back on, and placed her 

body in a suitcase in the closet. He threw away the clothes he 

wore while cleaning up. The "metal piece" he used broke into "a 

thousand pieces," which he threw into a nearby river. He moved 

Wilson's body to the hallway early Friday morning, afraid that 

otherwise the apartment would start to smell.

During the suppression hearing, Vendas testified in addition 

to Elizabeth Police Department Detective Thomas Koczur. Defendant 

challenged the admissibility of his statement on the basis that 

police did not advise him that he was going to be charged with 

murder. Koczur testified that when police arrived at the apartment 
11 A-3753-14T2

building on January 6, defendant was on the living room couch. 

Defendant and Cook agreed to speak with Koczur, and within five 

minutes were transported to headquarters. Koczur found 

defendant's extremely calm demeanor unusual given that his wife's 

body had just been discovered outside his front door. Upon their 

arrival at the police station, Cook and defendant were seated in 

the reception area.

While defendant was waiting, Koczur learned there was an 

active bench warrant. Defendant was then taken into custody, 

handcuffed, and moved to an interview room at the Union County 

Prosecutor's Office. 

Vendas said defendant did not sign the Miranda waiver himself 

because of his swollen hand, which he initially claimed he injured 

at work, and only later admitted he injured while punching Wilson. 

He never sought medical attention prior to being brought to the 

station, nor did he request it during the interview. Defendant 

was offered coffee and food. After being taken to the location 

where the clothes worn during the homicide were discarded, 

defendant was charged with murder. The clothing was not recovered. 

He was treated for a sprain to his right hand, although no 

medication was prescribed, just an ice pack.
12 A-3753-14T2

The Law Division judge found Koczur and Vendas to be credible 

witnesses. He was satisfied that defendant clearly and 

unequivocally understood his rights and his waiver of them. 

The judge considered the precedent defendant relied upon, 

State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56 (2003), to be distinguishable because 

in this case no complaint or warrant had issued before defendant's

interview. Defendant was in actual custody only because of the 

civil matter. 

When the judge sentenced defendant after trial, he found 

aggravating factor one, the nature and circumstances of the 

offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). He listed the marital

relationship between defendant and the victim, the broken bond of 

trust, and "the brutal and senseless nature of this crime, which 

was followed by . . . a cover-up, such that Wilson was placed in 

a . . . suitcase and stored in the closet," as the reasons which 

supported the factor. He also found aggravating factor two, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), because the victim was asleep and helpless 

when defendant's attack began. He noted defendant stood six foot,

two inches tall and weighed 190 pounds. He further found 

aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), the risk 

defendant would reoffend in light of his significant criminal 

history and ongoing drug problem, and factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(6), as the murder conviction was defendant's eighth 
13 A-3753-14T2

indictable offense. His criminal history began in 1983, his parole 

was revoked on four occasions, and he had been arrested numerous

times. Defendant's prior convictions included robbery, burglary, 

and drug possession. The judge included factor nine, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(a)(9), the need to deter, in his sentence calculus, and 

he found no mitigating factors. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our 

consideration:

POINT I

DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF HIS NEW JERSEY COMMON 

LAW PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WAS 

NOT VALID BECAUSE THE POLICE FAILED TO INFORM 

HIM THAT HE WAS THE "TARGET" OF THEIR 

INVESTIGATION WHEN THE POLICE ACKNOWLEDGED AT 

THE SUPPRESSION HEARING THAT PARKS WAS A 

SUSPECT AT THE START OF THE INTERVIEW.

POINT II

THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ERROR IN FINDING AGGRAVATING 

FACTORS ONE AND TWO THAT WERE NOT SUPPORTED 

BY THE RECORD RESULTED IN A MANIFESTLY 

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE.

I.

When reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, an 

appellate court upholds the factual findings of the trial court 

when they are based upon "sufficient credible evidence in the 

record." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (citation 

omitted). Deference is given to the trial court's factual findings 
14 A-3753-14T2

because of its firsthand observations of the witnesses. Id. at 

244 (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We do not 

disturb a trial court's factual findings merely because we would 

have reached a different conclusion. Ibid. (citing Johnson, supra, 

42 N.J. at 162). However, the trial court's factual findings will 

be overturned if justice so demands. Ibid. 

The standard of review of a trial court's sentence is "one

of great deference and 'judges who exercise discretion and comply

with the principles of sentencing remain free from the fear of

second guessing.'" State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 160 

(App. Div.) (quoting State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 501 (2005)),

certif. denied, 208 N.J. 335 (2011).

II.

Defendant asserts that the relevant law regarding the 

voluntariness of his confession is State v. A.G.D., 178 N.J. 56 

(2003). We do not agree.

"The privilege against self-incrimination, as set forth in 

the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is one of 

the most important protections of the criminal law." State v. 

Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 312 (2000). Therefore, in order for a 

"confession to be admissible as evidence, prosecutors must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances." 
15 A-3753-14T2

Id. at 313. A confession cannot be the product of police coercion. 

Ibid. 

In determining whether a suspect's confession 

is the product of free will, courts 

traditionally assess the totality of 

circumstances surrounding the arrest and 

interrogation, including such factors as "the 

suspect's age, education and intelligence, 

advice as to constitutional rights, length of 

detention, whether the questioning was 

repeated and prolonged in nature and whether 

physical punishment or mental exhaustion was 

involved." 

[Ibid. (quoting State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 

402 (1978)).]

In our view, the relevant and dispositive case is State v. 

Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 831, 130 S. Ct. 65, 

175 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2009). There the Court reiterated that police 

must inform a suspect that a complaint or arrest warrant has been 

lodged. Id. at 404-05. In Nyhammer, the defendant was not told 

that allegations had been made by a sexual assault victim against 

him. Id. at 390. At the time he spoke with police, at least 

initially, the defendant stated that he believed he was assisting 

in the investigation of another family member whom the child had 

also accused. Id. at 389-90. He was then questioned in a manner 

which was not coercive, and that was relatively brief. Id. at 

391-92. The defendant acknowledged understanding his rights. Id.

at 390. 
16 A-3753-14T2

The Court found the defendant's inculpatory statement to be 

admissible, and affirmed the trial court's decision denying 

suppression, because:

Unlike the issuance of a criminal complaint 

or arrest warrant, suspect status is not an 

objectively verifiable and discrete fact, but 

rather an elusive concept that will vary 

depending on subjective considerations of 

different police officers. A suspect to one 

police officer may be a person of interest to 

another officer.

[Nyhammer, supra, 197 N.J. at 405.]

The failure to advise a suspect that he or she is a suspect is 

only one of several factors in applying the totality of the 

circumstances test when reviewing the admissibility of a 

statement. Id. at 407. The Court went on to say:

[T]he failure to be told of one's suspect 

status still would be only one of many factors 

to be considered in the totality of the 

circumstances. We must acknowledge the 

reality that in many, if not most cases, the 

person being questioned knows he is in custody 

on a criminal charge. We also are mindful 

that the Miranda warnings themselves strongly 

suggest, if not scream out, that a person is 

a suspect, . . . . Those and the other 

warnings should be a sobering wake-up call to 

a person under interrogation. [] [T]he nature 

of police questioning would be another stark 

reminder that the person under interrogation 

is deemed a suspect. For example, there can 

be little doubt that when [the investigating 

officer] told defendant that [the victim] had 

made sexual allegations against him that he 

knew – at that moment – that he was a suspect 

in a criminal investigation.
17 A-3753-14T2

[Id. at 407-08.]

Clearly, the officers in this case suspected that defendant 

might have been involved in the murder. Just as clearly, because 

the investigation was only beginning, everyone was a potential 

suspect and source of information. Police brought both defendant 

and Wilson's uncle into the station. Initially, neither had their

freedom of movement restrained. Defendant was not taken into 

custody until officers learned he had an outstanding warrant. 

Defendant's atypical response may have been a signal that he 

warranted a second look, but the investigation was not focused 

just on him. For that reason, the outcome here is controlled by 

Nyhammer. Applying the totality of the circumstances test, 

defendant's status at the beginning of the investigation was 

ambiguous enough that the officers' disclosures to him sufficed

to guarantee that he exercised his Miranda rights knowingly and 

intelligently.

III.

Appellate review of a sentence involves ensuring that the 

trial court's "exercise of discretion [is] based on findings of 

fact that are grounded in competent, reasonable credible 

evidence," and that it "appl[ied] correct legal principles in 

exercising its discretion." State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 
18 A-3753-14T2

(1984). Sentences should only be modified when the trial court 

made "such a clear error of judgment that it shocks the judicial 

conscience." Id. at 364. Aggravating and mitigating factors 

identify "individual circumstances which distinguish the 

particular offense from other crimes of the same nature." State 

v. Yarbough, 195 N.J. Super. 135, 143 (App. Div. 1984), remanded 

for resentencing on other grounds, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), cert. 

denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 1193, 89 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1986).

Although the sentencing judge took into account the 

relationship between the parties as a significant fact 

contributing to aggravating factor one, he also acknowledged the 

"brutal" nature of the onslaught. The force employed by defendant, 

who acknowledged repeatedly striking the victim while she lay 

helpless on the floor, on her stomach so she could not resist, is 

alone appropriate evidence supporting this aggravating factor. 

Similarly, aggravating factor two focuses on the 

circumstances that make a victim vulnerable. Wilson was asleep 

when this attack began. That is a sufficient basis for factor

two. Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that the judge 

correctly applied sentencing principles based on facts grounded n 

competent, reasonably credible evidence. He did not err in his 

analysis. The sentencing decision does not shock our conscience.

Affirmed.